An Indian Grammarian Notion of Intuition (Pratibhā) - CiteSeerX

Meaning, Understanding, and Knowing-what: An IndianGrammarian Notion of Intuition (Pratibhā)

Chien-hsing Ho

Philosophy East and West, Volume 64, Number 2, April 2014, pp. 404-424(Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i PressDOI: 10.1353/pew.2014.0022

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404 PhilosophyEast&WestVolume64,Number2April2014404–424 ©2014byUniversityofHawai‘iPress

MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, AND KNOWING-WHAT:AN INDIAN GRAMMARIAN NOTION OF INTUITION(PRATIBHĀ)

Chien-hsing HoGraduateInstituteofReligiousStudies,[email protected]

Prologue

ForBhartṛhari,afifth-centuryphilosopheroftheIndianGrammarian(Vaiyākaraṇika)school,allconsciousbeings—beasts,birdsandhumans—arecapableofwhathecalledpratibhā,aflashofindescribableintuitiveunderstandingsuchthatoneknowswhatthepresentobject“means”andwhattodowithit.Contemporaryscholarswrit-ingonpratibhāgenerallytranslatetheSanskrittermas“intuition,”notinthesenseunderstoodbymanyanalyticalphilosophers as anapriori judgment appealed tointhoughtexperimentstotestphilosophicalhypotheses,butinthesenseofaspon-taneouslyarisingawarenessthatisimmediate,reliable,indescribable,andpregnantwithmeaning.Significantly,ourinstantaneousunderstandingofasentenceorcom-pleteutterancealreadycountsasaninstanceofpratibhā.Giventhattounderstandasentence is toknow itsmeaning, suchanunderstanding, ifcorrect,amounts toamodeofknowingthatmaybestbetermedknowing-what,todistinguishitfrombothknowing-thatandknowing-how.

ThisessayattemptstoexpoundBhartṛhari’sconceptionofpratibhāinrelationtothenotionsofmeaning,understanding,andknowinglaidoutinhismagnumopus,theVākyapadīya(henceforthVP ).1Theconceptionisphilosophicallyintriguingandcontemporarilyrelevant.Yet,ithasnothithertobeensubjectedtoasystematicana-lyticalphilosophicaltreatment.2Here,Ihopetofillthislacuna.

Now, to offer a broadly coherent and focused philosophical analysis, I shallneglect the metaphysical and presumably exotic aspects of the conception. Myoverall purpose is to provide a rational reconstruction of Bhartṛhari’s empiricalthought on pratibhā to suggest its relevance for contemporary studies of relatedtopics.

Iidentifythreedifferentyetinterrelatednotionsofpratibhā:intuitivemeaning,intuitiveunderstanding,andknowing-what.Theremainderof theessaydealswitheach in turn. In“IntuitiveMeaning,” I touchbrieflyonBhartṛhari’sviewsofcon-sciousnessandlanguage,andexamineatsomelengthhisindescribabilitythesiscon-cerningtheintuitivemeaningofasentence.In“IntuitiveUnderstanding,”Idelineatethegeneralfeaturesofpratibhāasintuitiveunderstandinganddiscussitsprobablerangeinrelationtoexpertintuitionandsenseperception.Thereafter,in“Knowing-what,” I relate pratibhā to the notion of knowing-what and show why these twonotions are to be differentiated from knowing-that and knowing-how. I conclude

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with some remarks on the contemporary relevance of Bhartṛhari’s conception ofpratibhā.

Intuitive Meaning

Bhartṛhari’sphilosophyaffirmstheomnipresentandworld-constitutingcharacteroflanguagewhilerevealingholisticandmonistictones.Heiswellknownforclaimingthatallawarenessappearsasifpermeatedbywords.Itisbydintofwordsthatcon-sciousnessiscapableofilluminatingitsobject,thatoneisabletograspdistinctionsamongthings.Meanwhile,Bhartṛharihasaholisticpreferenceforthatwhichiscon-ceptuallyundifferentiated;forhim,awholeistypicallymorerealthanitsparts.Hegoeson,itseems,topositanundividedandlinguisticrealityastheultimatesourceofmyriad things in theworld.3However, I shallnotdiscusssuchmetaphysicalorquasi-metaphysicalaspectsofhisphilosophy,butwillconfinemydiscussiontothegenerallyempiricaldimension.

Equallyunmistakable is the fact that forBhartṛhari thenatureand functioningoflanguageiscloselyinterlinkedwiththatofconsciousness.Aperceptualawarenessoranepisodeofperceptualconsciousnessconsistsoftheactofperceptionandtheimmanentlyknownformofitsexternalobject.Letuscallsuchaformapercept.Forexample,whenIseeagraytreepiebird,therewouldappearinmyconsciousnessagray-treepiepercept,whichresultsfromithavingbeingilluminatedandassimilatedby theconsciousness.4 InBhartṛhari’sview, further,consciousness isself-aware inthatboththeactandtheperceptareinstantaneouslyandimmanentlyknowntocon-sciousnessitself.Inperception,oneisawareofboththeperceptualactandtheinten-tionalpercept.5Similarly,inunderstandingaword,oneisawareofboththesignifyingwordanditssignifiedmeaning.6Here,Bhartṛharitakesthemeaning(artha)ofawordlike “treepie” tobean immanent intentionalobject (buddhiviṣaya) — basically theformorimageappearingintheawarenessofunderstandingtheword—whichhasasitsgroundanexternalobjectandisexternallyimposed.7Forhim,theunderstandingcanoccurevenifnoconcernedexternalobjectispresent.

ForBhartṛhari,theprimarymeaningfulunitoflanguageisthesentence,nottheword.Onlyasentenceorcompleteutteranceconveysaclearandcompletemeaningandpromptsthehearertoaction.Words,bycontrast,expresstheirmeaningsonlyinthecontextofasentence. In fact,Bhartṛhariwould tend toviewthemeaningsofwordsinisolationasimaginaryconstructs.Consequently,henormallyusesthetermpratibhātorepresenttheinstantaneousunderstandingofasentenceandthecorrela-tivesentencemeaning,butnotwordunderstandingandwordmeaning.Significantly,thesentencemeaningisalsomental,or,wemaysay,intentionallyimmanentinchar-acter.8Additionally,theperceptandthesentencemeaningarealikeinthattheybothfigureasgestalt-likewholesthatcannotbereducedtoamereaggregationoftheirconstituents.Letusnowfocusonthenotionofsentencemeaningasaninstanceofpratibhā.

WithBhartṛhari’semphasisonlinguisticpracticeandconsciousness,thenotionofsentencemeaningdiscussedhereisnottheconventionalorsemanticmeaningof

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asentence,butwhatthehearerintentionallyapprehendsattheprecisemomentsheunderstandsacompleteutterance.Intheprocessofcomprehendingasentence,wetypicallyapprehenditsconstituentwordsandtheirindefinitemeaningsindividuallyandsequentially.Towardtheendoftheprocess,accordingtoBhartṛhari,adistinctsentencemeaningaspratibhāmayappearinaflash,broughtforthbythewordmean-ings.Letustermsuchameaningintuitive meaning,usingtheadjective“intuitive”tocapturetheimmediate,holistic,andsomehowindescribablecharacterofthemean-ing.HereishowBhartṛharicharacterizesitintheVP:9

It [i.e., the intuitivemeaning]cannotbeexplained toothersas “it is this.”Though itsexistenceisborneoutbyone’sownexperientialactivity,eventheagentherselfcannotrenderadescriptionofit.(2.144)Whilebeingbeyondanalyticalreflection,itseemstocompletethecombinationofthewordmeaningsandassume,asitwere,thewholeform[coveringallthemeanings].Itfiguresasanobject.(2.145)

Uponhearingasentencethatisunderstood,anintuitivemeaningspontaneouslyoc-cursastheintentionalcorrelateoftheactofsentenceunderstandingandisimma-nentlyanddistinctivelyknownorexperiencedbythehearer.Thisfactshowsitselfinthehearer’sknowingwhattodoinresponsetothesentence.

ForBhartṛhari,onecandirectlyandinstantlyexperiencetheintuitivemeaningofasentence,which,wemaysay,approximateswhat it is like tounderstandwhatthesentencemeans.10Whileprobablymanywouldconcedethatuponunderstandingasentenceasomewhatunitarymeaningorsenseappearsandisexperiencedincon-sciousness,whatisremarkablehereisBhartṛhari’sviewthattheintuitivemeaningcannotbeproperlyverbalized.Heseesalimitoflanguagerightinlinguisticunder-standing!WemayascribetohimthefollowingIndescribabilityThesis:thatthein-tuitivemeaning that isdirectlyexperienced in linguisticunderstandingcannotbeadequatelyexpressedasittrulyisbywords.Significantly,theindescribabilitydoesnotarisebecausethemeaningisuniqueandprivatetoeveryindividual.Themeaningisasineffabletooneselfasitisincommunicabletoothers.Bhartṛharidoesnotpositanykindofprivatelanguagetoaddresstheproblem.

Ifsomeonedoesnotknowwhatitisliketoseelavender,wecanhardlydescribetohimwhatseeingthecolorislike.Wemayjustshowitbyinducinginhimavisualexperienceofthecolor.Similarly,ifoneisignorantofwhatitisliketounderstandwhatismeantbythesentence“Lavenderisextensivelyusedinaromatherapy,”wemaymakesureheunderstandsthemeaningofthewordsconcernedandtheninduceinhimtherelevantexperienceofsentenceunderstanding.Itisnoteasytoputade-quatelyintowordstheexperienced(intuitive)meaning.11Bhartṛharicouldbehintingatthiswhen,inVP2.421–422,heexplainsthedifferencebetweentheparticularizedexperienceofsentencemeaningandtheindefiniteapprehensionofwordmeaningbyreferringtothatbetweentheactualexperienceofbeingburntandthemereap-prehensionofthemeaningoftheword“burn.”Inanycase,IdetectintheVPthreeinterrelatedreasonsfortheindescribabilitythesis,towhichweshallnowattend.

Tostatethefirstreason:forBhartṛhari,intuitivemeaningisofthenatureofinter-relationbetweenwordmeanings,whilearelationinitselfcannotbedescribed.A

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relation is not determinately cognizable; it lacks an independent form on whichwordscanalight,becauseitdependsentirelyontheitemsthatarerelatedbyit.12Inaddition,giventheentity-likenatureofnouns,anynounusedtosignifytherelationinevitably turns it into an entity that possesses a relation, but not the relation assuch.13Wethenreformulatethereasonasthefollowingargument:

A1.Theintuitivemeaningofasentenceisofthenatureofarelation,becauseitknitstogetherthemeaningsofthewordsthatconstitutethesentence.A2.Arelationisindescribable,foritisindeterminateandcannotbeexpressedwithoutbeingturnedintoarelatum.A3.Hence,theintuitivemeaningisindescribableinwords.

Inanessaythattouchesupontheissueofineffability,itisadvisableheretoex-plainthesenseinwhichwordscanbesaidtodirectlyandproperlyexpress,thatis,todescribe,theirobjects.BroadlyfollowingBhartṛhari,wemaytakethesemanticobjectofaword,thatis,thatwhichisdirectlyandproperlyexpressedbyaword,tobewhatthewordisinvariablyandreferentiallyconnectedtoineachofitsliteralusesinasentenceandwhenitisusedwiththesamemeaning.Thesemanticcorrelateofwordsthatformasentencecanbeunderstoodmutatis mutandis.Now,wordsthatformasentencedirectlyandproperlyexpressathingifandonlyiftheirsemanticcorrelateconformstothething.Ifthecorrelatedoesnotconformtothething,thenthewordsfailtodescribeit.AChristiantheologian,forexample,mayconsiderGodineffableonthegroundthatthesubject-predicateformofthelanguagethatweuseconnotesasemanticcorrelatethatrepresentsadivisionbetweenasubstanceanditsattributes,yetGodisaltogetheroneandsimpleinHimself.Thesemanticcorrelateoflanguageisstructured,withdistinctionsduetowordmeanings,yettheDeityistakentobevoidofdivisionandstructure.

Languageoperatesintherealmsofgeneralityorsemblance,andthesententialformoflanguage,togetherwiththedistinctionsduetowordmeanings,indicatesthatthesemanticcorrelateofasentence isstructuredanddoesnotconformto thingsthataredevoidofdivisionandstructure.Thus,Bhartṛhariisoftheviewthatanitemthatisdevoidofdivisionandstructure,andsolacksadistinctbasisfortheapplica-tionofwords,isindescribableinitself.14Withregardtoourcase,thesentence“Theskyisclear”mayexpressasemanticcorrelatecomposedofdistinctrelata,whereastheintuitivemeaningknownfromthesentenceisaninterrelationoftheform,say,of“the-sky-is-clear.”Thecorrelatedoesnotconformtothemeaning.Hence,theinde-scribabilitythesisfollows.15

Onemay,ofcourse,havedoubtsaboutpremiseA1.However,Bhartṛharialsocontends that an intuitive meaning is divisionless and sequenceless, which maycount as the second reason for the thesis. Even though the meaning results fromthe combination of word meanings, it is actually a unitary, structureless wholethat is beyond analytical reflection.16 It cannot be put into words, for the merecombinationofwordmeaningsentailsastructurethatfailstoconformtoit.Hereistheargument:


B1.Theintuitivemeaningofasentenceisaunitary,structurelesswholethatcan-notbeanalyzedandreducedtothemerecombinationofwordmeanings.B2.Anysentenceusedtoexpressthemeaninginvariablyconnotesasemanticstructurethatfailstoconformtoit.B3.Hence,theintuitivemeaningisindescribableinwords.

Again,onemayquestionthetenabilityofpremiseB1.Howcanasentencemeaningthatarisesoutofdistinctwordmeaningsbewithoutdivision?Letusthenconsiderthethirdreasonforholdingtheindescribabilitythesis,whichconcernstheirreducibilityofaneffecttoitscauses.ForBhartṛhari,aneffectarisesspontaneouslyanddistinctlyfromasetofcausalfactorsandisnotrelatedtotheminadefinitemanner.Theeffectasaunitary,previouslynon-existentitemissaidtocomeintoexistencebyawonder-fulprocess—onemaythinkoftheintoxicatingpowerofwineinrelationtoitscausalmaterials.Asaresult,itsnaturecannotbedescribedandproperlyrevealedbyrefer-encetoitscausalfactors.

Inunderstandingasentence,wesequentiallyapprehenditsconstituentwordsandtheirmeanings,andthemeaningsmayleaveinoursubliminalconsciousnesstheir residual traces, which finally help to bring forth the intuitive meaning.Themeaning,whichfiguresasanundifferentiatedgestalt,eventhoughitdependscaus-allyonthevaguelyknownwordmeanings,isfarmorethantheirmereconglomera-tion.Itresultsfromtheinterrelatingofthewordmeaningsinsuchawaythatitdoesnot reside inanyof themeanings taken singlyorcollectively,andcannotbede-scribedbyreferencetothem.17Giventheforegoing,wemayformulatethefollowingargument:

C1.Aneffectthatarisesfromasetofcausalfactorsisirreducibletoamerecon-glomerationofthefactorsandcannotbedescribedbyreferencetothem.C2.Theintuitivemeaningofasentenceisaneffectthatarisesfromthemeaningsofitsconstituentwords.C3.Hence,theintuitivemeaningcannotbedescribedinreferencetothewordmeanings.

Indailylinguisticpractice,wemayanalyzeasentencemeaningbasedonthewordmeanings.Yet,thisisonlyanexpedientmeasureforbetterunderstandingthesen-tence.Theintuitivemeaningofthesentence“Theskyisclear,”beingadistincteffect,cannotberevealedasittrulyisbyamerejuxtapositionofthewords“the,”“sky,”“is,”and“clear.”Appealtootherwordssurelycannotdoanybetter.

Weseemtobefacingaparadox:theintuitivemeaningthatisknownbyunder-standingasentencecannotbedescribedbythesentenceitself.However,thisonlyindicatesthattheexperientiallyknownmeaningofasentencediffersdistinctlyfromtheabstractlyconsideredsemanticmeaningofthesamesentence,thelatterbeingthesemanticcorrelateofthesentence.Putconceptually,butnotlinguistically,thecorrelatewouldbereplacedbyapropositional,structuredthoughtthatconsistsof

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compositionallycombinedconcepts.Still,suchathoughtisnomatchfortheintui-tivemeaning.

Nevertheless,Bhartṛharimusthaveoveremphasizedthedistinct,undifferentiatedcharacteroftheintuitivemeaning.VP2.145,quotedabove,impliesthattheintui-tivemeaningseeminglycompriseswithinitselfallthewordmeanings.Indeed,thewordmeaningsascooperatingfactorsfortheintuitivemeaningoccurbothbeforeandsimultaneouslywiththemeaning.Afterthesequentiallyandindefinitelyappre-hendedwordmeaningsgiverisetotheintuitivemeaning,thelatter,whilemakingthemeaningslessindefinite,isintertwinedwith,andsomewhatdifferentiatedbythem.Ifso,themeaningisnotasdivisionlessasBhartṛhariwouldliketotakeittobe,andmay instead be endowed with a texture of interrelated word meanings such thattheindescribabilitythesisshouldonlybetakenwithapinchofsalt.Still,thisobser-vationdoesnotnecessarilyinvalidatethethesis,whichshouldremainworthyofourconsideration.

ItisworthwhileatthispointtoturntoMichaelPolanyi’stheoryoftacitknowingforfurtherelucidation.ForPolanyi,everyobject-directedawarenesshasatacit,inar-ticulateroot.Inwieldingahammertodriveanail,forexample,onewatchestheef-fectsofthestrokesonthenailandisalsoawareofthefeelingsinthehandthatisholdingthehammer,whichguideone’shandlingofiteffectively.Yetthefeelingsarenotattendedtointhewaythatoneattendstotheeffects.Here,oneknowsthefeel-ingsonlybyrelyingonthemforattendingtothehammerhittingthenail,andsoonehasonlywhatPolanyicallssubsidiaryawarenessofthefeelings,which,wemaysay,ismergedintoone’sfocalawarenessofdrivingthenail.18Likewise,inmanyotherconsciousactivities,onefocallyattendstoacoherentitemthatemergesfromone’sintegratingvariousassistingfactors,whicharecalledsubsidiaries,ofwhich,asare-sultofsuchintegration,onebecomesonlytacitlyandsubsidiarilyaware.Often,onefirstneeds toattend to thesubsidiaries focally. Ifone is skillfulorknowledgeableenoughtoperformtheintegration,onethenintegratesthesubsidiariestoattendtotheemergingfocus,which,interestingly,issaidtobetheirmeaningorjointsignifi-cance.Meanwhile,ifoneturnsone’sattentionbackto(someof)thesubsidiaries,thelatterbecome the fociwhilebeingdeprivedof theirmeaning justas thepreviousfocusisrelinquished.

Polanyiapplieshis theory tovarious fields, including linguisticpractice.“Themost pregnant carriers of meaning,” says he, “are of course the words of a lan-guage.”19Wemaysaythatwhenonehearsaseriesofaudiblewordsthatconstituteanutterance,oneintegratesthewordsandtheirmeaningsinordertoattendfocallytothemeaningoftheutterance.Attheendofthisprocess,oneisonlytacitlyawareofthewordmeanings.Similarly,forBhartṛhari,inunderstandingawordinasentence,onefirstattendstoitssoundandapprehendsitstrueformasasignifier;thenthewordbecomesaremainder,secondarytothenow-attendedmeaning.Likewise,inunder-standing the sentence, the word meanings, after being known sequentially andvaguely,fusetogetherwiththeresultthatthemeaningofthesentencedistinctlyap-pearsinaflash.Bhartṛhariagreesthatwhenthesentencemeaningisobscure,one


mayre-attendtosomeoftheconstituentwordsinordertohaveare-fusionofthewordmeaningsthatresultsintheappearingofaclearsentencemeaning.

By“tacitknowing,”Polanyimainlymeanstheactofknowinginvolvedinone’stacitlyintegratingthesubsidiariesintothecoherentfocalentityastheirjointmean-ing.Onepointofhistheoryoftacitknowingisthattheproductofatacitintegra-tioncannotbereducedtoameresummationofitsdetectablesubsidiaries.ThisisalsowhatBhartṛhari is driving atwhenhe speaks of intuitivemeaningbeingbe-yond analytical reflection. However, while Bhartṛhari stresses the indescribabilityof themeaning,Polanyihighlights theunspecifiabilityof the subsidiaries and theineffabilityoftheirtacitknowledge.20Still,giventhatinmanycasesthefocalentityisformedjointlybythesubsidiaries,thelatter’sunspecifiabilityandtheineffabilityoftherelationbetweenthemmakeithardtodescribetheentityadequately.21Inanycase, Polanyi’s notionof tacit integration andhis claim thatwe know more than we can say mayhelp inelucidatingandstrengtheningBhartṛhari’s ideason intui-tivemeaningandunderstanding.Wealsonotehisviewtotheeffectthatallkindsof rational knowing involve theknower’s existentialparticipationandare shapedandsustainedbycertaininarticulatementalfacultiesthatwesharewithnonhumananimals.

Intuitive Understanding

Itisnocoincidencethat,forBhartṛhari,thetermpratibhāstandsforsentenceunder-standingaswellassentencemeaning.Theintuitivemeaningquasentencemeaning,beingtheinnerintentionalobjectofanunderstandingact,isimmanentintheaware-ness of sentence understanding, whereas the awareness, comprising within itselfboththeactandthemeaning,issaidtobeaunitary,indivisiblewhole.Itisthroughconceptualanalysisthatweholdtheactandthemeaningapart.22Here,asentenceunderstandingisaspontaneouslyarising,unitaryawarenessthatcomprisesboththeactandthemeaning,andthepreviouslymentionedindescribabilityofthemeaningcanreadilybeextendedtothatoftheunderstanding.

Significantly,sentenceunderstandingisonlyaparadigmaticcaseforBhartṛhari’snotionofpratibhā asa flashof indescribableunderstanding such thatoneknowswhatthepresentobjectmeansandwhattodowithit.Letususetheterm“intuitiveunderstanding” or simply “intuition” for this notion.23The notion can be appliedacrossawiderange,althoughitisdifficulttoascertainpreciselywhatthatrangeis.Forourpurposes,andonthebasisofmyreadingofthepassagesintheVPthatcon-cern the notion, let us first delineate the general features of pratibhā as intuitiveunderstanding: (1) itcannotbeadequatelydescribed,givenmainly the indescrib-abilityofitsintentionalcontent;24(2)itarisesspontaneouslyinaflash,followingatacitintegrationthatinvolvesthepresenceofwordsorlinguistictraces(śabdabhāvanā)anddependsonrepeatedpracticeornature/instinct,suchthatitcannotbereducedtoameresummationofitscausalfactorsandconstituents; (3) it isanimmediate,noninferentialawarenessofanobjectforwhatit“means”aswellasofwhattodowithit,andisgenerallyconsideredreliableconcerningwhatitreveals;and(4)its

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contentcannotbe transmitted toothers—everyonehas toacquire it through theirownpracticesandexperiences.The last three featureswillbecomeclearerasweproceedtodiscusstheprobablerangeofintuitiveunderstanding.

Whyissentenceunderstandingaparadigmcase forpratibhā?Bhartṛhari,asagrammarian-philosopher,recognizesthecentralityoflanguageinallourtheoreticalandpracticalactivities.Inhisview,ourexperiencesofdailylifeareinvariablyim-pregnated with words. However, he also has a notion of linguistic traces and ofinarticulatewords (anākhyeyaśabda).BhartṛhariwasaHinduwhobelieved in thedoctrineofrebirth,and,forhim,wehaveallusedlanguageagreatnumberoftimesinthisandpreviouslives.Suchlinguisticactivitieshaveleftinthesubliminalcon-sciousnessnumerouslinguistictraceswaitingtobeawakened.25Whencertaintracesareawakened,theygiverisetoarticulateandinarticulatewordsonthesurfaceofconsciousness.26ItishardtotellwhatpreciselyBhartṛharitakesinarticulatewordstobe.Yet,weknowthatsuchwordsarepresentintheconsciousnessofaninfantwith-outlanguage;theyalsooccurinanadult’sperceptualawarenesswhentheobjectisnotyetattentivelyanddeterminatelycognized.Hecanindeedclaimthatallaware-nessappearsasifpermeatedbywords.

Thus,ourcomprehensionofthingsintheworldcansometimesbebroadlysimi-lartosentenceunderstanding.Wemayunderstandinaflashafacialexpression,aperceivedstateofaffairs,anabruptsituation,orthequalityofajewel,byvirtueofexperiencingacoherentmeaning therein,whileknowingwhat todowith it.Theunderstandingspontaneouslyarisesthroughourtacitlyintegratingtheexperiencedaspectsoftheobjectaswellasthearticulate/inarticulatewordsandtheirmeanings.Thatwouldbeanintuitiveunderstandingifitbearstheaforementionedfeatures.

The followingverses in theVP indicate the functioning, significance,and far-reachingpresenceofanintuitiveunderstanding:

Concerningwhatistobedone,noonecantransgressthat[intuitiveunderstanding]whichariseseitherdirectlyfromwordsorthroughtheworkingoflinguistictraces.(2.146)Thewholeworldconsidersittobeareliablemeansofknowledge(pramāṇa).Eventheac-tivitiesofanimalsproceedbydintofit.(2.147)Justasthepowertointoxicateandthelikeappearspontaneouslyincertainsubstancesbymerematurity,likewiseareintuitiveunderstandings[thatemergeintheconsciousness]ofthosewhohavethem.(2.148)

Theintuitiveunderstandingthatarisesdirectly fromwordsispresumablyintuitionassentenceunderstanding,whichresultsfromthecomprehensionofaudiblewordsinanutterance,whereasothertypesofintuitiveunderstanding(whatevertheyare)occur through theworkingof linguistic traces,whichbring forth innerwords thatinduce the intuition concerned. Either way, the emerging intuitive understandingtypicallygivesonethebestguidanceregardingwhattheappropriateactionistotakehereandnow.

Whocausesinfantstomovetheirspeechorganstouttermeaningfulsoundsforthefirst time?Whoteachespigeonstobuildnests forbreeding?Whodrivesarat,trainedtorunamaze,tosucceedinfindingitswayoutevenwhenblindfolded?Nei-therhumaninfantsnornonhumananimalshaveanarticulatelanguage.Yetgiventhe


doctrineofrebirth,theyare,forBhartṛhari,endowedwithlinguistictracesthathelptoinduceintheirmindanintuitiveunderstandingthatguidesthemintheirpurpo-siveactivities.Thismightexplainwhylittlechildrenwhoarelearningalanguagemayuttercompletelynewsentencesinawaythatsurprises theirelders.However, thisidea is unpersuasive to thoseof uswhohavenobelief in rebirth, andBhartṛhariwouldbeleftnearlyonlywithnatureorinstincttoappealtoforexplaininganimals’spontaneous,appropriateactivities.27

Meanwhile, Bhartṛhari highlights repeated practice as an important factor forthearisingofintuitiveunderstanding.Ourabilitytounderstandsentencesofourna-tivelanguagealreadyhingesonlong-termlinguisticpracticeinearlychildhoodandthereafter.Here,Bhartṛhariappearstotakeexpertintuitiontobeaformofintuitiveunderstanding.28InVP1.35,hereferstoanexpert’struthfulawarenessofpreciousstones,which,hesays,isbornofpracticebutnotofinference,andcannotbecom-municatedtoothers.Tobecomeaconnoisseurofjewelry,forexample,oneneedstoreceiveinstructionandtrainingfromjewelryexperts,togetherwithyearsofpracticeindiscerningdifferenttypesofjewel.Aconnoisseur’sintuitionofajewelforwhatitisarisesfromatacitintegrationofherverbalknowledgeofjewelry,variousvisualcues,andsoforth;thelearnedconceptsintheknowledgebecomeonlysubsidiariestowhatsheintuitivelyknows,andshemayhavedifficultyindescribingthelatter.Tacitintegration,asPolanyitellsus,differsfromdeductiveinferenceinthatinferenceconnects two focal items, thepremisesandconsequents,while integrationmakessubsidiariesbearononefocus.Inaddition,theCommentaryonVP1.35statesthatthecausalorconstituentfactors (pada, hetu) foranexpert’sintuitionaresubtleorfine-grainedandcannotbeexplainedtoothers.29Inanycase,wecanwellascribetoBhartṛharitheviewthatanintuitiveunderstandingdoesnotarisefromanyconscioususeofreason.

Of course, an expert’s intuition generally gives rise to an intuitive judgmentabouttheobjectinquestion,andshemaymanagetosaysomethingabouttheprob-able reasons for the judgment.Yet, were the intentional content and immediatecausalfactorsoftheintuitionadequatelydescribable,thecontentwouldbetransmit-table.Ifthecontentcouldbetransmittedtoothers,anovicewouldhavetheintuitionmerelybyhearingtheexpert’swords,whichisabsurd.Plainly,everyonehastoac-quireintuitionthroughrepeatedpractice.

Bothsentenceunderstandingandexpert intuitionare intellective incharacter.What of skillful and practical knowing such as knowing how to swim or kneadbread?30Shouldwetreatknowing-howasakindofintuitiveunderstanding?TheviewthatthecontentofintuitiveunderstandingcannotbetransmittedtoothersremindsusofthestoryaboutanoldwheelwrightintheChineseDaoisttextZhuangzi.Thisoldmanspokeofhisknow-how for subtlychiselingawheel,whichwasacquired in the hand and felt in the mindbutcouldnotbeputintowords.Hecomplainedthathecouldnotimparthisexpertisetohissonandsohesaid,“I’vegonealongforsev-entyyearsandatmyageI’mstillchiselingwheels.”31IntheVP,Bhartṛharidoesnotdiscusspratibhā in relation toskillsandskillfulknowing,althoughhedoesassertthatallcraftsarebasedonanawarenessthatislinguisticinnature,supposedlyrefer-

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ring to theprolongedprocessofacquiringcraft skillswhereinanapprentice triestocomprehendthemaster’sinstructionsandcloselywatchandemulatethelatter’seffortsatgettingtheworkdone.Now,aknowing-howtypicallydependsonrepeatedpracticeandhasanineffablecontentthatcannotbetransmitted.Yet,itdoesnotseemtoarisespontaneouslyinaflash,norisitanimmediateawarenessofanobjectforthe intuitivemeaning.Given the lackof the secondand third featuresdelineatedabove, it is advisable not to include knowing-how under the notion of intuitiveunderstanding.

Furthermore,canwecountsenseperceptionasaformofintuitiveunderstand-ing?AlthoughBhartṛhariappearstotreatascasesofintuitiveunderstandingcertainsupersensoryperceptions(suchasthosethatresultfromthedisciplineofyoga),theVPdoesnotclearlyplacesenseperceptionunderthenotionofpratibhā.Indeed,ifsenseexperiencesareinvariablyimpregnatedwithwords,theymightbesoconcep-tualastoexcludeanyindescribablecontent.Aswehaveseen,however,by“words”Bhartṛhari may include inarticulate words, which we supposedly share with ani-mals.32Besides,evenifarticulatewordsorverbalizableconceptsarealwayspresentinahumanadult’ssenseperception,thismightwellbeacontingentfactratherthanwhatisintegraltotheperception.

VP1.53and2.7implythattheperceptinsenseexperience,likesentencemean-ing,isanindivisiblewhole.AccordingtoapassageintheCommentaryonVP1.26,athingofinterrelatedconstituentsfirstappearstoanawarenessasawhole,butmaythenbedeliberatelydividedinordertofocusondifferentconstituents;yet,forthearisingofanintuitiveunderstandingthatleadstopurposefulactivity,oneneedstounitetheconstituentsandonceagaincomprehendthethinginitscloselyinterrelatedform.33ItisquiteclearthatforBhartṛharianintuitiveunderstandingmayoccurinsenseexperience.

Suppose,forexample,apersonwhoisafraidofsnakessuddenlyseesasnakewhenwalkingpastabush.Thepersonmayatthatverymomentunderstandthesnakeinaflashbyvirtueofexperiencingacoherentbutindescribablemeaning therein,whileknowingtostepbackimmediately.Thisunderstandingarisesfromthepersoninstantly integrating the perceived aspects of the snake, the past experiences ofsnakes,andotherthings.Thiswouldnotbeverydifferentfromtheintuitionahungryraccoonmayhaveonseeingthesnake,eventhoughthetwointuitionswillresultinverydifferentactions.

Nevertheless,what is the intuitivemeaning that figures in such sense experi-ences?ThemeaningisperhapsclosetowhatMichaelDummetthaschosentocall“proto-thought.” For Dummett, the notion of proto-thought serves to account forthe fundamental non-sensory component of sense perception that we share withanimals.Adogcandistinguishbetweenbeingattackedbyonehostiledogandbyseveral,yetwecannotseriouslyascribetohimthethought,“Thereisonlyonedogthere.”Thedoghasonlyproto-thoughts,whichcannotbeaccuratelyexpressedinwords,becausetheydonothavethestructureofverballyexpressedthoughts.Where-asproto-thought,unlikefull-fledgedthought,doesnothavelanguageasitsvehicleand cannot be detached from present situations, it may enable us, on seeing an


object, immediatelytorecognizetheobjectaccordingtoits type,say,asadog,atree,etcetera,andmayevokespecificbehavioralresponsesonourpart.34

The intuitive meaning as the intentional content of intuitive understanding ispresumably more holistic and less differentiated than Dummett’s proto-thought.Whileitisdifficulttosaypreciselywhatitis(afterall,itisindescribable!),Bhartṛharimayagreethatneitherdoesanintuitive senseexperienceinvolveaconceptualjudg-mentalcontentthatcanbeverbalizedproperly,norisitanon-conceptualexperi-ence thatwasbelievedby someBuddhist epistemologists tobealonecapableofmanifestingtheobjectasittrulyis.Itseemstomeimplausiblethat,uponseeingasnake,conceptslike“snake”orpropositionalthoughtslike“thatisasnake”wouldalwaysinthefirstplacefigureinone’svisualexperience.Instead,onemayfirstseethecreaturemeaningfully inthesenseofapprehendingitsmeaningof theunitaryform,say,“that-is-a-snake!”andactimmediatelywithoutanyreflectioninthemid-dle.Iftheexperienceinvolvesaconceptualjudgment,onewouldnotactinstantly;ifitwerewhollynon-conceptual,onewouldnotactatall.Inanycase,Iconcurthatoursenseperceptionisoftenloadedwithconcepts.Whatissuggestedhereisonlythatsenseexperiencecaninsomecasesbearthepreviouslymentionedfeaturesandthereforecountasaformofintuitiveunderstanding.

Finally,whileBhartṛharinotestheoccasionalunreliabilityofsenseperception,inference,andverbaltestimony,whichareregardedbymanytraditionalIndianphi-losophers,perhapsevenbyhimself,aschiefmeansofknowledge,heclaimsinVP2.147thatthewholeworldtakesintuitiveunderstandingtobereliable.Suchaclaimisnotgroundless.Even if theutteredsentence“The tea is tasty”andmyresultantjudgmentthattheteaistastyarebothfalse,myintuitiveunderstandingofthesen-tenceiscorrectinsofarasIcorrectlyapprehendthemeaningofthesentence.TheunderstandingwouldonlybeconsideredincorrectifImisunderstandthesentence.Again,expertintuitionsarepenetrativeandtypicallytrustworthy.Moreover,severalcontemporarystudiesindicatethatpeopletendtotrustandusetheirintuitionswhentheyareinpositivemoodstates;also,inmanydecision-makingsituations,intuitionisconsideredmoreeffectiveandaccuratethananalysis.35Thatsaid,Bhartṛharidoesnotassertthatintuitiveunderstandingisinfallible,anditseemsadvisabletotakeittobeconnectedwiththepossibilityofbeingmistaken.

Knowing-what

Intheprecedingsection,wediscussedthegeneralfeaturesandprobablerangeofintuitiveunderstandingaspratibhā.Althoughtheunderstandingisnotinfallible,itisconsideredgenerallycorrect.Whencorrect,theunderstandingamountstoamodeofknowing.Forsomereasons,suchaknowing,whichIhavetermedknowing-what,shouldbedistinguishedfrombothknowing-thatandknowing-how.Thepresentsec-tionismeanttoaddressthisissue.

GilbertRyle’scerebrateddistinctionbetweenknowledge-thatandknowledge-how,whichhepresentedinhis1949bookThe Concept of Mind,hasrecentlybeendebatedamonganalyticalphilosophers.Somethinkersdismissthedistinctionand

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attempttoshowthatknowledge-howisindeedaspeciesofknowledge-that,36whileothers argue against any wholesale reduction of knowledge-how to knowledge-that.37Icannothereexplorethisissueatlength,butmerelymakeafewpreliminarypointspertinenttomyapproach.

(1)Asemanticanalysisof“knowinghow”sentencescanindeedlendsupporttotheviewthatknowledge-howisaspeciesofknowledge-that.Afterall,inmanyusesofthelinguisticform“knowhowtoF”(whereF denotesanactivity),whatisex-pressedisclearlyknowledge-that,aswhenwesay“Jimknowshowtogotothepark”(he knows that the route is such and such). However, in our concern with typesofknowledge,weshouldratherattendtothesubstantivemessageofutterances,notthepreciseverbalformulationsthatareused.Rylewasoriginallyconcernedwiththemessage.Ifso,wemayconstruetheterm“knowledge-how”prescriptivelytomeanpractical knowledge, roughly a practical ability to do something, which involvesembodied,action-centeredandnormallylearnedskillsthataredevelopedthroughactualbodilyperformance.Bycontrast,theterm“knowledge-that”referstofactual,propositionalknowledge,roughlyatrue(dispositional)beliefthatisdescribableandhasanappropriatewarrant.38

(2)Isuggestweusetheterm“knowing”intheoccurrentsense,and“knowledge”in thedispositionalsense.Aknowing-that isbasicallya true,warrantedcognitionharboringaconceptualthoughtthatcanbearticulatedintheformofapropositionthattellshowthingsstand.Itwillthenbecomedispositionalasaknowledge-that.Aknowing-how,meanwhile,isanagent’sgoodorsuccessfulmanifestationofherprac-ticalabilityasknowledge-how.Here,apersonmaybesaidtoknowhowtoF,yetbeunabletoFsuccessfully.Supposeanaccidentleftamasterpianist’sarmsseverelyparalyzed.Foracertain timeperiodshewouldstillhave theknowledge-how, theability,toplaythepiano,butwouldhavenoknowing-how,beingnowunabletoplaysuccessfully.Inaway,shebothknowsandknowsnothowtoplaythepiano.Thepointisthatshewouldnotloseherabilityovernight;if,soonaftertheaccident,herparalysiswasmagically cured,hermasterly abilitywouldagainbemanifested inactualmusicalperformance.

(3)Onemayhaveconsciouslyaccessiblebeliefsaboutone’sknowledge-how,yet,asthewheelwrightstorytells,itisdifficulttoclearlyarticulateandimparttheknowledgeproper.Onemayknowhowto rideabicyclewithoutanyconceptualunderstandingofhowonemaintainsbalance.Onecannotlearntoplaybowlsjustbyreadingabookonthegame;onemustpracticeittogettheknack.Thereisaninef-fablecontentinone’sknowledge-how.Inaddition,knowinghowtoswimandknow-ing that one is swimming are plainly two phenomenologically distinct episodes.Hence,theirreducibilityofknowledge-how(andknowing-how).

Now,onemaythinkthatthetwotypesofknowing/knowledgedepictedabovearejointlyexhaustive.Thedualitybetweenthemcorrespondstothatbetweentheoryandpractice,thinkinganddoing,andintellectandwill.Aswithmanydualitiesanddichotomiesinphilosophy,however,tochallengeandbridgeitcanbephilosophi-callyrewarding.Tobeginwith,Polanyihasalreadytakenhistacitknowingtounder-liebothknowing-thatandknowing-how.Besides, Ihaverelatedabovethenotion


ofintuitivemeaningtothatofwhat-it-is-likeness.Here,EarlConeearguesthatknow-ingwhatanexperience is likeconsists inacquaintancewith theexperience,andsuchknowledge by acquaintance,whichrequiresonlyamaximallydirectepistemicrelation to theexperience,“constitutesa thirdcategoryofknowledge, irreducibletofactualknowledgeorknowinghow.”39Further,Eva-MariaJungandAlbertNewenvery recently claimed that the Rylean dichotomy between knowledge-that andknowledge-howhastobereplacedbyatheorythatdistinguishesthreedifferentfor-matsofknowledge:(1)propositional,(2)practical,and(3)image-like.Propositionalandpracticalknowledge,respectively,roughlycorrespondtoourknowing-thatandknowing-how,whereasimage-likeknowledgeissimilartoknowing-whatinthatitissomewhatunstructuredsuchthatitscontentisonlypartiallyexplicablebyconceptsandtheircombinations.40

Inthisessay,thetypeofknowing-whatwithwhichweareconcernedisacorrectintuitiveawarenessaboutsomeobjectthatbearsthefeaturesdelineatedintheprevi-oussection.Lackingapropositionalcontent,anintuitiveawarenesscannotbeas-sessedfortruth,butonlycorrectnessanditsintentionalcontentcannotbedescribedadequately.Meanwhile,aknowledge-whatwouldbeadispositional tracethatre-sultsfromaknowing-whatawareness.Now,acorrectintuitionasaknowing-whatissimilartoaknowing-thatinthatitisbroadlyepistemicasitisintentionallydirectedtosomeexternalobjectandmayrevealtotheknowercertainaspectsofreality.Inaddition,itreadilybecomesaknowing-thatoraconceptualjudgment.However,itdiffersfromaknowing-thatinthatitinvolvesnoexplicitpresenceofconceptsandisnotstructuredbytheircomposition.Asaresult,neitheritnoritsintentionalcontentcanproperlybedescribed;again,whatisthusknowncannotbetransmittedandhastobeacquiredbyeveryoneviatheirownexperiences.

Likeaknowing-how,acorrectintuitionhasanineffabledimension:itscontentcannotbematchedbyanylistofpropositions.Itdependsforitsarisingonrepeatedpracticeornature/instinct.Yet,unlikeaknowing-how,itconcernsmainlythemindandsenses,notthebody.Itisanintuitiveunderstandingthatcomprehendsitsobjectmeaningfully,ratherthanasuccessfulmanifestationofaskillfulabilityinbodilyac-tions.Consequently,oneknowswhatswimmingisevenifonedoesnotknowhowtoswim,yetittakesnothingshortofajewelryconnoisseur’sintuitiontoknowwhatitistodiscernagenuinejewel.

Notbeingendowedwithlanguageandconceptualthought,animalsareunabletograsppropositions.Theydonothavefactualorpropositionalknowledge.Never-theless,ratsinaneight-armmazeknow,onthesightofaredsign,whicharmofthemazetoenterforfood,andscrubjaysknowwheretorecoverparticularfooditemstheypreviouslycached.Itisproblematictoplacesuchtypesofknowingunderthesameumbrellaasone’sknowinghowtoswimandchicks’knowinghowtofly.Infact,weshouldcastdoubtsonthejointexhaustivenessofknowing-thatandknowing-how,andIhavesketchilyshownthatcorrectintuitiveunderstandingquaknowing-whatneedstobedistinguishedfromthesetwotypesofknowing.Itisalsopalpablethatthenotionofknowing-whatcanhelptobridgebetweenthem.41

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Concluding Remarks

Ihaveattempted toexplicateBhartṛhari’sconceptionofpratibhā in its relation tothenotionsofmeaning,understanding,andknowing.Apratibhā,wehaveseen,isaspontaneously arising, broadly word-tinged intuitive understanding about some-thing.Itisaknowing-whataswellifitcorrectlyapprehendsanunstructuredmeaningof thething.Further,itisnotreducibletoitsverbalandnonverbalcausalfactorsandcannotbedescribedadequately.Ihavetriedtoprovideacoherentrationalrecon-structionoftheconception,althoughmyreconstruction,beinglargelyconstrainedbyBhartṛhari’slaconicexposition,remainsincomplete.

Westernphilosophersusedto thinkthat thehumanbeingis theonlycreatureendowedwithamindthatthinksintermsofconceptualideas,andistheonlycrea-turethatpossessesanarticulatelanguage.It is theuseoflanguage,aswellastheexerciseofrationalthinking,thataccountsfortheintellectualsuperiorityofhumansover animals. Polanyi, however, cautions against such a view.The human gift ofspeech,hesays,cannotitselfbeduetotheuseoflanguagebutmustbeduetosomepre-linguisticcapacities.Accordingly,weshallhavetoaccountfortheacquisitionoflanguageinhumansbyacknowledginginthemthesamekindofinarticulatepowersasweobserveinanimals.42Inthemeantime,anumberofrecentstudiesinmoralpsychologysuggestthatpeople’smoraljudgmentsaregenerallytheresultnotofaprocessofratiocinationandreflectionbutofmoralintuitions.Inareviewofthesestudies,JonathanHaidtwrites:

RatherthanfollowingtheancientGreeksinworshipingreason,weshouldinsteadlookfortherootsofhumanintelligence,rationality,andvirtueinwhattheminddoesbest:perception,intuition,andothermentaloperationsthatarequick,effortless,andgenerallyquiteaccurate.43

Whileanalysisandratiocinationneedtobevaluedinoursearchfortruthandknow-ledge,theymayhavetobesupplementedbyspontaneousholisticintuitions.Here,Bhartṛhari’sconceptionoffersusanIndianGrammarianperspectiveonintuitionthatshouldbeworthyofourconsideration.

Incontemporaryscholarship,intuitionisoftensaidtooccurquicklyandeffort-lesslysuchthatonlytheoutcome,butnottheprocess,isaccessibletoconscious-ness.Theprocessisregardedasnon-conscious,whereastheoutcomeisanintuitivejudgment.WesawthatonecharacteristicfeatureoftheBhartṛharianintuitionisthatitsintentionalcontentisindescribable:onehasanintuitivesenseofwhatisanap-propriate response tomakehereandnow,butonecannotproperlyverbalize thesense—nottosaythereasonsforit.Theterm“intuitivejudgment”wouldthenbeamisnomer forpratibhā.Suchapositionis indeedunconventional.Nevertheless, itaccountsforthe thresholdstatebetweentheprocessandthejudgmentandbettercaptures the immediate, not yet propositionally structured character of the sud-denlyarisingintuitiveexperience.(Afterall,ittakessometimeforthemindtoforma judgment!)The intuition, further, is related to thenotionsof knowing-what and


ofknowingwhatanexperienceislike.Thenotionofknowing-whatgivesusathirdtypeofknowingasidefromknowing-thatandknowing-how.Inaddition,weknowwhatitisliketoseeorhear,yetthenatureoftheknowingremainsobscure.44Over-all, while more work needs to be done, I hope to have shown the relevance ofBhartṛhari’sconceptionofpratibhāforcontemporaryphilosophicalstudiesofrelatedtopics.

Notes

AnearlierdraftofthisarticlewasreadasapaperintwodifferentseminarsinTaiwanin2010and2011.Iamgratefultotheparticipants,particularlyProfessorNormanY.TengandDr.Cheng-hungTsai,fortheircriticaldiscussionandhelpfulsuggestions.MythanksalsogotothereviewersofPhilosophy East and West fortheirvaluablecomments.

1–ForacriticaleditionoftheSanskrittextoftheVākyapadīya,seeRau1977.Versenumbersinthepresentarticlearegivenaccordingtothatedition.

2–Bhartṛhari’spresentationofthetopicislaconicandrequireshermeneuticeluci-dation,forwhichonemayrefertoSubramaniaIyer1982,TolaandDragonetti1990,andAkamatsu1994.However,theapproachoftheseworksismorephil-ologicalthanphilosophical.ReadersmayalsoconsultCowardandRaja1990fordiscussionsoftherelevantissuesintheGrammarianschool.

3–Forrelativelyrecentdiscussionsontherelatedissues,seeAklujkar2001andBronkhorst2001.

4–Ogawa1999,pp.276–278;apartfromtheversescitedtherein,onemayrefertoVP1.51and88(verses51and88ofthefirstdivisionorKāṇḍaoftheVP ).

5–VP1.51andtheCommentary(theVṛtti )onitinSubramaniaIyer1966,p.109.(IassumethatBhartṛhari is theauthorof theVṛtti.)WhatI taketobetheact hereiscalledtheown form(ātmarūpa)intheverse.Boththeactandtheinten-tional percept (jñeyarūpa) are immanent in the awareness or consciousness(jñāna).

6–Thesignifyingwordastheownform(svarūpa)ofawordiscalledsphoṭaintheVP,butIshallbypassthisnotion.

7–VP2.132.Thisversestatesthattheintentionalobjectisunderstoodtobethemeaningofawordwhenitisknownasanexternalobject.InlightofVP2.445and 3.7.6, I take this to mean that the intentional object is superimposed(bāhyīkṛtya, samāropya)ontheexternalworld.Cf.Ogawa1999,pp.271–276.ThesuperimpositionservesforBhartṛharitheimportantfunctionofrelatingtheinnerimagetotheexternalworld.Incidentally,althoughBhartṛharigivesotherdifferentviewsofwordmeaning,heseems,atleastattheconventionallevel,togenerallyacceptthepresentview.

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8–VP2.445speaksofsentencemeaningasofthenatureofawareness(saṃpratyaya),whileVP2.145takesittoappearintheformofanobject(viṣaya).Thus,themeaningisanobjectimmanentintheawarenessofsententialunderstandingandisinthissensesaidtobeintentionally immanent.Themeaningsofwordsconstitutingasentencearealsointentionallyimmanent,buttheyaresaidtobeabstracted or analyzed out of the sentence meaning, while being externallyimposed.Cf.VP2.445–446.

9–To save space, only my translations, not the Sanskrit originals of the versesquotedfromtheVP,aregiven.

10–DavidPitt(2004)hasargued,Ithinkquiteconvincingly,thatconsciousthoughtshaveproprietaryphenomenalpropertiesthatoutstripanyaccompanyingaudi-tory or visual imagery—thatwhat it is like to think a conscious thought (orunderstandasentence)isdistinctfromwhatitisliketothinkanyothercon-sciousthought(orunderstandanyothersentence)andfromwhatitisliketobein any other kind of conscious mental state.Thus, there is something it isuniquelyliketoapprehendthemeaningofasentence.

11–SeePitt2004,p.31.

12–ItseemsforBhartṛhari thatathingisdirectlyandproperlyexpressibleif it isindependent in the senseofbeingdeterminatelycognizableand isqualifiedby a distinct qualifier that functions as the basis for the application of thewordconcerned.Suchathingisstructuredoratleastendowedwithaqualifier-qualificand division.Astructurelessthing,bycontrast,canonlybeindirectlyexpressedbyconceptuallyimposingsuchadivisiononit.

13–VP2.425,439,441.Theineffabilityofrelationisexplainedmainlyinthethirdchapter of the third division of the VP: 3.3.3–5, 19; see Houben 1995, pp.170–213.Cf.Russell1927,pp.275–276,whereRussellrecognizestheunsub-stantialityofrelationsandthedifficultyofexpressingthembywords.Afterhigh-lightingtheineffabilityofrelation,BhartṛharigoesoninVP3.3.20–24toshowwhyonecan,withoutcontradiction,speakofsomethingbysayingthatitisinef-fable;foranelaborationofthisissue,refertoHo2006.

14–Cf.VP2.440,3.3.54,3.11.7,3.14.475.ForBhartṛhari,anindescribablethingmostlybearsvariouspropertiesandcapacities,yettheyaresointimatelyinter-woventhatthethingassuchisindivisible.Toexpressit,oneneedstoabstractfrom it a distinct form or impose on it an extraneous adjunct that serves toqualifyitandfunctionsasthebasisconcerned.Thisartificiallydividedorextra-neouslyqualifiedthingisdescribable,butitisnottheoriginalthing.Forexposi-tionofsuchideas,seetheCommentaryonVP2.440inSubramaniaIyer1983,p.313,andHelārāja’scommentary(thePrakīrṇaprakāśa)onVP3.11.7inSub-ramaniaIyer1973,p.98.

15–TheCommentaryonVP1.132assertsthatwhenanobjectfreshlypresentsitselftoconsciousnesswithoutanybasisfortheapplicationofwordsbeingcognized


therein,itappearsinanunspecifiable(avyapadeśya)wayas“itisthis.”TheremayseemtobeatensionbetweenthisassertionandVP2.144.However,theuse of the word avyapadeśya (literally meaning “indefinable” or “unspeak-able”)heresuggestsotherwise,andwemaytaketheobject—andtheintuitivemeaning—tobeonlyindirectlyexpressiblebyanexpressionsuchas“itisthis”orbyademonstrativelike“this.”

16–VP2.145,419,444.

17–VP2.234,425,442,446;3.3.81.

18–PolanyiandProsch1975,p.33.

19–Polanyi1958,p.57.

20–Polanyi 1958, pp. 62–63, 87–93; Polanyi 1959, pp. 44–46; Polanyi 1969,pp.123–127,132.

21–Cf. Polanyi 1958, pp. 87–93. Polanyi states on p. 90: “by acquiring a skill,whethermuscularorintellectual,weachieveanunderstandingwhichwecan-notput intowordsandwhichiscontinuouswith the inarticulate facultiesofanimals.”Onpp.91–92,hetakesone’sfocalknowledgeofthemeaningofatexttobeinarticulateknowledge.

22–Cf.VP2.7,25,andTolaandDragonetti1990,p.96.

23–Modernscholarsinthefieldsofpsychology,philosophy,andmanagementhaveoffered various definitions and characterizations of intuition; see the discus-sionsinShirleyandLangan-Fox1996andDaneandPratt2009.Ofcourse,Iamconcernedmainlywiththecharacterizationsgiveninthepresentarticletothenotionofpratibhā.

24–By “intentional content” I mean the ideal content that is immanent in con-sciousnessastheintentionalcorrelateoftheactofawarenessconcerned,whichwould,inthecaseofintuitiveunderstanding,besaidtobeanintuitivemeaning(inaratherstretchedsenseoftheterm“meaning”).

25–VP1.129–131anditsCommentary.

26–See the Commentary on VP 1.129, 131–132. Roughly, articulate words areinner,unspokenwordsthatcanproperlybearticulatedasaudiblewords,whileinarticulatewordscannot.ForBhartṛhari,thinkingamountstoaninnersilentspeech thatconsistsofa seriesof sucharticulatewordsand theircorrelatedmeanings.

27–Apartfromwordsandlinguistictraces,Bhartṛhari,inVP2.152,listsnatureandtraining/practiceamongsixkindsofcausalfactorsthathelptobringaboutanintuitiveunderstanding (theother four kinds are somewhat exotic).Hedoesnotethatsomeanimalscanbetrainedsuchthathearingofspecificsoundsin-ducesinthemanintuitiveunderstandingaboutwhattodoinresponsetothesounds;seeVP2.117–118andtheCommentaryonVP1.123.

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28–IntheCommentaryonVP2.152,anexpertdigger’sintuitionofwheretodigawellisconsideredanintuitiveunderstandingthatresultsfrompractice.Insitu-ationsrelatedtoexpertise,anexpertknows,almostspontaneously,whattodo,yetmaynotbeabletoexplainthereasonsforhisorherjudgment.

29–PolanyiandProsch1975,p.40;SubramaniaIyer1966,p.93.

30–Peoplemayspeakofexpertwinetastersandchickensexersaspossessingspe-cific skills.Onemaybe said topossess the skillsofunderstandingacertainlanguage.Suchskillsareintellectiveinthesenseofbeingcorrelatedwithdis-cernmentandunderstanding.However,here,Iusethenotionofskillonlytorefertoembodied,action-centered,andnon-intellectiveskills thataredevel-opedthroughactualbodilyperformance,butnottointellectiveskills,althoughtheborderlinebetweenthetwotypesofskillscanbesomehowfussy.

31–Watson1968,p.153.

32–If thenotionof inarticulatewords seemsunappealing,wemayconsiderMi-chaelDummett’s(1994,p.125)notionofproto-concept.Whileacatcannothaveanyconcepts,properlysocalled,itmaypossessproto-concepts,whichwesharewithanimalswithoutlanguage.Proto-conceptsconstituteproto-thoughts,andIshallsoondiscussDummett’snotionofproto-thought.

33–SubramaniaIyer1966,p.75.SubramaniaIyer(1982,pp.54–55)andTolaandDragonetti(1990,p.110)takepratibhātooccurinordinarysenseperception,althoughtheydonotgivetextualevidence.

34–Dummett1994,pp.121–126.Dummettcontends that toattainanadequateaccountofperception,weadulthumanbeingsmustberegardedasfrequentlyengaginginproto-thoughts,voluntarilyandinvoluntarily.

35–DaneandPratt2009,pp.12–16.Surely,theBhartṛharianintuitionisonlyakinto,butnotidenticalwith,theintuitionsdiscussedinmodernscholarship.

36–SeeStanleyandWilliamson2001,Snowdon2003,andBengsonandMoffett2007.

37–Forexample,Noë2005,Wallis2008,andJungandNewen2010.

38–Nocommitmentneedbemadeheretoaparticularkindofwarrant;anywilldoforthepresentpurposes.

39–Conee1994,p.136.

40–JungandNewen2010,pp.124–130.However, their approachcentersonlyon knowledge we have of our actions and is therefore not very pertinenthere.

41–If, as Subramania Iyer holds (1982, p. 54),pratibhā takesplaceall the time inus,itwouldoftenremainonlyimplicitandsubconscious,andyetprobablybe integral to knowing-that and knowing-how. I shall not pursue this issuehere.


42–Polanyi1958,p.70.

43–Haidt2001,p.822.Intuitionisheresaidtobecommontoallmammals;itisreportedthatpeopletypicallycannottellhowtheyreallyreachedamoraljudg-ment.Significantly,Puṇyarāja,anancientcommentatorontheVP,commentingonVP2.147,takesthemanifestationofpeople’sgoodconsciencetobeanin-stanceofpratibhā;seeSubramaniaIyer1983,p.66.

44–Forthedifficultiesofclassifyingtheknowingasknowing-that,seeMellor1993,pp.7–9.Forsomeofthedifficultiesinvolvedinclassifyingitasknowing-how,seeSnowdon2003,pp.22–25.

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