Neo-Stoicism and Agricultural Biotechnology: A Stoic Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically...

Neo-Stoicism and Agricultural Biotechnology:

A Stoic Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically

Modified Crops

Anthony J. Gavin

Concordia University

NEO-STOICISM AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 1

ABSTRACT:

In “A Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically Modified Crops”,

Sandler develops a virtue ethics framework for assessing whether

certain genetically modified crops should be promoted. The

framework maintains a presumption against the use of genetically

modified crops, but allows that “some crops might still be

acceptable under certain circumstances if there are compelling

virtue-based reasons to use them” – Golden Rice is an example of

an acceptable genetically modified crop. Central to his

framework is Sandler’s “external goods criterion”, which

“establishes a minimum level of consideration for the

environment” (Sandler 2005, 218-9) for both Stoic and

Aristotelian traditions of virtue ethics. I argue that Sandler’s

virtue ethics perspective only represents the Aristotelian

tradition; Stoics need not accept his criterion. I go on to

develop a Stoic virtue ethics perspective on genetically modified

crops, grounded in Stoic naturalism, cosmic sympathy, and the

virtue of natural piety. Natural piety provides a strong

prohibition against the use of genetically modified crops in

agriculture, and against the genetic modification of natural


entities in general. By refuting the external goods principle,

the Stoic virtue ethics framework will also caution against the

commodification of the environment, encouraging sustainable

agricultural practices without the use of genetic modification.

My heart leaps up when I behold

A rainbow in the sky:

So was it when my life began;

So is it now I am a man;

So be it when I shall grow old,

Or let me die!

The Child is father of the Man;

And I could wish my days to be

Bound each to each by natural piety.


William Wordsworth, My Heart Leaps Up (1802)

Introduction

Contemporary scholarship in environmental ethics is deeply

seeded with virtue language. The strength of a virtue ethics

framework lies in its seamless integration with our commonsense

moral vocabulary, offering itself to a unique and dynamic

discourse on ethical quandaries that are central to the health of

the planet, and our continued survival as a species. The plight

of environmentalists is often phrased in terms of having a

certain respect or compassion for nature, condemning the greed or

hubris of alternative, anthropocentric approaches. ‘Respect’ and

‘compassion’ are two among many examples of what we might call

environmental virtues, while ‘greed’ and ‘hubris’ count among the

vices1.

Traditionally, virtue ethics theories have concerned

themselves with ideals of human excellence, and as such may

rightly be called egocentric. The central ethical norm for moral

agents is the cultivation of virtue in the individual. It is not

clear prima facie that a virtuous person will behave in any

particular way towards the environment. Thus, the question of

securing some level of care for the environment on a virtue

1 For further reading on the use of virtue language in environmental ethics, see Louke van Wensveen, “The Emergence of Ecological Virtue Language,” in Environmental Virtue Ethics (Washington: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pg. 15-30.


ethics framework is of central importance to the development of

an environmental virtue ethic. There have been many attempts to

articulate an answer to this question in the literature, ranging

from extensionist theories, to agent benefit theories, and

others2. In this paper, I shall focus on one strategy in

particular, which focuses on the role of ecosystems in providing

necessary material preconditions for the cultivation of virtue.

This kind of strategy is most clearly taken up by Louke van

Wensveen and Ronald Sandler. Wensveen argues for ecosystem

sustainability as a genuine virtue3; Sandler’s ‘external goods’

argument makes use of the same premises as Wensveen’s, with a

weakened conclusion4.

This strategy, which amounts to assigning an instrumental

value to the environment in ethical considerations, is

potentially dangerous, and not required on a Neo-Stoic approach.

The primary aim of this paper will be to assess the application

of Sandler’s external goods approach in the case of genetically

modified crops5, with specific reference to the example of Golden

Rice6. Sandler argues that both Aristotelian and Stoic2 See Ronald Sandler, “Introduction: Environmental Virtue Ethics,” in Environmental Virtue Ethics (Washington: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pg. 1-12.3 Louke van Wensveen, “Ecosystem Sustainability as a Criterion for Genuine Virtue,” in Environmental Ethics 23 (2001): 227-41.4 Ronald Sandler, “The External Goods Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics,” in Environmental Ethics 25 (2003): 279-93.5 Ronald Sandler, “A Virtue Ethics Approach to Genetically Modified Crops,” Environmental Virtue Ethics (2005): 215-233.6 Golden Rice is a Vitamin A enriched genetically modified crop engineered to help battle VAD in many poor countries where rice is a dietary staple, particularly in Southeast Asia. Though indisputably useful in the treatment of VAD, the crop has sparked some significant controversy. See Dawe et al., “Golden Rice: What Role Could It Play in Alleviation of Vitamin A Deficiency?”


traditions in virtue ethics have reason to accept his external

goods criterion, which “establishes a minimum level of

consideration for the environment” (Sandler 2005, 218-9).

However, disagreement about the value of external goods harkens

back to the point of divergence between Aristotelian and Stoic

ethics; traditionally, the latter would not accept Sandler’s

criterion. The strength of a Stoic virtue ethics framework,

however, is that it does not stand in need of such a criterion to

establish a level of care for the environment.

Interconnectedness and cosmic sympathy7 are fundamental features

of Stoic metaphysics, which directly informs their resulting

ethical norms; indeed, some modern philosophers have pointed

towards convincing subtextual links between Ancient Stoicism, and

the Deep Ecology and Ecosophy platforms of radical

environmentalists like Arne Naess, Warwick Fox, George Sessions,

and others8. If the Neo-Stoic ethical framework that I begin to

develop in this paper will be preferable to the Aristotelian

alternative – in keeping with these environmentalist platforms –

it will be because the former approach will not lend itself to

viewing nature merely as a commodity, with instrumental value to

serve human ends.

Food Policy 27: 541-560; and Vandana Shiva, “Genetically Engineered Vitamin ‘A’ Rice: A Blind Approach to Blindness Prevention,” http://www.biotech-info.net/blind-rice.html for a small sampling of positions for and against.7 Evangelos Protopapadakis, “The Stoic Notion of Cosmic Sympathy in ContemporaryEnvironmental Ethics,” in Antiquity, Modern World and Reception of Ancient Culture (2012): 290-305.8 For example, see Jim Cheney, “The Neo-Stoicism of Radical Environmentalism,”in Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 293-325.

http://www.biotech-info.net/blind-rice.html


§1. Virtue Ethics and the External Goods Criterion

If virtue ethics are to provide a reliable normative

framework for moral reasoning about the environment and our

relation to it, then some level of consideration for the

environment must first be established. Virtue is eudaimonic, good

in itself, and the cultivation of virtue in the individual is a

crucial part of what it is to live the good life. The extent to

which virtue is itself constitutive of the good life is the main

point of disagreement between ancient traditions in virtue

ethics. The Aristotelian tradition maintains that virtue is

necessary, but is not by itself sufficient for living the good

life. If somebody is virtuous, but poor or in poor health, we

can meaningfully say that this person’s life could have been

better. Proponents of the Stoic tradition disagree, claiming

that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for living the good

life. Thus, those befallen by grave misfortunate with respect to

wealth or health are no less able to live the good life than

those whom fate has placed in better stead. Their disagreement

is about the intrinsic value of external goods; Aristotelians on

the one hand, affirming, and the Stoics denying it9.

External goods can be thought of as what gets produced by

ecosystems – evidently, things like food, water, and shelter are9 For more on the disagreement between the Aristotelian and Stoic virtue ethics traditions about the value of external goods, and the necessity or sufficiency of virtue, see Julia Annas, “Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue”, The Morality of Happiness (1995).


external goods provided by the environment in natural ecosystems.

Note that it is not necessary that external goods be produced by

natural ecosystems; we can conceive of advanced artificial

ecosystems that sustain our livelihood as well. The Stoics do

not see external goods as being intrinsically valuable, and the

Aristotelians do.

But although they disagree about the intrinsic value of external

goods – that is, about whether external goods are constituents of

human flourishing – both Aristotelians and Stoics must

acknowledge an indispensable instrumental role for external goods

in human flourishing (Sandler 2005, 217).

Sandler shifts the emphasis from intrinsic to instrumental value

in order to establish some degree of moral consideration for the

environment that would be acceptable for both the Aristotelian

and Stoic traditions. Refuting the instrumental value of

external goods would be stronger than the traditional Stoic claim

denying their intrinsic value. On this view, external goods are

not constitutive of human flourishing, but rather serve as a

necessary precondition for the cultivation of virtue.

Sandler’s move involves a creative interpretation of Stoic

texts, since they do not explicitly distinguish between

instrumental and intrinsic value. For an ethics essentially

founded on denying the value of external goods, founding a

criterion of care based on their (diminished) value should seem

like sleight of hand, particularly when we consider that the


Stoic position against the value of external goods is defined in

terms of their disagreement with Aristotle.

The Stoics, in arguing that Aristotle's account of happiness is

wrong, are in effect, though not in so many words, producing an

argument that virtue alone is complete and self‐sufficient and

thus competent to form our final end, without the addition of

external goods.

(Annas, “Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue” 1995, 8)

It may seem prima facie to be the case that both Aristotelians and

Stoics would accept Sandler’s principle, even if we suspect that

they have been put together in an uncomfortable union; however,

by articulating one of the key virtues which arise from this

ethos of interconnectedness, I propose to show that, for every

case in which Sandler’s external goods criterion would apply, a

Neo-Stoic virtue ethics framework will have overriding virtue

based reasons to reject it in favor of a stronger principle.

Ancient Stoic ethics are largely influenced by their metaphysics,

which is a metaphysics of profound interconnectedness and unity

with the cosmos. Cultivating virtue in the individual, for the

Neo-Stoic philosopher, amounts to the same kind of project as

self-realization in the Ecosophy of Arne Naess. And it is in

light of this similarity of ideas that I hope to bring the

applicability of a Neo-Stoic framework to environmental ethics to

the fore.


§2. Stoic Naturalism and Neo-Stoic Environmentalism

As the ethics of ancient Stoic thought have always been

directly influenced by their metaphysics, I will first venture to

describe the latter in such a way as to illustrate its similarity

with the conceptual platform of some radical forms of

environmentalism, like Deep Ecology and the Ecosophy of Arne

Naess. A later Stoic philosopher – Posidonius, with his concept

of cosmic sympathy – will be of special interest, as he carries the

ancient Stoic ethos of interconnectedness and unity with the

cosmos most fully through to its logical end. Bringing this

similarity to the forefront of our understanding will point most

clearly to the usefulness of ancient Stoic thought as a critical

device in modern environmental discourse, which I shall do by

using a Neo-Stoic virtue ethics framework to assess ethical

issues surrounding the use of genetically modified crops in

agriculture.

The Stoics envision a metaphysics of deep

interconnectedness, with individual beings all partaking of a

single, rational cosmic whole.

[E]ach being is associated with the rest of the world in the way

limbs and parts of the body are associated with the whole body:

they belong to it, and everything the body suffers has effect on

the part, and vice versa. Hence, private interests can only coincide

with the common one (Protopapadakis 2012, 292).


On this view, the idea that goods are external to the individual

is confusing, speaking more to our experience of the world than

to rationality. However, for the Stoics, the cultivation of

virtue is a rational activity that involves a process of

familiarization with the external, which allows us to transcend

the things themselves with the aim of arriving at an appreciation

of their rationally structured relations.

The Stoic speaker, Cato, begins his account with a description of

the process of ‘familiarization’ or oikeiōsis; we start from affinity

to and concern for ourselves and for natural advantages, but as

reason develops we come to discover that what matters to us as

rational beings is something which is distinct in kind from

these, namely the moral point of view. Just as we move from

valuing one friend to most valuing the person to whom he

introduces us, we move from valuing natural advantages in a

rational way to valuing our rationality itself, and appreciating

the demands it makes on us (Annas, “Theophrastus and the Stoics:

Forcing the Issue” 1995, 8).

Oikeiōsis, translated as ‘familiarization’, shares a root with

‘ecology’ (oikos logos). Oikos is the home, the hearth, that to

which I return. Thus, the rational activity of familiarization

amounts to internalizing the external, returning the rationally

structured relations among apparently external things to our

inner rationality.


Nowhere is this strong unity of the cosmos and our ethical

stance within it more clearly given than in Posidonius’ notion of

cosmic sympathy10. The use of psychological language is a telling

clue about the character of Posidonius’ philosophy. Originally

interested in the effect that the moon had on the tides,

Posidonius came to think of change in nature as being the sum of

the “sympathetic relations” between its parts. These relations

are the manifestations of a pantheistic God or soul which

pervades all of nature. “Still this all pervasive soul is

nothing distinct of separate from nature, but just nature endowed

with sensation” (Protopapadakis 2012, 294). Coming to realize this

is tantamount to realizing that individual (human) and natural

flourishing are mutually sustaining; “bonum singulorum overlaps

with bonum omnium” (Protopapadakis 2012, 292). Living in

awareness with this fact is precisely what it is for the Stoic to

live virtuously; one could never willingly bring harm to the

whole of which one is part.

Self-realization as embedded within a cosmic whole is

exactly the kind of normative self-realization found in deep

ecology; it is particularly visible in Arne Naess’ Ecosophy.

Ecosophy … places itself in a tradition that conceives of correct

environmental practice as involving, in some fundamental way, an

understanding of the cosmos and humanity’s place in the wider

10 Though the idea finds its clearest expression in Posidonius, “it was by no means strange to the early Stoics and especially to Chrysippus, nor is it alien to the overall attitude of Stoicism in general” (Protopapadakis 2012, 293).


scheme of things. Ethics, as this term is used in the context of

Ecosophy … is to be understood “in the sense of the development

of an experientially grounded state of being that issues in ‘an

organic ethos, a way of life’”11 (Cheney 1989, 298).

Ethics understood as such clearly moves beyond the minimal

consideration of environment as external goods offered by

Sandler. Because the Stoics saw the cultivation of virtue as

familiarizing oneself with the rational relations governing

‘things’ within the cosmic whole, and as adequating agent

rationality to those ostensibly external relations, a Neo-Stoic

virtue ethics framework takes a deep level of care for the

environment for its very foundation.

There are two possibilities for the emergence of a virtue

language from this Stoic ethic. A more moderate Neo-Stoicism,

inspired by the rational project of the ancient Stoics, would

resemble a radical extensionism, seizing much or all of the

virtue vocabulary of interpersonal relations for the

environmental cause. Although ‘extension’ would be a misnomer,

since the widened use of interpersonal virtue language would

result uniquely from the realization of self as interconnected

with all entities, rather than just with other persons; if we

accept the Stoic metaphysics, then the interpersonal virtue

vocabulary was wrongfully constrained to exclusivity between

persons in the first place. However, by identifying God with11 Warwick Fox, Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan’s Critique of Deep Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20 (Hobart, Australia: Board of Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 1986), 42.


nature, Posidonius’ articulation leads us to a stronger virtue

approach, which I take to be more in line with the Ecosophy of

Naess12. One virtue that we might make use of on this approach

is that of ‘piety’. Abstracting away any accidental religious

connotations, ‘piety’ stems both from the Latin Pius, meaning

dutiful, faithful to kindred, prompted by natural affections; and

from Purus, meaning pure, or clean. The virtue of natural piety

does not stand moral agents apart from nature, as modern

religious piety seems to distance one from a God. By returning

to the original use of the word, cultivating the virtue of

natural piety can mean being faithful to kindred, where the

natural environment is one’s ken. It would only distance us from

an environmental vice – hubris, which stands at the root of the

anthropocentric disposition to shape nature to human ends – by

token of purity. On Sandler’s approach, hubris provides one

presumption against the use of genetically modified crops in

agriculture;

Given the historical record, it does appear to be hubris or

arrogance for us to believe that the best way to address our

12 A Neo-Stoic framework inspired mainly by the general rational project of the ancient Stoics would make a few assumptions about our epistemic access to nature; viz., that we have direct, unmediated epistemic access to the rational relations in nature, and that nature remains the kind of thing which might appear as rational to the human knower. The reason why Naess makes use of theterm ‘Ecosophy’ is by way of contrasting a form of wisdom (Sophia) with the rational knowledge implied by the Logos of ‘Ecology’. For the sake of buildingan ethical framework, the metaphysical commitments of Posidonius’ pantheism seem less problematic to me than these epistemic assumptions, if only because ethnography of early societies tends to reveal a spiritual, rather than a rational relationship with nature.


agricultural problems is by further manipulation and domination

of nature, which is precisely what agricultural biotechnology

attempts to do (Sandler 2005, 226).

The Neo-Stoic virtue of natural piety should appear as radically

biocentric. But it is not an unprecedented view. In the

aftermath of the catastrophic 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Monsanto

aggressively pushed 475 tons of genetically modified corn and

vegetable seeds on Haitian farmers, who proceeded to burn the

seeds in protest. Monsanto’s seeds were seen as a threat to food

sovereignty and biodiversity in Haiti, and it is not uncommon to

hear Haitian farmers chanting about how the seeds will destroy

the people and the land. Haitian farmers share a sacred

relationship with local creole seeds and agriculture, which is

also threatened by genetically modified seeds13. Such a respect

for the land and natural biodiversity is surely an aspect of

natural piety.

§3. A Neo-Stoic Virtue Ethics Approach to Genetically Modified

Crops

Although the opposition of Haitian farmers to genetically

modified Monsanto seeds demonstrates the Neo-Stoic disposition of

natural piety, an application of the resulting virtue ethics

framework is likely not required. There are plenty of overriding13 From an interview with Jean-Baptiste Chavannes, Executive Director of the Peasant Movement of Papay (MPP), in GMO OMG (Compeller Pictures, 2013): 9:02 – 13:00.


political and ecological considerations – such as food

sovereignty and biodiversity – against the use of the seeds.

Golden Rice provides a more difficult example. The Vitamin A

enriched rice crop has not proven to be a likely threat to local

ecosystems, and I agree with Sandler that there are clear virtue

based reasons to promote its use14, such as compassion for the

millions of people in Southeast Asia who lose their sight or

their lives to VAD each year. The Neo-Stoic virtue of natural

piety is normatively opposed to any genetic modification of

natural entities, which is viewed as intractably anthropocentric.

In this way, natural piety functions much like Sandler’s vice of

hubris, which provides a presumption against the “further

manipulation and domination of nature” (Sandler 2005, 226). In

the example of Golden Rice, the question is whether virtue based

reasons to promote its use override the prohibition laid out by

virtue of natural piety; if not, we should ask ourselves whether

this is significantly problematic.

For Sandler, any use of agricultural biotechnology that

passes the external goods criterion is not hubristic. “The

external goods criterion is in part concerned with the effects

the technology might have on natural entities” (Sandler 2005,

224), insofar as the natural environment and entities within it

are taken to have only instrumental value, for the role that they

play in the production of goods for human consumption. Here,

Sandler’s view is inescapably anthropocentric. Using only the

14 Ronald Sandler, “A Virtue Ethics Approach to Genetically Modified Crops,” Environmental Virtue Ethics (2005): 215-233.


external goods criterion, we can imagine the construction of a

perfectly sustaining artificial ecosystem, at the cost of wanton

destruction in the natural environment, so long as the artificial

ecosystem furnishes humankind on the whole with more goods than

nature. This conclusion would be abhorrent on the Neo-Stoic

approach. Using this kind of reasoning, Sandler concludes that

Golden Rice overcomes the anti-hubristic presumption against the

use of genetically modified crops. The Neo-Stoic virtue of

natural piety is stronger, strictly forbidding the genetic

modification of natural entities as an inherently anthropocentric

act. The comparative strength of the Neo-Stoic approach should

be expected – it ensures a profound respect for nature as

tantamount to the cultivation of virtue in the individual.

Making respect for nature a criterion of virtue results in a

deeper level of care than Sandler’s ad hoc environmental

considerations. Thus, Stoics will have reason to reject

Sandler’s external goods criterion in each case, in favor of the

stronger normative demands of virtue.

This conclusion seems to fly in the face of basic

humanitarian concerns – shouldn’t we do whatever is in our power

to alleviate human suffering? This question will arise only if

we see technology as our only means of salvation. Even Golden

Rice, a quick technological intervention to problems which are

fundamentally socioeconomic in character, fails to do the job

alone15; an average helping of the latest version of Golden Rice

15 Greenpeace, “Genetically engineered ‘Golden Rice’ is fools gold” (2001).


provides 60% of the RDA of Vitamin A16. The problem with

addressing the socioeconomic issues underlying health concerns

like VAD is that it is slow and difficult – in the absence of any

clear profit resulting from such an approach, it is even more

difficult to see who might step in to take on such a task. But,

as in the case of Haitian farmers, we cannot expect technological

quick fixes to address complex and foundational problems. Poor

socioeconomic conditions practically guarantee poor health

outcomes, and the technological approach can only tilt the scale,

offering improved human health outcomes at the expense of

environmental health. This runs counter to virtue on the Neo-

Stoic approach. The virtue requirement to disavow the quick

fixes of agricultural biotechnology, and the corollary to address

socioeconomic problems to alleviate human suffering, is surely an

onerous task. But a Stoic ethics is revisionary; “[i]f the

Stoics are right, then most of us have radically wrong priorities

in practical matters, and we should revise and improve our

practical beliefs in the light of Stoic theory” (Annas

“Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue” 1995, 7).

Protecting our natural environment to the extent that we should

is not easy, but the flourishing of the environment is essential

to the flourishing of humankind. A Neo-Stoic virtue ethics

framework for environmental ethics sets us on the right path to16 Amy Harmon, “Golden Rice: Lifesaver?” in The New York Times (2013). Although the RDA is lower than the EAR (Estimated Average Requirement), it is still clear that Golden Rice cannot alone ensure positive health outcomes in those countries afflicted by VAD. See also Dawe et al., “Golden Rice: What Role Could It Play in Alleviation of Vitamin A Deficiency?” in Food Policy (2002): 541-560.


ensure the mutual flourishing of human and environmental kind, as

a unified whole.

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