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Introduction

Poverty and Moral Obligation

Poverty affects most if not all of the societies in the world. The problem of poverty has

been and it is almost as old as the history of mankind. This is evident from the period in

humanity when the dwellings had no adequate sanitary arrangements- above all there was hunger

and famine which were so chronic that only the worst examples were recorded. Hazzilt (1996)

remarks that war, droughts, scarcities, famines, crimes, violence, diseases were prevalent to a

degree and if empirical research is done on the issue, this is still evident and simply, the recurrent

starvation that runs through the whole of human history are needed to remind us of the appalling

dimensions and persistence of the evil. The presence and prevalence of poverty and its effects

on various societies is still evident which means that poverty seems to have not left us in any

shape; it has been one of the causes why individuals cannot find access to shelter, food, housing,

health security, education and more importantly to live adequately.

There are different dimensions of poverty. These include material poverty, intellectual

poverty, spiritual poverty, moral poverty, poverty of leadership. Poverty can also be relative or

absolute. The dimensions of poverty make the meaning and understanding of poverty to be

problematic. Spicker, Sonia & Gordon (2007) think that material poverty in its dimension can be

described as a lack of material things such as clothes, housing, and appliances. while on the other

hand intellectual poverty denotes the lack of knowledge, relative poverty is described as being

poor in contextual situations which is based on cultural evaluations, and absolute poverty does

not attract any contextual situations, it denotes being in total abject poverty. This is the more

reason why one cannot ignore the subject even though there are many issues apart from poverty

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which are still affecting us as humans; therefore the issue is one which is affecting the human

condition of individuals to live up to the maximum standard of their capabilities.

Given, the volume of literature on the discourse of poverty, we must focus on a particular

issue in relation to poverty. Our focus in this essay is to discuss raise the question whether the

rich has a moral obligation to help the poor. In order to do this we must contextualize our

meaning of poverty, given the fact that there are many dimensions of the term. Simmel&

Jacobson (1965) think that when the ideal of moral obligation is applied to poverty, it becomes

much more interesting because sometimes the former and the latter are said not to be

incompatible with each other; however in subsequent discussions in the essay- it will become

notable that both concept will be seen as compatible. Sometimes in public discourse and in

philosophical discourse, there have been arguments that as individuals we do not have the moral

obligation to alleviate poverty and also there is other side of the argument that we as individuals

certainly have a moral obligation to help those who are less privileged in the society.

The position which I will hold in this essay is that the rich have a moral obligation to help

those who are considered to be poor in the society. However, I am of the view that there will be

counter arguments against my position as Hegel (1998) and Willde (1915) do not believe that

those who are affluent do necessarily have a moral obligation to pull those who are deprived out

of poverty because they do not necessarily need their help and sometimes the rich end up further

pushing those who are poor to the brim where they themselves will further end up convincing the

rich that they are worse of.

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The essay is divided into thee chapters. Chapter one takes an overview of the literature on

poverty. This chapter identifier the different dimensions of poverty. It is suggested that what is

common to all these view of poverty is the condition of lacking something.

Chapter two discusses the concept of moral obligation from the perspectives of different

moral philosophers of the ancient, the modern and contemporary periods. The essence of this

chapter is to pave the way to examine the question of whether the rich have a moral obligation to

help the poor.

The third chapter considers the question whether the rich have a moral obligation towards

the poor. The essay responds to this question in an affirmative way. It suggests that human

beings, no matter the class, culture and status in life, we are obligated to one another in virtue of

our common humanity.

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CHAPTER ONE

LITERAURE REVIEW ON THE CONCEPT OF POVERTY

Spicker & Guizamen et al Gordon (2007) in twelve clusters of meaning of poverty

evidently proved how the definition of poverty seems difficult to be established. The debates on

poverty have been bedeviled by an artificial formalism, which insists that there is only one

agreed meaning of poverty. How ever, poverty does not attract a single meaning.

For Gordon, poverty is commonly understood in at least twelve discrete senses, which are

logically separated: The first meaning denotes poverty as a material concept: individuals are

attributed as being poor because they do not have something they need or because they lack the

resources to get the things they need; here ‘needs’ may refer to things like-food, clothing, fuel or

shelter. These needs may be relative or absolute; however Hazzilt (1946) thinks that the sources

and foundation of the needs are linked to different preferential wants.

The second meaning denotes a pattern of Deprivation; every need can be said to be

equivalent to been termed as poor. However, there are several interpretations of what makes up

being poor due to level of needs: food and shelter for some is seen more important than

entertainments and transport, thus what they lack is relative as affirmed by Simmel & Jacobson

(1965).

Simmel (1965) thinks that the third meaning denotes poverty as limitation of resources

which is commonly known as the failure to meet certain minimum requirements for the standards

of living. But the fourth meaning denotes poverty as poor economic circumstances: Hazzilt

(1946) thinks that poverty can be understood in economic terms as the mostly used approaches to

identify those who are known to be living in a state of deprivation.

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The fifth meaning denotes a fall from the humane standards of living; since the poor are

considered as individuals who do not meet the required standards of living. However Hazzilt

(1946) and Simmel (1965) affirm that what is considered as the humane standard of living of a

human being is relative to every individual.

The Sixth meaning of poverty denotes inequality: people may be held poor, because they

are disadvantaged by comparisons to others in society – This situation where some are at the

bottom of the economic ladder is referred to as economic evidence of social stratification; which

is rather distinguished by the terms, higher class, middle class, lower class.

The seventh meaning of poverty denotes an economic position: where a class of people or

certain individuals is identified by their economic position in the society; this definition

maintains that poor people should be understood as belonging to certain classes. In Marxian

analysis, which I will also consider in my subsequent discussion, classes are defined in terms of

social interaction with the means of production - in the Weberian sense, classes refer to people

who are envisaged into distinct economic categories.

In relation to the eight meaning, social circumstances and the social class involved need

to be focused upon; this is the idea that the social class should be linked with circumstances of

the poor persons.

The ninth meaning denotes poverty as dependency; this is a situation where those

considered as poor people are sometimes defined as 'contingent beings’ that depend on those

who are above the standard of living. This is described by Engbersen & Spicker (2007:9) as:”the

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structural exclusion of citizens from all social participation, along with a situation of dependence

in relation to the state where they are found”.

While the tenth meaning denotes a lack of security; poverty is defined as the vulnerability

to social risks often identified as social exclusion from other individuals in the society because

they are considered by Sherover & Hegel (1979) as not belonging to the class of the elite.

The eleventh meaning denotes a lack of entitlement as fundamental to the condition of

poverty; people who have the necessary entitlements in the society are not poor; but some are

due to lack of sufficient entitlements.

While the eleventh meaning denotes poverty as exclusion; Simmel (1965) thinks that

poverty can be seen as a set of social relationship in which individuals are excluded from the

participation of the normal pattern of what is termed as social life, in the course separating them

from society.

Finally, the twelfth meaning denotes poverty as a moral judgment; poverty consists of

serious deprivation when people are known to be poor, when their material circumstances are

defined to be morally unacceptable, this definition is an attachment of value judgment to the

moral elements of the concept of poverty which makes it difficult for one to provide a clear

definition of poverty.

From Spicker, Guizamen & Gordon (2007) analysis it seems that the definitional clusters

and denotations focused upon attract a conceptually different meaning of poverty. These

definitions are logically separated- in certain cases, they overlap, it thus seems that poverty needs

a composite concept which embraces the meaning of poverty, but this is not analytical- a socio-

political philosopher who discusses the concept of poverty in an analytical sense is Karl Marx

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The concept of poverty in the socio political philosophy of Marx is refined as that of a

civil society based on the wood theft debates. Sherover (1979) aims to: firstly, show how Marx’s

discussion of the poor represents a particular transformation of Hegel’s view on the poor and

secondly, how Marx early views of the poor have proved problematic due to the connection of

Hegel’s own characterization of the ‘unincorporated poor’ but he transforms the concept by

making it synonymous with the definition of the poor by Simmel & Jacobson (1965:40) as “the

elemental class of human society”.

Sherover (1979) thinks Hegel used the term “stand” to refer to any social groups which

an individual belongs to in a society; this term’ stand; is used in a dual manner; for he sees no

connection between the classes of civil society because there is a unification of a state and a civil

society. Thus one can only discuss Marxist concept of poverty from a Hegelian point of view.

According to Hegel as quoted in Sherover (1979, 283):

The unincorporated poor is described as the corporation of the unknown where their

members need the external signs beyond his own membership as evidence of his skill and owner

of an income as an evidence that he or she is somebody that belongs to a whole which is itself

an organ of the entire society that he or she is interested in and its members makes effort to

promote the disinterested end of this whole, this is a war of finding a solace in the state which he

or she has been excluded from

Thus, in Hegel’s statement, there is a reciprocal relationship between a legal status and a

civil society. The poor then have to be known as an unincorporated’ of a non-member of a civil

society, Hegel’s distinction between corporate members and those of the unfortunate who are

regarded as the unincorporated poor- is referred to as ‘rabble’ which is translated as being

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‘poverty stricken, malcontent and rebellious’. Hegel’s description of the poor and their state has

nothing in common with the notions of an ideal- which denote that there is nothing’ honorable’

in Hegel’s eye as a member of the incorporated poor. Honor for Hegel is that of a civil honor

where members of a civil society belong to and in a significant sense, the poor are not members

of this society.

However, it is not their state of deprivation which leads them to being outsiders (non-

members) but because they do not belong to any authorized estate. As such an individual could

not live according to his or her standards because the standards of a civil society are not

compatible with their status. The consequence of this reasoning is that the poor do not really

exist in a society- since they lack the requirements of membership. For Hegel, this is a distinction

between the notion of real existence and that of membership in a society-real existence is a

legally recognized existence- and it is a rational existence; the existence of the poor is within the

periphery, an existence that is entirely irrational, and purely contingent on the affluent members

of the society.

However, Hazlitt (1946) seems to have different opinions on the concept of poverty in his

book Conquest of poverty. In one of his chapters, he begins with the discussion of the problem of

poverty before focusing on the concept of poverty. In relation to the problem of poverty, he

seems to begin by tracing the history of poverty from the ancient world to our present

contemporary world: he thinks that the history of poverty is almost similar to the history of

humankind, this is evident from the ancient world of Greece and Rome where there were

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prevalence of poverty exemplified in hunger and famine and where dwellings had no adequate

sanitary arrangements.

For him, the middle ages did not fare better when war, droughts, scarcities, famines,

crimes, violence, diseases were prevalent to a degree that were unaccustomed to in our present

day. For him, the recurrent starvation runs through the whole of human history. His aim of

tracing the problem of poverty from the ancient through the modern and to the contemporary

periods was because the chronicle is needed to remind us of the appalling dimensions and

persistence of the problem of poverty. Thus there is evidence that poverty is still very much with

us at local, national, regional and international levels. Thus, Hazlitt (1996, 20) observed

that:):“In most of Asia, Central and south America and Africa- in short even affecting the great

majority of mankind which shows the terrible dimensions of the problem are still to be solved

In relation to the definition of poverty, Hazlitt thinks that any study of poverty should

logically begin with a definition of the term, ‘poverty’. For him, the term ‘poverty’ appears to be

vague; it is nearly always employed in a relative rather than an absolute sense. The definition of

poverty is enveloped in comparative terms; it is obvious that all relative definitions of poverty

make the problem in defining poverty insoluble. Comparative definitions lead us to endless

difficulties; because if poverty means being worse off than somebody else, then all but one of us

is judged as been poor- for an individual could be subjectively deprived. According to Hazlitt

(1946:32):”it is part of man’s nature never to be satisfied as long as he/ sees other people better

off than himself”.

In the above view, poverty is not seen as an absolute concept. Rather, poverty is a

relative concept which depends on who is defining the term and in what situation in which the

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term is defined. Thus for Hazlitt (1996) our conception of poverty necessarily involves a value

judgment of people in different ages, epochs, countries and in different personal circumstances.

This means that the definition of poverty depends on the range of conditions and the situations

and circumstances of those who are described as being poor.

Boyle’s (1999) definition of poverty shows that there is a satisfactory long standing

controversy as to whether the concept of poverty should be elucidated in terms of minimal living

or an absolute standard. According to Schultz, as quoted in Boyle (1999:3),”most of the people

of the world are poor, so if we knew the economics of being poor we would know much of the

economics that really matters”. In his view, the concept of poverty evokes a different response

from one person to the next- because any answer is a reflection of a personal value system.

Poverty is an unmet physical need; individuals are known to be poor, when they lack or are

deprived from standards of minimal living. However, the question is whether a person's physical

need termed as absolute or relative? An answer to the question will suggest that these two terms

‘relative ‘ and ‘absolute’ compound the problem of having a clear concept of poverty.

Boyle (1999) thinks we fail to define poverty adequately because everyone evades the

question of what it means to be human. Failure to answer this question-has led to the long

standing spilt as to whether poverty is absolute or relative. This is because of the diversity of

human nature, which shows that human beings are diversified in cultural as well as social and

economic situations.

On the other hand, defining poverty in a relative term suggests that one will ignore the

fact that human beings have communalities, in form of shared aspirations. However, nature has

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not predestined everyone to be poor, it is how resources are been managed in the world-which

leads to inequality and as a result individuals are poor.

The treatment of the concept of poverty by Katz (1985) in Caste, Class and Counsel for

the poor is impressive because he traces the concept of poverty from the classical period to the

contemporary period in a twinkle of an eye. According to Katz (1985:251): “In modern society,

poverty has been defined not only to quantitative measures of well being but as a morally distinct

category; this moral distinct category has been associated with primordial characteristics of race,

ethnicity, national origin or religion”. Katz thinks that over the past centuries in the industrialized

west, the poor have been organized into a social status with caste-like features. The meaning of

being poor in western industrial societies has been accounted for the scale of social significance-

the term ‘poverty’ has become a moral deviance and the poor have become a sort of a modern

moral caste. This caste has been identified as a morally unique primordial identity and its

members have been segregated in the socio-economic order. He introduced the theme of the poor

as caste because there are variations of those who can be identified as being deprived.

The historical development of the concept as viewed by Katz (1985) has been seen in

terms of sympathy and pity and being poor continues to be referred to as been in a pitiable state.

In the contemporary period, being poor has now been transformed from an age-old moral

adjective of sympathy into a noun of disgust and disgrace; poverty then has been ascribed to

living in ‘slums, ghettos, tenements’.

Sen’s (1981, 2) treatment of the concept of poverty relegates the concept to an existential

situation. He describes poverty as:”to live in poverty may be sad, but to offend or be hurtful to a

society which creates problems for those who are not poor” (p, 2). In the quote, Sen asserts that

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there are requirements to be used in any concept of poverty; the requirement is of a criterion as to

who should be the centre of attention, is the concept of poverty related to the interests of only the

poor or the non-poor? Sen thinks we should direct our concern on the poor; because the suffering

of those who are deprived depends on the condition of those who are said to be rich.

However, Nagel (1979) provides us with an allusion to the subjective experiences of the

poor and what it feels like to be in poverty. This is because in his view, being poor cannot even

be described because it is a conscious experience of a widespread phenomenon, and it may be

argued that the rich cannot understand the lived experience of the poor person. As suggested by

Simmel & Jacobson(1965) being poor may be a subjective phenomenon which is analyzable in

terms of any system of functional states or intentional state because since one cannot know or

feel what it means to be poor , if one is not in the situation.

Being poor then is more of an subjective evaluative tone because of the inability of those

who are not in the particular situations to explore or assess the state of mind of those which are

involved. What can only be feasible is to sympathize with those who are labeled as poor in a

society which does not sometimes pay particular attention to them. The various discussions by

the authors which are considered in this chapter tend to make us understand the difficulty in

coming to a conclusive definition of poverty.

To conclude this chapter, it was observed that poverty is of various dimensions.

However, the common element that runs through the various understanding of the term is that

poverty means “lack of something” This something can be material, psychological, economic,

intellectual, leadership and other virtues that contribute to human well being. .

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In the next chapter, attention will be on the question whether persons have a moral

obligation to alleviate poverty. In order to do this, we shall interrogate the concept of moral

obligation and attempt to respond to a specific question, whether the rich, for instance, has a

moral obligation to help the poor.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE CONCEPT OF MORAL OBLIGATION

’Morality’ and ‘obligation’ are two words which appear to be related to each other. The

definition of morality itself is a problematic notion in moral philosophy because of the contextual

usage of the term. The word can be used to refer to a judgment of what is morally right or wrong.

What is morally right or wrong can also be seen either from a cultural perspective or from a

universal perspective.

Obligation on the other hand, is used as a form of moral or legal commitment to an action

or inaction. If somebody is obliged to another person, then it means that that person is either

legally or morally committed to do something or refrain from do something in respect of another

person. Furthermore, human beings are said to be morally obliged to law, societal standards,

academic achievements, donating to charity. According to Sartorius (1998), being morally

obligated to do something which might promote a good action and a good consequence is the

right thing to do in all situations even though it is not in our power to do so in situations which

we may find uncomfortable.

In this chapter, we shall examine the views of other moral philosophers about the concept

of moral obligation. These philosophers include: H.L.A. Hart, Charles Finnley, David Hume,

Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill.

According to Hart (1974) one of the central problems in both moral and legal philosophy

has been to offer a satisfactory analysis of the concept of moral obligation and he asserts that

‘obligation’ can be used in different contexts to designate many states of affairs.. For example, I

am morally obligated to keep my promise to a friend. I am also both morally and legally

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obligated to obey the law. In moral philosophy, scholars have given reason why we are

obligated to do certain things and refrain from doing certain things. The utilitarian believes that

we are morally obligated to somebody or to obey the law if our action will promote the

happiness for the greatest number of people. The deontologist, on the other hand holds that

obligation depend on the performance of certain actions that we are duty bound to carry out. Hart

has observed that any statement of obligation presupposes the existence of a general ‘social rule’

that covers the particular circumstance that occasioned the obligation. It thus means that social

rules that impose obligation are distinguished from all others by three distinct features: the first is

that obligation imposing rules are supported by serious social pressure, which involves physical

sanctions for deviation from the obligation; but he thinks that this rule may enjoy some public

support because of the strong disapproval of many in the public sphere.

The second feature is that obligations are thought to be important because they are

believed to be necessary for the maintenance of social life and the third feature is that

compliance to rules is what imposes obligation. Hart thought that properly, speaking, the concept

of obligation belongs to the sphere of law. Hart insists that that it makes no sense to talk about

having a moral obligation to do something unless it is accepted by the rule of morality. But given

the fact that rules of morality may vary from person to person, from time to time and from

culture to culture, it becomes difficult to hold that there is indeed a moral obligation which

defines what we should do or not do universally. Hart then distinguishes moral obligation from

other social rules and from other moral principles because statements of obligation, presuppose

the existence of social rules that meet his three criteria in relation to four cardinal features (Hart

1974, 455):

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First, all social rules of morality are regarded by the group that holds them as being important;

Second, social rules of morality are immune to changes; third, social rules of morality are

supported by a form of guilt and remorse; fourthly, the lack of intention to disobey social rules of

morality is regarded as an excuse for non-compliance with them.

Hart’s treatment of moral obligation seems to differ from the analysis of other moral

philosophers because of their concern with moral rules- Hart’s view of moral obligation creates

serious consequences; for example: an individual might believe that in some circumstances, the

morally right thing to do is different from an accepted moral rule by the public. Thus, his

analysis of the concept of obligation is necessary to understand the concept, however it is not

sufficient. However, Finnley (1851) has attempted to redefine moral obligation as related to a

moral agent.

Finnley (1851) suggests that human beings are subjects of moral obligation. According to

him, there are certain extents to which human beings are morally obliged to do certain things. All

human beings are aware of this by a necessity of nature and such obligations are affirmed in their

day to day practical judgments. In his view, human beings possess the attributes of ‘wit’

(intellect) which includes reason, conscience and consciousness. Finley thinks that human beings

have the idea of the valuable, what is right and wrong. According to him, there is other authority

outside human reason that is responsible for the awareness of our moral obligation. However, he

thinks this assumption is irresistible and as well as universal; for any moral obligation is praise--

-worthy or blame--- worthy as they are either selfish or benevolent – which again shows that all

human regard themselves as subjected to moral obligation.

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Moreover, Finney) asks us to reflect on the extent to which we do have a moral

obligation. For him, there are three reasons why there has to be a reflection of this fundamental

question. The first is to show by an appeal of reason to what acts and states of mind, moral

obligation cannot directly extend to; the second is to what acts or states of mind, moral

obligation must directly extend to, and the third is to what acts and mental states, moral

obligation must indirectly extend to.

In relation to the first, he thinks that moral obligation is connected with the action of the

will. Moral obligation does not extend to external action because it is linked to the involuntary

states of mind. It is impossible that moral obligation should- extend to any involuntary act. In

relation to the second, he thinks that moral obligation must extend to the choice of the conditions

and means of securing the objective of ultimate choice; because it is valuable to a moral agent.

And the third reason, moral obligation indirectly extends to all acts of will; it extends to

everything about us.

Wand (1979) expounds on Hume’s ethical theory in relation to moral obligation.

According to Hume, moral obligation makes sense in respect to good and evil rather than one of

duty According to Wand (1956:55):”this statement is quite erroneous’ for Hume does not merely

wish to discover the foundation of our moral actions”. Hume's account of how motives prompt

men to moral actions is quite complex, but Wand (1979) also asserts that Hume distinguishes

between two basic types of action to make it more understandable. The first type are those

action which human will perform without the aid or influence of reason or custom; the second

are those action which it can be expected human will normally perform with the aid or influence

of reason or custom.

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Hume distinguishes these two types of action-in terms of the specific moral nature of

their motive, whether or not the action is done from a sense of duty. Thus Hume distinguishes

four classes of actions. The first, are those actions prompted by the natural or -moral motives; the

second are those actions prompted by artificial, non-moral motive; third; those actions prompted

by artificial moral motives. In consideration of his account of moral motivation, Hume’s ultimate

intention is to show that it cannot be a natural duty to carry out certain types of obligation such

as being just or keeping promises. Hume thinks that the actions envisaged cannot constitute duty;

it would never be a duty unless human nature possesses some rational inclination prompting

individuals to perform certain actions.

Hume thinks that the content of our duties is in our natural state, because it is determined

by spontaneous inclination. Two different accounts of our moral valuation are intended when we

are applying them to two distinct situations. The first account is to give a description of the basis

of our moral appraisals in which only the spontaneous affections operate when there is no stable

social environment. The second account gives a description of the foundation of morals in a

stable social environment in which we are all familiar. According to Hume as quoted by Wand

(1979:157); “our natural uncultivated ideas of morality provides a remedy for the partiality of

our affections, and they do rather conform themselves to additional force and influence”,

The moral worth of any action for Hume is always determined by the nature of its

prompting motive; but this would mean that we are arguing in a circle because we perform a

particular action from a regard for its moral worth, which is regarded as a prompting motive. But

Hume will call this a sense of duty which can never be a natural motive of action because the

only condition under which a person feels hatred towards himself is when such individual is

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lacking a motive. But this does not satisfy the reason why individuals are subjected to moral

obligations.

Wand (1979) thinks that the most succinct account of the meaning of moral obligation is

to be found in Hume’s discussion on the original contract for he asserts that the second accounts

of moral duties are such which are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but we

perform such act on true basis. It thus denotes that what makes an action morally obligated

according to Hume is the recognition on the part of the moral agent, that he or she has the

necessity to perform them when s/he desires to attain the satisfaction of himself/herself and when

s/he does not hold such a moral obligation beyond the supposed situation, as a sense of duty can

never be an original reason for actions.

In analyzing the concept of moral obligation, Hume attempts to isolate and analyze the

factors under which moral obligation can be predicated upon selfish or selfless grounds. For

Hume, what plays a significant part is habit, for in the case of feeling or when self--- interest has

disappeared; the agent merely acts out an outward habitation which attracts an altruistic end.

The utilitarian approach to moral obligation is advanced by Jeremy Bentham and John

Stuart Mill. There are two types of utilitarianism: The act utilitarianism and the rule

utilitarianism. Sartorius (1969) asserts that act utilitarianism claims that features of moral

obligation are based upon retrospective considerations-Utilitarian and non –utilitarian moral

philosophers alike have typically described normative ethics as being concerned with the

provision of a theory or account of our moral obligation, implying that there are no

philosophically relevant distinctions to be made between what a man ought to do and what man

has an obligation to do. The rule utilitarian who would agree that an obligation or duty is not

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necessarily a moral obligation; they suggest that an obligation arises within instutions of

practices which on utilitarian grounds attract good and bad consequences; which is then a moral

obligation.

Sartorius (1969) suggests that the act-utilitarian may then say that even though the reason

for the existence of an obligation may lie in the past, there are still many grounds for a given

moral obligation; which do not determine whether the act is fulfilled from a sense of duty or

other motives and end result.

Quillian’s (1949) treatment of the concept of moral obligation not only gives an

exposition of the concept, but also seeks to clarify the theoretical problems involved in it. He

argues that any treatment of moral obligation will follow two dimensions. Firstly, either it will

seek to explain the fact of moral obligation or it will deny or at least question the validity or

meaningfulness of the notion of unconditional moral obligation. Secondly, when the notion of

moral obligation is analyzed, the only defensible meaning which it will have is that of a

conditional moral obligation, because he thinks that the understanding of what one really wants

or desires is discovering what specific acts and attitudes will achieve the fullfiment of these

desires. For him, the question of ‘ought’ or of ‘ought not’ in the multitude of situation makes the

concept of moral obligation much more problematic.

Furthermore, Quillian thinks that non naturalistic writers in ethics have consistently tried

not only to account for the concept of moral obligation, but also they defend and explain the fact

of unconditional moral obligation. There are three important theories of this type: the first is

from a source of obligation in the will of God; the second is from Immanuel Kant’s

deontological ethics; the third is from the source of moral obligation in value and virtue ethics.

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According to him, the source of moral obligation that is predicated on God’s will is the view that

moral obligation is derived from the command or the will of God. In this vein, what reason only

does is to recognize that there is a moral obligation and not to create any moral obligation; rather

ii is derivation from a transcendental realm from where “ought” is derived from “is”, where

morality is based on religion. This kind of moral obligation is a form of hypothetical imperative,

a moral obligation done to attain the ‘highest good’, which is Virtue. This kind of moral

obligation is that of a master’s will which rests on a divine authorship.

Moreover, Quillian(comments on the Kantian moral obligation, that the notion of a moral

law represents what moral obligation denotes in an unconditional sense which is seen as an

objective fact of duty; where the moral agent, in recognition of this moral duty, is constituted by

his/her own will and not that of any divine commander. This moral agent upon recognition of

this moral law wills it as the duty to enact his own actual obligation or duty. This is Kant’s

familiar principle of autonomy.

Kant’s belief in the will of the agent is that of consciousness which requires that agent

wills the law as that to which he or she is morally obligated. However, the appearance of this

sense of duty remains to be explained. Quillian thinks that Kant frankly confesses his inability to

explain the origin of the motive of duty itself. He thinks that Kant does not find the problem as

an insoluble one because it is possible for the will to be determined solely by considerations of

duty.

However, Kant will think that the determination of the will results from the recognition

of an end in which the agent has an interest or which he or she desires. In this sense, Kant’s

examination of moral obligation does not really deal with certain wants or interests or desires of

22

the human being. His notion of self-legislation is both possible and meaningful if only such

fulfillment and the destiny of the individual’s own nature surfaces in situations which are’

higher’. We are thus, left with an agent’s moral obligation to act with reference to that value of

self-commitment.

Quillian has reasoned that naturalists deny the fact of any categorical obligations. He

thinks that they explore a subjective sense of moral obligation which has been attributed to

various forms of external restraints; be it political, social and religious. Such naturalistic

treatment of moral obligation is described by H.N. Weman in the source of moral obligation in

the will of God as quoted by Quillian (1949:40) that:”the imperative of moral obligation is not

derived from enlightened self-interest or altruism or the authority of tradition and custom of

social approval and disapproval”.

From the above view, it follows that there is a non-human power creating good and

opposing evil in human life and moral obligation arises due to the operation of a power in the life

of a human being which demands a certain order of relationships among people-but again this is

in a hypothetical sense. Quillian thinks that another naturalistic treatment of moral obligation is

found in the universal ethical standard, when a human being is obligated to the degree that he or

she realizes that it is in a form of an end- this is an absolute good possible for all persons which

is universal.

This is between the self and the absolute good-a relationship of concern and a

relationship of moral obligation or duty. In the above analysis, the self is concerned with the

absolute good. The individualistic self ought then to seek this good, unless a moral obligation is

in a conditional sense.

23

From these various examinations of the concept of moral obligation, I think that the heart

of the problem is to determine the meaning of the notion of moral obligation to see what are its

sources and to what extent it is binding on human beings. However, an outstanding problem here

is that there are certain external forces-natural, social and spiritual which seem to act as

constraint against our moral obligations.

The various external, social and religious sanctions are generated quite differently from

the kind of demand which would be characteristics of a feeling of moral obligation when one

feels constrained to act in a certain way because of what individuals would approve of or feel

when I am morally obligated to act in a way- rather when I am confronted by a hypothetical

imperative which tells me that there is a unique feeling in respect towards a moral obligation.

The implication of many of the discussion in this chapter seems to be that at the end, can we say

that moral obligations are real? Are human beings morally obliged in any way?

The only answer I want to leave in this chapter is that it seems reasonable to me to say

that I possess a moral obligation because such action is in harmony with my own highest good.

It is said by some philosophers that to do away with the idea of obligation is to take away the

very heart of morality. This is because it is often believed that at the heart of morality is the

concept of other regarding, the idea that suggests that we need to transcend the self and act in an

altruistic manner. It is this notion of altruism that is embedded in the idea of moral obligation.

Thus the concept of moral obligation implies that I have a duty towards a particular person, law

or social institution ethical decisions have to be made. These decisions may, in turn, have some

positive or negative consequences if they are or not carried out the essay will examine the view

whether the rich has a moral obligation towards alleviating the condition of the poor.

24

CHAPTER THREE

DOES THE RICH HAVE A MORAL OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THE POOR?

One of the questions that cut across the domains of moral philosophy is whether the rich

have a moral obligation to alleviate the condition of the poor. This question cuts across

substantive ethics, meta-ethics and applied ethics. The question is that of looking for theories that

will justify the position, raising epistemological issues as well as applying ethical theories to

practical matters.

One recent philosopher that has examined this issue is Kekes (2002). His position is

based on the argument that it is only a rationally indefensible rampant moralism that will claim

that the rich has an absolute obligation to support the poor. His aim is to examine one influential

attempt to make a reasoned case for this moral obligation- that of Peter Singer. According to

Kekes, Singer has provided a utilitarian defense of the position that the rich has an obligation to

relief famine. According to Kekes (2002: 509):

Singer says that when individuals are starving, it is immoral to have such things such as

stylish clothes, expensive dinners, a sophiscated stereo system, overseas holidays and singer

undoubtedly intends that a very large majority of people in affluent societies is immoral; and

most people above the poverty level and many below it spends money on things that are not

necessities.

25

In this light, some may disagree with the examples provided by Kekes (2002), however

Singer himself will agree because by not giving more than we do, we are allowing those in abject

poverty to suffer; however the question is whether there is a moral obligation to do so, and if

there is, how strong is this supposed obligation? Kekes' (2002) claim that Singer’s argument in

support of the moral obligation of the rich to help the poor is very feasible. It is not the obligation

of charity, which is usually thought to be the right thing, but sometimes the wrong thing to do.

For him, it is a clear positive duty and our failure to execute this duty is equivalent to killing

those whom we could have saved.

But Singer realizes that the general acceptance of the stance that the rich are morally

obligated to help the poor would lead to a revision of the affluent conceptual moral scheme and it

would have ‘radical implications as well on their status. But given the suffering from absolute

abject poverty, nothing less is called for. Singer then thinks that the rich should change the way

they think.

He is persuading the rich to do this, and what he wants to do- is to propose and defend a

principle and this principle is called the prevention principle and he claims that this principle

seems uncontroversial. However, Kekes claims that this is patently false due to five reasons:

First, it obviously makes a great difference who is threatened by the very bad thing; Second- it is

no less obvious that it is folly to prevent a very bad thing from happening without asking about

the consequences of doing so; Third, it is equally obvious that it affects the supposed obligation

why the very bad thing is threatening some people; fourth, it is similarly questionable whether

the obligation will hold if the people threatened by the very bad thing are proud, independent

26

and refuse help; fifth, should it be asked how good are the chances of preventing the very bad

thing from happening(p,506).

Kekes' critical observation renders the putatively uncontroversial prevention principle

controversial. However, one also needs to ask what makes Singer so confident that the

prevention principle is uncontroversial? The answer is that he supposes that the principle is a

straightforward implication of ethics. This is because for him, ethics is hinges on the egalitarian

principle, a principle of equality where equal considerations are supposed to be given to all

human beings that are in the same condition. The only form of inequality will be when an

unequal treatment will result in a more egalitarian state of affairs. In other words, Singer is also

echoing Rawls’ (1971) doctrine of justice as fairness.

Kekes thinks that this basic ethical principle is problematic. First, it commits one to the

absurdity of considering equally the interests of benefactors and scourges of humanity. Secondly,

it does not say how people’s interests are to be identified or determined. Thirdly, his principle

rests on severely criticized principle of marginal utility. However, I think Singer might be able to

respond to these criticisms by claiming that these are practical issues and that they do not affect

the position that the egalitarian position is an ethical one. Egalitarianism is a position that

advocates equal treatment for all people, irrespective of age, gender, culture and social classes.

Given this position, then egalitarianism takes the form of universality, which is one of the

ingredients of the moral point of view. This view is echoed by Singer as quoted in Kekes

(2002:510):

“This universal aspect of ethics provides a persuasive reason for taking a broadly utilitarian

position- for it allows us to choose the course of action that has the best consequences- and also

27

because ethics is impartial since it considers the interests of everyone and it further prevents

something bad from happening to anyone”.

However, ethics need not to be committed to the universal point of view. For example, a

particular obligation to one’s family, friends, political and religious ideals often take

justificationary precedence over impartial obligation that may be owed to everyone. More

importantly, the equal consideration of interest does not impose the obligation to prevent

something bad from happening to anyone, for we can ask whether they have brought it upon

themselves.

Kekes seems to explain that Singer’s rampant moralism is derived from this failure- most

affluent people claim to be committed to ethics and will be disturbed by the claim that they must

either donate what they do not need for basic necessities and failing to do so, they will let the

poor die in absolute poverty. Kekes' supposition is that if Singer can dispose of all these

difficulties , he can they say that the rich are in a position in which they must make a ‘ultimate

choice’ in which their fundamental values come to the fore-which is’ rampant moralism’-to

radically change the lives of the poor.

Kekes then seems to offer a revised version of singer’s prevention principle- that the

suffering of people in absolute poverty is reason enough to try to help them and the rich are in

the position to do so. However, good reasons are evident to reject this much weakened position,

because the prevention principle is in isolation from any other ethical duty as the rich instead

would accept a responsibility principle.

28

One reason for rejecting the weakened form of the argument in support of the view that

the rich has a moral obligation to support the poor is because the supposed obligation is

obviously affected by the responsibility principle. It makes a difference to the obligation whether

the people living in absolute poverty are considered responsible for their ordeal: it should be

revised to say that affluent people have some obligation to alleviate the suffering of those who

live in absolute poverty, if the sufferers are not responsible for their own suffering.

Considering Kekes’ analysis of Singer’s arguments, the implication of Singer’s view is

that affluent people have the obligation to give up their pleasures in order to enable people in

absolute poverty to enjoy the pleasure of ‘sex’ without having to worry about feeding their

offspring; and if affluent people fail to do so, it is because they regard it more important to help

others in their own context who do not live in absolute poverty and are not responsible for their

deprived condition. Singer agrees that the rich have no obligation to make sacrifice and that to

the best of our knowledge, they have no propensity of reducing poverty but the public would

have to be able to judge whether the aid is going to result in superficial short term relief that

prolongs the suffering or whether it brings about changes in the long run.

Another alternative argument that we shall examine is Benbaji’s (2001) treatment of

moral obligation of the rich to support the poor. He aims to critically examine Frankfurt’s CIP

(Care Importance Principle).Frankfurt principle is that if there is something that a person does

care about, then it follows that it is important to him; this is not because caring for someone

involves an infallible judgment, rather it is because caring about something makes that thing

important to the person.

29

Benbaji (2001) claims that Frankfurt Care Importance Principle is false, because if we are

generally unable- to make unimportant things important to ourselves and we fail to do so and if

the rich is morally obligated to help the poor; then the rich caring for the poor may be an

important obligation for the rich, but they do not fulfill this obligation as caring may generate

genuine needs or caring may have a blinding effect. For instance, if the rich offer to help the

poor but do not know the needs of the poor, then there is a possibility that the condition of the

poor may be worsened by such help.

In this connection, Frankfurt Care Importance principle seems not to be applicable in all

situations when our personal-altruistic feeling gets involved; However, Frankfurt claims that the

notion of importance is more valued than caring- if something is important to one, it makes an

important difference to one; it seems that when caring we are vulnerable to loses and injuries

According to Frankfurt as quoted by Benbaji(2001:156), "the rich necessarily consider whatever

they care about to be important to them; and conversely they care about anything which thus

seems that the notions of importance of the rich helping the poor out of poverty is connected to

the needs of the poor”. Benbaji then attempts to provide an argument that fills the gap between

what the poor need as he thinks the rich caring about the poor increases their vulnerability to

harm as the poor can steal from the rich and in the process depriving the rich of his/her freedom.

More importantly, Benbaji claims that the rich caring for the poor does not mean that

there is a genuine moral obligation for alleviation of their deprived state; even though Frankfurt

seems to respect that intuition and appertains that judgment about importance and needs are

normative moral obligation of the rich should be a norm, the rich’s belief about the independent

importance of things is motivated by an action which is egoistic.

30

Benbaji thinks that the rich become vulnerable to pain and frustration as a result of

helping the poor, especially when the poor themselves reject the help offered by the affluent in

the society. We then seem to lack the way of evaluating the rationality of the rich caring for the

poor; because their action may be or may not to be motivated by caring; the rich then may be

suspected of trying to relegate themselves to the existential situation of the poor. He thus

suggests that the caring principle of Frankfurt sets a dilemma between the moral and the

personal- that is how we should deal with conflicts between our moral obligation and our

personal commitment? Benbaji thinks that a solution to this problem of whether the rich have a

moral obligation to alleviate the condition of the poor- is that if the rich help the poor, we should

not be skeptical about the motivations of their caring, for at least they offer a helping hand.

However, McKinley’s (1981) treatment of the matter in , ‘Obligations to the starving’

consider the question of whether principles that ascribe duties of benevolence can provide an

adequate basis for the moral obligation of the rich to the to the poor. Firstly, he argues that the

principles of benevolence are appealed to as a source of the affluent obligation to the starving are

either false or do not in fact yield a genuine instance of moral obligation. Secondly, he argues

that many persons who are deprived have the right to be helped by the rich on the basis of

benevolence. Consequently, he proposes a principle of benevolence which does yield moral

obligation to the poor; and he tries to spell out the nature and extent of moral obligation to the

starving, because they are members of groups which have such obligation. On the issue of the

moral obligation of the rich towards the poor; he thinks that the poor ought to be helped. But

Mckinsey (1981) thinks that many of those who have attempted to help are doing it on the basis

of a ‘life saving model”. According to McKinsey(1981:309): “The relation between each

starving or malnourished person and each member of an affluent society is conceived of as

31

analogous to the relation between a person who is in poverty and those who are rich”. In this

short quote, he thinks that the use of the life saving model to determine the affluent moral

obligation to the deprived is misconceived.

Peter Singer’s argument about John Kekes article on the “supposed obligation to relieve

famine which I had earlier examined at the beginning of this chapter is scrutinized by Mckinsey

(1981). He thinks that his argument is false because suppose that there is a starving person whom

I am in position to help, my action is not based on sacrificing anything on comparable moral

importance, for he thinks that we cannot save all of those who are deprived without sacrificing

any comparable moral importance. This is because most members belonging to the affluent

society do not have the resources to save those in wretched conditions. According to Mc Kinsey

(1981: 309)” even if the affluent sacrifice their wealth and attention for the deprived- they would

no longer be able to fulfill their own life goals.

However a weaker principle according to McKinsey (1981) would be that if it is in our

power to prevent the death of an innocent without sacrificing anything of substantial significance

then we ought morally to do it”. Thus, Peter Singer has been misled by the life-saving model

because the relationship between each poor person is seriously disanalogus to that of the rich.

According to McKinsey (1981, 312) we thus think that we can find a correct principle, which

would tell us that, the rich ought to save the poor from their wretched condition; this principle is

as follows:

S is known to be a set of action such that it contains all and only of those action which is open to

an individual agent in which: Firstly, it can be done by the rich without the rich sacrificing

anything of substantial moral significance. Secondly, it can attract consequences at least as good

32

as that of every other alternative action is open to the rich as given action performed by the rich.

(p, 55).

From the above quotation, it seems likely that the principle better captures the intuitions

of those who defend the view that the rich have duties of benevolence to the poor. When an

individual has an opportunity to increase the amount of good in the world or decrease the amount

of evil. He can do so without violating some other overriding moral obligation. Then the most

good the rich can accomplish would be to help the poor; but this is not self-evident as there are

many forms of human suffering and there are many ways in which the rich can effectively use

their resources to contribute to that relief.

From his observation, the rich have a prima facie moral obligation to positively

contribute toward the situations of those who are considered as poor; even if the issue of

benevolence interplays in their action, they have an absolute obligation to do so. But

Simmel(1965) thinks that in so far as human beings are social beings, each of their moral

obligations corresponds to a right on the part of others or distant others. The conception will be

that rights existed and this because of the obligations towards distinct others; but since every

person with obligations possesses individual respectable rights, a network of rights and

obligation is formed which in this case means that right is the primary element that sets the tone,

and moral obligation is nothing more than a inevitable correlation.

33

Since rights imply moral obligations for others, this simply denotes that if it were

possible to satisfy- every right in such a way that it would not implement the fulfillment of a

moral obligation, then individuals in no way need to resort to any obligation as a satisfaction of

being a social being. However this is a radical view because it does not correspond to

psychological reality which could be reconstructed and developed into an ethical idea. which

could mean that all pretentions of love and compassion of generosity are rights of the beneficiary

and ethics has asserted that in the face of these motivations, the highest to which a man can

aspire to do is to act out his or her duty and the fulfillment of duty requires a thinking which is

prima facie that is, a prima facie obligation.

Our duties it is said are duties toward ourselves and there are no distant others- this is a

full autonomy by the self and its own purely internal demands, being independent of anything

that lies outside of it- it is thus said that we ourselves are the only ones responsible for them only

to better our inner selves and in return our self esteem.

He thinks the fundamental dualism in basic sentiments is said to govern the course of

moral action in relation to the rich assistance towards the poor. The moral obligation of the rich

towards the poor may then appear as a simple correlate of the rights of the deprived. For

example, in countries where begging is a normal occupation, the beggar believes more or less

naively that he has a right to alms and frequently considers that their denial of this right is a

withholding of a tribute that the individual is entitled to.

34

An idea that the moral obligation of the rich towards the poor is based on their

predicament denotes that the rights of the poor is a basis of all assistance to the poor: the

humanitarian motive of making it easier for the poor person to request and accept assistance and

when by doing so, the poor exercise their due right-for humiliation, shame and declassment when

the rich are not offering assistance to the poor out of compassion or a sense of moral obligation

which is selfless. An example is when assistance is offered in cash to the deprived, it makes it

more difficult for the poor person to make use of the money because you are literally saying to

the poor that they are wretched or they are valueless.

Simmel & Jacobson (1965) think that the poor person addresses her demands in the face

of the affluent; however this is not specific to an individual, but to the individual on the basis of

the solidarity of humankind. Where assistance to the poor has its ‘raison d etre’ in an organic

elements, the rights of the poor are more highly emphasized when assistance to the poor is acted

upon from a motive then the affluent's hopes to offer assistance in a causal or unified way, seem

to be based on nothingness.

From Simmel & Jacobson's (1965) suggestion, as soon as the welfare of the affluent

requires assistance to the deprived, the motivation turns away from this focus on the giver

without turning to the recipient- then the moral obligation takes place voluntarily, so that the

poor will not become dangerous enemies of society. The fact that the poor receive help from the

rich is not an end in itself but merely a means to an end; assistance to the poor by the rich

denotes a sociological character in a situation where the rich is only focusing on the concrete

activity of the situation of the less affluent.

35

Consequently, in the case of negligence of the rich towards the poor- it would not be the

poor who are entitled to take action against the state-but rather the other elements indirectly

harmed by such negligence; the meaning and concept of moral obligation is to provide support

symbolized by the manner in which it is carried out; the poor man at his request of the rich is

assisted; may be it is debatable whether in certain cases, assistance is not morally obligatory. But

Simmel(1965) thinks that the poor themselves are not only poor, they are also human beings- this

is because of the solipsist tendency of the medieval type of almsgiving neglects the principle of

Kant’s categorical imperative which maintains that persons should not be treated as mere means

but always as ends in themselves..

The rich person who offers assistance to the poor - the former and the latter are said to

come to a diffusion of effect from themselves respectively. The modern conception of assistance

to the poor considers the poor as ends in themselves; but nevertheless, their reactions fall to any

specific individuals who offered such assistance. It thus seems that the conception that defines

assistance to the poor as an organization of the propertied classes in order to fulfill the

sentiments of moral duty is associated with a relapse- when an act of assistance has been

performed, even though it has other motives, it is recommended that the rich is morally

obligated. These motives may be due to self appraisals when the affluent do help those who are

in abject poverty; but the important stance is that the rich should offer assistance to those who

are less fortunate to pull them away from the trappings of poverty.

Willde (1915) solution to poverty will not stem from the rich supporting poor but from

the establishment of socialism which would relieve the social problem of poverty. He argues that

majority of people spoil their lives by an unhealthy and exaggerated altruism, as those who are

deprived could find themselves in hideous starvation. Charitable persons set themselves to the

36

task of remedying the evils of poverty that exists in the society when instead of trying to solve

the problem of poverty; they keep the poor alive- in some cases they end up by amusing them.

He thinks that this is not the solution to helping the poor out of their low life state, the

proper thing to do is to try and reconstruct the society on a basis that poverty will be eradicated.

This is because it is immoral to use private property to alleviate the problem, such an action is

immoral and unfair. Socialism has to be the instrument which will alleviate poverty in a society

which encounters one, as there would be no individual who are living in fetid dens; it will lead us

to an era of individualism which will convert private property into public wealth and it will

eventually restore society into its proper condition and it will ensure the material well being of

each individual.

According to Willde (1915:20)”Socialism will get rid of the institution of poverty

because property not merely has duties, it is endless seeking and for the virtues of the poor, it has

to be scraped, some poor are known to be grateful to charity, but not all of them will accept this

offer because they cannot be grateful for the crumbs which fall from the rich man’s table”. The

poor in his view can be seen as been hypocritical because they have made private terms with the

enemy; misery and poverty are so absolutely degrading and it exercises a paralyzing effect that

no class is really conscious of this suffering.

Hence, a type of socialism for Willde (1915) which will once and for all alleviate poverty

in the society is individualistic socialism. Through this new form of socialism, individuals will

not waste his/her whole life in accumulating things which are known to be materialistic; one will

then live his life to the fullest. He seems to balance his argument, by saying that there is only one

class in the community that thinks about more money than the rich and this will be the poor.

37

Thus in his view, persons will only be much more interested in this socialist

individualism when they realize that sympathy and exercise are free and spontaneous. In the

duties of the rich in helping the poor, sympathy with suffering will then be the order of the day as

the era of sentiment will be lessened. The assistance of the rich towards the poor will be feasible

in a state where individualistic socialism has thrived, that is why it is more important for the rich

individuals in the society to offer support based on a promissory obligation rather than that of

self- benevolence which is based on altruism.

Kourlisky (2012) agrees with Willde (1915) for both thinks that Alturity is a key to the

fight against poverty and in the process helping the poor. Alturity is a highly specific form of

rational altruism which according to Willde (1915:50)“is the state whereby individual duty is

seen as the necessary counterpart as a means of providing assistance to the poor”.

Willde sees alturity then as a dual key philosophical practical method which will alleviate

poverty in the society. However, the question which still has to be asked is why we should help

the poor? Can it be out of a sense of duty, religious conviction, for the sake of kindness, empathy

and generosity or can it be out of selfishness, individualism and negligence? The different

actions mentioned above have different motives for why the affluent is offering assistance to the

deprived. Sometimes it is said that the poor are entirely responsible for their pitiable state. But

Alturity is seen as radically different from ‘generosity’.

38

Kourlisky (2012) thinks that the rich being generous in support of the poor appeals much

to the heart as much as to the head. Whereas Alturity strives to be exclusively rational; altruism

is a duty incumbent upon me on rational grounds and within a set of moral framework. However,

both appear to be complementary because generosity sometimes emerges from both reason and

emotion. Alturity is seen as envisaging a practical approach to poverty, it provides the basis for

justice, and individuals who subscribe to it are likely to formulate more equitable judgments

when they consider their assistance to the deprived. Thus donations, markets, regulations,

charities are four pillars which should be used to fight off poverty because they are embedded in

altruism as a concept.

From these discussions, the sense of moral obligation that the good action leaves in the

doer cannot be explained by any altruism, any good action and any self sacrifice is nothing but a

duty and obligation. The treatment of the moral obligation towards the poor is seen in relation to

rightness and obligation. I think that the poor have a right to assistance and then an obligation to

assist them is not oriented towards the poor as having a right, but toward a society whose

preservation of this obligation contributes to, since according to Simmel&Jacobson (1965: 24):

“The poor person, sociologically speaking is the individual who relieves assistance because of

his deprived state, but the rich moral obligation should be based on any motive in the process”.

I think in a world where poverty exists, we should support those individuals who are poor

because the society would be a better place where care, unity, love, kindness will exist. Even

though the economical situation in the society is on a downward turn, I believe that I am obliged

to help, but this form of assistance should not be based on monetary terms alone because money

isn’t really everything.

39

As a student of philosophy, , if I am able to understand the lived experiences of those

who are poor, then one can find a solution to their problems. However, I think this would be

difficult because seeing a person in ragged clothes on the street and trying to understand his

situation is not enough, but action has to be taken in relation to his/her condition. The question is

what kind of action? The answer depends on the type of situation that is described as being poor.

Poverty is not only in lacking in material things. There are certain areas of lack that are not

related to the material. We have already identified different kinds of poverty in the first chapter

of this essay. However, the present essay focused more on the idea of material poverty. From the

arguments that have been presented and analyzed here, our view is that the rich have a moral

obligation to help the poor; but this should be selfless and empathy should be what they should

be striving towards. According to Hardin (1972) as quoted in Abelson and Friquegnon (1991:

310): “We are all the descendants of thieves, and the world’s resources are inequitably

distributed, but we must begin the journey of tomorrow from the point where we are today”.

40

CONCLUSION

This essay has addressed several issues that relate to poverty. Firstly, we have been able

to expose the reader to the concept of poverty in chapter one which identified the various

dimensions of poverty. Secondly, the essay has been able to examine the concept of moral

obligation from different perspectives. Thirdly and lastly, this essay was able to examine the

question whether the rich have a moral obligation to alleviate the condition of the poor.; Our

position is that from the arguments presented, we are of the opinion that the rich have the moral

obligation to help the poor on the basis of altruism and not the basis of pity and self

engradisement.

What this essay has done is to expose reader to different dimensions of poverty and the

problems encountered when defining the term. According to Seligman (1968: p, 5):“the problem

of counting the poor can be a troublesome one”. The main problem is to identify those who are

considered to be poor, because there are many levels of poverty, an individual who sees

himself/herself as poor could be seen by another person as been rich; may be those who identify

themselves as poor are in a way doing so because of how they perceive themselves in relation to

other persons in the society. At the last count, our position is that not only should the rich offer

support to the poor, but they should also empathize and sympathize and such gestures should not

only be on monentary terms but also other non tangible ways as well.

41

On a final note, the question that still perplexes me relates to the position that there are

certain persons in the society who are deemed to be poor but who on their own do not regard

themselves as being poor. Also, there are persons who know that they are poor but who do not

want any help from the rich. If I have the opportunity to continue my research on poverty, I will

like to seek answers to these questions. Meanwhile, I am of the opinion, that the answer to the

question whether the rich have a moral obligation to help the poor should be answered in the

affirmative.

42

BILBILOGRAPHY

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Bernard Wand. Hume’s Account of Obligation. The Philosophical Quarterly, vol 6: No 23, no

(October 1979), pp 435-440.

Bertrand Russell. The Problems of Philosophy. United States: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Ben Seligman. Selected Studies in Social Problems: Aspects of Poverty. United States of

America: Thomas Y. Crowell Company Inc, 1968.

Charles Finney. Lectures on Systematic Theology. United Kingdom: William Tegg and Co, 1851.

Edward Boyle. Towards an Improved Definition of Poverty. United Kingdom: Mayo Research

Institute, 1999.

Erica Sherover. The Virtue of Poverty: Marx’s Transformation of Hegel’s Concept of the Poor.

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