ROMANIAN REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCES AND ...

VOL. VI No. 2 2009

C O N T E N T S

LOCALAND NATIONAL IDENTITY

ION BULEI, L’identité des Roumains....................................................................IONAª AURELIAN RUS, The Roots and Early Development of Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia (1900-1917) ..........................................

CRISTI PANTELIMON, Vladimir Soloviev et le problème national à la lumièrede l’approche morale .........................................................................................

DOINA FLOREA, Der Hesperidengarten und der Rumänische Goldene Apfel ...ABDENBI SARROUKH, Emmanuel Levinas’ Ethical Metaphysics and theCritique of the Philosophy of Violence: the Concept of the Other ...................

HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, The Feminist Identity as a Political Edge:The Project of Engendering Democracy ...........................................................

VIORELLA MANOLACHE, National vs. Global Identity: Philosophical andPolitical Discourse After September 11, 2001 ..................................................

REGION AND REGIONALISM

MARIA SASS, Sächsische Landschaft als Bezugspunkt Kultureller Identität ......

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FLAVIA JERCA, The Transformation of the CSCE, 1990-1995.An InstitutionalistPerspective ........................................................................................................

EDUARDO ARAYA LEÜPIN, La Formación del Estado y de la Naciónen América Latina. Estudio de caso sobre Mexico ...........................................

RÃZVAN VICTOR PANTELIMON, La izquierda actual en America Latina ...MARIA CÃTÃLINAMOISESCU, Étude de Cas.................................................LUCIAN JORA, Contemporary Challenges to Public Diplomacy: Theoryand Practice .......................................................................................................

BOOK/BOOKS IN DEBATE ...........................................................................

SCIENTIFIC LIFE ............................................................................................

BOOK REVIEWS .............................................................................................

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS..........................................................................

THE AUTHORS................................................................................................

ROMANIAN REVIEW OF POLITICALSCIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., VI, 2, p. 1–184, Bucharest, 2009.

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S O M M A I R E

COLLECTIVITÉS LOCALES ET IDENTITÉ NATIONALE

ION BULEI, L’identité des Roumains....................................................................IONAªAURELIANRUS, Les racines et le début du développement du nationalismemoldave-roumain en Bessarabie (1900-1917) .................................................

CRISTI PANTELIMON, Vladimir Soloviev et le problème national à la lumièrede l’approche morale .........................................................................................

DOINA FLOREA, Le jardin des Hespérides et la pomme d’or roumaine ..........ABDENBI SARROUKH, La métaphysique éthique d’Emmanuel Levinas et lacritique de la philosophie de la violence: le concept de l’Autrui .....................

HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, L’identité féministe en tant que périphériepolitique: le projet de générer la démocratie ....................................................

VIORELLAMANOLACHE, Identité nationale et globale: le discours philosophiqueet politique après le 11 Septembre 2001 ...........................................................

RÉGION ET RÉGIONALISME

MARIA SASS, Le paysage culturel des «Sächsische» en tant que pointde référence de l’identité ...................................................................................

RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

FLAVIA JERCA, La transformation de la CSCE, 1990-1995. Une perspectiveinstitutionnaliste ................................................................................................

EDUARDO ARAYA LEÜPIN, La création de l’État et de la nation en AmériqueLatine. Etude de cas sur le Mexique .................................................................

RÃZVAN VICTOR PANTELIMON, La gauche actuelle en Amérique Latine ...MARIA CÃTÃLINAMOISESCU, Étude de Cas.................................................LUCIAN JORA, Les défis contemporains de la diplomatie publique: théorieet pratique ..........................................................................................................

LIVRES EN DÉBAT.........................................................................................

LA VIE SCIENTIFIQUE ..................................................................................

COMPTES RENDUS........................................................................................

REVUE DES REVUES.....................................................................................

AUTEURS.........................................................................................................

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L’IDENTITÉ DES ROUMAINS

ION BULEI*

Abstract. Romania does not belong to Central Europe, to the Balkans orto the vastness of the Slavic East. It is both Balkan, East-Central European,though so bounded belongs to any of these divisions. History, in the caseof Romanians, imposed a certain identity, which is a synthesis of ruralbackground, — powerful and strong — and outside influences. A summaryof contrasts. There is now in the Romanian society a coexistence of disparateelements, taking in account the traditional life of nostalgia for the interwarperiod, structures and attitudes communist developments post-communistyet well defined. Hopes in historic reunion of the Romanians are not least:the cohesion of their country in a troubled area, with borders that threatento move, the remarkable ability to assimilate models, the important strategicposition for Europe, integration into the new structures of the continent.A Romanian philosopher, Constantin Noica, wrote that the history ofRomanians is open to all possibilities. Therefore, to all hopes too.

Key words: Romanian identity, communist and post-communist attitudesand developments, historical reunion.

Introduction

Le pays des Roumains1 n’appartient ni à l’Europe centrale, ni aux Balkans,ni à l’immensité slave de l’Est. Il se trouve à leur carrefour et il a quelque chosede chacun de ces espaces. Il est à la fois balkanique, oriental, central-européen,sans pourtant appartenir de manière délimitée à aucune de ces divisions.Son histoire est, elle aussi, une histoire de frontière: aux confins de l’Empire

romain, de l’Empire byzantin, à l’orée de l’expansion ottomane, russe ou, plus tard,occidentale. Une situation de frontière qui, d’une part, a créé un état d’isolementde cet espace, de marginalisation, et, d’autre part, une conservation de certainesvaleurs autochtones traditionnelles, état qui s’est perpétué jusqu’aux tempsmodernes et même au-delà d’eux. La situation dans laquelle cet espace s’esttrouvé a entraîné une assimilation des influences, différenciée en fonction desrégions ou des époques, mais toujours présente. Une incessante circulation des

LOCAL AND NAT IONAL IDENT ITY


————————* Director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy.1 La Roumanie compte aujourd’hui 21,5 millions d’habitants sur une superficie de 238 391 km².

personnes et des valeurs, propre aux territoires ouverts. Tout comme l’Europe àlaquelle elle appartient, la Roumanie est une synthèse des diversités, lesquelles,à cause de l’instabilité permanente, n’ont pas eu le temps nécessaire de se fondreles unes dans les autres et de se redéfinir. D’autre part, il y a toujours eu dans cetespace une mesure qui a empêché l’excès et a provoqué une résistance. C’estl’élément autochtone qui a nourri cette résistance. De là, l’originalité de cet espace,sollicité de tous les côtés, chargé de toutes les tentations et se maintenant pourtantcomme une unité au milieu des diversités.

Contexte

Pour l’Occidental, l’espace roumain constitue une sorte de premier cercle del’altérité. Un espace intégré à la civilisation européenne, mais insuffisant pourêtre considéré tout à fait européen, un espace de frontière, un amalgame de viecitadine moderne et de primitivisme rustique. L’écrivain français Paul Morandobservait, non sans amusement, qu’à Bucarest en 1935 on pouvait voir circulerdans la ville des voitures Ford ainsi que des chariots traînés par des bœufs! Unmonde de l’élément relatif, dans lequel l’écrivain français remarquait l’indulgence,l’adaptabilité, l’optimisme, une sorte d’insouciance historique où rien n’étaitvraiment pris au sérieux, parce que rien ne méritait d’être pris comme tel. Et toutcela dans un espace où la nature est belle, les sites sont pittoresques, les gens sonthospitaliers, l’art est original, de même que les chansons populaires! Un espace descontrastes.L’histoires des Roumains est un besoin permanent d’intériorisation, de «descente

en soi-même». Un vœu presque jamais accompli. Et lorsqu’il semble s’accomplir,comme dans la période de l’entre-deux-guerres, il s’agit alors d’une existencesous la terreur, «la terreur de l’Histoire», selon l’expression de l’historien desreligions Mircea Eliade. C’est une sorte d’obsession. L’histoire américaine oucelle française ont des vocations universelles, l’histoire russe est messianique.Celle des Roumains est une recherche. Ils sont toujours en train de chercher leuridentité. Ils essaient toujours de se définir. C’est un drame muet, vécu par chaquegénération. En même temps, l’histoire des Roumains est une histoire descontradictions non résolues, selon l’expression de l’historien français CatherineDurandin. Une histoire à la recherche de l’identité, une culture à la recherche desa propre destinée2.Plus que chez d’autres peuples, dans l’histoire des Roumains persistent des

confusions que chaque génération s’efforce à tirer au clair: les sources écrites neparlent des Roumains que tard, au IXe siècle; l’espace roumain a été politiquementfragmenté pendant de longues périodes de temps et les provinces roumaines (LaValachie, la Moldavie, la Transylvanie) ont été et continuent à être historiquementrevendiquées par les voisins; en cherchant leur spécifique culturel, les Roumains

4 ION BULEI 2

————————2 N. Iorga, La place des Roumains dans l’histoire universelle, Bucarest, 1980; Vl. Georgescu, The

Romanians: a history, Londres, 1991; C. Durandin,Histoire des Roumains, Paris, 1995; L. Boia, La Roumanie:un pays à la frontière de l’Europe, Paris, 2003; I. Bulei, Brève histoire de la Roumanie, Bucarest, 2005.

tombent sur les Russes, les Ukrainiens, eux aussi de confession orthodoxe pourla plupart; ils tombent sur les les peuples de l’ancien Empire des Habsbourg, auxcôtés desquels ils ont d’ailleurs longtemps vécu; ils tombent sur les peuples desBalkans, avec lesquels ils partagent en plus le même héritage byzantin, etc.

De l’identité roumaine

L’espace roumain s’est toujours trouvé à une croisée des civilisations et descourants d’idées. La civilisation indo-européenne s’y est développée dans laseconde moitié du Ier millénaire av. J.-Chr., par l’intermédiaire des Géto-Daces,qui sont nombreux (on connaît les noms de 20 tribus daces), relativementunitaires, sédentaires. Ils vouaient un culte au dieu Zamolxis, croyaient àl’immortalité et méprisaient la mort. Les Géto-Daces sont entrés en contact directavec le monde grec et sa civilisation, laquelle les a marqués de son influence, àtravers les colonies grecques du littoral occidental de la mer Noire: Istros (Histria),Callatis (la ville actuelle de Mangalia), Tomis (la ville actuelle de Constantza).Ils sont également entrés en contact avec la civilisation des Celtes, qu’ils ontd’ailleurs en partie assimilée. Au début du IIe siècle après J.-Chr., sous le règnede l’empereur Trajan, l’espace dace a été intégré à l’Empire romain, se trouvant,de ce fait, massivement colonisé avec des éléments romains ou romanisés,amenés, selon Eutrope, de tout le monde romain (ex toto orbe romano). Le processusd’urbanisation a été très rapide. Des chemins pavés sillonnaient la province, enl’intégrant, avec ses richesses, au flux général économique et commercial del’empire. Après le retrait de l’armée et de l’administration romaines au sud duDanube, entre l’an 271 et le XIIIe siècle, l’histoire de l’espace carpato-danubiano-pontique peut être définie comme un millénaire sous les migrations. Unmillénaire pendant lequel l’histoire des Roumains s’est écoulée entre l’empire deConstantinople (l’empire de la nouvelle Rome) et les peuples migrateurs. L’empirebyzantin a été un facteur de consolidation du caractère roman, de même qu’unfacteur de christianisation. Il a a représenté aussi un modèle pour les structuresdes États féodaux roumains. Par contre, les peuples migrateurs ont eu uneinfluence négative sur le développement historique du peuple roumain, en leretardant et en le déformant. Parmi les peuplades migratrices, les Slaves ont jouédans les contrées danubiennes le rôle des Francs et des Burgonds en France, desLombards en Italie, des Wisigoths en Espagne. Au nord du Danube, les Slaves,réduits au nombre après 602, ont cohabité avec la population locale, en finissantpar être assimilés, jusqu’aux Xe-XIIe siècles, par les Roumains. La romanité aunord du Danube est restée une île entourée par des peuplades slaves.Le christianisme a pénétré dans cet espace dès l’époque de la domination

romaine et s’est répandu ensuite par la conversion de la population. Les Roumainsn’ont pas été christianisés de haut en bas, comme leurs voisins ou autres peupleseuropéens, parce qu’ils n’avaient pas, à l’époque, de chefs politiques. Ce fait aentraîné, du point de vue religieux, une annexion des Roumains par leurs voisins.Les prêtres des Roumains deviennent orthodoxes de rite slavon. Les Roumainsse sont ainsi écartés de l’église de Rome, ils se sont, une fois de plus, isolés de

3 L’IDENTITÉ DES ROUMAINS 5

l’Occident par la confession, et se sont attachés à l’Orient. Non pas à l’Orientgrec, byzantin, mais à celui slavon. La langue de communication ecclésiale,mais aussi culturelle et officielle, a été, à partir du Xe siècle, le slavon. Cettelangue a imposé une suzeraineté culturelle à travers laquelle l’éclat de l’Occidentn’a plus réussi à pénétrer.Sous la domination ottomane, effective au XVIe siècle, les Pays roumains,

qui ont conservé une situation d’autonomie dans le cadre de l’empire, ont menéune existence contradictoire. Au début, depuis la fondation des États roumainsau XIVe siècle jusqu’à la chute de Constantinople, en 1453, l’influence de lacivilisation byzantine a été évidente. Mais l’influence des cours royales de Budaet de Cracovie (la Hongrie et la Pologne se disputaient la suprématie dansl’espace roumain) s’est fait aussi sentir avec force. L’influence byzantine acoexisté avec celle occidentale. On a fréquemment évoqué la manière dont a étéconservé le portrait de l’érudit prince régnant Dimitrie (Démètre) Cantemir: onpeut le voir tantôt en vêtement oriental, tantôt en vêtement à l’occidentale. Cettedualité a été aussi présente dans les manifestations culturelles de ces sièclesmédiévaux: Il y a eu les splendides églises situées au nord de la Moldavie —Voroneþ, Moldoviþa, Suceviþa, etc. — influencées par l’art byzantin, ou les églisessituées dans d’autres centres monastiques — Cozia, Curtea-de-Argeº, en Valachie,etc. En même temps, les fils d’aristocrates sont allés faire des études dans descentres de la culture catholique, à Cracovie, Padoue ouVienne. À cette contradictions’en est ajoutée une autre, de nature linguistique, entre le slavon et le latin,langues entre lesquelles il y a eu un conflit permanent qui s’est fait aussi sentirdans les créations littéraires.Les sens de la modernisation chez les Roumains, comme d’ailleurs dans tout

le monde non occidental, a été la synchronisation du développement de l’espritroumain avec celui de l’Occident. Mais le résultat n’en a été que partiel. Lamodernisation dans la zone de l’Europe du Sud-Est est restée un processusinachevé. Elle est souvent demeurée à l’état de cadre formel et instable. Le cadrevide ne s’est pas rempli avec un contenu réel. La Roumanie avait eu lesconditions de devenir en effet une «Belgique de l’Orient», selon l’expression del’époque, grâce à ses richesses naturelles. Mais son évolution normale (commencéeaprès le milieu du XIXe siècle) a été brusquement interrompue par l’occupationsoviétique en 1944. Le bilan de l’expérience communiste a été, au cours desdeux dernières décennies du XXe siècle, la relégation du pays dans les statistiquesinternationales aux côtés de l’Albanie. L’expérience communiste a été doubléepar l’expérience d’une dictature du type totalitaire, celle de N. Ceauºescu, laquellea isolé une fois de plus la Roumanie du reste de l’Europe et même du reste despays socialistes, en modifiant et en singularisant la destinée historique du pays.Faute d’une continuité du développement, ce qui a suffisamment contribuéà accentuer le décalage entre la Roumanie et l’Europe centrale et occidentale,en 1989 les Roumains se sont vus à nouveau obligés à tout reprendre dès lecommencement, comme en 1821, 1859, 1918, 1945, comme dans un perpétuelmythe de Sisyphe.

6 ION BULEI 4

L’histoire, dans le cas des Roumains, a imposé une certaine identité, qui estune synthèse du fond rural, puissant et résistant, et des influences extérieures.Une synthèse des contrastes. Il y a aujourd’hui dans la société roumaine unecoexistence d’éléments disparates, tenant de la vie traditionnelle, des nostalgiespour la période de l’entre-deux-guerres, des structures et des attitudes communistes,des évolutions post-communistes pas encore bien définies. Les espoirs dans desretrouvailles historiques des Roumains ne sont pas moindres: la cohésion de leurÉtat dans une zone trouble, avec des frontières qui menacent de bouger, laremarquable capacité d’assimiler les modèles, la position stratégique importantepour l’Europe, l’intégration dans les nouvelles structures du continent. Unphilosophe roumain, Constantin Noica, écrivait que l’histoire des Roumains estouverte à toutes les possibilités. Par conséquent, à tous les espoirs aussi.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boia, L. La Roumanie: un pays à la frontière de l’Europe, Paris, 2003.Bulei I., Brève histoire de la Roumanie, Bucarest, 2005.Durandin, C., Histoire des Roumains, Paris, 1995.Georgescu, Vl., The Romanians: a history, Londres, 1991.Iorga, N., La place des Roumains dans l’histoire universelle, Bucarest, 1980.

5 L’IDENTITÉ DES ROUMAINS 7

THE ROOTS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENTOF MOLDOVAN-ROMANIAN NATIONALISM

IN BESSARABIA (1900-1917)

IONAª AURELIAN RUS*

Abstract. A study of Moldovan national consciousness is necessary forunderstanding Bessarabia. Outside the former Soviet Union, it has beenalmost generally accepted by Romanians and by Western experts thatMoldavians are not ethnically distinct from Romanians.In this paper, I have dealt with how the Moldovan national movementappeared and became a mass phenomenon. The “old” and weak nationalmovement, pre-modern and aristocratic before 1900, can be said to havegiven way to the modern national movement of “commoners”, especiallyintellectuals, which emerged around 1905. Even this movement was ratherweak before the Russian Revolution of 1917. A large majority of theMoldovan-speaking people felt that they were ethnic “Moldovans” ratherthan “Romanians” throughout the period, with the percentage of the latterincreasing over time. One might be surprised that most Moldovans votedfor autonomist platforms in the elections of 1917 if he would look atliteracy and other “development” statistics and at the weakness of theMoldovan national movement; it is clear that the strength of pre-existingproto-nationalism is key in the process of determining the growth of thenational movement.

Keywords: Moldovan national identity, “old”Moldovan national movement,“new” Moldovan national movement.

Bessarabia, the historical province between the Prut and Dniester rivers, isundoubtedly one of the most mysterious and underresearched areas in the formerRussian Empire (or Eastern Europe). The issue of Moldovan/Romanian nationalismis undoubtedly more interesting and controversial than most topics connectedwith Bessarabia. In this paper, I will try to evaluate, almost exclusively on thebasis of secondary sources, the nature and strength of the Moldovan nationalmovement before the Bolshevik Revolution in the fall of 1917. How nationalisticwere the masses? How much mass support did the nationalist movement get, and


————————* Professor of Political Science at Raymond Walters College.

from whom? What was the nature, and what were the divisions of the nationalmovement? How much Moldovan-Romanian nationalism was “Moldovan”, andhow much was “Romanian”? How should one place Moldovan nationalism inrelation to the agrarian question and the Russian Revolutions of 1905-1907 and1917? What were the strong points and pitfalls of the various historiographicaland sociological treatments of the problem? How did Moldovan reality fit in theframework of a number of studies on nationalism, and Russia during thatparticular period of time?A study of Moldovan national consciousness is necessary for understanding

Bessarabia. Outside the former Soviet Union, it has been almost generally acceptedby Romanians and byWestern experts that Moldavians are not ethnically distinctfrom Romanians. This is no longer denied by most post-Soviet authors, andespecially by Moldovan historians. The Bessarabian Moldovan idiom, “Moldovan”,diverges from standard Romanian only in terms of differences of dialect andaccent. However, if one uses Walter Feldman’s terminological framework, thereis, and there has been throughout history, a very large population of Romanian“nationality” with a “Moldovan” “nationality consciousness”.1Overall, Romanian scholarship has argued that historically all ethnic Romanians

(including the Bessarabian Moldovans) have thought of themselves as Romanians.Soviet sources have argued that the process of the formation of the Moldovannation was ended in the late 19th century. The truth is, of course, more complicated.Since at least the 13th to 15th centuries, in the principality of Moldova, in additionto a Romanian identity shared by a minority of the population, including (but notonly) members of the aristocratic and intellectual elites, there was a Moldovanidentity shared by most people, who thought that they were part of the “Moldovanpeople”.2 Historically, many individuals seem to have shared both identities.Each one of them had different degrees of salience (and meaning) in comparisonwith the other one for different groups of people.3 During the period of Russianrule in Bessarabia, which lasted from 1812 to 1917, the survival of the Moldovanidentity was caused by traditionalism, plus the isolation, backwardness, repressivecharacter and Russification policies of the Tsarist Empire.

In any case, according to the most prominent conservative Russian Bessarabianlandlord, politician and anti-Romanian activist, A.W. Krupensky, probably

2 NATIONALISM IN BESSARABIA (1900-1917) 9

————————1Walter Feldman, “The Theoretical Basis for the Definition of Moldavian Nationality”, in Ralph S. Clem

(ed.), The Soviet West: Interplay Between Nationality and Social Organization, (NewYork, Praeger Publishers,1975), p. 47-48.

2 See, for example, Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians, (Columbus; Ohio State University Press, 1991),p. 15-16, 18, 41-42, 67, 70-71, Dimitrie Cantemir, Descriptio Moldaviae, (Bucureºti; Editura AcademieiRepublicii Socialiste România, 1973), p. 298-299, 337-341, etc., Cronica Ghiculeºtilor, (Bucureºti, EdituraAcademiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1965), and Radu Popescu, Istoriile Domnilor Þãrii Româneºti,(Bucureºti, Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române, 1963), Ionas Rus, “Românii ºi Minoritarii înBasarabia Interbelicã”, in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa, 1994), no. 1 (17), January-March 1994,p. 29-30, and Ionas Aurelian Rus, Self-Determination, Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism, and NationalityConflict in Bessarabia, 1900-1940, Henry Rutgers Thesis, History and Political Science Departments, April 1995,p. 9-11, and passim.

3 See Dimitrie Cantemir, Descriptio Moldaviae, p. 298-299, 337-341, 365-367, Mihai Canciovici,Domnitori Români în Legende, (Editura Sport-Turism, 1984), and Octav Paun and Silviu Angelescu, LegendePopulare Româneºti, (Bucureºti, Editura Albatros, 1983) and my two works cited above.

developed in 1917-1918 or before that, 48.2% of Bessarabia’s population was“Moldovan” and 21% “Romanian”.4 Of course, the percentages are not whollyaccurate because the Moldovans/Romanians, officially counted as “Moldovans”represented 47.6% of the province’s population according to the Russian censusof 1897. Even adjusting for Russification, the Moldovans represented, accordingto the research of a Soviet scholar, only 52.1% of Bessarabia’s population.5 Inany case, Krupensky’s estimate that most Moldovan-Romanians of Bessarabiathought of themselves as “Moldovans” at the beginning of the twentieth centuryis accurate and corroborated by various Romanian estimates.The Moldavian-Romanian nationalist movement (a term which refers to

networks and groups of Moldovan-Romanians, some of whom had apredominantly “Romanian”, and some of whom had a “Moldovan”, identity andnationalism) was initially very weak. It did not involve the peasant masses (whoformed more than 90% of the Moldovan population) for a long period of time. Thiswas the situation between 1812 (the year when Russia annexed Bessarabia, mostlyfromMoldova, and the south-eastern and extreme northern parts, from the OttomanEmpire) and around 1900. It was so partly because of the repressive Russificationof the church, school and administration, and the end of the use of Moldovan forany public functions. Perhaps even more importantly, it happened this way becauseof the pre-political, pre-activist frame of mind of the serf peasants and theirdescendants, and, to a lesser extent, of the other non-noble sections of thepopulation. This mentality did not start to slowly wither away until the beginningof the twentieth century.6 Up to the last decade of the nineteenth century, the onlypolitically-minded and politically-activized group was the landed aristocracy.7Demographics also played a role. A Soviet scholar, V. Zelenchuk, shows on

the basis of Russian archival data, that in 1817, Moldovans formed 78.2% of thepopulation of the province, 58.2% in 1835, and in 1858, 51% (or 54.9%, if oneincludes Russified Moldovans, in 1859) of all the Bessarabians.8 In other words,the proportion of Moldovans was lower than most official Russian imperialestimates, and the Romanian sources which used these numbers, alleged. Thedemographic change is explained by the colonization of the province (especiallyup to the 1860’s) with, or other forms of immigration into the province of,Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Bulgarians, Gagauzi, Jews, etc., as well as by theRussification of Moldovans.The Moldovan national movement in the nineteenth century has been dealt

with only in Romanian sources. Throughout the nineteenth century, some members

10 IONAª AURELIAN RUS 3

————————4 A.W. Kroupensky, Bessarabie, (Paris, 1920), cited in Ioan Scurtu, Constantin Hlihor, 1940. Drama

Românilor dintre Prut ºi Nistru, (Bucureºti, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1992), p. 145.5 Michael Bruchis, The USSR: Language and Realities — Nations, Leaders, and Scholars, (Boulder,

Colorado, East European Monographs, 1988), p. 276-278.6 Consult, among others, Prince Serge Dimitriyevich Urussov,Memoirs of a Russian Governor, (London;

Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1908), and Grigore Constantinescu, “Din Vremuri Þariste”, in Iurie Colesnic,Basarabia Necunoscutã, (Chiºinãu, Universitas, 1993), p. 35-36.

7 Consult Prince Serge Dimitriyevich Urussov, and Iurie Colesnic, Basarabia Necunoscutã, (Chiºinãu,Universitas, 1993), p. 35-36, 250.

8 Michael Bruchis, The USSR: Language and Realities – Nations, Leaders, and Scholars, p. 276-278.

of the Moldovan aristocracy very much desired, and sometimes agitated for, anumber of things. They demanded the greater use of the Moldovan (as opposedto Russian) language in the public sphere, for political autonomy for Bessarabiaand, in the case of some isolated individuals throughout the period, for unionwith the other Romanian-inhabited areas in a Romanian national state.9 In 1862-1867, the nationally-minded sections of the Moldovan nobility united in aloosely-structured, small “Party of the Moldovan Boyars”.10 In the repressiveconditions of the Russian empire and with the banishing of the Moldovan languagefrom education and the church which started in the 1860’s and 1870’s, nationalismswitched from being both political and cultural to being only cultural. Nationalorganizations disappeared.There is a universal consensus that many Moldavian nobles and city people

became completely or partly Russified, even before the 1860’s. Nevertheless, theview of a number of Romanian and Western scholars, including the Romaniannationalist historian and politician Ion Nistor, that most Moldovan nobles hadswitched to using Russian as their mother tongue, is false. According to variousRomanian and Western scholarly works, the nobility of Moldovan descentrepresented 28.6%, 29.5% or 34.7% of the Bessarabian nobility.11 Seymour Becker’sstudy on the Russian nobility shows that 22% of all the Bessarabian nobles used“Moldovan” as their native language. Most Bessarabian nobles used Russian astheir mother-tongue, but 63-77% of those of Moldovan descent (or even more)were Moldovan-speaking. It would be more fair to say that most Moldovannobles believed that Russian should be used in public affairs, and Moldovan infamily, colloquial and local discussions.12Russification did not make any significant inroads into the great mass of the

Moldovans because of the latter’s peasant traditionalism and inertia, and evenmore saliently, medieval-style ethnic identity, pride and xenophobia. Historianssuch as Ion Nistor note some examples of this. For example, during the 1860’sthere were a few unsuccessful petitions signed by peasants who de facto demandedthat the switch from Moldovan to the Russian language in teaching in the villageschools, which was taking place during that decade, be reversed. The petitionersalso demanded more Moldovan-language schools.13 However, the only form ofwidespread militant fight against Russification during the nineteenth centurywas the smuggling (and reading) of Romanian books, but even this was an informalgrass-roots rather than organized effort, which, of course, involved only a smallminority of the population.


————————9 See ªtefan Ciobanu, Basarabia: Populaþia, Istoria, Cultura, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa, 1992), p. 47-60. Also

consult Ion Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei, (Bucureºti, Humanitas, 1991) andAlexandru V. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei,(Bucureºti, Editura Victor Frunza, 1992), p. 454-455.

10 See ªtefan Ciobanu, p. 58-60, 95-97 and Alexandru V. Boldur, p. 395-398. Also consult Ion Nistor.11 See Alexandru V. Boldur, p. 538, Ifor L. Evans, The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania, (Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 1924), p. 171, Charles Upson Clark, Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on theBlack Sea, (New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1927), p. 111.

12 The data are from Seymour Becker, Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia, (Dekalb, Illinois,Northern Illinois University Press, 1985), p. 185.

13 See Ion Nistor, passim.

A number of ethnic Romanian scholars, including Andrei Popovici andmyself, have argued that the Russification process failed, and that this compelledthe Russian authorities to make a few concessions.14 This was undoubtedlypartially true, but a Romanian sociological study by D. Dogaru of the village ofNapadeni, a village of formerly free peasants of mostly aristocratic descent, whowere classed by the Russian authorities as small nobles, presents a somewhatdifferent picture. These people were always Romanian-speaking, but at least thepeasant-nobles believed that knowledge of Russian made one a “distinguished”man.15 Although this phenomenon has not been noted by historians, it is clearthat a minority of the Moldovans took Russian-style first and second-nameforms (e.g. “Nikolai Ivanovich” instead of the Moldovan “Nicolae Ion”) or Russiannicknames/abbreviations such as “Vania”.16Many students learned very little in the Russian schools because of their lack

of knowledge of the Russian language. The use of Russian in education alsoaccounts for why fewer rural Moldovans went to school, which explains why,according to Keith Hitchins, the number of village schools in Bessarabia plummetedfrom 400 (with 7,000 students) in the mid-1860’s, to only 23 in 1880.17 Whateverliteracy existed among the Moldovans was often only in the Moldovan language,and, as C.U.Clark notes, the Russian authorities found it necessary to print“emergency” information about epidemics, plant diseases, etc., in Moldovan allthroughout the Russian period.18 The Russian authorities felt compelled topermit Moldavian to be used again in church activities in 1900.19The national movement emerged in 1898, 1901, 1903 or 1905 (according to the

chronologies of Ion Nistor, Alexandru Boldur, Keith Hitchins20, etc.). I wouldargue that Hitchins’ definition of a national movement is more restrictive thanthe others. His conceptualization of “a Moldavian national political movement,or even a political party”, which “did not exist before 1905”21 does not includethe underground small, but modern, nationalistic group of Bessarabian Moldovanstudents in the Ukraine, and even in Bessarabia, before 1905.During the 1905-1907 Russian Revolution, many (though, because of passivity,

not most) Moldovans clearly demonstrated their opposition to Russification, andtheir desire for cultural and territorial autonomy. Even more peasants showedthat they wanted more land from the mostly city-living absentee landowners,who happened to be overwhelmingly Russian or Russified.The various Moldovan nationalist currents which were emerging during the

1905-1907 revolution were not united, as Nistor notes. The “Moldavian CulturalSociety”, a continuation of noble nationalism, demanded the end of Russification,


————————14 See Andrei Popovici, The Political Status of Bessarabia, (Washington, D.C., School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University, 1931), and Ionas Rus, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în Basarabia Interbelicã”.15 Dumitru Dogaru, “Nãpãdenii, Un Sat de Mazili din Codru”, in Sociologie Româneascã, Year 2, no. 7-8,

July-August, 1937, p. 297.16 Ibid.17 Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 245.18 Charles Upson Clark, Bessarabia, p. 80-81.19 Andrei Popovici, p. 105-106.20 See Ion Nistor, passim., Alexandru Boldur, passim., and Keith Hitchins, p. 249.21 Keith Hitchins, p. 249.

and teaching in Moldovan. The nationalism of this group was, as one can seefrom its program and activities, cultural rather than political.The Democratic Moldavian Party, founded by the lawyer Emanuel Gavrilita

and which included, as Alexandru Boldur and some newer research show,mostly current or former students of the Theological Seminary of Kishinev(Chiºinãu), the provincial capital. Iurie Colesnic argues (I think convincingly inview of the few dozen cases of important activists whose lives are discussed inhis work and other sources) that these young people of rural origin, mostly thesons of priests and deacons, absorbed in the villages, as children, a Moldovanethnic consciousness.22 However, I believe that they absorbed an activistic frameof mind, which allowed them to act on their beliefs, not from the villages, butfrom more modern realities and forces. This group included numerous peoplewith an emerging “Romanian” national consciousness.23 It obtained the supportof a number of priests, teachers, other intellectuals, and peasants, especiallyyounger ones. It demanded education in Moldovan, land reform, Bessarabianautonomy, universal suffrage and the creation of a cooperative movement.24 Theleadership and activists of the group were, like their Ukrainian counterparts,mostly Social Revolutionaries in sympathies according to Alexandru Boldur.The program of this nationalist group, more than that of the aristocratic

nationalists, is consistent with Miroslav Hroch’s model of the fight of the nationally-activized population in “small nations” (even though the Bessarabian Moldovansdo not fit perfectly in the category of “small nations” under “foreign” rule asdescribed by Hroch). He believes that these nationalistic movements fought for“equal rights, national language and culture, for a share in economic prosperity,for social liberation and political autonomy”, which is certainly true of theMoldovanmovement.25For a time, the Russian authorities allowed the publishing of various Moldavian

newspapers (including one in Latin characters, as in Romania). They also permittedthe introduction of teaching in Romanian at the theological seminary, and at ahigh school in the provincial capital of Kishinev (Chiºinãu in Romanian).26 In1905, a church congress decided that Moldovan could again be used for preachingin the villages, after a formal interdiction of such practices for a few decades.But after that, during the period of reaction that started in 1906-1908, the authoritiestried to minimize the open manifestations of Moldovan nationalism and to rollback some of these Moldovan gains.It is rather clear, as I have argued elsewhere, that the politicized Moldovan

national movement of 1905-1907 was still rather weak.27 It was not able to getits members elected to the Russian Duma (parliament). In 1905-1907, some


————————22 Iurie Colesnic, p. 250.23 R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Romanians, (Archon, 1962), p. 563.24 Andrei Popovici, p. 113, 116-117.25 Miroslav Hroch, “How Much Does Nation Formation Depend on Nationalism?” in East European

Politics and Societies, (University of California Press), vol. 4, No. 1, p. 109-113.26 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, (New York; Frederick A. Praeger Publishers,

1969), p. 235.27 See Ionas Rus, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în Basarabia Interbelicã”, p. 30-31.

grievances were expressed through meetings and mass petitions to the Tsar forland and national linguistic rights (like the ones convened in a few localities).Nevertheless, in numerous, possibly most villages, people were not concernedwith things beyond the village level, as the study by the Romanian interwarsociologist T. Al. ªtirbu of the village of Valenii would seem to indicate.28Therefore, no activity in favor of Moldovan nationalism or the Moldovanlanguage took place during the period of Russian rule in them.Only a minority of the agrarian discontent was channeled towards the national

movement, which was demanding land reform. Most rural discontent manifesteditself in spontaneous agrarian unrest. The non-nationalistic character of theagrarian strife would seem to indicate that most peasants found their Moldovanidentity relevant only in terms of language, traditions and culture, not in thepolitical and social arenas.The aristocratic cultural nationalists were opposed to land reform. So, as the

Romanian historian Ion Nistor emphasizes, the Moldovan nobles made commonfront with Russian conservative forces, apparently driven by their class interests.This would indicate that social and political factors were more important in shapingtheir attitudes than their nationalism, which was in any case cultural rather thanpolitical-autonomist.It is not clear whether 1905-1907 represented the “breakthrough” for the national

movement. The work of the Romanian interwar historianAlexandru Boldur containsstatistical data showing that a small (though, one could argue, increasing)number of non-nationalist Moldovan deputies were elected among the nineBessarabians sent to the various Dumas. There were no Bessarabian Moldovansin the 1906 first Duma. There was one in the February 1907 second Duma, onein the third Duma of November 1, 1907, and two in the fourth Duma of 1912.29It is possible that, even in Russia’s system of unequal suffrage, and not altogetherfree and fair elections, the Moldovan population’s electoral choices wereincreasingly discriminating along the ethnic line.In 1913, a newspaper which represented a common nationalist front of some

nobles, and especially members of the radical group of 1905, including bothlaymen and priests, appeared. It was called Cuvânt Moldovenesc (MoldovanWord). It was the first Moldovan endeavor in which nobles and non-nobles cametogether. The nucleus of the Moldovan-Romanian national movement consolidateditself around this newspaper.30Nistor argues that in 1905 (and, it would appear, also in 1917), most nationalist

activists were not the descendants of serfs, but the educated sons of clergymen,and to a lesser extent, of the old estates of market-town dwellers and freepeasants. I would tend to think that his use of class or estate is to some extentmisleading because there were comparatively few, if any, nationalists before1917-1918 who were descended from the old market-town dwellers. Moreover,


————————28T.Al. ªtirbu, “Vãlenii de Lângã Prut”, in Sociologie Româneascã, Year 3, October-December 1938, p. 521.29 Alexandru V. Boldur, p. 377-378.30 See Onisifor Ghibu, Pe Baricadele Vieþii în Basarabia Revoluþionarã (1917-1918), (Chiºinãu, Editura

Universitas, 1992), Alexandru V. Boldur, and Iurie Colesnic, etc.

the students (or former students) of the Kishinev theological seminary weresocial-revolutionary nationalist activists because of their social position asstudents or budding intellectuals rather than because of who their parents were.One observes the comparative lack of importance of the industrial and commercial

bourgeoisie and proletariat in national activism. The role of industrialization,whichMiroslav Hroch and Ernest Gellner emphasize as a factor in the developmentof nationalism31, was totally unimportant in Bessarabia, at least amongMoldovans.By 1900, as Edward H. Judge shows in his study of the famous 1903 anti-Jewishpogrom inKishinev (in which, like in the 1905-1907 pogroms throughout Bessarabia,the participants included Russians, Moldovans, Ukrainians, etc.), commercialand other business positions were occupied overwhelmingly by Jews. Theyformed more than 80% of the merchants of the province, and three fourths of allthe industrialists of the provincial capital, Kishinev.32 By 1900, there were alsovery few Moldovan proletarians, bureaucrats, or urban inhabitants in general. Atthe turn of the century, 37.2% of all urban people were Yiddish-speakers, 24.4%were Russian-speakers, 15.8% spoke Ukrainian, and only 14.2% Moldovan.Roman Szporluk’s category of nations without a modern economy, where

nevertheless nationalism is developing in the area of civil society/culture isuseful for understanding the case of the Bessarabian Moldovans.33 One has toagree that the Eastern European pattern postulated by Szporluk, that nationalismfirst appeared in the area of culture is applicable to the Bessarabian Moldovans,especially in the area of print culture.34 This is true in terms of “cultural”nationalism, with its “journalistic” connections. The previously-noted evidenceshows that his emphasis on the role of schooling (for the “studious youth” whichwas enrolled in the national movement), newspapers, and (sometimes smuggled)books is to some extent accurate.35 However, Szporluk, Gellner, Hroch and otheranalysts (though not Ronald Grigor Suny) tend not to discuss, and to de factoignore, the existence of ethnic identities, and of pre-modern mass proto-nationalisms, among the popular masses since theMiddleAges. These “ethnocentric”realities would transform into genuinely modern nationalism at the time whenthe masses would later be mobilized or activized, and politicized.During the first part of World War I, the newspaper Cuvânt Moldovenesc

(“MoldovanWord”) marginally helped the national cause.After the fall of Tsarismon March 12, 1917, the Moldovan nationalist movement reemerged politicallyin the form of the Moldovan National Party (PNM) on April 3rd. Its partycommittee and activists included prominent figures from the 1905-1907generation, and people of various social classes, including peasants. The party’snewspaper was Cuvânt Moldovenesc, and the party demanded the use of Moldovan


————————31 See, for example, Miroslav Hroch, p. 106 and Ernest Gellner, “The Dramatis Personae of History”,

East European Politics and Societies, (University of California Press), vol. 4, No. 1, 126-127, 131.32 Edward H. Judge, Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom, (New York; New York University Press,

1992), p. 26.33 Roman Szporluk, “In Search of the Drama of History: or, National Roads to Modernity”, in East

European Politics and Societies, (University of California Press), vol. 4, no. 1, p. 141-144, 146.34 Ibid, p. 141-143.35 See Ibid, p. 146.

in education, the church and administration, and an autonomous Bessarabia, amostly Moldovan state or polity.Although traditional scholarship has presented the PNM as a very popular

party, indeed as the party which included most Moldovan nationalists andobtained the support of large numbers of Moldovans, I would argue that this wasnot the case. One of its weaknesses was the fact that the party was accused ofbeing in favor of union with Romania by Russocentric anti-autonomist, mostlynon-Moldovan revolutionaries. PNM was also accused by groups more leftistthan itself (like the Socialist Revolutionaries) of not being radical or revolutionaryenough on issues of social reform (especially land reform, that is, the giving ofland to the peasants without compensation).36Moldovan nationalism and the option of union with Romania had the support

of only a small minority of even theMoldovans according to a Romanian sociologistwho investigated the attitudes of the Moldovan soldiers on the Romanian frontduring the period.37 For most of them, their community of language with otherethnic Romanians did not have too much significance, and did not indicate acommon nationality. The people felt that they were “Moldovans”, not “Romanians”,and did not find anything unnatural in living under Russian rule.38 There isuniversal agreement that many articulate and less articulate Bessarabians,including some Moldovans, were anti-unionist partly because Romania was seenas an undemocratic country ruled by landlords who owned most of the land.The Soviet of Deputies of the Peasants (SDT), which is still a mysterious

group, and which has been largely ignored by Romanian and Westernscholarship despite its great importance, was an officially non-partisan group ofpeople originating from various political parties. Its most important activists hadbeen elected by the peasants in the provincial peasant Soviet. These peoplewould eventually put forward an electoral list for the elections for the RussianConstituentAssembly in late 1917. SDT included among its foremost personalitiespopular and well-known more or less Socialist Revolutionary Moldovannationalist leaders and activists. SDT was in favor of the restoration of MoldovanBessarabian autonomy (like in 1812-1828), which explains the conflict betweenSDT and the SR’s. There is widespread scholarly acceptance of the view thatland reform was somewhat more important for the party than Moldovannationalism. In any case, it is an accepted fact that the Bessarabian peasants hadseized 2/3 of the arable surface of the landed estates from March 1917 until theend of the year. The desires of the SDT leaders, and of its overwhelminglyMoldovan peasant constituents, caused the group to adhere to the program of theNational Moldovan Party, including in its demands for Bessarabian autonomy,but with more radical plans for land reform than the PNM.The SDTwas widely regarded as being led mostly by “Moldovan nationalists”

(some of whom had a “Romanian” national consciousness) and as being almost


————————36 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la Problema Adunãrii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 1,

in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa, 1991), no. 2(6) for 1991 (April-June).37 Dumitru Dogaru, p. 297.38 Ibid.

a Moldovan peasant party. However, as some recent research done in Moldovashows, unlike the PNM, it was not regarded as, or accused of, being in favor ofBessarabia’s union with Romania, despite the past desires for such a union ofsome of its leaders. It was accused only of having some reactionary nationalistleaders.39 The mostly false accusations of reactionarism did not stick, and the“reactionary nationalist” SDT leaders were apparently the most popular politicians.The party’s calls for Bessarabian autonomy, which were convenient for theMoldovan majority in the province, and were well-received among that nativepopulation, were hardly supported by any non-Moldovan descendants of thecolonists who settled in Bessarabia during the Tsarist period. This guaranteedthat SDT would get very few non-Moldovan votes. Some Ukrainians who hadbeen natives of northern Bessarabia for centuries voted for SDT, but theethnonational rift between SDT and the SR’s can not be doubted.After the overthrow of the Tsars, the Moldovan population, or, more exactly,

a large part of it, through its political mass mobilization, achieved for itself thenational linguistic rights which the national movement was demanding (the useof Moldovan in education and the church, etc.). It was increasingly agitating infavor of autonomy. Elected peasants’, teachers’ and priests’ congresses, cooperativecongresses, a number of grass-roots village assemblies, etc., proclaimed theirsupport for not only the use of Moldovan in public functions, but also forBessarabian autonomy. There was even ethnic friction, which partly explains thecreation of the SDT political group. In the first (multiethnic rather thanMoldovan) peasant congress, the Moldovans felt insulted by the other ethnicgroups, and left the Congress until concessions were made to them in the area ofethnic rights. The PNM activists were also able to make more Moldovansidentify themselves as Romanians.Pro-autonomy rallies, in which thousands of people (mostly soldiers and

peasants) participated, took place. On October 20/November 2, 1917, there wasa meeting of theMilitary Committee. This body represented not 300,000 Bessarabiansoldiers, as most scholars have believed, but slightly less than 100,000, becauseeach of the 989 delegates to the committee were selected either one delegate byone hundred soldiers, or two by one hundred officers.40 In fact, the number300,000 probably refers to the entire adult male population 18 to 60 years old.The body decided that a local parliament or diet, Sfatul Þãrii (“The Council ofthe Country”), should rule an autonomous Bessarabia.For the elections for theAll-Russian ConstituentAssembly held in November

1917, we have three published sets of statistics. One set was published by OliverRadkey in his updated study of the Russian Revolution, which covers a minorityof Bessarabia’s population on the basis of the calculations of the Soviet historianAfteniuk (who is well known for his polemics against pro-Romanian studiesdealing with Bessarabia). Another set includes the partial, detailed results whose


————————39 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la Problema Adunãrii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 2,

in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu; ªtiinþa, 1991), no. 3 (7) for 1991 (April-June), p. 18.40 Wim P. Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography: Nationalist and

Communist Politics and History Writing, (Columbia University Press; East European Monographs, 1994), p. 59.

accuracy has been proven, and which have been published in Revista de Istoriea Moldovei (“Moldovan History Review”) by G. Cojocaru. They cover almosttwo-thirds of Bessarabia’s voters, but do not include the votes of the soldiers.There are also allegedly complete results published by the Soviet author G. Ustinovin the interwar period, which seem plausible enough since they tend to becorroborated by the other data. Although Radkey does not indicate the districtsfor which he has the data, one realizes (after playing with the numbers) that theMoldovan numbers apparently includes the districts covered by Radkey’s data,plus some new electoral new statistics. However, one can not be completely surebecause of some discrepancies in connection with the numbers, so I will alsoinclude Radkey’s figures. Finally, I will also include my own calculations in whichI will add the military votes to the civilian votes of G. Cojocaru, thereby includingall the reliably counted ballots cast in Bessarabia.According to the Moldovan set of data, between a little over 40% of all adult

men and women, or over 60% according to the second Ustinov set, participatedin the election.41 For the districts where the rate of turnout is known, 52.4% ofthe eligible voters participated in the elections.42According to my calculations on the basis of the various sets of data, the

National Moldovan Party won 2.2%-2.3% of vote (2.6% according to Radkey’sdata, and 2.1% according to my numbers). The province’s list of the Soviet ofDeputies of the Peasants, whose votes were almost exclusively Moldovan, won36.7% of the reliably counted votes according to the Moldovan historians,35.3% according to my numbers, one-third of the total according to the Sovietinterwar source, and only 27.2% according to Radkey’s data. The two predominantlyMoldovan parties obtained about 42.5% of all the rural civilian votes tabulatedby Cojocaru, and 38.9%, 35.7% and 37.5% of all the votes according to theMoldovan, Soviet, and, respectively, my, numbers. The votes for the SDT camefrom the rural areas where peasant holdings were of particularly small size. Thegreatest mass land seizures by the peasantry largely coincide territorially withsupport for the SDT.One has to take into account the fact that the Moldovans represented about

52.1% of the population. On the basis of the county by county, and locality-by-locality electoral and ethnic distribution and turnout figures, to the extent towhich they are available, it would appear that a clear and undeniable majority ofthe Moldovan voters cast their ballots for the two autonomist lists. However, lessthan 1/5 (indeed 1/10) of the urban Moldovan vote went for these two lists.One-fourth or less of all the Bessarabian civilian Ukrainian voters supported

a left-wing nationalist party, the Ukrainian Socialist Party, which won 4% of thevote according to Cojocaru, 4.1% according to my numbers, and 1.7% accordingto Radkey. The Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR), whichwas opposed to Bessarabianautonomy, obtained 31.2% of the vote according to Cojocaru, 31.6% if one


————————41 Oliver H. Radkey, Russia Goes to the Polls: The Election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly,

1917, (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 107-108, 153-158.42 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la Problema Adunãrii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 2,

p. 10-15 and passim.

includes the soldiers’ vote, 33.6% according to Radkey, and 38.2% according tothe Soviet source. The SR obtained numerous ethnic minority votes (the bulk ofits support), particularly from southern Bessarabia. A substantial minority ofMoldovan votes seems to have gone to the SR according to Radkey.43 TheNational Jewish Party obtained 10-10.6% (11.3% according to Radkey, 10.2%according to me) of the total number of votes, at least 90% of the members ofthe Jewish f the votes according to the Moldovan source and my numbers, and6.5% according to Radkey.44The closest thing to a Bolshevik electoral list were the Internationalist

Socialists (SI), which included Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The SI were for thisreason generally branded as Bolsheviks by a part of the press, and by Radkey.The SI list obtained 6.9% according to Cojocaru, 8.2% according to me, 10.1%according to Radkey, and more 15% of all votes of the “workers and peasants”of Bessarabia according to the unproven and improbable allegations made bySoviet sources published after World War II.45 The Bolshevik votes wereoverwhelmingly non-Moldovan, with a strong Ukrainian overrepresentation.According to the partial detailed results, the SI (Bolsheviks) were popular

among the soldiers who voted in military polling places. They obtained 41% ofall the military votes, which represented 39.8% of the SI-Bolshevik votes inthose districts. In addition, many soldiers who voted SR (41.4%) were in favorof the SR agrarian policy, but took the radical Bolshevik position that thereshould be an immediate peace in the war against the Central Powers.46 TheseLeft SR and Bolshevik soldiers, and their comrades who were leaving theRomanian front and passing through Bessarabia, especially after the October25/November 7, 1917, Communist takeover in St. Petersburg (Petrograd), werealmost exclusively neither Bessarabians nor Moldovans, but from the Russianheartland, and secondarily, from the Ukraine. This explains why only 2% of thesoldiers in Bessarabia voted for SDT and PNM.47Overall, Bessarabia elected five deputies from SDT, 5 SR’s, one Kadet, one

Jewish National Electoral Committee candidate, and an Internationalist-Bolshevik.48 All the SDT deputies were Moldovans, and the other deputiesincluded 5 or 6 Russians and 2 or 3 Jews (including 1 or 2 SR’s).The history of Bessarabia from November 1917, with which I have dealt with

elsewhere, does not concern us in this paper, except to the extent to which asynopsis might help put some things in perspective.49 The deputies from SfatulÞãrii (more than 70% of whom were Moldovans), were elected, mostly


————————43 Oliver H. Radkey, p. 151,160.44 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la Problema Adunãrii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 2,

p. 14-15, and Oliver Radkey, p. 151, 160.45 Idem.46 Idem.47 Ibid.48 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la Problema Adunarii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 2,

p. 15.49 For more details and information, consult Ionas Rus, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în Basarabia Interbelicã”,

and Ionas Aurelian Rus, Self-Determination, Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism, and Nationality Conflict inBessarabia, 1900-1940.

indirectly, by about half of the Bessarabian population. The emergence of SfatulÞãrii on November 21/December 2, 1917 inaugurated the beginning of Bessarabia’sseparation from Russia. Sovereignty was declared.When “the right time” (January5-13/18-26, 1918) came, most of the soldiers, whose political opinions I havediscussed above, supported the attempted Bolshevik coup against Sfatul Þãrii.The Romanian troops called in by the diet defeated the Bolsheviks in January1918, after which, for a number of reasons, Sfatul Þãrii voted for independence(January 24/February 6, 1918) unanimously, and later for union with Romania(March 27/April 9, 1918). At that time 86 members voted for union, 3 against,36 abstained, and 13 were absent.The evidence from both primary (including archival) and secondary sources

clearly supports the view that from the 1923-1924 on, and probably from 1918,until 1940, half (between 1938 and 1940) or more (before 1938) of the Bessarabianswere pro-Romanian. The rest was divided between the pro-Soviet populationand a slightly smaller group of “neutral” people. The available evidence suggeststhat most Moldovan historians have found my arguments persuasive.50 It is alsoclear that most Moldovan-Romanian voters were clearly definite and conscioussupporters of Romanian nationalism by the late 1930’s.It has already been shown that the period up to 1917 presents a Moldovan/

Romanian nationality that was a nationality in itself, aware of its identity. But itwas not necessarily also “for itself”, if one adapts Szporluk’s terminology.51 Thenation becomes “for itself” when its members support nationalist demands,hopes, options, fears, desires, etc. This did not happen to most Moldovans until1917, when, during the Russian Revolution, they showed this in a fashion whichwas undeniable from the electoral point of view. Most of those Moldovans whohad a choice between more than one candidate from their ethnic group, chosenationalists over non-nationalists, and the SDT over the PNM. These choiceswere consistent with their mentality. Most Moldovans were clearly ethnically-minded and proto-nationalistic (or, more exactly, in a state of transition fromproto-nationalism to nationalism). However, I would hesitate to call most ofthose who lived in 1917 Moldovan and/or Romanian “modern nationalists”.It is hard to place the Moldovans in the framework of Ronald Grigor Suny’s

models of national (“vertical”) and class (“horizontal”) integration during theRussian Revolution. The Moldovans, unlike the Belorussians, Lithuanians andAzerbaijanis, did have a national consciousness.52 Moldovan ethnic consciousnesswas older and more universally widespread than the Ukrainian one, even though,obviously, the Moldovan population was more inert and more illiterate.53 Sunyargues that most Ukrainian peasants voted for Ukrainian parties because theypreferred people of their own kind over foreigners rather than because of


————————50 See the response of the editorial board of Revista de Istorie a Moldovei to my article, in Revista de

Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa, 1994), no. 1(17), January-March 1994, p. 29, 37.51 Roman Szporluk, p. 136.52 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet

Union, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 30-43.53 Oliver H. Radkey, p. 108.

nationalism.54 In any case, the Ukrainian SR’s and other Ukrainian parties weresimply national offshoots of Russian parties with the same names. This appliedto many other parties of other non-Russian nationalities (Finns, Georgians,Estonians, Latvians, etc.), but did not apply to the Bessarabian Moldovans.55The Moldovans had the SDT and the PNM, which were not offshoots of anyRussian party. These groups were two genuinely Bessarabian major parties inevery sense of the word despite the former, or current, SR connections of manyMoldovan nationalists. The Moldovans were also different from the Armeniansbecause the latter had only one real option, the Armenian RevolutionaryFederation (Dashnaksutiun), but similar because that Armenian group, like theSDT, was a group including people of various political ideas.The issue of vertical, as opposed to horizontal, integration is difficult and, in

some sense, somewhat dialectical and irrelevant for the Bessarabian Moldovancase. For the voters of the SDT, that is, for most Moldovan peasants, class orland was more important than Moldovan nationalism. However, they refused tovote for horizontal integration across the national line, by not voting for theSR’s, Bolsheviks, Kadets, Mensheviks, etc. Instead, they preferred a Bessarabiansolution to the agrarian problem, and for a moderately, but unambiguously,nationalistic program. We are dealing with oblique integration.I would argue that the Moldovans should be treated as an ethnic group different from

most other peoples in Russia. Moldovan-Russian nationalism was definitely as muchcentral or southeastern European as similar to other nationalisms in the Russian Empire.A large majority of the Moldovan nationalists were educated in seminaries, andwere religious and parochial or provincial-minded. Moreover, there was the pan-Romanian aspect. Many key Moldovan nationalists, including the PNM activists,and some of the SDT leaders of SR origin, had been more connected to Romaniathrough their university education, through what they read and wrote, andthrough their friends and mentors, even before the war. The program of theMoldovan National Party of 1917 was written by a Transylvanian Romanian,Onisifor Ghibu, who wanted to “channel” the Moldovans out of all-Russian andSocial Revolutionary orientations, and largely succeeded in doing that for mostintellectuals and activists.56 The SDT accepted the PNM program with fewchanges and additions. Moldovans, to the extent to which they had cared aboutall-Russian currents before, retreated into provincialism. Being interested inBessarabian autonomy within Russia, and in Bessarabian rather than in all-Russian politics by November 1917, the Moldovans elected to the ConstituentAssembly simply did not leave Bessarabia to go there.57 Most Moldovansstarted not to care about new Russian ideas and politics before they started toseparate from Russia. The switch to the Latin alphabet was intimately connectedwith this, because it represented a change in orientations.In this paper, I have dealt with how the Moldovan national movement appeared

and became a mass phenomenon. During the period from roughly 1900 until


————————54 Ronald Grigor Suny, p. 48.55 Oliver H. Radkey, p. 160.56 Consult Onisifor Ghibu.57 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la ProblemaAdunãrii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 2, p. 15.

1917, most Moldovans had proto-nationalistic views, but passivity was dominantbefore 1917. Nationalism and national mobilization increased through theactivization of the masses rather than through the imposition of an ethnicconsciousness by the elites, or by turning “peasants into Moldovans/ Romanians”.The “old” and weak national movement, pre-modern and aristocratic beforearound 1900, can be said to have given way to the modern national movementof “commoners”, especially intellectuals, which emerged around 1905. Even thismovement was rather weak before the Russian Revolution of 1917. A largemajority of the Moldovan-speaking people felt that they were ethnic “Moldovans”rather than “Romanians” throughout the period, with the percentage of the latterincreasing over time. During the year 1917, mostMoldovan voters came to supportthe Moldovan-Romanian national movement which was in favor of giving theland to the peasants, and was fighting for national rights, and especiallyprovincial autonomy. The agrarian current, which was visibly stronger than thenational one, and distinct from it, in 1905-1907, was merged with the nationalcurrent through “oblique integration”. One might be surprised that most Moldovansvoted for autonomist platforms in the elections of 1917 if he would look atliteracy and other “development” statistics and at the weakness of the Moldovannational movement; it is clear that the strength of pre-existing proto-nationalismis key in the process of determining the growth of the national movement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bruchis, Michael, The USSR: Language and Realities — Nations, Leaders, and Scholars, Boulder, Colorado,East European Monographs, 1988.

Cantemir, Dimitrie, Descriptio Moldaviae, Bucureºti; Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1973.Cantemir, Dimitrie, Cronica Ghiculeºtilor, Bucureºti, EdituraAcademiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1965.Constantinescu, Grigore, “Din Vremuri Þariste”, in Iurie Colesnic, Basarabia Necunoscutã, Chiºinãu,

Universitas, 1993.Canciovici, Mihai, Domnitori Români în Legende, Editura Sport-Turism, 1984.Feldman, Walter, “The Theoretical Basis for the Definition of Moldavian Nationality”, in Ralph S. Clem (ed.),

The Soviet West: Interplay Between Nationality and Social Organization, New York, Praeger Publishers,1975.

Georgescu, Vlad, The Romanians, Columbus; Ohio State University Press, 1991.Kroupensky, A.W., Bessarabie, Paris, 1920, cited in Ioan Scurtu, Constantin Hlihor, 1940. Drama Românilor

dintre Prut ºi Nistru, Bucureºti, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1992.Popescu, Radu , Istoriile Domnilor Þãrii Româneºti, Bucureºti, EdituraAcademiei Republicii Populare Române,

1963.Pãun, Octav, Angelescu, Silviu, Legende Populare Româneºti, Bucureºti, Editura Albatros, 1983.Rus, Ionaº, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în Basarabia Interbelicã”, in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa,

1994), no. 1 (17), January-March 1994.Rus, Ionaº, Self-Determination, Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism, and Nationality Conflict in Bessarabia,

1900-1940.Urussov, Serge Dimitriyevich, Memoirs of a Russian Governor, London; Harper and Brothers Publishers,

1908.


VLADIMIR SOLOVIEV ET LE PROBLÈME NATIONALÀ LA LUMIERE DE L’APPROCHE MORALE1

CRISTI PANTELIMON*

Abstract. The study tries to evaluate and to find possible answers to thequestion “May the post-modern humanity, not ethnic, may find the moralresources necessary for it to exist?”, approaching Vladimir Soloviev’s majorphilosophical ideas. The design of Soloviev is a Christian humanism, a truehumanism, which ultimately emerged the voice of Christian love for allpeople. It is not an easy cosmopolitanism, indifferent to the plight of realpeople or careless to them. It is an internationalism, based on Christianpersonalism, which can be found elsewhere in the German Romantics, ofcourse, with less religious connotations.

Key words: Vladimir Soloviev, Christian humanism, Christian personalism,moral resources.

«Le premier et le plus important système éthique de la philosophie russe» estLa justesse du bien (1897) de Vladimir Soloviev. Sa conception sur la nation etle nationalisme a un caractère extrêmement systématique et clair, étantconstruite à l’ombre claire de la foi chrétienne. Le texte du grand philosophe neconnaît pas de tensions excessives, n’est pas soumis à des passions nationales,ni à des craintes cosmopolites, il n’exalte pas et il ne détruit aucune desdeux dimensions du sentiment de l’amour pour la patrie (nationalisme etcosmopolitisme — volets antagoniques d’une possible attitude envers lespeuples). Préoccupé par l’idée du bien chrétien dans l’histoire, Soloviev déploredès le début ce qu’il appelle le mal collectif qui se manifeste suite audébordement des passions au sein de la société. La conception de Soloviev estun humanisme chrétien, un véritable humanisme, dans lequel, finalement, surgitla voix de l’amour chrétien pour tous les peuples. Il ne s’agit pas d’uncosmopolitisme facile, indifférent au sort réel des peuples ou insouciant enversceux-ci, il ne s’agit non plus d’un internationalisme qui, en pérorant au nom detous les peuples, perd de vue justement le concret de chacun, mais d’une sorte————————

* Senior Researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of the Political Science and InternationalRelations.

1 Traduction par Ruxandra Luca, ISPRI.


de personnalisme des peuples, inspiré du personnalisme chrétien, et qu’onretrouvera d’ailleurs chez les romantiques allemands, certes, avec moins deconnotations religieuses.Le nationalisme et le cosmopolitisme sont, d’après lui, des attitudes exagérées,

partisanes. Le premier se résume tel que l’on voit ci-après: „On doit avoir del’amour pour notre peuple et apporter notre concours, par tous les moyens, à sonbien-être, et envers les autres peuples nous avons le droit d’indifférence; ensituation de confrontation entre leurs intérêts el les nôtres nous sommes obligésde traiter ces peuples comme ennemis»2.Le cosmopolitisme s’exprime par les idées suivantes: „Le peuple est un

phénomène naturel, dépourvu de toute signification morale; nous avons uneobligation pas envers le peuple en tant que tel (le nôtre ou un autre), mais enversdes individus, quelle que soit leur appartenance à un peuple ou à un autre”3.Le philosophe russe n’est d’accord ni avec la première ni avec la deuxième

version d’attitude. La première donne une importance exagérée, absolue à ladifférence entre les peuples (ce qui constitue une exagération), alors que ladeuxième ne respecte point la différence entre les peuples.Le nationalisme signifie exagérer les différences entre les peuples (en accentuant

les traits positifs de son peuple, et le désintérêt, voire la haine envers les autrespeuples — en situation de conflit), alors que le cosmopolitisme nie l’importancedes différences ethniques au profit d’un individualisme abstrait, qui reste auniveau de l’individu et n’arrive pas au niveau ethnique. Dans le premier casl’individualité des peuples est excessive, alors que dans le second on leur nie ledroit à l’individualité, une fois que la «réalité» concrète n’appartient qu’auxindividus de l’espèce humaine, séparément.Evidemment, le nationalisme et le cosmopolitisme se définissent par leur

opposition. En raison de leur rapport antagonique, il est intéressant de voir si, ditSoloviev, l’amour pour son propre peuple peut servir de bonne justification del’emploi de tous les moyens afin d’en défendre les intérêts, et de l’indifférenceou de la haine envers les autres peuples, et, à l’égard du cosmopolitisme, si uneattitude morale égale vis-à-vis de tous les humains peut conduire à l’indifférenceenvers les autres peuples, généralement, et plus particulièrement envers sonpeuple.Le nationalisme se justifie par le patriotisme. Mais il y a plusieurs formes de

patriotisme: il existe le patriotisme irrationnel (aveugle, qui nuit au peuple,même si des actions sont faites à son nom), il existe le patriotisme stérile (lasimple prétention orale, la simple fanfaronnade patriotarde, «l’ivresse des mots»patriotiques, sans conséquences bénéfiques au peuple) et le patriotisme faux (quin’est qu’un masque au service des buts égoïstes et ignobles). Ces formescorrompues de patriotisme (faire attention à leur graduation) n’excluent pasl’existence du patriotisme authentique. L’idée de patriotisme authentique est liéeà l’idée de morale, par le biais d’une comparaison de nature économique.

24 CRISTI PANTELIMON 2

————————2 Vl. Soloviev, La justesse du bien, Ed. Humanitas, Bucarest, 1994, p. 326.3 Ibidem, p. 326.

Prenons l’exemple d’une relation d’amitié, celui qui se déclare ami de quelqu’unfait tout ce qui lui est possible pour que son ami acquière tous les biensimaginables. Le bien-être matériel constitue un but justifiable, mais il n’est pasabsolu, puisque si les moyens mis en place pour y arriver sont ignobles, l’actionentière est atteinte de nullité morale, et en conséquence, l’amitié est pernicieuse.Au dessus de toute considération sur le bien-être d’un individu ou d’une

nation, on retrouve la problématique des moyens mis en place pour parvenir à cebien-être. Dans le sillage de la grande tradition de la pensée antique, continuéepar l’approche chrétienne, Soloviev considère que les biens matériels doivent sesubordonner aux biens moraux. Exprimé différemment, toutes les actions visantà soutenir de point de vue matériel le peuple ne sont pas bénéfiques. Si la luttepour le bien-être matériel du peuple est menée par des moyens ignobles, l’actionaura des connotations négatives et ne sera pas une preuve de patriotisme. Lepatriotisme ne signifie pas servir le peuple par n’importe quel moyen, et lemeilleur enseignement en ce sens est tiré de l’histoire, qui nous fait voir que lesplus grands peuples ont été ceux qui s’étaient mis au service d’idéaux universels.D’autant plus que «l’histoire nous démontre au travers les faits le caractèrenon fondé de l’idée même selon laquelle les nations ou ethnies seraientoriginairement et définitivement porteuses de vie communautaire de l’humanité»4.L’universalité sera, à partir de ce point, la clé à l’aide de laquelle Soloviev

essayera de déchiffrer l’histoire des plus importants peuples de l’Europe. Lenationalisme même sera placé, tranquillement, sous le parapluie plus ample del’universalité, dans son acception chrétienne.Si l’on regarde vers le passé très lointain, l’Antiquité, l’idée nationale y apparaît

extrêmement faible. Toutefois, le monde avait ses propres critères forts luipermettant de distinguer entre les groupes communautaires. L’humanité neconnaissait pas les différences nationales, mais cela ne veut pas dire qu’ellen’était qu’une masse amorphe, homogène. Au contraire, les différences étaientencore plus marquées qu’aujourd’hui. Il ne faut pas en déduire que la nationn’est pas suffisamment marquée pour assurer à ses membres le sentimentd’appartenance stable, mais qu’elle peut se constituer en forme de transition versle type de communauté du Christ à laquelle l’humanité tend. Même s’il nel’affirme pas de cette façon, c’est celle-ci l’idée du sous texte de Soloviev.Lorsque la nation aura disparu, l’humanité aura besoin d’une autre formecommunautaire; il ne s’agira pas de dépasser la nation par le biais de la négation,mais de la transfigurer dans une autre communauté, où les relations entre leshommes auraient la même nature spiritualisée: c’est l’humanité chrétienne:«L’opposition entre les nôtres et les étrangers étaient à cette époque-là beaucoupplus tranchante et intransigeante que de nos jours, mais ce n’était pas le critèrenational qui la déterminait»5.

3 LE PROBLÈME NATIONAL À LA LUMIÈRE DE L’APPROCHE MORALE 25

————————4D’où l’on déduit que les nations n’ont pas été et ne seront pas à jamais les matrices de la vie communautaire

du monde. Elles n’ont pas été dès le début présentes dans l’histoire et il est possible qu’elles ne durent pas dansl’avenir. Mais leur disparition ne va pas priver l’humanité de sa vie communautaire. La communauté, d’aprèsSoloviev, est vie spirituelle renouvelée par le Christianisme et en aucun cas vie communautaire fondée sur laliaison de sang.

5 Soloviev, op. cit., p. 329.

Le premier peuple analysé sous l’angle du rapport entre ses sentiments et satrajectoire historique est le peuple grec. Celui-ci n’a pas connu de sentimentspatriotiques proprement dits, ou, en tout cas, de sentiments patriotiques à accentnational et moderne. L’unique moment de l’histoire de l’antiquité grecque où lepatriotisme est sorti à la lumière est celui des guerres médiques. Cette périoden’a duré que quatre ans, car, avec la guerre de Péloponnèse les luttes intestinessont redevenues dévastatrices. Ces luttes intestines ont fait que les petitescommunautés de Grecs perdent leur indépendance, mais sans pour autant enfaveur de l’unité nationale, mais d’un projet culturel à valeur universelle. Cepassage du particularisme à l’universalité sera suivi par Soloviev, comme on l’adéjà dit, chez tous les peuples importants de l’Europe. Il essaye, ainsi, de saisir,tacitement, une loi historique. Les grands peuples ne sont pas ceux qui serenferment à l’intérieur de leurs confins ethniques, mais tout au contraire, ceuxqui se sont ouverts à l’universalité, même au prix d’une perte partiale d’identité.Le prix payé pour ce sacrifice universaliste n’est jamais bas, mais il vautpleinement la peine de l’accepter. Les Grecs ne sont pas devenus une nation ausens moderne du terme, mais ils ont donné au monde entier la mesure culturellede tous les temps. Il est fort probable que le renfermement égoïste à l’intérieurdu périmètre ethnique ne leur ait été aussi bénéfique sur le plan de leurexcellence culturelle.C’est peut-être aussi le cas de Rome, plus spectaculaire encore, en raison de

sa dynamique: «En ce qui concerne Rome, son entière histoire s’affiche commeun passage continu de la politique de la cité à la politique de la monarchiemondiale — ab urbe ad orbem —, sans qu’il y ait d’arrêt sur un momentpurement national. Durant la résistance face à l’invasion punique, Rome n’étaitque la plus forte ville en Italie, et lorsque son ennemi a été vaincu, elle a dépassésubtilement les frontières ethniques et géographiques de la latinité et a acquis laconscience du pouvoir universel et historique (...)»6.Le scénario se répète pour tous les peuples analysés.Même si les Juifs avaient une conscience nationale extrêmement soudée à la

veille de l’apparition du Christianisme (ils étaient, à ce titre, une sorte d’exceptionà l’époque antique), cette conscience ethnique était indissolublement liée à laprémonition d’une vocation historique universelle. Les prophètes d’Israël l’annoncentdans le Livre de Mésie, et le Livre de Daniel «est la première philosophie del’histoire au monde», dans lequel, on le sait, on évoque la monarchie mondialeet l’empire de la vérité du Fils de l’Homme7.C’est à ce point qu’intervient une question assez sensible, que Soloviev résout

sans hésiter. La religion chrétienne a été souvent accusée de cosmopolitisme, enraison du fait que son message ne s’arrête pas aux barrières ethniques, mais il a


————————6 Ibidem, p. 330.7 Livre de Daniel, 2, 37 „Toi, ô roi, roi des rois, à qui le roi du ciel a donné la royauté, la puissance, la

force et la gloire, 38 dans la main duquel il a donné, dans tout le monde habité, les hommes, les bêtes deschamps et les oiseaux du ciel, et qu’il a fait dominer sur eux tous: c’est toi qui es la tête d’or. 39 Après toi, ils’élevera un autre royaume, moindre que toi, puis un troisième royaume, d’airrain, qui dominera sur toute laterre (...) 44. Dans les temps de ces rois, le Dieu du ciel suscitera un royaume qui ne sera jamais détruit et dontla domination ne passera pas à un autre peuple; il brisera et anéantira tous ces royaumes-là et lui-mêmesubsistera à jamais”. La Sainte Bible, Copright by Société Civile d’Études et de Publications non Commerciales,Auteurs-Éditeurs, Paris, 1951.

un caractère universel. Pourtant, l’universalisme n’est pas cosmopolitisme. LesApôtres ne pouvaient pas ignorer l’existence des peuples à leur époque, nous ditSoloviev, mais, d’autre part, les peuples avaient franchi leur conscience limitéeet guerrière d’autrefois. La pax romana fonctionnait, même si de manièreimparfaite, et par la suite, le message chrétien ne pouvait pas être limitatif-national, mais universel, au reflet du monde politique de l’époque. Ce qui,encore une fois, ne suppose pas ignorer les peuples, mais avoir la conscience quele message chrétien s’adresse de manière égale à tous ces peuples. L’universalismesignifie garantir l’égalité de tous les peuples considérés positivement commeunités concrètes, alors que le cosmopolitisme signifie égaliser les peuples en lesignorant8.La religion chrétienne a réussi, a travers le personnalisme, à concilier le

dilemme individuel — universel. “Grâce au Christianisme, la conscience fait lepassage de l’homme généralement abstrait des philosophes et des juristes, àl’homme concret, personnalité pleine, en écartant de la sorte, définitivement,l’ancienne hostilité et l’ancienne distance entre diverses catégories d’hommes.Chaque homme, une fois ayant reçu le Christ, c’est-à-dire, une fois pénétré parl’esprit achevé de l’homme, se dirigera vers Son visage qui s’identifie à la normeidéale et à l’activité, en s’impliquant de la sorte dans la divinité par la force dela présence du Fils de Dieu en lui”9.Et encore, en parlant des actions de l’Apôtre Paul, Soloviev remarque que

celui-ci “était obligé de déclarer que Christ n’était ni Juif, ni païen, ni hellène, niScythe, ni homme libre, ni esclave, mais qu’il était le «nouvel être»10, ce qui n’estpas pour autant une simple réduction au dénominateur commun des Anciens”11.On comprendra pour quoi Soloviev dit que la distinction entre le caractère

d’un peuple et le caractère d’un individu n’est pas d’ordre principiel12:


————————8 D’après l’Église, le nationalisme combiné avec le localisme religieux s’appelle phylétisme, ou la

tendance à accaparer ou «nationaliser» excessivement le message universaliste de l’Église. C’est uneexagération qui menace les églises autocéphales, locales. D’où la raison qui justifie de lutter contre lui. D’autrepart, il n’est non plus souhaitable de nier le localisme et les traditions locales. L’universalité de l’Églisen’implique pas nier le spécifique ethnique. Voilà ce que dit, de ce point de vue, le théologien grec ChristosYannaras: „On a beaucoup parlé du phylétisme qui torture les Églises Orthodoxes et qui est, comme je l’ai dit,une vraie maladie. Dans le même temps, il existe pourtant un risque de plus, à savoir celui de considérerl’Église et l’Orthodoxie comme une réalité abstraite. Je veux dire que l’Église a toujours été incarnée dans unpeuple concret, ayant sa langue propre, ses racines propres, ses coutumes propres, ses traditions….On ne peutpas l’ignorer. L’Église se nourrit d’expériences locales. Pour cette raison notre tradition n’est pas une traditionintellectuelle, mais la tradition des expériences du peuple. On ne peut pas s’opposer à ce caractère local,spécifique pour les Églises Orthodoxes. Le nationalisme est l’exagération du local, ou, plutôt, il en estl’idéologisation”. (L’orthodoxie sous la pression de l’histoire, Ed. Bizantinã, 1995, p. 49-50.)

9 Soloviev, op. cit., p. 333.10 Epîtres aux Galates, 6, 15: „Car la circoncision n’est rien, pas plus que l’incirconcision; seule est

quelque chose la créature nouvelle”, Epîtres aux Colossiens, 3, 11: „Là, il n’est plus question de Grec ou deJuif, de circoncision ou d’incirconcision, de barbare, de Scythe, d’esclave, d’homme libre; il n’y a que leChrist, qui est tout en tous”.

11 Ibidem, p. 333.12 Une nation est une personne, disait Adam Müller. Finalement, tel que Soloviev l’affirme, «le

Christianisme ne réclame pas la dépersonnalisation, il ne peut même pas accepter la suppression des caractéristiquespropres du peuple. La résurrection ou le renouvellement spirituel qu’il demande aux individus et aux peuplesne conduit pas à la suppression des caractéristiques et des capacités natives, mais exclusivement à leurmodification dans le sens d’en renouveler le contenu et de les réorienter» (p. 334). Formulé différemment, dansl’approche chrétienne les peuples sont pleinement (ré)configurés dans la mesure où ils respectent la moraleinnovatrice de l’Evangile.

autrement dit, le Christianisme accepte toutes les différences, leur confère unpotentiel créatif, mais, dans le même temps, se soucie pour que ces différencesne conduisent pas à des conflits. La définition de l’humanité coïncide avec cellede l’Église et comprend l’ensemble des traits positifs que les divers peuplespossèdent. Ces traits positifs sont cultivés par l’Église et c’est ici qu’on peut voirla vraie universalité qu’elle réclame. Sur ce point, l’universalité de l’être humain,en tant qu’Humanité, est synonyme de l’Eglise, telle que sesApôtres la voyaient.En approchant l’époque moderne, on voit que le cas des nations européennes

ayant atteint leur maturité, pleinement constituées, s’insère dans le mêmeparadigme des idéaux universalistes, les seuls ayant donné du sens au processusmême de maturation nationale de chaque ethnie prise à part. Les nations sontd’autant plus elles-mêmes que les idéaux auxquels elles adhèrent sont «plus»universels, sans pour autant être moins ethniques et moins locaux.Les peuples de l’Europe occidentale ont été les premiers à se constituer en

pleine autonomie. Parmi ces peuples, dit Soloviev, le premier à avoir une consciencenationale pleinement formée (au XIIe siècle, au travers la ligue lombarde) a étél’italien. Le génie italien, pleinement forgé avec Dante ou Saint Francis, aexprimé dès le début des valeurs universelles, sans prétentions unilatérales, detype nationaliste moderne. Dante est d’ailleurs reconnu pour son attitude hostileau localisme des communes italiennes. L’Italie s’exprime comme force créatricepar des génies du calibre de Dante, Marco Polo, Amerigo Vespucci. Grâce à eux,l’Italie devient une force spirituelle de premier rang en Europe. L’Italie doit sabrillance et sa force à ces noms à valeur universelle, mais qui appartiennentpourtant au peuple italien. On retrouve à ce point une preuve de plus du caractèremoral de la catégorie ethnique: en dehors du bien universel, l’ethnicité s’avèreêtre un récipient trop étroit et l’exacerber ne fait qu’épuiser le contenu naturel del’énergie créatrice.Si les Italiens ont excellé en quelque sorte dans l’universalisme naturel, décliné

de leur caractère ethnique, les Espagnols, confrontés durant des siècles au dangermusulman, ont, en quelque sorte, dénaturé l’esprit du Christianisme et ont instauréla violence à son sein. Certes, les Espagnols n’avaient non plus cette conscienceexagérée de leur caractère ethnique exclusif13.Soloviev n’hésite pas à affirmer que la violence non justifiée des Espagnols,

pour laquelle ils ont trouvé des arguments religieux, est la cause première de leurdéchéance14. Au-delà des intérêts de moment de la nation, le fait de servir àl’universalisme chrétien a permis à l’Espagne de survivre dignement le long del’histoire. Par contre, sa déchéance nationale devient une évidence lorsque lesforces morales au service desquelles la nation s’était mise ne sont plus aussifortes. En autres termes, la lutte excessive contre la Réforme (appréciée par le


————————13 «Jamais ne leur avait traversé l’esprit de dire que l’Espagne était aux Espagnols, ce qui serait en fait

dire que l’Aragon appartenait aux Aragonais, la Castille aux Castillans etc. Ils sentaient, réalisaient et disaientque l’Espagne appartenait au monde chrétien dans son ensemble, tout comme le christianisme appartient aumonde entier» (p. 339).

14 On peut comparer cette vision et celle de Ortega y Gasset, qui sans insister sur le caractère pécheur duchristianisme espagnol, voit dans la suppression de l’universalisme des faits historiques de l’Espagne une desforces fondamentales de la déchéance ibérique.

philosophe russe comme unmoment nécessaire dans l’évolution du Christianisme)a représenté l’abandon de la voie de normalité morale et l’entrée de l’Espagnedans la zone d’échec historique.La correspondance entre la dimension morale universelle et la trajectoire

heureuse des histoires nationales se vérifie aussi dans le cas du peuple anglais.Bacon, Shakespeare, Milton, Newton ou Penn sont les créateurs de la grandeurde l’Angleterre, sans pour autant l’envisager! L’universalisme anglais, vérifiépar la constitution de l’empire britannique ou des États-Unis, ne pouvait pas seréduire au localisme des îles britanniques. Probablement plus que dans le cas desautres peuples, dans les grands actes historiques desAnglais, le caractère universelest directement ressenti, prôné, accompli.Le cas de la France est lui aussi facilement à déchiffrer. La période post 1789,

la période des guerres napoléoniennes représentent le comble de l’universalismefrançais, époque de gloire de la France dans sa qualité de peuple civilisateur. Nidans le cas de la France il n’y a de lien direct entre sa force de rayonnementhistorique et le caractère exclusivement national de ses actions: finalement, legrand auteur de la gloire universelle de la France était un personnage dont lesang qui lui coulait dans les veines était un peu italien!Soloviev continue la série de ces exemples avec le cas allemand (et qu’est-ce

qui peut être plus universel encore que la philosophie profondément allemandede Kant ou Hegel, ou la littérature de Goethe?), mais aussi avec le cas polonaisou russe (les cas évoqués sont Pierre le Grand et Pouchkine). Tous ces exemplesservent de vérification pour une vraie loi historique:«À son époque de gloire et de grandeur, tout peuple a pensé que sa

signification et son spécifique s’affirment au-delà de ses limites, au niveau del’universel, du supranational dont il ne doutait pas l’existence, en se mettant àson service et en l’accomplissant par sa propre création nationale au regard de lasource et des modalités d’expression, mais pleinement universelle par soncontenu et par les œuvres achevés (…), d’où il apparaît que les peuples ne viventpas que pour eux, mais aussi pour tous les autres»15.Mais qu’est-ce que cette vie des peuples au service de l’universel, des autres

peuples, peut-elle être, sinon une vie inspirée des lois morales universelles? Certes,les modalités concrètes d’atteindre ces idéaux moraux peuvent être discutables.On l’a vu dans le cas de l’Espagne, la volonté exagérée insufflée au Christianismetend à occulter le vrai message des faits des Espagnols. De même, l’universalismedes droits des citoyens diffusés par la France peut être mal compris et mal misen œuvre.Aujourd’hui, au nom des droits fondamentaux de l’homme énormémentd’erreurs de politique étrangère peuvent être commises. Pourtant, dans la mesureoù les peuples croient à ces valeurs, il est évident que le lien entre morale etdimension universelle-ethnique de ceux qui y sont attachés est très fort.On ouvre de cette façon un chapitre particulièrement difficile de nos propos:

dans quelle mesure les déclarations d’intention des représentants politiques denotre époque conservent-ils encore un lien avec les principes moraux qui ontjalonné la politique de l’Europe dès sa constitution jusqu’à présent? L’Europe


————————15 Op. cit., p. 345.

est-elle encore le lieu où la morale universelle est incarnée par les peuplesindividuels? Du tableau brièvement crayonné par Soloviev on déduit quel’universalisme de la morale, du bien, est ce qui a mis pratiquement en mouvementl’histoire significative de l’Europe, non seulement au niveau politique, maisaussi artistique, spirituel, culturel. Mais aujourd’hui, qu’est-ce que c’est cetteEurope encore peuplée de nations, mais incapable de croire à une dimensionmorale transcendante? En quelle mesure peuvent les peuples européens prendrele relais de la morale et la transformer en faits historiques significatifs? C’est unequestion à laquelle le présent ne peut pas répondre (d’autant plus que le présentsemble ne pas encourager une réponse positive à cette interrogation); il est peut-être nécessaire d’attendre que l’avenir déchiffre cette énigme16.L’Europe actuelle, unie ou en train de s’unir, ne pourra pas se parfaire de

point de vue historique (nous y introduisons une nuance importante: de point de


————————16 Il est à noter que l’approche moraliste des relations internationales est encore conservée au XXe siècle,

au moins dans les déclarations des hommes politiques américains de notoriété. Cette approche ressort, parexemple, de la lettre envoyée par le président Theodore Roosevelt à Edward Grey le 22 janvier 1915, danslaquelle il évoque le non respect de la neutralité de la Belgique par l’Allemagne en 1914. Roosevelt expliqueà Grey (à l’époque ministre des affaires étrangères de la Grande Bretagne et adepte du réalisme politique) quepour les États Unis le respect des principes de la morale internationale vaut plus que les intérêts ou les affinitésde moment: «Pour moi, le coeur de la question a été la Belgique. Si la Grande Bretagne ou la France s’étaientcomportées avec la Belgique de la même façon que l’Allemagne, je m’aurais opposé aux deux de la mêmemanière où je m’oppose à l’Allemagne. J’ai approuvé avec beaucoup d’émoi vos actions en tant que modèlepour ce que pourraient faire ceux qui croient que les traités doivent se respecter de bonne volonté et qu’il existequelque chose qu’on nomme de morale internationale (n.s., C.P.). Je prends cette position en qualité d’Américainqui n’est pas plus Anglais que Allemand, qui essaie loyalement de servir les intérêts de son pays, mais quis’efforce, dans le même temps, de faire tout ce qu’il lui est possible pour la justice et la décence de l’humanitéen général et qui, donc, se sent obligé de juger toutes les autres nations en fonction de leur comportement entoute circonstance», (Hans J. Morgenthau, Politica între naþiuni, Ed. Polirom, 2007, p. 54).

L’impression que les relations internationales sont soumises aux principes généraux et valables de lamorale reste encore, aujourd’hui, reconnue. La nuance apportée au réalisme politique porte sur le fait que, au-delà de l’expérience indiscutable de ces principes, personne ne sait avec précision quelles sont les bonnes etquelles sont les mauvaises actions. En plus, cette reconnaissance rejoint à un certain moment le besoin deprudence résultant de l’impératif de la survie nationale: «Tant les individus que l’État doivent juger l’actionpolitique conformément aux principes de la morale universelle, tout comme au principe de la liberté. Maisalors que l’individu a un droit moral de se sacrifier au nom d’un tel principe, l’État n’a pas le droit de permettreque la contestation morale des transgressions de la liberté empêche l’action politique de succès, inspirée, à sontour, du principe moral de la survie morale» (Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 51).

Les propos de Morgenthau ne sont point convaincants. Car on ne peut pas comprendre pour quelle raisonles principes moraux universels s’appliqueraient plus facilement aux individus qu’aux États nationaux et pourquelle raison ceux-ci seraient plus dignes de survivre que les individus. Certes, une nation peut sembler avoirun plus de légitimité de survivre aux individus en raison du grand nombre d’individus qui la composent.Autrement dit, si les individus peuvent se sacrifier par «excès» de principes, les nations doivent être plusprudentes, justement puisqu’elles représentent le destin de plusieurs générations d’individus. Mais, une fois deplus, une telle idée n’est pas du tout justifiée et ne peut pas être démontrée dans la sphère idéale de la moraleuniverselle, où les principes sont souverains et ne prennent pas en compte la quantité de l’espèce humaine quiles respecte ou non. Le réalisme politique est à ce point dépourvu de réalisme, sur un plan supérieur, car lasurvie de la nation par le moyen de l’amputation de certains principes universels pourrait lui être fatale à uneépoque différente, lorsque ces principes ne peuvent plus être éludés. Imaginons une nation excessivementprudente, envieuse de survivre à tout prix, dans telle ou telle circonstance historique: justement en raison d’untel comportement de précaution, ne serait-elle plus faible et moins capable de survivre dans des conditionshistoriques dures, qui lui exigent une capacité de sacrifice? La prudence évoquée par Morgenthau ne peut pasexclure un certain défaut de prudence, dans le sens des risques encourus, au moins dans des circonstancesparticulières. Le réalisme est la doctrine qui s’oppose au dogmatisme des relations entre nations. Mais leréalisme peut aussi devenir un dogme, dans la mesure où il se substitue aux principes universels de la moraleet arrive à relativiser toute valeur transcendante.

vue politique elle peut être, au moins temporairement, une entreprise viable. Depoint de vue historique, cependant, les choses sont plus compliquées (car parl’histoire on comprend la mise en œuvre concrète des idéaux universels de lamorale) si ses peuples n’apprennent pas une forme dérivée du commandementévangélique: aime les autres peuples comme s’ils étaient ton propre peuple. Celasignifie pleine acceptation des autres peuples, totale fraternité entre eux,conscience de la multiplicité ethnique acceptée au niveau européen, et, au fond,redécouverte des racines chrétiennes de l’Europe, une entreprise avec laquelle,malheureusement, l’appareil administratif et politique du supra-État européenn’est pas d’accord. Dans la zone d’intérêt de la philosophie de Vladimir Soloviev,nous dirons qu’une Europe chrétienne peut devenir une Europe unie, mais parcontre, une Europe néo-païenne, une Europe dépourvue de sa dimension morale,exclusivement économique, ne pourra jamais être la matérialisation des idéauxévoqués au niveau continental.

Le primordialisme est synonyme de l’universalisme. Le paradoxedu particularisme et sa déduction de l’universalisme

Donc, les peuples sont, selon Soloviev, des particularités de l’universalité del’être humain, de point de vue biologique, et de point de vue moral, ils sont desparticularités naturelles du bien absolu. Le rapport entre la morale et l’ethnie estd’autant plus important que cette dernière n’a pas de caractère primordial-universel. Les peuples sont, exprimé différemment, des parties naturelles de l’êtrehumain universel. Les peuples ne peuvent pas prétendre un statut primaire dansl’ordre de la création. Même si la morale est indissolublement liée au peuple,d’une manière très concrète, les peuples ne sont, à une analyse plus avancée, quedes «fragments» moraux de l’humanité entendue comme manifestation du bienabsolu. Du peuple universel et bon se détachent des fragments vivants de moralecommunautaire, c’est-à-dire les peuples concrets, chacun avec sa propre langue,ses habitudes, ses lois, ses ascendants etc.À la place de l’humanité constituée de la somme des qualités essentielles des

peuples, Soloviev met en lumière l’idée des peuples qui ressortent du peupleuniversel. Les éléments communs de constitution et d’identification des peuplessont l’occasion de la démonstration de cet apparent paradoxe. Nous savons tousque Renan recherchait des solutions à la question de savoir ce qu’une nation est,en avançant de divers éléments de sa coagulation: langue, territoire, passécommun, intérêts communs etc. Les mêmes éléments concrets peuvent êtreinitialement passés au patrimoine universel, pour se retrouver après dans lesparticularismes ethniques. Ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui primordialisme est uncourant de réflexion cherchant à prouver que les ethnies sont des créationsprimordiales de l’humanité, ayant, de la sorte, un caractère universel, pérenne etachevé de point de vue politique. En tant que réaction à l’inventionisme, qui estle courant contraire, niant l’origine naturelle des peuples, le primordialismeretrouve des arguments justes. L’inventionisme ne prend pas en compte unfacteur essentiel du devenir ethnique, c’est-à-dire le passé. Etant donné que nul


peuple ne peut se constituer en dehors d’une aire temporaire vaste ouextrêmement vaste, l’inventionisme (qui est une forme de volontarisme considérantque l’apparition des peuples est un processus à date fixe, certaine, déterminéepar des conditions historiques strictement détectables) pèche par son autoritarisme.Le grand avantage du primordialisme par rapport à l’inventionisme est

justement l’idée de passé, qui voile nécessairement toute ethnie, quel que soitson positionnement. Toutefois, de point de vue logique, métaphysique et religieux,ni le primordialisme n’est assez fort pour lutter contre l’universalisme chrétien,qui voit les peuples sous l’espèce de l’unité d’une création primaire unique.L’espèce humaine étant une et dérivant de la volonté divine, le primordialismene peut pas prétendre plus que la gloire d’une juste vengeance contre la visionétroite — idéologisée de l’inventionisme17.Pour quoi le primordialisme serait-il une forme d’universalisme, ou pour

quoi les ethnies ne peuvent-elles prétendre leur primauté logique et métaphysiquepar rapport à l’humanité?Les arguments de Soloviev portent sur trois volets. Le premier est relatif au

lien biologique ou à l’unité biologique. «Pourtant, cette supposition (n.s.C.P.),est plus valable dans le cas de l’humanité que dans le cas de l’ethnie. L’unitéoriginaire de l’humanité constitue non seulement le dogme des trois religionsmonothéistes, mais de surcroît l’opinion prédominante parmi les philosophes etles scientifiques18, alors que l’idée de l’unité de l’origine biologique est dans laplupart des cas une fiction pure19».S’il est impossible de soutenir, dans le cas de l’ethnie, l’unité ou la pureté

biologique, serait-il possible que l’unité de langue soit un argument à sa faveur?Nous savons que la langue est souvent invoquée à l’appui de l’unité nationale,ethnique, voire comme facteur essentiel de cette unité. Soloviev soutient, aucontraire, que la diversité des langues n’exclut pas l’unité de compréhensionentre les hommes. Dit d’autre manière, la langue est un accident engendrant desdifférences postérieures à une unité originaire de conscience humaine. Alors quela langue spécifique du peuple représente la forme différente de compréhensionentre les hommes, dans cette forme se moule un contenu unique, qui rendcompte du parentage latent entre tous les humains.“La langue constitue l’expression la plus profonde et la plus fondamentale du

caractère populaire, mais tout comme les différences entre le caractère individueldes hommes n’empêche pas l’unité réelle du peuple qui regroupe tous ceshommes à identité distincte, de la même façon les différences entre les unités


————————17 Celui-ci, à son tour, dispose de certains fondements découlant de la pratique politique immédiate,

instrumentale, surtout à l’époque moderne. Pour cela, l’inventionisme, dans la mesure où il est „valide”, nepeut s’appliquer que dans les cas modernes. Mais à ce point aussi il se voit dépasser par la vision plutôtcompréhensive — grandiose du primordialisme.

18 Aujourd’hui, d’autant plus qu’à l’époque de Soloviev, l’argument de cette unité est soutenu par lesrécentes découvertes en matière de génétique.

L’impossibilité de démontrer la pureté biologique de la nation est une constante de la science historique-sociale.

19 Op. cit., p. 476.

nationales ne peuvent pas obérer l’unité réelle de tous les peuples au sein del’humanité qui, pour sa part, a sa propre identité”20.De la sorte, même si la langue nationale est reconnue comme expression

fondamentale du caractère national, elle ne peut pas se constituer en unité ultimede celui-ci. Même si elles trouvent dans la langue leur façon la plus adéquate des’exprimer, les différences ethniques ne supposent pas une faille totale entre lespeuples.Au contraire, l’unité de conscience ou l’unité de vie spirituelle de l’humanitéest le gage de l’unité et de l’indivisibilité de l’humanité, au-delà de toute différencede forme. Il aurait été inexcusablement erroné de la part du philosophe russe dene pas reconnaître à la langue ce statut exemplaire dans la définition des traitsethniques. Mais, tout comme chaque peinture est différente par rapport à uneautre en fonction de la façon du peintre de manipuler son pinceau, l’unité essentielledes peintures provient de l’unité ou de l’unicité du créateur (peintre) et de l’espèceau sein de laquelle il a placé son entière création.Enfin, si le sang et la langue ne sont pas des éléments suffisants pour définir

l’ethnie en tant que monade séparée de toute les autres, l’élément historique oul’histoire pourrait, probablement, assumer ce rôle? Il est vrai que l’histoire peutmodeler ou remodeler, dans une grande mesure, le matériel ethnique ou linguistiquequ’il a à sa portée, à un certain moment. Les traditions communes, le passé commun,la communauté d’histoire, de destin, on l’affirme souvent (les théoriciensroumains qui s’intéressent à cette problématique l’affirment eux aussi), semblentêtre suffisamment forts pour souder, de façon indestructible et pour toujours, lesparties disparates d’une ethnie dans une unité indestructible. Tel que nouspouvons le constater, le scénario se trouve ici inversé: il n’y a plus d’unité initiale(le sang) qui se conserve non altérée. Par contre, il y a une unité post-festum, uneunité surgie de l’exercice de la vie ensemble sur des longues durées de temps.La tradition achève ce qui ne s’est pas dès le début achevé. Le temps unit ce

qui n’a pas été dès le début identique: le sang et la langue. Dans le passé lointaindes peuples, le sang aura été «multi couleur». De même que la langue, avec sesaccents locaux ou avec ses origines diverses. Mais, suite à un long processus defaçonnage côtés à côtés, le sang et la langue ont acquis un profile unique, nonrépétable. Ce profil porte le nom d’un peuple et ne peut pas se répéter, tout commel’information génétique d’un individu ne peut pas se répéter.A ce point il faut insister sur le fait que, réellement, le processus est inversement

orienté par rapport au cas invoqué, celui de la génétique. Le temps qui s’écoulefait que les humains se différencient de point de vue génétique, à partir du tronccommun d’un ancêtre. Ce qui porte le nom d’unité individuelle n’est qu’unedifférenciation par rapport au cas unique, à une unité primordiale. Pour quelleraison les choses se passeraient-elles de manière distincte dans le cas despeuples? Pour quelle raison les peuples seraient-ils constitués par des «rajouts»d’unité et non pas par le fait de briser cette unité initiale? Ainsi, l’unité acquisedans le temps est-elle que dans l’apparence une croissance dans l’unité. L’unitéacquise dans le temps est, fondamentalement, différenciation, et cette


————————20 Ibidem, p. 477.

différenciation revêt un aspect d’unité, car la comparaison se fait avec les autresunités apparues elles aussi suite à la différenciation. Néanmoins, le fait que lesunités apparues suite à la différenciation ne ressemblent plus trop entre elles nesignifie pas qu’elles sont devenues ou qu’elles découlent d’éléments distincts,mais par contre que le processus historique occulte souvent l’unité essentielle.L’histoire est une différenciation qui engendre des unités apparemment

distinctes. La différenciation historique, si l’on s’exprime différemment, mène àd’unités de rang inférieur par rapport à l’unité de rang supérieur d’où elles sontparties. L’histoire est un processus dérivé. Le processus fondamental par contreest la création originaire. Or, la création originaire est fondamentalement unité.Soloviev retrouve d’autres formules pour exprimer la même idée: “Si l’histoire

nationale est la base de l’unité du peuple, l’histoire universelle ou mondialefonde l’unité plus ample, mais pour autant également durable, de l’humanitéentière. Plus encore, l’histoire nationale ne peut se concevoir que comme partieintégrante de l’histoire universelle”21.Finalement, si nous sommes conscients de l’argument premier de cette triade

(unité biologique de l’humanité qui prévaut sur l’unité biologique de la nation),ce dernier argument est par lui-même compréhensible. Car, comment pourrait-on imaginer que l’histoire particulière puisse être plus relevante que l’histoire duTout qui englobe le particulier (ici le particulier est le peuple et le Tout estl’humanité)? Il serait impossible de prouver que l’histoire d’une partie —humanité est, logiquement, plus forte que l’histoire du Tout — humanité. Certes,dans l’histoire les parties sont extrêmement actives. Ce sont les peuples qui fontl’histoire. C’est celui-ci le sens dans lequel les peuples jouent tout le temps à laroulette leur propre destin. Mais ce mouvement particulier très important ne peutpas nous tromper: la scène, le fond sur lequel ce destin est joué est toujours celuide l’entière espèce humaine, de l’humanité. Il existe des peuples si forts, qu’ona parfois l’impression qu’ils veulent mener à bout des missions universelles,comme s’ils étaient réellement l’humanité. En réalité, aucun peuple, aussiuniversaliste que ce soit sa manière de voir son propre destin, n’a réussi à jouerplus qu’un rôle partiel dans l’histoire de l’humanité. L’universalisme constituela grande attraction pour la vie des peuples — ce qui est parfaitement naturel vule rapport de subordination qui s’installe entre partie et Tout. Il est tout à faitnaturel que la partie soit tentée par le destin majeur, ultime, du Tout. Il est tout àfait naturel que la partie (le peuple) souhaite le destin du Tout (l’humanité). C’estla raison pour laquelle les aspirations de certains peuples sont du niveau del’universel. Mais ces aspirations ne sont atteintes que à court terme. Les Egyptiens,les Romans, les Espagnols, les Français, lesAnglais, les Russes ou lesAméricainsont désiré et ont fait, pour des durées courtes de temps, figure presque universelledans l’histoire. Mais tous, jusqu’à présent (à l’exception des Américains) ontdépassé ce stade universaliste ou prétendument universaliste et se sont retirés,sagement, au local, à leur matrice nationale, limitée.


————————21 Ibidem, p. 477.

L’universalisme s’assoit, naturellement, sous le signe de la morale. Or, c’estlamorale qui donne de l’unité à l’espèce humaine. Le peuple, tout comme l’humanité,se nourrit de la même unité de morale:«Sous le signe du Bien, la même solidarité morale non conditionnée qui lie

l’individu à ses prédécesseurs et à ses successeurs, en constituant ensemble lafamille normale, l’attache par le biais de ces liens libérateurs initiaux et directsau Tout universel, tel qui est concentré dans l’humanité»22.L’ethnique est, de la sorte, une des formes partielles de manifestation de la

morale. Partielles, cela veut dire que l’idée morale n’existe pas exclusivement auniveau national. Elle est pourtant parfaitement représentée à ce niveau et ceuxqui croient que les peuples sont “dépassés” par l’histoire supposent une chosequi est impossible: que l’universel peut se passer du particulier pour exister.La crise morale que le monde actuel traverse ne découle pas de l’existence

des peuples, mais, tout au contraire, de la méconnaissance des forces moralesque les peuples abritent et qui, d’ailleurs, donnent du fondement à leur existence.Les peuples sont des formes morales — s’ils sont authentiques. En qualité defoules, ils n’ont plus aucun rôle moral. C’est, peut-être, la raison pour laquelleaujourd’hui, dans un monde affranchi de la problématique morale, les peuplessont condamnés à une sorte de mort civile. Il semble que leur mission ait fini.Est-ce que l’humanité post-moderne, non ethnique, peut trouver les ressourcesmorales qui lui sont nécessaires pour exister? La réponse à cette questionconditionne la réponse à la question de savoir en quelle mesure est possible unmonde sans peuples.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Morgenthau, Hans J., Politica între naþiuni, Editura Polirom, 2007.Soloviev, Vl., La justesse du bien, Ed. Humanitas, Bucarest, 1994.


————————22. Ibidem, p. 478.

DER HESPERIDENGARTEN UND DER RUMÄNISCHEGOLDENE APFEL1

DOINA FLOREA*

Abstract. The critical project of European identity has the naturalcondition of a European uniform mentality. But association is far fromuniformity. The inauguration of a culture includes the transformation ofthe inner core in reformed values: the weight of a historical moment is notas extensive as the possible incorporation of diverse values and heterogeneouselements, but in some decisive preponderance own values, which shapethe era and character.

Key words: European identity, European mentality, reformed values.

Die Geistigkeit der Völker enthüllt sich in ihrem Schaffen, das heißt imGesprächmit der Existenz, durch den Vergleich zur Ewigkeit, Energien anziehend und siemit Bedeutungen auffüllend. “Keine starke, gesunde Literatur, fähig den Geisteines Volkes zu bestimmen, kann ihrerseits selbstständig existieren nur festgesetztvom Geist des betreffenden Volkes, nähmlich auf dem ausgebreiteten Grundedes Nationalgenies” (Mihai Eminescu).Der Girant der Echtheit ist das Selbstgewissen, welches die Zeit-und Ortlage

durchsetzt. “Den eigenen Geist im Wert zu setzen ist erstens vom sich selbstentdecken bedingt und nur so dann in die Richtung des Ganzen zusammen zuarbeiten. Sadoveanu, Arghezi, Blaga tun unbegrenzt mehr als ein paar — zigSchriftsteller, die ausschließlich damit beschäftigt sind, eine universelleästhetische Sprache in Wirklichkeit zu setzen”2 — betont Constantin Ciopraga.Als er den Grundbegriff der Nationalität als “Mittel zu einem höheren

Zweck” definierte, und zwar “der Fortschritt der menschlichen Zivilisation durchToleranz undWissenschaft, durch materielles Wohlsein und Moralität, immer andem Kulturniveau eines Volkes angepasst”3, beschloss Titu Maiorescu eigentilcheine Kultur. Die rumänische Kultur.————————

* Professor of Cultural Studies at the “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu.1 Rückübersetzung: Alexandra-Catrina Ciornei.2 Const. Ciopraga, Personalitatea literaturii române, Iaºi, Junimea Verlag, 1973, Seite 10.3 Titu Maiorescu, Critice III (1867-1892), Neue und ergänzte Auflage, Bukarest, Verlag der Buchhandlung

Socec & Comp., 1893, Seiten 174–175.


Ein großer Historiker und Theoretiker, A.D. Xenopol, meinte, dass der Zielder Nationalkultur “das Selbstgewissen eines Volkes zu erhalten” sei, in Folgedessen, gemäß seiner Begabungen, dieser dann zum universellen Fortschrittmitwirkt. Als ein Bestandteil der Nationalkultur, genügt die rumänische Literaturdiesen Aufträgen. Es sprach sich über Voltaires Jahrhundert und über GoethesEpoche (Geist der Goethezeit). “Warum würden wir, aus unserem eigenenSichtpunkt — fragt sich der Kritiker — nicht über Eminescus Epoche reden, oderdiejenige von Sadoveanu —Arghezi — Blaga?”4Die Einweihung einer Kultur schließt die Verwandlung des “Innenkerns” in

reformierende Werte ein: “Das Gewicht eines historischen Moments liegt nichtin einer so umfangreichen wie mögliche Einverleibung von vielfältigen Wertenund uneinheitlichen Elementen, sondern im entschiedenen Überwiegen manchereigenen Werte, welche der Epoche Gestalt und Charakter verleihen”5. UnsereWiederbelebung im kulturellen Sinne hat — laut der “Richtlinie” von Maiorescu— im Geiste der modernen Kultur stattgefunden.Jedwelche Interpretation des heimischen Phänomens schliesst, ab initio,

folgende Bemerkung ein: eine Literatur mit eigener Identität, die keinen eigenenRaum, keine historische Bestimmung und kein völkskundliches Profil hat, gehtüber die Begriffe. “Es existiert, in Folge dessen, ein genius loci, nicht als einirrationales, metphysisches Element, sondern al seine Synthese der psychophysischenFaktoren, welche eine voranschreitende Realität definiert”6. Fachleute derKulturphilosophie bringen öfters die Beziehungen, die sich zwischen einemgegebenen Raum und dem geistigen Stil bilden, vor. Lucian Blaga ist derVerfasser des wissenschaftlichen Konzepts der “stilistischen Matrix”, dadurcherscheint das rumänische Phänomen als “eine von Latenzen und Leistungenumrissene Gesamtheit”7. Die Faktoren der stilistischen Gestaltung analysierend,erkannte Lucian Blaga dreiArten der formativen Bestrebung: die individualisierendeArt, die typisierende Art und die geistige Art. Der Dichter, auch Kulturphilosoph,zitiert die deutsche Kultur als vorbildlich für die individualisierende Art.Goethes Sagen verleiht Farbton diesem stilistischen Muster: “Das größte Glückder Sterblichen ist die Personalität”.Auf ihremWege zur Universalität, muß sich eine Literatur durch eine deutliche

Note bemerkt machen, welche dann ihre Besonderheit festsetzt. Die Einflüsseund die Vermengungen, die Ansätze und die Parallelismen, die Abstammungenoder die Überschneidungen zwischen den Kulturen und Kulturstile habenmehrfache Maße. Aber die Originalität einer Literatur besteht, insbesondere, inihrer Fähigkeit sich abzutrennen, sich zu unterscheiden. “Zum Universellengeöffnet, vergleicht die rumänische Literatur alles zu einem ihrem Raumeigenen Humanismus. Sie bringt eine forma mentis zum Ausdruck — das heißt,dass verschiedene Impulse von Außen sich progressiv anders modelliert haben.

2 DER HESPERIDENGARTEN UND DER RUMÄNISCHE GOLDENE APFEL 37

————————4 Const. Ciopraga, op.cit., Seite 272.5 Emil Cioran, Schimbarea la faþã a României, Bukarest, Humanitas Verlag, 1990, Seite 181.6 Const. Ciopraga, op. cit., Seiten 15–16.7 Lucian Blaga, Trilogia culturii, Bukarest, E.L.U., 1969, Seiten 255–256.

(…) In einem Wort, die Dauer wird immer erneut, sich selbst neue Elementehinzufügend, so dass die Botschaft der Kunst und der Literatur nur eine evolutivesein kann. Es gibt keine “vorherbestimmte” Literaturen. Kräftige Stimmen könnenimmer aufwachen, von überall. Im Sinne der Schaffung, die Benennung kleinesVolk (von derAnzahl her) verliert ihre statistische Bedeutung; durch die kreativenVerfügbarkeiten, ein eingeschränktes Volk tritt unbehindert im Wettkampf mitanderen großen”8.Die Literaturkritiker und -historiker haben bemerkt, dass das 19-te Jahrhundert,

das der Durchsetzung der Nationalitäten, ein Jahrhundert der erweiterten Öffnungzum Universellen war. Das Interesse für andere Literaturen schwankt immer:Alecsandri, Russo, Bãlcescu machten die lateinische Idee zu eigen; Kogãlniceanuist dem deutschen Geist geneigt; die Junimisten der ersten Etappe: Maiorescu,Eminescu, Slavici, in den deutschen Schulen belehrt, verteidigen das deutschePhänomen, wobei der Gegenjunimist Hasdeu dieses heftig widerlegt; Macedonskiwird später gleich wie Hasdeu handeln; von den Persönlichkeiten der Zeit umdas Jahr 1948 beeinflußt, steht der junge Eminescu der Idee der Romanität bei,um sich danach, zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt, der Idee des Dakismus anzuschließen.Zwischen dem Orient und dem Okzident liegend, haben wir uns nach eigenen

Modellen gerichtet. Die Tatsache, dass in der rumänischen Literatur derRomantismus, der Symbolismus, der Expressionismus einen verschiedenen Tonhaben, ist offensichtlich. Es spielt keine Rolle wieviel eine Literatur von deranderen leiht, sondern in welchem Maße dieses Geliehene zur Verwertung dereigenen Gabe hilft — bemerkt Constantin Ciopraga.Der grundlegende Stil einer Kultur, verglichen zum Universellen, verwirklicht

sich, in acto, im Streben nach Kohärenz. Basil Munteano macht eine suggestivePräzisierung: eine Synthese entsteht “aus einer langen Anstrengung des Geistesin Richtung der Einigung und stellt den Begriff eines langen Labors der Trennungdar, in der Essenz dann zu der Kombinierung der verwandten Elemente führend”9.Der Mentor der Junimea Gesellschaft ist derjenige, der “die Entmutigung”

der Nichtwerte im rumänischen Raum verteidigt hat, zum Zweck der Unterstützungder klassischen Werte, so dass der Name von Titu Maiorescu nicht von der Ideeder Synthese getrennt werden kann. Eine Strategie der Werte entwickelnd,Maiorescu wird für die Eingliederung dieser in der nationalen Kultur kämpfen,mit dem Ziel der Bestimmung des “Grundes”.Das Postulat von Maiorescu zielt eigentlich die Festlegung eines universellen

Maßes der Kultur. “Durch Eminescu wurde, in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts,eine Synthese der rumänischen Geistigkeit hergestellt, von anderen Größen undmit anderem Widerhall als diejenige von Cantemir vollzogen. Eminescu ist,literarisch und außenliterarisch, eine hervorragende Mühe in RichtungKonvergenz”10.

38 DOINA FLOREA 3

————————8 Const. Ciopraga, op. cit., Seite 264.9 Basil Munteano, Constantes dialectiques, Paris, Éditions Didier, 1967, Seite 16.10 Const. Ciopraga, ibidem, Seite 268.

Über die Veränderung der ästhetischen Werte erläuternd, machte EugenLovinescu eine kraftvolle Bemerkung: “Wir sind weit davon die Schwelle Europasmit leeren Händen zu betreten und wir schreiten nicht nur mit den Möglichkeiteneines originellen Geistes, vom Grunde und Form her, voran, sondern auchmit festen Behauptungen, solidarisch untereinander, aber differenziert inder Chromatik der Weltliteratur”11. Der Kritiker sprach für Gleichlauf, alslebenswichtiges Gesetz des rumänischen sozialen Lebens definiert. Diewesentlichen literarischenWerke der rumänischen Schriftsteller, im Patrimoniumder universellen Werte anerkannt, sind das Zeichen einer vollen Reife.Die literarischen Versuche vor Eminescu haben den Verdienst Voraussetzungen

geschaffen zu haben, das Feld durch Bestreuung mit fruchtbaren Samen vorbereitetzu haben. “Eminescu hat über den bis zu ihm existierenden individuellenKoeffizienten einen Nationalkoeffizient gelegt, polarisierend und vereinigend”12.Der Nationaldichter stellt sich als ein summum einer Geistigkeit vor, als “einvollständiger Ausdruck des rumänischen Geistes”, und ist im gleichen Maße ein“Europäer seiner Zeit”, weil “das ganze metaphysische Europa in ihm lebt”13.Das Modell Eminescu — unterstreicht Tudor Vianu — überschreitet dasNationalgebiet: Der Emineszianismus ist viel umfaßender und viel nuancierter.In aufregenden Essays, das Paradox benutzend, spricht Nichita Stãnescu über

“den Größten der rumänischen Geistigkeit”: “Eminescu ist für uns ein Geschöpfgleich dem Meer, welches den homerischen Archipel des Odysseus mit Wellenwäscht. (…) Eminescu ist der Name dieses Landes. Rumänien ist EminescusName”14.Im rumänischen Kulturgewissen ist der Emineszianismus das höchste

Wertkriterium. Eminescu bedeutet für uns ein “Identität ausdrückendes Paradigma”15— unterstreicht Mihai Cimpoi.Als ein hochkomplexes Phänomen, besteht eine Literatur aus unzählige einzelne

Gewissen, welche mit Hilfe der Sprache, sich im Feld des sozialen Gewissensund im Umkreis der historischen Zeit wiederfinden, und sich durch das Wort“die Stimme” und die Gestalt eines Volkes definieren. Die Sprache verleihtIdentität und entfaltet sich als ein vereinigendes Prinzip.Merkwürdigerweise, kann die Sprache manchmal ein Hindernis auf demWege

zur Universalisierung darstellen. Weit erörtet ist die Schwierigkeit des direktenZugangs zu den Literaturen in nichtuniversellen Sprachen. Wörter, scheinbareinfach, wie: doinã, dor, colind sind Teile der Kategorie der unübersetzbarenAusdrücke, welche keine Synonyme haben, und tief in der rumänischen Spracheverwurzelt sind. Prinzipiell sprechend, ist die Unübersetzbarkeit eines derMerkmale der Genialität.


————————11 Eugen Lovinescu, Istoria literaturii române contemporane. VI. Mutaþia valorilor estetice, Bukarest,

“Ancora”, 1923, Seite 153.12 Const. Ciopraga, ibidem, Seite 35.13 N. Iorga, Eminescu. Gepflegte Auflage, einleitende Studie, Bemerkungen und Bücherverzeichnis von

Nicolae Liu, Iaºi, Junimea Verlag, 1981.14 Nichita Stãnescu, Fiziologia poeziei, Bukarest, 1990, Seite 237.15 Mihai Cimpoi, Critice. Fierãria lui Iocan, Craiova, “Scrisul Românesc” Stiftung, 2001, Seite 176.

Die Werke bezüglich der Theorie des Übersetzens heben die Unmöglichkeitdes Übersetzens der lyrischen Rede in anderen Sprachen ohne Rest hervor. Aufdem Gebiete der Dichtung, setzen sich die Übersetzer mit der “Vergangenheit”der Metaphern auseinander, mit deren enormen ästhetischen Ladung zumKennzeichen der emotionalen Geschichte gebunden. Mit Hilfe dersprachwissenschaftlichen Vorgänge, welche auch der Semiotik zuzuschreibensind (die Bestandteilanalyse, die Entlehnungen, die Berechnung, die Umsetzung,die Modulierung, die globaleAusgleichung, dieAnpassung), wird manchmal dieVersetzung des Bildes aus der Quellensprache in die Zielsprache gemacht.Als Beispiel, die fremdsprachigen Fassungen der Gedichte von Lucian Blagawerden als ein glücklicher Fall der “Ausfuhr” des rumänischen Bildes betrachtet.Im Gegensatz dazu, die Lektüre — in Übersetzung — der Texte von Sadoveanuheben die zweifellose Wahrheit hervor, dass “Mihail Sadoveanus Werke oratiopoetica sind. Was eigentlich Musik ist, also unaussprechlich, geht in denÜbersetzungen verloren, wie treu sie auch sein mögen bezüglich derAusdruckskraft”16.Aber der Bruch welche die Übersetzer in der undurchdringlichen Mauer der

Unübersetzbarkeit geschlagen haben, wird ständig erweitert, und die Anzahl dergemeinsamen Werte der Humanität wächst exponential.Über die “Odysee des Kampfes für die rumänische Sprache” erläuternd,

beweist der Literaturkritiker Mihai Cimpoi eine traurige Wahrheit: “Dierumänische Kultur aus Bessarabien stellt ein einmaliges Phänomen in der Weltdar: sie ist im Laufe von mehr als anderthalb Jahrhunderte geschaffen, in einerverbannten Sprache”17. Für die bessarabischen Schriftsteller ist das Schreiben,vor allem, eine “existenzielle Handlung”18. Ihr Werk bedeutet eigentlich Mühefür Wiederentdeckung und Durchstetzung der rumänischen Sprache, für dieWiederkehr auf die rechte Bahn.Im Ausdruck Heideggers, ist die Sprache die essenzielle Rede, die Rede des

Gottes im Mund des Sterblichen gesetzt. Der Dichter macht sie durch seineprophetische Ansprache bekannt, welche höchste Gewissheit der Volksidentitätwird. Eine hauptsächlich romantische Erscheinung, der bessarabische DichterAlexie Mateevici (in Cãinari — Tighina, 1888 geboren, und in Mãrãºeºti, aufdem Kampffeld, in 1917, gestorben) ist der Autor der schönsten Hymne, welcheder rumänischen Sprache gewidmet wurde. Das Gedicht Unsere Sprache bestehtaus “Bilder einer großen Dichtung” (G. Cãlinescu).Die bessarabischen Dichter der Generation der 60er-70er Jahre stellen ihr

Werk unter dem “Stern” Eminescu, die Liebe für das Volk, die Zuneigung zumGlauben und zur Sprache, die Wiederkehr zu den Quellen verkündend — inRichtung des Mittelpunkts der rumänischen Geistigkeit. Das Gedicht Auf deinerSprache, von Grigore Vieru, befindet sich in einer erhabenen Konsonanz, über

40 DOINA FLOREA 5

————————16 Doina Florea,Mihail Sadoveanu sau magia rostirii, Vorwort von Constantin Ciopraga, Bukarest, Cartea

Româneascã Verlag, 1986, Seite 100.17 Mihai Cimpoi, O istorie a literaturii române din Basarabia. 2te Auflage, durchgesehen und erweitert.18 Idem, ibidem, Seite 342.

die Zeit, mit der Hymne von Mateevici. Der Anhäufung von glühenden Verben,im Sinne der Identität, setzt der Dichter, am Ende, die Heimlichkeit der Un-Wörter, der Un-Sprache entgegen. Die Stille wird hier zum Identitätausdrückender Protest: Auf derselben Sprache/ Alle weinen,/Auf derselbenSprache/Weint eine Welt./Nur auf deiner Sprache/Kannst du Schmerzentrösten,/Und die Fröhlichkeit/In einem Lied verwandeln./Auf deinerSprache/Vermisst du deine Mutter,/Und der Wein ist der beste Wein,/Und dasEssen ist das beste Essen./Und nur auf deiner Sprache/Kannst du alleinelachen,/Und nur auf deiner Sprache/Kannst du dich vom Lachen trennen./Undwenn du nicht/Weinen und auch nicht lachen kannst,/Wenn du nicht trösten/Undauch nicht singen kannst,/In deiner Welt,/Mit deinem Himmel vor dir,/Dann hälstdu still/Auch auf deiner Sprache.Im Dialog mit dem “Freund Europaeus”, in dem einmaligen Stil von Mihai

Cimpoi, werden wir — unvermeidbar — zur Frage der Veränderung kommen:wie wir unseren Wesen in einem Gewissen von kontinentaler Größe integrieren?“Europa ist der auserwählte Platz der vielfachen, vielfältigen, komplementärenWerke: vom geistigen und kulturellen Standpunkt, Europa ist keinmonolithischer Block — und kann auch nicht sein. Es braucht also die orphischeund zamolxische Dimension um sich zu vervollständigen und um neueSynthesen zu schaffen” — erweckte damit Mircea Eliade die Aufmerksamkeit.Die rumänische Kultur bildete sich, im Falle von Eminescu, mit der ganzen

Kultur der Welt, und “das Wunder” hat sich ergeben. “Warum würden wir nichteinsehen, dass die Weltkultur sich mit der rumänischen Kultur gebildet hat, wiees bei Eminescu oder bei Brâncuºi der Fall ist?”19 — fragt sich, mit vollerGerechtigkeit, Mihai Cimpoi.Das kritische Projekt der “Euroidentität” hat als natürliche Voraussetzung

eine europäische einheitliche Mentalität. Aber Vereinigung heißt bei weitemnichtVereinheitlichung. “Wird sind dazu berechtigt an einem vonWunden geheiltemEuropa zu glauben, welches fähig ist seine Einheit wieder zu erwerben. DemRhinozeros von Ionesco, Symbol des Irrationalen und des Sinnlosen in derheutigen Welt, fertig uns aufzuspeisen, können wir die Kraft der Vernunft, desHeiligen, der harmonisierten Ordnung entgegensetzen”20.Kontinent der “weißen Idealität, geträumt in blauen Farben”, erscheint Europa

als ein Raum der kulturellen Vielfältigkeit, ein “Hesperidengarten, in welchemder Goldene Apfel verheimlicht steht”21. Aber wenn wir unser Feld mit Vorsichtbearbeiten werden und wenn wir unseren Garten mit Schüchternheit reinigenwerden, die Anregung des Herrschers aus der Citadelle von Saint-Exupéryfolgen, werden wir bei uns selbst, zu Hause, die mythische Frucht, entdecken.Seht, in dem wundervollen Garten der Hesperiden trägt der Goldene Apfelbaumschon seine Früchte.


————————19 Mihai Cimpoi, Europa, sarea Terrei..., Bukarest, Ideea Europeanã, 2007, Seite 12.20 Idem, ibidem, Seite 202.21 Ibidem, Seite 8.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cimpoi, Mihai, Critice. Fierãria lui Iocan, Craiova, “Scrisul Românesc” Stiftung, 2001.Ciopraga, Const., Personalitatea literaturii române, Iaºi, Junimea Verlag, 1973.Cioran, Emil, Schimbarea la faþã a României, Bukarest, Humanitas Verlag, 1990.Florea, Doina, Mihail Sadoveanu sau magia rostirii, Vorwort von Constantin Ciopraga, Bukarest, Cartea

Româneascã Verlag, 1986.Iorga, Nicolae, Eminescu, Gepflegte Auflage, einleitende Studie, Bemerkungen und Bücherverzeichnis von

Nicolae Liu, Iaºi, Junimea Verlag, 1981.Lovinescu, Eugen, Istoria literaturii române contemporane. VI. Mutaþia valorilor estetice, Bukarest,

“Ancora”, 1923.Maiorescu, Titu, Critice III (1867-1892). Neue und ergänzte Auflage. Bukarest, Verlag der Buchhandlung

Socec & Comp., 1893.Stãnescu, Nichita, Fiziologia poeziei, Bukarest, 1990.

42 DOINA FLOREA 7

EMMANUEL LEVINAS’ ETHICAL METAPHYSICSAND THE CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY

OF VIOLENCE: THE CONCEPT OF THE OTHER

ABDENBI SARROUKH*

Abstract. Some words have the chance to be resurrected from theconfines of dictionaries and suddenly they become current and public inbeing cited, mentioned in books and figure on TV and in officialdiscourses. The aim of this paper is to try to delimit the notion of the Otherin Emanuel Levinas’ critical reading of the Occidental philosophicaltradition from its Greek origins up to modern times. As ethicalmetaphysics that subverts modern thought of violence and imperialismwhich excludes and assimilates alterity, Emanuel Levinas’s work, mainlyhis Totality and Infinite, traces Hegel’s antagonistic notion of the other, theviolence of theoria in Husserl and Martin Heidegger’s insufficientontological anthropology. Instead, he proposes the respect for the irreducibleface of the other that resists all pretensions of domination since it iscreated in the image of the Infinite.

Key words: Emanuel Levinas, Otherness, ethical metaphysics, violenceof theoria.

“Je te cherche pour ne pas te trouver, car si je te trouvais, je teperdrais, et je me perdrais.”

(E. Morot-Sir, La pensée française D’aujourd’hui)

While in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger analysis of Dasein’s Being-with-other fallsshort of embracing the radically Other, his inadequacy is made clear whenEmanuel Levinas criticizes the former’s notion in his Totalité et Infini:“L’ontologie Heideggérienne qui subordonne le rapport avec autrui à la relationavec l’être en général … demeure dans l’obédience de l’anonyme et même,fatalement, à une autre puissance, à la domination impérialiste, à la tyrannie.”1Heidegger’s analysis of the other in public as another Dasein “different” from

the self is thought of negatively in the sense that this existence with the otherabsorbs the thinking Dasein in publishes and hence is swallowed in that common


————————* Professor of Political Philosophy at Abdelmalik Essaâdi University, Tétouan, Morocco.1 Emanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini: essai sur l’extériorité, Lahay, Martinus Nijhof, 1980, p. 17.

and superfluous everydayness finding himself lost in the talk of the public whichpresumes to understand everything. And in dismissing what is close on the basisof familiarity, Dasein shows curiosity for the new only. In such a mode ofexistence, the “they” does the talk of everyone and no one. Here Daseins becomeinterchangeable since they are active in the same anonymous “they”. Heideggersays in this regard that” everyone is the other and no one is himself”2 in the sensethat the subject should make his own way to an authentic existence excluding theother’s inauthenticity.However, where Heidegger’s analysis of the other proves to be short of any

description of the other as radically other in his irreducibility and inaccessibility,the mode of existence with (mit-sein) as Dasein’s — everyday-being — withposes every other Dasein’s presence in a spatial position characterized bybesideness only (neben-sein), are necessarily as hostile as posing the binarycorrelation of subject versus object. The latter correlation has its main origin inthe classical formulation of the pretension of scientific method or theoria thatassumes understanding and therefore mastering the known object announcedfirst by Descartes scientific method towards objectivity when he established thedichotomy between Res cojetans versus Res extansia. Therefore, the analysis ofthe other as radically other calls for a description outside the confines of Heidegger’slimited analysis of otherness, with emphasis on language as epiphany in the faceof the otherEmanuel Levinas’ ethical metaphysics, particularly when dealing with the

relation to the other, is the appropriate framework within which the extremelyimportant phenomenon of the other must be considered in this paper together withMaurice Blanchot’s thought on the Outside and exteriority, will also concern us.So according to Blanchot, what belongs to and is the Outside as exteriority

can only exist in errance as the stranger, the homeless and the separate within thefield of the other. Thinking about the other in such terms is thinking beyondBeing as the Same. Heidegger’s thinking of the Same and Levinas’ questioningof it constitute two modes of presences. Nonetheless our purpose is not intendedto force together opposite and incompatible models of thought, that of Levinascriticizing and subverting Heidegger’s, as it is meant to indicate a meaningfulperspective of inquiry in view of what I consider the one primordial issue tocontribute to the promotion of world peace by encouraging an active, and openresponsibility towards the other, namely the question of the other not inheritedfrom the philosophy of presence since the Pre-Sarcastic thought, but rather fromthe point of view of ethical metaphysics that goes beyond history and Greekthought to interpret the creation of man or Adam in the image of God, givingsupremacy to the other over the self, serving the other instead of appropriatinghim as a term to oneself.The thought of exteriority where the other is posited as the Outside is

characterized by Levinas and Blanchot as a departure from any recognizable

44 ABDENBI SARROUKH 2

————————2Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tans. JohnMacquarie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,

1978, p. 165.

limits. It is a departure with no return to an Ithaca and an epic without Audia asself-centered intelligence of an Odysseus and an ex-posure of the self in theabsence of the manifestation of Logos or Arêté, facing the seductive silent chantsof the sirens. The thought of the Outside also differs from the experience ofmysticism where there is a loosing of oneself in the ecstasy of the union mysticaor Nirvana in a union with the neutral or the totally Other as Atman or Spirit orany principle, in that it negates any hope to recompense the expenditure spent onthe way out. It is an exteriority without interiority, a separation without unionand an exi-stance without a stance as in the fixed position of the ‘I’ . The “ex”in existence is itself the without, the de-possession and negation of anyplenitude. In this connection Michel Foucault says: Cette pensée (the Outside)qui se tient hors de toute subjectivité pour en faire surgir comme de l’extérieureles limites, en énoncer l’absence, et qui en même temps se tient au seuil de toutepositive mais pour retrouver l’espace où elle se déploie, le vide qui lui sert delieu, la distance dans laquelle elle se constitue3.

The Other in Emanuel Levinas’ thought

Emanuel Levinas’ thought of the Ouside and the question of the relation withthe Other is partly related to the post-Socratic philosophy namely Plato’s andDescartes’ in their ideas of the Infinite or the absolute good (Eperkeina tes ousia).It is mainly an exegesis of ther ethical question in the Tora where he emphasizesthe manifestation of the Infinite in the face of the other. For Levinas Plato’spositing of the Eidos in a beyond and Descartes’ idea of the Infinite show that thequestion of the other is not only religious but philosophical when the former positsthe Eidos as the Good beyond Being. He sees that in the Occidental philosophicaltradition, concepts like Being, the Same, Unity, totality presence, Ousia, the One,Consciousness, Self, subject, Dasein, etc., lead to the egology which claims topossess the’ object’ and the ‘other’ and tends to submit them to the power of the‘I’. Thus the foundation of Being as truth in the hands of the subject’s appropriationof the object is challenged by Levinas’ metaphysical ethics. He attracts attentionto the oblivion of the question of the other as an ethical experience and not as aconcept within the framework of the metaphysics, since it relates the existent otherwith its Arché, that is, the absolute Other as the Good.Maurice Blanchot’s summing up of a typology of possible relations with the

other is interesting here: Dans l’espace interrelationnel, je puis chercher àcommuniquer avec quelqu’un de diverses manières: une première fois, en leregardant comme un autre moi, fort différent peut-être, mais dont la différencepasse par une identité première… Une troisième fois, dans une tentative derelation immédiate, le même et l’autre prétendant perdre l’un dans l’autre selonla proximité du tutoiement qui oublie ou efface la distance. Ces trois rapports onceci de commun qu’ils tendent tous trois à l’unité. Le “je” veux s’annexerl’autre… reste une modalité (sans mode). Cette Fois il ne s’agit pas d’une

3 THE CONCEPT OF THE OTHER 45

————————3 Michel Foucault, La pensée du dehors, “Critique”, Juin, 1966, no. 229, p. 225-226.

recherche unificatrice… Ce qui est enjeu, c’est l’étrangeté entre nous… c’esttout ce qui me sépare de l’autre, c’est-dire, l’autre dans la mesure ou je suisinfiniment séparé de lui, séparation, fissure, intervalle qui le laisse infinimenthors de loi, mais aussi prétend fonder mon rapport avec lui sure cetteinterruption même.4These are then two basic modes of relating oneself to the other. In the first,

the other is missing but is accessible, and the search of the ‘I’ is nostalgic,unitary and comes to a full circle by appropriating the other and effacingseparation. In the second, the looked for other is forever stranger, unknown andinaccessible because the relational space is a-symmetric and poses the otheroutside of the confines of the ‘I’. The first points to the aspiration for the otherfor consumption as for a lost unitary identification in what would Jack Lacansay, lack and need; the second points to the metaphysical desired other as for adesire never fulfilled. In other words, these two modes are two differentdiscourses and opposing thoughts of the other which is the aim of this paper tomake clear namely the Greek (Hellenic) as the philosophy of presence and theother (Jewish messianic), that is, the metaphysics of absence.While in Levinas’ thouhgt the self looses its sovereign coincidence with itself

and its identification where consciousness becomes triamphant and reposing onitself. However, in front of the other, the self or ego expulses itself from itsrepose. For Levinas, la vérité indiquerait ainsi l’aboutissement d’un mouvementpartant d’un monde intime et familier… vers l’étranger, vers là-bas, Platon l’adit. La vérité impliquerait mieux qu’une Extériorité, la transcendance. Laphilosophie s’occuperait De l’absolument autre… Fille de l’expérience, laphilosophie, prêtent très haut. Elle s’ouvre même sur la dimension de l’idéal. Etc’est ainsi que la philosophie signifie métaphysique et que la métaphysiques’interroge sur le divin.5It was Parmenides who first thought of Being as identity and unity. Almost

similarly, Plotinus thought of the unity of Cosmos with the subject. LaterLeibniz echoes Aristotle’s’ thinking of the Same. However Levinas does notagree with such formulations and goes beyond Being as totality and the Same inan identity with itself by thinking of identity in difference. Here he comes nearerto Nicholas of Cusa’s view of identity in the idea of coincidentia oppositorumwhen he thinks the relation between the finite and the Infinite or rather thepresence of the Infinite in the face of the other created in His own image.For Aristotle, Being as the One, the spirit of principle, that is to say, as

Energia, is thought of in relation to the Many as particulars. Here Plato’s Eidosand its imitation are handled by Aristotle as the One and the Many. Among thelatter’s definitions of identity and Sameness under the One and the Many is theexample he gives about the ultimate substratum of wine and water asindivisibility in kind, namely as fluid, soluble, water and air. From these categories


————————4 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien Infini, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 188.5 Emaunel Levinas, La philosophie et l’idée de l’infini in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et

Heidegger”, Paris Vrain, 1982, p. 165.

he draws the following conclusion. “Two things are said to be essentially onewhen their definitions are indistinguishable”.6 The same definition of identity asunity is taken up by Leibniz in his idea of Monadology as simplicity, individualityand uniqueness obtained through the undiscernability between two things: “Iftwo things have absolutely nothing which distinguishes them from each other,they are identical, they are the same thing.”7In modern Occidental philosophy, Hegel’s analysis of the other in his

Phenomenology of Spirit, especially in his second part of the first volume,emphasizes the force of dialectic and negation behind the self recognition andbehind the ever antagonistic struggle of the master and the slave as the historyof the free man’s self-consciousness. For Hegel the presence of the other as theother opposite term is necessary for self-consciousness only in so far as the lattercomes back to itself in a narcissistic return: “La conscience de soi est la réflexionsortant de d’être du monde sensible et du percu; la conscience de soi estessentiellement ce retour en soi-meme a partir de d’être-autre.”8The movement of the self to its self-recognition after fighting to death for

recognition in war applies equally to the other term who is taken as an object inthe eyes of the subject while he sees himself as subject and hence the conflictand antagonism. Each of the self and the other are looked at in their ownessences. Yet they are so only through the mediation of the other. This mediationlets the two find their essences in a reciprocal relation. Hegel says that “Lerapport mediate constitue l’essence du movement negative,au cours duquel laconscience se dirige contre sa singularité, qui néanmoins comme rapport, est ensoi positive et produira pour la conscience, cette union sienne.”9 Consequentlythis identification with themselves of the two Hegelian struggling consciousnessesis an identification in the Same as union and is obtained through the mediationof the other conscience as an object of knowledge and hence assimilated andsubjected to the power of the central dominating and reflexive self conscioussubject. For Levinas, this is the second feature after the claim of union, in theoccidental philosophy of presence. Understanding the non-self as an object onlyand as another essence subordinates alterity to the power of the self. Instead ofmaintaining its singularity, the being of the other conscience becomes a theme,a concept and an object seized and made one’s own appropriation: Se range déjàsous un concept ou se dissout en relations. Il tombe dans le réseau des idéesappriori, que j’apporte pour le capter. Connaitre, c’est surprendre dansl’individu affronté… Cet étranger (L’autre) entre dans un concept. Laconnaissance consiste à saisir l’individu… non pas dans sa singularité qui necompte pas, mais sa généralité. La réédition des choses extérieures à la libertéhumaine a travers leur généralité ne signifie pas seulement leur compréhension,mais aussi leur prise en main, leur domestication, leur possession. Dans la


————————6Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. and trans., John Warrington London, The Adeline Reass, 1956, p. 13.7 Leibniz cited in introduction to Heidegger’s Identity and Difference, trans. John Stambaugh, New York,

Harper and Torchbooks, 1969 p. 10.8 G.W.F. Hegel, La phénoménologie de l’esprit, trad. Jean Hyppolite Paris, Montaigne, 1941, p. 146.9 Ibid., p. 189.

possession le moi achève l’identification du divers. Posséder c’est maintenircertes la réalité de cet autre qu’on possède… suspendant son indépendance.Dans la civilisation reflétée par la philosophie du Même, la liberté s’accomplitcomme richesse. La raison qui réduit l’autre est une appropriation et unpouvoir.10It is in these terms that Levinas questions the liberty of the appropriative

power of the self vis-à-vis the other. And to possession, identification, concept,self, wealth, liberty, etc., he advocates de-possession, separation, face-to face-encounter, other, donation, being a hostage. With regard to the narcissisticmovement of conscientiousness, he sees that when posing the other as radicallyother, irreducible to understanding, the return to the self reveals itself aspretension to bring the wealth and the complete possession of the other to theextent of indicating not only egoism but also imper-rialism.The tyranny of the ‘I’ over the other is exemplified in the Hegelian struggle

for recognition between the master and slave dialectic, in the Nietzschian will topower, in the Heideggerian potentiality-for-being-oneself and even in theSocratic maeutic, to name but a few. Violence and war are what comes out of thesupremacy of the philosophy of presence and the Same over absence and theother. Therefore Levinas advocates the killing of the Greek god or father, that isto say, the philosophy of the Same and totality issued from a pagan civilization.Instead of violence, he repeatedly points out to the other untrodden path inthought where metaphysics is an insatiable desire that never possesses acomplete truth as an adequation between logos and reality, nor does it pretend todo so in consuming the other. Thus the metaphysical desire or ethicalmetaphysics is posited beyond pleasure and need that Aristotle’s theory ofpleasure overlooks in his Ethics. The metaphysical desire is transcendental andconstitutes the essence of ethics in its being a transcendental intention. It followsthat this Greek pagan philosophy of the Same is against the Infinite, themetaphysically desired. For Levinas the relation between the Same and the otheris far from being reduced to the knowledge of the other in the Same as theHeideggerian unconsealment of an entity in Dasein’s understanding of itsexistential structures. Such a relation is represented in Descartes’ thought as thatbetween the finite cogito and the Infinite in his Metaphysical Meditations. Theradical separation of the cogito from the Infinite and the impossibility for thethinking ‘I’ to contain the Infinite is called by Descartes the idea of the Infinite.En pensant l’infini, le moi d’ambré ne pense plus qu’il ne pense. L’infini nerentre pas dans l’idée de l’infini,n’est pas saisi; cette idée n’est pas un concept.L’infini, c’est le radicalement, l’absolument autre.11Far from positing intentionality where the subjective thinking ego is an

adequatio to the ‘object’ of thought, Levinas emphasizes an irreducible distancebetween the two terms and the capacity of the self.


————————10 Levinas, L’idée de l’Infini et la métaphysique, in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”,

op. cit., p. 172.11 Idem.

To contain more than it is possible for it to contain. The surplus of the Infinitethat overwhelms the confines of the ‘I’ points to the disproportion, irruption anda-symmetry between the two terms. And in Levinas’ words there is a spatialcurve that disrupts formal logic implied in the equation or opposition of the twoterms inside a simplistic notion of the spatial dimension. The impossibility of theself to break through the frontiers separating it from the alterity of the radicallyother, is akin to Plato’s Eidos which has no fixed spatial dimension. Levinas’view of the other is such that the alterity of the other cannot enter into anopposition or a positing of the two identities; the other’s alterity being anteriorto egoism:Dans le rapport éthique, autrui se présente à la fois comme absolumentautre, mais cette altérité radical par rapport à moi ne réduit pas, ne nie pas maliberté… La relation éthique est antérieure à l’opposition des libertés, à laguerre qui d’après Hegel, inaugure l’histoire.12The impossible opposition between the Same and the other is due to the fact

that the latter cannot be enclosed in a totality or a co-relation characteristic ofbeing. Hence the ethical experience is produced beyond the economy of Being,the Same and narcissistic return to the self. Its production lies in the departurefrom the self towards the other (autrui) in a face to face encounter that cannot bereduced to the understanding and to the synthetic thinking activities thatestablishes identification between the two terms. Hence, this relation cannot bequalified as being even an inter-subjective one, since ‘inter’ and ‘subjective’point out to a symmetrical equation where the subject’s thinking is an adequationto the object. That is to say, a-symmetry, heterogeneity, the overwhelmingInfinite and the thinking-more-than-the self-can think, are counter words usedby Levinas in his thinking of the ethical metaphysical experience beyondessence and beyond Being. If Levinas establishes an irreducible rupture betweenthe ‘I’ and the Thou as the Absolutely other, this rupture seems to fade awaybetween the latter and the other (autrui). The other is posited in the image of “theradically Other”. Hence the sphere of the metaphysical desire of the self for theInfinite is an ethical one, where the other is not a mere photocopy of the radicalOther yet, once encountered face-to-face, the ‘I’ experiences separation andweakness as Levinas says: L’absolument Autre c’est Autrui. Il ne fait pas nombreavec moi… Ni la possession, ni l’unité du nombre, ni l’unité du concept, ne merattache à autrui. Absence de parti commune qui fait de L’autre-l’étranger… surlui je ne peux pouvoir… Nous somme le même et l’autre. la conjonctionn’indique ici ni addition, ni pouvoir d’un terme sur l’auter.13The equation “L’absolument Autre c’est Autrui” allows for an experience

with the radically Other in ‘Being-for-the-other’ through the encounter with hisor her face. The latter is not so much mediation for the ‘I’ but rather holdshim/her in a mysterious retreat. The other in his/her otherness is also irreducibleto common measures with the ‘I’, because an unbridgeable gulf separates them.They are so separate that neither Heidegger’s referential totality nor Husserl’s


————————12 Emanuel Levinas, Une religion d’adultes, in “Difficile Liberté”, Paris, Albin Michel, 1963, p. 33-34.13 Emanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini: essai sur l’extériorité, op.cit., p. 9.

analogical intuitive representation of the object of consciousness, nor evenAristotle’s’ truth as adeqautio rei et intellectus between the intellection asabstract knowledge and the object, can render without reducing the other/objectto the Same. Hence to the tyranny of the pre-Socratic logos and the adequatio ofAristotle in the apophansis (something as smoothing), there is the face of theother where language bids the ‘I’ to the obedience in its epiphany. Here the faceis itself the in-between and the relation that appropriates nothing for the benefitof the ‘I’. Hence Levinas posits the face as “The Relation”(reli-gion ), “Reli-gar” in Latin ,where the ‘I’ as a hostage for-the-other expresses the “here I am”before the orphan, the stranger and the outcast. Levinas often cites the words ofDostoevsky’s hero in The brothers Karamazov: “Nous somme tous coupables detout et de tous, et moi plus que les autres.”14Such a being-for-the-other as responsibility and service is presupposed by

sociability and ethical relation which require also sensibility and being-a-hostage-for-the-other (le prochain) in the face to face encounter with him\her.The French word ‘’prochain’’ points to the closeness to the other in his/hersociability with the ‘I’. In Levinas , such a relation must be understood not in itsreference to a side-by-side only but also to a more intimate yet separate face-to-face presence . However, in the closeness to the pro-chain lies a resistance topossession. Therefore to Heidegger’s primordially of the ontological over theontic, Levinas substitutes the priority of the existent over existence as essence.Both of Levinas and Blanchot approve of Franz Rosenweig’s remark about theessential character of the commandments: “Je ne puis pas présenter le caractèredivin de toute la Thora d’une autre manière que le Rabbin Nobe: et dieu apparutà Abraham: celui-ci leva les yeux et il vit trois hommes.”15The third term between the ‘I’ and the radically Other is a “mediation” that

increases rather than reduces the distance between them. In Sartre’s words, theother is a hole in the world. His/her relation with the absolutely absent doesneither indicate nor signify the Absent. Yet the latter has a signification in theface of the other as the neighbor (le prochain).This relation, which goes from theface to the Absent, is outside every Heideggerian essence of truth asconcealment in language. Rather in the face, discursive relation is establishedbetween the other and the self taking place in their encounter and it is thecondition of truth: La condition de la vérité… est la parole de l’Autre, sonexpression… Aborder Autrui dans le discours, c’est accueillir son expression ouil déborde à tout instant l’idée qu’en emporterait une pensée. C’est doncredevoir d’autrui, au-delà de la capacité du Moi, ce qui signifie exactement:avoir l’idée de l’infinni.16Levinas defines the face as language. The latter is the way the other presents

himself/herself to the self: “Le visage d’autrui détruit à tout moment, et déborde.Il ne se manifeste pas par ses qualités. Il s’exprime. Le visage, contre l’ontologieimage plastique qu’il me laisse, l’idée à mesure de son ideatum-l’idée adéquate…


————————14 Levinas, Ethique et infini, Paris, Fayard, 1982, p. 95.15 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien Infini, op.cit., p. 188.16 Emanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini: essai sur l’extériorité, op.cit., p. 22.

contemporaine, apporte une notion de vérité qui n’est pas le dévoilement d’unNeutre impersonnel, mais une expression.”17The nudity of the other’s face is an epiphany and its manifestation is discourse.

Levinas’metaphysics of the face describes the idea of immediacy as interpellationand as a face-to-face encounter to be distinguished from the schematization andthe sensibility of contact. The abstraction of the mystery of the face drives fromthe beyond. The face has the signification of a trace (Spur), the trace of theunnamable and inaccessible beyond. It is the opening where the significance ofthe beyond does not negate the ‘I’: but signifies beyond Being. Such a relationbetween the signified and the significance is not correlative, formal or adequate.The other’s presence as discourse and significance unlike Heidegger’ssignificance that refers to the totality of the matrix of referents in being in theworld as unconcealment in logos and the opening of an entity. Levinas’ view ofsignificance is not a phenomenon offered to the intellectual intuition but is thepresence of exteriority as a presence that overwhelms the ‘I’. In the nudity of theother’s face, the eyes and the look speak. Their discourse is an appellation froma remote place; the enigma of an absent agent.Such a dialogue as discourse in the encounter of the face of the other is

described by Blanchot in terms of equality and the mutual recognition ofotherness as: Le dialogue est fondé sur la réciprocité des paroles et l’égalité desparlants; seul deux “je” peuvent établir une relation dialogue; chacun reconnaîtau second le même pouvoir de parler qu’à soi, chacun se dit égal à l’autre et nevoit dans l’autre qu’un autre “Moi”.18Yet in Levinas the incommensurable separation negates the possibility of

symmetry and common measures between them and the ‘I’ is in a nude relation,without any mediation and in an immediate exposure to the other and whereinfinite distance or the presence of the infinite manifests itself in the resistingdetour of the face. As such, the face-to-face encounter is an authentic relationwhere the power of the ‘I’ is questioned by the ambiguity of the epiphany of theface. The latter’s resistance lies in its expression of the presence of an absence.As Levinas says: La vraie extériorité est dans ce regard qui m’interdit touteconquête. Nom pas que la conquête défie mes pouvoirs trop faibles, mais je peuxplus pouvoir:la structure de ma liberté se renverse totalement ... Ici s’établit…ce qui arrête l’impérialisme irrésistible du Même et du Moi. Nous appelonsvisage l’épiphanie de ce qui peut se présenter aussi directement à un Moi et, parla même, aussi extérieurement.19The assertion of the interiority in the wished for face-to-face, is an encroaching

upon the alterity of the other since it supposes a “vis-à-vis”, a homogeneousequality with other. In this context Blanchot argues that: Cette expression esttrompeuse; elle l’est doublement. En premier lieu parce qu’un tel vis-à-vis n’est


————————17 Ibid., p. 21-22.18 Emanuel Levinas, La trace de l’Autre, in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”,

op.cit., p. 200.19 Levinas, La philosophie et l’idée de l’infini, in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”,

op.cit., p., 173.

pas l’affrontement de deux figures, mais l’accès de l’homme en son étrangetépar la parole. En second lieu, parce que dans un tel face-à-face, ce qu’il rendgrave le mouvement ou l’homme se présente directement à l’homme… C’estqu’il n’y a pas de réciprocité de rapports: je ne sis jamais en face de celui quime fat face; ma façon de faire face à celui qui vient en face n’est pas uneconfrontation égale de présences. L’égalité est irréductible.20To sum up we can say that Heidegger’s pre-Socratic logos is undermined by

Levinas since it is still based on the propositional predicative logos that assumesthe structure of positing something-as something. On the contrary the ethicalmetaphysics of a language as Levinas advocates the de-possession of the egofrom, appropriating or positing the other as a subject. Whereas the predicationsubstitutes the signs to things by gathering them into the identity of the One, itposes a possibility and theGrund to justify any appropriation with the pretensionto thematise the subject’s intentionality. As such the predication proves to bepretentious: “Non pas que cet” en tant que “ éloigne le pensant de “l’être enoriginal” comme l’intention “significative” de Husserl… L’entendement de cecien tant que cela, n’entend pas l’objet, mais son sens… Le sens ni donné ni nondonné, est entendu. Mais c’est à partir de son sens qu’un être se manifestecomme être… Le mystère de la conscience ne se résume pas en ce que “touteconscience est conscience de quelque chose. “L’intentionnalité est pensée etentendement, prétention, le fait de nommer l’identique, de proclamer quelquechose en temps que quelques chose… La formule est Heideggérienne.”21Hence Levians in his Autrement qu’etre ou au-dela de l’essence takes the

signification of the saying as going beyond the said and that it is not ontology oressence related to the subject who says something. On the contrary it is thesignification of the Saying that goes beyond essence gathered in the sayingwhich could justify the exposition of being or ontology. So the ethical existencenear the other or in proximity signifies more than what a mere propositionalpredication in an apophanitic discourse. For Levinas such nearness from theother allows for a resistance of the other in one’s nearness to him and thereforebecomes an ex-postion to Being rather than an opening on Being. It lies outsidespatial mediation and hence the impossibility to measure and comprehend themystery of the other’s existence: “La proximité n’est pas un état, un ropos, mais,précisament inquietude, non-lieu, hors lieu du repos bouleversant le calm de lanon-ubiquity de d’être qui se fait repos en un lieu… La proximité ne se fige pasen structure sinon… elle retombe en simple relation.”22 Here the example of thesense of election illustrates the ethical responsibility of the practice of theavatars in Buddhism, the service of others in Christianity, the dedication toothers in Sufism, the erasure of subjectivity in its proximity to the other goesbeyond intentionality to a compassionate inter-subjectivity that feels rather thanthinks the existence of the other. And with respect to the superiority of the


————————20 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien Infini, op.cit., p. 89.21 Levinas, Langage et proximité, in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”, op.cit.,

p. 218-219.22 Levinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence Lahay, Martinus Nijhof, 178, p. 103.

other’s face in relation to the subject elected to service Levinas says that: “dansla proximité s’etend un commandement venu comme d’un passé jamais present,qui n’a commencé dans aucune libérté. Cette façon du prochain est visage.”23Here the other becomes neither a subject nor an object but an articulation itself ofthe encounter. The other is what makes meeting in proximity a separation and aninterval is established in-between to resist the pretension of the ego to appropriatethe other to oneself. It is this in-between that represents the space of significance.The essence of language that deploys itself in the interval, consists neither in apredicative proposition nor in the doxa of the appophanisis that announcesadequation between what-is-said-in-the-talk and the Being it encounter is, epsofacto, language addressed to the self. The presence for the other is an engagement,a service, an election bound to be responsible for the other and a presence-for-the-other that experiences infinitude or the infinite in the face of the other.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. and trans., John Warrington London, The Adeline Reass, 1956.Blanchot, Maurice, L’entretien Infini, Paris, Gallimard, 1969.Foucault, Michel, La pensée du dehors, “Critique”, Juin, 1966.Hegel, G.W.F., La phénoménologie de l’esprit, trad. Jean Hyppolite Paris, Montaigne, 1941.Heidegger, Martin, Identity and Difference, trans. John Stambaugh, New York, Harper and Torchbooks, 1969.Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, tans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,

1978.Levinas, Emanuel, Une religion d’adultes, in “Difficile Liberté”, Paris, Albin Michel, 1963.Levinas, Emanuel, Totalité et Infini: essai sur l’extériorité, Lahay, Martinus Nijhof, 1980.Levinas, Emanuel, La philosophie et l’idée de l’infini in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et

Heidegger”, Paris Vrain, 1982.


————————23 Levinas, ibid., p. 12.

THE FEMINIST IDENTITY AS A POLITICAL EDGE:THE PROJECT OF ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY

HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN*

Abstract. The author presents a perspective of feminist identity as sustainedby Anne Philips in her work Engendering Democracy and within thecomplex context of the works reshaping political theory from a feministperspective. A special attention is given to the interplay between a contestingactivity and one aiming to reshape politics and political theory. Privateand particular gender constraints shape the scope and the relevance ofthe public involvement, and thus the meanings of “freedom”, “citizenship”,“oppression”, etc. Glimpses of certain observations made by SlavenkaDrakulic, Kate Millet, Mihaela Miroiu, Carol Pateman, Sheila Rowbotham,and Iris Young are underlined, too.

Key works: feminist identity, reshaping political theory, feminist vindication.

The topic of feminist and gender identity as political identity is not a radicallynew subject in political science, but it continues to be relevant and actual, to agreater or to a lesser extent, strictly related to the profile of patriarchy for thelocal political power. Everywhere in the world, due to the social and politicalrealities and expectations in contemporary societies gender and feminist identityremain meaningful in terms of interpreting and alleviating contemporary socialand political inequalities.Feminist identity as political identity aims to redefine terms such as “political”

and “politics” along with the relationship between public and private and thecritique of (liberal) democracy. “Feminist identity” is a generic phrase for a range offeminist identities situated in various relations with the women’s movement, thewomen’s rights, the gender issues and the slogan “the personal is political.” I amsustaining here that feminist identity makes more sense to be conceived inrelation to feminist action, even if merely discursive, and a political project of(revolutionary) reform, again, even if merely in a discursive state, while all thesecannot be understood outside a theoretical tide reinterpreting political theory.Matters related to who looks after the children, who goes “out” to work and

for how long are private affairs that influence the ability to be present in the————————

* Senior Researcher at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the RomanianAcademy.


public space, to be informed about public decisions, to comment upon them and,more importantly, to pressure in order to have a say in (these) decisions. Fromthis perspective, feminist identity is with necessity build up around contestation.Anne Phillips is a first rank feminist writer construing the aspects of social

inequity to shape the project of engendering democracy. This project implies theneed to reconsider the rich and diverse feminist and gender literature availablein order to identify the wrongs of society and the possibilities to correct them inaccordance with the guiding lines represented by the implementation of“dignity”, “freedom” and “rights” within family and society, and in politics and law.Most of the authors come from the Anglo-Saxon world and are, understandably,interested in concepts related to “patriarchy”, “gender equality”, “ethics of care”,“freedom”, “rights”, “independence”, “citizenship”, “privacy”, ”empowerment” thatare central for the liberal and democratic political theory. In the environmentsbeyond Europe and the USA such concepts are not only as well relevant, but alsoeven more “revolutionary” in nature. The political marginality experienced bywomen has a common ground with that experienced by people due to ethnicityand race. Investigating this common ground a “politics of difference” becomesboth clearer and necessary. The gender blind conceptualization of the “rights”,“freedom”, “citizenship”, “privacy”, “public/private dichotomy” does nothing elsebut privilege the (white) male.A first observation indicates that feminist identity as a political identity was

shaped by the American left daring in the 60’s to embrace women’s problems aspolitical problems, apparently unrelated to the complexities of the act ofgovernment nor to these of elections or to the theories of state. They are closelyinvolved with the structures of exploitation functioning when women are treatedeither as sexual objects, or as persons depending materially on men because theyare not paid as well as men and thus incapable of living on their own. AnnePhillips nuances this observation quoting Kate Millet who defined politics in herwork Sexual Politics (1970) as the essence of politics and the patriarchal governmentas “the institution whereby that half of the population which is female is controlledby the half which is male.”1Another observation shows that whenever politics is redefined, so is democracy.

Sheila Rowbotham noticed from this perspective that feminism directs attentiontoward everyday life, hence widening the substantial scope of democracy toinclude “domestic inequality, identity, control over sexuality, challenge to culturalrepresentation, community control over state welfare and more equal access topublic resources.”2Anne Phillips explains how private constrains shape public involvement. In

all the countries women have the main responsibility in caring for household andchildren. They play important roles in agriculture, textile, electronics and computerparts, in most cases without the flexibility of part-time jobs. And, as the

2 THE FEMINIST IDENTITY AS A POLITICAL EDGE 55

————————1 Kate Millet, Sexual Politics, Johnatan Cape, 1970, p.25, apud Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy,

Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, p. 94.2 Sheila Rowbotham, Dreams and Dilemmas, Virago, 1983, pp.85-86, apud Anne Phillips, Engendering

Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, p. 95.

Romanian political scientist Mihaela Miroiu3 and other authors have noticed inseveral occasions in the public sphere and in interviews, with rare exceptions,when “reading” the political dimension of the social life, women do the actualwork and men are often in supervising and decision making positions. SlavenkaDrakulic captures this aspect in a more literary form: “Women’s lives, by nomeans spectacular, banal in fact, say as much about politics as no end oftheoretical political analysis. I sat in their kitchens — because that was alwaysthe warmest room in their poorly heated apartments — listening to their lifestories, cooking with them, drinking coffee when they had any, talking abouttheir children and their men, about how they hoped to buy a new refrigerator, ora new stove or a new car. (…) We had all been forced to endure the samecommunist system, a system that ground up people’s lives in a similar waywherever you lived; then, of course, as women, we shared a perspective on lifethat was different from men’s. Ours was trivial, the ‘view from below’. But triviais political.”4 From this perspective, the personal is relevant as legitimategrounds for political action. In this sense, Mihaela Miroiu also wrote in herrecent book Nepreþuitele femei. Publicisticã feministã (Priceless Women. FeministNewspaper Writings) meaningful comments on the patriarchal transformation ofthe concept of Trivia — the mythological Tree of Life — into that of “triviality”(something that lacks importance) and especially interesting is the way shechanges it back, imposing the trivial female experience as valuable, personal,political and priceless.Participation in the public life is therefore impeded by a great number of

practical obstacles generated by the lack of time, sometimes for economic reasons(because in many cases women are less paid than the men executing same jobs),or because of the particularity of their role in society and family. I see this finalaspect is in a strict correlation with the aspect that Anne Phillips mentions thedifferences in the experiences of power between women and men, but also withanother one.Women and men are differently influenced by the misogynist cultural and

political traditions of society, in the first case they being discouraged, and in thesecond case, encouraged, to take part into the processes of decision-making. Theauthor implies the aspects I mentionwhen she notices that “feminists have frequentlyargued that the experience of domestic and familial subservience undermineswomen’s self-confidence and that the patterns of male dominance will continue toreassert themselves until women have learnt to participate in groups of their own.”5I consider such a perspective especially dangerous for the feminist positions.

One cannot sustain both that women could and should participate in the public

56 HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN 3

————————3 Mihaela Miroiu, “Despre societatea în care mintea femeilor nu conteazã” (“About the Society Where

Women’s Mind Does Not Matter”), in the Romanian newspaper “Observator cultural”, nr. 240, 2004. See alsohttp://www.progen.md/index.php?mod=home&hmod=viewinterview&id=188 and Mihaela Miroiu,Nepreþuitele femei. Publicisticã feministã (Priceless Women. Feminist Newspaper Writings) Iaºi, Polirom,2006.

4 Slavenka Drakulic, How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed, HarperPerennial, 1993, p. xvi.5 Anne Phillips, op. cit., p. 98.

sphere, which implies public communication and debates preceding the decisionsand that they might lack the self-confidence to do so. At the same time, howwould such a participation in groups of their own would transform womenlacking self-confidence in relating to men, in women possessing the necessaryself-confidence in relating to men, since they avoid this type of interaction? Notto mention that women do interact with men on a daily basis within their familieswhere they participate successfully in all sorts of decision-making processes withprojective political, cultural, social and economic relevance. In my viewsustaining the position considering that whatever men can do women can do, andyet, that they should not copy male attitudes at all costs, since not everything iseither beneficial or dignifying, seems more useful as a political position, from afeminist standpoint.Also, there is the following aspect: “If democracy were just about the occasional

trip out to vote, then the differences might not much matter. But as soon as youmove on to a more participatory notion of democracy, then equal involvement ofwomen and men seems to depend on substantial change in the private sphere.”6Men political theorists have confirmed similar arguments for participatorydemocracy. Thus, David Held is quoted with his model of democratic autonomythat has as an important condition the “collective responsibility for mundanetasks and reduction of routine labour to a minimum.”7 Then she relates to thepoint of view advocated by Philip Green. He argues for a radical democracy witha participation that goes beyond the conventional political sphere where it ismerely “episodic” and “occasional” at best.Here would be interesting to slightly enter into the discussion about the

significance of the feminist literature quoting male literature on political theorywith feminist relevance, which could be seen either as a need for validation frommen or as a treachery of some sort, or as a daring enterprise (in the light of thecomments about women exercising their participatory abilities with other womenbefore they confront men). But such a standpoint is narrow-minded when weconsider that both women and men should advance relevant, accurate andcomprehensive political theories, both interpreting and benefiting society as awhole. With this observation, we can better understand that it is crucial that thefeminist and gender political theory to be in an open dialogue with politicaltheory as a whole, provided that a feminist political literature for women wouldbe a non-sense, actually erasing any shred of feminism. But these aspects composea different subject matter and would be worth of a separate investigation.Returning to the slogan that opens the wider perspective on the issue of

feminist identity, “The personal is political”, one has to understand it in its wholecomplexity. As shown byAnne Phillips, the personal is political not only becauseit influences the political in multiple ways through the constraints of the personalsituation within society, but also because the political intrudes all the deepestmost private corners of the “personal”, It stresses “the ubiquity of power”: “Never


————————6 Idem.7 Idem. David Held, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, 1986, p. 291.

mind the learning process, never mind the equalization of time, never mind thecumulative effects of household equality on political participation outside.Democracy is as important in the household as anywhere else, for in the householdthere is unequal power.”8At this point, outside the theoretical realm described by radical democracy

where the personal, as politics in general, are interpreted as a matter of becoming9,this perspective appears as a collapse of the personal into the political (CarolPateman) and as attack on the family (Jean Bethke Elshtain).Perceiving the personal as political does not imply also a rejection of the right

to privacy. In this respect a woman’s right to choose is a key phrase in feministactivism and thought. It is now considered that freedom for women cannot beconceived disregarding the woman’s right to decide about her body. This rightwas conceptualized in relation with the woman’s right at abortion. In this view,Anne Philips mentions that in the USA in the case of Roe v. Wade the right ofabortion was established under the interpretation of a broader right of privacy, aright that encompasses that of the woman to decide over terminating or not apregnancy.Meanwhile, the feminist position seems to encounter a paradoxical situation,

when we think that the claim that fathers and society should get involved morewith raising the children is in a contradiction with the demand that father andsociety should be denied a voice in the decision of continuation of terminationof pregnancy. But when argued that a woman’s decision to have children hassocial implications the comments turn toward the cases when women decide tohave more children than the norm, demanding a redirection of social resourcestoward them, and not to the cases where they decide to terminate a pregnancy.In my view, this cannot be a social matter even if it is always socially contingent.“The personal is political” is in this situation just a political claim at the right todecide in the specific situation of a woman’s life which aspects of her life we areentitle to state that they are our own and exclude others from them.This is taking Iris Young’s argument a step further.10 But, as Anne Phillips

notes none of us should be compelled to keep private a certain domain either.“There is no inconsistency, for example, in saying that our sexuality should beour private concern, but that homophobia should be on the public agenda. In asimilar vein, there is no inconsistency in saying that abortion is a decision weshould make for ourselves, but that the treatment of children should be a publicconcern.”11 Thus, women should not be, for example, compelled to clean thehouse, or to have a baby, or ten, or to give up the job when they decide to havechildren. All such things should be outcomes of decisions made by women


————————8Anne Phillips, op. cit., p. 101.9 Anne Phillips comments in this respect the opinions of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis that

democracy is vital at once in the liberal democratic state, in the capitalist economy and in the patriarchalfamily. (p. 103)

10 Iris Marion Young, “Impartiality and the Civic Public,” in Sheyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.),Feminism as Critique, Polity Press, 1987. She states in her chapter that there ought to be several aspects of ourlife that we can keep entirely as our own. A similar point was made by Carol Pateman.

11 Anne Phillips, op. cit., p. 109.

themselves, by the women in question, and not by men or by the other womenfor that matter. Indeed, all these can empower women in claiming their rightfullyplace as equals, adapting the practices of democracy in the home, too, therefore,inducing a grassroots process of democratization of society. “At the end of theday, what happens will depend on the individuals themselves, on how much theyinsist on change.”12 The “personal is political” is not to dismantle the personal,but to function as a political edge, within a wider process of political change. “Thepersonal is political” says that politics should be grounded in the realities of theeveryday life and not reduced to rules, procedures and programs for changewhich are not sufficient.13 On the other hand, the adamant insistence on thedemocratization of everyday life cannot be a substitute for the “classical”, livelypolitical life.14Feminism identity is politically relying heavily on an extension of participation,

and, in turn, the extension of participation and equalitarianism is caught betweenthe danger of a tyranny of majority and that of a “tyranny of structurelessness”(Jo Freedman).Investigating the limits of the liberal society from a feminist perspective, she

identifies two approaches to the opportunities to involvement in politics. Thefirst one sees people in their abstract character as abstract individuals andconcentrates on reducing the relevance of sex in order to reduce inequality andto increase the opportunities for involvement. The second one takes into accountthe differences of at least two (sex-based) groups in society, each with differentinterests. Given this situation, in the second approach the proportionality shouldnot be left to chance. If sexes have different degree of power even if theprocedures are genuinely neutral, the distribution of the power positions shouldbe equalized to a greater extent, or even ensured to be equal.To state it briefly, we acknowledge that liberal democracy accords formal

equality to all in public life. Feminist identity is shaped by the inequality that prevailsin the economy and the family. This inequality inevitably gets translated into politics.Capitalizing on Anne Phillips’ ideas, the project that should define from a

political standpoint the feminists ought to emphasize the fact that even withuniversal suffrage some are more equal than others, and many, especiallywomen, never get to voice their perspectives, interests or demands. In otherterms, liberal democracy has some exclusionary tendencies that might not bemiraculously cured by means of participatory democracy (even if this democraticform was championed by 1960s feminists and unionists and by the civil rightsworkers as the answer to liberal democracy’s exclusionary tendencies).The forum that participatory democracy granted brought to the fore many

opinions about gender oppression and how to overcome it, at the cost of the


————————12 Ibidem, p. 111.13 As well, political thought, lately, experienced this powerful pragmatic turn, reevaluating its increased

interest for the (political) philosophy. Anne Phillips quotes Benjamin Barber with the idea that “essentialcontestability is the premise of politics”, in Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a NewAge, 1984, becausepolitics begins only there at the point where we do not agree.

14 Ibidem, p. 119.

further exclusion of those who have chosen to continue to attend their familyobligations — the great majority of women. Anne Phillips points to the distinctionthat it is one thing to dream of an unfashionably androgynous future and anotherto wish differences away.15 In the light of this fact Iris Young was proposing apolitical scenario where the oppressed groups were granted a veto power. Sinceour identities are shaped by inequalities and we are who we are given thedifferentiations along the lines of the classical dichotomies women or men, non-white or white, worker or employer, our political projects should be shaped bythese differentiations as well, and we should be granted opportunity to voicethese different interests. “We live in a class society that is also structured bygender, which means that men and women experience class in different ways,and that potential unities of class are disrupted by conflicts of gender. To put theemphasis the other way around: we live in a gender order that is also structuredby class, which means that women experience their womanhood in differentways, and that their unity as women is continually disrupted by conflicts ofclass. Draw in race to complete the triangle and you can see how complex thegeometry becomes. No one is ’just’ a worker, ’just’ a woman, ’just’ a black. Thenotion that our politics can simply reflect one of our identities seems implausiblein the extreme.”16Thus, groups ought to be seen different, while individuals ought to be seen

still as essentially the same. This is paradoxical only if we do not understand thenuances implied by the modern civic republicanism, where the equitable anddemocratic society is one in which political participants are able to abstractthemselves from their selfish interests and identify with the public good. Only inthis sense the individuals continue to be essentially the same. Focus on genderdifferences should be only a stage in this effort to identify with the public good.Universal suffrage and universal representation should not be replaced but

corrected by the attention for gender differences. And this attention, for now,should take the form of affirmative action, either by reserving a number of seatsfor women in the legislative branches of majoritarian systems as it happens inthe United States or set a fixed percentage of seats to be occupied by womenunder systems of proportional representation as it is in Britain. The example ofNorway is extremely relevant. Statistics show that in 1972, only 10 percent ofpublic officials were women 30 percent were by 1985, and 40 percent by 2008.Is self-conscious political engineering utopia? Is it in some paradoxical boomerangeffect a sort of confirmation of the second rate position as citizens for women?In my view, such experiences are to be considered extremely relevant for

countries with less consolidated democracy such as Romania. The stages ofpolitical change should not be unquestionable, but efficient. What counts up tonow is that the difference made by this increased female presence in theadvancement of policies important to women has been dramatic. Using the


————————15 Ibidem, p. 151.16 Anne Phillips, Divided Loyalties: Dilemmas of Sex and Class, Virago, 1987, p.12, apudAnne Phillips,

op. cit., p. 155.

terminology mentioned above at Mihaela Miroiu, and in the light of all thesearguments presented above, it makes sense to consider a Romanian developmentand the implementation of a Project Trivia for political change in Romania withtwo dimensions: (a) a first one, operating against instigation at contempt, and (b)retrieving the self-awareness of males in what concerns their importance for lifeas potential fathers, as a political platform for militating for the reservation for50% seats in the Romanian Parliament for women.Feminist identity is shaped by the power relationships, by the discourse

contesting the power relationships and by the projects proposed, and all theseelements are important, but most of all it is shaped by the particulars of eachsituation, country and society, by the realities and traditions that are still at play(representing nothing else but the forms of manifestation of power relationships).At the same time, without a project and a discourse, all identities are helpless, atthe “mercy” of the tides brought about by the power relationships and confrontations.“We have to find a political language that can recognize heterogeneity anddifference, but does not thereby capitulate to an essentialism that defines each ofus by one aspect alone. The arguments now raging inside feminist circles providean exhilarating guide through this terrain.”17

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Drakulic, Slavenka, How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed, Harper Perennial, 1993.Held, David, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, 1986.http://www.progen.md/index.php?mod=home&hmod=viewinterview&id=188 Millet, Kate, Sexual Politics,

Johnatan Cape, 1970.Miroiu, Mihaela, “Despre societatea în care mintea femeilor nu conteazã” (“About the Society Where

Women’s Mind Does Not Matter”), in the Romanian newspaper “Observator cultural”, nr. 240, 2004.Miroiu, Mihaela, Nepreþuitele femei. Publicisticã feministã (Priceless Women. Feminist Newspaper Writings),

Iaºi, Polirom, 2006.Phillips, Anne, Engendering Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991.Phillips, Anne, Divided Loyalties: Dilemmas of Sex and Class, Virago, 1987.Rowbotham, Sheila, Dreams and Dilemmas, Virago, 1983.Young, Iris Marion, “Impartiality and the Civic Public,” in Sheyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.),

Feminism as Critique, Polity Press, 1987.


————————17 Anne Phillips, op. cit., p. 168.

NATIONAL VS. GLOBAL IDENTITY:PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE

AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 20011

VIORELLA MANOLACHE*

Abstract. My analysis starts from the conviction that after September 11,2001, theAmerican spot (a place in which “parochial” and “global” are twoinseparable coordinates) holds forth dual antinomies: pressure/oppression.My hypothesis affirms that peace reappears, from the perspective of acultural accomplishment in a space specific for temporal refuge, in whichthe citizen gradually processualizes the liberties (in a defensive or aprojective way) within a quotidian institutional reconstruction found at thebasis of impartial assessment of moral conflicts of action.Structured on three levels (Peace and Freedom. Sovereignty and power;Americans vs. Terrorists: pressure and oppressor and Cultural discourseafter September 11, 2001 in 22) my study (re)affirms that, after September11, the American Leviathan settles a guideline: on the surface, the space isguided up by a mechanic commotion. There, the human being is not standingstill, but is it becoming, following some well-known pulses, which conserveideal steadiness, considered by Nietzsche and Heidegger as fortuity samples.

Key words: pressure vs. oppression,moral conflicts of action, national vs.global, September 11, 2001.

Peace and Freedom. Sovereignty and power

It is already well-known that the historical coordinate is the convergencepoint of some manifest or latent oppositions. The political and historical mentalityexisted before its verbalization: it existed, diffuse, coagulating a meaning mood.The spotting major idea is that no language, no wording is innocente: all theseare trying to hide/complicate their primal structure, at the end very simple,delineated through binary or ternary opositions: a system of indexes, emblems,constituents of a typical language which asks for deciphering, first and foremostpolitically speaking, for deserving the terms of the new polis.————————

* Researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of the Political Science and International Relations, atthe Department of Political Philosophy.

1 The paper was presented (in a short form) at the conference New Meanings of Peace after 9/11, 2001,Tetuan, Morocco, 2008.


If the twentieth century launched the concept of political and/or legal sovereignty,providing definitions, principles, criteria and classifications, a thinker such as G.Bataille2 proposes a different perspective: sovereignty is not a kind of Hegelianor Nietzschean lordship which still works within the traditional understanding ofsovereignty. One is sovereign when he has the right or the force of commandover oneself or one’s dominions. In this political and philosophical equation,sovereignty is the collapse of the dualism that grounds Western thought: subject/object, good/evil, body/spirit.If, from Descartes and Hobbes, neither political philosophy nor the knowledge

can be designed out of their articulation on the idea of sovereignty, Batailleprovides that neither the power nor the knowledge or the subject cannot be designedas sovereign.In the Preface to transgression3, M. Foucault4 passes over the conceptualization

and archeology of sovereignty, considerate it bound, inextricably, to the idea ofthe leviathan of repression by the king which must be cut head just to find thatsubjectivity transgression invoice. Starting from this premise, Foucault developsstrategic conception of power, a philosophy more concerned about the relationsof power than the language games, played in terms of tactics and strategy.Foucault makes a distinction between games of limited power, small, marginaland single games and power structure with strong, provided that the powergames of the marginal in greater measure than the battle state and institutionalunrest of the subject multiple theorization.Because, according to Michel Foucault, power means action after action.

Choosing a layout of the system of power, Foucault believes that the legal andcivil penalty interrogates the moral ideas. From the perspective of practice andpenal institutions, prison became the general form of punishment. Thetransformation of the penalty can not be associated only with a history of bodies,but, more specifically, with a history of the relations established between politicalpower and bodies. The report launching a new triad consists of an opticalpolitical power (the panoptical establishment of the organs of general andconstant surveillance, the police organization, a system of records), a newmechanical(total disciplinarily establishment, isolation and regrouping of individuals,optimum use of force, control and improve efficiency) and a new physiology(defining the rules, a mechanism of restoring their corrective and punitivetherapeutic interventions).

Sovereignty takes many forms: it is rarely condensed in a person, but eventhen it is diffused. Sovereignty adds force to violate the prohibition that opposeskilling, under the conditions that define the customs. Sovereignty becomes aparticular historical reality, marked by an autonomous decision!Using the same deluged register, after September 11, 2001 the American spot

(a place in which “parochial” and “global” are two inseparable coordinates) holds

2 NATIONAL VS. GLOBAL IDENTITY 63

————————2 Georges Bataille, Suveranitatea, Editura Paralela 45, Piteºti, 2004.3 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien infini, Gallimard, Paris, 1969.4 Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits, vol. I, Gallimard, Paris, 1994.

forth dual antinomies: pressure/oppression. The American Leviathan settles aguideline: on the surface, the space is guided up by a mechanic commotion.There, the human being is not standing still, but is it becoming, following somewell-known pulses, which conserve ideal steadiness, considered by Nietzscheand Heidegger as fortuity samples.The political actor on-comings nearby the newAmerican limits, changes him

into a zoonpolitikon, contested both by the mundane space (with its political,economic, military) and by the spatial borne. This pressure is being politicallycounterbalanced by the triad: authority — oppression — pressure as frames/orderor disorder contender formula.The theorethical option invests theAmerican space with a common perpective:

the citizen appears disputed by the exterior sphere of opportunities, by theinterior one of constraint. In the sphere of privacy, the individual organizes itmorally and politically, according to the driving principles and the principle ofconcord that require means of manifestation and liberation from the pressure ofits negation as an entity, and the achievement of certain ways of manifestation atthe level of the individual, the group, the micro-macro community.The removal of all the elements of supervising history transposes us into a

sphere of re-irrigating the human perspective from a perspective of liberatingdecisive historical close-ups. Thus, freedom becomes the model that is hiddenbeyond this reciprocal revilement. The encounter of liberty requests its inventoryfrom the point of view of its practical nuance of outburst in history and reality:on one hand, freedom means the possibility of the subject to choose its shape ofhuman achievement and on the other hand, freedom means the free subject’spossibility to create itself and the world according to its nature.Peace reappears, therefore, from the perspective of a cultural accomplishment

in a space specific for temporal refuge, in which the citizen (American or Terrorist)gradually processualizes the liberties (in a defensive or a projective way) withina quotidian institutional reconstruction found at the basis of impartial assessmentof moral conflicts of action.

Americans vs. Terrorists: pressure and oppressor

The umma society involves living together in terms of freedom and a reciprocalinfluence of the “I” and the “other”. The rational motivation of the versus theother, the peopling of the political sphere with active human presence, threatensthe institution as a reaction to absolute individual freedom. The structural andbasically, or only random limits, clarify the status of state-freedom, by avoidingabuse of any kind. Society becomes the compound shape, in which man’sdisposure to his equal with a view to living together receives a special significance.This dual (pressure/oppression) picture takes into account the liberty understoodin a liberal way, as the liberty of the individual subject towards the choices andpolitical judgments of the subject (negative liberty) and the liberty of the individualsubject to accede to or to fall, respectively to detect politically speaking as aresult of the individualist exclusive thinking (positive political liberty!).

64 VIORELLA MANOLACHE 3

Searching for reasons to validate it, the individual that is subdued to freedomsuggests extensive variants of choosing freedom as a resurrection of a dynamicway of making history. For the human being, essential remains the practice offreedom, perceived both from the inside — as means of interior manifestation— as well as from the outside — as a polytheic political action. The constantquestion concerning the existing relationship between the ever greater influenceof reason over thinking, ideology and techniques of government, over the everincreased restrictions brought to the individual and collective liberties nowadaysappears on the background of “recoil” of hope in a general emancipation ofmankind.According to Baudrillard5, the American power deploys the rhetoric of military

conflict as a means of legitimizing its authority to act as global police and economiccenter: the global police state will resort to hot wars in order to validate itself.Proposing a postmodern option, Baudrillard uses this approach to understand

September 11, 2001 in terms of critical intensification rather than dialecticalopposition. His claim that people in the west had dreamt of an event such asSeptember 11, 2001 immediately disposes of the ”clash of civilizations” hypothesis.Baudrillard argues that September 11, 2001 is a manifestation of globalization’sattack upon itself: the terrorists’mirror, the violence that western capitalism createsbut cannot use, constitute a Diaspora that is produced by and structurally mirrorsmultinational capitalism, and assimilate and intensify all aspects of power, such asusing “the banality of everyday American life as cover and camouflage”.For Baudrillard, the towers of the World Trade Center are figures for the

dominance of a binarism that includes digital culture, the genetic code, and theduopoly of liberal capitalist states. Developing this analysis, Baudrillard suggeststhat the towers suffered two attacks and two deaths that constitute a criticalextension of a binary logic: the effect of the attacks is to suggest the possibilityof the overthrow of the power embodied in the towers. Baudrillard’s claims thatthe WTC attacks represent “a setback for globalization”. According to him, theterror attacks are an “absolute event” because they combine western technologicaladvancement and sacrificial suicide, operational structure and symbolic pact. Hedescribes September 11, 2001 as a hyperrealist spectacle that is so extreme thatit generates an extra degree of fictional supplementary, and it is this process of“reinventing the real as the ultimate and most redoubtable fiction”, a certainpossibility of global capitalism’s death6.The zoonpolitikon appears cultivating the productive hypnosis of becoming

accustomed to freedom. What is produced is the attempt to organize theseprinciples of freedom step by step, to take them seriously, in order to draw pre-requisites and conclusions. In this context, the first free election took place,without any outside involvement, gapping the democracy settlement and itsconsolidation. As part of this actionable motivation, the individual that is subjectto the reasons of subjectivity, distinguishes between freedom as rational choiceand freedom as volunteering, pathos or dissolution. These “laws” imply the


————————5 Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers, New York, Verso, 2002.6 See also http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/internetnation/anniversary.

existence of an active subject, whose actions start and become obvious throughconstructions and permanent de-constructions of freedom.Taking over a concept by Michel Mafesoli, we consider the terrorists as new

tribes. “Meet the terrorist of the future: less ideological, more likely to harborethnic grievances, perhaps fired by apocalyptic visions, harder to distinguishfrom others outside the law. He (or she) is armed with new weapons andexperimenting with others, and using them more indiscriminately. Terrorism isby no means the only option now; a political wing can openly raise funds, runschools, and contest elections. The loner with a grudge has turned to terror, andmay be the computer hacker next door. At the other end of the scale, state-sponsored terrorism takes the place of warfare. The destructive power of terrorismis on the rise, and the most advanced societies are the most vulnerable.”7

The new tribes are sociability outbursts, spontaneous expeditions into theworld of the inaccessible morality. Because these are not some hereditary orlegislative patterns, the new tribes organize short recognition invasions8. Theseare like a phenomenon described by Ilyia Prigogine, that of creating the crystalin saturate solvents. We assimilate the concept of new tribes to a conscious self,and the American space to a habitable substrate. The variability: citizen/strangeroverlap to the oppressive dichotomy: captive/inhabitant into a status space.According to Konrad Lorenz, the territory is only the function of a deferential

dependence on pressure. The aggressive, oppressive instinct grows up, intensively,as the distance to the centre of the territory is overgrowing. In an attempt todefine the aggressive instinct, K. Lorenz, E. Fromm and J. Monod believed thatthis is bipolar, destructive and creative, an instinct that reflects the discrepancybetween the genetic evolution, slow and rapid cultural evolution of the humanenvironment. On such an argumentative approach, for Lorenz, the most intimaterelationships the higher animals are capable of (including humans) are based onaggression and inhibition.Getting into another utopia of the History of the American “valley”, Zizek’s

theory9 of the political meaning of the terrorist attacks engages with a vast rangeof cultural and political material.Considering it as a tensegrity, the American space is an architectural system,

both natural (exterior) and artificial (politically, military or economically). We“see” intermediary forms between alive putty-skeletons (cartographies by DonaldE. Inger) and cable/ metallic balks’ sculptures of Kenneth Snelson. This productionstructure will be stabilized only when the dynamic forces of pressure (tension)and oppression (compression) are balanced.


————————7 Laqueur,Walter, Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game, “ForeignAffairs”, September/October

1996.8 The greatest change in recent decades is that terrorism is by no means militants’ only strategy. The many-

branched Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinian Hamas, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Kurdishextremists in Turkey and Iraq, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA)movement in Spain, and many other groups that have sprung up in this century have had political as well asterrorist wings from the beginning (Walter Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game, in“Foreign Affairs”, September/October 1996).

9 Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates, NewYork, Verso, 2002.

Even if the liberties nowadays are perceived as an essential subject-liberty forthe individual and personality as an object, negative liberties, and as direction-liberties of the risk and of exploring, peace as a principle must be understood asa progressively democratic value and perception. In the attempt to get accustomedto freedom and global peace as a vision and mission, the new identity is requiredto eliminate any kind of means of alienation in the framework of a viablecommunity consensus, as a reverse of passivity and technical reasoning. Freedomcan’t but allow the search of conditions of political legitimacy.Anticipating the decisive historical movements and the importance of this

dismount which involves Unity and Multiplication, Ihab Hassan asked himselfin “The Dismembering of Orpheus” what paradigm is hidden Outside or Beyondthis mutual involvement? Terrorism and totalitarian, heresy and ecumenicaltendencies mutual involvement, and an annihilated authority, concludes thepostmodernist theoretician.Relegated from Marshall McLuhan’s global village, sent into another

Alexandrines paradigm which requires another language and dialogue.

Cultural discourse10 after September 11, 2001 in 2211

Beyond what we usually call, tolerant to the external theoretical influences an“events pragmatic”, the idea of an “infinite theory” provides for a imperative whichemits that “something is a sign only if it is interpreted as a sign for something byan interpreter”12.The triad sign — type — occurrence13 or the relation sign — icon — index —

symbol14 establishes, pragmatically, a signification relation marked as sign —interpreter — object. I hold forth for an out of the accent from an analysis of the


————————10 The media content functions as a machine of the consuming civilization, in the sense that it is no longer

a stage for the manifestation of life style. The pretensions and the power of absorption of the message by eachcategory of population guide those who finance, for instance, the political advertising. The new politicaldirection in the U.S.A, namely that of “yuppies” groups with a limited social consciousness and an extremelydeveloped consumer consciousness, adapts the social category of the “average man” to the new reality. Thefundamental values acknowledged by this “average man” (“the common person”) are those of friendship,solidarity, of their acceptance by the whole community. The policy of altruism, of lacking any sense of identity,of blurring the outlines of personality up to its total absorption in a given group addresses precisely to thiscategory. Consequently, we have to include within this equation another two concepts, typical for postmodernity,defined by Fukuyama as spontaneous order and hierarchy, networks or individual agents groups that shareinformal norms or values besides those previously considered necessary for the common transactions of themarket. This is a society in which fashion and taste are eclectic, “opportunities” seem numberless, and thesearch for new market segments seems constant. The services and industries mainly offer entertainment. It iswell-known that, in its canonic sense, the term nation-state used to imply, besides its juridical nature, (in thissense, as a set of norms that euphemize and dissolve forces and interests within some legitimating illusions) acivic nature, as a system of force relationships. Yet, the nation-state gives way to the prerogatives of thewealth-state. This represents an attempt to mobilize the economic interests as a means of setting free all thepolitical interests from moral restraints.

11 “22” is the first independent Romanian Review after 1989. Its name is related to the 22 December 1989,the day when Ceauºescu left the Central Committee Building’s. The Review proposes a philosophical, historical,political, social and economic perspective and is it known as the best Romanian Review of cultural politics.

12 Umberto Eco, Lector in fabula, Editura Univers, Bucureºti, 1991.13 Charles S. Pierce, Semnificaþie ºi acþiune, Editura Humanitas, Bucureºti, 1990.14 Ferdinand de Saussure, Curs de lingvisticã generalã, Polirom, Iaºi, 1998.

cultural discourse conventions into a crosscheck of what it is called “the act ofinterpreting the text and the event by a cooperating lecturer”15. This imperativegets an insight into the text’s regularity obstruction, into the formal experiences‘memories, intercession into the persuadable act, into the optimum organizationof the text.My analysis endorses September 11 celebration articles, from “22” (no. 758,

762,885/2004, 653/2002, 810/2005), for the fact that “22” submits a circuitsimulation — crisis — tendency which operates for recovering a significationsorder16. Following Umberto Eco’s analytic equation, we allow that thecommunication chain parceling into four factors: transmitter — receiver —message — code — with its repertoire of logical and/or abstract definitions,emotive frame, like, cultural commonness, a multitude of prefabricaterepresentations, provided and well organized possibilities.The article Filosofia dupã 11 septembrie17 (22, No. 885, 2004) proposes an

overlap of actualize to reference, underlying designations which postmark anexpressive adequacy, conjuring the relation object — event — text. The object(philosophical and political order, after September 11) has some propertieswhich allow us to recognize a specific philosophical relation: object — world,by presenting Habermas and Derrida’s point of views. Concretely, the articleuses objects which are understood as signs (strategies, confrontations, monstrousaccidents, disillusion and crisis). The running thrill inclines an intrinsic temporality(September 11, 2001) and configures the new dimensions of the post September11 philosophy.According to Traian Ungureanu18, September 11 never ends. Whenit will be over we will be aware of out cowardiceness and blindness/as well inWest and in the Est.

In Derrida’s terms19, “to mark a date in history” presupposes that “something”comes or happens for the first and last time, “something that we do not yet reallyknow how to identify, determine, recognize, or analyze” but that should remainunforgettable: an ineffaceable event in the shared archive of a universal calendar,that is, a supposedly universal calendar. The brevity of the appellation (September 11)stems not only from an economic or rhetorical necessity. Derrida believes in thenecessity of being attentive first of all to this phenomenon of language, naming,


————————15 Umberto Eco, Limitele interpretãrii, Editura Pontica, Constanþa, 1996.16 The approach is an “old” one in the Romanian cultural and philosophical context. In 1943, in

Luceafãrul, D.D. Roºca considered that the interpreters of the identity phenomena do not usually distinguishbetween legal and philosophical basis of the scientific idea of national. In any case, the lack of qualitativediscrimination leads, in terms of political philosophy, reaches dangerous practical confusion. Nation as auniversal value is not only due to the fact that there is. Its existence is justified by the cultural values that makeit possible. A nation is justified by its potential spirituality existence. In this perspective, our politics appearsas an extension of the biological. Ethics which detaches from such a design becomes, according to D.D. Roºca,only a transcript, in the form of rules and laws found in the biological field. Because, there are rights whichsome people have and others not (D.D. Roºca, Temeiuri filosofice ale ideii naþionale, in Luceafãrul, 1943, III,p. 83-87).

17 “Philosophy after September 11” signed by Camil Pârvu.18 Când va veni 12 septembrie (When 12 September will come), 22, no. 653/2002.19 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques

Derrida, University of Chicago Press, 2003. See also http://www.press. uchicago. edu/books/ derrida/ derrida911.html

and dating, to this repetition compulsion (at once rhetorical, magical, andpoetic), not in order to isolate ourselves in language, but on the contrary, in orderto try to understand what is going on precisely beyond language precisely therewhere language and the concept come up against their limits. Such an “event”calls for a philosophical response.Nevertheless, the denial of the traditional structures, the overlapping of successive

movements make up an answer given to the public necessity of “putting onstage” as a way of concentrating feelings, of organizing events or determining space.“The message of the second grade” incubates an operational zone of transgressionof precision to the transmitter, marked by dissemblance and indetermination.The multiple transmissions make the rigor of the factors which participate in thedetermination of the discourse questionable.

Despite any pressures, the writing and (re)writing of the political segment,especially on its discursive and image side, follows the route of a socialized art,which requires an activity of political socialization, of interiorizing any standards,and reactivate it by “in situ” approaches. The article Cei ce înþeleg terorismul(Henryk Broder, 22 no. 762/)20 establishes that assuming that no geography, no“territorial” determination, is thus pertinent any longer for locating the seat ofnew technologies of transmission or aggression.For Traian Ungureanu (De ce ne apãrãm21, “22” no. 810/2005) the matrix of

discourse follows the approach of the political receiver situated between privateand public, thus creating an “enlarged private”. But in a full postmodernistdisintegration of the public sphere, it can only speak about a sphere of alchemyand hybridization as exponential reference of a project about political resumption.The territorization policy implies (re)defining the relationship among the

victim and aggressor. Generally speaking, it replaces a sector function with acoordination function, pleading for a public actor/private actor partnership. Whilethe network is a social term, the territory, as redistribution of chances, belongsexclusively to the political domain.According to Traian Ungureanu symbolical structuring of the territory implies

the contract procedure mediator/receiver, as reconciliation between autonomyand political purpose of the transmitted political message (even Katrina becamean amnesiac index!).The reconstruction of the public discourse, in its territorialized hypostasis

requires the celebration imperative, as a relay-point of the centre. Trei ani de la 11septembrie 200122 proposes a celebration discursive ritual, confirming that the newterritory of communication is the meeting place of fluxes and networks, but also ofachieving symbolical productions, according to an imperative of institutionalexigencies, because “symbolical forms/shapes can be applied to any object”.The characteristic of this type of territoriality, according to Bauman23 is

represented by the fact that politics implies “that public dialogue, that noisy


————————20 “Those who understand terrorism”, translated by Florin Gabrea.21 “Why are we protecting for”.22 “Three years from September 11, 2001”, Alexandru Lãzescu, 22, no. 758, 2004.23 Z. Bauman, Etica postmodernã, Editura Amarcord, Timiºoara, 2000.

conversation that society keeps up with itself in order to produce and manage itsown historicity, as a faithful performant expression of a social formation thatproves capable to tell in a conscious way, what it wants and what it can be”. Suchpolitical options about public risks of technical communicational difficulties,view a double axiom, according to which, by these public variants “what youcan do, but also what you must do” is accessed. The article Trei ani de la 11septembrie 2001, concludes that the new order establishes a lose-lose parametersfor Europe, U.S. and for the world.

In conclusion, we can deny ourselves the possibility, that at the beginning ofall, for the entire land to use only one vernacular and common collocation.However, we are used to scheme the thorny problem of survival according toland desertion and to the fact of heading for a (post) beyond.Moving easterly, the human being sets up a land, dismounts and bricks up a

stronghold, using well burned bricks.The rock look corporal: these are rising inwards, having as a vow the rainbow.

Left alone in this “no man’ s land”, the first human being and his History anchoredinto artificiality, excluding all the conventional dense: “the bricks commuted thestone and the tar commuted the hydrate of lime”.God interrupts the temptation of the complete, but he will no longer destroy

those who were eager to gain fame former to their dissipation!This is the point of origin in History!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bataille, Georges, Suveranitatea, Editura Paralela 45, Piteºti, 2004.Baudrillard, Jean, The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers, New York, Verso, 2002.Bauman, Z., Etica postmodernã, Editura Amarcord, Timiºoara, 2000.Blanchot, Maurice, L’entretien infini, Gallimard, Paris, 1969.Borradori, Giovanna, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida,

University of Chicago Press, 2003.Eco, Umberto, Lector in fabula, Editura Univers, Bucureºti, 1991.Eco, Umberto, Limitele interpretãrii, Editura Pontica, Constanþa, 1996.Foucault, Michel, Dits et écrits, vol. I, Gallimard, Paris, 1994.Pierce, Charles S., Semnificaþie ºi acþiune, Editura Humanitas, Bucureºti, 1990.Saussure, Ferdinand de, Curs de lingvisticã generalã, Polirom, Iaºi, 1998.Zizek, Slavoj,Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates, New York,

Verso, 2002.


SÄCHSISCHE LANDSCHAFT ALS BEZUGSPUNKTKULTURELLER IDENTITÄT, EXEMPLIFIZIERTAM ROMANWERK DES RUMÄNIENDEUTSCHEN

AUTORS EGINALD SCHLATTNER

MARIA SASS*

Abstract. The present article centers on the “Transylvanian landscape” asa reference point for the cultural identity of the Transylvanian Saxons,identity that is exemplified through the work of the Romanian-Germanwriter Eginald Schlattner. The above text is made up of two parts: atheoretical part — where the theoretical notions of individual, social andcultural identity are explained by reference to the French sociologistsÉmile Durkheim (1858-1917) and François de Singly (*1948) — and aninterpretative part — where, through the analysis of the work of the writerEginald Schlattner, I have tried to point out the constitution of the culturalidentity of the Transylvanian Saxons, which lasted eight centuries andwhich decayed over five decades to the point that it is represented almostjust in literary works at present. The notion of “Transylvanian Saxons”refers to a German ethnic minority which was colonized in Transylvaniaby the Hungarian King Geysa II beginning with the 12th century, whichgained privileges and liberties due to the Hungarian King Andrew II, bybuilding up a cultural identity. Eginald Schlattner (born 1933,Arad) presentsin his so-called “Transylvanian trilogy” — which is made up of the novelsDer geköpfte Hahn, Rote Handschuhe, Das Klavier im Nebel — thedestruction of the culture of the Transylvanian Saxons with whom heidentifies and from whom he draws his inspiration in his works: theSecond World War, in which many Saxons took part, attracted by theperspective of the “Third Reich”; the Communist Dictatorship, with all itsmeans — pursuits, arrests, deportations, hard labour, etc.; the Revolutionof 1989, which made a massive immigration to Germany possible.Schlattner’s novels seem to preserve this secular culture through literature,for the generations to come.

Key words: Eginald Schlattner, cultural identity, cultural minorities, politicalresistance.

REG ION AND REGIONAL I SM


————————* Professor at the “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu.

Vorüberlegungen: Zur kulturellen Identitätder Siebenbürger Sachsen

Billigt man jemandem eine Permanenz, eine zeitliche Kontinuität zu, soverleiht man ihm eine Identität. Diese ist nur schwer zu fassen, etwas Absolutes,Invariantes, Unantastbares, das eine Person oder ein Volk in seiner Kontinuitätdefiniert. Eine Identität setzt Einheit und Kohärenz voraus, welche jedoch, genauwie Permanenz und Kontinuität, nie einfach gegeben, sondern von Menschenangestrebte Ideale sind.

Nach dem französischen Soziologen Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) existierteine duale Identität: — das individuelle Sein, das Charakterzüge, Erbgut undpersönliche Erfahrungen umfasst — und das gesellschaftliche Sein, das denWerten und Normen der Zugehörigkeitsgruppe entspricht. Beide Identitätsarten,das individuelle und das soziale bzw. kollektive stehen in Wechselwirkungzueinander, weil die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe und deren Identitätsmerkmaleauf den Einzelnen zurückwirkt. Zugleich entwickelt sich aus den individuellenIdentitäten die kollektive Identität. Ein weiteres Element, das erwähnt werdenmuss, ist das des Soziologen François de Singly (*1948), der der Ansicht ist,dass sich die Identität als Konfrontation und Selbstbezug zum Anderen aufbaut.

Fragt man sich nun nach der kulturellen Identität, so bezeichnet man damitinstitutionalisierte Ordnungsvorstellungen, die eine Einheit bilden, sich gegenandere abgrenzen lassen und sich dadurch selbst beschreiben. Kulturelle Identitätensind immer heterogen und umfassen bestimmte Vorstellungen, die untereinanderin Konflikt geraten können. In solchen Konflikten tritt die Identität meist inErscheinung.Kulturelle Identität umfasst Gemeinsamkeiten, wie Klima und Geographie,

Sprache oder Religion und die Identifikation mit einem territorialen Raum übermehrere Generationen hinweg, wobei sie sich auch durchaus verändern kann. Es seihier noch ergänzt, dass kulturelle Identität nicht zwingend an ein bestimmteskulturelles Gebiet und an eine historische Epoche gebunden ist. So ist zum Beispieldie jüdische Diaspora ein Beispiel für identitätsstiftende kulturelle Gemeinschaft,die zunächst über Jahrhunderte auch ohne ein von ihr fest bewohntes Gebiet eineausgeprägte kulturelle Identität entwickelte, vielleicht sogar stärker als beimonoterritorialen Kulturen und, in diesem Kontext kann auch mit der sächsischenkulturellen Identität exemplifiziert werden, die durch dieAuswanderung der Sachsenim binnendeutschen Kulturraum in neu konstruierten Gruppen weiterlebt.Kulturelle Identität ist also eine Bezeichnung für das im kulturhistorischen

Zusammenhang erworbene Weltbild oder Selbstverständnis eines Individuums,einer Gruppe oder Nation im Hinblick auf Werte, Fähigkeiten undGewohnheiten. Die kulturelle Identität des Individuums entsteht aus demEingebundensein des Einzelnen in die kulturelle Identität eines Kollektivseinerseits und dem Bestreben nach Autonomiebewahrung der eigenen Identitätandererseits.

Im Folgenden werde ich mich auf die Siebenbürger Sachsen beziehen, zuderen Gruppe Eginald Schlattner gehört, und mit deren Kultur er sich identifiziert.

72 MARIA SASS 2

Mit dem Begriff “Siebenbürger Sachsen” bezeichnet man eineBevölkerungsgruppe, die im Zentrum Rumäniens angesiedelt wurde und die alsdie älteste deutsche ethnische Gruppe Südosteuropas gilt. Die Kolonisationbegann im 12. Jahrhundert durch den ungarischen König Geysa II und wurdedurch den Ungarnkönig Andreas II weitergeführt, der den Kolonisten durch densogenannten “Goldenen Brief” weitgehende Privilegien, politische und kirchlicheAutonomie verlieh.1

Das Ansiedeln der Sachsen wirkte sich positiv auf die EntwicklungSiebenbürgens aus, gemeint ist der wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Fortschritt desGebietes. Gepflegt wurde auch eine intensive Beziehung zu Deutschland und imsiebenbürgischen Raum entwickelte sich eine starke deutschsprachige Kultur, dieschon durch denAnschluss Siebenbürgens an Rumänien (1918) einiges einbüßenmusste. Und dies war nur der Beginn, denn nach dem II. Weltkrieg wurden alleDeutschen in Rumänien — nicht nur die Sachsen Siebenbürgens — als Mitläuferdes Naziregimes qualifiziert und in ihrer Substanz schwer getroffen. Es seien hiererwähnt: Die Trennung vieler Familien infolge von Krieg, Flucht, Evakuierungund Deportation, die Zerstörung der Existenzgrundlage der Deutschen in Stadtund Land — durch die kommunistische Enteignung und Verstaatlichung vonGütern — der Verlust des ethno-kulturellen Identitäts- und Zusammen-gehörigkeitsgefühl, die zunehmende Isolierung vom gesamten deutschen Sprach-und Kulturraum, schließlich das Gefühl der Rechtsunsicherheit und der totaleMangel an Vertrauen in die kommunistische Führung des rumänischen Staates.

Somit kommt es zu einer schrittweisen Zerstörung der siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Gemeinschaft und implizit der jahrhundertelang konstruiertenkulturellen Identität dieser Gruppe, die zum Kernpunkt des Werkes vielerrumäniendeutscher Autoren geworden und auf mehrere Faktoren zurückzuführenist: Die ersten, die die Sachsen ins Verderben geführt haben, waren dieNationalsozialisten, die ihnen den Gott genommen und sie durch Manipulationin einen abenteuerlichen Krieg geführt hat. Danach waren es die Kommunisten,denn das von den Nazis Begonnene wurde von dem “neuen Regime” durchDeportation und Enteignung weitergeführt. Zur Zerstörung der sächsischenIdentität sollte auch der Verrat der sächsischen Opportunisten, die Liquidierungder sächsischen Presse und, nicht zuletzt, die Kirche — die auch alsnationalistische Institution gewirkt haben soll — eine Rolle spielen.

Der rumäniendeutsche2 Autor Eginald Schlattner

Eginald Schlattner wurde am 13. September 1933 in Arad geboren und lebtheute als Pfarrer und Schriftsteller in Siebenbürgen. Er wuchs in Fogarasch —am Fuße der Karpaten — auf und studierte evangelische Theologie, danachMathematik und Hydrologie in Klausenburg.

3 SÄCHSISCHE LANDSCHAFT ALS BEZUGSPUNKT KULTURELLER IDENTITÄT 73

————————1F. Zimmermann und C.Werner,Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen. Urk. 19, S. 11.2 Der Begriff “rumäniendeutsche” Literatur bezeichnet eine deutschsprachige Literatur, die auf dem

Gebiete Rumäniens entstanden ist. Alexander Ritter (In: Südostdeutsche Vierteljahresblätter. 50/2001, 4,München 2001, S. 364) definiert diese Literatur als schriftliche Leistung eines Bevölkerungsteils, der sich in

1957 wurde er verhaftet und 1959 wegen “Nichtanzeige von Hochverrat”verurteilt. Nach der Entlassung arbeitete er als Tagelöhner und später alsIngenieur. 1973 nahm Schlattner noch einmal das theologische Studium, diesmalin Hermannstadt, auf. Er war bis zur Pensionierung evangelischer Pfarrer inRothberg (Roºia) bei Hermannstadt und auch als Gefängnispfarrer in Gherlatätig. Auch nach seiner Pensionierung ist er weiterhin als Gefängnispfarrer,sowie als evangelischer Pfarrer für seine inzwischen nicht mehr vorhandeneGemeinde tätig.

Seine bisher drei erschienenen Romane, die in der siebenbürgischenLandschaft angesiedelte Romantrilogie, — Der geköpfte Hahn (1998), RoteHandschuhe (2001) und Das Klavier im Nebel (2005) — brachte dem Autorgroßen Erfolg im In- und Ausland. Die Bilder, die durch die großangelegtenepischen Schilderungen Schlattners angeboten werden, lassen sich zeitlich ganzbestimmt festlegen: eine autobiographisch motivierte Erinnerungslandschaft ausder Zeit des zweiten Weltkrieges und der nationalsozialistischen Verstrickungender siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Gemeinschaft (Der geköpfte Hahn), aus derunmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit — eine zerrissene und vertriebene Gemeinschaft(Das Klavier im Nebel) und die frühen Jahre des Kommunismus bzw. Stalinismusmit den jeweiligen Verfolgungen und Repressionen (Rote Handschuhe).

Neben seinen Romanen, in vielen anderen Aussagen, spricht Schlattner vom“Ende der Siebenbürger Sachen”, von der Zerstörung einer kulturellen Identität,mit der er sich als Individuum identifiziert — Hier ist mein Platz!—und aus derer Stoff für seine Schriften schöpft.

Schlattners Heimat scheint wie ein in Unordnung geratenes Eden. Ein in dieWeite eines sanften Tals hingewehtes Dorf. Dort lebt der Schriftsteller in einembarocken Pfarrhaus mit antiken Möbeln, die letzten Überbleibsel einer Epoche,deren Untergang nicht erst die Kommunisten, sondern schon die Nationalsozialisteneinleiteten, mit denen sich die Rumänen zunächst verbündet hatten. Das DorfRothberg, in dem er lebt und als Pfarrer dient, hinterlässt den Eindruck einesatemporalen Ortes. Vom Turm der verwaisten Kirche hat man einen Blick über dieLandschaft Siebenbürgens. Hinter Weizenfeldern und Kartoffeläckern, Hügelnvoller Mais, dichten Wäldern, türmen sich die Fogarascher Berge. Zu ihren Füßenliegt die Stadt Fogarasch. Sie ist die Kindheitsheimat des Autors, die “menschlicheLebensform”, wie er sie inAnlehnung an ThomasManns Essay “Lübeck als geistigeLebensform” nennt. In den Augen des Autors ist es eine edenische Landschaft.

74 MARIA SASS 4

————————Folge von wanderungsgeschichtlichen und/oder politisch-territorialen Veränderungen in einer allgemeinenMinderheiten-situation befinde. Somit lässt sich die rumäniendeutsche Literatur, von der Verfassung undVerbreitung her, als die Literatur der deutschsprachigen Minderheit (Deutsche und deutschsprachige Juden)in Rumänien beschreiben. Ihre Entstehung wurde von einer spezifischen Wanderungsgeschichte, vongeopolitischen Entscheidungen und soziologischen Umständen geprägt. Weiter muss noch gesagt werden, dassdiese Literatur zwischen zwei Sprachen und Kulturen positioniert ist (die binnedeutsche und die rumänischeKultur). Die “Position zwischen den Sprachen und Literaturen ist gleichzeitig eine diese Literatur wesentlichprägende Herausforderung an Identität und Autobiographie, an literarisch-künstlerischem Auftrag undAuthentizität.” (Al. Ritter, Germanistik ohne schlechtes Gewissen. Die deutschsprachige Literatur des Auslandesund ihre wissenschaftliche Rezeption. In: Deutschsprachige Literatur im Ausland. Hg. VonAl. Ritter. Göttingen1985, S. 29).

Schlattners schriftstellerische Karriere begann “aus einsamer Verzweiflung” nachdem Zusammenbruch der rumänischen Diktatur 1989, als die SiebenbürgerSachsen seines Dorfes mit allem was sie hatten nach Deutschland auswanderten.“Sie beraubten sich Ihrer Wurzeln”, sagt Schlattner. Mit jedem Sonntag jedenfallswurden die Kirchenbänke leerer, die Häuser verlassener, schließlich brauchte derPfarrer nicht einmal die Glocken mehr zu läuten. Die Gegenwart, die Zukunft vonRothberg, sie waren gelaufen. Es gab nur noch die Vergangenheit, die ihn an denSchreibtisch zwang, sie aus der Erinnerung aufzuschreiben und durch seine Romanewieder zum Leben zu bringen.

Über Eginald Schlattners Siebenbürgische Romantrilogie ist viel geschriebenund gesagt worden. Die Rezeption im deutschsprachigen Raum ist fast besser alsin Rumänien, ein Grund dafür ist, dass der siebenbürgische Autor eine fürDeutschland historisch und geographisch entfernte, “mithin exotischeKulturlandschaftin lebendigen Farben wiedererstehen lässt, und zwar in einer literarisch gefälligenForm, die die komplexe Erinnerungskultur Siebenbürgens trotz des Einsatzesvon Verfremdungselementen wie Ironie und Groteske auf drei abgerundeteGroßerzählungen herunterbricht.”3Der geköpfte Hahn ist ein Erinnerungsroman von starker erzählerischer Kraft über

die allmähliche Zerstörung einer europäischen Kulturlandschaft durch politischenFanatismus, “genau beobachtet und mit einem kräftigen Schuß Humor erzählt.”4

Der Debütroman Eginald Schlattners gehört in den Kontext der kleinenrumäniendeutschen Literatur und muss an ihr gemessen werden. Der Autor isteiner der wenigen, der in Rumänien geblieben ist, die meisten-Oskar Pastior,Herta Müller, Werner Söllner, Richard Wagner u.a.-sind nach Deutschlandausgewandert und haben mit ihm nur noch den vergangenen Erfahrungshintergrundgemeinsam: die problematische Geschichte ihrer Herkunftsgruppe in Siebenbürgen,im Banat, in der Bukowina, die Nazizeit, die rote Diktatur, schließlich denWeltwechsel. Von den einst ca. 750.000 Deutschen leben noch wenige in Rumänien.Eine alte, über achthundertjährige Kultur stirbt. DieVertreter der rumäniendeutschenLiteratur können daraus ihre Themen und Stoffe schöpfen. Schlattners Erfolgberuht auf seinem Abschiedspathos, dem “Schwanengesang” nach demgeschichtlichen Ende. Der Autor geht in diesem Roman an den Anfang diesesEndes zurück, im Roman ist “Der geköpfte Hahn” ein immer wiederkehrendesUntergangs- und Todesmotiv. Die Handlung setzt am 23. August 1944 ein, derTag des Frontwechsels Rumäniens, eines Schicksalstages. Die Klammer diesesTages ist das magische Wort “Exitus” und “Exitus letalis”. Die Exitus-Feier, einTanz von Schülern, und der “exitus letalis”, der Selbstmord des deutschenBotschafters in Bukarest kurz vor dem Einmarsch der Sowjets. Doch immerwieder weist der Roman auf das eigentliche Ende der Rumäniendeutschen hin:ihre schuldhafte Verstrickung mit Nazideutschland; 6.500 dienten in der Waffen-SS; der Auschwitzapotheker war Siebenbürger Sachse usw.


————————3 Lulé, Susanna, Siebenbürger Erinnerungsorte. Zur Erschreibung des Vergangenen bei Eginald

Schlattner und Joachim Wittstock. Typoskript, S. 3.4 Eva Leipprand (1998), “Süddeutscher Zeitung”.

Eginald Schlattners Roman beginnt scheinbar ganz harmlos und fast idyllisch:“Exitus das war das Fest am Nachmittag, das die Großmutter mit zwei

Hausangestellten vorbereitete. Unsere Klasse, die Quarta der Deutschen Schulevon Fogarasch, feierte Exitus — so der tradierte Sprachgebrauch inSiebenbürgen: Abschied von der Schule, Abschied voneinander, Abschied vonder Kindheit sowieso, wir alle waren über fünfzehn. Ein verspätetes Fest, denndie Schulen hatten bereits im April geschlossen, als die ersten Bomben aufBukarest, Ploieºti und Kronstadt fielen. So wurde die Veranstaltung verschoben,eben auf heute, den 23. August 1944.”5.

Gleich danach folgt ein Erwachen: “unsere Deutschen” schossen mitMaschinen-gewehren auf eine im Schulhof versammelte Schülerklasse, wobeiein Schüler verletzt wurde. Der Roman bietet die Jugendgeschichte Schlattners,mit Rückblenden bis Advent 1942, dabei wird die schuldhafte Verstrickung mitdem Dritten Reich dargestellt. Die dargebotene Landschaft ist oft apokalyptischgefärbt. Es ist ein seltsames Bild Siebenbürgens, wo gegenwärtig sogar dieSachsen mit ihrer Ahnengalerie ein “Exotikum” darstellen. Das Erzählte istdoppelperspektivisch: einerseits ist es die Sicht des erwachsenen erinnerndenAutors, andererseits ist es der Sechszehnjährige, der die Welt eben entdeckt,wobei alles auf das Abschiedsfest fokussiert ist, als könne die Zeit damitaufgehalten werden. Die Verwendung von Rückblenden hilft dem Autor eineindrucksvolles Panorama der Nazizeit zu zeichnen: alltägliche Vorurteile,Antisemitismus, Ordnungssucht, nationalistische Haltungen der SiebenbürgerSachsen lassen die Ursachen der Verstrickung aus den Dialogen, der Erzählungselbst, deutlich werden. Meist ist es der schrecklich banale Familientag, derdiese Schuld plastisch, und genau am Ort ihres Entstehens, erzählbar macht.

Das Buch scheint volksnah, nah dem siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Charakter zusein. Der Autor verwendet Witze, Anekdoten oder Volksweisheiten. Alles wirkt,auf jemanden, der die ehemalige siebenbürgischeAtmosphäre kennt, fremd. DieseVerfremdung ist wohl das Subtilste und Wertvollste an diesem Roman. Es zerfälltalles, es ergibt sich kein einheitliches Bild mehr. Alles wirkt fremd, distanziert,gerade weil es in jenen, die es kennen (sogar im Autor selbst, der, weil er vor Ortlebt, es täglich miterlebt), ein Prozess der Entfremdung von der eigenen Heimatsattgefunden hat. So gibt der Autor diesen Zerfall wieder und es gelingt ihm mittraditionellen Erzählmitteln zu suggerieren, dass es all dies Vertraute von früherbis in die Großfamilien, die Bräuche, die Redensarten, die Landschaft und die Ortehinein, nicht mehr gibt, dass Siebenbürgen heute — um mit Dieter Schlesak zusprechen — “ein Panoptikum, ein Wachsfigurenkabinett”6 ist.

Auch die Erinnerung ist anders, das Gedächtnis ist entleert, verstört durch dieEreignisse. Vielleicht ist genau dieses die Chance des Autors gewesen, der dieZeit beider Diktaturen schmerzlich miterlebt hat, denn er wurde verfolgt, warmehrere Jahre in Haft, das von Sachsen leere Siebenbürgen, mit leeren Dörfern,

76 MARIA SASS 6

————————5 Eginald Schlattner (1998), Der geköpfte Hahn. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, S. 8.6 Schlesak, Dieter (1999), Halbjahresschrift für die südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik.

Heft. Nr. 1/Mai 1999, 11. Jahrgang. AGK Verlag.

wo er als Pfarrer hiergebliebene Landsleute aber auch Häftlinge betreut, alldieses hat ihn weitgehend geprägt. Die Seelenlandschaft von heute überlagertüberall, unsichtbar im Buch, diejenige von früher, als es das deutsche Siebebürgennoch gab. Die Nazizeit und das Ende, die Endzeit, strahlen ein unheimlichesLicht auf den Roman.“Es erhebt sich die Vergangenheit, in dem woran einer Schaden genommen

hat an Leib und Seele, was er erlitten hat in seinem Gewissen: der Aufstand derVergangenheit. Nicht nur vor dem, was kommt, auch vor dem was war fürchteman sich!”“Leuchtend und seidig schimmerte der Himmel über der Stadt und anders als

über Berlin. Denn dies war Siebenbürgen, das `Land des Segens´ im Südostendes Abendlandes”.“Wenn einmal der eiserne Vorhang vor der Zukunft fällt, dann wird die

Vergangenheit über mich daherrauschen und wird mich in einer Weiseverschlingen, dass es mir heute noch graust. In jeder schlaflosen Nacht ist dieVergangenheit in einer Intensität hier. Außerdem, diese übergenaue, Sie sagtenvom “Aufleuchten”, dieses Aufleuchten der Erinnerung hat auch ein Momentder Vereinsamung, bringt Vereinsamung mit sich. Ich habe aber Angst vor derErinnerung. Nur, dass diese Bücher doch diese Intensität, diesen Grad anSinnlichkeit vermitteln, das hängt ganz bestimmt auch damit zusammen, dassdiese Dinge in dieser leuchtenden oder brennenden Weise präsent sind.”7

In Schlattners Erinnerung hatten alle Ethnien — Rumänen, Ungarn,Zigeuner, Juden und Siebenbürger Sachsen— das siebenbürgischeVölkergemisch— ihren Platz. Dies konnte an einem dargestellten Sonntagspaziergang inFogarasch jener Jahre deutlich gemacht werden. Doch anhand der Jahre 1942-1944 wird der Vorabend des Untergangs der Deutschen von Fogarasch undimplizit jener Siebenbürgens geschildert. Das Naziunwesen hat nämlich auch inSiebenbürgen mit Fahnen und Aufmärschen voller Pathos Einzug gehalten. Im“Rassenkuddelmuddel” dort enthüllt sich die ganze Perversion des völkischenGedankens. Dem Erzähler stehen an der Schwelle zum Erwachsenwerden zweiInitiationsriten zur Wahl — die Vereidigung auf den Führer oder dieKonfirmation. Zunächst lockt die Hitlerjugend mehr, mit ihren Ritualen vonBefehlen und dem Erzähler stehen an der Schwelle zum Erwachsenwerden zweiInitiationsriten zur Wahl — die Vereidigung auf den Führer oder dieKonfirmation. Zunächst lockt die Hitlerjugend mehr, mit ihren Ritualen vonBefehlen und Gehorchen, ausgetobt in wilden Kriegsspielen, dem Hochgefühlder Männergemeinschaft, wofür Schlattner Sätze von bestürzender Direktheitfindet. Der alles überschwemmende, homoerotisch gefärbte “Rausch derVerwandlung” ist wie Schmerz und Lust undTod alles eins: “Welch ausschweifendesGlück, mit dem geliebten Feind zu verschmelzen!”Auf den Höhepunkt folgt aberrasch die Demütigung durch die stumpfe Horde; die Parolen, zeigt sich, sind sohohl wie die Helden. Jetzt wendet sich der Erzähler Alfa Sigrid zu, derMärchenprinzessin im roten Samtkleid, und ihren drängenden Fragen nach dem


————————7 Schlattner, Eginald, a.a.O, S. 317.

ewigen Leben. Er lässt sich konfirmieren und lädt zu seinem Schulabschluss-Tanztee auch die verfemte Jüdin Judith Glückselich ein.

Dieses Abschlussfest, in Fogarasch Exitus genannt, bildet den erzählerischenRahmen des Romans. Es ist der 23. August 1944, der Tag, an dem Rumäniensich auf die Seite der Alliierten schlägt. Der Tag wird ein Schlusspunkt für alle,für die Klasse, für die Naziherrschaft in Siebenbürgen und für das “sächsischeVölkchen” selbst. “Wir gehen unter”, sagt der Großvater. “Ein Wunder derWeltgeschichte, dass wir uns achthundert Jahre über Wasser gehalten haben.Exitus letalis”. Man trifft zwar gewisse Vorbereitungen, baut einen Splittergrabenim Garten und tauft den Hund Litwinow um in Ingeborg, um die Russen, wennsie kommen, nicht zu verärgern. Trotzdem: wenn sie kommen, ist alles aus. Aberdies ist kein Grund, um nicht lustig zu sein. Beim Fest sind alle noch einmalzusammen, die Freunde, die ganze Verwandtschaft. Aber schon darf die JüdinGlückselich anfangen aufzuatmen, die Rumänen gehen auf Distanz zu denDeutschen, der hitlertreue Hordenführer Hans Adolf wird entthront und hatausgespielt. Märchenhaft verklärt erlebt der Erzähler die Berührung mit AlfaSigrid und die unmittelbare Nähe des Todes.

In Schlattners Roman werden immer wiederkehrende Bilder aus Märchenund Aberglauben aufgenommen. So z.B. ist der geköpfte Hahn so doppeldeutigwie das Leben selbst. Er ist Vorbote des Unheils; der Kopf allein aber, an die Türgenagelt, bannt die bösen Geister. Die schöne siebenbürgische Landschaft mitdem Fluss Aluta bildet die innere Entwicklung des Erzählers ab, das Forschenins Ungewisse, das Untertauchen und Zerfließen im sexuellen Erwachen. DieSprache selbst ist für den Heranwachsenden ein wichtiges Mittel des Erkundensund Erkennens; der Brockhaus der Mutter erschließt neue dunkle Wörter wieOrgasmus und Libido. Aber auch die Sprache ist zweideutig, sie schafft Nähezwischen Menschen und liefert sie einander aus, sie erfasst die Dinge undverändert, verfälscht doch gleichzeitig, das in Worte Gefasste. So hält derRoman die Dinge in einer reizvollen Schwebe, an der Schwelle, im fließendenZwielicht zwischen Leben und Tod. Der Hahn ohne Kopf—wie es auch im Titelbeginnt — wird vom ungarischen Hausmeister auf einem Fensterbrett deselterlichen Hauses des Protagonisten gefunden, in dessen Festräume diebürgerliche Jugend ein Fest zum Schulschluss feiert; Es ist ein Fest, das denfrühen Ausklang einer kurzen Jugend besagt, eine Jugend, die von Krieg undVerrat bedroht wird. Der Bulibascha der Bindnerischen Zigeuner, weiß esgewiss: ein geköpfter Hahn zieht böse Geister ins Haus, der Kopf aber allein ansTor genagelt, der hält sie ab. Hier aber fehlt gerade der segensreiche Kopf.8 Esist 23. August 1944, an dem Rumäniens König Michael der I., als Verbündeterder Deutschen die Partner wechselt, mit den Aliirten einen Waffenstillstandabschließen will und den Mareschal Antonescu als Gefährten Hitlers verhaftenlässt: “Der deutsche Botschafter Manfred Freiherr von Killingen war eben vonder Gemsenjagd in den Karpaten zurückgekehrt. Stehenden Fußes suchte erbeim König um eine Audienz an, die ihm zu später Stunde gewährt wurde, und

78 MARIA SASS 8

————————8 Schlattner, E., a.a.O., S. 456.

forderte die sofortige Freilassung von Antonescu: Andernfalls, Majestät werdeich Rumänien in ein Blutbad verwandeln. Ich bin so frei.”

Wieder in der deutschen Botschaft, schoss sich der Freiherr eine Kugel in denKopf. Die Ärzte befanden: “Exitus letalis!”9 Meistens ereignet sich Politik informellin das gesellschaftliche Gefüge hinein, bestehend aus Onkel und Tanten, unterHeranwachsenden, unter wackligen Balance der sozialen Klassen, in der fragilenKultur des Zusammenlebens mit Rumänen, Ungarn, Deutschen, Juden undZigeunern. In dieser Verwobenheit lässt sich nichts ausmachen, ob der zitierteExitus, der ganz am Ende des Romans steht, sich speziell auf den Tod derdeutschen Minderheit beziehen lässt. Ein Hauch von Vergänglichkeit streiftjedenfalls die gesamte transsilvanische Multikulturalität. Denn “Exitus” ist auchdas allererste Wort des Romans. Zwischen diesen beiden Erwähnungen desUntergangs wird der Tanztee der jungen Leute gefeiert, begegnen uns Nationalistenaller in Fogarasch versammelten Völker, Zivilisten, Offiziere und ihre Burschen,rasche Liebe und immerwährende Gleichgültigkeiten, Flüchtende, Versteckteund Evakuierte: Theatrum mundi transsilvanum. Diesen Roman kann man sichals filmisches Gemälde vorstellen: kleinteilig-siebenbürgisch und darin auchdeutsch und rumänisch.

Schlattners zweiter Roman Rote Handschuhe ist, chronologisch gesehen, dasdritte Glied der Trilogie, bezieht sich auf den Beginn der kommunistischen Ärain Rumänien, die stalinistische Zeit, mit Verfolgungen, Verhaftungen undEinkerkerungen von siebenbürgischen Intellektuellen. Der Autor wurde vonseinen Landsleuten als “Verräter” bezeichnet, er sei im Gefängnis vom Staatsfeindzum Staatsmitarbeiter geworden, habe fünf deutsche Schriftsteller “verpetzt”, sodass diese verhaftet und eingekerkert worden sind. Der Roman ist SchlattnersBekenntnis zum Verrat und seine Selbstdemütigung. Die Geschichte desrumäniendeutschen Autors von der erzwungenen Aussage unter der Folter wirdvon den meisten bezweifelt.

Der Roman Rote Handschuhe enthält hauptsächlich den Verhöralltag derbrutalen Jagd auf Konterrevolutionäre der kommunistischen Machthaber, denender Ich-Erzähler erliegt und gilt als spannendes Zeitdokument rumänischerNachkriegsgeschichte, das aber die Schuldfrage des Verrats offen lässt. Ererzählt die Geschichte und Vorgeschichte der zweijährigen Haftzeit. Die Zelle istder Ort des Erzählvorgangs. Die Personen werden ständig gewechselt. So z.B.finden sich am 23. August 1958 in der Zelle ein katholischer Priester, einproletarischer Aktivist, ein jüdischer Buchhändler und ein orthodoxer Mönchein. Alle haben sich entweder durch zu viel oder zu wenig gesellschaftlichesEngagement verdächtig gemacht und sie wissen, dass sie auf Gerechtigkeit nichthoffen dürfen. Sie erzählen tage- und nächtelang, wobei manchmal der Priesterals Moderator eingreifen muss, die Häftlinge durch Anekdoten oder Späße zuberuhigen, damit sie sich nicht gegenseitig zerfleischen.

Die Zelle wird für den Erzähler in diesem Roman ein Ort der Erinnerung, dieNachkriegsgeschichte in Rumänien wird mit so viel Ressentiments dargestellt,


————————9 Ebenda, S. 517.

wie noch kein anderes Buch über diese Zeitspanne in Rumänien. Auch hier istein weiterer Schritt zur Zerstörung der siebenbürgischen Identität zu vernehmen.

Im August 2005 erschien das dritte Glied der sogenannten Siebenbürgen-Trilogie von Eginald Schlattner. Es umfasst die Jahre 1948-1951, chronologischbetrachtet wäre es das zweite Glied in der von Schlattner geschildertensiebenbürgischen Zeitgeschichte. Der Ort der Handlung ist Schässburg — dasörtliche Gymnasium soll zur Hebammenschule werden, auf klassische Fächerwie z.B. Latein und Religionsunterricht wird verzichtet, demgegenüber wirdrussischer Sprachunterricht und Parteigeschichte in die Curricula aufgenommen.Clemens Rescher, vor nicht zu langer Zeit ein wohlhabender Fabrikantensohn,wird nun als Klassenfeind betrachtet. In wenigen Wochen hat er fast allesverloren: das Elternhaus wird von der Partei besetzt, das Klavier wird verholzt.Der Vater sitzt in Kronstadt im Gefängnis, weil er einen Kommissar bei derEnteignung seiner Fabrik geohrfeigt hat. Alleine Ottilie Rescher, die Großmutterdes Protagonisten, ist zurückgeblieben und hat sich in einem Pferdestalleingerichtet. Ihr Kammermädchen hat ganz plötzlich ihr Klassenbewusstseinentdeckt und macht beim großen Diktaturspiel des Volkes mit. Das ist der Standder Dinge in Siebenbürgen dieser Jahre.

Es sei hier festgehalten, dass Clemens Rescher als Alter-Ego des Autors zubetrachten ist, wobei viel Autobiographisches in die dargestellten Ereignisseeinfließt. Nach der Jugendzeit in Fogarasch 1944 und vor den Erlebnissen einesSecuritate-Gefangenen, der auch zum Verräter wird, wandert der Erzählfadennun in den Mittelteil zurück, wobei von kleineren Dingen gesprochen wird,hauptsächlich von Liebe und Familie. Ein Onkel bringt Clemens bei, dass er sichan die neuen Umstände anpassen müsse, wobei auf den zivilisatorischenKomfort verzichtet werden muss. Er flüchtet “zu den Feldern seiner Vorfahren”,wobei er nicht einmal “strictul necesar” — das Notdürftigste — mitnimmt, nureinen “Kotzen” (eine schäbige Decke), mit der er sich nachts unter freiemHimmel zudecken kann. Ein Hirt lehrt ihn “Palukes” zu kochen und so lernt erüberleben. Es kommen die ersten Lieben, doch sie gehen auch bald. Für den zumAktivisten gewordenen Vater der jungen Petra ist Clemens kein rechter “Arbeiter”und Isabelle, mit der er früher vierhändig Klavier gespielt hat, hält die Grenzendes Standesgemäßen hoch. Nicht einmal die Liebe mit dem ZigeunermädchenCarmencita gelingt, weil in Clemens Adern falsches Blut fließt, das zurAusgrenzung führt. Einzig mit der schönen Rumänin Rodica, mit der ihn tiefeGefühle verbindet, kommt es zu einer Liebesgeschichte. Und wenn das jungeLiebespaar dann eine Reise von Siebenbürgen bis in das Banat macht, dann nutztder Autor die Gelegenheit, in kleinen Nebenhandlungen, die Geschichte dernach Rumänien eingewanderten Sachsen und Schwaben neu aufzuleben. Diesesoll dazu dienen, die untergehende deutsche Kulturlandschaft Siebenbürgens,einem Album gleich, in die Seiten des Romans zu drängen. Dieser Darstellung,der viel Traurigkeit anhaftet, fehlt es nicht an Ironie, wenn der Erzähler über den“neuen Menschen”, der “herausgeprügelt” wird, spricht. Die Dorfbewohner, diezur kollektiven Wirtschaft übergehen müssen, lernen so schnell und klatschen soheftig, dass Stalins Portrait von der Wand fällt. Weniger kooperationswillig sind

80 MARIA SASS 10

die in der Staatsfarm “Roter Stier” zusammengefassten Kühe. Sie reagieren aufdie Grobianismen der Massentierhaltung mit einem Produktionsstreik. Nurnachdem die sanften Hände der zurückgeholten sächsischen Bäuerinnen eingreifenlassen sie die Milch fließen. Dazu kommt natürlich auch die klassische Musik.Ein Klavier steht — es wird zum metaphorischen Titel — “im Nebel”. DieseMetapher kann als Allegorie auf die Sinnlosigkeit der gewaltsam verändertenVerhältnisse gedeutet werden. Klassische Musik, als bürgerliche Musikbetrachtet, kommt nur in den Ställen zum Klingen und sie wird auch nur dortgeduldet, denn wenigstens das Vieh darf allergisch auf Parteigebrüll sein und mitMozart bei Laune gehalten werden. Das Klavier im Nebel ist eine Metapher fürdie Zerstörung und den Untergang einer Gesellschaft, die stolz auf ihre Kulturwar. Es wird in diesem Roman ein bleibendes literarisches Denkmal deruntergehenden sächsischen Lebenswelt gesetzt.

Schlattners Romane sprechen implizit und explizit von der sächsischen kulturellenIdentität Siebenbürgens, die in jahrhundertelanges Bemühen konstruiert unddanach, wie oben erwähnt, im Laufe einiger Jahrzehnte zugrunde gerichtetwurde. Die Romantrilogie hat die Rolle, diese Kultur für die Nachwelt und dasAusland zu konservieren. Wie sich Susanna Lulé ausdrückte: “Der Wille zurGroßform in Verbindung mit einer Betonung des ,Exitus’ oder ‚Exitus letalis’,des tödlichen Abgangs, des Untergangs, unterstreicht die Intention des Autors,eine zu Ende gehende 800-jährige Gemeinschaft in Literatur zu transformierenund darin zu bewahren.”10

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lulé, Susanna, Siebenbürger Erinnerungsorte. Zur Erschreibung des Vergangenen bei Eginald Schlattner undJoachim Wittstock, Typoskrip, 2001.

Ritter, Alexander, Germanistik ohne schlechtes Gewissen. Die deutschsprachige Literatur des Auslandes undihre wissenschaftliche Rezeption. In Deutschsprachige Literatur im Ausland. Hg. VonAl. Ritter, Göttingen1985.

Ritter, Alexander, In Südostdeutsche Vierteljahresblätter, 50/2001, 4, München, 2001.Schlattner, Eginald, Der geköpfte Hahn, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998.Schlesak, Dieter, Halbjahresschrift für die südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik, Heft. Nr.

1/Mai 1999, 11. Jahrgang. AGK Verlag, 1999.


————————10 Lulé, Susanna, a.a.O., S.5.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CSCE, 1990-1995.AN INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE

FLAVIA JERCA*

Abstract. The research is focused on explaining why the process ofadaptation of the CSCE led to this degree of institutionalization. The studyconsists of four sections. The one presents the theoretical framework onwhich I will later draw the analysis of the CSCE’s institutionalization. Theexternal shock and the states’ policies towards the European institutions ingeneral, and in particular towards the CSCE are elaborated in the nextsection, so that afterwards, withholding each state policies, to focus in thethird section on the bargaining process from which the final form of theOSCE resulted. Before drawing the final conclusions, the fourth sectionadvances a comparison between the “old” and the “new”CSCE,with emphasison different institutional quality indicators. It was considered necessary tospecify from beginning the starting and the ending point in the institutionaldegree of CSCE. Therefore, the section below shortly presents the “old” andthe “new” CSCE.

Key words: institutionalization, “old” CSCE, “new” CSCE, securityarchitecture.

Introduction

The 1989 revolutionary year, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from theEastern Europe and the end of the Cold War brought with them new challengesthat were going to change the existing international security, by their extensionor adaptation. One of these institutions was the CSCE (Conference of Securityand Cooperation in Europe), which was created as a dialogue and consensus-building process since the early 1970’s in the context of an East-West conflict.By adapting it to the new challenges the participating states considered it asuitable framework for addressing the current European security issues. Theinstitutionalization process is considered to have taken place between 1990 and1995. In December 1994 the participant states decided to change its name inOSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), but this did not————————

* Ma Student in International Relations, University of Bucharest.


change its legal status. In 1995 it had all the characteristics of an organization(permanent bodies, political organs, instruments and mechanisms) but it lackedjuridical personality.

My research is focused on explaining why the process of adaptation of theCSCE led to this degree of institutionalization*. This means that from a diplomaticconference it was transformed into a security management institution. Whywould it be important for us to know? Because at the end of the Cold War andafter WTO’s dissolution, the CSCE was one of Europe’s two multilateralsecurity institutions, but the only one in which all the former enemies wereparticipating and also with a special meaning for the East-European countries,left for the moment without any security umbrella.

The analysis starts from two working hypotheses. The first hypothesis is ageneral one, based on the existence of an external shock. The new securitychallenges of the post-Cold War era consisted in a pressure to adapt this atypicalconference by strengthening it with new structures and mechanisms. Yet, thiscannot explain us the specific CSCE’s institutionalization. For this purpose anactor centered complementary hypothesis must be introduced. This one can helpexplaining the specific change that took place from moment A (CSCE in 1990)to moment B (OSCE in 1995). The CSCE’s final functions and forms dependedon state’s interests, because each state had different aims and interests and faceddifferent domestic, foreign, security problems.

As a theoretical foundation I will draw upon the institutional theory, formulatedby C. Wallender, H. Haftendorn and R. Keohane. This approach starts from thepoint that ‘institutions matter’, i.e. state policies are influenced by the existenceof international institutions. The theory’s focus is on the reciprocal interactionbetween institutions and national governments: first focus on the impact ofinstitutions on national policies and then on the impact of such national policieson the institutions themselves1. Correlated with the institutional theory, theanalysis uses the function and form framework, which provides the basis forexplaining, along other elements, the change that occurs inside an institution.

The study consists of four sections. The one presents the theoreticalframework on which I will later draw the analysis of the CSCE’s institutionalization.The external shock and the states’ policies towards the European institutions ingeneral, and in particular towards the CSCE are elaborated in the next section,so that afterwards, withholding each state policies, to focus in the third sectionon the bargaining process from which the final form of the OSCE resulted.Before drawing the final conclusions, the fourth section advances a comparisonbetween the “old” and the “new” CSCE, with emphasis on different institutionalquality indicators. It was considered necessary to specify from beginning thestarting and the ending point in the institutional degree of CSCE. Therefore, thesection below shortly presents the “old” and the “new” CSCE.

2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CSCE, 1990-1995 83

————————* The letters written in italics show my emphases.1 Celeste Wallender, Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane: “Introduction”, in Helga Haftendorn, Robert

O. Keohane, Celleste Wallender (ed.): Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space, Oxford,1999, p. 12.

2.1. The “old” and the “new” CSCE

Two main block-agendas led to the establishment of this Conference. On onehand, the Soviet Union was looking for the recognition of the Second WorldWar’s status-quo, and on the other hand, the West was looking for a possibilityto stimulate democratic changes the communist regimes from inside. TheHelsinki “Decalogue” from The Final Act (August 1, 1975), which establishedthe basic ten principles that should have guided the relationship between states,and the three “baskets” (political-military security; economic, environment,technology; humanitarian area), constituted the framework for interactionbetween the two blocks. It should be noted that all European states wereparticipating to this political process (minusAlbania). Yet, the Helsinki Final Actwas not a legally but a political binding document, a comprehensive code ofconduct for all major areas of international relations. Some argue that in the mid80’s the increase in the frequency and length of the CSCE review sessions,regularly attended by the same group of national officials, allowed the CSCE todevelop even an institutional identity2.

For many it was hard to imagine the ‘old’ CSCE in the new Europe. After theevents in 1989, the Conference had an uncertain future because its raison d’êtrehad been the division of the continent, so it had little relevance for the post-ColdWar Europe3. But instead of disappearing, the CSCE was adapted to the neworder, as the only way to reunify the continent. The first step came in November1990, when the participant states of the CSCE adopted the Paris Charta for aNew Europe (November 1990), which contained basic principles and rules foran intensified cooperation after the East-West conflict, plus permanent organisms,instruments, and mechanisms. Yet, the functions of these organs will take timeto be clearly defined. The events that followed (intrastate crisis, ethnic violence,internal wars, spillover of conflicts into regional conflagrations) demanded fromthe CSCE more organs and mechanism. Especially the CSCE’s weak responseto the Yugoslav crisis determined an overall review of its structures.

At the end of the institutionalizing process, the OSCE structure consisted of:Summits, Ministerial Councils, a Senior Council, a Permanent Council (regularbody for political consultation and decision-making, weekly meetings), a Forumfor Security Cooperation (regular body for arms control and CSBMs, weeklymeetings), a OCSE ParliamentaryAssembly. The Chairman-in-Office had a largestructure under its command: personal representatives of the CiO, the Office forDemocratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OCSCE Representative onFreedom of the Media, the OSCE Secretariat with its Secretary General, a HighCommissioner on National Minorities, the OCSE field activities; the OCSEAssistance in Implementation of Bilateral Agreements. There were also the

84 FLAVIA JERCA 3

————————2 ªtefan Lehne: “Vom Prozess zur Institution: Zur aktuallen Debatte ueber die Weiterentwicklung des

KSKE-Prozesses“, Europa-Archiv, no.16(1990), p. 500; quoted in Richard Weitz: “Pursuing Military Security inEastern Europe“, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.): After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategiesin Europe, 1989-1991, Center for International Affairs, Cambridge; Hardwar Univ. Press, 1993, p. 347.

3 ªtefan Lehne: The CSCE in the 1990s, Common European House or Potemkin Vill?,Wien, Braumüller,1991, p. 1.

OCSCE related bodies: the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (Geneva), theJoint Consultative Group which promotes the implementation of the CFE Treaty,and the Open Skies Consultative Commission which promotes implementationof Open Sky Treaty.

As it was showed above, in a few years the old Conference was endowed withseveral political and decision-making bodies, some of them permanent, plusinstruments and mechanisms useful to implement their purpose. The paper doesnot have the intention to look at the “new” OCSE effectiveness and efficiency.So a statement whether the institutionalizing process led to a “better” CSCE ornot won’t be made here. Yet, in the last part of the paper a comparison of the“old” and “new” is made, focused on several institutional quality indicators.

2.2. Theoretical framework: “the institutionalist theory”4

In the last two decades the international institutions started to get more attentionfrom scholars, and shortly after, the idea that “institutions matter” emerged. Thisapproach knew in time various versions, and the “institutionalist theory” presentedin the current study is one of these versions, generally named “neo-liberalinstitutionalism”, and based on the presumptions of the rational institutionalism5.

Having as bedrock the idea that institutions matter, the theory views thesystem not as an anarchic but as an institutionalized one, which affects, due tothis character, the states actions. They define institutions as ‘persistent andconnected sets of rules, often affiliated with organizations, which operate acrossinternational boundaries’. Why do institutions matter in the view of this approach?Because they affect states’ cost-benefits calculations and due to that also areshaping their strategies, by reducing possible actions; they induce conformity,due to the norms and rules that regularize behavior; they alter how societies viewtheir interests and the mandate that states have to act in world politics6.

States are expected to cooperate in pursuing common interests, since cooperativestrategies under some circumstances produce more benefits than unilateral ones.States will still face the problem of uncertainty and will worry about beingexploited, but these can be minimized by institutions by increasing informationabout other states’ intentions and likely choices. The state as an actor is not to beneglected, but the vector is reversed, from the institutionalized system to thestates. Power and interest remain important. Preferences are fixed but the theoryadmits that these can change due to a fundamental external shock, or in time.

Due to the limit space, not all security institutions’ effects are going to bediscussed, just the ones that apply more on the current case study. Institutions


————————4 The institutional theory can sometimes create confuson due to the name, as even the authors themselves

admit, because in some of the literature, this approach has been referred as ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’. Butdue to several reasons, the authors prefer the first name.

5 The authors underline that “... our brand of institutionalism relies heavily on contractual theories ineconomics and on the rationality assumptions. States are viewed, within limits, as actors whose strategies canbe seen as the result of rational calculations by their leaders. (…)…institutions play a role…by effecting states’cost-benefit calculations”. Celeste Wallender, Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane (ed.): “Introduction”, inHelga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, Celeste Wallender (ed.): Imperfect Unions…, p. 3-5.

6 Ibidem, p. 1.

may affect a state’s strategies by changing the options available and altering theircosts and benefits, which leads in the current analyze to the conclusion that theinstitutionalization of the CSCE after the Cold War was meant to prevent thereturn to mistrustful and overly defensive security strategies by involvingmember states in an ongoing process of information exchange and transparency7.Coming back to the core of the present analyzes, that is explaining institutionalchange, we come around another process: change by adaptation. This seems tobe necessary for an institution in order to survive, and requires it to be sensitivenot only to general changes in its environment, but specifically to the interestsand foreign-policy preferences of its most important members8. Afterinvestigating the change in state policies, the analyze needs to be extended toinstitutional dynamics, more precisely to see how interactions between statepolicies yielded outcomes, through bargaining processes, that were notnecessarily predictable from the set of policies themselves9.

The core element in the analysis of the CSCE’s institutionalization is thefunctions and forms framework (Fig 1). Therewith, the relation between theinstitutional functions and forms is important for the institutional theory becauseit provides the basis for explaining the variation I the institutional forms and forframing hypotheses with view to the causes and the directions of the institutionalchange10. Different security obstacles and problems impose for their solution certaininstitutional functions, and different functions impose different institutionalforms. To help for a better highlighting of this analysis framework, the attentionhas to be first directed towards the security institutions and the security problemswith which states confront themselves during their cooperation.

diffrent security problems diffrent security strategies different functions different forms

interaction between states policies and bargaining processes

Fig. 1. Functions — Forms Framework

86 FLAVIA JERCA 5

————————7 Ibidem, p. 9.8 Ibidem, p. 12.9 Ibidem, p. 13.10 Ibidem, p. 7.

Commondenominator

Identify each state’sfunctions and forms

definition

Identify each state’ssecurity problem

definition

Definition ofcommon security

problem

Common concepton required functions

and forms= +

The final result of the institutionalization process represents in fact the commondenominator reached during the bargaining process. Identifying each state’ssecurity problem definition leads to the common security problem. Identifyingeach state’s functions and forms definition for the institution in change leads tothe common concept on required functions and forms. All together point out thecommon denominator. We are interested in the interaction between states policieswhich takes place during the bargaining processes. This process is influenced by theinstitutions, because when choosing a strategy, a state depends not only on whatit wants, but also on what it believes other states seek, information which isprovided due to the existence of institutions.

In modern informational terms, the essence of the security dilemma lies inuncertainty and private information. This leads us to the observation that theConference should be changed in an institutions designed to cope with thesekinds of risks, this means will have rules, norms, procedures to enable themembers to provide and obtain information and manage disputes in order toavoid generating security dilemmas11.

2.3. States’ policies

Governments in the west and east sought to develop appropriate strategies tocope with the decline in Soviet power, the unification of Germany and thecollapse of the Soviet Union itself12. Plus the new kind of risks: possiblefragmentation of control over Soviet nuclear weapons, the outbreak of ethnicviolence within states and across borders and spread of civil violence, possibilityof political and economical collapse in the East with profound socialconsequences, mass migration in the wake of violence and collapse, militaryactions outside Europe, as in Middle East etc.. In an international environmentmore and more interdependent, the fate of an institution is directly influenced bythe existence of other institutions. Once with the end of the Cold War, theinstitutions needed to be adapted in order to face the new challenges, otherwisethey might no longer meet the challenges of the new world. The institutionalizationdegree depended not only on the characteristics of the respective institution, butalso on the availability of the member states to invest in these, according to theirown security problems and strategies, or to the opportunities or constrains raisedby other institutions.

In the western highly institutionalized system state behavior was governed byrules and norms and the CSCE represented only a part of this system. Therefore,we have to look not only on how the Conference influences states policies, butalso at the other institutions part of that system, some of them with a very highinfluence role, like the NATO and the European Community. The former Eastern‘block’ is characterized after the Cold War by a void of institutions, tried to befield by some Central and Eastern countries with western institutions. States’


————————11 Ibidem, p. 26.12 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye: “Introduction: The End of the Cold War in Europe”, in Keohane,

Robert O. (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 1.

policies towards the CSCE will be influenced also by these institutions, by beinga member or by wanting to become one. And not to forget that these also wentthrough an extensive process of institutionalization. The sections below focuson the characterization of each state’s position, continued to general functionsand then linked to respectively institutional form. The attitude towards theinstitutionalization of the CSCE is also analyzed according to some criteria, like:competencies, mode of decision-making, instruments, encompassed policyareas13. Only significant representatives of the old blocks will be presented.Germany. As a legacy of the ColdWar, Germany developed reflexive support

for institutions that were not only instruments of policy but also normativeframeworks for policy-making14. This means that the web of interlockinginstitutions of which it was a member defined and limited its foreign actions.

In its quest for unification, Germany had to reassure both allies and formeradversaries of the consequences of its unification. In order to handle its securityproblems and to achieve its foreign policy objectives, Germany used, in general,the following strategies: deepening its support for NATO to reassure the US andfor the EC to reassure France and Britain, support for strengthened CSCE toallay Soviet fears15, bilateral diplomacy towards east bloc countries. Germanywas one of the unceasing promoters of the adaptation of existing internationalinstitutions to the circumstances of the new world. Germany’s strategies weredetermined by NATO, CSCE, EC, and WEU, perceived as indispensable andcomplementary. In this picture, the CSCE provided a framework that wasappropriate for increasing stability among the countries on the continent and foraddressing spillover regional conflicts, but a framework that had to adapt itsstructures as to avoid inefficiency16. The CSCE was also an important pillar inher policy to promote economic and political stabilization in the former easternbloc, and to prevent the political and economic isolation of the USSR.

The unification was accomplished under the 2 plus 4 process (the fourwinners of the SecondWorldWar plus the two German states) but the CSCE wasgoing to be the framework through which Germany would reduce uncertaintyabout its own intentions. In this way CSCE, in the big picture of institutionalizedmultilateralism, became from mean an end. Germany wanted the CSCE toperform a new function, which was to include a new kind of internationalcooperation, with new operational measures for multilateral attempts to manageand possibly dissolve emerging risks and conflicts and to foster democratization.

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————————13 For the whole table of the criteria for assessing international institutions and institutionalization

policies (in this case, security institutions) and more explanations see Ingo Peters: “The “old” and the newCSCE” — Institutional Quality and Political Meaning”, in Ingo Peters (ed.): New Security Challenges: TheAdaptation of International Institutions, New York, Lit Verlag, p. 87-89.

14 Jeffrey J. Anderson, John B. Goodman: “Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold WarEurope”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 23-24.

15 Initially a united Germany as member of the NATO was not acceptable for USSR, and after longbilateral negotiations and unilateral concessions made by Germany, like limitation of the army or financialsupport for the soviet army forces leaving GDR, plus inviolability of borders and a change in NATO’s doctrine,the latter agreed.

16 Jeffrey J. Anderson, John B. Goodman: op. cit.; in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 43.

The CSCE was to become the main engine of an “all-European cooperativesecurity strategy”17. To be able to accomplish all these new functions, the CSCEneeded new form (instruments and institutional structure): new politicalstructures, a council of the Foreign Ministers, regular summits, agencies, forums,institutions for conflict prevention and peaceful settlements of disputes, etc.

Regarding the CSCE’s future policy area, beside the three classical baskets,now it should have also promoted democracy, protected minorities, preventedconflict and manageed crisis. The CSCE’s competencies were to be verycomprehensive, from consultations, setting norms and rules, implementationverification, operational measures, to political sanctions. Germany also wantedto change the mode of decision-making, introducing the “consensus-minus-one”. It can be concludeed that Germany was one of the leading countries withextensive institutionalization programs for the CSCE.The Soviet Union. Immediately after the events in 1989/90, it can be argued

that Soviet (and later the Russian Federation) strategies were substantially affectedby the existence of institutions in Europe and it relied at least in part on institutionrestrains and opportunities in calculating policies. It relied on institutions incoping with the new uncertainties and in the same time to reassure other statesabout Soviet intensions18.

The Soviet Union was most interested in German unification and the collapseof the alliance system it had imposed in the Eastern Europe. Regarding the WTO,it first proposed to be transformed in a political organization (as well as theNATO), and after its disintegration, it used it as an example for the westernmilitary alliance. The CSCE would have to take its place as an all-Europeaninstitution more appropriate for the entire range of post-confrontation Europeansecurity19. The CSCE remain so important in the first years of the new era, dueto its characteristic of being the only major European institution in which theSoviet Union was a member. And was also an important link to the West, whichallowed it to participate on an equal basis in the management of Europeanaffairs20. After the military withdrawal from the Eastern Europe countries and theturn of these to the western institutions, the Soviet Union saw the strengtheningof the CSCE as the only way to prevent the lost of the political influence in thispart of Europe. The CSCE had a special relation with the Russian Federation inthe context of its missions of conflict prevention in former soviet territories.

With such functions to accomplish, the CSCE also needed new forms. Russiapursued to extend the Conference competencies and component, by creating, forexample, a “«pan-European security system» through which Russian securityproblems could be administrated”21. A significant increase of CSCE’s policy


————————17 Ingo Peters: “The “old” and the new CSCE…”, in Idem (ed.): New Security Challenges…, New York,

Lit Verlag, p. 199.18 Celeste A. Wallander, Jane E. Prokop: “Soviet Security Strategies toward Europe: After the Wall, with

Their Backs up against It”, in Robert O Keohane (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 99-100.19 Ibidem, p. 91, 94.20 ªtefan Lehne: op. cit., p. 7.21 Itar Tass, 31 January, 1922, quoted in Leszek Buszynski: Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War,

Praeger, London, 1996, p. 251.

areas (especially regarding peacekeeping) and its institutional structure was alsowanted. However, the support existed, but no finality was sought. On the otherhand, Russia bitterly opposed a change of the voting procedures.The United States. US ought to adapt NATO in order to maintain it as a

source of American influence, and to continue support for the EC as a stabilizingforce inWestern Europe and a magnet to democratic change in Eastern Europe22.The adaptation to the new challenges sought also to maintain NATO as thecentral military alliance that would address the European security. In the sametime it supported the development of a strong European defense policy, as a wayto reduce American burden, but not to the limit of undermining the importanceof NATO. Regarding the CSCE after the end of the Cold War they wanted totransform it in a large security framework that would give the east Europeancountries the sensation of playing an important role in the European security(e.g. the CSCE new institutions were located in countries from the former eastbloc) while they were still left outside the NATO’s door. US were ready to goalong with the strengthening of the CSCE to the extent that this was necessaryto encourage democracy and to assist the East European governments, topromote German unity and to strengthen Gorbachev’s internal position, but thesupport for the change was temperate by the wary of the risk that thisdevelopment might affect NATO’s role23. To successfully accomplish thesefunctions, the CSCE must not pass through an extensive process ofinstitutionalization, therefore, its forms (institutional structure), as well as thebureaucracy which followed it, should be as simple as possible. U. S wereperhaps the state which resisted the most the process of reforming the CSCE,trying to get as little as possible at the negotiating table.France. Immediately after the events that took place during 1989, France

was concerned about two things: the effects of German unification and themaintenance of an independent French diplomacy. Its strategy to cope with thefirst concern was to promote the ‘deepening’ of the EC, which came in disputewith the other important stream within the Community, the ‘widening’. Francewas also active within the debate between the primacy of NATO and anindependent European security policy. In the minds of the French officials cameback the old concern of a “European Europe”, i.e. a Europe that would not bedominated by the U.S.24. In this context theWEUwould had to gain an independentrole and to become the institutions responsible with the European security.

In this highly institutionalized environment, the CSCE captured no specialattention from the French officials. Before 1989 it was seen as a good way toinfluence change within the eastern countries; now it was seen as lackingpotential in addressing the new challenges with which the whole Europe wasconfronting. As functions, the Conference had to activate in the field of peacefulsettlements of disputes and supporting democracy, rule of law and fundamentalhuman rights in the new eastern democracies. An ambitious plan, approved in

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————————22 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye: op. cit., in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 11.23 ªtefan Lehne: The CSCE in the 1990s…, p. 8.24 Ibidem, p. 139.

the end, was a court of arbitration and counseling based on a judicial convention.It also pleaded for a permanent executive political organ and for the CSCEdevelopment on a legal line.Great Britain. One concern for Britain was the unification of Germany. This

was perceived as a threat both to its position in Europe and to its relationshipwith the US, especially after George Bush’s offer to Germany of a ‘partnershipin leadership’ (May 1989)25. This privileged position near the United States wasusually occupied by Great Britain. The problem posed uncertainty about Britain’splace in general in Europe and in the world, and especially in the economicsphere. The fear of a more integrated Community that would tie its hands,determined Britain to be the leader of the ‘widening’ stream. In this direction, itpushed for a sooner enlargement of the EC towards the new democracies in theEast Europe. Related to NATO, the British position was another story. Duringthe Cold War, British defense policy had become so integrated with NATOpolicy that it was difficult to separate the two26. Going down this road, Britainsupported a more political role for the alliance and a strengthenWEU that wouldallowed the Europeans to have an increased role in their own defense while notundermining NATO’s importance, read as US. In the same time it opposed an ECrole in defense issues.

In this whole picture, the CSCE drew little attention. Even during the Cold Warthe British officials had little faith in its abilities. Now they were supporting thestrengthening but without expecting big outcomes.With regard to CSCE’s functionsand forms, the British officials mostly were not counted among thosewith initiatives;instead they tried— at least in some issues— to undermine the final outcome. Theyopposed a increase of CSCE’s autonomy and supported theAmerican argument, thatmaximum efficiency is obtained with a minimum of bureaucracy.East Europe. After the collapse of the Eastern institutions — the WTO and

CMEA — most of the governments from this region turned their eyes towardsthe western institutionalized system. But lacking invitations to join, they soughtto use the CSCE, although its procedures were slow and difficult and its abilityto act coherently against a determined threat virtually nonexistent27. Along theseyears we can observe that the East European governments tried to do their bestto meet the standards of the institutions in which they were (CSCE) or were notyet (NATO, EC) members.

Regarding the CSCE, the states were fervent supporters of the strengthening.But due to the opposition of some important countries, particularly the US, theambitious proposals of the Eastern countries of a categorical change werealways simplified. The East European governments had several reasons forsupporting an increased role for the CSCE regarding the security of Europe28.


————————25 Louise Richardson: “British State Strategies after the Cold War”, in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): After the

Cold War…, p. 150-151.26 Ibidem, p. 159.27 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye: op. cit., in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): After…, p. 14.28 See Richard Weitz for a detailed description of the reasons; Richard Weitz: op. cit., in Robert O.

Keohane (ed.): After…, p. 346-347.

1) Through the CSCE they identified themselves as members of the Europeancommonwealth. 2) Offered a place to exchange information and to express theirdefense concerns in very uncertain times through an extensive dialogue. 3) TheConference’s existence facilitated their campaign to weaken the WTO andSoviet Union’s membership made it easier for Moscow to relinquish the WTO.4) The CSCE remained the only European security institution in which theSoviet Union (and afterwards the Russian Federation) was still a member. It isworth mentioning that the CSCE’s weak response to the Yugoslavian crisisundermined its importance in the eyes of eastern countries. Their focus will beafterwards on confidence building and crisis management mechanisms29. Themost ambitious plan of transformation came from Czechoslovakia. The visionwas of a Europe-wide security system centered on a Commission on Security inEurope, which would have assumed the functions of all existing alliances, endingwith a confederation that would have act as a single actor30.

There is no doubt that the relative abundance of international institutions didaffect the East European security environment, especially if we consider that therewere weak governments, and traditionally they favor international institutions31. Themembership or not of an institution influenced in equal measure the states’ policies.

2.4. Proposals, bargaining, decisions

The new environment after the Cold War was characterized by a high degreeof uncertainty, which combined with competitive bargaining, would have toresult in obstacles to cooperation32. Being an institution dealing with risks, thetransformation of CSCE would have to consider a design that copes withproblems of assurance and coordination. The first problem required mechanismsthat allow members to exchange information about one another’s preferences,while the latter required negotiating forums and bargaining structures, especiallyin an institutions characterized by the consensus principle. Immediately after theend of the Cold War, the CSCE offered the perfect framework for negotiationsbetween the former enemies. There were now focused on adapting the Conferenceto the new challenges of the international environment by strengthening itsinstitutional structure and endowing with new mechanisms, instruments andcapabilities. The section below presents chronologically the stages of theinstitutionalization process, by emphasizing on states’ proposals, bargaining and,in the end, the reached common denominator.

In the wake of the 1989/90 revolutions, ambitious packages for thestrengthening of the CSCE were offered by the East-European countries andGDR, with concrete proposals for permanent organs, like a secretariat, centersfor disarmament and verification, or for conflict prevention and peaceful

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————————29 Ibidem, p. 353.30 Ibidem, p. 362.31 Ibidem, p. 374, 378.32 Ingo Peters: “Introduction: New Security Challenges and Institutional Change”, in Ingo Peters (ed.):

New Security Challenges…, New York, Lit Verlag, p. 13-15.

settlements of disputes (even permanent agencies at the political level)33. InDecember 1989 the Soviet president Gorbachev called for an earlier summit ofthe CSCE in the second half of 1990 for the strengthening of the CSCE, aresponse to Kohl’s ten-points plan ‘for overcoming the division of Germany andEurope’34. Immediately French president Mitterrand offered Paris as the placewhere the first summit after the one in 1975 to be hold, but now in totally newinternational context. At the Conference on the Human Dimensions of the CSCEin Copenhagen (July 5-29, 1990): it was decided to set up a Committee to preparethe summit.

The Preparatory Committee was the first one to reflect the new changeswithin the negotiating partners. There were no longer two blocks with the NNAsas mediators. The new central force was now EC, as the only group of states stillclosely coordinating their positions35. The Soviet Union presented flexibility,and was interested only in the common NATO-WTO declaration. Within theeastern countries, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were very active andwith ambitious proposals. Yet what was to be obtained at the Paris summit hadbeen already decided. In July 1990 at the NATO summit, the London Declarationwas released as the common denominator within theWest. The document containedthe program concerning the institutionalization of the CSCE: at the center of thenew CSCE would be a mechanism for regular consultations at the head of state,ministerial and senior official levels, which would be supported by the permanentsecretariat, a mechanism to monitor elections, a center for the prevention ofconflicts and a CSCE parliamentary body36. For the moment the idea of a strongCSCE was reduced by the fear of the Western states that it would diminish therole of NATO and affect the integration within the EC.The Charta of Paris for a New Europe37 signed at the Paris summit in

November 1990, was the first official document to record that the era ofconfrontation and division of Europe has ended and that the time of profoundchange has come. Also there were taken the first decisions regardinginstitutionalization. At the political level regular meeting were established:summits, a Council of Foreign Ministers (will provide the central forum forpolitical consultations within the CSCE process; regularly meetings, at leastonce a year.), follow-up meetings (every two years). A Committee of SeniorOfficials will prepare the meetings of the Council and carry out its decisions.The Committee will review current issues and may take appropriate decisions,including in the form of recommendations to the Council. Permanent organswere established in order to provide administrative support to the political level(both the Council and the Committee), i.e. the Secretariat in Prague. Plus


————————33 Ingo Peters: “The “old” and the” new” CSCE — Institutional Quality and Political Meaning”, in Ingo

Peters (ed.): New Security Challenges…, New York, Lit Verlag, p. 102-103.34 Ingo Peters: “The CSCE and German Policy: a Study in How Institutions Matter”, in Haftendorn,

Keohane, Wallender (ed.): Imperfect Security Institutions..., p. 202.35 ªtefan Lehne, The CSCE in the 1990s…, p. 17.36 Ibidem.37 The information regarding the decision taken in Paris is from “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”,

Paris Summit, 21.11.1990, www.osce.org.

specialized agencies on specific policy areas: the Conflict Prevention Centre inVienna to assist the Council in reducing the risk of conflict. It will also supportthe implementation of the CSBMs mechanism for consultation and co-operationas regards unusual military activities; annual exchange of military information;communications network; annual implementation assessment meetings; co-operation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature. An Office for FreeElections in Warsaw was created to facilitate contacts and the exchange ofinformation on elections within participating States. Instruments forimplementing agreed measures have been developed, ascribed to either thepolitical forums or the organs, depending on the areas of assignments. Alsomechanisms, which would provide prearranged procedures for consultations anddecision-making in conflicts or crisis situations, e.g.: “unusual military activities”,“human rights mechanism”. It was also created the CSCE parliamentary assembly,involving members of parliaments from all participating States.

Starting with 1991 there is a “second wave” in the construction of new CSCEinstitutions, a phenomenon with more causes: the NATO government no longerfeared the CSCE, as a potential rival of the Alliance; the central and easterncountries realized they will would not receive direct western security guaranteesand reoriented towards the CSCE. Hereby the wishes of the small states werethis time welcomed by a positive western attitude38.

So the Paris summit was the first one to decide in the matter ofinstitutionalization. But it wasn’t going to be the last one, because as it wasmentioned, the process lasted at least until 1995. The first Council of Ministers39held in Berlin in June 1991 decided on a mechanism for consultation andcooperation with regard to emergency situations, which “arise from a violationof one of the Principles of the Final Act or as the result of major disruptionsendangering peace, security or stability”.A state can demand an emergency meetingif it has the support of only other 12 states. But the rule of consensus remainsvalid regarding other decisions (like measures to be taken, etc.). It followed thesecond meeting, Prague Council, which had to set the guidelines for the thirdCSCE summit at Helsinki.

The Prague Council40 which took place in January 1992 represented a totallydifferent CSCE, at least regarding participating states, with ten new ones; someof them not even ‘European’. The Council took some important decisionstowards strengthening the CSCE. In order to increase its effectiveness, theCommittee of Senior Officials (CSO) will meet more regularly, at least everythree months, and it can delegate tasks to other CSCE institutions or to open-ended ad hoc groups with a precise mandate. An important deviation from theconsensus principle was realized: appropriate action may be taken by theCouncil or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of the

94 FLAVIA JERCA 13

————————38 ªtefan Lehne: The CSCE in the 1990s…, p. 31.39 The information regarding the decisions taken in Berlin is from the “Summary of Conclusions”, the

First Meeting of the Council in Berlin, 19/20.6.1991, www.osce.org.40 The information regarding the decisions taken in Prague is from the “Summary of Conclusions”, the

Second Meeting of the Council in Prague, 30/31.1.1992, www.osce.org.

consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violationsof relevant CSCE commitments (para, 16, p. 16), i.e. principle of ‘consensus-minus-one’. Functions andmethods of the CPCwere further enhanced. For example,it has the authority to initiate fact-finding and monitor missions in connectionswith the mechanism on unusual military activities within CSBMS. The Officefor Free Elections in Warsaw was expanded and renamed Office for DemocraticInstitutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), with the task of reviewing implementationof the CSCE human dimensions and of serving as an institutional framework forsharing and exchanging information, expertise and programmes aimed atassisting the new democracies in their institutional-building. The EconomicForum was created to meet within the CSCE framework to discuss economiccooperation, the transition to market economy and other related issues.

There was also no agreement in several issues proposed like: the CSCE rolein peacekeeping, a court of arbitration and conciliation (France), a high commissionerfor minorities (Netherlands)41. The discussion of these had to be postponed forthe forthcoming summit. It should be mentioned that the idea of the CSCE tobecome a regional IGO started to take shape since then. The main supports wereFrance and Germany followed closely by Italy, Belgian, Poland, Sweden, Finland,Greece and Austria. The main opponents were clearly the United States. Aspecial focus was on the further development of conflict prevention and crisismanagement mechanisms, especially now when the ethnic conflicts seemed tobe an increased risk to everyone. Germany was perhaps the most ferventadvocator of these further strengthening, yet others were also preoccupied, likeU.K. or Italy.

At the Helsinki summit42 states had reached the compromise in some of theissues presented above. Germany’s idea for supporting the Chairman-in-Office(CiO) was accomplished by creating the troika, formed by the CiO, itspredecessor and its successor. The post of a High Commissioner for NationalMinorities was created within the human dimension. The security dimensionwas reinforced by the creation of the Forum for Security Cooperation, a placefor negotiations on disarmament and arms control, as well as confidence andsecurity building measures. As instruments of conflict prevention and crisismanagement, were created fact-finding and rapporteur missions, and peacekeepingoperations as support for a political solution.

The third Council meeting in Stockholm43 (December 1992) stood under thesign of adapting the mechanism for the peaceful settlements of disputes, and theone of regional issues, i.e. the ethnic conflicts within the former Yugoslavia andthe former soviet territories (the Baltic States, Transnistria, Abkhazia, SouthOssetia, Nagorno-Karabakh). The deficiencies obvious during the attempt to


————————41 Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International

Organization, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993, p. 29.42 The information regarding the decisions is from the “Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Summit, 10.07.

1992, www.osce.org.43 The information regarding the decisions is from the “Summary of Conclusions”, the Third Meeting of

the Council in Stockholm, 14/15.12.1992, www.osce.org.

deal with these conflicts and the appearance of a marginal role left for the CSCEin the European security issues, were sufficient reasons for a comprehensivereview and a further reform44.

The review report of the new Secretary General of the CSCE led to theadaptation of new decisions regarding the institutionalization process, at thefourth Council meeting in Rome, in December 1993. Under the title of “CSCEand the New Europe-Our Security is Indivisible” the document recorded: theCSO became the Permanent Committee in Vienna (ambassadorial level), incharge of the day-to-day work and supervision of operational measures; the newSecretariat in Vienna, while in Prague remained only a bureau; the CPC becamethe fourth department of the new secretariat; new responsibilities for the Bureaufor Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw etc.

The numerous proposals for a further development of the CSCE and its thirdfollow-up meeting at Budapest in December 1994 were all overshadowed by thequestion of NATO and EU expansion with respect to the East-Central Europeanstates45. Russia was clearly against an expansion of NATO towards its formersatellites, and as a contra weight favored a further expansion of the CSCE. In thiscontext the adoption of several institutional proposals were again prevented andthe Budapest documents consisted of compromising variants. It can be said thatthe results stood under the sign of changing names. A lot of central CSCEinstitutions were touched by this change: the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministerswas renamed into the CSCEMinisterial Council; the Committee of Senior Officialsbecame the Senior Council; the Permanent Committee became the PermanentCouncil. Yet all these process of renaming had no consequences on theirresponsibilities. But perhaps the most notable change was recorded by the nameof the institution itself. The transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE (‘O’ fromOrganization) can be seen as a compromise made towards Moscow. Because itconsisted only in a political transformation and not a legal one. The states remainedto be bound politically and not legally, and the “organization” still had no internationaljuridical personality.

The negotiation process after the Cold War presented new features comparingwith what was before. The CSCE was not anymore characterized by the twoblocks and the NNA as mediators, but by states that wanted a more profoundtransformation, the ones that wanted as little as possible to be changed, and theones on the middle ground. The EC was now the central force during thenegotiations, and sometimes have appeared to be taking over the traditional role ofthe NNA by providing the middle ground and articulating a compromiseacceptable to all. The emergence of the five states of the Pentagonale (Italy,Austria, Hungary, CSFR, and Yugoslavia) as an effective and well-coordinatedgroup, rivaling even the cohesion of the “12”. The gradual appearance of Centraland East European states as protagonist (Hungary first, after Poland, CSFR, Soviet

96 FLAVIA JERCA 15

————————44 Ingo Peters: “The “old” and the new” CSCE…”, in Ingo Peters (ed.): New Security Challenges…, New

York, Lit Verlag, p. 107.45 Ibidem, p. 108.

Union). The solidarity and cohesion within the NATO group has been shakier thanbefore, the difficulties being between the EC and US46. Germany was perhaps themost fervent supporter from the western camp for a more ambitious adaptation ofthe CSCE. It tried to coordinate its strategies with its other NATO allies and ECpartners. Yet due to their reluctance it had to compromise many times.

It can be drawn as a conclusion that the common denominator was obtained byreducing the Czech initiative as to become compatible with the continued existenceof NATO47. Strong interests in promoting integration within the EC and inpreserving a key role for NATO were clearly the most important limiting factors48.

2.5. Assessing the “new” CSCE/OCSCE

The process of adaptation that took place until 1995 has changed some basicfeatures of the original CSCE. Thus for a better understanding of the process acomparison between what it was and what it became is suitable. Interesting arethe characteristics in which they differ. Due to the limited space only a few of themare discussed here49.International system: The “old” CSCE was characterized by the East-West

conflict and the blocks’ incompatibility, while the “new” CSCE/OCSE wascomposed by more homogeneous structures of states. The threats of the oldbipolar system were more tangible than the ones characterizing the newmultipolar system. The new risks were no longer state-centered and varied frominter-or intra-states ethnic conflicts combined with their spillover, to terrorismand illegal activities. The new post-ColdWar environment and security challengeswere characterized by interdependence that led to a demand for cooperation,especially institutionalized cooperation. A lot of European states were left outsidea security umbrella and were confronting with political, economic, social instability.All of these new features of the international system were opportunities for thecreation of a “new” CSCE.Negotiation process: Fundamental conflict of interests and values no longer

hamper the “new” CSCE negotiations in general, instead conflicts were aboutmeans50. The negotiations were no longer between the two blocs, now therewere different coalitions from an issue to another. It can be said that the EC andNATO shaped the most the outcomes of the process. The Central and EastEurope usually had a principal role in negotiations due to their ambitious plansand their eagerness to fortify the “old” CSCE.The policy areas: The “old” CSCE was characterized by the traditionally

three “baskets”: security and military; economy, technology, environments; humanrights. The “new” CSCE known a widening of its policy areas, dealing beside


————————46 This resume is drown upon the conclusions of Alexis Heraclides: Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The

Making of the CSCE into an International Organization, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993, p. 26-27.47 ªtefan Lehne: The CSCE in the 1990s…, p. 6.48 Ibidem, p. 8.49 For a complete schema with the criteria’s for comparison of the “old” and the “new” CSCE, see Peters,

Ingo: “The “old” and the “new” CSCE…”, in Ingo Peters (ed.): New Security Challenges…, New York, LitVerlag, p. 117.

50 Ibidem, p. 113.

the three “baskets” with: democratization processes, protection of minorities,conflict prevention and crisis management.The mode of decision-making: The decisions in the “old” CSCE were taken

only by the consensus of all participant states. In the “new” CSCE the generalprinciple is still consensus, but there is an exception: consensus-minus-one. Thismeans that in cases of violation of norms and rules, the state/s in discussioncannot vote for the mechanism that should be applied.Institutional structure: The “old” CSCE was a political process, with a flexible

structure (follow-up and sporadic experts meetings) that was suitable for thatinternational context. The disappearance of the East-West conflict facilitated itto gain a whole new and more complex structure, with political and decision-making bodies, permanent and functional organs, mechanism51.

As a general description it can be said the “new” CSCE/OCSE is an “all-European” institution (“from Vancouver to Vladivostok”), politically not legallybounded, has participant not member states, consensus or consensus-1 for decision-making, and with a “comprehensive concept of security” with 4 components: earlywarning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation.

Conclusions

In the course of five years the CSCE went over “a series of steps thattransformed it from a loosely structured conference of states into a more organizedpolitical entity”52. Therefore it became a security management institution, whichmeans an institution designed “to meet the need to provide for transparency,consultation, incentives for cooperative strategies among their members”53 (here,among its participants).

It was shown that the external shock existed and with it the pressure to adaptthe CSCE. The next step was to show that this external shock created differentdilemmas for different states. As a consequence, there were a variety of interests,and the final outcomes regarding the CSCE’s functions and forms was thecommon denominator of these.

The theoretical framework used for this research was suitable for explainingthe evolution of the CSCE due to its focus of the reciprocal interaction betweenthe international institution and the national governments. In the context of newsecurity architecture in Europe (highly institutionalized) with a central focus onNATO and the EC/EU, explaining the institutionalization of the CSCE cannot befocused only on states’ interests or on the institution itself. States’ policies wereinfluenced by the existence of a network of complementary institutions, whilethe negotiation process for the institutionalization of the CSCE was determinedexactly by these constrained policies.

98 FLAVIA JERCA 17

————————51 A complete description of the “new” structure is included in 2.1. The “old” and the “new” CSCE, as

part of this paper.52 Miriam Sapiro: “Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation”, The

American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 3. (Jul., 1995), p. 631-637.53 Celeste Wallander, Robert O. Keohane: “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions”, in Helga Haftendorn,

Robert O. Keohane, , Celleste Wallender (ed.): Imperfect Unions…, p. 33.

The bargaining took place especially between the states with advanced viewsregarding strengthening the CSCE, and the ones that wanted the change as littleas possible. The latter ones were relying more on other institutions for their securityinterests, and the outcome was highly influenced by the existence of these. Theintegration process within the EC/EU and the urge not to undermine NATOdetermined a limitation of more ambitious plans.

The structure of the OCSE in 1995 embodied the features of an interdependenceworld that required a more cooperative and institutionalized international system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bryans, Michael, The CSCE and Future Security in Europe. A report of a two-day conference held in Prague,Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 4-5 December 1991, Working Paper (Canadian Institute forInternational Peace and Security), no. 40, March 1992.

Buszynski, Leszek, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Praeger, London, 1996.CSCE/OCSE Documents, http://www.osce.org/documents, the official site of the OSCECuthbertson, Ian M., Redefining the CSCE. Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe, Helsinki,

Institute for EastWest Studies, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1992.Flynn, Gregory; Farrell, Henry, “PiecingTogether the Democratic Peace, The CSCE, Norms, and the “Construction”

of Security in Post-Cold War Europe”, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Summer, 1999),p. 505-535.

Freeman, John, Security and the CSCE Process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, MacMillan, RoyalUnited Services Institute, 1991.

Gärtner, Heintz; Hyde-Price, Adrian; Reiter, Erich (ed.), Europe’s New Security Challenges, Lynne RiennerPublishers, London, 2001.

Haas, Ernst B., “International Organizations, Adapters or Learners?”, in When Knowledge is Power. ThreeModels of Change in International Organizations, Berkely, University of California Press, 1990, p. 17-49.

Haftendorn, Helga; Keohane, Robert; Wallender, Celleste ed., Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions overTime and Space, Oxford, 1999.

Hall, Peter A.; Taylor, Rosemary C.R., “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism”, Political Science(1996), XLIV, p. 936-957.

Heraclides, Alexis, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath, The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization,London, Pinter Publishers, 1993.

Keohane, Robert O., “Neoliberal Institutionalism, A Perspective on World Politics”, in Keohane, Robert O.,International Institutions and States Power. Essays in International Relations Theory,Boulder, CO, 1989, p. 1-20.

Keohane, Robert O. (ed.), After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Center for International Affairs, Cambridge; Hardwar Univ. Press, 1993.

Keohane, Robert O.; Martin, Lisa L., “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, International Security, Vol. 20,No. 1. (Summer, 1995), p. 39-51.

Kummel, Gerhard, From Yesterday to Tomorrow — CSCE/OSCE a Twenty, Achievements of the Past andChallenges of the Future”, OSCE Bullerin, Winter 1994/1995, vol. 4, nr. 1, Varºovia, p. 9-16.

Klingenburg, Konrad; Mietzsch, Oliver, Herausforderungen im Wandel, Die KSZE nach dem IV. Folgetreffenin Helsinki, Arbeitspapiere der Schweizerischen Friedensstiftung, nr. 15, Bern, Decembrie 1992.

Lehne, ªtefan, The CSCE in the 1990s. Common European House or Potemkin Vill?, Wien, Braumüller, 1991.Lucas, Michael R. (ed), The CSCE in the 1990s, Constructing European Security and Cooperation, Nomos

Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1993.***: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Post-Cold War Era, Institut für

Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, 2000.Moens, Alexander; Anstis Christopher (ed.), Disconcerted Europe. The Search for a New Security Architecture,

Westviews Press, Boulder, 1994.Peters, Ingo (ed.), New Security Challenges, The Adaptation of International Institutions, NewYork, Lit Verlag.Sandole, Dennis J.D., “Changing Ideologies in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe”,

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 542, Flexibility in InternationalNegotiation and Mediation. (Nov, 1995), p. 131-147.

Sapiro, Miriam, “Changing the CSCE into the OSCE, LegalAspects of a Political Transformation”, The AmericanJournal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 3. (Jul., 1995), p. 631-637.


LA FORMACIÓN DEL ESTADO Y DE LA NACIÓNEN AMÉRICA LATINA. ESTUDIO DE CASO SOBRE MEXICO

EDUARDO ARAYA LEÜPIN*

Abstract. The study approaches the process of emancipation in LatinAmerica, which can generally be treated, with the exception of the casesof Cuba and Brazil, under two different readings, but complementary toeach other. These processes of decolonization, also represent the task ofbuilding a new political order, formally and ideologically liberal Republican;additionally represent parallel processes of nation-building, defined hereas the generation process, basically of collective identities that define an“imagined community”.

Key words: Latin America, emancipation, decolonization, “imaginedcommunity”, collective identities.

Nación y Estado en el Contexto de la Independencia

Los procesos de emancipación en Iberoamérica, si se exceptúan los casos deCuba y Brasil, pueden ser tratados genéricamente bajo dos lecturas diversas perocomplementarias entre si. Son procesos de descolonización, pero representantambién la tarea de construcción de un nuevo orden político, ideológicamenteliberal y formalmente republicano;1 adicionalmente representan en paralelo procesosde construcción de la nación, entendiendo aquí este proceso básicamente comola generación de identidades colectivas que definen una “comunidad imaginada”.

¿ Existía al momento de la independencia una cierta “conciencia nacional”?Algunos autores, como Eyzaguirre para el caso de Chile sostiene que si, otroscomo Góngora han afirmado que es el Estado el que crea la Nación. Tambiénhay quienes afirman que se trata de procesos paralelos.2 Si existía ese tipo de————————

*Director of the Institute of History and Political Science from Pontificia Catholic University of Valparaiso.1 El caso Mexicano representa una excepción parcial, dado que el régimen que emerge inmediatamente de la

independencia, el “Imperio” deAgustín de Iturbide, (en la práctica una Monarquía Constitucional que se fundò enla misma Constituciòn española de 1812) representa una experiencia muy breve que durò menos de un año (Mayo1822-Marzo 1823). Sobre la Independencia mexicana véase Hamnett, Brian, Revolución y Contrarrevolución enMéxico y Perú (México, 1979). De la Torre, E.: La Independencia de México (Madrid 1992).

2 Véase: Eyzaguirre, J: Ideario y Ruta de la Emancipaciòn Chilena (Santiago, 1957) Góngora, M: EnsayoHistòrico sobre la Nociòn de Estado en Chile en los Siglos XIX y XX (Santiago, 1981), Oszlak analiza el casoargentino como procesos paralelos, Oszlak, O, La Formaciòn del Estado Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1985).


certidumbres a nivel de ciertas elites, esta no era en ninguna parte de AméricaLatina extensiva a la totalidad de la sociedad ni tampoco era claro el espacioterritorial que debía abarcar el estado-nación. En Argentina, a tres décadas de laIndependencia, Esteban Echeverría observaba que:“La patria para el correntino es Corrientes, para el cordobés, Córdoba, para

el gaucho el pago en que nació. La vida e intereses comunes que envuelve elsentimiento racional de la patria es una abstracción incompresible para ellos yno pueden ver la unidad de la república simbolizada en su nombre”3.

Si se toma como ejemplo el caso deArgentina, al momento de la constituciónde la Junta del 25 de Mayo de 1810, la fracción predominante de la élite deBuenosAires, asumió la representación de la soberanía real sobre la totalidad delVirreynato del Río de la Plata. Dichas pretensiones fueron cuestionadas yresistidas militarmente en diversos puntos de ese Virreinato. En la vecinaCórdoba, la Junta de Mayo debió imponerse por las armas. La antigua provinciade Misiones, el actual Paraguay, tanto como la “Banda Oriental”, el actualUruguay, debieron hacer su proceso de independencia tanto en contra de laMonarquía Española como en contra de Buenos Aires.4

Esto permitiría tal vez contra-argumentar, que si esto ocurrió fue por queexistía algún tipo de identidad colectiva nacional o al menos proto-nacional. Yahemos señalado que es posible que esta existiese efectivamente a nivel defracciones de las elites, pero en ninguna parte el “espacio” del ejercicio de lasoberanía nacional estaba plenamente definido. El caso de José GervasioArtigas, una de las principales figuras de la independencia de Uruguay esilustrativo al respecto. Por la independencia de su patria Artigas debió luchartanto contra los realistas uruguayos, como contra los invasores portugueses,como contra las pretensiones de sus aliados-enemigos de Buenos Aires y en estapugna contra la hegemonía de Buenos Aires, Artigas en algún momento (1815-1816) (con la denominación honorífica de “caudillo de los pueblos libres”)hegemonizó una región que incluía no solo el actual Uruguay, sino también laregión “argentina” de Entre Ríos (Santa Fe-Corrientes), por la sencilla razón deque el alineamiento político mas importante y común era la oposición a lasupremacía política y comercial de Buenos Aires.

Esta claro que en Iberoamérica al momento de la independencia existíanregiones que habían ido adquiriendo fisonomía propia a través de los siglos dedominación colonial. Para alguien como Bolivar que siempre pensó y soñóHispanoamérica dentro de un horizonte de dimensiones continentales, eranabsolutamente claras esas diferencias regionales, pero al momento de escribir sucélebre Carta de Jamaica5 Bolivar seguramente no prefiguraba los Estados

2 ESTUDIO DE CASO SOBRE MEXICO 101

————————3 Echeverrìa, E. “El Dogma Socialista” (Buenos Aires, 1846) cit en Oszlak, op. cit., p. 42.4 Véase: Narancio E., “La Independencia de Uruguay“ (Madrid, 1992) Acevedo, E.O: La Independencia

Argentina” (Madrid 1992).5 Bolivar, S. “Carta de Jamaica” en Salcedo, J: “La Esperanza del Universo” Collier sostiene que el uso

del término “nación” en los escritos de Bolivar (aleatorio al uso de “patria”) no tiene un contenido homologablea un cierto nacionalismo. Véase: Collier, S: “Nationality, Nationalism and Supranationalism in the Writings ofSimón Bolivar” en “Hispanic American Hstorical Rewiew” (HAHR) Vol. 63 N. 1, 1983, p. 37-65.

Nacionales que hoy existen (se refiere por ejemplo a Chile, pero globalmente al“Río de la Plata”) sino que pensaba en la diversidad regional que se habíaconstituido de hecho a partir de la estructura político — administrativa delImperio Español en América. Por lo demás, el uso del término nación en elsentido que hoy le otorgamos, es bastante posterior a la independencia, su usotradicional (derivado del latín natio) se refiere a lugar de origen o estirpe y EricHobsbawn nos recuerda que la característica central de la nación es su modernidad6.Antes de 1884 el Diccionario de la Real Academia de Lengua Española, leasignaba a la palabra “nación” como significado solo el de “colección de loshabitantes de alguna región, país o reyno” a partir de esa fecha, nación se define“estado o cuerpo político que reconoce un centro común y supremo degobierno” y también como “ territorio que comprende y a sus individuos...”, esdecir recién a partir de 1884 se relacionan directamente nación con gobierno.7

Nación y Estado Nacional como problemas conceptuales

A diferencia de lo que ocurre con el concepto de Estado, respecto del cual enmayor o menor grado las definiciones apuntan al tema del poder legitimado(Weber) o su virtualidad productora de “orden” o de “relaciones de dominación”(Marx, Gramsci) el concepto de nación y sus términos afines resulta mucho maselusivo. ¿ Como, cuando y porque una colectividad se define una nación ? En autorestan diversos como Maritain, y Stalin una nación es una comunidad que definevínculos de pertenencia, a partir de elementos culturales comunes (idioma,tradiciones, etc.),8 Renan por su parte, en su celebre definición de la nacióncomo un plebiscito cotidiano puso de manifiesto otro elemento central: la naciónexiste cuando existe la voluntad (colectiva) de que exista9; no obstante, resultaenormemente difícil discernir el peso de cada uno de esos factores en laconstrucción de estados nacionales a fin de construir una suerte de modeloexplicativo de aplicación general.

En su cuna europea, la nación fue identificada como comunidad cultural y elnacionalismo, al estilo de Mazzini como la demanda de hacer simétrica larelación entre nación y estado (tantos estados como naciones), pero ni en Europani en ninguna parte del mundo se ha dado esa simetría de manera estricta. Unsuizo que habla alemán puede sentirse mucho mas afín y con sentimientos deidentidad colectiva con suizos que hablan francés o italiano que con loshabitantes de Viena y probablemente mucho menos con algún berlinés, ejemplosde ese tipo podrían reproducirse hasta el infinito.

102 EDUARDO ARAYA LEÜPIN 3

————————6 Hobsbawn, E.: “Nación y Nacionalismo desde 1780”, (Barcelona, 1991), p. 24, y ss.7 Ibidem, p. 23.8 “Una comunidad étnica puede definirse como una comunidad de normas de sentimiento arraigadas en

el suelo físico original del grupo asi como en el suelo moral de la historia ; se convierte en una nación cuandoesta situación de hecho entra en la esfera del autoconocimiento, en otras palabras, cuando un grupo étnico setorna consciente del hecho que constituye una psiquis común incosciente... Una nación es una comunidad degentes que advierten como la historia las ha hecho...” Maritain, J.: “El Hombre y el Estado” (texto original de 1949)(Santiago, 1973 p. 30) Stalin: La Naciòn texto de 1912 cit en Hutchinson, J y Smith, D: Nationalism (Oxford,1994) p. 18-21.

9 Renan, E: Que es una Naciòn? (texto de 1882): en Hutchinson y Smith op. cit. p. 17-18.

En relación a la “nación”, una de los pocas cosas que están absolutamenteclaras es que la construcción de los estados-naciones han respondido a pautasmuy desiguales en el tiempo. La Nación francesa se definió en su momento porel ideario de la revolución (ciudadanía, republicanismo) y no por la homogeneidadlingüística. Fichte y Herder, en la línea del romanticismo alemán apelaronespecíficamente a la idea de comunidad cultural definida por tradiciones eidioma, pero en ambos casos identificaron la nación con una suerte de“comunidad imaginada” dotada de soberanía. En algún momento, la reflexiónsobre la nación también incluyó el tema de la economía nacional; en todos loscasos las demandas por la construcción de la nación correspondieron a unimaginario que identificaba nación y “modernidad” (imaginario además compartidotanto por liberales como por socialistas). El nacionalismo del siglo XIX, al estilode Mazzini fue básicamente una demanda de autonomía y unidad para comunidadesculturales que existían dentro de imperios multiculturales y multiétnicos; elnacionalismo en el siglo XX se ha orientado a demandar autonomía contraestados, que a su vez se autorrepresentan como comunidades nacionales.10

El nacionalismo fuera de Europa ha sido — dependiendo del momento y dellugar — un eco de todas esas tendencias, a veces de manera segmentada, a vecesde manera superpuesta, pero un eco en donde la resonancia la constituyennormalmente élites formadas o influídas por Occidente. En esta perspectivaresultaba evidente que el impacto de la modernización (alfabetización,reestructuración de relaciones sociales y económicas, etc.) socavan las lealtadestradicionales (clan, tribu, religión, etc.) y dejaba a los individuos disponiblespara sumir nuevos valores, nuevas pautas de conducta, permitiendo la transferenciade lealtades a una entidad mayor: la nación.

Es efectivo que también se han dado ciertos procesos en donde la comunidadimaginada se define en función de patrones religiosos y con un discurso“antimoderno”, pero el fundamentalismo religioso (de cualquier tipo) tiene unadiferencia básica respecto del nacionalismo cultural o étnico: la adscripción a lafé “verdadera” es la que salva e integra, independientemente de cualquier otracaracterística individual o grupal.

El punto de partida en esta reflexión, es la consideración de la nación comouna comunidad imaginada11 caracterizada por su limitación espacial y por suaspiración a la soberanía política. Esto supone tanto la generación de identidadescolectivas como la transferencia de lealtades primarias (la patria chica, la región,el patrón, la iglesia, etc.) a una entidad superior que integra y subssume a las otras.El nacionalismo sería la fuerza ideológica capaz de dar vida a esa comunidad.

La generación de identidades colectivas es un producto cultural que como talpuede ser definido y redefinido transformándose a lo largo del tiempo, estoresulta particularmente evidente en el contexto de procesos revolucionarios. Lageneración de identidades colectivas en cualquier grupos social supone ladefinición de un “nosotros” que se contrapone a “otros” por exclusión y contraste,


————————10 De Blas Guerrero, A: Nacionalismos y Naciones en Europa (Madrid, 1994).11 Anderson, B. Imagined Communities, (Londres, 1983).

por lo mismo, hay mucha sabiduría en un viejo aforismo de Tilly que dice queel estado hace la guerra y la guerra hace la nación. En algunos casos son losconflictos externos los que definen una identidad nacional, no obstante, pareceser que este en muchos casos es solo uno de los elementos, también la definiciónde un cierto “proyecto histórico común” resulta muy importante porque respondea aquello que Renán identificaba como un “plebiscito cotidiano”: la voluntad deser (o de hacerse) nación no solo en función de la historia (pretendida o real) sinode cara al futuro.

La generación de identidades colectivas adquiere por tanto las característicasde un proceso de imposición, exclusión y cooptación y por lo mismo el Estadoes normalmente el instrumento que termina por configurar o redefinir la nacióny no a la inversa12, no obstante, sería erróneo identificar el tema de la construccióndel estado-nación solo como un problema de competencia o de capacidad deelites, la nación también se construye — a veces — como un diálogo entreimpulsos desde arriba y desde abajo, pero este proceso es lo que Hobsbawn hadenominado protonacionalismo popular, asociado por ejemplo a ciertaspercepciones históricas de haber pertenecido, a lo largo de la historia, a unacomunidad cultural específica.13

Las “naciones” hispanoamericanas se originaron y consolidaron fuera deprocesos de esa naturaleza, se originaron sin el impulso del nacionalismo comoideología, como ocurrió en muchos casos europeos, por lo mismo, nuestra tésiscentral en este trabajo es que el imaginario de la nación y del estado-nación esuna “construcción” producida y difundida desde el Estado (o si se prefiere porlas fracciones de la élites que lo dirigen), que se define en algunos casos comoun proyecto modernizante, en otros en función de conflictos externos, ofinalmente por combinaciones de ambos.14

La consolidación del estado nacional en América Latina es un procesocomplejo y lento que se despliega a lo largo del siglo XIX. Chile en ese contexto,representa un caso excepcional en donde una confluencia de diversos factores(Espacio acotado, ausencia de tensiones centro-periferia, homogeneidad de laselites, ausencia de intereses regionales significativamente divergentes,capacidad de la elite política, etc.) permitió resolver tempranamente el tema del“orden” estatal y de la nación. La situación común de hispanoamérica tras laindependencia sin embargo fue la anarquía. La crisis de la monarquía en 1808generó un vacío de poder que hizo colapsar el orden político. La consolidaciónmilitar de la independencia (hacia 1824) resolvió el tema de la dependenciacolonial, pero no restauró el orden político. La anarquía y el caudillismo son


————————12 “... One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: nation is a comunity of sentiment

which would adequately manifest it self in a State of its own; hence, a nation is a community whch normallytends to produce a state of its own”. Weber, M. Essays in Sociology, en Hutchinson y Smith op. cit. Guellner:Cultura e Identidad Política. Nacionalisdo y Cambios Sociales. (Barcelona, 1989).

13 Es el caso de nacionalismos europeos antiguos como el francés o cierta imágenes como la de la “SantaRusia” Véase: Hobsbawn, op. cit., p. 56-86.

14 Resulta sorprendente que en el penetrante ensayo de Marcos Kaplan “La Formación del Estado Nacionalen América Latina” (Santiago 1969), el autor desarrolle una extensa reflexión sobre el estado y la produccióndel orden, pero que eluda toda reflexión sobre la construcción de la nación.

problemas complejos que requieren de explicaciones multicausales, pero en granmedida estan asociados al vacío de poder generado por la crisis de la monarquíay a la atomización de los mecanismos de dominación en un contexto de relacionessociales de tipo patrimonial propias de una sociedad rural o “pre-moderna”.15

El análisis que queremos aplicar aqu, el modelo de “nation building”,16 aunquese trata de un tipo de análisis relacionado de la teoría de la modernización (y portanto una derivación del paradigma estructural-funcionalista) y desarrollado enfunción de los procesos de descolonización de la década de los 60, parecetambién plausible para al análisis de la construcción de estados nacionales enAmérica Latina en el siglo XIX, con esta racionalidad común, pero con distintosmatices, Oszlak y Sinkin han analizado los casos deArgentina yMéxico. El esquemaque usamos toma elementos de ambos y supone básicamente que el estado-nación se consolida en la medida que puede desarrollar capacidades (“formas depenetración”) en tres dimensiones diversas pero complementarias entre si: coacción,cooptación y penetración material.

La capacidad coactiva supone concentrar en una sola entidad (el estado) eluso de la violencia legítima o legitimada a través de un instrumentario (fuerzasarmadas y un aparato policial) que garantice de manera eficiente y efectiva laalocación de decisiones colectivas. El problema no es menor, si se considera quelos incipientes estados que emergen de los procesos de independencia enHispanoamérica lo hacen en medio de guerras civiles o con una sociedadaltamente militarizada y dominada por caudillos. El tema por tanto se relacionaa un proceso de transferencia de relaciones de poder atomizadas desde actoreslocales y /o tradicionales hacia un actor estatal que concentra y simultáneamenteexpande su propio poder.17

No obstante, no hay experiencias históricas en donde el orden político hayasurgido solo sobre la base de la coacción. La construcción de cualquier “estado”supone recursos tanto a la coacción como a la construcción de ciertos consensos. Lacapacidad de cooptar grupos mas allá de las fracciones dominantes de la elite resultapor lo tanto básica para la estabilización de algún tipo de orden político. Esto suponetanto la existencia de una cierta producción simbólica o un “proyecto” histórico (uncierto imaginario colectivo sobre la sociedad deseada o deseable) como uninstrumentario capaz de socializarlo: sistema educativo, prensa, producción cultural,en general mecanismos de comunicación que proyecten identidades colectivas.18

El problema que se conceptualiza como “penetración material” dice relacióncon la capacidad del estado de extraer recursos (económicos) desde la sociedad


————————15 Lynch, J “Caudillos en Hiapanoamérica” (Madrid, 1992).16 “Nation Building refers the processes by which certain groups in society act to attain political

autonomy for the society. Nation building should be viewed as only one aspect of the larger process ofmodernization, which can be generally defined as the expanding control over the environment throughcloserineraction among men Deutsch, Karl y Foltz, William: Nation Building (NY, 1963), Bendix, Reinhard: NationBuilding and Citizenship: Studies of our changing social order (NY, 1964) Sinkin, D. The Mexican Reform. AStudy in Liberal Nation Building (Texas, 1979).

17 Huntington. S. El Orden Político en Sociedades en Cambio (1968).18 Véase: Kaplan, M: op. cit., p. 43-46 Deutsch, K.: Nationalism and Social Communication en Hutchinson

&Smith op. cit., p. 26-28.

para garantizar su “reproducción material” o transformarlos en capacidad coactivay cooptativa financiar aparatos coactivos, aparatos burocráticos y mecanismosde cooptación y en última instancia también la capacidad de generar bienespúblicos. En otras palabras, el estado no se consolida sin que se consolide tambiénalgún tipo de economía nacional y las implicancias de este problema sonparticularmente evidentes en las limitaciones de los incipientes estadoslatinoamericanos.

Estudio de Caso. México

Tanto en el Cono Sur de América del Sur como en la “Gran Colombia” laindependencia tuvo la matriz común de un proceso conducido por la élite criollay que apeló a la alternativa de Juntas de Gobierno autonomistas en una primerafase. En México y Perú en cambio, en el contexto de la crisis de la monarquía,en las que fueron la colonias mas ricas de todo el Imperio Español en América,la reacción predominante de la élite (tanto de hispanos como de criollos) fue ladefensa del statu quo. Por lo mismo, en México, la pequeña fracción de criollosinteresada en promover un cambio político, intentó movilizar a las masasindígenas como la única alternativa eficiente en la promoción del cambiopolítico, pero para provocar esa movilización debieron incorporar también loque constituían demandas mas reales dentro de la población indígena: el tema dela propiedad de la tierra.

El proceso de independencia en su primera fase (bajo la dirección de caudilloscomo los religiosos Hidalgo y Morelos) adquirió así las características de unmovimiento social, sustentado en masas indígenas, con un programa notablementeradical en sus demandas de transformación de las relaciones económicas ysociales19 y no solo en al ámbito político. No obstante, este movimiento de masas,pese a algunos éxitos iniciales se agotó rapidamente: las improvisadas miliciascampesinas no fueron capaces de enfrentar el sólido aparato militar del Virreinatoy el riesgo de transformaciones radicales solidificó a la élite blanca en defensadel statu quo. Tras la temprana pérdida de sus líderes principales, el movimientoinsurgente derivó en un movimiento guerrillero segmentado, incapaz por si solode forzar el cambio político, pero aun lo suficientemente vigoroso como para obligara las autoridades monárquicas a mantener un enorme y agobiante gasto militar.

Los cambios políticos ocurridos en España entre 1812 (instauración de unaConstitución liberal), la restauración del absolutismo tras el regreso de FernandoVII (1814), la rebelión del ejército encabezada por el Gral. Riego y la subsiguienterestauración liberal (1820) tuvieron efectos decisivos en el proceso políticomexicano. De la misma manera que ocurrió en Perú, las conflictivas alternancias


————————19 Se expresó en medidas como la supresión de la esclavitud e impuestos, pero particularmente en el caso

de Morelos hay decretos que apuntan a la supresión de todas las formas de una economía capitalistas basadasen la gran propiedad territorial en beneficio de las formas de propiedad comunal tradicionales del mundoindígnena, no obstante este reformismo social no puede considerarse como rasgo determinante del movimientoindependentista con posterioridad a la muerte deMorelos ocurrida en 1811, Véase. Silva Herzog. J, “El PensamientoEconómico, Social y Político de México” (México 1974), p. 39-53.

entre liberales y absolutistas en España fracturaron las lealtades al interior de laélite blanca y la consiguiente inestabilidad llevó a una fracción de los realistasen México a considerar la conveniencia de la independencia.

Como consecuencia de esos procesos, la independencia mexicana se resolviócon un mecanismo de pacto entre algunos de los lideres guerrilleros (VicenteGuerrero entre otros) y uno de los líderes del ejercito realista (Agustín de Iturbide).Este pacto, denominado Plan de Iguala, fue finalmente refrendado por el últimoVirrey español (O´Donoju), aunque rechazado por la monarquía española. Esta fasedel proceso de la independencia mexicana (febrero de 1821 hasta Mayo de 1822)dio lugar a alineamientos muy diversos al interior de la élite: La fracción masconservadora (absolutista) estuvo a favor de la independencia como una formade rechazo al gobierno de los liberales españoles. Las fracciones mas liberales dela élite (independientemente de su origen) se dividieron entre aquellos que siemprehabían defendido la independencia (muchos de los cuales lucharon desde 1810) yaquellos que por fidelidad al Gobierno liberal español se opusieron a la independencia.Esta situación y la forma pactada de la independencia mexicana ha sido interpretadade maneras diversas. Algunos autores lo interpretan como una suerte derevolución conservadora y antiliberal,20 no obstante, aunque como ya se señaloel primer gobierno independientemente fue una monarquía, este utilizó la mismaconstitución liberal española de 1812 y el tema de las “garantías” pactadas (“fe,independencia y unión”) deben ser interpretadas fundamentalmente como unadefensa de intereses corporativos (fueros) que beneficiaban también al Ejercito.21

Estas particularidades de la independencia mexicana contribuyeron a lapervivencia de fracciones conservadoras al interior de la élite, que a diferenciade otros casos hispanomericanos no solo eran católicas y antiliberales (en loideológico), sino que además monárquicas. Paradigma de esta posición fue LucasAlamán, destacado político e intelectual mexicano. El desarrollo o la mantenciónde una perspectiva monárquica como una solución al problema del “orden” enesta fracción de la élite se vinculó inicialmente a las propias características de laIndependencia, luego a la percepción de crisis generada primero por la pérdidade Texas y finalmente a la perdida de mas territorio mexicano (en total una cifracercana a la mitad de lo que fue el territorio Virreynal) en al guerra con EstadosUnidos (finalizada con un Tratado en 1848).22 En esa perspectiva, un gobiernomonárquico encabezado por algún miembro de alguna familia real europea y laconsiguiente vinculación a potencias europeas, era vista como una eventualsalvaguardia para contener otros intentos de expansión o anexión norteamericana23.


————————20 Lynch, J: “Las Revoluciones Hispanoamericanas” (Barcelona,1980) p. 316-345.21 Hamnett, B: op. cit., p. 316-345.22 Texas se autonomizó en 1836 aunque solo en 1845 fue anexada a la Unión. En 1846 se inició la Guerra

y aunque solo duró unos meses, esta concluyo oficialmente solo en 1848 (Tratado Guadalupe-Hidalgo), Mexicoperdió Nuevo México y California, aunque logró mantener la Baja California y recibió US $ 15 millones, loque evitó que la economía mexicana colapsara, posteriormente también cedió el territorio de Tucson Bazant,J: México en Bethell L (edit) Historia de América Latina (Cambridge / Barcelona, 1991) p. 105-143.

23 Alaman (1792-1853) fue diputado y varias veces ministro de relaciones exteriores, además uno de lospioneros de la industrialización mexicana.Entre sus obras se destacan: “Disertaciones” e “Historia de México”,Véase: Siva Herzog J: op. cit. (México, 1967) Josè Luis Romero: Pensamiento Conservador enAmèrica Latina(antologìa) Caracas, 1986, p. 52-55.

El liberalismo mexicano por consiguiente (y a diferencia de los otros casoslatinoamericanos) — se desarrolló desde sus inicios en una permanente tensiónideológica y programática con esta tradición conservadora, aun cuando tambiénexistieron siempre áreas de confluencia.24

Sea cual fuese la interpretación de la independencia y de su inmediata solución“imperial”, esta no se tradujo ni en la consolidación de un orden político y en laconsolidación de la nación. Por el contrario, solo significó el inicio de unaprolongada fase de inestabilidad y guerras civiles cuyas causas son muy similaresa la de otros casos latinoamericanos. México representa y representaba unaenorme diversidad de intereses regionales derivados de formaciones geográficasy económicas muy diversas, a la cual debían sumarse de manera recurrenteconflictos étnicos y sociales (como por ejemplo la “Guerra de Castas en Yucatánhacia 1847”); por lo mismo, las precarias posibilidades de consensuar o imponeralgún tipo de orden estable pasaba por los actores que realmente detentaban elpoder: caudillos que sustentaban su poder en el ejército o los caudillosregionales25 y finalmente la Iglesia. Ejercito e Iglesia eran las únicas institucionespropiamente “nacionales” en su cobertura y la Iglesia era la institución mas ricaen todo el país. El estado central, con escasos recursos de poder no era capaz deejercer un control efectivo sobre la totalidad sociedad.

La Iglesia mexicana, fuera de detentar una posición muy influyente en lacultura, era la institución mas rica del país, las razones que permitirían explicaresta situación son complejas y múltiples y sus detalles escapan a los propósitosde esta monografía, pero es importante señalar que, mas que la Iglesia en cuantoinstitución, algunas órdenes religiosas y por cierto su jerarquía eran los principalespropietarios en México, tanto en relación a la propiedad rural como respecto debienes inmuebles urbanos, pero estos quedaban además en el status de “manosmuertas”, es decir no podían ser nuevamente transadas en el mercado.26

El orden político trató de estructurarse sobre una constitución de tipo federal(1824)27 a imitación norteamericana pero el federalismo mexicano fue básicamenteuna forma de mantener la autonomía de los caudillos regionales. Entre los casi30 años que van desde 1824 hasta 1855 hubo en México 46 cambios de gobierno.En 1833 la presidencia de México cambio en 7 oportunidades y en 1847 en 5. Elpromedio de duración de los gobiernos en todo el período que va desde laIndependencia hasta el “Plan de Ayutla” (1855) fue de solo 9 meses; no obstantecontra lo que pudiera suponerse, esto no significaba en México una alta


————————24 Sobre los orígenes del liberalismo mexicano véase: Hale, Charles: El Liberalismo Mexicano en la

Epoca de Mora 1821-1853 (México, 1972).25 En realidad la distinción ente caudillos regionales y caudillos militares es muy precaria, todo caudillo

(por definición) era capaz de movilizar un contingente militar, pero evidentemente había un ejército (noprofesional) que era un actor per se: Bajo Iturbide el ejercito tenía 16.136 plazas, bajo Santa Anna este llegó ate ner 64.316. que en 1855 consumía el 80% del presupuesto federal. Sinkin op. cit., p. 97.

26 En 1857 Lerdo de Tejada, ministro de hacienda liberal calculó que el total de la propiedad en Méxicotenía un valor aproximado de $ 1.3 billones, de los cuales 275 millones (21%) pertenecía a la Iglesia, estosdatos deben ser contrastados con el peso “demográfico” de la Iglesia, para una población de 8.000.000 habitantes,el clero (sin considerar a las religiosas) solo representaba el 0,5% de la población.Véase López, Francisco: LaEstructura Económica y Social de México en la Epoca de la Reforma (México, 1967) p. 191-201.

27 Vasquez, Josefina: El Federalismo Mexicano (1823-1847) en Carmagnani, M: op. cit., p. 15-50.

“circulación de las elites”, por el contrario, el control del aparato estatal se mantuvoconcentrado en la manos de relativamente pocos caudillos. Tres “presidentes”ocuparon ese cargo en tres oportunidades (Nicolás Bravo, Anastasio Bustamantey José Joaquín Herrera), pero el GeneralAntonio Lopez de SantaAnna batió todoslos records: Entre 1834 y hasta 1855 como presidente y/o dictador, varias vecesdepuesto y varias veces llamado de nuevo al poder como “restaurador” del orden,gobernó México en 9 oportunidades. De todos los cambio de gobierno ocurridosen el período, 18 de ellos involucraron solo a 4 caudillos.28

En 1855 una revolución “liberal” encabezada por Juan Alvarez, caudillo-gobernador del Estado de Guerrero logró expulsar del gobierno central — porúltima vez — al sempiterno Gral. Santa Anna. Este, con el apoyo de losconservadores, había derrocado un gobierno liberal en 1853 y había seguido unapolítica fuertemente centralista que afectó naturalmente los intereses decaudillos y oligarquías regionales. La rebelión liberal contra Santa Anna y queconvirtió a Alvarez en presidente de México se fundó, como tantas veces en lahistoria deMéxico en un “plan”: El Plan deAyutla, que suponía recuperar la tradicióndel federalismo y generar un nuevo orden constitucional que garantizara elejercicio de las garantía individuales. El Plan de Ayutla no fue una revolución,pero fue mas que uno de los tantos cuartelazos de la historia de México: con élentró en escena una nueva generación de políticos que son los autores de “LaReforma” y con ella la consolidación del orden nacional en México.

De una manera similar a la generación argentina del 37, en esta generación,solo 3 habían nacido antes de 1810, la mayor parte de ellos (2/3) lo hicieronentre 1810 y 1830; es decir, se trata de una generación formada en los años delos post-independencia, y el caos político fue una constante en sus vidas y eranadolescentes en los años de la guerra con EEUU. Pero no solo se trató de unrecambio generacional, también fue un movimiento desde la “periferia contra elcentro”29, la mayoría de estos liberales provenía de lo que fue la “periferia colonial”,en donde, como por ejemplo en Guadalajara o Veracruz, pervivían resentimientoslocalistas contra la tradición centralista del México colonial. Veracruz además,como todo puerto, tenía una sólida tradición liberal-modernizante, y por lo mismoanticlerical. Dicha periferia también tenía una mayor tradición de movilidadsocial. Algunos de las figuras de la generación liberal de la Reforma eranmestizos (Manuel Doblado, I. Comonfort, Lafragua y los Hermanos Lerdo deTejada), otros, los menos, eran indios como Benito Juárez e Ignacio Altamirano,aun cuando para muchos efectos sociales ambos (por su educación) podían serconsiderados también como “mestizos” y este rasgo (lo “mestizo”) llegó a ser


————————28 No obstante, aunque cabe hacer un paralelo entre la generación argentina del 37 y la generación méxicana

de la Reforma, no se puede establecer el mismo paralelo entre Rosas y el General Santa Anna. En el primeroes valorable tanto su preocupación por la expansión interna (inició la incorporación efectiva de la Pampa alestado argentino) y tuvo la capacidad de defender a Argentina de las presiones del imperialismo europeo; por lomismo, hay toda una tradición historiográfica argentina (independientemente de los fundamentos que talinterpretación pueda tener) que recupera su imagen como precursor del nacionalismo argentino. Santa Anna encambio pasó a la historia solo como una figura pintoresca (se hacia llamar a si mismo “su alteza serenisima”)que como señala Charles Hale que en México solo cosecha burlas.

29 Ibidem, p. 37.

desarrollado dentro de este grupo como un elemento de identidad colectivaaunando lo étnico y el tema de la discriminación social.30

Profesionalmente, los liberales de la Reforma era un grupo heterogéneo, peropredominaban los abogados, los militares y los burócratas, muchos de ellosademás desempeñaban funciones como periodistas o editores, pero a pesar dealgún éxito profesional en su gran mayoría era gente que debió luchar arduamentecontra la discriminación social y étnica. Por este rasgo vinculado a su formacióny/o a su ejercicio profesional eran anticlericales, pero muchos de ellos (Juarezpor ejemplo) no eran antirreligiosos. En la óptica de estos liberales, México aparecíacomo una sociedad tradicional, cuya cultura y educación eran controladas por laIglesia y esto era un actor que generaba discriminación. Para muchos de ellos, elparadigma de orden conservador estaba representado por la pervivencia de latradición colonial de “fueros” para la iglesia y el ejército.31

En contraste con esta imagen de la realidad mexicana, estos liberales creíanen el progreso32, mas o menos en los mismos términos que la generación deAlberdi enArgentina, por cierto, el tema de la “población” o la inmigración no eraen este caso tan relevante, pero en la generación liberal anterior (la de Mora) eltema de la inmigración europea también fue vista como una solución frente allastre que la población indígena representaba en la producción del progreso33. Elresto del imaginario del orden y del progreso era genéricamente compartido. Frentea un México débil, arcaico, dominado por caudillos incapaces de defender a supaís e impotente frente a un vecino demasiado fuerte y ambicioso, no había masalternativa que construir un orden “nacional”, liberal y secular que fuese capaz depromover el “progreso”, este a su vez permitiría reproducir materialmente el “orden”.

Francisco Zarco en su periódico “El Siglo XIX” escribía: ¿ Que importa quehaya buenos caminos si nadie puede recorrerlos sin pasaportes, sin vejación; silas mercancías han de permanecer estancadas y ha de haber trabas que hagan


————————30 En Francisco Zarco, editor y periodista del “El Siglo XIX”, el tema de lo mestizo adquiere

reminiscencias o un paralelo evidente con el texto de Sieyes “Que es el Tercer Estado”, según Zarco, losmestizos son ... la parte mas fuerte de la nación, los mejores trabajadores, los mas industriosos, los políticosmas ilustrados... (pero) sistemáticamente discriminados, por una intolerancia llevada al extremo de noadmitirlos ni en el clero, ni en las cortes de justicia, ni en los altos grados militares, porque, como individuosno pueden ostentar ser descendientes de alguien con titulo de nobleza... La elite tradicional, de mentalidadaristocrática representa el pasado, pero se ha hecho inutil de la misma manera que la nobleza francesa se hizoinútil, justificando la revolución. La aristocracia y el clero, incapaces de defender a los reyes no quieren nipueden defender al pueblo Sinkin p 43.

31 Los fueros era básicamente el privilegio corporativo de no poder ser juzgado por tribunales ordinarios,sino solo por tribunales especiales dentro de la propia corporación, pero este privilegio se hizo extensivoademás a las familias en el caso de los militares y en todo los casos a dispensas de pagar algunos impuestos.Estos fueron suprimidos por la llamada “Ley Juarez” de 1855, Bazant, op. cit., p. 131.

32 “Como creo que el progreso es una condición de la humanidad, espero que el porvenir serénecesariamente de la democracia y tengo cada día mas fe en las instituciones republicanas del mundoamericano se harán extensivas a los pueblos infortunados de Europa que aun conservan, a pesar suyo, monarcasy aristocracias”, Silva Herzog, op. cit., p. 194.

33 “... El indio se aferra con obstinación a sus costumbres, lo cual hace dificil que progrese... estos cortosy envilecidos restos de la antigua población mexicana aunque despierten compasión no pueden considerarsecomo la base de la sociedad mexicana progresista...” Mora: Revoluciones 1, 63-73.

“Mora creía que mediante un programa concertado de inmigración europea, México en el término de unsiglo podía realizar la fusión completa de los indios “y la total estinción de las castas” Hale, Ch. op. cit., p. 229.

imposible el desarrollo de la agricultura y de la industria ¿ Para que quierebuenos puertos y faros salvadores el país que no admite en sus costas buquesextranjeros, que rechaza nueva población y prohibe caprichosamente el librecambio ¿ Quien ha de emplear sus capitales en canalizar ríos o construir puentessi la propiedad está insegura, si la leva ha de privar de brazos a los trabajosútiles y si los hombre que se reúnen a promover mejoras han de inspirardesconfianza.¿ Habrá colonización en donde son frecuentes las contribucionesde guerra ‘? ... ¿ Que progreso es posible donde el ciudadano vive a merced dedespreciables esbirros...¿34

En la misma línea Benito Juarez escribía: ...La falta de población produce lafalta de consumo ; así es que los agricultores solo cultivan la parte de terrenos muynecesarios para cosechar las semillas suficientes para el abasto, bajo la pena deque toda abundancia considerable disminuya los precios y los precise a perderexistencias... la exportación es muy difícil por la falta y lo escabroso de los caminos; así es que cuando suele hacerse de semillas y algunos otros frutos resultan en lasplazas para donde se exportaron de un valor excesivo que impide su venta35.

La dictadura de Santa Anna funcionó como una suerte de catalizador paraesta heterogénea generación de liberales, en algunos casos esta experiencia setradujo en exilio “fisico” (Juarez y Ocampo por ejemplo)36 en otros casos, estose tradujo en “exilio moral”. Los resultados de esa experiencia común para hombresde formación y origen diferente fue hacerles descubrir intereses y visiones comunesacerca del futuro.

La coyuntura para llevar a cabo ese proyecto fue el “Plan deAyutla”, el Gobiernode Alvarez (en donde muchos de estos jóvenes liberales asumieron importantesroles políticos), posteriormente los trabajos de la Asamblea Constituyente en laConstitución de 1857 y finalmente en las “Leyes de la Reforma” (1857-1861)que completan la consolidación de México como un estado-nación. La constituciónde 1857 recoge y resume el imaginario liberal de esta nueva élite, pero representaun “imaginario”, no la realidad del México de la época, el proyecto que estaincluía era vista por ellos no solo como una forma de legitimar una rebelión, sinocomo una suerte de regeneración de la nación.. Reconocía el principio de latolerancia religiosa y la libertad de educación, de la misma manera, recogía laconcepción típicamente liberal de la sociedad fundada en individuos iguales antela ley, por lo mismo, tanto los fueros, como otras restricciones corporativasrelativas a a ejercicios profesionales fueron suprimidas. Con todo, los liberales dela “Reforma” por moderación o por simple cálculo político, no radicalizaron suanticlericalismo, el fuero eclesiástico por ejemplo, fue suprimido por una ley deJuarez, pero se mantuvieron los tribunales eclesiásticos para algunas causas.

Los temas relativos al status de la Iglesia y la religión fueron los que masresistencias causaron fuera de la élite liberal, pero para los constituyentes de


————————34 Francisco Zarco doc. cit. en Carcía Cantú “Utopías Mexicanas” cit. por Silva Herzog op. cit. p. 217.

Por otra parte, el imaginario del orden y el progreso de esta élite mexicana tampoco aparece expuesta con elmismo grado de sistematicidad y coherencia que en el caso de Alberdi.

35 Juarez, B. cit. en Silva Herzog, op. cit., p. 189.36 Silva Herzog, p. 178.

1856 los temas relativos a las relaciones entre los poderes del estado fueron losissues mas intensamente debatidos37. La razón es entendible: la política mexicanase había movido hasta allí en el marco de un federalismo muy amplio que en lapráctica significó solo alternancias entre dictaduras y anarquía, por lo mismo,pese al discurso de defensa de libertades amplias y de que en su origen el PlandeAyutla fue una reacción contra el centralismo de SantaAnna, los Constituyentesde 1856 creían en un orden mucho mas centralista y autoritario, el núcleo (noresuelto) del problema era de un lado la fé en un orden liberal como proyecto ydel otro las certezas sobre las necesidades de imponer (apelando a las dimensióncoactiva del estado) la construcción del orden nacional contra la tradición de lamultiplicidad de poderes locales y regionales.

Como una forma de generar “conciencia nacional”, por primera vez en su historia,todos los habitantes de México fueron obligados a jurar la nueva Constitución,aunque obviamente muchos se resistieron, entre ellos el clero. El marco generadopor la nueva Constitución y la posición inflexible de la Iglesia derivó en lapromulgación de un conjunto de leyes tendientes a limitar su poder. Una de ellas,la Ley Lerdo de Tejada obligó a la Iglesia a vender su cuantiosa propiedadinmobiliaria en condición de “manos muertas”, impidiendo paralelamente suposible reconstitución. La motivación de esta legislación no era una cuestión depuro anticlericalismo, en ella subyacía también el ánimo de, por la vía de generarun mercado de tierras, crear un nueva clase de pequeños y medianos propietariosque debían ser, a imagen y semejanza de los “farmers” en Estados Unidos, el sustratosocial del México “moderno”, no obstante, este segundo objetivo nunca llegó aconcretarse.

La respuesta de la Iglesia y los Conservadores no se hizo esperar y por tres años(1858-1861) una sangrienta guerra civil asoló México En una sociedad yaacostumbrada a la violencia entre huestes de caudillos, la Guerra de la Reforma o“de los tres años” fue algo nuevo. Para ambos bandos la lucha fue vivida como unacuestión que definía el futuro de la sociedad en su conjunto, pero los liberales ademásla transformaron en una cuestión “nacional”, no solo por el carácter universal de laIglesia, sino porque ellos identificaban su propia causa con el interés general de lasociedad. “Fueros y privilegios o reforma y progreso”.38 El triunfo liberal en 1861permitió imponer el programa anticlerical de la Reforma mucho mas allá de sudiseño original. La Iglesia no solo había apoyado al bando conservador, tambiénhabía financiado sus campañas militares, no solo era un lastre para la producción del“progreso”, era un contendor por el poder, por lo mismo, la Iglesia fue separadacompletamente del estado, sus restantes bienes fueron nacionalizados (Julio de 1859)y tanto las ordenes regulares como las hermandades fueron suprimidas.39


————————37 Sinkin, R.: “The Mexican Constitutional Congress 1856-1857: A Statistical Analysis. HAHR” Vol. 53/1,

1973 p. 1-25.38 Powell, T.G.: Priests and Peasants in Central Mexico: Social Conflict During “La Reforma” HAHR

Vol. 57/2, 1977, p. 296-313, Sinkin p. 134-137.39 Como consecuencia lógica de la separación entre Iglesia y Estado se definió además un conjunto de

leyes civiles (matrimonio, registro, cementerios, etc.) Sinkin p. 134-137. También la representación diplomáticaante la santa Sede fue retirada y dichas relaciones a nivel de embajadores no se restauraron sino hasta mediadosde los 90 en el siglo recién pasado.

Los conflictos entre Iglesia y Estado (liberal) representan un clivaje generalizadoen laAmérica Latina de mediados de Siglo XIX, estos no solo estaban relacionadosa formas diversas de entender el ser y el deber ser de la sociedad, también estabanvinculadas a la institución del patronato colonial (un conjunto de atribuciones dela monarquía en el ámbito eclesial que los gobiernos liberales asumieronposteriormente como “atributos de la soberanía”)40, tésis rechazada obviamentepor la jerarquía de la Iglesia, pero en donde paralelamente, la Iglesia aspiraba amantener los privilegios de su relación con el Estado (el carácter de religiónoficial por ejemplo y todas sus derivaciones). Las tensiones entre la Iglesia y losliberales mexicanos deben situarse en este contexto, pero agravadas tanto por elpeso económico e influencia política de la Iglesia mexicana como por la ausenciade una “arena” política institucionalizada que permitiera soluciones negociadas.

No obstante el gobierno liberal no tuvo la posibilidad de disfrutar de su triunfo.En 1861, los gobierno de España, Inglaterra y Francia suscribieron un acuerdotripartito para intervenir en México como consecuencia de deudas por empréstitosy demanda por daños de nacionales de esos países radicados en ese país. En1862 México fue invadido por un cuerpo expedicionario francés quien debíatransformarse, junto con el apoyo de los conservadores y de la Iglesia mexicana,en la base política de la Monarquía de Maximiliano de Habsburgo, pero contralas espectativas de la Jerarquía de la Iglesia, ninguna de las “Leyes de la Reforma”fueron abolidas por el nuevo régimen.41

En 1866 las preocupaciones de Napoleón III respecto de la dinámica expansiónde Prusia lo llevó a que retirar a su cuerpo expedicionario de México, aunque eraobvio que sin ese soporte militar, el “Imperio” de Maximiliano no podría sobreviviry no sobrevivió. En Julio de 1867, Benito Juarez, después de cuatro años regresóa Ciudad de México como gobernante. El resultado de la intervención francesafue solidificar la identidad entre nación y Reforma42. Para los liberales, la guerracontra los franceses fue percibida en gran medida como continuidad de la mismalucha: Los conservadores y la Iglesia no solo apoyaron la monarquía deMaximiliano,también durante la guerra de los tres años, el gobierno conservador de Zuloagahabía solicitado y obtenido el reconocimiento de algunas potencias europeas.

Por otra parte, la intervención francesa estimuló la cohesión de los masdiversos grupos mas allá de cualquier identidad regional o local, se tradujo en laemergencia no solo de un genuino patriotismo sino también en la consolidaciónde una ideología nacionalista dentro de la elite liberal que se construyó tanto enoposición a la amenaza norteamericana (preservación del territorio) como enoposición a Europa. Paradojalmente, junto con luchar contra las tropas francesas,


————————40 Véase: Matinez de Codez: La Iglesia en el Siglo XIX. (Madrid 1992). Krebs, R y otros: Catolicismo y

Laicismo.41 Para una visión “conservadora”, pero crítica de los problemas y contradicciones del Gobierno de

Maximiliano de Habsburgo en México, existe una singular fuente: el epistolario de un noble alemán que actuócomo oficial de ejército. Véase: Haydenreich, T: Ein Unbekantes Zeuge der Intervention in Mexico: EngelbertOtto Freiherr Von Brockal-Velda en Jahrbuch für Geschichte,Staat, Wirtschafts und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas(JbLA) 25 Köln, 1986.

42 Ni la libertad, ni el orden constitucional, ni el progreso ni la paz, ni la independencia de la nación hubiesensido posibles sin la Reforma. P. 83 / nota 21.

los liberales mexicanos siempre se habían sentido herederos culturales deFrancia, de la revolución y de su liberalismo, por lo mismo, esa “contradicción”francesa sirvió para cimentar una concepción mas autónoma y concluir el procesoe separación del Viejo Mundo43. En relación a Estados Unidos, pese a la importanteayuda en material militar que los liberales mexicanos recibieron, se mantuvo unafuerte desconfianza, tanto que estos asumieron que la mejor política posiblerespecto del poderoso vecino del norte era el aislamiento y que la mejor fronteraposible era las mas “profunda”, es decir el desierto.44

Los años de guerra aunque militarizaron a la sociedad, (el ejército llegó atener 60.000 soldados) permitieron simultáneamente la emergencia de una nuevaélite militar y una nueva estructura coactiva para el estado. La élite militartradicional, estuvo en el lado de los perdedores y eso permitió una renovacióndrástica de sus cuadros: los nuevos generales fueron “civiles con uniforme” endonde el Gobierno además apeló al viejo recurso de “divide et impera” creándoseestructuras militares paralelas: milicias y posteriormente los “rurales” una suertede “guardia nacional” cuya función básica fue imponer el orden nacional contrala autonomía de los caudillos locales y en las áreas mas periféricas contra todaforma de disidencia (incluyendo grupos marginales o indígenas)45. Así, el gobiernomexicano no dependería mas de la buena voluntad de los militares en cuantoinstituciòn corporativa o grupo de presiòn. Sinkin sostiene que ocurrió lo mismocon muchos de los grandes caudillos regionales, pero F. Xavier Guerra haaportado suficiente evidencia en el sentido de la que la política mexicana siguióbasándose en redes clientelísticas46, lo que efectivamente ocurrió es que loscaudillos regionales y locales perdieron mucho de sus antiguos espacios deautonomía, pasando ahora a depender mas de relaciones clientelísticas (redes)establecidas en el nivel del gobierno central.

La consolidación del estado también dio lugar a una mayor penetraciónmaterial: en 1860 México tenía solo 15 millas útiles de ferrocarril (entre Ciudadde México y Veracruz), en 1872 eran 200 y 1876 400. Aun cuando la expansiónmas significativa de los ferrocarriles se dio bajo el largo Gobierno de PorfirioDiaz, la existencia del Ferrocarril no solo permitió generar mercados integrados,también (como lo insinuara tempranamente Alberdi) permitió hacer llegar lapresencia del Estado Central (y en particular su dimensión coactiva) hasta losrincones mas apartados de la Nación. Por otra parte, como se adelantó, el Estadodio lugar a una profunda reestructuración de la propiedad territorial; esta seinició con la desamortización de tierras de la Iglesia, y continuó con una conjuntode leyes (denominadas de Colonización y Baldíos) tendiente a poner en producciónuna mayor cantidad de tierras, estas leyes tendieron tanto privatizar tierras


————————43 Francia viola su propia tradición y legado, Francia no puede seguir siendo un ideal... ahora somos

solo mexicanos que aspiramos a defender nuestro país, a no obedecer ningún gobierno excepto a aquel queemana de nuestro pueblo, nosotros moriremos por nuestra soberanía nacional cita 56 en p 160.

44 Lerdo de Tejada prohibió expresamente la construcción de Ferrocarriles entre Estados Unidos yMéxico, su lema fue “... entre (su) fortaleza y (nuestra) debilidad,, el desierto”, Lerdo de Tejada, F.: cit porPablo Macedo en Silva Herzog, op. cit., p. 301.

45 Vanderwood, P.: Mexico’s Rurales: Image of a Society in Transition HAHR Vol. 61/1, 1981 p. 52-84.46 Guerra, F.X: Mexico el Antiguo Régimen y la Revolución (México, 1989).

improductivas de propiedad del Estado como s a entregar a particulares todasaquellas tierras en donde no se pudieran acreditar efectivamente títulos de dominio.Estas leyes, pretendían generar una nueva clase de propietarios capitalistas endesmedro de las formas tradicionales de propiedad comunal. El resultado, en uncontexto de apertura de la económica mexicana,fue una importante expansión decultivos industriales y agroexportación, pero la gran propiedad solo se reconcentróy nunca se cumplió el sueño liberal de un México de pequeños propietarios.47Pero la presencia del estado no solo se expresó en sus dimensiones de penetraciónmaterial y coactiva. sino también a través de una significativa ampliación delaparato educativo, monopolizado ahora por el estado. Para figuras como Juarez,la educación pública siempre fue un tema central, por cuanto veían en ella nosolo un mecanismo de movilidad social sino también una posibilidad dedemocratizar la sociedad.48 Al inicio de la Reforma solo existían 1310 escuelasprimarias en todo México, de las cuales solo un pequeño número erangubernamentales. Juarez promulgó desde 1860 varios decretos sobre educación,pero en el contexto de la guerra estos no pasaron de ser buenas intenciones, siembargo en 1876 el número de escuelas primarias superaba las 8000. El efectode esta acción del Estado en la generación de identidades colectivas resulta obvio,tanto mas, cuanto ciertas áreas de la educación, como por ejemplo la enseñanzade la Historia se hizo sobre la base de una historiografía oficial que exaltaba laReforma y el naciente nacionalismo Mexicano.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

De la Torre, E., La Independencia de México, Madrid 1992.Góngora, M., Ensayo Historico sobre la Nocion de Estado en Chile en los Siglos XIX y XX Santiago, 1981.Hamnett, Brian, Revolución y Contrarrevolución en México y Perú, México, 1979.Hobsbawn, E., Nación y Nacionalismo desde 1780, Barcelona, 1991.Huntington. S., El Orden Político en Sociedades en Cambio,1968.Lynch, J., Las Revoluciones Hispanoamericanas, Barcelona,1980.Oszlak, O., La Formacion del Estado Argentino, Buenos Aires, 1985.Silva, Herzog J., El Pensamiento Económico, Social y Político de México, México 1974.Véase, Eyzaguirre J., Ideario y Ruta de la Emancipacion Chilena, Santiago, 1957.


————————47 En general las granades figuras de la Refoma (BenitoJuarez, Melchor Ocampo, los Hermanos Lerdo de

Tejada, Fransico Zarco etc) fueron tan liberales en lo político como en lo económico, en los fragmentos de susescritos reunidos por Silva Herzog se aprecia esta idea común de asociar la imagen del progreso a laliberalización de todo tipo de relaciones económicas. Véase Silva Herzog p. 177-259.

48 “La instrucción es la base de la prosperidad del pueblo y el medio mas seguro para evitar el abuso delos poderosos... El deseo de saber y de ilustrarse es innato al corazón del hombre. Quitenles las trabas que lamiseria y el despotismo le imponen y el se ilustrará naturalmente... ” Juarez, B cit por Silve Herzog, op. cit., p. 191.

LA IZQUIERDA ACTUAL EN AMERICA LATINA

RÃZVAN VICTOR PANTELIMON*

Abstract. This article assesses the general trend in Latin America’s Leftin the last twenty years, the characteristics of left-wing political partiesand the change in the ideology and political discourse of Latin Americansocialism. Our working hypothesis is that the fall of the socialist andcommunist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has animportant influence on the evolution of the traditional socialist parties inthis region.

Key words: LatinAmerica, political discourse, ideology, traditional socialistparties.

En el comienzo de los años 90 la situación de la izquierda en América Latinano ha sido nada alentador, el letargo político y la desorientación, el descréditopolítico y el fracaso del modelo socialista fueron pautas comunes de la izquierdalatino-americana. Este articulo quiere analizar cual ha sido la evolución generalde la izquierda de América Latina en los últimos veinte años, las característicasde los partidos políticos de izquierda y como cambio la ideología y el discurso políticodel socialismo latino-americano.

Nuestra hipótesis de trabajo es que la caída del los regimenes socialistas ycomunistas de Europa del Este y de la Unión Soviética ha influido en una medidaimportante la evolución de los partidos socialistas tradicionales de esta región.También un hecho muy importante, más que el derrumbe del Muro de Berlín, hasido la derrota electoral de los Sandinistas en 1990, que demostraba que elsocialismo revolucionario del pasado no funcionaba más y que tuvo mayoresconsecuencias para el conjunto de las fuerzas de izquierda1. En estas condicioneslos partidos de izquierda tradicionales han cumplido la tarea de “reconciliar elsocialismo con la democracia”, mientras en el mismo tiempo las estrategias políticasde estos organizaciones cambio también en el sentido de la renunciación alasalto sobre el poder y la adoptacion de estrategias que tienen más a ver con losconceptos de Gramsci sobre “hegemonía”, “guerra de posiciones” y “sociedad civil”.————————

* Researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy).1 Löwy, Michel, 2007, El marxismo en América Latina. Antología, desde 1909 hasta nuestros días (edición

actualizada), Editorial Lom, Santiago, p. 59.


Nunca fue sencillo ponerse de acuerdo con respecto a qué se entiende porizquierda en América Latina. Una de las especificidades de la políticalatinoamericana desde muy temprano en el siglo XX ha consistido en las enormesy muy conocidas dificultades de la diferenciación convencional entre partidos ofuerzas políticas de derecha y de izquierda, para dar cuenta de los más relevantesprocesos de transformación social y política con sentido de progreso — algogeneralmente asociado a posiciones de izquierda. Fenómenos de amplia convocatoriapopular con impacto duradero en el diseño de sus sociedades y sus entramadosinstitucionales como las revoluciones mexicana y boliviana, o las muchasvariantes de regímenes nacional-populares, se acoplan con dificultad al conceptoconvencional de izquierda. Más aún: en diferentes momentos de su desarrolloesos procesos se vieron enfrascados en enfrentamientos ríspidos con partidos yorganizaciones socialistas y comunistas, al mismo tiempo que impulsaban políticasde transformación que estimulaban las esperanzas de los trabajadores del campoy la ciudad y alimentaban la oposición de los sectores del poder económico o delas potencias que sentían cuestionada su hegemonía.2

Siguiendo a Norberto Bobbio consideramos que el criterio básico diferenciadorde la izquierda y la derecha lo define la postura frente a la igualdad. Ser de izquierdase identifica como una postura que asume la defensa de la igualdad, lo que no debeconfundirse con el igualitarismo. Esta postura entiende que la desigualdad es en lobásico un asunto social, no natural. De aquí el establecimiento de un programa dondelo central es, en la perspectiva social, la lucha por la igualdad de oportunidades y, enconsecuencia, la lucha contra todo tipo de exclusión social y económica. De estaforma mientras para la derecha el criterio de asignación de recursos es en lofundamental el mercado, para la izquierda lo es la sociedad; mientras para la derechael criterio exclusivo de demarcación política lo es el de la democracia liberal,básicamente de tipo electoral, que afirma sobre todo la ciudadanía política y civil,para la izquierda la democracia debe ir más allá y englobar una ciudadanía afirmativaen el ámbito de los derechos sociales, la defensa de las minorías y la participaciónde la sociedad civil como actor legítimo en la escena política.3

Acerca de la calificación de los partidos como de izquierda o no para larealización del presente estudio se entenderá como partido de izquierda aquellospartidos que en la escala izquierda-derecha son situados en izquierda o centro-izquierda. Consideramos que esta escala es un mecanismo correcto para concedera cada partido una etiqueta ampliamente aceptada en las ciencias sociales.Creemos que podemos extender a América Latina la afirmación de Peter Mair,quien refiriéndose a Europa Occidental indica que izquierda y derecha no solamentecontinúan siendo los mayores principios de organización en la política sino quetambién ayudan a crear unos cimientos uniformes en las pautas contemporáneasde la competición política.4

2 LA IZQUIERDA ACTUAL EN AMERICA LATINA 117

————————2 Vilas, Carlos M, “La izquierda latinoamericana y el surgimiento de regímenes nacional-populares” en

Nueva Sociedad, no. 197, mayo/junio 2005, Caracas, p. 84-85.3 Bobbio, Norberto, 1995, Derecha e izquierda. Razones y significados de una distinción política, Taurus,

Madrid, p. 131-135.4 Mair, Peter, 1997, Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Son algunos científicos como el periodistaAndrésOppenheimer, quien considerancomo superado el antiguo binomio derecha-izquierda: Existen muchos paísesdonde líderes «izquierdistas» siguen la exitosa apertura económica chilena, yunos pocos donde líderes petro-populistas despilfarran dinero sin preocuparsepor construir una base sólida de crecimiento a largo plazo. La próxima vez queescuche que Latinoamérica está virando hacia la izquierda, diga que sí, peroañada que en la mayoría de los países la izquierda está virando hacia la derecha.5

Para delimitar exactamente nuestras unidades de análisis, los partidos deizquierda que van a ser utilizados como estudios de casos o ejemplos paraanalizar los cambios que han surgido después de la caída del socialismo real,vamos a utilizar los datos presentados en un estudio reciente de ManuelAlcántara6.

A lo largo del período de democratización de los sistemas políticoslatinoamericanos acontecido después de las transiciones políticas, para unoscasos, y de continuidad para otros, los partidos políticos de la región han sufridoprofundas mutaciones que tienen su base en aspectos tanto endógenos comoexógenos, en cuestiones de alcance estrictamente político institucional como enotras de contenido social o económico.

La gran mayoría de los autores son de acuerdo que el descalabro del socialismoreal y la pérdida de un referente sólido ideológico y práctico para grandes sectoresde la izquierda latinoamericana fue el factor exógeno por excelencia. Los efectosdel año 1989 sobre América Latina son muy evidentes al nivelo macro político,porque después de la caída del muro de Berlín se redujo a la mínima expresiónlos apoyos procedentes de aquel espacio, se hizo desparecer en el imaginario deWashington la idea que su “patio trasero” pudiera caer en manos enemigas,desplazo la centralidad de la política norte-americana hacia el este de Europa yel Oriente Medio etc.7

Son muchos autores que han escrito sobre el desgaste de la izquierda alcomienzo de los noventa, pero lo más conocido es el politólogo mexicano JorgeCastañeda que abría su libro de 1993 con una sentencia categórica: La guerrafría ha terminado y el bloque socialista se derrumbó. Los Estados Unidos y elcapitalismo triunfaron. Y quizás en ninguna parte ese triunfo se antoja tan claroy contundente como en América Latina. Nunca antes la democracia representativa,la economía de libre mercado y las efusiones oportunistas o sinceras desentimiento pronorteamericano habían poblado con tal persistencia el paisajede una región donde antaño hombres y mujeres del mundo entero depositaron sufe revolucionario en otro ideario a partir de otra victoria: la Revolución Cubana.8

¿Cuales pueden ser las causas de este descrédito de la izquierda? MartaHarnecker una observadora muy atente del panorama político latino-americana

118 RÃZVAN VICTOR PANTELIMON 3

————————5 Oppenheimer,Andres. “LatinAmerican ‘Left’Has Been Shifting to the Right” enMiami Herald, disponible

en www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/columnists/andres_oppenheimer/16205845.htm, consultado en25.05.2008

6 Alcántara, Manuel, 2004, La ideología de los partidos políticos latinoamericanos. Estudio/WorkingPaper no. 20, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid.

7 Alcántara, Manuel y Freidenberg, Flavia, “Los partidos políticos en América Latina” en América LatinaHoy, no. 27, 2001, Salamanca, p. 24.

8 Castañeda, Jorge, 1993, Utopia desarmada, Ariel, Buenos Aires, p. 9.

de izquierda consideraba que la izquierda latinoamericana quedó desconcertaday sin proyecto alternativo; está viviendo una profunda crisis que abarca tresterrenos: el teórico, el programático y el orgánico.

En su opinión la crisis teórica de la izquierda latinoamericana tenia un tripleorigen: su incapacidad histórica de elaborar un pensamiento propio porque en lamayoría de los casos la tendencia fue más bien la de extrapolar esquemas deanálisis propios a otras latitudes; no ha sido capaz de realizar un estudio rigurosode las experiencias socialistas — tanto de sus éxitos como de sus fracasos — ytampoco ha realizado un análisis serio de las causas de sus derrotas; la inexistenciade un estudio crítico del capitalismo de fines del siglo XX-el capitalismo de larevolución electrónico-informática, de la globalización y las guerras financieras.9En el mismo tiempo la izquierda latinoamericana ha vivido una crisis programáticaal comienzo de los noventa, cuando ha tenido grandes dificultades para diseñarun proyecto transformador que pueda asumir los datos de la nueva realidadmundial y que podría hacer confluir en un sólo haz a todos los sectores socialesafectados por el régimen imperante.10 La crisis orgánico o institucional de lospartidos de izquierda se ha expresado tanto en la pérdida de su capacidad deatracción y convocatoria ante las gentes y especialmente ante la juventud, comoen una evidente disfuncionalidad de sus estructuras, hábitos, tradiciones y manerasde hacer política, con las exigencias que la realidad social reclama de un actorpolítico de carácter popular y socialista.11

Vamos a ver cuales han sido las características de la izquierda tradicional enAmérica Latina, para entender después el cambio que surgió después del momento1989.

En oposición con la nueva izquierda sobre cual vamos hablar más tarde, laizquierda histórica es entendido en este trabajo como el conjunto de partidospolíticos, movimientos sociales y organizaciones guerrilleras que conformaronel espectro de la izquierda entre 1959, con la revolución cubana y 1990, con el finde la segunda ola revolucionaria latino-americana.

La mayor parte del siglo pasado los partidos de izquierda no se cuestionabalos objetivos, que estaban muy claros, pero analizaban solo sobre los métodospara realizar su misión histórica, sobre las formas de las acciones para llegar aestas metas. Los objetivos que deberían ser obtenidas estaban una simplereproducción en el espacio latino-americano de unos modelos u otros (aquel deURSS, de Cuba, de China, de los países comunistas, de Yugoslavia). Podemosdecir que para los partidos latinos-americanos “si qué hacer ya estaba aclarado,bastaba discernir el cómo hacerlo”.12

Lo más conocida discusión ha sido aquella entre los partidarios del modelorevolucionario para tomar el poder (que tenia sus origines intelectuales en la


————————9 Harnecker, Martha, 1999, Haciendo posible lo imposible: la izquierda en el umbral del siglo XXI, Siglo

XXI Editores, Mexicó, p. 223-224.10 Idem, p. 232.11 Idem, p. 238.12 Castro, Nils, 2005, Las izquierdas latinoamericanas: Observaciones a una trayectoria, Fundacion

Friedrich Ebert, Panama, p. 95.

teoría leninista del asalto sobre el poder y sus origines practicas en la RevoluciónCubana) y aquellos que sostenían la vía democrática, electoral para llegar alpoder. Podemos hablar de la influencia de estas dos teorías utilizando lametáfora de los flujos y reflujos: si el los años 60 el más fuerte estaba el modelorevolucionario, impulsado por el éxito de la Revolución Cubana, y adoptado demuchos partidos, por ejemplo: el Partido Socialista de Chile, que en diferentesCongresos de estos años proclamaba la legitimidad de la violencia revolucionariacomo única vía para lograr el éxito de la Revolución Socialista13, al comienzode los 70 el fracaso del movimiento guerrillero de Che Guevara en Bolivia y eléxito del Salvador Allende creaban la impresión que la vía electoral puede sermejor; pero, el golpe de estado contra Allende y la victoria de los sandinistas enNicaragua hacían de nuevo muy atractivo el modelo revolucionario que se hamantenido en los 80; la derrota electoral del FSLN y del golpe militar de HugoChávez en 1992 han hecho que los partidos de izquierda renuncian de nuevo ala idea de revolución y buscan métodos legales para tomar el poder, modelo quese ha probado exitoso en el comienzo del nuevo siglo.

Una de las ideas fuertes de la izquierda estaba la creencia en la imposibilidadde un camino “nacional-democrático” para el desarrollo social enAmérica Latinay la necesidad de una revolución socialista como única respuesta realista y coherenteal subdesarrollo y a la dependencia.14

Democracia social, cambios socioeconómicos profundos orientados hacia lasclases trabajadoras y autodeterminación nacional constituyeron hasta recientementeel núcleo de las propuestas “de izquierda” en América Latina.15

La crisis vivida de la izquierda latino-americana en los últimos lustros delsiglo pasado ha sido la expresión regional de una crisis mundial de la viejaizquierda, manifestada en el declive de las tradiciones progresistas provenientesde dos de las grandes revoluciones modernas, pero en el mismo tiempo, hay otrocomponente de esta crisis que tiene a ver con la estrategia política y estasimbolizado por el ocaso del canon leninista proveniente de la revolución rusa.16Estas dos direcciones: el cambio ideológico y el cambio de estrategia políticason en nuestra opinión las características principales de la evolución de la izquierdalatino-americana en los últimos veinte años.

Son muchas interpretaciones sobre las causas del surgimiento de una nuevaizquierda enAmérica Latina, dentro de una coyuntura mundial muy poco favorablea este tipo de políticas. Nos vamos a limitar aquí a presentar la opinión de Atilio


————————13 Verdejo, Inés Picazo, 2001, “Chile” en Alcántara Sáez, Manuel y Freidenberg, Flavia, eds. Partidos

políticos de América Latina. Cono Sur, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2001, p. 312. Véasetambién Jobet, Julio César, 1987, Historia del Partido Socialista de Chile, Ediciones Documentas, Santiago;Arrate, Jorge y Rojas, Eduardo, 2003, Memoria de la Izquierda Chilena, Ediciones B, Santiago.

14 Löwy, Michel, 2007, El marxismo en América Latina. Antología, desde 1909 hasta nuestros días (ediciónactualizada), Editorial Lom, Santiago, p. 52.

15 Vilas, Carlos M., “La izquierda latinoamericana. Búsquedas y desafíos” en Nueva Sociedad, no. 157,septiembre/octubre 1998, Caracas p. 78.

16 Garavito, César A. Rodríguez y Barrett, Patrick, “¿La utopía revivida? Introducción al estudio de lanueva izquierda latinoamericana” en Garavito, César A. Rodríguez, Barrett, Patrick y Chavez, Daniel, 2005,La nueva izquierda en América Latina. Sus orígenes y trayectoria futura, Grupo Editorial Norma, BuenosAires, p. 25-26.

Borón que en un trabajo reciente encuentra cuatro puntos principales que explicanel surgimiento de una nueva izquierda y que sintetiza muy bien los debates.17

En primer lugar, a principios de los noventas comenzaron a sentirse losproblemas y los limitaciones del modelo neoliberal basado en las políticas delConsenso de Washington. A medida que se multiplicaron las crisis económicasy los escándalos de corrupción, relacionadas con las reformas estructurales,surgieron o se fortalecieron los partidos y movimientos de izquierda que seoponían a este tipo de políticas económicas. Un segundo factor que puede explicarel renacimiento de la izquierda es la aparición de nuevos actores políticos quevinieron a compensar el declive de los viejos actores, como los sindicatos.Aunque la organización clásica de partido queda vigente, cada día aparecen nuevostipos de organización (movimientos indígenas, organizaciones campesinas,movimiento de desempleados, organizaciones feministas etc). El tercer factor hasido el desgaste, el descrédito y la crisis interna de los partidos políticos tradicionales,que ha dado lugar a nuevas formaciones de izquierda. El caso lo más claro es elde Venezuela, donde el “fenómeno Chávez” y su consolidación en el poder nopuede ser entendido sin tener en cuenta la situación de los partidos tradicionalesque perdieron toda la confianza de los electores como resultado de casi cuarentaaños del Pacto de Punto Fijo. Un último factor que fortaleció la izquierda latino-americana ha sido la revitalización de la izquierda internacional a partir delsurgimiento de un movimiento global contra la globalización, el neoliberalismoy la guerra.

Para sintetizar podemos decir que el voto popular por los partidos de izquierdaes en mayor o en menor grado conforme a los países, la expresión de undescontento con el neoliberalismo, con la dominación imperialista, con eldesorden establecido y busca una alternativa radical a las estructuras socialesexistentes — independientemente de los límites programáticos de tal o cualorganización o frente político.18

Aun hoy en día existe una pluralidad de partidos y movimientos dentro de laizquierda latino-americana actual con experiencias muy diversas podemosdestacar algunos rasgos comunes que constituyen características principales deestas formaciones y cuales diferencian los partidos de izquierda actuales de unaizquierda tradicional.

Si la izquierda anterior sostenía la unidad teorética y la centralización estratégica,la nueva izquierda es caracterizada de una pluralidad de estrategias y de formasde articulación organizativas descentralizadas. En lugar del partido comovanguardia del proletariado, sujeto político unitario especifico por el leninismo,en actualidad las formas predominantes son los frentes amplios de partidos ymovimientos, las coordinadoras o los encuentros. Otro rasgo de la nueva izquierdaes la ampliación de la base social y de las agendas políticas para incluir otros


————————17 Boron,Atilio, “La izquierda latinoamericana a comienzos del siglo XXI: Promesa y desafíos” en Garavito,

César A. Rodríguez, Barrett, Patrick y Chavez, Daniel, 2005, La nueva izquierda en América Latina. Susorígenes y trayectoria futura, Grupo Editorial Norma, Buenos Aires, p. 405-433.

18 Löwy, Michel, 2007, El marxismo en América Latina. Antología, desde 1909 hasta nuestros días (ediciónactualizada), Editorial Lom, Santiago, p. 66.

temas como la lucha contra la discriminación, los derechos de las minorías etc.Un tema recurrente y común de las fuerzas de izquierda actuales es la reivindicaciónde la sociedad civil como espacio de acción política. La diferencia con laizquierda tradicional tiene a ver también con la estrategia política, cual pone elacento en el reformismo y deja a un lado la revolución o las vías insurrecciónales.Una ultima característica de la nueva izquierda es el acento sobre la democraciacomo “el único juego en la ciudad” para utilizar una frase celebre de Juan Linz yAlfred Stepan, lo que significa la “reconciliación del socialismo con la democracia”.19

Hemos visto las causas del surgimiento de una nueva izquierda y unos de suscaracterísticas. Antes de analizar más detallado el cambio ideológico y las nuevasestrategias políticas, debemos dar una definición de esta nueva izquierda parasaber a que nos referimos cuando hablamos de ella. Por eso utilizamos unadefinición de Marta Harnecker, citada de Ronald H. Chilcote en un articulosobre la izquierda en América Latina: ser de izquierda hoy significa luchar oapoyar un proyecto de sociedad cual se opone a la lógica capitalista de profit-making y cual busca de construir una sociedad con una lógica humanística.20 Esuna definición bastante larga pero consideramos que ella cubre todas lasorganizaciones o estructuras que hoy en día son conocidos como “de izquierda”.

Si antes de la caída del “socialismo real” la izquierda latino-americana debatíasobre las modalidades y formas para cambiar la sociedad e implementar elsocialismo en estos países, hoy en día la cuestión principal es aquella de cómoobtener la mejor justicia social en una economía de mercado. Asistimos a la“declaración de la muerte de las ideologías. El evento que suscitó esa desilusiónfue el fin de los socialismos reales, considerado como el fracaso de los grandesdiscursos o de los discursos que pretendían sostener una teoría de la historia,que vinculara de manera férrea, a través de leyes, el presente con el porvenir”.21

La desaparición del modelo comunista ha tenido consecuencias importantessobre la izquierda latinoamericana tradicional que perdía su mayor referente, losmodelos invocados de los socialistas probándose a ser equivocadas y que nopodrían resistir a la prueba del tiempo y de la historia. Como resultado la izquierdalatinoamericana tradicional ha debido de adaptarse a las nuevas realidades, debuscar nuevos modelos, de redefinir sus objetivos y de buscar unos nuevos paranacer un nuevo proyecto. Esto puede ser muy bien observado en los discursos ydeclaraciones de los líderes políticos de izquierda, que han sido obligados, en sumayoría, de utilizar teorías y conceptos nuevos, pero aun se pueden encontraralgunos ideas y teorías que han sido antes expuestos de los que pueden serdenominados “clásicos del socialismo latinoamericano” como Jose Marti, JuanMella, Jóse Carlos Mariatégui, Che Guevara, Salvador Allende.


————————19 Garavito, CésarA. Rodríguez y Barrett, Patrick, “¿La utopía revivida? Introducción al estudio de la nueva

izquierda latinoamericana” en Garavito, CésarA. Rodríguez, Barrett, Patrick y Chavez, Daniel, 2005, La nuevaizquierda en América Latina. Sus orígenes y trayectoria futura, Grupo Editorial Norma, Buenos Aires, p. 31-37.

20 Chilcote, Ronald H., “The Left in Latin America: Theory and Practice” en Latin American Perspectives,Issue 131, Vol. 30 No. 4, Julio 2003, Sage Publications, p. 10.

21 Moulian, Tomás, “El sistema de partidos en Chile” en Cavarozzi, Marcelo yAbal Medina, Juan Manuel(compiladores) El asedio a la política. Los partidos latinoamericanos en la era neoliberal, Homo SapiensEdiciones, Rosario, 2002, p. 244.

De estas mismas fuentes, pero en una medida más amplia, se alimentan loslíderes de los nuevos partidos socialistas que encuentran en los escritos de los“viejos marxistas de América Latina” el material par sus discursos, ideas políticasy actitudes. Por ejemplo, aquí se puede encontrar la justificación de las medidasde nacionalización tomadas reciente en algunos países, que no son basadas en laidea marxista de la necesidad de la propiedad publica de las medidas deproducción, pero en la lucha para la soberanía nacional contra los interesesimperialistas de los grandes multinacionales, representantes del antiguo enemigoimperialista deAmérica Latina: EE.UU. (los casos de nacionalización del petróleoen Venezuela o del gas en Bolivia)

Conceptos como la lucha de clase, proletariado, explotación, internacionalismoproletario, dictadura del proletariado etc, que han hecho parte del discurso y delos programas de los partidos de izquierdas por muchos años, han sidoremplazados con: justicia social, equidad, redistribución, los derechos de losindígenas y de las minorías, la integración y la unidad latinoamericana, lasoberanía nacional frente al imperialismo y capitalismo. Los dos temas centralesde la nueva izquierda son la búsqueda de alternativas al neoliberalismo y lademocratización de la política y las sociedades latinoamericanas (incluida lademocratización de las propias fuerzas de izquierda).22

Si hasta el comienzo de los noventa la izquierda se presentaba como unaalternativa al modelo social, hoy constituye una más de las alternativas dentro dela oferta política. A veces, para ampliar su base de sustentación y su legitimidaddemocrática, la izquierda debe presentarse con un discurso menos “a laizquierda” que otros partidos ubicados en el centro o a la derecha. Quizá no hayamuestra más concisa del significado del famoso lema “el fin de las ideologías”que esta suerte de enredo ideológico cotidiano que implica para las organizacionesde la izquierda que sus discursos deban adaptarse a las demandas sociales mientrasse atiende al mismo tiempo a las bases partidarias y los temores electorales.23

En actualidad los conceptos de democracia y reformas han ocupado el espacioque hasta hace no mucho pertenecía al cambio sistémico o a la revolución social.Estamos en presencia de una izquierda gradualista y pragmática, sin definicionesideológicas duras. En vez de un enfrentamiento en bloque al diseño estructuraldel capitalismo neoliberal, o incluso un drástico cambio de modelo macroeconómico,postulan un capitalismo más balanceado, con un Estado que, más que intervenirdirectamente en los mercados, regula y fiscaliza su desenvolvimiento paraampliar la competitividad, articulando las demandas de rentabilidad y los requisitosde inversión del capital, las aspiraciones de bienestar social de la población, y lavigencia efectiva de las instituciones democráticas y los derechos humanos.Constitutivo de los diseños de reforma es el énfasis en el fortalecimiento de la


————————22 Garavito, César A. Rodríguez y Barrett, Patrick, “¿La utopía revivida? Introducción al estudio de la

nueva izquierda latinoamericana” en Garavito, César A. Rodríguez, Barrett, Patrick y Chavez, Daniel, 2005,La nueva izquierda en América Latina. Sus orígenes y trayectoria futura, Grupo Editorial Norma, BuenosAires, p. 37.

23 Vilas, Carlos M., “La izquierda latinoamericana. Búsquedas y desafíos” en Nueva Sociedad, no. 157,septiembre/octubre 1998, Caracas p. 80.

sociedad civil a través de la descentralización y la promoción del asociativismo y eldesarrollo local.24

Los discursos de los lideres políticos de la izquierda latinoamericana ilustranmuy bien este transforme de los ideales e ideologías de la izquierda actual,muchos de ellos rechazando la titulatura de socialistas o comunistas, que antesha sido ligado con la izquierda. Vamos a dar en adelante algunos ejemplos dedeclaraciones o discursos políticos para observar como se ubican ellos mismosunos líderes que son cualificados como “de izquierda”.

Tabare Vazquez, el presidente de Uruguay, declaraba a pocos días desde elcomienzo de su mandato: ”[S]i me pregunta si ideológicamente nuestro programade gobierno es un programa socialista, le voy a decir que no lo es. Es unprograma nacional, profundamente democratizador, un programa que buscapor el camino de la solidaridad, la justicia social, el crecimiento económico conjusticia, es decir el desarrollo humano (…) Los cambios que vamos a hacer soncambios a la uruguaya o no serán (…) es un cambio pacífico, gradual,meditado, serio, profundo, responsable, con participación amplia de todos losactores de la vida económica, política y social del país, que busque un objetivocentral de nuestro gobierno, que es mejorar la calidad de vida de todos losuruguayos, comenzando con el mandato histórico que tenemos que se remontaa la noche de los tiempos de nuestra nación, el ideario artiguista, cuandoArtigas decía que los más necesitados sean los más privilegiados; que la causade los pueblos no admite la menor demora”.25

El Partido Socialista Chileno ha abandonado el marxismo y promete mantenerlas características centrales de la revolución neoliberal de Pinochet. Hoy en díael PSCh no tiene ninguna continuidad histórica con el pasado porque refundo suhistoria, renegó de ella, convirtiéndose en una corriente social demócratadespués de haber sido desde su fundación un partido revolucionario. RicardoLagos, presidente de Chile entre 2000 y 2006 repetía que no quería ser “elsegundo presidente socialista de Chile (después de Allende) sino el tercero de laConcertación (después de dos demócrata-cristianos)”.26 El mismo Lagos, respondea una pregunta sobre si después de las elecciones de 2005–2006 se puede hablarsobre un giro hacia izquierda, que la región, más que hacia la izquierda, girahacia la profundización del sistema democrático.27

El discurso de los líderes del nuevo socialismo es diferente en mayoría de loscasos, pero son casos cuando se parece al discurso de los partidos másmoderados. Por ejemplo Hugo Chávez, el más conocido y visible líder socialistade hoy declaraba: “no acepto que [actualmente] vivamos un período de revoluciones


————————24 Vilas, Carlos M, “La izquierda latinoamericana y el surgimiento de regímenes nacional-populares” en

Nueva Sociedad, no. 197, mayo/junio 2005, Caracas, p. 88-91.25 El País, Montevideo, 4 marzo 2005 apudVILAS, Carlos M, “La izquierda latinoamericana y el surgimiento

de regímenes nacional-populares” en Nueva Sociedad, no. 197, mayo/junio 2005, Caracas, p. 93-94.26 Colomer, Joseph M. “Las elecciones primarias presidenciales en América Latina y sus consecuencias”

en Cavarozzi, Marcelo y Abal Medina, Juan Manuel (compiladores) El asedio a la política. Los partidoslatinoamericanos en la era neoliberal, Homo Sapiens Ediciones, Rosario, 2002, p. 131.

27 Zovatto, Daniel, “América Latina después del «rally» electoral 2005-2006: algunas tendencias y datossobresalientes” en Nueva Sociedad, no. 207, enero/febrero 2007, Caracas, p. 24-26.

proletarias; la realidad nos lo dice día a día. Pero si me dicen que por esarealidad no se puede hacer nada por los pobres, entonces respondo [que] jamásaceptaré que no pueda haber redistribución de la riqueza en la sociedad. Creoque es mejor morir en la batalla que mantener una bandera revolucionaria muyalta y muy pura, y no hacer nada... [Prefiero] avanzar un poco, aunque sea unmilímetro, en la dirección correcta, en vez de soñar en utopías.”28

Una última opinión citada aquí es de los líderes del MAS (Movimiento alSocialismo), el partido político que ha ganado las elecciones en Boliva. HugoSalvatierra, Ministro de la Agricultura define el MAS como “una herramientaencaminada a plasmar la «autodeterminación» de las 31 naciones indígenas delpaís. Para lograrlo, el MAS ha ido desarrollando la idea de un socialismo «a laboliviana», un modelo que no parte de las teorías sociales o políticas, sino de laexperiencia concreta”. Habla, por ejemplo, de un sistema de propiedadcolectiva, que no es obra de los intelectuales tradicionales sino de la vida mismade los pueblos. Para Salvatierra, la principal contradicción no es la que enfrentaa indígenas y no indígenas, sino la que contrapone a Bolivia y el imperialismo.Otro líder boliviano, Asterio Romero, vea Bolivia como „la patria de todos”,este modelo integrador pasando los clásicos diferencias clasistas o raciales.29

Una de las características del discurso de izquierda actual es que el no es dirigidoa los trabajadores o al proletariado, si no a unos conceptos unificativos muy largos,como “pueblo” que intentan a integrar muchos grupos sociales. Este tipo dediscurso no es totalmente nuevo porque la izquierda latinoamericana reclutó susbases sociales, sus cuadros y sus dirigentes, de un amplio espectro: asalariados delcampo y la ciudad, campesinado pobre y medio, pequeña burguesía rural y urbana,actores de reclutamiento generacional o ideológico (movimiento estudiantil porejemplo). Fue una izquierda popularmás que estrictamente proletaria, apoyada pory orientada hacia un amplio arco de actores unificados por el común denominadorde la opresión— social, nacional, cultural — y no solo por la explotación de clase.En consecuencia la “frontera” que separó a la izquierda del resto del espectropolítico fue difusa y de carácter político-ideológico más que social.30

Pero si antes de 1989 existían algunas referencias a la clase obrera, altrabajador etc, que daban a los partidos de izquierda un carácter más o menosclasista, hoy en día el discurso de izquierda renuncia totalmente a cualquierreferencia hacia una diferencia de clase y utiliza conceptos más difusos comopueblo o población, que le da un carácter más integrador. Si para la izquierdatradicional las clases sociales estaban el actor principal del enfrentamiento y dela lucha social, para la nueva izquierda no hay una diferencia entre gobernantesy gobernados porque el pueblo que debe participar al acto de gobernar.

Heinz Dieterich, uno de los más importantes ideólogos del socialismo delsiglo XXI del presidente Hugo Chávez, afirmaba, hablando sobre el nuevo modelo


————————28 Ali, Tariq, „¿Por qué gano Chávez?” en La Jornada, México DF, 19 agosto 2004.29 Archondo, Rafael, “¿Qué le espera a Bolivia con Evo Morales?” en „Nueva Sociedad”, no. 202, enero-

marzo 2006, Caracas, p. 7-8.30 Vilas, Carlos M., “La izquierda latinoamericana. Búsquedas y desafíos” en Nueva Sociedad, no. 157,

septiembre/octubre 1998, Caracas p. 82.

de izquierda, que lo que se busca es que la población sea un simple receptorpasivo del actuar gubernamental, sino por el contrario; en consonancia con elparadigma democrático protagónico y participativo; se impulsa una verdadera yabsoluta participación del pueblo en el gobierno, otorgando de esta manera unnuevo sentido a nuestra democracia.31

Como un resumen de los nuevos valores e ideas de la izquierda contemporáneautilizamos el preámbulo de la Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana Venezuela,considerado este país como lo más vocal caso de lo que puede ser denominado“nueva izquierda”: ….establecer una sociedad democrática, participativa yprotagónica, multiétnica y pluricultural en un Estado de justicia, federal ydescentralizado, que consolide los valores de la libertad, la independencia, lapaz, la solidaridad, el bien común, la integridad territorial, la convivencia y elimperio de la ley para esta y las futuras generaciones; asegure el derecho a lavida, al trabajo, a la cultura, a la educación, a la justicia social y a la igualdadsin discriminación ni subordinación alguna; promueva la cooperación pacíficaentre las naciones e impulse y consolide la integración latinoamericana de acuerdocon el principio de no intervención y autodeterminación de los pueblos, lagarantía universal e indivisible de los derechos humanos, la democratización dela sociedad internacional, el desarme nuclear, el equilibrio ecológico y los bienesjurídicos ambientales como patrimonio común e irrenunciable de la humanidad.32

También se cambio mucho el modelo organizativo de los partidos deizquierda que tiene a ver con el cambio en la visión para llegar al poder. Comohemos dicho anterior si antes de los 90 el partido estaba visto y organizado segúnel modelo leninista, como la vanguardia del proletariado cual debe asaltar elpoder, hoy en día, en un mundo más complejo, el modelo organizativo es muyinfluido de las teorías y conceptos de Antonio Gramsci sobre la “guerra deposiciones” y sobre “hegemonía”. Es necesario captar y organizar la sociedadcivil, las organizaciones sociales, y después se puede obtener la victoria electoral(así podemos explicar la importancia de los movimientos sociales, de losmovimientos indígenas etc, en las victorias de la izquierda actual).

La influencia gramsciana ha sido muy fuerte en America Latina, y en losúltimos años sus ideas y su filosofía han sido redescubiertos de loa liderespolíticos de izquierda. Con la derrota electoral de los sandinistas en 1990 laizquierda latino-americana abandona la vía revolucionaria y el modelo basadoen el asalto sobre el poder, que se han probado ineficientes al largo plazo. Elplazo de esta estrategia ha sido ocupado por ideas tomados desde AntonioGramsci, muchos de sus conceptos enunciados en los años 30 del siglo pasadoprobándose ser más apropiados para el nuevo contexto político y social.Asistamos así a una novedad en la estrategia de la izquierda contemporánea, queen términos de John Holloway radica en el proyecto de cambiar el mundo sintomar el poder.33


————————31 Dieterich, Heinz, 2007, Hugo Chávez y el socialismo del siglo XXI, Editorial Quimantú, Santiago, p. 23.32 http://www.constitucion.ve/documentos/ConstitucionRBV1999-ES.pdf .33 Holloway, John, 2001, Cambiar el mundo sin tomar el poder. El significado de la revolución hoy,

Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, Puebla, p. 174.

Aun si no todos los partidos de izquierda utilizan de un modo explicito losconceptos de Gramsci, en la práctica ellos han seguido una ruta común paraconstruir su capacidad política y reducir las dificultades de las disyuntivas queenfrentan. Se trata de una estrategia de escalas, que parece mucho a la “guerrade posiciones” de Gramsci, y que va desde avances en los ámbitos locales yprovinciales hasta a victorias en el ámbito nacional. Como ha sido documentadoen varios estudios los gobiernos locales de izquierda han sido invariablementelos puntos de apoyo para el lanzamiento de candidaturas y plataformas políticasnacionales.34

La influencia de Antonio Gramsci sobre las estrategias políticas de lospartidos políticos de izquierda tiene una “historia” bastante larga. Todo el procesode Renovación Socialista en Chile de los años ochenta, la integración de MAPUen el socialismo, la unificación de los diferentes corrientes del socialismo, laestrategia de la Concertación (que aun funciona) se han hecho sobre la influenciade los conceptos gramscianos.35

Uno de los conceptos de Gramsci lo más utilizado de la izquierda latino-americana ha sido el termino de “hegemonía”. Podemos analizar muy bien laevolución y el uso de ese concepto si consideramos como caso de estudio elPartido des Trabajadores de Brasil. En los documentos preparativos para elprograma político del partido de 1979 se utiliza el término de hegemonía. Unmomento muy importante ha sido la quinta Conferencia Nacional de 1987 dondelos conceptos de hegemonía y de sociedad civil han utilizados muy a menudo.Lo mismo pasó con la resolución de la sexta Conferencia Nacional de 1989.36

Pero el término de hegemonía va a ser el concepto clave de la séptima ConferenciaNacional del PT, al menos seis de las ocho tesis presentadas aquí utilizan de unmodo explicito conceptos e ideas gramscianas.37

En el primer Congreso del PT llevado a cabo en 1991 dos de las secciones dela resolución final han sido denominados El papel central de la lucha para lahegemonía y La lucha contemporánea para la hegemonía. Esto se constituye enuna demostración muy clara del hecho que la lógica política para definir laestrategia política esta basada en el concepto de hegemonía.38


————————34 Garavito, César A. Rodríguez y Barrett, Patrick, “¿La utopía revivida? Introducción al estudio de la

nueva izquierda latinoamericana” en Garavito, César A. Rodríguez, Barrett, Patrick y Chavez, Daniel, 2005,La nueva izquierda en América Latina. Sus orígenes y trayectoria futura, Grupo Editorial Norma, BuenosAires, p. 54-55.

35 Véase Massardo, Jaime, “Consideraciones iniciales a propósito de la lectura en Chile del pensamientode Antonio Gramsci”, en Älvarez, Rolando y Massardo, Jaime (editores), Gramsci. A 70 años de su muerte.Ariadna Ediciones, Santiago, 2008, p. 11-38; Quiroga, Patricio, “Gramsci y la política. Una reflexión desde lahistoria de los derrotados” en idem, p. 111-132; Arrate, Jorge, “Gramsci: apuntes para una memoria y sucintasreflexiones sobre qué hacer” en idem, p. 133-144.

36 Burgos, Raul, „The Gramscian Intervention in the Theoretical and Political Production of the LatinAmerican Left” in Latin American Perspectives, Issue 122, vol. 29, no. 1, January 2002, Sage Publications, p. 23.

37 Diaz, Osvaldo Fernandez, „In America Latina” en Eric Hobsbawm, Gramsci in Europa e in Americhe,Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1995, p. 135.

38 Burgos, Raul, “The Gramscian Intervention in the Theoretical and Political Production of the LatinAmerican Left” en Latin American Perspectives, Issue 122, vol. 29, no. 1, January 2002, Sage Publications, p. 24.

Paul G Buchanan aplica los conceptos de Gramsci, especialmente hegemonía-contra hegemonía como una modalidad de oponerse al auge del neoliberalismoen Argentina.39

Hemos visto anteriormente como otro concepto muy caro a Gramsci, lasociedad civil, se ha transformado en una de las características mayores de lanueva izquierda latino-americana. Podemos analizar el caso de casi todo lospartidos y movimientos de izquierda de América Latina y somos seguros que entodos estos casos vamos a encontrar, en una medida más o menos explicita,algunos de los conceptos de Gramsci.

La intención de este artículo ha sido de ofrecer una imagen general, muyrápida y por supuesto incompleta, de la evolución de los partidos de izquierdaen América Latina en los últimos veinte años, de los cambios surgidos en estospartidos después de la caída del socialismo real y de las nuevas direcciones ycaracterísticas de la ideología y de la estrategia política de estos partidos.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alcántara, Manuel, La ideología de los partidos políticos latinoamericanos. Estudio/Working Paper no. 20,Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, 2004.

Alcántara, Manuel y Freidenberg, Flavia, “Los partidos políticos en América Latina” en América Latina Hoy,no. 27, Salamanca, 2001.

Arrate, Jorge y Rojas, Eduardo, Memoria de la Izquierda Chilena, Ediciones B. Santiago, 2003.Bobbio, Norberto, Derecha e izquierda. Razones y significados de una distinción política, Taurus, Madrid,

1995.Castañeda, Jorge, Utopia desarmada, Ariel, Buenos Aires, 1993.Castro, Nils, Las izquierdas latinoamericanas: Observaciones a una trayectoria, Fundacion Friedrich Ebert,

Panama, 2005.Harnecker, Martha, Haciendo posible lo imposible: la izquierda en el umbral del siglo XXI, Siglo XXI

Editores, Mexicó, 1999.Julio César, Historia del Partido Socialista de Chile, Ediciones Documentas, Santiago, 1987.Löwy, Michel, El marxismo en América Latina. Antología, desde 1909 hasta nuestros días (edición actualizada),

Editorial Lom, Santiago, 2007.Mair, Peter, Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997.Oppenheimer, Andres, “Latin American ‘Left’ Has Been Shifting to the Right” en Miami Herald, disponible

en www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/ news/columnists/andres_oppenheimer/16205845. htm, consultadoen 25.05.2008.

Verdejo, Inés Picazo, “Chile” enAlcántara Sáez, Manuel y Freidenberg, Flavia, eds. Partidos políticos de AméricaLatina. Cono Sur, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2001.

Vilas, Carlos M, “La izquierda latinoamericana y el surgimiento de regímenes nacional-populares” en NuevaSociedad, no. 197, mayo/junio, Caracas, 2005.


————————39 Buchanan, Paul G., “Counter hegemonic Strategies in Neoliberal Argentina” en Latin American

Perspectives, Issue 97, vol. 24, no. 6, November 1997, Sage Publications, p. 113-132.

ÉTUDE DE CAS1

MARIA CÃTÃLINA MOISESCU*

Abstract. Study: Press articles qualitative analysis about the interventionof the ambassadors and of the officials of the international organizationsin Bucharest: before and after the integration in NATO and the EU.

The ambassadors and the officials of the international organizationshave played a very active role in the international relations as well as inthe national context. But a question does arise: howmuch do the internationalofficials have interfered with the Romanian political projects? In order toanswer this question I found relevant to study the information offered bythe press relating to this aspect, considering two intervals situated beforeand after the integration in NATO and in the EU, as the changes that tookplace had been significant. All in all, I would say that the results obtainedare relevant for understanding the role played nowadays by the ambassadorsand by international organization officials.

Keywords:media studies, NATO and the EU integration, Romanian politicalprojects.

Introduction

Dans quelle mesure les ambassadeurs et les représentants des organisationsinternationales ont intervenu dans les projets politiques de la Roumanie? En vuede répondre à cette question, on a comparé deux périodes différents de temps:1er mars-22 mai 1998 et la même période de l’année 2008. Cette recherche a lebut d’offrir une perspective plus claire sur l’importance de ces interventions qui,on va voir, sont très nombreux. Un autre motif pour lequel j’ai décidé dedévelopper cette étude c’est parce que j’ai considéré importante la réaction desmedias aux nouvelles réalités dont le pays devait faire face. Le rôle joué par lesjournaux devient plus important, au moment où il devient évident qu’ils peuventavoir une influence très grande sur l’opinion publique, et l’appui des citoyens————————

*Master Student of European and Romanian Policy at the Faculty of Political Science within the Universityof Bucharest.

1 Le reflet dans la presse roumaine des interventions des ambassadeurs étrangers à Bucarest et des représentantsdes organisations internationales dans le contexte du projet roumain d’adhésion à l’OTAN et à l’Union Européenneet dans la période post adhésion 2008.


dans un processus aussi compliqué comme c’est l’intégration dans les grandesstructures internationales est essentiel.

La perspective des représentants du milieu international — les ambassadesétrangères, le FMI, la Banque Mondiale, l’UE et l’OTAN — sur la Roumanie,change graduellement. L’appui de ces institutions dans le processus de reformea été visiblement nécessaire au moment 1998. Il sera utile de comprendre lanature, le contexte et aussi la dimension de ce changement de la Roumanie en lerapportant aux interventions étrangères. L’un des buts principaux de cette étudeest de voir, en comparant les deux périodes, l’efficacité et la fréquence desinterventions des ambassadeurs et des représentants des organisations internationalesà Bucarest. Outre, une analyse comparative de l’importance des interventionsdes ambassadeurs vis-à-vis celles des représentants des organisations internationales,sera très utile pour voir la magnitude du rôle joué par ceux-ci.

Même si l’année 1999 n’est pas sujet de recherche dans cet étude de cas, ilfaut mentionner un événement qui est définitoire pour comprendre la dimensionde l’intervention des organisations internationales en Roumanie. Lesinterventions externes prennent de plus en plus contour sur la scène politiqueroumaine. Le commissaire européen Günter Verheugen envoie une lettre aupremier ministre Radu Vasile dont il suggère que la Roumanie doit travailleravec des experts du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale en vue de réaliser unestratégie pour le développement du pays. À ce moment il y a eu beaucoup depoliticiens qui ont dit que la proposition d’aide du commissaire européen étaitinacceptable. Même le président de PDSR, Ion Iliescu, a eu, au début, uneréaction contraire envers la lettre de Günter Verheugen. La proposition ducommissaire européen mettait en évidence deux aspects: le gouvernement n’étaitpas capable d’élaborer une stratégie de développement pour le pays et la peurdes pays occidentaux que la situation en Roumanie pourrait devenir instable.

Le fait que la Commission Européenne a intervenu souligne la situation decrise avec laquelle la Roumanie se confrontait en 1999. Même si l’on bénéficierade l’expérience des représentants des organisations internationales, leurintervention met en évidence l’échec de la classe politique. Les choses étaientsimples: l’UE devait monitoriser la dépense de l’argent (700 millions de dollarsannuellement) n’importe les partis qui gouverneraient. Si le Premier Ministre RaduVasile a accepté l’appui, les positions des leaders politiques y étaient différentes.L’ex premier ministre, Theodor Stolojan, a accentué les avantages et lesdésavantages de cette implication. Il a dit que «les représentants des cesorganisations internationales — FMI, Banque Mondiale, l’UE — sont desprofessionnelles mais que la perception de la population sera que la politiqueéconomique ne se fait pas à Bucarest et que le FMI est celui qui fait la loi. Laconséquence sera la perte de confiance de la population dans les gouvernants».Pendant que le ministre des transports Traian Bãsescu voit seulement desavantages vis-à-vis de ce débat,Adrian Bãlãnescu, le président du Conseil nationaléconomique de l’ApR, dit que «même si les organisations internationales sontbien intentionnées, l’élaboration de cette stratégie devait être l’apanage de lapolitique roumaine. Elle devrait être élaborée dans le pays et après elle pourrait

130 MARIA CÃTÃLINA MOISESCU 2

être discutée avec les autres forums»2. On voit que les interventions du représentantGünter Verheugen ont un impact très grand sur la scène politique roumaine. Lesautorités roumaines réagissent aux déclarations du commissaire européen dansla mesure où le Premier Ministre a accepté la stratégie proposée par la Commissionpour le développement durable du pays.

Les méthodes utilisées pour réaliser la recherche

La méthode de recherche que j’ai considérée convenable à utiliser en vue deréaliser cette recherche est l’analyse des articles des journaux qui traitent le sujet élu.On a pris en compte le fait que les informations données par les journalistes peuventoffrir, dans une certaine mesure, le tableau général pour les périodes prises. Mais, envue d’aller d’une analyse plus générale vers une analyse approfondie j’ai trouvé utilede suivre deux autres moyens: l’analyse quantitative et l’analyse qualitative.

La recherche s’est concentrée sur une analyse quantitative parce que j’aitrouvé nécessaire de voir les fréquences des articles concernant les ambassadeursvis-à-vis ceux concernant les représentants des organisations internationales.D’un autre côté, l’analyse n’est pas réalisée seulement sur le nombre des articlessur les deux entités, pendant trois mois de l’année 1998, respectivement del’année 2008. On a fait ce monitorage aussi en vue de déterminer la place desarticles ou leur grandeur.

L’analyse qualitative est extrêmement importante parce qu’elle révèle laqualité du contenu de l’article en vue d’évaluer les attitudes médiatiques et lesréactions des autorités roumaines envers les événements qui sont en train deprendre lieu et envers les représentants étrangers. La présentation journalistiqueest parfois claire, parfois radicale ou parfois laconique mais toujours un étalonpour essayer à comprendre les événements qui se déroulent autour de nous.

J’ai orienté cette recherche vers trois journaux— «Evenimentul Zilei», «JurnalulNaþiona»l et «Adevãrul». J’ai concentré cette étude sur 412 numéros des deuxpériodes: 1er mars–22 mai 1999 et respectivement la même période de l’année2008. Le motif est le suivant: on a fait cette recherche sur les trois publications,les plus importantes selon le tirage3 et selon le numéro des accès on line4, ensoulignant qu’il y a des situations quand les tirages sont dépassés par les accèson line5. On a considéré comme relevant de prendre en compte les quotidiennesles plus lus, en tenant compte du fait que les journaux influencent dans unecertaine mesure l’opinion publique. On a élu pour la période du 1er mars–22 mai1998 les mêmes publications que pour la même période de l’année 2008, parceque l’on a voulu donner l’impression de continuité et parce que ces journauxétaient parmi les préférences des citoyens aussi en 1998. On a élu ces périodes

3 ÉTUDE DE CAS 131

————————2 «Jurnalul National», no. 1962, 3 novembre 1999, p. 11.3 Accessible en ligne sur http://www.brat.ro/index.php?page=cifre, consulté le 20 mai 2008.4 Accessible en ligne sur http://www.banknews.ro/stire/7168_audiente_record_pentru_editiile_online_

ale_ziarelor_românesti.html, consulté le 20 mai 2008.5 Accessible en ligne sur http://stiri.acasa.ro/articole/stiinta/topul-celor-mai-vizitate-categorii-de-site-uri-

din-internetul-romanesc, consulté le 20 mai 2008.

comme critère de recherche, parce que l’on a considéré que, en comparant lereflet dans la presse roumaine des interventions des ambassadeurs et des représentantsdes organisations internationales dans deux périodes différentes du point de vuesocial et politique, on mettra mieux en évidence le changement au niveau de lasociété roumaine. La période de 1998 est relevante en tenant compte du fait quec’est juste l’année d’après le sommet de Madrid, dont on a mis en question pourla première fois la possibilité de l’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’OTAN. On n’apas pris une période antérieure pour ne poser pas les institutions internationalesdans une position inférieure en tenant compte du fait que les ambassades sontprésentes sur le territoire de la Roumanie avant les représentations des organismesinternationales; la position de l’OTAN, par exemple, s’est consolidée dans notrepays après le Sommet de Madrid. Depuis ce moment là, les discussions sur cethème, aussi comme les interventions des représentants de l’OTAN en Roumanieaugmentent. Outre, les mois mars, avril, 22 mai 2008, représentent la période laplus récente dont cette recherche a été réalisée. On est parti de la supposition que,le rôle des ambassadeurs et des représentants des organisations internationaleschange pendant ces deux périodes étudiées.

Les questions de l’étude et les résultats

Cette recherche part d’une série des questions qui trouvent leur réponse dansles pages des journaux étudiés:

1. Dans quelle mesure est-ce que les ambassadeurs étrangers en Roumanieinterviennent dans le milieu politique, social et économique du pays?

Les ambassadeurs sont des acteurs importants sur la scène politique maisleurs actions ne sont pas toujours ouvertes au grand public. La raison de cettesituation est dans une certaine mesure explicable, en tenant compte du statut decette fonction, qui suppose: négocier pour l’intérêt de leurs pays, présenter leurspays le mieux possible, informer leurs états sur les événements qui prennent lieudans le pays accréditaire. L’étude réalisée met en évidence que les interventionsdes ambassadeurs représentent seulement 28% du total des articles publiés surles organismes internationaux et les ambassades. En ce qui concerne la nationalitédes ambassadeurs qui jouent un rôle important sur la scène roumaine, il fautpréciser que dans les trois mois de l’année 1998, l’ambassadeur des États-Unis,Son Excellence James C. Rosapepe, y a été le plus présent. Sur les lieux secondaires,se situent les ambassadeurs de la France, de la Grande Bretagne et l’Italie. Unautre aspect important de la recherche est le fait que la représentation desambassadeurs a diminué considérablement depuis 1998. Les mêmes mois de2008 montrent qu’ils sont présents dans la presse seulement en proportion de11% du total des articles publiée sur les interventions des ambassadeurs et desreprésentants des organisations internationales. Cette diminution est due, enpremier lieu, aux événements des deux années étudiées. Si en 1998 les ambassadeurss’impliquaient dans le processus d’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’OTAN etrespectivement à l’UE, en 2008 la situation est différente: la Roumanie était déjàmembre de ces organismes internationaux. L’ambassadeur qui intervient le plus


dans les événements de 1998, concernant l’aspect de l’intégration du pays àl’OTAN, est, évidemment, l’ambassadeur des États-Unis. Ses discours surl’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’OTAN occupent les premières pages des journaux.Dans une interview, prise en exclusivité par «Evenimentul Zilei», Son ExcellenceJames C. Rosapepe déclare que «pour améliorer la perspective d’adhérer à l’OTAN,comme soulignait aussi le président Clinton l’année dernière, la Roumanie doitse maintenir sur la même voie démocratique et réformiste. Tous ceux qui sontintéressés de la situation de la Roumanie, doivent savoir que les Roumainesn’ont pas renoncé aux reformes»6. On observe ici qu’il reprend les idées duprésident des États-Unis pour les faire connaître aux Roumains. En fait, unaspect connu de la diplomatie c’est que le rôle des ambassadeurs est aussi detransmettre le message de leurs pays. À la question, s’il croyait que l’adhésiondu pays à l’OTAN était conditionnée par son acceptation dans l’UE, idée développéepar des sénateurs américains, l’ambassadeur a répondu qu’il partage l’opiniondu président Clinton qui était en contre. «La politique de la porte ouverte del’OTAN vers tous les pays européens et démocratiques est l’idée principale de lapolitique de l’OTAN»7. En ce qui concerne son devoir comme ambassadeurd’entretenir un fort lien avec le milieu des hommes d’affaires américaines, SonExcellence dit que «c’est la plus grande provocation d’augmenter le nombre deshommes d’affaires américains en Roumanie»8. L’intervention de son excellenceà un message positif: la Roumanie a toutes les chances d’adhérer à l’OTANparce qu’elle fait des reformes et parce que l’organisation reste ouverte aux paysdémocratiques dont la Roumanie y fait partie. Son Excellence s’implique aussidans l’économie en cherchant des hommes d’affaires américains qui pourraientinvestir en Roumanie. Dans la recherche effectuée on voit que les actiones desambassadeurs se concentrent aussi sur d’autres aspects. Les diplomates étrangersde Bucarest, ont critiqué le manque de protection envers les délinquants etl’insalubrité de la ville. Jean Claude Joseph, l’ambassadeur de Suisse, a dit queBucarest est une ville très sale9. La problématique des visas est discutée parl’ambassadeur de la France, Son Excellence Pierre Menat, qui informe lesautorités roumaines que la France a l’intention de libéraliser les conditionsexistantes pour l’obtention des visas par les citoyens roumains10. En avril 2008,l’action de l’ambassadeur anglais Robin Barnett, concernant les changementsclimatiques, occupe la première page du «Jurnalul Naþional». «Le rôle de lagénération des jeunes dans la lutte contre les changements climatiques est trèsimportant. Les jeunes ambassadeurs, qui participent au concours organisé parl’Ambassade de la Grande Bretagne, auront la mission de promouvoir des actionsen vue de combattre d’une manière efficiente ces changements climatiques»11.On voit que l’ambassadeur de la Grande Bretagne s’implique dans une action deconscientisation de la population roumaine.

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————————6 «Evenimentul Zilei», no. 1757, 7 avril 1998, p. 3.7 Ibidem.8 Ibidem.9 «Jurnalul Naþional», no. 1473, 31 mars 1998, p. 13.10 «Jurnalul Naþional», no. 1456, 11 mars 1998, p. 12.11 «Jurnalul National», no. 4650, 16 avril 2008, p. 12.

2. Comment est-ce que se positionnent les interventions des ambassadeursvis-à-vis les interventions des représentants des organisations internationales enRoumanie?

Cette recherche a été effectuée sur les mois mars, avril et mai de l’année 1998et respectivement 2008. Pour comprendre la position privilégiée des représentantsdes organisations internationales envers les ambassadeurs, il faut souligner queleur appui a été nécessaire pour l’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’OTAN et à l’UEet pour dépasser les crises gouvernementales. On a vue que les interventions desambassadeurs sont moins débattues par les journaux dans l’année 2008. Maisquelle est la situation des représentants des organisations internationales? Lesstatistiques réalisées en lisant les trois journaux, montrent que ceux-ci jouent unrôle plus important en 1998 qu’en 2008; il y a moins d’articles publiés sur lesreprésentants des organisations internationales, en 2008 qu’en 1998. Comme onpeut bien observer, l’importance de la participation des représentants étrangersdiminue. C’est aussi en 1998, que ce type d’information occupe les premièrespages des quotidiens. Le numéro des articles qui contient des photos est aussiplus grand en 1998 qu’en 2008. En ce qui concerne la représentation dans lapresse roumaine des interventions des experts des organisations internationales,le FMI occupe le premier lieu. Il est représenté sur la scène roumaine par PoulThomsen — le négociateur chef dans la relation avec la Roumanie, MichaelDeppler — le représentant FMI pour l’Europe et Albert Jaeger — le chef de lamission du FMI en Roumanie. Sur le second lieu se trouve la Banque Mondialeau nom de laquelle interviennent François Ettori — le représentant de la BanqueMondiale à Bucarest, Kenneth Lay — le directeur pour la Roumanie de laBanque Mondiale et Johannes Linn — le vice-président de la Banque Mondialeet de l’Asie Centrale. Les dernières places sont occupées, en ordre, par l’OTAN— par la voix de Javier Solana — le secrétaire général de l’OTAN et StrobeTalbott — l’adjoint du secrétaire d’État américain pour les Affaires étrangères,et par l’UE — qui est représentée principalement par Jose Maria Gil Robles GilDelgado — président du Parlement européen. Pour mieux comprendre lesinterventions et le rôle joué par les représentants des organisations internationalesil faut prendre quelques exemples. L’expert de la Banque Mondiale, FrancoisEttori souligne que son rôle est d’aider la Roumanie à dépasser la crise dont ellese trouve. «La Roumanie doit convaincre l’UE qu’elle accorde beaucoupd’importance à la politique»12. En avançant dans la recherche, on découvre queles représentants du FMI partagent les idées de la Banque Mondiale. Le FMI«désire d’assurer l’expérience technique nécessaire pour aider la Roumanie. Lenouveau gouvernement doit réfléchir avant de nommer les ministres pour éviterles erreurs de l’ancien gouvernement»13. Les représentants de la Banque Mondialeet du FMI interviennent dans le secteur économique du pays, en vue de réaliser,en collaborant avec le gouvernement, des projets pour un développementdurable. Le FMI fait aussi des pronostiques. Le chef de la mission du FMI pourla Roumanie, monsieur Albert Jaeger dit que «les turbulences internationales


————————12 «Adevãrul», no. 2469, 8 mai 1998, p. 5.13 «Adevãrul», no. 2447, 9 avril 1998, p. 1.

peuvent affecter l’économie de la Roumanie»14. Pendant que le représentant del’OTAN, Javier Solana, dit que l’on n’a pris aucune décision, au moment avril1998, en ce qui concerne l’adhésion de la Roumanie,15 il observe aussi que lalégislation roumaine est très différente de celle internationale16. On voit, que lesautorités roumaines se concentrent à l’OTAN et à l’UE. On observe que lesinterventions des organisations internationales sont concrètes. Il y a des foisquand les représentants s’impliquent en vue d’offrir leur appui et leur expériencepour le secteur économique mais il y a aussi des situations quand ils participentà l’élaboration du programme gouvernemental. Ils offrent aussi des statistiquestrès importantes. Les interventions des représentants internationaux sont plusfréquentes que celles des ambassadeurs. La recherche met en évidence que laplupart des articles publiés sur les ambassadeurs et les représentants desorganisations internationales, parlent des experts des ces organisations internationales.

3. Un aspect qui doit être pris en compte dans cette recherche, c’est le fait queles événements sont à la base de tous les articles. C’est-à-dire que mêmesles articles sur les ambassadeurs et les représentants des organisationsinternationales peuvent être conditionnés par les événements déroulés sur lascène politique interne et internationale. Dans quelle mesure est-ce que lesévénements importants influencent les articles publiés sur la question étudiée?

L’année 1997 a été marquée par la conférence de Madrid où l’on a discutépour la première fois sur la possibilité que la Roumanie adhère à la plus forteorganisation internationale: l’OTAN. L’UE entre aussi fortement en scène.Depuis ce moment là, les efforts du pays se sont concrétisés dans des reformesimplémentées maintes fois à l’aide des autres organisations internationales: leFMI et la Banque Mondiale. Un autre aspect de la première période étudiée c’estque le gouvernement n’était pas capable de réaliser un programme gouvernementalfonctionnel. De nouveau, le FMI et la Banque Mondiale entrent en scène enoffrant leur appui. En 2008 la situation est visiblement autre: la Roumanie estmembre de l’OTAN et de l’UE; elle est aussi celle qui organise le sommet del’OTAN. C’est l’explication pour laquelle on a moins d’articles concernant lesujet discuté, en 2008. La perspective d’adhérer à l’OTAN a fait que les journalistesdonnent plus d’importance au phénomène. Les interventions des représentantsdes organisations internationales sont reprises par tous les trois journaux, parcequ’elles contiennent des messages qui peuvent, ou non, confirmer la date d’adhésionà l’OTAN et à l’UE.

4. Quelle est l’attitude des journalistes vis-à-vis le rôle des ambassades et desorganisations internationales — FMI, la Banque Mondiale, l’UE et l’OTAN —en Roumanie?

Les éditoriaux sur le rôle joué par les organisations internationales peuventêtre considérés, dans une certaine mesure, comme formateurs d’opinion. Leséditoriaux représentent aussi une manière pour que les journalistes expriment

7 ÉTUDE DE CAS 135

————————14 «Jurnalul Naþional», no. 2649, 23 avril 2008, p. 9.15 «Adevãrul», no. 2442, 3 avril 1998, p. 15.16 «Evenimentul Zilei», no. 1747, 26 mars 1998, p. 6.

leurs opinions concernant une problématique, le plus souvent, actuelle. Onobserve que les éditoriaux des quotidiens étudiés débattent le statut de laRoumanie vis-à-vis le projet d’adhésion à l’OTAN et à l’UE. En étudiant leséditoriaux publiés sur ce sujet, il est important de prendre aussi en comptequelques détailles très importantes: qui sont les auteurs des éditoriaux? Quel estleur message? La plupart des éditoriaux traitent les événements importants etd’actualité et leurs titres sont incitants en vue d’attirer l’attention: «L’économiemalade cherche un médecin expérimenté»17, «Le programme économique — unvoiture Dacia avec des modifications»18. Leurs auteurs se distinguent parcequ’ils sont soit des personnes publiques — comme c’est le cas de «EvenimentulZilei» de 2008 avec Ion Cristoiu — soit ils occupent des positions importantes— le directeur du département de politique, Alexandru Macoveiciuc, de«Adevãrul». Les éditoriaux écrits par des personnes connues, ont un grandpouvoir d’influencer l’opinion publique. La plupart des éditoriaux se trouventaux pages principales: la page 2 ou 3 dans «Adevãrul» et «Jurnalul Naþional» de1998 et de 2008. «Evenimentul Zilei» accorde aux éditoriaux la page 6 ou 8. Lessujets des éditoriaux sont différents, comme on a déjà dit, en fonction del’événement. L’éditorial de 28 mai 1998 du «Jurnalul Naþional», fait référence àl’ambassadeur des États-Unis, Son Excelence James Rosapepe. La visite de PoulThomsen, le représentant de FMI pour la Roumanie, a soulevée l’intérêt de lapresse roumaine. Dans «Jurnalul Naþional», la visite de Poul Thomsen estcommentée dans les éditoriaux de 2 mars et de 4 mars 1998. «Les negociationsavec la délégation FMI a finit après trois semaines. La déclaration de presse demonsieur Poul Thomsen a été très dure. Il a critiqué l’inflation, le parcours de lareforme et les compagnies qui n’obtient aucun profit. Le gouvernement refused’accepter la vérité. Je ne peux pas croire que les autorités appliquent la mêmepolitique, celle de l’autruche, que le gouvernement Ciorbea après chaque fautefaite»19. Un autre journaliste, Constantin Gheorghe, publie un article deux joursaprès avec le titre «L’état d’urgence économique»20. Ce sujet est traité aussi dansles autres journaux étudiés. «Adevãrul» publie un article signé par Daniel Oanþã, quisouligne le fait que «le Gouvernement doit être toujours ferme et non seulementdans la présence du représentant du FMI, monsieur Poul Thomsen.»21 La situationde crise qui existait en Roumanie à ce moment est intensifiée aussi par lesjournalistes. On observe que les éditoriaux qui traitent les interventions desambassadeurs et des représentants des organisations internationales sont plusnombreux en 1998 qu’en 2008. L’importance que les journaux accordent auxinterventions des ambassadeurs et des représentants des organisationsinternationales en Roumanie, peut être discutée en tenant compte des quelquescritères: le positionnement des articles, le nombre des articles concernant cetteproblématique, la dimension de l’article, la présence des photos. La plupart des


————————17 «Adevãrul», no. 2415, 3 mars 1998 p. 2.18 «Adevãrul», no. 2449, 14 avril 1998, p. 2.19 «Jurnalul Naþional», no.1448, 2 mars 1998, p. 3.20 «Jurnalul Naþional», no.1450, 4 mars 1998, p. 3.21 «Adevãrul», no 2443, 4 avril 1998, p. 2.

articles sont de dimensions réduites, mais ils sont positionnés d’une manièrevisible. Concernant le pourcentage des photos qui accompagnent les articles, lasituation est la suivante: les articles qui contiennent des photos représententapproximativement 20% du total des articles prises en compte (sur les ambassadeurset sur les représentants des organisations internationales). Les trois quotidiensaccordent presque la même importance aux interventions des ambassadeurs etdes représentants des organisations internationales. La différence est subtilemais il faut la discuter. En ce qui concerne les interventions des ambassadeurs,«Jurnalul Naþional» a publiée plus d’articles que «Evenimentul Zilei» et «Adevãrul».La plupart des articles sur les représentants des organisations internationales ontété publiés dans les trois mois de l’année 1998. Le quotidien qui a met le plusl’accent sur cet aspect a été «Adevãrul». La deuxième place est occupée par le«Journal National».

5. Quel est le message de l’implication des organismes internationaux enRoumanie et quelle est la réaction des autorités roumaines envers cela?

Le message de l’implication des représentants des organisations internationalesest vu parfois comme un échec du gouvernement qui n’est pas capable deconduire seul le pays. Les interventions étrangères en Roumanie peuvent déterminerla population à perdre la confiance dans les autorités. La réaction des politiciensa été parfois dure, parfois en concordance avec les déclarations des représentants,mais elle n’a jamais été inexistante. Chaque intervention d’un expert suscitaitl’intérêt des autorités. Le président du Bloque National Syndical, Dumitru Costin,s’exprime sur la thèse formulée par quelques individus, conformément à laquellele FMI a fait le programme de gouvernement. «FMI présente des variantes. Lenouveau Premier Ministre a été mis dans la situation de négocier avec desexperts et il n’avait à ce moment aucune variante propre; il a pris les propositionsdes représentants des organisations internationales et il les a présentées commeétant son propre programme»22. Les positons des politiciens roumains sontdifférents. Il y en a certaines qui soutiennent qu’il y a des avantages mais en mêmetemps des désavantageas en ce qui concerne l’implication des représentants dansles affaires nationales. Parmi les désavantages on dit que le gouvernement perdrasa crédibilité de la parte de la population. L’avantage est que l’on travaillera avecdes experts mondiaux.

6. Quelle est la relation des ambassadeurs avec les organisations internationales?Cette question s’impose en tenant compte du fait que l’on a découvert, en

étudiant les trois journaux, que la plupart des interventions de l’ambassadeur desÉtats-Unis faisaient référence à l’OTAN et au possible adhésion de la Roumanie. Sil’on prend en compte que les organisations internationales sont formées par despays, on comprendra la relation avec les ambassadeurs. Un autre aspect c’est quedans l’intérieur de chaque organisation il y a des pays qui se remarquent en étantplus forts et plus importants que les autres. C’est le cas, par exemple, de l’OTAN etdes États-Unis, ou de l’Union Européenne et de la France ou l’Allemagne. En plus,

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————————22 «Jurnalul Naþional», no. 1448, 2 mars 1998, p. 9.

les ambassadeurs sont ceux qui représentent les intérêts des leurs pays à l’étrangère.Ils sont aussi ceux qui présentent la position de leurs pays envers un certain aspectou événement. Tous ces motifs donnent du crédit à l’ambassadeur des États-Unis des’exprimer en ce qui concerne la position de l’OTAN en Roumanie. «L’OTAN n’apas promis qu’il invite des nouveaux états à y adhérer à l’occasion du sommet de1999. Pour s’intégrer, la Roumanie doit accélérer la privatisation et combattre lacorruption. À ce moment, l’OTAN pourrait décider ou non à inviter des nouveauxÉtats.»23 «Je crois que la Roumanie a un appui massif de la part des Américains entenant compte du sondage Gallup, où 52% ont été pour l’adhésion de la Roumanieà l’OTAN. Si le nouveau gouvernement était capable à accélérer la reforme, celaserait une chose positive»24. On voit que l’ambassadeur J. Rosapepe exprime dansses discours la position américaine en ce qui concerne l’adhésion. C’est un motif enplus pour les journaux, en vue d’apprendre des nouveautés sur ce processus,d’interviewer l’ambassadeur américaine.

Conclusion

La redéfinition de la diplomatie traditionnelle, par les interventions desreprésentants des organisations internationales, est une réalité qui nécessite plusd’attention. Cela ne veut pas dire que les ambassades n’existent plus ou quellesne doivent plus exister. Cela n’est pas du tout le cas! Mais il faut prendre encompte que leur statut s’est modifié. Il faut accorder, si l’on ne l’a pas fait encore,aux institutions internationales la place qu’elles ont gagné par l’intermédiairedes interventions des leurs représentants au niveau national.

La recherche que l’on a faite met en évidence que l’importance donnée auxinterventions des ambassadeurs sur le territoire de la Roumanie a beaucoupdiminuée depuis 1998. De nos jours, les articles publiés ne traitent plus le rôleet les activités des ambassadeurs. On observe que l’intérêt donné aux interventionsdes représentants des organisations internationales est plus grand que l’intérêtpour les déclarations des ambassadeurs.

Cette étude est importante parce qu’elle offre une vision différente sur lestatut de la diplomatie de nos jours. Les informations données offrent une imageplus claire sur le statut des ambassadeurs vis-à-vis la position occupée par lesreprésentants des organisations internationales. La nouveauté des découvertesest que, en comparant le rôle des ambassadeurs avec le rôle des représentants desorganisations internationales, on a offert aux derniers une position privilégiée surle territoire national.

La diplomatie joue un rôle extrêmement important mais «elle toute seule nepeut pas tout résoudre. Il est besoin d’un esprit nouveau, de la tolérance, de lacompréhension, de la modération et de responsabilité de la part de tout le monde:citoyens et hommes politiques»25. La diplomatie a plusieurs mérites, c’est un motifde la garder et de ne pas renoncer facilement à ses services.


————————23 «Jurnalul Naþional», no.1491, 22 avril 1998, p. 13.24 «Adevãrul», no. 2445, 7 avril 1998, p. 7.25 Teodor Meleºcanu, «Renaºterea diplomaþiei Româneºti 1994–1996», Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 2002, p. 29.

Je considère nécessaire que la nouvelle tendance est de transférer les tâchesdes ambassades établies par un seul État dans une structure au niveau européen.«L’UE met en discussion la possibilité d’ouvrir les propres ambassades avec unpersonnel d’approximativement 3000 diplomates. La création d’un servicediplomatique européen est prévue dans le traité de Lisboa, mais il pose unproblème sensible parce que l’Union adopte l’image d’un État fédéral. Un autreaspect qui doit être pris en compte c’est le fait que ce nouveau service rivaliseraavec le service diplomatique des pas de l’UE. De nos jours, il y a une bataillepour le contrôle des corps diplomatiques qui se donne entre les gouvernementsnationales et la Commission Européenne. En fait, cela est le commencement del’établissement d’un seul service diplomatique européen qui remplacera lesservices nationaux»26.

En guise de conclusion je considère nécessaire d’attirer l’attention que laproblématique discutée reste ouverte. Le rôle des ambassadeurs n’est pas mis enquestion seulement par les organisations internationales qui sont devenues deplus en plus importantes, mais aussi par les organisations non gouvernementales.Les organisations non gouvernementales ont posé aussi des vrais problèmes —les droits de l’homme, la nature, la pollution — sur l’agenda internationale:Greenpeace, Amnesty International. La conséquence c’est que «les diplomateset implicitement les gouvernements perdent le contrôle des relationsinternationales.» Comment peuvent les diplomates justifier leur rôle concernantces problèmes qui sont discutés et résolus par les organisations nongouvernementales? La diplomatie des ONG a un impact important sur le planmondial: par exemple, «L’action mondiale contre la pauvreté», action promuepar les ONG a passé sur l’agenda des discussions dans la réunion de G8 de 2005.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

«Adevãrul», no. 2415, 3 mars 1998.«Adevãrul», no. 2442, 3 avril 1998.«Adevãrul», no 2443, 4 avril 1998.«Adevãrul», no. 2445, 7 avril 1998.«Adevãrul», no. 2447, 9 avril 1998.«Adevãrul», no. 2449, 14 avril 1998.«Adevãrul», no. 2469, 8 mai 1998.«Evenimentul Zilei», no. 1757, 7 avril 1998.«Evenimentul Zilei», no. 1747, 26 mars 1998.«Jurnalul Naþional», no. 1448, 2 mars 1998.«Jurnalul Naþional», no.1450, 4 mars 1998.«Jurnalul Naþional», no. 1456, 11 mars 1998.«Jurnalul Naþional», no. 1473, 31 mars 1998.«Jurnalul National», no. 4650, 16 avril 2008.«Jurnalul Naþional», no.1491, 22 avril 1998.«Jurnalul Naþional», no. 2649, 23 avril 2008.Teodor Meleºcanu, «Renaºterea diplomaþiei Româneºti 1994–1996», Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 2002.

11 ÉTUDE DE CAS 139

————————26 «Adevãrul», no. 5538, 5 mai 2008, p. 9.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:THEORY AND PRACTICE

LUCIAN JORA*

Abstract. Public diplomacy should be about building relationships, startingfrom understanding other countries’needs, cultures, and peoples and thenlooking for areas to make common cause presumably based on commoninterests. The idea of public diplomacy is generally referred to as “internationalcultural policy” or “foreign cultural policy”. Public diplomacy can no longerbe seen as an add-on to the rest of diplomacy — it must be seen as acentral activity that is played out across many dimensions and with manypartners. As a result most of the multilateral agreements in parallel withan economic or a political basket a include nowadays a cultural one,the Euromediterranean Partnership being an example. The concrete resultsrelay as usually not only in the initial design but also in a proper implementation,whose results remain to be seen in the future.

Keywords: public diplomacy, “international cultural policy”, “foreign culturalpolicy”.

Public diplomacy (often confused or taken for granted as Propaganda) shouldbe about building relationships, starting from understanding other countries’needs,cultures, and peoples and then looking for areas to make common causepresumably based on common interests. The idea of public diplomacy is generallyreferred to as “international cultural policy” or “foreign cultural policy”.

From the very beginning we can notice an overlap and an interchangeable usebetween public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. The diplomatic historian FrankNinkovich observed that public diplomacy is “the promotion or communicationbetween peoples as opposed to governments…” and is designed to “buildagreement based on common values.” (Ninkovich, 1996, p. 3).1 More or less theaim of public and cultural diplomacy efforts is to tell own country’s story to theworld. Public diplomacy is a two-way communication process that includes both————————

* Researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy).1 Quoted by Margaret j Wyszomirsky, Chirstopher Burgess, Chaterine Peila in International Cultural

Relations, AMulticountry Comparision,Arts Policy andAdministration Program, The Ohio State University-2003,p. 1, available at http://www.culturalpolicy.org/pdf/MJWpaper.pdf.


efforts to project a nation’s image and values to other countries and peoples aswell as to receive information and try to understand the culture, values andimages of other countries and their peoples. Cultural and educational diplomacyemphasize exchanges of persons and ideas that directly involve a relativelysmall number of people and are concerned with promoting long-term mutualunderstanding between peoples. However, the small number of people involvedin classical public diplomacy almost always the same it’s a solid counter argumentquestioning the efficiency of classical approach to public diplomacy. Thosepeople who are usually attending the public diplomacy events usually know wellthe culture and issues which are going to be expressed within that particularevent. Their presence is more motivated by maintaining relationships, or just thedesire to participate at a fashionable event. The message supposed to betransmitted by this kind of events often does not reach its target audience.

Cultural diplomacy when in relation to Public Diplomacy in our view refersto the cultural content of the message while public diplomacy refers to thestrategies the cultural diplomacy content known and well perceived by the targetaudience. Both approaches (the one supposed by cultural diplomacy and the onesupposed by public diplomacy) are amatter ofmutual knowledge and communicationwhich is meant to crate communities of trust and understanding. Public diplomacyseeks to support traditional diplomacy by addressing non-governmentalaudiences, in addition to governmental audiences, both mass and elite. It worksvery much in coordination with and in parallel to the traditional diplomaticeffort. It obviously contributes to predictability, an important asset in InternationalRelations particularly in the Security area. However the mutual knowledge ofeach other culture does not, per se, create trust. The existence of trust requires atleast some identification with the other because without such association actorswould be self-contained and devoid of any common basis.2 Communities can beeven “virtual”, linked by communication media (see the relationships betweenUK and New Zealand), but usually they are attached to a particular locale.

Any public diplomacy approach appeals to the presumed existence of commoninterests which often correspond to the process of the collective identity formationand, more specifically, shared values, identities, and meanings. The collectiveidentity establishes patterns of diffuse reciprocity manifested in the mutualresponsiveness among the members of the community (Deutsch et al. 1957, 129-33;Adler and Barnett 1998b, 30-33, 47-48;Williams 1998).3 The general Deutschianemphasis on communication networks, leading to trust, social learning, andinstitution building as paths to security communities have been adopted byconstructivist scholars (Adler and Barnett 1996, 63-72; Adler and Barnett

2 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 141

————————2 Ideas developed in a short article in 2000 by Raimo Väyrynen, Stable peace trough security communities?

Steps towards theory-building, available at: http://kroc.nd.edu/ocpapers/op_18_3.pdf.3 Adler, Emanuel, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations”,

Millenium: Journal of International Studies 26, no. 2 (Summer 1997a): 249-77; Williams, Michael C. “TheInstitutions of Security. Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations, Cooperation and Conflict 32, no. 3(September 1997): 287-307.

1998b; and especially Adler 1997b). They see at least at regional level (Balkans,Mediterranean, or more generously Euro-Mediterranean involving the deeplycultural religious and economic divided shores of the Mediterranean Sea) thecreation of security communities as the formation of cognitive regions whoseborders are defined by the intensity of shared understandings and commonidentities. However the continuous globalization process are continuously erodingthe valability of such theoretical constructs. The very notion of “border” culturalor whatever become slim in the virtual space, while from another perspectivesthe globalization and increased accessibility to information make the “border”as such to be more painfully perceived especially in the minds of the youngergenerations.

As the relationships deepen, public diplomacy can achieve a hierarchy ofobjectives: increasing familiarity (making people think about your country andupdating their images of it); increasing appreciation (creating positive perceptionsof your country and getting others to see issues from your perspective); engagingpeople (encouraging people to see your country as an attractive destination fortourism and study and encouraging them to buy its products and subscribe to itsvalues); and influencing people’s behavior in all possible meanings involving afavorable attitude towards the own country. To achieve these goals, governmentsare supposed to build public diplomacy that operates in at least three dimensions:

The first would be the communication of dally events as far as those eventshave any meaning for the target audience in the target country — in other words,aligning traditional diplomacy with the news cycle. However we should bare inmind that here the state actor does not have the exclusive control. The globalizationof news and the new technologies available to distribute it coverage complicatesthis task. Diplomats have no control over the way the media present theircountries, since those reports are typically filed by foreign correspondents. Orhere the issue would involve the sources the foreign correspondents are using orto what kind of sources those correspondents have access. Also many of thestories that have the biggest impact abroad are not traditional foreign policystories that embassies are equipped to deal with but are domestic stories.Diplomats will talk to the press about foreign news stories, but they will referenquiries about domestic stories to the relevant government departments (suchas education, health, culture or religious affairs), which are often not equippedto understand the international repercussions of their actions.

According to Mark Leonard the second dimension of public diplomacy wouldbe strategic communication4. Governments are adept at conveying their stanceson particular issues (economic issues mostly related to trade, regional securityissues in Central Eastern Europe or Black Sea area, the peace process in Caucasusor the Balkans etc.), but officials are much less effective at managing overallperceptions of their country. One reason for this failure is that different institutionshave been responsible for dealing with politics, trade, tourism, investment, and

142 LUCIAN JORA 3

————————4 Leonard, M. (2002), “Diplomacy by other means”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 132 No. September/October, p. 48-56.

cultural relations and in order to keep on the same track of public diplomacy allthese different issues a particular government needs whether professionaldiplomats, whether top quality diplomatic teams. Strategic communication islike a political campaign but at another level and in a more diverse an oftenunknown environment. It involves developing a set of comprehensive messagesand planning a series of symbolic events and imagistic opportunities to reinforcethem. As people are exposed to thousands of messages every day, the themesmust not be very complex: In commercial advertising a big amount of work isinvolved to decompose long messages and complex ideas into very simple conceptsand messages which are often transposed in images repeated obsessively troughadvertising campaigns. However we are not that convinced that what actuallyworks in the commercial advertising may work just as well in the publicdiplomacy as the concepts, medium and the points of reference are just toodifferent. Dally commodities are not the same think as individual or collectiveissues regarding identity may be.

For Mark Leonard the third dimension of public diplomacy would be at theinter-individual level, and would consist in developing lasting relationships withkey individuals through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences,and access to media channels. This approach differs from the usual diplomaticpractice of nurturing contacts through lunches, cocktail parties, and receptions.These relationships are not built between diplomats and people abroad — theyare between peers (politicians, special advisors, business people, culturalentrepreneurs, and academics). This approach differs from messages designed tosell because it involves a genuine exchange that leads to a different picture of thecountry. Would be useful to insist a bit about this dimension because in manyways despite the fact that it seems to be the most effective in time, it is the mostdifficult to perceive and for instance the most neglected by the researchers. Thedaily events, people and officials are of paramount importance in creating acertain desired image.Awell done imagistic campaign at the individual level canbe easily ruined by a bad personal experience, with a corrupt state official, a thefton the street, a late train, a dirty room or an under standard hotel service. In theinterwar period many reports coming from various Romania Embassies use torecommend prudency in promoting a tourist offer until the country is having theproper tourist infrastructure the international traveler is use to. Also othermembers of the Romanian diplomatic service in their reports use to describe theways efforts of propaganda are just ruined by various uncontrollable events fromthe individual’s experiences in Romania. For example many leading intellectualsinvited in Romania at the expenses of the Romanian State in the interwar periodended by been attracted to the Hungarian point of view and propaganda simplybecause during their trips in Transylvania especially they benefited of thehospitality of various Hungarian aristocrats which at the time were numerousand wealthy, possessing castles and properties. The corrupt civil servants were


also a black spot which at any type could have ruined the efforts of an expensivepublic diplomacy project as far as the individual perceptions are concerned.

Often communication initiatives developed after a striking event or crisis fallinto what Mark Leonard plastically describe as conveyor beltmodel for transmittinginformation. Recent debates about public diplomacy suggest that many policymakersfeel the key problem is a lack of information for the cause of a particular state,event or policy. However, nowadays considering the impact of new mediatechnologies the major international events are covered by enough informationcampaigns. According to Mark Leonard referring mostly to the US and Britishpublic policy towards the Islamic World, in the last years the Public diplomacyof major international actors did not fail to deliver information5. Rather, it hasfailed to deliver information convincingly. The tone of many messages isdeclamatory, without any apparent intent to engage in dialogue or listen. And atthe same time most often the audiences are sensitive only to the information theywould like to listen which involves more sophisticated techniques of transmittinga certain message, techniques which can be provided by proper cultural diplomacystrategies and techniques. If a particular government is to move beyond cheappropaganda which most often involve wasted funds and wasted time, they mustmeet four challenges: understanding the target audience, confronting hostilitytoward own culture, engaging people emotionally, and proving their ownrelevance to the public concerned coming from the concerned public culturalbackground and way to see the things. You don’t have to be a professionalnegotiator or diplomat to know that your audience is the top priority for aneffective communication in any domain. But diplomats are often more interestedin winning arguments than in persuading skeptical publics. Governmentsstruggle to internalize and prepare for potential threats that do not conform totheir underlying strategic assumptions. The executive in charge with the externalaffairs just like many other individuals have a one sided perception and are veryreluctant to accept anything which do not conform to a certain ideologicalframework already set in their minds. Carrying out successful diplomacy isdifficult if you do not have ears for things you do not want to hear. The answerseems to be not more information, but a different form of engagement speciallydesign to meet the target audience’s needs, (not necessarily expectations becauseby doing that a public or cultural diplomacy approach would become automaticallypropaganda). Just like any other political approach public diplomacy is not justabout delivering a message to an audience but rather about getting some effectiveresults. And to get a result, you need to acknowledge that the listener’s viewsmatter as much as the message.

The second step toward effective communication involves avoiding theperception of cultural invasion some cultures create often in real terms. Also isimportant for a certain state actor in terms of public diplomacy to avoid thepaternalistic discourse, the teacher and student attitude which most often

144 LUCIAN JORA 5

————————5 Ibid.

generate frustration and the opposite result, and an instinctive hostile audience.The right message and positioning on a topic can prevent arguments from fallingon deaf ears. Also the way a certain message is promoted should be carefullycalculated. For instance the issue of integration can be easily perceived by thetarget audience coming from a certain cultural background as assimilation.

The third challenge to public diplomacy is to avoid isolation in the “IvoryTower”, to avoid the pretentious language, the excessive theoretisation, andeventually to move beyond exclusive intellectual forms of communication. Thepractice shows that several projects involving the “mutual knowledge” have as atarget audience a small number of intellectuals which usually are alreadyfamiliarized with the realities at the source. For example the islamist theoristprophile in theory would be an ignorant and an easy prade for the extremistdiscourse. The reality shows a different picture. Most often the islamist theoristsare college graduated (often in the Western countries) who are acquainted wellwith theWestern culture. In other words the haters may originate not in ignoranceor lack of mutual knowledge but rather in frustration.

Also according to recent studies most of communication is nonverbal. Manyother factors — experiences, emotions, images — influence people’s responsesto certain messages, fabricated or spontaneous, intended or unintended have tobe taken into account in order to transmit a certain message. To deliverinformation is the easy part of the job, capturing the imagination or reinsuringthe effectiveness of this information is the real challenge. The degree a certainmessage succeeded or not to capture the imagination as it was designed is verydifficult to measure and always needs a generous time perspective. By talkingabout proving the relevance of a certain message we just came to the fourthchallenge of any imagistic campaign. ForMark Leonard one way of demonstratingrelevance is to concentrate on “niche diplomacy”. Norway, Finland, Sweden orAustria are examples of a countries that have a voice and a presence on theinternational stage out of proportion to their modest position, military power andeconomic capacity. Those are examples of countries which had succeeded toinsure a valuable presence through a ruthless prioritization of the target audiencesand the concentration on a single message: The Nobel Peace Prize, originatingin Oslo, is a happy historical fact that also raises Norway’s profile as a trustedpeace provider in the international arena. Issues regarding the interests towardenvironment protection policies and the respect of the human rights alsocontributed to the respectable image those countries have in the internationalsystem of today. To all this we may add also the fact that those countries are notperceived as a potential military threat by any of the so called anti-western blocactors. Also the very presence into international meetings or UN projects is notalways representative for what is happening at the grass roots level in aparticular country especially in the developing world.

Mark Leonard wisely notice that: “effective public diplomacy relies on morethan just the quality of a message. Sometimes, the problem is the messenger.


Even themost well-crafted argument will be ineffective if transmitted by an uninspiredor bay a partisan source. The traditional approach to public diplomacy activityoverseas, be it cultural festivals, seminars, economic promotion, or policyadvocacy, is that it should all be concluded with “a few words from theambassador”. In some cases, it would be far more useful to keep the ambassadorindoors. Sensitive messages to foreign publics are often best disseminated bypeople who have something in common with the target audience”.6 If a messagewill engender distrust simply because it comes from a foreign government, thenthe government should hide that fact as much as possible. Increasingly, if a stateis to make its voice heard and to influence events beyond its direct control, itmust work through organizations and networks that are separate from, independentof, and even suspicious of governments themselves. In the reports containingadvises for the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent by the Romaniancultural attaches in Washington in the interwar period there is repeatedlyemphasized the need for any kind of propaganda material to come from a locallytrusted source, most advisable form prestigious journalists or renown Americanintellectuals otherwise they would be totally ignored by the American publicopinion. However, those assessments just like those of Mark Leonard 70 yearslater are referring to realities and political culture specific to the US, British orEuropean political culture. We would rather say that a combination of bothsources official and unofficial would make a qualitative difference.

Remain to be seen which are nowadays the most effective media for this typeof public diplomacy. For Mark Leonard those are: NGOs, diasporas, and politicalparties.

The NGOs have three key resources not readily available to foreign governments:credibility, expertise, and appropriate networks. People are often quick to questionthe motivations behind the diplomatic pronouncements of a state, but someNGOs have a long-standing reputation for independence — and hencecredibility — that it is not feasible for a government to create for itself. NGOshave access to networks of activists, experts, and foreign politicians — and theyknow how to marshal those networks to exert pressure in a given policy area. Nodiplomatic mission possesses (or would wish to possess) the capability toorganize street demonstrations, nor are diplomats well positioned to coordinatesustained lobbying campaigns. More than 20.000 transnational NGO networksare already active on the world stage (of which 90 percent were created duringthe last 30 years), and many of them could make effective partners for conductingpublic diplomacy.

Diasporas. Thanks to increased international migration during the latter halfof the 20th century, there are now “living links”— relations, friends, former businesspartners — within virtually every country in the world. The untapped potential

146 LUCIAN JORA 7

————————6 Parts of the article published quoted for Foreign Affairs were published in synthesis on: http://ics.leeds.

ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=500&folder=7&paper=1062, accessed on 16 of March2009, 14 pm.

in the global Diaspora could, with sustained involvement, yield several advantagesto policymakers. First, and most obviously, diasporas can help fill the demandfor language skills Furthermore, such links provide the cultural knowledge,political insight, and human intelligence necessary for a successful foreign policy.The mistakes and disasters that marked several events across the history mighthave been avoided had there been more comprehensive and intimate knowledgeof those societies available to policymakers. An important and easily overlookedaspect of Diaspora diplomacy is the complexity of relations between differentexpatriates of the same country. For example the Romanian Diaspora in Canadaor US has a different image as compared to the Romanian Diaspora in Italy orSpain simply because most often the origin of those immigrants the way theyimmigrated and their motivation were different. While in the case of Canada andUS the immigrants are most often highly educated professionals carefullyselected by immigration schemes in the case of Italy or Spain the immigrants areoften society proscripts.

As a third area where nongovernment-to-government diplomacy could bevery fruitful is in building relations between political parties in differentcountries. Problems between governments may appear to be diplomatic when, infact, they stem from difficulties that revolve around perceived political differences.The relations between political parties of the same broad stripe in differentcountries can be an important dimension of those nations’overall foreignrelations. On a growing list of issues— economic reform, social rights, agriculture,drugs, terrorism, and the environment, not to mention humanitarian intervention— national interests are neither immutable nor particular to a single country.Instead, such issues can only be addressed through a deliberative politicalprocess. Increased links between political parties represent one way to deal withthat historic shift. This approach has many advantages7. First, nurturing relationsbetween politicians of different countries makes diplomacy easier by giving bothsides a clear idea of the political positioning of the other. Second, suchrelationships open a channel for policy exchange that renews the intellectualcapital of political parties. Third, exchanges help develop an international outlookwithin parties that are not in power, which can be advantageous in smoothing thetransition between administrations.

Finally one of the biggest challenge is to the culture and priorities of diplomaticinstitutions themselves. Public diplomacy can no longer be seen as an add-on tothe rest of diplomacy — it must be seen as a central activity that is played outacross many dimensions and with many partners. As a result most of themultilateral agreements in parallel with an economic or a political basket includenowadays a cultural one, the Euromediterranean Partnership being an example.

The concrete results relay as usually not only in the initial design but also ina proper implementation, whose results remain to be seen in the future.


————————7 Leonard, M. (2002), “Diplomacy by other means”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 132 No. September/October, p. 48-56.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adler, Emanuel, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations”,Millenium:

Journal of International Studies 26, no. 2, Summer 1997a.

Leonard, M., “Diplomacy by other means”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 132 No. September/October, 2002.

Väyrynen, Raimo, Stable peace trough security communities? Steps towards theory-building, 2000, available

at: http://kroc.nd.edu/ocpapers/op_18_3.pdf.

Williams, Michael C., “The Institutions of Security, Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations”,Cooperation

and Conflict 32, no. 3, September 1997.

Wyszomirsky, Margaret j, Chirstopher Burgess, Chaterine Peila in International Cultural Relations, A Multicountry

Comparision, Arts Policy and Administration Program, The Ohio State University-2003, p. 1, available at

http://www.culturalpolicy.org/pdf/MJWpaper.pdf.

148 LUCIAN JORA 9

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMSIN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

ARISTIDE CIOABÃ

A new edition of Giovanni Sartori’s work, entitled Ingineria constituþionalãcomparatã. Structuri, stimulente ºi rezultate (Comparative ConstitutionalEngineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes), was issuedat Jassy in Romanian translation at the Romanian Publishing House, EdituraInstitutului European.

This Romanian translation was conducted by the researchers Gabriela Tãnãsescuand Irina Mihaela Stoica, foreworded and edited by the political scientistGheorghe Lencan Stoica, following the 1997 edition of the volume. This bookcompletes the series of fundamental works of the same author, issued inRomanian in the last two decades: Teoria democraþiei reinterpretatã (1984),2000; Homo videns (1997), 2006; and Ce facem cu strãinii? Pluralism ºimulticulturalism (2000), 2007. This book under investigation reveals anothermain direction for political analysis for the educated readers, through whichGiovanni Sartori leaves a clear and original mark on the political science of thelast half of the century, at whose progress he had remarkably contributed.

The core around which the analysis and the conclusions concerning thefunctionality of the present day democratic and constitutional systems are

BOOKS IN DEBATE

GIOVANNI SARTORI

INGINERIA CONSTITUÞIONALÃCOMPARATÃ.STRUCTURI, STIMULENTEªI REZULTATE

Colecþia Politica, traducere de GabrielaTãnãsescu, Irina Mihaela StoicaIaºi, Editura Institutului European, 2008,326 p.


constructed has as main theoretical landmarks of the democratic constitutions seenas “structures of government”, based on “sanctions and incentives”. Given thatthey establish procedures and forms that „structure and discipline the processesof decision-making, the constitutions — says Sartori — show how should thenorms be created”, without substituting themselves to the popular will, nor to theresponsibility of the institutions to which they attribute the responsibility for thepolitical decisions, respectively, for the “processing” of the concrete publicpolicies. The essential function of the constitutions stays therefore in the “efficientmanagement of the organization of the state” (p. 268) through institutions (theParliament, the Executive) that “satisfy the exigencies of the governance” (p. 272).

Especially because within this realm we investigate structures through whichthe people govern other people — to appeal to a Madisonian phrase —, theguarantee of their functionality cannot be reduced, according to Sartori, to themere obedience in front of the orders and constraints stated by the constitutionalnorms. The capitalization on the potential of stimulation and equilibriumcontained by the adequate recompense or reward of these entitled to govern, forthe proven merits of government, is as important as the obedience. It isunderstood that the absence of a proper mechanism allocating incentives impedeson the efficient functionality, even when there are stipulated drastic sanctions forthe infringements upon the constitutional constraints.

The hypothesis according to which the institutions, in general, and the state,in particular, have “to be restrained by a system of rewards and sanctions, ofattracting incentives and terrifying menaces” represents undoubtedly one of themost inventive and satisfactory perspectives of analysis and interpretation of theconstitutional systems.

Sartori submits this set of generalizations and hypotheses to a “comparedcontrol”, functioning both as approaching method and as empirical covering,proceeding to the analysis of all the existing democratic forms. The correctappreciation of the comparative enterprise accomplished in this book cannotavoid a brief reference to the contribution brought by Sartori to the developmentof the comparative theory and method within political science, in general. Sartorihas introduced strictness and logical order to this field. His study “ConceptMisformation in Comparative Politics”, published in The American PoliticalScience Review (LXIV, No. 4, Dec., 1970, p. 1033-1053), remains until today amethodological landmark in the theoretical and empirical comparative research.

Thus, as early as the 70s, when comparative politics has gained extension giventhe behaviorist and systemic revolution and due to structural-functionalism, Sartoriwas precisely and radically diagnosing the logical, theoretical and conceptualshortcomings affecting the explicative and integrative capacity of the politicalcomparativism. Correlatively he was drawing a few directing lines envisaging theirremedy and the correct evaluation of the end and conditions necessary for theanalysis. A major requirement consists of the resistance in front of the temptationof the “conceptual stretching”, that is the extrapolation of the concepts that arespecific to the Western political systems, through a dilution of their conceptualcontent, in order to extend their applicability to the scale of world politics.

150 BOOKS IN DEBATE 2

This author has re-established the ultimate importance of the generalizationsused in classifications where the concepts play not only the role of the elementsof a theoretical system, but also that of instruments for the documentation andclassification (the storage) of the empirical data, that will be then controlled and,respectively, compared, and eventually amended. Sartori was thus explicitlyrehabilitating a theoretical approach aiming at the adequate formation of theclassifying concepts and categories, as proper objective of a medium level ofabstraction, from which the comparative approach might drift (traveling) eitherupwards or downwards on the scale of abstractions, as to combine a relativelyincreased explicative force — the macro theories — with a relatively precisedescriptive (contextually configurative) content. At this medium level, noteSartori “we are required to perform the whole set of operations that some authorscall “definition by analysis”, that is the process of defining a term by finding thegenus to which the object designated by the word belongs, and then specifyingthe attributes which distinguish such object from all the other species of thesome genus” (p. 1043). For Sartori the comparative analysis does not produceper se the explanation of the things that are compared, without a preamble oftheorizing and empirical conceptualization. “The unconscious thinker does notask himself why he is comparing; and this neglect goes to explain why so muchcomparative work provides extension of knowledge, but hardly a strategy foraquiring and validating new knowledge. It is not intuitively evident that tocompare is to control (our italics — A.C.), and that the novelty, distinctivenessand importance of comparative politics consists of a systematic testing, againstas many cases as possible, of sets of hypotheses, generalization and laws of the“if ... then” (p. 1035)*.

Sartori subsequently refined the comparative method, starting with itsapplication to the party systems in Parties and Party Systems. A Framework ofAnalysis (1976) and continuing with the field of democratic political systems inhis Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentivesand Outcomes.

This book includes three interdependent parts. In the first one the authoranalyzes the electoral systems and their effects on the party systems, which theyare not necessarily components of the constitutional structure; they play anindispensable role within the functional mechanism of the democratic systems.The second part is reserved to the definition and the typological evaluation of thedemocratic systems with their two distinct classes: the presidentialism and theParliamentarism. The third part will confront the functional problems of thedemocratic political systems with the author’s proposal for the amelioration of thepresent constitutional engineering, from the perspective of the intelligent structuraland normative combination of the threats with the compensatory incentives.


————————* It is necessary to underline to this end that his merits in developing the qualitative methods in forming

the concepts “and especially his contribution to helping scholars think about problems of context as they refineconcepts and apply them to new spatial and temporal settings” were honored by theAmerican Political ScienceAssociation (APSA), the Section Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, instituting the Giovanni SartoriBook Award in the field.

The comparative analysis of the electoral systems emphasizes the definingelements of the plurality formula, proportional representation, or “double-ballotsystems” with their intended and unintended effects to attempt determine whichone offers the best option. His preference turns toward the “double tour” votingsystem or the ballotage, in the version used in the parliamentary elections inFrance, nowadays. The argument seems to be that unlike the plurality votingsystems, the proportional representation ones or the alternative (preferential)vote, etc., the “double tour” voting system allows the elector to revote. Thus,after a more or less random vote in the first tour in selecting the candidates(excepting the case of those who win the mandate with 50%+ from the firstattempt) the elector returns in the second tour, voting in full knowledge, on thebasis of the configuration selected in the first tour. Moreover, the accession inthe second tour of more than two (3 or 4) candidates permits political parties tocoordinate strategies entering in a negotiation of rational exchange, makingtransparent agreements in the time interval between the two tours, while thevoters can approve or penalize these inter-party agreements, through their votein the second tour, offering to a greater extent a “rational vote” (p. 106-107).

But the most important point for the contribution of the author in this field isthe formulation of his own laws concerning the influence of the voting systemson the party systems. Sartori develops and clarifies as well the theoreticalgeneralizations related to the notion of law in social sciences, as the specificconditions under which the hypotheses (laws) suggested more than half ofcentury ago by Maurice Duverger can be validated or invalidated by the empiricalevidence. Sartori also includes in a fundamental manner in the theoretical andexplanatory equation that he proposes, not only the influence of the votingsystems on the party systems, but their own influence (or lack of influence) ofthe parties and party systems on the electoral behavior of the citizens, accordingto the degree of structure (or lack of structure) they provide (or not) for thepolitical life. As a correlate aspect, Sartori adds to the premises influencing theformulation of his laws a clearer criterion for counting the parties in relation tothe assessment of their relevance. The result is the alternative formulation ofcouples of laws concerning the effects or the non-effects of the plurality systemson two party systems and of the proportional representation systems (with orwithout access threshold) on the types of multiparty systems and on theirfunctional capacities (chapter III, 3 and 4) from the perspective of the exigenciesof the governance. If the electoral systems and the party systems do not representconnotative attributes for the classification of the constitutional systems, thefunctionality of the latter is influenced by that of the former.

In the second part of the book the analysis is concentrated on the typology ofthe democratic systems. In a different manner than that of the well-knownjuridical or political science approach, with the categories of democratic systems— presidential, parliamentary and of assembly — Sartori delineates clearly thedefining criteria of the presidential and parliamentary systems, through themutual exclusion and the mechanism of the division/separation of thegovernmental power, highlighting for each type their own systemic logic accordingto which they are constituted and maintained.


The prototype or the referential of the presidential system is the North-American one, where the President (the head of state) 1) results from a popularvote (or as if it were a direct vote); 2) he cannot be deprived of confidence duringhis mandate by the parliamentary vote; 3) presides and leads the governments henames (p. 131). The division or the separation of power, as a structural andconstitutive arrangement, within the logic of this system, consists in theseparation of the executive from the parliamentary support, while the division ofpower means that the executive is sustained by and falls without the support ofthe Parliament (p. 133). In this case, the unified governance, that is, a governingbased on the parliamentary support for the government of the President, cannotresult otherwise than from the agreement between the presidential party and thepolitical majority in Congress; in its absence, the governance remains dividedand the presupposition according to which within such systems we have to dealwith a strong and efficient government is infirmed. If, nevertheless, the Americanpresidential system has functioned and is still functioning (even if only badly),the fact is owed not to it divided structure of power, but to the unlocking of thesystem performed by three non-structural political factors: the absence of(ideological) principles, the weak parties, without a rigid parliamentary discipline,and the local concessions offered by the President to the Members of Parliamentto gain their votes for the laws that are necessary for the governmental policies.

Even when the President has the majority in Congress, his control over theParliament remains relative, given the lack of discipline in what concerns thevote within the party. Therefore, the presidential system contains a structurallogic predisposing it to obstruction. This fact is illustrated to a greater extent bythe Latin-American countries that imported the North-American system andwhere the outcome of the presidential system is disastrous. The multipartysystem from these countries rendered futile the policies of the presidents who,even though they have looked for the solution in increasing their constitutionalpowers way beyond those of the American President, did not alleviate thefunctionality of the system, but on the contrary, they have exposed it to the militarycoup d’etat.

Sartori sees the solving of the structural deficiency of the presidential systemin the Latin-American context in the alternative of the semi-presidential systemthat would answer to a large extent to the question of the structural rigidity ofthe presidential system and not in that of a parliamentary system, because of thelack of a party system in these countries that would be adequate (compatible) fora functional parliamentary system.

The parliamentary systems are based entirely on the division of power betweenthe legislative and the executive, the governments depending in principle on theParliament for the nomination, the support and, if applicable, the overthrowingfrom power, through the no-confidence vote of the Parliament. According, to thestructural (constitutional) arrangements and to the correlation with the partysystems, the parliamentarism denotes a variety of parliamentary systems that inturn produce either powerful or weak governments, either stability or instability,either efficiency or immobility (p. 151), related to the degree of cohesion, discipline


and division of the party system. Thus, Sartori distinguishes according to themeasure of shared power of which the Prime Minister disposes in relation to themembers of government and to the Parliament, somewhere between the Britishsystem of premiership, or Cabinet governance, based on a powerful Premier(situated above unequals) and elections with plurality system, two party system,and extremely disciplined parties (a combination difficult to obtain but easy todismantle) which, if consolidated, ensures the governmental stability andefficiency. A moderate version, under the structural and functional aspects, ispresented in the German postwar parliamentary model, where the Chancellor isthe first among unequals (the only one named by the Parliament, while the otherMinisters are named by the Chancellor), the government cannot be demittedunless the Parliament elects a new Chancellor instead of the old one (constructivevote of confidence), operates with the excluding threshold of 5% at the access inParliament (sperrklausel) and the interdiction of the anti-system partiesaccording to a decision of the constitutional court from the 50s. Due to the lasttwo non-structural factors, the party system functions relatively well with twobigger parties and one or two smaller parties, ensuring the stability of thegovernmental coalition (because of the constructive no-confidence vote, too).

The efficient and standing parliamentarism includes cases such as the Britishand German ones and similar as well to these from the countries with predominantparty systems (Sweden, Norway, Spain, Japan, along their different historicalphases) that, even where they do not present premiership or two-party system(or, 2 ½ party) structures, have or had over the years a majority one-party governmentof the same party, for a long while, generator of stability and efficiency. Thefunctionality of the parliamentary system does not rely so much, as Sartoriproves, on its structural and constitutional principle (the sovereignty of theParliament) as on the factors that are limiting the unfolding of its capacities,either constitutionally, either due to the structuring and the functional mechanicsof the party system.

Hereby, we encounter a type of parliamentary system — assembly typeparliamentary system — where the Parliament is sovereign, the governmentsubordinate to the Parliament, the party system is weakly structured and extremelyfractioned (extreme multiparty), the responsibility is ambiguous, while thePrime Minister and the governments cannot act efficiently and rapidly becauseof the disagreements in the coalitions and the absence of the unity of the will.

Finally, another kind of democratic system is the semi-presidential system, towhich Sartori, starting from the French prototype of the Fifth Republic,attributes as connotation the dual authority of the executive power, resulted fromits division between a President elected through popular vote, either directly orindirectly, and a Prime Minister, according to the criteria concerning the following:1) the independence of the President against the Parliament with which hemediates through his government the acceptance of the given directives; 2) theindependence of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet against the President to theextent they are dependent on the Parliament (through the confidence or no-confidence vote, or the support of the parliamentary majority) and 3) the facility


of different equilibriums and mutual power arrangements within the executive,related to the configuration of the relationships between the two factors of theexecutive and to the parliamentary majority. Besides the French prototype,Sartori includes in the sphere of semi-presidential system several similar cases(Weimar Republic, Portugal between 1976-1982) and a few dissimilar cases (SriLanka, Finland and, possibly Russia).

The thesis that Sartori is convincingly sustaining when he evaluates thestructural virtues and flaws of the pure presidential and parliamentary systems isthat concerning the superior capacity of the semi-presidential system to dealbetter than the presidential system with the divided parliamentary majority andthan the excesses of the assembly systems, because “more applicable”, thusmore sensitive in what concerns the aspect of constitutional engineering, it couldpartially eliminate the vices of extreme multiparty system and those of theelectoral proportional representation, through the double tour majority pluralityvoting system and greater powers for the government in relation to the Parliament.

Even so, the semi-presidential system leaves several unsolved problems, towhich Sartori searches answers through an interesting proposal of presidentialsystem “with two engines,” respectively the alternant or intermittent presidentialsystem.

The fundamental idea of this proposal is to have for the whole length of thelegislature a “parliamentary system stimulated or, on the contrary, penalized, bya presidential destitution-substitution” in case it does not work (it becomesobstructed), the parliamentary engine — the rules of the responsibility of thegovernment in front of the parliamentary majority — could be replaced by apresidential government, the role of the Parliament having to become significantlyreduced during the functioning of the presidential government. Sartori sees apossible utility for this type of constitutional mechanism even in the case of thenon-functional presidential systems, similar to those in Latin-America (Brazil,Mexico), or that of the systems with an accentuated party atomization or that ofmany ex-communist countries with dysfunctional democratic systems.

The strong points of alternant presidential systems would be the following:the limitation of the Parliament to voting one or maximum two formula ofgovernment during a mandate of 4 or 5 years; the incapacity to maintain infunction the government beyond the precedent condition would be sanctioned bythe entry of the President on the political scene, who was directly (or indirectly)elected by the people, and who would continue the mandate with his ownpowerful government nominated exclusively by the President and independentlyby the Parliament, to which it would be reserved only the role of legislativecontrol. As an element of stimulation, the President elected for a similar periodof time could be re-elected for several times — in order to avoid the abusivebehavior of the President in relationship with the Parliament.

The gain would be, according to Sartori, that in the alternant presidentialsystem, the initial phase (the parliamentary one) is going to consolidate thepower of parliamentary governments making them more incisive and moreresponsible, in the detriment of the hunting for governmental chairs by the


diverse Parliament Members. Otherwise, they would hurry up the triggering ofthe presidential phase and that of the penalization of the Parliament. Anintermittent President should have, given the interregnum that he is enjoying,greater powers than a standard President in a presidential system, during thefinal part (from a third to a half of parliamentary mandate), the risks beingreduced due to the limited span for the effective exercise of the mandate and/orre-election, or for the ending of the stimulated duration for the presidential andparliamentary mandates.

Choosing both on the basis of the majority vote with the double tour woulddescribe a behavior that leads to the bipolar configuration of the parties and tothe insurance of parliamentary majorities that sustain governments with highperformances, in the initial phase.

Sartori envisions in the anticipation of the real behavior of the two alternantprotagonists — the President and the Parliament — consolidated democraticsystems and a reasonably high degree of rationality, beyond the brakes and theconstitutional counterweights that he proposes, such as the impossibility of thePresident to reward the Parliament Members who eased the overthrow of theparliamentary government, and even the incompatibility between functions suchas Member of Parliament and Minister. What happens when the majoritypresidential party from the Parliament, initially and deliberately, gives in thegovernment to his leader, the President? Or, when a Parliament that is hostile tothe President maintains in function an inefficient government to avoid the phaseof a presidential government formed by its rival? Or, even, when the electedParliament fails from its very constitution in aggregating a majority? Of course,such anomalies seem unbelievable in a consolidated democracy, but not withinthe post-communist regimes, too, where it is most difficult to distinguish a phasefrom another sometimes, the President being able to govern in disguise througha façade parliamentary government, that is, when he is not tempted to enterdirectly the political scene, and from the very beginning, through the means of apersonal interpretation of the Constitution. Probably, in this case one cannotspeak even about a minimal democratic system.

The book of the Professor and political scientist Giovanni Sartori stands out,as his entire work does, given the exceptional density of ideas on whichunfortunately it is impossible to dwell here. Conscious of the simplifications andreductions operated in this analysis, the invitation to read and study Sartori’sbook, admirable through its stylistic elegance and scientific precision, remainsthe only recommendation.


GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE FATHER OF CONSTITUTIONS

CRISTIAN IOAN POPA

What Giovanni Sartori has accomplished by his comparative analysis of modernconstitutions, shows Gheorghe Lencan Stoica in Preface to the Romanian editionof Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures,Incentives, and Outcomes, a good connoisseur of works and even Sartory itself,may be compared with the work of the great Greek philosopher Aristotle whostudied in comparison the Greek polis and other states in the Mediterranean andthe Orient. “The enterprise is truly colossal...”1. Moreover, given that somechanges of the Constitution of Romania seems to be again at order of the day,Romanian specialist invites all those interested in this topic to study carefullySartori’s Engineering.

Indeed, as assessed Gianfranco Pasquino, the substantially theoreticalcontributions of Sartori on democracy, parties systems or political and constitutionalengineering has made Italian scientist “one of the most prominent theorists ofthe politics in the XX century”2.

Comparative Constitutional Engineering is the result of a long study of electoralsystems and, generally, of modern political institutions and procedures. At 15years after its first edition (1994), this work still enjoys the greatest authority inthis field. According to Pasquino, three aspects are particularly remarkable inthis work. Firstly, it makes immediately intelligible constitutions by presentingthem in terms of sets of “incentives” positive and negative, of rewards andpunishments. Then, it reveals the results of various political and electoral systems,offers a typology of parliamentary, presidential and semi presidential systemsand evaluating their merits and shortcomings. The third aspect to be especiallyemphasized reveals Sartori’s view of political science in general. “Sartori isconvinced — and he says so clearly — that the type of knowledge acquired bypolitical science can be put to work to improve the performance of politicalsystems. Of course, this kind of applicable knowledge (s.m.) must be acquiredand utilized through carefully crafted comparative analyses”3.

Thus, according to Sartori, the Greek politeìa (often translated by “republic”)or Latin constitutio are very different in content from the modern concept of


————————1 Lencan Stoica in Preface to the Romanian edition of Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An

Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes, Iaºi, Institutul European, 2008, p. 23.2 Gianfranco Pasquino, The Political Science of Giovanni Sartori, in “European Political Science”,

nr. 4/2005, p. 33.3 Ibidem, p. 38.

constitution. The first modern constitution was promulgated in 1770 in the U.S.Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania with the essential meaning of a “plan” or“frame” of government, including even a Chart of Rights (Bill of Rights). At thePhiladelphia Convention of 1787 Madison and Hamilton were opposed toplacing it in the Constitution, arguing that rights are not protected by thedeclarations, but by the frame of constitutional government itself. Only in 1789,first Congress has introduced in the federal Constitution of United States a chartof rights as the Ten Amendments.

Therefore, the fundamental theoretical problem suggested by this veritableexperimentum crucix is this: a constitution that lacks a charter of rights isincomplete? Following Sartori, “a constitution without a declaration of rights isstill a constitution, while a constitution whose nucleus does not determine thegovernment scheme is not a constitution”4.

Any genuine constitution must first define the “free government” investingwith the primary function of formal protection of the rights of citizens, quitedifferent by their material claims. Thus, the constitutional state (protective) isrequired to abstain from action, while the “social” state (productive) is requiredto act. Current constitutions include “positive rights” (affirmative rights), economicand social rights, including right to education, employment, health, socialassistance, etc. And their transformation in material “entitlements” appears toexceed the constitutional sphere.

Or, for genuine constitutionalism, constitutions are only those state forms inwhich-as Rousseau said-we are free because they are governed by laws, not byother people. Madison had really a good summary of this idea in Federalist, 51:“In creating a governance structure which means the administration of somepeople by other people [...] must first to authorize the government to control thepolitical subjects, and then to force him to control himself”5. Therefore,constitutions are, originally and essentially, “tools which restricts, requires andbrings under control the exercise of political power”6. And Sartori insists on that“quintessential constitutionalism” which seems to be forgotten by the creators ofcontemporary constitutions. After World War II, there were 74 states; today arealmost all 200 and all of them elaborate increasingly comprehensive constitutionswhich promise the terrestrial paradise. For example, Brazilian Constitution of1998 (the eighth), of the size of a “phone book”, contains many insignificantdetails, but provisions and promises impossible to fulfill. The Constitution“promised paradise on earth, but ultimately has disadvantaged the poor”, saidAntonio Britto, Minister for social assistance. It is a fact that in this country over100 million people receive benefits of social services, while employees are, atleast formally, only 23 million. By engaging too many social promises, a constitutionmay prepare the ruin of a country.

Constitutions must remain “forms”, “frames” which predetermine the processesof major political decisions-making in a state. They define the procedures for


————————4 Giovanni Sartori, op. cit., p. 266.5 Ibidem, p. 267.6 Ibidem.

limiting the exercise of power, prescribing how the political decisions should betaken. Therefore, constitutions are and should remain neutral in matters ofcontent (content neutral). A constitution which assumes a priori the contents ofpublic policies in a state substitutes in an abusive way the institutions(parliaments and governments) to which it entrusts precisely these tasks. Such“aspiration constitutions” should be avoided as far as possible.

As there were, with disastrous consequences, “target economies” — centralizedand planned in the Soviet-style —, in a same way develops today “targetconstitutions”, likely to induce also social disasters. If the authors ofcontemporary constitution can not quell their “high aspirations”, they must beplaced at best in a programmatically Preamble, after which to develop what isproperly to any constitution: a framework for the exercise of political power ableto meet the requirements of good governance. Sartori has in mind here thejuridical distinction between “programmatic” and “imperative” norms. Firstsuggested, and possibly encourage, some desirable courses of possible governmentaction. Second, however, are imperative norms, endowed with the full force ofthe ultimate constitutional command. For example, when the Italian Constitutionenvisages that “the Republic protects the natural environment”, this statementcontains a weak programmatic norm, which does not allow to Italian citizens tocall in court the “Republic” for its negligence towards the environment.

As for the Romanian Constitution, Sartori refers to it in his Speech on theoccasion of receiving the title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University ofBucharest, 20 June 2001, published in full in Annex 4 (“On the RomanianConstitutional System”) of Romanian edition of Engineering. Obviously, Sartorihas in mind the Constitution in 1991, without its revisions in 2003.

The Constitution of Romania, considers Sartori, seems meant to create a semipresidential political system following the model of French Constitution of theFifth Republic, but no one “forte”, but rather “weak”, which he considers to be,however, “an appropriate system for the context in which it work“7. In general,Sartori has strongly recommended the semi presidentialism for its flexiblecharacter, suitable to constitutional engineering.

This system is largely the creation of the French Constitution of 1958, draftedby Michel Debré, and then a result of constitutional practice initiated with thedirect election of the president in 1962. Having an intermediate status —between the pure presidential system, such as theAmerican one, and parliamentarysystem — the semi presidential system establishes a structure of dual authority,two-headed, with two alternant centers of power, in swinging one to anotherdepending on who holds majority in Parliament: the President or the Prime Minister.The intrinsic merit of this system, asseses Sartori, is that it works satisfactorily,inclusively in the cases of divided majorities. In pure presidential system, thepresident found in a minority is largely paralyzed in its political actions, as isfrequently the case in Latin America; in a semi presidential system, instead/by


————————7 Ibidem, p. 313.

contrast, there is always a majority that can govern effectively. “The innovationin constitution, if we stay to think well, is brilliant”8, Sartori concludes.

However, looking at particular constitutional provisions, the Italian scientistconsiders that the Romanian political system is a parliamentary rather than asemi presidential one, in spite of fact that the president is directly elected bycitizens. For example, Article 80, paragraph (2) establishes that “The Presidentshall/will act as a mediator (n.p.t.) between the powers of the state and betweenstate and society”9. However, this is a typical attribute for the President inparliamentary systems. While/If the American president, for example, is a part,a parliamentary president must be super parties.

Also, under Article 85 (1) the president has no power itself to appoint thePrime Minister: “The President of Romania shall designate a candidate for theoffice of Prime Minister and Government on the vote of confidence for theParliament” (n.p.t.). Similarly, according to Article 102 (1): “The President ofRomania shall designate a candidate for the office of Prime Minister, afterconsulting the party which has an absolute majority in Parliament or, if there isno such majority, the parties represented in Parliament” (n.p.t.). These are, evaluatesSartori, typical constitutional rules and practices of parliamentary systems.Similarly, underArticle 86, “the Presidentmay (n.p.t.) consult with the Governmenton urgent and special importance matters” and, according to Article 87 (1),“President of Romania may (n.p.t.) take part in meetings of the Governmentdebating issues of national foreign policy, the country’s defense, public orderensuring and, at the request of Prime Minister (n.p.t.), in other situations,although it is true that, according to paragraph (2), “Romanian Presidentpresides (n.p.t.) the meetings government in which he participates”.

These are — Sartori admits —, somewhat semi presidential attributes. But onlythe last is really important, because the assertions that the “president can ...” donot describe in any case strong constitutional powers. Then, the fact that eventhe presence of President in meetings of the Government must be requested bythe Prime Minister substantially limits his constitutional powers.

Also, the dissolution of Parliament is not in any way a presidential prerogative,under Article 89 (1): “After consulting (n.p.t.) the Presidents of both Chambersand the leaders of parliamentary groups, the President of Romania may (n.p.t.)dissolve Parliament if it did not give vote of confidence to form a governmentwithin 60 days after the first request and only after rejection of at least tworequests for investiture”. Or, about Referendum, according toArticle 90: “Romania’sPresident, after consultation with Parliament (n.p.t.), may request the people toexpress, by referendum, his will on some problems of national interest”. Similarly,the president has no right of veto and no right of legislative initiative, etc., all ofthese determining at the end Sartori to assess, from his perspective of comparativeconstitutional law, that the Romanian “semi presidentialism” does not allow “adual power structure, with two heads and, therefore, a genuine semi presidentialsystem”10. With all the consequences, positive or negative, arising out of here.


————————8 Ibidem, p. 315.9 Constituþia României, Bucureºti, Editura All Beck, 2003.

10 Giovanni Sartori, op. cit., p. 318.

CERC BULLETIN No. 3/2009

A bulletin on European studies and research compiled by the Contemporary Europe ResearchCentre (CERC) at The University of Melbourne

Globalisation and European integration: ‘the nature of the beast’ 5-6 June 2009,University of Warwick.

The conference aims to stimulate interdisciplinary exchange on the historical materialistframeworks used to investigate the relationship between global governance, regional integrationand the national state, with special reference to the European Union. It will also seek to stimulatea constructive engagement, in one of its panels, between historical materialist, constructivist andpost-structuralist approaches to European integration. The conference will showcase and challengethe most promising critical theories of regionalisation and globalisation, including neo-Gramscian,Open Marxist, Regulation and World-System approaches, with the purpose of generating usefulconnections and intellectual exchange.

Abstracts (250wds max) due 15 March to [email protected] information: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/ss/beast/

Registration due 15 April. £27 per delegate inc. lunch, wine reception, refreshments.

Borders, theory, art and power. Contemporary borders, theory and art journeys in thereciprocal construction of identity between Australia and Europe

17-19 June 2009, Bari, ItalyThe second Imagined Australia International Forum continues its research and discussion of

the relationship between Europe and the Oceania-Australia region in artistic and cultural terms.The specific focus this time is on contemporary Australia and the way European and Australianthought and arts have occupied themselves with each other’s spaces and themes and why.

Abstracts due 15 March 2009Further information: INFO@AILAE,ORG /+39 345 29 65 555

Legal, Political and Economic Initiatives Towards Europe of Knowledge24 April, 2009, Kaunas University of Technology, Institute of Europe, LithuaniaSelected papers will be published in European Integration Studies: Research and TopicalitiesAbstracts due: 20 March, 2009. Registrations due: 3 April, 2009Further information: http://www. euroi.ktu.lt/en/ index.php?option= com_frontpage& Itemid=1

New journal on languages, linguistics and area studies seeks papersDebut: the new, online, undergraduate journal of languages, linguistics and area studies welcomes

scholarly papers written by undergraduate students in languages, linguistics and area studies. Fulldetails and guidelines are at: http://www.llas.ac.uk/news/3088

JCER (Journal of Contemporary European Research) – articles wantedArticles wanted for Autumn 2009 (general) issue of JCER.Further information: www.jcer.net

Constitutionalism and governance beyond the stateThe editors of ConWEB Jutta Brunnee (Law, University of Toronto) andAntje Wiener (Politics

and IR, University of Bath) invite the submission of unsolicited manuscripts from social scienceand law backgrounds, which address the broad themes of constitutionalism and governancebeyond the state. Papers focussing on international relations, international law, European integration

SC IENT IF IC L IFE


theories and/or empirical studies of complex state contexts and international relations are welcome.Interdisciplinary work is particularly encouraged.

Further information and manuscripts should be sent as email attachments to either ProfessorJutta Brunnee ([email protected]) or Professor Antje Wiener ([email protected]).

‘Boundaries of EU Law after the Lisbon Treaty’ – 7th Session of the Jean Monnet Seminar19-26 April 2009, Dubrovnik

Accepted papers will be considered for publication in Vol 5. of Croatian Yearbook of EuropeanLaw and Policy

Further information: http://www.pravo.hr/EJP/jean_monnet_projekt/dubrovnik_2009

‘Europe’s Expansions and Contractions’ XVIIth Biennial Conference of the AustralasianAssociation of European Historians (AAEH) 6 – 9 July 2009, Adelaide, Australia

Papers and panels sought on modern European history (broadly defined). Postgraduates arewelcome to submit proposals. Co-sponsored by the Innovative Universities European UnionCentre. Abstracts sent to [email protected]

Further information: <http://www.theaaeh.org>

ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops: The EU in the World Economy, Lisbon 2009Seeking papers on EU foreign economic relations in general from different theoretical angles

and using different methodologies. Workshop directors: Andreas Dür (University College Dublin)and Manfred Elsig (Universität Bern, World Trade Institute).

Abstracts to be sent to [email protected] and [email protected]

The Laboratory of International Relations, ISPRI

THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE “RELIGIOUS TEXTAND DISCOURSE” IAªI, 5-6 DECEMBER, 2008

TheDepartment of Romanian Language from “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaºi organized,between the 5th and the 6th of December 2008, the National Conference “Religious Text andDiscourse”. The first edition of this scientific event was devoted to the analysis of the dominantfeatures that distinguish religious communication from other types of present-day communicativepractices. Among the main objectives of the conference, the organizers included the description ofthe most prominent elements of the Romanian religious language and culture, the elaboration ofan adequate methodology to analyze and interpret various linguistic and cognitive aspects of thereligious phenomena in the broader context of cultural interference and the development of thenew media, the establishment of long lasting connection among the members of the scientificcommunity, by finding new medium and long-term research opportunities and promoting theactual research to a broader audience.

In order to fulfil the objectives, the organization committee (prof. dr. Alexandru Gafton, lect.dr. Sorin Guia, lect. dr. Ioan Milicã) proposed that the presentations should be divided accordingto nature of the audience. Consequently, the plenary session, devoted to a larger public (researchersand academics, students and other various persons) was followed by two sections, entitled “Thetranslation of the sacred text” and “The Rhetorics of the Religious Discourse”.

The proceedings of the conference were attended by more than sixty five specialists withvarious research interests. The interdisciplinary approach was favoured in the presentationsdelivered by many guests coming from the most important Romanian universities and researchinstitutes, such as Bucharest, Cluj, Iaºi, Sibiu and Timiºoara, to name just a few.

Among the most prominent speakers who took part to the scientific event hosted by theUniversity of Iaºi, we can mention Bartolomeu Anania, the Metropolitan bishop of Cluj, Alba andMaramureº, Teofan Savu, The Metropolitan bishop of Moldavia and Bucovina, Petru Gherghel, theBishop of the Romano-Catholic Diocese of Iaºi, prof. dr. Vasile Iºan, the Rector of the “Alexandru

162 SCIENTIFIC LIFE 2

Ioan Cuza” University, prof. dr. ªtefan Avãdanei, The Dean of the Faculty of Letters, prof. dr. pr.Gheorghe Popa (The University of Iaºi), prof. dr. pr. Ioan C. Teºu (The University of Iaºi), dr. PetreGuran (The Institute of South-Eastern Studies, Bucharest), prof. dr. Dumitru Irimia (The Universityof Iaºi), prof. dr. pr. Emil Dumea, the Dean of the Faculty of the Romano-Catholic Theology (TheUniversity of Iaºi), prof. dr. Vasile Þâra (The University of Timiºoara), prof. dr. GheorgheManolache(The University of Sibiu), prof. dr. Gheorghe Chivu (The University of Bucharest), prof. dr.Constantin Frâncu (The University of Iaºi) and lect. dr. pr. Lucian Farcaº (The University of Iaºi).

The presentations and discussions focused on the technique and importance of the biblicaltranslations, the connections between the religious language and other cultural linguistic varieties(the languages of literature and science, especially), the Orthodox iconographical art, the blendingof prophetical and religious discourse in the Romano-Catholic tradition and, last but not least, theimportance of the religious books in the development of the Literary Romanian. The proceedingsof the National Conference “Religious Text and Discourse” will be published in a volume and theorganization committee already plans the second edition.

Sorin GuiaIoan Milicã

SESIUNEA ANUALÃ DE COMUNICÃRI ªTIINÞIFICE, COMITETULROMÂN PENTRU ISTORIA ªI FILOSOFIA ªTIINÞEI ªI TEHNICII

(CRIFST), THE ROMANIAN ACADEMY, 15 OCTOBER, 2008

Wednesday, 15 October 2008, at the Romanian Academy Aula, took place the Annual Session ofScientific Communications, Division of Logic, Methodology and Science’s Philosophy.

The debate focused upon logic, methodology and science’s philosophy implied both a “sketching”of the dominating social, political, philosophical and cultural climate, and an “inventory” of the technicalpostulates — all recognized in the theoretical models of an alternative communicational paradigm.

According to professor and researcherAngela Botez, logic, methodology and science’s philosophycan be seen only as a summon of an organically evolution, which led to the “energeticallydomination” of what can be called a transitive language, a transparent, multifunctional, non-mediatedone, as a background for a maximal (logical, philosophical and methodological) disponibility.

The inventories of the theoretical structures were focused upon: Current trends in philosophyand social sciences (Angela Botez); Aristotle’s definition of truth. Binary operators (Cornel Popa);About Ethics in oratorical fights (Maria Cornelia Bârliba); Ethics of science in the consciencesociety (Ionuþ Isac); The source and the meaning of natural and artificial evolution (Laura Panã);Some aspects of the emotional intelligence in neurobiology field (Mihai Teodorescu); Evolutionand progress in social sciences (Gabriel Nagâþ); Romanian coordinates of the social and politicalsciences (Henrieta ªerban); Sociology and socio-political sciences. Romanian (post)modernsketches (Viorella Manolache).

(Re)phrasing the old trends and theories, the conference promoted a new theoretical view,intending to detonate the well-known patterns, articulated on some formalist and controlledacceptations, proposing a de (and re) contextualization of what can be called a “rebuilt of the logic,methodology and science’s philosophy”.

The distinction between the logical, methodological and philosophical basis and the substancebrought together various fields of procedures, in order to express the relations between theelements which form the new Science and to reconfigure a so-called “corpus of logic, methodologicaland philosophical discourse”.

Considering it more a debate than a simple academic procedure, the conference proposed onlyto describe the dynamic of logic, methodology and science’s philosophy’s dynamics, updating it’smechanism and stratagem, identifying its major projects, annihilating the apparent dogmaticlinearity — so much used — in the scientific interventions!

Viorella Manolache

3 SCIENTIFIC LIFE 163

Ion GoianMachiavelli, Enigmaticul. Omul, epoca, volumul I, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi RelaþiiInternaþionale, Bucureºti, 2008, 210 p.

Written and (trans)written according to a faustic imperative (that of the settlement on the writing table ofthe translations and images, of what the author calls all the ingredients of a small iconography), Machiavelli,the enigmatic writer. The man, the epoch aims to provide an immediate reality of Machiavelli, placed behindderived images (direct or indirect),mortuary masks or imaginative representations (marked by posthumous irony).

Organized as “an annotated biography” of NiccolóMachiavelli, the study formula allows the reader to traversethe main events of Machiavelli’s life in an chronological order, or, referring to the footnotes to the text, to beintroduced to the most influential comments of the experts in his biography and writings (p. 201-202).

Machiavelli, the enigmatic writer. The man, the epoch aims to overcome the iconography’s stasis, balancingscientifically, what has been denatured by the assault of those who have considered a duty to block Machiavelli’sthoughts into conventional factors (formulas/ terms in which Machiavelli is commonly described the EvilPrinciple, the discoverer of ambition and revenge, the original inventor of perjury!).Machiavelli, the enigmaticwriter. The man, the epoch is a necessary tool of those who attempt to draw, documentary, the Machiavelli’sportrait. The contradictions in Machiavelli’s writings should be understood in their historical context. This isa useful corrective, because it would be unlikely for Machiavelli to measure himself by the academic valuesof systematic coherence and plodding argumentation!

This volume is meant to be the first part of a trilogy. The second volume deals with some interpretationsof the most important writings by Machiavelli, while the third is an approach of the cultural background of thehistorical lectures of his works.

Machiavelli’s life falls into three periods, each representing a distinct and important era in the history ofFlorence. A member of the impoverished branch of a distinguished family, he entered the political service ofthe Florentine republic and rose rapidly in importance.

His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzode Medici, Il Magnifico. The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, when Machiavelli enteredthe public service. During his official career Florence was free under the government of a Republic, whichlasted until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his position. The Medici again ruledFlorence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’sliterary activity and increasing influence. When, in 1527, the republic was briefly reestablished, Machiavelliwas distrusted by many of the republicans, and he died thoroughly disappointed and embittered. He died,within a few weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 21 June 1527, without having regained job.

Reconsidering the importance of the descriptive and historical fragments, Ion Goian return to a new senseof the political and philosophical discourse engaging it with a different point of view and with different effects:in a fringed interference between the iconography and the real, preconception and careful observation (of thehistorical facts, documents and translations).

The historical preliminaries (The political life in Florence before the 16th century and the origins ofFlorentine politics in Machiavelli’s time) provide, as Ion Goian states, a necessary, but short review of thehistory of the city of Florence, essential in order to understand both, the political confrontations in which theFlorentine Secretary was involved, as an official of the Soderini’s government and afterwards as a thought-to-be opponent of Medici regime and theorist of Florentine liberty, but also Machiavelli’s perspective aboutpolitics in general and about his fatherland’s history in particular (p. 201). These preliminaries, doubled byMachiavelli’s annotated biography, establish a two-double time perspective: a historical and a political one,assimilating, deliberately, the historical data, returning to the idea of a discursive (co)property in his processof framing an epoch and a man.

From the perspective of a documented and philosophical restless point of view,Machiavelli, the enigmaticwriter. The man, the epoch focuses on a half decreased light in articulating Machiavelli’s profile as (still!) anenigmatic presence. Although, from the Palazzo Vecchio of Florence, Machiavelli’s remains alert, almostsmiling, and completely inscrutable!

Viorella Manolache

BOOK REVIEWS


Viorella Manolache (coord.)Centru ºi Margine la Marea Mediteranã (Filosofie Politicã ºi Realitate Internaþionalã) — Center andMargin at the Mediterranean Sea (Political Philosophy and International Reality), Editura Institutuluide ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, Bucureºti, 2009, 460 p.

The collective volume focused upon Center and Margin at the Mediterranean Sea (Political Philosophyand International Reality) joins scientific contributions from eight countries (Romania, Morocco, Tunis, Turkey,Brazil, USA, Italy) providing a rich mix of theoretical and philosophical comparative, international andtransnational issues, addressed to all who are interested in the contemporary political phenomena in theMediterranean context of increasing international interdependence and global change.

According to Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, the collective volume answering to the theme Center-Margin atthe Mediterranean Sea (Political Philosophy and International Reality) was conceived as an ampler echo andalso as a complementary dimension to the laboratory work of the journal of the Institute of Political Scienceand International Relations of the Romanian Academy, entitled Romanian Review of Political Sciences andInternational Relations. While the journal has proven a wide opening both for a great diversity of recurrentthemes now within political sciences, and for certain “marginal” areas of interdisciplinarity, this work aimsalso at the same ample scope. In other words, the volume maintains the same type of innovative ambitions andthe same manner of relating to contemporary tendencies as the journal, approching through some of the texts,certain attempts to inter-relate also a few “weak” theoretical concepts, to a significant extent more adequatedto the complexities associated with the investigation of such a theme, coming from different universities andfrom different countries. You are contemplating the effort to estimate the present geo-political research of theMediterranean community, and the endeavour to enter into a dialogue with this community.

As the coordonator of the volume, Viorella Manolache states in the argument, the volume comes in thecontext of an unfortunate Romanian theoretical void which enhances a sense of mechanistic synchronizationand/or the pressure of dogma, from proletcult-marxism to protochronism-impressionism. The volume’s pivotson the modern/ postmodern political paradigms confirm three constant dimensions, in this dynamic formula:Political philosophy of Mediterranean Centre and Margin; Cultural approaches on the Mediterranean Marginand International reality at the Mediterranean Sea. The volume contains the following perspectives: Marginsof Theories and Theories of Margins. Short Introduction (Abdellatif Akbib), Coloniality/Post-ColonialityRhetoric and the Paradox of Center and Peripheries (Mohamed Dellal), The End of Theory in the Age of Post-Tradition (Said Graiouid), The East and the West: Relations of Centre and Margin (Abderrazzak Essrhir), TheModernizing claim of “Partnership” between the U.N initiative and the southern Mediterranean region(Abdenbi Sarroukh), Evaluãri “slabe” despre marginea mediteraneanã: filosofie ºi realitate internaþionalã(Viorella Manolache), Despre centru ºi margini la Marea Mediteranã. Mediterana ca simbol al puterii (LorenaPãvãlan Stuparu), Ironismul ca gestionare a relaþiei dintre “Centru” ºi “Margine” (Henrieta ªerban), Gramscie i Sud del Mondo: Tra Oriente e Occidente (Carlos Nelson Coutinho), Perception de la Mediterranée et duMaghreb a Travers le Recit de Voyage d’Emanuel De Aranda (Alia Bournaz Baccar), An archaeologicalapproach to the cultural and political background of East-Mediterranean: Alâiyye and its Periphery (Z.KenanBilici), The Pentagon’s Palimpsest: How the screening of Battle of Algiers underlies the torture at Abu Ghraib(Perri Giovannucci), Le relazioni economiche tra Europa e Islam nel Mediterraneo moderno (XV-XVII sec.)(Daniele Casanova), E. Lovinescu ºi Mediterana. Note de cãlãtorie (Antonio Patraº), Reversiuni mediteraneeneîn orientarea clasicistã de la Junimea (Anton Naum) (Gheorghe Manolache), Reconfigurãri ale mitului lui DonJuan. Între tradiþia spiritualã spaniolã ºi culturalitatea mediteraneanã (Rodica Grigore), Le Dos Tourné À LaTerre (DianaAdamek), Consemnãri de (la) margine: persistenþa unei fobii (Leonte Ivanov), Creºterea, descreºtereaºi renaºterea valorii de pivot geopolitic ºi geostrategic a Mãrii Mediterane (Florin Diaconu), Evoluþia Africiide Nord în contextul Mediteranean (Gabriel Florea), UE ºi Bazinul Mediteranean. Dificultãþi ale ParteneriatuluiEuro-Mediteranean (Ruxandra Luca), Parteneriatul Euro-Mediteranean–Consideraþii conceptuale (LucianJora), Influencing the Process of Enlargement: The Commission and the Parliament case study: the 2007Enlargement (Daniela Ionescu), Rolul României în politica europeanã de vecinãtate a UE (Rãzvan Pantelimon),O þarã mediteraneanã: Italia–între proiect comunitar ºi perspectivã regionalã (Alexandra Vasile).

The volume is meant to be a focal point for the serious research exchange in terms of geographical andpolitical community, methodological orientation, and theoretical preference, concerning the domestic,comparative, transnational and international political and cultural aspects, demonstrating highest standards ofexcellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, illuminating significant research problem, oranswering important research question, of general interest in political science.

Center and Margin at the Mediterranean Sea (Political Philosophy and International Reality) has importantinternal and external collaborators, constant ones, whose landmarks are offered in the rubric that containsauthors’ presentations (mentioning The Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Bucharest,Romanian Diplomatic Institute, Bucharest, “Al.I.Cuza” University, Iaºi, “Babeº Bolyai” University, Cluj,

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“Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, Universidad Federal do Rio de Janeiro, University Mohammed V, Rabat,AbdelMalek Essaadi, University in Tetouan, Université de La Manouba, American University in Dubai,Ankara University, Università degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”, Napoli s.o.)

Hence the innovative character of the volume resides in overcoming the general(ising) tendency ofRomanian political science thinking, re-directing the common analyze, built on the modernist canons, towardsthe new horizons of transparent societies, re-thinking the research priorities, proposing a shift fromcommunication to performativity.

Multifaceted and plural, the topic includes fundamental concepts which enforce coincidences between twoplatforms— the discursive, theoretical one, typical of the new, decentralized, structurally democratized universitypedagogies, and the intra — and interdisciplinary scaffolding of applied research — are easily recognizable inthe postmodern Romanian project, fed by pluralistic views, and encouraged by the rethinking of the actualpolitical and philosophical opportunities for research and political decentring.

The volume promotes a conversation among a spectrum of political scientists and it is opened also to thecontributions from related disciplines that help to enrich knowledge in political science.

These are the strong points of the Center and Margin at the Mediterranean Sea perception, an evaluationof both coordinates— political philosophy and international reality, as a double face of some new challengesin the Mediterranean area!

Alexandra Vasile

Guy HermetL’hiver de la démocratie ou le nouveau régime, Editions Armand Colin, 2008, 229 p.

Guy Hermet continue la série d’interrogations qu’il formule quant au régime démocratique par un nouveaulivre paru aux Editions Armand Colin en 2008, sous un titre expressif — L’hiver de la démocratie ou lenouveau régime — recherché avec beaucoup de finesse par l’auteur, dans son souci de faire que le contenu dulivre soit complètement mis en valeur.

Ce titre annonce d’ailleurs sa thèse de la fin du régime démocratique, une thèse provocatrice vu lerayonnement de ce régime dans le monde, son extension géographique impressionnante, mais aussi uneévidence si l’on regarde avec attention quelques aspects. En effet, cette extension géographique de ladémocratie est seulement un indicateur quantitatif, alors que le vrai critère à prendre en compte est celuiqualitatif: «…c’est le triomphe de la démocratie en surface, pour ainsi dire, qui attire l’attention du public. Enrevanche c’est la perte de substance de la démocratie en profondeur qui demeure largement et volontairementinaperçue» (p. 10). D’où l’on voit s’appliquer le paradigme qui fait que tout régime atteigne à un momentdonné sa fin, même si les contemporains de cet épuisement ne s’en rendent pas compte ou vivent avec laconviction contraire de ce que le régime qu’ils connaissent se trouve au comble de son existence et qu’il n’ya aucun signe de sa prochaine disparition: «Comme nos ancêtres de 1775 ou de 1785, nous touchons au termed’un futur ancien régime, d’un régime finissant, voué à céder la place à un autre univers politique encoredépourvu de nom mais dès maintenant largement esquissé dans la pratique. Comme eux, nous sommes à laporte du Prochain Régime» (p. 13).

Et l’auteur insiste à bien préciser qu’il n’annonce pas la crise de la démocratie mais exactement sa fin: «Parlerde crise, c’est suggérer que nous vivrions simplement un passage à vide, que la situation va s’arranger. C’est unevue erronée. Je crois profondément que la démocratie telle que nous la concevons n’existera bientôt plus»1.

L’auteur rentre dans les subtilités de cette équation ancien régime — régime actuel — prochain régimepour expliquer quels sont les arguments soutenant que la démocratie actuelle est arrivée à ses limites; il fait undétour obligatoire en analysant la démocratie de la Grèce antique ou la citoyenneté médiévale pour expliquerdes concepts-clé de son discours — peuple, souveraineté, droits, citoyens, gouvernement, gouvernance, etc. —et pour arriver à l’époque du suffrage universel avec lequel le peuple est devenu le point de référence requispour légitimer le gouvernement.

Mais comment entend le peuple d’accomplir ce rôle de détenteur de la souveraineté? Le processus dedémocratisation paraissait avoir atteint son objectif une fois que l’égalité juridique et la citoyenneté politiqueont été reconnues et complétées par une troisième phase correspondant à la citoyenneté économique et sociale.L’égalité juridique et politique se voyait compléter par des droits sociaux et économiques menés à protéger lestravailleurs contre les inconvénients de l’économie libérale. C’est justement dans la superposition de ces trois

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————————1 Interview du 7 janvier 2008, réalisée par Dominique Berns et publiée sur http://archives.lesoir.be

(archives), dans laquelle Hermet explique les axes centraux de L’hiver de la démocratie.

types de droits que Hermet place la source du déséquilibre de la démocratie: «Alors que les droits civils etpolitiques se voulaient dès le début égalitaires dans leur principe et le sont devenus de plus en plus dans leurréalité, les droits sociaux ne se sont jamais débarrassés de leur visage inégalitaire d’indemnité de sujétionoctroyée aux plus faibles. Pourtant, en dépit de leur nature condescendante, ils ont vite pris le pas sur les droitsprécédents aux yeux de la masse des Européens» (p. 34). Hermet développe providence dans la continuitélogique de sa réflexion une critique de l’État —, dont le blocage est contemporain de la fin du régimedémocratique. Cette coïncidence dans le temps n’est pas du domaine du hasard. L’auteur le souligne parexemple lorsqu’il s’interroge quant au choix que les citoyens feraient, s’ils étaient en situation de choisir entreles droits juridiques et politiques et ceux sociaux et économiques. La probabilité accrue qu’ils optent pour lesderniers indique que pour eux la démocratie doit se légitimer à chaque fois par des promesses dont la spiralene peut plus être entretenue par l’État or, «sur le plan pratique, la démocratie a atteint ses limites. C’est le seulrégime qui est obligé se légitimer à chaque élection. Les promesses constituent son carburant. Au début, on apromis le suffrage universel masculin, puis le vote des femmes, puis encore l’abaissement de l’âge du droit devote — tout cela ne coûtait pas très cher. Ensuite, on a promis la démocratie sociale: l’assurance-maladie, lespensions de retraite, la sécurité sociale en général. Maintenant, la démocratie arrive au fond du réservoir despromesses réalisables. Le déclin de la démocratie — et ce n’est pas une coïncidence — accompagne la fin del’État — providence»2.

Ruxandra Luca

Bart CammaertsInternet-mediated participation beyond the nation state, Manchester and New York, ManchesterUniversity Press, 2008, 266 p.

The volume entitled Internet-mediated participation beyond the nation state brings to the fore a topic ofgreat interest concerning contemporary democracies. Communication and participation are the two facets ofthe same coin and both represent a high stake in promoting substantial democracy. The triggering idea is thatdemocratic decision, may be revitalized now since all stakeholders in society have a voice, that can be heardthanks to the spread of the new media and of the Internet, and thus we encounter a radical power shift worthinvestigating.

The book is structured in two parts: “Theoretical perspectives” and “Empirical Analysis”. Convinced thatit is nothing more practical than a good theory (Kurt Lewin) I shall attempt to underline the first part. Thus,the first section of the book starts from “Theorising multi-stakeholderism”, a chapter analysing the research ofthis concept of multi-stakeholderism in the beginning used in the international politics with reference toincreased participation of non-state actors in policy processes beyond the nation state. Now this concept isapplied to national, regional and even local contexts and the author even talks about a “multi-stakeholderdiscourse” (p. 13) implying several assumptions that show a deficit of theoretical perspective in what the conceptis concerned. These assumptions relate to the tensions between centralized and decentralised democracy, thedifficulties associated with deliberating in the public sphere and consensus, the theoretical perspective on thesignifier participation, the urge to define power both within and outside multi-layered decision processes,along with the issues such as inclusion and exclusion of the citizens, etc. “For multi-stakeholderism to haveany meaning, the nature of its relationship with the still dominant representative, state centred and centralisedlogic at international level must be clear. Furthermore, the consensual focus implied by multi-stakeholderismrequires more precise articulation” (p. 23), in my opinion with the notion of deliberation and with the processesof inclusiveness defining the logic of democratic life. This type of discourse is founded of highly disputableassumptions of rather equal participants to communication processes, the open access to the deliberationprocess centred on the common good of the reasonable, active, interested, and open to new views andknowledgeable citizens for whom the strength of the argument is more important than their agenda, their prideas protagonists of discourse. At this point it becomes highlighted that the type of participation at the core ofmulti-stakeholderism relies, on the one hand, on the possibility of emergence of Habermas’s public sphere and,on the other hand, on a Lockian perspective on the political nature of the human being.

Since the 70s, the very important distinction between access and participation to/in media was introducedin the debates. Decision-making and participation are to be seen in strict relationship (p. 25-30). The achievementof full participation is now assessed as in Carol Pateman’s perspective stated in 1970 as following: “equalpower in determining the outcome”. Since then, notions of “pseudo-participation” (Verba, 1961), “non-

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————————2 Idem.

participation” (Arnstein, 1969) or “manipulative participation” (Strauss, 1998) were overcome. The developmentsin the specialised literature (R. Heeks, 1999) have brought to the fore several types of participation: veneeredparticipation (top-down and rhetorical), inequitable participation (decisions made solely by those in powerand/or able to better articulate themselves publicly), skewed participation (similarly, participation and decisionis biased in the favour of the more powerful and articulated), “non-communicative participation” (due to areticence or inability to communicate given the differences in culture, world views, or language in front ofdelays, misunderstandings and inappropriate design or implementation) and “career-enhancing participation”(the processes of participation reflect as well personal agendas of a few powerful staff rather than the concreteneeds of the organisation).

Thus, power and participation are to be seen in a strict relationship, too. Participation is an ideal motor ofinteraction among actors. Nowadays, the actors are not only considered entitled to be animated by the will toparticipate, but also they ought to. The social and political actors in the contemporary societies have the dutyto attempt to pursue their own agendas acknowledging the necessity to understand both the conflictual modelsand the consensual models of power as in the works of Giddens, 1984 and M. Haugaard, 1997 not to fall underthe restrictive power and not to exclusively embrace the power to resist. This perspective is identified by theFoucaultian remark: “Just as the ability to read and write and freely communicate gives power to citizens thatprotects them from the powers of the state, the ability to surveil, to invade the citizens’ privacy, gives the statethe power to confuse, coerce and control citizens. Uneducated populations cannot rule themselves, but tyranniescan control even educated populations, given sophisticated means of surveillance”. (Foucault, Discipline andPunish, 1979: 290)

From this perspective, the question “Who do you represent?” gains both substance and complexity. Civilsociety could be in this respect a stakeholder as well (in my opinion, including the market in the definition ofcivil society in order to discuss more realistically aspects such as access, participation, agendas, inclusion andexclusion). The multi-stakeholder concept is in this light the concept of an individual that is reasonablyknowledgeable, active, lucid and has a lot at stake in the social and political interaction within a society “ofbirth and/or of residence” and beyond. The concept of multi-stakeholderism highlights the concept of participationonly in relationship with a more (optimistic) complex and general notion of citizenship, inscribed within abroader discussion on constructivism and critical theory. Briefly put, the citizen should be the “rational, self-directing and knowledgeable agent of action” (M. Gergen and K.J. Gergen, 2003), within the paradigm ofproductive power developed by the works of Foucault on discourse, power, resistance and truth, on Giddens’sdialectics of control, and on the less acknowledge perspective on the generic type of liberal-ironist individualproposed by R. Rorty in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 1989 and by the post-structuralism (and) feminism.

Social constructivism indicates toward the importance of identity in the formation of the actors, to theimportance of the speech acts and of the socialisation and learning processes. Thus it offers a better view fora discussion of a multi-centric world and power, a broader theoretical frame to interpret multi-stakeholderismbeyond the nation state, too.

In the second chapter of the first part, “Internet and democracy”, Internet is advocated as a politicalopportunity structure (P. Eisinger, 1973, S. Tarrow, 1994), following a concept of not only productive, butdynamic power as Giddens does. The argument starts from the easier access to policy documents and from theincreased transparency triggered by the use of the Internet. The networking and distribution of the alternative,counter-hegemonic discourses are also favoured. On the other hand, while Internet creates offline citizens,there is as well the argument that dissent might be ever easier ignored by the offline world. Yet, e-campaigningis evermore received as a powerful tool in strategic communication bringing to the fore the concept ofpermanent campaign. E-government and e-voting are still pragmatically captive at the rhetorical level. E-consultation might emerge as a decentralised decision-making process targeted at accommodating the multi-stakeholder citizens in a broad consensus. Finally, e-protest, forums and mailing lists are the promise for anemerging e-civil society. Only the next decade could assess the hope of the Internet as the empoweringinstrument for better access and participation, and for an articulate and influencing “voice”. Time hurries up.

The second part of the book is dedicated to empirical analysis. As concerns the global and European multi-stakeholder processes (Chapter 3) they are investigated in relation to the civil society actors and activities withthe intention to answer three important questions: How are participatory (multi-stakeholder) discourses ofinternational organisations (UN, EU) implemented?; What power mechanisms/resistance strategies enable orrestrict participation?; and What role does the Internet play in this dialectic context? Then, the chapters 4 and5 look at the productive power processes from a generative perspective, against a restrictive one. Chapter 4,“Productive power in the WSIS” related to the productive power process in the case of the WSIS. The WorldSummit on the Information Society (WSIS) consisted of a couple of conferences about information,communication and information society sponsored by the United Nations, that took place in 2003, in Geneva,and in 2005, in Tunis. Briefly, their purpose was to address the imperative need to re-relate the so-called“global digital divide” separating rich countries from poor countries by spreading access to the Internet in thedeveloping world. The author pleads for the importance of a more serious standpoint in these matters, both in

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what concerns the academic scholars and the activists so that WSIS does not remain a vain “war of words”since it was from the very beginning a “war of positions”. There were concrete outcomes of WSIS, consistingof an articulated opposition to the neo-liberal vision of the information society, a proof of the trans-nationalcivil society, and a learning exercise contributing to raising the awareness among the civil society national andtrans-national actors on the importance of media and communication.

Chapter 5, “Productive power in the Convention on the Future Europe” emphasized the role and the impact ofcivil society in the production power process involved by this Convention. Civil society was consulted and listenedto, even if it did not extend to the deliberative and drafting processes, also provided that the diverging agendas withincivil society made passions, anxieties and concerns the enemy of a civil society articulated discourse.

Chapter 6, “Does any of it make a difference?” bridges the former two chapters in an assessment of the multi-stakeholderism in practice. The results of this well-situated, documented and conceived study are structuredaround a critical position regarding the implementation of the participatory discourses (implicitly seen as thepillars of the democratic processes). The emergence of the alternative is a plus, that of timid strategies ofresistance, too. International policy processes show glimpses of slight change. As for conclusion, making adifference, as the accomplishment of the aim of more inclusive and democratically legitimate policy processes,still remains a task, just not one to be addressed radically. A small but relevant difference is a great difference.

Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban

Rodica GrigoreLecturi în labirint, Cluj-Napoca, Casa Cãrþii de ªtiinþã Publishing House, 2007, 256 p.

If the venerable Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges imposed in the field of literature the image withinfinite meanings of a library seen as a perfect paradise, here we have a young literary critic, coming fromSibiu, Rodica Grigore, who finds herself as a reader a similar space: the infinite act of reading. This is a culturalspace as specialized as it is equally privileged, for the author’s own work contributes in its turn to the actionof making the above mentioned library more and more complete. We are talking especially of her latest book,Readings in the Labyrinth [Lecturi în labirint], Cluj-Napoca, Casa Cãrþii de ªtiinþã Publishing House, 2007,256 pages.

Taking into consideration Sibiu as a cultural city, we have to mention first and foremost that RodicaGrigore is one of the most distinguished members of her literary generation: she already published her doctoralthesis, The Rhetoric of Masks in Romanian Modern Fiction. Mateiu I. Caragiale, Urmuz, Max Blecher, GeorgeMihail Zamfirescu, G. Cãlinescu (in 2005), as well as another book of literary criticism, Of Books and OtherDemons [Despre cãrþi ºi alþi demoni, 2002] and she is teaching Comparative Literature at “Lucian Blaga”University of Sibiu. Besides, Rodica Grigore has authored several translations (from the work of Octavio Paz,Manuel Cortés Castañeda and Andrei Codrescu), her Romanian version of Codrescu’s volume of novellas andshort stories, A Bar in Brooklyn having been awarded the special prize for translation of the Writers’ Union in2006. And if we also think that in 2005 and 2006 Mexico and Spain have warmly welcomed her as an exquisitetranslator of Romanian poetry, prestigious literary magazines from these two countries having publishedanthologies of Romanian verse she has realized, we clearly see and easily understand that Rodica Grigore alsohas the gift of using Cervantes’s language and placing Romanian poems in its specific rhythm, thus fulfillinga very well defined literary destiny within the field of contemporary culture.

We should warmly welcome — and I certainly do it — Rodica Grigore’s book, a diary of her readings, asthe most recent accomplishment within a series tending to reshape, in its own rights, in contemporaryRomanian culture, some kind of democracy of authentic values, inscribing itself in a long and well-knowntradition of living together, perfectly identifiable within our Transylvanian world. It is, for sure, a clear sign ofa thorough and elegant cordiality, of course, sometimes full of antinomies, but never of antagonisms, anattitude that characterized the young intellectuals known as Criterion Association during the years 20s and 30sof the last century. Therefore, the young author practices a friendly criticism, somehow following the directionimposed by Eugen Lovinescu. She has nothing of the pernicious mentality based upon the old saying “I maydestroy you whenever I want!” that characterized entire generations of literary critics until our times and evennowadays. After all, Rodica Grigore expresses, by her writing, a new way of thinking as well: it is a wonderfulmoment, so long desired and expected in our literature that could be placed under the following statement: “Ideconstruct you (your work) just in order to be able to reconstruct you afterwards and do structure you evenbetter; and therefore to be able to reconstruct myself for our common reader.” This kind of critical discourse,be it somehow “impressionistic” needs to be cultivated more and more in our cultural space, be it EastEuropean or post communist as well.

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Besides, the author’s “politic” attitude is more than honoring in the general confusion of values that surroundsus and that sometimes also surrounds the process of critical evaluation by using some reductive patterns, a newkind of censorship… Rodica Grigore analyses the work of many writers who were awarded the Nobel Prize orsome others prestigious literary distinctions. But this is not the author’s specific criteria of appreciation,because what brings together all the subjects of her book Readings in the Labyrinth proves to be the obsessionof writing that fully characterizes the entire activity of those authors Rodica Grigore chooses to write about.Some of the authors who express themselves this obsession are Manuel Cortés Castañeda, Eliseo Diego or GaoXingjian and their confessions are deeply analyzed in Rodica Grigore’s book. In other words, the authorschosen by Rodica Grigore are the creators of that kind of true and great literature understood as a completedestiny, or as a “continuous spiritual searching”, to repeat Gao Xingjian’s words.

In a word, we could say that Rodica Grigore is, herself, “an artist of the word”, even an artisan of the word,maybe because her subtle lecture notes — notes that do not simply represent several pages dedicated to worldliterature, but a true handbook of necessary readings, namely a very well structured critical system — apartfrom proving her perfect and extensive knowing as far as world literature is concerned, especially Latin-American literature, apart from her style, lacking any inadequacy of tone or expression but always offering areal joy to the reader, fight in their own way to surpass (or trespass) any politic border or boundary that mightstop the free circulation of any authentic cultural values, the poetic ones in particular. It is the courage of anauthentic intellectual, a courage come from a profound understanding of the realities of the world we live in,that makes Rodica Grigore express always decently, but always explicitly, all the shortcomings that ruin ourlife, especially those shortcomings affecting our mentality. We could find many examples in the pages of herbook, but let us just quote one: “The reasons why this remarkable poetry [the Cuban poetry] has usually beenignored are many and various, but one of the most common is a regrettable and often confusion between thepolitics and the poetics of this country and also the so called border of critical spirit, in reality a border or aboundary that may be found only within the narrow minds of those who learnt to read using only the patternsimposed by one or another of the cannons of our Occidental culture.” (p. 10)

Last but not least, Rodica Grigore knows perfectly how to reintegrate Andrei Codrescu (born, in fact, inthe same city, Sibiu) in the field of Romanian literature: she is the one who, apart from her translations of hisessays and short stories, also wrote several excellent pages about the Romanian born American author, withoutbeing intimidated by his fame or his reputation gained in the United States, a reputation somehow comparableto that of another native of Sibiu, Emil Cioran, who gained his celebrity in France and then in the entire world.Therefore, Andrei Codrescu himself, deciding to write the preface of this young critic’s latest book, calls her“Rodica, the guide” and compares Readings in the Labyrinth to a “Babylonian city inhabited by people fascinatedby books”. Moreover, he is proud to say the following: “This is where I came across myself more than onceand when I tried to find another way, I encountered other writers: José Saramago, Gao Xingjian, AlejoCarpentier, Bei Dao or Samuel Beckett. For in this particular city that the young critic knows perfectly how tomap, live only people preoccupied by books and mirrors, thus the reader having to face the illusion of ametropolis with a population exclusively dedicated to this unusual fortress. And those specific mirrors we, thewriters, are carrying, reflect everything but do not prevent us from greeting our fellow writers and even,sometimes, to enthusiastically change among ourselves books or some other writings.”

This is an understanding of literature that could be called, without any hesitation, truly European. Andalso, if we take into account the young critic’s high specialization in the filed of Romance and Anglo-Saxonlanguages, an impressive international one. All these make the reader of Rodica Grigore’s book think of a well-known poem by Fernando Pessoa: “A flor que és, não a que dás, eu quero./ Porque me negas o que te não peço./Tempo há para negares/ Depois de teres dado./ Flor, sê-me flor! Se te colher avaro/ Amão da infausta esfinge,tu perene/ Sombra errarás absurda,/ Buscando o que não deste.”

Mihai Posada

Lúdmila Malìková and Martin SirákRegional and Urban Regeneration in European Peripheries: What Role for Culture?, SlovakCommission of UNESCO, National Committee of MOST, Institute of Public Policy, Bratislava,2008, 98 p.

The increased attention paid to culture as a public policy tool is organized as a possible response to theapparent new questions: Does it really matter who wins and who loses in this culture-led development game?What makes a city, a region, a country culturally unique? Is it possible to measure the benefits and specificimpacts of cultural investment and culture-led development projects? Why do some Slovaks think that the

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country’s “centre of culture” lays anywhere but in the City of Martin and why do some people complain thatBratislava is not a well-known brand across the world?

The study focused upon Regional and Urban Regeneration in European Peripheries: What Role forCulture? tries to approximate an answer to a single question with its normative version: What is the role ofculture in the processes of renewal and development of cities and regions?/ What should be the role of culture,so that it can contribute to successful local and regional development?

The contemporary process of restructuring the post-communist societies as European can be approximatein terms of dissolution of the communist past and of its strong cultural impregnation.

Slovak history shows that changing cultures takes a long time, and social change requires stamina fromcivic leaders and belief and involvement on the part of citizens in general. Regional and Urban Regenerationin European Peripheries: What Role for Culture?,will help increase the interest of Slovak academics and expertsin this relativity new research agenda, contributing to the preparation of the Kosice ECOC 2013. The ECOCevent, introduced to the European cultural policy agenda in 1985, has provided the key for selecting andorganizing this study in order to present the experiences of the peripheral areas of European cities which haveexperimented with cultural as a new strategic development asset.

The study Regional and Urban Regeneration in European Peripheries: What Role for Culture? is organizedin three parts, including analyses developed by young academics coming from “Classical Europe” (as Italy andGreece), or qualitative accounts of how ECOC impacts on local populations and cultures (North West-Liverpool; North East of England-Newcastle and Stavanger-Norway).

The urban-cultural organizational metropolises of the Western settle political and social contradictionsthrough consumption and leisure organization, principle that is also applicable in the metropolises of SouthEastern Europe. In an attempt to imitate the lifestyle of the West, the East fails because of lack of purchasingpower for a wide blanket of the population. Europe is not an invention quota, but a state of aggregate. Europecreates free democracy and culture. The way that Eastern Europe and West grow together produces atransitional space — an ideal field of activity for culture. Culture transcends borders and is a producer of newpolicies and discursive image, which help to overcome the old way of thinking.

Closed cultures get local under the assault of globalization and generalized communication, forced tobecome able to “introduce” themselves to the others, to create an interface, to become a brand. Regional andUrban Regeneration in European Peripheries: What Role for Culture? aims at restoration of the old euro-cultural ties, placing the multicultural management in the context of European community consensus. Startingfrom the belief that introducing the local culture, Lúdmila Malìková and Martin Sirák consider that theEuropean sensitivity can be resumed to its bivalent tension, putting together the centered-local-culture and thedecentered, multicultural and global one. A new cultural geography in which we are determined to live together!

Viorella Manolache

Brian J. Brown, Sally BakerPhilosophies of Research into Higher Education, Continuum International Publishing Group, London,2007, 192 p.

Well accustomed with relevant and well chosen literature, well argued and structured, this volume is veryconvincing that, as Kurt Lewin said, nothing is so practical as a good theory.

The book proposes a journey into the realm of research in education, and especially higher education, withthe starting point in investigating the philosophical and epistemological basis of the theories underliningmethodology, in order to allow for more useful, more innovative and better designed projects of research.

Addressed to a wide range of students, scholars and researchers the volume represents an interestingdialogue between philosophy in everyday life and philosophy at work in higher education. The study insistson the history and philosophy of knowledge, describing critically the different investigative traditions(positivism, hypothesis testing, realism, “interpretativism” and postmodernism) at the same time empoweringthe readers in what concerns interpreting research, designing and attempting one of their own.

The book provides a clear account of what is the modern and postmodern horizon for reading theeducational aspects and, namely, knowledge. From this relevant outline I have selected the greatest moments.Talcott Parsons (1937, 1951)1 was among the first to analyze the function of educational institutions in modernsociety. He discussed the anthropological idea that the patterns of social interaction have consequences in themore or less adequate functioning of society. For the educational institutions the most important fact is that theshared values and norms and the means to attain the ends dictate the operation of society as a system.Gadamer2 placed the accent not on the functioning of the system, but on the interaction between people, and

8 BOOK REVIEWS 171

————————1 Apud, Brian J. Brown, Sally Baker, Philosophies of Research into Higher Education, Continuum

International Publishing Group, London, 2007, passim.2 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward, 1979.

therefore, on conversation. In his perspective, conversion makes people understand each other and open toeach other. The very knowledge is conceptualized within a horizon of understanding. Knowledge has to passthrough pre-judgment, involvement and understanding. As Bernstein notices (1991) the play of the dialogueand not the mere agreement turns ideas intelligible, but without having necessarily to agree with the other(Gadamer, 1979). In this perspective the horizons fusion and the new and the old “continually grow togetherto make something of living value, without either being explicitly distinguished from the other.”3 (Gadamer,1979) A more dystopian vision is brought to the fore by Jean-Francois Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition:A report on knowledge, 1984. Lyotard shows that in postmodernism knowledge is a product manufactured tobe sold, consumed and/or valorized in a new production and not at all an end in itself.4 At the same time this“product” becomes the major stake in the competition for power. From this perspective, the distinctionbetween knowledge and ignorance, but between “payment knowledge” (exchanged in a “daily maintenanceframework”) and “investment knowledge” (“dedicated to optimizing the project”).

The volume is relevant for the social sciences as well. They notice that, at present, within the developedknowledge societies, research has become a “key building block in its approach to policy. The use of researchevidence in the formulation and evaluation of policy has become widespread across the range of publicservices.”5 Even more, the argumentation of the authors is convincing that both evidence-based and evidence-informed practices are politically also a fashion. Arguing that, we have to understand that at the core of all thepolitical activities stays the interest for legitimacy, and in this case we are talking about legitimacy by prestige.Social science attempts in this respect to take its well-deserved place at the heart of policy-making. Again,more so in the developed knowledge and learning societies Governments tend to understand, or at least beginto understand the imperative of revolutionizing their relations with the social research community.

Yet policy-making is rarely a rational process. Having said that the authors of the volume emphasize thoughthe instances in which the policy makers might undertake research evidence. First, the knowledge-driven modelderived from the natural sciences shows that discoveries exercise a pressure for even more development and useof knowledge. Second, the problem-solving model refers to the application of results to imminent decisions.Third, the interactive model limits the consequence of research in the sense that researchers are just a part of thecomplex process inter-relating experience, political insights, political pressures, social technologies and(educated?) guesswork. Fourth, the political model sees research as political ammunition in supporting a specificstandpoint. Fifth, the tactical model, involves research in avoiding the responsibilities in front of unpopularpolicies. Sixth, the enlightenment model underlines the indirect but powerfully influences and impact of research.

The authors capture the interesting idea that one cannot answer the question of what education is without talkingabout what knowledge is and in which relationship it stays with the human beings and their lives. These last twoaspects previously stated could be related to answering the question of what is the purpose of a university. Thus, theauthors valorize the work of Delanty6, and Blackmore7, to identify the main directions for the future of theuniversity. The entrenched liberal thesis presents university as a place of cultural reproduction to be secured frompolitical life and from the superficiality attacking the “canon”: “great” literature or “significant” science. Then, thepostmodern thesis announce the “end” of the university provided the “death” of the author, the loss of theemancipator role of the university along with the fragmentation of knowledge and the separation of research fromteaching. These dystopian views undertaken from Lyotard8 go unchallenged and nuanced. The reflexivity thesisplaces the accent on the reflexive relationship between the users and producers of knowledge as in the perspectiveof Barnett9. Finally, the globalization thesis underlines the instrumentalization of the university run bymarket valuesand informational technologies, where the universities become major players in the global information market10.

The volume has the strong point of emphasizing the complexity of research nowadays, while it states itsrelevance and utility, especially by this postmodern awareness that research might prove to be sometimes justanother inconvenient for a “canon”, administration, ideology, business, market, etc. The valuable lesson here isthat, when this is the case, they should be seen somehow heroically useful and emancipator, hence empowering.


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————————3 Ibidem, p. 273.4 J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge, Manchester, Manchester University

Press, 1984, p. 4-5.5 Brian J. Brown, Sally Baker, Philosophies of Research into Higher Education, Continuum International

Publishing Group, London, 2007, p. 19.6 G. Delanty, “The University in the knowledge society”, Organisation, 8 (2), 2001, pp. 149-54.7 J. Blackmore, ‘Is it only ”What works” that “counts” in the new knowledge economies? Evidence-based

practice, educational research and teacher education in Australia’, Social Policy and Society, 1(3), p. 257-66.8 J.-F. Lyotard, op.cit.9 R. Barnett, Higher Education: A critical business, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1997.10 The authors quote G. Rhoades and S. Slaughter, ‘Academic capitalism, managed professionals and

supply-side higher education’ in M. Randy (ed.) Chalklines: The politics of work in the managed university,Durham and London, Duke University Press, 1998.

Doina FloreaRepertoriul cãrþii germane, italiene ºi româneºti din Biblioteca Muzeului Brukenthal (secoleleXVII-XVIII), Editura TechnoMedia, Sibiu, 2008, 260 p.

In der Arbeit mit dem Titel Das Patrimoniumbuch-kulturelles Vektor (Verlag der “Lucian Blaga” —Universität in Sibiu/Hermannstadt, 2007), setzt sich Doina Florea für die Kaste der Bibliophile ein. DieVerfasserin bietet uns im Jahre 2008 eine zweite Überraschung an: Das Sammelwerk der deutschen,italienischen und rumänischen Bücher aus der Bibliothek des Brukenthal Museums (XVII-tes-XVIII-tesJahrhundert), durch die Nachforschung eines umfangreichen kulturell-historischen Raumes.

Die alten und seltenen Bänder, aufgeschichtet in dem Gebäude des prunkvollen Palastes des Barons inHermannstadt, sind nicht nur vomGesetz des Kulturerbes geschützt, sondern auch vom Eifer der Forscher. Stapelnvon ausländischen (deutsche, italienische) und rumänischen Büchern- aus demXVII-ten und XVII-ten Jahrhundert—, beherbergt in der Bibliothek des Brukenthal Museums, wurden aus der “Entschlafung” geweckt, danachwurden sie geordnet und in einem Inventar gelegt, aus welchem dieses wichtige Sammelwerk entstanden ist.

Sachlich gesehen, kann jedes Sammelwerk- sei es auch ein Sammelwerk der Patrimoniumbücher- eineinfaches “aide mémoire” zu sein scheinen. Der ausforschende Geist der Verfasserin hat für die Leser des III-ten Jahrtausends wertvolle Einzelheiten, scheinbar vergessen, die der Aufklärung angehören, ins Gedächtniszurückgerufen.

Was hebt das den Verfassern und Büchern aus den erwähnten Jahrhunderten: XVII-XVIII gewidmetenStudium hervor? Eine flüchtige Statistik bringt wesentliche “Zeichen” der bildungssprachlichen Lebenskraftans Licht: die Sprache in der sie geschrieben oder übersetzt wurden; der Ort (die Stadt/ das Land) wo dasDrucken stattgefunden hat; Namen/ Familien von berühmten Herausgeber, Buchdrucker, Buchhändler;Bibliophilieelemente (Buchbinderei-und Ornamentikeinzelheiten); Audienzgrad; der Umlauf der Bücher in derEpoche; Lieblingslektürthemen und ihre Häufigkeit: Architektur, Astronomie, Biologie, Chemie, Philosophie,Geographie, Geometrie, Geschichte, Wappenkunde, Linguistik, Medizin, Politik, Religion u.a.

Aus den über 1000 ausgewählte Titel im Sammelwerk, treten aus der germanischen Schriftwelt hervor: F.Balduinus, Questiones illustres ex divinis…(Wittenberg, 1671), Aegidius Hunnius, Operum latinorum…(Frankfurt, 1606), H. Drexelius, Trismegistus christianus (Monachia, 1618), Erasmus, Colloquia (Leipzig,1684), J.Försterus, Luterische Catechismus (Wittenberg, 1609), I. Lipsius, Politicarum libri (Frankfurt, 1674),Martin Luther, Biblia-das ist die gantze heilige Schrift (Wittenberg, 1613), A. Manutius, Thesauruselegantiarum (Köln, 1646), A. Osiander, Biblia sacra (Frankfurt, 1611), Ovidius,Metamorphosus… (Nürnberg,1679), M. Wenderlerus, Practicae philosophiae (Wittenberg, 1655); aus dem italienischen und italienisiertemRaum: Alphonso Ciacconius, Historia utriusque belli dacici (Roma, 1616), Athanasius Kircher, Musurgiauniversalis seu ars magna (Roma, 1650), Fortunius Licetus, Hieroglyphia sive antique schemata (Patavia,1653), Sforza Pallavicino, Istoria del Concilio di Trento (Roma, 1656), Petrarca, Di nuova Ristampata(Venedig, 1609), C. Tacitus, Vita, honores et scripta (Venedig, 1645); schließlich, aus dem rumänischen Raum:Biblia/ Die Bibel (Bukarest, 1688), Dimitrie Cantemir, Descrierea Moldovei/Die Beschreibung der Moldau(Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1771), Clain – ªincai, Elementa linguae daco-romnae sive valachicae (Wien, 1780),Dosoftei, Psaltirea în versuri/Das Psalmenbuch in Versen (Uniev, 1673), Noul Testament/Das Neue Testament(Belgrad, 1648), Psaltirea/Das Psalmenbuch (Alba Iulia, 1651), Viaþa ºi pildele lui Esop/Das Leben undSprüche von Äsop (Sibiu, 1795).

Dieser echte “buchmäßige Schmaus” — versichert uns die Verfasserin —, veranlasst von seltenen undwertvollen Arbeiten, bringt attraktive Studiumelemente vor, imstande nicht nur die Aufmerksamkeit derFachforscher, der Bibliophile, sondern auch die der begeisterten Buchprofessionisten zu fesseln.

Warum deutsche, italienische und rumänische Bücher? Die Verfasserin der Arbeit fasst durchgreifend dieGründe kurz zusammen. Es ist bekannt, dass die Buchdruckerkunst in Deutschland entstanden ist, aber sichgleich danach in Italien verbreitet hat. Und warum rumänische Bücher? Weil die Rumänischen Länder imMittelalter die Brücke dargestellt haben, die das uralte, kaiserliche bysantinische Reich mit dem Europa desToma d’Aquino, des Nicolaus Cusanus und später der Aufklärung, verbunden hat.

Warum die Jahrhunderte XVII-XVIII? Die Argumente die Doina Florea vorbringt sind schwerwiegend:diese umfassen die europäische Geschichte, die Geschichte der europäischen Kultur, in einem chronologischenBogen, der mit dem ersten Jahrhundert nach der Reform und Gegenreform beginnt-der arhitektonischeAusdruck der letzteren: der Barockstil-und dieAufklärung des Jahrhunderts in welchem der Baron Samuel vonBrukenthal gelebt hat.

“Gelehrt in berühmte Universitäten, in Jena und Halle, im hohen Geiste, der im Jahrhundert von Kant undVoltaire vorherrschte, wird sich Samuel von Brukenthal in einem beeindruckenden Profil abzeichnen, typischder großangelegten europäischen Elite” — verzeichnet die Verfasserin.

Die aufmerksame Lektüre Des Sammelwerks der deutschen, italienischen und rumänischen Bücher ausder Bibliothek des Brukenthal Museums (XVII-tes–XVIII-tes Jahrhundert), das Doina Florea zu verdanken ist,

10 BOOK REVIEWS 173

beweist einwandfrei dass, das wissenschaftliche Vorgehen sich vorgenommen hat, nicht nur zu belehren,sondern zu gleicher Zeit, auch ein Forschungsmodell anzubieten. Die Verfasserin der neulichen, von TechnoMedia-Sibiu sorgfältig herausgegebenen Arbeit, hat als nützlich betrachtet dem Sammelwerk sowohl einbuntes einleitendes Essay, ein Nachwort (Verfasser: Constantin Ittu), als auch die notwendigen Register(Verfasserregister; Titel; Herausgeber und Drucker; Ortschaften und Buchdruckzentren) hinzuzufügen.

Diejenigen die die Patrimoniumbücher-die kultureller Nationalschatz geworden sind-liebhaben, werdendaher Zugang zu einer weniger bekannten “Welt” der Bücher, beherbergt von der Bibliothek des BrukenthalMuseums, haben. “Die zeitgenössischen Leser werden — jeder für sich selber-ein feinabgestuftes,unbeschattetes Bild desjenigen Mecena von Hermannstadt, der für die rumänische Kultur ein echtesmonumentum aere perennius errichtet hat, zusammenstellen — betont überzeugend Doina Florea. Der zuermüdete Leser des XXI-ten Jahrhunderts wird-dank der Verfasserin-Stunden der Muße und Freude erleben,in der Nähe der Hermannstädter Archiven, mit musealem Brukenthalduft, die seltene Bücher und derenGeheimleben bewahren.

Alexandra-Catrina Ciornei

Dominic HydeVagueness, Logic and Ontology, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2008, 226 p.

The topic of vagueness seems to be a contemporary heritor of philosophical topics of indeterminancy, ofthe paradoxes of logic and of the theories of the semantic and logic of natural language. The volume investigatesthe matters related to vagueness and the paradox of vagueness (the sorites paradox), proposing avenues forfuture revisions in semantics, metaphysics and logic an opening perpectives in related fields of philosophy,linguistics, cognitive science and geographic information systems.

The book is structured in 7 chapters: Vaguess, Russell’s Representational Theory, DescriptiveRepresentationalism, Going Non-classical: Gaps and Gluts, Ontological Vagueness, Vague Individuation andCounting, and The Logic of Vagueness.

This analysis is based on a series of differentiations and nuanced arguments conerning the perspectives oflogic, semantics and ontology. Vagueness is introduced as an ambiguous term. Nevertheless, there is a moreclearer sense of vagueness when we differentiate the notion from the lack of specificity, exactitude andprecision. The specificity of vagueness, in this sense, is construed starting from a description of the borderlineor penumbral cases. The author is concerned with the vagueness of predicates. He underlines that thecharacterisation of borderline chases is construed in terms of “an agent’s inability to apply predicates, ratherthan in terms of the semantic properties of the predicate”. (p. 3)As a consequence the book unfolds a paradigmaticconcept of vagueness, applied to predicates and characterised by the presence of borderline cases. It is a conceptpresent in many of the works of many of greatest philosophers of communication seen from the perspective oflogic: Peirce (1902), Russell (1923), Black (1960), Church (1960), Quine (1960), and Alston (1964).

The author agrees with Menges and Skala (1974) that social sciences concepts tend to be more vague thannatural sciences concepts, but insists that their point is more related to the different nature of disciplines, to thegreater importance of interpretation and sometimes of ethics at the core of social sciences disciplines. Yet, hisinterest focuses on the sorites paradox as a symbol for all borderline cases. This paradox is actually thedevelopment of a puzzle, the sorites puzzle developed as a series of questions about the predicate “heap”. Itsvery name comes from the Greek word for “heap”, “soros”. The puzzle goes as following: Would you describethe presence of one grain a heap? No. What about two grains together? No. What about three grains together?No. What about... What about ten grains? Maybe, a very small one. Where do we draw the line? The relatedfalakros puzzle is similar, addressing baldness.

The argument continues by explaining the road from puzzle to paradox and then to classical soritical cases,to arrive at a very interesting discussion of the relationship between soriticallity and vagueness. Hyde leavesopen the question that all vagues predicates are “typically” soritical. (p. 15) This space for comments raises theinterpretation of the distinction between what Alston (1967) calls “degree-vagueness” and “combinatoryvagueness”. The first type refers to the cases where vagueness is caused by the lack of precision in whatconcerns the boundaries between the application and the non-application of the case along a dimension. Forexample, “bald” does not draw a sharp boundary along the dimension represented by “hair quantity”. Combinatoryvagueness is explained starting from the word “religion”. One need to list the clear cases considered religions,the rituals, the sacred objects, the differences among them, the moral code sanctioned by Gods, the feeling ofawe and the sense of mystery, the prayers, the specific worldview, the more or less thorough organization ofindividual and social life on the basis of all the above mentioned elements. Each of these conditions is

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necessary but not sufficient, and only the combination of elements becomes sufficient to define “religion”.Even when some elements are missing a subset might be sufficient. The vagueness arises from the lack ofprecision as to what characteristic, or combination of, is necessary.

Another distinction is between linear and multi-dimensional vagueness. Linear vagueness is illustrated bymeans of qualities which form a continuum: defining blue does not clarify situations such as the presence of ablue-green. (Burke, 1946) Multi-dimensional vagueness is defined with the example of chair: how much backa chair needs to be a chair and not a stool?

He also distinguishes between vagueness of application (for instance, “mountain(s)” as topography) andvagueness of individuation (for example, “mountain” as one, two, or many more mountains).

There are many more logical questions to be raised. Thus, one may wonder about the logical connections,could these be vague? Is the vagueness of a singular term sufficient to determine the vagueness of any sentencein which it figures? (p. 19)

The extension of the concept of vagueness leads to a general principle stating that precision is inherited.“If all but one of the constituent sub-phrases of a complex phrase are precise, then if the complex phrase isvague so is that one remaining constituent sub-phrase”. (p. 23-4) To give a more accurate impression of thecomplexity of the debates on the subject, on the one hand, given a vague sentence, if the predicate is precise,then the name is vague and if the name is precise then the predicate must be vague. On the other hand, whenthe predicate is vague the name might be just passive, not necessarily precise.

Dominic Hyde identifies three directions for his analysis. The first is an epistemic perspective onvagueness. Williamson (1994) and Sorensen (1988, 2001) sustain that the lack of clarity concerning theboundaries of the predicates is a manifestation of human resilient ignorance. From this perspective, “the soritesis valid but unsound”. (p. 31) The second one perceives vagueness as a semantic matter. The third deals withthe ontological perspective on the subject.

Russell is an exponent of the semantic perspective, mainly given his 1923 paper “Vagueness”. He placesthe source of vagueness in the representational nature in language and, for this reason, in representations, butnot in what is represented. Russell defines a representation vague when the relation of the representing systemto the represented system is not one-one, but one-many. Hyde notices that the representational nature ofvagueness is related at Russell to a celestial nature of logic. This semantic perspective does not urge a revisionof the classical metaphysical view that the world is not vague, nor of classical logic or semantic. The criticismbrought to this position is given by confusion between connotation, the application of a term and denotationthe clear significance of the term. Another criticism states the lack of reference to borderline cases. These andmany other instances of criticism led to descriptive representationalism, which shows that vague descriptionsshadow the precise ones. The ideal language to clear vague terms and descriptions does not exist, but withinthe celestial logic of Russell’s.

Then, Hyde investigates the answers given to the matter of vagueness by super-and subvaluationism,considering them inadequate. He suggests that non/classical semantics and an associated logic should deal withthe phenomenon, but should look to “strongly paracomplete and strongly paraconsistent systems for a moreacceptable logic of vagueness”. (p. 103) The insight is in my view strongly related with the idea that thevagueness of language and the vagueness of representations are possible to be sourced in what is represented.Hyde argues that objects, properties and relations could be vague even if not all of them at all times. There isan ontological basis of vagueness! His position relies on the explanations of Burks (1946), Rolf (1980),Burgess (1990), Tye (1990, 2000), van Inwagen (1988, 1990), Zemach (1991), Akiba (2000, 2004), Dummett(2000), Parsons (2000), Moreau (2002), and Rosen and Smith (2004). First he addresses vague identity startingwith split indeterminate identity the Evans criticism for the vagueness of objects, the characterization of vagueobjects, the relation between vague composition and vague existence, the vague identity thesis, vagueproperties. All these analyses lead to the interesting dilemma: vagueness “in the world” or “of the world”?Hyde supports Sainsbury’s stand that there is no intelligible notion of the world independently of our concepts.This is the reason why the dilemma is solved. The two apparently irreducible aspects overlap. At the sametime, this is a damaging conclusion to the traditional metaphysics. Vagueness is a semantic phenomenon ofontological import. (p. 209)

Then, observing that the ontological source of vagueness does not quite answer the Russell’s problem ofdenotation, the investigation relating vagueness, logic and ontology leads to a perspective where vaguepredicates could designate with precision vague properties, and vague terms vague objects. In turn theobservation underlines the importance of the paracomplete approach in modeling vagueness: the truth-value-gap approach to vagueness.

Hyde’s compelling, well documented and argumented book is a definite gain in making “the streets ofspeculation just a little bit safer for the philosophers of tomorrow” (Sorensen, 1989) even though he does that notby bannishing it, but by placing speculation into quite a different and complementing logical-ontological limelights.


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Jeanette Bougrab, Les discriminations positives, Dalloz, 2007, 179 p.

En 2007 les Editions Dalloz nous proposent, dans la collection À savoir, sous la direction d’Evélyne Pisieret Olivier Duhamel, le livre Les discriminations positives, de Jeanette Bougrab. Il s’agit d’une sélection detextes de loi — américains, français, indiens, européens, de l’Afrique du Sud — mettant en lumière lapréoccupation du politique de lutte contre les discriminations à n’importe quelle raison: religie, ethnie, sex,handicap etc.

Dans étude qui ouvre le livre et qui argumente la justesse de l’intérêt prêté aux textes qui font l’objet dela sélection, l’auteur nous propose un débat autour d’un thème représentant un axe primordial de la penséephilosophique et politique: la question de l’égalité. À partir de la réalité de deux société modernes —américaine et française — dans lesquelles les inégalités persistent, et sont reconnues et assumées, l’auteur sedemande comment pourrait-on résoudre de telles inégalités, comment l’outil qu’est la loi agit pour les corriger,quelle est la philosophie et la volonté politique qui se trouvent derrière ces lois et, finalement, quelles sont leslimites et les effets pervers de cette action. Les discriminations positives ne sont que le maillon qui ferme lecircuit qui débute par la problématique de l’égalité, passe par le constat des inégalités et des discriminationsde fait et ensuite par les mesures vouées à les corriger, mais au bout de cette boucle on arrive à: «Instaurer desinégalités pour restaurer l’égalité, telle pourrait être la formule résumant la philosophie des discriminationspositives» (p. 1). Et au delà d’une position pro ou contre les discriminations positives, notre attention doit sepencher vers tous les acteurs qui y sont entraînés: les individus destinataires des traitements préférentiels; lesindividus qui ne sont ni visés, ni directement préjudiciés par les dits traitements; les individus à chargedesquels ces traitements sont appliqués et qui s’en sortent directement préjudiciés1.

Le parallèle entre les deux sociétés a comme point de départ le récent intérêt que la société françaisemanifeste pour le modèle américain de politique sociale anti-discrimination, et l’auteur s’interroge quant à laviabilité du transfert du modèle américain — avec les adaptations nécessaires — en France, dans un momentoù le modèle français semble avoir atteint ses limites — la panne de l’ascenseur social.

L’usure du modèle français est-elle tout simplement suffisante pour justifier la mise en place d’un modèleexterne? La réponse à cette question est négative, mais avant d’exprimer son point de vue l’auteur analyse lapolitique d’affirmative action aux États Unis, politique dont l’origine et le fondement seront un argument fortpour sa conclusion.

Aux États Unis donc, avec l’abolition de l’esclavage et le principe de protection égale assurée par la loi,s’instaure à partir de 1880 un système de ségrégation raciale accueilli par la Cour Suprême Américaine et quise repose sur le fait que la nation était conçue en tant que somme de groupes sociaux, entre lesquels il fallaitinstaurer un équilibre social: le droit américain voit “le principe de l’égalité... en termes de parité statistiqueentre les groupes et non entre les individus” (p. 7). L’auteur prend des exemples portant surl’institutionnalisation de la ségrégation raciale dans les écoles, sur le marché des emplois, dans la vie couranteavec l’interdiction des relations sexuelles ou des mariages mixtes. Le tournant des années 50’, lorsquel’affirmative action — qui marque le glissement de la discrimination à la non discrimination active — débuteavec sa première phase, celle de “système classique de lutte contre les discriminations” (p. 6). Avec l’ampleurgrandissante que prend la question des discriminations à l’époque, avec les décisions des juges et les activitésde toutes sortes de commissions spécifiques traitant de manière segmentaire la problématique desdiscriminations — par exemple Equal Employment Opportunity Commission — on assiste, au milieu de ladécennie 60’, à la transition progressive vers la seconde phase, celle des traitements préférentiels. Ceux-cireprésentent la réponse au fait que la “mobilité sociale ne suppose pas simplement l’élimination des barrièresdressées par les préjugés racistes ou sexistes”, situation qui a déterminé le pouvoir politique d’admettre que“l’égalité ne peut être obtenue par le seul fonctionnement méritocratique et transparent du marché” (p. 12).

Depuis 1965 on peut parler de cette deuxième phase d’affirmative action, qui met de plus en évidence quela discrimination n’est pas abordée, aux États Unis, au regard du comportement individuel, mais en tant quephénomène structurel de la société américaine. Les divers instruments légaux instituant l’obligation pour lesentreprises d’embaucher des Noirs, condition pour pouvoir passer des contrats publics fédéraux en constituentun exemple. La troisième phase de l’affirmative action, qui met en cause cette politique sociale, débute en 1995et la contestation du modèle vient tant de la Cour Suprême Américaine que du peuple américain2.

L’auteur cite des exemples relevant les effets non désirés de ce mécanisme. L’affirmative action afinalement bénéficié plutôt aux Noirs appartenant aux couches sociales dynamiques et éduquées, qui pouvaientdéjà prétendre à la reconnaissance par leurs équivalents blancs d’un traitement égal. En conséquence, un critèreneutre, économique et social, affranchi du facteur racial et ethnique, serait plus adapté pour que les mesuressociales atteignent précisément le segment touché par l’exclusion sociale.

176 BOOK REVIEWS 13

————————1 P. 182 P. 12-13.

Ensuite, les quotas de représentation des Noirs imposées par lois aux divers secteurs — enseignement oumarché des emplois — ont conduit à ce que un citoyen noir qui obtient un emploi dans les conditions prévuespar une telle loi soit victime des doutes quant à ses vraies compétences professionnelles le recommandant pourle poste respectif3.

En France, l’intérêt pour l’affirmative action se manifeste exactement dans cette période d’interrogationset de mise en cause du modèle aux États Unis. Même si la pérennisation des inégalités à raison ethnique etraciale et le blocage de la redistribution de la richesse légitiment en France la quête d’un nouveau modèle,l’auteur construit son argument défavorable au transfert du modèle américain sur la différence essentielle entrela nation américaine conçue en tant que somme de groupes sociaux et la nation française, avec la proclamationde l’unité et de l’indivisibilité du peuple français4, et avec l’égalité entre individus et non pas entre groupessociaux, quel que soit leur critère d’organisation. De cette différence découlent d’autres arguments: le faitqu’en France les citoyens ne doivent pas déclarer, lors des recensement, leur appartenance à un groupe; le faitqu’il n’y a pas eu en France métropolitaine une vraie politique de ségrégation raciale.

À ces arguments liés au spécifique de la société française viennent s’ajouter des arguments extraits deslimites mêmes et des effets pervers de l’affirmative action dans son pays d’origine.

Ruxandra Luca

14 BOOK REVIEWS 177

————————3 P. 30-32.4 Les seuls cas en France où le droit s’adresse à des groupes et non pas à des invidus sont celui des femmes

et respectivement celui des personnes handicapées.

APPRAISAL— The Journal of the Society for Post-Critical and Personalist StudiesVol. 7 No. 1, March 2008

The philosophical and interdisciplinary perspectives of the Appraisal accumulate different theories andconstructing schemes of some referential points of “printed models” and constant thematic preferences in orderto study and translate contemporary points of views.

As the editorial policy states, Appraisal seeks to develop and promote constructive ways of thinking,especially from within a personalist perspective, in philosophy and other intellectual disciplines. The journalbelieves that philosophy should not be a narrow, academic and technical specialism, but should address itselfto the general public and to the intellectual and practical issues of the present.

From time to time Appraisal includes Re-Appraisals, articles or collections of articles upon 20th Centurythinkers whose work deserves to be more widely known. Appraisal takes a particular, but by no meansexclusive, interest in the work of Michael Polanyi.

Apart from some reserves, generated by the relation between technical points and “constructing scheme”,what mainly held our attention is the preference for the dynamism of the philosophical theories and for theireverlasting possibility of (in) forming the specialized reader. Under the circumstances of an “alienated”existence, Appraisal represents a fulfilled experiment of denying a “rhetorical perspective”, taking advantageof some multi-dimensional approaches.

Vol. 7 No. 1, March 2008 proposes a corpus texts and referential points for some dynamic philosophicalconcepts: the concept of person, philosophy of mind, rationality, the ended nature of interpretation, meaning,intention and value (Charlie Lowney, Seeing, saying and being the Gestalt: Continuing Investigations onWittgenstein and Polanyi on the concept of the person, Philip Rolnick, Wittgenstein and Polanyi on the person,Book Reviews on Dan O’Brien (A Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of Mind. Rationality and the Open-Ended Nature of Interpretation — Henrieta ªerban and Viorella Manolache) and Graham Dunstan Martin(Living on Purpose: Meaning, Intention and Value — Wendy Hamblet).

According to PhilipA. Rolnick, neitherWittgenstein nor Polanyi offers a systematic concept of the person,but each one offers important insights. After a brief biographical comparison that shows their similar originsand background, their thoughts on the person are compared. Both are concerned with transcendence, butWittgenstein counsels silence where Polanyi ventures discourse. Both see the importance of language butdiffer greatly on its use and limits. Wittgenstein sees his work as a kind of therapy for philosophy. Polanyiattempts a kind of epistemological encouragement. Both see a crucial role for community — Wittgenstein’s“form(s) of life” and Polanyi’s “dwelling in and breaking out”.

For Charles W. Lowney, L. Wittgenstein and M. Polanyi both recognize a tacit background to knowing,but vary significantly in their understanding of how we know, what we can know, and what we can say aboutit. The study explores whether we can say anything about the person as an emergent entity and how we knowit, as Polanyi believed we could, or whether, as Wittgenstein early and late believed, the person is among thosepurported things that can only be shown and attempts to say how we know it lead to nonsense — if there evenexists such an entity apart from the actions we may describe.

Avoiding (pre)fabricated formulas, showing, saying and inventorying major concepts and philosophicalconstructs, Appraisal’s structure can be seen as a totality of transitive and multifunctional theories, offering a(re)vitalization of the philosophical sources, proposing new scientifically ingredients.

Seen more as a level and not as a textual procedure, Appraisal proposes a magma in which there arecorrelated stratagems of practice and philosophy, along with personal achievements, as a commonphilosophical and cultural project. These philosophical signs are “translated” in Appraisal, creating a relationof tolerance between hard/ soft theories, insisting on textual and philosophical relations as Wittgenstein andPolanyi, rationality and the open-ended nature of interpretation, meaning, intention and value, seeing, sayingand being.

With a forte profile found in a continual philosophical interest, Appraisal remains a journal capable ofarticulating itself in a returning to the author openly extending the essential data of old or new theories: agirovag aspect of a journal which imposes a tolerant relation philosophy/ reality.

Viorella Manolache

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS


ARHIVELE TOTALITARISMULUI, An XVI, nr. 60-61, 3-4/ 2008, Institutul Naþional pentruStudiul Totalitarismului, Academia Românã, Bucureºti.

The Totalitarianism Archives (Review of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, volumeXVI, number 60-61, Fall 2008) is organized as a “response of the researchers” to the “exigency of the new”and to the accurate inventory of the past. The revitalization of the interest for the real historian sources, beyondthe prefabricated formulas, puts in the light the veridical theoretical filters which can bring us again, in a lucidway, closer to the past.

The Review of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism opens with an editorial of RaduCiuceanu, the president of the N.I.S.T., focused on History as Ballast, XXXII. The editorial combines thehistorical truth about the strange correspondence between Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin, with the style of ascientific prerogative of a personality participating directly in the Romanian crucial historical events, capableto (de)construct the truth beyond the already recorded facts.

The studies gathered in the Review deal with: The Legionary Movement between “Political Religion” and“Collective Effervescence” (Radu H. Dinu), The road to Truth about Katyn (Ion Constantin), The Relationsbetween the Legionary Movement and the RCP, 1945-1948 ( Tiberiu Tãnase), The waves of Arrests in 1947(Dumitru ªandru), The Dissolution of the National Peasant Party — A new Stage in the Plan on SovietizingRomania, II (Mihail Lancuzov), The Meaning of Signing the Romanian — Soviet Treaty from February 4, 1948(Dragoº Zamfirescu), Parallelism and Convergence. Underpinnings of the French — Romanian Rapprochement,1956-1963, I (Irina Gridan), The Influence of Anticommunism over Recent Romanian Historiography (FlorinAbraham).

The documents inform, looking into the personal historical details, about the reference historical points,deciphering political aspects which also represent the phenomenon of “staging” social coexistence. Suchan operation has the role of inducing a system of representations through which it displays itself on the samescene with its activators: Demetrescu Radu Gyr: An Essential Autobiographical Contribution, III (AlexanduV. Diþã), The Churchill — Stalin Percentages Agreement in Soviet Documents (Laurenþiu Constantiniu),The Collectivization of Agriculture. Total Repression, 1947-1962, XXV (Octavian Roske), Differently aboutthe Romanian — Soviet Relations: The Small Tourist Traffic (Dan Cãtãnuº), After invasion: Romania inthe Shadow of the “Brezhnev Doctrine”. September-October 1968 (Mioara Anton), Behind-the-Scenes ofNicolae Ceauºescu’s Rise to the top (Vasile Buga), The Agony of the Communist Regime in Romania: theCeauºescu-Gorbachev Exchange of Messages, Nov. 1989 (Simon Gheorghiu). An initiative meant to facilitatethe access to the documents from the communist period and to debunk the certain huge historicalmystifications!

“The sense of biographism” does not only lie in the meaning of the biographical detail. The TotalitarianismArchives focuses upon a biographical dictionary (Ana Maria Cãtãnuº — Vlad Georgescu and Cristina Diac —Corneliu Mãnescu), because the personalism defines one of the main principles of the interpretation of adetermined interval (temporal, historical, cultural, and political).

Offering investigation and facets of the Romania phenomenon of Totalitarianism, in the new societytraumatized by the long communist experiment, but taking out the survey forms and precedents, The TotalitarianismArchives became a turntable of historical information and documentation, despite any institutional andhistoriographical pressure.

The National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism remains in a state of wakefulness now, when thetotalitarian virus looks to be still alive, because there is no suitable land for its development than a driftingdemocracy.

The dictatorships that have shaded also our country, established as a goal, the dissolution and thedestruction of any democratic components. Fulfilling this empty theoretical space, the Totalitarianism Archivesis built up depending on the expectance horizon of a mature public (reader), ranging from mere love of historyto the political leader interested in knowing the Romanian political system in the past, but also in decryptionand evaluation the post communist present. This confirms the constant concern of the historian and professorRadu Ciuceanu and of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism for avoiding the manipulation ofhistory and historiography and for releasing the historic speech from the rhetoric of some image (political,historical, cultural) promoters.

Viorella Manolache

2 THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS 179

ANALELE UNIVERSITÃÞII DIN CRAIOVA, Seria Filosofie, No. 21 (1/2008), 187 p.Present in the European Reference Index for Humanities and on the list of scientific magazinesAERES

In general, any accessing of the concept of postmodernity (which Umberto Eco has considered a termgood at everything), is claimed by the effects felt from the “end of the modern age” (G. Vattimo), throughpostmodernity.

Reporting it to the Nietzsche’s problematic, which Habermas considers the turntable of getting intopostmodernism, or to the eternal return of the overcoming Heidegger’s metaphysic, the theorization ofpostmodernism, mostly decentred and inconsistent, becomes accurate only following a philosophical rigor anddignity by extending the new conditions of existence in the late industrial world.

Proposing a revision of the relation between the dominating modernism and the recessive postmodernism, theReview of Craiova University focuses on the ontological dimension of the philosophical and cultural paradigm.

Browsing or scanning the texts published in the Review of Craiova University, a mature reader can findan extrusive delimitating assumption of the concept, found in extravert theoretical and philosophical texts,concluding the fact that the vogue of postmodernism represents also a language game, a specific aestheticmodality, a subtle symptom of a diffuse premonition of the changing, an experiment, a montage, a manner ofexpression and of refinement of perception of language!

Organized in three sections, the Review proposes three philosophical lines:— Modernism and Postmodernism in Philosophy (Bruce A. Little — The Emergence of the

Postmodern Mind at its Mind; Angela Botez — Between Modernity and Posmodernity; Richard T. Allen — Aphilosophy of diversity: R.G. Collingwood and Lucian Blaga; Ana Bazac — What means ontology of thehuman? Following some remarks of Derrida and via Habermas or Foucault; Gheorghe Dãniºor — EthicalPostmodernity; Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban — The typology of the Postmodern discourse; Marius AugustinDrãghici — Modern presuppositions of the postmodernism in philosophy; Adriana Neacºu — “Anonimous”and “hipostasis” at Emmanuel Levinas; Adrian Niþã — The concept of the world at the Merleau-Ponty; LorenaPãvãlan Stuparu — Postmodernism: relativism and humanization of the discourse);

—The Philosophy of Language and Science (François Rivenc — Philosophie du langage: une critiquedu contextualisme; ªtefan Viorel Ghenea — Relativism and scientific rationality) and

—Moral Philosophy (Marta Rizea Albu — Le spectacle humain dans “Les Caractères” de La Bruyère).The studies gathered in the Review of Craiova University (no. 21, 1/2008, imply both a sketching and an

inventory of the philosophical postmodern effects — all recognized in theoretical models as an alternativeparadigm. Seen as a summum of the fundamental marks of the postmodernity, the articles adopt the postmodernideology of plurality and of accepting the difference. All these under a forte philosophical and theoretical profile!

Viorella Manolache

THEMONIST, July-October 2008, Volume 91, Number 3-4 Peru, Illinois, The Hegeler Institute,2008, 262 p.

This double issue of “The Monist”, founded in 1888 and edited by Barry Smith, is as well an expressionof an additional attention for the philosophy of everyday life within contemporary philosophy, as of the interestfor the political relevance of everyday life.

Thus, I see the first article of the journal comments on the value of contemporary theory of law in its socialimplications. “Privatizing Marriage”, by Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler sustain the idea that many ofthe social practices represent only incomplete theoretic attempts. To understand marriage as an incompletelytheorized institution is a difficult endeavor when it is not seen a private business. From this perspectiveprivatizing marriage is somehow recommendable.

John Finnis deals with “Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good” where he pleads for marriage as such agood, basic and exigent and also fundamental for a humane way of life. He brings arguments for his distrustin the possibility to replace marriage as a moral way of life and as an ideal. He does not see as an ideal theworld where the civil unions would decide everything, from the number of members and the sex of membersto the number of children (who would be raised and loved by all). His arguments place in marriage not onlysocial norms, but also the entire philosophy of the natural right and the philosophy of the inherent morality andof the ability/need to sustain friendship of the human being.

The study “On the Nature of Marriage: Somerville on Same— SexMarriage”, byAdèle Mercier, approachesthe reductive character of the language and of the “argument of nature” — briefly stating that nature is sacred,


to be preserved in its favorable aspects and “tamed” in these implying destruction, murder, rape, etc., contextwithin which a marriage is “naturally” formed by a woman and a man, its purpose being to procreate. Thisreductive edge is nicely emphasized on the background of human complexity. The author interprets criticallythe perspective described in Margaret Somerville’s 2006 book, The Ethical Imagination: Journeys of theHuman Spirit (Anansi Press). Somerville claims that: (1) the rule is to form families by natural reproduction;(2) this rule establishes the right of the children to biological parents; (3) given the rule of natural reproduction,children are entitled to biological parents or, a sufficient condition for the right of children to biological parentsis that natural reproduction is the rule; (4) if we allow the same sex couples to get married, the family wouldnot be based on the rule of natural reproduction anymore; (5) if natural reproduction is no longer the rule, thenthe rule does not entitle children to biological parents, that is, a necessary condition for the right of the childrento biological parents is that natural reproduction is the rule, hence (6) if we allow the same sex couples to getmarried, all children lose their right to biological parents.AdèleMercier argues against this line of reasoning stressingthat essential both for raising children and for long term marriages is only the love doubled by stability.

Patrick Lee claims that true love comes exclusively from biological parents in “Marriage, Procreation andSame-Sex Unions” sustaining the point of view advanced by Margaret Somerville, and criticized by AdèleMercier. For him, the political community has a duty of honor in protecting the institution of heterosexualmarriage. Adèle Mercier answers in the following text to these theoretical views that “any child whose parentswould use legal recognition of same-sex marriages as pretext for dispensation from their parental obligationswould be better off adopted by a child-eager same-sex couple.” (p. 441) Then, in his answer, Lee nuances hispositions pointing to the aspects that he considers same-sex marriages as a menace, for instance, for the attemptto socially encourage fathers to fulfill their specific responsibilities as fathers (p. 445)

For political philosophy, especially interesting is Jeremy R. Garrett’s, “History, Tradition and the NormativeFoundations of Civil Marriage”, a study elaborated on philosophical ideas such as these sustained by Burke,in order to defend the traditional civil marriage as an institutional form representing embodied wisdom. Theauthor comments as well on various other philosophical ideas, such as those of Friedrich Hayek, to overcomethe Burkean position. The study relates as well to the interesting observation of MacIntyre, stating that traditionis less vulnerable to the dialectic investigation and generally toward the objections of all sorts. We have herea captivating mechanism of cultural selection to be followed in Garrett’s study. The conclusion is that theintrinsic value of marriage stays in the philosophical facets of the concept of marriage and not in the “historicalpedigree” of this institution.

The article “A Populist Argument for Legalizing Same — Sex Marriage” byAlex Rajczi brings argumentsin favor of the same-sex marriages from the perspective of liberalism. The author is aware that his argumentsmight prejudice traditional marriage and they might be considered a more or less implicit agreement withhomosexuality, but considers that from a liberal perspective they are nevertheless at least theoreticallysustainable. “Marriage and the Norm of Monogamy” by Bryan R. Weaver and Fiona Wollard is captivating inits philosophical nuanced argument for the acceptance of the norm of monogamy when it is originated in the“reality” of an important, sexually and emotionally satisfying relation, and not when it is the expression of thedesire of control over the other.

Mary Catherine Geach in “Lying with the Body” elaborates a philosophical and poetic approach withessentialist metaphysic aspects, intriguing in terms of “corporeal turn.” Thus, the differences between the beingsand their bodies should be erased since our humanity owes a great deal to the body. Human authenticity is to becorrelated, differently for women and men, inclusively through sexuality. The sexuality is human when it isgenerative — the woman as an authentic being is a potential mother, while the man as a human being should beseen as a potential father. Andrea C. Westlund interprets in “The Reunion of Marriage” marriage within theliberal feminism. Marriage as a reunion on the one hand transcends the legal frame and on the other handprovides the opportunity to re-conceptualize the dynamic interplay of perspectives on life. Therefore, marriagebecomes the effort of continuous reconstitution of the both necessary and fragile common practical perspective.

Brook J. Sadler in “Civil Unions and Same-Sex Marriage” wonders whether political wisdom should notabandon the critique of the practice of marriage in general to be able to promote the cause of the same-sexmarriages, seen as short term political and social purposes, and in this sense, more realistic. Yet, the study tendsto be more in favor of the civil unions considered more a progress from a social standpoint, more radical froma political standpoint and ethically easier to be sustained than the same-sex marriages. In “What’s in a Name?APhilosophical Critique of ’Civil Unions’Predicated Upon a Sexual Relationship” GerardV. Bradley goes beyondthe perspective where the civil unions are just marriages under another name. he comments on the case Lewisv. Harris to identify the substance of the name “marriage” in the moral normative frame for the sexual relationsand procreation.

As a whole, the journal presents a captivating and diverse range of arguments indicating the pragmatic turnwithin contemporary philosophy.



Ion Bulei is the Director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations ofthe RomanianAcademy. He is a specialist in the modern history of Romania (1821-1920); specializationdevelopment issues in Romanian political phenomenon in the general fund of social and economicdevelopment, political and cultural discernable in Romanian political dimensions of the entireRomanian space without omitting the international developments; participation in the editing toolsWork on modern history (governments, governance, democracy and liberalism to the Romaniandictionary of political parties, encyclopedias); contributions in the politico-diplomatic and militaryaffairs, especially with Italy; participation and responsible in various projects Research Institute ofthe Romanian Culture and Humanistic Research in Venice and the Institute of Political Sciencesand International Relations Research, activity reflected in the work and published magazines. Heparticipates regularly in the life science and international, contributions to both scientific andorganizational, as part of colloquia, symposia and scientific sessions are held under the aegis ofthe Romanian Institute Culture of Venice, the Institute of Political Science and InternationalRelations of the Romanian Academy and the University of Bucharest.

Ionas Aurelian Rus is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Raymond WaltersCollege, the largest regional campus in the state of Ohio (USA) of the University of Cincinnati, amajor urban research university. He has received his PhD in Political Science in October 2008from Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA. The title of his dissertation is“Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Impact of the Ethnic Basis, the Educational System,Industrialization and Sudden Shocks”. His fields of specialization include Comparative Politicsand International Relations, and he has an M.A. in Modern European History from ColumbiaUniversity. He has published six articles in peer-reviewed publications, including “The Rise ofMoldovan-Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia (1900-1917)”, in Interstitio. East EuropeanReview of Historical Anthropology, vol. 1, no. 2, and “The Electoral Patterns of the RomanianRight in the Interwar Years”, parts I, II and III, in Arhivele Totalitarismului (1998-1999), etc. Hehas published an encyclopedia article, articles in various internet journals, and has presentedpapers at five, and served as a panel chair at two, international scholarly conferences.

Cristi Pantelimon, PhD in Sociology, researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of thePolitical Science and International Relations. He is a professor at the “Spiru Haret” University,Bucharest. Fields of interest: political sociology, sociology of nation and nationalism. He is theauthor of the books: Sociologia politicã (Political Sociology, 2005), Prin cenuºa naþiunii (TheNation ashes, 2006), Sociologia corporatismului ºi a capitalismului (Sociology of corporatismand capitalism, 2007), and the coordinator of the collective volume Ideea naþionalã ºi ideeaeuropeanã (National Idea and the European Idea, 2008). Numerous articles published in Academica,Sociologia Româneascã, Revista Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale.

Doina Florea, essayist and translator. Since 1999, she is professor at the “Lucian Blaga”University, Sibiu. PhD with the research theme concerning Vizualitate ºi audiþie în opera luiMihail Sadoveanu (1982). Editor-in-chief of the Publishing House Junimea, Iaºi (1970-1991),Albatros (1991-1992), editor of the Journal of Historical Monuments and General Director of theFF-Press Publishing House in Bucharest (1993-1999). Employee of the journals Ateneu, Convorbiriliterare, Cronica, Luceafãrul, Transilvania and s.o. Author of numerous studies and critical essaysas: Mihail Sadoveanu sau magia rostirii (1986), Drumul spre eseu (1998), Scrierea ºi cartea(1998), Bazele biblioteconomiei (1998), Studii de istoria literaturii române (2000), Bibliologiegeneralã. Sinteze (2004), Edituri ºi colecþii (2004), Cartea de patrimoniu — vector cultural(2007), Repertoriul cãrþii germane, italiene ºi româneºti din Biblioteca Muzeului Brukenthal

THE AUTHORS


/secolele XVI-XVII (2008), Dicþionarul copiilor francez-român (2008). Translations from theuniversal literature: Vasili ªukºin (1972), Kostas Assimakopoulos (1972), Bonaventura (1973),Willibald Alexis (1976), Emmanuel Roblès (1977), Marcus Clarke (1978), Émile Gaboriau(1992), Franz Storch (1982), Voltaire (1985), Iannis Gudelis (1987), E. Barrington (1993), WalterScott (2003). Translations from the original language in other languages: versions in French by theBrothers Grimm (1977) and Cezar Petrescu (1982). Supervised conditions: Nelu Ionescu (1984),Traian Chelariu (1989), Daniel Defoe (1992), Mihai Cimpoi (1994), Danes G. (1996), RudyardKipling (2003). Member of the RomanianAssociation of correspondence Eller (1980). Price of theEller Federation of Romania (1982).

Abdenbi Sarroukh is a member of the English Department at Abdelmalik Essaâdi University,Tétouan, Morocco. He is a member of MoroccanAssociation of Human rights in Tetouan; memberof “The research group in theatre and drama” and a formerly member of “The research group inlinguistics and thought” in Tetouan.Publications:A call in “Aljisr”, a monthly journal in Tetouan, 1993,third number; The question of Moral in Nietzsche’s work in Arabic in the daily journal “Al ItihadAlichtiraki” May 1997;When we were in Challa in “Revue” no. 3, “Picturing Tangier”, July, 2007.

Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban owns a PhD from the Romanian Academy since 2006, and she isa scientific researcher at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of theRomanian Academy, and the Institute of Philosophy and Psychology “Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru” of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania. Research interests: philosophy ofcommunication, political communication, (soft) ideologies (feminism, ecologism, ironism). Shehas lectured at the Catholic University of Brussels (2000-2006, within the Academic ExchangeProgramme), and at Loughborough University (2006, within the same programme). Authoredbooks: Limbajul politic în democraþie (The Political Language in Democracy) in 2006 andParadigmele diferenþei în filosofia comunicãrii. Modernism si postmodernism (The Paradigms ofDifference in the Philosophy of Communication. Modernism and Postmodernism) in 2007. She hasarticles published in both Romanian and English languages (for example, in English, Reading thenew horizon. The role of Romanian media discourse in the 2004 elections power shift, in Carpentier,Nico, Spinoy, Erik (coord.), Discourse Theory and Cultural Analysis: Media, Arts and Literature,New Jersey, Hampton Press, 2008, p. 55-70.), and books translated from English into Romanian(for instance, N. Chomsky’s Failed States for Antet Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006).

Viorella Manolache graduated from the Political Science Faculty, Law Faculty, has a masterin Journalism and Public Relations, with a PhD in History from the University of Bucharest. Shehas published several books: Postmodernitatea româneascã între experienþã ontologicã ºinecesitate politicã (Romanian Postmodernity/ Between Ontological Experience and PoliticalNecessity) “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2004; Cecitatea politicã — între sindrom ereditar ºifaza lungã a maºinistului (Political Blindness as a Heredity Syndrome), “Lucian Blaga”University, Sibiu, 2005; Ipostaze ale fetiºului în presa culturalã româneascã (Fetishism. Hypostasisof the Romanian Cultural Press), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2006; Elite. Conceptualizãrimoderne (Elitism. Modern Conceptualization), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2006; Antielitele.Forme tipice ºi atipice ale elitismului politic contemporan (Antielites. Typical and atypical formsof elitism), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2007; Elita politicã româneascã între deconstrucþiacomunismului ºi reconstrucþia democraþiei (Romanian Political Elites), Techno Media, Sibiu,2008. She works as a researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of the Political Science andInternational Relations, at the Department of Political Philosophy.

Maria Sass graduated from the Faculty of Sibiu, specialization German-Romanian (1983),Phd since 1999 (doctoral thsesis: Coºbuc ºi literatura germanã), holder of the Chair of GermanStudies and of the disciplines: German Literature and Translation of Literary Texts within TheLucian Blaga University of Sibiu. Fields of research:German Literature and Language; ComparativeLiterature, particulary — the study of literaly relations between the German and Romanianliteratures, author of numerous studies and articles published in professional periodicals from

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Romania and from abroad (Germany, Austria). Contributions at: Transilvania, GermanistischeBeiträge, Zeitschrift der Germanisten Rumäniens, Saeculum, Steaua, Tribuna (Cluj), Spiegelungen(München) etc. Books: Coºbuc ºi literatura germanã (2000); Einführung in das Ûbersetzen(2004); DieAnalyse dramatischer Texte. Eine Einführung mit Beispielen aus der deutschen Literatur(2004); Schiller (2005); Stationen deutscher Dichtung (2006). Several volumes of didactic use,translations (in volume) and several translations of poetry in the following periodicals: Transilvania,Tribuna (Cluj), Steaua etc. Editorial activity: the periodical Germanistische Beiträge (CNCSIS).International scientific collaborations: J.G. Herder Institute-Leipzig/ Germany (1994); Universityof Tübingen/ Germany (1994); University of Bochum/ Germany (1997); University of Marburg/Germany (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007); Institute for German Culture and History of South — EasternEurope-München/ Germany (2006); University of Trier, The Department for SpecializedResearchers (2007); The Erika Mitterer Literary Society/ Vienna (2007).

Flavia Jerca has a Bachlor in International Relations and European Studies, obtained atUniversity of Bucharest. She is currently a MA candidate in International Relations at the sameuniversity. In the university year 2007-2008 she had a scholarship at Freie Universität Berlin. Herfields of interest are international security and the Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope and she is currently preparing a MA project on OSCE.

EduardoAraya Leüpin graduated in History at the Pontificia Catholic University of Valparaiso(Chile) and is PhD in Political Sciences and History at the Johannes Gutenberg University fromMainz, Germany. Presently is Director of the Institute of History and Political Science fromPontificia Catholic University of Valparaiso and professor at the same institution. His mainsdirections of research are: contemporary history of Latin America, political science and electronicdemocracy.

Rãzvan Victor Pantelimon graduated from the Faculty of Political Science at BucharestUniversity and the Faculty of Law at “Nicolae Titulescu” University, Bucharest. He has a MasterDegree in “Romanian Politics and European Policies” from the Faculty of Political Science at theBucharest University. At present he is a PhD student in Political Science at Bologna Universityand Bucharest University. Research interests: political parties, systems and doctrines in SouthAmerica. Participations at national conferences. Several studies and articles published in variousscientific journals.

Maria Cãtãlina Moisescu, graduated in 2008 the Faculty of Political Science, FrenchDepartment at the University of Bucharest. At present she is attending the Master of European andRomanian Policy at the Faculty of Political Science within the University of Bucharest as well asthe Master of Security and Defense at the National University of Defense Carol I. Formervolunteer for the Francophone Summit in the Ministry of External Affaires, now she is collaboratingwith the Romanian Academic Forum.

Lucian Jora is a researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations(Romanian Academy) in Bucharest. Postgraduate studies at the University of Catania, CopenhagenUniversity and Jangelonian University. At the moment he is preparing a PhD at Babeº-BolyaiUniversity in European Studies with a research on Cultural Diplomacy through the representationin History. He authored several articles with a focus on International Relations, European Studiesand Cultural Diplomacy.

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