COLLEGE OF EUROPEBRUGES CAMPUSIRD DEPARTMENT

The EU at the UNFCCC: a newparadigm?

An interdisciplinary analysis ofclimate negotiations since

Copenhagen

Supervisor: Christian Egenhofer Thesis presented byErik Lindner Olssonfor theDegree of Master of EU International Relations anddiplomacy studies

Academic Year 2014-2015

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by myself

without any external unauthorised help, that it has been

neither presented to any institution for evaluation nor

previously published in its entirety or in parts. Any parts,

words or ideas, of the thesis, however limited, and including

tables, graphs, maps etc., which are quoted from or based on

other sources, have been acknowledged as such without

exception.

Moreover, I have also taken note and accepted the College

rules with regard to plagiarism (Section 4.2 of the College

study regulations).

ii

Word count: 15,563

iii

AbstractHas the experience of the fifteenth Conference of the Parties

in Copenhagen created a new paradigm in the European Union’s

approach to climate negotiations? This is a question that has

been increasingly central to academic discussions of the

European Union (EU) as an international climate actor. This

study further explores that question, and seeks to challenge

some of the approaches within studies of the EU’s role of

climate negotiations from Copenhagen onward by introducing an

interdisciplinary perspective, through the use of literature

in regime theory by authors such as Arild Underdal, Scott

Barrett and Frank Grundig. The study further contextualises

its observations with information from interviews with EU

officials, in an effort to shed more light on the less

researched informal arrangements for EU negotiations within

the global climate diplomacy infrastructure. The main

conclusions of the study is that while the post-Copenhagen

climate process has undergone changes that can qualify as a

paradigm shift, the EU’s own approach remains rooted in the

same principal objectives as in the past, albeit with new

instruments and approaches being applied. The study also finds

that EU performance in climate negotiations is often

erroneously evaluated according to the organisation’s own

objectives, rather than the general potential for the

conclusion of an effective regime. An additional conclusion is

that research in the field of EU studies fails to take into

account a growing range of forums and actors making up the

climate negotiation process, both inside and outside the

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conventional negotiation process of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Based on

these findings, it is recommended that analyses originating in

the field of EU studies would benefit from using a broader

scope of perspectives, and that interdisciplinary approaches

to the EU’s role in climate negotiations would be able to

produce added value for future research in the field.

v

Keywords

Climate Negotiations

Climate regime

Copenhagen climate conference

DG Climate Action

European Union

International Cooperation

Regime Theory

Paradigm

Public Goods

UNFCCC

vi

Table of ContentsStatutory Declaration.......................................ii

Abstract...................................................iii

Keywords....................................................iv

List of Figures............................................vii

List of Abbreviations.....................................viii

1 Introduction.............................................1

2 The climate issue, regime theory, the UNFCCC and the EU:

an overview..................................................4

2.1 Public goods, environmental regimes and strategies....4

2.1.1 Climate as a public good: projections and models...6

2.2 Environmental agreements as regimes...................9

2.3 The UNFCCC framework.................................12

2.4 The EU as an international climate actor.............15

2.4.1 The evolution of climate policy as an EU external

competence..............................................15

2.4.2 Evaluating EU actorness in climate negotiations...17

2.4.3 The EU’s institutional configuration for climate

negotiations............................................18

3 A Copenhagen paradigm shift? the EU at COP 15 and beyond 21

3.1 The EU at the 2009 Copenhagen COP 15 and its inter-

sessional meetings........................................21

3.2 Outcome of COP 15....................................23

3.3 From Copenhagen to Paris: a new paradigm in EU climate

negotiations?.............................................26

4 Setting the record straight: perspectives from

practitioners...............................................31

vii

4.1 The Copenhagen climate conference....................31

4.1.1 The political environment.........................32

4.1.2 EU influence in the negotiation process...........32

4.1.3 Other actors at Copenhagen........................33

4.2 The Copenhagen experience and EU informal arrangements

33

4.2.1 The lack of a negotiation mandate.................34

4.2.2 A broadening negotiation process..................35

4.2.3 Informal arrangements with other actors...........36

4.3 The post-Copenhagen paradigm.........................37

5 Challenging our understanding: The EU as a climate actor

and the post-Copenhagen paradigm revisited..................40

5.1 A post-Copenhagen paradigm or an enhanced negotiation

approach?.................................................41

6 Conclusion..............................................43

Bibliography................................................45

ANNEX I: Transcript of Interview with Anders Turesson.......56

ANNEX II: Interview with Anonymous Council Official.........65

ANNEX III: Interview with Anonymous Commission Official, third

party relations.............................................74

ANNEX IV: Transcript - Interview with Anonymous Commission

Official, internal coordination.............................79

viii

List of Figures

Figure 1 The IPCC's emissions scenarios as presented in the

2000 special report on emissions scenarios...............7

Figure 2 IPCC projections over four scenarios from the 5th

assessment report........................................9

Figure 3 Schipper's pathways for responding to climate change.

........................................................11

Figure 4 The structure of the UNFCCC system.................13

Figure 5 Schematic of model for assessing impact at Copenhagen

by Eppstein et al.......................................25

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List of Abbreviations

ADP Ad-hoc working group on the Durban

platform

AR Annual Report (IPCC)

AWG Ad-Hoc Working Group

CBDR Common but differentiated

responsibilities

CMP Meeting of the Parties (Kyoto

Protocol)

COP Conference of the Parties

DG CLIMA Directorate-General for Climate

Action (EU)

DG ENVI Directorate-General for Environment

(EU)

EC European Commission

EEAS European External Action Service

EIT Economies in Transition

EU European Union

FAC Foreign Affairs Council

GCF Green Climate Fund

GDN Green Diplomacy Network

HST Hegemonic Stability Theory

x

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change

KP Kyoto Protocol

LCA Long-term Cooperation

RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism

REDD (+) Reducing emissions from deforestation

and forest degradation

REIO Regional Economic Integration

Organisation

SBI Subsidiary body for Implementation

SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and

Technological Advice

SEA Self-Enforcing agreement

SI Social Institutionalism

TEU Treaty on European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union

UN United Nations

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change

WPIEI Working Party on International

Environmental Issues

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xii

1 IntroductionIn the lead up to the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP), to

take place in December 2009 in Copenhagen, hopes for an

ambitious agreement to tackle climate change reached new

heights. The European Union (EU) consistently stressed the

absolute importance of an agreement, stating that:

”The EU is pressing for a global, ambitious,

comprehensive and legally binding international treaty

that will prevent global warming from reaching the

dangerous levels. The global warming average temperature

needs to be kept below 2°C above the pre-industrial level

in order to prevent the worst impacts of climate

change.”1

Less than a year later, it was clear that none of this was

to become real. While the Copenhagen Accord represented some

progress, it was far from what EU negotiators had hoped for,

with Commission President Barroso stating, “quite simply, our

level of ambition has not been matched.”2

There has been significant academic investigation of COP

15, and the subsequent efforts to build an alternative

agreement. These studies have often focused on faults in the

EU’s internal organisation and climate strategy, yet an area

that has been more scarcely documented is the role that inter-

sessional negotiations have played for the EU’s negotiation1 European Commission, “The Copenhagen climate change negotiations:EU position and state of play”, MEMO/09/493, Brussels, 9 November2009.2 European Commission, ”Statement of President Barroso on theCopenhagen Climate Accord”, SPEECH/09/588, Brussels, 19 December2009.

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strategy, notably with regards to evolving third party

positions. It became increasingly clear during the preparatory

meetings of the Copenhagen conference that the United States

(US) would not accept the EU’s proposal for a legally binding

agreement,3 and neither would China4. Further, while

substantial research of the climate negotiation process exists

both in the field of regime studies, as well as within the

European Union literature, these two fields remain subjected

to a form of silo mentality. This thus raises a set of

questions for our understanding of climate negotiations. Were

EU negotiators fully aware of the level of opposition they

would face at Copenhagen? Are the EU’s arrangements for

climate negotiations detrimental to absorbing and reacting to

third party positions? How has the experience of Copenhagen

affected the EU’s approach to climate negotiations? These

questions, associated with the post-Copenhagen climate regime,

together feed into a larger, overarching question: has the EU,

as some authors claim, entered a new paradigm in climate

negotiations following Copenhagen?56 These questions become

particularly pertinent, given the similarly high expectations

3 G. Bang & M. A. Scheurs, ”A Green New Deal: framing US climateleadership”, The European Union as a leader in International Climate Change Politics,R. K. W. W. Wurzel & J. Connelly (eds.), London, Routledge, 2011,p. 247.4 X. Dai & Z. Diao, “Towards a new world order for climate change:China and the European Union’s leadership ambition”, The EuropeanUnion as a leader in International Climate Change Politics, R. K. W. W. Wurzel & J.Connelly (eds.), London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 264-266.5 Falkner et al., ”International Climate Policy after Copenhagen:Towards a ’Building Blocks’ Approach”, Global Climate Policy, vol. 1, no.3, 2010.6 S. Fischer & O. Geden, ”The Change Role of InternationalNegotiations in EU Climate Policy”, The International Spectator: Italian Journalof International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 1-7.

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ahead of COP 21 in Paris later this year. This analysis will

thus investigate the above questions and examine how the

experience of COP 15 has affected the EU’s negotiating

strategy ahead of Paris, so as to improve our understanding of

the EU’s evolution as a climate negotiator.

To investigate this, the analysis in this study is

structured in four parts with the intention of providing an

interdisciplinary perspective of EU engagement with third

parties. The first chapter provides a general overview of

climate change as an international issue, regime theoretical

approaches to climate governance, the UNFCCC as an

institutional setting for climate negotiations, and the EU as

an international climate actor. The purpose of the chapter is

to provide a basis in regime studies to demonstrate that the

EU’s performance in climate negotiations should not be

conditioned only by our understanding of its own nature as a

climate negotiator, but also the environment it operates

within. Based on that foundation, the second chapter focuses

on how existing literature approaches COP 15 in 2009 and how

the EU’s approach to climate negotiations evolved as a

consequence, and whether this evolution constitutes a paradigm

shift. The purpose here is to establish what answers existing

literature can provide for the questions raised above about

changes in the EU’s role in the UNFCCC negotiation process,

and whether the regime studies perspective can offer a

complimentary element. Those findings are then contrasted in

the third chapter by introducing findings from interviews with

practitioners in EU climate negotiations, so as to identify

inconsistencies and new areas of investigation that may

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improve our understanding of the EU as a climate actor. The

fourth chapter then brings together the first three chapters

to outline whether the academic understanding of the EU’s role

in international climate governance accurately captures how

the EU conducts climate negotiations, in particular with

regards to third parties and a possible new paradigm, or

whether the interviews introduced in chapter three provide us

with a basis for rethinking and further investigating the

field.

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2 The climate issue, regime theory, the UNFCCCand the EU: an overviewThis chapter lays the ground for examining climate

negotiations at Copenhagen and after, by providing an overview

of how academic literature currently understands the issue of

international climate governance and the EU’s infrastructure

for engaging with it. The section begins with a broader

perspective on regime studies, environmental economics and

climate science to set the stage for the climate negotiation

environment, and will then narrow its focus to the EU’s nature

as a climate actor.

2.1 Public goods, environmental regimes and strategies

When discussing climate change a definition is in order.

The terms “global warming” and “climate change” are often used

interchangeably, but it is important to note that the term

climate change may equally refer to a natural process of

changes in the Earth’s climate resulting from processes that

are not man-made.7 To some extent, global warming is a more

accurate term in that it refers to the increase in global

temperature caused by anthropogenic (human) activity. Yet

global warming may not accurately capture the phenomena

associated with anthropogenic climate change, such as extreme

weather events.8 This study concerns itself with anthropogenic

climate change in the form that the IPCC envisages it,

7 B. Lomborg, The Sceptical Environmentalists: Measuring the Real State of The World,Cambridge, CUP, 2001, P. 259-260.8 IPCC, “Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report – Summary forPolicymakers”, 2014.

17

including extreme weather events and adverse consequences both

for human and non-human life.

The environment, including climate change, can be

considered a public good at virtually all levels of study,

which contributes to its complexity as a problem. This is

because a public good can be understood as a good that is non-

excludable and non-rivalrous; that is to say, once the good is

provided, it is impossible to prevent actors from accessing it

regardless of their contribution to its provision, and the use

of the good by one actor does not limit simultaneous use by

another.9 The second aspect of this may be discussed in the

context of the international environment given the limited

nature of carbon stocks, but certainly the current dynamic of

environmental politics appears to adhere to the logic of a

public good.10 As Mancur Olson argues, the fundamental problem

of a public good is to ensure its provision through collective

action while simultaneously limiting free riding, the practice

of profiting from a good without contributing to it.11 As

Hardin suggests in the Tragedy of the Commons, rational

individual behaviour leads to collectively suboptimal

results,12 resulting in what Olson calls collective action

problems.

9 F. Grundig and H. Ward, “Structural Group Leadership and RegimeEffectiveness”, Political Studies, vol. 63, no. 1, March 2015, p. 222.10 J. Hovi et al., “Implementing Long-Term Climate Change Policy:Time Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, International Anarchy”, GlobalEnvironmental Politics, vol. 9, no. 3, August 2009, p. 20. 11 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: public goods and theory of groups,Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 9-16.12 G. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, no. 162, 13December 1968, 1243-1248.

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Public goods can be provided relatively easily at the

national level through the use of centralised authority, by

making mandatory the contribution to the provision of a good

within a governance structure.13 However, the absence of such

authority at the international level creates a different

dynamic. Some authors point to hegemonic stability theory14 as

a primary means of ensuring delivery, but as will be discussed

further below, the ability for a single actor to force

compliance with a public goods regime is increasingly

unfeasible.

The provision of a public good also involves some measure

of cost. In the context of climate change, this cost is

significant, as undertaking emission mitigation involves

imposing restrictions on certain types of economic activity,

often cheaper production methods.15 While modelling of costs of

environmental costs arising from climate-related damage over

time are subject to constant debate and uncertainty, some

points stand true: first, both the emission of gases

contributing to climate change and the potential damage

resulting therefrom are unevenly distributed globally.16 This

results in some actors having a narrower cost-benefit margin,

thus becoming less interested in providing the good in

13 S. Barrett, “Self-Enforcing International EnvironmentalAgreements”, Oxford Economic Papers, no. 46 (special issue onenvironmental economics), 1994, pp. 878-881.14 O. Young, “Political leadership and regime formation: on thedevelopment of institutions in international society”, InternationalOrganisation, vol. 45, no. 3, June 1991, P. 286.15 A. Giddens, The politics of Climate Change, 2nd ed., Cambridge, PolityPress, 2011, pp. 57-58.16 S. Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: the strategy of environmental treaty-making, Oxford, OUP, 2003, pp. 53-56.

19

question.17 An example to this point is that the average

American citizen emits 17.6 metric tons of CO2 (2010 figures)

compared to 1.7 metric tons for every Indian inhabitant.18 Yet

projections indicate that agricultural yields in the US may

see a net increase by 2100 due to climate change, as opposed

to a fall in yields in Northern India by nearly 70%, while

rapid population increase is expected.19 Thus, the cost-benefit

analysis for actors varies greatly. Second, the political

responsibility for undertaking abatement costs is unclear.

While the EU has accepted responsibility to undertake heavier

costs on the basis that it is economically capable to do so,

this has not been the case in the US.20 Conversely, developing

states such as China and India stress the historical

responsibility for carbon stocks21 by developed states, and on

that basis defend the fact that emissions now increasingly

originate in emerging markets, with China overtaking the US in

gross CO2 emissions measured in metric tonnes in 2006.22 This

tension over how to distribute mitigation costs among various

actors is captured in the notion of common but differentiated

responsibilities (CBDR), a concept that has been subject to

much dispute in climate negotiations.23

17 Ibid, p. 56.18 From the World Bank’s development indicators online database, seebibliography.19 N. Stern, “Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change”,Independent Review, HM Treasury, London, 2006, p. 1320 G. Bang & M. A. Scheurs, op. cit., p. 235.21 Carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere for approximately 100years, creating a historical stock. This shifts discussions onemissions to historical responsibility.22 J. E. Aldy & R. N. Stavins, “Climate Negotiators create anopportunity for scholars”, Science, no. 337, 31 August 2012.23 P. Pauw et al., “Different perspectives on differentiatedresponsibilities”, discussion paper, German development institute,

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2.1.1 Climate as a public good: projections and models

Climate science has certainly not been a stranger to

controversy. In several political narratives, in particular in

the US, a phenomenon of ‘believing’ in climate change has

taken up significant space in the public dialogue, which is

particularly curious given the scientific nature of the

problem. Such debates are proving very unhelpful, in

particular in the light of mounting scientific evidence for

anthropogenic climate change. The most authoritative body on

the issue, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),

found in its 2014 synthesis report (assessment report 5) that:

“Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent

anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest

in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread

impacts on human and natural systems.”24

June 2014, P. 3.24 IPCC, “Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report – Summary forPolicymakers”, 2014, p. 2.

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What popular debate on climate change often fails to

capture is not whether anthropogenic climate change is

occurring, but rather to what extent human activity influences

the climate now and in the future. This is where debate still

exists within international climate politics. In its prolific

2000 special report on emissions scenarios, the IPCC developed

an intricate system of scenarios (see fig. 1).25 The number of

scenarios reflects the complexity of assessing the trends and

consequences of emissions, for a number of reasons.

First, emissions trends are subjected to economic

projections which themselves are unreliable. An example of

this is the reduction of European emissions as a consequence

of the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing debt crisis.26 Second,

while climate change can be linked to adverse changes in our

25 IPCC, “Emissions Scenarios: summary for policy makers”, 2000, p.4.26 S. J. Davis and K. Caldeira, “Consumption-based accounting of CO2

emissions”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), vol. 107, no.12, March 23 2010, p. 5687.

Figure 1 The IPCC's emissions scenarios as presented in the 2000 special

report on emissions scenarios.

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environment, the subsequent damage is hard to assess, as

damage in itself is not easily conceptualised.27 Most often,

climate economists interpret damage in terms of economic loss

over time, or discount rates. The use of discount rates has

created a broad range of results, from the Stern Review

arguing for 1% of global GDP being invested in mitigation and

adaptation,28 to Nordhaus rejecting any significant

investment.29 These projections are also subjected to changing

technological circumstances, as technologies are developed to

phase out emissions or make adaptation cheaper, albeit in an

uncertain manner.30

Fundamentally, projections are subject to a high degree of

uncertainty, In particular those for impacts and adaptation,

and adherence to specific scenarios is thus a mix of political

interest and scientific conviction. As we shall see, this is

one of the contributing factors to the broad range of

different positions on climate action. There is some

controversy as to which target for limiting global temperature

increase should be employed. At COP 15 in 2009, and later

legally endorsed at COP 20 in Cancun, the UNFCCC adopted a

target of limiting temperature increase to below 2°C above

1990 levels. As the IPCC finds:

27 S. Caney, “Human rights, climate change, and discounting”,Environmental Politics, vol. 17, no. 4, 2008, p. 540.28 M. L. Weitzman, “A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics ofClimate Change”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 45, no. 3, Sep. 2007,p. 708.29 E. Neumayer, “Global warming: discounting is not the issue,substitutability is”, Energy Policy, no. 27, 1999, p. 33.30 J. H. Ausubel, “Technical progress and climatic change”, EnergyPolicy, vo. 23, no. 4/5, 1995, p. 416.

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“Risks of global aggregate impacts are moderate for

additional warming between 1–2°C, reflecting impacts to

both Earth’s biodiversity and the overall global economy

(medium confidence). Extensive biodiversity loss with

associated loss of ecosystem goods and services results

in high risks around 3°C additional warming (high

confidence). Aggregate economic damages accelerate with

increasing temperature (limited evidence, high

agreement), but few quantitative estimates have been

completed for additional warming around 3°C or above.”31

It must however be stressed that a temperature below a 2°C

increase would still incur significant damage for the global

climate, notably for small developing island states (SIDS), as

sea rise threatens to submerge large parts of their territory.

Other areas identified by the IPCC that are expected to be

affected disproportionately are coastal areas, food production

near the equator, and tropical areas where disease may become

more prevalent.32

31 IPCC, “Climate Change 2014: impacts, adaptation, andvulnerability – summary for policymakers”, 2014, p. 11. 32 Ibid, p. 13.

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Figure 2 shows the IPCC’s later scenarios as outlined in

assessment report 5 (AR5).33 What the graph indicates is that

under the more likely scenario based on current trends

(RCP8.5), there is a high probability that without further

mitigation, global temperatures will surpass the 2°C target,

possibly reaching as high as 4°C.

It is based on this scientific premise that a need for a

global regime for limiting human action contributing to

climate change has emerged. We will now proceed to examine the

dynamics of environmental agreements as international regimes.

2.2 Environmental agreements as regimes

The previously mentioned lack of central authority in the

international system means that a public good such as

environmental protection must be delivered through a regime,

in the form of an international agreement that changes the

behaviour of the actors capable of affecting climate change.

33 IPCC, Op. Cit., “Climate Change 2014”, p. 11.

Figure 2 IPCC projections over four scenarios from the 5th assessment

report.

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In Krasner’s34 definition, a regime is a “set of implicit or

explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making

procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a

given area of international relations”. According to

Underdal,35 a regime may be assessed in three stages:

1. Output – negotiating a regime acceptable to all parties

involved. This stage includes the conclusion of a regime

through signature and putting domestic measures into

effect.

2. Outcome – the stage at which measures have been put in

effect, and a change in behaviour can be observed among

relevant target groups.

3. Impact – the consequences observed in the issue in

question by the change in behaviour that is created

through outcome.

As this overview indicates, regime formulation not only

involves delivering a solution to a problem, but one that will

result in set of regulations that can guarantee a specific

impact on how the environment is governed. For the purposes of

this study, the first stage, output, will be the primary point

of analysis. As discussed earlier, the basis for regime

formation can come from different sources. There are

historical cases of a state holding enough influence in a

specific issue so as to either unilaterally provide a public

good, or coerce other actors into subscribing to a regime

34 S. D. Krasner, International Regimes, 1983, Ithaca, Cornell UniversityPress, p. 2. 35 A. Underdal, “One Question, Two Answers” in Eduard Miles et al(eds.), Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence,Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2005, p. 7.

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under what is known as hegemonic stability theory (HST).36 HST

appears to be less applicable to international climate

politics for two reasons. First, the nature of abatement

suggests that unilaterally providing emissions reduction would

not only be costly, but also reduce economic power relative to

other actors over time. Second, emissions are distributed over

a broad range of economically powerful states, making it hard

to coerce all necessary actors into conformity. This

understanding is supported by Hugh Ward and Frank Grundig, who

in their model find that environmental regime effectiveness

depends on US participation, and conversely the US is not

sufficient to ensure effectiveness alone.37 This form of

regression analysis of international climate negotiations

takes a prominent role in regime studies, but as we will see

they remain absent in the field of European Union studies. An

alternative solution would be to establish centralised

authority by creating a supervisory institution. However, this

would suggest that there is already sufficient consensus to

empower that organisation as an agent for developing a climate

change regime, raising questions about its necessity for

creating an institution in the first place.38

36 O. S. Stokke, “Regimes as Governance Systems”, Global Governance:drawing insights from the environmental experience”, Oran Young (ed.),Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997.37 F. Grundig & H. Ward, Op. Cit., pp. 237-239.38 A. Najam, M. Papa & N. Taiyab, Global Environmental Governance: a ReformAgenda, Winnipeg, International Institute for SustainableDevelopment, 2006, pp. 30-32.

27

Thus, Barrett argues that a climate change agreement will

have to be a self-enforcing agreement (SEA), in which

participants voluntarily subscribe to a regime on the basis of

a favourable cost-benefit analysis.39 In order for this to be

possible, Grundig40 argues that three conditions must be

fulfilled. First, no member should benefit from withdrawing.

Second, no member should benefit from being noncompliant.

Third, the first two conditions must hold without external

enforcement. While a number of academic visions exist of an

SEA, including stringent enforcement mechanisms, SEA’s

proposed in international environmental politics have relied

predominantly on norms-based commitments where actors attempt

39 S. Barrett, Op. Cit., Environment and statecraft, pp. 397-398.40 F. Grundig, “Political strategy and climate policy: a rationalchoice perspective”, Environmental Politics vol. 18, no. 5, 2009, p. 750.

Figure 3 Schipper's pathways for responding to climate change.

28

to extract reciprocal commitments at a satisfactory level with

little or no consequences for intentional non-compliance.41 The

main exception to this is the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which

could rely on enforcement through management of private goods,

as production of chlorofluorocarbons and other substances were

produced by a limited number of states.42 This is natural,

given that the distribution of bargaining power makes states

able to avoid subjecting themselves to punitive mechanisms. It

is also important to recognise the mitigation-adaptation

dichotomy; as Schipper argues, any commitment to reducing

emissions will not be immediately visible, and so

international climate action becomes subjected to a discourse

dilemma where calls for mitigation and adaption make up a set

of pathways which negotiations move through (see figure 3).43

This creates an interlinkage between the two issues that has

remained persistent throughout the climate regime negotiation

process.

Following this examination of the regime studies

perspective on climate change, we will proceed to examine the

political arrangements for governing climate change, by

examining the UNFCCC framework and the EU as an environmental

actor.

41 J. Hovi, C. Bretteville Froyn & G. Bang, “Enforcing the KyotoProtocol: can punitive consequences restore compliance?”, Review ofInternational Studies, vol. 33, no. 3, 2007, P. 436.42 Barrett, Op. Cit., Environment and Statecraft, p. 239.43 E. L. F. Schipper, “Conceptual History of Adaption in the UNFCCCProcess”, Reciel, vol. 15, no. 1, 2006, p. 85.

29

2.3 The UNFCCC framework

The international climate regime can be considered a subset

of the global environmental governance infrastructure, with

its origins in the United Nations (UN) system. Throughout the

20th Century, the UN has produced what Seyfang44 calls four

environmental mega-conferences, which are:

1. The Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE), 1972,

Stockholm;

2. The Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)

also known as the Rio Earth Summit, 1992, Rio;

3. The General Assembly Special Session on Sustainable

Development, or Earth Summit II, 1997, New York;

4. The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD),

2002, Johannesburg.

These conferences have over time raised the profile of

environmental governance on the global agenda, and during the

second mega-summit, the Rio Earth Summit, the members of the

UN agreed to establish a framework convention on climate

change (UNFCCC). The agreement on the UNFCCC was concluded

with its signature in 1992, and the Convention formally

entered into force in 1994.45 From then onwards, the UNFCCC has

served as the primary forum for negotiations on an agreement

to address climate change and its consequences. The first

agreement produced by the UNFCCC was the Kyoto protocol (KP)

of 1997, but this agreement has seen growing non-compliance44 G. Seyfang & A. Jordan, ”The Johannesburg Summit and SustainableDevelopment: How Effective Are Environmental Conferences?”, O. S.Stokke & O. B. Thommessen (eds.), Yearbook of International Co-operation onEnvironment and Development 2002/2003, London, Earthscan Publications,2002, p. 20.45 S. Barrett, op. cit., Environment and Statecraft, pp. 368-369.

30

due to substantial flaws in its regime design.46 As such, the

parties of the UNFCCC have now moved on to negotiate a new

agreement, which is to replace the KP paradigm. It is this

period that the present study seeks to investigate.

A few key aspects of the UNFCCC must be noted. First, the

UNFCCC does not impose any concrete obligations on its

members, but rather forms a framework for negotiations on

climate governance.47 Second, the UNFCCC in its founding treaty

divides its members into Annex I parties, consisting of

industrialised economies and economies in transition (EIT,

post-soviet parties), while leaving developing states as non-

annex parties, including China.48 Third, the Convention

established consensus as the decision-making rule.49 As we will

46 Hovi et al., op. cit., “Enforing the Kyoto Protocol”, pp. 440-445.47 S. Barrett, op. cit., Environment and Statecraft, p. 369.48 F. Yamin & J. Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide toRules, Institutions, and Procedures, Cambridge, CUP, 1004, p. 107.49 See UNFCCC (English version), art. 7(k).

Figure 4 The structure of the UNFCCC system.

31

see, these aspects play a key role in UNFCCC climate

governance.

Since the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the

UNFCCC structure has been divided into two tracks; the ad-hoc

working group for long-term cooperation action (AWG-LCA, since

2011 referred to as the Durban platform for enhanced action or

ADP), and the ad-hoc working group for the Kyoto Protocol

(AWG-KP).50 Each track has its own annual summit, the

conference of the parties (COP) and the meeting of the parties

(CMP) respectively. In 2012 at COP 18 in Doha, the work of

AWG-KP was officially concluded.51 For the purposes of this

study, we will focus on the first track. The COP sessions in

turn have two subsidiary bodies for scientific and

technological advice (SBSTA) and Implementation (SBI), which

have subsidiary expert groups for technology transfer and LCD

implementation respectively.52 The Convention has its own

secretariat and president, while the COP, SBSTA and SBI have

their own bureaus. COP sessions are mandated by the UNFCCC to

take place annually unless the parties decide otherwise. So

far no change has been made to this practice, although some

parties suggest this to be exhaustive.53 While in session, the

working bodies of the COP traditionally divide into informal

working groups targeting specific issues such as finance,

reporting and more. Apart from COP sessions, the AWG-LCA/ADP

officially meets in four meetings (which may have sub-

50 UNFCCC, decision 1/CMP.1, Official Journal of the United Nations,FCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, Montreal, 10 December 2005.51 UNFCCC, decision 1/CMP.8 (the Doha Amendment), Official Journal of theUnited Nations, FCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/add.1, Doha, 8 December 2012.52 F. Yamin & J. Depledge, op. cit., p. 415.53 ibid, p. 408.

32

meetings) throughout the year.54 Each COP has a presidency that

presides over the bureau, which traditionally is the country

hosting the conference. As specified in the COP rules of

procedure, the responsibilities of the COP presidency include

chairing the Conference and upholding the rules of procedure,

including arranging schedules and putting questions to a vote.

The presidency “remains under the authority of the

Conference”, and should thus remain impartial.55

What is clear from this structure, in particular when

keeping in mind the separate structures under the Kyoto

Protocol is that any party would have to invest significant

amounts of time and resources to gain a full overview of

technical and political aspects of the UNFCCC process. As we

shall see, combining this complicated structure with the far

from straightforward EU structure creates a specific set of

difficulties.

2.4 The EU as an international climate actor

This section outlines the EU’s nature as an actor in

international climate politics by examining literature on EU

actorness, the evolution climate policy as an EU competence,

and the institutional arrangements for international climate

negotiations.

2.4.1 The evolution of climate policy as an EU external competence

The EU’s competence in climate policy has grown out of the

gradual expansion of EU coordination within general

54 Ibid, pp. 407-408.55 Ibid, pp. 413-414.

33

environmental and energy policy. Integration within the field

of environment has played a central role in the evolution of

external competences, notably through disputes such as ERTA

and Opinion 1/76 – Rhine River Barges.56 As a policy area that

interacts with many aspects of governance, from industry, to

energy, to food standards, an increasingly dense web of

legislation has enabled the EU institutions to take on an

increasing responsibility for international environmental

relations. As in ERTA however, EU competence has grown out of

the principle of In Foro Interno, In Foro Externo, thus meaning that

internal competence and action must precipitate external

competence.57 This is problematic for climate negotiations,

given the broad range of policy areas concerned with it. As

the Member States have sought to retain significant

competences for themselves, notably the right to determine the

composition of their energy mix, the competence to participate

in environmental negotiations has always been divided between

Member States and EU institutions.58 In the Lisbon treaty59

environment was clearly spelled out in in art. 4(3)TFEU as a

shared competence, and external competence was given to the EU

and its Member States “within their spheres of competences” in

art. 191(4)TFEU.

56 J. Vogler, “The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and ClimateChange”, International Relations and the European Union, Ed. C. Hill and M.Smith, Oxford: OUP, 2011, p. 354.57 Ibid, pp. 351-353.58 T. Delreux, & K. Van den Brande, “Taking the lead: informaldivision of labour in the EU’s external environment policy-making”,Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 20, no. 1, 2013, pp. 115-120.59 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and theTreaty Establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the EuropeanUnion, 2007/C/306/01, 13 December 2007.

34

The EU’s role in climate negotiations is demonstrated by

its presence as early as the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, where

the UNFCCC was agreed upon and opened for signature. It was

thanks to this early presence that the EU and its members

ensured that a regional economic integration organisation

(REIO) clause was included in the Convention, thus opening up

for EU membership in its own right, albeit without a vote.60

The EU was as such a participant in UNFCCC negotiations

already in 1994, and increasingly sought to take on a

leadership role.61 EU documentation reveals how several

interests for the EU in doing so have evolved, such as

obtaining the first-mover advantage in green industry,

improving security of supply in energy by reducing demand for

fossil fuel imports, and creating green growth through

transitioning into a zero-carbon economy.62 This is supported

by Van Schaik and Schunz, who point to climate change as an

economic opportunity and energy security issue for the EU.63

Drawing on Ian Manners’ work,64 Sebastian Oberthür,65 as

well as Parker and Karlsson, has famously argued, that the EU

60 J. Vogler, op. cit., p. 351.61 C. F. Parker & C. Karlsson, “Climate Change and the EuropeanUnion’s Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?”, JCMS: Journal ofCommon Market Studies vol, 48, no. 4, 2010, pp. 923-930.62 European Commission, “A Framework Strategy for a Resilient EnergyUnion with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy”, COM(2015) 80final, Brussels, 25 February 2015.63 L. Van Schaik & S. Schunz, ”Explaining EU Activism and Impact inGlobal Climate Politics: is the Union a Norm- or Interest-drivenactor?”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 176-177.64 I. Manners, ”Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”,JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-258.65 S. Oberthür, ‘Global climate governance after Cancun: options forEU leadership’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs,vol. 46, no. 1, 2011, pp. 5-13.

35

has gone beyond a purely interested-oriented understanding of

climate change to pursue the role of a normative leader.66 This

is made clear in the 2020 Climate and Energy Package, where

the Commission sees the EU “take the lead internationally”

against climate change “to 2020 and beyond”.67 The EU and its

Member States have consistently made ambitious commitments to

climate mitigation, such as in the 20-20-20 plan, and played a

key role in ensuring that the Kyoto Protocol could enter into

force by investing itself in bilateral negotiations with

Russia.68 Since 2007, the EU has also affirmed its support for

the below 2°C target, and seeks to ensure that arrangements

under an agreement can meet it.69 Van Schaik and Schunz also

make these observations to conclude that EU actorness is

driven by a mix of norms and interest, going as far as to

argue that normative concerns are the primary driver.70 It is

also possible to argue that as a clearly international issue,

climate change is an ideal issue for the EU to extend its own

international role and relevance.71 This is a modus operandi

often discussed for the EU as well as international

institutions at large.72

66 C. F. Parker & C. Karlsson, op. cit., pp. 925-926.67 European Commission, “Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degreesCelsius – The way ahead for 2020 and beyond”, COM(2007) 2 final, 10January 2007, p. 2.68 R. D. Keleman, “The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for aGlobal Grand Bargain?”, JCMS: Journal o European Public Policy, vol. 17, no.3, 2010, p. 340.69 European Commission, Op. Cit., “A Framework Strategy”, p. 3.70 Van Schaik & Schunz, op. Cit., 182-186.71 C. F. Parker & C. Karlsson, op. cit., p. 924.72 M. N. Barnett & M. Finnemore, “The Politics, Power andPathologies of International Organisations”, International Organisation,vol. 53, no. 4, 1999, pp. 699-732.

36

The EU’s history as an international climate actor thus

tells us that it has a vested interest in ensuring the driving

of the process of developing of a viable climate change

regime, also implying a need to take into account the

positions of third parties to ensure their compliance. At the

same time, an agreement would have to meet expectations for a

desirable outcome among the EU’s constituent Member States and

institutions, placing constraints on an acceptable output. For

the purposes of this thesis, we will now move on to examine

the EU’s own institutional configuration for climate

negotiations to identify what limitations these may impose on

the EU’s ability to engage with and react constructively to

third party positions.

2.4.2 Evaluating EU actorness in climate negotiations

A broad range of literature exists on the topic of EU

actorness, including works by Allen & Smith on presence,73

Jupille and Caporaso’s actorness taxonomy,74 Bretherton and

Vogler’s focus on opportunity, presence and capabilities,75 and

others. In the context of climate negotiations, Tom Delreux’s

work76 on EU actorness in environmental affairs provides a

73 D. Allen & M. Smith, “The European Union’s Security Presence:Barrier, Facilitator, or Manager?”, in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), TheEuropean Union in the World Community, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers,1998.74 J. Jupille & J. A. Caporaso, “States, Agency, and Rules: TheEuropean Union in Global Environmental Politics”, in Carolyn Rhodes(ed.), The European Union in the World Community, London, Lynne RiennerPublishers, 1998, pp. 213-229.75 C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, ”Conceptualising EU actorness”, TheEuropean Union as a Global Actor, London, Routledge, 2006, 2nd edn, pp.12-61.76 T. Delreux, The EU as International Climate Negotiator, Farnham, AshgatePublishing Limited, 2011.

37

thourough overview. In applying principal-agent theory,

Delreux recognises Rasmussen’s emphasis on social relations

between principals and agents, and points to normative

pressure in establishing delegation of authority.77 Delreux

further contrasts rational choice institutionalism’s (RCI)

emphasis on the dual presence of Member States and the

Commission as a control function for Member States with

sociological institutionalism, further highlighting how an

atmosphere of partnership represents a positive normative

aspects and possibly convergence.78 A potential criticism of

Delreux’s use of principal-agent theory is its emphasis on

formal institutional arrangements, which may fail to capture

how negotiations are informally arranged on the ground.

Delreux also recognises how informal arrangements remain less

explored by academia.79 What Delreux’s analysis would tell us

however, is that the EU’s ability to adjust its strategy in

relation to third parties is significantly constrained by the

checks and balances contained within the principal-agent

relationship that plays out during UNFCCC negotiations. This

is an expectation that we will examine in detail in the

following sections.

2.4.3 The EU’s institutional configuration for climatenegotiations

The EU’s institutional configuration for negotiations in

the UNFCCC is far from straightforward. The EU (using the

legal personality of the European Community) signed the UNFCCC

as a regional economic integration organisation (REIO), and is77 Ibid, pp. 49-50.78 Ibid, p. 51.79 T. Delreux, Tom, & K. Van den Brande, op. cit., p. 114.

38

thus a party without a separate vote from its members. Under

article 3(k) of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was to have “a

policy in the sphere of the environment”, establishing some

competence at the EU level.80 Nevertheless, Member States also

retained the right to legislate on environment, a principle

that remains under Lisbon, where environment is defined as a

shared competence.81 This has meant that the EU must represent

itself next to the Member States in their own right, in turn

creating a need for establishing practices for common

representation and negotiation. To achieve this, so-called

“practical arrangements” have been employed, wherein EU actors

and Member States arrive at a common agreement over a

distribution of responsibilities.82 Traditionally, this has

entailed that the presidency of the Council of the European

Union takes on the role as lead negotiator, with support from

the Commission.83 A system of issue leaders has also been

utilised, where Member States with more resources or stronger

interest can take the lead on a particular issue.84 Throughout

the negotiation cycle, the EU and its Member States are

jointly present in the UNFCCC process, and internal

coordination is done through Council working groups, notably

the Working Party on International Environmental Issues

(WPIEI), on a continuous basis. Throughout the UNFCCC

negotiation cycle, it is this working group that issues

mandates, receives briefings on preparatory negotiations, and80 European Union, Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), Official Journal of the European Union, 1992/C/191/1, 7 February 1992.81 European Union, op. cit., Treaty of Lisbon, art. 4(1)(e).82 T. Delreux, Op. Cit., The EU as as an international climate negotiator, pp. 76-77.83 Ibid, p. 74-79.84 T. Delreux, op. cit., The EU as International Climate Negotiator, p. 114.

39

issues positions, yet little literature exists on its

functioning and effectiveness. It is also here that third

party positions would most likely have to be absorbed,

reflected on and reacted upon, but investigation of the WPIEI

is often contextualised in processes85, and this has not been

done in the context of third parties. This is where the first

hand sources in this thesis may contribute positively.

This institutional configuration produces clear problems

and limitations. First, practical arrangements have had very

varied results in their implementation, and undermines

continuity in EU representation at the UNFCCC.86 As will be

discussed later in the study, it is argued that the

arrangements ahead of Copenhagen led to the failure of the EU

negotiating position. Second, the division of competences

leads to questions about authority. While the presidency

ostensibly represents the EU, any negotiations moving outside

of the EU’s agreed position have to be discussed internally by

the Member States, forcing the EU bloc to retreat from the

negotiation floor87. If contingency planning has not taken

place, this can paralyse the EU for the greater part of

negotiations. As will be discussed later, this may also give

rise to a specific “Europe problem” if conferences are held

where European leaders can easily attend, given that this

muddles authority structures and by bringing up negotiations

85 See T. Delreux & K. Van Den Brande, op. cit., p. 119-121 for adiscussion of the WPIEI in the context of issue leaders.86 Ibid, p. 126.87 T. Delreux, “The EU and multilateralism in the environmentalfield : UNEP reform and external representation in environmentalnegations” in E. Drieskens & L. Van Schaik (eds.), The EU and EffectiveMultilateralism: Internal and external reform practices, London, 2014, p. 76.

40

to the head of state level, excluding the EU presidency.

Third, the issue leader system creates significant

coordination issues, as COP working groups may be organised on

an informal basis, which then requires EU negotiators to

redistribute their own resources while keeping the presidency

informed of the overall progress of negotiations.88 Fourth,

while Member States seek to retain their own authority

wherever they retain competence, they may not possess the

expertise required to engage with a policy area.89 In

particular smaller Member States (or states less invested in

the negotiations) may be left to take a decision on internal

EU coordination without being able to appropriately grasp the

issue, while not trusting experts of other Member States.

Finally, an issue less often discussed is the ability of

the EU to function as a bloc during preparatory meetings, and

which informal practices apply.90 Previous research indicates

that the Commission (now DG CLIMA) has gained an increasing

role during these meetings as they are often of a more

technical nature and a lower priority for Member States,91

which may be why Commission officials were expecting a

positive outcome ahead of COP 15. Yet the question as to how

progress during preparatory meetings is communicated and

sanctioned by the Member States, and fully absorbed by the

entire EU bloc ahead of COP meetings remains unclear, and has

88 T. Delreux & K. Van den Brande, Op. Cit., p. 116.89 Ibid, p. 115.90 Ibid, p. 115.91 P. M. Barnes, “The role of the Commission of the European Union:creating external coherence from internal diversity”, The EuropeanUnion as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics, R. K. W.W Wurzel & J.Connelly (eds.), New York, Routledge, 2011, Pp. 55-56.

41

not been well explored in the literature. It is possible that

it is within this process that absorption of and reaction to

third party positions plays a central role, and where there

may be an institutional failure in appropriately adjusting

negotiation strategy towards third actors.

What these factors suggest is that there may be obstacles

for the EU partially to absorb and communicate information

from third parties, but also primarily to adjust its

negotiation position in a changing context. What also quickly

becomes evident is that literature focusing on the EU’s role

in climate negotiations remains detached from the studies of

international regimes that have been discussed in the first

chapter, as well as institutional studies of the UNFCCC. Our

understanding of the EU as a climate negotiator could thus be

improved by adopting an interdisciplinary approach, where

notions of EU actorness and its performance in climate

negotiations are contrasted with regime modelling and the

previously discussed regression analyses of the climate issue.

In order to examine how the aspects discussed in this

chapter influence the EU’s performance in climate

negotiations, we will now turn our attention to the 2009

Copenhagen COP 15, and then proceed to assess what lessons

were drawn from that conference ahead of COP 21 in Paris

before moving on to analysing interviews with practitioners.

42

3 A Copenhagen paradigm shift? the EU at COP 15 and beyond

3.1 The EU at the 2009 Copenhagen COP 15 and its inter-sessional meetings

The 2009 Copenhagen COP 15 was arguably exceptional in the

level of effort and expectations raised by the EU. In March

2007, the EU took initiative in being the first party to

present concrete reduction targets for a post-Kyoto agreement,

which was followed by the 2008 20-20-20 package, setting out

targets for renewables and decarbonisation towards 2020.92 This

can be understood as a form of directional leadership, where

EU policy makers were to an extent hedging their own climate

strategy on being able to deliver an agreement at Copenhagen.93

In the communication “20 20 by 2020 – Europe’s Climate Change

Opportunity”, where the 20-20-20 targets were introduced, the

Commission stresses that:

“The EU must do everything possible to promote a

comprehensive international agreement to cut greenhouse

emissions. The proposals are conceived to show that the

Union is ready to take further action as part of an

international agreement, stepping up from the 20% minimum

target for greenhouse gas reductions to a more ambitious

30% reduction.”94

The communication as such makes clear that the 20-20-20

targets were delivered with the hope that an international92 C. F. Parker & C. Karlsson, Op. Cit., p. 924.93 Ibid, p. 926.94 European Commission, Op. Cit., “20 20 by 2020”, p. 5.

43

climate agreement would be reached at Copenhagen. This was

further made clear by the Council conclusions of November

2009, which stressed the need for a “legally binding

instrument”, with a “strong and effective compliance regime”.95

Notably, the proposed enhanced target of 30% was intended to

function as a carrot, indicating an assumption that other

parties could be incentivised to go further than an initial

agreement and take on more stringent commitments. Radoslav S.

Dimitrov, in interviews with EU negotiators, found that four

scenarios were being considered internally: first, a legal

treaty; second, a “comprehensive core decision”; third, a

political declaration; or fourth, no output whatsoever.96

According to Dimitrov, the negotiators reflect that the last

option was not considered a real possibility.

2009 was however a complicated moment for the EU to act, as

the Lisbon treaty was to enter into force on December 1, less

than a week before Copenhagen. It was decided to employ the

troika system as in the past, where the EU presidency formally

serves as the “spokesperson, main contact point, main

negotiator and representative of the EU [...] and is

responsible for the EU’s internal management and

coordination”,97 and the incoming presidency and commission (DG

ENVI) take a supporting role. Here, we may argue that the EU

faces a specific problem when a UNFCCC conference is hosted

95 Council of the European Union, ”Council Conclusions on EUposition for the Copenhagen Climate Conference”, 2968th EnvironmentCouncil meeting, Luxembourg, 21 October 2009, p. 13.96 R. S. Dimitrov, “Inside Copenhagen: The State of ClimateGovernance”, Global Environmental Politics vol. 10, no. 2, 2010, p. 19.97 P. M. Kaczynski, “Single Voice, Single Chair? How to re-organisethe EU in international negotiations under the Lisbon rules”, CEPSPolicy Brief no. 207, CEPS, p. 12.

44

within the EU. The Danish COP presidency had to take on the

impartial character of that function, while at the same time

engaging with the EU’s own approach to the conference. This

creates a friction during sessions where the EU COP presidency

is tasked with bringing negotiations forward, while the EU

presidency is doing the same with its own interests in mind.

It could further be argued that the EU presidency is a source

of incontinuity in climate negotiations, as the six-month

period from July to December only covers half a negotiating

cycle. The Swedish presidency at COP 15 was the last

presidency in a trio98 including France and the Czech Republic

(often an opponent to ambitious climate action), and only

formally began its work during the preceding summer. While the

Swedish government has traditionally adopted an ambitious

climate strategy, Kaczynski99 also highlights its limited

resources for the functions of the EU presidency, which

equally were factors for the Danish COP presidency.

COP 15 saw five preparatory (inter-sessional) meetings,

three in Bonn, one in Bangkok and one in Barcelona.100 In

addition, several informal meetings were organised at a

bilateral and multilateral level between the EU, its Member

States and third parties. An often overlooked fact during

these meetings is that the Commission, along with the

presidency, did accurately identify that Copenhagen would not

produce their expected outcome, albeit late in the process. In

November, president Barroso markedly attempted to lower

98 EU presidencies are organised into groups of three, in an attemptto create some continuity between the positions.99 P. M. Kaczynski, op. cit., p. 2.100 UNFCCC, ”Meetings”, UNFCCC website.

45

expectations by stating, “of course we are not going to have a

full-fledged binding treaty by Copenhagen. There is no time

for that.”101 This statement coincided closely with signals

from the US government that no treaty could be reached,102

signalling that this had been made clear during the

preparatory meeting in Barcelona, only a month before COP 15.

The question that we are ultimately left with upon observing

the preparatory process is whether the failure to build

support among third parties can be attributed to the EU, or to

the general political environment of the negotiations. We will

explore this further in the following section.

3.2 Outcome of COP 15

A key aspect of the image of Copenhagen as a failure for

the EU is that the Copenhagen Accord was developed largely

without the engagement of the EU.103 While the accord is far

from a new agreement, it nevertheless included some successes.

Notably, the 2°C target was recognised, paving the way for its

official adoption.104 It further established the Green Climate

Fund (GCF) for climate finance, and created agreement on

developing nations having to undertake some form of mitigation

action, further breaking down the firewall between Annex 1 and

non-Annex 1 parties.105 In retrospect, the Accord thus laid the

101 A. Stratton, “Hopes fading for Copenhagen climate change treaty,says Ed Milliband”, The Guardian, 5 November 2009. 102 S. Goldenberg & J. Vidal, “US scales down hopes of global climatechange treaty in Copenhagen”, The Guardian, 4 November 2009.103 R. S. Dimitrov, op. cit., pp. 21-22.104 UNFCCC, “Copenhagen Accord”, Journal of the United Nations,FCCC/CP/2009/11/add.1, Copenhagen, 19 December 2009, p. 5.105 Ibid, P. 6-7.

46

foundations for valuable progress,106 and it can be argued that

this facilitated the adaptation of the Durban Platform at a

later stage.

At the time however, this progress was far from what was

hoped for. Politically, several actors have identified

Copenhagen as a failure. The Swedish presidency called the

outcome a “great failure”, “clearly below [the EU’s original]…

objective”.107 Joseph Curtin has placed the blame for this

squarely on the EU, calling the conference a “failure of EU

diplomacy”.108 Several factors have been attributed to this

failure, including:

1. Poor cohesion: EU Member States diverged on several

issue, which resulted in a weak mandate and forced them

to dedicate an excessive amount of time to internal

negotiation.109

2. Lack of flexibility: because of disagreements, the

presidency was unable to react to third party actions,

and consequently allowed for rivalling coalitions to

form.

3. Poor regime design: the EU’s proposal for an increase

of its own commitments was made redundant by agreements

106 C. Egenhofer & A. Georgiev, “Why the transatlantic climate changepartnership matters more than ever”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels,10 January 2010, pp. 1-2.107 Swedish Presidency, Press conference at COP 15 with Fredrik Reinfeldt and JoséManuel Barroso, December 19 2009.108 J. Curtin, ”The Copenhagen Conference: How Should the EUrespond?”, Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin, January2010, p. 8.109 C. Damro, ”EU-UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence andEffective Multilateralism”, K. Verlin Laatikainen & Karen. E. Smith(eds.), Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European Union at the United Nations,London, Palgrave, 2006, p. 186.

47

over any form of targets. The emphasis on a legally

binding agreement was also a continuous sticking point.

These three factors may all contribute to why EU engagement

with third parties failed to produce enough support for an

agreement, but these still remain very much at the macro

level. What the literature up to this point has not adequately

investigated is how continuous coordination has affected

relations with third parties, in particular within the WPIEI.

A possible explanation for why this is the case is that a high

degree of confidentiality applies during Council working party

meetings. The only work drawing from direct observation of the

WPIEI that has been reviewed for this study is that of Delreux

and Van den Brande, and in that case as a part of a Member

State delegation.110 Another issue of concern is that there is

a tendency to qualify the EU’s performance on the basis of

what it deems as an ideal outcome in a climate negotiation,

and what outcome is ultimately produced. Delreux employs this

approach in his 2014 study, judging the 2009 Copenhagen

conference to be a “major step backwards for the EU’s climate

effectiveness”.111 This form of analysis retains a blind side

towards the more intricate nature how political conditions can

shape negotiation outcomes, a perspective that regime studies

may be better suited to achieve. As Delreux himself

recognises, the highly politicized nature of Copenhagen as

well as the detrimental international context played a key

role for its outcome, but that he then concludes this to be a

110 T. Delreux & K. Van Den Brande, op. cit., p. 119-121.111 T. Delreux, “EU actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness inenvironmental affairs”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 21, no.7, 2014, p. 1027.

48

determinant of the EU’s own effectiveness, rather than the

negotiation process as a whole, suggests that goal attainment

remains the determinant qualifier.112 Within regime theory

meanwhile, game theory would suggest that climate negotiations

are games with multiple equilibria, meaning that an actor can

function coherently and deliver strong results in building

majority coalitions, but a consensus-based system will require

a tremendous degree of convergence for any agreement to be

reached.113 Within that context, it may be worth noting that

actors other than the EU are also pursuing an agreement, and

the UNFCCC as a regime offers significant obstacles even to

conventional unitary actors.

An additional question exists as to whether a qualifier of

the EU’s objectives as being realistic is beneficial or not.

An understanding of this certainly affects a goals-based

assessment. In our earlier discussion about drivers for EU

actorness, we noted that several authors identify a normative

commitment as a key driver for the EU’s international climate

action. It may be hasty to assume that objectives based on

normative commitments could easily be subjected to a goals-

112 Ibid, p. 1027.113 S. Barrett, op. cit., Environment and Statecraft, pp. 85-05.

Figure 5 Schematic of model for assessing impact at Copenhagen by Eppstein

49

based evaluation of its performance, if this goes beyond what

may be acceptable for the UNFCCC parties in the first place.

Given the EU’s commitment to the multilateral process and

reaching an agreement, there is a wide spectrum of outcomes

between its ambitions and what it will deem an acceptable

agreement.

Another example of this is the model that Eppstein et al.

use to illustrate the outcome of Copenhagen from the EU

perspective, based on Putnam’s two level games theory.114 They

argue that due to a weak internal mandate and a range of

conflicting statements at the intra-European level, and an

unfavourable political environment at the international level,

it is possible to conclude that the EU had a low impact on the

outcome.115 While this model has some explanatory power, its

binary conceptualisation of the political environment does not

accurately capture the potential for different outcomes at

Copenhagen, as the question remains as to whether conditions

were unfavourable for any agreement, or primarily the EU’s

proposed model. Clearly, some progress was possible, given

what we now know about the Accord. Again, regime studies may

provide another piece to the puzzle.

3.3 From Copenhagen to Paris: a new paradigm in EU climate negotiations?

In 2010, the US special envoy for climate change, Todd

Stern, suggested that Copenhagen was leading the way towards a114 R. D. Putnam, ”Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organisation, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427-460.115 G. Eppstein et al., The EU’s Impact on International Climate ChangeNegotiations: the Case of Copenhagen, DSEU, Loughborough, LoughboroughUniversity, 2010, P. 15.

Figure 5 Schematic of model for assessing impact at Copenhagen by Eppstein

50

new paradigm in climate diplomacy, which he called a “global

deal”.116 A similar sentiment has been echoed in an article by

Falkner et al., who argue that the post-Copenhagen climate

regime is moving towards a building-blocks approach, a process

“already evident in the pre- and post-Copenhagen process”.117 A

question that emerges then is whether the EU’s approach to

climate negotiations after Copenhagen would embody a new

paradigm in its own efforts to develop the climate regime.

First, we must define the notion of a paradigm. This study

applies Thomas Kuhn’s understanding of a paradigm as “a

framework of concepts, results, and procedures within which

subsequent work is structured.”118 What is thus meant by a new

paradigm in the EU’s approach to climate negotiations is a

significant shift in its guiding logic.

Falkner et al., as well as other authors, have argued that

the post-Copenhagen era represents a new paradigm also in EU

climate policy, where emphasis on top-down measures, including

ambitious, binding reduction commitments, are being abandoned

in favour of a bottom-up approach based on voluntary

contributions and local or regional cooperation. This approach

is aimed at extracting a credible agreement, which may serve

as the basis for more ambitious action in the future. Yet the

dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up regime formation does

not accurately capture the current EU strategy, which could

best be described as drawing elements from both forms. Ahead

116 T. Stern, ”A New Paradigm: Climate Change Negotiations in hePost-Copenhagen Era”, remarks delivered ain Ann Arbor, MI, 8October 2010.117 Falkner et al., op. cit., p. 259.118 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, London, University of Chicago Press Ltd., 1962, p. 10.

51

of Paris, the EU has continued to emphasise the need for a

legally binding agreement, even proposing a “new body” to

“facilitate implementation and address questions that are

raised over compliance with regard to the implementation of

any Party’s monitoring, reporting, verification and

accounting”.119 That 80% of global emissions should be covered

by contracting parties also suggests that the EU is pursuing a

global top-down agreement to set the rules for climate

mitigation for all parties.

In their 2010 article, Falkner et al. describe the approach

to negotiations up to this point as a “global deal strategy”,

and argue that this approach “from Rio (1992) to Kyoto (1997)

and beyond” is yielding increasingly diminished returns. 120 As

an alternative, they propose a ”building blocks” approach,

relying on incremental progress by developing “different

elements of climate governance”.121 This, Falkner et al. argue,

remains a second best scenario, but offers hope in proceeding

with climate negotiations and is in fact already playing out

in the post-Copenhagen era.122 While this analysis does more to

build our understanding of a bottom-up momentum in the post-

Copenhagen era, Falkner et al. may be overstating their case.

They bring up the example of independent progress on the

instrument for reducing emissions from deforestation and

forest degradation (REDD), as well as the reluctance

demonstrated by the United States (US) and China in taking on

119 European Commission, “The Paris Protocol – a blueprint fortackling global climate change beyond 2020”, COM(2015) 81 final,Brussels, 25 February 2015, p. 9.120 Falkner et al., op. cit, p. 253.121 Falkner et a., op. cit., p. 252.122 Ibid., p. 260.

52

a binding framework. If we examine these two points however,

we find that nature of these factors is far from

straightforward.

First, it is true that REDD negotiations have been carried

out at a relatively fast pace, notably through the opening up

of demonstration activities following COP 13 in 2007, as well

as the inclusion of a (+) to indicate the inclusion of carbon

stock concerns.123 Yet UNFCCC guidance on REDD+ has

historically been scarce, and overall financial support and

action remained low until COP 19 linked its activity to the

activities of the GCF.124 Given existing reservations about GCF

funding, as well as the close link between climate finance and

expectations ahead of Paris,125 it may be hasty to hold up

REDD+ as incremental progress without a global deal. Instead,

this may equally be described as part of the negotiation

process for a top-down agreement.

Second, American and Chinese hesitance towards a binding

framework is indeed an obstacle to a global deal, in

particular when the EU’s emphasis on a legally binding

agreement is taken into account. However, it must be noted

that American and Chinese opposition is not directed expressly

at any form of top-down agreement, but rather a strong binding

framework for climate mitigation.126 As the recent agreement

123 UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.13 (reducing emissions from deforestationin developing countries: approaches to stimulate action), The OfficialJournal of the United Nations, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 15 December 2007.124 UNFCCC, Decision 6/CP.19, (Arrangements between the Conference ofthe Parties and the Green Climate Fund), Official Journal of the UnitedNations, FCCC/CP/2013/10.Add.1, 23 November 2013.125 Green Climate Fund, “GCF central to Paris 2015 agreement onClimate Change”, Press Release, Manila, 1 March 2015.

53

between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping indicates,127

there may instead be a potential for a global deal that

provides strategic guidance and facilitates climate finance at

the UN level, but without having targets being legally binding

on parties. This too indicates that a division linking top-

down and bottom-up progress to the prospects of a specific

global agreement may not accurately capture the current state

of climate negotiations.

With regards to third parties, it is clear that the EU has

recognised the shortcomings of its previous approach, and has

put the new institutional tools made available by Copenhagen

into effect for remedying this. The Green Diplomacy Network

(GDN), combined with the Green Diplomacy strategy, are now

jointly overseen by DG CLIMA and the European External Action

Service (EEAS) in an attempt to mainstream EU climate policy

in the diplomatic relations of both the EU and its Member

States.128 Climate diplomacy is now targeted directly at

outreach and building support ahead of COP 21 in Paris,

signalling that third party engagement has gained additional

priority.129 From a regime studies perspective, this approach

should yield results, as it may help to ensure the right level

of participation in an eventual regime.130 The introduction of

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC’s)126 Z. Zhang, “In what format under what timeframe would China takeon climate commitments? A roadmap to 2050” Nota di lavoro, no. 112,Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2010, P. 14.127 The White house, “U.S.-China Joint Announcement on ClimateChange”, Beijing, China, 12 November 2014128 “EU Green Diplomacy Network”, European External Action Service.129 European External Action Service & European Commission, ”EUclimate diplomacy for 2014 and beyond – reflection paper”, 26 March2013.130 S. Barrett, Op. Cit., Environment and Statecraft, pp. 195-220.

54

following Warsaw131 also establishes a means of creating

predictability of third party positions, as well as

accountability. From the EU perspective, this may be a way of

limiting third party flexibility, thus compensating for the

EU’s own inflexibility. This mechanism corresponds to regime

theoretical discussions of mechanisms for accountability,

which emphasise it as a factor contributing to successful

regime design.132

As a part of the EU’s renewed climate diplomacy, climate

policy is being mainstreamed not only across bilateral

relations, but also across issue areas. This is made clear in

the Council conclusions of June 2013, where mainstreaming of

climate change into “EU and Member States’ priority agendas”

is established as an objective.133 An example of this is the

growing profile of climate policy in the EU’s strategic

partnerships, notably with China.134

What we can thus deduce from an analysis of the post-

Copenhagen era is that negotiations on global climate

governance are moving towards a hybrid structure of renewed

top-down negotiations based on a broader participatory regime,

and with increased emphasis on differentiated action,

accompanied by a bottom-up process where climate action is

becoming mainstreamed across levels and sectors. It is within

131 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.19 (Further advancing the Durban platform),The Official Journal of the United Nations, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, Warsaw, 23November 2013.132 S. Barrett, op. cit., Environment and statecraft, p. 139133 Council of the European Union, ”Council Conclusions on EU ClimatePolicy”, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 24 June 2013,p. 3.134European Union and the People’s Republic of China, EU-China Strategic2020 Agenda, Beijing, 21 November 2013, P. 11-13.

55

this environment that the EU operates, and certainly the EU’s

own strategy appears to have adjusted to, and perhaps even

driven, these circumstances. Yet despite that new strategies

are taking form and a broader range of instruments are being

applied, the EU’s principal object remains the same: a legally

binding treaty with a global scope. Therefore, in dealing this

new hybrid negotiation structure the EU’s own approach may not

necessarily represent an entirely new paradigm.

In these two chapters, we have now identified the major

strands of reasoning about the climate change regime, the EU

and third party relations in climate negotiations during and

after Copenhagen, both in the area of regime studies and

European studies. We have also identified a level of

complementarity between these fields, allowing us to suggest

that interdisciplinary research has the potential of improving

our understanding of the EU as a climate actor. Finally, we

have seen that a new paradigm may be evolving in the climate

negotiation process, while the EU’s post-Copenhagen approach

rests on the same objectives, but with a reinforced set of

resources and instruments. With this analysis in mind, we may

proceed to introducing original material gathered through

interviews from policy makers, which we will employ to

contrast the conclusions of this study up to this point.

56

4 Setting the record straight: perspectives from practitioners This chapter introduces a test of the study’s reasoning

about a new paradigm in EU negotiations by contrasting it with

views from practitioners.135 The chapter does so by first

examining perspectives on the Copenhagen conference, and then

the post-Copenhagen paradigm. In order to provide a broad,

nuanced set of perspectives on climate negotiations following

Copenhagen, this section includes interviews with officials

from three stakeholders: DG Climate Action, the Council

Secretariat, and an official with the Swedish presidency at

COP 15 who now remains active with the Swedish government. The

interviewees from the EU institutions agreed to participate on

the condition of anonymity.

4.1 The Copenhagen climate conference

While perspectives of the outcome of Copenhagen varied

somewhat among the sources, the overall conclusion among the

interviewees is that Copenhagen failed to deliver the desired

outcome. Interestingly, there was also a common understanding

that the EU’s own negotiation infrastructure was less of a

decisive factor than the overall political climate at the

conference. Anders Turesson, EU negotiation coordinator for

the Swedish presidency at Copenhagen and now with the climate

unit at the Swedish ministry of environment, argued that:

“of course, we could have done better. It would be very

strange otherwise. But I do not believe that the EU bloc

collapsed, we kept our group together. And if we look at135 See the annex for full transcripts of all interviews undertaken.

57

the entire negotiation process, Sweden and the preceding

presidency succeeded in their primary task.”136

This perspective is further echoed by officials at DG

CLIMA, who argued that that the image of Copenhagen as a

failure cannot be attributed to how the EU works.137 Instead,

the evolution of working practices should be understood in a

long-term perspective, with the breakdown of EU coordination

at COP 6 in The Hague as a decisive moment for the EU’s

current approach to internal organisation.138 A second

commission official suggested that rather than an overall

revision of working practices, the post-Copenhagen strategy

has meant consolidating and reaffirming existing strategies,

by introducing the 2050 roadmap and later the 2030 climate and

energy package.139 An official with the Council secretariat

further suggested that strategic decisions rather than

coordination contributed negatively to the EU’s role at

Copenhagen, notably the formal announcement that the Kyoto

Protocol would be abandoned.140 The official, in some

contradiction with the other sources, also emphasised that a

lack of preparation was a key factor to the outcome at

Copenhagen, but further reasoned that this was primarily a

consequence of relying too much on the UNFCCC’s negotiation

process rather than going beyond that format.

136 Interview with Anders Turesson, in Stockholm, 16 April 2015.137 Interview with anonymous official interview, in Brussels, 22April 2015.138 Ibid. 139 Interview with anonymous Commission official, by phone, 14 April2015.140 Interview with anonymous Council official, in Brussels, 15 April2015.

58

4.1.1 The political environment

Turesson also provided a long-term perspective of climate

negotiations, which allows us to further emphasise the value

of a regime theoretical approach at the macro level. By

contrasting a “golden era of international governance” during

the 1990’s, Turesson suggested that the political environment

in the UNFCCC has moved towards a harsher negotiation climate,

meaning that perceptions of EU action in that environment must

be understood accordingly. As Turesson suggested, the EU can

“lead the horses to the water, but cannot force them to

drink.”141 A Council official expanded on this, suggesting that

while the EU remains inflexible in its position, this occurs

in a context where several parties increasingly do the same.142

These points contribute to our reasoning in two ways.

First, they provide further credibility to applying a regime

theoretical evaluation of EU performance in climate

negotiations, in order to ensure that we can attain a more

nuanced perspective of negotiations dynamics. Second, they

also support our previous argument that evaluating EU

performance with its own objectives as a primary reference may

fail to capture the potential for reaching an agreement with

third parties.

4.1.2 EU influence in the negotiation process

An observation about the negotiation process as a whole may

help us understand the EU’s failure to anticipate the outcome

at Copenhagen early on. As one Commission official noted:

141 Interview with Anders Turesson, 16 April 2015.142 Interview with Council official, 15 April 2015.

59

“We are taken for granted, because we need so much more an

international agreement, and we are keen to uphold the

multilateral process, so people expect that we would be

prepared to make compromise in order to avoid failure.

Obviously, if you are a party who does not care too much

about an agreement, you have much more leverage.”143

This observation is important, because it suggests that the

EU’s ability to influence an outcome diminishes towards the

final stages of the negotiation cycle. Indeed, the official

suggested that the EU’s influence is “to frame the issue,

rather than standing in the way for a final compromise at the

end”, a statement that is further supported in game

theoretical models about players’ interest in achieving an

outcome.144 Building on this, it is thus possible to suggest

that late changes in positions or obstacles to an agreement

are far harder to overcome for the EU, and that this

contributed to the failure of anticipating the difficulty that

reaching an agreement in Copenhagen would entail.

4.1.3 Other actors at Copenhagen

An additional set of observations allow us to once again

emphasise the necessity of examining the role of the COP

presidency for the EU’s approach to climate negotiations. As

virtually all interviewees note, a significant obstacle for

COP 15 was the poor performance of the Danish COP presidency.

Commission officials and Turesson note how the Danish

government was politically pursuing a successful outcome,

leading them to raise expectations continuously. Yet internal

143 Interview with anonymous Commission official, 22 April 2015.144 S. Barrett, op. cit., Environment and Statecraft, pp. 73-75.

60

divisions led to a late change in the negotiation team with

staff from the Prime Minister’s office, who were poorly

prepared and lacked established relationships within the

UNFCCC process. It is thus very important both not to conflate

the EU’s performance with that of the COP presidency, but also

to recognise the additional difficulties created when it is

held by a EU Member State.

4.2 The Copenhagen experience and EU informal arrangements

Turning to the less explored issue of informal arrangement

at Copenhagen and beyond, a key aspect that emerged from the

interviews is the issue of how informal arrangements have

evolved over time. While Turesson emphasised that the EU bloc

had been kept together despite different interests, the

Council official stressed that the EU’s own arrangements only

went so far once the nature of the conference drifted outside

of the conventional negotiation format. As the Council

official described the situation,

“What was wrong in Copenhagen, I think, was to involve

[heads of state] in almost line by line drafting, and that

was after we had realised, or after the Danish COP

presidency had realised, that it was going nowhere, this

agreement that we were going to have, and that we were

working on a declaration, and which heads of state were

drafting line by line. I have never seen such a thing, and

I think the heads of state were surprised to see that.”145

This observation helps us understand how formal

organisation of EU negotiation teams can be rendered

145 Interview with Council Official, 15 April 2015.

61

ineffective by negotiation circumstances, and this is an

aspect that may not be accurately captured in a EU-centred

analysis. These meetings came about through engagement with

non-EU heads of state, and thus constituted an external demand

on the EU’s negotiation structure. They also raise the issue

of the previously mentioned “Europe problem” resulting from

conferences held inside the EU, where stakeholders can easily

access the negotiations. Several interviewees raised this

issue, with a Council official noting that there is already

35,000 participants registered for the Paris COP,146 and it

links closely into an apparent divide between the technical

and political levels of negotiation. One Commission official

nevertheless highlighted that a primary goal of the new

climate diplomacy strategy is to bring the climate agenda into

the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) early on, in order to

coordinate political actors at a much earlier stage in the

process.147

4.2.1 The lack of a negotiation mandate

A key issue with regards to working practices that has

emerged in several interviews, and which is absent in the

reviewed literature, is the fact that no formal negotiation

mandate for the UNFCCC process has ever been proposed by the

Commission and approved by the Council. This opens up for

pragmatism, but also incontinuity. The reasons for this were

described both by Council and Commission officials as a

consequence of political concerns, where the introduction of a

mandate would create intense debate over the nature of the

146 Ibid.147 Interview with Commission official, 14 April 2015.

62

shared competences that climate policy covers. As we will see

in the following section, this remains a point of contention

in the post-Lisbon system. This issue was further expanded on

by a Commission official, who argued that the EU negotiating

team is more of a “ghost team” because of a lack of formal

arrangements, and that some underlying tension remains as to

the nature of the team as being under joint authority of the

Commission and the Council.148 When asked whether arrangements

could be formalised, the official pointed to how transaction

costs would be extremely heavy, as practically establishing

competence would consume time and resources. Our previous

example of head of state engagement suggests that the

pragmatism allowed by the lack of a decision on working

practices can be an obstacle once different authoritative

actors are introduced.

Nevertheless, all interviewees describe informal

arrangements as having been a process of building trust to a

level where the respective EU actors can accept the working

process without formalisation. As identified by both

Commission and Council officials, the WPIEI and internal

coordination sessions have become less focused on competence

and authority, and more on policy substance. While one

Commission official identifies the period immediately after

Copenhagen as “incredibly tough” at the political level, she

also suggested that once policy had been agreed upon and

brought to the technical level, “there is no one shouting

competence here or competence there, who should do this or

that.”149 Another official suggested that while formal148 Interview with Commission official, 22 April 2015.149 Interview with Commission official, 14 April 2015.

63

authority over the EU coordination has not been established,

team working practices function well, albeit with occasional

confusion about responsibilities and competences.

4.2.2 A broadening negotiation process

Another finding of note is that a focus on the UNFCCC

process as the primary mode of conducting climate negotiations

obscures the full extent of activity in this area. A

Commission official stressed how the mainstreaming of climate

change now means that the issue is being negotiated formally

and informally across a vast number of forums, including more

prominent meetings such as the G7/G20 and the Major Economies

forum, as well as the Petersberg climate dialogue, but also

through all bilateral partnership meetings, like the EU-China

summit and the college-to-college meetings with the African

Union.150 Adding to this, interaction takes place in a broad

range of non-governmental forums that parties attend in

different capacities and carry on climate negotiations. This

finding is very much in line with Grundig and Ward’s

conceptualisation of structural power through networks,151

another example of a regime theoretical explanation that may

contribute to our analysis.

4.2.3 Informal arrangements with other actors

An important observation as to informal arrangements made

by several of the interviewees focuses on the relationship

between the actors involved at a conference. As previously

discussed in this study, research of the EU as a climate actor

150 Interview with Commission official, 22 April 2015.151 F. Grundig & H. Ward, op. cit., p. 4.

64

focuses predominantly on the main actors within the EU

negotiation structure, but Anders Turesson, as well as a

source at the Commission, emphasised the role of the UNFCCC

secretariat as a source of authority:

“It is important for the presidency to work closely with

the secretariat, as they have an incredible competence

there. You can get so much good advice, and so much

information there, and also concrete help, concrete

support. My experience is that a presidency has to rely on

the secretariat. I also know that many are worried because

the secretariat is so strong, so there is a worry that the

secretariat can have its own agenda.”152

Turesson’s observations should be contextualised on the

basis that the Swedish presidency, as a smaller state, may

have had to rely more heavily on the secretariat for

resources. Turesson does however consider his observation to

be of a general nature:

“There is always a suspicion, the same way that within the

EU family there are always suspicions against the

Commission. Sometimes well founded, but often in a very

unjust way. They try to be helpful, but it is natural,

they have many very skilled people, and it is very hard

for the rotating presidency to match this incredibly

professional organisation. And the same applies to

relations between the rotating presidencies under the

climate convention and the climate secretariat. At some

152 Interview with anonymous Commission official, 22 April 2015.

65

point it has to be accepted and embraced that there is a

skilled climate secretariat.”153

While some literature exists on the role of the UNFCCC

secretariat, notably in the previously discussed works by

Farhana and Yamin as well as Scott Barrett, it is

conspicuously absent in studies focusing on the EU’s

performance in climate negotiations. Given that first hand

sources for this study emphasise its role for the presidency

as well as the conference as a whole, an important finding is

thus that observers should better explore the EU’s engagement

with the secretariat. Turesson’s observation is also

interesting in that he highlights the importance of the EU

presidency in ensuring ownership and building trust for the EU

negotiation positions, something that the Commission as an

institutional actor is not suited to do given the inherent

tension of a principal-agent relationship.154

A similar point emerges in discussions about the COP

presidency. EU Member States participating in the EU

negotiation team while simultaneously organising the

conference face a specific set of challenges related to COP

presidency impartiality and interest management within the EU.

As a Commission official suggested, this is less of an issue

when a Member State’s own interests are closely aligned with

the EU position, but as in the example of the Polish COP

presidencies in Poznan and Warsaw, a high degree of effort is

required to both influence the EU negotiating line and manage

impartiality.155 One official also identified a learning

153 Interview with Anders Turesson, 16 April 2015.154 Ibid.155 Interview with Commission official, 22 April 2015.

66

process within the COP presidency as an institution,

reflecting on how the Mexican COP presidency at the subsequent

COP 16 in Cancun drew from the Danish experience to avoid

similar problems. There may thus be an evolutionary process

within the COP presidency as an institution, which would be

another influencing factor in the UNFCCC process. Again, this

is an issue less explored in the literature that could benefit

from further investigation.

4.3 The post-Copenhagen paradigm

Interviewees were also questioned about the idea of a new

paradigm in climate negotiations, and what this entailed from

a EU perspective. An important finding from the interviews up

until now is that the post-Copenhagen climate process does not

necessarily appear to represent an entirely new approach from

the perspective of the EU. As discussed, the EU’s approach has

rather been to consolidate existing working practices and

complement them with new instruments made available through

the Lisbon treaty. The most substantial change in the

organisation of the negotiation team, as highlighted by a

Commission official, is the introduction of issue leaders on a

semi-permanent basis, who are part of a team carried over

between EU presidencies.156 Yet all the interviewees identify

the formal objective of the climate process to be a legally

binding agreement with broad coverage, suggesting that the

main principles have stayed in place. An interesting

observation is that officials from two institutions and one

Member State all conclude that while this goal remains the

formal negotiation line, unofficially the EU’s own negotiation156 Ibid.

67

arrangements and their international context mean that

ultimately, it may have to settle for any comprehensive deal

where agreement can be found. As previously mentioned, a

Commission official suggested that “we are keen to uphold the

multilateral process, so people expect that we would be

prepared to make compromise to avoid failure”.157 This would

nevertheless suggest that the EU’s objectives before and after

Copenhagen have remained similar. It is rather at the level of

strategic approaches to attaining these objectives that some

change has taken place. As Commission officials suggest, the

EU remains weak in interacting with third parties, in

particular with regards to engaging with alternative proposals

put forward during conferences. But in interviews they also

describe a full-fledged strategic approach to a range of

actors, where previous approaches such as mainstreaming have

matured, and new post-Lisbon instruments such as the green

diplomacy network and the EEAS’ functions have contributed to

developing an overarching negotiation strategy with continuous

formal and informal engagement, with the purpose of building a

broad coalition. An interesting observation by an official is

that ahead of Paris COP 21, the COP presidency indirectly

plays a positive role for the EU negotiating position as the

French government has focused its efforts on “outlier” parties

that may not be amenable to any agreement.158 Here, we can

further emphasise the under-explored role of the COP

presidency for the EU’s negotiating role, as its interests can

align with the EU’s without violating its impartiality, in

157 Ibid. 158 Ibid.

68

that it also pursues an agreement as a positive outcome of a

conference.

These observations thus give us a mixed image, very much in

line with the conclusions presented in the fourth chapter. It

would appear as if the core principles of the EU’s approach to

climate negotiations remain fixed, but strategic approaches

and competence to promote them have grown over time,

suggesting a paradigm shift based more on strategy and

instruments rather than objectives. Further, a range of

factors that are less dealt with in the literature have been

identified as playing a significant role for the EU’s role in

international climate negotiations.

Having now brought forwards a range of perspectives to

contrast our initial analysis, we may move on to a final

consolidation of findings in the next chapter before bringing

the study to a close.

69

5 Challenging our understanding: The EU as a climate actor and the post-Copenhagen paradigm revisitedHaving reviewed the perspectives of practitioners, several

important points for how we understand EU climate negotiations

have emerged. First, we find that the reviewed approaches to

evaluating the EU’s performance as a climate actor either fail

to take into account or use overly simplistic analyses of the

prospects of developing a climate regime at a given time. The

goals based evaluation discussed in the fourth chapter has

resulted in conclusions in academia about EU effectiveness

that are remembered and described in far more nuanced terms by

practitioners. This highlights that there is a clear silo

mentality between the fields of regime theory and European

Union studies, despite that the fact that these can provide a

high degree of complimentarity. As has been demonstrated,

regime theory helps to contextualise evaluation of EU

performance in climate negotiations, notably by providing a

more complex analysis of the prospects of an agreement during

conferences. Conversely, European Union studies help break the

black box thinking in regime studies often present when

discussing the EU. Throughout this study, an interdisciplinary

approach drawing from both fields has created added value for

the analysis, and it could as such be concluded that such an

approach may benefit our understanding of the EU as a climate

negotiator in future research.

Second, interviews also revealed the importance of actors

only partially discussed in regime theory, and barely at all

70

in European Union studies. Notably, the UNFCCC secretariat was

highlighted by several interviewees as being a key actor,

given its knowledge capital and authority in conferences, as

well as ability to facilitate progress in the negotiation

process. The secretariat’s role should thus be further

explored in future studies, in order to improve our

understanding of interactions in climate negotiations. The

issue of informal arrangements during negotiations has also

been brought up as a subject needing further investigation by

the literature. Adding to this, the complexity facing a EU

Member State also holding the COP presidency during

negotiations is often overlooked, and the findings of this

study suggest that this is an influential factor for EU

coordination dynamics.

Third, the results of the interviews make clear that given

the lack of a formal mandate for climate negotiations and the

more pragmatic approach that this allows, it is unhelpful to

focus primarily on the formal division of competences and

institutional organisation of the EU in order to properly

understand how EU internal coordination is now organised. As

suggested by several interviewees, ahead of COP 21 in Paris,

it would appear that the French government is absorbing

several functions previously managed by the EU presidency, and

that a more pragmatic burden sharing with smaller Member

States holding the presidency is developing. Further, the

informal approach to organisations leaves several issues

unsettled, notably the competence of the Commission in jointly

organising the EU’s negotiation team.

71

Fourth, the expanding range of forums where EU climate

action plays out alongside the larger number of key actors

identified by practitioners suggests that the literature

reviewed for this study focuses on only a limited part of the

EU’s role in climate negotiations. This is an issue that may

impede how future research contributes to analysis of the

field, unless this is mitigated. As identified, a macro

perspective on networks exists in the field of regime theory,

suggesting that research directed at addressing this issue

could benefit from the application of methodology drawn from

that field.

Finally, The interviews also highlighted the issue of a

broadening negotiation process, spanning across a multitude of

points of interaction and involving a broader range of actors.

As suggested in the previous chapter, regime theoretical

theory has engaged with analysis of structural power exercised

through networks, notably in the studies of Grundig and Ward.

It could be reasoned that there therefore is a growing utility

in drawing on similar statistical modelling in order to engage

with larger, more complex sets of interactions that

qualitative analysis is too limited in its methodology to

capture.

5.1 A post-Copenhagen paradigm or an enhanced negotiation approach?

Finally, on the issue of whether the post-Copenhagen era of

climate negotiations represents a new paradigm for the EU,

what we have found is that this is partly the case. Both the

literature and interviews identify the post-Copenhagen era as

a new paradigm, with a mix of top-down and bottom-up

72

approaches to developing a climate regime being employed.

Interviews further revealed that Copenhagen is considered a

key point in the climate process by all the officials

interviewed, but not necessarily for the EU’s own working

practices, which adds further credibility to its influence on

a new paradigm in climate negotiations but not for the EU as a

climate actor. However, it is worth noting that many of the

new instruments that have been developed to put the new

approach into effect are only made possible by the Lisbon

reforms, notably the EEAS’ role in climate diplomacy and the

expanded role of the Commission, and as such there is a

convergence where it is hard to attribute different factors to

the post-Copenhagen and post-Lisbon period of negotiations.

Further, as has been made clear, the EU still pursues a

legally binding agreement with broad coverage, just as it did

ahead of Copenhagen. It is thus possible to conclude that

Copenhagen has provided an impetus towards expanding and

reconsolidating the EU’s own institutional organisation, while

the Lisbon treaty has provided the technical basis for putting

this approach into effect. As has been highlighted by the

interviews, the internal working practices of the EU have

employed roughly the same practices with only some

modifications, albeit perhaps with more confidence. Yet the

political understanding of how to develop the climate regime

has remained similar, though its objectives have been

contextualised not by significant internal change, but by an

evolving political environment. Thus, the nature of a post-

2009 paradigm in EU negotiations is rather a combination of

73

internal consolidation and adaption of entrenched objectives

to the context of an evolving international setting.

74

6 Conclusion

To bring this study to a close, we may now reintroduce the

questions presented at its beginning, and then proceed to

highlight other findings of note for the field, as well as

sources for further investigation.

First, As observed in the third chapter and further

discussed during interviews, EU negotiators did grow

increasingly aware of opposition to their strategy ahead of

Copenhagen. This largely took place after preparatory

meetings, suggesting that developments there were indeed

absorbed by the EU’s institutional structure. We further find

that practitioners, who nevertheless nuance this in the

context of a negotiation environment where inflexibility is

common practice among the parties, support the literature’s

observation of EU inflexibility in its position. Their

observations also indicate that the EU’s approach through the

UNFCCC negotiation process has to remain long-term and rely on

framing, as the its fixed position and strong interest in

reaching an agreement through the multilateral process leaves

it less able to significantly influence the outcome of the

process towards its final phase.

This also helps to explain why expectations ahead of

Copenhagen were continuously being raised. First, Commission

officials signalled late in the process that expectations must

be lowered, as did other Member States. However, the overlap

of EU membership and conference organisation represented by

the Danish COP presidency created difficulty in managing

75

expectations; the COP presidency in its own role had to

maintain an attitude of being able to deliver results in

Copenhagen, while its messages became conflated with the

overall EU position. At the same time, as interviews indicate,

the late change of the Danish conference team may also have

contributed to poor management of the Conference. Adding to

this, the resources of Denmark, as a smaller Member State,

were stretched thin during the conference, leading to

expectations being poorly managed at home, given the Prime

Minister’s direct involvement, as well as abroad, where the

responsibility for overall communication was poorly defined

between the Commission, the Swedish EU presidency and the

Danish COP presidency, and EU Member States at large, in line

with the lack of a decision on working practices.

With regards to the notion of a new paradigm in EU climate

negotiations, we have seen that this is not necessarily the

case. The discussion in this study has certainly indicated

that a measure of change is occurring at the international

level, and that the EU, equipped with new instruments and

competence following the Lisbon treaty, has reacted to these

changes with a range of new strategies and approaches. Yet it

cannot be disputed that the principal objectives remain the

same. The EU is still the primary promoter of a global,

legally binding agreement with ambitious reduction targets,

and this entails that many of the issues that have been key

points of conflict still are very much relevant. What this

tells us is that even with the far greater range of resources

and instruments that are now available to the EU ahead of

76

Paris, there is no guarantee that an agreement will be

delivered as conceived by EU stakeholders.

Apart from these answers to the questions first introduced,

the study has also yielded some important observations about

how scholars approach the EU as a climate actor. The

application of regime theoretical perspectives throughout the

study has revealed aspects often overlooked in European Union

studies, notably the use goals-based approaches in evaluating

EU effectiveness. Interviews also reveal the far broader range

of actors and forums now involved in EU climate action,

creating a need to better map out the full extent of areas

where the EU operates as a climate actor, and how it does so.

Notably, the influence of the COP presidency and the UNFCCC

secretariat, and how these interact with the EU negotiation

system could be subject to further investigation. Further, the

absence of a decision establishing working practices and the

consequences this has for informal working arrangements is

also a point of interest, in particular if it can be

contextualised with similar situations in other parts of the

EU system. In order to ensure that the scope of research for

EU climate action remains relevant, further research is

required to ensure that these aspects are taken into account.

To formally conclude, while this study has provided some

answers for its initial line of questioning, it has also

opened several doors for further research. It is the hope of

the author that this will both contribute to contextualising

our understanding of the EU as a climate actor, and also to

how we can improve our methodology for examining the EU’s role

77

in climate negotiations by engaging with fields not primarily

associated with the European Union.

78

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91

ANNEX

ANNEX I: Transcript of Interview with Anders TuressonInterview conducted in Stockholm, 16 April 2015. Translated

from its original language.

If I could begin by asking you to reflect a bit on the

preparatory meetings leading up to Copenhagen, the outcome of

COP 15, and how that outcome has affected approaches to

climate negotiations since, that would very much be

appreciated.

Copenhagen was the end of a very long process, which

actually begun, if we look at it within the bigger picture, it

actually began with the Rio de Janeiro Convention, when the

climate convention was planned. But also more concretely with

Kyoto, as it was necessary to develop practical rules to make

it possible to implement the Kyoto protocol, and also to make

it rafiable. This was an extraordinarily long process, which

formally ended in Marrakech, completed in 2001, and then

continued for a long time up until we had the Kyoto protocol

ratified. That was 2005, I think. But even then, that is to

say when we entered the 21st century, we realised that the

final date of 2012, the final date for the first commitment

period, was drawing close. And with hindsight, from the first

negotiation, from round and signature of the climate

convention to the entry into force of the Kyoto protocol in

2005, with this experience we understood that this will take a

lot of time before we would reach an agreement on the second

93

commitment period of the Kyoto protocol, and perhaps even

something beyond that. So what then happened from 2005 onwards

was that the EU pushed the issue of a need for a new

negotiation round with the purpose of reaching a new agreement

before 2012, exactly for the period after 2012. And this

started very carefully. The parties were very unwilling to

discuss the future, and very suspicious.

And we could also state that there has been a gradual

development, sadly, but the 1990’s were, to say in a

reflective view, a golden decade for this type of

international governance. There was the view that it was

possible to achieve far-reaching governance at an

international level in certain areas, such as the climate

area. To even be able to think that the Kyoto protocol became

an expression of this, one of the best expressions for exactly

this thinking, was the consequence of the end of the cold war.

We looked ahead and believed that we would be able to build an

international regime with a binding international legal order,

that everyone would be able to submit themselves to. So with

Kyoto followed an entire international system, with which we

still work, but the mandate is quite limited as pretty few

countries are subject to it. But there was the establishment

of a compliance committee that was to take decisions on

penalties and the like. Today these forms of thinking appear

quite visionary. We have gone backwards. These types of legal

orders are not on the agenda today. And it can only be stated

that it’s deeply regrettable, others and I feel, that the

international situation has worsened, and that we’re back in

this situation, and that there are countries who are pulling

94

away from this thought that they will not surrender

sovereignty to achieve this kind of public good. So it was a

very special situation that led to this negotiation round. And

when we introduced the thought of beginning a new round, this

was done in an environment that was characterised by worsening

international relations. We could see that even then, back in

2005.

Anyway, the EU kept up the pressure, and over time we

made some gains during some meetings, where Montreal was

probably the first, where the parties agreed to discuss a new

agreement, albeit in free and unregulated forms as to what

could happen after 2020. Then we arrived at Bali, 2007, where

we got a, what did we call it, a form of mandate although it

wasn’t, but it was a sort of roadmap for arriving at a new

agreement two years later in Copenhagen, 2009. So 2007 in Bali

there was an agreement on the framework of an agreement that

was to be concluded in Copenhagen. There is a lot to tell

about this, obviously, it was two very intense years. And what

characterised this entire process was that the EU was the

driving party, the only party who really wanted a new

agreement after the 2020’s. The EU and industrialised

countries were very keen on breaking this division between

industrialised and developing countries, because what

characterises the Kyoto regime is a strongly marked firewall

with very different rules systems for the different categories

of countries. The industrialised countries considered this to

be outdated, that in particular China had progressed to become

an economic great power, and was about to become the greatest

emitting country, as it is today. We could see the

95

transformation of the rapidly developing countries, and that

the regime which seemed logical in 1997 when the Kyoto

Protocol was concluded naturally was obsolete 12 years later.

So that is something that also very much affected that

negotiation round.

It was absolutely necessary to bring in the US.

Unfortunately the US did not sign the Kyoto protocol, but the

EU decided to procede down that track regardless, but

eventually there was agreement that after 2012 the US must

participate in the regime, otherwise this was not meaningful,

for a number of reasons. And it’s easy to see why; this is the

superpower, the country that emitted the most. It is also the

country that can influence China, and the country who produces

all the technology. So we must include the US in order for

this to be meaningful.

Then there was the question of which type of regime, and

this became very infected ahead of Copenhagen: the question of

the continuation of the Kyoto protocol. The EU tried to open

this discussion, but it lead to very upset countries,

especially within the collective of developing states, but

also within the EU. So that became an infected discussion that

wasn’t really very well informed, because the EU was actually

interested the entire time in continuing with a Kyoto system.

But there had to be a creation of a system where the US could

also be included, that was what was missing. And this was

misunderstood, I would like to claim, by other parties, and

there was a belief that the EU wanted to leave the Kyoto

system, but this wasn’t at all the case.

96

Something else that signified this negotiation round was

that expectations were raised to enormous proportions, for

better and worse. The problem was that we saw that it was

necessary to have high expectations to have a meeting in

Copenhagen at a very high level if this was to be possible.

And therefore the approach was to raise expectations very

high. But I then think that somewhere on the way, control was

lost over this. It is hard to say; I like to say that

Copenhagen wasn’t a failure. We will get to this when we

discuss the role of Copenhagen for the negotiation process.

Copenhagen can’t be compared with The Hague, for instance,

which became a real collapse. Copenhagen didn’t collapse:

something came out of it, the Copenhagen Accord. And that

wouldn’t have been possible if the highest representatives of

the most powerful countries hadn’t been on the scene. So I

would claim that it was good to raise expectation, but

naturally everyone left disappointed, as everyone walked away

without the agreement that they had hoped for. And naturally

this struck the organising country the worst, the presidency,

namely Denmark. Unfortunately. So in a way Denmark and the

Danish presidency became sacrificial lambs in this game. But

thanks to the presence of presidents and other heads of

governments it was possible to reach the Copenhagen Accord,

and otherwise, and this is my definite opinion, Copenhagen

would have ended the same way as The Hague.

If I can ask a really quick question before you carry on, as

this is something that is not covered in the literature: when

EU negotiations are discussed among scholar, much focus is

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being placed on the EU presidency. But what I have heard about

Copenhagen onwards, is that the COP presidency weighs in

heavier. The French are very active ahead of Paris, rather

than Luxembourg.

This is naturally the case, because Luxembourg will only,

well I say only, lead the EU. But this was important ahead of

Copenhagen, although perhaps less ahead of Paris: the EU was

the big demandeur. It was the EU that was behind this process,

which should be finalised in Copenhagen. Had it not been for

the EU this process would not have come to be. We wouldn’t

have gotten a meeting a meeting in Copenhagen. It was the EU

who formulated what we were supposed to do in Copenhagen, what

we were supposed to achieve. But it wasn’t meant for the EU to

deliver in Copenhagen, it was China and the US who were

supposed to deliver. And that is an important point, because

often it is claimed in the literature that the EU was pushed

aside, behind the more important actors. That is true, but the

fact is that this was to some extent the intention. The EU had

in some ways done its part before Copenhagen. The horses had

been led to the water so to speak, and it was meant for them

to drink, but you know, you can lead the horse to the water

but you can’t force it to drink. So it is not at all a clear

failure that the EU was side-lined in the negotiations, even

if it is regrettable. It is unfortunately a very thankless

task that the EU has during climate negotiations, as a

demandeur. It is the party that will always have to agree to

the most painful concessions, and that will always be side-

lined by the larger actors. And which will take the blame for

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a variety of things that happen. But I think the EU must be

ready to take on that role. The EU is somewhat masochistic in

a way, and it’s very unfair, but it is the way it has been and

I think it is perhaps the way it must be. In Copenhagen it was

definitely so, that it was China and the US and other who had

to deliver, and they didn’t want to deliver what was necessary

for a binding agreement with far-reaching emission reductions

and all the rest, an arrangement similar to Kyoto simply, they

did not want this. But they delivered something else instead,

the Copenhagen Accord, which came to be the foundation for

future relations. And we can see this, the Copenhagen Accord

in its function works similarly to the climate convention

following Rio, as a foundation. Then the entire negotiation

process is about successively concretising the various key

aspects of this foundation.

And then it can be stated that the Copenhagen Accord

meant that the negotiation system was disconnected from the

form that the EU wanted it to be, namely on the path to a

strong, binding agreement with similar characteristics to

Kyoto. The question of a legally binding agreement remains a

controversial issue, and one where pretty fantastic

compromises are being found. In contrast, there was a success

perhaps not at Copenhagen, although it was an underlying

unpronounced aspect of the Copenhagen Accord, but there was a

success later in the process to make clear that the coming

arrangement should be binding on all parties, that the

firewall would be abandoned. Then the parties are to varying

degrees in agreement about that interpretation.

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The there has actually been progress between the US and

China. And it’s very encouraging ahead of Paris that both

China and the US have managed to agree on something that still

is somewhat ambitious, it must be said. Naturally not enough,

but in relation to what it could have been, it’s still quite

ambitious. So the conditions ahead of Paris are not too bad,

the way I see it. Adding to that, something that is

extraordinarily important and which was missing before but we

now begin to see, is that facts on the ground are emerging. We

are seeing the growth of a renewables industry, with a great

many stakeholders. And many countries actually begin to

believe that wind and sun can deliver something. I think that

during the last 10 years, a belief in in an alternative

development so to speak has not existed, but this has

gradually emerged, and the cost image has changed dramatically

over the last ten years, for both wind and sun, and energy

conservation, and all of this which is sustainable in the long

term affects the view of countries on the potential for an

agreement. But it must be remembered, a country’s instructions

ahead of a negotiation round is only an expression for how a

country views its interest, and what is possible and what can

be achieved. And there are actually significantly more

countries today who actually want to and recognise that an

alternative way of development is possible other the

conventional one which is based on fossil fuels. And it is

extremely exciting that 2014 became the first year where

global emissions did not increase. Maybe we have actually

peaked, it would be great to believe so. Despite that global

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growth has increased. I think this is a determining factor in

reality for the negotiations’ ability to deliver.

Yes, with regards to the dynamic between the EU presidency and

the COP presidency, how did you experience this in Copenhagen?

Sweden was supposed to coordinate, but the Danes were very

important. Do you believe that this contributed to or was an

obstacle in the end for the negotiations, and do you think

this has changed in any way since then?

I think that the EU’s cooperation with the climate

secretariat was good, that it was of the character it was

supposed to be. There were no conflicts, a good cooperation on

the whole. I have also experienced it very much from the

inside, especially before and after the presidency as I

chaired several processes, and then I sat with them, I was

more allied with the secretariat than the EU’s machinery. So I

was in Cancun for example, where the process focused on the

shared vision, which became the basis for agreement on the 2-

degree target. So I’ve experienced this from both sides, and I

see no major problems in that relationship. What was however

seemed problematic was the relationship between the

secretariat and the Danish presidency, and why that was the

case I don’t really know. I think that it was very traumatic

that the Danish presidency switched their negotiation team a

few months ahead of the Conference. The ladies and gent’s of

the Prime Minister’s team took over.

And why do you think this happened?

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That was due to internal conflicts within the Danish

government. And it was devastating, I would claim. They had a

very well established team that of course also had an

extensive network within the negotiation group, and naturally

well-established relations with the climate secretariat. And

in Copenhagen, and I have had this confirmed afterwards, it

seemed as if the Danish presidency didn’t understand how

important the climate secretariat is. It is important for the

presidency to work closely with the secretariat, as they have

an incredible competence there. You can get so much good

advice, and so much information there, and also concrete help,

concrete support. My experience is that a presidency has to

rely on the secretariat. I also know that many are worried

because the secretariat is so strong, so there is a worry that

the secretariat can have its own agenda. There is always a

suspicion, the same way that within the EU family there are

always suspicions against the Commission (Laughter). Sometimes

well-founded, but often in a very unjust way. They try to be

helpful, but it is natural, they have many very skilled

people, and it is very hard for the rotating presidency to

match this incredibly professional organisation. And the same

applies to relations between the rotating presidencies under

the climate convention and the climate secretariat. At some

point it has to be accepted and embraced that there is a

skilled climate secretariat.

Do you think that EU coordination could have been done better

as well?

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Naturally it could have, and now you’re of course

speaking to the person who had the primary responsibility for

that coordination. Of course, we could have done things

better, it would be very strange otherwise. But I do not

believe that the EU bloc collapsed, we kept our group

together. And if we look at the entire negotiation process I

believe that the EU kept together, Sweden and the preceding

presidency succeeded in their primary task. This is important:

the presidency’s most important function, what the Commission

cannot do, is to maintain the cohesion of the Union. A

prerequisite for the EU to succeed is always that it can stay

together. This cannot be underlined enough. I have experienced

how traumatic it can be when the EU disintegrates, what

happened in The Hague. There we had a French presidency, who

did the exact same mistake as the French did in Paris, namely

change their negotiation team a couple of weeks before, and

this meant that the EU could not keep together. The British

began playing their own game, as did the Germans, and everyone

was watching with extreme suspicion, there was a bad

atmosphere. This is actually the absolutely most important

task of the EU presidency. And I would claim that we

maintained the EU bloc. It is always trick to review oneself,

but I believe we succeeded with that particular task.

What we might have done better was to place the EU more

centrally in the negotiations. Then we’re back in what I would

say is not really the most important issue, namely to be seen

and be the key actor, but we could still have been seen more,

and we ended up in some unfortunate discussions, including

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ones about the Kyoto protocol and the EU’s will to carry it

on. There, we could have done better. But that’s always the

case, you can be wise after the fact.

Would you be able to comment briefly on the EU’s approach to

third parties after Copenhagen?

It is important to ensure that developing states can

speak for themselves, and not for Saudi Arabia, China, or

others. It is unfortunately so that the countries who will be

the worst affected are those who are the weakest, that is part

of the nature of the issue, they will be affected because they

are weak. Then they travel to conferences with two delegates,

and they cannot cope. They’re not bad negotiators, the ones

who do come I would say are very skilled, but two are not

enough to grasp the negotiations and affect the negotiations,

so they become completely dependent on their negotiation

groups. They are left in the hands of resource capable

delegations, not the least OPEC countries. I do hope that time

will work for a change in this regard.

A proposition in the literature is that the EU’s emphasis on a

top-down agreement with legal force may not be feasible, and

if this does not work in the end, mainly due to the decision

making process at COP’s, it is possible to use building block

agreements to achieve a similar effect. Do you think this is

an alternative if the original approach fails to deliver?

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I believe that to be an unfortunate development, but if

we can’t reach a global agreement that is what we will have to

do. But we can’t get as far with this method. And the reason

for this is that if you don’t have a global framework, under

which you could have several projects and agreements, one does

not exclude the other, but a global framework instead be a

support for these types of regional or sectorial or climatic

cooperation. If you do not have this, different regions or

countries will be worried about losing competitiveness, about

carbon leakage and similar issues. You need a foundation for

countries to really dare to utilise their full potential.

It is possible to do both at the same time. It is

actually very good to have processes coming both from above

and below, because if you manage to have bottom up processes

they create confidence, like I said earlier, facts on the

ground, that it is possible. It is possible that the EU can

cut emissions by 20%. These facts affect what is perceived to

be possible, and what is deemed to be possible at the

international level. And the other way around as well, it can

affect what is believed to be possible at the local level. So

I prefer to see all types of cooperation to that effect, but I

am convinced that we need a global framework, and that this

can only be created under the climate convention. It is only

the UN that provides the necessary legitimacy towards the

important growth economies.

China is prepared within the UN to go much further than

otherwise, because of this legitimacy.

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Having focused on China in the past, I’d imagine that is in

particular the legally binding aspect of an agreement would be

a primary point of conflict.

Yes, that would be very hard with China. As would it be

with the US. Besides, the US has a congress, which doesn’t

like this! On the other hand China has corruption, and it’s

very hard for central government to control the provinces and

so on. So I would claim, as I have done in the past, that a

prerequisite for a progressive environmental policy is

democracy. Sometimes I hope I am wrong, because that would

make the outlook very bleak in the world at this point. It is

easy to believe that when central decisions are made in China

they are carried out, but this isn’t necessarily the case. I

also think that it is very healthy to have an environmental

opinion, which pushes policy makers when needed. That is what

we have, and I would claim that it is one of the main reasons

why we are so progressive.

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ANNEX II: Interview with Anonymous Council Official Interview conducted in Brussels, 15 April 2015.

Any reflections that you have relating to the preparatory

process leading up to Copenhagen, and anything relating to how

Copenhagen is remembered as an event within the institutions,

and how that affects the process at this point would be very

useful.

Well, that’s a question that we could spend some time,

because it is very broad, and there are lots of parameters to

talk about. I will focus on the essentials. I will try to make

a distinction between Copenhagen and now, I think that it will

be easier to understand as well.

I would say that it’s completely different now, we are in

a completely different world now pre-Paris than we were pre-

Copenhagen. When we look at Copenhagen, the basic problem that

we had was that we were not prepared! People went into that

conference thinking, well we knew already that nothing

substantial was going to come out, the insiders let’s say, but

the world was thinking that we were going to get out of

Copenhagen with a fully fledged deal to combat climate change

for the next decade. That was simply not possible. There was

no draft agreement, the parties had not come up with their

pledges sufficiently in advance. I remember the pledges for

some had come out some months in advance, one month in

advance, that’s something that cannot work, clearly. I

remember for example that the financing pledges, the 100

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billion per year, that was something that was essentially

endorsed when Hillary Clinton arrived, and said that “by the

way, that is something we are going to do as well”. So

basically, the dynamics were not in place to have an agreement

there.

If you compare that now, to pre-Paris, we’re not in a

perfect world, sure, but there are some very clear

differences. We have a draft text. You can argue about this

text, because it’s unreadable, it’s unwieldy, but at least you

have basis to work on where you can say “this is something

that we can work on the coming months”. That was not available

pre-Copenhagen. Secondly, we have in place a whole process for

the INDC’s, the contributions. So we have already not a lot,

we have only six contributions or seven contributions that

have come in until now. But there is this process going on.

You have this text; you have the contributions, you the

ongoing debate. It’s still very difficult: we have to

acknowledge in the end maybe we will only get a minimalistic

agreement with the parameters, with the contributions, and

with hopefully an upward review mechanism were we can in the

end reach the 2 degrees. But at least we have everything in

place to get there, and that was not available pre-Copenhagen.

That is for the general international dynamics. When you

look at the EU internal dynamics, well, it’s related to what

I’ve said from the international side. I think that from an EU

internal dynamic perspective we have made a major mistake pre-

Copenhagen, and that was to announce, I think in September,

that we were going to abandon the Kyoto protocol. I think that

was a basic mistake, because there was no need to do that; we

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could just have gone on to see what would happen. I am not

going to say that this contributed to the failure, but at

least it was the spirit, in this spirit that we had no draft

text, we had no contributions, we had no clarity, and to add

on top of this this, that was not helpful. So also the EU was

to blame in the preparation, in the run up to Copenhagen,

there were mistakes made, and the EU made at least one

mistake.

The other issue that was related to the international

dynamics is this involvement of Heads of state and heads of

government. The EU needs to involve heads of state and

government, of course, they need to have political ownership

of things. But what was wrong in Copenhagen I think was to

involve them in almost line by line drafting, and that was

after we had realised, or the Danish COP presidency had

realised, that it was going nowhere, this agreement that we

were going to have, and that we were working on a declaration,

and which heads of state were drafting line by line. I’ve

never seen such a thing, and I think the heads of state were

also surprised to see that. And that was also a major flaw and

I think that is something the French are reflecting on right

now, because the French know they have to have a balance

between the involvement of the heads of state, but not

involving the heads of state in such a way that they become a

hindrance to a final agreement.

As far as EU internal organisation is concerned, I think

there have been serious improvements since pre-Copenhagen. I

mean, pre-Copenhagen, the problem was that, if I remember

correctly, it was on the first of December that year that the

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Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, and that was very awkward

because you had a whole new institutional framework that had

to be put in place, but I mean, that was impossible of course,

because you could not do it in two weeks time. But still, what

we have to say now is, the framework that should have been in

place is still not in place legally speaking, because legally

speaking, the basis of the Lisbon treaty, and that is what our

legal service says, and I think all the legal services of the

institutions would say, is that the Commission has to present

a proposal for a Council decision to negotiate there. They

haven’t done so until now, that’s already six years ago, for a

variety of reasons. If we go into that, that can also lead us

quite far, but basically for political reasons, because they

are of the view that they have enough clout now in the

negotiations that they don’t have to ask for a mandate,

because that would upset some of the big Member States that

see that as a competence grab from the Commission. But so

basically we are working on the basis of the same rules as we

were working in the past, and pre-Copenhagen, but in, how to

say, a perfected way in the sense that we are now more in a

kind of EU team spirit. Because if you would just follow the

rules that were used pre-dCopenhagen, which would mean that

the Presidency is the sole responsible for everything. Of

course that is not practical, and it’s not practical if you

look at presidencies that we’ve had from small Member States,

look now at Latvia, the next presidency Luxembourg, they just

cannot manage that. So we have more EU team approach where the

Commission is involved of course and the big Member States,

and that means that there is a sense of ownership that makes

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that things work in practice, even if you could question from

a legal perspective that there is no mandate, and of course

the Council cannot come up with something because there has to

be a Commission proposal for that according to the treaty

rules. But it works in practice right now, and that is what

counts.

And I think that’s the basic picture now comparing pre-

Copenhagen and pre-Paris.

Thank you so much for that. A question that I immediately

think of when I hear what you’ve said so far is that you have

referred to the French as being the ones thinking so heavily

about Paris, and the Conference is in Paris, but if practical

arrangements should still apply to how negotiations are

coordinated, the presidency will be Luxembourg, no? So that

the French are so involved, is that a sign that there is more

pragmatism in how coordination is approached?

Well, I think that as far as the French are concerned,

they are very well organised. I think they’ve demonstrated

that during their previous EU presidency in 2008 when they

managed to get the climate and energy package adopted. That

was in six months time, it was really a challenge they

managed, they are very well organised, coordinated, they have

all the structures in place, and basically their minister of

foreign affairs, Fabius, who is dealing with the Conference,

who is dealing the presidency of the COP in Paris. And then

you have the minister of environment, Segolene Royale, who

will deal with EU coordination, and I think that of course,

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Luxembourg is the EU presidency and is running EU affairs, but

I think that the French will heavily kind of try to influence

the debate there and they also have an interest in the sense

that they need to make clear that the EU is ambitious in what

it is doing, even if the end result of the conference in Paris

will not be the most ambitious one, but at least that they can

show to the world that from the EU perspective they are

pushing for this ambition, and then they settle at the

international level for what is feasible at that point in

time.

Turning a bit more to the meetings leading up to Paris and

during the last couple of years. During the preparatory

meetings, the same process has virtually applied? That hasn’t

been subjected to practical arrangements in the past, or has

it still been a clear coordination between DG CLIMA and the

Member States? So for instance, in Geneva just now?

Well, the working arrangements are always the same during

the last couple of years, apart from that there is more of an

EU team approach as I’ve said. That means in practice, for

example EU coordination meetings are chaired by the

Presidency, that all papers prepared are under the

responsibility of the presidency, but of course they can be

drafted by whomever volunteers. Apart from that, you have the

structure of EU lead negotiators that are the ones who

negotiate effectively, so for example during the Geneva

session, right now there are three EU lead negotiators, one

from the Commission, one from the UK, and one from Germany,

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and it’s the one from the UK who leads the three. And you have

then a whole structure of expert groups, which prepare things.

But the EU team approach has been visualised let’s say in the

fact that more power, more competence is accumulated by the

presidency, the commission and the lead negotiators. And the

most important group is becoming more and more the lead

negotiators, even if it is of course the working groups here

at the Council that set the guidelines, and the Commission

that can make the proposals for those guidelines in those

negotiations.

I have spoken to someone from DG CLIMA who’s been working with

the Conferences, and specifically with regard to how to absorb

third party positions. So when there are new announcements or

when there is progress being made, do you find that when

that’s being presented during preparatory meetings, that it’s

being absorbed appropriately throughout this process and

disseminated, and have you observed and larger changes within

strategies and within the system as a consequence of a

preparatory meeting?

I would say that when we have announcements and documents

from third parties, it is more kind of the experts who look at

them and then present them to the working party so that people

are aware. Except for maybe the INDC’s, I think that now

everyone is looking immediately at INDC’s, they don’t need

experts to do this. But it is thrue that the EU is a little

bit slow in its reaction. The fact that we are so democratic I

would say, and so open, makes it difficult to change our

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position well in advance of a conference. Of course, once you

get at the year-end conference, the political conference where

decisions are made, the ministers are present, and the

negotiating text is put on the table and followed up on quite

quickly, then ministers react on the spot and say we should

accept this or should not accept this. But when you have this

situation earlier in the year, and you don’t need to take a

decision, the EU is not rapid to react on that. It’s more like

we have our position, we need to stick to our position and so

on. And I think that is one of the major elements this year,

if things start moving, because I mean, I am ten years in the

process, I am rather pessimistic about this process, I think

it’s a process that doesn’t work basically, because there are

too many interests. Just have a look at how the UN system on

climate works. I mean, you put together a country of, as the

UK, with Saudi Arabia, or Bolivia. It’s never going to work. I

mean, the UK, who wants ambitions on everything using markets,

using everything at its disposal to get to the targets with a

country like Saudi Arabia that doesn’t really want climate

action, because it is against its interests, and a country

like Bolivia being on the leftist side that markets have never

resolved anything, that developed countries are to blame for

everything, and that we should be brought before an

international tribunal for our crimes. It’s so diverse in

positioning, that it’s very difficult to make it work. In the

end, everyone tries to compromise. Look at Copenhagen, look at

Cancun, look at Doha. There’s always somebody who has a

problem and who blocks. So it’s really very difficult to work.

So what I meant to say is that even if the EU is ready to kind

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evolve in its position, does it really make sense, because the

others will stay ingrained in their position, not move from

their position because some of them have very ideological

positions. And that’s a little bit what I see as a problem in

this process. And that brings me also what I see as, I am not

Madame Soleil, but what I see as the run-up to Paris, we’re

going just to muddle through here, we are going to stay with a

very long the text, nobody is going to change their position,

and in the end it will be the French who will need to put a

very minimalistic text in the second week of the conference.

If it works in another way, and if we manage to reduce that

text, to bring it to a manageable size with only political

options left, I would be very surprised and delighted, but I

don’t think it is going to happen.

There are clear fundamental issues with the UNFCCC regime.

Would you consider that the agreement between the US and China

will contribute to a success?

I think that as you say, the regime that we have now, and

the convention which has been perpetuated within the Kyoto

protocol with this dichotomy between Annex I and non-Annex I

is not going to change in the letter of the agreement, because

we are going to make, if everything goes well, a protocol that

is going to sit under that convention, in accordance with

those principles. But the fact is that the way in which we are

designing this protocol makes these principles more or less

obsolete, or makes that those principles get an evolving

nature, and that, to give you an example, the INDC’s, that’s

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the best example of that this dichotomy between AI and non-AI

does not exist anymore, but that you allow room to everyone to

present their contributions according to their evolving

circumstances. Look at Mexico, what Mexico has proposed for

example, that’s a clear example of that. So even if those

principles stay generic in the convention, you give them a

translation in this new protocol that will make sure that you

in fact more or less abandon them, without saying so because

that would irk developing countries, mainly China and others

would say “no, we’ll never accept that”. So you need to do it

without saying it basically, and I think this agreement

indeed, between the US and China, I think that it’s the basic

agreement to get an agreement in Paris. I mean without that it

would have been impossible. I mean, you need that. It’s clear.

That agreement is the basis for the agreement in Paris. The

only thing now is what we will have is that we will have those

contributions that will come in. We will not get to two

degrees with these initial contributions. So according to me,

what do you need in the 2015 agreement, the Paris agreement?

You need: one, an automatic upward review mechanism so that

every five years you review and you go beyond what you’ve

pledged in the last round. And without this being a continuous

negotiation, we have been in negotiations about a post-regime,

let’s say, now for ten years. We have to stop these

negotiations, so it has to be something automatic that you

don’t need to negotiate about. Second, you need to have in the

Paris agreement, the rules base, the rules infrastructure, so

that you can kind of basically track what is happening, that

you know what the emissions are, that you know what people are

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doing, that you know how markets are working, etc. That’s the

basic thing.

So the Paris agreement doesn’t need to have a lot. You need to

have a binding agreement, you need to have those contributions

anchored somewhere in that agreement. That’s still open, is

that the annex, is that in the agreement it will probably be

an annex because the Americans don’t want it to be in the

agreement because otherwise they need to go through the

senate, and we want to avoid that with the experience of the

US senate. It will need to be something outside from them so

that they can accept the agreement as something that doesn’t

need to go through the senate, and then this target, they do

it through executive action and so on, but it’s not an

international target. I think that is the basis for

everything. So we need to have those initial contributions, an

upward review mechanism and rules, basically. And that’s it.

And the rules then need to be developed in the coming years

before the agreement enters into force in 2020, so you have

still four years to develop those rules which the principles

have been set out in the 2015 agreement. So it’s an agreement

of five pages. I speak without contributions, because if you

take the contributions that will probably be 200 pages or

something like that. But the basic agreement is something like

five pages. Between five and ten pages I would say. Well yeah,

that’s the challenge.

Turning to China: one of the main sticking points coming up

with the EU position is the term legally binding. If it is not

possible at the end of the day to get China onboard with a

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legally binding agreement, would we have to move towards

either a voluntary agreement or a building blocks thinking of

concluding smaller agreements that would add up to the same

sum?

I think that this is an issue for the last night in Paris

at the end of the year, basically. We have avoided making a

decision on this, because there is no agreement on this

basically. So what we have always said is “form will follow

function”, that means let’s first get an agreement on the

substance, and then we will decide on its legally binding

character or not. Of course, that doesn’t preclude that we are

thinking about how to solve this conundrum, because it is a

difficult situation. We have the situation of China that you

outline, we have also the situation of the US, where it needs

to go through the senate, and where we need to see what is

possible and what is not possible. You have also the situation

of India. If you remember, when the mandate for this 2015

agreement was decided that was back in Durban, three or four

years ago, it was India blocking until the end, and it’s

because of this blocking that we have enshrined in the

decision that it would be, I don’t remember the exact wording

now, but a protocol, a legally binding instrument or another

instrument with legal force, so that can be basically

everything. According to the Indians that could still be a set

of decisions, a set of decisions by the COP. There could be

disagreement of course, I think most people disagree with

this. But in the end, this will be the crunch issue on what do

we do with this? What is the legal form, the legal character,

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the legal force of this agreement. I think that, it is very

difficult to answer this right now, but I think that in the

end, if the EU is the only one out there, and it’s the make or

break element of the deal, I can be almost sure that the EU

will go with a non-binding agreement. It’s clear that after

negotiating ten years an agreement after the failure of

Copenhagen, we cannot afford a failure in Paris, but not at

all price, that must be clear! So if you give in on this

legally binding element that is of crucial importance for the

EU, it must be clear that the substance should be good, and

should be capable, because that is the end goal, to at some

point in time put us on track for the two degrees. But I think

that is a consideration for the last night, and I think that

if we get to this point, it will be a difficult decision

within the EU. I can imagine a split within the EU, where some

member could say that we should stay firm on this legally

binding character while other say we should look more at the

substance, and then go with whatever form we have. But as I

say, that’s really the final call, the call at the end of the

conference that we will need to make.

One thing that Copenhagen and Paris has in common is that they

are both in Europe, and that means that there will be many

more stakeholders getting involved in the process. What do you

think is different this time around when it comes to engaging

with these stakeholders ahead of the meeting? Let’s say,

stakeholders outside of the institutions and Member States as

well.

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I think that indeed is a major challenge. When you look

now at what the French are saying they say that they’ve

received 35,000 people at that conference, so that is unheard

of, never seen before, even at Copenhagen they didn’t have so

many people. But what they are doing right now, the French, is

not only an outreach on the government to government level

from the ministry of foreign affairs, visiting other countries

and even the heads of state visiting other countries and

receiving other leaders to speak about this. There is also an

involvement of all possible stakeholders, and it’s cities, its

businesses, it’s everybody that they can enlist, because I

think that they know, they realise that the support of society

will be very important, so I think that the French are doing a

positive preparation to that, and I think that they are

managing right now. We’ll see how it evolves, because nearer

to crunch time, you hear people speaking up more and possibly

criticising some of the elements. And that will then be the

important thing for the French in how they will manage that,

because the Danes were not very good at managing that. They

got more upset than they reacted positively and constructively

to that sort of criticism, and that was one of the major

problems. The other thing, being, of course, if I may, one of

the main, if not the main issue of Copenhagen, and the failure

of Copenhagen, was the fact that the Danes were too US-minded.

You can be US-minded, and there’s no problem in that, the US

was one of the big players there, but you cannot be seen to be

US minded towards the developing countries, that is not

acceptable. And I think that the French there have an

advantage with their special relationship with African

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countries for example, if they play it seriously, and I think

they will be able to play it seriously there.

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ANNEX III: Interview with Anonymous CommissionOfficial, third party relationsInterview conducted via telephone on 14 April 2015. Translated

from its original language.

I would ask you to begin by reflecting on how you think that

COP 15 has affected how the preparatory process for subsequent

conferences after Copenhagen, and interaction with third

parties. It would be fine to speak more generally about these

issues.

What we do now, after Copenhagen, what we did during the

Barroso 2 Commission, with Connie Hedegaard as Climate

Commissioner, was that after we had lost it all, we had to

avoid the image that Europe seemed like an actor who did not

want to do anything. If we wanted to keep on going, we had to

take it as a sign that Europe still had to be the best, and

press the process forward, and that we had to remain

ambitious.

So already before Copenhagen, we had developed the 20-20-

20 package, and that was fine, but we couldn’t just leave it

there. After all, the ones who didn’t want to quit at

Copenhagen also realised that the big emitters weren’t

ambitious enough. Therefore, we at the Commission came out

with the 2050 roadmap, which you might be aware of.

And that was one of the major steps forward. From the

perspective of the Commission, that was already based on the

foundation of the 2030 climate and energy package, which was

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endorsed by the European Council in the end of October last

year. So this works as a basis for the roadmap, as it allows

us have a strategy to be ambitious, and with that trajectory

we could see where we would be at in 2030 with the goal in

2050. If you want to be taken seriously, you have to be

ambitious.

After this, our strategy meant that we had to search for

allies, and there we knew that those who wanted more ambition

are the ones who are our allies. And those who want more

ambition are the small island states, LDC’s, some African

states, which form the Progressives group. And these are the

ones who we consider the most progressive, including the small

island states and Bangladesh,, and also Mexico, South Africa,

and Australia (but those were the days, because that is no

longer the case). Also Chile and some South American states.

During 3-4 years, we met them once in Brussels, once at the

UNGA in New York. And this is an Alliance that could be

strong. And the first victory for this Alliance was in Durban,

where we took the first step towards a conference in Paris. It

was this alliance that pushed this through. And it was also

there for the first time that we saw a split among the G77,

the UN group of developing states that actually lack a lot of

homogeneity, as there is a big difference if you’re Mali or

China. For several years, India and China have spoken for

them, but they really don’t have the same interests. At Durban

we saw them split, and the countries most exposed made clear

that they don’t speak on their behalf, and it was actually an

EU objective to split this group in order to make free those

who support higher ambitions. Also, the BRICS in that group

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have stuck to CBDR, and the firewall division, which is

becoming redundant as China is now the largest emitter, who

must take responsibility now. So this was the strategy, to get

these countries with us and to have them put pressure on India

and China, as they are in the same group, which is obviously

not the same as if we do it.

What we now see in 2015, is that we must focus on INDC’s,

which must deliver more hands-on action to win over those

supporting something happening in 2015, by outlining country

deliverables. We have said that at Paris we need a robust,

international agreement with a common legal framework applying

to all countries, with which we mean no firewall, no CBDR, and

to include clear, fair, binding mitigation targets for all

countries based on evolving global economic circumstances.

This is another way of saying that everyone must do something,

which is obviously subjected to individual circumstances; we

can’t ask Bangladesh to do what we do. But everyone has to do

something. And the third issue is regular review and

strengthening countries targets in the light of the target of

below 2 degrees goal. This means that if we deliver the

INDC’s, the job is not done there. We need to ensure that

everyone lives up to what they say they’ll do. It is clear

with the commitments ahead of Paris we will not reach the

below 2C target, which creates a gap. That’s where the review

clause comes in. The last point is to hold all countries

accountable to each other, and to the public for meeting their

targets.

So this is our ambition. Europe has now come out with a

new climate diplomacy strategy, which you may have heard of.

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Yes. One of our teachers here works for the EEAS, so he has

spoken about their role in climate diplomacy.

Yes, exactly. So this is part of the same regime, saying

that climate cannot be seen in isolation, to ensure that

everyone works with this.

So that’s the strategy, and I don’t think anyone here is

100% that Paris will be the end game, but it will be the

beginning of something else. It will also be the beginning of

determining what we can do with certain strategic partners,

and what we can do bilaterally. I don’t believe that there

will be a new [decisive] COP next year, but maybe in two

years, as many states say we have to take a decisive step in

2017. In Europe, we naturally hope to do something ambitious,

but the details, the devil lies in the details, and that will

be made clear later.

But it is of course important that the Americans and

others, the big countries will be entering actively. And it

may be a bit early to say how they will enter, but if there is

nothing now, there certainly will be nothing next year. We

have a small opportunity now while Obama is still around,

unless Hillary gets elected, but we don’t know.

If I can turn towards the EU’s infrastructure in preparing for

the negotiations, when you work with third countries, how

practically do you communicate successes or other information

about third parties partially within the Commission but also

with the Council, and does this affect the overall strategy?

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This is where the Council’s working groups are so

important. And if we speak about exchanging information and

keeping the Council oriented in what is happening, this is an

ongoing process. They meet regularly. That is one way, and

another way is when we meet directly during preparatory

meetings such as those in Bonn, and there we meet every

morning for coordination meetings. We certainly hope that this

time round we will be more prepared, and we can see in recent

meetings that there is more agreement and that people are

increasingly speaking with one voice. This is where climate

diplomacy has been so important, so that everyone has known

which line to take. But we need to keep each other informed,

and we also need to work with the Presidency. It is the

Presidency who takes the initiative for these meetings,

including the coordination meetings, in the same way that they

take initiative in the working groups.

But you know, there is no one shouting competence here or

competence there, who should do this or that. Recently in

Geneva, for the first time we saw that when we needed to lobby

Argentina, we asked Spain or others to do so, and for India

others, so this is the first time we’re really splitting the

roles, and this creates ownership for successes, so the

Commission doesn’t do everything. This is climate diplomacy at

its maximum. With 90,000 diplomats we can do a hell of a lot

of outreach.

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The way it has looked leading up to Paris and preceding

conferences, do you think that the process has worked

relatively constructively?

Well, it depends on what you speak of when you say that!

I think that the last 4-5 years it has been constructive.

Internally, in Europe it has been much tougher to push

through, to keep the ambition at the same level at the same

time that we’ve had an economic crisis and what have you. This

has been very hard, as a lot of Member States have considered

this to be another thing from Brussels that will cost a lot of

money that we don’t have and so on. So therefore it has been

extremely hard to keep the level of ambition at the same

level. In the EU, we are the locomotive for this issue. This

time has been incredibly though, to get some countries, in

particular the Visegrad countries, to maintain high levels of

ambition. They thought that 2020 was enough.

With this as a basis, do you feel that there are any

reoccurring issues with the coordination process during

preparatory meetings, either with regards to the institutions

or the Member States? Or has the process moved on as intended?

The coordination itself has been OK. Yes.

(discussion after questions)

Copenhagen is incredibly sensitive. They were so keen for

an agreement. And it is very hard to say what really went

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wrong. There were heads of state and government that came

along, there was a [Danish] prime minister that came in far

too late. But there was still a lot of progress at Copenhagen.

There were pledges, and there was progress towards cementing

the 2C degree targets. So Copenhagen did not produce a blank

sheet.

This leads me to an additional question, if you would allow

it. There is one additional common feature between Copenhagen

and Paris, that the conferences are held in Europe. This means

that there will be a much larger range of European

stakeholders, including Heads of State and Government.

I think it will be hard to get an agreement, but if you

want an agreement you need these guys. I think that the French

will drive the process even before the summit, through the G20

or elsewhere, to seal the deal. The French have the logistics.

It will be terribly hard to handle security issues. They

cannot prevent them from participating, and they know that

many have scheduled in these dates in their agendas. But they

don’t want to go if they can’t have an agreement, they don’t

want to do Copenhagen again. I think that during the summer,

perhaps after July, we will know better how it will turn out.

How they enter and how they fit into this.

Do you think that there has been a closer engagement with

coordination from top-level politicians earlier on in the

process, outside of France?

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Well, since the foreign ministers have speak about these

issues now that when they travel, they also speak with their

Heads of State and Government. So now it is definitely a

different level. This was another goal of climate diplomacy,

to involve high-level politicians much earlier on.

But if there is no agreement in sight, then no single

person will want to be there either. Nobody wants to stand

next to Hollande if there is just a one-piece paper to show.

But Ban Ki Moon and Jim Kim of the WB are the big drivers in

all this, and they consider that the climate issue is the

biggest issue for the world. That’s the one, there is no

bigger issue. If they want to make climate their legacy, they

will add additional pressure from the UN level.

And within the US, it is the Pentagon and Homeland

Security that are drivers. It is a pressing security issue,

perhaps more than North Korea (laughter).

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ANNEX IV: Transcript - Interview with Anonymous Commission Official, internal coordinationInterview conducted In Brussels, 22 April 2015.

Could you reflect on whether, and if so how the experience of

Copenhagen has affected the EU’s approach to preparatory

meetings and engagement with third parties, as well as general

coordination?

The immediate thought that I had was that Copenhagen was

a landmark event in the history of the UNFCCC, Some people

picture it as failure. That was maybe not so much because of

how the EU works. We have had other experiences in the past

that influence more substantially how we work in climate

negotiations. We had that COP 6 in The Hague, in 2000. That

one was a total failure, and the way that we worked in the EU

certainly weighed in. There is obviously a big history from

1992 until now, and then we operated from a number of

treaties, so I wouldn’t say Copenhagen such a change of course

in the way we work as such. It’s a long history constant

change in how we work. We’re certainly not perfect, but we’re

a lot better than we were a few years ago.

There are the intersessional meetings, but you need to

picture that there is a lot more than this. You’ve got

informal processes. For example, this year you’ve got COP 21,

and then there are four additional sessions during the year,

one in February in Geneva, one in Bonn in June, and then

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another two Bonn in August and mid October. That’s just the

formal process. Then around it, you’ve got the COP presidency,

the French, who convene informal consultation meetings,

together with the Peruvian COP 20 presidency. There was one

last month, there is another one next month, and there are at

least two other such meetings in the second half of the year.

And then you have the Major Economies Forum, which brings

together major economies at the ministerial level typically So

we are counting on probably four sessions this year, and then

there is the Petersberg climate dialogue coming from the

Germans in a few weeks, and then lots and lots of other

meetings convened by NGO’s, or think tanks or press, with a

subset of parties being represented just to seek common

ground, although you’re not working on a text and they’re not

formal meetings. And then there are all the actual

negotiations. Typically you’ve got all the diplomatic

preparations of the G7/G20, and then the EU-China summit, the

EU select summit with Latin American countries, these kinds of

events. The college-to-college meeting between the EU and the

African Union. Every time you have statements in these sort of

meetings you would have a background of climate change, where

we try to progressively frame how we see things together. So

it’s a much broader exercise. And there’s the climate

diplomacy [strategy] that we adopted in January, to try to

organise ourselves to better, within the EU institutions and

the Member States diplomatic services, to try to have more

input in the process. So there is a lot more going on than the

negotiation process.

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Coming back to the way we’re organised, the negotiation

positions are established in the EU council in different

formations, the main one being environment, that adopts

conclusions from time to time. Typically there would be a set

of conclusions a few weeks before a COP every year, but this

year is different, because there is a lot going on and you

would expect to see EU-level engagement already in the summer

time, so we need to have conclusion adopted earlier. And then

there is the ECOFIN council who need to adopt conclusions on

climate finance. The European Council needs talking from time

to time. In October last year it has adopted the broad lines

of the EU’s contributions to meet the targets in the

agreement, last month it has provided some further details on

how to engage and so on. The Foreign Affairs Council has

adopted the climate diplomacy and so on. You know that the

main formation is the working party under the ENVI council,

which adopts position papers ahead of every negotiation

session. Position papers can be around a page, the Council

conclusions would usually be around two pages maximum. There

would be one position paper per subsidiary body. The UNFCCC

has the Durban platform, which the new agreement, and also

discusses areas of where we can increase ambition before the

entry into force of an agreement. So we call it the ADP, the

ad-hoc working group on the Durban Platform. And then we have

the subsidiary bodies, the SBSTA. Too much detail, you know

this already. For each of these subsidiary bodies, for each

session we adopt a position paper under the working party. And

then the working party has a number of expert groups, made up

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of experts from Member States and the commission, which

prepare the positions adopted by the Council.

So what I’m getting at that is that this is the realm of

establishing what we want. And then, there is the other realm

of negotiating it with the rest of the world. There is a

negotiation team, under the guidance of the current presidency

of the council, the Latvians now, and the Commission. And then

we have the lead negotiators, which are three individuals,

from the UK, Germany and the Commission. I myself am

coordinating the negotiation team together with others. There

you have coordinators by decision track, ADP, SBSTA. You’ve

got coordinators by clusters of issues, like adaptation,

mitigation, climate finance and so on. You’ve got issue

leaders on reaching a solution. So altogether, it would be

about I would say 80 people in the negotiation team.

It would not be good governance to make the position up

as we go into the negotiation team. Whenever there is an open

question, whenever and issue arises on which we haven’t

reached a position, we refer the issue back to the expert

groups and the WPIEI. That’s the basic idea. Then there’s no

need to discuss the tactics, the line to take, in the expert

groups. Full transparency is required when establishing the

position, and the negotiation teams need to be faithful to the

agreed positions, but there is no need to negotiate statements

and so on, in the broader process. It would create massive

inertia in the way we work, which has been a big problem we

had in the past.

We are a big party and a big organisation. We speak with

one voice, for the EU and its Member States, so it requires a

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lot of organisation. If you are, say Norway for example, you

have a lot more liberty to adapt, you can play tactically.

You’re more flexible and you can play in the negotiations. For

us, you just can’t suggest that your position is this while in

fact it’s that, because you’ve got all the Member States

sitting in the back, and they would shout out if there’s

something that isn’t in line with the positions, and lightly

so. So you don’t have the same level of flexibility in

negotiations. At the same time also, whenever you agree on a

position, you can’t change unless you revert back to the

authorities to get approval to change position. So there is a

lot of inertia there. The trouble we had back in 2000, which I

mentioned earlier, is that we had established very strong

positions, kind of as a way to influence the process by

adopting strong positions, but when the time came to make

compromise it turned out to be hopeless. So long as there was

one Member State that kept on saying that it didn’t conform to

the position, then the group wouldn’t move. And then on every

issue there would be someone who said “no, this is the most

important issue for us, we should stick to our position to the

end”, whereas some members would say “no, we should be

flexible and revise our position on that”, others would say

the opposite. The group wouldn’t move at all. And I think we

[the EU] were a problem at that time.

So from that experience of COP 6, people who were there are

very weary of adopting tough positions, because you might et

problems down the line. So we adjust practice to avoid that. I

think that experience from 10-15 years ago would also taught

us that we spent so much time discussing among ourselves,

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while there was a big disconnect with the general discussion

in the world. So we experienced that we should rather engage

with international partners than negotiate among ourselves to

reach an ideal agreement. So we’ve streamlined the way we

work, especially in the way we’ve developed our new

negotiation team. The general idea is that in between

sessions… you need to picture that these are essentially the

same individuals working in the expert groups to elaborate a

position, and in the EU team to negotiate with the rest of the

world. So the idea is that in between sessions it should

general be the work of the expert groups. During sessions, the

expert groups should stay away, as an institution, they should

not come unless there is a need to adopt a new position, and

leave the negotiation team to work in engagement with the rest

of the world. So that has been an evolution of the last 15

years.

The experience of Copenhagen I think was an

acknowledgement that maybe we are not so influential. Because

in 2000 we were so influential that we contributed to the

whole exercise to fail (laughter), whereas in 2009 we failed

to really make a difference and we were taken for granted.

Especially when so the conference is organised within the

European Union, the rest of the world would expect that we

would accept any deal. Our influence is to frame the issue,

rather than standing in the way of a final compromise in the

end. If we say that we are never going to accept this, our

partners would just laugh at us, because they would say “wait

until it’s the last minute, then we’ll see whether you are

able to say no to the final deal”. So there’s a tendency that

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we can observe in the world, and we try to react on that so to

say. We are taken for granted, because we need so much more an

international agreement, and we are keen to uphold the

multilateral process, so people expect that we would be

prepared to make compromise in order to avoid failure.

Obviously, if you are a party who does not care too much about

an agreement, you have much more leverage.

The other thing is that it’s not very much our side to

play the bear during negotiations, to hammer in our positions

and throw our strength around. I think we exert influence more

by throwing ideas in early on in the process, and then be more

in a central position to develop a compromise, to bring our

partners to a common ground. This is how we exert influence,

rather than issuing a range of opinions and sticking to strong

demands, because if we do that then we would just not be part

of the process. So these are changes in the way we work.

A similarity between Copenhagen and Paris is that you will

have a European COP presidency, and this is an issue I have

come across during my research. Could you comment on how the

negotiating team works with the COP presidency when it is a

European state?

This is a highly sensitive topic, because it is very

important for the French to be seen as neutral, impartial. If

they were seen as promoting their interests, then they would

fail. So it would be too easy for parties wanting them to fail

to picture them as unbalanced, so this is very sensitive. They

obviously have their own interests at the conference, so they

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have to rely on the EU to defend their interests, and to stay

away to some extent from it. For example, there is no one from

the French who are speaking on behalf of the EU from the

negotiation team. I mentioned lead negotiators from different

parts of the EU, but also you have EU speakers in subsidiary

formal groups, and you would never see anyone from the French

presidency speaking in any of these groups. The French staff

here has to work from the back office, but not sit behind the

EU nameplate or speak for the EU.

The poles have had two COP’s recently, but they were

minor conferences. You have a negotiation cycle, where you

build up to conferences where more is expected. COP 6, COP 9

and COP 15 were like this, but the ones hosted by Poland were

more for transition in a longer cycle. Yet the Poles have a

special situation in that they have specific interests that

may not match the EU common grounds, so they have to preside

over the conference but also keep their position within the EU

to make sure that the EU position doesn’t go too far away from

their own interests. So they really had to parts of their

team, one for presiding, the other for defending their own

interests within the EU. The French, and the Danes and the

Dutch before didn’t have that problem, because they were

positive towards the tendency of the EU position. The French

cares about whether the EU doesn’t become irrelevant by taking

radical positions, leaving it outside of the mainstream, but

on substance there is no difference so they rely on the EU

negotiation team for their interests.

They need to do a lot more outreach, for COP presidency

purposes, especially with the outliers. Because, in theory you

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have the established subsidiary bodies under the Durban

platform that should deliver an agreement, and all they would

have to do is hammer down the final plenary to adopt the final

agreement that is delivered to them by the ADP group chairs.

In practice, we know that this is not going to happen, so at

some stage, there would be a crisis where they would have to

step in and fix it. In particular, whereas in the EU we try to

favour our natural allies, and we try to talk to everyone but

we talk more to our allies to align strategies and seek common

ground, whereas the French have a very strong interest in

talking to the outliers, the people who could possibly stop a

deal in the final moments, because they need to prevent such a

situation. Just like what happened in Copenhagen for example,

and then the Mexicans learned from it, and they really worked

on the lessons from Copenhagen, to make sure that the same

mistakes were not repeated during the Mexican conference

[Cancun]. The French are maintaining dialogue with the central

outliers.

I think an aspect of your question related to how we take

into account other parties’ views. We’re not that good at

that, because as much as we try to avoid it, there is an

element of group thinking in the way we work. So we have a

history of our conversations in the expert groups to develop

the way we see things, and we tend to keep on building on our

own agreed position, because we find compromise on a

particular language and we expand on that as we go along.

Whereas, technically it would be a lot better to say “what

that government has just said, we agree on that, We’d like to

work on this and that in their proposal”. That would be a lot

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more efficient negotiation process rather than to say “we

ignore what they’ve said, and here is a further elaboration of

our own proposal based on what we told you before”.

The fact that we’re shielding the negotiation team to

some extent from the establishment of the positions enables us

to have that sort of technical approach from time to time, but

still we don’t have that flexibility and natural tendency to

bounce on what other people have said. That’s something we

could improve on.

From what I have come to understand, there is still no

decision providing a formal mandate for the EU in climate

negotiations. Do you think that this is beneficial or

detrimental to the negotiating process?

There are two sides to that coin. You may have identified

that you get national and EU competences here, but you also

get those in between where you can’t say that the Commission

is going to negotiate here, and that or this topic is Member

State competence so the presidency of the Council should

negotiate there. This topic is very much in between, so the

goal will have to be to speak with one voice overall, and then

have the Commission and the presidency negotiating on behalf

of the EU and the Member States. The position we try to

establish in the council conclusion and the working groups, is

that the working arrangements, they are more than informal,

it’s just a close cooperation (laughter). It is a problem,

because it isn’t written down on paper, the operating rules,

and then we keep on facing difficulties with the individuals

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not doing what they should do, so we need to remind them, but

it’s ambiguous all the time. We waste some energy dealing with

organisational issues, but we still feel that with our

prospects for the Paris COP, we can’t afford to open a

negotiation on working arrangements within the working party

and Council. That would absorb so much energy and time

deducted from negotiations ahead of Paris, and interacting

with the rest of the world.

We made that assessment already a while ago. This issue

is also sensitive. I think you need to educate people to the

requirements of the Lisbon treaty, whereas some people have

been there for a long while and they’re used to operating

under structures that existed in the past, that they may not

realise that this is not really consistent with the Lisbon

treaty. It would just be too hard to get everyone on board,

with an agreement based on relatively informal arrangements.

This cost of having to deal with issues every day is not

insignificant, but I think it is manageable with individuals

acting in good faith. Our current way of working is fine, I

guess. Then of course, the system falls under mounting

pressure. Especially I think, that there is a way that we work

on a technical level, and I think the transition to the

ministerial level is very tricky, because you need to transfer

the issue to another group of people who are elected, yet may

not be fully aware of all the subtleties of EU working

arrangements. Then they’re not so familiar with the details or

the substance, and need to briefed. Sometimes, politicians

have strong views. They want this, they want that, and it’s

our job to tell them why it won’t work (laughter). You find

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for example that time and again you will have someone say “I

disagree with what the EU is saying, I just want to take the

floor and say the opposite”. But you can’t do that!

(laughter).

I think we try to operate de facto under a system that….

The way we work would be consistent with the Lisbon treaty if

you were put that down on paper an agree on it with the

negotiation arrangement. But the transaction cost of getting

agreement on that decision through debate would be so high

that we would want to continue to operate informally.

Just to be a bit more precise, I think that the

presidency of the Council has a responsibility to chair the

working party under the Council, and the expert groups under

the working group and so on, whereas the negotiation team,

it’s a joint endeavour between the Commission and the Council.

I don’t think that everyone in the EU would acknowledge that

the Commission has a joint role with the presidency of the

Council in running the negotiation team, whereas that would be

a requirement under the Lisbon treaty. So if we were to put it

down on paper, we would have to deal with the legality of

this, and parties being opposed to it, and it would consume a

lot of time, whereas it has been functioning as is. My

understanding of the Treaties is that in dealing with a mixed

agreement, you have to have the Commission representing the

EU, and then the Council representing the Member States. They

could say the Commission is in charge also of that part, but

more often they would say the current presidency of the

Council is in charge.

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A quick, important point: as we go to that part of the

year, it is increasingly likely that we will not meet on a

technical level but a head of state level. As we move to head

of state level, the EU presidency is off, instead it’s the EC

president, which brings in a whole different game, especially

considering who is the president of the European Council and

his background! (laughter) Then there’s this role of the EEAS.

The rotating presidency of the Council: the experience we

had from the past, in particular 15 years ago, was that we

really had the presidency speaking on behalf of everyone, in

every meeting and contact group and so on. Sometimes you have

relatively small Member States. It is hard for them to put up

good speakers, knowledgeable speakers, so we when we made a

cryptic compromise on a common EU position, that person may or

may not speak good English, so the effect is not great.

(Laughter) People just don’t understand what the EU’s said and

move on with their conversation! So it was highly ineffective.

So we have established this system whereby we’ve got lead

negotiators who speak on a permanent basis. They don’t have a

permanent role, but the team is carried over from presidency

to presidency. So they are more efficient. There’s the

capacity of the speaker, and there’s also the fact that that

speaker is known to the rest of the world, as people are

engaged in long-term relationships on an individual basis,

because you know what that person would support or not

support. If you’re a newcomer, they don’t take so much into

account what you say, and you might be gone in a couple of

months, so why bother. So that division between lead

negotiators and the presidency came from that issue as well.

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It’s a way around the weakness of having a rotating

presidency.

To conclude, what are your expectations of the Paris COP? Do

you think it will be able to deliver an agreement?

I am worried, but not so much because of the French or

because of the EU. I am worried about the process in general.

We’ve got a negotiation text that is around a 100 pages. It

takes about one hour per line to clear a piece of text, so

we’re talking 3,000 hours, which we don’t have. So something

has to happen. Because you know, every Member State of the

United Nations has a say. So it requires a lot to get to an

agreement. Even if we agree on substance, we have to agree on

how to frame it. There we have it. If anyone wants to mess up

the process, there are plenty of political tricks in the bag

to do play for time and make sure that the process doesn’t

move forward. We just don’t have time to take time to take the

text and polish it until we’ve removed the options and get to

an agreement where everyone’s happy.

The ADP co-chairs, one from Algeria and the other from

the United States, they are taking a very cautious approach,

they don’t want to upset anyone in the room, they let the room

do whatever they want. And that’s no very helpful, because you

want to guide the parties to where there is prospect for an

agreement. My guess is that we will have to ramp up to the

political level pretty soon, to extract political questions,

resolve these questions and get back to the legal text and

adopt an agreement, all this to be done in September, so this

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means you need a political agreement by the October session,

but the technical level process has its own dynamics, and

there is still plenty of time left until decision making, so

you stick to your own position and you debate marginal aspects

and stick to your views with strong positions, and there is

really no progress. Because of this, the size of the

negotiation text, the number of parties involved, the number

of issues to be dealt with is really scary. We will see how

this can be dealt with.

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