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The Ethics of Agricultural Animal Biotechnology Robert K. Streiffer and John Basl

1. Introduction

Recent biotechnology research includes the development of genetically engineered

animals and cloned animals for use as food or breeding stock in agriculture. Such

research raises important ethical issues regarding the welfare of animals in agriculture

and animal agriculture’s environmental impact.

The livestock sector’s massive scale—fifty six billion land animals are consumed

each year1--means that several routine agricultural practices that are detrimental to animal

welfare or to the environment pose some of the most pressing global ethical issues the

human species has ever encountered. An application of biotechnology to animals in

agriculture (animal biotech for short) can either mitigate or exacerbate these problems. In

Section 2, after discussing the philosophical literature on animal welfare, we discuss the

prospects for ameliorating or exacerbating animal welfare issues with animal biotech. In

particular, we focus on how diminishing the cognitive capacities of animals in agriculture

might improve or harm their welfare. In Section 3, we turn to animal biotech and the

environment. After explaining how agriculture contributes to environmental problems,

we look at how a particular genetically engineered animal, the Enviropig, might alter the

environmental impacts of pig agriculture. In doings so we develop a framework for

thinking about other cases.

2. Animal Biotech and Animal Welfare

Theories of Animal Welfare

One way an application of animal biotech can have a morally relevant impact is by its

effect on an animal’s welfare (its well-being, quality of life, or how well its life is going).

Insofar as an application of animal biotech provides a net increase of animal welfare

compared to current practices, there is a moral reason in favor of adopting that

application. And, of course, insofar as an application decreases animal welfare compared

to current practices, there is a moral reason against adopting that application. However, to

assess the welfare impact of particular applications of animal biotech, we must know

what it means to improve animal welfare. This requires that we understand both what

constitutes animal welfare and what constitutes an improvement in it.

There are three types of general views about welfare: Mentalistic views, Desire-

Satisfaction views, and Objective List views.

According to Mentalistic views of welfare, welfare is solely a function of the

mental life of an individual. Negative mental states—such as pain, suffering, and

distress—count against an individual’s welfare, while positive mental states—such as

pleasure, enjoyment, and contentment—count in favor of an individual’s welfare.

One prominent problem with Mentalistic conceptions of welfare is that they

ignore the possibility that whether or not one’s desires are satisfied can have an impact on

1 UN FAO, http://faostat.fao.org

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one’s welfare without affecting one’s mental life. For example, someone who desires to

be in a committed relationship but, unknowingly, has an unfaithful partner is worse off

than someone who is otherwise the same but for having a faithful partner. This problem

motivates Desire-Satisfaction views, according to which welfare is constituted by the

satisfaction of one’s desires. As with Mentalistic views, Desire-Satisfaction views allow

that mental states are an important component of welfare. However, Desire-Satisfaction

views can accommodate the idea that facts about the world can affect welfare without

affecting the mental life of the individual.

Desire-Satisfaction views typically distinguish between actual desires and

informed desires. According to actual desire views, welfare is constituted by the

satisfaction of an individual’s actual preferences. However, the satisfaction of actual

desires is not always a component of welfare. For example, the satisfaction of a desire to

be shot on the basis of the false belief that being shot will make one live forever is not a

component of an individual’s welfare. This leads most proponents of a Desire-

Satisfaction view to adopt the requirement that, for a desire’s satisfaction to count as part

of the individual’s welfare, the desire must be “informed,” that is, capable of persisting in

the face of correct information and rational reflection (Griffin, 1986, pp. 11-14).

But moving to a Desire-Satisfaction view based on informed desires suggests that

the states of affairs themselves, rather than the preferences concerning them, are what

make a life go well. As James Griffin says, “What makes us desire the things we desire,

when informed, is something about them–their features or properties. But why bother

then with informed desire, when we can go directly to what it is about objects that shape

and form desires in the first place (Griffin, 1986, p. 17)?”

This supports Objective List views, according to which there are some goods that

contribute to welfare regardless of whether they contribute to the subjective experience of

the individual or whether the individual does or would desire them. In the case of

humans, the most plausible Objective List views are hybrid views that include mentalistic

and desire-based components, as well as the satisfaction of basic psychological and

biological needs and the development and exercise of valuable cognitive and emotional

capacities. David Brink, for example, includes the autonomous undertaking and

completion of “projects whose pursuit realizes capacities of practical reason, friendship,

and community” as components of welfare (Brink, 1989, p. 233).

The realization of some of the goods typical of Objective List views of human

welfare requires significant cognitive capacities, many of which will be beyond those

typical of livestock. Objective List views of animal welfare often focus on health or

natural functioning (i.e., functioning in species-typical ways). However, health or natural

functioning cannot be the full story with respect to an animal’s welfare. For example,

analgesia prevents a species-typical response, i.e. pain, but can contribute to welfare. For

these reasons, Objective List views of animal welfare must also include mentalistic

components of welfare. An animal may be made worse off by not being allowed to

function in species-typical ways, but it is also made worse off if it suffers in a way

consistent with typical species functioning.

While we are partial to such a hybrid Objective List view of animal welfare for

the reasons provide above, and in what follows, use such a view to evaluate the welfare

impact of animal biotech, many claims about what harms or improves animal welfare will

hold no matter which view of animal welfare is correct. Sickness and injury, for example,

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typically cause negative mental states, frustrate informed desires, and hinder natural

functioning. However, some of the applications of animal biotech discussed below are

philosophically interesting because they improve welfare according to some conceptions,

but negatively affect it according to others.

Two Ways of “Improving” Animal Welfare

A person might be making one of two different claims in saying that a technology

improves animal welfare. One claim is that there is an individual who is made better off

by that application. For example, a cow that is sick and receives antibiotics is made better

off. In this case, the technology is good for the animal simply in virtue of its effects

having a positive overall impact on the animal’s welfare. There is clearly a reason in

favor of using that technology, a reason grounded in the fact that the technology

improved an individual’s welfare.

In many cases where welfare problems are due to genetics, however, this simple

picture no longer applies. Cloning and methods of pre-conception genetic modification,

such as selective breeding, bring into existence individuals that are distinct from the ones

who would have been brought into existence had the cloning or selective breeding not

occurred. Thus, one cannot truthfully say that there is an individual whose welfare was

improved by the technology. Rather, there is an individual brought into existence who

has a certain level of welfare, and that individual is at a higher (or lower) level of welfare

than the level at which a distinct individual, who did not in fact come into existence,

would have been. So while aggregate welfare has been increased, no particular

individual’s welfare was improved. Let us refer to cases of the first kind as alterations,

because an individual’s welfare is altered, and cases of the second kind as substitutions,

because one animal is substituted for another.2

Cloning and selective breeding will count as substitutions. Genetic engineering

usually takes place post conception, and so the founder animals will count as being

altered. The individuals that result from the subsequent breeding of the founder animals,

however, will count as substitutions and are typically much more numerous than the

founder animals.

Whether alterations and substitutions are morally different is a matter of

controversy. On the one hand, an alteration is bad for the altered animal if and only if it

has a negative impact overall on the animal’s life-long welfare, whereas a substitution is

bad for the animal brought into existence only in the extreme case that the animal will

have a life so bad that it is not, on balance, worth living. Thus, many alterations will be

bad for an animal even though the similar substitution would not be. This suggests that

there is a morally relevant difference (Streiffer, 2008). On the other hand, consideration

of similar cases supports the view that alterations and substitutions are morally on a par

with each other:3

2 The difference between these cases has been most influentially discussed by (Parfit,

1984, esp. pp. 351-379. 3 These cases are adapted from (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler, 2000, pp. 244-

245).

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Case 1: A woman is currently pregnant with a child she knows will be

born mentally handicapped. By taking a safe and affordable medication,

she can prevent the child from being born with the mental handicap. She

chooses not to take the medication and the child is born with the handicap.

Case 2: A woman is contemplating becoming pregnant but knows that, if

she conceives within the next month, any resulting child will be born with

a mental handicap. If she waits to become pregnant, the resulting child

will not have the mental handicap. The woman decides against waiting,

becomes pregnant, and the resulting child has a mental handicap.

Case 1 is an alteration, whereas Case 2 is a substitution. However, assuming that

the handicap and the women’s reasons for their decisions are the same in both cases, then

the women’s actions seem equally morally problematic.4

That there seems to be a morally relevant difference between alterations and

substitutions but the women’s actions seem equally morally problematic suggests the

following: substitutions and alterations are, other things being equal, on a par with each

other, but a different explanation must be given of why a substitution is morally

problematic, one that does not appeal to the action’s being bad for any particular

individual. The problem of adequately articulating this explanation is known as the “non-

identity problem.” It is the subject of considerable controversy, but we will assume that a

substitution that results in animals being brought into existence with a welfare that is

worse than the welfare of animals that would have been brought into existence instead,

even if both animals have a life worth living, is as morally problematic as the similar

alteration would have been. Similarly, a substitution that results in animals with welfare

that is better than that of the animals currently used in agriculture is a moral

improvement, other things being equal.

Animal Welfare and Animal Biotech

Starting around the 1950s, housing practices in some parts of the livestock sector

significantly reduced the amount of space afforded each animal (Fraser, Mench, and

Millman, 2001; Duncan, 2004; NAHMS, 2003). While such changes made it easier to

care for the much larger number of animals typical in intensive agriculture, the changes

have also had many well-documented negative impacts on welfare, including: severe

osteoporosis, frustration over lack of nesting spaces, and increased agonistic behavior in

poultry; and boredom, atypical repetitive behaviors (so-called stereotypies), skins lesions,

bone problems, and frustration of nesting behaviors in sows (Gregory and Wilkins,

1989.5 Management and breeding practices for increased productivity have also

significantly exacerbated welfare problems arising from heat stress, lameness, and

mastitis in dairy cows (Heringstad, Klemetsdal, and Ruane, 2000). In addition, welfare

problems arise from many practices employed to manage the large number of animals on

a typical farm, including tail docking of swine, dairy cows and sheep, dehorning and

4 For a discussion of different ways to justify this claim, see (Steinbock and Ron

McClamrock, 1994; Brock, 1995; Rollin, 1995). 5 For further discussion, see (Webster, 2004).

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branding of cattle, castration of boars, and debeaking and de-toeing of poultry. These

surgeries are typically performed without anesthetic or analgesic (Fraser and Weary,

2008).

Because animal welfare issues are so extensive in standard agricultural practices,

there is a large potential for improving welfare through animal biotech. A comprehensive

literature review performed in 2002 by the National Research Council (NRC) of the

National Academies documented several ways that cloning and genetic engineering could

be used to improve animal welfare (NRC, 2004, pp. 93-102, 104-107). These include

creating animals that are more resistant to parasites and diseases, engineering animals

that lack traits that lead to current welfare issues (for example, genetically engineering

cattle without horns to avoid dehorning, or pigs that do not require castration to remove

“boar taint”), and sex selection to avoid producing animals of an undesired sex that are

then killed.

The NRC also documented several ways that cloning and genetic engineering

could increase risks to animal welfare. Collecting the genetic materials and embryos

necessary for animal biotech often requires that animals undergo painful procedures or be

sacrificed. Cloned animals have an increased risk for a variety of problems that are

painful and result in abnormal functioning, while the parents of such offspring are at a

higher risk of complications during pregnancy. Mutations can result from attempts to

create animals with novel genomes and many survivors suffer from problems such as

“severe muscle weakness, missing kidneys, seizures, behavioral changes, sterility,

disruptions of brain structure, neuronal degeneration, inner ear deformities, and limb

deformities (NRC, 2004, p. 97).”

Many of the above welfare issues are unintended and unwanted problems

associated with the process of genetically engineering or cloning an animal, and it is

important to note that researchers will continue to refine these techniques to minimize

their occurrence. However, even if nothing goes wrong with the process of genetically

engineering or cloning an animal, the intended effects themselves can have a negative

impact on animal welfare. For example, insofar as genetical engineering enables further

concentration in animal agriculture—i.e. even greater numbers of animals in even smaller

spaces—there is the potential for welfare diminishment. Genetically engineering an

animal to be resistant to disease or parasites could be, on balance, bad for animal welfare

if it results in animals being subjected to even more severe movement restrictions or

otherwise exacerbates the problems described above.

Temple Grandin, a leading expert on animal welfare science, goes so far as to

suggest that “the most serious animal welfare problems may be caused by over selection

for production traits such as rapid growth, leanness, and high milk yield (Grandin and

Deasing, 1998, p. 219).” So although each application of animal biotech should be

evaluated on its own individual merits, to the extent that genetic engineering and cloning

are used with the same motivations and for the same purposes as traditional selection, it

would be naïve and irrational to ignore the presumption that animal biotech, in general, is

more likely to exacerbate rather than mitigate animal welfare problems.

Improving Welfare by Diminishing Animals?

When most people think of using animal biotech to improve animal welfare, they think of

enhancing the animal in some way, for example, enhancing its capacity to resist injury or

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disease. But some have argued that we ought to use animal biotech to disable or diminish

animals relative to normally functioning members of their species.

Consider the example of using chemical mutagenesis to produce a line of blind

chickens. Chickens are naturally aggressive and have become more aggressive as an

unintended byproduct of selective breeding for egg productivity. This aggression is

exacerbated by the crowded conditions in which chickens are kept in industrial

agriculture settings (Ali and Cheng, 1985, p. 791). Producers typically try to minimize

the damage of the resulting attacks by trimming the birds’ beaks, combs, and toes, but

this is less than ideal. The results of debeaking are described by Ian Duncan: “behavioral

changes suggestive of acute pain have been found to occur in the 2 days following

surgery. These are followed by chronic pain that lasts at least 5 or 6 weeks after the

surgery (Duncan, 2004, p. 215).”

An alternative method became available, though, when researchers used chemical

mutagenesis to induce a genetic mutation that resulted in congenital blindness (Cheng et

al., 1980). Researchers at the University of British Columbia identified the specific

mutation, speculating early on that “because of [blind chickens’] docility and possibly

reduced interaction in a social hierarchy, studies of their behavior with relation to growth

rate, feed efficiency, and housing density may have some practical application (Cheng et

al., 1980, p. 2182).” Follow up studies indicated that flocks of blind chickens use less

feed and show increased egg productivity, while also suffering fewer injuries and less

feather and skin damage (Ali and Cheng, 1985).

Consider also microencephalic pigs. Researchers identified a gene (Lim1, also

referred to as Lhx1) responsible for head morphology in mice (Shawlot and Behringer,

1995). Using genetic engineering to knock out this gene resulted in mice with bodies that

were normally formed except for lacking heads. The pups survived in utero about

halfway through normal gestation. Such research vividly raises the possibility that highly

social and intelligent animals, such as pigs, which suffer greatly in current factory

farming conditions, could be engineered or bred to have just enough brain stem to

support biological growth, but not enough to support consciousness (Balduini et al.,

1986; Bach, 2000). Such animals, lacking the capacity for consciousness, would be

incapable of suffering.

Some of these diminished animals are of interest to producers because they use

less feed or show higher productivity, but the ethical argument for using them stems from

the idea that these animals will be comparatively better off than their non-engineered

counterparts. Whether this is so is partly an empirical question and partly a conceptual

question. The answer will depend on the empirical facts about the lives of the diminished

animals and the lives of their non-diminished counterparts, and it will also depend on the

conceptual facts about what constitutes animal welfare.

The traditional Mentalistic view of animal welfare characterizes welfare in terms

of the absence of mental states such as pain, suffering, or distress (Dawkins, 1980). A

broader, but still Mentalistic, conception of animal welfare also includes the presence of

positive mental states such as pleasure, enjoyment, or contentment McMillan, 2005). If

the traditional Mentalistic view is correct, then we need only ask whether the animals we

currently use experience more (or more severe) negative mental states than would their

diminished counterparts, if we used them instead.

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Taking the above examples as philosophical thought experiments, one can simply

stipulate that the diminished animals do better in terms of negative mental states than

their non-diminished counterparts. But we do not have the liberty to make such

stipulations in evaluating whether to actually adopt such technologies. It is also crucial to

be clear on the welfare claims being made: even supposing that the traditional Mentalistic

view is correct and that a modification alleviates a source of suffering, it is still an open

question whether the modification improves the animal’s welfare, on balance. After all, it

may introduce other sources of negative mental states.

With respect to blind chickens, it isn’t clear what the on-balance welfare impact

would be. On the one hand, blind chickens would not suffer the well-documented pain of

having their beaks, toes, and combs amputated, and there is data to support the claim that

they suffer fewer injuries and less feather loss (Ali and Cheng, 1985). On the other hand,

there were no significant differences in the two surrogate measures of psychological

stress, adrenal weight and plasma corticosterone levels. This suggests that they are just as

stressed as sighted birds (Ali and Cheng, 1985). Furthermore even if blind chickens do

experience fewer or less intense negative mental states because of their inability to see,

sight might still provide a significantly enhanced subjective environment that generates

positive mental states. So, even if blindness decreases the number and intensity of

negative mental states it still might be worse overall from a broader Mentalistic

perspective. It is difficult to even begin conceptualizing how we would measure and

compare the negative and positive mental states of individuals of a non-human species

where one of them is missing an entire sense modality of such crucial importance as

sight.

Even for diminished animals that do fare better than their non-diminished

counterparts from a mentalistic perspective, it is still possible that they will do worse in

terms of desire-satisfaction, health or natural functioning. Even if blind chickens suffer

less, because they are blind, they are still, other things being equal, less healthy and less

capable of natural functioning compared to normal members of their species. And the

blindness may have other effects that are relevant as well. For example, blind chickens

engage in significantly fewer social interactions than do sighted chickens (Ali and Cheng,

1985). Chickens will have desires that will be harder to satisfy if they are blind, and these

need to be taken into account if desire satisfaction is a component of welfare. So even if

blindness results in a better balance of mentalistic factors, it does not follow that the

welfare of blind chickens is better than the welfare of sighted chickens unless these other

components are also addressed.

What about microencephalic pigs who lack the capacity for consciousness? If the

traditional Mentalistic view of animal welfare were correct, then microencephalic pigs

would have a better welfare than normal pigs since microencephalic pigs have no

negative mental states. Indeed, if animal welfare were defined solely in terms of the

absence of negative mental states, then microencephalic pigs would have a better welfare

than any pig, no matter how well treated. But this, of course, demonstrates the

implausibility of excluding positive mental states as components of animal welfare.

According to a hybrid Objective List view, positive mental states are components

of animal welfare, and whether the welfare of microencephalic pigs is better than their

conventional counterparts will largely turn on whether the pigs in current industrial

agricultural practices suffer so much that the suffering outweighs any positive mentalistic

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benefits. That is, in mentalistic terms, are the lives of pigs in industrial agriculture so bad

that they would have been better off not having existed at all? If the answer to that

question is no, then pigs without the capacity for consciousness do not fare better than the

animals currently used. Admittedly, the lives of pigs in industrial agriculture fall far

below the lives that pigs are capable of in better circumstances, but that isn’t the relevant

comparison.

3. Animal Biotech and The Environment

A review by the United Nations of the environmental impact of livestock agriculture

concluded that the livestock sector is one of the most significant contributors to

environmental problems, both globally and locally (FAO, 2006). In the following

sections, we review these impacts. The general ways in which animal biotech might

alleviate or exacerbate environmental problems are then discussed, followed by an

examination of a specific application of animal biotech: Enviropigs.

Livestock Agriculture and the Environment

The most serious global environmental challenge is that of anthropogenic climate change.

Costs from climate change come in a variety of forms: health risks, loss of water and land

resources, displacement of people (i.e. refugees), biodiversity loss, and the economic

costs of adapting to a changing climate, for example (IPCC, 2007; Singer, 2002;

Gardiner, 2004; Hulme, 2005; FAO, 2006). According to the United Nations’ report

“Livestock’s Long Shadow,” the livestock sector produces significant amounts of three

main greenhouse gases: methane, nitrous oxide, and CO2. These contributions accrue

from deforestation to create more land for agricultural use (CO2), natural digestive

processes in agricultural animals (methane), and from the production and use of manure

(nitrous oxide).

Animal agriculture also contributes directly to local environmental issues such as

water depletion, water degradation, and biodiversity loss. While it is difficult to calculate

the full impact of animal agriculture on water resources, the amount used, both directly

and indirectly, is substantial. Water is used in animal agriculture to feed and service

animals, in processing products after slaughter, and to grow feed crops. The livestock

sector makes a major contribution—93% of withdrawal and 73% of consumption

(removal that renders the water unavailable for other uses)—to human water use globally,

and this does not include water used in aquaculture (Turner et al., 2004).

In addition to water use, animal agriculture contributes to water pollution. The

high number of animals produces large amounts of waste which is often used as fertilizer.

Given the scale of agricultural facilities, the amount of waste produced is typically much

higher than should be used for fertilization in surrounding fields, leading to excessive

applications of waste manure (Hooda et al., 2000). This increases the amount of runoff

that contaminates the water system, leading to excessive amounts of phosphorus and

nitrogen in the water system.

According to a 2005 Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, the most important

drivers of biodiversity loss include climate change, pollution, habitat change, and

invasive species (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). In addition to animal

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agriculture’s contribution to climate change and pollution discussed above, animal

agriculture also drives biodiversity loss through habitat change and the introduction of

invasive species (Ilea, 2009; FAO, 2006).

Potential Impact of Animal Biotech on the Environment

Animal biotech has the potential to affect the environmental impact of livestock

agriculture in several ways. While using animal biotech to increase individual

productivity imposes additional risks to animal welfare, it could have a beneficial effect

on the environment by decreasing the number of animals used in agriculture, thereby

reducing the amount of feed needed and pollution produced. Increasing feed-conversion

efficiency or nutrient utilization would also reduce the amount of feed or additives

needed, which would have environmental benefits and might not have any negative

impact on animal welfare.

Among the most widely discussed environmental risks of animal biotech is the

intentional or unintentional release of genetically engineered animals. Whether the

release of a genetically engineered animal results in an environmental harm depends, in

part, on what in the environment is valuable and the ways in which it is valuable. Views

about the value of the environment can be divided between those views on which the

environment has intrinsic value and those on which it has merely instrumental value. To

claim that the environment has intrinsic value is to claim that it is valuable for its own

sake, independently of whether anyone or anything values it (O’Neill, 2003). To claim

that it has merely instrumental value is to claim that it is valuable only because it is

instrumentally useful to other entities achieving their worthwhile ends.

Some environmental ethicists argue that the environment has intrinsic value

stemming from its naturalness (Elliot, 1982; Rolston III, 1989; Throop, 2000).

Naturalness is typically defined as freedom from the influence of humans, and it is

understood as coming in degrees . On such views, the novel presence of a genetically

engineered animal in the environment would itself detract from the naturalness of the

area and so constitute an environmental harm, even if its presence had no further

consequences.

Views on which the environment is intrinsically valuable because it is natural are

controversial. It is difficult to see why being natural would be a source of value except

instrumentally in that we value areas that are free of our impact and that such areas are

beneficial to ourselves and other entities. Similar worries arise for views that claim that

the intrinsic value of the environment stems from its biodiversity. But while the intrinsic

value of the environment is controversial, there is little doubt that the environment is

instrumentally valuable. Ecosystems provide services and resources for human and non-

humans alike. Whether the release of a genetically engineered animal results in an

environmental harm, on instrumental views of environmental value, will depend on (a)

the environmental consequences of the release and (b) the moral status of the entities

affected.

The environmental risk of the release of a genetically engineered animal depends

on several factors, including the animal’s ability to initially escape captivity, the ability to

travel, the ability to maintain a feral population, and the extent of environmental

disruption that might be caused by such a feral population (NRC, 2004). Taking such

factors into account, the NRC concluded that fish and shellfish pose the greatest

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environmental concern, pigs and goats pose a moderate degree of concern, and chickens,

cattle, and sheep pose the least concern (NRC, 2004). Concern is increased when the

transgene enhances fitness, as would be expected with several traits under study,

including salt water tolerance, cold tolerance, increased growth rate, enhanced disease

resistance, and improved nutrient utilization.

There are currently two genetically engineered animals that have been seriously

considered for commercialization in the United States: Enviropigs and AquAdvantage

salmon.6 In what follows, we discuss the case of Enviropigs to explore the environmental

issues raised by animal biotech in more detail.

Enviropigs

Swine require phosphorus in their diets but the phosphorus in the grain-based foods

standard in contemporary agriculture is bound in phytate, which swine are unable to

digest (Golovan et al., 2001). To meet the phosphorus requirements of swine, farmers

supplement the standard feed with mineral phosphate. This standard practice contributes

to a variety of local environmental problems and, in turn, to more global ones. The

phosphate must be mined and shipped to farms, where, because it is inexpensive, it is fed

to swine in abundance to ensure that their nutritional needs are met (Forsberg, Hilborn,

and Hacker, 2003). While the swine are able to digest the mineral phosphate, it increases

the amount of phosphorus in their manure. The manure is used as fertilizer and so the

amount of phosphorus released into the environment is increased. This causes serious

environmental damage, especially when the phosphorus makes its way into the water

system where it increases algal bloom and contributes to the death of native species and

to drinking water contamination (Carpenter et al., 1998; Jongbloed and Lenis, 1998).

Phosphorus pollution is consistently ranked by the Environmental Protection Agency as

one of the top causes of water quality problems.

The Enviropig is a transgenic animal, created by scientists at the University of

Guelph, which is intended to help alleviate these environmental concerns. The Enviropig

has been genetically engineered to produce saliva that contains phytase, an enzyme which

allows the pig to digest the plant-based phytate in standard feed, thus reducing or

eliminating the need for supplemental phosphorus. Enviropigs secrete up to 75% less

phosphorus in their manure than their non-genetically modified counterparts fed the

standard diet, and up to 25% less than swine fed supplemental phytase to help digest

plant-based phosphorus.

Insofar as the Enviropig merely replaces existing swine without causing further

changes to the agricultural system—for example without changing the number of pigs per

farm or the number of farms (what we will call the scenario of mere replacement)—the

use of Enviropigs yields environmental benefits by decreasing the demand for

phosphorus mining and reducing phosphorus pollution of ground and surface water.

Under the scenario of mere replacement, these environmental benefits provide a reason

for replacing existing swine with the Enviropig.

In scenarios where the adoption of Enviropigs results in an increase in the number

of swine (the scenario of growth), the opposite conclusion may be justified.

6 The EnviroPig program was recently dropped. However, it still provides an excellent

case to consider the environmental impact of animal biotech.

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Environmental pollution serves as one of the main constraints on the growth of the

livestock industry (Vestel, 2001). If the Enviropig allows for an increase in the total

number of swine used in animal agriculture by reducing the amount of phosphorus

pollution per pig, there may be no benefit in terms of aggregate phosphorus reduction.

Furthermore, the increase in the number of swine may contribute to other environmental

problems: ground compaction, where the number of pigs per unit area increases;

deforestation, where the area per farm can be increased; reduction in available water

resources; and an increase in other environmental pollutants, such as greenhouse gasses.

Even if Enviropigs do not increase the number of swine, they still pose an

environmental risk if they escape into the surrounding environment. As mentioned above,

the NRC identified pigs as a species the unintentional release of which poses a moderate

degree of environmental risk. Swine have been known to escape and live outside

captivity, and feral pigs have been known to cause significant environmental damage.

Moreover, Enviropigs, or their descendent feral pigs, could obtain needed phosphorus

from plants in the surrounding environment, increasing their pest potential (NRC, 2004,

p. 84).

4. Conclusion

An all-things-considered judgment about an application of animal biotech must consider

its impact on animal welfare and the environment. In this chapter we have presented a

general framework for evaluating an application of animal biotech by reviewing its

impacts on the animal welfare and environmental problems that plague modern

agriculture.

Although genetic engineering and cloning have the potential to mitigate existing

animal welfare problems, they continue to be imperfect procedures that often increase the

risk of welfare problems compared to the status quo. Even when nothing goes wrong with

the procedures, the intended effect can itself exacerbate welfare problems. This will be

especially likely when the intended effect is to increase individual productivity, as it often

will be. Proposals to improve welfare by using animal biotech to eliminate or reduce

livestock’s cognitive capacities should be viewed with substantial skepticism.

Animal biotech that reduces the number of animals or increases feed-conversion

efficiency or nutrient utilization could reduce the environmental harms of livestock

agriculture. Discussions of environmental risk from animal biotech have focused on the

effects of releasing genetically engineered animals into the surrounding environment. The

proposed benefits of an application of animal biotech should not be evaluated under the

assumption that livestock animals will merely be replaced by others that are more

environmentally benign. If an application of animal biotech allows for an increase in the

number of agricultural animals, there may be no net environmental benefit, or even

additional environmental harm.

12

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Discussion Questions

1. Which do you think is the greater ethical problem, animal welfare issues raised by

animal agriculture or environmental issues? Do you think that means that more

relatively more resources should be dedicated to animal biotech that addresses

problems of that kind? Why or why not?

2. Do you think that the scenario of more replacement or the scenario of growth is

more likely? What do you think this means for evaluating animal biotech?

3. Which theory (or family of theories) of animal welfare (Mentalistic, Desire-

Satisfaction, or Objective List view) do you think most plausible? Why? What

does this mean for animal agriculture?

4. If both animal welfare and environmental issues arising from animal agriculture

can be mitigated by non-technological means, e.g., reducing meat consumption,

what reasons are there to favor or reject technological solutions to these

problems?

5. Would you want to eat the products of diminished or engineered animals? Why or

why not? Should consumers be made aware that products are the result of animal

biotech? Why or why not?

Notes

16

We would like to thank Antonio Rauti, Tom Beauchamp, Justine Wells, Sara Gavrell

Ortiz, Rebecca Stepien, Richard Reynnells, the joint 2005 Agriculture, Food, and Human

Values Society and the Association for the Study of Food and Society discussion group,

and the 2010 Greenwall Fellows discussion group.