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The Implications of Different Analogies betweenBiology and Society for Effective Functionalist

Analysis

Edmund ChattoeDepartment of SociologyUniversity of Leicester

University RoadLeicester, LE1 7RHecb18@le.ac.uk

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Abstract

Criticisms of functionalism broadly occupy three classes: “those denying that functional claims have adequate evidence, those denying that functional claims are sufficiently explanatory … and those that claim there can be no real analogue of natural selection in the social realm” (Kincaid 1994, p. 416). This paper examines the lastclass because it has received least critical scrutiny. It distinguishes four distinct functionalist analogies with biological evolution and explores their implications for both our understanding of social change and the other two classes of criticisms. The paper’s purpose is to show the value of appropriate analogy for reconstructing functionalism. Pertinent analogy can not only guide the research process to develop and test theories but also leave traditional criticisms of the functionalist approach weakened or even dissolved.

Keywords: analogy, evolution, functionalism, social change.

1. Introduction

There are three broad classes of criticisms levelled against functionalism: that it is empirically inadequate, logically inadequate as an explanation and inapplicable to social (rather than biological) systems. Persuasive arguments appear to rebut criticisms of empirical and explanatory inadequacy (Cohen 1994, Kincaid 1994). In this paper, therefore, I investigate the applicability critique (which has received little attention and is thus the weakest link in any convincing functionalist account) by distinguishing four distinct analogies between biological evolution and social change found in traditional functionalism. Presenting these analogies in detail, I willshow that this clarification not only bears on the forcefulness of the applicability critique (as intended) but also on the strength of the other two critiques. In addition, the clarification process highlights an analogy, previously obscured by conflation, which is both defensibleagainst the traditional critiques and provides practical

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guidance for design and empirical testing of functionalist theories.

The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses analogy and argues that relating biological evolution and social change is scientifically useful. The next four sections describe the major biological analogies identifiable in functionalism and discuss their implications. The simplest analogy occurs between social change and single species adaptation in a stable environment (section 3). This analogy is the only one that lacks coherence and it is presented solely to underpin subsequent discussion. In reality, only multiple species ecosystems exist. The implications of societies as ecosystems were not explored in classical functionalism butthey are considered as a fourth analogy (in section 6). Thesecond analogy (discussed in section 4) is that between whole societies and individual organisms. This analogy is both the most problematic and the most pervasive in functionalism, echoing Social Darwinism. The third analogy discussed (in section 5) is between increasing ecosystem complexity and social differentiation. Section 7 uses the clearer analogies described in previous sections to motivate additional rebuttals to the empirical and explanatory inadequacy critiques. Firstly, this section demonstrates a methodological analogy between the testing of evolutionary theory in biology and how it should be tested in sociology. This discussion refutes the suggestion that functionalism is either intrinsically non-empirical or so difficult to test using sociological methods that it is effectively so. Secondly, the section argues that the explanatory emphasis on “functions” (with all the resultingproblems of identifying these and evaluating functional equivalence) is unnecessary once the implications of different analogies are clearly stated. Surprisingly, giventheir eponymous role, “functionalism without functions” proves to be coherent, empirical and recognisably evolutionary in terms of the objectives laid down by traditional functionalism. The final section concludes.

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For two reasons, this paper does not attempt an analysis ofdifferent analogies in the work of particular functionalists. Firstly, this would be a project in the history of ideas rather than contributing to explanations of social change. Secondly, the low status of functionalismseems to rest on perceived weaknesses of such theories as a class. If functionalism is to be re-appraised, it is the class of theories that must be examined rather than individual instances.

2. The Purpose of Analogy

Before examining analogies between social and biological evolution1 it is worth considering why analogy is useful atall. The answer lies in two principles of scientific method: the academic division of labour and the search for generalised theory (Brodbeck 1968, Hesse 1963). Since biology has spent nearly 150 years refining evolutionary theory, developing empirical tests and removing inconsistencies, it would be wasteful to ignore this when developing theories of social change.

However, there is clearly an inherent tension in analogy. No matter how well understood a theory, there is no point in applying it to a new domain if the logic of the cases isdifferent. Conversely, even if the logic of two different domains shows excellent correspondence, there is little value in importing a theory that is poorly understood in its original context.

The requirement for successful analogy, therefore, is that it takes well understood and tested theory from one domain and demonstrates that its structure can be mapped onto a different domain. This must be done without altering the logic of the original theory so much that either its conclusions or its explanatory ability are impaired.

The claim that natural selection is thoroughly understood (and thus eligible to support an analogy) can be justified on two grounds. The first is that even among biologists embroiled in evolutionary controversies, there is little

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question that the outcomes will be consistent with the Darwinian framework. These controversies are no longer about whether the theory is correct but how its details play out in particular contexts. The second justification is that many perceived weaknesses of functionalism echo “wrong turnings” in the development of evolutionary biology(such as teleology and Panglossianism) which have subsequently been corrected. We can be confident that understanding biological evolution will enhance functionalism because both have apparently followed the same intellectual path. Unfortunately, functionalism seems to have bogged down in wrong turnings (thus becoming deeplyunpopular) without exhausting the resources of evolutionarybiology to put it back on track.

3. Social Change as Single Species Adaptation

The simplest account illustrating “survival of the fittest”involves a plain containing only grass, ponds and rabbits. We suppose that selection pressure on rabbits only arises from non-evolving (exogenous) environmental features.2 An example might be the hazard from ponds tainted with poisonous minerals. Random genetic variation will sometimesproduce phenotypic changes beneficial to the rabbit possessing them. The mutant rabbit may be better at detecting tainting by smell or colour subtleties for example. In these circumstances, the mutant will reproduce more effectively than the existing population. (The relative fitness of mutants can thus be measured directly via differential reproductive success compared to non-mutants.) Because of inheritance, the mutant’s offspring are also likely to have the advantageous trait and (provided the environment is stable and the trait thus remains beneficial) ultimately displace non-mutants. Given enough time and continuing environmental stability, we might expect (through repeated mutations) that the rabbits would become effectively adapted to all environmental hazards, perhaps even to the point where no further beneficial mutations were possible.

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It appears to be this view of evolution that underpins bothfunctionalist claims that particular societies (or classes of societies) should tend to homogeneity in their routines (the dominance of the nuclear family under capitalism3) andthat it makes sense to consider some arrangements “fitter” than others. In practice, as soon as we alter the environmental hazard from tainted water to another animal species (foxes for example), the whole structure changes and now constitutes an ecosystem. Although we can still define the fitness of particular rabbit mutations other things being equal, other things no longer are equal. Foxesare also evolving continuously in response to rabbit capabilities. This has two important consequences. Firstly,it becomes inappropriate to claim that species are definitively “well adapted” since what they are adapting tochanges continuously. A trait may even turn from beneficialto harmful over time. The best we can say for species is

1 This paper only considers cases where change is explained by a mechanism analogous to biological evolution in the social domain. This must be sharply distinguished from theories in which social behaviour or organisation is explained by the mechanism of biological evolution. These theories draw on sociobiology (1975) in attempting to explain social behaviour through its direct contribution to reproductive fitness. Rather than forming a part of sociology (as functionalism does), such theories claim that explaining certain social behaviours is actually the province of biology and not sociology. This differenceshould make the sharpness of the distinction between the two types of theories clear.2 This is what makes the single species analogy incoherent. We cannot simply postulate a living organism (grass) which does not evolve and thus influence rabbit evolution.

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that they persist. Following from this persistence, however, we cannot say that species have any sort of teleological “destiny”. Family universals remain fascinating for sociology, but any evolutionary explanationsuggesting that families tend towards a single form impliesa stable environment and is therefore almost certainly wrong. Secondly, whatever we say about relative fitness within species, we cannot say anything about fitness across species. It makes no sense to argue that rabbits are generally fitter than foxes because they are more numerous or that foxes are fitter because they prey on rabbits. If rabbits (or other suitable prey) did not reproduce in sufficient numbers, how could foxes (or predators generally) ever have evolved? Even a predator-prey relationship turns out to involve interdependence rather than superiority. Clearly, adding more species increases ecosystem complexity, exacerbating environmental dynamism and making notions of optimal adaptation and “fitness” evenless applicable. Introducing other small herbivores to the ecosystem allows foxes to change their prey under rabbit scarcity for example.

Two subsidiary implications of the shift from single to multiple species are also relevant for understanding functionalism. Firstly, change can originate through mutation in any species. Species should not be viewed as inevitably conforming to environmental pressure. Sometimes they initiate change to which other species must respond.

3 While Parsons does not explicitly state the ubiquity of the nuclear family in industrial societies as an evolutionary outcome, he clearly implies it. For example: “It is of course not uncommon to find a surviving parent of one or the other spouse, or even a sibling or cousin of one of them residing with the family, but this is both statistically secondary, and it is clearly not felt to be the “normal”arrangement.” (Parsons 1956, p. 10) And again: “It is the combination of these two functional imperatives, which explains why, in the “normal” case it is both true that every adult is a member of a nuclear family and that every child must begin his process of socialisation ina nuclear family.” (ibid., p. 17) It is unclear whether “normal” refers to societal judgements, in which case its connection to the functionalsurvival of “deviant” forms is unclear or whether it is intended rhetorically to downplay such “survivals”.

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This is significant because, in social systems, innovationsmay also arise from deliberation, creativity and diffusion.The analysis of the nuclear family presented by Parsons suggests a (presumably unintentional) Marxist account of social change in which the family must accommodate the factory but not vice versa. Secondly, although a static environment might allow a single species to reach a point where all further mutations were harmful, this explanation for the potential disadvantages of change doesn’t apply in dynamic environments.

The implications of the “society as ecosystem” analogy willnot be examined in detail until section 6. However, even the discussion here shows how the study of ecosystems replaces unjustified notions of teleology and fitness with the empirical study of adaptability and persistence. In order to understand rabbit success, it is necessary to study their interactions with foxes and vice versa. It should also be very clear why the single species analogy (and its implications) are inapplicable to social systems. It is impossible to give a coherent account of evolution ina stationary environment for the biological case, let alonethe social one.

4. Society as Organism (SAO)

This analogy involves a major shift in perspective. Here, each society is treated as a single complex (differentiated) organism. The organisation of society is presented in terms of specialised “organs” like the economyand polity.4 In the biological case, the heart and lungs each have their functions for the whole organism and are co-evolved to perform these effectively.

The SAO analogy has roots in Social Darwinism: theories attempting to understand the “organs” of society and their interplay (Bannister 1979, Jones 1980). Unfortunately, the influence of Social Darwinism was pervasive in traditional functionalism and caused considerable harm to its plausibility (even if functionalists like Parsons and Merton explicitly repudiated it). The fundamental weakness

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linking both approaches is the environment within which societies supposedly operate. Very few modern states face selection pressure from the physical environment, invasion and destruction or total internal collapse.5 There is thus no reason to suppose that societies will display the finelyhoned co-evolution of “organs” observed in complex organisms for which survival is an “all or nothing” matter.This difficulty in defining a plausible environment for societal selection is recognised in two widespread criticisms of functionalism. Firstly, that it makes no sense to talk of societies having needs as individuals do and, secondly, that functionalism assumes societal consensus without justification. It makes sense to talk of societal needs and functional consensus only if it makes sense to talk of societies as single organisms under constant threat of destruction. Unless selection pressure is sufficient to put society on a knife-edge between persistence and annihilation, there is no reason why diversity of interests and even overt conflict should not occur. Clearly, there must be mechanisms regulating internal conflict or societal collapse would be more common. However, as I shall argue, there is a more plausible explanation for this regulation based on the “society as ecosystem” analogy.

Examination of the SAO analogy reveals another difficulty relevant to functionalism. Although we can describe the heart as having the “function” of pumping blood, this only makes sense within a specification of roles for other organs such as the circulatory system, kidneys and lungs.

4 “That the order of evolution [for organisms and societies] is necessarily the same in the two cases, is just as clear. In a creaturewhich is both very small and very inactive, like a hydra, direct passage of nutriment from the inner layer to the outer layer by absorption suffices. But in proportion as the outer structures, becoming more active, expend more, simple absorption from adjacent tissues no longer meets the resulting waste; and in proportion as the mass becomes larger, and the parts which prepare nutriment consequently more remote from the parts which consume it, there arisesthe need for a means of transfer.” (Spencer 1969, pp. 56-7) This quotation also illustrates the SAO view that societal change arises from interaction with an external environment.

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Ineffective (and contradictory) attempts to identify family“functions” may founder on inadequate specifications of roles for other institutions (pubs, churches and psychiatrists) in satisfying individual (and indirectly social) needs. For this reason, function talk about institutions considered in artificial isolation is imprecise shorthand for actual processes by which these interact and reproduce themselves. In biology, discussions of species capabilities and observations of their survival implications have superseded such talk. An ecologist doesn’t ask what the function of running is, let alone whatfunction rabbits serve, s/he only asks whether running faster conduces to reproductive success in rabbits and why.Similarly, it is much easier to establish empirically whether some family forms are more effective at passing on financial resources or educational advantage (thus reproducing themselves) than to explain, in general terms, what families are “for”. As we shall see in the next section, the SAO analogy also sits awkwardly with discussions of social differentiation.

5. Speciation and Social Differentiation

One of the perceived strengths of Darwin’s theory was that speciation was explicable without recourse to additional mechanisms beyond selection, inheritance and variation. Returning to the previous example, a population of rabbits relocated to a region with distinct predators would find different mutations beneficial than the rabbits remaining 5 This approach may remain appropriate for historical sociology. Eisenstadt (1963) develops an impressive theory of the origin and persistence of bureaucratic empires (although his approach gives much weight to the intentions of contending power groups and is thus not strictly functionalist). Similarly, much of Herbert Spencer’s analysisdeals with historical societies and should be criticised separately from his Social Darwinist prescriptions for Victorian England. This paper does not intend to dismiss historical sociology but focuses on the role of functionalism in understanding industrial societies that no longer develop by conquest or geographical expansion, an aim sharedby those like Parsons and Merton now most widely regarded as “traditional” functionalists. For a detailed review of functionalist explanation in the specific context of historical sociology, see Holmwood and O’ Malley (2003).

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behind. One unintended consequence might be, if differencesbetween the environments were sufficiently marked, that thepopulations evolved independently until they could no longer interbreed. According to the modern definition, one species has become two. This terminology is quite differentfrom the “folk” understanding of species. Because folk notions are often based on appearance rather than constitution, it is presumed that all sparrows are effectively the same (a natural kind). This is misleading on two counts. Firstly, it is genetic variation in the sparrow population that allows the species to respond to environmental change. Sparrows may all look rather similar but turn out to have important differences in capabilities that are revealed when disease strikes or the climate worsens. Secondly, two species may be genetically similar but different in appearance or similar in appearance and genetically quite distinct.

Thus it transpires that, contrary to folk belief, “natural kind” species are not the evolutionary building blocks. Instead, species are defined by genetic similarity between ancestors and descendants induced by the environment. Unfortunately, this insight sits awkwardly with the SAO analogy. It is appealing to see increasing social differentiation as an adaptive response to environmental pressure particularly since the biological record suggests that simple organisms have given rise to complex ones by progressively “delegating” functions to specialised organs.However, as before, closer examination suggests that we cannot reconcile the SAO analogy with this biological process. In biology, it is argued that there is “more room at the top”. It is better (in survival terms) being the first predator species preying on herbivores than being just another competing herbivore species. Although one might make a historical analogy with empire building pace Eisenstadt (1963), modern societies do not convincingly display any such hierarchy. Unfortunately, arguments applicable to sets of species in ecosystems do not necessarily apply to particular species or instances of a species. Ecosystems may become more complicated through newpredator-prey relationships but it does not follow that the

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rabbit species will necessarily become more complicated over time let alone individual rabbits. (Viruses remain simple and devastatingly effective because they operate on cellular architectures common to most species.) Returning to the case of societies, therefore, it is not clear what functional (as opposed to deliberate or other) advantages there are to increasing social complexity. Even if such advantages do exist (and I shall return to this point), theSAO analogy mistakenly postulates increasing complexity in particular instances of a species (or perhaps increasing complexity of a species6) rather than, as in biology, increasing complexity through speciation. It may be this awkward relationship between the SAO analogy and differentiation that produces the tension in functionalism between the implied superiority of current social institutions (apparently originating in the single species analogy) and the historical benefits of increased social differentiation. It is this kind of special pleading for the present (perhaps resulting from a confusion of analogies) that gave functionalism its reputation for conservative apologia.

In the previous sections I have examined three distinct analogies between social and biological systems. I have discussed the implications of each analogy, how it might have influenced the conclusions of functionalism and, in some cases, how functionalist analysis appears to have muddled different analogies. In the next section, I shall consider a fourth analogy, implied but largely undeveloped in traditional functionalism, which may contribute to resolving these difficulties.

6. Society as Ecosystem

It is clear that single species accounts of social change are unsatisfactory. What would it mean to treat society as an ecosystem?

6 It is seldom clear in these discussions whether societies are taken to be distinct species or instances of the same species but both interpretations face the same problem.

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The basic hypothesis would be that similar (but still heterogeneous) bundles of social routines7 would constitutespecies just as similar bundles of genes do in biology.8 Thus churches or firms would form identifiably distinct species. There might be both competition between churches (to secure worshippers) and between species (with churches and firms both demanding “adherence” from members). There would be no attempt to assess the relative fitness of churches and firms but there might be assessments of the relative success of firms or of churches (Hannan and Freeman 1988, Iannaccone 1994).

Focusing on routines in this way avoids many problems raised by previous analogies. Innovations (deliberate or accidental) can arise in any species. There is no implicit assumption about which parts of society “drive” social change. The routine of management training by moving trainees around branches might impact on the relative success of nuclear and extended families in accessing the managerial class. Conversely, however, reproductive routines endogenous to the family might require changes to the organisation of production – increased automation or a “family wage” for example. Routine bundles also allow 7 It is hard to find terminology for repeated non-calculating behaviourthat has not already acquired a specific set of associations in socialscience. I have avoided “practices”, “strategies”, “institutions” and “rules of thumb” because I do not want to have to endorse or reject the complex debates that have grown up around them. For the purposes of the argument all I want to convey is that institutions can have different sets of repeated behaviours (actions on a production line, rituals in an act of worship) which are more or less similar. (Church rituals, while different, recognisably share elements unlikely to be confused with activities on a production line.)8 The arguments for “routine bundles” in individuals and institutions are different and differently compelling so I shall consider only “institution functionalism” here. For individuals, it can always plausibly be argued that deliberation outweighs routine. By contrast, for institutions, routines can reasonably be seen as constitutive (following Weber’s discussion of bureaucracy) and the role of individual deliberation heavily circumscribed by co-ordination difficulties. For this reason, the extensive literatures on cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985) and memetics (Blackmore 1999), both of which consider routines at the individual level (albeit sometimeswith collective benefits) are beyond the scope of my paper.

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speciation to be defined in a way that is compatible with biological evolution. The emergence of secular schools or hospitals involves the development of sustainable bundles ofroutines that are able to replace the “integrated” educational and medical roles previously performed by churches. This is not a case of roles being transferred between existing species but of a new species sustaining itself by performing a role previously only available as part of a “package”. As in the biological case, “environmental” effects may cause bundles to diverge to thepoint where exchange of routines between institutions is nolonger possible. A routine for setting piecework rates in afactory would be unusable in a hospital treating patients on demand. This approach to speciation also reinstates a plausible evolutionary justification for increasing social complexity. The existence of a particular set of institutions may make new social forms sustainable. For example, the possibility of consulting requires the existence of both codified technical knowledge and measurable success in organisational species. Consultants can profit by offering advice improving relative performance but only once a particular set of institutions exists (Bell 1999).

The ecosystem approach also provides a significantly different justification for societal stability. This neither requires a mysterious consensus or supra-national selection pressure. Instead, ecosystem stability results from internal homeostasis. New opportunities for sustainable routine bundles (like consulting) arise from the existing population of institutions. New resources result in adaptations of existing institutions (or creationof new institutions) to exploit them and the scale of resource availability regulates the level of adaptation/innovation. (Just as lions will always be less numerous than gazelles in a sustainable ecology, so will management consultants be less numerous than firms.) In biology, overall ecosystem stability is still compatible with extreme conflicts of interests (predator-prey relations for example) because of the rich web of resource exploitation. A sudden disease induced slump in the rabbit

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population will not typically lead to fox extinction both because rabbits have evolved disease resistance and are likely to recover their numbers but also because foxes can shift to other prey if necessary. In the same way, societies can remain broadly stable despite quite intense competition and even moderate amounts of overt conflict.

However, it is very important to stress that while homeostatic stability forms part of a coherent analogy, it does not reintroduce a Panglossian view of social order. Ecosystems (and societies) do collapse and routine bundles (like species) do die out.9 In fact, the ecosystem view is vital to removing misleading concepts (like Panglossianism) from functionalism. I have already discussed the incoherence of measuring relative fitness across species. The dynamics of multi-species environments also destroy thepossibility of teleology and thus any Panglossian implication that species are absolutely “well adapted” as discussed in section 3. As argued above, talk about “functions” of institutions in isolation is likely to be insufficiently explanatory and needs to be replaced by observations of the ways that institutions interact and what impact these interactions have. For example, what is it about the routines of strict churches that means that they are able to both recruit and keep worshippers better? Specifically, how do churches impinge on the work, school, family and social lives of members and how does this “fit” enhance reproduction of some churches and not others (Iannaccone 1994).

Finally, the ecosystem analogy has a considerable impact onthe status of normative claims about social change. In the absence of teleology, the fact that a routine bundle is widespread and persistent makes it a worthy object of studybut does not justify any claims of superiority either in terms of morality or likely contribution to individual welfare. Given the way that evolution works, homogeneity ofroutine bundles is not necessarily an advantage and may be actively harmful to species in a changing environment. For 9 Cloistered orders of monks and nuns appear to be an example at present.

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this reason, diversity of institutional forms becomes a keypart of functionalism. Today’s minority or failing form maybe dominant in a century when circumstances have changed. Unfortunately, it is not possible to avoid some discussion of deliberate action and human norms at this point. It is important to distinguish normative claims about the processof social change from normative claims that shape that process. It is one thing to claim (without justification) that evolution’s purpose is to perfect humanity. It is something completely different for individuals to choose cheap mass-produced goods and thus enhance the success of industrial capitalism. It is important to be clear that evolution is not incompatible with teleology at the level of individuals and groups (human goals and preferences) butonly at the system level.10 There is thus nothing “unnatural” about humans trying to shape social change by deliberation even if it is very difficult. In fact, deliberation may be highly desirable because unshaped social evolution (like biological evolution) takes no account of individual (as opposed to collective) welfare. Although it is hard to imagine a routine bundle propagatingagainst the interests of all the participants, it is perfectly reasonable that a significant fraction should suffer and that a designed (rather than evolved) routine bundle might improve group and individual welfare. A clear role for teleology and deliberation thus exists in social systems but not in the form (or with the implications) thatSocial Darwinism attributed to it.

In this section, I have argued that some of the difficulties with three analogies between evolution and social change widespread in traditional functionalism are addressed using a fourth analogy barely worked out (but implied) in that literature. In doing so, I have supported my earlier claim that closer examination of the different analogies can start to rebut the inapplicability critique

10 Of course, matters can become very complex when human goals are applied to the system level – an example would be the legal framework within which firms compete while selected for profitability – but the distinction remains coherent. The evolutionary process has no intrinsic system level teleology.

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of functionalism. Not all analogies between biology and social change are equally coherent, empirically plausible or open to misinterpretation. In the next section, I shall support my subsidiary claim, that the examination of analogies not only bears on the inapplicability critique asone might expect but also contributes significantly to rebutting the empirical and explanatory inadequacy critiques.

7. Empirical and Explanatory Implications of Different Functional Analogies

So far, I have focused on the applicability critique because it has received the least critical attention and istherefore the weakest link in attempts to reconstruct a functionalist account of social change. However, it is all to the good for functionalism if additional distinctive rebuttals of the empirical and explanatory inadequacy critiques can be developed. The clarification of analogies challenges the empirical inadequacy critique through what might be termed a methodological analogy, showing how the methods by which convincing evidence for evolution has beenprovided in biology may be applied (suitably qualified) in sociology. Applying this methodological analogy, I go on tochallenge the explanatory inadequacy critique because it depends on notions of functions and functional equivalence and, as it turns out, these categories are redundant (and possibly even incoherent) in biological evolution. As such,despite their eponymous status, functions are simply not necessary to a functional account of social change.

It is a commonplace criticism of functionalism that it tooklittle account of data and failed to specify theories effectively for empirical testing. However, an important question is whether this was simply an omission by functionalists or whether there are factors making the collection of such data problematic or even impossible. In biology, data on evolution can be divided neatly in two. Firstly, there is research about how particular sets of genes “construct” specific bodies that are then environmentally selected. Secondly, there are ecosystem

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studies examining how different species interact and how their capabilities affect reproduction and survival. These two kinds of research are complementary in understanding the evolutionary process and facilitate a crucial division of labour. Observation can show us how (and when) fast running matters to species but this understanding is not dependent on immediately tracing the trait right back to the genetic level. The process of linking genes to capabilities can be carried out in the laboratory under more controlled conditions using experimental methods.

This distinction also proves crucial to collection of relevant data for understanding social change. When trying to understand the success or failure of churches, part of the task is obviously collecting accurate survey data aboutwhich churches are actually growing or shrinking. However, an equally important part is to establish qualitatively what bundles of routines within churches bear on this outcome and how they do so in terms of relations with families, schools, places of work, competing leisure activities and so on. It is explicit mechanisms linking microstructure (genes and routines) to macro outcome (persistence of organisms and institutions) via capabilities that stops evolution from being tautologous and makes it a testable theory. With only aggregate quantitative data, we have no warranted lower level explanation of observed patterns. With only qualitative data, we cannot tell which routine bundles actually do wellin the environment ex post and are in danger of propagandising for what we believe to be the likely outcome.

This point is illustrated by the explanatory strategy of organisational ecology, probably the best known evolutionary approach in contemporary sociology. This fieldexplores how birth, death and growth processes (shaped by environmental effects like competition) dynamically affect the population size and properties of organisational “species” (like credit unions or newspapers). In a typical example, Hannan and Freeman (1988) estimated statistical relationships between individual, relational and structuralfactors (like organisational age, the number of similar

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organisations and economic buoyancy) and probabilities thatUS trade unions disbanded in particular historical eras. They found, for example, that an organisation’s age was a significant predictor of survival. The difficulty with thisapproach (as suggested above) is that mechanisms proposed to explain particular aggregate associations, while credible, are not independently established at the micro level. It is certainly plausible that competition for members becomes more intense as the number of trade unions increases (as their model assumes) but it is also plausiblethat more unions provide a wider range of policy stances and by thus increasing overall membership, effectively decrease competition. The association observed may be the net effect of two (or more) mechanisms, some of which may have unknown magnitudes. (Hannan and Freeman obviously control for other associations specified within their model but cannot do so for equally plausible mechanisms excluded by a lack of data or failure of casual introspection.) Given the range of possible mechanisms and their potentially complex interplay, claims about net effects risk being “just so stories” unless they are grounded in ethnographic research, historical documents or biographicalinterviews.11

The requirement to combine qualitative and quantitative data, while far from insuperable, immediately suggests why sociologists have not found testing functionalist theories very appealing. The divide between research quantifying what takes place “objectively” and understanding people’s subjective reasons for doing things in a local context runsvery deep in practice if not in principle. Furthermore, understanding the emergent effects of complex interactions between routine bundles at the macro level may require novel tools like computer simulation.

11 Simulation approaches to organisational ecology have very recently been developed in an effort to make stronger links between micro interactions and macro associations (Bruderer and Singh 1996). However, this style of research has had no impact on sociology as yet and still makes negligible use of qualitative data to ground its microlevel assumptions (coming as it does from a theoretical strand of economics and management research).

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Of course, making an effective micro/macro link is not the only problem. The opportunities for ethical controlled experiments in sociology are considerably restricted. Thereis no equivalent to irradiating fruit flies to explore heritability or dissecting organisms with genetic disordersto understand their physiological effects. However, such difficulties should not be overstated. Natural or comparative experiments may still be possible. Furthermore,it is interesting to reflect that a logically coherent theory of biological inheritance considerably predated our ability to “see” genes. If so, subjective reports about routines may still display regularities which allow us to develop an effective theory even though we cannot yet (and may never) “see” them as we can directly observe behaviour.

Setting the different functional analogies in order and considering the ecosystem analogy in more detail also makesan indirect contribution to the task of studying social change empirically. This involves modifying the nature of the research question to encourage empirical analysis and discourage attempts to quantify superfluous concepts like fitness or teleology. Asking what churches are for provokesmetaphysical speculation. Asking why some churches succeed and others fail provokes fieldwork! Understanding the role of the family no longer involves trying to identify its abstract functions but instead studying what it concretely transmits to children (Grabrucker 1988) and what other institutions it interacts with and how (Devine 2004). It turns out that this perspective shift is not only desirableto encourage empirical sociology but receives justificationfrom a challenge to the very notion of functions as the basis of functional explanation.

The basis of this challenge is the other insight suggested by the clarification of different analogies and bears on the explanatory inadequacy critique. The claim is that the concepts of function (and thus functional equivalence) are effectively redundant outside the SAO analogy and of highlyrestricted use within it. This issue has already been discussed in passing but can now be stated more clearly.

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Talking about the “functions” of the heart only makes sensewithin a context of other organs and this in turn only makes sense for an organism surviving in an environment in a particular manner (by being a fast running predator for example). It does make sense to say that such a predator islikely to have a more specialised (and thus more efficient)respiratory/circulatory system than a sedentary insect. However, such function talk cannot be extended from discussions of the current state of a particular organism (conditional on its ecological niche) to the architecture of organisms in general. It is not the case that “something” must always be fulfilling the role of eyes in an organism (except in the most generalised and therefore unhelpful sense) since other organisms may simply depend onhearing and smell instead. Even if we disregard the conceptual difficulties of environmental selection in the SAO, the persistence of societies no more prescribes their form in terms of a list of “essential” functions than ecology requires all animals to be mammals.12 What is essential to a species depends on the role it plays in the ecosystem and how evolution happens to have equipped it forthat role. One herbivore may be toxic, another very fast and a third very good at blending in. Identifying “core functions” of social institutions and assessing different ways in which they are served (societies must either have religion or extended kinship networks because these are theonly ways that the functionalist can envisage group cohesion being ensured) simply has no workable equivalent in biology even within the SAO.13 Outside the SAO, it is hard to make any use of the function concept at all. In theecosystem analogy, as already suggested, it makes no sense to ask what the “function” of rabbits is and little sense to ask about the “function” of running since in one case itmay be used by a predator and in another by prey. Instead, the interest is in how, in practice, different species

12 It is true that ecology tries to characterise general aspects of organisms (respiration, excretion and the like) but this is an inductive typological or didactic exercise and not a basis for seriousfunctional analysis.13 Furthermore, this assumes that societies cannot create routine bundlesto achieve their goals.

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manage to persist in the light of particular threats: by running fast, by hiding, by being poisonous, by breeding prolifically and so on. It is perfectly possible, indeed easier and less confusing, to study such interactions between evolving institutions and their outcomes without using any “function talk” at all.14 It is important to stress however that removing reified “functions” from functionalism no more makes the resulting theory non-evolutionary or non-empirical than removing them from biology did. Because of their problematic conceptual status, the quest for “functions” has impeded rather than advanced the search for an evolutionary theory that explains social change in terms of the selection, variationand reproduction of routines, a goal which traditional functionalists would undoubtedly have endorsed and seen themselves as contributing to.

Although it is hard to explain a historically unjustified assumption, I think the mistaken emphasis on functions as usable entities arises from several sources. Firstly, the muddling of functionalist analogies which permitted the survival of inappropriate notions of teleology and fitness:the idea that species could be “for” something and assessedin those terms. Secondly, and perhaps consequently, the “extension” of legitimate function talk from the case of a particular species with a given niche to the (illegitimate)case of persistent species in general. (To labour a point, persistent societies need have no more in common that sharks and butterflies.) Thirdly, the fact that the folk conception of biology suggests a tight and simple link between genes and traits. It is a short step from the (mistaken) idea of a “muscle gene” to that of a “group cohesion routine” and thus to a “core function”. In fact, aset of routine bundles (like a set of genes) associated 14 This observation provides another justification for the term “selectionism” to describe a suitably reconstructed functionalism (Runciman 1998). Since the analysis no longer focuses on the identification of functions, the old name is actively misleading.15 It is a recognised objective of ethnography, particularly in anthropology, to show how cultural complexes achieve their effects holistically while individual practices and beliefs may be hard to make sense of.

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with a family or church solves the problem of persistence as a set and cannot necessarily be decomposed into particulargenes or routines for specific purposes.15 Muscles may be useful both for fast running and cracking bones. Fourthly, the existence of confusion over the questions that biology (and thus sociology using any analogy with biology) is capable of answering which may be worsened by particular sociological views of history. (This returns us to the methodological analogy discussed earlier.) Biology cannot

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answer the question “Why is the ecosystem necessarily just like this?” because the answer is lost in the mists of history and is in any case contingent.16 Ecology is never necessarily anything. Nor can it answer the question “Will an ecosystem always produce something like the rabbit?” because the answer depends in a complex way on all the other species that make it up. (The fact that ecology is a paradigmatic complex system is a corollary of the fact thatgene and routine bundles persist as sets and not as 16 In the light of this point, the emphasis on the difficulties of functional equivalence is surprising. What other sociological theory would be expected to deliver necessary truth?

Bibliography

Bannister, R. (1979) Social Darwinism. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.Bell, D. (1999) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York, NY:Basic Books.Blackmore, S. (1999) The Meme Machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Boyd, R. and P. Richerson (1985) Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Brodbeck, M. (1968) ‘Models, Meaning, and Theories’, in M. Brodbeck (ed) Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, pp. 579-600. New York, NY: Macmillan,.Bruderer, E. and J. Singh (1996) ‘Organisational Evolution,Learning and Selection: A Genetic Algorithm Based Model’, The Academy of Management Journal 39(5): 1322-49.Cohen, G. A. (1994) ‘Functional Explanation: In Marxism’, in M. Martin and L. McIntyre (eds) Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, pp. 391-402. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Devine, F. (2004) Class Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Eisenstadt, S. (1963) The Political Systems of Empires. London: Free Press.Grabrucker, M. (1988) There’s a Good Girl, Gender Stereotyping in the First Three Years of Life. London: The Women’s Press.Hannan, M. and J. Freeman (1988) ‘The Ecology of Organisational Mortality: American Labour Unions, 1836-1985’, American Journal of Sociology 94(1): 25-52.

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separable traits.) What it can do is answer questions like “Given what this ecosystem is like, what might happen if itgets colder?” or “Given what we know about history and the fossil record, what might have happened to bring the ecosystem we observe into being?” A functionalist account of social change is thus not compatible with historical determinism under any of the analogies discussed above, nordoes it imply that different societies will find similar solutions to similar problems (though it is very interesting when they do just as parallel evolution is interesting in biology). Instead, it is limited (as is ecology) to understanding systems of interaction between classes of entity (species) and offering some reasoned (butnot necessarily predictive) insights into where society might be heading. It is not clear that any other theory of social change can credibly claim to deliver more given the existence of novelty, human deliberation and self-awareness.

In the early stages of a project to reappraise functionalism (and in the course of a single article), it is not feasible to illustrate this approach with a case study, especially since conceptual clarity is a necessary precursor for effective empirical research. The purpose of this section has been to suggest that there is no reason why functionalism should not collect data analogous to thatoffering strong support for biological evolution (largely using existing methods from sociology) and to suggest that difficulties with identifying functions and functional equivalence may simply be irrelevant. Of course, as with any novel data collection exercise, unique difficulties maypresent themselves in practice but the purpose of laying out the conceptual framework here is precisely to encouragecritical responses that may anticipate these before empirical research begins.

8. Conclusion

Given space constraints, I have not tried to make an activecase for “ecosystem functionalism” as a theoretical (let alone empirical) approach. Instead, I have merely shown how

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it avoids the main weaknesses found in the other analogies and how, at least in principle, it is compatible with normal empirical research in sociology. However, even this preliminary discussion suggests that the new analogy is hardly a panacea. The complexities of the relationship between deliberate and unintended action (and their relative significance) in social change remain to be properly explored. Sense also needs to be made of the claimthat a certain set of routines constitutes a “sustainable” institution which can “reproduce” itself. (In biology, turning food into energy to resist the entropic process is a necessary precondition of reproduction. Does it make sense to treat individuals as “fodder” for churches, factories and schools and if so, what sense?) Following on from this, is there a theoretical problem raised by the role of individuals with multiple memberships in sustaininginstitutional routines? Does it matter for the sake of the analogy that a person can be a churchgoer, a chair maker and a liberal voter at the same time? I intend to explore these questions in future work but I hope I have shown thatthe ecosystem analogy is an improvement over previous analogies if nothing more. This is still systematic progress even if, in its turn, the ecosystem analogy must be replaced by something else or even by an ultimate rejection of biological analogies in sociology.

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Notes

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Hesse, M. (1963) Models and Analogies in Science. London: Sheed and Ward.Holmwood, J. and M. O’ Malley (2003) ‘Evolutionary and Functionalist Historical Sociology’, in G. Delanty and E. Isin (eds) Handbook of Historical Sociology, pp. 39-57. London: Sage.Iannaccone, L. (1994) ‘Why Strict Churches Are Strong’, American Journal of Sociology 99(5): 1180-211.Jones, G. (1980) Social Darwinism and English Thought. Brighton: Harvester.Kincaid, H. (1994) ‘Assessing Functional Explanations in the Social Sciences’, in M. Martin and L. McIntyre (eds) Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, pp. 415-428. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Parsons, T. (1956) ‘The American Family: Its Relationship to Personality and to the Social Structure’, in T. Parsons and R. Bales (eds) Family, Socialisation and Interaction Process, pp. 3-33. London: Routledge.Runciman, W. (1998) ‘The Selectionist Paradigm and Its Implications for Sociology’, Sociology 32(1): 163-188.Spencer, H. (1969) Principles of Sociology. London: Macmillan.Wilson, E. (1975) Sociobiology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bibliographical note

Edmund Chattoe is a Nuffield Foundation Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology at the University of Oxford. His research interests centre on the application of computer simulation to the understanding of social behaviour, specifically the evolution of social structures

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and decision strategies.

Address

Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ, Email: edmund.chattoe@sociology.oxford.ac.uk

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