John HarrisPOLS 509

The Notion of Empirical Theory in Political Science

Political science seeks to provide explanations of human behavior

in the realm of politics. The purpose of this goal is to provide

useful information that will lead to the betterment of humanity.

It also seeks, therefore, to suggest how politics might act in

ways that are more becoming to the promotion of all humanity as

well as the Earth itself. Political science has always used a

variety of methods to achieve this goal, and, like the natural

sciences, has achieved discovery within the paradigms in which it

has existed. Paradigms, of course, change.

A more recent phenomenon in political science has sprung up since

the successes of the natural sciences in the areas of natural

selection, Newtonian physics, etc. The natural sciences, through

their practice of the scientific method, have made great

discoveries that have benefitted the human race and, arguably,

provided a counter-benefit in areas such as nuclear physics as it

is being used to produce weapons that have the capability to wipe

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out the human race. The success of the natural sciences has led

to the suggestion (and at some instances the demand) that

empirical theory in political science should be modeled after the

natural sciences and aspire to objective (scientific)

explanations. The purpose of this theory is to explain, not to

justify action or indulge in social engineering. Political

scientists, this suggestion demands, should make every attempt to

eliminate, rather than incorporate, normative concerns in their

empirical work. The best way to achieve this is to employ

rigorous methodologies that are free of “ideological bias.”

This suggestion is based on a reasonable argument, since the

methods of the natural sciences have produced great findings. It

may be argued, however, that the natural sciences are within an

elongated paradigm that uses the scientific method as the prime

and sometimes only method in its search for scientific discovery.

A study of the history of science will show that scientific

discovery has occurred in eras that have used alternative methods

alongside the scientific method in the production of scientific

discovery useful for the era in which the discovery was made.

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It is also reasonable to suggest that the theory of natural

selection is no longer a theory, but it is rather a fact that

science has proven over and over again. I myself have no reason

at all to disbelieve this theory, and have always considered it

to be absolute truth. At the same time, I recognize that even

the scientific community has labeled natural selection to be a

“theory,” and that even the most Popper-like of scientific

theorists suggest that a falsification process be included in

every scientific discovery. This shows that not even the natural

sciences are fundamentalist in their approach to discovery and

truth: there is room for error.

Given both the successes of modern science as well as the non-

fundamentalist approach scientists have to the natural sciences,

there is reason to approve and disapprove of the suggestion that

political science use only the modern scientific approaches in

their search for political discovery. What is missing from this

suggestion is that natural science and political science are two

different things. The scientific method is working very well for

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the natural sciences, but that does not necessarily mean it will

work well for the political science. Also, political science, in

the estimation of many, is interested not only in discovery, but

in the application of that discovery in terms of making

suggestions that will benefit humanity and the Earth. While this

addition to a definition of political science may irk many in the

natural sciences, and even cause some of them to decry it as

nonscientific, the political sciences must stand by our

definition of what is science to us and what is not. The natural

sciences may not dictate the definition of science to the

political science community, nor may it shove its methods down

our throats as the only legitimate methods of discovery. To do

so would suggest an element of fundamentalism within the natural

science community, a community that has labeled its own findings,

again, as “theories.”

Within political science, there exists a school of thought that

seeks to abide by the suggestions of the natural science

community as stated above. It is called rational choice theory.

In Jonathan Cohn’s article, When Did Political Science Forget about Politics?,

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we are introduced to the inclusion of natural choice theory into

political science. Rational choice theory seeks to identify

universal explanations for political behavior by using the

scientific methods as the means of analysis. As Behavioralism

had ran its course, there was a natural response to some of the

criticism of political science, that it was not a science because

it did not adhere to the guidelines of the natural sciences, and

that it was not producing universal truths about political

behavior. This response is called rational choice theory,

stating that political science must be based on scientific method

in order to be a valid science. It borrows its main theory from

an economic principle that assumes that individuals always make

prudent and logical decisions that provide them with the greatest

benefit or satisfaction and that are in their highest self-

interest (Cohn 1-6).

Stanley Kelley, Jr. has taken the time to detail what he believes

to be a working definition of rational choice theory. He

identifies seven steps used in the rational choice model:

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1. Identify the agents (classes of individuals, kinds of groups) associated with a phenomenon or situation (broadly or narrowly defined) that you seek to understand.

2. Identify the goal or goal of those agents as they relate to the phenomenon or situation.

3. Delineate the features of the agents’ environment that may aid or impede them in achieving their goals.

4. Determine the kind of quality of information that the agent possesses about this environment.

5. Identify the courses of action the agents might take to achieve their goals within the bounds that their environment, and their knowledge of it, impose.

6. Identify, from among these possible courses of action, the ones that realize the various agents’ goals most effectively.

7. Predict that the rational choice for any agent will be its actual choice, or explain any agent’s actual choice by showing it to have been its optimal choice (Friedman 97).

In a breakdown of his steps, it can be determined how the terms

“rational and “choice” play into the theory. Based on a presumed

goal of an individual or group, we can determine the choices that

she may have before her. We can then analyze how she will

process information in her rational mind based on what she knows.

Therefore, we may predict what her course of action will be.

Put this way, this seems very appropriate to the social sciences.

It includes a variety of factors that are held in simultaneous

consideration. It takes into consideration what someone knows,

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rather than assuming all members of a given society behave the

same. In that way, it is complex. If a political scientist

desires to predict a particular behavior in a group, this

certainly seems like a useful tool. The fact that rational

choice theory does or does not adhere to the scientific method

should not be an issue of debate among political scientists.

What is more important is that it works or it does not.

There is evidence that rational choice not only works, but has

helped change some of the goals of political science. John

Ferejohn and Debra Satz, in their essay Unification, Universalism, and

Rational Choice Theory, point out some instances where this has

happened:

Consider, for example, the way that rational choice theoriesmade the act of voting problematic in ways it had not been in earlier theories. This shift meant that it was now voting rather than nonvoting that a successful theory neededto explain. Rational choice models of legislatures also made the apparent stability of processes and, as a result, shifted attention away from explaining change and toward explaining stability. In both cases, rational choice theoryshifted the explanatory agenda and guided subsequent and theoretical work (Friedman 72).

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At question to some may be the validity of a finding that says

it’s really a rational choice not to vote. To a political

scientist, however, this information may prove invaluable. If

the finding is true, what is it, then, that drives people to

vote? To the social reformer, finding those reasons may produce

suggestions on how to get poorer people to vote more often. The

study of legislative stability may lead us to help create

situations that aid to the stability of our own legislatures.

While this may smell of Parson’s “Grand Theory” (Mills 25 – 49),

it does not necessarily reflect a structural-functionalist

worldview that often denies actual conflicts that lead to

anomies; taken at face value, rational choice’s findings in

legislative stability is just that; findings. It is empirical

science.

Given its methodology and success, rational choice theory has

proven than it can be an addition to political science.

Morris P. Fiorina is a promoter of rational choice theory within

political science. Contrary to the attacks on rational choice

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theory in the book Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (Green and

Shapiro 1996), Fiorina provides a general understanding into how

RTC is useful in political science. He cites the work of one of

his rational choice teachers as follows:

Consider a work by one of my teachers, Richard Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees (1973). In this book Fenno moves from his earlier structural functionalist approach to an RC framework. Members of Congress have goals, they gravitate (self-select) to committees where these goals can be met, they adopt strategic premises (previously called “norms”) that facilitate the achievement of these goals, they structure committee processes to attain their goals, and they reach equilibrium when their goals are met through committee membership. Fenno’s book is highly empirical… (Friedman 90).

Although Fiorina continues his presentation by stating that Fenno

drew no universal applications nor did he analyze potential

objections to his findings, he nonetheless arrived at scientific

finding regarding the behavior of legislators. He did it through

applying the rational choice theory to the situation he was

studying and arrived at scientific finding. Fiorina emphasizes

that rational choice theory is not as universalist in its

approach as it sometimes construed, leaving the reader to

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consider the option of rational choice theory as something useful

in political science:

I teach my students that RC models are most useful when stakes are high and numbers low, in recognition that it is not rational to go to the trouble to maximize of the consequences are trivial and/or your actions make no difference. Thus, in work on mass behavior I use minimalistnotions of rationality, whereas in work on elites I assume ahigher order of rationality (Friedman 88).

It should be noted, according to proponents of rational choice

theory within political science, that rational choice provides

clear understandings into both the practice of and the study of

politics. Moreover, our proponents have noted that elements

within rational choice theory in political science are heavily

debated within its own paradigm (Friedman 87). For the political

scientist who is open-minded to all theories and methods that

arrive at scientific findings, rational choice can definitely be

used as a great tool in the study of politics. In addition,

political scientists may then apply rational choice findings in

political science to theories that may lead to the betterment of

humanity.

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There is no other modern theorist than C. Wright Mills in showing

how this application is possible. In his book The Sociological

Imagination, Mills argues that personal experience, when brought

together with social and political analysis, can help a person

fully understand what has happened and why it has happened. In

his opinion, we must find connections between 1) our personal

lives and environments and 2) and historical, political, and

social forces to which pour lives and communities are shaped by

(Mills 3 – 12). He presents his thesis as follows:

To be aware of the idea of social structure and to use it with sensibility is to be capable of tracing such linkages among a great variety of milieux. To be able to do that is to possess the sociological imagination (Mills 10-11).

Mills goes on to suggest that social scientists must direct their

research towards

1) a theory of history,

2) a systematic theory of the nature of humans and society,

and

3) empirical studies of contemporary social facts and

problems (Mills 22-23).

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Let us take a moment to examine how these three directions for

social science may play out with rational choice controversy.

The historical suggestion is obviously a very difficult one to

determine. RTC seems to promote the study of the here and now

rather than offer grand schemes that provide universal truths of

all time (with the exception, of course, from its original thesis

that all actors act according to their own self-promotion in all

areas of life, including economics and politics.) But a

realistic view of RTC shows that it really is not interested in

things like historical analysis of all time; it is rather

imbedded in making scientific findings that apply to explaining

modern and specific phenomenon. Other methods of social and

political science are, therefore, to be useful. These methods

will not follow the teachings of natural science; rather, they

will be found primarily within the structure and function of

social and political science and will include, among other

methods, traditionalism, behavioralism, and first-hand analysis

of cultural groups learned through the immersion of social

scientists into alternative people groups.

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As for the systematic theory of the nature of humans and society,

RTC is again at a loss. The methods listed in the previous

paragraph are also more useful in the discovery of theories of

who people and society are and how they behave. RTC may have

something to offer, such as their suggestion that we act

rationally according to our own benefit, but true social science

believes that this is only one component of many that can be

useful in the analysis of something as grandiose as whom we are.

Number systems, computer programs, and statistical analysis

common to RTC are not designed to answer questions like this

because the notion of who we are and how society is organized is

grounded in philosophy, personal experience, social analysis,

competing theoretical systems, ad nauseum.

The third item in Mills’ list, empirical studies of contemporary

social facts and problems, is a place where RTC may be used as

one of many methods to arrive at scientific finding. It is here

that the scientific method, as found in the natural sciences, is

most helpful. By borrowing this tool that has proven great

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success in the natural sciences, political science has developed

important findings through a variety of scientific methods

including the applications of RTC.

Richard Sklar provides appropriate insight into the inner-

workings of a political science that is multi-faceted in its

approach to discovery, as suggested in the article Theory that

Matters: the Intellectual Legacy of Richard L. Sklar. This essay more than

adequately describes the brilliant mind, actions, and findings of

a political scientist that has used a variety of approaches,

methods, and theories that have allowed him to develop an

analysis of politics on the African continent (Bowman 1-22).

Richard Sklar knows much more about African politics and culture

than do other scholars of the continent. He has lived there. He

has taught there. He knows and has had enormous access to

African political leaders. Having begun his studies at a time

when the African continent was under a political restructuring,

he was able to see the conflicts between what he has called

African exceptionalism and abstract universalism (Bowman 1-2).

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African exceptionalism is the theory that a social scientific

study of the African continent can lead to an appropriate

understanding of current problems with politics and society and

can therefore suggest remedies to these problems. Abstract

universalism is the theory that all areas of the world can be

best explained by universal notions of humanity, history, and

politics; this theory is a Western theory and is therefore

dominated by Western thought and perspective which, according to

many, contains elements of Western imperialist thought (Bowman 1-

2).

Rather than rely on one theory, as some rational choice theorists

and other promoters of “scientific method only in the political

sciences” folks have suggested, Sklar depended on both African

exceptionalism and abstract universalism in his analysis of

politics in several of the African nations. Bowman summarizes

Sklar’s approach as follows:

Far too frequently, claims of African exceptionalism make a failure to grasp the universal in the particular. Conversely, imported theories that purport to explain

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African politics often do violence to the particular for thesake of validating universalistic claims. The objective of social-scientific research, as Sklar conceives it, lies between these two extremes. One must understand a subject in all its peculiarities by studying it on its own terms. Then, and only then, can one hope to explain its theoreticalsignificance. This is accomplished by constructing theory that elucidates the relationship between the particular and universal. In this sense, empirical theory is always concrete, which is to say, it possesses practical relevance because it is about real-life problems that affect the humancondition (Bowman 2).

Besides adjoining theories, which stands in the face of some of

the previously mentioned suggestions put forth by some within the

RTC world, Sklar suggests that “empirical theory” has come as a

result of adjoining these two theories. We must take a step back

and ask how the theories of African exceptionalism and abstract

universalism have developed. Are they the result of methods of

research that only employed the scientific method? Of course

not! African exceptionalism and abstract universalism are both

the result of a variety of theories and methods spanning numerous

paradigm shifts within the political science world.

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And how shall a rational choice theorist respond to the findings

of Sklar, that he found nothing? That he found something, but it

wasn’t science?

Sklar’s notion of “mental emancipation” might have something to

say to those that demand “that empirical theory in political

science should be modeled after the natural sciences and aspire

to objective (scientific) explanations,” as our prompt has

suggested. Bowman and Halisi document Skalr’s methodology as

follows:

In his provocative essay, “Nnamdi Azikewe and the political Economy of Freedom” (1994, essay 30), Sklar described “five principles of thought and action for a renascent Africa” first announced by Azikewe in 1937, including “mental emancipation,” which implies that Africans should pursue a course of “ideological creativity rather than excessive deference to imported ideologies.” This same principle of creativity, as applied to Africanist research in political science, may be gleaned from Skalr’s philosophical reflections and numerous empirical studies… “As a rule,” Sklar observed, “lasting scholarship is written against the grain of a disciplined thinker’s personal predispositions.” One might say that scholarship endures precisely because it rises above the conventional wisdom of the day (Bowman 5).

To those who demand that the natural scientific theory be the

sole source of relevance in the world of political science, let

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it be said that they would benefit from a shot or two of mental

emancipation. Just because thinking within a box has proven well

in the natural sciences does not mean that doing the same will be

prosperous within the social sciences. Sklar’s analysis of

African politics has proven to be a priceless resource to the

nations on the African continent. Not only have his findings

gained through empirical analysis proven beneficial, but his

findings gained through other methods have also demonstrated

greatness. To continue, his suggestions as to the use of his

findings (social engineering?) have also proven beneficial to the

politics of Africa. This is all political science, and it is

effective. As the great prophet and songster Bob Marley has

written, “Emancipate yourself from mental slavery, none but

ourselves can free our mind.”

In the discipline of political theory, there is purpose in a

variety of theories, of which empirical theory is one. Empirical

theory provides us with substance that has been proven effective

in both the natural and the social sciences. Its purpose, as are

the purposes of all other theories, is to help us arrive at

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truths that can be applied for the betterment of humanity and the

planet. Within the discipline of political science, there is a

great place for values in our research; it should be the driving

force of our explorations. As with a “Sociological Imagination’

especially as revealed in the open-mindedness of Richard Sklar,

the value of the promotion of humanity have guided our research

towards theories and applications that have the capability to

bring a greater dignity to humankind. Any political science that

arrives at theories that provide no benefit is a political

science that is merely tooting its own horn. Knowledge produced

by political scientists has immeasurable consequences on the

world, and the needs of the world, therefore, must dictate the

range and scope of our political findings.

Of course, the role of different theories varies depending on the

subject matter. RTC has proven beneficial in some realms of

political science. So has first-hand experience. So have many

more. It is the mental emancipation of political science and the

sociological imagination that will help guide us down the path of

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selecting the theories and methods we use in seeking both

knowledge and application.

For Sklar, this is a wonderfully beneficial concept. As an

ending statement and summary for this writing, let us consider

his approach:

Theory should not be an end in itself. Rather, it is best employed as a tool for elucidating problems of social import. In this sense, theory is always secondary to issuesin terms of priorities: “Scholars do not need theories or methodologies to help them identify problems of society. Principles, or values, will suffice; theories can (and should) be avoided until they are absolutely necessary to explain what is going on, in which case they should be formulated cautiously and with skeptical reservations (Bowman 21).”

Herein lays room for rational choice theory.

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Sources

Bowman, Scott and C.R.D. Halisi, "Theory that Matters: The Intellectual Legacy of Richard L. Sklar," in African Politics in Postimperial Times, ed. Toyin Falola (African World Press, 2002), pp. lxi-lxxxvi.

Cohn, Jonathan, "Irrational Exuberance: When did political science forget about politics?" The New Republic (October 13, 1999).

Friedman, Jeffery (ed.), The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered (Yale University Press, 1996).

Mills C. Wright, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford University Press, 1959, 2000).

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