The Secessionist Movement of the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang and the Chinese Governments PRC Response

新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新

(新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新)

新新新新：新新新新新新新新新：新新新新新新新：新新新

新○ 新新新新新一

The Secessionist Movement of theMuslim Uighurs in Xinjiang andthe Chinese Government’s (PRC)

Response

Thesis Submitted to

Tsinghua University

in partial fulfillment of the

requirement

for the professional degree of

by

Sehyung Kim

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Chu Shulong

OCT, 2012

新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新

新新新

、

新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新、，：，；，、。

(新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新)

Statement on Thesis Usage Authorization

I entirely understand Tsinghua University policies

concerning reserving and using copies of graduate theses.

That is, the university has the right to distribute a

copy of the thesis and allow students to read and borrow

it. The university may publicize the whole or part of the

thesis content and distribute the thesis by means of

filming, microfilming, or any other duplication methods.

(Any confidential thesis must also fully comply with

this policy following declassification.)

Signature by Author：

Date：

Signature by Advisor：

Date:

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze the development of secessionist movements by ethnic Uighurs and the effect of these movements on China’s future stability within its borders. Since the foundation of NewChina in 1949, a number of massive demonstrations, violent riots and acts of terrorism by ethnic Uighurs against ethnic Han Chinese as well as interethnic clashesbetween the two groups have occurred in the Xinjiang region of China. Throughout the paper, the author will try to explain the origin and development of Uighur’s secessionist movement by analyzing the history of Uighur ethnic people in Xinjiang with a focus on their ethno-religious identity and the on-going discontent among themunder the rule of the CCP. By analyzing these elements, the author concludes that the secessionist movements are not due to one specific issue—especially not a temporary phenomenon—but are rather the result of an accumulated ethno-religious identity of the Turkic Muslim Uighurs andtheir ordinary resentment against discrimination by the ethnic majority Han Chinese in the Xinjiang region throughout the history.

Keywords: Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, UighurSecessionist Movement, Ethno-Religious Identity, Eastern Turkestan, Han Chinese, the People’s Republic of China

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract................................................ITABLE OF CONTENTS......................................IICHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION................................1

I. Research Questions and Objectives.................4II.........................................Literature Review

6III............................Research Method and Outline

8CHAPTER 2 – DEVELOPMENT OF XINJIANG UIGHUR’S RELGIOUS IDENTITY...............................................11

I. The Influx of Islam..............................12i.The Holy War Against the Qing Empire..........14ii..................The Rise of Yakub Beg (1865-1884)

18II.The Independence Movements under the Republican Era

19i.The First East Turkestan Republic (1933-1934). 19ii...The Second East Turkestan Republic (1944-1949)

21CHAPTER 3 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECESSION MOVEMENTS SINCE 1949.............................................26

I. Domestic Causes..................................28

II

i.Assimilation Policy since the Late 1950s until 1978............................................28ii................The Uighur’s Discontent with Their Underrepresented Political Voice................32iii.......Economic Disparity between Uighur and Han

36II.....................................International Factors

42i.Relationship between Xinjiang and the Central Asian States after 1989.........................42ii.........Strengthening of Ethno-Religious Identity

44III..The Revival of Islam in Xinjiang and the Rise of Pan-Turkism and Islamism............................46

CHAPTER 4 - THE PRC’S COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE UIGHUR’S SECESSION MOVEMENTS...........................50

I. The Importance of the Xinjiang Region............50II...........Fostering Economic Development in Xinjiang

53III...............................................Strike Hard

56IV........................................Diplomatic Efforts

58CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION.................................63REFERENCE..............................................68新新/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................76新新新新/PERSONAL STATEMENT................................77新新新新/RESUME............................................78

III

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION


The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a multi-national state with 56 officially recognized min zu1, including the majority Han Chinese that constitute about 92% of the total population. Once the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949, it succeeded in fully unifying the country and establishing a new China, a nation stable enough to withstand severe threats from Japan and the Western superpowers. The CCP’s firm resolution in supporting the unity and independence of the nation gained popular support from the masses due to its promising prospects, something that the previous regime could never achieve.

After the first 30 years of planned economic growth under the strong political ideology of Chairman Mao, the country has gone through a complete transition towards a full developmental state under the market economy system via reform and opening-up policies, which Deng Xiaoping laid the foundation since the late 1970s until his death in 1997. The growth strategy established in 1978 made China a new superpower in the world and only the United States is considered as its equal and rival. The economicdevelopment strategy changed the skylines of China with modern skyscrapers built at an unprecedented rate with anannual economic growth rate of over 8%. As a consequence,

1 Min zu ( 新新 ) is the Chinese word that can be translated intovarious English words meaning ethnic group, nation, nationality,etc. In this thesis, the author intends not to define andtranslate this Chinese word as it connotes such differentpolitical meanings and as it is used ambiguously both in Chineseand English.

1


these increased growth numbers place China second only tothe United States in GDP based on purchasing power parityand put China at number one in terms of foreign reserves and exports.

However, where there is light there is always shadow. China itself confronts a set of side effects within its sociopolitical and socioeconomic areas, such as regional economic disparity, an economic gap between urban and rural dwellers, growth of its unemployed population, environmental degradation, human rights issues, and ethnic resistance and secessionist movements with regard to minorities, etc. Any or all could serve as a major variable and possibly an obstacle to further stability and development in China’s future. Among other problems, the Chinese leaders have shown particular attention to the secessionist movements in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) by ethnic Uighurs. This is due to its frequent inclination toward extreme violence against authority, its strategic geographical position onChina’s frontiers, its critical role in China’s energy security, and its symbolic importance in the stability ofthe whole China under the rule of the CCP.

Xinjiang became a part of the People’s Republic of China after the “Peaceful Liberation”1 in 1949 and acquired the status of province-level autonomous region on October 1, 1955, following the implementation of the Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China law (新新新

1 The occupation and incorporation of the Xinjiang territory inOctober 1949 by the People’s Liberation Army Commander Wang Zhen isregarded as an invasion by foreigners among Uighurs, especially inthe minds of the separatists.

2


新新新新新新新新新新新新新新), which was passed in 1952 (Cho, 2006, p.123). It is now home to a population of 21.3 million people comprised of 55 different nationalities including 13 major nationalities who have lived in the region for generations. Table 1 shows the demographic changes of thefour largest and eleven other nationality groups residingin Xinjiang from 1945 to 2008 (Howell and Fan, 2011, p. 123). Among these 15 major nationalities, 8 groups are Muslim and the followers of Islam comprise 59.2 % of the total population in Xinjiang as of 2008.

Table 1. Demographic Profile of Xinjiang (1945-2008)

1945

1982

1996

2008

Muslim

Non-Muslim

Total(million)

3.6 13.1

16.8

21.3

59.2 40.8

Uygur (%) 82.7

45.7

50.6

46.1

√

Han (%) 6.2 40.3

41.1

39.2

√

Kazak (%) 1.1 6.9 8.0 7.1 √

Hui (%) 2.8 4.3 4.9 4.5 √

Other (%) 7.2 2.8 2.8 3.1 * **

*Other major nationalities in Xinjiang, such as Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar, and Dongxiang are also Muslims. **The Mongol, Xibe, Manchu, Russian, Daur, and Tibetan nationality groups are non-Muslims.

Over the last 30 years of economic transition,

3


Xinjiang has not been exempted from the Chinese government’s efforts to achieve a socioeconomically developed state. Since the mid-1980s, the central government of China has invested hundreds of billions of Yuan in Xinjiang, trying to modernize its society and expand its economy and trade. As a result, since 2003 Xinjiang’s average GDP growth has been 11%, which is morethan the average national GDP growth of 8.3%. Moreover, its per-capita consumption doubled during 2000 and 2007 from 2,662 Yuan to 4,890 Yuan (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2009). However, a series of protests and violent riots have regularly occurred throughout the 1980s and continuing into the present. These violent incidents have overshadowed Xinjiang’s remarkable growth rate as well as the Chinese government’s hope that economic development and modernization would improve ethnic tensions and assuage secessionist movements in China.

The current round of secessionist movements are mainlyled by ethnic Uighurs, who see themselves as the indigenous people of the Xinjiang region which is colonized by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), whereas the Chinese government insists that historically,Xinjiang has always been a part of China. These differences in perception with regard to both the identity of and the history between the Uighurs and the majority Hans has often and continues to cause interethnic tensions and deadly clashes and violent activities conducted by some Uighur separatists against the authority that is dominated by ethnic Hans. In the wake of changing international circumstances, especially

4


since the demise of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York, the Chinese government identifies that these separatist movements areassociated with foreign terrorist groups, such as the Taliban and Osama bin Laden in particular. However, an attempt to separate from China and establish a new independent state, the East Turkestan Republic—based on religion and ethnicity—implies a much more complicated background to the Uighur’s secession movements than simply putting the blame on few Uighurs as terrorists influenced by foreign activists.

Therefore, this thesis attempts to study the origin and development of the secessionist movements in Xinjiangand the response from the PRC with regard to any separatist activities inside or outside of China’s mainland in order to maintain stability and reach the ultimate objective of creating the one great Chinese min zu, namely 新新新新 (zhong hua min zu). By studying the history and various other causes of the movements as well as the strategies used by not only the PRC but also past government agencies against these movements, this study will examine the aspects of the Uighur secessionist movements and its implications for the Chinese government’s efforts toward the complete integration of China.

I. Research Questions and Objectives

Throughout its history, Xinjiang has been the most

5


rebellious and unstable region compared to other minorityregions within China. However, long before the establishment of the New China in 1949, Xinjiang has alsobeen one of the most strategically, politically, and economically important regions to Chinese rulers. In order to pacify the region and maintain stability, various governments have implemented a number of rules and policies. Although the Xinjiang region has a documented history going back at least 2,500 years, in this paper I will only discuss its history and treatment under the last three authorities since when it officiallybecame a part of China proper: the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), the Republic of China (ROC, 1912–1949), and the current regime of the PRC (1949–present).

Until 1884, the Qing adopted a system of self-governance, leaving Xinjiang to local leaders and ministers under the supervision of a military presence . In 1884, the court took over direct control of the regionafter its full incorporation as a province to the Qing Empire. After the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang was brutally ruled by a severe assimilative policy under the Guomindang (GMD), which was based on Hannationalism.

After the establishment of the New China, the CCP implemented a long-term plan for the development of a newmin zu, “the Great Chinese min zu” or “新新新新,” based on the socialist theory that each ethnic nationality would eventually disappear and blend into one great min zu underthe name of China (Cho, 2006, p.18). Although the political dark ages eclipsed a promising start for a

6


blissful time in Xinjiang during most of the first 30 years of New China, the minorities were given relatively favorable treatment when the new leadership came to powerin the late 1970s. However, over the same period, nonviolent popular demonstrations, fatal interethnic clashes, violent riots and planned attacks on the Hans bythe Uighurs have constantly erupted, stirred by the Uighur’s accumulated ordinary resentment towards the authority and urge to secede1 from China. This implies that there exist fundamental and practical causes behind the Uighur secessionist movements that do not seem to be easily solvable.

Hence, the objective of this thesis is to study the development of the secessionist movements occurring in XUAR, the causes behind these movements, and the implications that these movements hold with regard to theChinese government’s efforts toward establishing a harmonious and developed state. By examining these aspects of the Uighur secessionist movements and the various responses and strategies from the Chinese authorities over the past 130 years or so, this study attempts to answer the following thesis questions:

Historically, how did the Uighur’s ethnic-religious identity form?

1 From the Uighur secessionists’ viewpoint, the term independence isused instead of secession. However, as the modern China is a unifiednation-state, the author uses secession as it indicates theseparation from an established political system. Therefore, withregard to the use of term, it does not indicate or connote anysubjective opinion of the author’s political issues.

7


How have the Uighur’s secessionist movements developed in the context of China’s history?

What are the fundamental and practical causes behind these movements?

What strategies has the Chinese government used with regard to these movements and what are the prospects for both the secessionist movements andfor China’s future?

Throughout the paper, I will demonstrate that the secessionist movements does not have a single root cause nor is it based all on a single issue within the economic, political, societal, or international realms. Rather, the secessionist movements stem from a historically developed sense of ethnic identity of the Turkic Uighurs with Islam as the strongest element in unifying them against the accumulated list of complaints on the Hans and the authority that often explode into a massive demonstration and a violent riot. These dynamics in the Uighur secessionist movements imply that, as a problem, the presence of the secession movements cannot be solved in a short period of time and thus can and willhave a certain destabilizing effect on the integration ofChina, although China is unlikely to dissolve as the Soviet Union did in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, due to the instability of this particular autonomous region. Therefore, it will continue to influence Chinese domestic and foreign policy as the Chinese leaders strive

8


to deter any secession movements while at the same time working to develop and further deepen ties between the New China and XUAR.

II. Literature Review

Since the late 1970s, when China opened its doors to outsiders, a number of research studies have been undertaken, are currently in progress, or will be carriedout on topics with regard to China in various fields, including sociology, anthropology, politics, economy, history, ethnic identity, art, and so on. However, although the problems of the Uighur’s secession movementsin China qualify for attention as much as other issues, there has not been much scholarship due to the limits in accessing and collecting data considered sensitive in China’s political arena. Nevertheless, there is valuable work available from distinguished and trusted scholars onthe problem of Xinjiang and China’s minority nationalities.

Colin Mackerras’s 1994 book China’s Minorities explored thestatus of minorities such as Uighurs, Mongolians, Tibetans, and Koreans in China using a historical lens tostudy the dynamics between these minority communities andthe Hans and their various aspects, including population growth, economic development, relations with the Han, andrelations with foreign states, etc. He found that southern Xinjiang Uighurs tended toward violence because the region has historically retained its ethnic and religious peculiarities more than their counterparts in

9


northern region of Xinjiang, who have gotten along relatively well with the Hans.

His historical explorations of the Xinjiang Uighurs provides a valuable background on Uighur, but it fall short of explaining the current causes of the proliferation of active secessionist movements under the regime of CCP.

David Bachman (2005) and Dru Gladney (1998) explored the ethnic conflict between the Uighurs and the Hans through an explanation based on an internal colonialism. In their paper, they argued that the Uighur’s discontent with the authorities was due to three reasons, (1) the exploitation of valuable natural resources in their land that was then exported to the other regions for consumption without appropriate compensation, (2) the uneven distribution of economic benefits between the Uighurs and the Hans, and (3) the Xinjiang Production andConstruction Corps’ occupation of Xinjiang with large Hanmigrations into the region.

In a similar vein, David Wang (1998) explained the ethnic tensions using the model of socioeconomic disparity between wealthier northern Xinjiang, where large Han populations reside in comfort, and the southernregions of Xinjiang, where many Uighurs live in relative poverty. Similarly, Hollis S. Liao (1989) also explored the problem behind the ethnic tensions in Xinjiang by examining the migration of large Han populations into theregion since 1949 and the effect of this migration on thedemographic composition within minority communities.

These studies provide valuable insights into many of

10


the issues and possible causes behind the ethnic clashes in the Xinjiang region by taking into account resource distribution and control, demographic changes from Han migration into minority regions, and socioeconomic disparity. However, these theoretical frameworks all havelimitations in terms of explaining why similar ethnic conflicts and clashes have not occurred in the other minority regions where similar problems—the large migration of Han, the intra-regional economic disparity, and uneven distribution and control of wealth between minorities and the Hans—have taken place.

Although all of these studies provide sound theoretical evidence in explaining the validity of possible causes for the ethnic clashes in Xinjiang, they also have limitations in terms of explaining the complex causes of the Uighur’s secession movements that need to take into account dynamic changes throughout Xinjiang Uighur’s past and present and their interaction with the Hans in political, economic, and social arenas. Xinjiang,unlike Tibet, demonstrates a much more complicated minority problem through its Islamic and Turkic identity that often finds connections with the Central and West Asia. This identity set has produced ethno-religious conflicts in Xinjiang that frequently lead to the explosive outburst of violence when they collide with various practical problems under the rule of the established regime.

11


III. Research Method and Outline

This paper mainly used a qualitative research method in conducting the study on the topic of the Uighur’s secession movement. Ethnic conflict has been a very sensitive issue in China and, for that reason, certain degree of limitations and restrictions have been placed in conducting a research related with the topic. Because of its sensitivity and the author’s identity as a foreignstudent in China, conducting field research and collecting a first-hand data in Xinjiang could not be realized. Instead, the author tried to examine as many documents, books, journals, news sources, and Internet sources as possible for all numerical data. However, to avoid a biased position favoring one side or the other (the Uighurs and the PRC both claim that the other’s arguments have been manipulated), the author made an effort to identify and utilize objective sources. Moreover, due to the author’s lack of knowledge of the Chinese and Uighur languages, the author mainly used sources with English translations as well as Korean sources.

Based on the above method, in Chapter 2, I explore thehistorical background of the Xinjiang Uighurs from as early as the Northern Wei Dynasty and describes how Islammade its way into Xinjiang and eventually became the single powerful element in uniting the Uighurs. Then I review the major incidents of rebellion against the established authority in Xinjiang in the name of Islam. These disturbances in the 18th and 19th centuries were usually led by Muslims from outside of Xinjiang, such as

12


the Khojas, Khokand, and Yaqub Beg, who took advantage oflocal disenchantment with imperial rule. Among these rebellions, Yaqub Beg’s establishment of the Kingdom of Kashgaria during the era of the GMD laid the foundation for future secession movements.

In Chapter 3, I analyze the development of the secession movements by the Xinjiang Uighurs since 1949 when the region became a part of China under the PRC. Here I will provide an account of the domestic and international factors involved in the various causes of the secession movements. Domestic factors include an assimilatory stance by the CCP toward minorities in the first 30 years of New China, the lack of Uighur representation in the political arena to express their concerns, and inter-regional economic disparity and the income gap between the northern Hans and the southern Uighurs of Xinjiang. International factors include the change of circumstances around its border, especially thedemise of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence ofthe former Soviet Central Asian states, increased interchange of trade and people, and the rise of pan-Turkism and Islamism in the Central Asia along with the revival of Islam in Xinjiang.

Then, in Chapter 4, I examine what countermeasures have been taken against the secession movements in order to maintain the unity of the nation. The PRC has adopted a policy of socioeconomic development in Xinjiang and a policy of “strike hard” against any illegal demonstrations, riots, or religious activities. The PRC has also worked to establish diplomatic ties and

13


cooperation agreements with foreign states to prevent activities by members of the secessionists’ movements in foreign countries and minimize their possible affiliationwith Islamic terrorist groups.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I will conclude by summarizing the findings of the study set down throughout the paper with a review of possible issues with regard to the future of the secession movements and their implication in the integrity of China.

14

CHAPTER 2 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS OF XINJIANG

CHAPTER 2 – DEVELOPMENT OF XINJIANG

UIGHUR’S RELGIOUS IDENTITY

The distance from Capital Beijing to Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, is currently 2,428.7 km by plane andit only takes slightly over 4 hours of travel time by plane.1 This only became possible recently through the technological development of the modern era. The transportation conditions in the 1920s and 1930s, let alone in the pre-modern era, were so tough that it sometimes took several months to reach Xinjiang from inner China. In the 1920s, there were three travelable routes to get to Urumqi. The first was from Lanzhou, the capital city of Gansu province, via Hami, a city located in the eastern end of Xinjiang. The second was from Suiyuan, a city in Inner Mongolia, via Ningxia to Hami, atotal travel distance of 2,950 km. The third was from Beijing, passing through Inner and Outer Mongolia to Urumqi. However, proper roads and railways did not exist at the time and the boundless Gobi Desert blocked the entrance into Xinjiang (新新, 2001, 331).

A city like Kashgar, a county-level city located at the western extremes of China had historically been influenced much more by adjacent empires located in Central Asia. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Xinjiang region, especially southern Xinjiang, has retained its distinctiveness and that this part of the country is different from that of inner Chinese in terms

1 http://map.baidu.com/?newmap=1&ie=utf-8&s=s%26wd%3D%E4%BB%8E %E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%88%B0%E6%96%B0%E7%96%86

15

http://map.baidu.com/?newmap=1&ie=utf-8&s=s%26wd%3D%E4%BB%8E%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%88%B0%E6%96%B0%E7%96%86

http://map.baidu.com/?newmap=1&ie=utf-8&s=s%26wd%3D%E4%BB%8E%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%88%B0%E6%96%B0%E7%96%86


of religion, race, history, culture, and lifestyle and more similar to Central Asia. This chapter will examine how Islam entered the region by tracing historical accounts since the late 10th century and how the religion had a pivotal role in forming a group of rebels against the established authority.

By examining historical accounts, the chapter will illustrate that Islam created a deeply rooted sense of common identity among Uighurs and became a centripetal force of the later secession movements. However, it was not until around the 1920s that the modern ethnic identity of the Uighurs in conflict with other ethnicities was built and their pride as an historically inhabited population of the central Asian oases grew in people’s mind.

During the early 1910s and the late 1940s, severe assimilative policy and poor economic conditions under the tyrannical GMD helped to solidify and strengthen the collective ethnic identity of Uighurs that was already starting to coalesce among Uighurs through their exposureto modern Western ideas, including nationalism, by Turkicscholars traveling abroad. Over the centuries until the PRC’s rise to power in the region, a combination of external ideas and influences in this central trade routeof the Silk Road helped to form Uighur people’s idea of amodern collective identity on a firm religious foundationand establish the conditions for secession movements in the years to come.

16


I. The Influx of Islam

The Uighur people were a small group among several Tiele tribes—a coalition of nine Turkic peoples resided in northern China, Mongolia, and Central Asia—whose records of whom can be found as early as the Northern WeiDynasty (386-534 AD) where they were referred to as the Gaoche (新新) (Eberhard, 1982, p. 96). They established their own dynasty in 744 AD, the Uighur Khaganate or Uighur Empire (新新新新), which lasted until 840 AD. The Uighur Khaganate’s territory ranged from the Altay Mountains in the west and to the upper reaches of the Heilong River in the east and the Khaganate maintained a friendly relationship with the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD) (Eberhard, 1982, p. 55; Woo, 2009, p. 137).

However, the Battle of Talas in 751 AD between the Tang Dynasty forces, which allied with the Uighurs, and the Arab Abbasid Caliphate forces marked the end of the Tang’s territorial expansion to the west and caused the decline of the Tang’s influence over the Xinjiang1 region. Eventually, the Uighurs also lost control of the western region of the Pamir Plateau (Harris, 1993, p. 1 The name Xinjiang, previously referred to as Xiyu ( 新西 ) meaning

“western region” under the Han Dynasty, was given by the QingDynasty when it put this vast area under its rule in 1759following the conquest of the Zunghar Khaganate in 1756, a nomadicpower ruled over the area of which most of its territory is partof Xinjiang in present day from the 17th century (新新, 2001, p. 249-253; Rossabi, 2004, p. 5; Chen, 1977, p. 127). However, there arealso different interpretations on the meaning of its name amongsome Chinese and Western scholars. Western scholars interpretXinjiang as “new dominion” or “new frontier,” whereas some Chinesescholars and the Chinese government refer to it as “old territoryreturned to the motherland (新新新新)” (The People’s Republic of ChinaGovernment Website, 2003; Kung 2006, 379; Kim, 2010, p. 32–33).

17


113). The rise of the Abbasids’ power over the region brought changes to the tributary relationships. The formal Tang tributaries switched to the Abbasids and fromthe later 10th century onward, Islam penetrated into the region.

The Xinjiang region has undergone a variety of societal changes. Before the 11th century, Tibetan Buddismand Hinduism were dominant in the region due to its geographical proximity to Tibet and India. During the 11th

and 12th century, Buddhism and Hinduism gave way to Islam and the Uighurs were Islamized and begun to play an important role spreading Islam over China afterwards. After the mid-15th century, most of the Turkic peoples whoresided in the Tarim oases became Muslim and by the turn of the 16th century, almost all of Uighurs had converted to Islam. (Song, 1998, p. 170; Hwang, 2009, p. 113; Eberhard, 1982, p. 58).

It was actually Muslims who ruled over Xinjiang, especially the southern part, mainly Kashgar (or Kashi) and Yarkand (or Shache), before the Qing Dynasty’s (1644-1912) expansion to the region and throughout most of the time of the Qing’s rule until the complete annexation wasmade in 1884 (新新, 2001, p. 250).The leaders among Muslimswere the Shaykh, were elders of Sufism whose name connotes the meaning of leader or governor; the Imam, whoprovided religious guidance and served as community leaders; and the Khoja1 families. They were widely

1 A Persian word meaning master or teacher in the Islamic world; itwas a title to the descendants of Central Asian Naqshbandi Sufismteacher Ahmad Kasan. During 17th and 19th century, the Khojas werepowerful religious and political figures who played a great role

18


respected within the Muslim communities due to their noble status, strict adherence to Islamic values, inspirational teachings, and community leadership (Eberhard, 1982, p. 60). From the 18th throughout the 19th century, these Muslim leaders were the leading figures for leveraging a number of uprisings in the region as jihad or a holy war against the autocratic and corrupted Qing government in Xinjiang, with which local people wereso discontented that they eventually supported the uprisings.

i. The Holy War Against the Qing Empire

Historically, the Chinese Dynasties’ rule over Xinjiang was rather sporadic and it was not until the Qing’s conquest in 1759 that more or less continuous control was established (Rossabi, 2004, p. 155). The Qing’s Emperors were devout Tibetan Buddhists. They each proclaimed themselves as a Chakravartin, an ideal universal ruler who protects Buddhism, allowing each ruler to establish his authority over Tibet. Also, as nomadic tribes came into power over central China, the Qing rulers could establish their control over Mongols byproclaiming themselves the successors of the Mongolian Empire.

However, conditions in Xinjiang were quite different as the power of Islamic values preceded any of the valuesor legacies that the Qing Court was exerting to rule overother regions. For these reasons, after the Xinjiang cameunder the rule of the Qing Dynasty, the Qing established

in Xinjiang’s politics (Chen, 1977, p. 121-123).

19


a dual-governing system to establish political and military control over the region. In 1762, the Imperial Court in Beijing put Xinjiang under the rule of local military authority system (“新新新新”) and appointed the YiliCommander (“新新新新新新新”统 or simply “新新新新”), who oversaw the military affairs of Imperial forces in the region and thecivil affairs as the top administrator (新新, 2001, p. 253).

Yet, the Qing leaders appointed local people who cooperated with the Court in charge of daily civil administration in local communities at various levels; these men were called “begs,” meaning chiefs or commanders in Persian (新新, 2001, p. 253-255). There were 35 “begs”1 in positions within civil affairs, including “hakim beg,” who was in charge of the actual civil administration; “ishikagha beg,” who assisted hakim beg as a vice-governor; “khazanachi beg,” who oversaw financial affairs; “mirab beg,” or canal superintendent who was in charge of irrigation; and “qadi beg,” a Muslimjudge imposing Islamic law on individuals and the community, to name just a few (Yu, 2002, p. 279; Kim, 1999, p. 42). With these “begs” composed of local people,a Manchu or Han “amban,” a high official appointed by theCourt to rule in conjunction with “hakim beg,” also existed to check and balance the power of local leaders (Chen, 1977, p. 143).

Under the Qing rule, Xinjiang’s economy flourished andboth markets and other commercial activities proliferated1 Some documents record 15 types of begs(新新新, 2006, p. 122)

20


due to the measures taken to expand and specialize the economy. With the introduction of new irrigation systems and farming tools, agriculture production increased as became possible for each unit of land to produce more (新新新, 1985, p. 544-556). However, the indigenous people—especially the Uighurs—regarded the rule of Qing as “the ultimate illegitimacy and impermanence of the idolater’s dominion” (Fletcher, 1978, p. 90). This account provides us with another clue that Islam was a key element in the Uighur community in forging a distinct sense of identity which set them apart from other non-Muslims.

Moreover, despite reinvigoration of regional economy, increase in agricultural products and populations, local people suffered from abuse of power and corruption by begs and ambans. In 1765, shortly after 6 years of the Qing’s rule in the region, the Uighurs in Wushi rose in rebellion against the local hakim beg and amban 新新’s exploitation and cruel governance, such as extortion of the land, the rape of Uighur women, and the monopolization of agricultural water, to name but a few (Park, 2010, p. 195).

At the turn of the 19th century, conditions for local residents did not get better and the abuse of power by the local officials got worse. A number of officials intentionally volunteered for posts in southern Xinjiang with the sole object of extorting the locals (新新, 2001, p. 266-267). Under these circumstances, the regional powers based on Islamic identity and values broke out in a number of rebellions or jihads against the Qing garrison troops and government officials. After that, the

21


Qing’s control over the region began to weaken and more or less continuous insurgencies arose over the next sixtyyears. Unsurprisingly, the Qing Empire described the western Muslim regions as “the most rebellious territory”in the 19th century (Mackerras, 1994, p. 36).

In 1815, the Kirgiz raised a rebellion against the Qing garrison troops, but it was quickly suppressed due to a lack of support from the local population. Beginningin 1820, the “Kashgar khoja”1 family carried out more than eight jihads—in 1820, 1824, 1826, 1828, 1830, 1847, 1852, and 1857—against the Qing Empire to recover their long gone sovereignty and to restore the power in the southern Tianshan Uighur community until the late 1850s (Chen, 1977, p. 133; 新新, 2001, p. 267). Among them, the ensuing jihad by the khoja Jahangir from 1820 to 1828 wasthe largest and longest; it demonstrated that the khoja family still had influence over the region and had sufficient prestige and support from the people to inflict its sentiments against the Qing’s legitimacy in the Tarim Basin.

1 The “Kashgar khoja” or “White mountaineers” was one of thetwo powerful ruling families (the other family was “Yarkandkhoja” or “Black mountaineers” putting their main city ofinfluence in front of khoja to distinguish each other) thatexerted its influence over Kashgaria, a term used to referpresent-day Xinjiang before the Qing’s era in the region (新新,2001, p. 250). Most of khojas escaped to the Kokand Khanate,an Islamic state that was in tributary relations with the QingDynasty and existed from 1709 to 1876 in present-dayUzbekistan, after the Qing Empire conquered the Tarim Basin(Kim, 2004, p. 20; Fletcher, 1978a, p. 88). Exiled khojasgathered support in Kokand and built up an army that consistedof Uighursand other followers who fled to Kokand beginning inthe early 1760s and lasting until the 1850s.

22


The Jahangir’s jihads were finally stopped after the Qing channeled 10 million silver and 36,000 troops over seven years into the region, took him captive, and brought him to Beijing, where he was executed. For security purposes, the Qing decided to leave more than 10,000 troops in Xinjiang in addition to the 40,000 troops who were already stationed in the region (Fletcher, 1978b, p. 366). Ironically, the increase of troops in the region weakened the Qing position in Xinjiang. After a seventeen year period of peace and stability in the region, the Khoja families raised another series of jihads starting with the Rising of the Seven Khojas in 1847; the Jihad of Divan Quli and Wali Khan in 1852; Husayn Ishan Khoja’s Jihad in 1855; and ending with the 1857 Reinvasion of Wali Khan (Kim, 2004, p. 29-36; Toru, 1978, p. 76-77). Although they were ultimately suppressed, they caused significant political and economic strain on both the Qing Court and the regional administration.

After the 1850s, the Qing’s influence over the region weakened because it was financially and emotionally strapped by the fighting of foreign wars, the Opium Wars,and the repression of the Taiping Rebellion. The chronic deficit conditions of Xinjiang got worse as the Qing Court cut off administrative and military support in Xinjiang. The Imperial forces were underpaid, poorly trained, and addicted to opium. As a result, the local administrators—the begs and amban—imposed punitive taxes and harsh labor requirements and even sold a government post to cover the administrative expenses as well as to make money for themselves (新新, 2001, p. 269; Tanner,

23


2010, p. 83).

In 1862, the Shaanxi and Gansu Hui (or Han Muslim) rose up in small scale and sporadic rebellions. The Hui were infuriated by the Qing officials’ oppressive measures against them in league with the Han militia, which was ignited by rumors that the Hui were aiding the Taiping forces. Soon after, these rebellions were turned into a jihad by their Muslim religious leaders against non-Muslims, corrupted Manchu, and Han ruling circles. With the onset of the Muslim rebellions in 1862, the heatsoon spread throughout the Xinjiang Muslims and the oppressed local people who were bitterly aggrieved against the government rose in a series of rebellions (Chen, 1977, p. 136; Clarke, 2011, p. 25-26). The first rebellion started in June 1864 in Kucha, Urumqi, Yarkand,Yengisar, and Kashgar in July, Hotan (uncertain), and Yili in November. The rebels soon diverted it from an uprising targeted at the Qing authority, ruling elites, and non-Muslims into a jihad by having religious figures and sages as their leader in order to legitimize an overthrow of the government in the name of Islam. After the Yili won by Muslim rebels, it marked the end of the Qing’s authority over the region of Xinjiang.

As noted above, the begs’ and ambans’ oppression and exploitation of their own people were the main reasons for the uprisings. Another element in the nature of theseuprisings or jihads that we should not overlook is that the Islamic values and ethics were a significant force inXinjiang communities at the time as they were deeply settled in the daily life. In this sense, the rebellions

24


over the whole region in Xinjiang throughout the 19th century were a religious war and thus it was by far the most important reason that successfully gained popular support from the people.

ii. The Rise of Yakub Beg (1865-1884)

Soon after the collapse of the Qing’s power in the region, the followers of Islam and various rebel groups got into a power struggle, all claiming authority over the region. In Kashgar, the ethnic complexity and its power struggles came to a standstill as Hui, Uighurs, andKyrgyz confronted each other for authority of the city (Fletcher, 1995, p. 40). Thus, the leader of Kyrgyz and Hui appealed to Alim Quli, the Khan of Kokand at the time, to dispatch a khoja of White mountaineers along with a Kokandi force expectating that a khoja, whose religious authority was still influential in the region, would leadthe jihad and raise the people’s spirits (Kim, 1994, p. 156).

The Khan of Kokand sent Buzurg Khoja, a son of Jahangir Khoja, and a Kokandi force under the command of Yakub Beg to Kashgar. After suffering defeat in a number of battles, and then victory in a series of power struggles among other forces in Xinjiang, he managed to unite the region under his rule for a time. Yakub Beg also outmaneuvered Buzurg Khoja and sent him away on a pilgrimage to Mecca, from whence he never returned. In 1866, he finally conquered Yarkand, established the Kashgaria kingdom, and proclaimed himself Amir in 1867 (Chen, 1977, p. 151; Kim, 2004, 140; Mackerras, 1994, p.

25


36).

The Kingdom of Kashgaria survived until 1877, when Yakub Beg committed suicide in May of that year due to the defeat of his army at the hands of the Qing forces led by the Commander Zuo Zongtang in 1876–77 (Mackerras, 1994, p. 36). The Qing succeeded in reclaiming the regionexcept for the region of Yili. After a long term of negotiation with Tsarist Russia, they both agreed on the Treaty of Yili in 1881 and the Qing finally recovered thewhole Xinjiang territory. On November 17th 1884, the Qing court made the region into a province after it came to realize the importance of border security (Mackerras, 1994, p. 38).

Yakub Beg was a Tajik, born in the Kokand Khanate. However, he managed to conquer, establish his kingdom, and rule over the Xinjiang region in a reign that lasted about 11 years. This feat is largely attributed to his commitment to Islamic values and religious policies, which could be cruel on occasion. From several accounts, Yakub Beg was a fine actor who often shed “copious tears”at the funeral of a khoja whose family members were annihilated by Yakub Beg during his reign (Chen, 1977, p.151-152).

Yakub Beg tried to narrow the gap between the Uighurs and other Muslims that might degrade the legitimacy of his rule over Muslims by presenting himself as a devoted and faithful Muslim. The local population considered him as a pious Muslim; one account described him as a person who did not walk just a few steps or embark on anything without a prayer. Whenever he visited the local

26


population, especially Islamic school facilities and students, he granted endowments, clothes, and daily supplies. A number of Islamic courts of justice were established in every corner of the region and the status of imams and Islamic school facilities also rose in standing. He even mended the tombs of the khoja families.Hence, Yakub Beg was able to gain popular support from Muslims over the region (新新, 2001, p. 272-273). Not surprisingly, however, he executed many non-Muslim Manchus and Hans as well as many others who refused to convert to and embrace Islam (Chen, 1977, p. 154).

II. The Independence Movements under theRepublican Era

i. The First East Turkestan Republic (1933- 1934)

In late 1911, the Xinhai revolutionaries, led by Sun Yatsen, succeeded in overthrowing the last dynasty—the Qing Empire—and in establishing the first ever republic—the Republic of China—at the beginning of the following year. The repercussions of the 1911 Revolution immediately swept through Xinjiang. In December 1911, a series of uprisings by disgruntled secret society members, who had long struggled against the Manchus, started in Urumqi and then spread to Yili within a month.The first uprising was swiftly suppressed by the Qing butthe second one succeeded in establishing a provisional government (Chen, 1977, p. 170).

Facing the crisis and his potential demise, the

27


Governor of Xinjiang, Yuan Dahua, fled after handing his authority over to one of his high officials, Yang Zengxin. Yang immediately pledged allegiance to Yuan Shikai, the Republican President, and was appointed the Governor of Xinjiang under the Republic of China (Mackerras, 1994, p. 53). However, the change of regime did not bring correspondent changes to the political order. Yang Zengxin and his successor Jin Shuren barely changed anything about the governance of the area. Both of them were “the last of the old imperial bureaucrats” in the government under whom the methods and strategies of rule during the Qing period continued (Lattimore, 1975, p. 29).

The demise of the Qing Empire brought fragmentation ofpolitical authority and power as well as the loss of economic security in China. An annual subsidy of 2.5 million tael provided by the Qing court stopped as the weak Republican authority at the center could not afford it (新新新, 1985, p. 64-65). However, during his period of rule Yang Zengxin maintained continuity in the structure of administration as parallel to that of the Qing model by attaching more importance to military control over theregion (Nyman 1977: 25–6). Xinjiang’s annual military budget during 1917 and 1922 recorded an average of 74% ofgovernment expenditure and it was under this large budgetdeficit that the fiscal spending excessively exceeded fiscal revenue (新新, 2001, p. 327-328). Moreover, border commercial activity with Russia ceased from 1917 to 1920.As a consequence, the people in Xinjiang suffered from heavy taxes, decreased income, and inflation of which resulted from the Republic’s currency inflation policy.

28


Yang Zengxin tolerated Muslim practices to some degreeas long as no foreign influence was detected. However, herestricted Turkic language publications, especially newspapers, and prevented Islamic education by keeping foreign clerics or teachers from employment by the schools or mosques (Millward and Tursun, 2004, p. 69). After Yang’s assassination in 1928, Jin Shuren came to power in Xinjiang. However, he was more corrupt and incompetent than his predecessor and even harsher toward Muslims. He taxed animal butchering (proper butchering was and is important to Muslims for conforming to Islamiclaw) and banned pilgrimages by Muslims to Mecca (Forbes, 1986, p. 42).

When Jin coercively annexed the Kumul Khanate1 in 1930, Muslims resentment against his harsh rule exploded and they rebelled in 1931. The government’s use of extreme force, causing immeasurable casualties during rebel suppression, generated enough resentment in Muslim communities that the rebellion boiled over into a secessionist movement. In late 1933, Muslim leaders declared the Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan or the First East Turkestan Republic (ETR)2

1 It was a Muslim vassal khanate established by directdescendants of the Chagatai Khanate ruling family and remainedas a semi-autonomous khanate under the rule of Qing from 1757to 1911 and then under the ROC until 1930. It was situated inpresent-day Hami within Xinjiang.

2 The term “Eastern Turkestan” is a politically controversialterm that connotes multiple meanings in regard to its usageand context. The term has its origin with the 19th centuryRussian Turkologists when they replaced the Chinese termreferring the southwestern part of Xinjiang in the Qing erathat lines in continuity with “Western Turkestan” or thestates in Central Asia that was formerly under the Soviet

29


with Kashgar as its capital, a historical city which Xinjiang Muslims consider the homeland of their heritage and spirit. However, the Republic only lasted for less than a year as it was defeated by a Hui army from Gansu led by Ma Zhongying in early 1934 (Mackerras, 1994, p. 64-65). Although it was a short-lived dream of Uighur’s and other Turkic-Muslim ethnics to establish an independent Islamic republic in Xinjiang, it continued toinspire Uighur secession movements afterward.

ii. The Second East Turkestan Republic (1944- 1949)

Meanwhile, in May 1933, Jin was ousted via coup d’étatand was replaced by Sheng Shicai with help from the Soviet Union. Sheng joined the Communist Party in August 1938. Between 1934 and 1939, Xinjiang was at peace and prospered under Sheng’s enlightened rule based on his “Eight-Point Declaration” supplemented with the “Six-Point Program Policy.”1 However, by the early 1940s,

Union. Since the 20th century, Uighur secessionists haverejected the term Xinjiang as it connotes a Chineseperspective in the name. Instead of Xinjiang, they use andprefer the term “East Turkestan” to emphasize its ethnicconnection to the western Turkic groups or “Uighurstan,”meaning the land of the Uighurs, as a name referring thepresent-day Xinjiang Autonomous Region or a future independentstate that they may eventually seek out (Frederick, 2004, p.6-7; Davis, 2008, p. 1-2).

1 “Eight-Point Declaration” is a new deal Sheng promised to theXinjiang people in 1933 that assured “national freedom,religious freedom, immediate aid for the rural areas,financial reform, administrative reform, extension ofeducation, encouragement of regional self-government, andjudicial reform” (Chen, 1977, p. 183)

“Six-Point Program” is a supplementary policy program issued in1934 that identified “opposition to imperialism, friendship

30


Sheng started to lose interest in the Soviet Union as a patron, sensing the decline of Soviet power during World War II. Sheng turned to the GMD in order to secure his power over the region and Xinjiang was put under the ruleof GMD on the 5th of October, 1942.

By 1943, the GMD effectively and completely removed the Soviet power from Xinjiang and began to initiate its political and military authority in the region (Forbes, 1986, p. 159). Before long, however, Xinjiang’s economy started to deteriorate due to inflation caused by the linkage of Xinjiang’s currency to overvalued GMD currency. Moreover, its problems were further exacerbateddue to the closure of border trade with the Soviet Union since mid-1942 (Benson, 1989, p. 36). In addition, the GMD’s policies toward minorities were based on “the strict implementation of racial1 assimilation (新新新新)” forwhich the four other major minorities2 residing in the Republic of China must “constitute a single powerful nation” along with the majority (400 million Han), eventually leading to “racial evolution” and the promotion of earnest nationalism in order to defend the nation against foreign intruders (Mackerras, 1994, p. 55–60).

However, the GMD’s power was never consolidated over

with the Soviet Union, democratic and equal rights for all thepeoples of Sinkiang, clean government, peace, and a systematicprogram of economic and cultural construction” (Chen, 1977, p.187).

1 Sun Yat Sen conceived the term “nationality” with racialovertones to some extent (Mackerras, 1994, p. 55).

2 Sun acknowledged the five nationalities existing in China,namely, Han, Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, and Muslim Turks(Ibid.).

31


the region and its position was tenuous in terms of control. In November 1944, Turkic Muslims backed by the Soviet Union started a rebellion in Yili against the government of the Republic and established the Second East Turkestan Republic with Gulja, the main city in Yili, as their capital. The Chinese Muslims sought to control the whole region and to form an independent state. Their desires for this were ignited by the oppressive policies, with the GMD government as the main driving force implementing these policies.

The Yili National Army, which consisted of Turkic Muslims, advanced to the east and subjugated the three far northern districts of Yili, Altay, and Tacheng (新新新新,1984, 274). An ongoing war with Japan left the central government of the GMD with no other alternatives but to negotiate and mediate the conflict with the Muslim leaders in Xinjiang. The East Turkestan Republic also wished to cease fire and sit down at the negotiation table as they were certain that they would capture victory (Forbes, 1986, p. 190). As a consequence, both they and the Soviet Union reached an agreement to establish “the Xinjiang Provincial Coalition Government” on the 2nd of January, 1946, which assured self-governmentthrough the right to elect a government. Moreover, one ofthe provincial vice-chairman would have to be from the East Turkestan Republic. In addition, the Second ETR and the GMD agreed to end the discrimination against religionand the right to use the local nationalities’ language inprimary and secondary schools with Chinese as a required language course in the secondary level.

32


Nevertheless, the GMD continued to exert its influenceand extend its control over the region by preventing the implementation of the agreed reform policies (Mackerras, 1994, p. 66). The already established ethnic tensions between the Turkic Muslim and the Han Xinjiang were exacerbated under the coalition government of the GMD andthe Second ETR (1946 to 1949), in large part due to differences in policies and their implementation. In addition, the GMD emphasized the great importance of “unity of nationalities” on the one hand while on the other hand prevented the minorities from taking part in the governance and extended its control over the region. The negotiated ratio of 70:30 minority nationalities to Han in government posts was never effectively put into practice. As a consequence, the GMD ultimately deepened the divide in the relationship between minorities and Hanas well as exacerbating existing ethnic tensions in Xinjiang (Mackerras, 1994, p. 67; Benson, 1990, p. 4).

The coalition government came to an end when the GMD was defeated by the CCP in the Civil War and reached the agreement of separation in the fall of 1949. The Soviet Union convinced the Second ETR leader to accede to the CCP and they accepted the accession of the Xinjiang into the newly established China under the rule of the CCP. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the CCP entered Xinjiang in October, 1949, and Xinjiang was in complete control of the CCP by the spring of 1950 (Rossabi, 1975, p. 275).

These series of rebellions stated above were caused bythe resentment of Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims in

33


Xinjiang against the Han; this eventually led to the establishment of two short-lived republics, although the second one lasted longer than the first. Out of the many practical reasons that caused the rise of the two ETR governments, such as poor political and economic governance, increasingly poor economic conditions, especially in southern Xinjiang due to a break in trade relations with the Soviet Union at the onset of the two World Wars, and severe repression of Muslims by the GMD officials, nascent nationalist ideas promoting a pan-Turkic ethnic identity among Uighur communities played a major role in uniting the rebellion. Xinjiang is located at the heart of the Silk Road, especially Kashgar (or Kashi in present-day China) and other historically ancient oasis cities in the southern part of Xinjiang, where not only were different products exchanged but alsonew ideas were shared.

Therefore, Xinjiang was susceptible to the new ideologies that were circulating around the world. At theturn of the 20th century through 1920s, Turkic scholars and businessmen traveling around the world promoted a modern educational and intellectual movement (jadidism) in Xinjiang in order to bring modernity into the area community by establishing a modern education system and opening up schools with European curricula (Millward and Tursun, 2004, p. 72). It was during this period that manyWestern ideas, including nationalism with the history of Turkestan, were taught and eventually grew into a pan-Turkic identity within the Uighur communities.

Whereas the southern part of Xinjiang’s modern idea of

34


nationalism arrived through by the modern educational system, in the northern part, the people were more influenced by the communist ideology of the Soviet Union.Due to its close proximity, Russia and the Soviet Union have historically played a significant role in influencing the Xinjiang community. This has been especially true since the early 1920s, when the border trade was reopened a new set of ideas were ushered into the Xinjiang community; a nationalistic ideology spread across the region and instigated Uighurs to create underground communist revolutionary organizations (Forbes, 1986, p. 17).

From time to time, foreign powers came along with different ideas and cultures (from the influx of Islam inthe late 10th century and to the introduction of a modern nationalistic ideology in the early 20th century) whose influence swept through the Uighur community and continued to play a prominent role in influencing the Uighurs. Consequently, the modern Uighur ethnic identity was formed around the 1920s on the basis of the collective religious identity of Islam. This modern Uighur identity formed over the centuries while many different players’ power games in the region created conflict and rebellion before the rise of New China. These conditions eventually established the settings for complicated ethnic relations in the years to come under the CCP regime.

35

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS SINCE 1949

CHAPTER 3 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS SINCE 1949

On July 5th 2009, in the year that marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC, a mass of Uighurs started a protest against the authority in Xinjiang Urumqi but it soon escalated into a series of violent ethnic clashes with the Hans and spread to the other regions of Xinjiang. From July 5th to the 17th, 197 died and 1,700 were injured, 718 people were detained, and 331 commercial stores and 1,325 vehicles were damaged(Jeon, 2010, p. 153). The result of accumulated ethnic tensions between the two nationalities, this was the mostsevere ethnic clash that had ever happened in Xinjiang. The violent riots were initially caused by the killing oftwo Uighur workers in the southern region of a Guangdong toy factory by Hans during an ethnic brawl on June 25th. Disgruntled Uighurs, demanding full government investigations into the killings and protection of their nationality workers, organized a street protest in order to voice their discontent in July (Wong, 2009).

Such fatal events as an ethnic clash put extreme pressure on the CCP as it has always stressed the unity of its nationalities. The problem of minorities in China has always been one of the most important issues in termsof politics, economy, diplomacy, and security matters. Inother words, the stability in the regions where minorities dwell has a direct relation with the

36


development and security of the whole nation. Moreover, success in integrating and unifying the minority nationalities has the advantage of showing the superiority of the CCP regime in terms of maintaining stability. However, the ethnic tensions have historicallybeen a constant problem and despite integration efforts through appeasement policies, Uighurs developed secessionist movements in the form of mass uprisings on one occasion or terrorism on another and it shows no signs of abating. Since the mid-1980s, a series of violent demonstrations and unrest against Chinese authority and the Hans has escalated and might possibly suggest the intermittent or sporadic success of the PRC’sappeasement policy, which evolved since 1978 from a radical assimilatory policy to an appeasement policy.

Like the deadly clashes in July 2009, most of violent ethnic riots have demonstrated certain characteristics, such as that of contingency and impulsivity, albeit varied in its origin, formation of organization, and outlook of demonstration on occasions in different time. For example, Muslim students in Urumqi rose in demonstration from May through June of 1989 against the publication of a book in Shanghai called Sexual Customs or 新新新 (xing feng xi), which contains distorted and insulting description about Islamic culture (Li et al., 1994, p. 207-211). Another example occurred also in 1989,near Kashi (or Kashgar) where a group of Uighurs gatheredat the downtown area and protested against the Hans aftera Han man killed an Uighur woman with a shotgun during a personal argument (Seo, 1999, p. 41).

37


These incidents suggest that a certain degree of disenchantment is inherent among the Uighurs against the Hans and that a small event can gather enough momentum totrigger violent demonstrations and riots, even deadly ethnic clashes. In this chapter, I will examine how the Uighurs’ resentment of the Hans has developed since the establishment of the PRC and become a powerful factor in gathering the Uighur community together at the onset of triggering events. First, I will review the history of minority policies during the first 30 years of the PRC, until 1978. Second, I will examine the Uighur’s representativeness in the political and administrative arena in Xinjiang to find out how well their voices are expressed. Third, I will explore the economic disparity between the Uighurs and the Hans, whose regions of residence are clearly divided into the southern and the northern parts of Xinjiang. This disparity has created the conditions for the Uighurs to develop complaints against the regime. Lastly, I will observe the changes inthe international arena, especially after the fall of theSoviet Union, and the revival of Islamic values in Xinjiang in the 1990s and explore how they have worked asa factor for further determining and strengthening the ethnic identity of the Uighurs.

I. Domestic Causes

i. Assimilation Policy since the Late 1950s until 1978

The people of Xinjiang under the GMD government,

38


before New China came into power in 1950, suffered in large part due to assimilation policies and oppressive measures taken by the great majority Han rulers. It was only after the CCP took control of power in the region that friendly measures and positive reciprocal policies with regard to the minorities in Xinjiang came into effect.

Throughout Chinese history, the integration of the territory and the people was the first and foremost concern for each and every ruler. Not surprisingly, the main idea of nationality under socialist China is to blend each nationality into one min zu, which is “the Great Chinese min zu” or “新新新新” through integration of thewhole min zu. In other words, the blending of all of the country’s min zu into the one great min zu is the natural evolution of the four characteristic features of a min zu,which are “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (italics added for emphasis), a theory that was adopted by the CCP with regard to determining the min zu (Stalin, 1973, 60; Cho, 2006, p. 180). Therefore, after the establishment of New China, the CCP carefully struggled to develop minority policies under the Marxist-Leninist theory of min zu based on unity and equality. Article 3 ofthe First Constitution of PRC adopted on the 20th of September, 1954, by the First National People’s Congress displays the basic idea of a minority nationality policy (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1961, p.9):

39


The People’s Republic of China is a unitary multinational state.

All the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against or oppression of any nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities, areprohibited.

All the nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages,and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways.

Regional autonomy applies in areas where a minority nationality lives in a compact community.

All the national autonomous areas are inseparable parts of the People’s Republic of China.

As a result, the implementation of minority policies was cautiously put into effect during the first decade (until the late 1950s), which gave a great amount of preferential treatment toward minorities in order to unify the people and the territory of China under the CCPrule. In doing this, the CCP hoped to distance itself from the GMD’s segregated and strict discriminatory policy against the minorities. However, these trends of friendly measures toward minorities started to change into a radical and progressive leftist policy after the late 1950s that lead to secession movements based on the anti-Hans sentiments.

By the late 1950s, the promising start of Uighur and

40


Han relations began to deteriorate. The CCP, succeeding in the unification of the territories, began to fully incorporate the minorities politically and ideologically by moving the overall minority policy of integration further towards assimilation during the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 through 1976 (Schwarz, 1973, p. 193–207). During the Hundred Flowers Campaign1 period in 1956, minorities openly expressed opinions on and criticized the minority policy of the CCP and some requested secession from the PRC. In reaction, the CCP initiated the Anti-Rightist Movement2 in mid-1957 and classified the opinions from the minorities as local nationalism, which was as taintedas anti-socialism. Preferential treatment and policies toward the minorities were discontinued and while other hard-left policies came into effect that disregarded min zu.

Minority leaders in the government were purged during the Anti-Rightist Movement. Although minorities’ traditional cultures and customs as well as literatures were preserved, they had to reflect the ideology of socialism in its contents and thus cultural traits were blurred among nationalities. In order to maximize

1 A period of brief liberalization that was started by ChairmanMao’s comment to promote pluralism of views and to encourage itspeople to openly comment and express opinion about thegovernment in order to gather pluralalistic views and solutionsto the national policy (Meisner, 1999, p. 155-190).2 An abrupt change of policy of the Hundred Flowers Campaign byChairman Mao through early 1960s, which purged and suppressedalleged rightists or dissidents who openly criticized the regimeand the CCP (Meisner, 1999, p. 155–190).

41


agricultural products, the communes3—which were part of the reform during the Great Leap Forward—were set up in minority regions in 1958 (Mackerras, 1994, p. 151). Due to this reform, large populations all over China sufferedfrom a great famine and the will to produce deteriorated.Complaints against the communes were also detected in thesouthern region of Xinjiang among Uighurs and among Kazakfarmers in the northwestern region (Rossabi, 1975, p. 276). As a consequence, in 1962, over 60,000 Uighurs and Kazaks crossed the border and entered into exile in the Soviet Central Asian countries (Dreyer, 1968a, p. 101-108). Moreover, although it was swiftly suppressed by thegovernment without much difficulty, military opposition against the regime and the reform erupted in Xinjiang during 1958 and 1959 (Dreyer, 1976b, p. 169).

A military revolt, albeit an uncoordinated one, occurred in 1958 not only in opposition to communes but also in resentment against the new religious policies; the Uighurs accused the Chinese government of destroying their religion. The radical leftist political ideology campaign was extended to the religions and after 1957, the complaints of religious believers that they suffered discrimination as well as persecution were widely heard within the minority regions. These harsh conditions exerted on the minorities were further exacerbated duringthe Cultural Revolution period, which placed the basic

3 The largest collective units of government and politicaladministration with economic functions in the rural areas wherepeople share property, resources, possessions, houses,production, and so on in order to improve agriculturalproductivity with ideological mobilization of the people(Lieberthal, 2004, p. 104–105).

42


and specific premise that the min zu problems could only be solved through the revolutionary struggle by the exploited working mass within each min zu against the reactionary class enemies in order to attain equality andimprovement of that min zu (Mackerras, 1994, p. 152).

This premise made the decade of the Cultural Revolution the most assimilative period for the minorities in the history of the PRC. Religion became oneof the “four old things—an old way of thinking, old culture, old customs, and old morals” that had to be eradicated from society as any faith or belief not in Chairman Mao’s philosophy was seen as superstition and substantially condemned. All religious places were closeddown and religious writings, paintings, art works, and statues were destroyed. Muslims in China were forced to raise pigs and eating pork became a basic requirement fora Hui (Han Muslim) to be accepted into the party or for any access to privileges, such as promotions in jobs (Heberer, 1989, p. 108-109). Religious activities were banned because they consumed time that belonged to work on the commune. Even national costumes became the target of criticism because of their ineffectiveness in the workprocess.

In addition, although the national autonomous region survived in theory as it was retained in the State Constitution adopted by the Fourth National People’s Congress in January 1975, it was in fact downgraded as noconcrete measures were in place to ensure its implementation. The institution in the Party that oversawthe minority min zu policy was abolished and the positions

43


of the officials in charge of the policy implementation and the training of minority cadres in the Party were also abolished. The incomplete destruction of the minorities’ culture, language, religion, and customs werefurther criticized as the main obstacle to the path of great unity of the nation and integrity of the class of exploited during the last years of the Cultural Revolution. The discussion of the min zu problems and its policies were strictly forbidden under the radical far-leftist leaders in the Party (新新新新新新新新新, 1980, p. 20).

During the late 1950s until the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Hans—especially the radical leftists in the Party—attempted to secure socialist unity within the nation with the class struggle as the focal point using brutal and relentless measures against the minorities as well as any Han who resisted the doctrine of Chairman Mao. Minority min zu leaders had no other choice but to completely subordinate themselves to the power of the regime and the idea of following their own culture, traits, religion, and traditions by various min zu meant severe suppression, which often caused casualties (Mackerras, 1994, p. 153).

However, after the Cultural Revolution and Deng Xiaoping’s accession to power in late 1978, the assimilative policy began to shift toward appreciation ofthe minorities’ interests; from 1979 onward, the rights of minorities to equality and autonomy were restored and guaranteed without any disturbance. The new minority policies also included ameliorating the living conditionsof minority regions, accepting the cultural differences

44


and distinctions of minorities, permitting religious activities as well as restoring Mosques and publishing the Koran, and allowing the use of the Uighur language. In addition, the Party reestablished the training programfor the minority cadres, supplied food aid to the povertystricken area of the southern Xinjiang, and provided subsidies for local administrative affairs (Heberer, 1989, p. 109; McMillen, 1984, p. 577).

The privileges that Uighurs enjoyed before the turmoilof political and ideological campaigns by hard-leftists in the Party were again affirmed under the relatively liberalized leadership. Nevertheless, the resentment against the regime and the great majority of Han by Uighurs in Xinjiang remained in the community and served as a catalyst over the coming decades for the Uighurs’ attempts to secede from the PRC.

ii. The Uighur ’ s Discontent with Their Underrepresented Political Voice

The implementation of autonomous control by minority min zu over the region where they are concentrated is one of the core ideas of the PRC’s policy for national integration. In addition, training minority min zu cadres became the central focus for the successful implementation of the regional autonomous policy, the realization of equality among min zu and national unity, the common prosperity, and the settlement of min zu contradictions. Since the start of the policy for training minority cadres in November 1950 by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, the government has established

45


cadre training schools and minority min zu educational institutions as well as technical training schools in themain provinces and cities in China in order to educate minority min zu in political affairs and cultivate professional minority nationalities in various fields. However, a large number of minority cadres were purged and all training schools were shut down during the Cultural Revolution period. Although a significant numberof minorities were reinstated after this decade of severity, a large number of posts and main seats were possessed by the Hans in the autonomous government and, as a consequence, has instigated complaints from the Uighurs asserting that their political voices has not been thoroughly heard.

In the time before the shadow of the Cultural Revolution spread over the whole of China, 85% of executive level cadres and over 50% of ministerial level cadres were comprised of minorities in their autonomous regions by mid-1961 (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 28). This numberof minority cadres began to decline, and by October, 1965, executive level minority cadres were 55.8%, a decline of about 30%, and high ranking minority officialswere just about 10% in the autonomous governments. Duringthe Cultural Revolution, 99,000 out of 106,000 minority cadres were ousted from their seats as antirevolutionary elements. It was only in the early 1980s that about 100,000 previously purged minority cadres came back to power through the government’s acknowledgement of the errors committed during the Cultural Revolution and by the needs of the government for active participation of the minority populations as it turned away from the class

46


conflict toward the establishment of a modernized socialist state (McMillen 1979, p. 75-76).

On May 31, 1984, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy was adopted at the Second Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress and in Chapter II, Article 17 and 18 specifically stipulated the personnel structure of the organs of self-government of a national autonomous area (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 1984):

Article 17

The chairman of an autonomous region, theprefect of an autonomous prefecture or the headof an autonomous county shall be a citizen ofthe nationality exercising regional autonomy inthey are concerned. Other posts in the people’sgovernment of an autonomous region…should,whenever possible, be assumed by people of thenationality exercising regional autonomy and ofother minority nationalities in the areaconcerned.

The People’s governments of nationalautonomous areas shall apply the system ofgiving overall responsibility to the chairmanof an autonomous region, the prefect of anautonomous prefecture or the head of anautonomous county, who shall direct the work of

47


the people’s governments their respectivelevels.

Article 18

The cadres in the departments under theorgans of self-government of a nationalautonomous area should, whenever possible, bechosen from among citizens of nationalityexercising regional autonomy and of the otherminority nationalities in the area.

The above laws guarantee the political participation of minority min zu in the state organ and stipulate the principle of self-autonomous rule over the minority regions by themselves. Along with the establishment of aninstitution that guarantees minority’s political participation, a subsequent minority cadre training policy led by then-CCP Secretary Hu Yaobang created 181,860 minority cadres which made up 43.1% of the total autonomous government posts. However, the ratio of minority cadres was still short by 10% compared to that of 1965.

In 1987, Xinjiang’s minority population was 60% of thetotal, whereas only 38.3% of the Party membership was comprised of minority min zu (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 29). Moreover, in 1990, only 0.87% of the Uighurs were employed in government institutions, the Party, and the PLA and only 1.07% of the Uighurs were working in State

48


enterprises, which is far short of the national average (新新, 1994, p. 12). According to the Xinjiang White Paper in 2003, the ratio between the Uighur and the Han cadres in the region shows no great difference as it was 51.8% and 48.2%, respectively. However, considering the population ratio of 59.39% and 40.61% or 6:4, the number of minority cadres in the region is less than that of theHans (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 30).

Moreover, under China’s system of a single-party stateform of government, the Party Committees at each level ofthe state’s organizations are the de facto decision-making institution and the seats of the Party secretary at these organizations in Xinjiang are dominated by the Han party members regardless of the population ratio of the region. The current Chairman of Xinjiang is Nur Bekri, an Uighur minority who joined the CCP in 1982 and served most of his career in high-level posts in Xinjiang. Although he has been given executive power and the overall responsibility of Xinjiang, the main decision-making power remains with the Party Secretary ofXinjiang as his order of rank precedes that of the Chairman. The current posts of the Party Secretary in Xinjiang’s provincial and prefectural-level are possessedby Hans; the same is true of the seats for top officials in the government institutions (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 64).

The reason for this lack of minority appointments at the political and administrative organs, especially in high posts, can be attributed to several reasons. One such reason is the geographical distinction that Xinjiangholds for security matters to China. For example, in

49


2000, the central government appointed 100 retired military officers to the head of Xinjiang’s law-enforcingand military affairs institutions (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 25). Suisheng Zhao, for another reason, questioned the ability of the CCP education system and the min zu universities in developing key minorities into leadershipposition, arguing that they often fail to train students in the technical matters of management and instead focus on developing political allegiance toward the CCP (Zhao, 2004, p. 183). Table 1 shows a survey for a question asked of both the Han and the Uighur cadres about the overall competency of the Uighur cadres in workplace (Yee, 2003, p. 441). Whereas 76.6% of the Uighur cadres assessed their fellow min zu cadres positively, only 53.8%of the Han cadres gave a positive assessment to the Uighur cadres.

Table 1. Assessment of the Uighur Cadres in the WorkPlace in Three Elements: Sincerity, Diligence, and

Capability(%)

VeryGood

Good NoComment

Poor VeryPoor

Numberof

SurveyedUighur 20.0 56.6 15.9 7.6 0.0 145Han 14.4 39.4 25.0 20.7 0.5 188

Another explanation is that there exists discrimination against or lack of trust in Uighurs in thegovernment institutions, especially when they are in top

50


positions; there are even some allegations that many Han officials do not respect the Uighur’s cultural distinctiveness (Bovingdon, 2002, p. 45).

The Chinese government has created a legal institutionthat provides the right to self-govern over a region where the majority population consists of minorities. However, the lack of incorporating the Uighurs into the political and bureaucratic process and the shortage of Uighur representatives able to redress unfair policies through voicing their concerns via legal avenues has caused complaints among Uighurs and eventually lead them to choose an alternative option, namely violent demonstrations and riots.

iii. Economic Disparity between Uighur and Han

The central government of the PRC has focused on modernization and economic growth as key policies in Xinjiang with an expectation to see a decrease in ethnic conflict in the region as a result. This is based on modernization theory, which holds that the interaction ofpeople from different min zu working toward modernization and economic growth would eventually create strong bonds with each other and form a larger community regardless ofethnicity, religion, and history. Although evidence of positive economic growth and improvement in living conditions within Uighur communities have been seen in recent decades, including the fact that over 30% of ruralhouseholds are now able to afford washing machines, motorcycles, refrigerators, and other household

51


materials,1 widening gaps in economic development and income disparity between the Uighurs and the Hans has increased resentment among that Uighurs. It provides a reason to secede and breaking away from China (Schwartz, 1994, p. 202).

In the past few decades, the government has invested an enormous amount mainly in infrastructure and heavy industries in the region. As shown in Figure 2, Xinjiang’s GDP growth rate from 2000 through 2008 has been higher than that of all of China (except in 2002 and2009) (Shan et al., 2010, p. 59). In 2010, the average GDP per capita was RMB 24,978, which is an increase of 9.4% from 2009. This ranks Xinjiang one of the most successful regions in terms of economic growth not only among the five autonomous regions but within China as whole (CIP, 2011, p. 69). Figure 2. Comparison of GDP Growth between Xinjiang and

China since 2000(%)

1 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, “Developmentand Progress in Xinjiang: White Paper”http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2009-09/21/content_18565939.htm

52

http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2009-09/21/content_18565939.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2009-09/21/content_18565939.htm


However, among the 31 provinces—excluding Taiwan, two Special Administrative Regions, and the direct-controlledmunicipalities—the net income of rural populations in Xinjiang recorded at the 25th in 2007 (Woo, 2009, p. 147).Table 2 shows the income comparison between China’s average rural population and Xinjiang’s rural population from 2003 to 2009. In 2009, the net income of the rural population in Xinjiang was 4,005 RMB, with an annual increase of 15% since 2003, whereas an average Chinese rural population’s net income rose from 2,622 RMB to 5,153 RMB, an increase of 16.1% over the same period. In addition, Table 3 shows the income disparity between urban and rural populations in Xinjiang over the period of 2003 through 2009. The differential rate between urbanresidents and rural residents increased from 1:30 in 2003to 1:0.33 in 2009 (Liu, 2021, p. 16-17). As approximately90% of the Uighur min zu resides in the historical oases rural areas located in southern part of Xinjiang (south of the Tian Shan mountain range), and whereas the Han

53


mostly reside in cities located in the northern Xinjiang,we can conclude that the economic disparity between the Uighurs and the Hans is growing worse (National Bureau ofStatistics [NBS ] & State Ethnic Affairs Commission [SEAC], 2003).

Table 2. The Income Disparity between Average RuralPopulation in China and Rural Population in Xinjiang

(2003-2009) (CNY)

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Xinjiang2,106

2,224

2,482

2,737

3,183

3,503

4,005

Average2,622

2,936

3,255

3,587

4,140

4,761

5,153

Table 3. The Income Comparison between Urban and RuralPopulations in Xinjiang (2003-2009)

(CNY)

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Rural2,106

2,224 2,482 2,737 3,183 3,503 4,005

Urban7,006

7,503 7,990 8,87110,120

11,432

12,258

One reason for this economic disparity between the Uighurs and the Hans in the region can be attributed to the structure of financial assistance provided by the central government as well as imbalanced economic development in the region; the actual benefits of the economic progress mainly enjoyed by Han entrepreneurs and

54


workers. During the 1980s and 1990s, a large investment from the central government in Xinjiang focused on the development of the northern region, where the majority population is Han, because the industrial setting was better than in the southern part. As a consequence the Uighurs, who largely populate the southern rural area, have not enjoyed the fruits of investment and developmentthat the Hans have. Moreover, a mandatory quota of at least 60% of employment occupied by minority in the state-owned enterprises (SOE) were abolished due to bankruptcy of a lot of SOEs in the recent decades and most of it has turned into privately owned companies thatare not bound by the official regulation of employment. This monumental shift from a socialist planned economy toa market economy significantly reduced the importance of the state’s role in employing minorities. Hence, private owners in the region are more inclined to hire Han workers due to their advanced abilities in language and technical skills, over and above those of the local Uighurs. Indeed, the level of wage differentiates betweenHans and Uighurs employees (Lam, 2009; Shan et al., 2010,p. 59). From one account in the wake of the Guangdong factory riots, an Uighur interviewer complained that manyUighur inhabitants in Xinjiang are suffering from high unemployment rate due to the reduced employment opportunities and loss of arable land to improper developments back in home villages caused by the large migration of Han into the region.

Another reason for the cause of economic disparity between the Uighur and the Han is because of the destruction of the local ecology and the decrease in

55


arable land due to exploitation of the land in the name of modernization and development. In these days, desertification in the Xinjiang region needs significant attention. Over 20 ancient cities located along the Silk Road have been buried under the sand. Indeed, natural ecological changes are inevitable in the desertification of Xinjiang, but it occurs at a slow pace over the time. In contrast, the destruction by man from indiscreet development projects accelerates the desertification and further exacerbates the economic condition of rural population in Xinjiang by creating sudden changes in the region.

According to a government document published by the Forestry Administration of Xinjiang on June 17th 2002, thedesertification rate of Xinjiang land is increasing at anannual rate of 400 km2 and the desertified area reached 100,000 km2. More than twelve million people were affected by the threats from the desertification and about 6,475 km2 of farmland suffer hazards from sandstormevery year and 1,335 km2 of grassland is in critical danger of desertification. The main reason for the catastrophe is the indiscriminate development of the arable land and the irresponsible development of natural resources (新新, 2002). Moreover, Xinjiang’s southern region does not have many cities that could host the population due to the extensive Taklimakan desert placed right at the center and traditionally, the population hasconstantly gathered around the oasis cities. In 1999, thearea that a human could reside on was only 4.2% or 70,700km2 of the total area of Xinjiang, which shows the population density similar to that of their counterpart

56


in the populated cities in the eastern part of China, about 207 people in 1 km2. In 1990, the arable land per person in two of the main Uighur-populated cities, Hetianand Kashi, was 0.0017 km2 and 0.0016 km2 respectively. However, in 2003 it sharply decreased to 0.001 km2 and 0.0007 km2, which is smaller than the average of China 0.0011 km2 per person (Woo, 2009, p. 149). As a consequence, according to the 2005 sample population census of 1%, the labor population in Xinjiang increased from 12.2 million in 2000 to 13.3 million in 2005. However, the employed population over the same period wasonly 773,700. Among these increased labor population, themain population resides in southern Xinjiang due to the decrease in arable land (Woo, 2009, p. 150). As a consequence, the Uighurs have to travel to the far-east regions of China in order to find work and once there, most of them find difficulties accommodating to circumstances due to differences in culture and language (Lam, 2009).

Not only has the decrease in the arable land caused problems, but also an ethnic clash during the procurementof the arable land by the large Han migrants has created friction between the two min zu. Since the establishment of the PRC, a large number of Han migrants have settled in the northern part of Xinjiang and plowed the land. From 1949 to 1998, Xinjiang saw an increase of 2.6 million ha of arable land, among which only 807,700 ha was in the Tarim Basin, the southern part of Xinjiang where most of the Uighurs reside. Therefore, a serious shortage of agricultural water occurred in the downstreamregions of Xinjiang, and subsequently, ethnic clashes

57


often erupted over water resources (Lee, 2003, p. 716–719).

Other than the actual economic disparity between the Uighurs and the Hans in terms of income, the Uighurs havea negative perception of the government that, since the 1980s, they have been exploited by the government’s economic development priority on the eastern and southeastern coastal cities. At the 7th Five-year plan, the central government designated Xinjiang as a supporting region for the economic development of the other parts of China by providing its abundant reserve ofnatural resources with considerably lower prices according to the government’s plan. In contrast, the products made in the other provinces are sold in Xinjiangat market prices (Christoffersen, 1993, p. 137). This dual-price system added to the perception among the Uighurs of being exploited by the economic system and waswidely believed throughout the Uighur community.

After the massive riot in Baren on April 5th 1990, Urumqi Television made an announcement on behalf of the government to emphasize the importance of the resource transfer to the developed provinces as important to the success of the economic development plan. The announcement emphasized that resource ownership is sharedby the whole nation, not owned by a particular region or one min zu (Seo, 1999, p. 45). This economic disparity and its side effects caused by the unequal development plans during the early reform and opening-up era occurred not only in Xinjiang, but in the other provinces and regions as well, especially in the mid-western regions of China.

58


However, this has helped to form and spread a perception of unfair treatment and injustice among the Uighurs, whose community has an historic ethnic resentment againstthe Hans. In other words, from the Uighur’s point of view, they felt an ever greater sense of deprivation by this unequal distribution of wealth in spite of the supply of valuable natural resources, whereas China as well as the Hans who reside in Xinjiang enjoy the fruits of economic development. These conditions of economic disparity have amplified the existing grievances of the Uighurs that have previously led to ethnic tensions.

II. International Factors

i. Relationship between Xinjiang and the Central Asian States after 1989

In the wake of the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union fell, nationalism based on ethnicity, race, and religion swept around the world as the rhetoric of political ideology lost its position as the core element in forming political unity. Along with these waves of change and the subsequent establishment of the former Soviet Central Asian States into new republics,1 these changes also influenced and even inspired a nationalist sentiment among several Uighur secessionists in and out of China. As a consequence, since 1991, Xinjiang shares borders with eight different countries: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Russia, Pakistan and India. Among the eight neighboring nations,

1 Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, andTurkmenistan.

59


the ethnic majorities in four out of five Central Asian states, excluding Turkmenistan, reside in Xinjiang as minority min zu and four Central Asian states (except Tajikistan) share a common language and customs with Muslim Turkic Uighur min zu (Woo, 2009, 134).

The government of the PRC became more aware of the ripple effect as they saw that the independence of these newly born Central Asian states (now led by ethnic groupswho share similar ethnic and racial affinity with the Uighurs) might spill over into the region and further instigate nationalistic sentiments within the Uighur community (Dreyer 1998, 130–131).

Moreover, since the mid-1980s, the PRC and the Soviet Union agreed to reopen Xinjiang’s border to resume trade.However, it was only in the early 1990s that Xinjiang wasfully reopened and began to develop closer economic ties with its neighboring countries. Until 1989, China had to be cautious with opening the trade border of Xinjiang in consideration of border security due to its ongoing hostile relations with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the economic strategy of opening Xinjiang and establishing the “Great Islamic Circle,” which sought to expand economic ties between Xinjiang and the western Islamic region and Eastern Europe, could not be fully implemented as the Chinese economic planners hoped (Christoffersen, 1993, p. 133). When broken ties between China and the Soviet Union were completely and officiallynormalized in 1989, and threats from the bordering statesdiminished as the former Soviet Central Asia states established their newly born republics (which could not

60


possibly pose any threat to China), Xinjiang’s ties with these regions greatly increased in terms of economics andthe exchange of people.

In 1990, China’s trade volume with Kazakhstan was 85 million ruble, which is only 2% of the Kazakhstan’s totalforeign trade volume. By 1992, the trade volume between the two countries comprised 20% of Kazakhstan’s total trade volume, a sharp increase of ten-times only in 2 years (Seo, 1999, p. 49). Figure 2 shows how Xinjiang’s foreign trade has increased since the late 1970s.

Although it saw a decrease in 2001, the overall trend shows an increase in rate and time (Oh, 2009, p. 216). In2008, Xinjiang’s total volume of border trade increased by 87.4%, marking USD 17.6 billion, which consisted of 57.1% of the total border trade volume of China (Ministry

61

Total Volume

of

Trade

Figure 2. Xinjiang’s Total Volume of Foreign Trade since the Late 1970s (100million USD)

Source: Xinjiang Uighurs-Hans Conflicts in China

Yr


of Knowledge and Economics [MKE] & Korea Trade InvestmentPromotion Agency [KOTRA], 2009, p. 3). The trade with thebordering states, especially the Central Asian states, now takes a great part in not only Xinjiang’s economy butalso in China’s economy as a whole and it has become one of the most geographically important regions for China’s economic expansion.

ii. Strengthening of Ethno-Religious Identity

There are significant numbers of Uighurs dispersed throughout the Central Asia and they have ethnic communities in almost all of these countries as a result of past migration. The largest Uighur community is in Kazakhstan, with over 200,000 Uighurs or 1.5% of the country’s total population. Over 46,000 Uighurs reside inKyrgyzstan, about 1% of the total population and over 23,000 Uighurs live in Uzbekistan. The smallest Uighur communities are in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, with no significant or noticeable cultural association. These Uighur communities abroad and the Uighurs in Xinjiang aremore and more forming a shared identity through the restoration of ethnic links, through commerce, and through mutual visits, which were stopped along the closed borders in the past (Kamalov, 2009, p. 121-124).

In addition, the completion of the Trans China Railwayor the Euro-Asia Railway in 1992 with a total length of 11,000 km, from far eastern China cities to Rotterdam in the Netherlands, as well as the installation of a Euro-Asian optical fiber communication system in 1994, furtherfacilitate the exchange of freight and communications

62


between Xinjiang and Central Asia. These transportation and communication advances in present day Xinjiang help not only its economy to be more closely connected with the Central Asia but also the Uighurs to easily contact other Uighur residents abroad. This is an impressive advance compared to the past, when personal exchanges were banned.

Moreover, the establishment of the Central Asian republics by key nationalities within their state is a key motive for instigating the Uighur desire for secession from China. For instance, Kazakhstan is led by Kazakhs, Kyrgyzstan by Kyrgyzs, Uzbekistan by Uzbeks, andso on, leaving the Uighurs as the only Turkic Muslim nationality in the region without their own nation-state (Dorian et al., 1997, p. 466). The ethnic riots in Kashi rallying against the authority and the Hans in 1994 with their slogan of “Drive out Hans,” “East Turkestan belongsto Turkestan,” and “Stop the Colonial Rules of Han in East Turkestan” well demonstrate the ultimate goal of Uighur secessionist activists. For another instance, a series of protests in Ghulja in 1997 also showed rallyingcry such as “Independence for East Turkestan” or “Defend to the Death for the Independence of Uighuristan” and “God is Great” suggesting the characteristics of an Uighur secessionist movement (Lidster, 2002). As a result, a change in the international order which eventually led to the establishment of the Central Asian States and the efforts to expand the economic territory by establishing transportation and communication infrastructure helped to strengthen a separate ethnic religious identity of the Muslim Uighurs than the past.

63


Moreover, the Uighurs are now more open to the political or religious movements taking place not only in the Central Asia but also around the world through swift collection of information about topics that encourage independence, such as democracy, human rights, self-determination, and religious liberalization.

III. The Revival of Islam in Xinjiang andthe Rise of Pan-Turkism and Islamism

The religious identity of Muslim Uighurs is by far themost influential identity among the many elements in Xinjiang. Since the influx of Islam into the region in the late 10th century, it has been at the center of the Uighur’s lifestyle and the Uighurs adhere fiercely to thetraditional Islamic values. However, the Islamic culture within the Uighur community was nearly destroyed during the Cultural Revolution period and, as a consequence, a severe atheist assimilation policy brought about an underground religious community among the Uighurs and caused further deterioration of relations and an increasein ethnic resentment against the Hans.

After the transition of power and the adoption of reform and opening-up policy in 1978, which brought radical changes throughout all of China, the Chinese leaders acknowledged the need to stabilize the Uighur community in order to win support from these people, allowing the government to concentrate fully on China’s development strategy. As a consequence, the government issued a document on March 31st, 1982, “the Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our

64


Country’s Socialist Period”—simply referred to as “Document No. 19”—that encapsulated the state’s attitude towards religious matters. This was the first time ever that a definitive and clear religious policy was stated and circulated across the country. In this document, the CCP’s attitude toward religion in China is well describedas it states (Document No.19, 1982):

[R]eligion had its own cycle of emergence,development and demise, and that religion willsoon disappear from human history, naturallyonly through the long-term development ofsocialism and communism, when all objectiverequirements are met…we communists are atheistsand must unremittingly propagate atheism, andyet at the same time, we must understand thatit will be fruitless and extremely harmful touse simple coercion in dealing with people’sideological and spiritual questions, and thisincludes religious questions.

The government understood religion as an historical phenomenon pertaining to a certain period in the development of human society. In other words, it would eventually and naturally disappear along the long-term path of development and when society reaches an advanced socialist state. It also acknowledged the importance of religion in the peoples’ lives, which cannot simply be dissolved by force, and its critical role in maintaining the stability of a community. Hence, the government took a more liberal stance toward religion and heralded an

65


open policy for cultural vitality, which is unprecedentedsince 1949. Until 1984, the government corrected unfairlyoppressed religious incidents, re-opened and built mosques, permitted religious practices and organizations as long as they were approved by the government, returnedconfiscated religious estates, to name just few reparations.

As a consequence, the Uighurs went public about being Islamic and the number of mosques in Xinjiang increased to 20,000, which is more than 5.8 times compared to a decade ago; 17,540 of these mosques are located in the southern part of Xinjiang and their numbers are still at an increasing trend which reached 23,753 in 2003 (Finley,2007, p. 634). According to 新新新, a professor at the Central University of Nationalities, there is at least one mosque per one Uighur-populated village and the current mosque density per Muslim population in Xinjiang is higher than that of the Middle East or any Arab communities, which makes it one of the few regions with the highest mosque density.

Since the late 1980s, along with the revival of Islamic practice and culture in Xinjiang, the demise of the Soviet Union and the revival of pan-Turkism and Islamism in the subsequent independent Turkic Muslim republics in Central Asia have influenced ethnically Turkic and religiously Muslim Uighurs in the 1990s in thesetting where trade and communication exchange has increasingly widened and deepened between the two regions.

In the interests of establishing independent

66


republics, the former Soviet Central Asian States began to be greatly influenced by Islamism and pan-Turkism in the power vacuum of a strong central political authority.Pan-Turkism was aroused among ethnic Turkish people in the Central Asia from dissatisfaction with the recent history of colonialism by the Imperial powers and with anaim to revive the ancient glory of the Ottoman Empire by achieving cultural and political unification of Turkish peoples. In a similar idea, but with much more weight given to Islam as a political ideology, Islamism seeks toestablish pan-Islamic political unity against infidels with strict adherence to the Islamic values and laws.

Pan-Turkism and Islamism already existed in Xinjiang in the early 1900s, arriving via Uighur intellectuals andbusinessmen travelling abroad. Moreover, an ideology of political Islam and a Turkish nationalist movement influenced Xinjiang during the 1930s and 1940s when the Uighur secessionist leaders sought to establish an independent state based on Turkish Muslims in the region.These two failed ETRs shared the same idea and spirit of “our motherland is East Turkestan, we are Turkish people,and our religion is Islam” when establishing an independent republic (Seo, 1999, p. 59). This shared ideaamong secessionist activists indicates the characteristicof Xinjiang Uighur’s secessionist movement as they attempt to establish an independent state that could self-determine its future with the people sharing the same ethnic and religious traits within the territory where they have historically resided. Moreover, by calling for unity under the same ethnic and religious traits, not only does it include the Uighurs but also all

67


ethnicities who share these natures, such as the Kazakhs or Kyrgyzs. However, these movements faded away in the political arena of China as the New China under the powerful CCP was established and when the Xinjiang borders were closed, cutting the Uighurs off from CentralAsia as the Sino-Soviet relationship devolved into hostility in the 1960s.

Although the “floodgate of the Islamic revival” was opened in Central Asia in 1989, the year that the Soviet Union decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, it wasn’t until the early 1990s that the revival and growth of these movements were detected in the Central Asian statesand in Xinjiang (Rashid, 1994, p. 244). Islamic fundamentalism is often associated with militant movements and terrorist activities as its ultimate goal is to establish authentic pan-Islamic state and convert all non-Muslims. In Xinjiang in April 1990, an Islamist uprising occurred in Baren Township, near Kashi, led by Uighur Zahideen Yusuf who had been inspired by the idea of the jihad being practiced by mujahedeen in Afghanistanagainst the Soviet invader (Michael, 1997, p. 31). This uprising led to a subsequent series of uprisings in Xinjiang, including in Yinning in 1997, often associated with violence against the Hans.

68


CHAPTER 4 - THE PRC’S COUNTERMEASURES

AGAINST THE UIGHUR’S SECESSION MOVEMENTS

I. The Importance of the Xinjiang Region

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is one of five autonomous regions (the other four are Xizang Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia) and the largest administrative division located in the northwest of China, covering an area of 1,664,900 km2, which is one-sixth of the nation’s total area. Its border ranges from the northeast to the southwest at the westernmost front of China, and has the longest borderline, more than approximately 5,400 km, which is one-fourth of the total border of the country (China Intercontinental Press [CIP], 2011, p. 6-26). The vast area of Xinjiang holds the regional importance by itself as the westernmost front facing eight different foreign countries. Moreover,

69


Xinjiang is of great importance to China’s political-economic strategy in the era of China’s rise as a superpower in a world where the United States is the onlyother power influential enough to countermeasure China’s influence over the world.

During most of the 20th century, China emphasized national security in Xinjiang due to its proximity with the Soviet Union as both were in hostile relations. Consequently, border trade with the Soviet Union was closed until the 1980s. However, since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the wave of new changes that have swept both in and out of China, the geo-economic, geo-strategic, and geo-political importance of Xinjiang has gained a new momentum and caught the attention of Beijing.

First of all, Xinjiang has been widely known for its abundant and large deposits of minerals and oil resources; 115 out of 147 kinds of minerals are found in Xinjiang. Since ancient times, it has been famous for producing gold, jade, coal, and other minerals. As the technology for exploring underground resources matured, Xinjiang’s positive developmental potential has increased. Among other rich reserves, such as copper, nickel, salt mineral, rare metal, chromium, gold, construction nonmetal and other resources, the region is most significant for its energy deposits, which accounts for 30% with 20,922 million tons (petroleum), 34% with 1,040 million cubic meters (natural gas), and 40% with 2,190 billion tons (coal) of the total reserve in China (CIP, 2011, p. 24-25).

70


In 2007, Xinjiang region’s total production of petroleum was 26.1 million tons, which is an increase of 5.5% compared to 2006, and the total production of natural gas rose by 27.9% during the same time. This amount puts Xinjiang at 3rd and 1st, respectively, within China in terms of production (Woo, 2009, p. 148). Becauseof its natural endowment of valuable resources, Xinjiang is the starting point for the energy project called “transporting the gas from the west to the east” (or 新新新西) that sends 17 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to 12 eastern provinces and 80 big and small cites and municipalities with its amount to be increased with the additional construction of a set of pipelines from Xinjiang to the east.1 Moreover, Xinjiang lies at the heart of the historic Silk Road that has connected Europe and Asia for over 2,000 years. As China intensifies its opening-up and cooperation policies with the world at a speed and depth that has never been observed in China’s history, the region’s location as theentrance for import of energy resources from adjacent countries and the gateway for exports endows Xinjiang with a great importance to China’s energy security for its industrial development and for its commercial expansion to the west, especially after China embarked ona full-scale economic development in 1978.

1 新西新新 (is a part of the 10th five-year economic development planinitiated in 2002 to send an enormous amount of natural gas tothe east region of China through a set of pipelines which passthrough 10 provinces and 66 cities in China with a total lengthof 4,000 km. The additional pipelines from Xinjiang to the eastare in construction or are planning to be built for moretransportation of natural gas (People’s Daily, 2006; Shin, 2012).

71


Second, the geo-strategic significance of Xinjiang hasalways been an important concern in Beijing throughout the history of China. In the 1870s, when the Qing empire faced the threat of losing its influence over the physical territory in the southeastern and northwestern part of the country to military expansion by Japan, Russia, and Great Britain, there was a discussion in the Qing court about whether to abandon Xinjiang in order to reinforce its coastal borders (新新) or retake its positionin inland Xinjiang. Unlike Li Hongzhang, who insisted on reinforcing and focusing resources into coastal borders, Zuo Zongtang strongly argued the importance of Xinjiang and defending it from a threat imposed by the western Imperialists was of great significance to the future of the Qing. He stressed Xinjiang as a geo-strategically important region by saying “by taking one step back from the region, thieves will take one step forward to our house” (新新, 2001, p. 275).

Moreover, after the fall of the Soviet Union, a new set of games were established in Eurasia. Brzenzinski described the region as “the grand chessboard” for the United States’ geo-strategic power games stating that having firm control over the region would help maintain the United States’ position as the global power (2000). Moreover, in regard to Eurasia, Sir Mackinder in the early 20th century described Central Asia as the heart of the world and that anyone controlling the region would eventually dominate the world (Do, 2010, p. 45). Hence, securing the stability of Xinjiang gives the high hand tothe government of China not only in terms of political stability of its various min zu throughout the country but

72


also by enhancing its position in Central Asia and the Middle East as it serves a continental bridge that can extend the reach of China over these regions and simultaneously act as a security buffer zone for inner China.

For these reasons, all emphasizing the significance ofXinjiang, the Chinese government has constantly adhered to the fundamental principle of maintaining stability in the region by any means. Moreover, although the government in Beijing recognizes the problem of secessionist movements by the Uighurs as a non-imminent issue that has a possibility of realization in a matter of time, they consider it as an intolerant risk that could seriously deteriorate the regime’s ability to control the state if it might affiliate with other socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-ecological problems such as the pressure for democracy, eradication of corruption, dissatisfaction with economic polarization, and natural ecology protection. Hence, the problem of Xinjiang’s Uighur secessionist movement has a significance in the regime’s strategy of “stability through development,” “stability for development,” and “securing the regime through development and stabilization” in order to maintain its regime and system(Lee, 2004, p. 65).

II. Fostering Economic Development inXinjiang

According to one survey conducted in June 1994 and again in June 1995, targeting 33 first class minority

73


cadres in the Central Party School of the CCP in Beijing and 109 executive officials in various autonomous regionsand prefectures, 100% and 98.2% of those surveyed answered “Increased” to the status of widening gap between the east and the west since the 1980s. On the question of what will come from this increased economic disparity between the east and the west region, 83.9% and81.5% answered the outbreak of “sociopolitical destabilization.” In another survey conducted in late 1995 targeted at executive cadres in the minority regions, 95% answered that regional disparity between theeast and the west negatively influenced the relationship between the Hans and minorities and two-thirds answered that the negativity was at a serious condition (Yang, 1996, p. 212-220). This economic disparity between regions is largely attributed to the core economic policyof China’s early reform and opening-up era, called Getting Rich First or 新新新 (xian fu lun) in the coastal regions and helping the rest of the country through accumulated capital and resources.

Therefore, the Chinese government has focused its effort to improve economic conditions, especially in underdeveloped western regions of minorities, where economic dissatisfaction could link with secessionist movement and have a ripple effect of societal disorder onthe whole minority community if aggravated economic conditions do not improve. Through a series of large-scale economic development programs in the minority regions, the Chinese leaders hoped to accelerate economicimprovement not only in the minority regions but also improve prosperity and common progress across the whole

74


country by taking a full-scale momentum of development, which would eventually narrow regional economic gaps and strengthen the cohesiveness of the nation with sociopolitical and socio-economic stability.

In 1992, the State Council approved the economic development plan and eight preferential economic policiesin Xinjiang, which can be represented by the phrase “新新新”西 or “connecting to the east and advancing to the west,” that attempted to make Xinjiang the modern Silk Road by opening up the region to the west with assistance from the industrially developed eastern part of China, throughany means possible, to ultimately develop the economy of Xinjiang. This was because Xinjiang itself is rich in natural resources but lacks the production capability to export goods to the world market (Kim, 2008, p. 266). Hence, by coordinating a development project with much more developed eastern and middle provinces and cities was considered the best way to foster vibrant economic activities in Xinjiang.

In the same year, the State Council approved the establishment of Border Economic Cooperation Zone or 新新新新新新新 (bian jiang jing ji he zuo qu) in three frontier cities Yining, Tacheng, and Bole and invested 140 million, 64.5 million, and 133 million RMB, respectively for the construction of basic infrastructure. As a consequence, Xinjiang’s total volume of trade increased by 142% and the scale of external economic cooperation increased by 116.67% during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) compared to the last period (Seo, 1999, p. 66-67). This stress on the development of the western region of China

75


was intensified when Jiang Zemin announced on June 17th 1999 the need to accelerate the development of the western region and declared “the fundamental principles of western development program,” which indicated that to develop the socioeconomic conditions in the western region is to realize sociopolitical stability and national unity. In November, the Great Western Development Program1 guidelines were clarified and a Leadership Group for Western China Development was launched under then-Premier Zhu Rongji (Kim, 2008, p. 269).

The government of the PRC is putting a great amount ofeffort into maximizing the efficiency of the reform and the opening-up by fostering economic ties between the west and the east part of country while also improving socioeconomic conditions in the underdeveloped western

1 The Great Western Development Program is a grand economicstrategy adopted by the PRC to develop its vast underdevelopedwestern regions, which cover 71.4% of China—including Gansu,Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, InnerMongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang, Chongqing—from 2000 to 2050,through three phases of development plans. The first phase isfrom 2000 to 2005, where they set the overall blueprint of theplan, policy, and law with the establishment of institutions andconcentrate investment on social overhead capital in order tofacilitate the development of infrastructure. The second phaseis set to initiate a large scale development from 2006 to 2015,aimed to increase self-development capacity of the westernregions and increase the foreign and domestic investment. Thethird phase is a full-scale development stage set to run from2016 to 2050 by securing capital and strengthening marketizationand globalization of the western region. For this grand scaledevelopment strategy to be successfully implemented, thegovernment of the PRC decided to issue 1 trillion Yuan ofnational bonds per year and invest over 80% of foreign loans andover 50% of government investment into the western regions (Kim,2008, p. 269-270).

76


regions in order to close a gap of regional economic disparity in order to eventually strengthen national unity. However, most industries and investments in the past have gone to the northern part of Xinjiang where most Hans live, whereas most of the Uighurs reside in thesouthern region, which ultimately widened the income gap between the Hans and the Uighurs due to this geographically imbalanced development.

Yet, this problem of ethnic resentment based on economic disparity started gain recognition after the deadly ethnic clashes between the Uighurs and the Hans inUrumqi in July 2009. In November that same year, the Chinese government sent three investigation teams to Xinjiang and conducted wide ranging first-hand research regarding socioeconomic situations, religions, and political stability. Based on these reports, the leaders of the government attended the Xinjiang Work Conference in May 2010 and agreed that Xinjiang’s “major contradiction” lies in the discrepancy between the growing demand of material and cultural needs and the lowlevel of socioeconomic development available to fulfill these demands. As a consequence, the government came up with a set of strategic plans1 to improve the livelihood

1 These strategic plans include three-pronged approach. Firstly,in the financial support plan, the government decided todramatically increase investment in Xinjiang by doubling thecurrent amount of fixed asset investment during the 12th five-year plan, an estimation about two trillion Yuan. An assignmentof 19 provinces and cities under a “pairing assistance” plan tohelp the development of designated areas in Xinjiang byproviding 0.3% to 0.6% of annual budget every year as well ashuman resources, technology, and management know-hows.Encouraging various kinds of banks to open branches and outletsin remote areas, mostly in the southern part, of Xinjiang.

77


of the Uighurs by putting the spotlight on the southern region of Xinjiang through fiscal and financial means, and creating more job opportunities as well as vocationaltraining in order to “leap frog development” and to “achieve long-term stability” (Shan & Weng, 2010, p. 62-63).

III. Strike Hard

As Xinjiang moved into the 1990s, the secessionist movements by the Uighurs diversified into a general unrest with bombings, kidnapping, assassination, and attacks on the Hans as well as the Uighurs closely associated with the Han circles, government facilities, and in a public place. Unlike the general Uighur people who rarely rise in massive demonstrations and riots, these attacks against the Hans in Xinjiang during the 1980s and 1990s were based on a strengthened ethno-religious identity combined with socioeconomic and sociopolitical dissatisfaction among some radical Uighur separatists . On March 19, 1996, the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo sent a secret directive called Document 7 to the Xinjiang government. Document 7 warned

Secondly, on the fiscal support, the government decided tochange the current tax system on natural resources from aquantity-based to price-based levy. Enterprises in southernregion will be granted with a privilege of complete taxexemption in the first two years after it begins making profitand 50% tax reduction in the following three years. Thirdly, anew Special Economic Zone, which enjoys an advantage frompreferential policies in most of business sectors, will beestablished in the southern Xinjiang city Kashi with total areaof 50 km2 as the center for modern-day Silk Road and the enginefor economic development in the region.

78


the government of Xinjiang about the seriousness of both illegal religious activities and foreign religious separatist forces’ infiltration into Xinjiang. It indicated that the CCP required stricter and firmer action in the matter of the burgeoning violence of ethnicseparatism and conflict. It further warned that if these threats were not effectively stopped, it would eventuallydestabilize not only Xinjiang but the whole country (Mackerras, 2003, p. 52).

The government’s attempt to subdue separatists’ threats in Xinjiang went further when subsequent violent incidents occurred during April and June of 1996, including bombings in Kucha and assassinations of Uighur officials of the Islamic Association of China and an Uighur Deputy to the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region People’s Congress in the cities of Kashgar, Kucha, and Aksu. In a meeting of top government officials in Urumqi about these incidents, the Chinese government adopted a policy called “strike hard” or “新新 (yan da)” at the end ofApril, 1996. Strike hard is a systematic crackdown targeting violence and crimes in general, but clearly focused on separatist activists and any underground political organizations in the regions of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. In the meeting, officials firmly acknowledged strengthening the campaign against separatists and focusing on the organized violence and terrorist cases. In fulfilling the campaign against separatists, the Xinjiang Party Committee designated the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) as a major force for the assignment of maintaining the stability of Xinjiang and defending the country’s

79


frontiers (Dillon, 2001, p. 19).

The XPCC or 新新 (bing tuan for short) is an economic and semi-military state organization founded in 1954 under the banner of “Construct Xinjiang and Defend Frontiers” (新新新新, 新新新新) with the goals of defending and developing Xinjiang’s frontier regions, promoting economic development, and ensuring social stability by protecting it from any domestic disturbances. By 2002, its membership reached 2,501,200 or about 13% of the population of Xinjiang. Its major role has changed over time, in accordance with the changes in the domestic and international arenas. For instance, back in the 1950s, itfocused on settling, cultivating, and developing sparselypopulated regions; in the 1960s and 1970s, it served as areserve force after the Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated; and since the 1980s it has worked as a security force focusing on the deterrence of separatists in Xinjiang (新新新, 2003, 205–217).

Although the active policy in use for solving ethnic problems in Xinjiang turned from “stability above all andby any means” in the 1980s and 1990s to economic development and modernization in minority regions in 2010, the Chinese government maintained its “strike hard”stance with a will to firmly oppose any ethnic separatistforces or secessionist movements in order to maintain thestability of the region. For instance, during the Xinjiang Work Conference from May 17 to 19, 2010, four senior military generals of the PLA and members of the Central Military Commission conveyed the full support of the army for Xinjiang’s development plans and “strike

80


hard” actions against separatists. Moreover, in order to effectively and swiftly deal with insurgencies in cities,a special anti-riot police unit, named the “Flying Tiger Commandos,” was established in Urumqi (Shan & Weng, 2010,p. 64).

IV. Diplomatic Efforts

The Chinese government seeks active diplomatic and military cooperation with the Central Asian States and other neighboring states to the west of China where Islamic fundamentalists are established, such as Afghanistan, in order to prevent secessionist activities in and outside of China by Uighurs that could further develop. They hope to prevent secessionist activists fromexpanding their scope and increasing their connections with Islamic extremists or ethno nationalists within these regions. These diplomatic efforts have developed further since Jiang Zemin and Li Peng’s visit to the Central Asian States in 1994 and 1995. During their visitto these countries, they and those countries agreed to oppose ethnic secession in any form and to not tolerate the domestic activities of any secessionist organizationsmoving toward separation from the partner state (Xing, 1998, p. 45).

One reason underlying the establishment of diplomatic ties with these countries is that China sees the activities of the Uighur separatists as largely supportedby foreign Islamic forces in the newly independent Central Asian countries who have become sources of weapons, money, training, and places of refuge

81


(Mackerras, 2009, p. 137). Hence, the Chinese government is attempting to cut links between foreign influences andthe Uighur separatists in the hope that any secession movements will eventually fail and thus would not continue to pose a significant threat to China (Yan, 2000, p. 4).

Since the mid-1980s, both the exiled and the local Uighurs have often associated with some Turkic people in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and so on and they started to form activist groups working to be freed from China and ultimately establish an Islamic republic named East Turkestan or “the land of the Turks” consisting mainly of Turk Muslims (Israel, 1997). Table 4 shows dozens of Uighur activists groups currently operating in various foreign countries.

Table 4. The Current Worldwide Uighur Activists GroupsCountry NameGermany World Uyghur CongressGermany East Turkestan Union in

EuropeTurkey East Turkestan FoundationTurkey East Turkestan Solidarity

AssociationStockholm East Turkestan

AssociationBelgium Belgium Uyghur

AssociationBelgium Uyghur Youth Union in

Belgium

82


UK Uyghur Youth Union UKHolland Uyghur HouseRussia Uyghur AssociationUS Uyghur American

AssociationCanada Canadian Uyghur

AssociationAustralia Australian Turkestan

AssociationKazakhstan Nozugum FoundationKazakhstan Kazakhstan Regional

Uyghur OrganizationKazakhstan Uyghuristan Freedom

AssociationKazakhstan Kazakhstan Uyghur Unity

AssociationKazakhstan Uyghur Youth Union in

KazakhstanKyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Uyghur Unity

AssociationKyrgyzstan Bishkek Human Rights

CommitteeGermany East Turkestan

Information Center

Therefore, in the wake of the independence of neighboring countries and in order to draw a positive response from the Central Asian States in establishing close ties against possible threats from these separatistgroups, China approached them with its basic principles

83


of foreign policy. As stated in the then-newly enacted 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the basic principles of foreign policy were that

China adheres to an independent foreign policyas well as to the five principles of mutualrespect for sovereignty and territorialintegrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs,equality and mutual benefit, and peacefulcoexistence in developing diplomatic relationsand economic and cultural exchanges with othercountries…

Li Peng’s visit to the Central Asian States in April of 1994 was based on the four basic principles above; by not creating any perception of being a threat to them, his work led to successful diplomatic ties with these countries (Seo, 1999, p. 71). This strategy was importantfor China’s national interests not only in deterring secessionist activities linked with foreign separatist organizations but also in fostering economic ties and developing commercial interchanges and securing the allies in this region for China’s geo-strategic advance.

Historically, China has been perceived as a threat to Central Asia due to the Chinese Empire’s traditional expansionism to the west, as it was simultaneously one ofthe most important trading partners in the region. Similarly, when China substantially increased its power in terms of its economy and its military after 1949 and especially since its initiation of full-scale economic development, China has been perceived as a threat to

84


neighboring countries, especially the Soviet Union. However, the newly established Central Asian States also had political and economic imperatives that needed to be stabilized in order to solidify their control. Hence, establishing and maintaining friendly relations with China was a prerequisite for these countries. Moreover, the complicated composition of various nationalities in the Central Asian region also provided a reason to be aligned with China’s stance on the issue of resolving ethnic conflict and aiming for an ultimate unity and peace.

Since 1996, this mutual understanding of political, economic, and national security has led the pertinent states—Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and China—to continue to hold a series of summit talks declaring coalition efforts against ethnic separatism andreligious extremism. These summit talks eventually led tothe formation of a multi-national organization, includingUzbekistan, called the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO) on June 15th, 2001. This organization would allow everyone involved to cooperate with each other in close partnership on a dynamic spectrum of issues ranging from international and regional security, to the economy, human rights, and so on. As it expanded the areas of management from peace and stability within the region to energy security and counter-terrorism military exercises, it became the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of the East (Do, 2010, p. 45–46). Theorganization now allows other neighboring countries to participate in the activity in the form of observer states (including Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and

85


Pakistan), dialogue partners (Belarus, Sri Lanka, and Turkey), and guest attendances (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Turkmenistan).

After the 9/11 attack on the United States in 2001 by al-Qaeda and the subsequent “War on Terror” by the US, China has also promulgated its war on the “three evils ofterrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.” Such an approach was outlined in a government paper which detailed alleged incidents of terrorism in Xinjiang since1990 (Information Office of State Council, 2002). On December 15, 2003, the Chinese government designated fourterrorist groups and eleven terrorist suspects who have perpetrated “the three evils.” The four terrorist groups are the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, established in Pakistan in 1997; the East Turkestan Liberation Organization in Turkey, established in 1996; the World Uyghur Youth Congress in Germany; and the East Turkestan Information Center, established in 1996 in Germany (Woo, 2009, p. 151–152).

Moreover, China has bolstered the role of the SCO along with new bilateral security agreements and increased cooperation with the Central Asian states since2002. In July of 2002 and again in 2003, China held jointmilitary exercises with and extended military aid to Kyrgyzstan, signed the Sino-Kazakh Mutual Cooperation Agreement in December 2003, and established a bilateral agreement with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in September 2003 to establish cooperation in fighting against extremism, terrorism, and separatism. In 2002 and 2003,

86


China and the Central Asian states and as far as Nepal, through bilateral security agreements and police joint cooperation, extradited Uighur separatist and terrorist suspects from Central Asia (Clarke, 2009, p. 42).

87


CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

Throughout the history of China, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which takes up to one sixth of China’sterritory, has been one of the most important regions forChina’s rulers in terms of politics, economics, and strategy. Regimes in the past and the current regime of the CCP in the PRC have regularly adopted new and different approaches to handling the governing of the region, but all worked toward the shared goals of integrating the Uighurs into China’s population, easing the ethnic tensions, and maintaining China’s stability and supporting its advancement toward becoming and remaining a powerful nation. However, due to the Uighur’sdistinction as an ethno-religious group that was formed over the past several centuries, Xinjiang has been a stage for ethnic tensions, clashes, and uprisings that often shed blood of both the Uighurs and the Hans.

In this paper, the author analyzed the development of the Uighur secession movements by examining the historical accounts with regard to the influx of Islam into Xinjiang, establishing a solid foundation for the unity of Uighurs when facing practical problems. By looking into accounts discussing and dissecting a number of uprisings and demonstrations throughout the history ofthe region, the findings show that while the primary cause of the ethnic tensions and clashes are non-religious problems, the majority of these conflicts include religious matters in their development.

However, it is hard to say whether the Uighurs had a

88


sense of ethnic identity until the 1930s because the various rebel movements were often dismantled by power struggles from within with various factions seizing control and eventually causing the collapse of a given movement. However, this religious identity was further strengthened in the 1920s and 1930s by modern education, which might be referred to as the Uighur Enlightenment, introduced throughout Xinjiang by intellectuals and merchants travelling abroad, continuing a long tradition of travelers moving along the Silk Road. By introducing modern Western ideas, including nationalism and the history of the Turkic identity, the Uighur communities began to form an ethnic consciousness based on an alreadydeeply held and well-established religious identity.

Since 1949, the development of secessionist movements illuminates the practical problems under the rule of the PRC that caused a series of ethnic riots in Xinjiang. TheUighurs became disenchanted with the PRC’s turn to an assimilative policy based on an authoritative political ideology after several years of a promising start in relations between the Uighurs and the Hans. The religiouspractices and distinctive ethnic identity was forced underground in order to survive, especially during the decade of the Cultural Revolution. These hardline oppressive policies and assimilative stance toward minorities planted a seed of hatred and ordinary resentment against the Hans and created long lasting ethnic tensions between the Uighurs and the Hans.

However, after the new leadership rose to power in 1978, the policy toward the minorities went through

89


another big transformation to ease the ethnic tensions. With a number of preferential policies—including reopening of mosques, approving religious activities, as well as using the ethnic language—the ethnic tension seemed to be eased to a great degree. However, the lack of the Uighur’s participation in the political and bureaucratic process instigated a resurgence in dissatisfaction among the Uighurs, leading to massive andviolent demonstrations as their way of express their concerns.

An income gap between the Uighurs and the Hans has also been a problem about which the Uighurs often complained. Among other reasons for this income disparity, the government’s strategic decision to concentrate most of the investments in infrastructure andheavy industries in northern Xinjiang, where most of the Han population resides, thereby created southern deprivation among the southern Xinjiang Uighurs compared with the Hans. Tensions were further exacerbated by the Uighur’s criticism of the Han’s expropriation of valuableresources the Uighurs consider theirs for the other partsof China as part of the country’s macro-economic development plan and receiving insufficient compensation in return.

The changes in the international arena, especially thedemise of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a series of Central Asian states, have influenced the strengthening the ethno-religious identity of the Uighurs. As the newly established Central Asian states share similar ethnic and religious traits with the

90


Uighurs, the Uighurs have clear models, encouraging them to secede from China since the Uighurs are the only Turkic Muslim ethnic group in the region without their own nation-state. Moreover, the reopening of border tradewith neighboring countries resulted in the exchange of both commodities and people and it was further accelerated by transportation and communication technology development. Under these conditions, the ideasaround the revival of pan-Turkism and Islamism in CentralAsia and the Middle East made their way into Xinjiang much more easily than in the past. Therefore, the distinct identity of Turkic Muslim Uighurs residing in Xinjiang is ever present.

The above analyses show that the Xinjiang Uighur’s attempts to secede from China are based on an ethno-religious identity and they are growing, multiplied by domestic and international factors. However, due to the importance of Xinjiang in the interests of the whole of China, the Chinese government is striving to maintain stability in Xinjiang and to deter the separatist’s activities by using a multi-dimensional strategy. Recently, the government decided to accelerate the modernization and economic development rate in Xinjiang—especially in the southern region—by investing heavily toease the dissatisfaction stemming from the economic disparity between the Uighurs and their counterpart in the northern region.

In a diametrically opposite strategy, the government is also making use of the “strike hard” policy which willnever allow any secessionist movements in China and will

91


put down unrest quickly and firmly. China also has a solid reason to be worried about international terrorist organizations that might further instigate the secessionist movements of the Uighurs. Therefore, China established diplomatic ties and a number of bilateral agreements with neighboring countries, as far away as Nepal, in order to eradicate the separatist forces withinor outside of China. These efforts led to the establishment of a multi-national organization called theSCO, which seeks a cooperative strategic partnership in the Central Asia region with respect to the dynamic spectrum of issues from international and regional security, economic issues, human rights, eco-security andso on.

However, there is a limit to China’s ability to contain the growing secession movements despite the government’s best efforts. China’s strategy of economic development and increasing the livelihood of the southernUighurs seems to have positive prospects in terms of easing the economic dissatisfaction among the deprived Uighurs. Nevertheless, even if it succeeds in closing theeconomic gaps between the Hans and the Uighurs it might only be a medium-term solution as the growing perception of an ethno-religious identity within Uighur community will pose an ongoing threat to Xinjiang’s stability.

In order to mitigate these problems, the Chinese government needs to open more channels to allow the Uighurs to complain and also allow the government to heartheir concerns. They could increase minorities’ politicaland bureaucratic participation by appointing more Uighurs

92


as well as other minorities in their autonomous government offices. However, the current system of a one-party regime does not seem to have much room for this discussion. Thus the grievances of the Uighurs might burst out and degenerate into mass demonstrations and violent riots, as has happened so frequently in the past when the Uighurs felt their concerns were not being heard. Even if violent riots and secession movements takes place more often in Xinjiang, China is firmly determined to suppress those activities and movements by any means necessary to send a significant message to the Uighur separatists and any other minorities considering whether to challenge the authorities.

However, with the ever-increasing free flow of information, the mass media and human rights organizations from all over the world, especially in the west, could place blame on the Chinese government’s brutal suppression of its people. Moreover, Turkey, Iran,and other Islamic and Turkic countries could put pressureon China for its suppression of the ethnically and religiously similar Uighurs. China will, however, respondto those complaints with the principle of noninterventionby foreign entities in domestic policy.

With all the analyses presented above, this paper concludes that the secession movements by the Uighurs is growing into an ethno-religious nationalism with an ultimate goal of establishing an independent nation-statebased on Islam. There is no way that the ethnic tensions that lie behind these movements can be solved in a short period of time. Although the Uighur’s secessionist

93


movements are becoming more organized, the absence of thepowerful leading figures, such as in the case of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, could leave their movement in state of confusion due to power struggles from within between various forces. However, by taking into account the Chinese government’s increasing determination to maintainstability and suppress secession movements by Uighurs, the likelihood of an actual secession of Xinjiang from China seems very low.

94


REFERENCE

Bachman, D. (2005). Making xinjiang safe for the han?In Morris Rossabi (Ed.), Governing China’s Multi Frontier.Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Benson, L. (1989). The Ili Rebellion: The MuslimChallenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944 – 1949 .New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Bovingdon, G. (2004). Autonomy in xinjiang: hannationalist imperatives and Uyghur discontent. PolicyStudies, 11.

Bovingdon, G. (2002). The not-so-silent majority:uyghur resistance to han rule in xinjiang. Modern China,28, 1, pp. 39-78.

Brzezinski, Z. K. (1998). The Grand Chessboard:American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. NewYork: Basic Books.

Chen, J. (1977). The Sinkiang Story. New York:Macmillan Publishing Co.

Clarke, M. E. (2011). Xinjiang and China’s Rise inCentral Asia-A History. New York: Taylor&Francis.

China Intercontinental Press. (2010). The Facts andFigures on Xinjiang, China, 2010. Beijing: The WorldPress.

95


Cho, J. N. (2006). The Modern Chinese MinorityNationality Policy. Kyonggi: Korean Studies InformationCo.

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.(1961). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.(1982). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Christoffersen, G. (1993). Xinjiang and the greatIslamic circle: the impact of transnational forces onChinese regional economic planning. The China Quarterly, 133,pp.130-151.

Davis, E. V. W. (January 2008). Uyghur muslim ethnicseparatism in xinjiang, china. Asia-Pacific Center for SecurityStudies, 1-15.

Do, Y. J. (2010). China’s strategic interest towardthe sco. Modern China Studies, 11, 2, 43-88.

Dorian, J. P., Wigdortz, B. & Gladney, D. (1997).Central asia and xinjiang, china: emerging energy,economic and ethnic relations. Central Asian Survey, 16, 4,pp.461-486.

Dreyer, J. T. (September 1968). China’s minoritynationalities in the cultural revolution. The ChinaQuarterly, 35, pp.96-109

96


Dreyer, J. T. (1976). China’s Forty Millions, MinorityNationalities and National Integration in the People’sRepublic of China. Cambridge, Massachusettes: HarvardUniversity Press.

Dreyer, J. T. (1998). The potential for instability inminority regions. In D. Shambaugh (Ed.), Is China Unstable?:Assessing the Factors. Washington, D. C.: Sigur Center forAsian Studies.

Dreyer, J. T. (1996). China's Political System:Modernization and Tradition. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Eberhard, W. (1982). China’s Minorities: Yesterday andToday. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co.

Fletcher. J. F. (1978a). Ch’ing inner asia c.1800. InJ. K. Fairbank (Ed.), The Cambridge History of China, 10, LateCh’ing, 1800-1911, 1, (pp. 35-106). Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Fletcher. J. F. (1978b).The heyday of the ch’ing orderin mongolia, sinkiang and tibet. In J. K. Fairbank (Ed.),The Cambridge History of China, 10, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, 1, (pp.351-408). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Forbes, A. D. (1986). Warlords and Muslims in ChineseCentral Asia, A Political History of Republican Sinkiang1911-1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frederick, S. S. (2004). Xinjiang: China’s MuslimBorderland. New York: M.E.Sharpe.

97


Gladney, D. (1998). Internal colonialism and theuyghur nationality: chinese nationalism and its subalternsubjects. CEMOTI, 25, 47-64.

Howell, A., & Fan, C. C. (2011). Migration andinequiality in xinjiang: a survey of han and uyghurmigrants in urumqi. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52, 1,119-139.

Harris, L. C. (March 1993). Xinjiang, central asia andthe implicationsfor china’s policy in the islamic world, The China Quarterly,133, 111-129.

Hwang, B. H. (2009). History of xinjiang muslims and china’s islam policy. Journal of Middle East, 30, 1, 107-140.

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (September 2009). Development and progess in xinjiang. Beijing: The State Council. Retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7077515.htm

Israeli, R. (March 1997). A new wave of muslim revivalism in mainland china. Issues & Studies, 33, 3, 21-41.

Jeon, S. H. (February, 2010). The problems of china’s minorities. East Asia Studies, 58, pp.151-182.

Joo, J. W. (2002). China’s position in multi-national cooperation and its policy changes. Modern China Studies, 4, 2.

98

http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7077515.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7077515.htm


Kamalov, A. (2009). Uyghurs in the central Asian republics: past and present. In Mackerras, C.et al. (Ed.), China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, transition and crossborderinteraction into the 21st century (pp.115-132). New York: Routledge.

Kim, H. D. (1999). Ebs and Flows of Modern Central Asia. Seoul: Four Seasons.

Kim, H. D. (2004). Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kim, J. K. (2008). Central-Local Relations in China: Dialectic of Centralization and Decentralization. Seoul: Pyungmin Co.

Kim, Y. K. (2010). A study on the independence movement of the xinjiang uyghurs. Middle East Studies, 29, 2, 27-56.

Kung, L. Y. (December 2006). National identity and ethno-religious identity: a critical inquiry into chinesereligious policy, with reference to the uighurs in xinjiang. Religion, State & Society, 34, 4, 375-391.

Lam, W. (July 2009). The xinjiang crisis: a test for beijing's carrot-and-stick strategy. China Brief, 9, 15. Available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35307&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=459&no_cache=1

Lattimore, O. (1975). Pivot of Asia, Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia. New York: AMS.

Lee, D. Y. (2004). The chinese government’s understanding of the problem of minority nationalities’

99

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35307&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=459&no_cache=1




separatistism. Journal of National Strategy, 10, 3, pp.59-88.

Lee, K. Y. (December 2003). Lop-nor debates and the xinjiang production-construction army corps: a social process of desertification in northwest china. Journal of Korea Geography, 38, 5, pp.701-724

Li Z., Liu T., Li D., & Liu Y. (1994). Research on separatism among xinjiang nationalities. In F. Yang (Ed.), Research on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. Urumchi: Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences.

Liao, H. S. (1989). Ethnographic and demographic features of the sinkiang Uighur autonomous region. Issues & Studies, 34, 11/12, 56-89.

Lidster, S. (2002, September 10). China’s War on terror. BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2241025.stm

Lieberthal, K. (2004). Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform. New York: W.W.Norton&Company, Inc.

Liu, B. (2012). A Case Study on Minor Ethnics in Western Region of China. (Master dissertation). Bukyeong University.

Mackerras, C. (1994). China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

Mackerras, C. (2003). China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation. London: Routledge.

McMillen, D. H. (1979). Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang 1949-77. Boulder: Westview Press.

McMillen, D. H. (1984). Xinjiang and wang enmao new

100

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2241025.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2241025.stm


directions in power, policy and integration? The China Quarterly, 99, pp.571-593

Meisner, M. (1999). Mao’s China and After. New York: The Free Press.

Millward, J. A. & Tursun, N. (2004). Political Historyand Strategies of Control, 1884-1978. In S. S. Frederick (Ed.), Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, (pp.63-98). New York:M.E.Sharpe.

Ministry of Knowledge and Economics & Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency. (July 2009). Economic impactof xinjiang uyghurs autonomous region’s unrest. China Investment Report, 159, 1-4.

National Bureau of Statistics & State Ethnic Affairs Commision. (2003). Tabulation onNaitonalities of 2000 Population Census of China, vol. 2. Beijing: Nationalities Publishing House.

Nyman, L. E. (1977). Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese Interests in Sinkiang, 1918-1934. Lund: Scandinavian University Books.

Oh, H. Y. (2009). Xinjiang: Uyghurs-Hans Conflicts in China. Seoul: Chindirus.

Park, E. Y. (2010). The early qing empire’s xinjiang governance and local community movements. Journal of History, 42, 171-212.

People’s Daily. (2006). China Proposes Construction of2nd West-East Gas Pipeline. People’s Daily. Retrieved from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/11/print20060311_249910.html

Rashid, A. The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or

101

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/11/print20060311_249910.html

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/11/print20060311_249910.html


Nationalism?. London: Oxford University Press.

Rossabi, M. (1975). China and Inner Asia: From 1368 tothe Present Day. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd.

Rossabi, M. (2004). Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Schwarz, H. G. (1973). The Treatment of Minorities. InMichel Oksenberg (Ed.), China’s Developmental Experience. Pp.193-207.

Schwartz, R. D. (1994). Circle of Protest; Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising. New York: Columbia University Press.

Seo, Y. H. (2003). A Study on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Separatist Movement in China. (Master dissertation). Yeonsei University.

Shan, W. & Weng, C. (Jul/Sep 2010). China’s new policyin xinjiang and its challenges. East Asian Policy, 2, 3, 58-66.

Shin, S. H. (2012, October 16). China Begins the 3rd West-East Natural Gas Pipeline Project. Yeonhap News. Retrieved from http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=104&oid=001&aid=0005875996

Smith, F. J. (November 2007). Chinese oppression in xinjiang, middle eastern conflicts and global islamic solidarities among the uyghurs. Journal of Contemporary China, 16, 53, pp.627-654.

Song, K. G. (1998). Islam in china. Journal of Islam Studies,8, 1, 165-182.

Stalin, J. (1973). Marxism and the National Question.

102

http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=104&oid=001&aid=0005875996

http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=104&oid=001&aid=0005875996


In B. Franklin (Ed.), The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1905-1952, (pp.54-84). London: Croom Helm.

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. (1984, May 31). Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy. Retrieved from http://www.110.com/fagui/law_314253.html

Tanner, H. M. (2010). China: From the Great Qing Empire through the People’s Republic of China. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

The Government of the People’s Republic of China. (May2003). History and Development of Xinjiang. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/28/content_17948.htm

The Central Committee of CCP. (1982, March 31). Document No. 19: The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country's Socialist Period. Retrieved from http://www.purdue.edu/crcs/itemResources/PRCDoc/pdf/Document_no._19_1982.pdf

Wong, E. (2009, July 5). Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html?ref=global-home

Wang, D. (1998). Han migration and social changes in xinjiang. Issues & Studies, 34, 7, 265-283.

Woo, H. Y. (2009). A feud between xinjiang ‘uygur-zu’ and ‘han-zu’. Journal of Nationality Studies, 38, 133-160.

Xing, G. C. (1998). China and central asia:towards a new relationship. In Zhang, Y. & Azizian R (Ed.), Ethnic

103

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html?ref=global-home

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html?ref=global-home

http://www.purdue.edu/crcs/itemResources/PRCDoc/pdf/Document_no._19_1982.pdf

http://www.purdue.edu/crcs/itemResources/PRCDoc/pdf/Document_no._19_1982.pdf

http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/28/content_17948.htm

http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/28/content_17948.htm

http://www.110.com/fagui/law_314253.html


Challenges beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conumdrum. New York: Macmillan Press.

Yan, X. (2000, March 7). Best friends next door. China Daily. Retrieved from http://.www.china-daily.com.cn/cndydb/2000/03/d4-1tie.307.html

Yang, Q. (1996). Economic and Social Situation in Minority Regions, 1995-1996. Hong Kong: Ciity University of Hong Kong.

Yee, H. S. (August 2003). Ethnic relations in xinjiang: a survey of uygur-han relations in urumqi. Journal of Contemporary China, 12, 36.

Yu, J. G. (2002). Reformers of the late qing dynasty reformers. Daegu Journal of History, 69, 1-46.

Zhao, S. (2004). A Nation State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

新新新新. (1984). The Chinese Minority Nationalities Before the NewChina – On Occasion of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. (S. I. Yoon,Trans.). Seoul: Isaac Publishing Co.

新新. (2001). 新新新新新 - 新新新新新新新新新新新新统一 . 新新:新新新新新新新新新.

新新新新. (2003). 新新新新. 新新新新: 新新新新新新新.

新新新. (1985 新新 1 新). 新新新新新新新新新新. 新新新新新新

新新新. (1985). 新新新新新新 , 新新 . 新新:新新新新新.

新新. (2002, 新新 18). 新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新 . 新新新新新.

104


http://people.com.cn/GB/huanbao/57/20020618/755131.html

新新新新新新新新新新新新新新. (1980). 新新新新新新. 新新新新新新新：.

新新. (1994). 新新新新新新新新新新新新. 新新新新新新, 新 22 新, 新 4 新.

新新新. (2006). 新新新新新新新新新新. 新新: 新新新新新

105

http://people.com.cn/GB/huanbao/57/20020618/755131.html

新新新新新/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS & PERSONAL STATEMENT

新新/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Over the last two years of study at Tsinghua University for my master’s degree, I have been fortunate to meet a number of good people who have shared my joys and sorrows. But first of all, all of my gratitude and love goes to my family in Korea who have tirelessly supported and encouraged me throughout my life. I love you guys!

During my years in Beijing, I got the most amazing present that I could ever wish for, which is my lovely wife Jeesan Han (a.k.a. GBONG). Thank you so much for bearing with this fool as a lover these eight years (and who still is a fool even after the marriage). I could nothave come this far without your endless love and care. I love you and will always.

A great amount of gratitude goes to the world’s best supervisor professor Chu Shulong as well. He has shown me by example how to be a scholar and I have learned not only from his excellence and expertise but also from his wisdom in greeting every person with a smile. Thank you, Professor CHU, for guiding me through my years at Tsinghua University.

My special thanks go to Kelly J. Cooper, who has helped me over the last several years to develop my writing skills and always answered my questions when I needed help. Thank you very much Kelly and I appreciate your professionalism!

Last but not least, I have to show my thanks and love

106


to all those people who I met over the past decades of mylife. They will know who they are! Yes! It is You!!

And this thanks need not to be put down here but for the record, Thank you God for letting me to live to experience this second!

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

新新新新/PERSONAL STATEMENT

The author asserts that this thesis was preparedsolely by myself under instruction of my thesis advisor.To my knowledge, except for documents cited in thethesis, the research results do not contain anyachievements of any others who have claimed copyrights.To contributions made by relevant individuals andorganizations in the completion of the thesis, I haveclearly acknowledged all their efforts.

新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新新：，，。，，。体，。

Signature by Author:

107


Date:

108


新新新新/RESUME

I was born on August 15, 1984, and raised in Seoul for about 17 years before I went study abroad in the United Statesof America. I graduated in 2003 from Cotter High School, located in Minnesota, and entered Boston University in the same year. Before graduating from the BU in 2010, I was conscripted to serve the Republic of Korea for 2 years as a soldier in the Korean National Defense University, providing interpretation services. After a year at KNDU, I voluntarily accepted a dispatch to Lebanon for a year, where I worked as apeacekeeper for the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon. After graduating from Boston University with a bachelor’s degree of arts and sciences, with a major in political science, I further extended my education by entering Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management.

109

The Secessionist Movement of the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang and the Chinese Governments PRC Response

Documents

Transcript of The Secessionist Movement of the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang and the Chinese Governments PRC Response