European Journal of Personality, Vol. 8,45-58 (1994)

The effect on mundane decision-making of the need and ability to achieve cognitive structure

YORAM BAR-TAL Tel-A v ~ v University, Israel

Abstruct

It is proposcd that coping with conflictual decision-making can be viewed as a special case of coping with uncertainty. It is further suggested that two factors determine coping with uncertainty: ( I ) the individuals’ need for cognitive structure ( N C S ) , and ( 2 ) the individuals’ ability to achieve cognitive structure ( A A C S ) . This paper demon- strates that the interaction between A A C S and NCS may explain subjects’ reaction to decisional conflict. The results show that high-NCS and low-AACS individuals experi- enced the greatest dificulties in their decision-making and showed a positive correlation between the extent to which they perceived the conjlict in the situation and the amount of time that they spent making the decision. In contrast, high-AACS and high-NCS subjects showed a negative correlation between these factors. In addition, these subjects experienced the least dificulty in the situation.

INTRODUCTION

Much of the research in the area of decision-making centres around the examination of conditions that may influence the quality of the decision-making. Within this approach, systematic divergence from optimal decision procedures by intuitive decision-makers has often been demonstrated (Hogarth, 1981 ; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980), and various aids have been proposed to optimize the process (Brown, Kahr and Peterson, 1974; Davies, 1970; Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1979; Keeney, 1982). However, relatively lit Vj ntion has been paid to the psychological impact of the decision process on the decision- maker. Research on this problem has been mostly devoted to the effect of situational variables on the stress and difficulties experienced by the decision-maker. For example, under conditions of stress or conflict, decision-makers tend to adapt cognitively simpler strategies (Slovic, 1975; Wright, 1974). Janis and Mann (1977) suggested that the patterns of coping with decisional conflict are determined by the presence or absence of three situational conditions: (1) the awareness of serious risks associated

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Yorarn Bar-Tal, Department of Nursing, School of Health Professions, Tel-Avik University, Tel-Aviv, Israel 69978.

CCC 0890-2070/94/0 10045-14 0 1994 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Received 12 June 1992 Accepted6 August 1993

46 Y. Bar-Tal

with the chosen alternative; (2) the hope of finding a better alternative; and (3) the belief that there is adequate time to seek information and to deliberate before a decision is required.

In contrast to the situational approach to the study of coping with decision-making difficulties, the present research examines this question from a more stable, trait- bound perspective. The analysis is based on the assumption that coping with decisio- nal difficulty can be viewed as the consequence of coping with uncertainty. The uncertainty in a decision-making situation may stem from lack of sufficient infor- mation about either the possible choices or the consequences of each choice. In addition, if there is conflict between the possible choices there is, inherently, even greater uncertainty. Conflict arises from the simultaneous tendencies within the indi- vidual to both accept and reject a given course of action (Janis, 1982) and it leads to uncertainty regarding the right choice (Kruglanski, 1980).

Recently, Bar-Tal (1989, 1993a) suggested that achieving a sense of certainty depends on two orthogonal factors: (1) the needfor cognitive structure (NCS), and (2) the ability to achieve this cognitive structure (AACS). NCS is defined as the desire for clear and firm knowledge concerning a given topic, as opposed to ambiguity, doubt, or confusion (Kruglanski, 1989). AACS refers to the extent to which indivi- duals are able to avoid information that either cannot be categorized or clashes with their existing knowledge, and/or to their ability to organize their knowledge to fit an already existing cognitive structure.

Individual differences in the need for certainty have long been at the centre of attention in psychology (Bunder, 1962; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Kagan, 1972; Rok- each, 1960; Sorrentino and Short, 1986). Over the years, different names have been given to this trait, such as tolerance of ambiguity, open-mindedness, and the need for certainty. In addition, different theoretical conceptions were formulated. Frenkel- Brunswik, for example, suggested that intolerance of ambiguity is a preference for familiarity, symmetry, definiteness, and regularity. This conception also implies a tendency toward premature and unqualified black-and-white solutions and oversim- plified dichotomizing. Smock (1 955) suggested that intolerance of ambiguity reflects an increased striving for a stable and/or familiar environment. These definitions share the assumption that the need for cognitive structure is likely to trigger intense epistemic activity in the case of confusion, ambiguity, and lack of clarity. It is assumed that high-NCS individuals exhibit the kind of epistemic activity that is directed toward the structuring of their thoughts. Such cognitive structuring provides them with the needed certainty (Bunder, 1962). In this line, typically, the cognitive processes used to reduce uncertainty, especially under stress, are ‘category-based’ rather than ‘piecemeal’ or ‘individuation’ processes (Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Pavelchak, 1986). The category-based process is more effective because it is relatively automatic, effort- free, and faster than vigilance behaviour (Brewer, 1988; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). In addition, this process facilitates achieving certainty by helping to omit inconsistent or irrelevant information, on the one hand, and by adding consistent information necessary to attain high certainty, on the other (Fiske and Linville, 1980). It is possible to suggest that deviations from optimal decision-making, such as manifested when using various heuristics (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974), may be conceptua- lized in terms of consequences of high NCS (Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983).

Until recently, it was assumed that individuals with high NCS were able to provide themselves with the required cognitive structure. Therefore, when NCS has been

Decision-making 47

used as an independent variable, cognitive structuring practice has been featured as a dependent variable (Friedland and Keinan, 1991; Kruglanski and Freund, 1983; Smock, 1955).

At present, however, there are some indirect and direct indications that individuals differ in their ability to either develop or effectively use the category node (Frost, Lahart, Dugas and Sher, 1988; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). For example, non- clinically compulsive individuals are characterized by a lower categorization ability (Frost et al., 1988). Sinclair (1988) demonstrated that subjects in a state of depression displayed narrow categorization, the least amount of halo, and the greatest accuracy (for the connection between the halo effect and cognitive structuring, see Kruglanski and Freund, 1983). Also, in a series of studies Kofta and Sedek demonstrated that normal subjects who were made to experience learned helplessness exhibited deficien- cies in cognitive structuring and uncertainty (for a review, see Kofta, 1993).

In this vein, Bar-Tal (1989, 1993a, b) suggested that people may not only differ in their needandability to achieve cognitive structure, but also in the extent of correspon- dence between their NCS and AACS. Bar-Tal (1991a, b, 1993a) found that (a) NCS and AACS are orthogonal; (B) the effect of NCS is different for low-AACS subjects than it is for those with high AACS; and (c) subjects with high NCS but low AACS suffer from the greatest uncertainty, while subjects who are high on both NCS and AACS suffer from the least uncertainty. For example, Bar-Tal(1993a) demonstrated that subjects’ sense of sufficiency of knowledge regarding their health was the lowest among high-NCS but low-AACS subjects. Also, Bar-Tal (1991b) found a positive correlation between NCS and stereotypical thinking for high-AACS subjects. In contrast, for low-AACS subjects this correlation was negative. Bar-Tal(1991b) sug- gested that since NCS motivates subjects to achieve certainty, for those with high AACS, the stronger their NCS, the more they will tend to achieve certainty by organizing their knowledge to view the world in an unqualified and oversimplified way (stereotypical thinking). For low-AACS subjects, however, the increase of their NCS cannot be satisfied by cognitive structuring. Therefore, in order to achieve the desired certainty, they have to use more individuating information processing, and thus they show less stereolyping.

The above conceptualization can be applied in explaining different response pat- terns to decisional conflict. It is suggested that following the results mentioned earlier, the effect of subjects’ NCS on their decision-making will be different according to their AACS level: for low-AACS subjects, the greater their NCS, the more difficulty they will experience in their decision-making. The opposite is predicted for high- AACS subjects. For them, higher NCS may be associated with less difficulty in their decision-making.

This study was designed to demonstrate these claims. Specifically, subjects were requested to report on how much conflict they experience in common choice situations and on how much time they devote to contemplating these choices. It was assumed that for high-AACS subjects, the higher their NCS, the stronger the evidence of a negative correlation between the amount of conflict in the decision-making process and the time spent on these decisions. That is, for subjects high in both NCS and AACS the uncertainty inherent in the conflict situation is intolerable (because of their high NCS). Since, however, they also have a high AACS, they are able to structure the situation in such a way that the more aversive its conditions are to them, the less time they will spend in it. Therefore, they will tend to experience

48 Y. Bar-Tal

less difficulty in the situation. For the low-AACS subjects the opposite pattern will be found: NCS will be associated with a more positive correlation between the time spent on the decision and the decision difficulty. The high-NCS and low-AACS subjects are assumed to be unable to free themselves from the difficult decision-making situation by means of cognitive structuring. Therefore, the harder the decision, the more time they will spend on it, experiencing more difficulty.

METHOD

Subjects

The participants were I 14 female students at Tel-Aviv University, who volunteered. Their mean age was 25.46 years (SD = 7.91 years).

Measures

Need for cognitive structure ( N C S )

N C S was measured by a 20-item questionnaire (see Appendix, Table Al) that reflected preference for structured, clear-cut situations (e.g. ‘I feel more at ease when the rules of the game are clear and structured’), and uneasiness in situations that are not well-structured (e.g. ‘I am very annoyed when I find I doubt my own beliefs’). The response option to each of the 20 items was a 6-point scale ranging from ‘comple- tely disagree (1) to ‘fully agree’ (6). The composite NCS score was the mean of the responses to the 20 items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88).

Ability to achieve cognitive structure ( A A C S )

AACS was measured by a 24-item questionnaire (see Appendix, Table A2) reflecting the following three themes: (1) the ability to achieve certainty in the correctness of made decisions (e.g. ‘Even after I have reached a decision, I continue to think about the pros and cons to make sure that I did not make a mistake’; ‘Usually, I don’t have afterthoughts after making a decision’); (2) the ability to adopt a clear-cut solution (e.g. ‘I often experience stress when I have to reach a clear-cut decision’; ‘Often it is hard for me to decide about relatively simple things such as how to dress or what to order in a restaurant’), and (3) the ability to structure life (e.g. ‘Even if I make notes of things that I have to do, it is hard for me to act upon them’; ‘It is easy for me to create a steady routine in my life’). It is assumed that these themes reflect the ability to achieve cognitive structure because achieving cer- tainty requires cognitive structuring (Bunder, I962), and structuring life is also related to cognitive structuring. The AACS scales (as well as the NCS scale described above) were validated in previous studies (Bar-Tal, 1991a,b, 1993b). The reliability of NCS and AACS across all studies (1650 male and female subjects) was 0.86 and 0.85, respectively. A test-retest correlation (with an interval of 5 weeks between measure- ments) was 0.85 and 0.86, respectively. The response option to each of the 24 items was a 6-point scale ranging from ‘completely disagree’ (1) to ‘fully agree’ (6). The composite AACS score was the mean of the responses to the complete set of 24 items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83).

Decision-making 49

Perceived conflict

To assess how much conflict subjects experienced in common choice situations, a measure developed by Shiloh and Melamed (1988) was used. The Perceived Conflict Inventory (PCI) consists of ten everyday situations, with two behavioural alternatives for each: (a) to stick to the habitual or intended reaction, and (b) to change one’s behaviour. For example:

‘On your way home frorn work you get stuck in a traffic jam. You can continue on your usual route, or turn around and choose another route that is longer 6ut less busy. (a) Would you lose anything by sticking to your usual route? (b) Would you lose anything if you turned around and took the other route? (c) How much time do you spend contemplating the choice between routes? 1 = No time, 2 =very little time, 3 = some time, 4 = much time, 5 = a very long time.

On the basis of the PCI, two scores were computed. The total conflict score (PCI- Conflict) is the number of items on which a positive answer was given to both ques- tions (a) and (b) (subject’s perceived losses for any choice). This score reflects the concept of conflict as formulated by Janis and Mann (1977). The scores ranged from 0 to 10 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.61). The second score (PCI-Time) was computed by averaging the responses to question (c) of all ten situations (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77).

RESULTS

To test the hypotheses, a hierarchical regression analysis was performed. In the first step, AACS, NCS, and PCI-Conflict scores were entered. Then, in the second step, the three simple interactions (AACS x NCS, AACS x PCI-Conflict, and NCS x PCI-Conflict) were added. Finally, in the third step, the triple interaction (AACS x NCS x PCI-Conflict) was introduced. The dependent measure was PCI-Time. The results, presented in Table 1, show that the triple interaction was significant.

Table 1. Hierarchical regression of AACS, NCS, PCI- Conflict, and the interactions between them on PCI-Time (n = 105)

Beta T

Step I AACS -0.26 2.74** NCS 0.09 0.95 PCI-Conflict 0.13 1.34

Step 2 AACS x NCS -0.23 0.28 AACS x PCI-Conflict -0.07 0.70 NCS X PCI-Conflict -0.29 2.97**

Step 3 AACS x NCS x I’CI-Conflict -0.26 2.36*

F0,,,) = 4.09.** *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

50 Y. Bur-Tul

In addition, the main effect of AACS and the AACS X PCI-Conflict interaction achieved significance. However, since these two effects are qualified by the higher- order interaction, they will not be discussed. In order to investigate further the triple interaction, AACS and NCS were divided into high- vs. low-using median splits (3.67 and 3.90, respectively). Then the correlations between PCI-Time and PCI- Conflict were calculated for the four cells obtained. Figure 1 shows that, as expected, the correlations in the cells made up by low AACS tend to be more positive as NCS increases, while the correlation in the cells produced by high AACS tends to be more negative as NCS increases. A consideration of the difference between the correlations in the four cells reveals that a significant difference between the correlations was obtained when comparing subjects with high NCS placed in the two cells of high and low AACS ( U = 1.96, p < 0.05), and when comparing between the two cells of high and low NCS for high-AACS subjects ( U = 1.91, p c 0.05).'

0.4 n=24

n=31

0.2

0.0

I n=25

-. . low AACS high AACS

Figure 1. AACS and NCS

Correlations between PCI-Conflict and PCI-Time as a function of the level of

The analysis of the within-subject level supports the hypotheses, but it does not show the level of decision difficulty portrayed by each of the four cells. After all, the correlations do not indicate whether the characterization of the subjects by their AACS and NCS reflects their difficulties in the decision-making situation. If it is correct to characterize decision patterns by AACS and NCS, it should be demon- strated that subjects with high NCS and low AACS experience the greatest difficulties in decision-making. In contrast, subjects with both high AACS and high NCS should be shown to experience the least difficulty.

To examine these hypotheses, a measure of difficulty was constructed via multiplica- tion of the PCI-Time and PCI-Conflict scores. This was done in three steps. First, the Z scores of PCI-Time and PCI-Conflict were calculated for all subjects. Second, to avoid negative values, the two Z scores were transformed by adding to each

' The tests were performed in two steps: first, the Fisher transformations from correlation to Z score were used. Then, U tests were performed on the Z scores (cf. Courts, 1966).

Decision-muking 5 1

the most extreme negative value of the distribution, so that the lowest value in each distribution would equal zero. Finally, multiplication of the two values was performed. Since NCS and AACS are orthogonal ( r = -0.03, n.s.), the hypothesis was examined by a 2 x 2 ANOVA (AACS x NCS).

Table 2. ANOVA of AACS and NCS on PCI-decision difficulty ~~~

SS df M S F

NCS 3.84 1 3.84 0.29 AACS 94.55 1 94.55 7.22** NCS x AACS 97.46 1 97.46 7.44** Residual 1323.02 101 13.10

**p < 0.01.

The results presented in Table 2 show that the effects of AACS and the interaction achieved significance. Figure 2 shows that, as expected, high-NCS and low-AACS subjects experienced the greatest difficulty ( M = 6.20). It can also be seen from this figure that high-NCS and high-AACS subjects achieved the lowest level of difficulty ( M = 2.24). Finally, high-AACS and low-NCS subjects ( M = 3.68) achieved an inter- mediate level of difficulty.

0 High NCS . t - 7

low AACS high AACS

Figure 2. PCI-decision difficulty as a function of AACS and NCS

The Tukey B u posteriori a.nalysis of the residuals (cf. Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1989) shows that for low-AACS subjects, those with high NCS experienced signifi- cantly greater difficulty ( M = 0.99) than those with low NCS ( M = -0.98). Among high-AACS subjects, those with high NCS ( M = - 1.04) experienced significantly less difficulty than those with low NCS (M=0.87). From a different perspective, among low-NCS subjects, those with low AACS suffered significantly less difficulty than those who had high AACS. Among high-NCS subjects, those with low AACS suffered significantly more difficulties in their decision-making than those who also had high AACS.

52 Y. Bar-Tul

DISCUSSION

This study aimed to demonstrate the effect of the need for cognitive structure and the ability to achieve it on subjects’ decision-making. It was hypothesized that because making decisions in general, and in conflict situations in particular, requires achieving certainty, and because the need and ability to achieve cognitive structure determine the level of certainty, the combination of the two factors governs subjects’ coping with the decision-making situation.

The present results support the hypothesis: high-NCS and low-AACS subjects are least able to achieve certainty in their decisions and therefore they experience the greatest difficulties in their decision-making. In contrast, high-NCS and high- AACS subjects experienced the least difficulty in this situation.

These results add further evidence to the validity of the conceptualization of AACS. First, they demonstrate again that the two concepts of NCS and AACS are orthogo- nal. Second, they show that the interaction between AACS and NCS contributes to the explanation of the dependent measures over and above the explanation of every effect separately. This study also demonstrates again that individuals with both high AACS and high NCS effectively apply epistemic behaviour that is charac- terized by cognitive biases and stereotypical thinking (cf. Bar-Tal, 1991 b). In contrast, high-NCS and low-AACS individuals are characterized by uncertainty, lack of ego biases, and a relatively low ability to cope with stress (Bar-Tal, 1991a, b, 1993a).

The differentiation between AACS and NCS demonstrated in this study also implies that the commonly accepted opinion regarding the effect of stress on cognitive rigidity may be erroneous. It is often proposed that the premature closure and cognitive rigidity evident under high stress are the results of the impairment of attentional and perceptual processes (Easterbrook, 1959; Hancock, 1986; Keinan, 1987; Poulton and Edwards, 1974). The fact that high-NCS and low-AACS subjects experience the greatest psychological difficulty in a decision-making situation, and do not escape it by earlier closure, means that stress does not necessarily cause premature closure. Rather, it seems possible that stress affects individuals’ level of NCS. This, in turn, may affect cognitive structuring but only to the extent that individuals have sufficient AACS. This possibility should be explored further.

The characterization of the patterns of coping with decision-making by subjects’ NCS and AACS reveals some resemblance to Janis and Mann’s (1977) description of the five basic patterns of coping with decisional conflict. These patterns are ‘hyper- vigilance’, ‘vigilance’, ‘unconflicted adherence’, ‘unconflicted change to a new course of action’, and ‘defensive avoidance’. The hypervigilance pattern is associated with indecisiveness, overalertness, and the uncontrollable search for additional infor- mation. The vigilance pattern is characterized by a rational and thorough search for relevant information and assimilation of the information in an unbiased manner. Finally, the remaining three patterns represent cognitive biases in which decision- makers, in order to avoid the difficulties of the decision, ignore information about the risks associated with their choice, construct wishful rationalizations, and remain selectively inattentive to corrective information.

The hypervigilance pattern may represent an ‘ideal type’ of subject who shows high NCS but is unable to attain cognitive structure (low AACS). Much like Janis and Mann’s description of hypervigilance, the high-NCS but low-AACS subjects, in the present study, had the greatest difficulties in their decision-making. The fact

Decision-making 53

that for these subjects, the stronger the conflict, the more time they spent making up their minds may imply that they were unable to stop the process of weighing the two alternatives.

The fact that subjects with high AACS and low NCS were found to have moderate levels of decision difficulty, although the correlation obtained in this group between PCI-Time and PCI-conflict did not differ significantly from that obtained for the low-AACS, high-NCS subjects (hypervigilant), may indicate the similarity between these subjects’ behaviour and what is described under the vigilant pattern. Such individuals, when trying to reach an important decision, are able to search painstak- ingly for relevant information. What distinguishes vigilants from hypervigilants is the ability of the former decision-makers to ‘digest’ the incoming information due to their high ability to achieve cognitive structure (Bar-Tal, 1993b). In addition, the same ability enables them to stop the search once sufficient information is obtained, and thus to achieve enough certainty to reach a decision (which is also why they experienced less difficulty in the decision-making situation).

Finally, the characteristics of high-NCS and high-AACS subjects may be analo- gous, to a large extent, to Janis and Mann’s description of the three patterns that represent cognitive biases. The present results show that these subjects suffer from the least amount of stress, while the negative correlation found in their case between PCI-Time and PCI-Conflict indicates that in order to avoid stress these subjects use cognitive biases most effectively. Since it is evident that ignoring information, constructing rationalizations, and remaining selectively inattentive to corrective information all depend on successful cognitive structuring, and since the highest level of cognitive structuring is found among subjects who score high on both NCS and AACS, patterns like ‘unconflicted inertia’ or ‘defensive avoidance’ may best describe the behaviour of thew persons.

An interesting combination that does not fit any of the coping patterns specified by Janis and Mann occurs where both AACS and NCS are low. It is possible that this combination represents individuals who are not affected by the decisional conflict because they are not very motivated to resolve the uncertainty that it causes (low NCS). Therefore, this cell is characterized by the lowest correlation between PCI- Time and PCI-Conflict. If this explanation is correct, it suggests that Janis and Mann wrongly assumed decisiion-makers to be necessarily motivated to resolve the conflict. Such an assumption may be the reason why this pattern does not appear in Janis and Mann’s model.

Even though the present framework emphasizes the personal attributes of the decision-maker as determining decision style and products, this does not imply that the effect of situational conditions should be ignored. These, however, can be explained in terms of the impact that they have on the individuals’ certainty through their epistemic motivation (Kruglanski, 1989) and their ability to achieve cognitive structure. Thus, for example, time pressure as well as stress in general are known to affect subjects’ NCS (Friedland and Keinan, 1991; Jamieson and Zanna, 1989; Keinan, 1987). Similarly, factors like fear of invalidity (Kruglanski, 1989), the import- ance of the problem to the individual (Ronis, Yates and Kirscht, 1989), negative mood (Fiedler, 1988), or helplessness training (Kofta, 1993) may cause a reduction in individuals’ AACS in the specific situation. Also, self-awareness (Hull and Levy, 1979; Zimring and Katz, 1988), priming (Baldwin, Carrel1 and Lopez, 1990; McNa- mara, 1992), positive mood (Fiedler, Asbeck and Nickel, 1991; Isen, Daubman and

54 Y. Bar-Tal

Nowicki, 1987), experience (Bar-Tal, 1992; Fazio and Zanna, 1981), and imagery vividness (Wallace, 1990; Wallace and Hofelich, 1992) were found to increase AACS (increase of cognitive structuring) in the situation. Therefore, it is possible to concep- tualize AACS and NCS as both trait and state-like constructs.

Finally, the question of generalizability of the present results should be addressed. This study is based on data collected from a sample of female subjects. Since the extent to which subjects achieve certainty is at the basis of the present framework, and since gender may be related to sense of uncertainty, it could be claimed that the applicability of the conclusions is restricted only to a female population. However, the interactive effect of AACS and NCS found in the present study was also found in other studies that used mixed-gender samples or male-only samples (Bar-Tal, 1991a,b, 1993a). Thus, while it is possible that females and males differ in their level of AACS and/or NCS, and therefore suffer from a greatedlesser uncertainty, there is no indication of a gender-based difference in the effect of the interaction between AACS and NCS. This does not mean, however, that replications of this kind of study with other groups of subjects are not worthwhile.

To conclude, this study suggests that it is useful to conceptualize decisional conflict in terms of the various combinations of AACS and NCS. This framework enables integration and understanding of the effects on the decision-making process of various factors suggested by the different decision-making models. By doing so, it may also help in pointing out contingency variables that may moderate the effects of factors affecting decision-making. Finally, this study highlights the important role of cogni- tive structuring in achieving certainty in the decision-making situation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Shoshana Shiloh for her help in planning and data collection, and Daniel Bar-Tal and Miriam Hadar for their helpful remarks on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Decision-making 57

APPENDIX

Table Al . The Need for Cognitive Structure (NCS) scale

I feel better when everything is in its own place People who seem to me uncertain about various things make me feel uneasy It is unpleasant for me to enter a situation without knowing what to expect from it I don’t like to work on a problem that does not have a clear-cut solution 1 prefer things to be predictable and certain I always felt that there is a clear difference between what is right and what is wrong I cannot enjoy a movie when it is not clear to me what the director meant I t irritates me to listen to someone who cannot make up hidher mind I don’t like to dwell on hypothetical situations I am very annoyed when something unexpected disturbs my daily routine I get very disturbed when forced to put aside something I was doing unfinished 1 feel uneasy when I am in the company of people whose behaviour I can’t understand I feel more comfortable when the rules of the situation are clear and well defined I am very bothered when I doubt my beliefs I don’t like modern paintings in which I don’t know what the painter meant In order to get a good dish it is absolutely essential to follow the recipe exactly I hate to change my plans a1 the last moment I think that every problem has a clear-cut solution If I were a scientist, 1 would be bothered by the fact that my work would never be completed (because in science new things come up all the time) I can’t eniov mv life when I do not have a stable routine

Table A2. The Abilitv to Achieve Cognitive Structure (AACS) scale

I tend to delay the making of important decisions till the last possible moment and even then I continue to be troubled by it (R) It takes me a long time before I commit myself to interpersonal relationships, because 1 can never be sure enough of the attitude of the other person towards me (R) Usually I see to it that my work is carefully planned and well organized I have no problem in meeting deadlines Even if 1 make notes of things I have to do, it is hard for me to act upon them (R) I’ve always adopted a very structured way of life I tend to hesitate when I have to make an important decision even after thinking a lot about it (R) Sometimes I am irritated b j my hesitation to make a decision (R) Only seldom do 1 doubt my own beliefs Even after I have reached a decision, I continue to think about the pros and cons in order to make sure that 1 did not make a mistake (R) When I find myself involved in a discussion, I often d o not commit myself to any point of view in case 1 might be wrong (R) Usually, I don’t have afterthoughts after making a decision I find myself avoiding new experiences but I am not comfortable with sticking to the known and experienced (R), I frequently feel that time just melts away (R) Sometimes I hesitate to commit myself out of fear of making a mistake (R) It is easy for me to create a :steady routine in my life I often experience stress when I have to reach a clear-cut decision (R) Even if I finish my exam early, I stay until the end in case I change my mind (R) Even when I am botheredl by a decision I should make, it is hard for me to make up my mind and free myself‘ from the hassle (R)

58 Y. Bur-Tul

(20) Often it is hard for me to decide about relatively simple things such as how to dress or what to order in a restaurant (R)

(21) Even in new situations I don’t need many cues in order to decide what is the appropriate social behaviour

(22) I d o not tend to ‘dwell’ on important decisions before making them ( 2 3 ) Sometimes it is difficult for me to decide between two possibilities with similar chances

of success or failure (R) (24) Only rarely d o I put something somewhere and cannot find it later

(R) The scoring of the item is reversed.