The Interethnic Conflict in Perak: Ideology, Communalism and Resolution

DRAFT ONLY – Not for citation

1

The Interethnic Conflict in Perak: Ideology, Communalism and Resolution1

By Abdur-Razzaq Lubis

Introduction: A Boast

A boast amongst British administrators, capitalists and industrialists to visitors to Malaya

between the First and Second World Wars was that Malaya was ‘a country with no

politics’ when contrasted with India and Ceylon (Sri Lanka today). However the boast

was confined only among the colonialists alone, whose high officials, in fact, formed ‘the

government’ of Malaya. The absence of nationalist or labour movements offered no

impediment to their authoritarian rule over Malaya.2

British colonial rule over the lower part of the isthmian bridge became whole

when the entire southern part of the peninsula came under British control on the eve of

the First World War. Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu came under British weight

and indirect rule in 1909 consequent to a treaty between Great Britain and Siam in which

the latter relinquished its rights over the so-called ‘Siamese Malay States’.3 These states

were regrouped as the Unfederated Malay States (U.M.S.) with Johore coming into the

orbit only in 1914.

British colonialism, a totalising ideology of control, manipulation and

exploitation, direct or indirect over the so-called ‘Malay States’ began with the

acquisition of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, incorporating them into the Straits

Settlements (S.S.) in 1826. This was followed by the creation of the Federated Malay

States (F.M.S.) comprising Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan in 1896 and the

U.M.S. in 1909. The S.S. were crown colonies whereas the F.M.S. and U.M.S.

protectorates. The corporatization of the colonies and ‘sovereign’ states was an integral

part of the expansion and centralisation of colonial authority over the so-called ‘Malay

Peninsula’.4 This political and social engineering reached its zenith in the post-war years

with the attempts to form the perfidious Malayan Union.

Indeed the centralisation and effective political power in British hands only

amounted to authoritarian rule by an oligarchy.

1 Paper presented to The International Conference on Humanities and Social Sciences (ICHSS2014) 3 – 5

June 2014, Kuala Lumpur Convention Center, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 2 G.L. Peet, Political Questions of Malaya, Cambridge at the University Press, 1949: 3. At the time Peet

was the editor of the Straits Times in Singapore. 3 They are called ‘Siamese Malay States’ to distinguish them from the ‘British Malay States’. A

sequence of events led to the signing of the treaty. By 1904 the northern Malay States fell within the

British sphere of influence under the terms of the Anglo-French Entente. A bargain struck in 1905

whereby Britain offered to renounce its claims to extra-territorial jurisdiction in Siam in exchange for

territorial concessions over the ‘Siamese Malay States’ which was perceived as a source of trouble to

the latter besides bringing no appreciable revenue to Bangkok, sealed the treaty. (Abdur-Razzaq Lubis,

‘Regional power politics and the birth of Penang’ in Penang Economic Monthly, January 2010: 50-1). 4 The idea that the Peninsula was particularly ‘Malay’ was almost exclusively an English imagination since

other Europeans usually called the Peninsula ‘Malakka’ (Malacca), after the emporium of that name. The

Malays themselves had used the term ‘tanah Melayu’ (Malay land) to assign the appendix of insular

Southeast Asia albeit sometime applying the term to Melaka and at other times to a broader area where

there are Malay kings. (Anthony Reid, ‘Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern

Identities’ in Timothy P. Barnard (ed.) Malay Identity Across Boundaries, Singapore University Press NUS

Publishing, 2004: 12).


2

In practice the British administration in the Federated Malay States was just as

authoritarian and almost as direct as it was in the Straits Settlements….

None of the five million people in Malaya before the war had the vote, because

there was no public voting to do. A majority were Chinese, Indian and Ceylonese5

immigrants, who were only temporarily residents in the country and therefore had no

rights of citizenship there anyway. Representation of the public was by Government

selection and nomination at several level…

One safeguard of administrative autocracy was the fixed majority of Government

officials in every Malayan legislature. This made sure that in the last resort the British

administration could put through any proposal of its own or defeat any unofficial motion.

In practice the whip of the official majority hardly ever cracked, because Government

took care to keep its financial, economic or social policies within the conservative limits

that would be approved by the unofficial members.6

Roff has described the dichotomy of British policy and practice between 1874 and

1942 as ‘schizoid’ in character.7 Although the condition described was applied to ‘British

Malay policy’ its implications impacted on the body politics of the colonised subjects of

British Malaya. Colonialism prolonged and sustained campaign of conquest and

subjugation of the so-called ‘Malay States’ altered irreversibly and produced

unprecedented changes to the socio-cultural, economic and political world of the

colonised society.

Political Awakening

The lack of political consciousness or indifference among the population had, in parts, its

roots in the diverse communities of the people. They had radically different languages,

traditions and many of them were largely immigrants whose loyalties lay entirely with

their country of origin. Labour had no representation in Malayan public life at all as there

were no recognized trade unions and legislation making them legal was not passed until

1940.

Consciousness of Malaya as one country was only just emerging. In fact the very

name Malaya itself, a British invention, did not come into general use until the twentieth

century. Right up to the Japanese invasion people still thought in terms of separate

Malayan groups – the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States and the

Unfederated Malay States, apart from being mindful of their own mores, traditions and

culture.

The end of an epoch and the beginning of another cannot be dated precisely but

one can recognize that by 1920 an age had ended and another had begun in Malaya. By

the 1920s Malaya was abuzz with all sorts of new ideas and trends originating from the

Straits Settlements where a new generation of urbane foreign-educated Muslim

intellectuals led by Syed Sheikh al-Hady and Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin and similar

5 The colonial-orientalist fabricated identities of ‘Malay’, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’ was first promulgated in

the 1891 Straits Settlement census. This is not to say there are no Malays but for the purpose of the census

enumeration, Malay was defined to serve population statistics, administrative imperatives, social

engineering, colonial political and economic agenda. Ceylonese is a geographical ascription taken from

Ceylon, a nation rather than an ethnicity. 6 Peet, 1949: 4.

7 William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1980:

12-3.


3

individuals dedicated to specifically reform of the Malay-Muslim8 community. These

‘Kaum Muda’9 intellectuals were politically motivated Muslim modernists and reformists

who sought to uplift the standards of life and education of the colonized subject of the

peninsula in order to bring them into the modern world and to face the challenges of

colonialism and imperialism. It was during this period that the non-Muslims (‘Chinese’

and ‘Indians’) were also growing increasingly political. The ‘Chinese’ in Malaya were

inspired by both the nationalists of China and the Chinese Communist Party while

Malayan ‘Indians’ were inspired by the rise of the Indian Congress Party and its fight for

India’s independence.

As the second decade of the twentieth century approaches, it was disclosed in the

1921 and 1931 censuses of British Malaya comprising the Straits Settlements the

Federated and the Unfederated Malay States that the ‘Malays’10

had become a minority in

their own country to the horror of both British and indigenous authorities. The Chinese

were so numerous that a British traveller observed in the 1930s, ‘the real Malays appear

to have been engulfed in the rising tide of the Chinese invasion.’11

All this happened

under their watch which added a ‘racial’ dimension to the anomalous situation the

‘Malays’ find themselves vis-à-vis the perceived benevolence of British rule.

Colonial rule had not only brought with it a tide of migration that changed

irrevocably the complexion of the ‘Malay Peninsula’ but its immigration and race-

relations polices were largely responsible for the traumatic changes in the socio-cultural,

political and economic fabric of the colonised country. The introduction of large-scale

migration was to create and sustain a colonial import-substituting economy, which

divided the colonised society according to their economic functions or utility inevitably

leading to racial, ethnic, social and religious tensions between the colonised subjects. The

political economy of Malaya was founded in part upon a racial ideology or racialised

capitalism which facilitated and provided the justification for British interference in the

‘Malay States’.

Chinese coolies in particular served as both a source of cheap labour and a market

for goods over which the British enjoyed a monopoly. As the British establishment was

‘almost completely dependent upon Chinese entrepreneurial activity for their economic

8 The use of the term ‘Malay-Muslims’ in this paper refers to the Malays as well as Muslims who are not

ethnic Malays but are seen as such by the non-Malays and the authorities, as well as taking into cognizance

the historical process through which they have become part of the Malay race, without going into details

here. Dividing them into the simplistic Malay and non-Malay categories would lead one to fall into the trap

of inevitably concluding that the former has a historical and cultural continuity in Malaya, whilst the other

has none. 9 Literally younger generation but politically in so far as they challenged the established order, the

figurative expression ‘young Turks meaning ‘the new breed’, impatient or eager for radical change applies

to them. 10

The term Melayu (Malay) began to be used widely as an ethnic category rather than just as a referent to

place of origin, only from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Malay as used in the colonial census is a

distinct and totalised identity of govermentality for the control, policing, monitoring and exploitation of

colonized subjects. 11

Robert W. Foran, Malayan Symphony: Being the impressions gathered during a six month's journey

through the Straits Settlements, Federated Malay States, Siam, Sumatra, Java and Bali, London:

Hutchinson & Co., 1935: 30.


4

base’12

in the early stages of their rule, it comes as no surprise that the colonial authorities

neglected to look at the issue of Chinese migration as a ‘problem’ until it was highlighted

to them as such by the ‘Malays’ and the glaring disparities caused by the colonial ‘open-

migration’ policy.

A major share in the responsibility for the mass invasion of Chinese into Malaya

lay at the door of the British ‘for, no matter, with what justice, many educated Malays

hold the British responsible for the communal problem in Malaya today.’13

The colonial authorities were indifferent to the fact that they had complicated the

situation even further by ‘creating an unstable demographic balance among widely

divergent cultural populations by an unrestricted immigration policy’ and by ‘policies

which sowed fear and distrust among Malay, Chinese and Indian populations’.14

Indeed

the initial impetus of British colonial intervention in the so-called ‘Malay States’ was

neither missionary nor altruistic but motivated by the fundamentals of self-serving

economics and realpolitik before all else.

By the third decade British rule in Malaya had been firmly established and its

administration had been entrenched. Equally established was the fact that economic

might was largely concentrated in British hands and to a certain extent with the

‘Chinese’. The indigenous Malays remained contented with their subsistence peasant

economy or as Peet puts it, ‘[i]n the Malay States the chiefs and peasantry were only one

or two generations away from the Middle Ages.’15

The ‘Malay States’ found themselves

increasingly handicapped in the race for development as the form and content of the

development was being defined by Siam in the case of the so-called ‘Siamese Malay

States’ and the newly established British colonial rule in the case of the S.S., F.M.S. and

U.M.S. Under colonial rule, Malays began to feel the effects of the economic and

political marginalisation on them by the British and migrant communities.

The colonial-capitalist ideology introduced by the British counted the resources of

the ‘Malay Peninsula’ as commodities and markets. Consequently they had to be

domesticated and exploited according to the logic of Western rationalistic and cost-

effective method. The result of this development saw Great Britain, the metropolitan

power, with more than 70 per cent of the total economic assets and they became the

leading colonial-capitalists in business investment in Malaya, by 1937. Not less than two-

thirds of the government bonds were in the hands of British subjects, many of them

resident in Malaya. Up to the end of 1941 the greater part of the rubber industry and the

rubber market were controlled by British capitalists with considerable interests in coconut

and oil-palm plantations.

In mining too, British capital held sway. In the F.M.S. alone, about 40 British

companies were engaged in tin dredging. In tin smelting the British Straits Trading

Company and the equally British Eastern Smelting Company had a virtual monopoly.

12

Charles Hirschman, ‘The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology’,

Sociological Forum, 1 (1986): 346. 13

Introduction by Dr John Bastin, formerly Professor of History in the University of Malaya to second

edition of Rupert Emerson’s classic study of direct and indirect rule in Malaya in R. Emerson, Malaysia, A

Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964. 14

Hirschman, 1986: 332. 15

Peet, 1949: 6.


5

The production of tungsten by the British-owned mine at Pulai in Perak, made the F.M.S.

the fourth largest producer of the ore in the world.16

The Chinese were a good second to the British in business investments in Malaya.

Vast sums of monies were annually remitted from Malaya to support family members

living in China. Chinese-owned plantations increased substantially by the 1940s. The

cultivation of and trade in tapioca, areca nuts, pineapple canning and saw-milling were

largely or entirely in Chinese hands. The Chinese also controlled the fishing industry. In

the years preceding the Japanese conquest, the output from mines owned or worked by

Chinese was about 47 per cent of the total. Where the Chinese constituted the majority of

the merchant class in Malaya as they did elsewhere in South-Eastern Asia, the retail trade

depended entirely upon Chinese shops.17

The report tabled by Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Wilson, the Permanent Under-

Secretary of State for the Colonies on the occasion of his visit to Malaya in 1932, where

he interviewed scores of outstanding individuals including the author’s great granduncle,

Raja H.M. Yacob and community leaders, sums up the situation at hand in the third

decade of the twentieth century (1930s) by which time ‘the Chinese and Indians form the

major part of the population.’

He pointed out, however, that

…the number of the Chinese population which has been for a long time in the

country is relatively very small and the number of those who were born there and expect

to end their days there is smaller still. The...same is true of the Indian immigrant, so that

the number of non-Malays who have adopted Malaya as their home is only a very small

proportion of the whole population of the territory, and the increase that is taking place in

this number is hardly appreciable. That the people who come under this category form

only a small proportion of the total population must not, however, be allowed to affect

the way in which they are treated; and indeed, when I have explained in detailed the

cause of their anxiety, I think it will be agreed that the smaller their numbers the more

easy will it be to ensure that they receive fair play.

Those who have been born in Malaya themselves, or whose children have been

born there, call attention to the fact that they have acquired great interests in the land of

their adoption and have contributed in no small degree to its prosperous development.

They state that in a great many cases those concerned have never seen the land of their

origin and they claim that their children and their children's children should have fair

treatment.

That the anxiety of these communities has increased of late appears to be due to:-

(a) The cry of Malaya for the Malays which has recently been heard much more than in

previous years. [The same cry rings loud today than ever before causing anxiety amongst

the non-Malay communities.]

(b) The proposals expounded by the High Commissioner at Sri Menanti for transferring

considerable powers of the State Governments, and the fear that the reduction of the

powers of the Chief Secretary will expose them to discrimination, since they appear to

regard this officer as the protector against unfair treatment by the State Governments.

16

Helmut G. Callis, ‘Capital Investment in Southeaster Asia and the Philippines’, Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1. Vol. 226, Southeastern Asian and the Philippines, Annals,

(Mar., 1943), pp. 24-5. 17

Callis, 1943: 29.


6

(c) The fact that the progress of education amongst the Malays has resulted in more

appointments in the Government services being given to Malays than previously.

(d) The fact that the alienation of so much land in recent years for the development of the

rubber and other industries has led to a longer view being taken of the land needs of the

Malays: and a correspondingly greater use of the Government's powers under the Malay

Lands Reservation Enactment.

Because of the facts mentioned in (c) and (d) above, the non-Malays

communities are inclined to the view that the Government have adopted a new policy.

This is not so, since for some years past the Federated Malay States Government have

recognized the claims of the Malays to preferential treatment in the matter of the

appointments in the Public Service and to the reservation of suitable and sufficient land

for their needs. Indeed some of the non-Malay gentlemen whom I met went so far as

expressing the view that this was the opinion not unreasonable in the territories of the

Malay Rulers; but what they appear to object to is discrimination in principle and the

extension of the preferential treatment to immigrant Malays from the Dutch Archipelago

who are Dutch subjects. Some of them would, I think, willingly support a policy of fair

chance.18

The non-Malays who have made Malaya the country of their adoption, form a

loyal section of the community and it has been the policy of the Government to accord

full recognition to their status as British subjects (in the case of those born in the Colony)

and British protected persons (in the case of those born in the Malay States).

No one will deny the important part that the non-Malays who have made Malaya

their home have played in its development, and the share they are destined to take in

helping its future progress, and I think that for this reason alone they are entitled to an

assurance that their interests will not be allowed to suffer as the result of effect being

given to a policy of decentralization. Moreover, subject to the policy of preferential

employment of qualified Malays in the Government Service, and the reservation of

sufficient lands for Malay needs. I take the view that the persons born in the Malay States

of non-Malay parents (although only British protected persons) should be treated in those

States in exactly the same way as persons born in the Colony of non-Malay parents (who

are British subjects) and should have the same professional and business opportunities as

European British subjects.

I should record that some of the representatives of the non-Malay communities

whom I met raised questions in connexion with the educational facilities, representation

in the Councils and in other public bodies, the restriction of alien immigration and so on.

I had to explain that these were matters not directly relevant to the decentralization

18

Firstly the extension of preferential treatment is at best selective and tainted. In the eyes of the ‘Chinese’

and ‘Indians’ in particular the treatment appears to be equal, in part due to their inability to differentiate

between the immigants from the Duth East Indies whom they all cast as Malays and the native Malays.

Secondly the so-called ‘immigrant Malays from the Dutch Archipelago’, many of whom are not Malays at

all but represent the multitude of ethnic groups found in the archipelago which is beyond the

comprehension of the non-Malays and the British authorities. The Sumatrans in particular were regarded by

Perak Malays are ‘anak dagang’ or ‘orang dagang’ (foreigners or foreign traders) and are treated as such.

See William R. Roff (ed.), The Wandering Thoughts of A Dying Man, The Life and Times of Haji Abdul

Majid bin Zainuddin, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979: 79-80, 82-4. Indeed all the various

non-Peninsular peoples of the archipelago was compressed under one sub-heading of the Malaysian

category as ‘Indonesian’ in the 1957 census, taken on the eve of Merdeka (Independence). This practice

continued in 1970 and 1980. A considerable number of these Malaysian ‘Indonesians’ have assimilated into

the ‘Malay’ community through marriage and adoption of ‘Malay’ identity and as a result it became

increasingly difficult to measure a distinct Indonesian ethnic origin.


7

proposals, but that I would bring their representations to the notice of the Governor and

High Commissioner, which I subsequently did.19

The 1930s was a watershed in the social, economic and political developments of

Southeast Asia with ‘British Malaya’, the appendix of mainland Southeast Asia located at

the intersection between insular and maritime region of an emerging geo-political area of

importance and significance in the immediate post-war period.

The 1930s saw swift political developments in Malaya. The rallying cry then was

‘Malaya for the Malays’ and ‘Malaya not for the Malayans’. ‘Malays’ themselves

rejected outright the national status termed ‘Malayan’ as it was perceived as a

contradistinction to the word ‘Malay’.20

‘Malayan’ to the Malays referred only to non-

Malays who were regarded as aliens. In newspaper columns of Malay periodicals of the

time Malay readers were warned of the dangers of them losing their birth right to ‘the

greedy aliens’.

The Malay-Muslim elite, through the print media, became vocal over social,

economic and political issues affecting them and were politically mobilized by the

proposed decentralization of the Federated Malay States (F.M.S.) devolving powers back

to the respective states.21

Similarly, the Chinese and Indians were inspired by nationalist

development in their respective homelands and were becoming more conscious of the

need to improve their political and social positions in Malaya.

The main strand of early ‘Malay-Muslim’ political stirrings hardly constituted a

challenge to colonial rule. This comes as no surprise as the British colonial administration

followed a consciously ‘pro-Malay’ policy that far from posing a threat to the legitimacy

of the Malay rulers, British colonial rule reaffirmed and reinforced the traditional

political culture of the Malays which was the preserve of the ruling class.

The bureaucracy though overwhelmingly British, by the 1930s began to admit to

its middle and upper echelon a large number of ‘natives’ especially those from the

hereditary aristocratic elites.

Regionally by the 1930s, the Malay-Indonesian archipelago was being swept by

the fervour of anti-colonialism and ethno-nationalism. Ideas of national liberation and

independence inspired by the political philosophies of the Jose Rizal, Subhas Chandra

Bose, Ho Chi Minh, Sun Yat Sen, Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta came to influence the

nationalist and freedom movements in Southeast Asia in an effort to oust the colonial

19

Report of Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Wilson, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E., Permanent Under-Secretary

of State for the Colonies on his Visit To Malaya 1932, London: Printed and Published by His Majesty's

Stationery Office, 1933: 26-8 20

The term ‘Malayan’ to designate the national status was completely unacceptable to the ‘Malays’.

They felt that the term ‘Malayan’ had always been used in contradistinction to the word ‘Malay’ to

denote the non-indigenous inhabitants of the country, and that the Malays had therefore become

accustomed to regarding themselves as excluded from the category of ‘Malayans’. The use of the term

‘Malayan’ to designate the common national status would therefore involve abandonment by the

Malays, as the indigenous people of the country, of their proper title, and the acceptance by them of a

title which, in its accepted sense, included many who do not regard Malaya as their real home and as the

object of their loyalty. (The People’s Constitutional Proposals for Malaya 1947, drafted by PUTERA-

AMCJA, Kajang: Ban Ah Kam, 2005: 30). 21

For an summary of the issues involving decentralization, see Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y.

Andaya, A History of Malaysia, London: Macmillan, 2001 (1982): 247-252.


8

powers and reconstruct the political, economic, social and cultural landscapes of

Nusantara.

By the late 1930s many of the ‘Malay’ nationalists formed political parties to take

on British colonialism, but at the same time aimed at securing a special place in the

country for the Malays, itself a colonial construct of the colonial census, reflective of

British slanted policies. The communitarian-minded political parties closed the doors to

an open and inclusive politics.

Race Relations in Perak

At the height of imperialism and modern colonial-capitalism, knowledge of the colonised

subjects – the order of knowledge and power upon which the modern imperial age was

constructed – had become a modern instrument utilised in the social, economic and

political entitlement, empowerment and manipulation. The socio-cultural, economic,

political, religious, residential and educational divisions between the colonised subjects

were the product of colonialism which introduced its own rigid order of knowledge,

imperial epistemology and ordering of its citizens. In colonised states, the status and

identity of the colonised subjects were based their respective countries of origin, hence

‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’ distinguishing them and making a distinction between ‘local’ or

‘native’ subjects as oppose to ‘migrant’ subjects.

Colonial census effectively deepened the ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages

between the colonised subjects which rigidly categorised and compartmentalised the

various cultural and racial grouping into their appointed allotments contributing to the

hardening of divisions along ethnic lines. The doctrine of racial supremacy of the

Europeans and Westerners (the colonialists and occupiers) and irreconcilable racial

differences between the ‘Asiatics’ framed and located within a centralised yet

differentiated capitalist economy increased and intensified racial tension which became

confounded and problematic overtime. At the same time, it ensured that the boundaries of

race would be maintained and policed by the colonial masters and only they and they

alone would be the final arbiter that would keep the ‘peace’ between the diverse

groupings and managed the allocation of wealth and resources among them.

As Hirschman has pointed out, colonial rule and European racial theory had

‘constructed a social and economic order [in Malaya] structured by ‘race’’.22

In other

words, colonial race-relations was effectively based on the principle of divide and rule in

the socio-cultural, economic and political context.

Before World War II race relations in Perak was circumscribed by differing

economic, residential and educational conditions. Generally, Malay-Muslims were

peasants or fishermen, and lived in villages near rivers or the sea. The Chinese were

involved in mining and business; some lived in towns or in Chinese enclave, while the

majority of Indians worked and lived in the estates.

In rural areas, schoolchildren were also segregated. Malay-Muslim children went

to pondok (Islamic educational institutions) or Malay schools, whereas the Chinese and

Indians sent their children to their respective vernacular schools. Only in urban areas did

children of different ethnic origins attend common schools; these were English-medium

schools run by the government or missionaries.

22

Hirschman, 1986: 330.


9

The different modes of living, work and education precluded integration between

the various ethnicities as they lived mainly within their own ethnic cultural confinements.

As such, their awareness of each others development was minimal and this segregation

did not allow for integration between them. In spite of this, life was relatively peaceful

and free of conflict.

By the 1920s Malay-Muslim consciousness was already making a comparison of

their socio-economic status with that of the immigrant communities not only in terms of

access to the ‘modern’ sector of the economy, but also in terms of mobility through

educational opportunities. On top of that the Malay-Muslim indebtedness to Chinese

shopkeepers and Indian moneylenders exponentially grew during the depression putting

further strain on inter-ethnic relations.

Malay-Muslims began to associate Chinese economic success with the

opportunity structure of the colonial government contrived to serve European and British

capital interests, from which the Chinese benefited from their positions as middlemen

with opportunities and possibilities to positions of ownership and management. The

racially plural colonial economy segregated the economic sector according to imagined

differences in ethnic traits perceived or predetermined behavioural patterns measured in

terms of capabilities and weaknesses of the native ‘races’ in the prejudicial and racialised

categorisations of the colonised subjects – ‘Chinese’ are a nation of shopkeepers and

mining coolies, ‘Malays’ – the idealised peasantry and ‘Indians’, the conscripted

labouring workforce.

In 1931, for example, a total of 70,704 Chinese were employed in tin mines, of

whom 209 were managers and owners, compared to 4,622 Indians and only 543 Malay-

Muslims. Chinese mines exclusively hired Chinese workers, with very minor exceptions.

Malay-Muslims had problem of access to work in Chinese owned mines. Difficulties

encountered by Malay-Muslims in employment, job retention and promotion, had begun

to generate ethnic consciousness and ethnic animosity.

The Second Slump from 1928 to 1933 triggered by the World Depression was far

more severe and protracted than the first slump after the First World War. Towards the

end of the second slump, tin prices hit rock bottom in 1930-31. A drastic cut of Malaya’s

tin quota in September 1931 caused retrenchment. Without enough jobs to go around,

more than 50,000 male Chinese from the Federated Malay States (FMS) were repatriated

to China, 33,000 from Perak alone.

Mass unemployment among Chinese labourers became a looming social problem,

manifesting itself in a general increase in crime, including looting for rice.23

Wage rates

and earnings were significantly affected by the Depression. Wages were cut to

subsistence level in rubber estates and mines. As a result, large numbers of unemployed

labourers drifted to the town areas where many became hawkers and also turned to

garden farming.

Steps were taken to repatriate the unemployed and the FMS introduced legislation

aimed at restricting the arrival of Chinese immigrants. The Immigration Restriction

Enactment No. 24 of 1930, drastically reduced the number of Chinese entering the

FMS.24

23

Khoo and Lubis, 2005: 270. 24

Lee and Lee, 1978: 38-9.


10

The problem also began to be racialized. The [Perak] Malays had long felt

overwhelmed by the influx of foreigners, both Indian and Chinese. When many Malays

lost their lands during the slump of 1929-33, their feelings against the aliens [kaum asing]

were heightened. For the first time in history, the Malays felt ‘land poor’ while they

perceived the Europeans, Chettiars and the better-off Chinese as ‘land rich’. Malay

newspapers of the period stridently called for a stemming of the tide. The British

administration was reminded of its duty to protect the Malays. The government

responded with a ‘Malaya for Malays’ policy and introduced the Aliens Ordinance of

1933.25

A quota was set for the entry of Chinese males but it neglected to restrict the entry

of Chinese women and children. As the male population had already been adjusted by the

recent repatriation, the sex ratio which stood at somewhere around 5 females to 10 males

in 1931, rose to something like 10 females to 11 males in 1947. This resulted in a baby

boom and a demographic change which transformed the Chinese society in Perak, from

one consisting largely of sojourners into a growing colony of permanent settlers.26

The pro-Malay policy of the British government inevitably translated into a pro-

British attitude Malaya’s Malay-Muslim leadership, at the time led by the aristocracy,

and by extension a pro-British support from the Malay-Muslim masses. The pro-Malay

policy ignored the rights of the Chinese and Indians who were mainly regarded by the

British colonial government as ‘transient aliens’ little more than ‘birds of passage’

essential to furtherance of Western commercial and capitalist interest.27

At the same time, there was a distinct movement among the Malay-Muslims

which was anti-colonial, anti-Chinese and anti-aristocracy, and which attributed the

depressed socio-economic position of the Malay-Muslim masses to the ruling class of

British and Malay aristocracy. In Perak, this movement was in the main led by Malay-

Muslims of Sumatran descent who saw the salvation of the bumiputera (sons of the soil)

in closing ranks with Indonesia as a stratagem to rid itself of European and Chinese

dominance. Meanwhile the CPM was all for a ‘Malayan People’s Republic’ which

implied all the above except that it was suspected of being anti-Malay-Muslims instead of

being anti-Chinese.

Communist Party of Malaya

Tan Malaka’s dismal assessment of communism’s future in Malaya, in a coded message

dated November 25, 1925, intercepted by British Special Branch, said that the communist

agents’ work had not been successful among ‘Malays’ and ‘Indians’, and any success

could only come from the Chinese ‘whatever sort of movement it may be’.

On his recommendation, China Communist Party (CCP) agents were invited over

to Malaya to win over Chinese workers and to infiltrate Chinese schools and night

classes. In 1925 they succeeded in forming an ‘overseas branch of the CCP’, which later

became the Nanyang (South Seas) Communist Party under the leadership of Fu Ta

25



Similarly the ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’ are not homogeneous entities but are each made up of several

language/dialect groups, each with different religion, traditions, occupational preferences and geographical

concentrations within the state.


11

Ching.28

By virtue of the latter being an off-shoot of the mainland communist party, its

allegiance and loyalty was directed towards and focus on things ‘Chinese Communists’.

The Nanyang Communist Party was the forerunner of the Communist Party of

Malaya,29

which was established in 1930 by the Vietnamese Nguyen Ai Quoc (better

known as Ho Chi Minh), who had replaced Tan Malaka as the Comintern representative

in South-East Asia. Ho reportedly criticised the poor showing of CCP agents in Malaya,

especially their failure to make headway in recruiting ‘Malays’ and ‘Indians’, and urged

the CPM to resolve the racial question.30

Against the background of increased unemployment especially of the ethnic

Chinese in Perak, the CPM was inaugurated. Not a registered body, the CPM was forced

to work underground and was seen as a ‘subversive’ threat to and by the colonial state.

And as such was constantly harassed by the British police, which raided its meeting

places and printing presses and carried out arrests, detentions and banishments (of those

who were Chinese nationals) to clamped down on their activities.

The party established new cells in both urban and rural areas, but its support never

extended beyond Chinese workers and their trade unions into the ‘Malay’ and ‘Indian’

segment of the population, partly because communist literature were in the main issued in

the Chinese language targeting a largely Chinese reading public.

Although the CPM adopted a Malaya-centred orientation, its principal focus of

activity was concentrated among the Chinese students and labourers, mobilizing them

through a campaign of propaganda and organizational activism. The ratio of Chinese to

‘Malays’ in communist-front organisations was said to be 15:1 and as high as 50:1 in the

CPM itself.31

In this, the communist were forever cut off from the getting the support and

sympathies of more than half the population who preferred to work with the colonial

authorities especially when the CPM and its affiliated organisations began to show their

true colour.

By then, Chinese youth in Tanjong Tualang in the Kinta Valley were already

supporting the CPM.32

The same probably hold true for the rest of Perak. Inevitably

communism and being communists was identified and associated almost exclusively with

the Chinese, and the rejection of both on account of it being intrinsically foreign and

damaging to well-being, safety, security and the faith of Malay-Muslims.

The association of the communist party with the Chinese community is best

illustrated in the memoir by Halimi Ibrahim, a first generation Talu migrant from

Pasaman in Sumatra. He was born in Talu and was brought by his parents to Tronoh in

Kinta in the 1920s where they already have relatives living there.

In 1936, Halimi and his friend Sa’ad were on their way home from Tanjung

Tualang to Tronoh. As they approached Tanjung Tualang town around 4am, they heard

28

Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, A look at how communism took root in Malaya, Sunday

Star, November 29, 2009. 29

Communist literature prefers CPM to MCP, the latter is the preferred acronym of the academia. In other

words, communist literature give emphasise on the communist rather than the Malayan aspect of the party. 30

Cheah Boon Kheng, Sunday Star, November 29, 2009. 31


Halimi Ibrahim, Dari River Kwai ke Sungai Temboh, Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Aminuddin Baki dan

Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 2005: 38. The memoir was originally written in 1949 and published in 2005.

He is the father of Dr Haji Ahmad Jelani bin Halimi, a lecturer in Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) in

Penang.


12

in the distance the clanking of the bell from the Tanjung Tualang police station marking

the time. The streets were lighted by electricity supplied by Perak Hydro which also

provided electrification to the ‘white people’s (European) dredges’ throughout the Kinta

Valley.

As we were crossing the football field in the middle of the town, suddenly we

heard a challenge followed by the sound of something that was pulled out quickly –

probably a knife or a pistol.

“Whose there?” asked a voice in the darkness.

“I…” I answered.

“Whose you?” came the rejoinder.

“I am a Malay”.

“From where?” the voice came back.

“[I am] on my way home from fishing”

The voice was that of a detective (mata-mata gelap) of the Malay race who was

on duty to keep the peace in the town. He was on night duty. At the time the town of

Tanjung Tualang was a bit hot as there was already youth from the Chinese race fighting

the English which formed the government in Malaya. The youth supported the

communist in China which apparently had revolted against the government that ruled the

country, who was with one heart (sehari sejiwa) with the English. Because of that, I was

forced to say “I am a Malay”. The reason was purely to prevent the policeman from being

suspicious and arrest us.33

Had he declared that he was Chinese, it would have probably elicited a different

response from the sentry on duty. And the scenario would probably have ended

differently too. In the end, Halimi himself was murdered by the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-

Japanese Army (MPAJA), the militia and guerrilla wing of the CPM in Tronoh on 12

September 1950.

The CPM infiltrated trade unions such as shop assistants (include restaurant

workers, chefs and kitchen hands), barbers, brick-foundry labourers, tin mine, plantation

labourers and transportation workers to garner support for its cause. Members of CPM

infiltrated existing workers’ organisations and catalyzed the formation of new ones. By

the 1940s

This [CPM’s instigation] led to the increasing politicization of social discontent.

While in the earlier recessions, the down-and-outs resorted to spontaneous food riots and

petty criminal activity, now they were instigated into organised and sustained labour

demonstrations. … [This period also] saw the beginning of organised labour

demonstrations by the Tin Mining Workers’ Union.34

Industrial unrest caused by unemployment, low wages, employers’ intransigence

and trade union militancy in which communists were involved marked the post-war

destablisation. The disparity between rich and poor, the large numbers of disenfranchised

migrants, the cycles of booms and bust – all these circumstances in the tin-mining centres

of Perak generated ideal conditions for industrial conflict instigated by the communists.

33

Halimi Ibrahim, 2005: 37-8. 34

Khoo and Lubis, 2005: 271.


13

However, it was the Japanese Occupation that created the conditions for inter-ethnic

conflict.

The Japanese Occupation

Japan occupied Malaya militarily from December 1941 to August 1945. This period,

known in history as the Japanese Occupation, was the period that spawned ethnic

tensions in the country. In the words of G. L. Peet,

…the Japanese sword severed the ties with the past, and the tranquil, complacent

and politically backward Malaya that we have seen in this retrospect vanished for ever.

After the liberation it soon became evident that the Japanese occupation of

Malaya had ended one era in the history of the country and opened another. A crop of

new political movements, parties and groups appeared all over the country.35

The intense anti-Japanese resistance mounted by the Overseas Chinese had

already begun in 1937, in response to the Japanese invasion of China. The aggression and

cruelty of the Japanese occupiers towards the Chinese in Malaya is well documented. Just

after the fall of Singapore, thousands of ‘hostile Chinese’ were massacred in a bloodbath

called sook ching (meaning purification by elimination). With the exception of a minority

of ‘collaborators’, most of the Chinese population were bitterly opposed to the

Japanese.36

Many Chinese fled to the jungles to escape persecution, and turned to farming

and husbandry to support themselves.

At the outbreak of war, the British made a pact with the CPM, whom they had

previously suppressed. Members of the CPM were trained in the British Special Training

School and armed by the British. They worked closely with the British to stage guerrilla

resistance to Japanese rule, until such a time when the British were ready to return.

The Chinese communists led the formation of the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army

(MPAJA) and supplied it with arms, training, financial aid, logistical and medical

support. The majority of Chinese who were already supporting CPM by supplying them

with food, money, information and recruits, also backed the communist-led MPAJA, as it

provided them political leadership and military protection against the Japanese. The

British who were already in league with the CPM gave tacit approval and supported the

MPAJA as the most substantive anti-Japanese resistance. The guerrillas were fed and

sustained by the Chinese living and growing their own food in the jungles.

The CPM not only fought the Japanese but also targeted Japanese ‘collaborators’.

It is estimated that the MPAJA had murdered 2,545 Chinese, Malay-Muslims, Indian and

others considered to be Japanese ‘collaborators’.37

The MPAJA’s infamous military arm

was the Fifth Independent Regiment established in Perak in 1942, carved out from a

‘traitor killing’ unit.38

In contrast to general hostility to the Chinese, the Japanese attempted to cultivate

a good relationship with the ‘natives’, in this case the Malay-Muslims. Soon after the

Japanese occupied the country, they issued statements to the effect that those who were

35

Peet, 1949: 6, 12. 36

Cheah Boon Kheng 2003 (1983, 1987): 21-3. 37

J. J. Raj, Jr., 2000: 57 38

Cheah Boon Kheng, 2003 (1983, 1987): 60-1, 63-4


14

government servants were required to go back to work. The majority of the workforce,

many of whom were Malay-Muslims, did precisely that.39

Many of the pre-war Malay-

Muslim bureaucrats who had served in the colonial government were reinstated and given

official positions in the lower ranks of the Japanese war or civil administrations. By and

large the Malay-Muslims of the time did not have much political awareness, and it did

not really matter to them who was in power, whether it was the British or the Japanese,

and by working for the Japanese, they were just continuing with the status quo.

The Malaya Military Administration (MMA) mobilized Malay-Muslim village

youths for service in the volunteer forces, while recruits for the police tended to be both

Malay-Muslim and Indians. Although in principle, ethnicity was not supposed to be a

criterion in recruitment, the large majority of the recruits were Malay-Muslims.

Aimed at garnering support from a segment of the Malayan population, the

Japanese recruited many Malay-Muslims into the Kempeitai (military police), Heiho

(auxillary forces), Jikeidan (peacekeepers), Giyugun (volunteer army) and Toko (special

branch). In Perak, the Heiho were attached to the Japanese forces to assist in labour

service and were not required to bear arms. Most Heiho were assigned to the transport

unit of the army, or as guides in Japanese raids on guerrilla hideouts. The popularity of

the Heiho eventually led to the formation of a Malay Women’s Auxiliary Corps in late

1944.40

As the MMA was harassed by the anti-Japanese resistance movement – the police

force was rapidly expanded and paramilitary organizations such as the giyugun and the

giyutai were established to strengthen internal security and local defence. The giyugun

recruits were given centralized military training, uniforms and barrack accommodation

while the giyutai they were organised and trained in the villages or towns.

District Officers (D.O.) were instructed to recruit locals to join the giyutai, and

each D.O. was given a quota of eight persons at any one time. Abdul Aziz, (later Tan Sri

Datuk), a Malay-Muslim of Mandailing descent, was one of those who was forced to join

and had to undergo 10 weeks of training, but fortunately for him, he was later released.

‘Quite a number of people joined and quite a number just disappeared, including one of

my relatives.’41

This policy of securing Malay-Muslim cooperation by employing and

empowering them in the various administrative and military services pitted them against

the Chinese who were involved in the underground resistance against Japanese

Occupation. In short, Malay-Muslim visibility in local government positions under

Japanese rule invited accusations of collaboration from the underground Chinese

resistance. Consequently, the Chinese hatred for the Japanese was also assigned to their

employees – the Malay-Muslims deemed ‘collaborators’ or Japanese stooges by the

Chinese. From the Malay-Muslims perspective joining the Japanese administration was

seen as a form of self-preservation.42

The MMA policy of mobilizing the Malay-Muslims in order to consolidate its

position had the effect of stimulating Malay political awareness. During the initial stage,

39

Abdul Aziz bin Zakaria, 1989: 13 40

Cheah Boon Kheng, 2003 (1983, 1987): 34. 41

Abdul Aziz bin Zakaria, 1989: 17. The Mandailings entered themselves as Malays in the census after the

category ‘Mandeling’ was dropped from the 1931 census. 42

From Pacific War to Merdeka, 2005: 64 (Interview with Abu Samah)


15

Malay-Muslims who were known to be anti-British and sympathetic to the Indonesian

nationalist cause, the so-called ‘Malay Left’ were used in propaganda work and as

political agents and advisers to the Japanese. However, the ‘Malay Left’ soon became

disillusioned with the Japanese. When Japan suffered from war reverses in 1943, the

MMA banned the political parties of the ‘Malay Left’ perceived as beginning to pose a

political threat to Japanese authority. The pro-Indonesian Malay-Muslim nationalists had

negotiated terms with the Japanese, and right up to the very moment of Emperor

Hirohito’s 16 August 1945 broadcast, the Japanese authorities were promising

independence for the Malays.

While the ‘Malay Left’ had a clear anti-colonial ideology and was working to

promote joint Indonesian-Malayan independence, most of the Malay-Muslim youth at the

time were absorbed by the junsa, heho, guitas and giugun, that is, secret police or

volunteers of the MMA. The recruitment of Malay-Muslims into the Japanese auxiliary

forces resulted in the loss of nearly all its Malay-Muslims members in the Chinese

communist led resistance against the Japanese fascists.43

In the view of Abdul Majid Salleh, this diversion of human resources aslo

thwarted the ‘Malay Left’s struggle to achieve joint Indonesian-Malayan independence.44

At the time the Japanese was ruling Malaya, Malay youth scrambled around

asking for work as junsa (spies) or kempeitai (secret police). What puzzled me most is

that the Malay youth were too quick to change their attitude. When they were accepted to

work as junsa, ‘like turmeric and chalk’, after a few days they have already changed their

attitude. Supposing before that he was our friend eating and drinking together or sleeping

on the same pillow for example, but when he has got the position, he will if possible

arrest and slap his friend even if he is innocent. By that time they will show their fierce

faces when looking at us, purposely showing that they have power and can cause trouble

to the people.

They will do as they please. For example, if they want something, they will

simply take it without asking the owner. To the extent that a new term was coined to

explain the actual behaviour. The term was ‘cho hap’, when a thing was labelled ‘cho

hap’ thing, it meant if you want it just take it.

People got angry, especially the Chinese, because most of the things taken away

belonged to the Chinese, but the Malays were also indignant as such behaviour showed

how low the Malays can stoop. When we say ‘they’, we mean ourselves, because they are

Malays and we are also Malays, but we do not carry on like them.

They did not want to think about tomorrow, the next day or the following year,

what more ten year ahead. Most of them could only see what was in front of them and no

further than that.45

Such behaviour amongst the Malay-Muslim secret police and informants would

have caused the Chinese to hold a grudge against the Malay-Muslims for confiscating

Chinese properties as well as siding with the Japanese.

In this climate of fear and suspicion, ethnic conflagration between the two major

ethnic/religious groups in Perak was inevitable. The ethnic dimension of the conflict

43

Cheah Boon Kheng, ‘Some aspects of the interregnum in Malaya’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,

Vol. 8, No. 1, 1977: 70. 44

Memoir Abdul Majid Salleh, 2004: 23-4. 45

Memoir Abdul Majid Salleh, 2004: 91.


16

assumed a religious dimension in the Malay-Muslim response. Malay-Muslim

collaboration with the MMA had generally made them objects of distrust and resentment

by the Chinese dominated resistance, and political developments put the majority of

Malay-Muslims and Chinese on opposing sides.

Thus, when the Malay-Muslim youth who had been trained in the Giyu Gun and

the Giyu Tai began organizing themselves against the MPAJA, they were opposed by the

Chinese. In such a scenario, an attack on the MPAJA by Malay-Muslims was perceived

as an attack on the ethnic Chinese. Likewise, retaliatory attacks by MPAJA on Malay-

Muslim villages were perceived by the latter as attacks by Chinese on Malay-Muslims.46

The historian Cheah Boon Kheng, who has extensively studied the social and

political conflict of the period, concluded that there is little evidence to show that the

Japanese deliberately promoted ethnic animosity between the Malay-Muslims and

Chinese as a matter of policy. ‘It was the overall social tensions which their policies

created, and the local interpretations of these policies by Malay and Chinese

communities, which led to bitter interracial conflicts.’47

Interregnum: Chinese Vendettas against Malay-Muslims In reconstructing the interregnum and the Malayan Emergency in Perak, we have relied

heavily on leftist and communist literature made available through memoirs, some

published by a leading local university press but in the main published by a pro-leftist

publisher based in Kuala Lumpur from 2000 onwards, state secretariat files and academic

exercises. The exception being the Sungai Manik incident; this is based on a written

account originally in the Banjarese language and translated into Malay, also by a

Banjarese.

From the point of Japanese invasion in 1941, their occupation and departure in

1945, violence and militarism was the norm in Malaya. The occupation polarised the

population into patterns of resistance and accommodation along ethnic lines which

erupted into clashes between the Malay-Muslims and the Chinese towards the end of the

Japanese annexation.

The Japanese surrendered on 15 August 1945 leaving a political and military

vacuum which lasted until the arrival of British troops to re-occupy Malaya. The CPM

and the MPAJA manipulated and took advantage of this indeterminate state. As the

MPAJA was the only credible fighting force against Japanese imperialism in Malaya, it

portrayed its arms struggle against the Japanese invaders as a national liberation, and

claimed credit for the ‘victory’ over Japanese forces at the end of the war. The fight

between the MPAJA and the Japanese was essentially a war between the Chinese and

Japanese, the former backed by the British and latter backed by Malay-Muslims and

Indians. At the end of the occupation, the MPAJA had 10,000 fighting men and women

divided into eight regiments. The CPM had 8,000 members compared to only 1,000

before the war.48

46

Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrila Warfare, The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Singapore:

Oxford University Press, (1989) 1993: 44-5; Cheah Boon Kheng, 1983: 195-240. 47

Cheah Boon Kheng, 2003: 41. 48

Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 66. Purcell gave the figures at between 6,000 and 7,000. (Victor Purcell,

The Chinese in Malaya, London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1948: 262).


17

During the two weeks interregnum the CPM and MPAJA emerged from the

jungle and occupied towns such as Ipoh, Taiping, Tronoh, Kampar, Pusing, Bidor and

countryside areas such Lenggong and Kroh, giving the impression that the communist

regime was in full control. Indeed it was CPM’s policy to ‘seize as much territory as

possible. …to capture as many small townships as we could.’ It envisaged taking over

banks, post offices, railway stations and police stations in small townships. However, the

CPM reckoned that it could not hope to hold population centres like Ipoh, Penang, Kuala

Lumpur or Singapore.49

Posing as a people’s liberation army, the communists initially were well received

by gullible people, set up ‘People’s Committee’ and restored some semblance of law and

order, but that display did not last long before they showed their true colours where

vengeful and unruly elements became dominant. By the CPM’s own estimation, they

controlled two-thirds of the peninsula and one-third of the population.

Practically all the big and small towns and villages throughout the country were in

MCP’s hands and the Anti-Japanese army except for the larger cities of Singapore,

Penang and Malacca. This is the biggest victory of all races in Malaya and the world!50

One Perak source says that about 70 per cent of the small towns and villages

throughout the peninsula fell into guerrilla hands; in other words, the MPAJA appeared to

be in control of Malaya.51

The MPAJA at the behest of the MCP carried out acts of reprisals and vendettas

against those they accused of committing criminality towards the people and against

Japanese ‘collaborators’. They orchestrated ‘people’s trial’ or ‘people’s court’ to justify

killing many Malay-Muslims, Chinese and Indians, and putting the populace at large

under a reign of terror. Some of the culling committed has been described as both

inhuman (beastly) and brutal murders. CPM’s acts of violence largely singling out the

‘Malays’ inevitably undermined inter-ethnic trust and undo the relative communal

harmony and peace prior to the arrival of the men in red stars. Although ‘collaborators’ of

all ethnic groups were targeted – in the main Malay-Muslims individuals and public

officials, and Sikh policemen – suffered the brunt of the violence and hatred.52

The

perception that the MPAJA sided with the Chinese further convinced the Malay-Muslims

that communism was a Chinese creed. Chinese dominance of the MPAJA would have

serious consequences for the CPM during the Malayan Emergency.

Former Inspector-General of Police (IGP) Tun Mohammed Haniff Omar, who

hails from Teluk Intan, Perak and whose uncle was murdered by the communists traced

the country’s interracial tension especially between the ‘Malays’ and ‘Chinese’ to the

MPAJA and Guomindang’s ‘cruel rule’ during the pre-independence period.

Ideologically it was communist and leftist, and ethnically Chinese rule. Haniff said that

hostility between the communities did not exist before then and only came to the fore

during a brief spell in 1945 when the MPAJA commanded by the CPM declared itself to

be in control. Both the MPAJA/CPM and Guomindang were the only ‘organised force’ in

the country then.

49

Alias Chin Peng, 2003: 112. 50

Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 67. 51

Chin Kee Onn, 1946: 202. 52

Cheah Boon Kheng, 2003: 178-79.


18

Pertempuran (clashes) between races never happened from zaman ke zaman (era

to era) until the Chinese ruled cruelly part of the Malaya peninsular through the Malayan

Communist Party (CPM) and Kuomintang in August, September 1945. Since then,

Peninsular (Malaysia) has racial problems. 53

Haniff said the MPAJA imposed a curfew on ‘Malay males’ and killed those who

breached the curfew – an imposition privileging the ‘Malays’ only, for which they took

exception to and became ‘really aroused’ and attacked the Chinese, which in turn brought

‘great fear’ to the Chinese of attacks from the Malays. ‘There was complete

pandemonium’ oligating the British to bring the leaders of the two communities together

to keep the peace.54

In the case of Papan, 16km south of Ipoh, Ho Thean Fook, an MPAJA guerilla

who returned to his hometown at the end of the war, wrote in his memoir,

Almost every night we could hear screams of agony from the unfortunate people,

the ‘spies’, ‘collaborators’ and the enemy ‘running dogs’ who had been caught in Ipoh,

Batu Gajah and other places and brought to Papan. They were tied to the electricity pole

in front of the market, where they were tortured before being put to death. These blighters

were more ruthless than the Japanese and wrought atrocities of the worst kind. Practically

all the victims were innocent people who were reported by people seeking revenge. A

few of the men and women killed were known to us and were former residents of

Papan.55

The victims in Papan were most likely Chinese. In Selama, Upper Perak, the so-

called people’s courts were held under trees. The condemned were shot point blank, and

their bodies dumped into the river. Old timers still remember that during the reign of the

MPAJA the river was awash with gunny sacks of corpses. Whosoever was arrested by the

MPAJA may never be seen by their families again. One of those abducted by the

communist militia at Tronoh was my great-granduncle (not Raja H. M. Yacob) who

disappeared altogether and was never ever seen again.

Interethnic Clashes during the Interregnum

Many of the local disturbances broke out when the Japanese withdrew their detachments

from the outlying towns and districts on 22 or 23 August 1945, and the anti-Japanese

resistance guerrillas began to take over their positions. The Japanese response to local

disturbances was to enhance their own self-preservation and maintain whatever

semblance of law and order they could until the arrival of Allied forces.56

Boestamam, a leading Malay-Muslim leader of Minangkabau descent, who was in

Ipoh when the CPM and MPAJA wrested control of the capital of Perak after the

53

http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/ex-igp-malay-chinese-friction-sparked-during-anti-

japanese-armys-rule The press reporting the talk titled “Cabaran Keselamatan Awam Masa Kini” (Today’s

Public Security Challenges) by the former IGP seems to doubt him ignorant of the real issues afflicting the

nation then. 54

http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/ex-igp-malay-chinese-friction-sparked-during-anti-

japanese-armys-rule 55

Ho Thean Fook, 2000: 241. 56

Cheah Boon Kheng, 2003: 132-3, 148.

http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/ex-igp-malay-chinese-friction-sparked-during-anti-japanese-armys-rule

http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/ex-igp-malay-chinese-friction-sparked-during-anti-japanese-armys-rule


19

Japanese surrender, observed how power in the hands of the ‘Bintang Tiga’ as the

MPAJA was called by Malay-speakers, led to euphoria and overwhelming bravado.

The situation emerged where those in power saw themselves as ‘Sultan in their

eyes and king in their hearts’. This lasted for about two weeks. During that time, the law

of “whosoever is mighty is king” and “the weak is food for the strong” was in place

everywhere – in the towns and in the villages. Bitter vengefulness was released. Old

wounds, even those arising from private animosity, were gauged until they bled again.57

The MPAJA episode is known among the Malay speaking people as the ‘Bintang

Tiga’ (three stars) episode associated with Chinese and communist rule. The three stars

on their caps were purportedly to represent the Malays, Chinese and Indians. However, in

the eyes of many Malay-Muslims who lived through this era, the Bintang Tiga was

Chinese, notwithstanding a few non-Chinese members.

In Taiping, a committee headed by the District Officer, Raja Haji Ahmad,

representing the Malay community was summoned to a meeting with the MPAJA.

…the leader of the Three Stars addressed the gathering and stated that the three

nationalities [sic] were brothers, namely, the Chinese, Indians and Malays. But it was

obvious that the big brother was the Chinese. The committee members were given cards

to identify them as committee members and their job was to ensure that the Malay

population in the town did not oppose the Three Stars and Malays who were arrested

were to be guaranteed by the committee to be of good behaviour. The guarantee meant

quite a lot to the committee because it involved life and death.58

The Bintang Tiga’s reign of terror could be seen as part of the international

agenda of the Chinese communists to seize power in Malaya through violent revolution.

Even though most Malay-Muslims may not have been aware of an international agenda,

on the ground they witnessed the Bintang Tiga taking advantage of the power vacuum to

exact revenge and victimize the Malay-Muslim community. These vendettas and

retribution were perceived by the Malay-Muslims as a show of supremacy and hegemony

by Chinese communists over Malay-Muslims. Mustapha Hussein gave an eye-witness

account.

In Batu Kurau, Upper Perak where the radical Malay-Muslim nationalists

Mustapha Hussain was in hiding during the duration of the occupation, the news about

the Japanese surrender was already known to the Chinese community there who had been

monitoring developments through a ‘jungle radio’ (radio hutan). With the knowledge that

Japanese currency was of no longer of any value, Chinese took advantage of the situation

by offering high prices for buffaloes and goats knowing all too well that they were

cheating the Malay-Muslim villagers. ‘They [the Malay-Muslim villagers] almost lost all

properties and poultry because they did not have the latest information.’59

This was only

the beginning of strained ethnic relations between Malay-Muslims and the Chinese there.

57

Datok Ahmad Boestamam, 1979: 9. 58

Abdul Aziz, 1989: 27. 59

Insun Sony, 1999: 387.


20

I heard that the Ijok policemen, 10 miles from our village, has been arrested and

taken to Sungai Bayur to be killed. They were struck with a cangkul staff. This was also

the fate of a few others in other places. This situation has spread to Batu Kurau where a

Chinese banana seller became so daring as to get on top of the table to give a speech. A

young Chinese buffalo herder in the nearby area said, “All Malays must have their hair

shaved!”

Kidnapping and killing is happening everywhere and villagers appear to be very

afraid and nervous.60

A meeting was called to prepare the defence of Batu Kurau. Mustapha Hussain

suggested that since there were many ex-army personnel and volunteers in Batu Kurau,

section of eight were formed.

We have a lot of weapons, each house has machetes, axes, saw and sharp knifes.

If they come in a lorry, we chop down a tree to block the road, attack, do not fear,

machetes never miss, a bullet pistol always misses! So was established a village

protection body amongst the Malays of Batu Kurau to defend their village and their life.

As villagers were also afraid that they might be ambushed when they are performing their

prayers, I suggested that they take turns to do it, do not all pray at the same time without

somebody taking care of the mosque security.61

Meanwhile Mustapha was informed that he would be kidnapped and killed, and it

was rumoured that he had already been eliminated by the MPAJA. His elder brother by

the name of Alli, a forestry assistant was indeed kidnapped and killed by the MPAJA at

Tanjung Tualang, Tronoh in July 1944.62

Throughout Perak, groups of vigilante Muslim villagers armed with ‘long swords’

formed militias known as ‘parang panjang’. In Sungai Manik, Batu Kikir, Bekor and

Lenggong in Perak, Malay-Muslims attacked Chinese in retaliation for the MPAJA’s

troops entering their village taking away their poultry and vegetables. The MPAJA forces

were armed with shotguns. Towards the end of 1945, ethnic clashes erupted in Tanjung

Tualang, south of Ipoh, where six Chinese were attacked by Malay-Muslims. Indian and

British troops arrested them together with 76 Chinese and charged them for being

members of the Chinese Self-Defence Corps. In Bukit Gantang, in the district of Kuala

Kangsar, north of Ipoh, it was reported that two Chinese died and two Chinese houses

were burnt by Malay-Muslims. Ethnic clashes spread throughout Perak and Malaya, but

Ipoh was somehow spared.

Some Malay-Muslims became victims of the treacherous murders by the MPAJA

because of mistaken identity and over petty matters such as differences of opinions and

petty theft. The way the Malay-Muslims saw it the trifling matters were rekindled

(ungkit-ungkit) by Chinese as an excuse to intimidate and punish them. A Malay-Muslim

informant described the MPAJA period as ‘nothing more than seeking revenge and being

anti-Malay.’63

60

Insun Sony, 1999: 388. 61

Insun Sony, 1999: 388 62

Insun Sony Mustapha, 1999: 9, 389.

63 Miskin bin Raboo, 1982/83: 15. Interview with Ahmad Talib b. Mohd. Saman.


21

There is little doubt that the inter-communal clashes in the long run caused many

Malay-Muslims to reject the communist ideology and from becoming members of the

CPM as they associated communism with Chinese-ness and Chinese chauvinism.

Many ‘Japanese collaborators’ had left town to avoid capture and execution by

the guerrillas.64

A Perak civil servant recollected that towards the end of the occupation

when the Japanese were no longer in control of the rural areas, the communists, the

Guomindang and Force 136 held sway and ‘…one had to be a member of one of these in

order to survive.’65

It is said that many Malay-Muslims of Sumatran descent in the Kinta

district joined the ranks of the CPM and the MPAJA either as members or sympathizers

so as to avoid being prosecuted by the communists.66

In the event, the CPM and MPAJA indeed carried out summary executions of

Malay-Muslim policemen, village headmen and alleged Malay-Muslim ‘collaborators’.

The tit for tat actions of the CPM and MPAJA reached its climax when the reprisals

extended to the Malay-Muslim villages. Inter-communal violence between the Malay-

Muslims and Chinese-Communists flared up with rural Malay-Muslims retaliating by

running amuk against the rural Chinese. The numerical preponderance of Malay-Muslims

among the MPAJA’s victims, the mutilation of victim’s bodies, Chinese distrust of

Malay-Muslims who joined the resistance all coalesce to an interclass alliance of Malay-

Muslims against the Chinese.67

Racial Riots in Central and Lower Perak

During the occupation, both the Japanese and the communists had imposed demands on

the villagers of mukim (parish) of Layang-Layang Kanan and Belanja, both in Lower

Perak; the former came during the daytime and latter after dark. Japanese excesses in the

mukim of Layang-Layang drove the villagers, some of whom were local-born, to the

communists. However, they found that in the later part of 1943 the communists posed a

greater danger than the Japanese.

For the nearby village of Changkat Banjar of Banjarese migrants from

Kalimantan (Borneo), a lot of dissatisfaction and resentment was caused by MPAJA

actions, for example, confiscating the villagers’ padi as well as other forms of exactions

arbitrarily levied especially by its Malay-Muslim members.68

In Lambor, the [Malay-Muslim] people there were preparing to have a fight with

the Chinese. They asked me to join them. I rejected with the excuse that there was no

preparation. As the situation was already very tense, I could not advise them anymore. In

the end a fight happened. In the clash both sides suffered death and [many were]

wounded.69

As a result,

64


Abdul Aziz, 1989: 21. 66

Interview with Ayub Dahlan, a former British intelligence officer, from Chemor, Kinta district, Perak. 67

Cheah Boon Kheng, ‘The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupatin of Malaya (1942-1945) in Alfred W.

McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian

Studies, 1980: 91. 68

Abu Talib Ahmad, 2003: 44. 69

Abdullah CD, 1998: 29-31.


22

In Lambor, my friend Seman was killed by the parang panjang party while

taking a bath. In Layang-Layang a CPM member was hunted by the parang panjang

party. But fortunately he managed to escape into the jungle. …In Bota, a CPM member

was detained but released on certain conditions. …[In Kampung Gajah] the Chinese there

also fled for fear of being hunted by the parang panjang party.70

The killing of Chinese villagers also took place in Parit in Lower Perak, 3 miles

from Lambor, but no details are available.71

It is said that many Chinese villagers were killed and their houses razed to the

ground. Those who escaped the bloodbath fled to Telok Anson and Bidor. It was

concluded that since the Malay-Muslims formed the majority in the Sungai Manik,

Tukang Sidin and neighbouring areas, the Malay-Muslims had the upper hand in the

inter-communal clash.72

The Sungai Manik-Batu Pahat Connection

Toward the end of the occupation, Malay-Muslim paddy growers in Lower Perak

especially Sungai Manik, Chikus, Tukang Sidin, Permatang, Sungai Kerawai and the

surrounding areas were harassed by the communists. They exacted taxes, rice and other

forms of exactions from the farmers. The final straw came when the MPAJA asked them

to provide them with Malay-Muslim ‘comfort women’, which they found offensive. They

decided that they would no longer bow down to the whims of the communists. When the

communists came to exact their demands they were opposed by villagers with long

swords or parang pajang. Many of these villagers were practitioners of religious sciences

(ajaran ilmu agama).73

When the MPAJA attempted to establish power in Sungai Manik and

neighbouring mukims, the Malay-Muslims resisted and clashes ensued between them and

the local Chinese settlers. Fighting raged until the arrival of British troops in September.

So forceful was the Malay-Muslim counter-attack that the Sungai Manik basin was

cleared of both the MPAJA and all local Chinese, who were forced to seek refuge in

Teluk Anson, the predominantly Chinese capital of Lower Perak, which became an

MPAJA stronghold.

According to Cheah Boon Kheng, in his study of social conflict during and after

the Japanese Occupation, the Sungai Manik incidents were linked to similar clashes in

Batu Pahat, Johore, to the south of peninsula Malaya. In both instances the non-Chinese

elements have been identified as ethnic Banjarese originating from Kalimantan in

Indonesia today. It appears that the Sungai Manik and the Batu Pahat Banjarese are

related to each other.

…When the racial trouble in Batu Pahat raged between May and August, the

news quickly reached Banjarese brethren in Sungai Manik, who themselves were

experiencing similar problems with the Chinese in the MPAJU/MPAJA. The MPAJU’s

70

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 103. 71


Miskin bin Raboo, 1982/83: 22. 73

Miskin bin Raboo, 1982/83: 13. This sequence of events was piece together from interviews with Abdul

bin Tuah and Prof. Datuk Zainal Abidin Wahid who hails from the Teluk Anson area. Zainal Abdin though

of Mandailing origin is perceived as a Malay nationalist.


23

attemps to recruit young Malay men and women in Sungai Manik to work in nearby

MPAJA camps had been rebuffed. When the MPAJU suggested to the Banjarese

headmen that they should change their Friday prayers to Sunday (as was suggested also

by the MPAJU in Mukim VII of Batu Pahat), this was deemed an unpardonable insult

and a sacrilege to the Islamic religion. Spurned by the Banjarese, the MPAJU stepped up

their harassment by making demands for cash contributions and murders of recalcitrant

Malays filtered through the Banjarese population. It soon became necessary for the

Banjarese to organize themselves for self-defence. Several tok guru emerged who were

prepared to teach the silat and the ilmu kebal.74

He concluded:

The organization and pattern of Malay attacks in Sungai Manik was very similar

to those in the Batu Pahat and Muar areas of Johore. It has all the characteristics of the

Sabilillah movement, although the initiative, planning, and organization were not

coordinated with those in Johore. Stories of the MPAJU/MPAJA takeover in Batu Pahat

in the interim period brought by Banjarese relatives did, however, fan the flames of

violence. The BMA succeeded temporarily in controlling the trouble, but soon it erupted

again.75

In the Sungai Manik incident, Abdullah C. D. (his full name is Che Dat Anjang

Abdullah), who later became chairman of the MCP, gave his own version of the event,

claiming that the instigators of the Sungei Manik incident were not MPAJA but

Guomindang bandits.

In Perak the situation was critical. Groups of armed robbers [meaning the

Guomindang] carried out all kinds of evil [acts] on the common people by masquerading

as the MPAJA. As a result the public, especially the Malays, were confused with the

situation. In Sungai Manik, Teluk Anson, Japanese fascists used this opportunity to

defame and blacken the MPAJA as well as stoking racial sentiments by backing parang

panjang teams [literally, the ‘long swords’], and providing arms and others [things].

Malays who were confused with the murky [situation] rose to organize themselves into

parang panjang teams and attacked the Chinese. Consequently, bloodshed took place

with vehemence.76

Abdullah claimed that the Japanese incited the Malay-Muslims to form parang

panjang groups and carry out the culling of the Chinese.

The Japanese fascists provided seven rifles and ten grenades as well as provided

some training to the [Malay] people’s militia that surrendered. However, the weapons

provided by the Japanese fascist were not used, probably because they strongly believed

that they were invincible or were just not competent in using the weapons. They incited

Malays and established the parang panjang groups. They attacked the Chinese, killing

whoever regardless whether [the victims were] children, elderly, women and such.

74



Abdullah CD, 1998: 29.


24

The Chinese who found out about it quickly fled to Langkap and asked for

assistance from an MPAJA company (stationed) there. To avoid worse bloodshed, the

MPAJA unit immediately went to Sungai Manik.77

Switching to a second person account based on an interview with the commander

of the MPAJA’s company that went to the rescue of the fleeing Chinese, Abdullah wrote

that the company encountered the parang panjang group and although they made

attempts to pacify them, they were unsuccessful and a clash ensued resulting in a number

of death of members of the parang panjang group; the rest fled leaving thousands of

swords behind.

The MPAJA’s company then entered the Sungai Manik area and gathered the

people around and debriefed them, after which the people understood that the

troublemakers were robbers (euphemism for Guomindang) and that the Japanese fascists

with the assistance of captured MPAJA operatives had incited the populace to become

confused (terkeliru).78

From Abdullah’s account, we can safely conclude that the MPAJA’s company

consisted of Chinese troops whilst the parang panjang group were Malay-Muslims. This

was clearly an ethnic clash, and being a propagandist for the communist cause, he

diverted the blame on the Guomindang, the British and Japanese fascists.

In the same memoir, he mentioned that a Chinese man, who was a member of a

gang of renegade robbers (Guomindang), was directly responsible for causing the rage of

the Malay-Muslims of Sungai Manik, who subsequently took revenge on the Chinese and

MPAJA. The suspect was caught by the people’s militia and brought to Tronoh to face

the people’s court and was lynched to death by the mob before justice could be delivered

by the MPAJA’s court.79

According to Abdullah, following the incident, the Propaganda Department

(Pasukan Propaganda) including Abdullah himself and other anti-Japanese ‘masses

organisation’ in the area carried out a mass campaign to undo the damaged done in

Sungai Manik. They shifted blame onto the British and Japanese fascists as the real

enemy of the people, stressing the importance of unity among the three ethnic groups to

achieve independence. ‘Through repeated campaigns the public realized that the Japanese

fascist was behind the incident,’ adding that ethnic relations in Sungai Manik returned to

normalcy whilst ethnic clashes erupted in other parts of Perak such as Parit and Bekor.80

Though Abdullah credited the work of the CPM Propaganda wing and the anti-Japanese

‘masses organizations’ for the return to normalcy in Sungai Manik, it was probably the

armed presence of the MPAJA’s company there that kept ethnic relations under control.81

The Teluk Anson Negotiations

On the eve of the surrender, the Japanese commandant at Teluk Anson instructed the

policemen, many of whom were Malay-Muslims to surrender their arms to the District

Police Headquarters. As soon as they stepped out of the compound, an unidentified

77



Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 69-70. 80


Communist literature used the term race instead of ethnicity.


25

Chinese clanked on the electric poles on the road side. Taking the queue from this, the

MPAJA emerged and attacked the unarmed policemen resulting in many fatalities

amongst them. It was discovered later that the Japanese commandant was bribed by a

Chinese leader.82

Attacks by groups of parang panjang in the lower reaches of the Perak river

caused the Chinese to flee leaving their properties to the town of Teluk Anson, the capital

of Lower Perak. Many of their businesses and shops were taken over by the Malay-

Muslims. Since then many Malay-Muslim shops emerged in the area, to the extent that

some of these Malay-Muslims became successful businessmen from the gain of Chinese

enterprise.

The Chinese refugees received sympathy from the Chinese of Teluk Anson

including rich towkays who provided them with cloth, food and daily necessities.

Together they formed militia groups to launch counter-attacks against the Malay-

Muslims. Everyday they trained with swords, spears and other weaponry. The situation

was described like ‘an egg balancing on horns’ waiting for the moment of explosion.

The CPM tried in vain to pacify the Chinese by having discussions and

negotiations, but the Chinese not only refused to listen but became unhappy with the

party. Upon receipt of reports from the party’s cadres from Teluk Anson that the Chinese

there wanted to avenge the attacks by the Malay-Muslims, Abdullah was assigned by the

Perak CPM office in Ipoh, to resolve the problem.

Abdullah summoned a few towkays and the Chinese to a meeting.

I notice that the Chinese were red in their faces, maybe they were very angry.

They took their weapons with them.83

Through a translator, a cadre from there, Abdullah called on the Chinese to calm

down and to resolve the problem through negotiations, explaining that all the interracial

clashes arose from British colonial deception, adding that animosity between the races

would only benefit the British colonialists.

Even though I gave a detailed explanation, they said they were victimized

[aniaya] and have lost patience and did not want to listen to the party any more.

In that case, I said I will no longer talk in the name of CPM again. Now I will

talk in the name of the Malays. So in the name of the Malays, I asked them to postpone

their plans for two or three days [to allow me] to have a discussion [with the Malays]. I

promised [them] that I will give them the feedback in a few days time.84

Abdullah was given the few days he asked for, and he went to see a few of his

relatives who were government servants and influential in the area. They were identified

as Yaacob, a religious scholar, Nik Aziz, the District Officer and Datuk Zainal Abidin, a

prominent Malay-Muslim businessman. Abdullah said they were against interracial

conflict and were ready to help him solve the issue.

82

Miskin bin Raboo, 1982/83: 14. 83

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 106 84

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 106-7.


26

Two days later, Abdullah and those named went to see the infuriated Chinese,

who were represented by a few influential Chinese towkays as well as ‘their group’. Nik

Aziz gave a fiery speech opposing war between the Malay-Muslims and Chinese. He

said, it does not matter who attacks who, it will bring chaos and all will suffer losses,

adding that there will be no peace if the war continues.

When it came to Yaacob’s turn to speak, he gave his views based on the Islamic

religion. He says that Islam was against the kind of war that was taking place. He was

opposed to violence against others irrespective of whether they were Malay-Muslims or

Chinese. According to him, Islam taught all of mankind to be united and to assist each

other.

In turn, Datuk Zainal Abidin as a businessman spoke about the ill effects of war to

the economy and business. He said the conflict, will not only cause chaos but it will

worsen the economic situation, and this will be felt by the Malay-Muslims as well as the

Chinese. For that reason, he was against the war between the Malay-Muslims and the

Chinese.

Initially the representatives of the Chinese refused to heed to advice, but they

eventually relented not to attack the Malay-Muslims, but imposed a condition that they

will not do business with the Malay-Muslims and will boycott Malay-Muslim products.

Apparently the condition was relaxed overtime as the Chinese and the Malay-Muslims

began to have business transaction again.

In the above instance, assuming the account is reliable, we see the constructive

and positive role of prominent and influential leaders of the community, that is, the

Malay-Muslim community leaders and British trained government bureaucrats, in

resolving an impending ethnic conflict. Their pro-active initiative averted further

interracial clashes, and restored public order and goodwill amongst the two

ethnic/religious groups.

Subsequently such incidents were backed by the British colonizers. It sent a

platoon of Indian Muslim troops to the Teluk Anson [now Teluk Intan] area and Parit.

They incited and stoked the fire of racial sentiments. Consequently killings took place

again in these areas.

As I was at the time with the Propaganda Department, I toured the small towns

and cities of Perak. Due to the killings, I was assigned by (the CPM) organization to

Teluk Anson to solve the problem. Thanks to the efforts of many parties including

patriotic and democratic figures who held progressive views, the ethnic tensions could be

relaxed. But in some areas the tensions were no longer under control, so unwanted

bloodbath took place.

In Teluk Anson the situation was very tense. Malays were preparing to attack

Chinese whilst Chinese were preparing to attack Malays. A number of Chinese comrades

were sent to pacify the mass Chinese who were in rage, and I worked to contact local

figures amongst the Malays as well as organize gatherings and discussions with the

public to pacify them. Fortunately both Malay and Chinese masses took advise. As such a

bigger bloodbath was averted. 85

In another version, Abdullah, wrote:

85

Abdullah CD, 1998: 29-31.


27

…the British colonialists quietly send an Indian Muslim platoon from India into

Teluk Intan (Teluk Anson), going along Sungai Perak towards the Malay villages along

the said river. Although the platoon did not stay long in the area, they stoked the fire of

racial sentiments so that the Malays hated the Chinese and the communist party with all

sorts of accusations. As a result, the Malays in the said villages which were formerly

strong anti-Japanese bases, became different. In many places there were groups of parang

panjang to oppose the Chinese and the communist party. Because of this situation, many

of the Chinese there fled to Teluk Anson and other areas (and) leaving their properties.

Meanwhile members of the parang panjang groups attacked and killed the Chinese and

communist people.86

The so-called ‘Malays’ in Lower Perak who were a party in the interethnic

conflagration were not Malays but Banjarese, migrants from Banjarmasin in Kalimantan

(Borneo), now part of Indonesia. Khoo Kay Kim, a doyen of ‘Malay studies’ who hails

from Perak, disclosed recently that ‘the Malays in the town were not involved [in the

clashes]. As a result, in the Teluk Anson town itself there were no clashes.’ Here he

makes a clear distinction between the Malays and the Banjarese. The Banjar community

in Johor beginning from Batu Pahat also retaliated against the ‘Bintang Tiga’.87

The

professor of Malaysian history has come out in the open recently to say that many of the

participants in the interethnic riots during the interregnum in Perak were not Malays at all

– a knowledge this author shares – but people of Indonesian descent.

The CPM’s Propaganda Machine When the Japanese surrendered, the MPAJA marched into Tronoh town in the Kinta

district to restore ‘public order.’ Their arrival was greeted with

…fire crackers, the sound of fire crackers filled up the air. The public, old,

young, men, women and children were waving small flags, those without flags waved

empty red flag and those without red cloth waved handkerchief. They with full spirit

shouted the slogan Long Live the Anti-Japanese War Victory! Long Live the Communist

Party of Malaya!

Long Live MPAJA!88

All the houses in Tronoh were draped with red flags, the flags of CPM and

MPAJA. Three towkays rented three restaurants providing a feast to the CPM members

and MPAJA’s troops. In front of the restaurants, probably in Chinese characters, a notice

informs the public that drinks and food were served free of charge to the ‘warriors’ of the

anti-Japanese war, namely the CPM, MPAJA, Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Union

(MPAJU), etc..

Upon their occupation of Tronoh, the MPAJA put up red flags with three stars to

signify that they were in possession and in power. ‘At the time Tronoh town was in the

86


Professor Emeritus Khoo Kay Kim’s launching remarks of ‘My Days in the Sun’, a memoir by a

distinguished radiologist. http://arecabooks.com/my-days-in-the-sun-professor-khoo-kay-kims-

launching-remarks/ accessed on 27 January 2014. Of late, Khoo has been the subject of ridicule

especially from so-called progressive and leftist leaning elements within the academia, dismissing his

work as ‘not history’ as they perceived the former’s work as endorsing the state’s narrative. 88

Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 60.

http://arecabooks.com/my-days-in-the-sun-professor-khoo-kay-kims-launching-remarks/

http://arecabooks.com/my-days-in-the-sun-professor-khoo-kay-kims-launching-remarks/


28

control of MPAJA. All Japanese offices such as the police station, prison, district office

and other [institutions] had been taken over by MPAJA and the [CPM] party organization

in Tronoh town.’ In an open field in the town, CPM flags and red banners in big letter in

several languages were put up by the MPAJA to celebrate the surrender.89

The CPM’s Propaganda Department was then operating from Tronoh, and was

manned by about 40 people mostly Chinese spreading the communist ideology in

Chinese (possibly Mandarin, Cantonese and Hakka), Malay and Tamil.90

The Propaganda

Department was officially set up in Ipoh when the MPAJA secured the capital from the

retreating Japanese military.91

The key leaders of the Department used English to

communicate with one another as they did not understand each others’ languages.92

We operated from one district to another district, focusing on small towns and

cities in the state of Perak. We whipped up the spirit of independence and hatred for the

colonialists, as well as nurtured racial unity, supporting the MCP and other [matters].

What encouraged me most is that wherever we went, the public from various ethnic

groups would receive us with great warmth. At some places the public gathering was

attended by more than fifty thousand of the populace.93

In spite of claims that the work of the Propaganda Department was warmly

received and that people of various ethnicities attended its function, ethnic unity was

necessary and expedient in the mobilization of hatred against British colonialism and to

instilled the idea of national liberation and independence as envisioned by the CPM.

From Tronoh the CPM propaganda team travelled by car, bus and lories to

Tanjung Tualang, Pusing, Parit, Batu Gajah, Menglembu and Kampar before entering

Ipoh to set up their base. The propaganda unit also went to Temoh, Tapah, Bidor, Telok

Anson, Tanjung Malim, Sungai Siput, Kuala Kangsar, Chemor, Tanjung Rambutan,

Lenggong Grik, Taiping, Parit Buntar, Beruas, Air Tawar, Sitiawan, Lumut dan

Pangkor.94

After the Japanese surrender, the CPM and the MPAJA focused its attention

on the urban areas in order to ‘keep the peace and social harmony.’ The rural areas which

were the basis of anti-Japanese struggle were left to local CPM branches and the people’s

militia.95

Abdullah described how the MPAJA went to take over these towns from the

retreating Japanese military. By using telephone, the MPAJA commander instructed the

Japanese soldiers to move out of Batu Gajah, the seat of the Japanese military command

in the district.96

The Japanese asked to be given a few lorries to transport the soldiers from there.

All the police, traitors to their people and the nation’s traitors who were with the Japanese

soldiers were allowed to retreat to leave Kampung [Batu] Gajah witnessed by the public.

89


Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 66, 67 and 71; Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 60. 91

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 83; Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 75. 92



Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 79 and 80; Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 62-3. 95


Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 75. Suriani said that they negotiated with the Japanese to vacate Batu

Gajah. (Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 64)


29

Only after the area had been vacated, did we gather the populace to hold public gathering

and big celebrations.97

Abdullah was silent about the ethnic identities of the police and ‘traitors to their

people and the nation’s traitors’ which in the terminology of the CPM and MPAJA, was

the euphemism for Japanese ‘collaborators’. It is obvious Abdullah was referring to the

mainly Malay-Muslim employees of the Japanese military administration, albeit not

discounting the existence of non-Malay staff.

The Menglembu Scare

As soon as they were about to leave Menglembu for Kampar upon the completion of the

celebrations there, the Chinese community panicked on hearing news that a group of

parang panjang troops from Ipoh would soon be attacking Chinese in the small

provincial town. Menglembu is about 9km from Ipoh.

…the situation in Menglembu immediately became chaotic. We had to help to

pacify the situation by advising the public to stay calm. In addition we made plans to

evacuate the children and elderly to a place considered safe in anticipation of unpleasant

events.98

The MPAJA’s company at Pusing was called in to provide assistance before the

propaganda team rushed to Ipoh to find out the source of the scare.

With the assistance of the CPM organization, the people from the various ethnic

groups in Ipoh were assembled in a park [probably Jubilee Park]. Nearby the park there

was a building a few stories high. In the building could be seen Ahmad Boestamam and a

number of his friends distancing themselves from the crowd. This is probably because

Ahmad Boestamam was a staff of the Japanese government, so he felt doubtful about the

MPAJA. During the occupation Boestamam, one of the key leaders of the ‘Malay Left’

worked as a censorship officer in the Japanese Propaganda Department in Ipoh.99

Nevertheless, he and a number of his friends from the top of the building gathered

joined the public gathered in the park.

A CPM member from an MPAJA company of Chinese descent with the nickname

Zulkifli explained the need to investigate the parang pajang group. Zulkifli who was

adept in speaking in three languages that is Chinese, Malay and English also had the

ability to convince the public to a point of view. Eventually the public exposed the fact

that there were three Malays who tried to incite violence using racial issues and wanted to

set up a parang panjang group to run amuck against the Chinese and the communist

party. Realising such a situation, Zulkifli stated that the organizing party of CPM in Ipoh

and MPAJA team worked to clarify to the public about the importance of racial unity in

Malaya. He also made clear about the colonial plans to divide the races in Malaya so that

the power of the people becomes weak, making it easy for them to rule the country again.

In the end he succeeded in bringing awareness to the public and wiped out racial

97

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 75-6. In this passage a typographical error was made when Batu Gajah in

Kinta, was rendered as Kampung Gajah, which is located in Lower Perak. See also Memoir Suriani

Abdullah, 2006: 64. 98


Khoo and Lubis, 2005: 246


30

sentiments spread by some people. The public assembly broke up peacefully after the

public understood the actual situation.100

The Bekor-Pusing Connection

Of the inter-communal clashes during the interregnum, the Bekor incident in Kuala

Kangsar district, to the north of Ipoh, is well documented. The MCP claimed that the

racial clash was incited by Force 136. A Pusing CPM field officer had reported that

members of the Force had entered Bekor and the neighbouring areas inciting the Malay-

Muslims to oppose the Chinese. As a result of the incitement, Malay-Muslims attacked

and killed ethnic Chinese there.

The Chinese who escaped the onslaught fled to Pusing across the mountain range

that separated the Kuala Kangsar district from the Kinta district, and sought the CPM

representative and former MPAJA members there. They demanded to be provided arms

to retaliate against the Malay-Muslims. Although they were advised not to resort to

violence and to resolve the problem through negotiation, it was to no avail. The refugees

continued to assemble weapons such as swords, spears and other kind of weaponry for

their counter-attack.101

…developments in Pusing…became critical and could not be stopped. The

[Bekor] Chinese who fled to Pusing had formed armed militia groups and marched to

Bekor. In Bekor, a Malay MCP member by the name of Harun (his nickname, I can’t

remember his official name) tried to …the Chinese at the head of a bridge. He ..both

hands while urging the Chinese to be patient and stop attacking. Harun said: “I am

prepared to die here if you won’t listen.” The Chinese group continued to barge in and

were hacked to death. Harun was a CPM Malay cadre who was responsible for mass

work in Bekor and surrounding areas. He was respected by the Malays and Chinese of

that area.102

Subsequently the Chinese group attacked the Malay-Muslims in Bekor, burning

mosque, houses and properties.103

Kampung Bekor was far from other villagers and

accessible only by river, making it difficult to get aid to the village if it was in imminent

danger in view of its isolated location.

The Malay-Muslim MPAJA leader in Bekor was aided by ten other Malay-

Muslims, receiving support from villagers including the local religious elite. The

wholehearted support for the MPAJA did not spare the Bekor residents from falling

victims to the deadly racial clash when more than 60 of them perished or were maimed

by a group of armed Chinese during a pre-dawn attack on 6 March 1946.104

The dead

included women and children.

In the post-mortem, the CPM conveniently concluded that there was no parang

panjang group in Bekor, citing Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, a respected religious and

political figure of the day. The so-called parang pajang group there were made up of

100



For further details on Harun, see Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 117. 103


Abu Talib Ahmad, 2003: 125. The Chinese razed Kampung Bekor to the ground and when the ashes

settled, police found 40 bodies. Charles Gamba, 1962: 223-4.


31

members of Force 136 together with a few other elements, not identified, were allegedly

responsible for killing the Bekor Chinese. ‘Therefore we found that the incident was

orchestrated by the British colonialists’.105

The CPM was quick to claim that they tried their level best to prevent the

retaliation but we know that the MPAJA had a well-armed platoon in Pusing, which was

one of their strongholds in the Kinta district. Pusing, a hotbed of resistance movement

against the Japanese, was already in the hands of the MPAJA and it had a company

stationed there.106

All the shophouses and most of the private houses in Pusing were

displaying the red flag of the CPM or the MPAJA.107

Pusing, about 20km from Ipoh, was

equally notorious during the Emergency. It is most likely that the source of weaponry for

the Bekor Chinese was from the arsenal of the CPM and MPAJA as they were the only

military outfit so equipped. Most of the weapons were air-dropped by Allied Command

during the last few months of the occupation.108

In retaliation the Malay-Muslims of Kuala Kangsar district especially those living

along the Perak River mobilized under the leadership of Sheik Osman. In troops of

parang panjang gangs, they attacked Chinese settlements in Manong and Sauk, killing

many ethnic Chinese. Those who escaped the violence fled. The scale of the conflict

earned it the notoriety ‘Perang Bekor’ (the Bekor War).109

The Memoir of Mark Yoi Sun Soo

Mark Yoi Sun Soon described the MPAJA in his memoir as the ‘rum lot’ emerging from

the dark tropical forests like ghouls making their appearance in the night,

The Allied-backed resistance, who had been waiting quietly in the jungle,

immediately seized authority. During the time between Japan’s surrender and Britain’s

return, they took advantage of the brief power vacuum to wreak revenge on those whom

they characterised as traitors. Chinese who had betrayed their countrymen to the Japanese

secret police, out of desire for a reward or escape torture, were hunted down and

summarily executed. Even those who had collaborated in lesser ways with the Japanese

feared for their lives. Having experienced British and Japanese rule, Kampar was no

stranger to outsiders, but the presence of heavily-armed guerrillas intent on running the

town seemed grossly inappropriate.

In a global war, protagonists choose allies for their perceived daring and nuisance

value; linguistic finesse does not figure in the equation. These transitory law-enforcers

spoke in hybrid Mandarin. Their lingo was akin to Hakka, a crossbreed vernacular of the

nomadic tribes in South China. The origin of this ‘rum lot’ was contentious. It later came

to light that these green-shirted fellows were part of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese

Army, jungle fighters who reconstituted themselves as the Malayan National Liberation

Army three years later. Much has written about their bravery against the Japanese during

the war, but their attitude towards the citizens of Kampar seemed replete with undue

condescension and braggadocio about their exploits. I felt disgusted to hear about their

favourite boast – an incident in which they threw hand grenades into the midst of a social

105



From Pacific War to Merdeka, 2005: 19 (Interview with Suriani Abdullah) 108

From Pacific War to Merdeka, 2005: 21 (Interview with Suriani Abdullah) 109

In Batu Pahat, Johore where the worst incidence of racial clashes took place, the encounter was called

‘Perang Parang Panjang’. (Sabda and Wahba, 1981: 43)


32

gathering consisting of Japanese officers and Chinese businessmen. It was obvious they

thought little of the horrendous injuries they caused to innocent bystanders.

Latent sympathises with so-called communists ideals were quick to join the ranks

of the resistance fighters who supported the ideology, although I dare say the intricacies

of Marxism were far beyond their intellectual horizon. It bemused me when a man whom

I considered a friendly neighbour turned out to be one of them. These braggarts even tried

to introduce an odd salute: a clenched fist raised next to the right temple. Taoist-type

worship and lion dancing lasted more than the customary three days as local Chinese of

different clan groups were pressured into joining the celebrations. Firecrackers stuttered

and smoked the air; victory celebrations were jolly wild, even while escaping Chinese

‘traitors’ were being hunted like wild animals.

The guerrillas appeared to be just another barbaric bunch drifting through the fog

of war. Thankfully, when it came to governance, it appeared they were short of ideas.

During the handover to the British, the provisionals were on their best behaviour,

reportedly restrained and respectful, no doubt as they had permission to retain their

firearms.

The disturbing actions of these muscling, swaggering fighters turned out to be a

brief foreshadowing of the sinister machinations of a burgeoning resistance movement. In

1948, the Malayan National Liberation Army launched a communist insurgency so

powerful that the country would feel its impact for an entire decade. The one thing I shall

never forget about these green-shirted individuals was their unashamed posturing. It

cloaked a simmering resentment that would manifest itself in pursuit of an agenda for

causing anarchy across the country. For the time being, peace had returned to the nation,

but civil unrest was to be the fate of Malaya for many years to come, and no-one was

exempt from its effects.110

The euphoria of victory and ‘liberation’ by the communist terrorist was short-

lived, indeed.

CPM and MPAJA Victory Celebrations in Ipoh

No where was the celebrations more grand that in Ipoh, which the Japanese made into the

capital of Perak state during their rule, and has remained the capital to this day, a lasting

legacy of the Japanese Occupation. In the Ipoh town padang, a stage was erected, draped

in cloth of riotous colours and bouquets of flowers. Banners with huge letters in several

languages were also put up. The CPM and MPAJA flags were ‘proudly flapping in the

winds’ and the ‘[shop] houses of the masses’ were draped in flags celebrating the ‘victory

of anti-Japanese war.’111

Abdullah felt odd that there was no Perak state flag and went out to find one. He

found a state flag in an office building that was also occupied by the Sultan of Perak and

his retinue. One of them asked Abdullah, ‘Are you Malay?’ and he replied, ‘Yes’ and

introduced himself as a Perakian who was involved in the resistance movement against

the Japanese with the CPM for the independence of Malaya. ‘They thought that the CPM

members were only Chinese.’112

Indeed this was the impressions of many Malay-

Muslims of the CPM, and as such they deduced that the party represented the Chinese

only.

110

Mark Yoi Sun Soo, My Days in the Sun, A Memoir, Penang: Areca Books, 2013: 41-2. 111

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 78; Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 68. 112

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 78.


33

The ‘gigantic celebrations’ around the town of Ipoh was joined by the Sultan of

Perak. In spite of the presence of the monarch, the front row of the parade was led by two

MPAJA ‘warriors’ bearing the CPM and MPAJA flags, the band, Eng Ming Ching’s car

(the head of the CPM’s Propaganda Department) and behind her, a car carrying the

MPAJA’s representative, members of the CPM’s Propaganda Department, between 1,000

to 2,000 MPAJA ‘warriors’, CPM’s ‘masses organizations’ comprising various races, and

at the end was the mass labour organizations, tradesmen and individuals. The towkays

(bosses) were at the rear of the procession. The procession leading to the Ipoh padang

was two to three miles long, all waving red flags. It was a Red day indeed!113

All the shop or houses hoisted the red flag of CPM and MPAJA at the door and

windows. All along the road people lighted fire crackers and performed lion dances. The

lion dances presented to the party’s and military representatives in honour and to

welcome the CPM and MPAJA. To feed the public, the party’s organization cooked 30

gunny sacks of rice in the morning and another 30 gunny sacks of rice in the evening.114

Communist propaganda songs, described as patriotic songs, singings, dances,

theatres and other activities were staged. Speeches in Malay, Chinese and Tamil were

delivered by members of the Propaganda Department and cries of ‘Long Live CPM!’ and

‘Long Live MPAJA!’ rang loud. The celebrations went on until the wee hours of the

morning.

…This is the happiest moment where the people of various races together

celebrated the victory in the struggle against the Japanese. To this day, I can still feel the

warmth and happiness of the occasion.115

Eng Ming Ching, Abdullah’s wife, also recollected the event of that day in Ipoh

with relish. Eng took the Muslim name Suriani Abdullah when she married Abdullah C.

D in 1955. ‘We were very, very happy.’ 116

As the events unfolded in the course of two

weeks of MPAJA rule, the warmth and happiness of the various ethnic groups was short

lived. What followed was a tragedy in ethnic relations unparallel in the history of

Malaysia, and the generations after still suffer from the war trauma of the post CPM-

MPAJA and Emergency period.

Similar celebrations were held in the small towns of the Kinta valley such as

Menglembu, Kampar, Batu Gajah, etc. In Kampar, it is claimed that 50,000 people

attended the celebrations.117

Suraini gave the figure at 10,000.118

All the celebrations took

place in the padang (field), which was a common feature of all the small towns in Perak,

a legacy of British town planning. From the images and the whole culture of the

celebrations as described by Suraini and Abdullah, these celebrations were initiated by

the Chinese and for the Chinese, celebrating Chinese victory over the Japanese. Banners

113

Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 67; Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 79. From Pacific War to Merdeka,

2005: 20-1 (Interview with Suriani Abdullah) In her memoirs, she gave the figures at 1,000 MPAJA

‘warriors’, all in green uniform.(Memoir Suraini Abdullah, 2006: 67) 114



Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 67-8; From Pacific War to Merdeka, 2005: 20-1 (Interview with

Suriani Abdullah) 117


Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006: 64.


34

and notices in Malay or languages were incidental and paid lip service to the notion of

ethnic unity. Malay-Muslim observers were counted as celebrants.

The Durian Dispute

Another incident that almost led to ethnic clashes was over the sales of the durian fruit.

Two Malay-Muslim durian sellers from Parit in Lower Perak had transported two lorry

loads of durian fruits to the Ipoh market, but could not even sell a single fruit and

consequently barged into the CPM office in Ipoh complaining of the turn of events. In

Boestamam’s version, the durian fruit sellers came with their complaints to PKMM, also

known as the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) Ipoh office, walking distance to the CPM’s

office.119

Because noone was buying their durians, ‘The Parit people were fuming mad and

wanted to go amuck against the Chinese. Because of that they came to the MCP office (in

Ipoh) to sort the matter out.’120

Apparently the Ipoh Chinese had boycotted buying durians from Parit in

retaliation for the killing of Chinese in the rural area. The two fruit sellers were aware of

the incident, but denied involvement, stating that they were business people. Both

Abdullah (CPM) and Boestamam (MNP) claimed credit for taking the initiative to

resolve the ‘durian dispute’, and informing the others about it. 121

Eng Ming Ching, the

head of the MCP Propaganda Department, Ahmad Boestamam and Musa Ahmad from

MNP, were appointed to by their respective organizations to find a solution to the

problem.

The trio (Eng, Boestmam and Musa) went to Parit and called on the police,

invited village representatives from the area as well as representatives from the Chinese

community comprising the business group and towkays. Following a ‘talking’ session, an

agreement was signed by representative of the Malay-Muslim and Chinese communities

and the police not to engage in racial riots again. The Malay representatives were made

responsible for conveying the spirit of the agreement to their respective villages. After

which, the businesses of the Malay-Muslims and Chinese were resumed and any

untoward incident averted. The durian sellers were satisfied as they sold all their durians

and credited the CPM and MNP for solving their woes. In Boestamam’s version, he said

that the trip to Parit had nothing to do with the durian dispute but was a separate exercise

‘to lower the boiling temperatures of both sides’ to avert an impending racial riot between

the Malay-Muslims and Chinese.122

In Boestamam’s version, it is seen that he informed Eng that it was ‘a serious

matter, which must be prevented at all costs with what every way possible.’ Furthermore,

he added, that he had ‘given my word to them [the fruit sellers].’ Eng agreed with him,

and Boestamam offered a ‘practical solution’ by asking Eng to ‘instruct your people to

buy all the durians sold by the Parit Malays, now!’ Eng could see the fruit sellers from

one of the windows of her office building.

119

Datok Ahmad Boestamam, Datok Onn Yang Saya Kenal, 1979: 12; Memoir Suraini Abdullah, 2006: 76. 120

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 104. In Boestamam’s version of the same event, he wrote that the sellers

were threatening to go berserk (amuck) against the Chinese in Ipoh for not buying their durians. See Datok

Ahmad Boestamam, Datok Onn Yang Saya Kenal, 1979: 12. This is collaborated by Suraini in her memoirs

Memoir Suraini Abdullah, 2006: 78. 121

Memoir Abdullah C. D., 2005: 104; Datok Ahmad Boestamam, Datok Onn Yang Saya Kenal, 1979: 12. 122

Datok Ahmad Boestamam, Datok Onn Yang Saya Kenal, 1979: 11-12.


35

Boestamam said that it would not be a problem for the CPM members to buy up

all the durians as they were flushed with money at the time, adding that he knew that

when he made the proposal.

I instructed the CPM people in Ipoh to buy the durians sold by the Malays. In the

end all the durian sellers were satisfied [with the sales]. Assuming that the feelings of the

durian sellers were not appeased, certainly a horrific tragedy would have befallen the

Malays and the Chinese.123

Later in the day, the durian sellers came to see him at his office to thank him,

reporting that they had sold all their durians and apologizing for not being able to offer

him even one fruit as they had sold out.124

In Abdullah’s version, the fruit seller feasted

them with durians before they left for Parit.125

Casting Blame

Chin Peng, the celebrated Secretary General of CPM, who hailed from Sitiawan in Perak

state, like all the other key leaders of the CPM, absolved the party of blame for the ethnic

clashes during the interregnum describing it as ‘an intensely complex time’ which have

been ‘over-simplified’ to fit into neat Western concepts of right and wrong, good and

evil. Chin Peng’s disclaimer:

Actually, these clashes had begun even before Tokyo’s surrender and I doubt that

the Japanese officers even knew that their troops were responsible for igniting tension

between Chinese and Malay communities.126

Chin Peng alleged that Japanese troops disguised as MPAJA guerrillas inflamed

Malay-Muslim and Chinese enmity by slaughtering a pig in a mosque in Batu Pahat,

Johore state. Thousands died in the ethnic clashes that followed. The MPAJA sanctioned

by the CPM came to the military aid of the Chinese. The violence ceased only when a

Johor-based political leader, Dato’ Onn Jaafar, brokered peace between the two ethnic

groups.

In other instances, Chin Peng blamed the Guomindang for the ethnic clashes.

In numerous other racial instances at this time Chinese bandit [by this he means

the Kuomintang as if distinguishing them ideologically from the CPM] were the culprits.

The CPM, of course, was blamed for their activities as well. Teluk Intan and Ayer

Kuning [a small township near Kampar] were areas suffered this way.127

123


Datok Ahmad Boestamam, 1979: 12-13. Eng confirms he and Boestamam’s involvement in the durian

dispute in an interview a Sin Chew Jit Poh, a Chinese press, in 2003. (Serikandi Suraini Abdullah, 2005:

29-30. But in her own memoir (Setengah Abad Dalam Perjuangan, Memoir Suriani Abdullah, 2006), she

made no mention of the affair. 125



Alias Chin Peng, 2003: 128. Both the MPAJA and CPM represented all non-communist armed bands as

‘bandits’ or ‘robbers’ including Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army (OCAJA) allied to the Chinese

Nationalist party, the Guomindang. OCAJA were guerrillas, controlling territory and resistng the Japanese.


36

Chin Peng categorically dismissed Japanese allegations that the MPAJA was

involved in the murder of 400 Malay-Muslim villagers in Grik. Instead, Chin Peng

blamed a company of ‘Guomindang bandits’ operating in Upper Perak close to the Thai

border for the Grik massacre, arguably the worst incident in Perak during the interregnum

but the least documented.

Their activities around Grik grew very disruptive as they began to take advantage

of a predominantly Malay population there.

Understandably, the local Malays took strong exception to the presence of these

intruders and reported them to the Japanese authorities. In retribution, the bandits

swooped on a series of Malay kampong settlements and slaughtered some 400 villagers

including children and infants. Additionally they kidnapped numerous women whom

they dragged back to their jungle camps. It was a horrific situation. The Japanese claimed

the communists’ ‘Three-Star Army’ had perpetrated the massacre and its barbaric

aftermath. We promptly issued a denial and identified the true culprits.128

Of CPM relationship with the Guomindang, Chin Peng described it as ‘decidedly

more complex matter to getting along with the British.’

The ‘Kuomintang bandits’ referred to were recent arrivals from southern China

where they had plundered the population in gangs and had been forced out by a series of

government crackdowns. In Malaya the gangsters began working for both British colonial

and Chinese businessmen. To camouflage their criminality and gain some respectability,

the bandits openly pledged allegiance to the Guomindang, hence the euphemism

‘Kuomintang bandits’. They took jobs as contract labourers in tin mines and on

plantations. Because of their accustomed lifestyle in China, they preferred a rural

existence and tended to live on the edge of the jungle. They retained their local dialects

and gradually began moving about the peninsula. Pockets of this group became

entrenched in Perak, Pahang, Kelantan and northern Johore. Under British rule, these

gangsters toed the line.129

The Japanese invasion changed all that. Law and order deteriorated and the

former bandits returned to their old criminal ways. They came down from their homes on

the jungle fringes to obtain weapons. Once armed, they began plundering. The CPM,

which was numerically stronger and better organised politically, took the initiative of

contacting them with the aim of forming an alliance.

We recognised that principles were the last considerations on their minds. They

agreed to CPM political instructions working with their units and in return we supplied

funds and food. This was all done at the state level.

Gradually the bandit elements began rejecting our control and what was being

taught them by our political instructors. The men were largely middle-aged and heavily

involved in opium smoking. They spent their money freely on drugs and women. When

they ran out of funds they began to loot, pillage and rape. At first they tried to hide their

criminal ways from us. When we uncovered their activities we openly criticised them and

imposed punishments. They escaped to even deeper jungle camps.

Those outside the group will see it differently from those within it. The maxim holds true to both

CPM/MPAJA and OCAJA/Guomindang. 128

Alias Chin Peng, 2003: 110-11. 129

Alias Chin Peng, 2003: 110.


37

As time passed, the various bandit units consolidated their forces into a number

of large groups.130

Chin Peng’s line is echoed by key Malay-Muslim CPM leaders such as Abdullah

and Rashid Maidin.131

Abdullah also blamed the Japanese for ethnic riots in Kampung Salak in Sungai

Siput South. ‘Immediately after the Japanese surrender groups of parang pajang emerged

out of the blue’.132

In Kampung Salak, a group of parang panjang assailants killed the

father of Khatijah Ali, a Malay-Muslim MCP member, and a writer for the party’s Malay

(Jawi) publication and a mass organizer. Her father was a Chinese convert to Islam.133

Some rumours circulated among the Malays that the Chinese were going to take

over the country from the Malays because they had won the war…some pro-British

elements also publicly praised the Chinese sky-high to cause uneasiness among the

Malays. 134

…at the end of Anti-Japanese War, the British colonialists carried out a policy of

dividing the racial unity in Malaya by stoking racial sentiments and religious difference.

The British colonialists are adept at putting the races at logger heads. Their successful

experience in India in pitting Muslims against Hindus was implemented in Malaya.

Because of that, the firm cordial [muhibah] relations in the struggle to fight the

Japanese facists was changed in a short time. The people in the Sungai Siput South area,

who in the past had firm cordial relationships, now became enemies. The Malays moved

in a mass movement to launch a holy war [sabil] against the Chinese. Because of this,

bloodshed.

However, only those Malays and religious figures who were confused swallowed

the colonialists’ incitement. Nationalists leading figures and progressive religious group

who were against colonialism could see clearly the divide and rule tactics of the

colonialists. Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy and Ahmad Boestamam firmly opposed the

colonial tactic and promoted unity amongst the various races. We [Abdullah C. D., Dr.

Burhanuddin Al-Helmy and Ahmad Boestamam] collaborated to prevent conflict

between the races. The religious clergy from Gunong Semanggol, Perak, firmly opposed

colonialism. They were not deceived by colonial incitement in fact collaborated with

various organizations including the MCP to oppose the British colonialists.135

Abdullah accused the Japanese and the British of stirring racial conflict towards

the end of their rule, describing it as a ‘conspiracy’ [komplotan]; ‘insidious [in] designs’;

of ‘divide and rule’ as well as ‘defaming the MPAJA’.136

Rashid Maidin blamed British ‘provocation’ and ‘instigation’ of pro-British

elements in Malayan society. He said as the British supporters had ‘lost face’ because the

130

Alias Chin Peng, 2003: 110-11. 131

Rashid Maidin, one of the key Malay-Muslim leaders of the CPM, was recruited by the CPM from a tin

mining workers union in Kinta and led the Kinta Mining Workers’ Association before the war. Memoir

Rashid Maidin, 2005: 11-16. He passed away in exile in South Thailand on 1 September 2006 (Rashid

pious late in his life, The Star, 11 September 2006) 132



From Pacific War to Merdeka, 2005: 36 (Interview with Rashid Maidin) 135


From Pacific War to Merdeka, 2005: 56 (Interview with Abdullah C. D.); Islam Melayu Komunis, 2005:

60; Abdullah CD, Perang Anti-British and Perdamaian, 1998: 29.


38

British had chickened out fighting the Japanese, they spread rumours and stirred up

trouble so that there would be lawlessness, thereby justifying the return of the British on

the grounds of restoring law and order, as they had done during their intervention into the

Malay States in the 19th century.

The Religious Resolution The Japanese surrender came during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan and in this

holy month, the Malay-Muslims turned to their religion – Islam – in response to the

conflict. They found strength and leadership amongst the spiritual and martial leaders of

their faith. In preparation, Malay-Muslims immersed themselves in traditional martial arts

called silat and inner sciences (ilmu kebatinan) based on religious teachings as a foil

against Chinese assaults. They acquired these defence mechanisms especially the inner

sciences from the ulama (clergy) and in the process further enhanced the position of this

class in Malay-Muslim society. Sheikh Osman, Haji Marzuki, Imam Haji Bakri and Haji

Shukor were some of the figures that provided political, martial and spiritual leadership

to the Malay-Muslims in Perak state.137

These magico-mystical activities were usually held in mosques or surau (a prayer

house of lower status and smaller in size than a mosque). Here they prayed to God for

power and peace, and the return to normalcy. These activities caused alarm and suspicion

amongst the Chinese who took these as an indicator that they would be targeted after the

retreat. The chant ‘La ila ha illallah’ (There is No God but Allah) especially the first

syllable ‘laila’ is erroneously construed by the Chinese as ‘come-lah’ taking it to mean

that the Malay-Muslims are calling on the ghost or spirits of the deceased Malay-

Muslims who died at the hands of their Chinese murderers to haunt the living Chinese.

The parallel here is with the Chinese festival of Hungry Ghost. It was reported that some

Chinese could not enjoy a good night’s sleep as they were spooked by the spirits of the

Malay-Muslim dead.138

Indeed for the Malay-Muslims, the attacks on the Chinese were transformed into a

religious obligation to wage holy war against the infidel (kafir). Being Chinese and being

Communists appear to be the same thing at this point, as Malay-Muslim communists

were also hunted down, arrested and killed. Any association with the communist implies

infidelity to Islam. Those killed in the fighting were considered syahid (martyr) as can be

seen in the mass burial of the Malay-Muslim dead in the Lambor incident.139

Not only the

Chinese were living in fear from the holy war mongers, Malay-Muslims communists (a

contradiction in terms) were also fair game.

According to G. C. Madoc, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, Sino-Malay

tension was believed to be caused by ‘religious fanatics’ linked to the invulnerability cult

of Sabilullah (waging jihad in the way of God) were involved in the clashes.140

Indeed

they were also called ‘barisan jihad’ (jihad front) set up to defend the sanctity of Islam

and their leaders as panglima jihad, khalifah, kiyai (Javanese term for a religious teacher)

or Tuan Guru, not unlike the Sufic tradition.141

These were said to be mostly preachers of

137


Seruan Rakyat, 21 November 1945: 2. 139


G. C. Madoc, ‘Sino-Malay tension’, 8 August 1946, Pahang Secretariat Files 47/1945/ 141

Sabha and Wahba, 1981: 43.


39

Indonesian origin who travelled the country preaching that Muslims owed allegiance to

nobody but Allah and that the time had come when all Muslims would arise to eradicate

the non-believers. The phenomenon of Malay-Muslim martial, and the ‘invulnerability

cults’ came to light again during the racial conflicts in 1969.

Clifford, the British Resident of Pahang, had warned in the late nineteenth century

that ‘if those against whom he rebels chance to belong to any other faith, no matter what

the cause of the quarrel, no matter how lax the rebel’s own practice may be, his revolt is

at once raised to the dignity of a sabil Allah, or holy war against the infidel…in this lies

the real strength of the Muhammadan population.’142

This seems to ring true during the

Interregnum and the Malayan Emergency.

According to Malay press reports, the situation became so dire that a delegation

led by Eng Ming Ching representing the Perak CPM and Chin Thaim Hwa representing

the Perak Chinese associations had an audience with the Sultan of Perak on 31 December

1945, pleading with the Sultan, the religious head of Islam in the state, to intervene and

re-conciliate the Malay-Muslims and the Chinese.143

Eng Min Ching @ Suraini makes no

mention of this meeting in her memoir.

The Sultan gave the assurance that he would strive for peace in the state. At the

time, British troops were stepping up their patrols in areas where inter-communal strife

was common occurrence especially between Tronoh and Layang-Layang as well as the

five miles stretch from Parit.144

The ethnic clashes continued even after the British had

reoccupied Malaya for some time. As late as July 1946, there were reports of ethnic

clashes in areas such as Kuala Kampar, Batu Gajah and Bagan Datoh in Perak.145

Peace

was restored gradually with the beefing up of security measures by the British Military

Administration (BMA) and consolidation through Emergency powers turning Malaya

into a police state to fight off the Chinese resistance.

Bloodbath at Sungai Manik

The best account to illustrate the religious resolution to the interethnic confrontation

represented by the CPM on one hand and the Banjarese on the other hand is the Sungai

Manik incident.146

Based on ‘Sungai Manik Bamandi Darah’ by Nilasakunta147

originally

in Banjarese language and translated by a Banjarese going by the nickname

Utuhlingkun,148

who rendered the account paragraph by paragraph ‘without approval’

into Malay.

In Nilasakunta’s the clashes between the Banjarese and Malays on one side was

with the Chinese and CPM on the other side. Nilasakunta used ‘Bintang Tiga’ which is

normally used by Malay-speakers to refer to the the MPAJA and the CPM

interchangeably. It appears that both the MPAJA and CPM were involved in the clashes

142

H. C. Clifford, Studies in Brown Humanity being Scrawls and Smudges in Sepia, White and Yellow,

London: Grant Richards, 1899: 229 143

Seruan Rakyat, 5 January 1946: 1. 144

Seruan Rakyat, 5 January 1946: 2. 145

G. C. Madoc, ‘Sino-Malay tension’, 8 August 1946, Pahang Secretariat Files 47/1945/ 146

I would like to thank Khoo Salma Nasution for drawing my attention to this source. 147

The account was downloaded in banjarcyber.tripod.com/sgmanik_1.html whereas the translation is

available from http://utuhlingkun.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/perang-sungai-manik 148

Utuh or Utoh is a common name for Banjarese males. Utuhlingkun is a Banjarese who hail from the

Alai district in Borneo (Kalimantan, Indonesia today).

http://utuhlingkun.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/perang-sungai-manik


40

which led to the mixed-up. In Abdullah’s account the ‘Malays’ were arrayed on one side

and the Guamindang and MPAJA on the other side.

By doing so, the author hoped that the children of today’s Banjarese (anak-anak

Banjar hari ini) and also Malay (dan juga orang Melayu) can appreciate how at one time

the Banjarese people rose to fight the communist armed only with machete parang

bungkol without having to screech in public drawing (menghunus, weapon from the

scabbard) and kissing the kris like the Malay politicians today (macam politikus Melayu

hari ini).149

The account is based on recollections by the grandfather of Nilasakunta, whose

name was not given and Emoh, both friends of Utoh Putih,150

the protagonist of the story.

The work is illustrated with images of the sites mentioned in the account, the machete

used in the conflict and the participants thereof, for example, Haji Bakri and Haji

Asmuni.

The story begins rather graphically and dramatically with the decapitated body of

Ismail Rudo or Mail Rudo, a strongman of CPM (orang kuat Parti Komunis Malaya)

whose legs and hands had been lobbed off (labuk) by the machete parang bungkol of

Utoh Putih, bobbing up and down (menggelupur) on the bridge waiting for his life to

snub him. The clear water under the bridge was getting red from Ismail Rudo’s blood

dripping into the stream.

Earlier Mail Rudo had emptied his six rounds on Utoh Putih but the bullets (pilur)

did not puncture the latter's body as he was impenetrable (kebal). In retaliation, Utoh

Putih swung his machete and cut off Ismail Rudo’s upper and lower limbs before calmly

walking away, leaving the latter groaning in pain.

Many of the Banjarese settled at Bendang DO, Parit 6, Sungai Manik, Lower

Perak. Utoh Putih himself comes from Pekan Rabu, Parit 6, Sungai Manik. At the time

their living situation was so powerless (begitu daif), cornered and closed in by a band of

communist at the base camp at Sungai Tungko led by Ah Pau, Ah Boon and Ah Jang.

Not unlike in the Kinta Valley, Mail Rudo and many of the Sungai Tungko and

Sungai Manik Banjarese joined the rank and file of CPM in the intelligence division.

After Japanese capitulation, Mail Rudo was assigned to recruit new members from the

Sungai Manik area. As many Banjarese were reluctant to join the communist cause, Mail

Rudo resorted to strong-arm tactic. Those who refused paid the price.

With each passing day, a villager irrespective of age – both young and old – was

arrested. They were tortured and stuffed into gunny sacks while still alive and dumped

into the Perak river, shot, impaled (disula) and subjected to all sorts of physical abuse.

The account gives the impression that Mail Rudo corrupted by his position forgot his

humanity was responsible for these atrocities.

At the time not few Banjarese and Malays supported the communist struggle. In

fact there were Banjarese known for their awe-inspiring/tremendous knowledge

149

This is in reference to UMNO Youth Chief Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein and Education

Minister, wielding his kris and waving it around in the name of Malay pride and power for which he later

apologised to the Malays and non-Malays. He apologised to the non-Malays that the keris wielding had

caused uneasiness to them, while at the same time apologising to Malays for failing to uphold the Malay

emblem as their symbol of heritage. 150

Literally the fair-skin man.


41

(hebat ilmunya)151

became collaborators (talibarut). People like these became thorn in the

flesh (duri dalam daging) of the local populace. Because of the extreme craze for

position, they are prepared to kill, razed houses and destroy properties of their own kind.

Fearful villagers actively joined the communist struggle also had to pay CPM

membership fees.152

As Banjarese families in Sungai Manik felt oppressed, many moved (madam)

across the Kinta river to settle at Kampung Balun Bidai and Kampung Gajah, which are

Malay settlements.

The CPM base camp at Sungai Tungko was shellshock (gempar) on hearing the

news of Mail Rudo’s death probably because the communist could not have imagined

that anyone would dare kill their strongman and challenged their authority. Armed with

MK5 rifles,153

throngs of communists led by their right-hand man Ah Pau in haste rushed

to Bendang DO, Parit 6, Sungai Manik. Not a single Banjarese family from Bendang DO

dared showed their faces. They all gazed safely from the privacy of their window curtains

at what when on outside their homes.

The communist found Mail Rudo dressed in the communist uniform, bayonet tuck

around his waist and a spent .38 pistol by his side, sprawled with his legs apart

(tabirangkang). His body was then fastened (ditayut) with ropes and yoked on a

crosspiece before taken away. The villagers felt angered and pitiful (maras) the way Mail

Rudo’s body was treated as if yoking a wild boar. The associated reference to the

perceived Chinese preference for pork (literally pig) is loaded with racial symbolism. No

one knew where the corpse was taken, buried or thrown into the Perak river, a direct

reference to MPAJA and CPM habit of casting their enemies into the Perak river, the

second longest river on peninsula which debouches into the Straits of Melaka.

If thrown into the river, surely wide agape the mouth of the crocodile receiving

its evening sustenance (habuan).

The call went out for the killer of Mail Rudo to be caught swiftly to make an

example of.

As dusk fell on that day, the communist insurgents were still noisily discussing

amongst themselves. Not a single villager understood what was being said; this was

probably because the communists were speaking in Mandarin or one of the Chinese

languages. Not long after, bands of communist went knocking hard (manggandah) on the

houses summoning the villagers – young and old – to assembly in front of Pekan Rabu.

One by one the villagers were questioned including Utoh Putih but the Banjarese

had unanimously agreed not to give him up as the person who killed Mail Rudo. Failing

to find Mail Rudo’s killer, the head communist Ah Pau issued an ultimatum: If the

151

Probably what is meant here is spiritual or magical knowledge. 152

Extortion is implied here. 153

Rifle No. 5 Mk I aka Lee-Enfield No 5 Mk 1, aka Lee-Enfield Jungle Carbine. The end of the war in

Europe saw the widespread issue of the No.5 and most of the operational use of this rifle occurred in post-

war colonial campaigns such as the Malayan emergency, This is where the ‘Jungle Carbine’ nickname

comes from. Production began in March 1944, and finished in December 1947.

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jungle_Carbine)


42

murderer of Mail Rudo was not found, Bendang DO will be scorched (padang jarak

padang tekukur).

Jointly the Banjarese urged Utoh Putih to leave Bendong DO with his wife and

children immediately for fear that someone may reveal his existence and whereabouts.

‘The mouth of the urn (muntung guri) can be shut (dipisiti), the human mouth who

knows’. Utoh Putih however refused to budge adding that what will be, will be.

As it turns out, the warning rings true. Three days after the incident, six

communist crept up (karayapato) to Utoh Putih house when his wife and eldest child was

out fishing (maunjun) ikan puyu154

with friends. Armed with MK5 rifles, the communist

peeked into the house and found Utoh Putih sound asleep and pointed their gun’s muzzle

(palumpongan) to his head from outside the window (lulungkang).

They fired three shots and delivered Utoh Putih his death with blood oozing from

his bubbling (mangarabuak) heart pouring from the orifices of his head. This time around

Utoh Putih invulnerability did not come to his aid. The sound of the shots startled and

woke up his youngest child who was fast asleep (marinuk) at the window at the projected

part (anjung, verandah) of the house, when into a fit screaming wildly (kuciak papar) and

crawled (bakayukut) to his now lifeless father, hugging the body. Fortunately his

youngest child was spared the same fate as his father.

The communist left laughing returning to Pekan Rabu, Bendang DO in the

direction of Sungai Tungko. En route, they almost cross path with Emoh, Utoh Putih’s

best friend who upon chancing on the communist took a different route and suspecting

something amiss rushed to the latter’s house.

That very evening, the Banjarese villagers of Bendang DO resolved to bury Utoh

Putih but the burial only took place at night for the lack of materials because of the state

incumbrance.

A week past and unbeknown to the villagers the CPM had established a small

tactical base camp about one kilometer from Bendang DO with the object of monitoring

and boasting that no one can liberate Malaya except for the CPM.

Many Malays and Banjarese began to be influenced by the communist

propaganda to the extent that some joined the armed resistance whilst those cowardly and

brave as a fly (berani-berani lalat) became the eyes and ears of the communist.

However the CPM base camp at Bendang DO was given the cold shoulders

(dipahawai) by the villagers. ‘What kind of struggle is this when its conduct is far worse

than the Japanese administration? That was probably the perception of all the Banjarese

residents of Bendang DO – really annoyed I reckoned (geram benar gamaknya).’

The communist head honcho at the main base camp at Sungai Tungko was rattled

that their campaign was given the cold shoulders by the Banjarese denizen of Bendang

DO whom he regarded as hard headed (keras hati). To soften the Banjarese, the CPM

played a different card by creating problems every day – food, properties were

confiscated and crops destroyed (takundangsai) trammeled upon (diinjak dilenyek).

These acts of intimidation did not produce the desired results instead it only inflamed

(barau) further the anger of the Banjarese.

Ah Pau, Ah Boon and Ah Jang the communist strongmen then issued an order and

ultimatum; if the Banjarese do not want to see Bendang DO becoming (padang

halilintar) within a week the Banjarese residents were to assemble young women

154

Climbing perch (Anabas testudineus).


43

(bibinian) and girls regardless whether they are damsel (anak dara, literally virgins) or

somebody’s wife to meet the sexual gratification of the communist. ‘For so long the

perchance foreskin (gerangan si kulup, in reference to uncircumcised Chinese) craved for

womenfolk. If this is their conduct [unbecoming], how are they going to resist the British

later.’

Such was the decree, a yearning/addiction (satu tagihan), that was burdensome to

the Banjarese residents of Banjar Bendang DO. Where do [we bring our] complain during

this trying times, there is no penghulu (headman), no village head. How [what to do].

In response to this challenge Tuan Guru Haji Bakri made a pact with the

Banjarese citizens of Bendang DO who were ready to fight the communist. To the Tuan

Haji the communist demands for ‘comfort women’ had crossed the line. Victimizing the

fairer sex was to him the last straw on the camel’s back. Haji Bakri, was a Banjarese from

the Rantau sib migrated (baandah) from Kalimantan to Sapat in Sumatra, and from there

to Batu Pahat, Johor, where he met his wife, illustrating another Sungai Manik-Batu

Pahat connection

Eight women were gathered but in the end only five agreed, that too after plenty

of coaxing (jenuh memujuk). Who in their right mind would be willing (rigi) to be the sex

slave (hulun) to the uncouth (tak tau bahasa) communist terrorist. The Tuan Guru

assured (manahapi) them that,

We are not so stupid as to extend (manjulung) wholly (budas) our young maiden

(sunti) excepting there a ruse (helah) as temporary bait (umpan).

With only three days left to meet the CPM’s ultimatum, the Banjarese

converged at the house of the Tuan Guru located next to the prayer house (surau) of Parit

8 to strategized on how to face up to the communist challenge. Bendang DO became

deserted as all the residents relocated to the Tuan Guru house which has now become the

Banjarese base.

There the residents sharpened (mangilir) their machetes which carried many

names, for example, Utoh Putih’s razor sharp machete si Kandal Larap can sculpt a head

bald. The Tuan Guru’s parang bungkol was called Mandam Layu. In preparation, the

Banjarese displayed all kinds of praxis and knowledge such as soaking overnight in an

decrepit well, performing wird (a form of prayer) all day long without stoping (berwirid

kada sing mandakan), taking bamboo bath and other normative practices (petua). ‘What

not (betapa tidak), the struggle between life and death cannot be taken lightly.’

Come Monday morning as the sun rise from the east, the time came for the

Bendang DO Banjarese to make their reckoning (perhitungan) with the accursed CPM

army (tentera PKM haram jadah).

After much coaxing, the Banjarese women presented themselves and were made

up causing the eyes to rove (rambang mata) as to which one to choose from. Amongst

them were Emoh, Acil and Sabran disgused (manyalumur) as women, dressed and made

up by Banjarese women of Bendang DO.

The faces of the women were shrunk with fear, seems red and fearful, at the same

time aflame fiery furious from the Tuan Guru’s spell (jampi). It was hoped that none

would have weak knees or tremble (lamah buluan) when facing the enemy or cannot bear

the sight of blood frothing up during battle.


44

The many shades of expressions in the description showed the desperation,

anxiety and anticipation of the Banjarese in their impending encounter with the

communist.

Around 9am, the dressed and made up Banjarese women began to march in a

single file towards the CPM based at the end of Bendang DO led by Ali and Amat Tuban

for the ‘surrender’. The two were prohibited (ditangati) from carrying any weapons. In

the past the Banjarese like the Hadrami Arabs bore arms what more when getting into

battle. Minimally they would carry a dagger (lading balati) as sharped as a razor tuck at

the waist and concealed by the clothing not visible to the naked eye.

On seeing the arrivals of the Banjarese women, the communist broke into laughter

especially their leaders – Ah Boon, Ah Pau and Ah Jang. It is unclear what triggered this

was it the very looks of the opposite sex or mocking the Banjarese.

The three crossed dressed Banjarese men walked behind the women holding fast

their machete Si Kandal Larap, Si Mandam Layu and Si Tungkih Kiwang. They walked

awkwardly as they are not used to wearing long cloth (kain bairitan).

The Tuan Guru who remained behind with a prayer beads in hand recited the wird

(a form of prayer) intensely non-stop in the surau.

On arrival at the CPM’s base, Ali and Amat Tuban did the ceremonial

surrendering of the women to the communist.

The transfer was received with even more laughter almost culminating into an

uproar, illustrated by the saying as if the moon was falling on the lap, as the unimaginable

has happened. The Banjarese who were believed to have dared challenged the ‘Bintang

Tiga’ was now proven as empty talk (omong kosong). The CPM camp broke into a

clamour of dialogues in Chinese.

After brushing aside and barking (mahingkau) at Ali and Amat Tuban, one of the

communist leaders began inspecting the arrayed Banjarese women starting from the front

to the back whilst pushing aside their scarf (salungkui) with roving eyes checking the

woman one by one. The rest began to mob the women like hungry tiger (macan) for

human prey. In the end lust go the better of the communist.

On inspection of the fifth Banjarese girl (diyang, a virgin), Ah Boon fingers

started to caress and was about to kiss the girl when a cry (hangkuian) of ‘Crooks

accursed pig …Allahuakbarrr’ (Bangsat, babi haram jadahhh…Allahuakbarrr!!!) bust

out from Emoh.

The Banjarese men sprang into action and the slaughter began. ‘Labukk…’ First

to lose his head was Ah Boon. Acil then pounce on Ah Jang who caught unaware was

stunt by the sudden surge. Next to fall was Ah Pau at the hands of Sabran. Their bodies

severed from their heads sprawled (humbalingan) on the camp grounds.

At the same time the Banjarese residents (bubuhan) Bendang DO who were

hiding (basungkup) in the canal (parit) for half the night, ambushed the CPM. The

Banjarese rushed (manyasah) from their hiding places and swamped the rest of the

‘Bintang Tiga’ troops who by then were in a state of bewilderment (kapipiyangan).

Amidst cries of ‘Allahuakbarrr!!!’ the Banjarese charged at the ‘Bintang Tiga’

who caught by surprise was slow to take up arms. The Banjarese swinging (mailai) their

machete chased after the communist who ran helter-skelter (bakatumbahan) cutting them

down like banana trunks.


45

Blood streak the grounds, bodies were sprawled (galing-galingan) and abandoned

weaponry scattered (hambur tauran) all over the place. Not a single MK5 rifles were

taken by the victorious Banjarese who thrusting their blades were disinterested in modern

weapons.

A search of the camp grounds, uncovered only one gunny sack of rice and

cooking utensils. The camp set ablaze (mandah) was engulfed by red flames (

this mangararau). With that the death of Utoh Putih was avenged.

All in all thirty-four (34) CPM cadres fell at the hands of the Bendang DO

Banjarese. Not a single Banjarese was harmed in the scuffle, only their trousers and shirts

were tainted red with spattered (kacuratan) enemy blood. It was a resounding victory for

the long oppressed Banjarese.

Contrast to the account by MPAJA’s commander above whose company went to

the rescue of the fleeing Chinese, where they encountered a group of parang panjang and

clashed with them resulting in a number of death on the side of the parang panjang group

whilst the rest fled leaving thousands of swords behind.

The figures on both sides were probably exaggerated.

In the aftermath, the Banjarese returned to the Tuan Haji’s house and took a dip in

the canal in front of the house as if cleansing themselves of impurities before performing

the zohor (mid-day prayers).

On receiving the tragic news, the CPM’s main base camp at Sungai Tungko was

rouse (gigir) as it was taken as a setback in the history of the communist party in Lower

Perak. While waiting for the arrival of higher officials of the party, like chicks

(ilah) losing its mother hen not a single communist operative dared to show their face at

Bendang DO.

In contrast the Banjarese who had gather at the Tuan Guru’s house, both men and

women were busy cutting cloth to be made into red sach (wafak Selindang Merah) as the

Tuan Guru had a prominition that the bloodshed at Bendang DO would not go away just

like that.

The scale of the clash was about to get wider. All of Sungai Manik Banjarese

were urged to make preparations for an all out and prolonged war – a war not limited

towards the CPM alone but an interethnic and religious strife.

On receipt of a new commander from the PCM base at Sungai Galah, Tanjung

Tulang, emboldened the Sungai Tungko communist terrorist whose acts of terrorism

increase in ferocity (mambala-bala) to avenge their recent defeat. Every village near to

Sungai Tungko was harassed, properties confiscated, people’s wife and maiden abducted.

Whosoever dared to resist would collapsed (tajalungkup) brought down by the MK5

rifles bullets. Even children in swings/cradle (dipukongan) were not spared from their

inhuman and merciless debauchery. Suraus were razed to the ground. The narrator,

Nilasakunta asked,

What kind of liberation struggle in this?

Or shall we say what kind of left-wing progressive politics it this? This question is

pertinent to ask as it has become fashionable nowadays for contemporary liberals, left-

wing politicians and oppositional political parties, the arty-farty types and non-

governmental organisations (NGOs) to cast and portray the CPM as ‘freedom fighters’ as

opposed to being an outright terrorist organization. They should revisit and relook at the


46

deeds and actions of the CPM instead of romancticizing about their idealized so-called

progressive ideology and being intolerant of those who disagree with them by labelling

them right-wing, pro-Umno or pro-BN. To the leftist and the rightist there can only be

two kinds of politics – their perverted kind. Minority views are not very much tolerated

by both sides of the equation.

The communist extended its victimization to the Malay villagers along the banks

of the Perak river. This was a miscalculated move as it triggered the mobilization of the

Malays and the Banjarese against the predominantly Chinese communist. Ten of

hundreds of Malays rushed to see the Banjarese Tuan Guru seeking the ‘art of war’. They

were given water incantated with prayers (jampi) to drink which was enough to convince

the Malays to participate in a joint attack on the CPM of Sungai Tungko.

In light of the intensity of the incendiary, the Tuan Guru declared in the name of

God and His Prophet, ‘Fisabilillah’ (struggle in the way of Allah), launching it by

repeated shouts of ‘Allahuakbar!’ which was rejoindered by the Banjarese.

In the interim the Banjarese unanimously elected Acil, the grandson of the Tuan

Guru as Khalifah Fisabilullah in spite of his young age he as ‘his chest was full of

knowledge’, who planned the attack on the CPM’s base at Sungai Tungko.

Those who were to participate in the attack don white robes, a red sach around

their persons, a white head handkerchief (laung) and armed with the parang bungkol

machete. After the Tuan Guru recited prayer (doa) to bless the war party, they were sent

off to Sungai Tungko.

Unbeknown to them, the CPM was anticipating their arrival with MK5 rifles

trained at the enemy and fingers ready at the trigger. At Parit 8 surau, the Tuan Guru

conducted zikir (repetitive utterances of short sentences glorifying God) continuously.

Only Sukri remained behind pacing up and down the village keeping an eye on the safety

of Banjarese women and children of those who went Fisabilullah.

With the cry of “Fisabilullah…Lailahaillallah [No God but

Allah]…Allahuakbar!!! [Allah is Great]’, Acil the war khalifah flagged the start of the

offensive.

In chorus the Banjarese chant ‘Lailahaillallah…’ continuously. This was followed

by the cracking of rifle fire (kalingungan, the sound of bullets) like heavy rain spouting

from the muzzle of the guns. To the horror of the CPM terrorist the bullets did no bodily

harm to the Banjarese. Within minutes, the Banjarese braves were six feet (sajangkauan)

from the communists. The sound (galabukan) of machete swaying with all the might and

slashing fast (ancap) could be heard. The weaponary of the communist was of no use and

instaed they were made sheilds to block the machete attacks.

It was a bloodbath. The Banjarese braves destroyed the CPM base camp at

Bendang DO. The attackers’ cloth and trousers were drenched (jimus) with the blood of

the communist terrorists.

‘Allahuakbar…’ exclaimed Acil to ceased (bamandak) the assault. The same

exclamation is employed for retreat to recover from battle exhaustion and strategize new

offensives.

The ground at the camp site was flushed with blood and bodies were strewn all

over the place. In spite of the carnage, five of the CPM leaders fled (talapas bukahan) the

war theatre. The Banjarese took the opportunity during the lull to assemble, do a head

count to see if any of them were missing, harmed or were among the casualties.


47

In reprisal for the onslaught, throngs (barara) of CPM operatives from all the post

in Lower Perak headed for Sungai Manik. The second encounter was far more dreadful

than the first as the CPM was armed to the teeth – not only with MK5 rifles, but Bren

guns155

and caches of hand granades the likes of jambu batu (karatukul).

In spite of the show of force, it did not dampen (manuhurakan) the will to fight

amongst the Sungai Manik Banjarese. Beside the parang bungkol machete, the Banjarese

were armed with the sacred kalimah ‘Lailahaillallah…Allahuakbar’. They held fast

(dipingkuti) to these as the main armament.

After a month of holy war (perang sabil) in Sungai Manik, there was no end in

sight, even though many (manjarau) communist had fallen they were still no deterred

(serik); in fact becoming more determined and their numbers increased daily.

The gang of communist across the Perak river became increasingly vicious,

torturing and killing Banjarese and Malays from Kampung Gajah dan Balun Bidai. No

harm came to the Chinese; in fact they were protected, confirming the suspicion of the

Banjarese and Malays that the CPM was by the Chinese, for the Chinese all along.

It was during the height of the insurgency and at a critical time in their fight

against the communist that Haji Masmuda, the brother of the Tuan Guru arrived from

Batu Pahat in Johor, turned up unexpectedly. The Batu Pahat Banjarese was the Sungai

Manik Banjarese counterpart to the south of Malaya. He was immediately elected to lead

the charge in place of Acil in Sungai Manik whereas the Tuan Guru himself and his

grandson Acil’s energies were diverted to Balun Bidai.

In the meantime the red sach (wafak Selindang Merah) emblazoned with the

words ‘Allahuakar’ were made especially for the people across the Perak river. One of

the calligraphers was a haji by the name of Haji Asmuni.

The magico-mystical leadership of Haji Masmuda in Sabiullah war in Sungai

Manik first came to the fore when in an attack by the Sabiullah fighters in Sungai Manik,

the communists fired way above their heads into the empty air (puang). Apparently in the

the communist vision the Sabiullah fighters were towering as high as coconut tree and

fired at that height, giving the fighers the opportunity to rush, hack (timpas), slash and cut

down their enemy.

Among those who fell in battle at the tip of the machete parang bungkol of the

Banjarese include many that proclaim the name of Allah. On close inspection it was

found that they are Malays and Banjarese who were duped into joining the communist

struggle. In the heat of battle it was hard to differentiate between the Banjarese, Malays

and Chinese as they all wore the Bintang Tiga uniform.

The CPM fighters were persistent and never gave up. While waiting assistance

from Sungai Karang across Teluk Anson, they continued (manyalajurakan) with their

struggle. The tongkang laden with gangs of CPM fighters sent as reinforcement sunk in

the Perak river near the Teluk Anson harbour. The Sabiullah fighters attribute this to

divine intervention.

Heap (melambak) of Chinese communist who do not know how to swim

(bakunyung) were drowned and met their watery graves. Whereas the Malays and

155

A .303-caliber, gas-operated, magazine-fed light machine gun developed from a Czec design and used

by British and Commonwealth troops during World War II and afterward.


48

Banjarese communist many of whom can swim were saved by swimming to Pulau

Galagak. ‘If not, for certain, beween Muslims will do battle in future at Sungai Manik.

Indeed Allah is All Knowing.’

The Banjarese claims that the sinking of the tongkang transporting the communist

from across the other bank of the Perak river dealt a death blow to their aspiration to

control Sungai Manik. Credit was given to the magico-mystical leadership of Haji

Masmuda, commander of the Red Sach (panglima Selendang Merah) from Batu Pahat,

Johor.

Nevertheless many Malays and Banjarese fled Balun Bidai, Kampung Gajah and

neighbouring villagers to the jungle leaving their homes behind as the communist on that

side of the Perak river whose terrorism increased in ferocity, shooting at houses randomly

(membabi buta) going berserk (mengamuk) taking repraisal against innocent people.

The Chinese in the same area did not suffer the same fate as almost all of them

supported the CPM and because of this they were left alone in peace.

On safely crossing the Perak River, the Tuan Guru, Acil and Emoh arrived at

Kampung Changkat, Bayas and Balun Bidai, and found the Banjarese there equally

resolute. There was no mention of Malay bravery.

Acil was elected as the Khalifah of surau Changkat Bayas, the headquarters of the

Sabilullah fighters at Balun Bidai. By know the young Khalifah Acil had months of

combat experience fighting the enemy at Sungai Manik. He was characterized as

stubborn and was said to be bullet-proff, and would dance (baigal) when shot at by the

communist. His ‘impenetrability’ reputation made him the target of the communist.

The sach (selendang) and red head handkerchife which was brought from Sungai

Manik was distributed. Those who have their own wafak were allowed to wear them. Day and night shots can be heard at the edges of Balun Bidai, what they [the

communist] were shooting at was not known. Killing and torturing is their work, that’s all

they know. [No doubt] in part the intention was to intermidate to display that the

communist was still strong [in power] even though they were defeated at Sungai Manik.

At the beginning seventy Banjarese sign up as Sabilullah fighters but when it

came to the crunch some decided to stay-behind as guards to watch over the wives and

children of the Sabilullah fighters who have gone to attack the CPM base on the banks of

Balun Bidai.

As usual, the Tuan Guru was in zikir and reciting sacred verses at the surau.

With the rallying cry of ‘Lailahaillallah…Allahuakbar!!!’ the holy war (perang

sabil) began in the Kampung Gajah area.

The war at Balun Bidai gave rise to another Banjarese hero named Mawi, the

owner of the machete parang bungkol named Si Kajang Rungkup. In battle, he will not

hesitate to pounched (marungkup) and kill, literally slaughter like a cow. What is

astonishing is that the enemy on being set upon becomes feeble and does not put up a

fight. This phenomenon was attributed to the magical qualities of the machete. After the

war, Acil became famous by the title of ‘Acil Wani’ (Acil, The Brave).

The protection/preservation (haragu) given [by CPM to the Chinese] is not

without strings, there is trickery (sipatan) in the protection. The Chinese many of whom

resided at every nock and crany of Kampung Gajah began to jeer, mock (kulibian) the

Malay when they meet them.


49

The boldness of the Chinese to be so impertinence in a Malay majority area stem

from the CMP hold on power and are well armed. Their propaganda directed to the

Chinese at Kampung Gajah disproved their claims of championing all Malayans. The

indoctrination sounds like this:

O my people, the holy war is manufactured by the Malays is largely directed

towards racism. They plan to wipe out the Chinese race throughout the peninsula; that is

their real motive. Are you willing to see your own race vapourized stamped out by

Malays? Surely you would not bear it. Nah what are you waiting for, let’s us join hands

and we resist until the last drop of blood!

If the above account is realiable, obviously the CPM did not make and is

incapable of making any distinction between the Malays and the Banjarese. To them

whosoever is not Chinese or Indians must be Malay. In counterpoint the Banjarese do

make a clear distinction between their ethnic group and the Malays.

As the Chinese were already indebted to the CPM for their protection and

preservation, they were ready to fight for their race and creed.

The Chinese could not see the ruse behind the sweet words uttered by the CPM;

when in fact [the CPM] was deceiving/defraud (mawalohi) them for their own vested

interest by pitting (menyaung) the Chinese against the Malays. How not, as many

communists have met their demise at the hand of Banjarese fighters.

The Chinese began to gather a multitude (sarabanya) of necessities – big

machete, crooked machete, wooden tempinis [Sloetia elongate] pole [yoke] whatever

there is for the purpose of war. If they come across Malays regardless of big [adult] or

small [children], they would finish them off.

The encounter between the Sabilullah fighters, the Chinese and the communist at

the outskirt of Kampung Sungai Galah was just as furious compared to previous

engagements accentuating the gravity of the interethnic conflict in that part of Perak state.

Nilasakunta wrote that in these battles, the Chinese were not lacking in either skills or

abilities in a struggle of life and death conceding some concessions to their enemies.

In one of these engagements, the Sabilullah fighters had to leave the battle fields

as ‘it was time to stop.’156

The enemy was in hue and cry (karahongan) urging that they

continue with the fight as they were not satisfied with the outcome. When the Banjarese

ignored them, the Chinese mocked them by teasing and mimicking (mauyati) the zikir

‘Lailahailallah’.

Lailahailalit…Malayu kasi habit! [finish off the Malays]

That the ‘Chinese’ were aware of the invocation of the Banjarese in preparing

their invisibility (invulnerable) in battle is revealing of the cross-cultural knowledge,

limited it may be, that they have of each other.

156

In pursuing a ‘holy war’ the Banjarese had to observe certain taboos. For example when the Khalifah

call for a stop, they have to stop immediately irrespective of the state of affairs otherwise harm will come to

the fighters. Some of these stops were for strategic retreat, to recover from battle exhaustion, etc.. It could

very well be just a case of losing a fight but not conceded in those terms.


50

Note that the Chinese saw the Banjarese as Malays although in this recollections

the Banjarese potray themselves as distinct from the Malays. Likewise the Banjarese

probably cannot tell apart the different ‘Chinese’ ethnic groups to be found within the

ranks of the CPM and in Lower Perak.

At this time, hundreds of Malays from Kampung Gajah came to see the Tuan

Guru at the surau at Changkat Bayas. Of these, only ten were granted the red sach as that

was what was leftover. However all of them were given blessed water (banyu

garangsang) and were given a trust (amanat) – if possible, wipe out the remnants and the

seeds (saki baki dan zuriat) of the communist in Kampung Gajah.

In realizing the Tuan Guru’s trusts, the Malay immediately – on the very same

day and not wait until the next day – launch a full scale assault on the Chinese at

Kampung Gajah, razing their homes and chasing them out.

The Banjarese claimed that the Kampung Gajah Malays became bold after

‘learning [magico-mystical] knowledge’ (menuntut ilmu) from the Banjarese and blamed

the selfish action (angkara) of Ali Amin, one of their own, for ‘trading’ the secrets to the

Malays.

On being taken into account for this by Acil and Emoh; out of shame Ali Amin

left Balun Bidai and dissappered without a trace.

After recuperating for three days, the Sabilullah fighters were ready to launch

another offensive on the enemy at the outskirts of Kampung Sungai Galah. According to

the premonition of the Tuan Guru, this was to be the last battle.157

The author gave the impression that in this battle, hand to hand combat took place

as he mentioned clashes (kalintingan) of weapons.

Whilst the clash was still live, the Chinese became dumbfounded as suddenly the

Banjarese vanished into thin air. The communist terrorists who were hiding emerged

from their hiding places to find the Banjarese braves. They thought that the Banjarese had

fled and rejoiced in victory.

But the ‘victory’ was shortlived as out of nowhere the parang bungkol machete

appeared in flight, swaying, slashing and stabbing like rain, which cannot be blocked.

According to the narrator, the machete was not flying by itself as there was no

agency and will (kudrat dan iradat) to direct them as such. In truth it was the Banjarese

who were the actors behind them but they were not visible to the eyes of the communist

as they were in the unseen world (alam ghaib).

Kampung Sungai Galah was red with blood. The panic-striken communist fled

helter-skelter in the direction of Tambun.

The bravery of the Banjarese raise the spirits (semangat) of the Malays elsewhere

in Perak which led to the the razing of Chinse villagers along Perak river and Chenderong

Balai in revenge for the communists past oppression against the Malays. Since then, no

Chinese are to be found in Kampung Gajah whereas the communist remnants fled to the

jungle.

Only after the rumble had settled down that the ‘the British Punjabi mercenaries

arrived to keep the peace at Sungai Manik and Kampung Gajah’; this is in reference to

the Punjab regiment that had served there during the disturbances, whom Abdullah

claimed instigated the ‘Malays’ to despice the Chinese and assault them. In the past the

157

Tuan Guru Haji Bakri died in Mecca at the age of 57 years old on 26 September 1950 and was buried at

the Ma’ala cemetery.


51

Chinese feared the ‘Mungkali Kwai’ (Sikh devils) who was effectively deployed by

British colonial rule to clamp down on ‘secret societies’ (triads) in Perak.158

It appears to

have done the job in Sungai Manik to keep the Chinese at bay.

PKMM, the first political party in post-war Malaya

The Japanese wartime occupation of Malaya which ushered in a new configuration of

power, shattered the old colonial order in more ways than one, and ironically in spite of

the violence and militarism, with the introduction of the discourse of nationalism, mass

politics, political mobilization, pan-Asianism – all new paradigm – emboldened the

‘Malay left’159

was political self-confidence and decisive action by providing entitlement

to political activisim or engagement to a previously subservient and quiescent public

under pre-war colonial rule. Alternative oppositional and critical voices began to be heard

loud and clear during the occupation period.

Japanese empowerment of the radical nationalists paved the way for a select

group of Malay-Muslim intellectuals to forge a new political movement that mobilizes

mass political action amongst the people (peasantry or rakyat, subjects) long before their

nemesis the conservative aristocrats could raise to the occasion. In the main, the largely

Sumatran proponents of this new politics drew inspiration from the rhetoric of the fiery

revolutionary republican model from across the Straits of Malacca, which posed a direct

threat to the ruling class nurtured by their British overlord.

The changed in the balance of power between the ruling class and the radical

nationalists translated into a direct political challenge to the traditional leadership of the

erstwhile protected lot under British benevolence. With the advent of the radical

nationalists in the new equation in ‘Malayan’ politics, the ruling class monopoly over

politics ended vanished with the emergence of the ‘Malay left’ as unfortunately

ethnicized by Western scholars.

The Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Melaya (PKMM) or the Malay Nationalist Party

of Malaya (MNP) formed two days after the end of Japanese rule in August 1945

emerged as the first radical anti-colonial nationalist left-leaning party of the post-war

period.160

The fact that it used ‘partai’ instead of ‘parti’ is indicative of its ‘Indonesian’

influence. PKMM was the first political organisation to use the word party in its official

name.

However the use of the word ‘kebangsaan’ in the party’s name makes the

nationalism of the organisation suspect seen from the prisim of radical pro-Indonesian

158

Abdur-Razzaq Lubis and Khoo Salma Nasution, Raja Bilah and The Mandailings in Perak, 1875-1911,

MBRAS, 2003: 109. 159

An academic, a son of one of the prominent leaders of the ‘Malay Left’ problematize the term as an

‘inherent contradictions between ‘communal’ and ‘ideological’’ but proceeded to retain the

questionable term nevertheless. (Rustam A. Sani, Social Roots of the Malay Left, Petaling Jaya: SIRD,

2008). A leftist member of the movement has owned up that the leading lights of the cause were of

Kerinci, Rawa (or Rao as they are known in Sumatra), Mendahiling (standard Mandailing),

Minangkabau and Talu ethnicity. (Memoir Abdul Majid Salleh, Dalam PKMM dan Kesatuan Buruh,

Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2004: 21). See also Khoo and Lubis, 2005: 222, 299-

301. 160

It has been suggested that the PKMM was formed two days after the Japanese surrender on 17 August

1945, the same day that Indonesia declared its independence from Dutch rule. The second postwar national

Malay political party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) established in 1946 upstagged the

radicals and went on to claim the mantle of mainstream Malay nationalism.


52

activisim as the root word ‘bangsa’ carries the exclusivity of ‘Malayness’ or ‘Malayism’.

Therefore the use of the term ‘kebangsaan’ is problematic as it posed troublesome

questions of nationality, nationalism and the form of government in a multi-bangsa

Malaya. Insofar as the pro-republican activists are concerned, the word ‘nasional’ is far

more aligned to nationalism and more inclusive. Seen from this perspective UMNO

would have been more inclusive as it used the word ‘national’ is in its official name.

However ‘nasional’ to both political spectrum is derived from the word ‘kebangsaan’

which only entered the political discourse in the 1940s and carries with it all the

connotations assigned to traditionalism, conservatism and Malayism. In that both were

confined and defined by their geo-political realities of being political entities established

in ‘British Malaya’.

The Suara Rakyat161

press in Ipoh played mid-wife to the birth of PKMM; the

former also became the party mouth organ. PKMM became the main political vehicle for

both secular and Islamist nationalists who demanded immediate independence from

British colonial rule. It quickly filled the vacuum left by the crumbling Japanese military

establishment and in the absence of the British authorities that had yet to reclaim their

former colony.

The radical nationalists furthered the new idioms of mass politics, the new

language of nationalism and popular or people’s sovereignty to the political landscape

through their mouth organs and public rallies, extolling freedom and justice, calling for

immediate independence from the British overlord while simultaneously

reconceptualising society. The new politics, the new language of nationalism and the new

discourse promoted the adherence to a set of universal principles – unity, humanity,

liberty, democracy, fraternity, etc. – rather than blind loyalty and obedience to authority

in particular the ruling class (the Malay rulers and aristocrats). The social standing and

prestige of the rulers in particular was tarnished during the occupation and immediate

post-occupation period.

The PKMM posed a direct threat to the traditional leadership of conservative

aristocrats and rivalled the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) in the main led

by the aristocrats-bureaucrats turned-politicians after the Japanase occupation. PKMM

was not a danger to the communists as the latter albeit Indonesian communist played a

key role in its inception through the agency of Arshad Ashaari, the manager of Suara

Rakyat, who was the proxy of Mokhtaruddin Lasso, an operative of Indonesian

Communist Party (PKI).162

Rather than a player in plural politics, PKMM was a

competitor within Malay politics for power and position in post-war Malaya.

Inspired by the revolutionary nationalism of Soekarno, PKMM called for closer

ties with Indonesia in forging a pan-peninsula-maritime political alliance uniting Malaya

and Indonesia under the aegis of Indonesia Raya. Dominated by Sumatrans, the PKMM

however failed to win over the support of the conservative Malay elite in Perak. PKMM

161

Immediately after the Japanese surrender, Ahmad Boestamam seized the opportunity to produce Suara

Rakyat, a Romanized daily paper, with the cooperation of the now unemployed typesetter of Perak

Shimbun. They use the newspaper, ink and print and printing press and even occupied the offices of the

former Perak Shimbun. The newspaper was peddled in the streets of Ipoh. (Khoo and Lubis, 2005: 246). 162

Memoir Ahmad Boestamam, Merdeka dengan Darah dalam Api, Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan

Malaysia, 2004: 132; Khoo and Lubis, 2005: 299-300. Communist operatives such as Tan Malaka, Alimin

and Musso has been active in the Malayan peninsula since the 1920s; in other words, communism made its

way into into the Malayan peninsular through the efforts of Indonesian communist agents.


53

had its own militant youth wing, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) led by Ahmad

Boestamam whilst its women’s wing was led by Aishah Ghani.163

In so far as the British colonial authorities were concerned, it was the ‘Malay

Left’ in particular the Ipoh-based API that posed a serious threat to state or homeland

security. The former first clamped down on API quasi-military drilling and then arrested

its leader, Ahmad Boestamam for sedition.

It was API, and not the Chinese left, that provoked the British government into

passing legislation to narrow the parameters of political activity… The API had the

distinction of being the first political party to be banned in post-war Malaya.164

In spite of its radical and leftist orientation, PKMM like many parties after it

subscribed to the hegemonic understanding of racial difference perpetuated by the

colonial census by which the colonial state herded their colonial subjects into separate

racial kraal identified in ethno-racial ascriptions of ‘Malay’, ‘Chinese’ ‘Indians’ (MCI) or

CMI in Singapore, and through which they are corralled into their assigned economic

roles and socio-political spaces. It had the effect of creating boundaries and frontiers

between different ‘races’, ethnic and religious groupings that had been set up against each

other. Unfortunately the interregnum only reaffirmed, reinforced, consolidated and

ossified these barriers of distinct and totalised identities.

The captive minds of the colonial subjects irrespective of whether they were

radical, right-wing, left-wing or socialist-communist replicated the social engineering in

their respective forms of anti-colonial politics were exclusive, communitarian and ethno-

centric in their appeal. They were first and foremost, subscribers to the doctored notions

of racial and ethnic solidarity above all else. In caged enclosures, these political parties

were unable and incapable of transcending the racial divide introduced by their colonial

masters in monitoring, subjugating and segregating their colonial subjects. These were

further complicated by the fact that the colonial census had introduced artificial

distinctions between the colonised subjects raising questions of identity construction, the

politics of identity and race-relations. The prevalence of the ideology of race and class,

amplified further race and ethnicity as a political marker and identity identification.165

Indeed the struggle for bangsa Melayu amounted to one of ‘Malay-ism’ rather than for

nationalism166

which is equally applicable to bangsa China and bangsa India.

Trade Unionism, Class Conflict and the Racial Factor

When the British returned to Malaya, the MPAJA were called to surrender their arms.

The communists, who were not ready to fight the British, hid secret caches of arms in the

jungle for the day when they would take up armed struggle. The BMA rule from

163

Khoo and Lubis, 2005: 300; Lenore Manderson, Women, Politics and Change, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1985: 55) 164

T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1999: 119. 165

For a discussion of these issues, see our paper, ‘Janus-faced Politics: State and Academe Collusion in

the Perpetuation of Racial Ideologies in West Malaysia’ a paper presented at the Asia Pacific Sociological

Association (APSA) International Conference ‘Transforming Societies: Contestations and Convergences in

Asia and the Pacific’ Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Thailand, 15-16 February 2014. 166

Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community, 1945-1950, Kuala

Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993.


54

September 1945 to April 1946 was a period of strife. The communists formed an Ex-

Comrades Association and infiltrated the labour unions while the leftists continued to be

politically active by organising political parties to mobilize popular opinion against the

British. By passing trade union, society and press legislation, the British suppressed

communist and leftist activities and made them illegal.

The economy had not yet returned to normal and unemployment was high. Tin

mine and plantation labourers took to the streets demanding jobs and higher wages. The

numbers of participants in demonstrations and rallies grew alarmingly. Hundreds if not

thousands at a time were angrily massing in towns throughout the state venting their

frustration at the British authorities.

On October 21, 1945, British troops were called in to disperse large

demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people from Sungei Siput, Ipoh and Batu

Gajah, all areas in the state of Perak. In Sungei Siput and Ipoh, the troops were ordered to

fire directly into the crowds. Ten demonstrators were shot dead in Sungei Siput and three

more in Ipoh. In Batu Gajah, emotions were so high that the British civil affairs officer

was cornered in the Court House and surrounded by 50 furious demonstrators. Troops

were ordered to rescue him.

Meanwhile, the Sumatran-dominated ‘Malay Left’, formed Malaya’s first political

parties to fight for national independence. They saw Indonesia and Malaya as having a

common struggle but failed to gain the support of the conservative Malay-Muslims who

did not subscribe to the notion of joint independence. Both Parti Kebangsaan Melayu

Malaya (PKMM), also called the Malay National Party (MNP) and the youth movement,

Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API), were formed in Ipoh between 1945-1946. The movement

was defused when MNP moved to Kuala Lumpur and the authorities clamped down on

API and arrested its leader Ahmad Boestamam.

In 1946, the Malay-Muslims became politically mobilized in their opposition to

the Malayan Union. Though led by the Malay-Muslim elite, the movement succeeded in

mobilizing the grassroots Malay-Muslims into political awareness.

The industrial unrests during the BMA did not overflow into social conflict and

ethnic riots in Perak because of several factors; one, the union leadership and

membership was largely in Chinese hands, and the union strike was perceived by the

majority of Malay-Muslims as a quarrel between the immigrants and the British

authorities of which the former were merely bystanders; secondly the emergence of

industrial and political consciousness amongst the Chinese posed a direct threat to the

British authorities, but as yet did not challenge Malay-Muslim political authority.

The Emergency and Ethnic Polarization

The roots of the Malayan Emergency lie within the Japanese occupation. Viewed from

this perspective, the Emergecny looks less like a spontaneous rising against British

imperialsim and more like a reassertion of a long-standing ambition of the CPM, giving

the fact that it had through its the militia and guerrilla arm MPAJA, annexed Malaya and

acted like a government during the interregnum. This is not to deny the anti-imperialist

dimension of the Emergency, but it does appear that the Malayan communists had

position themselves for control of the interior even before the end of the Japanese

occupation, long before the Emergency began.


55

The assassination of three European planters in Sungei Siput, Perak, provided the

pretext for the colonial government to declare a state of Emergency in 1948 and swiftly

shut down communist-dominated trade unions and arrested their leaders.

The Emergency was the British’s government euphemism for a war against the

communist that they could not call a war because the London insurance market provided

coverage to British miners and plantations for losses of stocks and equipments through

riot and civil commotion in an ‘emergency’ but not in a civil war.

Taken by surprise the CPM’s rank-and-file went underground, and the party

issued a call to them and to former MPAJA militias to take up arms again and flee to the

hills and jungles. Clearly the CPM’s decision to revolt was made in panic and haste,

accelerated by and partly in response to the severity of government action. A month later,

the CPM was proscribed.

The declaration of the State of Emergency had far-reaching unintended

consequences. It led to draconian Emergency laws, the rise of communalism, and an

initial military regime (under General Sir Gerald Templer) to combat communist

subversion and terrorism, ethnic urbanisation, the end of colonial rule and the birth and

building of a new nation.167

As many activists of the ‘Malay Left’ were arrested and held under detention

without trial, in the wake of the Emergency, forcing some to flee into the jungle or to the

Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) to avoid detention, the Emergency is seen by the ‘Malay

Left’ as a ploy by the colonial authorities to divert and detract the attention of the Malay-

Muslims from the struggle for independence from the yoke of British imperialism.168

In turn it has been suggested that the British declared the ‘Emergency’ to

mobilized the Malay-Muslims to fight the Chinese peril represented by the MPAJA and

the CPM.169

The MPAJA changed its image and renamed itself as the Malayan People’s

Anti-British Army and subsequently to the Malayan People’s National Liberation Army.

This time around the table was turned, with the Malay-Muslims fighting alongside British

and Commonwealth forces against the communist. In keeping with the status quo, Malay-

Muslims backed the establishment whilst the Chinese backed the underdogs.

As observed by Abdul Majid in his memoir

At the time, whoever talked about challenging the British government would be

given the title ‘communist’. Whoever had a skinny physique was said to have a

communist body, whoever was unshaven and had slightly long hair was also called a

communist as they had the perception communist as unattractive and shabby-looking.

This means the communist is ugly, scrawny, does have enough to eat, messy face

because ungroomed, unkempt and dishevelled. That is the image of the communist in the

eyes of the Malays. If a young man is handsome, properly dressed, the villagers would

greet him and exclaim, ‘Oh, so stylish like a white man’.

That was how the Malays evaluated and differentiated between a communist and

a colonialist. The reason why Malays think this way is because when Bintang Tiga

[MPAJA] ruled Malaya for 14 days, that is, after they took over from the Japanese and

167


Sabda and Wahba, 1981: 67. 169

Interview with Ho Thean Fook, 1999. Thean Fook is the author of Tainted Glory (Kuala Lumpur:

University of Malaya Press, 2000) which is about his involvement in the MPAJA. The work is a sequel to

Sybil Kartigasu’s No Dram of Mercy London: Neville Spearman, 1954.


56

before the arrival of British military, the Bintang Tiga were the policemen and guarded

the police stations. At that time, many Malays were victimized [anaiya] by Bintang Tiga

and many died [at the hands of the MPAJA]. Many of them were captured mostly for the

sake of revenge and the cause was quite likely a private matter. They were later arrested

by Malay members of Bintang Tiga.

The descendants of those who were wronged would exact retribution when the

opportunity arises.170

In this instance, the Malay-Muslims associate order, proper conduct and

appearance with the colonial regime, and disorderly behaviour, conduct unbecoming and

messy appearance with the communist. The way the MPAJA conducted themselves

during their two weeks reign of terror across the peninsula and the images of those

horrific times left a lasting impact on the minds of the Malay-Muslims. The memory of

those times was still fresh in their minds when the insurgency took place about three

years after the interregnum, reminding them of a period when hatred was mobilized into

inter-communal clashes leaving thousands dead.

At the time the war against communist insurgency broke out, the CPM

membership stood at between 12,000 and 14,000 members, 90 per cent of whom were

Chinese.171

Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner was of the view that the

attacks of the CPM were always directed at the Chinese ‘to obtain their support through

racial sympathy and intimidation.’172

According to Chin Peng, the CPM had started recruiting Malay-Muslims during

the Japanese Occupation, as they ‘enjoyed considerable support’ among the rural Malay-

Muslims at that period. ‘We had started recruiting and training Malays in Perak but the

Japanese surrender had interrupted this programme.’173

Lai Te’, then the party’s

Secretary-General, reasoned that the CPM could not yet wage war against the British

colonialist as ‘the Party’s influence in Malaya was strong only among the Chinese. It

was, on the other hand, weak among the Malays.’ He referred to the problem as an

‘imbalance’. If we were to continue the fight, he said, we could only rely on the support

of the Chinese.’174

In any case, the Malay-Muslim members and sympathisers of the Chinese-

dominated CPM were always in a minority, and of these most were of Indonesian or

more specifically Sumatran origin. Anthony Short, who wrote an authoritative account of

the Emergency, said ‘The terrorists were largely alien Chinese with no loyalty to Malaya

and the very few Malays and Indians among them attracted negligible support from their

own people’.175

In order to neutralize Chinese support for the communists, the British

administration granted citizenship to Chinese so as to win their allegiance as well as

divert their attention from China to the affairs of Malaya. It is not too far fetched to

suggest that the Chinese owed their citizenship to the communist struggle. As of midnight

14 September 1952, a total of 1.2 million Chinese, about 60 per cent of the Chinese

170


The Federation of Malaya and Its Police 1786-192, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1952: 31. 172

The MCA’s Stand Against Reds, C0 1022/176. 173

Alias Chin Peng, 2003: 128-9. 174


A. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, London: Federick Muller Ltd, 1975: 14.


57

residing in Malaya then and 180,000 Indians or 30 per cent of the Indians residing in

Malaya, were granted Malayan citizenship.176

The insurgency caused tremendous hardship to the people, but more significantly,

it increased ethnic suspicion and polarization to a higher level which were put in check

only by methods characteristic of a police state. In Perak, one of the sore points was the

neglect of traditional Malay-Muslim villagers and the emphasis on ‘new villages’ which

were provided with all kinds of infrastructure and amenities by the British government so

as to win over Chinese support to the government’s cause. The ‘new villages’ were

essentially concentrations camps under police supervision, the majority of whom were

Malay-Muslims, providing security to suspected communists sympathizers.

The irony did not escape the Malay-Muslims who wondered about the social

justice in all of this. In 1952 when the British introduced National Service for youth in

the 18-24 years age bracket, only 505 Chinese youth came forward to join the security

services when registration was opened from 1 April to 31 October. This represented only

0.089 per cent of the total Chinese population. The majority of Chinese youth was

disinterested to enter national service and would rather leave the country to avoid

National Service. In turn, Malay-Muslims willingly provided the bulk of the local

defence against the insurgency whilst the Chinese were in the main communist

sympathizers.

Commenting 56 years later, a leftist wrote a bitter criticism about the Malay-

Muslims’ role in the defence of the country against communist insurgency,

From mid-1948 to early 1949, the white people started to establish the Special

Constable (SC). By the droves the Malay youth went to apply to become SC and Malay

girls in turn applied to become Additional Police (AP). The white people simply accepted

them even though some of them had longer guns than their masters, some were illiterate

and didn’t even known their ABC’s. The British government were really in need of them

as they were counting on their loyalty to defend the properties of the British, American,

French and local capitalists.

The SC was set up solely to defend or to provide protection to the life and

properties of capitalists from attacks by bandits. For working to defend the properties

belonging to domestic and foreign merchants or capitalists, the SC was paid $96 up to

$104 monthly at the time. Whosoever had long life escaped from the danger of death at

the point of the gun. Whosoever’s time was up, he died because of the bullet. Amongst

them, were those who just joined and those who had worked for a long time and those

were about to finish their service. They died because of defending the properties and lives

of capitalists.

That is the fate of the Malay youth. Even though they have been had time and

again, they never learnt their lesson. That is one reason why I say that Malays are indeed

ready to die for others. If you weigh the income they earned and the threat or danger they

176

The Japanese occupation shattered the old colonial system of free immigration into Malaya and

accelerated the trend towards the permanent settlement of the immigrant population. In December 1941,

emigration from China ceased completely. After the British reoccupation in September 1945, entry into

Malaya was restricted to the Chinese who had applied for and received special entry permits. Emigration of

assisted Indian labourers to Malaya was banned by the Government of India on 15 June 1938.


58

faced for the duration of service, surely the latter is not commensurate with the salaries

received...177

The communist insurgency made worse the ethnic tensions that deteriorated

during the Japanese Occupation. The 12 years of war waged by the communists, who

were mainly Chinese, divided the nation and the bitter social memory experienced by the

Malay-Muslims made them anti-communist and by extension suspicious of most of the

Chinese, if not blatantly anti-Chinese. They blamed the Chinese for the unrest and for

causing death and destruction of their own kind and their properties. In their eyes the

communist was out to destroy the country they loved, and it was their duty to defend it.

Indeed some Malay-Muslims saw it as a jihad (holy war) against the infidel communist

as communism was associated with atheism and godlessness. In the same vein, the defeat

of the communists at the end of the Emergency was seen as a triumph of the Malay-

Muslims against international communism. Needless to say, government propaganda

enhanced this perception. In its turn the Chinese saw the Malay-Muslims as being part of

the establishment and ironically pro-international capitalism.

Communities Liaison Committee (CLC), Brokering Ethnic Relations

Realizing the threat of inter-communal clashes in maintaining public order, and mindful

that the insurgency was tied to the ethnic equation, it hit hard on the British that they had

to address these challenges seriously. They thought it prudent to revise some of their

earlier policies which had the effect of marginalizing and isolating the Chinese

community. Before 1948, the British had discouraged Chinese involvement in politics.

They nevertheless kept one eye closed on political activism originating from China,

resulting in the formation of KMT (Guomindang), anarchist associations and the CPM.

In contrast to their fixation on developments of the Malay-Muslim community,

the British had neglected the ‘transient aliens’. So they started to pick up where they left

off and reviewed their policies towards the Chinese. They realized the difficulty faced by

Malay-Muslims in accepting and having friendly relations with the alien Chinese because

of environmental and physiological obstacles that existed between them at many levels.

The British were pressed to find a solution to this impasse. The High Commissioner

himself was of the view that there was a need for a new approach in the relationship

between the Malay-Muslims and the Chinese, and encouraged the formation of an

alliance uniting the Malay-Muslims and the Chinese in the peninsula.178

Leadership and disunity were the biggest challenges facing the Chinese

community, compounded by the perception and suspicion by both the government and

the Malay-Muslim community that they were communist sympathizers, the community

as a whole felt marginalized and isolated. Whilst Malay-Muslims and Indians already had

political representation through the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and

Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) respectively, only the Chinese had no political

representation. They were also discriminated against by existing laws. Their predicament

became more acute when the British banned organizations such as the Malayan

Democratic Union (MDU) and MCP, accusing them of supporting communist terrorism.

177


Morris to Higham, 15 January 1949, CO 717/183


59

The Chinese who had supported the idea of independence, but not necessarily a

communist ideology, had no platform with which to articulate their political aspirations.

Henry Gurney, the new High Commissioner to Malaya, initiated the formation of

the ‘Malayan Chinese Party’ to divert Chinese support for the CPM, to make the Chinese

feel more appreciated by the government, to bridge the distance between the

administration and the community, to address the issue of citizenship, to fight the

communists and to improve ethnic relations between Malay-Muslims and Chinese. MCA

was only officially inaugurated on 27 February 1949 and in the beginning it was not a

political party. It became a fully fledged political party only in 1951. Gurney hoped that

MCA would become a ‘counterpart’ of UMNO.

Dato’ Onn took the cue and initiated a move to garner support from Malay-

Muslims by saying that independence could be achieved without the support of other

ethnic groups, and called for compromises. A ‘Malay-Chinese Goodwill Committee’ was

set up which evolved into the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) formed on 10

February 1949. By addressing socio-economic and political issues, the CLC collectively

addressed problems faced by the various ethnic communities and proffered common

solutions. Acting as a liaison body between the various ethnic groups, the CLC forged

understanding between them although it is questionable whether unity was ever achieved.

1959 Perak State Election and the Pangkor Riots

Perak had its first state election in 1955 with no untoward incidents, and Malaya gained

its independence from Britain in 1957. Perak faced its second state election in 1959 in

which ethnic issues dominated. Most of the issues were an extension of the election

issues of 1955. The opposition against the Alliance raised issues regarding the

Constitution, the Razak Education Report, Malay special privileges and the granting of

citizenships to the non-Malays.

On the eve of the Perak State Elections in 1959 an ethnic riot broke out between

Malay-Muslims and Chinese on Pangkor island on 4 May 1959.179

The riot was blamed

on dissatisfaction caused by Chinese middlemen accused of depressing the prices of fish

caught by Malay-Muslim fishermen. At one point the price of fish dropped to a low $1

for 30 catties of fish. Another sore point was the encroachment of Malay-Muslim fishing

areas by Chinese fishing trawlers. In Pangkor, the Chinese were the big time fishermen

with fishing fleets whilst Malay-Muslims were small time fishermen. It is still very much

the case today.

Trouble began at Sungei Pinang Ketchil village and spread to Pangkor village

causing one death, serious injuries to 11 and a row of shophouses were razed to the

ground. Loss of property was estimated at $150,000.180

Thousands of Chinese fled to

mainland Lumut. The Government invoked the Public Preservation Ordinance, a law to

deal with situations where public order had been ‘seriously disturbed or threatened’, and

a curfew from 6 am to 6 pm was imposed by the authorities to prevent further violence.181

179

The Perak State Elections were held on 15 May 1959. 180

The Straits Times, 4 May 1959 and 5 May 1959; Berita Harian, 4 Mei 1959. 181

Comparison was made with Penang, where violence broke out two years earlier but ‘Inadequate powers

frustrated action…, and official irresolution amounting to stupidity to blame. At Pangkor, the authorities

acted swiftly and firmly…’


60

As it stood, the Pangkor riots were localized affairs and quickly contained by the

authorities from spreading elsewhere.

In spite of the ethnic nature of the issues raised in the election, the majority of

Perak voters who turned up cast their votes for the Alliance. National independence and

the results of the election was a blow to the CPM as it could not go on carrying out its

subversive activities in the name of overthrowing British colonialism. Over time, the

party was viewed as anti-national and anti-establishment at least by the majority of

Malay-Muslims.

The Emergency gave right wing political parties the upper hand in spreading their

influence amongst the voters. Competition from the left wing had been minimized as

most had been banned, some during the Japanese Occupation and others during the

Emergency.

Conclusion Had Perak been an ethnically homogenous society, perhaps the problem then affecting

the state would have taken the form of a social class conflict, but precisely because the

state was an ethnically heterogeneous entity the problem took the form of an ethnic or

communal conflict. Further, the overlapping factors of socio-economic status and

ethnicity resulted in economic and social upheavals being inextricably intertwined with

ethnicity.

To begin with, communal divisions in Perak were not determined by ‘racial’

differences alone. There was also a complete lack of cultural homogeneity, each

community having its own religion, language, customs, culture and predominant

occupation. On top of that, the divide between Malay-Muslims and non-Malay-Muslims

was further reinforced by physical separation by way of residential and geographical

division, for example, most Chinese lived in the towns and most Malay-Muslims lived in

the rural areas, although during the Japanese Occupation, most Chinese lived in the peri-

urban areas. Furthermore, political and economic powers were not concentrated in the

hands of a single community – while political power, on one hand, was largely in the

hands of the Malay-Muslims; economic power, on the other hand, was with the Chinese.

By extension politics and ideology also divided the Malay-Muslims from the Chinese;

initially the non-Malay-Muslims were drawn into Indian or Chinese homeland politics

but when they became citizens, they focused their struggle on attaining equal rights with

the Malay-Muslims, thereby posing a direct threat to Malay-Muslims political hegemony.

Numerically the non-Muslims especially the Chinese outnumbered the Malay-

Muslims in the state, and this is the case up to the present day. The Chinese population of

Malaya was the largest outside the two Chinas (Taiwan, officially the Republic of China

and Communist China officially the People’s Republic of China) whereas the Indian

population of Malaya for the same period (in the 1960s) with the possible except of

Ceylon constituted the largest overseas Indian concentration outside the Indian sub-

continent. The fragmented plural economy in British Malaya was created through the

massive importation of large numbers of non-Malay Asian migrants mostly from China

and India.

The seed of Sino-Malay conflict was sown during the Japanese Occupation and

the harvest reaped during the interregnum, the BMA and the Emergency that followed.

The period, 1948-1960 witnessed the worsening of ethnic relations in Malaya (later


61

Malaysia). The genesis of ethnic tensions started during the occupation, and became more

complicated during the Emergency. Malay-Muslim participation in the Japanese military

and civil administration and in the Emergency, on one hand, and Chinese non-

cooperation, on the other, polarized the two communities along ideological, political,

socio-economic, ethnic and religious lines. The indifferent attitude of the bulk of the

Chinese community towards government efforts to stem out communism was perceived

by Malay-Muslims as continued Chinese support for the movement. As the communists

were mainly Chinese, failure to support the security forces (police and military) and the

administration was seen as confirmation of the complicity of the majority of Chinese.

Open Chinese support of Communist China also irked the Malay-Muslims, who haboured

suspicion and resentment against the ‘aliens’ (orang asing). To this day the lack of

Chinese participation in the security forces persist and in the event, ethnic stereotype with

occupational identification continues, at times colouring issues of law and order as well

as socio-economic justice.

In a number of memoirs published by former communist and leftist leaders, it is

obvious that the CPM and the MPAJA washed their hands of the ethnic riots that took

place during the interregnum when they were masters’ of the land, blaming the Japanese

fascists, the British colonizers, the Guomindang, reactionary elements in Malay-Muslim

society – everyone except for themselves – for stoking ethnic sentiments. It has been

suggested that the inter-communal conflict attributed by Malay-Muslims to CPM and

MPAJA arrogance, made it impossible for the latter to support the CPM and the

communist cause. And when the communists changed its tactics in support of Malay-

Muslim nationalism to attain independence it was too late.182

Malay-Muslims must have

concluded that the British were relatively better than the Japanese and communists put

together, and all that talk of liberty, equality, fraternity, justice, liberation, etc. was

hollow rhetoric. As communism began to be perceived as a direct threat to their ‘race’

and country, Malay-Muslims from all walks of life, from the aristocracy to the religious

clergy, closed rank and fought the communists in a united front together with the British

and Commonwealth forces.

Resentment against the Chinese also stemmed from the better treatment that ‘new

villages’ received from the authorities compared to the state of affairs in rural areas and

traditional Malay-Muslim villages. ‘New villages’ were practically concentration camps

under the watchful eye of a police state. New Villages had amenities such as water,

electricity, schools and health clinics, so as to make it self-contained and self-sustaining

as well as to win the hearts and minds of the residents. The perceived discrepancies and

discrimination, only stoked anger, frustration and suspicion from the Malay-Muslims,

compounding ethnic tensions. The existing economic gap between the ethnic groups

especially the Chinese and Malay-Muslims grew wider during the Emergency. It dawned

on them that their economic position had not improved and that they were no longer

masters of their own land as they now had to share power with the other ethnic groups

represented by political parties such as the MCA and MIC. MCA joined UMNO to form

the Alliance in 1952.

Nevertheless, an awareness of the explosive potential of ethnic conflict to the

emerging nation forced the authorities to take steps to find a solution and foster

understanding between the ethnic groups as a foil against communist propaganda and

182

Sabda S and Wahba, 1981: 175.


62

paved the way towards integration. This was done through the CLC, and the Alliance

comprising UMNO, MCA and MIC, which played a role in improving ethnic relations

and ensuring an effective conclusion to the state of Emergency. One of the objectives for

the formation of MCA was to shift the focus of Malayan Chinese from communism and

to offer itself as an alternative to CPM. Indeed the formation of the three communal

based political parties was to cement unity and cooperation between the three main ethnic

groups in the peninsula and present a united front against the communist movement as

well as to meet with British conditions for the granting of independence. A scholar of

race-relations of Malaysia concluded that ‘more than rubber and tin, the legacy of

colonialism in Malaya was racial ideology’,183

which legacy of racial stereotyping and

scapegoating continues to haunt us to this day. That this ethnic politics in later years

manifested itself as the dominant cause of political crisis and turmoil even

overshadowing class contradiction, is another story. End

183

Hirschman, 1986: 357.


63

Bibliography

Secretariat Files

G. C. Madoc, ‘Sino-Malay tension’, 8 August 1946, Pahang Secretariat Files 47/1945.

Second Supplement To Federation of Malaya Government Gazette, Vol. 1, No. 13, 23 July 1948.

Selangor Secretariat Files (SSF) 1208/1930 and 1380/1930.

Selangor Secretariat Files, 572/1933.

Books and Articles

Abdul Aziz bin Zakaria (Tan Sri Datuk), British, Japanese and Independent Malaysia, A Memoir,

National Institute of Public Administration, Malaysia, 1989.

Abdullah CD, Perang Anti-British dan Perdamaian, Hong Kong: Nan Dao Publisher, 1998.

Abu Talib Ahmad, Malay-Muslims, Islam and The Rising Sun: 1941-1945, MBRAS, 2003

Ahmad Boestamam (Datok), Datok Onn Yang Saya Kenal, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Adadi,

1979.

Alias Chin Peng, My Side of History, Singapore: Media Masters, 2003.

Andaya, Barbara Watson and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, London: Macmillan,

(1982) 2001.

Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community, 1945-1950,

Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Awang Sudjai Hairul and Yusoff Khan (eds.) Kamus Lengkap, Petaling Jaya: Pustaka Zaman,

(1977) 1984.

Barnard Timothy P. (ed.) Malay Identity Across Boundaries, Singapore University Press NUS

Publishing, 2004.

Callis, Helmut G., ‘Capital Investment in Southeaster Asia and the Philippines’, Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1.Vol. 226, Southeastern Asia and the

Charles Gamba, The Origin of Trade Unionism in Malaya: A Study in Colonial Labour Unrest,

Singapore: Eastern Universities, 1962.

Cheah Boon Kheng, ‘Some aspects of the interregnum in Malaya’, Journal of Southeast Asian

Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1977, 48-74.

Cheah Boon Kheng, ‘The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupatin of Malaya (1942-1945) in

Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, New Haven: Yale

University Southeast Asian Studies, 1980: 75-103.

Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, Resistance & Social Conflict During and After the

Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, Singapore University Press, 2003 (1983, 1987).

Clifford, H. C. Studies in Brown Humanity being Scrawls and Smudges in Sepia, White and

Yellow, London: Grant Richards, 1899.

Echols, John M. and Hassan Shadily revised and edited by John U. Wolff and James T. Collins

working in conjuction with Hassan Shadily, Kamus Indonesia Inggris, An Indonesian-English

Dictionary, Jakarta: Penerbit PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, (1961) 2003.

Emerson, R. Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya

Press, 1964.

Foran, Robert W., Malayan Symphony: Being the impressions gathered during a six month's

journey through the Straits Settlements, Federated Malay States, Siam, Sumatra, Java and Bali,

London: Hutchinson & Co., 1935

From Pacific War to Merdeka, Reminiscences of Abdullah CD, Rashid Maidin, Suriani Abdullah

& Abu Samah, Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2005.

Halimi Ibrahim, Dari River Kwai ke Sungai Temboh, Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Aminuddin Baki

dan Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 2005.

Harper, T.N. The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1999.


64

Hirschman, Charles. ‘The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial

Ideology’, Sociological Forum, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring, 1986): 330-361.

Hirschman, Charles. ‘The Meaning and Measurement of Ethnicity in Malaysia: An Analysis of

Census Classifications’, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 46, 3 (Aug. 1987): 555-582.

Ho Thean Fook, Tainted Glory, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2000.

Insun Sony Mustapha, Memoir Mustapha Hussain, Kebangkitan Nasionalisme Melayu Sebelum

UMNO, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1999.

Islam Melayu Komunis, wawancara dengan Adullah C. D., Rashid Maidin, Abu Samah, Petaling

Jaya: SIRD, 2005.

J. J. Raj, Jr., The War Years & After, Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2000.

Khoo Salma Nasution and Abdur-Razzaq Lubis, Kinta Valley: Pioneering Malaysia’s Modern

Development, Ipoh: Perak Academy, 2005.

Lee Poh Ping and Lee Kam Hing, Some Socio-Economic Aspects of Perak Society, Malaysia,

Tokyo: Institute of Development Economies, 1978.

Lubis, Abdur-Razzaq and Khoo Salma Nasution, Raja Bilah and The Mandailings in Perak,

1875-1911, MBRAS, 2003

Lubis, Abdur-Razzaq. ‘Janus-faced Politics: State and Academe Collusion in the Perpetuation of

Racial Ideologies in West Malaysia’, paper presented at the Asia Pacific Sociological Association

(APSA) International Conference ‘Transforming Societies: Contestations and Convergences in

Asia and the Pacific, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Thailand, 15-16

February 2014.

Manderson, Lenore. Women, Politics and Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Memoir Abdul Majid Salleh, Dalam PKMM dan Kesatuan Buruh, Bangi: Penerbit UKM, 2004.

Memoir Abdullah C. D., Zaman Pergerakan Sehingga 1948, Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2005.

Memoir Ahmad Boestamam, Merdeka dengan Darah dalam Api, Bangi: Penerbit Universiti

Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2004.

Memoir Ibrahim Chik, Dari API ke Rejimen ke-10, Bangi: Penerbit UKM, 2004.

Peet, G. L., Political Questions of Malaya, Cambridge at the University Press, 1949.

Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Malaya, London: Geoffrey Cumberlege Purcell, 1948.

Report of Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Wilson, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E., Permanent Under-

Secretary of State for the Colonies on his Visit To Malaya 1932, London: Printed and Published

by His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933.

Rustam A. Sani, Social Roots of the Malay Left, Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2008.

Stubbs, Richard. Hearts and Minds in Guerrila Warfare, The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,

Singapore: Oxford University Press, (1989) 1993.

Roff, William R. (ed.), The Wandering Thoughts of A Dying Man, The Life and Times of Haji

Abdul Majid bin Zainuddin, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Roff, William R. The Origins of Malay Nationalism, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya,

1980.

Sabda S and Wahba, Musa Ahmad (Bekas Pengurusi PKM) Kembali Kepangkuan, Subang Jaya:

Tra-Tra Publishing & Trading Cp., 1981.

Serikandi Suriani Abdullah, Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2005.

Setengah Abad Dalam Perjuangan, Memoir Suraini Abdullah, Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2006.

Soo, Mark Yoi Sun, My Days in the Sun, A Memoir, Penang: Areca Books, 2013.

The People’s Constitutional Proposals for Malaya 1947, drafted by PUTERA-AMCJA, Kajang:

Ban Ah Kam, 2005.

Winstedt, R. O., An Unabridged Malay-English Dictionary, Singapore: Marican & Sons, 1959.

Academic Exercises


65

Miskin bin Baboo, Perak Semasa Darurat Tahun 1948-1960: Suatu Tinjauan Terhadap Aspek

Sosial, Ekonomi dan Politik, Jabatan Sejarah, Fakulti Sains Kemasyarakatan dan Kemanusian,

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Selangor, 1982/83.

Newspapers

The Straits Times, 4 May 1959 and 5 May 1959.

Berita Harian, 4 Mei 1959.

‘Rashid pious late in his life’, The Star, 11 September 2006.

Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, A look at how communism took root in Malaya,

Sunday Star, November 29, 2009.

Internet

Wikipedia

banjarcyber.tripod.com/sgmanik_1.html


http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/ex-igp-malay-chinese-friction-sparked-

during-anti-japanese-armys-rule

Interviews

Ahmad Talib b. Mohd. Saman.

Ayub Dahlan


The Interethnic Conflict in Perak: Ideology, Communalism and Resolution

Documents

Transcript of The Interethnic Conflict in Perak: Ideology, Communalism and Resolution