The Two Gods of Hobbes: Rethinking Political (Dis)obligation in the Leviathan’s Theological...

This article summarizes the main arguments of my book “O Problema da Obediência em Thomas Hobbes” (The Problem of Obedience in Thomas Hobbes)

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The Two Gods of Hobbes: Rethinking Political (Dis)obligation

in the Leviathan’s Theological Politics

Thamy Pogrebinschi

“LEVIATHAN, (...) that Mortal God to which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defense.”

Hobbes (Leviathan, XVII, 13).

It has become commonplace to assert that Thomas Hobbes is the founder of modern

political thought. The arguments which have been presented in order to justify this assertion are numerous and varied. According to some interpreters, Hobbes was responsible for breaking with scholasticism, with classical culture and with the natural law tradition (Strauss, 1952 and Macpherson, 1979). According to others, he was the founder of contractualism and therefore the first to base political authority on the consensus of men and no longer in the divine right of kings (Hampton, 1986 and Kavka, 1986). Some declare further that Hobbes is the father of liberalism, of individualism and even of legal positivism (Strauss, 1952 and Schmitt, 1996).

Indeed, these different readings that have led the history of thought to place Hobbes at the epicenter of modernity converge in such a way as to form a kind of official interpretation of his theory. This plurality of interpretations of Hobbes comes together in such a way as to form a homogenous version in which sometimes are also combined elements of materialism, mechanism, and rationalism.

This official or standard interpretation of Hobbes is, however, taught in schools and discussed in academia without questioning its assumptions. What if the attributed qualities which place Hobbes at the origins of modern political thought could not in truth be conferred on him? What if, looked at more closely, Hobbes is not quite so original and innovative as he appears to be? What if his theory rested on assumptions already well known in his time?

The purpose of this paper is to arrive, if not at new answers to these questions, at least at a putting into question of the commonsense ones. Hence, my aim is to critically inquire into some of the interpretations of what appears to me to be the core of Hobbes’s political philosophy: his concept of political obligation. And in so doing I will provide a new way of reading the problem of obedience in Hobbes, one that does not dismiss the limits of political obligation and the theological context that surrounds it. Two (or more) ways of reading Hobbes:

Hobbes scholarship has shown us that there are at least two (opposing) ways of reading

Hobbes: secularly and theologically (see Martinich, 1992). The latter trend of interpretation takes seriously the role of religion in Hobbes’s writings. It usually relies on the second half of Leviathan in an effort to bring to light the overlooked and misinterpreted ideas contained there. This leads to a more systematic and complete reading that allows for a literal (and not metaphorical) understanding of the natural law language employed by Hobbes in the first two parts of the book as well as in the third and fourth parts. The secularist way of reading Hobbes is the standard one. This interpretation of Hobbes does not take seriously his religious ideas as they affect his political thought. It denies that God plays any relevant role in Hobbes’s writings and assumes that all the religious language he employs is just rhetoric. These interpretations frequently disregard the whole second half of the Leviathan.


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Regarding the concept of political obligation, one can say that the secularist interpretations contend that its sources are either the social contract or the civil laws promulgated by the civil sovereign ― notwithstanding that its grounds might rely on accounts of fear, self-interest (prudence), or even law itself. Despite the internal differences among these interpretations, one can say that they all have in common the following features:

a) The political obligation, whatever its ground may be, derives from the consensus of men, therefore: b) The obligation is born out of the covenant, being inexistent in the state of nature; c) The laws of nature cannot be properly called laws; d) The laws of nature have no moral or ethical foundation; e) The laws of nature are not properly laws, but maxims of prudence or precepts of reason; f) God and religion do not play any relevant role in Hobbes’s theory of obligation.

The theological readings of Hobbes are usually known under the heading of the so-called “Taylor-Warrender-Hood” thesis, that is, the interpretation of the religious and the deontological natural law aspects of Hobbes’s thought advanced by A. E. Taylor (1938), Howard Warrender (1957) and F. C. Hood (1964).1 Despite minor differences in the focuses of these three authors, one can say that the theological thesis is univocal in affirming the following premises:

a) The laws of nature are laws in the strict sense, hence, they are obligatory; b) The laws of nature are divine laws; c) The laws of nature are obligatory both in the state of nature and in society; d) The laws of nature are what lead men to the covenant; e) The civil laws, promulgated by the sovereign, have their content conformed to the laws of

nature; f) The laws of nature establish obligations as much for the subject as for the sovereign.

If, on the one hand, the secularist interpretations of Hobbes’s political obligation are incomplete in so far as they disregard the religious and deontological natural law features of Hobbes’s thought, on the other hand, the theological ones are inadequate for they misread the limits of political obligation. This latter disregard makes some of the claims asserted in the theological interpretations, such as that of the weakness of Hobbes’s absolutism and contractualism, in a certain sense incoherent. Thus, a complete, adequate and coherent account of Hobbes’s concept of political obligation in the Leviathan should not only show how men are obliged to sovereignty but also obliged by the laws of nature to disobey it – what I will call ‘political disobligation’.

Hence, in order to render a theological interpretation of Hobbes more adequate and the overall set of his claims coherent, I would like to add the following premise:

g) When the commands and laws of the sovereign contradict the laws of nature, the subject is released from political obligation, and consequently an occasion for disobedience opens up.

Rethinking political obligation:

1 One may ask whether A. P. Martinich should be included in this list. While reading his The Two Gods of

Leviathan, which inspired the title of this paper, I have come to believe that his interpretation cannot be fully

considered a theological one. In my view his interpretation combines certain secularist and theological

elements as an attempt to reconcile both trends of interpretation, thus giving rise to what might be a third one.


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My task in this paper is twofold. First, I will restate the theological thesis in order to show how Hobbes’s account of political obligation is indeed a religious one. Second, I will argue how this account is drawn together with an account of what I shall call ‘disobligation’, which will show how political obligation may come to an end within the same presuppositions that establish it. This analysis is best undertaken if one considers all three of Hobbes’s major political works, De Corpore Politico, De Cive and Leviathan. This I have previously accomplished elsewhere (Pogrebinschi, 2003), and given the size limitations of this paper I will focus only on the Leviathan here, as it is in effect the final version of the other two books.

The first definition of law of nature that one finds in the Leviathan, in the beginning of chapter XIV, is certainly the most cited by the interpreters: “a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same” (Leviathan, XIV, 3). In fact, this identification of the laws of nature with reason continues throughout their exposition through the end of chapter XV, where they are defined as “moral virtues” (Leviathan, XV, 40). The final paragraph of that chapter seems to come as a reinforcement of this association between natural law and reason, in a way that has served to keep most of the interpreters of the Leviathan from seeking other meanings for the laws of nature beyond this point. Hobbes says:

“These dictates of reason men use to call by the name of laws, but improperly; for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defense of themselves, whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others…” (Leviathan, XV, 41). Certainly, if Hobbes were to stop there, certain readings would be validated: a) The laws of nature are not binding and obligatory, such as the "laws in proper sense”; b) The laws of nature do not derive their foundation from something external to them, but

rather, they derive from reason; c) The reason of which Hobbes speaks is human reason, founded in the nature of men or in

their experience; d) An obligatory and binding law can only derive from the word of the sovereign, that is, in

the last instance, he who has the right to command; e) Only the sovereign has the right to command. However, Hobbes does not stop there. Immediately after the final phrase cited above he

continues: “… But yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then they are properly called laws.” It is from this point that the standard interpretations should begin to be revised. Indeed a systematic reading of the Leviathan shows that the association of the laws of nature with precepts or dictates of reason is not repeated in any other passage. On the contrary, from this point on the identification of the laws of nature with the will of God (that is, their identification with divine law) becomes abundant throughout the text.

It is in this way that Chapter XXVI of the Leviathan, dedicated to the civil laws, provides beyond a typology of laws several passages in which the association between the natural law and the divine law is evident. To arrive at the definition of the civil law, the chapter opens with a short study of the laws, in which Hobbes affirms that “law in general is not counsel, but command; nor a command of any man to any man, but only of him whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him” (Leviathan, XXVI, 2). But what previous obligation is this? In what sense is the receiver of this order already obliged, even before its enunciation, to obey it? Yes, we know that in establishing the covenant men have consented to transfer many of their rights to the sovereign,


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who can then legitimately exercise and transform these rights into power and thus preserve the lives of those who then owe him obedience. However, is it just this primary obligation to the sovereign, derived from the contract, that Hobbes refers to here? Or might it be that, departing from this affirmation, one could arrive at a ground beneath these laws, or rather, could it be that their bindingness is concealed within some other ground, which is not the sovereign power?

I would like to demonstrate three points: a) That which Hobbes calls natural laws he also calls divine laws. So there is

no distinction to be made between these two concepts; b) The civil laws and the natural laws are reciprocally contained each one in

the other, as the former are founded in the latter; c) Even the sovereigns are obliged to the natural laws, to which they owe

obedience. By this reasoning, the subject is doubly obliged to the divine will, whether owing direct obedience to the natural laws, or obeying the sovereign.

As to the identification between the natural laws and the divine laws, the Leviathan is clear in numerous passages. The law of nature is that unwritten order that is mandatory for all men: “if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a law of nature” (Leviathan, XXVI, 13). Here Hobbes establishes one of the main differentiating elements between the natural laws and the civil laws: the civil laws should be written and publicized, in such a way that those who owe obedience to them can become aware of their content. The laws of nature, however, besides not necessitating written form and the requirement of publicity, have their obligation determined solely by the mere verification of their observance.

Once the obligatory character of the law of nature is established, Hobbes reinforces its binding feature, the autonomy of its content, and its immutability with the following passage: “princes succeed one another; and one judge passeth, another cometh; nay, heaven and earth shall pass; but not one title of the law of nature shall pass, for it is the eternal law of God” (Leviathan, XXVI, 24). Here also is affirmed that the laws of nature stand above the person of the sovereign, above the one responsible for interpreting them, and also above any other earthly object. The natural law is then expressly identified with the divine.

This identity between the natural and divine laws becomes even greater precisely through an attempt at differentiation:

“Another division of laws is into natural and positive. Natural are those which have been laws from all eternity, and are called not only natural but also moral laws (...) Positive are those which have not been from eternity, but have been made laws by the will of those that have had the sovereign power over others...” (Leviathan, XXVI, 37 and 38). Up to this point Hobbes has identified the previously described civil laws with the positive

laws. It follows then: “… again, of positive laws some are human, some divine...Divine positive laws (for natural laws, being eternal and universal, are all divine) are those which, being the commandments of God are declared for such by those whom God hath authorized to declare them” (Leviathan, XXVI, 39 and 40). Here, with just one stroke of the pen, Hobbes identifies positive laws with civil laws, positive

laws with divine laws, and natural laws with divine laws. At once we have also the identity


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between natural and civil laws, which I will approach next. For a theory that is meant to be logically and geometrically demonstrable, certain contradictions and ambiguities begin to appear. What is law in the Hobbesian system and what purpose does the legal typology serve if not to subsume any and all denomination within the same normative content, the divine will?

It is not only through these explicit passages in the Leviathan that this argument can be sustained. It appears that Hobbes’s well-known fear regarding the fragmentation of power – whether between sovereign powers (executive, legislative and judiciary), or between secular and spiritual powers – not only leads him to consolidate all of these manifestations in a sole agency, but also to ensure that any and all foundations eventually attributed to it would be the same, or at least would originate from the same and sole source: the Holy Scripture. In fact, Hobbes’s concern with the rise of new religions is evident throughout the Leviathan. He wants to affirm the Christian religion, and what better strategy could he choose than to advocate a State based on theological principles of obedience? The obedience to the divine word and the assurance of the survival of Christianity become manifest as obedience to the State. What is then more efficient than to identify the law with the will of God? The religious order and the social order are reciprocally assured by the formation of a single bond of obedience.

Hobbes goes even further in his affirmation of the similarities between the laws of nature and the divine laws: “the law of nature and the civil law contain each other, and are of equal extent (...) the law of nature therefore is a part of the civil law (...) reciprocally, also, the civil law is a part of the dictates of nature” (Leviathan, XXVI, 8). However, though, the civil law derives not only its validity from the law of nature, but also its content. This understanding suffices to dismiss the claim that Hobbesian men owe obedience to the civil law and nothing more, since as they obey the civil laws, men are first and necessarily obeying the laws of nature. The former would have no validity or effectiveness without the latter. “For justice is a dictate of the law of nature. But every subject in a commonwealth hath covenanted to obey the civil law (...) and therefore, obedience to the civil law is part also of the law of nature” (Leviathan, XXVI, 8). However, if the civil laws get their foundation from the laws of nature, the ground of obedience obviously cannot reside in the former. The true ground of obligation in the Leviathan-State is not its law, nor any law, but the manifestation of divine will through the laws of nature.

Therein we move on to another question: in order to oppose the argument that Hobbesian political obligation derives from the overwhelming power of the sovereign or from the State that embodies and legitimates the sovereign by means of the contract, I claim that obedience is actually owed in view of the laws of nature. And not only are the subjects obliged in the face of the laws of nature, but the sovereign is as well. The laws of nature, as I will demonstrate next, work as limits to the exercise of the sovereign power. Hence, and contrary to the statements of the majority of Hobbes scholars, the power of the sovereign is not absolute. The mortal god is subjected, as all other men of the State, to the laws of nature…to the immortal God.

It is not by chance that, precisely in the chapter of the Leviathan dedicated to the liberty of the subjects (chapter XXI) and in that on the office of the sovereign (chapter XXX), this idea is made clear: “...he [the sovereign] never wanteth right to anything (otherwise than as he himself is the subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature)” (Leviathan, XXI, 7). Even in the role of the supreme judge, the sovereign finds himself limited by the laws of nature. In his task of administering justice equally for the people as a whole, he should guide himself by equity, “...to which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much subject as any of the meanest of his people” (Leviathan, XXX, 15). Actor and author, sovereign and subject, State and society are placed by the laws of nature at the same level: that of the divine obedience.

Even in view of his highest responsibility, the task for which he has been chosen, the sovereign is subject to the theological order:


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“The office of the sovereign (be it a monarch or an assembly) consisteth in the

end for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely, the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author of that law, and to none but him” (Leviathan, XXX, 1). The security of the people, or rather the peace, should be sought simultaneously in the

temporal and spiritual planes. Hobbes desires not only the pax civilis, but also the pax dei. If in Hobbes the rights of men are converted into the power of the sovereign and their

liberty into obedience, sovereignty is first of all the mediation and self-limitation of a potency that is not within men, nor within the sovereign, but within God. What the development of this thought points to is that in fact the exercise of sovereign power in its all manifestations appears to be subjected to the divine authority. As we have seen above, the power to judge finds itself limited by the natural laws just as is the power to administer and organize the State. The power to give laws is also subordinated to God, a fact which can be grasped by the necessity to conform the content of the civil law to that of the natural law. Hence, the State-monster, the absolute State, and the sovereign judge/executive/legislator, are demythologized in face of the true object of myth, God.

As I argued earlier, the laws of nature are eternal and are immutable, unlike the civil laws. The latter are always subject to succession and to the death of the sovereign. Also, the sovereign that succeeds another is not subordinated ― any more than his predecessor ― to the civil laws; however, “it is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws be divine, and cannot by any man or commonwealth be abrogated” (Leviathan, XXIX, 9). The civil laws of the sovereigns can thus experience modifications, since they always keep their conformity with the laws of nature. But the latter are immutable and “whether men will or not, they must be subject always to the divine power” (Leviathan, XXXI, 2). Absoluteness for Hobbes does not pertain to sovereignty.

The laws of nature therefore create real obligations both for the subjects and the sovereign. We can now, then, reflect on a new question: if the laws of nature come before the civil laws, if the political obligation does not originate from the power of the sovereign, and if the sovereign himself is obliged to God, the obligation, then, exists previous to the institution of the sovereignty. In other words, the obligation is previous to the contract that establishes civil society: the laws of nature oblige in the state of nature. This is how Hobbes, in opening Chapter XXI of the Leviathan by recalling the ideas of the previous chapters, puts it:

“…that the condition of mere nature (that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs that neither are sovereigns nor subjects) is anarchy, and the condition of war; that the precepts by which men are guided to avoid that condition are the laws of nature (...) I have sufficiently proved in that which I have already written” (Leviathan, XXXI, 1). That is, it is the laws of nature which lead men to the contract. This idea is strengthened

when we remember that from the first law of nature, “by which men are commanded to endeavor peace” (Leviathan, XIV, 5), is derived the second law that prescribes the contract “as far-forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary” (Leviathan, XIV, 5), and from there is derived the third law of nature which commands “that men perform their covenants made” (Leviathan, XV, 1). Men are led to the contract by a theological consideration that outweighs all


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other elements of Hobbes’s thought. The contract then works precisely to assure that the laws of nature are obeyed, as these are a necessary condition to attain peace. The sufficient condition is thus a coercive power that assures their observance: the sovereignty. We now begin to understand how the apparent ambiguity of Hobbes originates, in truth, a quite coherent system.

The contract, consequently, does not create new obligations, but provides a new sanction for their observance. It is in this sense that the social contract validates the laws of nature. It remains to be seen how the sovereign – that is, the coercive power needed for the observance of the laws of nature – obtains the obedience of the subjects. The main right of the Christian sovereign is to interpret the Holy Scripture and to authoritatively determine the laws of God, thus creating the civil laws with the purpose of making the laws of nature written and publicized. Moreover, the sovereign is responsible for the public worship and for the nomination of those who will teach and preach the words of God, and of those who will interpret and judge in conformity with the Holy Scripture (see Leviathan, XLII). Also, the sovereign holds the earthly punitive power and the interpretation of divine punitive power, which obliges the subjects to behave according to that which is necessary to their salvation (see Leviathan, XLIII).

More than teaching, preaching and publicizing the laws of God, it is through this punitive power that the sovereign will seek to fulfill his obligations to God and to the men that established his sovereignty through the covenant. In the kingdom of men, the sovereign holds not only the monopoly over legitimate violence, but also the monopoly over fear. It is by inciting in the subjects the fear of civil punishments that the sovereign attempts to secure obedience to the divine laws. Note that the interpretation of Hobbes that we are making here – conferring the ground of political obligation on the divine authority – is perfectly compatible with the interpretation that is predominant among Hobbes scholars, that is, of the obligation as grounded in the fear and/or in the sovereignty instituted by the social contract. Sure, the Hobbesian men need fear in order to obey, but this fear is the fear of God.

The obedience owed to the sovereign and the obedience owed to God, however, are of two different kinds. As we have seen, the Hobbesian subject is doubly obliged to the divine will, whether owing obedience directly to the laws of nature, or to his sovereign. This obedience to the sovereign is also theologically justified in two ways: a) by consisting of a divine prescription (that is, the laws of nature laws determine the obedience to the sovereign authority) and b) because the commands and the laws of the sovereign also must conform to the laws of nature, thus mirroring their content. Consequently, one can qualify the obedience to the sovereign as a simple obedience and the obedience to God as an unconditional obedience. This nomenclature Hobbes himself suggests in the De Cive, where he defines the obedience to the sovereign in this way: “to absolute right on the part the sovereign ruler corresponds so much obedience on the part of the citizens as is essential to the government of the commonwealth, that is, so much as not to frustrate the grant of that right. Though such obedience may sometimes rightly be refused for various reasons, we shall call it SIMPLE obedience” (De Cive, VI, 13). Later, he adds: “and just as in the case of simple obedience we take it as ALL THINGS that are not against the laws of God (...)” (De Cive, XI, 5). As a consequence, only obedience to God is full and unconditional, as it finds no limits; civil obedience, on the contrary, finds several and diverse limits, as I will demonstrate below.2

2 Before beginning the next point, it is necessary to complete this argumentation by refuting some possible

objections to the interpretation we have done thus far. One problem commonly raised by some commentators

on Hobbes is that the laws of nature only oblige “in foro interno” (that is, in the conscience of each man), not

applying to the plane of action (“in foro externo”). This understanding can only arise from an inattentive and

partial reading of Hobbes’s political philosophy. Against this objection Hobbes himself clarifies: the laws of

nature oblige only “in foro interno” in the state of nature, as in this case there is yet no coercive power that

enforces their observance. The pact made, the sovereignty established, the laws of nature also begin to oblige


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Thinking Political Disobligation

“Why should we not change the name of Leviathan into the Rebel’s catechism?” John Bramhall (1995: 145)

Once one rethinks political obligation in the context of what is called a theological

interpretation of Hobbes it becomes possible to think of a concept of political disobligation. What do I mean by “disobligation” here? Disobligation does not only mean the state of being released from obedience. That would be a passive or negative account of disobligation. In a broadest - and thus active and positive – sense, disobligation means being constrained to disobedience. In other words, it does not only mean that the subject is no longer obliged to obey something (such as a sovereign command or civil law), but rather it means that the subject becomes obliged to disobey that. Thus, to keep Hobbes’s system of ideas coherent, disobedience is not merely an issue of possibility but of necessity. It is not only a right but a duty. Disobedience turns out to be a matter of obligation. When a disobligation arises, for example from the sovereign’s violation of a law of nature, the subjects obey it by being disobedient; they obey a disobligation by disobeying an obligation. That is, an obligation (e.g. to obey the civil sovereign by disobeying God) can generate a disobligation (e.g. to disobey the civil sovereign by obeying God), so what should be obeyed is, in the end, a principle of disobedience.

Hence, one can think that obligation and disobligation are ultimately one and same thing. What makes this whole interpretation feasible is the fact that both obligation and disobligation have the same ground: the laws of nature. So what makes a person obliged is exactly what makes him disobliged. In last instance, then, there is no obligation without disobligation (just as obviously there is no disobligation without a previous obligation). Man can only be obliged to something when they can also be disobliged to it. Otherwise obligation by itself has no meaning; what constitutes it as an obligation is the very possibility of disobligation. Thus obligation has an intrinsic relation to its own limitedness and finitude.

It is important to note, though, that while obligation and disobligation have the same ground, the laws of nature, this does not mean that they have the same source. While the laws of nature ground both obligation and disobligation, it happens that obligations can also arise from civil laws while disobligations have as their only source the laws of nature. This is why the subject can be disobliged to obey a civil law if it contradicts the laws of nature. Thus, while obligation and disobligation have the same ground, the source from where they originate is not the same. And as

“in foro externo”, whether to be contained in the civil laws, or because the sovereign is responsible by the

guarantee of their observance. Another similar critique, easily refuted, is that which insists that the laws of

nature only become obligatory by the authority of the sovereign that transforms them into civil laws. In fact,

the distinction that Hobbes makes between the civil laws and the laws of nature, which I demonstrated above,

is itself sufficient to avoid this misunderstanding. At no point does Hobbes affirm that the laws of nature only

become obligatory at the hand of the sovereign. They were always obligatory; for they do not come from the

consent of men, but are prior to it. The sovereignty arises just to establish a coercive earthly power that

assures their observance and punishes their violation. The sovereign has the function of unifying the

interpretation of the natural laws, and not of giving them a normativity that they already have. It is interesting

to note that even Hobbes’s conception of justice is related to the divine ground in his theory of obligation.

There are two terms that Hobbes uses to attempt to define what is apparently a single idea. Injustice means the

violation of a civil law while iniquity is the transgression of a law of nature (Leviathan, XV, 2, 3 and 39). This

is why one cannot speak of injustice in the state of nature: before the covenant, there were no civil laws to be

violated, but only laws of nature. The covenant turns out to be necessary precisely in order to suppress the

iniquities of the state of nature (that is, the violations of natural laws) by thus constituting a coercive power

that assures the obedience to the divine laws and, consequently, peace.


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we already know, there’s a necessary hierarchy between the civil laws and the laws of nature, as there is between the mortal sovereign and the immortal God.

The following analysis has two parts. First, I will briefly show how a general idea of disobedience is sustained in the context of the secular interpretations; that is, those that do not connect Hobbes’s theory of obligation to a theological ground. Then, I will present an alternative theological interpretation of disobedience as an account of disobligation. This interpretation aims to be compatible with the religious ground of political obligation that I have discussed in the previous section of this paper.

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When does political obligation end for the Hobbesian subject? When does he become free from his obedience to the sovereign? Can subjects resist the “irresistible” power of the sovereign? Can they disobey him? What are the limits of obedience in the context of a non-theological interpretation of Hobbes’s?

I would like to propose here the examination of disobedience through two forms, individual and collective. The individual form of disobedience is the right of resistance, which is subdivided into two categories, these being resistance aimed at physical preservation and the resistance aimed at moral preservation. The collective form of disobedience, in its turn, also has two forms: the right of rebellion and the right of revolution.

Concerning integrity or physical self-preservation, the right of resistance can be manifested in three ways: a) the right to resist death; b) the right to resist injury and imprisonment; and c) the right to avoid military service. Therefore we can see that the right to physical self-preservation is not limited to the right to life. Hobbes is concerned also with the physical integrity of individuals. There are some interpreters who even affirm that self-preservation aims at the wellbeing of individuals (Kavka), to their good life (Flathman) and to their private profit (Hampton). Hobbes does not wish only to guarantee the lives of individuals, he also wishes to assure them peace.

In order for this broad notion of individual preservation to be unlimited and inviolable, it is necessary to extend its warrant also against the power of the sovereign. The latter will find within the resistance of individuals limits to his actions, in such a way that these are always kept within the purposes for which they were instituted: the protection and security of the subjects. As Hobbes says, “... the end of obedience is protection… when, therefore, our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained, then there is no liberty to refuse; otherwise there is” (Leviathan, XXI, 21 and 15). The obedience to the sovereign is only due as long as he behaves in such a way that ensures the broad protection required by the right of nature, or right of self-preservation. When the latter becomes threatened, even if the threat originates in the exercise of sovereign power, the subjects are free to disobey.

It is precisely the liberty of the subjects which is the focus of chapter XXI, within which is located the majority of Hobbes’s references to resistance. After writing about liberty in general, Hobbes goes on to define the “true liberty” of a subject as “the things which, though commanded by the sovereign, he may nevertheless without injustice refuse to do” (Leviathan, XXI, 10). In other words, for Hobbes true liberty does not mean the lack of prohibitive commands from the sovereign, but rather in the possibility of disobeying him.

The right of resistance regarding threats to one’s physical preservation is systematically laid out in the Leviathan. The defense of life and of physical integrity is unrestricted and consists in the simplest case in a limitation of the sovereign’s action. As Hobbes affirms,


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“if the sovereign commands a man (though justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that assault him, or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he cannot live, yet hath that man the liberty to disobey”. (Leviathan, XXI, 12). Further, “... the same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience (as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded or imprisoned), as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not” (Leviathan, XIV, 8). Note that Hobbes is not concerned simply with the continuation of life, but with the

maintenance of at least a slightly dignified life. Hence, to live imprisoned, with incurable wounds, body injuries or even physically debilitated and weakened, is not to live with dignity. Perhaps it can be said, then, that there are worse eventualities than death in the Hobbesian world. The sovereign therefore should assure a dignified life to his subjects and not only provide them with physical integrity. If the protection offered by sovereignty is not complete, disobedience becomes legitimate.

The third case of resistance regarding the threat of violation of the physical preservation of individuals relates to the case of compulsory military service. Soldiers can refuse to participate in battles, because no individual is absolutely indispensable for the army. In this way, the soldier that desires to avoid going to war can do it as long as he appoints a substitute for him. “... A man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice, as when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place…” (Leviathan, XXI, 16). And it is not only this hypothetical case that permits the refusal of military service. The soldiers who desire to escape from duty because of fear can also do it legitimately: “and there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness...when armies fight, there is, on one side or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly…” (Leviathan, XXI, 16).

Indeed, wars constitute a true risk to life and physical integrity for those who participate in them as soldiers. And those who desire to avoid it, whether from fear or believing themselves to be dispensable for the task, are justified in doing so. The egoistical personality of the Hobbesian subject places itself above the authority of the sovereign, allowing for the refusal of his commands, even when they concern questions of national security. How one can render compatible the sovereign’s duty of protection (which should be active in cases of both internal and external threats) with the subjects’ freedom to refuse to take up arms in order to defend the State? Who decides if a certain subject is necessary or not for the defense of the State? Is it the sovereign or the subject himself?

The second case of the exercise of the right of resistance arises in circumstances in which the Hobbesian subject should be zealous for his moral preservation. These possibilities also originate from three fundamental rights: a) the right to not self-incriminate, b) the right to not incriminate another, and c) the right to not be obliged by one’s own words. Hobbes wants to guarantee not only physical integrity, but also the honor of individuals; to maintain integrity not only of one’s physical body, but also of his reputation:


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“… a covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation; and in the civil state the accusation is followed with punishment, which being force, a man is not obliged not to resist” (Leviathan, XIV, 30). Subjects can resist self-incrimination not only because the punishment arising from it is a

threat to their physical integrity, but also because it violates their moral integrity. For, if this were not the case, Hobbes would not affirm that, “the same is also true of the accusation of those by whose condemnation a man falls into misery (as of a father, wife, or benefactor)” (Leviathan, XIV, 30). So, the accusation of another does not lead to bodily punishments for he who accuses – to the contrary, often this can even contribute to avoiding them – but, instead, to moral damage. The “misery” in which one encounters the individual who accuses his father, his wife or benefactor is a moral misery. Once again, Hobbes wants to assure men a dignified life.

Thus, “if a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not bound (without assurance of pardon) to confess it, because no man can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself” (Leviathan, XXI, 13). Here we have the statement that even the criminals, those that have violated the civil laws of the sovereign, still retain the right of self-preservation. Nothing can take away this right, neither the initial social contract nor the disobedience to the civil laws of the State. The right of self-preservation – whether in its physical or moral forms – is indeed inalienable and unlimited; it is a true natural right. The sovereign that attempts to oblige a subject to sully his reputation through his own words can be freely disobeyed.

Moreover, “no man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself or any other man, and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign, to execute any dangerous or dishonorable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission, but on the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof.” (Leviathan, XXI, 15). Is Hobbes affirming in this passage that the subject can lie to the sovereign in order to preserve himself? That is, even though the subject consent to execute a sovereign’s command which appears to himself as dangerous or dishonorable, this consent should not be considered as such, but should be understood for its intention, which, in the case of Hobbes’s man, will never mean to put oneself at risk. The words of men do not always oblige them to their fulfillment. Submission to the sovereign power can require that words and consents appear to be held, but the instinct of self-preservation keeps men from oblige themselves to danger and dishonor.

If each individual can refuse to kill another or to execute dangerous or dishonorable tasks, what would happen if all of the individuals of the Hobbesian State were to decide, simultaneously, to refuse to carry out the commands of the sovereign? What coercive power would be left to the sovereign? After all, the criteria of the determination of what is dangerous or dishonorable seem to be also in the hands of the subjects; otherwise this would not be a matter of disobedience. The subjects can thus collectively exercise disobedience. Rebellion takes the place of individual resistance.

One of the collective forms of disobedience is thus rebellion: “…in a case a great many men together have already resisted to the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty then to join together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have; for they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent” (Leviathan, XXI, 17).


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If then a great number of men together have their integrity threatened – whether for having committed a crime punishable by death, or for having resisted the sovereign beforehand in an unjust way, that is, in a way not permissible with regard to the above-mentioned reasons for disobedience – it is just that they unite and collectively rebel, defending one another. And this right is unlimitedly extended to all, even to the one charged guilty of infringement of previous commands of the sovereign. A second act of disobedience can thus in some cases validate the first. “There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act” (Leviathan, XXI, 17). Hence, the disobedience can reinforce itself. If the subject who disobeyed has once felt threatened by possible punishment, he will have an incentive to rebel once more, this time with the purpose of self-preservation.

And “if it be only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all” (Leviathan, XXI, 17). By continuing the above cited paragraph with this sentence, Hobbes guides us to the understanding that not only can self-preservation lead a subject to take up arms against the State, but so also can the aim of preserving the lives of others. If the greatest enemy that Hobbes’s man apparently had was man himself (which is why they needed to submit to a power greater than themselves in order to be preserved) only a greater danger than themselves could make them gather and defend one another. What would this danger greater and stronger than men themselves be? The sovereign...?

“And though sovereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortal, yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death by foreign war, but also through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality by intestine discord” (Leviathan, XXI, 21). The rebellion, then, can turn into a revolution, and this occurs when the internal discord

could put an end to the sovereignty, since “the obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them” (Leviathan, XXI, 21). Hence, if the subjects feel that their integrity is threatened by the commands and punishments that the sovereign imposes, that is if they believe that their self-preservation is not satisfactorily assured by him, they can justifiably rebel, together initiating a revolution that might put an end to the sovereignty itself. The institution of sovereignty does not guarantee the establishment of peace, nor does it terminate the survival instinct of Hobbes’s man. The Leviathan-sovereign, after all, is as mortal as the other men are… and potentially as much of an enemy as them.

Thus we have seen the relationship, in the Hobbesian system of thought, between obedience and protection. The right of self-preservation is unlimited and cannot be renounced. It constitutes a limit to the contract that brings individuals to live in society. In making the covenant, men do not renounce all their rights: “a covenant not to defend myself from force by force is always void. For (as I have showed before) no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment (the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right), and therefore the promise of not resisting force in no covenant transferreth any right, nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus unless I do so, or so, kill me, he cannot covenant thus unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me.” (Leviathan, XIV, 29).

The covenants that impede individuals to resist threats to their integrity are null. The use of force by the sovereign legitimates the use of force by the individuals. The Hobbesian social contract does not exclude resistance and revolution. When the protection ends or is threatened,


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the subjects can take up arms against the sovereign. “For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting” (Leviathan, XIV, 29).

Hence, the power and the rights that subjects transfer to the sovereign in the moment of the contract are not irrecoverable. They are assigned to the sovereign so that he would ensure and improve the preservation of individuals, but if this does not happen it can be taken back. The power that men give to the sovereign does not take the form of a donation, but rather of a loan. The subjects can demand it back if and when they consider that the sovereign is not fulfilling his part of the contract.

Hobbes dedicates several pages in the Leviathan to the distinction between the concepts of renouncement and transference, just as between those of the covenant and contract (Leviathan, XIV, 6 ff). From there an appropriate analysis of these terms, such as defined and employed by Hobbes, would allow one to affirm that what is at stake is not a renunciation of rights, but a conditional and temporary transfer of some rights of the individuals to the sovereign.

In the same way, it is correct not to speak of a contract, nor of a social contract, but of a covenant of obedience, between “every man with every man” (Leviathan, XVII, 13), the object of which is the fulfillment of the laws of nature. But, as “... it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides covenant) to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe…” (Leviathan, XVII, 12), the men consent also to the institution of sovereignty. The latter is thus a consequence of the covenant of obedience to the laws of nature; it is a condition of validity of the covenant. Hence the structure of Hobbes’s contractualist argument has two stages: the consensus concerning the necessity of a covenant and the consensus related to the need of a coercive power that obliges its execution.

Given the double structure of this contractualist argument; given that the subjects covenant among themselves and not with the sovereign; given that the institution of the sovereignty is not the main purpose of the covenant, but merely its condition of validity; and, finally, given that consensus coexists with divine authority, we are able to claim that Hobbes’s contractualist model does not fit among the classical types of social contract; It could neither be classified as a pact of subjection (pactum subiectionis) nor as a pact of association (pactum societatis).

What is thus at stake is a pact of obedience whose aim is to give effectiveness to the laws of nature; in other words, to secure the peace and protection prescribed by the natural laws through their obedience. And the purpose of the institution of sovereignty is precisely to insure that this pact of obedience will be obeyed. Consequently, when the sovereign himself acts contrarily to the ends for which sovereignty was instituted – whether no longer caring for the enforcement of the pact of obedience, or whether acting against the natural and unalienable rights of the subjects ― he is no longer respecting its finality and causes, and therefore he can be resisted.

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Now I shall move on to examine disobedience in an account of political disobligation, in the light of a theological interpretation. We have already seen that the political obligation to which Hobbesian men are subjected – whether in the state of nature, or in society – derives from the divine will, as expressed in the laws of nature. We have also seen that the laws promulgated by the sovereign, the civil laws, are in truth contained in the natural (or divine) laws. Hence, the content of any normative document (everything that can receive the name of “law”) has its substance conferred on it by the laws of nature, in such a way that it would never be contrary to


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them. We have also seen that the sovereign, in exercising his duties of judging, executing and legislating, also submits to the laws of nature, owing them as much obedience as do his subjects. I will present henceforth a theological version of the disobedience of subjects regarding the sovereign. In so doing, I move to the second half of the Leviathan in order to inquire into the conduct of subjects who owe obedience, simultaneously, to God and to the sovereign. The question here is: in what way does the obedience owed primarily to God justify disobedience to the sovereign? That is, when does the duty to obey God imply the right to disobey the sovereign?

Further: how does one explain the obedience to the laws of God (indeed to the laws of nature) within a state governed by men? How does one explain the compatibility between the obedience to God and the powers conferred on the sovereign in the State? Hobbes has the ambition of solving this problem, once he allows that “the most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war, in Christian commonwealths, hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once both God and man, then when their commandments are one contrary to the other”. This ambition is not too difficult to achieve, for “it is manifest enough that when a man receiveth two contrary commands and knows that one of them is God’s, he ought to obey that and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawful sovereign (whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly) or the command of his father” (Leviathan, XLIII, 1).

Thereupon we find Hobbes’s statement that the commands of God are superior to the commands of the sovereign; this we could though have assumed earlier, when we saw that the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of the sovereign are subordinated to the laws of nature, that is, to the laws of God. But what is new here is the claim that the sovereign should be disobeyed when he commands something contrary to the divine laws. After all, men are subjects of God before being subjects of the sovereign. The divine commands should be obeyed without restrictions, even when the sovereign commands in a contrary way. Hence, the Hobbesian subject can disobey his sovereign, but not God. More than that: he can disobey the sovereign precisely to be able to give his obedience to God.

How then does Hobbes intend to make compatible the simultaneous obedience to the sovereign and to God? How does he provide that the commands of God will be followed without restriction? What ensures the primary obedience to the divine laws in the Hobbesian system of thought? Why does the subject desire so much to obey them? Why does, at the same time, he fears not obeying these laws to the point of disobeying his own sovereign? In the words of Hobbes, the answers would seem to be fairly simple: “but this difficulty of obeying both God and the civil sovereign on earth, to those that can distinguish between what is necessary and what is not necessary for their reception into the kingdom of God, is of no moment. For if the command of the civil sovereign be such as that it may be obeyed without the forfeiture of life eternal, not to obey it is unjust (...) but if the command be such as cannot be obeyed without being damned to eternal death, then it were madness to obey it…” (Leviathan, XLIII, 2).

As good Christians, Hobbesian men desire, above all, their salvation. That is, their major concern throughout life consists in securing their own entrance into the Kingdom of God, thereupon reaching eternal life. And for this they will only obey the sovereign as long as this obedience does not obstruct their salvation. The sovereign’s commands that could put the desired eternal life at risk should be disobeyed. How then does the subject know how to distinguish that which is necessary from that which is not necessary for his entrance into the Kingdom of God? What is the criterion that allows him to distinguish between those of the sovereign’s commands which, if fulfilled, endanger his salvation, and those which can be obeyed without such risk?

Once again, Hobbes’s answer comes easily: “all that is NECESSARY to salvation is contained in two virtues: faith in Christ, and obedience to laws” (Leviathan, XLIII, 3). Faith, according to Hobbes, consists in a divine gift that God can give to whoever desires. And only one article of faith


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is enough in order for salvation to be secured, which is the acceptance that Jesus is Christ. As to the obedience of the laws, there are no doubts; these are the laws of God, or rather, the laws of nature, as once more Hobbes insists in affirming:

“The laws of God, therefore, are none but the laws of nature, whereof the principal is that we should not violate our faith, that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns, which we constituted over us by mutual pact one with another. And this law of God, that commandeth obedience to the law civil, commandeth by consequence obedience to all precepts of the Bible…” (Leviathan, XLIII, 5).

This is the formula with which Hobbes believes obedience to God can be reconciled with

obedience to the sovereign: “there can, therefore, be no contradiction between the laws of God and the laws of a Christian commonwealth” (Leviathan, XLIII, 22). This is nothing new, though, since the second part of the Leviathan (in this exposition, I have now reached the beginning the fourth) Hobbes has demonstrated that the civil laws and the natural laws contain each other reciprocally. Further, he showed that the sovereign can only legislate within the limits of the natural laws. The sovereigns are therefore responsible for turning the divine laws into positive law (Leviathan, XLII, 37, 44 and 80). Moreover, as I have also argued earlier, they are subjected to the obedience of these laws, under penalty of being disobeyed by their own subjects. Therefore,

“... It is not hard to reconcile our obedience to God with our obedience to the civil sovereign, who is either Christian or infidel. If he be a Christian he alloweth the belief of this article, that Jesus is the Christ (and of all the articles that are contained in, or are by evident consequence deduced from it), which is all the faith necessary to salvation. And because he is a sovereign, he requireth obedience to all his own (that is, to all the civil) laws, in which also are contained all the laws of nature (that is, all the laws of God). For besides the laws of nature, and the laws of the Church which are part of the civil law (for the Church that can make laws is the commonwealth), there be no other laws divine. Whosoever, therefore, obeyeth his Christian sovereign is not thereby hindered, neither from believing not from obeying God” (Leviathan, XLIII, 22).

It is then by ensuring that the sovereign is as subordinated to the laws of God as are his

subjects that Hobbes reconciles the two objects of obedience owed by these latter. For the subjects are simultaneously obeying God and the sovereign insofar the latter is obeying God. After all, the same rewards promised to the subjects obedient to God, salvation and the eternal life, are also offered to the sovereign. In a corresponding way, the same penalties applicable to the subjects disobedient to the divine words, purgatory and eternal death, are also applicable to the sovereign. Hence the sovereign has the same incentive as his subjects to obey the words of God in the first place. Both desire the reward or fear the divine punishment.

Hobbes’s solution therefore involves indicating that the conflict between two different and simultaneous commands enunciated by God on the one hand and the sovereign on the other can be solved by its denial; that is, through the demonstration that all the commands of the sovereign must agree with the divine laws, in such a way that by obeying the sovereign the subject also would be obeying God. But what happens if the sovereign were not a Christian but an infidel? Or if, even being a Christian, the sovereign were to sin?

The sovereign who is an infidel or a sinner would not have the necessary faith in Christ and neither would he obey the laws of nature, that is the laws of God. Therefore, he could command his subjects to actions contrary to the divine words. In this case, as we have seen, the


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disobedience of the subjects to the sovereign is more than legitimate. The commands of the sovereign that run against the laws of nature should be resisted.

And what is a law of nature if not “a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved” (Leviathan, XIV, 3)? Here we are back to the Hobbesian right of self-preservation. The sovereign who disobeys the natural law would be necessarily threatening human self-preservation. And the sovereign capable of such threat should also be legitimately disobeyed. Hence we have the compatibility between, on the one hand, the perspective which allows for disobedience to the sovereign in the case of threat to the preservation of the subjects, and, on the other, that which grounds disobedience to the sovereign on the sovereign’s own disobedience of the natural or divine law.

The sovereign who threatens the self-preservation of his subjects and the sovereign who disobeys God can be resisted. After all, the sovereign who threatens the physical or moral integrity of his subjects will be necessarily disobeying the divine laws. It is worth remembering the content of the first law of nature, in which these two ideas are presented: “every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war” (Leviathan, XIV, 4). If the sovereign were to impede the subjects from obtaining peace - whether in the earthly world, or in the Kingdom of God - they should rebel, taking advantage of all means available to defend themselves.

One can thus think of a return to the conditions of the state of nature in cases in which there is disobedience to natural law on the part of the sovereign. In the state of nature men live at war, since they themselves interpret the laws of nature accordingly to their own will, thus becoming judges of themselves. Thus the covenant turns out to be necessary, since it unifies in the hands of the sovereign the power of interpretation of the laws of nature, as well as the earthly application of some of the punishments their disobedience entails. This power must be coercive in order to secure the obedience to these laws, that is, to divine will. If a subject violates the covenant in order to obey God, when one of his ordinances differs from a command of the sovereign, this disobedience is legitimate. If a subject breaks with the covenant in order to escape sovereign commands that go against the very purpose of the pact or against inalienable and imprescriptible rights, disobedience is also legitimated. And, in these two hypothetical cases, both society and covenant are left intact. Nevertheless, if the sovereign violates the covenant, its existence and that of society are put in danger. For in breaking the covenant by disobeying the laws of nature, the sovereign is no longer in possession of a monopoly of the interpretation of the laws of God. The conditions of the state of nature return, and the subjects become themselves responsible for the interpretation and judgment of the laws and are therefore able to verify the disobedience of their sovereign in face of God.

I have yet to respond to two objections that could be made to my interpretation. The first regards the so called authorship problematic. That is, the argument that, by the authorization given to the sovereign, his acts are also always acts of the subjects, so that the sovereign never acts unjustly, for this would mean that the subjects are unjust with themselves and this is impossible. Indeed the sovereign cannot act unjustly, since injustice is the violation of the civil laws and the sovereign, as we know, is not obliged to obey them. Though he is obliged to obey the laws of nature and therefore cannot act with iniquity. It is the iniquitous action of the sovereign, and not the unjust action, that legitimates disobedience. Furthermore, it could be argued that even if the sovereign always acted justly, this would not constrain the subject against disobeying him. The injustice of the sovereign is not a necessary condition for the legitimacy of resistance. For, even if the sovereign constantly acts within the bounds of justice and equity, the subjects can still resist based on their natural right of self-preservation.


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The final objection that remains to be considered concerns the compatibility of my interpretation with the possibility of atheism. One could argue that my interpretation would only be feasible if all subjects were believers, for the obligation theory that I have set forth would seem not to work for those who do not believe in God. Against this objection I offer the following responses: a) even if atheist subjects are not motivated to obey by divine rewards and punishments, they are motivated to obey by earthly punishments, or rather, civil punishments; b) in order to avoid civil punishment, atheist subjects act in conformity with the civil laws which, in their turn, conform to the laws of nature, in such a way that obedience to the civil laws implies the primary obedience – even if involuntary – to the laws of nature; and c) beyond the civil punishments, atheist subjects are subjected to the natural punishments, which Hobbes describes at the end of the chapter XXXI. The natural punishments are not divine punishments, but they are “natural, not arbitrary effects” that result from the violation of the laws of nature. The violations of the laws of nature and their respective natural punishments are so described by Hobbes:

“...These pains are the natural punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more harm than good. And hereby it comes to pass that intemperance is naturally punished with diseases; rashness, with mischances; injustice, with the violence of enemies; pride, with ruin; cowardice, with oppression: negligent government of princes, with rebellion; and rebellion, with slaughter. For seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of laws, natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the laws of nature, and therefore, follow them as their natural, not arbitrary effects” (Leviathan, XXXI, 40).

Therefore, d) the disbeliever subjects have a natural incentive to obey the laws of nature,

therefore they don’t need any divine incentive, and e) beyond all of this, the possibility of atheism in Hobbes’s system of ideas is not only compatible with my interpretation but even reinforces it, for since the atheists would never obey the laws of nature out of faith, one can justify a civil power that obliges them by force to obey those laws. That is, if the covenant was made in order to secure obedience to the laws of nature, and the sovereignty was established in order to assure this obedience, then certainly the very existence of the atheists must have been an incentive for the enactment of the covenant, for their erratic and non-virtuous actions (contrary to the laws of nature) has necessarily reinforced the state of war. Therefore, my justification for the establishment of the covenant and sovereignty is validated once it is known to be necessary that there be a sovereign power who creates effective laws as well for those who do not believe and thus do not obey the laws of nature as for those who do.

As can hopefully be inferred from the foregoing discussion, disobedience can assume three forms in Hobbes’s thought: resistance, rebellion and revolution. Resistance is the only individual form of disobedience and it has three legitimating causes: the natural right of self-preservation, the protection and peace that constitutes the end of the covenant, and the sovereign’s violation of the laws of nature. These causes legitimate three hypothetical cases of resistance, a physical, a moral and a religious one. These cases can also be divided into sub-cases. The physical case of resistance arises in three situations (or, better, derives from three sub-rights related to the right of self-preservation): when the subject is made by the sovereign to face death, injury, imprisonment, or compulsory military service. The rights inferred from these circumstances are thus: the right to resist death, the right to resist injury and imprisonment and the right to refuse to complete military service. The moral case of resistance also arises in three situations related to three different rights derived from self-preservation (which, as we have seen, includes more than merely the protection of life as such, but implies a notion of a dignified life). These rights are: the right to


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not self-incriminate, the right to not incriminate others and the right to not be obliged by one’s own words. Finally, the religious case of resistance arises out of a situation in which the faith of the subjects leads them to disobey the sovereign who violates the laws of nature. Note that while the two first legitimating causes (the natural right of self-preservation and the protection and peace that constitute the end of the covenant) apply to the physical and moral cases of resistance, the latter (the sovereign’s violation of the laws of nature), applies only to the religious one.

The collective forms of disobedience, as we have seen, are rebellion and revolution. Rebellion has two legitimating causes: the natural right of self-preservation and the sovereign’s violation of the laws of nature. It has also two hypothetical cases: civil and religious. The civil case of rebellion arises in two situations: when there is a previous and unjust situation of resistance to the sovereign power and when a subject commits a capital crime, for which he could be put to death. As happens with the resistance, the religious case of rebellion arises when the faith of subjects allows for a disobedience to the sovereign who infringes the laws of nature. Again, note that while the natural right of self-preservation is the legitimating cause for the civil case of rebellion, the sovereign’s violation of the laws of nature is the legitimating cause for the religious case of rebellion.

Finally, revolution also finds two legitimating causes in Hobbes thought: the end of the covenant, which is protection and peace, and the sovereign’s violation of the laws of nature. These causes are again related to two hypothetical cases, a civil and a religious one. The civil case of revolution stem from a circumstance of internal discord that puts sovereignty itself at risk. The religious case of revolution, originates in a situation in which the subject’s faith in God and his laws drives him to disobey the sovereign who breaches these laws. Once again, note that the first legitimating cause (the end of the covenant) relates to the first hypothetical case (civil rebellion), and the second (the violation of the laws of nature) relates to the second case (religious rebellion).

The chart below systematizes the individual (resistance) and collective (rebellion and revolution) forms of disobedience to the sovereign power, as well as the legitimizing causes and the hypothetical cases that authorize them.


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Resistance

Legitimating

causes

Natural right (self-preservation)

Finality of the covenant (protection and peace)

Violation of the laws of nature by the sovereign

Hypothetical cases

Physical

Right to resist death

Right to resist injury and imprisonment

Right to refuse to complete military service

Moral

Right to not self-incriminate

Right to not incriminate others

Right to not be obliged by one’s own words

Religious

Faith

Rebellion

Legitimating

causes

Natural right (self-preservation)

Violation of the laws of nature by the Sovereign

Hypothetical

cases

Civil

Previous and unjust resistance to the sovereign power

Committing of a capital crime, for which one could be put to death

Religious Faith

Revolution

Legitimating

causes

Finality of the covenant (protection and peace)

Violation of the laws of nature by the Sovereign

Hypothetical cases

Civil Sovereignty’s internal discord

Religious Faith


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Final Remarks: An Obligation Grounded on Faith?

A careful examination of the problematic of political obligation as undertaken in a theological reading of Hobbes indicates a broad horizon for scholarship yet to be conducted. In fact, the theological interpretation allows for a substantial hermeneutic malleability of Hobbes’s works, enabling one to approach topics that have not had much space within the traditional secularist commentaries. Such is the case with the topic of disobedience. Even though a secularist reading might approach this topic, as we have seen, that approach would be very incomplete since it only allows disobedience to be legitimated by the rupture of the contract or by the vacating of the consensus that made it concrete. Such a reading relies solely on the disobedience entailed in the idea of a natural right of self-preservation and all of its derivative rights. The account of disobedience implicit in the traditional theological interpretations goes further since it embraces all cases accepted by a secularist interpretation plus others derived from a theological account of political obligation. However, the studies of Taylor, Warrender and Hood, the main contemporary figures on the theological side of Hobbes scholarship, do not adequately account for the limits of political obligation. One can say that this task is better accomplished by Hood than it is by Warrender, and better by the latter than it is by Taylor. But in any case these approaches have at least two major problems. First, they don’t make full use of all the tools and methods that arise from a theological interpretation of Hobbes, and sometimes their approaches seem to be based on a consideration of the secularist cases of disobedience. Their accounts of religion and natural law in Hobbes’s thought are not fully related to their accounts of disobedience, as they can and should be. Second, while the theological interpreters lack a full account of disobedience, they claim that the common understandings of Hobbes as a prominent advocate both of an absolutist conception of sovereignty and State and of a consent-based contractualist justification of sovereignty should be attenuated. This fact renders their interpretations in a certain sense incoherent. A theological interpretation ought to do more than just vindicate the attenuation of those claims by showing how the focus on the religious aspects of Hobbes’s thought allows for a weakened conception of sovereignty that is still connected to a medieval way of thinking, or for a justification of sovereignty that is still based on the idea of the divine right of the kings. In so doing they provide a powerful account of how Hobbes’s concept of political obligation should be rethought, but they fail in simultaneously providing a perspective on how disobedience can and should be newly thought in light of that account. Nevertheless, the only way to make compatible simultaneously the attenuation of the claims of absolutism and consent-based contractualism on the one hand, and an account of the limits of political obligation based on the Christian natural law tradition on the other, is by placing the obedience of the subjects and that of the sovereign on a single level and upon the same ground that, if violated, legitimates disobedience. This is the task that I have tried to accomplish in this paper, by sketching an account of what I called political disobligation. As I have argued earlier, the only way of rendering a theory of obligation coherent in Hobbes’s thought is by developing it together with a theory of disobligation. There is no use in talking about obedience where we cannot envisage disobedience. At least not in the context of a theological interpretation of Hobbes that does not ignore certain parts of the Leviathan (and parts of De Cive and De Corpore Politico, as well as the entirety of Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined and Hobbes’s writings on heresy, which most interpreters completely neglect) and thus makes possible a more complete hermeneutics of it.

By way of conclusion a few other things are worth pointing out concerning the passage from a secular to a theological account of the limits of obligation. First, when we move from a secular account of disobedience to a theological one and from here to a (still theological) account of disobligation, we move from a conception of right to a conception of duty. That is, what is a right


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of disobedience in the former perspective becomes a duty to disobey in the latter. In other words, the possibility of disobedience turns out to be a necessity. This is something that the concept of disobligation accounts for that the concept of pure disobedience does not. And this also explains why, as I stated earlier, disobligation means being constrained to disobedience. That is, it does not only mean that the subject is no longer obliged to obey a sovereign command or civil law, but rather it means that the subject might become obliged to disobey those. Secondly, it is important to note that in the context of a theological interpretation of Hobbes such as I have attempted to present here an obligation always mean a political obligation. Even in the state of nature, as I tried to argue in the first part of this paper, the obligation is a political one. For this (political) obligation always has a religious and thus moral ground. What I want to call attention for in order to avoid misunderstandings is then that what is religious is the ground of the obligation and not the obligation itself. Thus this is not an account of Hobbes’s concept of moral obligation, but of political obligation. The claim that I hope was clear in my exposition is that in the Leviathan the concept of obligation always means what we nowadays understand as political obligation. In other words, the obligation is always a political obligation, though with a religious ground. Its ends and consequences are political even though its ground and source are religious.

As I hope to have shown in the above pages, Hobbes presents in the Leviathan a conception of political (dis)obligation whose source is the laws of nature and whose ground is the divine will as manifested through the Holy Scripture. Even though, as I argued at a certain point, the obligation could be fulfilled either out of fear of divine punishments or out of hope of divine rewards, this does not mean that the nature of Hobbes’s concept of political obligation is consequentialist (as might be the case in De Cive and De Corpore Politico but not in Leviathan). It is rather simply and purely deontological. Beyond fear or hope, what drives men to undertake both obligation and disobligation is faith.

Secularist interpretations usually rely on Hobbes’s account of either passions (notably fear) or reason (prudence or self-interest) to explain what motivates Hobbesian man to fulfill his obligations (the establishment of the covenant and every law and civil command that derives from it). A theological interpretation of Hobbes, though, is not compatible with any of these accounts taken in isolation. It is located in between those interpretations that aggrandize the role of reason and those that overly exalt the role of passions in Hobbes’s thought. In the theological interpretation that I have presented in this paper, these two elements are combined, in such a way that we can speak of a coexistence between a sort of theological reason and a divine passion. And that in which reason and passion are amalgamated, grounding (dis)obligation, is faith. References: BRAMHALL, John. The Catching of Leviathan, or the great whale. In: Leviathan: Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, ROGERS, G.A.J. (org.). Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1995. BURGESS, Glenn. “On Hobbesian Resistance Theory”, Political Studies, 42, 1994. COOKE, Paul D. Hobbes and Christianity. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Boston, 1996. CURLEY, Edwin. “Calvin and Hobbes, or Hobbes as an Orthodox Christian”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 34, 1996.


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FLATHMAN, Richard. Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality and Chastened Politics. Sage Publications, New York, 1993. HAMPTON, Jean. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. HOBBES, Thomas. Leviathan. With selected variants from the latin edition of 1668. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1994, Edwin Curley (ed.). ______________. The Elements of Law: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, J. C. A. Gaskin (org.). ______________. On the Citizen. Edited and Translated by Richard Tuck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. HOOD, F. C. The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964. KAVKA, Gregory. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986. MACPHERSON, C.B. Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964. MARTINICH, Aloisius P. The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. POGREBINSCHI, Thamy. O Problema da Obediência em Thomas Hobbes. EDUSC, São Paulo, 2003. SCHMITT, Carl. The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Greenwood Press, London, 1996. STRAUSS, Leo. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Its Basis and its Genesis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952. _____________. Natural Right and History. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953. TAYLOR, A. E. “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes” in Philosophy 13, 1938. WARRENDER, Howard. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1957.

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