On Our Moral Obligation to Act Sustainably in Relation to the Natural Environment: in Defense of a...

Brandon Pakker — 3465004 — Politiek en Moraal — Eindpaper — Doelgroep: filosofisch onderlegde en milieubewuste consumenten/beleidsmakers.

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On our moral obligation to act sustainably in relation to the

natural environment: in defense of a ‘weak’ anthropocentrism.

The negative impact of human conduct in relation to the natural environment can—

according to the contemporary empirical sciences—hardly be denied. The question,

however, seems to be to what extent this impact can be considered immoral or wrong, and

in relation to whom? Without denying its alleged importance, highly theoretical difficulties

of intergenerational justice such as the problem of non-identity will not be addressed here,

due to its irrelevance as regards the purpose of this essay. The task of environmental ethics

can be understood so as to form and assess different strategies in relation to the

abovementioned question, and to analyze strengths and weaknesses in their attempts to

provide a moral obligation for sustainable conduct in relation to the natural environment.

The clause “sustainable conduct” here is understood as human conduct in relation to the

natural environment that maximizes the wellbeing or pleasure of human beings in

contemporary and future generations. The non-controversial assumption here is that our

current destructive practices in relation to the natural environment undermines this very

possibility in both a short- and long-term period of time.

One general difference between the ethical strategies under consideration seems to be,

inter alia, their respective focus on either the individual, i.e., as expressed by a focus on the

human being as an important part of to the natural environment, or of the whole natural

environment—of which the human being constitutes one element among others. Strategies

that place a major emphasis on the recognized moral value of human beings are

anthropocentric in the sense that all other objects or systems of the natural environment

are deemed valuable only in relation to human beings: such objects or systems in this regard

are not thought to possess an intrinsic or non-instrumental value. Strategies of this kind I

will call examples of strong anthropocentrism, since here all non-human objects or systems

of the natural environment are of instrumental value to human beings only. The aim of this

paper is, first, to articulate an objection to strategies of the second type, namely those

strategies that place a major emphasis on the natural environment as a whole. Arne Næss’s

initial formulation of his ‘deep ecology’ strategy will function as a typical example. I will

argue that its attempt to shift the emphasis from the human being to the environment

considered as a whole fails on account of its erroneous ascription of intrinsic value to non-


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living natural objects or systems. Consequently, this approach offers no proper theoretical

foundation so as to justify a moral obligation to act sustainably in relation to the natural

environment. Second, I will show why even the subsequent modification of this theory

remains inadequate to answer the difficulties that will be raised. Finally, I will show how,

contrary to strategies such as employed by Næss, consequentialist approaches such as

exemplified by Peter Singer’s utilitarianism can in fact justify a moral obligation to act

sustainably. I will argue that such a strategy can achieve this without having to rely on the

shift mentioned above. That is, consequentialist strategies have the advantage of justifying

a moral obligation to act sustainably without having to ascribe an intrinsic value to non-living

natural objects or systems. Singer’s utilitarian approach can incorporate non-human beings

into the moral community and, at the same time, justify a moral obligation to act

sustainably so that thereby the wellbeing (or pleasure) of the members of this community

can be secured. Given that besides human beings Singer’s utilitarian strategy recognizes the

moral value of certain non-human organisms as well, this approach can be understood as an

example of weak anthropocentrism.

♦ ♦ ♦

The deep ecology movement

In accordance with the attempt to expand the moral community so as to include other

objects or systems of the natural environment, Næss’s strategy can be understood as

shifting away from approaches that are strongly anthropocentric in nature. Thus, even

those strategies characteristic of the ‘shallow ecology movement’ are not considered ‘deep’

enough in the sense that despite the shared goal of reducing both global scale pollution and

resource exploitation they still implicitly recognize the wellbeing or “health and affluence”

of human beings in the Western world as their central aim. It is in the ascription of an

intrinsic value to non-human objects or systems of the natural environment that Næss’s

initial egalitarian strategy distances itself from strongly anthropocentric strategies, together

with its denial of the human being characterized as possessing a unique self, indicating a

separate essence from the natural environment. Næss argues that the insistence of human


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beings possessing such a separate essence only facilitates or exacerbates the degree of

unsustainable human conduct towards the natural environment, since it grants human

beings an elevated moral status in relation to the rest of the world. Næss’s own strategy,

then, attempts to break with this notion of a separate essence, and as such suggests a

whole other perspective. That is, the identity of human beings (and non-human beings) is

not to be considered as existing separately from the natural environment, but rather it is

constituted by the vast interconnection of ecological relations that exist in the totality of the

natural environment.1 Thus, the strong anthropocentric moral focus on human beings is

negated on the basis of the identity of human beings being expressed in purely relational

terms: non-human objects or systems of the natural environment can be understood as an

expansion of the human self, so that this newly formed ‘ecological Self’ reflects a human

identity that transcends the traditional boundaries of the human body and consciousness.

Given this relational perspective, respect or moral consideration for ‘ourselves’ implies a

broader application as such: natural objects or systems possess an intrinsic value and

demand a moral consideration on our part.2

Respecting the intrinsic value of rivers?

Since the abovementioned relational perspective identifies human identity with natural

objects and systems and assigns to the latter an intrinsic value as such, one counterintuitive

consequence is that natural systems such as forests and rivers are hereby implicated as

objects of moral consideration, on the grounds that we respect human interests as well.

Aside from humans and certain non-human beings, the ascription of an intrinsic value and

corresponding interests to natural systems such as rivers seems to indicate a category

mistake: in what sense could we understand a river to possess any interests at all?

Furthermore, Næss’s initial “total-field” perspective does not provide any theoretical

touchstone according to which differences in the moral ‘weights’ of interests are to be

assigned to the objects and systems of consideration—e.g., no determinative principle is

1 Andrew Brennan and Yeuk-Sze Lo, "Environmental Ethics", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall

2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/#DeeEco (consulted February 6, 2014). 2 John-Stewart Gordon, “Bioethics”, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002,

http://www.iep.utm.edu/bioethic/#SH3c (consulted February 6, 2014).


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offered according to which one could assess what to do in scenarios of conflicting interests.3

For instance, given the unfortunate scenario of conflicting interests between a human being

and a dangerous spider, there exists no theoretical foundation according to which the

interests of the human being in question can be assessed as having more moral ‘weight’

than that of the spider. Moreover, one can rightly question whether the spider can be

understood to possess any morally relevant interests at all. In answering to these legitimate

concerns, Næss’s initial perspective was modified to the extent that it now restricted the

ascription of intrinsic value to recognized members of the moral community only—viz.,

“human and non-human life”. Another implication of this modification was the creation of a

list of seven additional principles or points that were to reflect the core of the renewed

variant of this deep ecology perspective:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have value in

themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are

independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.

2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and

are also values in themselves.

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital

needs.

4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller

human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires a smaller human

population.

5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation

is rapidly worsening.

6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic,

technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply

different from the present.

7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in

situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard

3 Andrew Brennan and Yeuk-Sze Lo, "Environmental Ethics", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall

2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/#DeeEco (consulted February 6, 2014).


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of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and

greatness.

8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly

to try to implement the necessary changes.4

Ambitious in its attempt to accommodate different philosophical perspectives, this

particular list still seems inadequate in answering the aforementioned difficulties. Although

the restriction of the moral community to include only living beings nullifies the category

mistake mentioned in the beginning of this section, it does not seem able to decisively deal

with conflicting interests between members of the moral community as such. For instance,

the third point on the list states that human beings have no right to reduce the richness and

diversity of ‘life forms’ except to satisfy vital needs. This seems to imply a collective duty to

protect this very richness and diversity. One such conflict of interests becomes apparent, for

instance, where a population of porcupines has an interest in damaging forests: killing this

population in order to protect this forest (in accordance with the third point on the list)

conflicts with the first point on the list, and our direct involvement in this scenario at all

seems prohibited by the fifth point on the list.5 It is on this account that this list seems

inadequate in providing a concrete, non-conflicting ethical guideline for human conduct in

relation to the natural environment.

In what follows, I will argue that a consequentialist approach such as articulated by Singer

does seem able to offer a remedy to deal with the difficulties mentioned above. Contra the

initial deep ecology strategy, it has the advantage of justifying a moral obligation to act

sustainably without having to ascribe an intrinsic value to non-living objects or systems of

the natural environment. Furthermore, contra Næss’s strategy, it does in fact provide a

determinative principle in order to decisively deal with scenarios of conflicting interests.

4 J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman, “Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy”, Detroit:

Macmillan Reference USA, p. 210. 5http://harvardforest.fas.harvard.edu/sites/harvardforest.fas.harvard.edu/files/publications/pdfs/Hosley_JFor

estry_1931.pdf


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In defense of a weak anthropocentrism

One notable defining feature of Singer’s utilitarian strategy is reflected by its emphasis on

interests rather than its respective bearers. Singer provides two distinctive arguments that

substantiate this point. First, an equal moral consideration of interests implies that any

subject that has an interest in not being hurt, viz., is capable of experiencing pain, should

receive an equal moral consideration. Against strong anthropocentric strategies that

attempt to grant human beings a higher or exclusive moral standing on the basis of a

defining human property, it is argued that any such attempt usually fails because of the

existence of marginal cases. If, for instance, the higher or exclusive moral status of human

beings is to be justified by rationality considered as a defining human property, it thereby

excludes certain mentally challenged human beings. Consequently, the property in question

undermines its status as being applicable to all human beings as such. This implication

being counterintuitive, the extension of the morality community to include all sentient and

future-oriented (self-conscious) beings, then, is based upon the recognition that the

property of being capable of experiencing pleasure and pain properly applies not only to

human beings but to all sentient beings that have an interest in not being hurt.6 Second, the

attempt of certain inegalitarian strategies to determine an exclusive or higher moral

standing of human beings on the basis of properties such as rationality fails because of

another counterintuitive reason as well: doing so would leave room for a justification of

discrimination against human beings who lack the property in question.7

Given that the abovementioned articulation of Singer’s utilitarian approach specifies that

only self-conscious beings belong to the moral community—and as such deserve an equal

moral consideration of interests—the ascription of an intrinsic value to non-living objects or

systems of the natural environment reflects no necessary argumentative step: only

members of the moral community properly possess interests as such, thereby avoiding the

difficulty of having to ascribe such interests to natural systems such as rivers or other non-

sentient objects of the natural environment. Furthermore, this utilitarian perspective does in

6 One metaphor that Singer employs so as to illustrate the expansion of the moral community is that of an

“expanding circle”, see: Wouter Achterberg, “Samenleving, natuur en duurzaamheid: een inleiding in de milieufilosofie”, p.181. 7 Scott D. Wilson, “Animals and Ethics”, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002,

http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ (consulted February 6, 2014).


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fact seem able to provide a determining principle so as to deal with contexts of conflicting

interests. This principle, then, takes sentience as its foundational touchstone. Accordingly,

the emphasis on the capacity to feel pleasure and pain is deemed characteristic of sentience

proper. This does not imply, however, that every sentient being should be treated equally.

That is, an equal moral consideration of interests ought not to be confused with an equal

treatment of interests as such. Clearly, non-human beings have different interests than

ours: chickens have no interest in receiving a wage, and accordingly we are not morally

obliged to guarantee its possibility as such. Given, however, that all sentient beings have an

equal interest in the avoidance of pain, this principle does demand an equal treatment in

this regard.8 How, then, does this principle cope with a scenario in which conflicting

interests between members of the moral community present themselves? In accordance

with the traditional tenets of utilitarian ethical theory, maximization of interests here plays

a crucial role.

Given the scenario in question, what is needed first is an estimation of the complex of

morally relevant interests involved. Since an equal moral consideration of interests does not

differentiate between different sentient beings themselves, a maximization of interests

demands that conflict resolution here is established by actions that both minimize harm and

bring about the greatest amount of interest-satisfaction possible.9 Without having to

ascribe an intrinsic value to non-living objects or systems of the natural environment, then,

this weak anthropocentric approach does seem committed to recognizing an intrinsic moral

value to all the members of the moral community. That is, the interest of not being harmed

as well as the maximization of pleasure can be understood so as to reflect moral ends in

themselves: the avoidance of harm is pursued for its own sake, as well as the pursuit of

pleasure. When comparing this utilitarian approach with that of deep ecology, it becomes

evident that the former can establish a moral obligation to act sustainably in relation to the

natural environment without having to cope with the difficulties that plague the initial

formulation of the latter. Whereas the deep ecology approach attempts to demand a moral

obligation to act sustainably by its troublesome ascription of an intrinsic value and

8 Of course, whether non-human beings in reality have an equal interest in avoiding pain is still a matter of

debate. However, It is reasonable, to grant these beings the benefit of reasonable doubt, on the grounds of a precautionary principle. 9 Alasdair Cochrane, “Environmental Ethics”, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002,

http://www.iep.utm.edu/envi-eth/ (consulted February 6, 2014).


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corresponding interests to all natural objects and systems of the natural environment, the

utilitarian approach has the advantage of establishing the moral obligation in question

without having to commit itself to this theoretical step as such. While the modification of

the deep ecology approach does avoid some difficulties, the resulting list which is to reflect

its new core is not free of contradictions. Furthermore, contra this strategy, its utilitarian

counterpart does provide a determinative principle on the basis of which scenarios of

conflicting interests between members of the moral community can be resolved. By its

ascription of a moral significance—expressed in an equal moral consideration of interests—

to members of the moral community only, the utilitarian approach can justify a moral

obligation to act sustainably in relation to objects outside of the moral community, since

doing so promotes the maximization of well-being or pleasure for the members of the moral

community. By its extension of a moral consideration so as to include all sentient beings,

this approach can properly be considered a weak anthropocentric strategy. Accordingly, this

approach does not seem susceptible to Næss’s critique pertaining to strong anthropocentric

strategies, since the utilitarian approach does not recognize a separate essence of human

beings and can in fact be employed so as to prohibit unsustainable human conduct towards

the natural environment.

Conclusion

It is in the ascription of an intrinsic value to non-human objects or systems of the natural

environment in which Næss’s deep ecology perspective differs from strong anthropocentric

theories. Furthermore, Næss’s strategy does not ascribe to the human being an elevated

moral status on the basis of an ill-conceived separate essence. Rather, the deep ecology

approach demands the adoption of a relational perspective: human identity is to be

identified with an ‘ecological Self’, the latter which functions so as to demand a moral

consideration for all the natural objects and systems that are subsumed under this newly

formed identity. This ecological Self, then, signifies an expansion and as such a

reassessment of the traditional boundaries of human identity. One implication of this,

however, is that natural systems such as rivers are considered to possess an intrinsic value

as well, since we respect human interests too. I have argued that this amounts to a category


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mistake. Furthermore, Næss’s strategy seems unable to provide a determinative principle in

order to deal with scenarios of conflicting interests. In response to these concerns, Næss’s

modified perspective restricted the ascription of intrinsic value to include human and non-

human life only. Another result of this modification was the creation of a list of seven

additional points that were to reflect the renewed core of de deep ecology perspective. As is

argued above, however, this list seems inadequate to deal with scenarios of conflicting

interests, since the points on the list stipulate vague and contradictory ways of conflict

resolution.

Singer’s utilitarian strategy departs from its emphasis on interests rather than its respective

subjects. An equal moral consideration of interests implies that any morally relevant

interest should be considered equally, irrespective of the subject in which it exists. Singer

initially substantiates this point by appealing to the argument of marginal cases, which

undermines the possibility of assigning a morally elevated status on the basis of an allegedly

universally human property. That is, not only does the property of being capable of

experiencing pleasure and pain properly suffices as a universal human property, it applies to

other non-human beings as well. Accordingly, it is argued, the scope of an equal moral

consideration of interests should extend so as to include these beings as well, since they too

have an interest in not being harmed. Furthermore, the attempt to grant human beings a

morally elevated status on the basis of allegedly human properties is inadequate for another

reason as well, since it allows for the justification of denying such a status to humans that do

not satisfy the property that is appealed to, e.g., rationality.

Given that Singer’s utilitarian approach only includes self-conscious or sentient beings in

the moral community, the ascription of an intrinsic value to objects or systems outside of

this community is not needed. Furthermore, this approach does provide a determinative

principle according which scenarios with conflicting interests can be morally assessed:

sentience is considered paramount in this regard since it implies a capacity of experiencing

pleasure and pain, allowing for an assessment on the basis of an equal moral consideration

of the interest in question, namely, the interest in not being harmed. Conflict resolution,

then, is achieved by deciding a course of action that maximizes the sum-total of this very

interest. Contrary to the initial deep ecology approach, depending on the ascription of an

intrinsic value as well as interests to all objects and systems of the natural environment in


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order to justify a moral obligation to act sustainably, the utilitarian perspective does not

need such a theoretical step in order to achieve the same end. That is, the justification of a

moral obligation to act sustainably here is achieved on the basis of the promotion of well-

being or pleasure that such conduct provides for the members of the moral community.

Since besides human beings all other sentient beings are considered members of the moral

community, the utilitarian perspective thus formulated can properly be considered a weak

anthropocentric strategy, thereby effectively avoiding Næss’s critique of strong

anthropocentric approaches.


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Bibliography

Achterberg, Wouter. Samenleving, natuur en duurzaamheid: een inleiding in de milieufilosofie.

Assen: Van Gorcum, 1994 (hfd: ‘Milieuethiek, respect voor de natuur en intrinsieke waarde’).

p.181.

Brennan, Andrew and Yeuk-Sze Lo. "Environmental Ethics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/#DeeEco (consulted February 6,

2014).

Callicott, J. Baird and Robert Frodeman. “Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and

Philosophy.” Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, p. 210. (consulted February 6, 2014.)

Cochrane, Alasdair. “Environmental Ethics.” In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN

2161-0002. http://www.iep.utm.edu/envi-eth/ (consulted February 6, 2014).

Gordon, John-Stewart. “Bioethics.” In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-

0002. http://www.iep.utm.edu/bioethic/#SH3c (consulted February 6, 2014).

Wilson, Scott D. “Animals and Ethics.” In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN

2161-0002. http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ (consulted February 6, 2014).

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