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“The nature of language”

Part A: Language in Monologue

1. Assumption: Assume I exist.

2. Derivation:Taking notes of Frege’s language model (1892), Where language = syntactic + semantic valuesWhere F(Q) = True F(Y) = False

Rearranging Frege’s model with Russell’s theory of object language (1940),

F(Q) = PF(Y) = D ----- 1

Where P and D is nonjudgmental1

Taking into account of the basis of information exchange by the semiotic circle, where semiosphere/semiocoine base on asymmetry, (J.Lotman 2005,2009, J.Grigorjeva 2011)

Noting that cognitive schema (J.Piaget 1926, H.Head 1926,D. Rumelhart 1980)equals to isomorphism (J. Lotman, F. Pfotenhauer 1975) is the basis of perceptionformation,

Noting also the duality arose from asymmetry, discreet and analogue, start from differentiation,

With reference of the equation of isomorphism (ibid.), P(O) = I2

1 To be more precise, primary judgmental, for differentiation is already judgement.2 Lotman considered a narrative text can be constructed in two ways, on basis of natural language and on basis of iconicity. “The word-

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Where P = function of correspondence, O = Object representation I = IconAccord equation 1 with the equation of isomorphism,

Adopting the formula provided by S. Lawrence and E.Margolis (1999), Where concept = mental representation, Q, P, Y, D= Mental Representation O, I = Mental Representation

Revising the notion of asymmetry, take the background sameness where any sort of differentiation comes about be unknown X

Q= F1(X) ----- 2 Where function F1 is function of distinction

Sub 2 into 1 F(F1(X)) = P ----- 3

Take every function as way of distinction, Nature of Language: P(F(F1(X)+ F1(X))^B(F(F1(X))+ F1(X)) = I

P(F(Г(X)))=I where P = Language function3

F = advanced judgmental functionГ = Primary judgmental function

Part B: The models of sign

1. Pre-ambulatories

signs are joined into chains according to the rules of the given language and the content of the statement, but it is necessary that the image be the projection of an object (the projection may be on toa real surface or on to an abstract space of the kind, "an aggregrateof all possible musical tones"). In practice, this only means that ifwe were to designate the image by the first letter of the word icon, I, the object of the representation by 0, and the function which setsup their correspondence by P, then the whole relationship could be expressed by the formula P(O) = I.” (ibid.)3 P(X) is not necessarily a language function; it is a broad functionreferring to any kind of functions of correspondence, an immediate example would be paintings or gestures.

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In accord to the concluded formula, subsequently referred as formula 1,P(F(Г(X)))=ILanguage is a set of differentiating functions which does not assume existence of external objective reality.

2. Reformulation of the Saussurean dyadic model of signRecalling the General Principle proposed by Saussure, (1915, 97) where nature of linguistic sign is “sign (signe), signifier (signifie) and signified (signifiant)”,

Recalling the notion of “concrete entity of language”, which underlined “signs are not abstract but real objects”, and that “linguistic entity does not exist unless bythe association of signifier and signified, ofwhich if one of these elements are not retained, it vanishes,4 (ibid. 32, 99, 144)

Recalling further the notion of the nebula of pre-delimitation5, (ibid. 155)

Noting that signifier and signified, which are inseparable but arbitrarily linked (First principle), are directly in accord of his earlier notion, image-sound (image-acoustique) and concept, (ibid. 28, 98 ,99)

Reformulate the notions with formula 1, so that:The nebula of pre-delimitation = X

4 In Chapter II, “Les entites concretes de la langue”, ……Les signes dont la langue est composee ne sont pas des abstractions, mais des objets reels…...; on peut les appeler les entites concretes de cette science……L’entite linguistique n’existe que par l’association du signifiant et du signifie; des qu’on ne retient qu’un des elements, elle s’evanouit… (Saussure, 1915, 144)5 “Prise en elle-meme, la pensee est comme une nebuleuse ou rien n’est necessairement delimite. Il n’y a pas d’idees preetablies, et rien n’est distinct avant l’apparition de la langue.” (ibid. 155)

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Signifier/sound-image = P(X)Signified/concept = F(Г(X))Sign = P(F(Г(X)))

3. Reformulation of the Peircean triad model of signRecalling the notion of phaneron,6 (Peirce 1931, CP 1.284)

Recalling the notion of firstness, secondness and thirdness, (ibid. CP 1.300, 322, 337)

Recalling the notion of monad, dyad and triad, (ibid. CP 1.293, 303, 326)

Recalling the notion of indecomposable elements, qualities of feeling, and its further elaboration, (ibid. CP 1.294, 304, 310)

Recalling the element of struggle, (ibid. CP 1.322)

Recalling the categorization of ego and non-ego, (ibid.CP 1.324, 332, 334)

Recalling the notion of volition and polar distinction,(ibid. CP 330, 333)

Recalling the notion of representation, (ibid. CP 1.338)

Recalling the notion of Sign, object, meaning and interpretant, and its subsequent functional triad of Sign as object, representamen and interpretant in speculative grammar, (ibid. CP 1.339, CP 2)

Recalling further the notion of distinction, (ibid. CP 6 “Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not.” (Peirce, 1931, CP 1.284)

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1.353)

Noting the difference between monad and object,7 (ibid.CP 1.303)

Noting that “monadic quality is mere potentiality, without existence”, (ibid. CP 1.328)

Noting that “existence is purely dyadic” where existence is understood as “presence in some experiential universe” without regard of materiality, law, phenomena or feeling, and can be further understood as experienced, (ibid. CP 1.328-329)

Noting the primary judgmental8 natureof firstness,9 of indecomposable elements and of feeling,10(ibid. CP 1.303, 306-307)

Noting the qualities of feeling as well as the notion of phaneron does not involve objective reality, and thereby bypass realist anti-realist arguments,11

Noting the similar nature of “feeling” and mental representation,12

7 “The pure idea of a monad is not that of an object. For an object is over against me. But it is much nearer an object than it is to a conception of self, which is still more complex.” (ibid. CP 1.303)8 See page 1.9 In the monadic state, “There must be some determination, or suchness, otherwise we shall think nothing at all. But it must not bean abstract suchness, for that has reference to a special suchness. It must be a special suchness with some degree of determination, not,however, thought as more or less. There is to be no comparison. So that it is a suchness sui generis”. (Peirce 1931, CP 1.303)10 According to Peirce, “feeling is simply a quality of immediate consciousness” (ibid. CP 1.307) and “a quality is not conscious: it is a mere possibility”. (ibid. CP 1.310)11 Peirce agreed that there is an external world of facts, and an internal world of fancy, (ibid. CP. 1.321) however as stated before, since objective reality is too hasty an assumption, at best the two world can be treated as a collective world (inter-subjectivity) and an individual world (subjectivity).12 The term representation may more precisely be rephrased to

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Noting that “struggle” in the secondness is based on changes and rearrangementsof quality and feeling as categorized in the firstness, as termed mutual action, (ibid. CP 1.322)

Noting that the realization of self and other, termed ego and non-ego is based on distinction and differentiation,

Noting that volition and polar distinction is based on differentiation,

Noting the advanced judgmental13 nature of Secondness,

Noting the presentational and correspondent nature of representamen,

Noting that phaneron is the background for distinction,

Noting the broad definition of object,14

Noting further the inseparability of meaning and interpretent,15

Reformulate the notions with formula 1, so that:Phaneron = XFirstness/monad = Г(X)Secondness/dyad = F(X)Thirdness/triad = F(Г(X))

presentation.13 See page 1.14 “That for which it (Sign) stands is called its object.” (Peirce, 1931, CP 1.339) “By the way, the dynamic object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind inperception, but including more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual Experience.” (Peirce, 1998, EP 2, 478)15 Meaning is what “sign conveys”, interpretent is the recognition of sign. (Peirce, 1931, CP 1.339) Sign does not have meaning until you recognize it as sign and give it meaning.

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Reformulate the functional triad with formula 1, so that:Object = F(Г(X))Representamen = P(X)Interpretent = P(F(Г(X)))

4. ReconciliationRecalling formula 1, P(F(Г(X))) = I

Noting the mirror nature of X, as well as its incognitability,16on which subsequently I derived itselfthrough the setting of functions of distinction,

Noting I is a term of convenience for P(F(Г(X))),

Represent formula 1 into representation model: P(F(Г(X)))

Recalling the reformulation of the Saussurean dyad and the Peircean triad,

Noting the inseparability of “object, representamen, interpretent”,“signified, signifier, sign”,their comparability, with particular focus on the comparability of interpretent and sign,

Noting the possible imprecision in representation of the Dyadic and Triadic model of Signs,17

16 X=X, F(X) will never equal to X, at least not in the foreseeable nature.17 Imprecisions lie especially on the triad, for the wholeness of the signifier (representamen) and signified (object), considered as the sign, is inseparable and unisolatable. Interpretent of sign as a signis in fact the perception of the sign as a whole, with representamen and object and is subsequently the sign itself for observer. It wouldbe extremely indirect and misleading to take the sign away from the unity and form a triad, where originally the so-called third leg is an encompassing idea of the other two. Eg. Front, hind, and coin itself, will be improper to be presented as a triad.

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Suggest alternativerepresentation model.

Part C: Theory of communication-modeling systems

1. Pre-ambulatoriesRecalling the representation model: P(F(Г(X))), subsequently referred as representation model 1,

Recalling the Peircean categorization of signs, “index,icon and symbol”, (ibid. CP 1.369)

Recalling the notion of sign vehicle, (ibid. CP 1.339)

Recalling Bolter’s notion of sign medium, (1991, 195-6)

Recalling the importance of materiality of text, (Kress, van Leeuwen 1996, 231)

Recalling Hjelmslev’s notion of form/substance distinction and the plane of content/expression, (1961,47, 49, 60)

Recalling the subsequent development of Hjelmslev’s model, (Tudor 1974, 110; Baggaley & Duck 1976, 149; Metz 1981)

Recalling further Chandler’s summarization and representation of Hjelmslev’s framework, (2013)

Noting the inclusivity of the three categories in Peircean categorization,

Reinterpret the Peircean categorization, so that:Index = Object oriented (F(X) oriented)Icon = Object oriented (Г(X) oriented)Symbol = Representamen oriented (P(X) oriented)

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Reinterpret representation of Hjelmslev’s framework by Chandler, so that:Plane of expression (signifier) = P(X)Plane of content (signified) = F(Г(X))Form of expression = P(X)Substance of expression = PnXForm of content = P(X)Substance of content = F(Г(X))Where n = medium use

Accord the above with formula 1 and representation model 1,

Provide supplementary formula 1a: Pn (F(Г(X))) = I

Provide supplementary representation model 1a: Pn (F(Г(X)))

2. Reformulation of Moscow-Tartu school’s modeling systemRecalling the notion of Primary and Secondary communication modeling system, (Lotman 1977)

Noting the original description of Primary and Secondary communication modeling system, respectively as “mechanism present, content theoretically absent”, and“content present, mechanism theoretically absent”, (ibid.)

Noting further its comparability with Saussurean notionof signifiers/signifieds, Peircean notion of representamens/objects and Hjelmslevean notion of form/content,

Propose expansion of Primary Modeling System to includeapart from natural language, all forms of functions of correspondence (P(X)),

Reformulate the modeling systems with formula 1, so

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that:Primary modeling systems = P(X)oriented systemSecondary modeling systems = F(Г(X))oriented systemAnd can be further reduce to P(X) and F(Г(X)) if the focus is put on modeling.

3. Reformulating Sebeok’s modeling systemRecalling the notion of Primary, Secondary and Tertiarymodeling systems proposed by Sebeok, (1988, 74, 77)

Noting the distinction of Sebeok’s Primary and Secondary modeling systems is verbal and nonverbal,18

Noting the comparability of Sebeok’s third modeling system with Moscow-Tartu school’s secondary communication-modeling system,

Reinterpreting Sebeok’s three modeling systems as:Primary modeling system = P(X) system (non verbal, Pnv(X))Secondary modeling system = P(X) system (verbal, Pv(X))

18 “To put it in another way, only hominids possess mutually sustaining repertoires of signs, the zoosemiotic nonverbal, plus, superimposed, the anthroposemiotic verbal. The latter is the modelingsystem which the Soviet scholars call primary, but which, in truth, is phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically secondary to the nonverbal; and, therefore, what they call 'secondary', is actually a further, tertiary augmentation of the former.” (Sebeok, 1988, 74)More details on nonverbal and verbal distinction, “The relatively simple, nonverbal models that animals live by and that normal human infants likewise employ are more or less pliable representations which, as we saw, must fit 'reality' sufficiently to tend to secure their survival in their ecological niche (an ethological expression which, in semiotic parlance, refers to the Umwelt as viewed by an observer of the subject under scrutiny). Such 'topdown' modeling (to use current jargon borrowed from the cognitive sciences) can persist,and become very sophisticated indeed in the adult life of exceptionally gifted individuals, as borne out by Einstein's testimonial, or by what we know about Mozart's or Picasso's ability to model intricate auditory or visual compositions in their heads in anticipation of transcribing them onto paper or canvas. This kind of nonverbal modeling is indeed primary, in both a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic sense.” (ibid. 77)

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Third modeling system = F(Г(X))

4. ReconciliationRecalling representation model 1,P(F(Г(X)))

Recalling the proposed expansion of Primary Modeling System to include apart from natural language, all forms of functions of correspondence (P(X)), and the subsequent reformulation,

Taking into account the reformulation of Sebeok’s modeling systems and its comparability with Moscow-Tartu School’s reformulation,

With special focus on the encompassibility of the functions of correspondence P(X),

Suggest alternative representation model 1.

Part D: Language in Dialogue

1. AssumptionAssume you exist.

2. DerivationRecalling the notion of intersubjectivity, (Husserl, 1907)

Taking intersubjectivity in the broadest sense, entirely experiential without assumption of external objectivity,

Expand formula 1 and representation model 1, so that:X = basis of intersubjectivity19

19 Although it is highly recommended to avoid any attempt to delimit X, for simple understanding, X can be treated as the whole mass of sensory data received, varied and ever changing but sharable.

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Recalling Jakobson’s scheme of communication, (Jakobson, 1956, 1958)

Recalling Lotman’s scheme of internal communication, (Lotman, 1977)

Noting Jakobson’s scheme of communication was subsequently referred by Lotman as external communication, (ibid.)

Noting the notion of untranslatability and non-identical message, (Jakobson, 1959)

Accord Jakobson’s scheme of communication to formula 1,so that:Addresser -I- AddresseeP (F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X)))20 --- 1Where -I- the sign of induction

Accord 1 with Lotman’s scheme of communication,Addresser -I- AddresseeI P (F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) I --- 2

Noting that I P(F(Г(X))) as a result of interpretation of addressee,21

Noting the process of induction (-I-) is already an interpretation,Revise 2,Addresser -I- AddresseeGeneral description: I = P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = IAddressee description: I P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) =I

Part E: Foundations of theory of signs

20 The possibility of identity between functions of Addresser and addressee is undetermined, the possibility of difference between is certain. 21 In a monologue, the only addressee is the addresser, thus P(F(Г(X))) = I

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1. Pre-ambulatoriesRecalling the notion of langue and parole, (Saussure, 1915, 23-39)

Recalling the immutability and mutability of signs, (ibid. 104-113)

Recalling the elaboration on langue and parole as collective and individual,22 (ibid. 112)

Recalling further the notion of synchronie and diachronie, (ibid. 113, 138-139)

In accord to Saussurean scheme of language, (ibid. 139)Language:(Langue, Parole)Langue: (Synchronic,Diachronic)

Language is 2 dimensional: Collective convention and individual interpretation23.Langue is 2 dimensional: spatial, temporal.

Accord with general description: I = P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = IWhere: Iaddresser = Parole formed with reference to addresser’s understanding of langueIaddressee = Parole formed with reference to addressee’s understanding of langueNote that Parole encompassesimage-sound (P(X)) and

22La langue est pour nous le langege moins la parole. Elle est l’ensemble des habitudes linguistiques qui permettent a un sujet de comprendre et de se faire comprendre… Mais cette definition laisse encore la langue en dehors de sa realite sociale; elle en fait une chose irreelle, puisqu’elle ne comprend qu’un des aspects de la realite, l’aspect individuel; il faut une masse parlante pour qu’il yait une langue. A aucun moment, et contrairement a l’apparence, celle-ci n'existe en dehors du fait social, parce qu'elle est un phenomene semiologique. 23And application.

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concept (F(Г(X))).

Langue is a collective convention, its formation and transformation24 can be represented as: F(Г(X))) P(X) F(Г(X))25

subsequently referred as FPF relation.

2. Reformulation of Morris’s foundations of signsRecalling Frege’s language model: language = syntactic + semantic valuesAnd his introduction of sense, (1892)

Recalling the notion of logical syntax, (Carnap, 1937)

Recalling the triad of sign vehicle, designatum and interpreter, (Morris, 1938, in 1971)

Recalling the notion of syntactics, semantics and pragmatics, (ibid.)

Noting syntactic is categorized as interrelations of signs or intrarelations of sign systems, but is broaderthan the notion of Logical syntax,26 (ibid.)

24Understood as individual interpretation and application (formation of parole) in the dimension of space and time, noting the inseparability of langue and mass-parole.25Note that for presentation purpose, details and relations between P(X) and F(Г(X)) is not indicated. The question whether men can thinkwithout functions of correspondence will be explored later.26 “In spite of the importance thus ascribed to logical syntax, it cannot be equated with syntactics as a whole. For it (as the term ‘sentence’ shows) has limited its investigation of syntactical structure to the type of sign combinations which are dominant in science, namely, those combinations which from a semantical point of view are called statement, or those combinations used in the transformation of such combinations. Thus on Carnap’s usage commands are not sentences, and many lines of verse would not be sentences. ‘Sentence’ is not, therefore, a term which in his usage applies to every independent sign combination permitted by the formation rules of a language – and yet clearly syntactics in the wide sense must deal with all such combinations. There are, then, syntactical problems in the fields of perceptual signs, aesthetic signs, the practical use of signs, and general linguistics which have not been

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Noting semantic is also referred as semantic structure,and is categorized as relations between sign vehicles and designatum/object, (ibid.)

Noting pragmatic is categorized as the relations between sign vehicles and interpreters, (ibid.)

With further regards on the abuse of signs and its pragmatics, (ibid.)

Reformulate Morrisean foundations of signs, so that:

Syntactics = intra P(X) relationsSemantic = FPF relationPragmatics = F(Г(X)) relations

Noting that functions of correspondence (P(X)) can onlybe functions of correspondence if it is interpretable, id est. P(X) is tied with F(Г(X)), functions of judgments27, where judgmental functions rest in at leastmy mind.

3. Reformulation of Chomskyan linguisticRecalling Chomsky’s notion of Language, Grammar, set and string,28 (1956)

Recalling the analysis of transformative grammar of

treated within the framework of what today is regarded as logical syntax and yet which form part of syntactics as this is here conceived.” (Morris 1938, in 1971:30)27In laymen terms, though incomplete and not entirely precise, meaningor make sense. 28 “… we shall deal with languages only in phonemic or alphabetic transcription. By a language, then we shall mean a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each of finite length, all constructed from afinite alphabet of symbols. If A is an alphabet, we shall say that anything formed by concatenating the symbols of A is a string in A. By a grammar of the language L we mean a device of some sort that produces all of the strings that are sentences of L and only these.” (Chomsky 1956)

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English and its conditions, (Chomsky 1956, 1973)

Recalling the notion of competence and performance29 andits subsequent development I-language and E-language,(Chomsky 1965, 1986)

Recalling the notion of Generative Grammar and Universal Grammar, (Chomsky, 1965)

Recalling the three major components, respectively the syntactic, phonological and semantic component of a generative grammar, with the latter two being purely interpretive,30(ibid.)

Recalling the notion of Deep and Surface structure,31 (ibid.)

Recalling the notion of Government and binding and its subsequent development, Principle and Parameter (P&P), (Chomsky 1981, Chomsky, Lasnik 1993)

Recalling the minimalist program, the removal of D and S structure and the retaining of LF (logical form) and PF (phonetic form), (Chomsky 1993)

29 “We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer´s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situation).” (Chomsky 1965)30 “The syntactic component specifies an infinite set of abstract formal objects, each of which incorporates all information relevant to a single interpretation of a particular sentence… The phonologicalcomponent of a grammar determines the phonetic form of a sentence generated by the syntactic rules… The semantic component determines the semantic interpretation of a sentence…Both the phonological and semantic components are therefore purely interpretive. Each utilizes information provided by the syntactic component concerning formatives, their inherent properties and their interrelations in a given sentence.” (ibid.)31 “The syntactic component of a grammar must specify, for each sentence, a deep structure that determines its semantic interpretation and a surface structure that determines its phonetic interpretation.” (ibid.)

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Noting the notion of competence and performance is entirely in accord with the reinterpretation of langue-parole,32

Noting the notion of Grammar as rule of string formulation in set is entirely syntactic,

Noting that the notion of deep and surface structure isin accord with the Hjelmslevian notion (1961) of content and form,

Noting that there exist a possible imprecision in the differentiation between written and spoken form of language,33

Noting that syntactical component generate surface structure and deep structure only for addressee,34

With reference to the argument over D-structure and S-structure and the introduction of LF, (Jackendoff 1974,May 1977)

Reformulate the above notions, so that:

Language/set = P(X) systemGrammar = Rules in P(X) system

Syntactic component = rules of a Plang(X)Phonological component = phonetic form of Plang(X)35

Semantic component = F(Г(X))32See page 1133Language exist in two form, written form and spoken form. Both formsare regulated or generated by rules of syntax (logical form). While the phonetic form of sentence is discussed, the written form of sentence is left out or mixed with the syntactical component (logicalrepresentation). 34 For addresser, in order to make an expression, first there must exist something for expression. As presented in page 12, and so in accord with rules of a P(X) expressed it in P(X).35 Language is a function of correspondence (P(X)) with two forms, spoken and written.

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The notion of surface structure and deep structure, though abandoned after the minimalist program, has its significance.

Surface structure = P(X)Deep structure = F(Г(X))

In the field of Chomskyan linguistics, which focuses only on pure syntactic aspect, id est. the rule of language (English) P(X) system, it is understandable toremove D-s and S-s in its study.

PF = phonetic representation of Plang(X)

Note that LF in current studies still lacks clear distinguishability between graphic representation (VF) and the true logical representation (grammatical rules).

Note:PF = P(X)GF = P(X)LF = Rules of P(X)

The notion of competence is related with the study of FPF relations.The notions of UG and I-language are related with the study of F(Г(X)).36

Part F: Language in Translation

36Note that though both notions are in accord with semiotics and cognitive science, the current focus of modern linguistic, which is entirely syntactic (P(X)), still have a very long way to go (if not impossible). The study of syntactic itself, focusing on a limited amount of P(X) systems, would only yield rules that govern the systems subjected to study. From such results attempting to reconstruct the common rules of P(X) formations would be extremely indirect. Tapping into the field of anthropology, sociology, semiotics, psychology…etc.

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1. DerivationRecalling the General description,Addresser -I- AddresseeI = P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = I

With regards of a translative situation, recalling the addressee description, I P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = I

Noting that the notion of D-s, S-s, first proposed by Chomsky (1957), later adopted into the field of translation (Nida 1964), is in accord with the above descriptions,37

Noting translation is a three party process, id est. author, translator, reader,

Three party (TP) Description: Author -I- Translator -I- ReaderGeneral (GTP): I = P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = I= P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = I38

Italic is used to indicate expressed P(F(Г(X))).

Revise GTP,Author -I- Translator -I- ReaderI = P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = I= P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) =II = P(F(Г(X))) -I- [P(F(Г(X))) = I= P(F(Г(X)))] -I- P(F(Г(X)))= I[P(F(Г(X))) = I= P(F(Г(X)))] = P(F(Г(X))) = I39

37 P(X) = surface structure, F(Г(X)) = deep structure; note that I only illustrate the identity of addresser’s P(F(Г(X))) and the interpretation of addresser’s P(F(Г(X))) by (in general description) addresser or (in addressee’s description) addressee.38 For simple illustration, a Chinese-English translation process can be presented as: I = Chin(F(Г(X))) -I- Chin(F(Г(X))) = I = Eng(F(Г(X))) -I- Eng(F(Г(X))) = I39To the translator, his translated text will correspond to what he

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Simplified (STP) I = P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = I

Textual (S-T) Description: Source Text -I- Translator -I- Target TextP(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) = I= P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X)))P(F(Г(X))) -I- [P(F(Г(X))) = I= P(F(Г(X)))] -I- P(F(Г(X)))[P(F(Г(X))) = I= P(F(Г(X)))] = P(F(Г(X))) = IP(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X)))

ST -I- TTP(F(Г(X))) -I- P(F(Г(X)))

2. Case studyChinese-English Translation by Italian translator:Translation of 囧to Mushroom FaceChin(E(X))40 -I- Eng(E(X)) + Ita(Г(X))41

Where E = emotive function42

Chinese-English Translation by English translator:Translation of 囧to Mushroom Face

interpreted from the author’s text. He might be well aware of the non-identity, but the fact that he produced the translation implied he saw an equivalence or correspondence during the process of translation.40Chin(E(X)) can also be represented as Chin(E(Г(X)), since it is clear the formation of the emotive function the sign now carries originate from the iconicity of the sign, but this is trivial in the current discussion as the sign has already been established as a symbol.41 The primary judgmental function here represents the icon of mushroom and face, or the general image of a mushroom face; it is differentiated from the Chinese interpretation. For the symbol for the Chinese has an iconic effect to the translator.42 Note the original meaning of 囧 has already become a metatext for most Chinese. Current usage was derived because of its iconicity and subsequently become a symbol representing an emotive function. In thetarget text, which is English, the word Mushroom Face would be established in relation of such emotive function. The delimitation ofmushroom face is made by an Italian, thus the primary distinction would be according to Italian. Investigation of subsequent reformulation of target text by reader would be another area of concern.

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Chin(E(X)) -I- Eng(E(X) + Г(X))43

Note the above is only a schematic sketch that offers one possibility; due to individual interpretation, there is never a definite way to describe the formulation of functions except by the author at the moment of function formulation, but every way of formulation would not escape the basis of P(F(Г(X))).

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43Another description would be Chin(E(X)) -I- Eng(E(Г(X)), which implytranslator relate the iconic ‘Mushroom face’ with the emotive function he interpreted in Chinese. However a scenario as such would be highly (in fact, entirely) impossible, for such imply the source text has only 1 word, or 1 symbol. The description than have to be changed to Chin(Г(X)) -I- Eng(E(Г(X)), and yet again a dilemma appear, the new scenario can only appear if the translator is acquainted with the symbol 囧 before, or else in the target text, the symbol would not have an emotive function, given the source text consist only of 1 symbol, id est. without even an exclamation mark. In fact, the translation would not even have a meaning without a context. But if there is a context, the symbol must carry a conventional interpretation and so the translation thus Eng(E(Г(X)) would not be possible.

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