St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, Radiological Emergency Plan

St Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 67

Summary of Changes

Administrative Changes

L-2018-091 Enclosure 1 of 2

1. Changed "URS Corporation" to "AECOM". USR Corporation was acquired by AECOM. AECOM has confirmed its commitment to support FPL in the event of an emergency at St. Lucie. • Pg. (4) Appendix E - Technical Support Agreements

Pg. (2-9) Section 2.1.5. - Private Sector Organizations • APP-E-1 Pg. (EP3:4) Appendix E-Technical Support Agreements

2. Changed "Site Vice President" and "Plant General Manager" to "Site Director." Aligns with revised NextEra executive organizational structure. ' • Affected pages: 2-11, 2-13, 2-17, 2-19,4-11, 7-15, 7.,.15

3. Changed "Chief Nuclear Officer'' to "Regional Vice President", as to whom the Site Director reports to. This aligns with revised NextEra executive organizational structure. • Affected Page 2-11

4. Removed "and Chemistry" from the Operations Director responsibilities. Activities within the functional area of Chemistry reside with the Chemistry Manager, which is described on Page , 2-12. • Page Affectea Page 2-11

5. Revised "Nuclear Oversight" to "Nuclear Assurance," Revised "Nuclear Oversight Manager" to "Nuclear Oversight & Assessment Director." Revised "QC" to "Nuclear Assurance." Revised "Quality Assurance" to "Nuclear Assurance." • Affected Page 2-13 and 7-17

6. Revised Figure 2-3., St. Lucie Plant Normal Operating Organization with current St. Lucie's organization flow chart. This aligns with revised NextEra executive organizational structure. • Affected Page 2-15

7. Revise "large conference room" to "Outage Control Center" to provides clarity in the location of the OSC.

Affected Page 2-32 8. Remove footnote (3) from Table 3-2A. This footnote pertained to the Unit 1 ECCS Area

Ventilation Exhaust Effluent Particulate and Iodine channels, that were replaced under EC #284322 (PCR 2175812) and should have been removed.

Affected Page 3-5 9. Replaced Figure 5-1 Protective Action Recommendations (Pages 1-3) with current form

revision "7". EPIP-08 Attachment 2 was revised under PCR 2186178. The previous changes (Rev 6 to 7) in this 8-page form were not associated with the 3-pages included in the emergency plan. However, the revision number on each page did change. • Affected Pages 5-12 thru 5-14

10. Changed "Juno Beach" to "Jupiter West." NextEra Corporate Nuclear Division was relocated from Juno Beach headquarters to Jupiter West. • Affected Page 7-15

11. Removed reference to membership in "the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)." NextEra Energy is no longer a member of the Nuclear Energy Institute. • Affected Page 7-18

12. Typographical changes. • Page 1-11, remove "(continued)" following 1.5-Supporting Plan and Agreements • Page 2-33, two words were misspelled (damage and preparation) and one paragraph

(3rd paragraph in section 5.) was incorrectly indented • Page 2-34, one word was misspelled (Stated "An Joint Information Center" corrected to

state "A Joint Information Center''

Significant Changes

L-2018-091 Enclosure 1 of 2

1. Revise EAL Cold Basis, EAL Hot Basis, E-Plan Appendix A & C to adopt Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) revised Notification of Unusual Event Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme for potential fires that are based on NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors." • EAL Cold and Hot Basis Cover Pages (2), List of Effective Pages (2), and Conditions

Table Indexes (2) updated to reflect revision and page number changes. • EAL Cold and Hot Basis Page 2 (2) updated initiating condition for HU 2 "FIRE potentially

degrading the level of safety of the plant. • EAL Cold Basis (pages 23-24) and EAL Hot Basis (pages 29-30) change to approved

NEI 99-01 revision 6 HU-2 EALs. • EAL Cold Basis (pages 25-26) and EAL Hot Basis (pages 31-32), reorganize Toxic I

Flammable EALs to accommodate HU-2 EAL; no changes to HA3 or HU3, just relocated in EAL matrix.

• Revise "This Page Intentional Left Blank" page revision numbers, as all EAL Basis pages are two sided, and with one side of page revised, the other "Intentional Left Blank" page revision numbers were also revised (Cold Basis pages 1, 3 and 27) and Hot Basis pages 1, 3 and 33).

• Revise page revision number for Cold Basis (page 22) and Hot Basis (page 28); no change to content of pages, reason (as noted above) based on EAL pages being 2 sided.

• Emergency Plan Appendix A (Hot Basis) and Appendix C (Cold basis) to incorporate revised EALs as noted above.

2. Revise approved SER for EAL Cold Basis (page 24) EAL Hot Basis (page 30) - HU2 Note Box "Emergency Director" to "Emergency Coordinator." • Submitted LAR included the reference to "Emergency Director" based on standard

template for NEI 99.01 Rev. 6, and this should have been submitted as a difference, "Emergency Coordinator."

3. Revise approved SER for EAL Cold Basis (page 24) EAL Hot Basis (page 30) - HU2. 2 "Diesel Oil Storage Task" changed to proper plant area name "Diesel Oil Storage Tank." • Submitted LAR included a typographical error. Plant area "Diesel Oil Storage Tank" was

incorrectly submitted.as "Diesel Oil Storage Task."

Enclosure 2

St. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 67

Effective Date: March 30, 2018 (1 copy- 218 pages)

L-2018-091 Enclosure 2

FPL

ST. LUCIE PLANT

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN

REVISION 67

Approved by: _L)_~ __ LJ_~------ Date: _:J_/ 30 /11_ Site Director

Effective Date: _.2__J~t.!.1_

EP3:4 (1) St. Lucie, Rev. 67

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Planning Standards Page (NUREG-0654)

1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION 1.1 Purpose 1-1 A.1.b 1.2 Definitions 1-1 A.1.b 1.3 Scope and Applicability 1-6 A.1.b 1.4 Concept of Operations 1-7 A.1.b 1.5 Supporting Plans and Agreements 1-11 P.9

2.0 ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES 2.1 Elements of the Emergency Response 2-1 A.1.a, b, C, 8.8, 8.9,

Organization C.4, L.4 2.2 Florida Power & Light Company 2-9 A.1.b, d, e, A.2.a

Emergency Response Organization A.4, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, C.2.b, G.3.a, G.4.a, M.2, M.3, P.2, P.3

2.3 Emergency Response Support and 2-27 8.8, C.1, C.3, C.4, Resources H.6.c

2.4 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 2-30 H.1, H.2, H.4, H.9, H.11

2.5 Medical and Health Support 2-37 F.2, L.1, L.2, L.4

3.0 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 3.1 Unusual Event 3-1 D.1 3.2 Alert 3-1 D.1 3.3 Site Area Emergency 3-2 D.1 3.4 General Emergency 3-3 D.1 3.5 Emergency Action Levels 3-4 D.1, D.2, 1.1

4.0 NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 4.1 FPL Emergency Response Organization 4-1 E.1, E.2, F.1.e, M.3

4.2 State and County Agencies 4-3 E.3, E.4, F .1 a, b, d, e, J.7, M.3

4.3 St. Lucie County and Martin County Department of Public Safety Emergency 4-6 E.3, F.1.a, b, d, e Management Directors

4.4 Federal Agencies 4-7 E.3,F.1.a, b, d, e

4.5 Notification of the Public by the 4-8 E.5 State/County 4.6 Communications Equipment 4-8 F.1 4.7 Testing 4-10 F.3


TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued) Planning Standards

Page (NUREG-0654)

5.0 RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 5.1 Accident Assessment 5-1 H.5, H.6, H.7, H.8,

H.12, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, M.4

5.2 Protective Response 5-9 E.5, E.6, J.1, J.2, J.3, J.4, J.5, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.10, K.7, M.4

5.3 Radiological Exposure Control 5-20 J.6, K.1, K.2, K.3, K.5

5.4 Recovery and Re-entry 5-27 M.1, M.2, M.3

6.0 PUBLIC INFORMATION 6.1 Preparatory Public Information Program 6-1 G.1, G.2

6.2 Florida Power & Light Company 6-1 E.7, G.3a, b, G.4.a, Emergency Public Information Program b, G.5

6.3 Rumor Control 6-4

7.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

7.1 Exercises and Drills 7-1 F.3, N.1, N.2, N.4, N.5, P.2

7.2 Emergency Response Training 7-8 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, P.2

7.3 Planning Effort Development 7-14 P.1, P.2, P.3, P.4,

P.5, P.9 7.4 Emergency Equipment Maintenance 7-17 H.10

7.5 Letters of Agreement 7-17 H.10


TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued) Planning Standards

Page (NUREG-0654)

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT APP-A-1-38 CONDITIONS TABLE

APPENDIX B EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FISSION APP-8-1-2 PRODUCT BARRIER CHART

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD APP-C-1-32 CONDITIONS TABLE

APPENDIX D STATE OF FLORIDA RADIOLOGICAL APP-D-1 A.2, C.2.a, 0.3, H.3, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 1.11, J.9, J.10.b, d NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS thru i, J.11, J.12, K.4,

L.3, 0.4 APPENDIX E

TECHNICAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS APP-E-1 A.3, 8.9

1. Westinghouse Electric (ABB/CE) 2. AECOM 3. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 4. U.S. Coast Guard 5. Florida Highway Patrol 6. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Department 7. St. Lucie County - Ft. Pierce Fire District 8. City of Ft. Pierce - Police Department 9. City of Ft. Pierce - City Manager 10. Martin County Sheriff's Department 11. AREVA NP Inc. (Framatome Technologies) 12. U.S. Department of Energy (Savannah River

Operations) 13. U.S. Department of Energy (REAC/TS) 14. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center 15. Martin Memorial Medical Center 16. Bechtel Power Corporation 17. Martin County Fire Rescue 18. Martin County Department of Emergency

Services

APPENDIX F LISTING OF EMERGENCY PLAN APP-F-1 P.7 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1-1 Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone 1-8

Figure 1-2 Initial Notification 1-14

Figure 2-1 FPL Emergency Response Capability 2-4

Figure 2-2 Figure number not used

Figure 2-3 St. Lucie Plant Normal Operating Organization 2-14

Figure 2-4 On-Shift Emergency Response Capability 2-15

Figure 2-5 Expanded Response Organization 2-28

Figure 2-6 St. Lucie Plant On-site Emergency Facilities Location Map 2-33

Figure 4-1 Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form 4-5

Figure 4-2 Communications Interfaces 4-12

Figure 5-1 Protective Action Recommendations 5-12

Figure 5-2 Site Evacuation Routes 5-25

Figure 5-3 General Public Evacuation Routes 5-26

Figure 6-1 Public Information Interfaces 6-2


LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1-1 Typical Sequence of Actions 1-13

Table 2-1 Minimum Shift Crew Composition for a Two Unit Site with 2-22 Separate Control Rooms and Shift Staffing Augmentation and Emergency Capabilities

Table 2-2 Florida Power & Light Emergency Response Organization 2-24 Functions and Responsibilities

Table 2-3 Radiological Emergency Equipment for Control Rooms and TSC 2-34

Table 2-4 Radiological Emergency Equipment for the Operational Support 2-35 Center

Table 3-1 Table number not used

Table 3-2A St. Lucie Unit 1 Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors Used for 3-5 Accident Assessment

Table 3-2B St. Lucie Unit 2 Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors Used for 3-6 Accident Assessment

Table 3-3 St. Lucie 1 and 2 Area Radiation Monitors 3-7

Table 3-4 Non-Radiological Instrumentation Used for Accident Assessment 3-8

Table 4-1 Communications Responsibilities 4-11

Table 5-1 Sources of Meteorological Data 5-5

Table 6-1 6-5 to 6-7 (Sample Initial) FPL Press Statements (for public release)

Table 7-1 Example Scenario Format 7-3


1. GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 Purpose

This Emergency Plan contains Florida Power & Light Company's plans for coping with radiological emergencies at the St. Lucie Plant, a facility with two commercial power reactors, Units 1 and 2 located in St. Lucie County, Floridc;1.

The plan has been designed to preclude or mitigate the adverse health and safety effects of an emergency. Four general objectives have been considered in the development of this plan:

1. Timely and accurate assessment of off-normal or emergency conditions, and proper notification of responsible authorities.

2. Effective coordination of emergency actions among all organizations having a response role.

3. Continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both on-site and off-site.

4. Continuing maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness.

1.2 Definitions

Annual - Occurring once per calendar year (January 1 through December 31 ).

Assessment Actions - Those actions taken during or after an emergency event to obtain and process information necessary to make decisions to implement specific emergency measures.

EP3:4

Company - Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)

Corporate Functional Area Manager (CFAM) - Emergency Preparedness -Emergency Preparedness is a key discipline that supports the FPL Fleet Excellence Plan. The CFAM is the highest authority in a specific functional area. The purpose of the CFAM is to provide fleet wide leadership and direction to position the applicable functional area as a top industry performer. The CFAM provides oversight of functional area programs, policies and processes utilizing assessment reports, performance indicators and peer groups to assess the health of programs, policies and processes. The CFAM works with the Site Functional Area Manager (SFAM), who is the site Emergency Preparedness Manager.

1-1 St. Lucie, Rev. 67 I

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued)

EP3:4

1.2 Definitions (continued)

Corrective Actions - Those measures taken to mitigate or terminate an emergency situation at or near the source of the problem in order to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material or to reduce the magnitude of a release, e.g., shutting down equipment, firefighting, repair and damage control.

Emergency - Any off-normal event or condition which is classified into one of the four event categories of Table 3-1, Emergency Classification Table. A radiological emergency at the Plant is classified in accordance with Section 3, Emergency Classification System and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies, as an (Notification of) Unusual Event, an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency.

Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - Plant specific values (such as radiological dose rates, contamination levels, or specific instrument indications); states (such as containment integrity breached or confirmed hurricane warning); or combinations of values and states that may be used as thresholds for initiating specific emergency measures (i.e., designating a particular class of emergency, or initiating a particular protective action).

Emergency Control Officer (ECO) - A designated company officer or senior manager who will act as the chief nuclear officer. He/she will serve as the official spokesperson for the Nuclear Division.

Emergency Coordinator (EC) - The title assumed by the Shift Manager, until relieved by plant management through proper turnover, in the event of emergency conditions at the plant that trigger the Emergency Plan. The EC is responsible for notifying off-site authorities, emergency responders both inside and outside the company, and has full authority and responsibility for on-site emergency response actions. The EC is also responsible for Protective Action Recommendations during the initial stages of an emergency.

Emergency Information Manager (EIM) - A senior manager or designated member of the Corporate Communications Department who directs the operation of the Joint Information Center, develops news releases, and serves as a spokesperson for the company.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) - Separate designated off-site facilities from which the St. Lucie County, Martin County and State of Florida Emergency Response Organizations will direct necessary assessment and protective actions for off-site areas.

1-2 St. Lucie, Rev. 67 J


EP3:4


Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - A designated off-site facility from which FPL emergency activities including assessment, protective action recommendations, and coordination with state and county officials is conducted.

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) - Specific procedures that provide instructions to guide plant operations to terminate or mitigate the consequences of an accident during potential or actual emergency situations.

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) - A set of emergency response procedures initiated and followed by the FPL Emergency Response Organization to implement the appropriate sections of the Emergency Plan, assess and classify the emergency, notify the appropriate authorities, and provide continuing response capability.

Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) - That area, in which emergency planning for plume and/or ingestion exposure has been given consideration, in order to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken, to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the plant.

Emergency Response Organization (ERO) - That portion of the FPL organization assigned responsibilities upon initiation of the St. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan.

Emergency Security Manager (ESM) - A designated company manager, supervisor, or specialist who will have the responsibility for security aspects of the emergency response.

Emergency Technical Manager (ETM) - A designated company manager who will be responsible for providing technical support for emergency response actions.

Expanded Emergency Response Organization - A group of designated individuals from within the normal company organization who may cease normal activities and assume responsibility for augmenting FPL corrective, assessment and protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency at the plant.

Governmental Affairs Manager (GAM) - A designated senior manager who has the responsibility for liaison between the Recovery Manager/ Emergency Control Officer and political officials of the State and Federal Governments during an emergency.



EP3:4


Hostile Action - An act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. ·

Ingestion Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone - That area, approximately 50 miles in radius from the center of the plant, for which plans are made to protect people from ingestion of food-stuffs and water contaminated by radioactive materials released from the plant.

Joint Information Center (JIC} - A designated facility for use by the EIM and his/her staff in communicating with the news media. Public information officers from State, local, and federal response agencies would also function from the JIC.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA} -Governmental agency responsible for the forecasting of weather conditions. The National Weather Service (NWS) is a branch under NOAA that provides weather information and warning of severe weather situations, such as hurricanes and tornadoes.

Operational Support Center (OSC} - An on-site emergency response facility area where FPL Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection, Security, and Chemistry support personnel can report in an emergency and await assignment.

Plant - The St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2.

Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone - That area, approximately 10 miles in radius from the center of the plant, for which detailed plans are made to protect people from exposure to a plume containing radioactive materials.

Protective Actions - Those measures taken for the purpose of preventing or minimizing radiological exposure to persons.

Quarterly - Occurring once per calendar quarter with quarters ending on March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 in a year.

Radiation Controlled Area (RCA} - The area (within the Protected Area) wherein personnel access is restricted for the purpose of monitoring and controlling exposure to radiation.



EP3:4


REAC/TS - The Radiological Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site is operated by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities for the Department of Energy. REAC/TS serves as backup medical support for the St. Lucie Plant.

Recovery Actions - Those actions taken after an emergency to restore the plant as nearly as possible to its condition before the emergency.

Recovery Manager (RM) - A designated company officer or senior manager, who will have responsibility for the direction and control of the EOF. He/she has the authority to establish policy and to expend funds necessary to cope with emergency situations that trigger the implementation of the Emergency Plan.

Shift Communicator (SC) - a specific shiftly designated individual trained and qualified to assist the Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator in the Control Room in making emergency off-site notifications, notifying the Emergency Response Organizations and performing other activities as directed.

Site - A general term referring to the location of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Other terms related to the site are given below:

On-Site - A relative term meaning those persons, things, locations, etc., which are associated with the "site."

Off-Site - A relative term meaning those persons, things, locations, etc., which are not directly associated with the "site." For example, this term is used to describe the State and local government groups as "off-site" agencies.

Owner Controlled Area - That portion of FPL property surrounding and including the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant which is subject to limited access and control as deemed appropriate by FPL.

Protected Area - The area (within the Owner Controlled Area) occupied by the nuclear units and associated equipment and facilities enclosed within the security perimeter fence. The area within which accountability of personnel is maintained in an emergency.

State - The State of Florida.

State Plan - The State of Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan.



EP3:4


System Operations Power Coordinator - An FPL System Operations position which is staffed 24 hours/day for uninterrupted coordination of electrical power distribution. Communication is maintained with all FPL plants, service centers, and the General Office.

Technical Support Center {TSC) - A designated on-site facility that serves as a work area for use by technical and management personnel. The TSC provides technical support to Control Room personnel in the event of an emergency.

Technical Support Center Supervisor - The person assigned to supervise the personnel and direct the technical support activities in the TSC.

Thyroid Dose {CDE) - The thyroid exposure from inhaled radioiodines -Committed Dose Equivalent. Thyroid Dose (COE) is used in Protective Action determination.

Total Dose {TEDE) - The total exposure from both external and internal (weighted) sources - Total Effective Dose Equivalent.

1.3 Scope and Applicability

The Emergency Plan describes Florida Power & Light Company's plans for responding to emergencies that may develop at the St. Lucie Plant. The plan has been prepared to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR 50. 72, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. The purpose of this plan is to define and assign authority and responsibility in order to protect the health and safety of the public and plant personnel. This plan applies to all plant emergencies which have resulted in, or which increase the risk of the accidental release of radioactive materials to the environment.

Plans have been developed based upon knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, and release characteristics of a spectrum of events. Emergency Planning Zones have been defined. Figure 1-1 illustrates the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone for the St. Lucie Plant. The map (Figure 1-1) does not specifically include the area of ocean east of the plant. Since there are no islands in that direction, any evacuation of boating traffic would be addressed on a best effort basis. A key component of this plan is coordination with federal, state, and county authorities who contribute to the overall response effort. This plan outlines company responsibilities within the framework of the overall emergency response organization, and provides a conceptual basis for the development of the detailed procedures necessary to implement the plan.



EP3:4

1.4 Concept of Operations

The Emergency Plan defines emergency conditions and delineates the responsibilities and duties of the FPL Emergency Response Organization. The Emergency Plan is concerned with the following basic activities, which are discussed in the Plan in detail:

1. Organization and resources adequate to detect the presence of an emergency condition, assess the condition, and respond in an appropriate manner (Chapter 2).

2. Assignment of an off-normal event to its proper emergency classification (Chapter 3).

3. Notification of off-site authorities, as required, and continuing communications (Chapter 4 ).

4. Gathering and interpreting data to determine appropriate actions (Chapter 5).

5. Assisting governmental agencies in the development of information for the public both in terms of preparatory education and emergency response information (Chapter 6).

6. Maintaining the FPL Emergency Preparedness Program in a state of readiness (Chapter 7).

Associated with this Emergency Plan are implementing procedures which provide a source of pertinent information and data required by the response organization during an emergency. These procedures are listed in Appendix F.


FIGURE 1-1 PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE

N

S LUC BLVD

(E)

MARTIN HWY

(D/PS1EPLAN-F11-R3)

EP3:4 1-8 St. Lucie, Rev. 67


1.4 Concept of Operations (continued)

Off-normal events have been separated into the following four classifications of emergencies:

A. Notification of Unusual Event

B. Alert

C. Site Area Emergency

D. General Emergency

These four classes represent emergency conditions which trigger activation of emergency plans and procedures. When an emergency is declared in connection with one of these four classes, individuals assume new titles with special responsibilities.

EP3:4

Each emergency class is characterized by abnormal plant events detected by Control Room instrumentation and/or routine or directed surveillance activities.

The company's response to an emergency condition consists of an on-shift (immediate) response and an expanded (augmented) response Emergency Response Organization (ERO) which can readily adapt to an emergency condition as it develops. The immediate response phase encompasses the period of time and sequence of actions associated with the initial detection of an off-normal event, classification as an emergency, and activation of th.e Emergency Response Organization, if required. During this phase, the Shift Manager assumes responsibility as the Emergency Coordinator and initiates the following general activities:

1 . Diagnosis of the emergency

2. Initiation of corrective actions

3. Classification of the emergency

4. Notification of appropriate FPL authorities

5. Notification of appropriate off-site authorities



1.4 Concept of Operations (continued)

During the expanded response phase, the Emergency Coordinator will assess the situation and expand, as necessary, the Emergency Response Organization. All available company resources (on-site and off-site) can be mobilized as needed during this period. State, county and federal response organizations can become fully operational, as required. Continuing corrective, assessment, and protective actions are underway as required.

EP3:4

Table 1-1 summarizes the sequence of actions taken during the phased response. Figure 1-2 delineates the initial notification flow.

As discussed throughout this plan, FPL maintains adequate facilities and equipment for detecting, assessing, and responding to emergencies. Redundant means of communications among key response participants are maintained. FPL also maintains agreements that will provide emergency medical, rescue, or fire support on-site, if needed. The training program is designed to maintain the proficiency of the Emergency Response Organization.

The FPL individual in charge of on-site emergency response during the immediate and expanded response phases is the Emergency Coordinator. The senior company official involved in emergencies, with responsibility for policy and authority to expend funds, is the Recovery Manager. The Recovery Manager is also responsible for Emergency Operations Facility operation during the expanded response phase.

In St. Lucie and Martin Counties, the individual responsible during emergencies is the Chairperson, County Board of Commissioners or his/her designate (Director of County Department of Public Safety/Emergency Management). In both counties, the Chairperson, County Board of Commissioners, is responsible for direction and control during emergencies.

As indicated in Chapter 2 of the State Plan, the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) will operate from the State Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee led by a Governor-appointed State Coordinating Officer (SCO), usually the Director of the Division of Emergency Management.



1.5 Supporting Plans and Agreements

EP3:4

Supporting plans and agreements are included in the Appendices of this plan. Additional material utilized in the preparation of the St. Lucie Plan are:

1. NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants; November, 1980.

2. NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supplement 3, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants -Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations, November, 2011.

3. NUREG-0578, TMl-2 Lessons Learned Task Force: Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations; July, 1979.

4. NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; November, 1980.

5. 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation.

6. 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.

7. 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(1 ), Potential Aircraft Threat

8. EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents; October 1991.

9. Reg. Guide 1.97, Revision 2, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, December, 1980.

10. NUREG-0728, Rev. 4, NRC Incident Response Plant (IRP), April 14, 2005.

11. NUREG/BR-0150, Vol. 1, Response Technical Manual (USNRC).

12. NUREG/CR-7002, Criteria For Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies

13. UFSAR- Unit 1, Section 13.3, Emergency Planning

14. UFSAR - Unit 2, Section 13.3, Emergency Planning

15. Fire Protection Plan (AP 1800022)

16. St. Lucie Security Plan

1-11 St. Lucie, Rev. 67

- _______ __J


1.5 Supporting Plans and Agreements ( continued)

EP3:4

17. Nuclear Energy Policy on Exposure Limits for Emergency Response Personnel, Revision to Policy Statement, Ur. No. JNO-HP-94-056, 26 October, 1994.

18. On-Shift Staffing Analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A, Revision 0, December 2012.

19. KLD TR-533, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Development of Evacuation Time Estimates


TABLE 1-1 TYPICAL SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS

FPL RESPONSE

Detection of Off-Normal Conditions

• Individual identifies off-normal condition.

• Individual immediately notifies Shift Manager (SM).

Response Actions

• Shift Manager (SM) diagnoses condition and directs initial corrective action to control or mitigate the condition.

• Shift Manager (SM) classifies condition in accordance with plant procedures. If the condition is classified as an emergency, the SM implements the Emergency Plan and becomes the Emergency Coordinator (EC).

• The Emergency Coordinator (EC) mobilizes on-site response teams as necessary to assess and control the emergency.

• Emergency Coordinator (EC) initiates necessary protective actions for on-site personnel, and evaluates need for protective action recommendations for the general public.

• Shift Communicator (SC) notifies state and county in accordance with plant procedures.

• The Emergency Coordinator (EC) orders mobilization of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) required for Alert classification or higher classification, in accordance with plant procedures.

• Shift Communicator (SC) notifies NRG via Emergency Notification System (ENS) communications link, in accordance with plant procedures.


TABLE 1-1 TYPICAL SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS

(continued)

FPL RESPONSE ( continued)

Expanded Response (as appropriate)

• The Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC) are staffed and declared operational assuming command and control of the emergency. This includes Protective Action Recommendations (PARs), notifications, and classification.

• The Recovery Manager (RM) proceeds to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Recovery Manager (RM) notifies Emergency Coordinator (EC) when Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is operational and assumes responsibility for recommending off-site protective actions and for communications with off-site organizations. The Emergency Coordinator (EC) can now devote his/her attention to control of the power plant.

• Recovery Manager (RM) (or designated response staff) receives and assesses periodic plant status, radiological data, and meteorological data, and continues communications and coordination with the state and county authorities.

• Recovery Manager (RM) continues assessment of conditions and control of FPL response until plant conditions stabilize then closes out with summary to off-site authorities (Alert or higher classification) or prepares for further long-term activities.

• Emergency Information Manager (EIM) proceeds to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as appropriate and establishes communications with the Emergency Control Officer (ECO) and the Joint Information Center (JIG).

EP3:4 1-14 St. Lucie, Rev. 67 I

STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF -EMERGENCY -

MANAGEMENT

STATE OF FLORIDA BUREAU OF -RADIATION -CONTROL

EPZ COUNTIES EMERGENCY -RESPONSE -

DIRECTORS

USNRC ~

OPERATIONS -CENTER

LOCAL SUPPORT -1. FIRE/AMBULANCE -2. MEDICAL

Legend:

FIGURE 1-2 INITIAL NOTIFICATION

EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

I ~ ' PLANT SHIFT

COMMUNICATOR '----• GENERAL

(1)

(2)

(3)

- MANAGER

FPL EMERGENCY -- RESPONSE - ORGANIZATION

ON-SHIFT (4)

~ EMERGENCY - RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

(1) Via State Hot Ring Down Telephone (HRD)

(2) Via Emergency Notification System (ENS) - Primary Notification Pathway (3) Medical & Fire Emergencies Only, As Needed

(4) Via Plant Public Address System (PA) --- Alternate Notification Pathway

(DIPS/ EPLAN/Fig.1-2/Rev.36)


2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES

2.1 Elements of the Emergency Response Organization

EP3:4

This section defines the primary components of the overall Emergency Response Organization and the relationship of each component to the total effort.

1. Florida Power & Light Company

Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) is the licensed operator of the St. Lucie Plant. As the licensed operator, FPL has developed this Emergency Plan (and associated procedures) to specify actions and provide a framework for emergency response. FPL's primary responsibilities include the following:

1. Diagnosis and corrective action.

2. Emergency classification.

3. Notification of appropriate outside response organizations and continuing communication.

4. Initiation of protective actions for employees and others on-site.

5. Recommendation of protective actions, for the public.

6. Mobilization of Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization.

7. Continuing data collection, dose projection, and assessment actions.

8. Owner Controlled Area recovery and re-entry.

The Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Capability is described in detail in Section 2.2 and illustrated in Figure 2-1, with minimum crew staffing illustrated in Table 2-1.

2. State of Florida Emergency Response Organization

As stated in State Plan, Appendix Ill, Section Ill, St. Lucie and Martin Counties are responsible for initial radiological emergency response operations. Should the scope of the emergency exceed the response capability of the risk counties, increased State action will be warranted. The Governor may transfer responsibility for overall emergency management to the State by issuing an Executive Order under the provisions of Section 252.35, Florida Statutes. Upon issuance of such an Executive Order, the risk, host and ingestion counties will continue to coordinate county response operations.


2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued)

2.1 2. State of Florida Emergency Response Organization (continued)

EP3:4

In accordance with Chapter 252, Part Ill, Florida Statues, Florida has also adopted the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and Memoranda of Understanding between the Counties, other States and private organizations. These agreements provide mechanisms to obtain additional resources.

State of Florida Division of Emergency Management

The Division of Emergency Management (DEM) is the state agency authorized to receive initial notification from Florida Power & Light Company (FPL). The State Watch Office (SWO) is responsible for alerting the state and county emergency response agencies to all notifications from FPL. Specific discussion on transportation of state emergency response personnel to the vicinity of the plant is discussed in Chapter 8 of the State Plan. This emergency response is conducted in accordance with the State Plan prepared by the DEM, in coordination with other State and County emergency response agencies. The locations where State Plan copies are kept at the St. Lucie Plant appear in Appendix D.

The OEM's defined responsibilities include:

1: Overall responsibility for coordinating the development and implementation of state and county emergency response plans.

2. Command and control of State emergency response resources.

3. Notification of state and county response agencies.

4. Coordination among state, federal (i.e., FEMA, EPA, DOE), and local agencies.

State of Florida Department of Health

The Department of Health is the state agency authorized to provide the DEM with technical support and expertise in public health matters.

Department of Health defined responsibilities include:

1. Emergency medical services, public health, and sanitation.

2. Economic and social services.

Through the Bureau of Radiation Control

3. Radiological monitoring, off-site.

4. Off-site radiological exposure control and protective response recommendations for plume and ingestion pathway counties.



2.1 2. State of Florida Emergency Response Organization (continued)

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Florida Highway Patrol

EP3:4

The Florida Highway Patrol, through the coordination of the Department of Law Enforcement, provides the following services.

1. Traffic control

2. Communications (support)

3. Law enforcement coordination

4. Upon request, assist in the transportation of samples for analysis when immediate analysis is necessary

5. Within their authority, evaluate and exclude individuals from designated public areas.

These services will be provided in accordance with the State Plan (Chapter 2).

Other State Agencies

As defined in the State Plan (Chapter 2), the DEM can request support as necessary from the following state agencies.

1. Department of Transportation

2. Department of Military Affairs

3. American Red Cross


w I-iii

I

LL LL 0

w !:: (/)

I z 0

EP3:4

FIGURE 2-1 FPL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY

EMERGENCY - INFORMATION

EMERGENCY MANAGER

CONTROL -OFFICER GOVERNMENTAL

I - AFFAIRS I MANAGER I

I I EMERGENCY I - SECURITY

MANAGER RECOVERY -MANAGER

EMERGENCY - TECHNICAL MANAGER

SHIFT MANAGER EMERGENCY SENIOR MANAGER COORDINATOR OR ALTERNATE

(ON-SHIFT) (EC) (PRIMARY)

ON-SHIFT EMERGENCY FUNCTION PRIMARY

As Directed by Recovery As Directed By

& Emergency Coordinator/ Emergency Coordinator Restoration Recovery Manager

TSC Health Physics Radiation Health Physics Supervisor Representative Protection or

Alternate

Fire Brigade Fire Fire Brigade Leader Protection Leader

Operations/Chemistry First Aid

Operations/Chemistry Personnel Personnel

Security Shift Specialist TSC Security Supervisor Alternate Security or

Protected Area Guard Alternate

As Directed By Site Assembly . Site Assembly Security Shift Specialist Area Supervisor

Other Trained Emergency Response osc ERO Personnel On-Shift (Re-entry/Repair) Re-entry Teams

Chemistry Off-Site TSC Dose Assessor/ Representative Dose Calculations EOF Dose Assessor

(DIPS1i:PLAN-F2. f-R371tif}


2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES

2.1 3. County Emergency Response Agencies

Counties that fall within the plume exposure pathway EPZ include St. Lucie County and Martin County. Counties that fall within the ingestion pathway EPZ include St. Lucie County, Martin County, Indian River County, Brevard County, Palm Beach County, Osceola County, Okeechobee County, Highlands County and Glades County. The responsibility for hosting evacuees rests on Palm Beach, Indian River, and Brevard Counties.

EP3:4

The county emergency response agencies are described in Appendix Ill of the State Plan.

Chapter 10 of the State Plan addresses short term actions required in the plume exposure pathway EPZ and ingestion pathway EPZ. State agencies take the lead in controlling ingestion pathway response. Appendix Ill establishes procedures to protect citizens of St. Lucie County and visitors to the County from the effects of an accident at the St. Lucie plant. Section II A of Appendix Ill includes the St. Lucie County Radiological Emergency Organization. Section II B of Appendix Ill establishes procedures to protect citizens of Martin County and visitors to Martin County from the effects of an accident at the St. Lucie plant. Section II B of Appendix Ill describes the Martin County Radiological Emergency Organization. Section II C, II D, and II E to Appendix Ill include host plans for Indian River County, Palm Beach County, and Brevard County, respectively.

Boards of County Commissioners will take proper and responsible action to protect life, health, safety, property, and the environment from the consequences of nuclear power accidents. During radiological emergencies, resources and personnel of St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, Palm Beach, and Brevard Counties will be reserved and available for use by County Commissioners. Decision to implement protective action recommendations will be made jointly by the Chairpersons, Boards of County Commissioners (of the affected counties), and the Governor or State Director, Division of Emergency Management. If time does not permit State involvement in initial decision making, the decision to take protective actions may be made by the Chairperson, Board of County Commissioners (for the respective affected county), or designated alternate. All County personnel and resources will be under the control of the County Commissioners. Federal and State resources will also be available to the Counties.



2.1 3. County Emergency Response Agencies (continued)

EP3:4

Alerting, warning, and evacuation of populations will be in accordance with procedures prescribed in Sections VI and VII of Appendix Ill and in Chapters 5 and 11 of the State Plan. Sections IX and XII of Appendix Ill describe hosting responsibilities, including shelter location and operation, and evacuee registration, monitoring, and decontamination.

Responsibility for direction and control of emergency response of each county rests with the Chairperson, Board of County Commissioners, unless a disaster declaration under provisions of Florida Statutes, Chapter 252 is in effect. If a disaster has been declared, responsibility for direction and control rests with the Governor or authorized representative.

In accordance with Chapter 252, Part Ill, Florida Statues, Florida has also adopted the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and Memoranda of Understanding between the Counties, other States and private organizations. These agreements provide mechanisms to obtain additional resources.

County Departments of Public Safety report to the Boards of County Commissioners. This is also true for other County resources, including the Sheriffs' Offices, Engineers' Offices, Fire Departments, Public Health Offices, School Boards, and other county organizations.

The Chairperson, Board of County Commissioners, has responsibility for overall emergency response planning. County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors are responsible for actual plan development and updating. St. Lucie County, Palm Beach County, Martin County, Indian River County, and Brevard County each have an Emergency Operations Center (EOG).




EP3:4

St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors

The Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors for St. Lucie and Martin Counties have the major responsibility for coordinating emergency operations including communicating with the County Board and State DEM. The County Public Safety Directors receive initial notification from Florida Power & Light Company simultaneously with DEM via the State's Hot Ring Down telephone for all radiological emergencies. The St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors then have responsibility for initiating any necessary protective actions for off-site areas (including off-site evacuations) based upon available information from the FPL Emergency Coordinator, Recovery Manager, and Bureau of Radiation Control. The St. Lucie County and Martin County plans are a part of the State Plan. In addition to overall responsibility, the Public Safety Directors have responsibility for the following:

St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors (continued)

1. Coordination of county resources

2. Protective response for off-site areas including warning and evacuation

3. Communications

4. Public information

5. Off-site radiological exposure control

6. Coordination of arrangements for shelter and feeding of evacuees




County Sheriffs (St. Lucie and Martin Counties)

EP3:4

At the request of the respective Public Safety/Emergency Management Director, the County Sheriffs can provide the following support services:

1. Law enforcement

2. Warning and evacuation (implementation)

3. Traffic control

4. Communications (support)

5. Rescue(support)

Other Local Agencies

As defined in the County plans, the Public Safety/Emergency Management Director can request support as necessary from the following:

1. County Engineer's Department

2. County Road Department

3. County Public Health Departments

4. Public School Boards

5. County Fire/Rescue Department

Other Local Agencies (continued)

St. Lucie County-Fort Pierce Fire District by agreement with Florida Power & Light Company (Appendix E) will respond to emergencies on-site upon request.

4. Federal Response Agencies

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will be notified via a dedicated telephone line (ENS) from the Control Room to the Operations Center in Maryland immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes. NRC is the Coordinating Agency for incidents that occur at fixed nuclear facilities.



2.1 4. Federal Response Agencies (continued)

U.S. Coast Guard

EP3:4

At the request of Florida Power & Light Company (on-site activities) and the DEM (off-site activities), the Coast Guard can provide rescue assistance in accordance with their general authority as described in Appendix E.

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

Upon request by the Department of Health, DEM can request that the DOE provide a Radiological Assistance Team to aid in evaluating radiological hazards. This support would be provided out of DOE's Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, South Carolina. This provision is described in Chapter 9, Section IV, of the State Plan. DOE is responsible for coordinating the off-site radiological monitoring and evaluation activities of the Federal Government.

Federal Emergency Management _Agency (FEMA)

FEMA has the responsibility for coordinating all non-technical response activities of the Federal Government off-site. They serve as the primary point of contact for requests for federal assistance from state and local officials and other federal agencies.

5. Private Sector Organizations

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

INPO maintains industry source lists for personnel and equipment which can be made available for support services during an emergency.

Westinghouse Electric

ABB/Combustion Engineering (CE), now Westinghouse Electric, is the Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor for the St. Lucie Plant. Upon request, Westinghouse Electric can supply emergency technical services and resources as provided by the Purchase Order listed in Appendix E.

AECOM (previously URS and Washington Group)

AECOM is the Architect/Engineer for the St. Lucie Plant. Upon request, URS Corporation can supply emergency technical services as provided by the Purchase Order listed in Appendix E.


2. ORGANIZATION. FACILITIES. AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued)

2.2 Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization (ERO)

EP3:4

The purpose of this section is to describe FPL's Emergency Response Organization. The Emergency Response Organization is defined relative to the two phases of response and actions which are anticipated. This approach recognizes that the organization will be a dynamic one, dependent upon response time and the severity of the emergency. The "on-shift" response consists of shift operators, the plant duty shift and other trained plant personnel as available who are responsible for diagnosing the emergency and taking corrective actions. Along with the required shift operations personnel, the "expanded" response includes personnel necessary to man the TSC, OSC, and EOF. The ERO includes plant and corporate personnel who are available, as the emergency warrants, to assist in assessment actions, control, and stabilization.

1. Normal On-site Operating Organization

A generalized operating organization chart for St. Lucie Plant is shown in Figure 2-3. The specific plant organization chart is in plant procedures. The plant is staffed with qualified personnel prepared to take necessary actions to implement the Emergency Plan and to initiate the necessary immediate response actions.



2.2 1. Normal On-site Operating Organization ( continued)

EP3:4

During normal hours, the operating staff at the St. Lucie Plant consists of approximately 1100 people. During off-hours approximately 76 employees are on-site. Key operating positions are described below:

Site Director - St. Lucie Plant

The Site Director - St. Lucie Plant, reports to the Regional Vice President and has the direct responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the St. Lucie Plant in a safe, reliable, and efficient manner.

Operations Director

The Operations Director reports directly to the Site Director and has the overall responsibility for directing the day-to-day operation of the plant. The Operations Director coordinates operations-related maintenance activities with the Maintenance Manager. The Operations Director is responsible for directing supervisory activities in the area of Operations.

Assistant Operations Manager

The Assistant Operations Manager reports directly to the Operations Director. He/she has responsibility for directing the activities of the nuclear plant operating shifts, including the Shift Manager and Unit Supervisors. He/she holds an NRC Senior Reactor Operator License. He/she is also responsible for supervision of fuel handling operations.

Shift Manager (SM)

The Shift Manager reports directly to the Assistant Operations Manager. He/she is responsible for the actual operation of the nuclear plant and fuel handling operations on his/her assigned shift. He/she holds an active NRC Senior Reactor Operator License. He/she directs the activities of the personnel on his/her shift and is cognizant of maintenance activities being performed while on duty.


2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES. AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued)

2.2 1. Normal On-site Operating Organization (continued)

Unit Supervisor (US)

EP3:4

The Unit Supervisor reports directly to the Shift Manager. He/she holds an active NRG Senior Reactor Operator License. He/she directs the activities of the Operators on his/her assigned Unit and remains cognizant of all maintenance activities performed on that Unit while on duty.

Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE)

The Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE) reports directly to both Unit Supervisors. He/she is the operating shift foreman and is responsible for plant operations on his/her shift. The NWE directs the activities of non-licensed operators on his/her shift.

Chemistry Manager

The Chemistry Manager is responsible for administrative oversight of the Chemistry Control Program. He/she serves as a member of the St. Lucie Plant Emergency Response Organization.

Radiation Protection Manager

The Radiation Protection Manager is responsible for administrative oversight of the Radiation Protection Program. He/she serves as a member of the St. Lucie Plant Emergency Response Organization.

Reactor Engineering Supervisor

The Reactor Engineering Supervisor reports to the Engineering Manager. He/she supervises the Reactor Engineering Department. He/she is responsible for monitoring day-to-day reactor operation, nuclear physics testing, fuel burnup calculations, fuel shuffles during refuelings, and various administrative duties.



2.2 1. Normal On-site Operating Organization (continued)

Maintenance Director

EP3:4

The Maintenance Director reports directly to the Site Director. He/she supervises the Electrical Maintenance, Mechanical Maintenance, and Instrument and Control (l&C) Departments. He/she is responsible for the maintenance of mechanical, electrical, and l&C equipment in the nuclear units.

System Engineering Manager

The System Engineering Manager reports directly to the Engineering Director. He/she supervises general plant engineers and technicians.

Nuclear Assurance Supervisor

The Nuclear Assurance Supervisor reports directly to the Nuclear Oversight & Assessment Director. He/she supervises the Nuclear Assurance Department. He/she is responsible for directing the activities of the Nuclear Assurance Inspectors who perform surveillance and inspection of nuclear safety related activities to monitor for technical specification and regulatory compliance.

Fire Brigade Leader

The Fire Brigade Leader reports to the SM, US or EC. The Fire Brigade Leader is a designated on-shift Operations Department individual who has the knowledge or has received sufficient training in plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability and advises the Control Room as required in the FSAR and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

On-site Review Group (ORG)

The On-site Review Group functions to advise the Site Director on all matters related to nuclear safety. Specific responsibilities of the ORG are identified in the Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR).



2.2 (continued)

EP3:4

2. On-shift Response Phase

Initiating Event (Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency)

The emergency response is initiated by any individual who discovers an emergency condition. This person notifies the Shift Manager by the fastest means possible. This first phase is characterized by diagnosis and immediate action by the plant operators on shift.

Organization

If the diagnosis indicates that the condition should be classified as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, the Shift Manager declares an emergency.

The Shift Manager becomes the Emergency Coordinator and, as such, directs the On-shift Emergency Response Organization. Initially, shift operators and the plant duty staff constitute the response organization. Emergency requirements take immediate precedence over normal operating responsibilities (as determined by procedure or at the direction of the Emergency Coordinator). The Plant Staff Emergency Assignments section describes the emergency services that can be provided initially by shift operators and the plant duty staff. Figure 2-4 shows the On-shift Emergency Response Capability.


N I .....

CJ1

fa r C ()

_ro· ;;u (1)

:< Ol --.J

TRAINING MANAGER

OPERATIONS DIRECTOR

RADIATION PROTECTION MANAGER

SAFETY MANAGER

REGIONAL VICE PRESIDENT SOUTHERN REGION

I I SITE DIRECTOR LICENSING

ST. LUCIE PLANT MANAGER

I EMERGENCY - PREPAREDNESS MANAGER

WORK MANAGEMENT

MANAGER

CHEMISTRY MANAGER

MAINTENANCE .__ MANAGER

FLEET EXECUTIVES

SECURITY MANAGER

HUMAN RESOURCES

SUPPLY CHAIN -MANAGER

PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT ,_

MANAGER

SUPERVISORS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES INCLUDING THE FUNCTIONS OF ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENT & CONTROL, AND MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE

0 BUSINESS PERATIONS MANAGER

EN GINEERING DIRECTOR

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

MANAGER

ERRT ENGINEERING MANAGER

ENGINEERING PROGRAMS MANAGER

(D/PS/EPLAN/Fig.2-3/Rev.55/png)

en :-' r C: (")

m "t1

> z -4 z 0 ;:o :s: !! )> G) re: 0 ;:o "tJ m mN ~w :::! z G)

0 ;:o G) )> z

E 0 z

FIGURE 2-4 ON-SHIFT EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY

SHIFT MANAGER/ EMERGENCY

COORDINATOR

SHIFT COMMUNICATOR

SHIFT TECHNICAL

ADVISOR

RADIATION PROTECTION PERSONNEL

FIRE BRIGADE LEADER

-

--

FIRST AID TEAM -

SECURITY SHIFT

SPECIALIST

CHEMISTRY REPRESENTATIVE

OTHER TRAINED

-

-

ERO PERSONNEL -ON-SHIFT

UNIT SUPERVISOR

I I

NUCLEAR LICENSED WATCH PLANT

ENGINEER OPERATORS I I

NON-LICENSED PLANT

OPERATORS

(DIPSIEPLAN/flg.2-4/Rev.36/png)



2.2 2. On-shift Response Phase (continued)

Line of Succession

EP3:4

In the event the Shift Manager is incapacitated, the Emergency Coordinator will be (in order of succession):

1. Unit Supervisor (from the affected Unit)

2. Any other member of the plant staff with an active Senior Reactor Operator license.

It is the responsibility of the new Emergency Coordinator to ascertain the status of all Emergency Coordinator responsibilities prior to assumption of duty. The Emergency Coordinator can grant permission for watch relief, including his/her own, when it is safe in his/her judgement to do so.

The Site Director, Operations Director, or Assistant Operations Manager should assume the Emergency Coordinator function from the Shift Manager following proper turnover. Other senior managers who have extensive plant or industry operating experience or knowledge and Emergency Coordinator qualifications may assume the Emergency Coordinator function.

Actions

The Emergency Coordinator initiates the following actions per plant procedures and using his/her judgement:

1. Orders corrective actions to bring the emergency under control.

2. Mobilizes the Emergency Response Organization.

3. Notifies the State Division of Emergency Management State Watch Office Duty Officer and County Public Safety Directors, in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Provides recommendations for off-site protective action as discussed in Chapter 5.

5. Notifies NRC via ENS immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes.




Delegation

EP3:4

The Emergency Coordinator shall not delegate the following responsibilities prior to the TSC being declared operational:

1 . Classification of Emergencies

2. Decision to notify off-site organizations and the content of those notifications.

3. Recommendation of protective actions for the public (off-site).

The EC may delegate the completion of certain tasks, but is responsible to ensure that all tasks are completed and logged.

Turnover

Once the Technical Support Center (TSC) is operational and proper turnover has been conducted, the TSC Emergency Coordinator will assume the responsibility for classification of emergencies, notification of off-site organizations and for recommending protective actions.

Once the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is operational and proper turnover has been conducted, the Recovery Manager will assume responsibility for notification of off-site organizations and for recommending protective actions.

Plant Staff Emergency Assignments

A. On-shift Emergency Response Organization

1. The On-shift Emergency Response Organization is composed of operators, the plant duty staff and other trained ERO personnel on-shift. All are qualified in procedures and practices required for the performances of their duties as ERO members. The On-shift Emergency Response Organization takes action until the emergency condition is mitigated or until relieved.

2. Members of the On-shift Emergency Response Organization may consider themselves relieved only upon the specific instructions of the EC or appropriate facility supervisor. Merely knowing that a replacement is present does not constitute a release from emergency duties and responsibilities.


2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) ·


EP3:4

B. Expanded Emergency Response Organization

1. The Expanded Emergency Response Organization is composed of operations personnel and ERO personnel to man the TSC, OSC, and EOF, as necessary.

2. With the knowledge of the appropriate facility supervisor, alternate ERO members may relieve their counterpart on the On-shift Emergency Response Organization.

C. Functional Areas of Emergency Activity

1. Plant Operations and Assessments of Operational Aspects

The Shift Manager (SM) on duty becomes the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the event of an emergency. His/her normal alternate is the Unit Supervisor (US) from the affected unit. The SM and US positions are constantly manned. The Site Director, Operations Director, Assistant Operations Manager, or another EC-trained person should assume the Emergency Coordinator function following proper turnover.

If the Technical Support Center (TSC) is activated, the EC should direct the on-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) from the TSC. The SM will remain in the control room to control and monitor plant conditions.

2. Emergency Direction and Control

Emergency Coordinator as previously discussed.

3. Notification and Communication

Emergency Coordinator as previously discussed.



2.2 2. C. Functional Areas of Emergency Activity (continued)

EP3:4

4. Radiological Accident Assessment and In-Plant Protective Actions

The primary TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor is the Radiation Protection Manager. He/she directs the radiological surveillance performed by the Radiation Protection technicians under the orders of the Emergency Coordinator. Prior to the availability of the TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor, the Radiation Protection technicians on-site will provide assistance to the EC in recommending protective actions based on radiological assessments.

The Chemistry Department performs off-site radiological dose assessment until the EOF is manned and operational and the Recovery Manager, through his/her staff, relieves them of this responsibility. The TSC Chemistry Supervisor will continue to monitor dose assessment results with personnel performing dose calculations in the EOF.

5. Plant System Engineering, Repair, and Corrective Actions and Support of Operational Accident Assessment

The Shift Technical Advisor will provide the initial technical support necessary for repair, corrective actions, and operational accident assessment.

6. Firefighting

The Fire Brigade provides first line response to a fire onsite. The Fire Brigade is under the direction of the Fire Brigade Leader. The St. Lucie County - Ft. Pierce Fire District can respond to fires on-site, if requested.

7. Rescue Operations and First Aid

A. Rescue Operations involve the First Aid Team and Radiation Protection personnel as necessary~ Under the control of the Emergency Coordinator/TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor, entry to potentially hazardous areas will be made by the First Aid Team with assistance from Radiation Protection personnel. Upon notification of the injury, the team will respond per the Emergency Coordinator's instructions.


2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES. AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued)

2.2 2. C. Functional Areas of Emergency Activity (continued)

EP3:4

7. B. An Operations Department representative (either an operator or chemist), trained in first aid will act as the on-shift team leader for the First Aid Team. Operations Department personnel, trained in first aid, serve as the First Aid Team members and will be the primary care provider.

8. Access Control and Personnel Accountability

The TSC Security Supervisor will ensure personnel control and accountability. It is estimated that personnel accountability can be accomplished within 30 minutes following the declaration of an evacuation by the EC. Notification of occupants in the Owner Controlled Area, outside the Protected Area, will be accomplished by security sweeps.

9. Repair and Damage Control

Repair and damage control will be performed by assigned teams. These teams may be composed of members from any plant discipline and may be augmented by non-Florida Power & Light Company support personnel. Under the direction of the Emergency Coordinator or his/her designee, these teams are used to mitigate the consequences of the accident and to help restore the normal operation of the plant. Actions include, but are not limited to, the movement and set-up of portable shielding, tools, emergency equipment, the repair of equipment and the operation of plant systems.



2.2 3. Expanded Response Phc;1se

Initiating Action

EP3:4

This phase is initiated by the Emergency Coordinator (EC). Notification by the EC provides the basis for mobilization of the Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization (ERO) as well as state, local, and federal emergency response organizations. Activation of FPL personnel proceeds to the degree necessary, as determined by the EC, in response to the severity of the emergency.

In an Alert or higher emergency, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC) shall become operational. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) shall become operational in a Site Area Emergency and/or General Emergency. Figure 2-5 shows the response organization that can develop during this period.


TABLE 2-1 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION FOR A TWO UNIT SITE

WITH SEPARATE CONTROL ROOMS

Position Shift Manager (SRO)

Unit Supervisors (SRO)

Reactor Operators

Shift Technical Advisor 1

Auxiliary Operators/Fire Brigade 2

Shift Communicator

Radiation Protection Technicians

Rad/Chemistry Technician

Security

Number of Individuals Required to Fill Position 1

2 (1 per Unit)

4 (2 per Unit)

1

7

1

2

1

Per Security Plan

1 A single, on-site STA position shall be manned unless the Shift Manager meets the qualifications for the STA as required by Technical Specification 6.3.1 or an individual on each unit with a Senior Reactor Operator's license meets the qualifications for the STA as required by Technical Specification 6.3.1.

2 Fire Brigade staffing consists of a minimum of five (5) personnel; One (1) Fire Brigade Leader and four (4) Fire Brigade Members from Operations.

Note: The St. Lucie on-shift staffing analysis confirms the above positions are not assigned concurrent duties as specified in 1 OCFR50 Appendix E, Section IV.A.9.


TABLE 2-1 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION FOR A TWO UNIT SITE

WITH SEPARATE CONTROL ROOMS (continued)

SHIFT STAFFING AUGMENTATION AND EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES

NOTE Augmented staffing capabilities are routinely tested to ensure timely response is maintained with respect to the goals identified in NUREG 0654.

Major Functional Area

1. Notification/Communication

2. Radiological Accident Assessment and Support of Operational Accident Assessment/Protective Actions (In-Plant)

A. Activate EOF (Sr. Mgt. Rep.)

B. Off-site Dose Assessment and Rad/Chem technician 1

C. Radiation Protection Technicians

3. Plant System Engineering, Repair and Corrective Actions

A. Core/Thermal Hydraulics

B. Electrical (TSC)/ Mechanical (TSC)

C. Mechanical Maintenance/ Radwaste Operator

D. Electrical Maintenance

E. l&C Technician

1 Combines all qualified individuals for similar functions from Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1

2 On-shift 3 Two are on-shift

EP3:4 2-24

Augmented Staffing Capabilities/

NUREG-0654 Goal

30 min.

1

12

63

1

1

1

60 min.

2

1

1

6

1 1

1 1

1

St. Lucie, Rev. 67 I

TABLE 2-2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

RESPONSIBILITY

Function On-shift Expanded

Command and Control Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator/ (Shift Manager) Recovery Manager

Warning Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator/ Recovery Manager

Notification Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator/ Communications Recovery Manager

Public Information Emergency Coordinator Emergency Information Manager

Accident Assessment Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator (assisted by Shift Technical assisted by TSC Technical Advisor) Staff

Fire Fire Brigade Leader Fire Brigade Leader

Rescue Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator

Traffic Control Security Shift Specialist TSC Security Supervisor (on-site)

Emergency Medical On-shift First Aid Team On-shift First Aid Team Services

Transportation Security Shift Specialist Emergency Security Manager

Protective Response Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator/ (on-site) TSC RP Supervisor

Radiological Exposure Emergency Coordinator TSC RP Supervisor Control (on-site) (assisted by Radiation

Protection Department representative)

Radiological Dose Emergency Coordinator Recovery Manager Assessment (assisted by Chemistry ( assisted by Recovery

Department representative) Manager's Staff)



2.2 4. Key Emergency Operations Facility Positions

Emergency Control Officer (ECO)

EP3:4

The ECO is a designated company officer or senior manager who will act as the chief nuclear officer. He/she will serve as the official spokesperson for the Nuclear Division.

Recovery Manager (RM)

The RM is a senior manager who has knowledge of nuclear plant operations and design and who will be responsible for declaring the EOF operational and directing the Company's expanded emergency response organization in conjunction with the Emergency Coordinator. He/she has the authority to establish policy and to expend funds necessary to cope with any emergency situations that arise. The Recovery Manager reports initially to the EOF. The following specific responsibilities are assumed by the RM in the EOF:

1. To inform the Emergency Control Officer periodically of the on-site status of the emergency and immediately of any significant changes.

2. To provide support and data as necessary to the Emergency Coordinator.

3. To obtain information on diagnosis and prognosis of the emergency, estimates of radioactive releases, prevailing meteorological conditions, projected radiological exposures, and recommended off-site protective actions.

4. To assume from the EC, the responsibility for communicating such information to and coordinating with off-site organizations, and the issuance of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the public.

5. To assure continuity of technical and administrative support, and material resources.

6. To request additional support from FPL and others as necessary.

7. To provide logistical support for emergency personnel (e.g., transportation, communications, temporary quarters, food, water and sanitary facilities in the field, and procurement of special equipment and supplies).



2.2 4. Key Emergency Operations Facility Positions

Emergency Information Manager (EIM)

EP3:4

The EIM is a senior manager or designated member of the Corporate Communications Department experienced in disseminating information to the public via the news media. The EIM operates from the Emergency Operations Facility. The EIM will have the following responsibilities:

1. To serve as a public spokesperson for FPL.

2. To disseminate available information from the ECO to the news media and to provide periodic updates.

3. To work with federal, state and county public information representatives to effect joint releases and public appearances.

4. To provide for dispatching a company representative to the St. Lucie County and Martin County EOCs, if appropriate.

Emergency Security Manager (ESM)

The ESM is a company supervisor, manager, or specialist with security experience and will be responsible to the RM for providing liaison with county law enforcement and rescue agencies. The ESM also provides for and manages security personnel at the EOF/JIC.

Emergency Technical Manager (ETM)

The ETM is a manager or senior engineer with detailed knowledge of nuclear plant design and who will be responsible for providing technical support and information regarding engineering design for the plant.

Governmental Affairs Manager (GAM)

The GAM is a member of the Governmental Affairs staff experienced in interfacing with political officials of local, state, and federal governments. He/she acts as liaison between the ECO and these political officials.



2.2 4. Key Emergency Operations Facility Positions (continued)

Lines of Succession

Lines of succession for the Recovery Manager and Managers of the Expanded Emergency Organization are controlled by procedures which are maintained by the site Emergency Preparedness Manager.

Delegation

Delegation authority is controlled by procedure.

2.3 Emergency Response Support and Resources

EP3:4

This section describes the arrangements that Florida Power & Light Company has made for assistance to augment the Emergency Response Organization.

1. Response Organization Representatives

Florida Power & Light Company has provided facilities in the Emergency Operations Facility for representatives from FPL, state, local, and federal response organizations.

2. Radiological Laboratories

Florida Power & Light Company has primary and backup radiological laboratory facilities on-site. A hot lab backup will be provided by portable equipment described in procedures. Environmental sampling will be augmented by the State's Radiological monitoring team and the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) within approximately three hours of activation. If required, the laboratory facilities at FPL's Turkey Point Plant can be used; appropriate arrangements will be made on an as-needed basis.

3. Additional Assistance

The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) maintains industry source lists for personnel and equipment which can be made available for support services during an emergency. Additional technical assistance can also be obtained directly from the Nuclear Steam System Supply (NSSS) vendor (ABB/Combustion Engineering Co., now Westinghouse Electric).


FIGURE 2-5 EXPANDED RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

ON-SITE (REQUIRED @ ALERT)

OFF-SITE (REQUIRED @ SITE AREA EMERGENCY

& GENERAL EMERGENCY)

i------ EMERGENCY INFORMATION

OFFICER

EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

1 I I

........L I I I I I I

RECOVERY MANAGER

---EMERGENCY

CONTROL OFFICER

L---------,

TSC SUPERVISOR

- OPERATIONS

- RADIATION PROTECTION

-CHEMISTRY

- REACTOR ENGINEERING

-SECURITY

,_ ENGINEERING

- TECHNICAL STAFF

EP3:4

I I I I L----------,

OSC SUPERVISOR

- OPERATIONS

,_ RADIATION PROTECTION

1-CHEMISTRY

-SECURITY

- MAINT. SUPERVISORS

,_ RE-ENTRY TM. MEMBERS

.__ SUPPORT STAFF

2-29

'-

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

MANAGER

EMERGENCY '- TECHNICAL

MANAGER

EMERGENCY SECURITY MANAGER

--- EOF STAFF

(DIP5/EPLAN/Fi'g2-5/Rev.1/png)


2. ORGANIZATION. FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued)

2.3. 4. Support to Federal Assistance Teams

EP3:4

The Recovery Manager has the authority to request Federal assistance. It is expected that such assistance will be provided primarily by the NRC. Also, FEMA may send a representative to the EOF for near-site coordination of federal resources. It is expected that NRC personnel will begin to arrive at the site within 6 hours after declaration of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.

Requests for assistance from the Department of Energy's Savannah River Operations office in Aiken, South Carolina can be made by the State under the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP). Such requests are the responsibility of the Director of the Division of Emergency Management in consultation with the Department of Health.

Federal assistance teams can achieve access to the plant area through the Stuart, Florida airfield, approximately one half hour from the plant. The company may assign an individual to meet such assistance teams and to escort them to the appropriate facilities, if necessary.

Florida Power & Light has reserved adequate space and facilities for the staff of the NRC and FEMA at the EOF. Designated phone lines, workspace and support services (reproduction, office supplies, etc.) will be arranged through Florida Power & Light. Similar arrangements have been made in the TSC for the NRC. These provisions are routinely exercised and evaluated for adequacy by the NRC.



2.4 Emergency Facilities and Equipment

EP3:4

This section describes the facilities and equipment that Florida Power & Light Company maintains in readiness for an emergency situation. Figure 2-6 shows the locations of the on-site facilities.

1. Control Room

For any emergency response, the Control Room of the affected unit serves as the initial point of control. The Shift Manager (SM) stations himself in the affected unit's Control Room when he/she assumes the role of Emergency Coordinator (EC). The EC can leave the Control Room if necessary, after a proper turnover to a qualified alternate EC, to make a personal assessment regarding plant safety.

The Control Rooms are designed to remain tenable under accident conditions described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). All plant related operations are directed from the Control Room. Nuclear plant instrumentation, including area and process radiation monitoring system instrumentation, is provided in the Control Room to give early warning of a potential emergency and to provide for continuing indication of an emergency situation. The Control Rooms contain the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the reactor under normal and emergency conditions.

A supply of radiological emergency equipment is maintained in each of the Control Rooms. Table 2-3 provides an example list of emergency equipment maintained for the two Control Rooms and the Technical Support Center (TSC) use.

Each Control Room contains the necessary communications equipment for notifying on-site personnel and off-site authorities in the event of an accident. This includes the Hot Ring Down (HRD) telephone to the State Watch Office (SWO), EMnet (Satellite Communications System), Emergency Notification System (ENS) to the NRG Operations Center (in Maryland), commercial telephones, Florida Power & Light Company radio system, public address system, portable radio sets (walkie-talkies), and a radio paging system. These systems are used as defined by procedure to accomplish the necessary notifications and communications.



2.4 2. Technical Support Center (TSC)

EP3:4

The company maintains an on-site Technical Support Center to provide the Control Room with in-depth diagnostic and engineering assistance without adding to congestion within the Control Room. The TSC interfaces with the EOF regarding those diagnostic and engineering decisions. This assistance can help determine the operational decisions that would be appropriate to best control and mitigate the consequences of the emergency. The TSC is located adjacent to the Unit 1 Control Room.

Activation of the Technical Support Center will be initiated by the Emergency Coordinator in the event of an Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Arrangements have been made to staff the TSC in a timely manner.

The Technical Support Center contains pertinent records and drawings.

The Technical Support Center has an emergency communications network similar to the Control Rooms. The TSC also has the NRC Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS).

3. Operational Support Center (OSC)

The company maintains an on-site Operational Support Center (OSC) to serve as an assembly point for auxiliary operators, radiation protection technicians, maintenance personnel, and other plant personnel available to support the emergency response. Required staff will be assigned to appropriate activities by the Emergency Coordinator or his/her designee.

Equipment that can be used by personnel dispatched from the OSC is stored in the South Service Building. Table 2-4 indicates the types of material and equipment stored there.

Activation of the OSC will be initiated by the Emergency Coordinator. The OSC will be activated and in operation for an Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Arrangements have been made to staff the OSC in a timely manner.

The OSC is maintained in the Outage Control Center on the second floor of the South Service Building. Telephone communications are maintained between the OSC and the Technical Support Center.



2.4 4. Alternate Operational Support Center

EP3:4

In the event that the OSC becomes uninhabitable, the Emergency Coordinator will designate an alternate location in accordance with procedures.

5. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The company maintains an Emergency Operations Facility from which evaluation and coordination of FPL activities related to an emergency can be carried out and from which FPL can provide information to federal, state, and local authorities.

The Emergency Operations Facility is located at the intersection of State Route 712 (Midway Road) and 1-95 approximately 10 % miles west of the St. Lucie Plant. The EOF has sufficient space to accommodate the Florida Power & Light Company response organization and designated representatives of the federal, state, and local authorities. Alternate temporary locations for the Emergency Operations Facility may be designated by the Recovery Manager if a natural disaster or other (non-radiological) external event significantly affects the operational capability of the facility.

The Emergency Operations Facility has an emergency communications network including but not limited to, commercial (Bell) telephone lines, Hot Ring Down (HRD) phone, NRC ENS, NRC HPN, NRC counterpart links, EMnet (Satellite Communications System), and various Florida Power & Light Co. maintained radio systems. Essential, precalculated emergency data and pertinent reports and drawings are readily available.

The RM is responsible for declaring the EOF operational. The EOF is required to be in operation for a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, but may go operational for an Alert. Arrangements have been made to activate the EOF in a timely manner.

The EOF serves as an alternate facility for the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center in a hostile action event at the station.

These facilities collectively have the following characteristics: the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action.



2.4 6. Joint Information Center (JIG)

EP3:4

A Joint Information Center (JIG) is provided to allow the news media access to information from the Emergency Operations Facility. The Emergency Information Manager will designate an individual to supervise the JIG. The JIG is co-located with the EOF (Midway Road/1-95 intersection).


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EP3:4

TABLE 2-3 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

FOR CONTROL ROOMS AND TSC

Unit 1 Control Room/TSC Storage Locker

1. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus 2. Pocket Dosimeters/ Electronic Personnel Dosimeters (EPDs) 3. Dosimeter Charger 4. TLDs 5. Coveralls 6. Hoods 7. Gloves 8. Shoe Covers 9. Full Face Respirators and Filters 10. Portable Count Rate Instrumentation 11. Portable Dose Rate Instrumentation 12. Contamination Smears and Envelopes 13. Radiation Tape/Rope 14. Radiological Signs 15. Step-Off Pads 16. Plastic Bags

Unit 2 Control Room Storage Locker

1. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus 2. Pocket Dosimeters/ Electronic Personnel Dosimeters (EPDs) 3. Dosimeter Charger 4. TLDs 5. Coveralls 6. Hoods 7. Gloves 8. Shoe Covers 9. Full Face Respirators and Filters 10. Portable Count Rate Instrumentation

11. Portable Dose Rate Instrumentation 12. Contamination Smears and Envelopes 13. Radiation Tape/Rope 14. Radiological Signs 15. Step-Off Pads 16. Plastic Bags


EP3:4

TABLE 2-4 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

FOR THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER

1. Coveralls

2. Shoe Covers

3. Hoods

4. Gloves

5. Full Face Respirators and Filters

6. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

7. Pocket Dosimeters/ Electronic Personnel Dosimeters (EPDs)

8. Dosimeter chargers

9. TLDs

10. Portable count rate instrumentation

11. Portable dose rate instrumentation

12. Radiological signs

13. Contamination smears and envelopes

14. Flashlights

15. Survey maps

16. Writing materials

17. Log Book

18. Decontamination kits

19. Radiological tape/rope

20. Selected procedures

21. Waste storage bags

22. Assorted batteries



2.4 7. St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center

EP3:4

The St. Lucie County EOG will be the point from which county response activities will be controlled. The facility is located at 15305 W. Midway Rd., Ft. Pierce, Florida. Communications include Hot Ring Down (HRD) phone, EMnet (Satellite Communications System), teletype, police department and fire department networks, and commercial telephone.

8. Martin County Emergency Operations Center

The Martin County EOG will be the point from which county response activities will be controlled. This facility is located at 800 S.E. Monterey Road, Stuart, Florida. Communications include Hot Ring Down (HRD) phone, EMnet (Satellite Communications System), teletype, police department and fire department networks, and commercial telephone.

9. Florida State Emergency Operations Center (State Watch Office)

The State's initial response comes from the State Emergency Operations Center (EOG) in Tallahassee. Initial notification goes to the State Watch Office (SWO) located in the State EOG. The location is 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida. Communications include Hot Ring Down (HRD), EMnet (Satellite Communications System), teletype and telephone. This facility is manned 24 hours a day by a duty officer.



2.5 Medical and Health Support

EP3:4

This section describes the agreements and provisions that Florida Power & Light Company has made for emergency medical support.

1. Plant First-Aid Facilities

The First-Aid Rooms on the ground floor of the Auxiliary Buildings are provided with first-aid supplies. The medical supplies in the FirstAid Rooms are checked on a two month basis and replenished as necessary. In addition, standard 24-unit First-Aid Kits are maintained at numerous locations throughout the St. Lucie Plant. The First-Aid Kits are checked once every two months and replenished as necessary. A commercial First-Aid Kit is maintained in the Site Assembly Station.

Personnel decontamination washrooms and shower rooms are provided on the ground floor of the Auxiliary Buildings. Accepted decontamination practices will be employed on-site and are described in a Radiation Protection procedure.

Life endangering injuries such as extensive burns, serious wounds or fractures shall receive prompt medical attention at off-site support medical facilities. Personnel with injures involving radiation or radioactive contamination can also be handled by these off-site support medical facilities. The off-site support medical facilities are Lawnwood Regional Medical Center in Ft. Pierce, Fl., and Martin Memorial Medical Center in Stuart, Fl.

Both of these medical facilities are equipped and staffed with physicians and nurses capable of treating a contaminated injured individual(s). The physicians will provide for medical examinations, treatment, and laboratory services for those employees and other persons, designated by Florida Power & Light Company, who have been involved in a radiation accident.

The patient receiving areas are equipped for patient decontamination and the performance of emergency medical procedures for lifesaving purposes. Additionally, these facilities have intensive care units available for the treatment of decontaminated radiation accident casualties or persons who have received only internal radiation exposure. Both facilities are available on a 24-hour basis.



2.5 Medical and Health Support (continued)

EP3:4

1. Plant First-Aid Facilities (continued)

Backup Facility

A letter of agreement between the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) and Florida Power & Light Company provides backup support for the definitive care and treatment of seriously irradiated persons. The ORAU Medical and Health Sciences Division operates the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the U.S. Department of Energy. It studies radiation and radioactive materials in diagnosis, therapy, and research. Its specialized facilities are available for the care and treatment of possible radiation accident victims.

2. Transportation of Injured Personnel

St. Lucie County-Ft. Pierce Fire District Rescue service, company, or private vehicle will provide transportation of personnel with injuries whether or not the injury is associated with radiation or contamination. The fire district rescue service is preferred, but in the case of injuries which require urgent transportation or external exposure without contamination, other transportation may be used.

3. Communications

When injured personnel are transported to an off-site medical facility by county ambulance, radio contact, as well as telemetry, is normally maintained between the facility and the ambulance. In accordance with procedures, telephone notification is made by the Plant to the medical facility concerning the pending arrival of an injured person(s).


3. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

The system which has been adopted for categorizing off-normal events or conditions at the Plant has four classes. In order of increasing severity, these are: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

3.1 Notification of Unusual Event

Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

1. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

2. Report the Unusual Event to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

3. Provide plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Close out by verbal summary to off-site authorities, or escalate to a higher class.

3.2 Alert

EP3:4

Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

FPL actions in response to this category will be:


2. The Emergency Coordinator will augment resources by activating the on-site Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center.

3. Report the Alert status to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Dispatch monitoring teams as directed by the TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor.

5. Provide periodic plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures, typically every sixty minutes or upon significant change in plant conditions.


3. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (continued)

3.2 6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures if releases are anticipated or occurring. If releases are occurring, provide dose estimates for actual releases.

7. Close out by verbal summary to off-site authorities, followed by a written summary within 24 hours, or escalate to a higher class.

3.3 Site Area Emergency

EP3:4

Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.



2. Augment resources as necessary by activating the on-site Technical Support Center, the on-site Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.

3. Report the Site Area Emergency status to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.



6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures.

7. Provide release and dose projections based on available plant and meteorological information and foreseeable contingencies.

8. Close out or recommend a change in emergency class when appropriate by briefing off-site authorities.

9. Submit a brief written summary to off-site authorities within 24 hours after closing out the emergency.



3.4 General Emergency

EP3:4

Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.



2. Augment resources by activating the on-site Technical Support Center, the on-site Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.

3. Report the General Emergency status to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.



6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures.

7. Provide release and dose projections based on available plant and meteorological information and foreseeable contin·gencies.

8. Provide off-site protective action recommendations to the State DEM.

9. Close out or recommend a reduction in emergency class when appropriate by briefing off-site authorities.

10. Submit a brief written summary to off-site authorities within 24 hours after closing out the emergency.



3.5 Emergency Action Levels

The Shift Manager (SM) uses the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) to evaluate plant conditions requiring declaration of an Emergency Class and initiation of the Emergency Plan. The EALs, listed in Appendices A, B and C, are grouped into Recognition Categories depending on the nature of the initiating condition and the impact on plant operation and safety. As the condition(s) of the plant degrade(s), increasing Emergency Action Levels are reached resulting in a higher (greater severity) class of emergency being declared. Fifteen (15) minutes should not be exceeded for assessing and classifying an emergency once indications (Emergency Action Levels (EALs) / thresholds) are available to Plant Operators that an Initiating Condition (IC) has been met and/or exceeded.

For EALs that are time-based, a prescribed assessment period is provided. It is to be acknowledged that the condition described in the EAL has been met if the stated time period elapsed. There is not an additional 15 minute assessment period.

Tables 3-2 and 3-3 contain listings of Process and Effluent Monitors and Area Radiation Monitors that may be used to initiate emergency actions. These tables contain information regarding the type of monitor, range of the instruments, and typical setpoints (actual setpoints are defined by procedure).

Table 3-4 contains a listing of non-radiological monitors, meters, or gauges that may be used to initiate emergency actions. This table contains information regarding the parameter measured and the range of the monitor, meter, or gauge.

3.6 Hostile Action

An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, takes hostages, and/or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address ~uch activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

3. 7 Hostile Force

EP3:4

One or more individuals whq are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.


TABLE 3-2A ST. LUCIE UNIT 1

PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORS USED FOR ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT

NUMBER MONITORS (PER UNIT) TYPE (1)

a. Steam Generator 2 SSL Slowdown

b. Condenser Air SSG Ejector

C. Fuel Handling NGM with low & high Building Stack range gas channels

d. Plant Stack NGM with low & high range gas channels

e. ECCS Area 1/train NGM with low & high Ventilation range gas channels Exhaust

f. Steam Dumps 1/train Shielded G-M tubes A&B

(1) SSG - single stage gaseous with beta scintillator detector.

SSL - single stage liquid with sodium iodide detector.

NGM - Noble Gas Monitor

CONTROL RANGE OF LOCATION FUNCTION MEASUREMENT

RAB Close SIG blowdown 1 x 1 O 1 to 1 x 106 CPM and sample valves FCV-23-3, 5, 7, 9

Turbine Bldg. NONE 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM (2)

FHB Roof NONE 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc G

1 x 10-4 to 1 x 1 o5 µCi/cc G

RAB Roof NONE 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc G

1 x 10-4 to 1 x 1 o5 µCi/cc G

RAB Elev. 43' NONE 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc G

1 x 10-4 to 1 x 1 o5 µCi/cc G

Main Steam Lines NONE 1 x 10-1 to 1 x 104 µCi/cc Upstream of MSIVs

(2) The condenser air ejector exhaust is normally diverted to the main Plant Stack. This point is monitored by the Plant Stack monitoring system.

EP3:4 3-5

TYPICAL HIGH ALARM SETPOINT

1 x 104 CPM

7.5 x 101 CPM

(low) 1.51 x 10-3 µCl/cc

(high) 3.2 x 101 µCi/cc

(low) 1.42 x 1 o-3 µCl/cc

(high) 3.24 x 1 o1 µCi/cc

(low) 5 x 1 o-4 µCl/cc

(high) 2.5 x 101 µCi/cc

2.7 x 10-1 µCi/cc

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

TABLE 3-28 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORS USED FOR ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT

NUMBER CONTROL RANGE OF MONITORS (PER UNIT) TYPE (1) LOCATION FUNCTION MEASUREMENT

a. Steam Generator 2 SSL RAB Close SIG blowdown 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-2 µCi/cc Slowdown valves and sample

FCV-23-3, 5, 7, 9

b. Condenser Air SSG Ejector

Turbine Bldg. NONE 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc (3)

C. Fuel Handling PIG FHB Roof (3) 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM p Building Stack 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM I (3)

1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc G (2)

d. Plant Stack 2 PIG RAB Roof (3) 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM p (3) 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM I (3) 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 CPM G

Plant Stack 3-stage gas with RAB Roof Auto switchback to 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc Low Accident Range multiple part/iodine normal range monitor 1.2 x 10-3 to 1.2 x 103 µCi/cc Medium

collectors 1 x 10-1 to 1 x 1 o5 µCi/cc High

e. ECCSArea 1/train 3-stage gas with RAB Elev. 43' Auto switchover to 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc Low Ventilation/ multiple part/iodine accident range 1.2 x 10-3 to 1.2 x 103 µCi/cc Medium Accident Range collectors monitor

1 x 10-1 to 1 x 105 µCi/cc High

f. Steam Dumps 1/train Shielded G-M tubes Main Steam Lines NONE 1 x 10-2 to 1 x 104 mR/hr A&B with bkgd subtraction Upstream of MSIVs

feature

(1) SSG - single stage gaseous with beta scintillator detector. PIG-particulate/iodine/noble gas with beta scintillator detectors and sodium iodide for iodine channel. 3-stage accident monitors use beta scintillator for low range, cadmium - teluride for medium/high ranges.

SSL - single stage liquid with sodium iodide detector.

TYPICAL HIGH ALARM SETPOINT

2 x 1 o-4 µCi/cc

2 x 10-6 µCi/cc

1 x 104 CPM

1 x 104 CPM

1 x 1 o-3 µCl/cc

1x104CPM

1 x 104 CPM

1 x 1 o-3 µCl/cc

1 x 1 o-3 µCl/cc

5 x 1 o-4 µCl/cc

1.5 mR/hr

(2) The condenser air ejector exhaust monitor is normally diverted to the Plant Stack. The FHB stack exhaust is diverted to the main Plant Stack under high fuel pool area radiation conditions and then becomes monitored by the Plant Stack monitoring system.

(3) These are effluent level monitors, not used for accident assessment.


TABLE 3-3 ST. LUCIE 1 AND 2 AREA RADIATION MONITORS

1. Containment Isolation Monitors

Unit 1: Range: Typical Alarm Setpoint

Unit 2: Range: Typical Alarm Setpoint

2. In-Containment High Range Monitors

Unit 1: Range: Typical High Alarm Setpoints:

Typical High/High Alarm Setpoints: Unit 2:

Range: Typical High Alarm Setpoints:

Typical High/High Alarm Setpoints: 3. Spent Fuel Pool Monitor

Unit 1: Range: Typical Alarm Setpoints:

Unit 2: Range: Typical Alarm Setpoints

4. Post LOCA Monitors



EP3:4 3-7

1.0 to 1 o5 mR/hr 8000 mR/hr

1.0 to 1 o7 mR/hr 8000 mR/hr

1 . 0 to 1 08 R/h r 6.4 R/hr (calibrated setpoint)

8.0 R/hr (calibrated setpoint)

1.0 to 108 R/hr 6.4 R/hr (calibrated setpoint)

8.0 R/hr (calibrated setpoint)

0.1 to 1 o4 mR/hr 5 mR/hr (High) 12 mR/hr (High/High)



10 to 107 mR/hr 75 mR/hr (High) 100 mR/hr (High/High)


TABLE 3-4 NON-RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION USED FOR ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT

INSTRUMENTS RANGE UNIT 1 RANGE UNIT2

RCS pressure 0-1600/ 0-750/ 1500-2500 psia 1500-2500 psia

0-3000 psia 0-3000 psia

RCS temperature

hot leg (control channel) 515-615 F 515-615 F hot leg (safety channel) 515-665 F 515-665 F cold leg (control channel) 515-615 F 515-615 F cold leg (safety channel) 465-615 F 465-615 F cold leg (wide range) 0-600 F 0-600 F

lncore thermocouples 32-2300 F 32-2300 F

Subcooled Margin Monitors (QSPDS) Calculated Calculated

Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range (Linear Scale) 0-125% 0-125%

Wide Range Power (Log Scale) 2 X 1 o-8-200% 2 X 1 o-8-200% Start-Up Channel 1-105 CPS 1-105 CPS

Pressurizer pressure 0-1600/ 0-750/ (same as RCS) 1500-2500 psia 1500-2500 psia

0-3000 psia 0-3000 psia

Pressurizer level 0-100% 0-100%

Steam Generator pressure (Main steam side) 0-1200 psig 0-1200 psig

Steam Generator level 0-100% 0-100%

Main steam pressure (safety channel) 0-1200 psia 0-1200 psia

ECCS header isolation red - open red - open valve lights green - closed green - closed

ECCS pumps 0-75 amps 0-75 amps

Containment pressure 0-50 psig (ESFAS) 0-15 psig (ESFAS) 0-60 psig 0-60 psig

-5-175 psig -5-175 psig

Earthquake monitor 0-20%g N/A

N/A = not applicable to unit


4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION

This section describes the procedures and methods established for initial notification and follow-up communications with Florida Power & Light Company, and from Florida Power & Light Company to the appropriate state, county, and federal response organizations. Section 4.6, Communications Equipment, describes the referenced systems in more detail. Figure 1-2 shows the initial notification flow. Table 4-1 presents the organizational positions and alternates for the primary response organizations responsible for ensuring the manning of communications links.

4.1 FPL Emergency Response Organization

EP3:4

The FPL Emergency Coordinator, acting in accordance with plant procedures, has the responsibility to make the necessary notifications and communications, and for determining the content of the notification. However, actual contacts may be made by designated communications assistants. The use of the phrase "Emergency Coordinator" below is also defined as "Emergency Coordinator or designated communicator," except for those items described in Section 2.2.2.2 which cannot be delegated.

1. Initial Notification

Florida Power & Light Company emergency procedures call for the following actions for initial notification within the FPL organization.

1. Personnel detecting a potential significant off-normal event or condition should report it to the Shift Manager by the fastest means available. This may mean face-to-face communication, the plant public address system, or the commercial telephone system. These systems provide adequate means of redundancy for this initial notification.

The following information should be related to the extent possible:

• Type of emergency (fire, pipe rupture, etc.).

• Location of emergency.

• Presence of injured personnel.

• Extent of damage to plant components.

The Shift Manager directs the investigative actions to address the off-normal event. The Shift Manager classifies the event and if it is determined to be an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, implements this Emergency Plan and becomes the Emergency Coordinator.


4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued)

4.1 1. 1. (continued)

EP3:4

As necessary, the Emergency Coordinator notifies plant personnel of the emergency situation and any required protective actions by the Plant Public Address system. Activation of FPL personnel proceeds to the degree necessary, as determined by the EC, in response to the severity of the emergency.

If necessary, the Emergency Coordinator directs the evacuation of all visitors and non-essential Florida Power & Light Company employees.

2. The Emergency Coordinator notifies the Shift Communicator (SC) by the most readily available communications system and provides basic information as described below and the status of his/her notification of off-site authorities. The SC notifies the Recovery Manager (RM) and appropriate response personnel by telephone, cellular phone, or beeper.

The Emergency Coordinator provides the following information to the SC to the extent possible:

• Type of accident or incident

• Affected Unit

• Assessment of the emergency condition (including the class of emergency).

• Information on personnel injuries, and an estimate of personnel radiation exposures.

• Off-site support already called in and/or required.

• An estimate of the magnitude of a radioactive material release and the area possibly affected, if applicable.

• Actions already taken or recommended with respect to the evacuation of various on-site areas, if applicable.

• Meteorological information.

• Assessment of potential radiation exposure to persons off-site and any protective actions for off-site areas recommended, if applicable.

3. Once the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is declared operational the Recovery Manager (RM) assumes responsibility for notification of off-site governmental agencies.



4.1 2. Communications

Initially, communications between the Emergency Coordinator (in the Control Room) and FPL's Expanded Emergency Organization are by redundant telephone systems, with radio as the backup. When the Emergency Operations Facility is mobilized, communications within the FPL Emergency Response Organization are accomplished primarily using commercial phones.

Follow-up messages regarding the prognosis for worsening or terminating of the event as well as requests for on-site support by off-site organizations will be made periodically or as needed by the EC to the RM. Recommendations for off-site protective measures to Division of Emergency Management (DEM) may be included as part of follow-up messages. These measures are indicated on Figure 5-1.

4.2 State and County Agencies

EP3:4

The State and County agencies are notified of an emergency situation (within 15 minutes) via redundant communication lines. State of Florida notification and communications procedures are presented in Chapter 6 of the State Plan.

1 . Division of Emergency Management

Initial Notification

FPL's Shift Communicator will make initial notification within 15 minutes of declaring an emergency to the Duty Officer at the State Watch Office (SWO) in Tallahassee. The State's Hot Ring Down (commercial telephone and EMnet (Satellite Communications System) serve as backups) will be used for notification of any emergency: Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Backup telephone numbers for 24-hour per day notification are provided by procedure.

Figure 4-1 shows the information to be communicated to SWO during initial and follow-up notifications. The listed information is provided to the extent possible at the time of initial notification. Periodically, additional update information is included in follow-up messages. Follow-up messages may come from the Technical Support Center (TSC), if operational, or the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), if operational.



4.2 1. Division of Emergency Management (continued)

EP3:4

The initial notification may be brief with certain information not available. Follow-up messages from the Emergency Coordinator or Re.covery Manager to the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) will include the required information as it becomes available.

The Division of Emergency Management has established a procedure to authenticate emergency notification from the St. Lucie Plant. The Hot Ring Down and EMnet systems are restricted circuits under control of the DEM and local government.

Communications

The Emergency Coordinator will maintain periodic contact with the State Watch Office, located at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOG) in Tallahassee, via the Hot Ring Down network.

FPL responsibility for communication with off-site agencies is transferred from the Emergency Coordinator to the Recovery Manager when the Recovery Manager declares the EOF operational.


FIGURE 4-1

FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM1 (Page 1 of 1)

On-line Verification: D SWP/DEM D DOH/BRC D st. Lucie County/Ft. Pierce D Martin County

1.* A. 0 THIS IS A DRILL B. 0 THIS IS AN EMERGENCY

2. A. Date: I B ... Contact Time: C. Reported by: (Name)------------D. Message Number: ___ E. Reported from: D Control Room O TSC O EOF F. D Initial/ New Classification OR D Update Notification

3.* Site: A. D Crystal River Unit 3 B. D St. Lucie Unit 1 C. D st. Lucie Unit 2 D. D Turkey Point Unit 3 E. D Turkey Point Unit 4

4.* Emergencl£ Classification: A D Notification of Unusual Event B. 0Alert C. D Site Area Emergency D. D General Emergency

5.* A. D Emergency Declaration: B. D Emergency Termination: Date: _ ... I_..:....._ Time: ___ _

s.• Reason for Emergency Declaration: A. 0 EAL Number / OR B. D Description: Alpha/ Alpha/ Numeric

7. Additional Information or Update: A. D None OR B. D Description:

s.• Weather Data: A. Wind direction from __ degrees B. Downwind Sectors Affected: ------

9. • Release status: A. D None (Go to Item 11) B. D In progress C. D Has occurred, but stopped (Go to Item 11)

10. Release Significance Category at the Site Boundary:

A. D Under evaluation C. D Non-Significant (fraction of protective action guide range) E D Liquid release (no actions required)

B. D Release within normal operating limits D. D Protective action guide range

11.* UTILITY PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC:

A. D No utility recommended actions at this time.

B. D The utility recommends the following protective actions:

Evacuate Sectors Shelter Sectors Monitor & Prepare Sectors

Evacuate Zones:

Shelter Zones:

OR 0-2

2-5

5-10

AND consider issuance of otassium iodide (Kl "

If form is completed in the Control Room, go to Item 15. If completed in the TSC or EOF, continue with item 12.

12. plant Conditions: A. Reactor Shutdown? D Yes D No C. Containment Intact? D Yes D No

B. Core Adequately Cooled? D Yes D No D. Core Condition: D stable D Degrading

13. Weather Data: A. "Wind Speed ___ mph B. Stability Class __ _

14. Additional Release Information: A. D Not Applicable (Go to Item 15)

Distance Projected Thyroid Dose (COE) for __ hour(s) Projected Total Dose (TEDE) for __ hour(s) 1 Mile (Site Boundary) 2 Miles

B. mrem C. mrem D. mrem E mrem

5 Miles F. __________ mrem G. _________ mrem

10 Miles H. mrem I. mrem

15. (Do Not Read) EC or RM Approval Signature:--------- Date: / / Time:

Message Received By: Name: _____________ _ Date: / / Time:

* Items are evaluated for NRC Performance Indicators (Pl's)

EPJP-08-F01

1 Format may vary in plant procedures.

Form Revision: 4

EP3:4 4-5 St. Lucie, Rev. 67 ,


4.2 2. Department of Health


The Division of Emergency Management (DEM) State Watch Office Duty Officer is responsible for notifying the Department of Health. Notification is made to the Bureau of Radiation Control. A Health Physicist contacts the St. Lucie County EOC to ascertain what, if any, protective actions have been initiated. If required, the Bureau of Radiation Control activates the Mobile Emergency Radiological . Laboratory (MERL) and/or the Radiological Monitoring Teams.

Communications

The Public Health Physicist maintains contact with the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) via mobile radio as he/she travels to the FPL Emergency Operations Facility. Contact is maintained with the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) by the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) via cellular phone while the MERL is in transit. On arrival, commercial phones are also available.

The State Plan describes provisions for communication between EOCs and off-site radiological monitoring teams in Chapter 6 and Appendix Ill.

4.3 St. Lucie County and Martin County Department of Public Safety Directors


EP3:4

The risk county EOCs are initially notified simultaneously via the same communications link used (Hot Ring Down or its alternates) to notify the Division of Emergency Management State Watch Office for all four classes of emergencies. Hot Ring Down and its alternates are monitored on a 24-hour basis by the St. Lucie and Martin County Departments of Public Safety.

The Department of Public Safety Directors can then be reached by telephone or by dispatching a patrol car. Also, the Duty Officer at the Division of Emergency Management's State Watch Office is responsible for confirming the receipt of emergency notification by the County Emergency Management Directors. When the emergency notification is by commercial telephone, he/she is responsible for verifying the message from the Plant by a callback procedure and informing the County Directors that the message has been verified. Alternate commercial telephone numbers for 24-hour per day notification are provided by procedure.


I

i -I


4.3 St. Lucie County and Martin County Department of Public Safety Directors (continued)

Initial Notification (continued)

Follow-up messages concerning the emergency (Alert Class and higher) may come from the TSC staff or the EOF. Information that should be contained in these messages is shown in Figure 4-1.

Communications

The County Department of Public Safety Directors proceed to the St. Lucie and Martin County Emergency Operations Centers, respectively and use the communication channels available there. These include Hot Ring Down, EMnet (Satellite Communications System), teletype, facsimile, police and fire radio networks, telephone, and RACES (Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services).

4.4 Federal Agencies

EP3:4

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission


The NRC Operations Center in Maryland is notified of certain events by Emergency Notification System (ENS) from the Control Room. The notifications include all radiological emergencies and are made in accordance with Federal Regulations and plant procedures. The Emergency Coordinator or his/her designee initiates this contact immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes. Alternate commercial phone numbers are provided by procedure.

Communications

Communications with the NRC may be handled by telephone from the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (if operational), or the Emergency Operations Facility (if operational).

2. U.S. Coast Guard

Assistance from the Coast Guard for on-site rescue, aid or evacuation of persons in danger, and the protection of property threatened by any type of disaster can be requested by telephone from the Emergency Coordinator or his/her designee or the Recovery Manager or his/her designee to the Coast Guard Duty Officer.



4.5 Notification of the Public by the State/County

The State Plan (See Appendix D for Distribution of State Plan) defines the state and county procedures for notifying the public in the event of an emergency. Appendix Ill, Section VI of the State Plan describes further provisions.

4.6 Communications Equipment

EP3:4

The various communications systems previously discussed are described in more detail below and shown in Figure 4-2.

This communications network incorporates all telephones, the plant public address system, fixed and mobile radio systems, and radio "beepers" employed for routine plant operation and other normal company business. Key personnel on-site are readily accessible, since at any time most or all of these systems are available to contact them. In addition, the communication systems of State and County agencies and other organizations with which the company has emergency assistance agreements will be used to implement emergency activities.

Public Address System (PA)

The PA system, with speakers strategically located throughout the Protected Area, provides for the transmission of warning and instructions in the event of an emergency. The system is in frequent use during normal plant operations, and consists of numerous separate amplifiers which operate from the plant 120 volt AC vital instrument power system. Handsets are provided in the Plant Control Rooms, the North and South Services Buildings, and numerous other locations within the Protected Area. The system includes one paging channel and five party line channels.

Commercial Telephones

There are numerous Telephone System lines connected to the plant for normal dial telephone service. This system represents the primary system for routine communication with areas outside the plant.

Portable Radio Transceivers

Various portable radio transceivers (walkie-talkies) are available to supplement the fixed communications equipment in the plant. These radios are lightweight battery operated units which may be easily carried by personnel to any location on the plant site. Some of these portable radios are capable of communicating with an FM radio transceiver over a range of several miles.



4.6 Communications Equipment (continued)

Radio Paging System

EP3:4

Telephones may be interconnected to the Radio Paging System. This system is capable of reaching beepers located within FPL's service area from Sebastian Inlet to Miami-Dade County/Monroe County line. Beepers are regularly assigned to key personnel in the Emergency Response Organization as shown in the Emergency Response Directory (ERO).

Company Radio System

The company radio system consists of a variety of fixed base radio equipment. The System Operations Power Coordinator's office, trouble dispatcher offices, service centers, power plants, and mobile service vehicles are equipped with one or more of these radio systems. In the event of interruption of electric service to the base radio stations, emergency power can be supplied to this equipment.

The Control Room, TSC, and EOF have access to one or more of these radio systems. These radio systems will provide back-up communications between the Plant, the EOF, and the System Operations Office. The System Operations Office has direct telephone lines and either direct, patch, or indirect radio contact with all the plants, radio-equipped vehicles and service centers in the Florida Power and Light Company system.



4.6 Communications Equipment (continued)

Hot Ring Down Telephone System (HRD)

The Hot Ring Down Telephone System is installed in the Control Rooms, TSC, EOF, State EOG, and risk county EOCs. This system uses dedicated commercial telephone lines and is activated through pre-designated three digit access "telephone numbers."

The initial notification of an emergency and other required notifications are made via this system to the State Division of Emergency Management (State Watch Office - Tallahassee) and the County Departments of Public Safety. The Hot Ring Down System is the primary system for communication among these facilities. Commercial telephone and EMnet (Emergency Satellite Communications System) serve as backups.

EMnet

EM net is an Emergency Satellite Communications System which is available in the Control Rooms, the Technical Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility. The EMnet is an alternate communications pathway for the Hot Ring Down telephone.

NRC Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS)

Portions of this system are used to contact the NRG, such as the ENS and HPN. These phone links are described below:

• Emergency Notification System (ENS) - The ENS is used for initial notification by the licensee, as well as ongoing information on plant systems, status, and parameters. The ENS is installed in each Control Room, TSC and EOF.

• Health Physics Network (HPN) - The HPN is used for communication with the licensee on radiological conditions (in-plant and off-site) and meteorological conditions, as well as their assessment of trends and needs for protective measures on-site and off-site. The HPN is located in the TSC and EOF.

Additionally, this system contains conferencing bridges and access to a Local Area Network (LAN) for use by the NRG Site Team.

4.7 Testing

EP3:4

As discussed in Section 7 .1, Exercises and Drills, communications equipment and procedures will be tested periodically as part of the FPL program of exercises, drills, and tests for maintaining emergency preparedness.


TABLE 4-1 COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES

The following positions are responsible to ensure the manning of communication links for the listed organizations/facilities:

1. FPL On-shift Emergency Response Organization/Control Room

Primary: Emergency Coordinator 1. Shift Manager (SM) 2. Alternate as defined by plan and procedure

Alternate: Shift Communicator (from available plant operating and technical staff).

2. FPL Expanded Emergency Response Organization/Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility

Primary: Emergency Coordinator/Recovery Manager 1. Site Director (TSC)/Senior Company Manager (EOF) 2. Alternate as defined by plan and procedure

Alternate: Designated Communicator (from available management or technical staff).

3. Florida Division of Emergency Management/State Emergency Operations Center, Tallahassee

Primary: Chief of Operations, DEM Alternate: As defined in the State Plan

4. St. Lucie County/Emergency Operations Center, Ft. Pierce

Primary: St. Lucie County Department of Public Safety Director Alternate: As defined in the State Plan

5. Martin County/Emergency Operations Center, Stuart

Primary: Martin County Department of Public Safety Director Alternate: As defined in the State Plan

6. Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC)/Field Monitoring Teams

Primary: Supervisor, BRC Alternate: As defined in the State Plan


FIGURE 4-2 COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACES

CONTROL ROOM HRD FPL RADIO

EMnetENS PLT PA TELE FAX

j ..

1, OPERATIONAL TSC

FPL RADIO SUPPORT CENTER ~ - •--• - - HPN HRD FAX ENS PLT PA TELE FAX PLT PA EMnetTELE

FPL RADIO j ..

, ' EOF/JIC

HRD FPL RADIO HPN FAX ENS EM net TELE

Legend: -Direction --- Coordination

HRD - STATE HOT RING DOWN ENS - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (NRC) FAX -TELECOPIER HPN - HEALTH PHYSICS NETWORK (NRC) PLT PA - PLANT PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM (PAGE)

~

~

EMnet - EMERGENCY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TELE - COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE

EP3:4 4-12

-~

r+

___.

1---.

___.

___.

USNRC REGION II/ OPS CENTER

ENS HPN TELE FAX

DIVISION OF EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT HRD TELE FAX EM net

ST. LUCIE COUNTY EMERGENCY

OPERATIONS CENTER HRD TELE FAX EMnet

MEDICAL, FIRE/ AMBULANCE SUPPORT

AGENCY FM RADIO 911 TELE

MARTIN COUNTY EMERGENCY

OPERATIONS CENTER HRD TELE FAX EM net

(P/PS&EIEPLAN/Rg.4-2/Rev.41/png)

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

Table 3-1 identifies a spectrum of off-normal events and classifies those events into four categories. The classification is based on Emergency Action Levels which are related to instrument readings, or observations, or a combination of these identified in the table. This section discusses the assessment of and response to these events.

5.1 Accident Assessment

EP3:4

Once an off-normal event has been detected and classified in accordance with the Emergency Action Levels, a process of continuing assessment will be initiated. System instrumentation and procedures which would be used as appropriate in the assessment process are described below. Specifications of instrumentation utilized for accident assessment are contained in procedures. Post accident sampling capabilities are also described in procedures.

1 . Plant Release Pathways

Units 1 and 2 at the St. Lucie Plant are equipped with independent systems for measuring radioactivity at potential release points and within the containment buildings (See Table 3-2 and 3-3).

The plant vent monitoring system samples the exhaust stream which is the pathway for releases from the containment purge, reactor auxiliary building, condenser air ejector exhaust and the waste gas decay tanks. The waste gas system has a separate monitor which controls releases to the plant vent.

Additional release pathways are also monitored. These include the fuel building vent (exhaust for fuel pool, new fuel room and fuel pool pump room). During accident conditions, the Unit 2 fuel building exhaust is diverted and monitored through the Unit 2 plant vent. The two Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pump bays at each of the units have monitored exhaust systems. The two main steam lines at each of the units are monitored for possible releases via the safety relief valves and/or atmospheric steam dump.

All monitored pathways, excluding the main steam lines, are equipped with high efficiency particulate filters or charcoal/iodine filters or both. The monitoring point is after the filters and before the release opening to the atmosphere.

For particulates and iodine, release points other than the main steam lines will be monitored using grab sampling and analysis in accordance with plant procedures.


5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued)

5.1 1. Plant Release Pathways (continued)

EP3:4

In addition to these monitors, each unit is provided with an area radiation monitoring system (see Table 3-3). This monitoring system employs detectors distributed throughout the unit and detector indicators are provided locally and in the respective Control Rooms. The area monitoring system provides early indication of a release of radioactivity within the unit.

Under accident conditions, the containment atmosphere is monitored for radioisotopic content by grab sampling. In addition, the containment is provided with radiation monitors. These monitors would provide an early indication of radioactivity in the containment, particularly as a result of a loss of reactor coolant to the containment building.

Chemical and radioisotopic analyses of the reactor coolant are provided by grab sampling.

Also, each plant has a system of fire detectors with appropriate alarms in the Control Room to provide warning of a fire emergency.

2. On-site Sampling Resources

The capability is available at the St. Lucie Plant to obtain grab samples of the reactor containment atmosphere and the reactor coolant.

To obtain grab samples of the containment atmosphere following an accident, a special removable gas sampling vessel is provided in the Containment Hydrogen Analyzer System on both units. The removable vessel would be transported to the plant laboratory. At the laboratory, a portion of the gas would be drawn from the vessel, and the radioisotopic content determined by a multichannel analyzer. Plant procedures provide detailed instructions for sample acquisition, transportation, and analysis.

Reactor coolant grab samples can also be taken following an accident. Details on sample acquisition, transportation, and analysis are described in plant procedures.



5.1 2. On-site Sampling Resources (continued)

EP3:4

Air samples will be collected using portable air samplers in accordance with a plant procedure. Portable air samplers are located such that time required to obtain results is minimized for critically manned areas (e.g., Control Room, Technical Support Center). Silver zeolite sample cartridges are stored on-site. To preclude interferences by noble gas adsorption, only silver zeolite cartridges will initially be used to sample critically manned areas (e.g., Control Room, Technical Support Center, other areas which require personnel to be present). Collected samples will be transported promptly to the lab. If necessary, an alternate Counting Room will be established using portable equipment in a low background area. Analysis by gamma spectroscopy, in accordance with approved procedures, is preferred, but portable instrumentation yielding usable results is available.

3. Meteorological Systems

Meteorological data are required to make estimates of off-site radiation exposure in the event of a release of gaseous radioactivity. Measurement of three meteorological parameters, wind speed, wind direction, and a measure of atmospheric stability, are required to make estimates of atmospheric dispersion, an essential part of an off-site radiation exposure calculation.

Meteorological data are collected at the St. Lucie Plant site. The readouts from the site meteorological tower are digital with strip chart recorders to provide 15 minute averages and the data are directly available at the Unit 1 Control Room. The National Weather Service Station serves as the backup. Table 5-1 summarizes the available data.

As indicated in Table 5-1, values of the key meteorological parameters are provided for by the St. Lucie Plant meteorological tower. These readouts are provided continuously and the data are directly available at the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) via the Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS).

Meteorological data are provided to the State via initial and follow-up communications. Data is also provided in response to direct inquiries from DEM and the Bureau of Radiation Control. The EOF and NRC can receive timely meteorological information through the TSC, upon request, or through ERDADS.



5.1 4. Source Term and Release Determination

EP3:4

As discussed in Section 5.1.3 certain meteorological parameters are required for the calculation of off-site radiation exposure from airborne releases. Additional essential pieces of information are the rate of release and isotopic composition of the released radioactivity. If radioactivity was released from a monitored vent, then a direct measure of the release rate would be available. Monitored release points are discussed in Section 5.1.1.

Based upon certain assumptions, a specific source term can be determined using EPIP-14, Dose Assessment Using the Unified RASCAL Interface for all monitored release points and grab samples.

In the event of a loss of coolant accident, the containment radiation monitors would provide the first indication of the magnitude or existence of radioactivity in the containment atmosphere. Additional information about the isotopic composition of the airborne radioactivity would be derived from isotopic analysis of a containment atmosphere sample.

Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRM) provide an indication of levels of radioactive material in the containment atmosphere. These monitors can be used to determine a certain concentration of radionuclides based upon the isotopic mixes assumed for the accidents described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Procedures addressing these parameters and calculations are provided in EPIP-14, Dose Assessment Using the Unified RASCAL Interface.

Procedures have been developed to assist the plant staff in estimating release rates and isotopic content for releases from the various plant vents.

A containment release rate for use in the off-site dose estimation procedure mentioned above is conservatively estimated as the design basis leak rate at the design pressure.


TABLE 5-1 SOURCES OF METEOROLOGICAL DATA

Meteorological Primary Source Type of Alternate Source Parameter of Information Display of Information

Wind Speed St. Lucie ERDADS display National Weather Meteorological Tower or Digital and Chart Service Station

(10 meter sensors recorder (15 minute serve as primary, averages) - Unit 1 only Melbourne 60 meter sensors

serve as first backup)

Wind Direction St. Lucie ERDADS display National Weather Meteorological Tower or Digital and Chart Service Station

(10 meter sensors recorder (15 minute serve as primary, averages) - Unit 1 only Melbourne 60 meter sensors

serve as first backup)

Stability Class St. Lucie ERDADS display National Weather ( 8T) Meteorological Tower or Digital and Chart Service Station

(60 meter temperature recorder (15 minute sensor - 10 meter averages) - Unit 1 only Melbourne

temperature sensor)

Other basic National Weather None meteorological Service Station (via telephone)

parameters Melbourne



5.1 5. Exposure and Dose Rate Determination

EP3:4

One of the uses of radiation monitors and meteorological instrumentation is the calculation of off-site radiation exposures. An estimate of doses is needed in the event of a radiological emergency so that responsible agencies can use this information to plan protective action.

EPIP-14, Dose Assessment Using the Unified RASCAL Interface, provides the details of how initial dose estimates are determined. In particular, current meteorological data, grab sample results, Field Monitoring Team data, process monitor data, and Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRM) readings are used in conjunction with tables to estimate doses under actual meteorological conditions. Dose calculations will be updated periodically during the course of the accident and the results will be provided to State and County authorities for their use in evaluating the need for protective action. Figure 5-1 compares off-site dose estimates with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Initial dose estimates would be prepared by the Chemistry Department representative who reports to the Technical Support Center. Refined dose estimates would be performed by dose assessment personnel in the Emergency Operations Facility, when operational. Dose estimates are performed using EPIP-14. Default values, estimating a worst case situation can be utilized if assessment instrumentation is not available (off-scale or inoperable) and field sample analysis has not yet been completed. FPL off-site dose calculations and field monitoring analysis will be compared with Florida Department of Health and other off-site agencies (NRC, DOE) calculations and analysis when those agencies co-locate in the EOF.



5.1 6. Off-site Monitoring

Dosimetry

EP3:4

The Florida Department of Health maintains a system of about 35 TLD stations in the vicinity of St. Lucie Plant. Stations are provided in each land based 22.5° sector, at approximately 1-mile, 5-mile and 10-mile radii.

Laboratories and Sampling

Laboratory facilities are provided as discussed in Section 2.3.2. The plant's on-site radiological laboratories serve as primary facilities with backup provided by portable equipment. Analysis of off-site environmental samples collected by the State will be performed at the State's Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory. This mobile lab can be in position near the site within three hours of notification. Bureau of Radiation Control representatives dispatched to the EOF will serve as a central point for the receipt of all State off-site field monitoring data.

Field Monitoring - State

Chapter 9 of the State Plan discusses the State role in accident assessment. It describes agencies and their missions, specialized personnel, special equipment, and other matters related to field monitoring within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Chapter 8, Section V and Figures 8-2 to 8-4 discuss in further detail the capability and resources for field monitoring.

Transportation of field teams is discussed in Chapter 8, Section Ill of the State Plan. Field team communications are described in Chapter 6 of the State Plan. Monitoring equipment is described in Chapter 8, Section V and Figures 8-2 to 8-4. Composition of field teams is discussed in Chapter 9 of the State Plan.

Although county plans discuss accident assessment, Section X of Appendix Ill, of the State Plan, indicates that the off-site accident assessment responsibility rests with the Bureau of Radiation Control.

DOH Bureau of Radiation Control provides for the measurement of iodine in air and the use of such measurements in assessment activities.



5.1 6. Off-site Monitoring (continued)

Field Monitoring - Plant

EP3:4

Plant procedure RP-SL-100-1005, "Radiation Protection Emergency Organization," provides methods for activation of emergency field monitoring teams and dispatching these teams throughout the plume EPZ.

Procedure RP-SL-102-2005, "Environmental Monitoring During Emergencies," includes techniques for measurements of airborne concentrations of radioiodine and direct radiation dose rates, transportation of teams, expected deployment times, and communications. Instrumentation, at the plant, is available with the capability to detect radioiodine in concentrations of at least 10-7

microcuries/cc, in the field. Assessment of data is discussed in EPIP-10, "Off-site Radiological Monitoring."

Coordination of Sampling Data

To assure that information concerning FPL off-site radiological assessment is exchanged, arrangements have been made for representatives from the Bureau of Radiation Control to be stationed at the EOF. Direction and control of field operations for the Department of Health will be provided by the Bureau of Radiation Control Health Physics Supervisor. He/she will conducUsupervise accident assessment and/or response of the field teams from a post at the EOF, where office space and communications equipment are available. Prior to the arrival of Bureau of Radiation Control personnel, coordination of this information will be through follow-up communications with DEM and the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ counties.

Department of Energy (DOE) off-site monitoring assistance, if required, will be requested by the DEM in consultation with the Bureau of Radiation Control. Lead responsibility for coordination with the DOE is assigned to the Bureau of Radiation Control.



5.2 Protective Response

EP3:4

This section describes the protective actions on-site and data provided to assist the State and County in determining appropriate off-site protective actions.

1 . Protective Actions

On-site

On-site protective actions for a radiological emergency consist of evacuation of the affected area (localized evacuation or site evacuation), monitoring of all personnel who were in the affected area, decontamination as required, and re-entry to determine the magnitude and extent of the problem when it is determined to be safe to do so.

During a Hostile Action event, protective actions can range from taking cover to evacuation, depending on the event and timing of the event.

Individuals remaining or arriving on-site during an emergency will be provided protective equipment as prescribed by the TSC RP Supervisor and plant procedures. Florida Power & Light Company will make Potassium Iodide (Kl) available for use as a thyroid blocking agent. Use of Kl will be in accordance with plant procedures.

Control Room personnel are in an isolated environment and need protective equipment if they leave the Control Room. An emergency kit with necessary equipment is present inside both Control Rooms and is to be used for this purpose {Table 2.3). In addition, if there is fire or smoke in the Control Room or if the Control Room air becomes contaminated, Control Room personnel might have to don respiratory protective equipment in order to remain in the Control Room to handle the emergency.

Decontamination

Personnel decontamination facilities are available in four locations. Their use will be governed by the nature of the incident.

1. Hot Locker Rooms - Showers and sinks available for the decontamination of personnel with no (or minor) injuries. One is located in the Auxiliary Building for each unit.



5.2 1. Protective Actions (continued)

Decontamination (continued)

EP3:4

2. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center in Ft. Pierce, FL and Martin Memorial Medical Center in Stuart, FL are available for medical treatment and decontamination of contaminated injured individuals. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center is located approximately 8 miles Northwest of St. Lucie Plant. Martin Memorial Medical Center is located approximately 10 1/4 miles South of St. Lucie Plant.

3. Decontamination Facility - The Site Assembly Station personnel decontamination capabilities consist of utilizing various types of decontamination agents, such as waterless cleaners and decontamination foams. A quantity of cloth material is available for use with these decontamination agents. Contamination monitoring is performed through the use of count rate instruments with beta sensitive probes. Extra clothing for personnel whose personal clothing has been contaminated is available in the form of disposable garments. Decontamination of vehicles will be handled following the accident. Methods for decontamination and monitoring are described in plant procedures.

Off-site

Off-site areas are the responsibility of the respective County Public Safety Departments, the Department of Health, and the Division of Emergency Management of the State of Florida. Control of radioactive contamination and public safety in off-site areas are responsibilities of these governmental agencies, and their criteria for implementing protective actions may be found in the State Plan Chapter 10. Decontamination of off-site areas will be performed under the direction of the Bureau of Radiation Control.

Section XII.E. of Appendix Ill of the State Plan discusses evacuation routes, times, and facilities in relation to St. Lucie and Martin Counties.

Recommendations for protective actions will be made by the Emergency Coordinator (Recovery Manager after EOF is operational) based upon consideration of severity of an accident (emergency class) and estimated off-site doses (if available). A range of protective actions has been developed in accordance with NUREG-0654, FEMA REP 1, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supplement 3 and EPA 400-R-92-001. Figure 5-1 shows the decision-making criteria for determination of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).



5.2 2. On-site Warning and Response

EP3:4

During an emergency, the relocation of plant personnel in the Protected Area may be required in order to prevent or minimize exposure to radioactive materials. Evacuation is the primary protective action anticipated for on-site personnel. An emergency evacuation is the orderly, rapid, and safe withdrawal of all personnel from an area affected by an emergency condition. The plant public address system will be used to announce evacuation orders. Announcement of an emergency situation to all plant personnel within the Protected Area can be accomplished in less than 15 minutes. Depending on the nature of the emergency and the extent of the area affected, evacuations have been classified as either a Local Evacuation or an Owner Controlled Area Evacuation.

1. Local Evacuation

Definition

A local evacuation is the evacuation of personnel from a room, area, or building located within the Protected Area.

Criteria

The evacuation of an affected local area will be initiated per routine RP procedures when any of the following conditions occur:

1. Area Radiation Monitor Alarm

2. Containment Evacuation Alarm

3. Unevaluated direct radiation dose rate increase in excess of 100 mrem/hour above normal levels.

4. Unexpected airborne radioactivity concentration in excess of 1 x 10-9 micro Ci/cc.

5. Removable radioactive surface contamination in an unpasted area in excess of 1000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma over an area 1 00 ft2

.

6. Removable radioactive surface contamination in an unpasted area in excess of 50 dpm/100 cm2 alpha over an area 100 ft2

.


/

General Emmgency?

Conl.lnuc lo Asse:n Condil lom

Downwind Distance

0-2 miles

2-S mlies

5-10 mites

EPIP-08-F02

<..

FIGURE 5-1

PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS1 (Page 1 of 3)

PARs Based on Plant Conditions

Rapld PtoSreu•nc s;,,_erol\cclde/

(Note I)

/

No

Downwind / Yes Distance

.. Downwind Distance

0-2 mik!s

2-5 miles

5.10 mllea

ConUnue Aneurnenl and Mninta1n Curren t

PAR$

(Note5)

Evacu i1te Sectors Shelter Sectors

A ll None

(Affected Sectora) None

None (Affected Seclora)

Evacuilte Sectors Shetter Sectors Mon Hor & Prepare Sec1.ora

.,., Is a Host ile Ac:tlon ().2 miles f a ins Place? ~ 1--------+-------+---

(Nole lf / 2•5 mllea

None All None None (Affected Soctora) All Remaining

S.t O mile-a None None All

Monitor & Prepare Sectors

None

All Rema ining

All Remoiolng

t /

Au~ PAGllo UJfCCC~d tit the srt.c Boundary o r /

tw~ond ? /

( .. b Hostile Action sUII It

factor? / (Note2) /

Evacuate Sectors Sheller Sectors Monitor & Prepare

Sectors ',

GC Cond"tloos Remain? (Nole GJ

All

(Affect"d Sectors)

None

None

None

None

None

All Remaining

All

As~smen\ (Notn S) tmd EJcp.JnO PAR.)

r Conun,e

'--------------------•.., based one.hanged l:lanlcondl ons or where PAG~ will be

e,cceeded.

Ye>

No

Con:)iQC"r tvaC\lut lns !4----------'L------1 S.hette.redAreas. ~--~

when safe to do 50

Form Rev1s1on 7



FIGURE 5-1


PARs Based on Plant Conditions

(1) A Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident involves a containment failure with >20% clad damage or PAG's exceeded at site boundary within 1 hour.

Loss of containment integrity= EALs indicate containment barrier loss. This path is used for scenarios in which containment integrity can be determined as bypassed or immediately lost during a GE with core damage.

20% Clad Damage is identified by ANY the following: • Pressure s 100 psia and 1250 CET Temp (F) • Pressure between 100 and 1200 psia and 1550 CET Temp (F) • Pressure between 1200 and 1650 psia and 1925 CET Tempt (F)

If this scenario cannot be immediately confirmed, assume it is not taking place and answer "no" to this decision block.

(2) Hostile Action: An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. Hostile Action should not be construed to Include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP.

(3) Shelter in Place (SIP) means that instructions are given to members of the public to remain indoors, turn off heating or air conditioning (as appropriate for the region and season), close windows, monitor communications channels, and prepare to evacuate.

(4) Monitor and Prepare: The instruction to monitor and prepare is intended to engage the population within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone, inform them of the emergency, and advise them that they should monitor the situation and prepare for the possibility of evacuation, SIP, or other protective actions. If an evacuation is underway, officials should ask members of the public who are not directed to evacuate to remain off the roadways to allow the evacuation to proceed.

(5) Continue Assessments: Radiological and meteorological assessments should be continued and evacuation considered for any areas where dose projections or field measurements indicate that PAGs may be exceeded. Communications with the public should be maintained while protective actions are in effect. Additionally, changes in wind direction may indicate that if a release begins, it would affect different downwind sectors. If a licensee believes that containment may fail, it should pursue the expansion of PARs.

(6) GE Conditions Remain : If the plant has mitigated the conditions that caused the GE declaration (i.e., core cooling is restored), expanding the PAR to evacuate downwind sectors upon completion of the initial staged evacuation may not be necessary. However, if GE emergency action levels are still met, expansion of the PAR to the downwind sectors may be appropriate. If the plant restores core cooling, it must still perform a radiological assessment to identify the extent of contamination, if any. If surveys or dose projections reveal areas under no protective action direction where protective action guidelines (PAGs) could be exceeded, the members of the public in those areas should be evacuated or sheltered, as appropriate.

EPIP-08-F02 Form Revision: 7



•

•

FIGURE 5-1


PARs Based on Dose Assessment Table

NOTE

If TEDE Dose or CDE Thyroid Dose is 2 PAGs (2 1.00E+03 and 2 5.00E+03 respectively) at the Site Boundary (1 mile for Manual Dose Calculations), notify the Emergency Coordinator andlor Recovery Manager and verify current Emergency Classification is General Emergency.

\•\/hen using URI Dose Assessment report or Dose Assessment Summation report, ensure Affected Sectors includes all sectors indicated on the Evacuation Area map.

Proceed down the page until PARs based on Dose Assessment are selected. Once PARs based on Dose Assessment have been selected, go to step 2.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

ls all calculated dose< 1.00E+3 TEDE andlor <5.00 E + 3 COE (Thyroid)? If so no PARs based on Dose Assessment are required. If not, proceed to step 2.

At greater than or equal to 10 miles is calculated dose 21.00E+03 TEDE andlor2 5.00E+03 COE (Thyroid)? If so, select the following PARs based on Dose Assessment and go to step 6. Additionally, perform a URI 50 mile assessment. If not, continue to step 3.

Miles Evacuate Shelter Monitor & Prepare 0-2 All None ti.Jone 2-5 (Affected Sectors) None All Remaining

5-10 (Affected Sectors) None All Remaining > 10 (Affected Sectors) None All Remaining

At greater than 2 miles and Jess than 1 O miles is any calculated dose 2 1.00E+03 TEDE andlor 2 5.00E+03 COE (Thyroid)? If so, select the following PARs based on Dose Assessment and go to step 6. If not, continue to step 4.

Miles Evacuate Shelter Monitor & Prepare 0-2 All None None 2-5 (Affected Sectors) ti.Jone All Remaining

5-10 (Affected Sectors) None All Remaining > 10 None (Affected Sectors} All Remaining

At less than or equal to 2 miles Is any calculated dose 21.00E+03 TEDE and.Eor2 5.00E+03 CDE (Thyroid)? If so, select the following PARs based on Dose Assessment and go to step 6. If not, continue to step 5.

Miles Evacuate Shelter l\•1onitor & Prepare 0-2 A.II None None 2-5 (Affected Sectors) ti.Jone All Remaining

5-10 None (Affected Sectors) All Remaining > 10 None None None

Compare the selected PARs based on Dose Assessment with Plant Condition PARs using the PAR Worksheet.

Once selection of PARs based on dose assessment is complete, dose assessors must continue to assess conditions and update dose assessment if: • Release Point Information increases by more than 25 percent or additional release pathways are

discovered; • Vv'ind speed decreases to less than one half of previous value;

• Atmospheric stability becomes more stable by more than one class (e.g., change from Stabilit>J Class D to F);

• \i\i"lnd direction changes by more than 22.5 degrees (i.e., plume centerline is more than one sector away from prior location}.

EPIP-1JS-F02



5.2 2. 1. Local Evacuation (continued)

Personnel Actions

EP3:4

When the containment evacuation alarm is activated or when the Emergency Coordinator makes notification over the public address system that a local evacuation has been declared, non-essential FPL and contract personnel, and visitors in the area will go to the designated assembly area and remain there for personnel accountability and monitoring. Plant visitors are escorted at all times by a trained person who is accountable for them. They will also be informed by their escort during any emergency of what they are expected to do during the emergency.

When a local evacuation is declared, the Security Force will assist in personnel accounting and be prepared to brief the SM/Emergency Coordinator.

Precautions

Every effort will be made to minimize personnel exposure to radiation. Personnel who have been in the area of an evacuation should remain in a group and should not mix with other personnel in the assembly area until they have been monitored for possible contamination, unless they are injured. Injured personnel will be treated by the First Aid Team. Provisions exist for off-site treatment of personnel, if required (see Section 2.5).

Evacuation Implementation

The SM/Emergency Coordinator will announce the local evacuation over the public address system, identifying the area affected, the assembly point and other instructions as required. All personnel in the evacuated area will stop work, turn off potentially hazardous equipment and leave the area. All personnel in the evacuated area should report to the designated assembly area for monitoring and accountability. The SM/Emergency Coordinator will activate the Emergency Response Organization as required. The SM/Emergency Coordinator, and department supervisors and foremen having personnel working in the evacuated area, will assist in verifying that all personnel are accounted for. The SM/Emergency Coordinator will initiate a search for personnel who have not been accounted for.



5.2 2. 2. Owner Controlled Area Evacuation

Definition

EP3:4

An Owner Controlled Area Evacuation is the orderly withdrawal of all nonessential personnel from the Owner Controlled Area (OCA), including the Protected Area (PA).

Criteria

An Owner Controlled Area Evacuation can be initiated at the discretion of the EC and is signaled by the sounding of the evacuation alarm followed by instructions given over the public address system. Evacuation of the OCA will normally occur at a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency unless such action is deemed unwarranted by the EC (i.e., personnel would be placed at greater risk).

Responsibilities

The EC advises the TSC Security Supervisor of evacuation of the OCA either directly or via the evacuation alarm and/or the public address system. Information needed by the Security Force to properly fulfill their responsibilities during the evacuation is provided to the TSC Security Supervisor by the EC. Significant responsibilities during the evacuation include directing the evacuation movements and personnel accountability.

The EC will direct that a search be initiated for any personnel not accounted for.

Evacuation Preparedness

The population within the OCA is approximately 1300, including workers who may be present on-site at shift change.

All visitors will have adequate transportation available to evacuate all members of their respective groups. The Security Force will assist in arranging for required transportation.



5.2 2. 2. Owner Controlled Area Evacuation (continued)

Evacuation Preparedness (continued)

EP3:4

Escorts accompanying visitors will assure that transportation is available at all times while the visitors are on-site. Escorts will maintain controls of groups of individuals to which they are assigned to enable all members of the groups to be located, notified, and evacuated in the event that evacuation of the OCA is called for.

Procedures used by the Security Force define which evacuation route(s) will be used by the various groups in the OCA.

Evacuation Implementation

The EC will sound the evacuation alarm and announce instructions for evacuation of the OCA over the public address system. Upon hearing the alarm and/or evacuation order, all non-essential personnel will evacuate. ERO personnel will report to the TSC, OSC, or EOF for assignment.

The EC will notify the TSC Security Supervisor that an Owner Controlled Area Evacuation is ordered and will advise him/her of all pertinent information affecting the evacuation, including priorities and/or special conditions which exist to enable the evacuation to be conducted in a safe manner. Security will assign specific areas of the OCA, outside the PA, for which they are responsible for personnel notification.

The TSC Security Supervisor will immediately initiate the evacuation procedures for the OCA, outside the PA including: (these actions may occur at the Alert level)

1. Notification of all security patrols and tour guides of the evacuation.

2. Notification of all non-company groups working in or using portions of the OCA.

3. Initiate sweeps of recreation areas and assist in personnel accountability.



5.2 2. 2. Owner Controlled Area Evacuation (continued)

Evacuation Implementation (continued)

EP3:4

Upon declaration of an Owner Controlled Area Evacuation, the Security Force will conduct personnel accountability in accordance with emergency procedures. An initial list of individuals in the PA is established in 30 minutes and continuously updated until all individuals are accounted for. The number of security officers on duty at any time is adequate to handle the evacuation of personnel in the OCA should such an action be called for by the EC.

Personnel Actions

When an evacuation is ordered, all non-essential personnel shall exit the PA via their normal gate unless otherwise directed by the EC. Non-essential personnel shall travel from the plant site following the designated evacuation route. Figure 5.2 shows the evacuation route(s) for personnel. It is expected that the primary evacuation route will not be affected by adverse weather or traffic conditions. If a release is in progress and the potential exists for contamination of evacuees, they will be directed to an off-site assembly area. The primary assembly area for evacuated personnel is the Jaycee Public Park on Highway A 1A, located approximately 7 % miles north of the plant on the road to Ft. Pierce. The alternate assembly area, south of the plant, is Jensen Public Beach Parking Area. All personnel will be requested to remain at the assembly area until instructed otherwise.

3. Off-site Area Protective Measures

An off-site area evacuation is the orderly withdrawal of all persons from the portion of the public areas surrounding the plant which have been affected by the emergency. The criteria for the initiation of the evacuation are determined by the Department of Health as specified in the State Plan. Appendix Ill of the State Plan describes evacuation measures and provides maps indicating designated evacuation routes.

Evacuation time estimates have been performed in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002. Annually, an analysis is performed for population changes. Figure 5-3 (Figure 111-21 in the State Plan) is a map of the evacuation routes for the general public. Maps and text describing evacuation routes, monitoring points, and reception centers are provided in the State Plan.



5.2 3. Off-site Area Protective Measures (continued)

EP3:4

The EC (RM when the EOF is operational) will recommend offsite protective actions based on the criteria shown in Figure 5-1, Protective Action Recommendations.

The St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors and the State Division of Emergency Management will be responsible for the direction and implementation of the necessary protective actions as specified in the State Plan, including notification and coordination with other State and local assistance agencies.

It will be the responsibility of the St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety Departments to notify the general public if an evacuation is warranted. This will be accomplished as discussed in Sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.8.

The State Plan describes the basis for the choice of recommended actions for the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ during emergency conditions. Protective action decisions are made on the basis of information which becomes available as a result of accident assessment. The Bureau of Radiation Control Standard Operating Procedures also discuss the process by which state officials collect information and make recommendations. The Bureau of Radiation Control Standard Operating Procedures also discuss assessment actions which would form a basis for recommendations. The State and County Plans point out that EPA Protective Action Guides will be an important basis for Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).

4. Public Warning and Information

Chapter 5, Section Ill to the State Plan, provides information on warning of the public, in general, and Appendix Ill Section VI discuss warning procedures in St. Lucie and Martin Counties, in particular.

Prompt notification systems are discussed therein. FPL has purchased and installed an alert (siren) and notification system as described in Section 5.2.8.

Notification to the population and arrangements with public communications media are described in the State Plan. Chapter 7 to the State Plan provides the guidance for keeping the public informed about the potential hazards, emergency response, and protective measures that can be taken to minimize or avoid public health effects. Chapter 7 also provides procedures for the timely and accurate collection, coordination, and dissemination to the public of such information.



5.2 4. Public Warning and Information (continued)

EP3:4

Chapter 7, Figures 7-1 to 7-8 of the State Plan also provides for sample releases to be used for media. These are consistent with FPL's classification scheme. These are examples of specific prior arrangements that have been made to use public communication media for issuing emergency instructions to the public. Section VIII of Appendix 111 discusses annual orientation of the media. Section VI of Appendix 111 indicates TV and radio stations which would be used to alert the public.

5. Population Exposure Estimates

Population exposure estimates are discussed in Chapter 13, Section IV of the State plan. Bureau of Radiation Control Standard Operating Procedures discuss the projected dose calculation process and assessment and monitoring in the Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ. Standard Operating Procedures are used to determine dose rates.

6. Special Needs Population

Section XII of Appendix Ill of the State Plan contains a discussion of evacuation of special need populations.

7. Population Distribution

The State Plan contains maps showing population distribution, and it describes the means for notifying transient and resident population. Population maps and tables are included in Appendix Ill of the·State Plan (St. Lucie Site Plan).

8. Alert and Notification System (ANS)

FPL has purchased an alert and notification system for use by the St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors in alerting the population of the need to possibly take protective actions. The system consists of 90 electronic sirens located throughout the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ. These electronic sirens have public address capability for voice messages. Upon sounding the sirens, the affected public, keyed through the public information program, should turn on their radios to the local Emergency Alert System (EAS) radio station and await emergency information and instructions. Backup Alert Notification System for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant is achieved through physical Route Altering, which is contained in the Radiological Response Plans and procedures for the State of Florida and Offsite response Organizations in the EPZ that have been approved by FEMA in accordance with Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 44CFR350.12 and 14.



5.3 Radiological Exposure Control

EP3:4

1. On-site Radiation Protection Program

An objective of emergency response is to minimize radiation exposure to individuals both on-site and off-site. Situations may arise, however, when observance of this goal is inconsistent with personnel or plant safety. In anticipation of such needs, guidelines have been established for emergency conditions. The guidelines on which the emergency radiation protection program is based are stated below.

Exposure to emergency response personnel should be maintained As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). Actions taken during an emergency should take into consideration the amount of exposure required to accomplish the task verses the potential benefit to the public health and safety.

Conditions may warrant re-entry into high radiation areas leading to exposure in excess of the regulatory limit. Except for rescue of personnel (life-saving only), authorization must be given in advance by the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in consultation with the TSC RP Supervisor. If time permits the EC should obtain concurrence from the Recovery Manager (if the EOF is operational). In any case where regulatory limits have been exceeded the EC shall notify the RM of the event.

For those remote circumstances involving an event in progress, and obtaining EC approval will result in leaving the accident scene or decrease the victim(s) chance of survival, lifesaving actions may be performed without obtaining EC approval. The EC shall be notified immediately following the rescue operation.

Re-entry personnel that have been selected/chosen to exceed regulatory exposure limits should be volunteers, broadly familiar with the risks involved (radiosensitivity of fetuses, effects of acute exposures, etc.), and whose normal duties have trained them for such missions.

EPA 400, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," EPA 400-R-92-001 states that "To assure adequate protection of minors and the unborn during emergencies, the performance of emergency services should be limited to non-pregnant adults." FPL endorses this guidance; however, FPL recognizes that it is the right of the worker to make the decision to perform as an on-site emergency worker, understanding the potential risks involved.



5.3 1. On-site Radiation Protection Program (continued)

For the following missions, (1) the exposure limit is:

Performance of actions that would not directly mitigate the event, minimize escalation, or minimize effluent releases.

Performance of actions that mitigate the escalation of the event, rescue persons from a non-life threatening situation, minimize exposures or minimize effluent releases.

Performance of actions that decrease the severity of the event or terminate the processes causing the event in an attempt to control effluent releases to avoid extensive exposure of large populations. Also, rescue of persons from a life-threatening situation.

Rescue of persons from a life-threatening situation. (Volunteers should be above the age of 45.)(4)

NOTE 1

TOT AL DOSE(2) (TEDE)

5REM

10 REM

25 REM

(5)

Both Total Dose {TEDE) and Thyroid Dose (CDE) should be used for purposes of controlling exposure.

NOTE2 Protective clothing, including respirators should be used where ap ropriate.

THYROID(3) (CDE)

50 REM

100 REM

250 REM

(5)

(1) Exposure limits to the lens of the eye are 3 times the Total Dose {TEDE) values listed.

(2) Total Dose (TEDE) is the total dose from both external and internal (weighted) sources - Total Effective Dose Equivalent.

(3) Thyroid Dose (COE) commitment from internal sources - Committed Dose Equivalent. The same dose limits also apply to other organs (CDE), skin (Shallow Dose Equivalent) and extremities (Extremity Dose Equivalent).

(4) Volunteers with full awareness of risks involved including numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects.

(S) No upper limit for Total Dose (TEDE) and/or Thyroid Dose (COE) has been established because it is not possible to pre-judge the risks that one person should be allowed to take to save the life of another. Also, no specific limit is given for thyroid dose since in the extreme case, complete thyroid loss might be acceptable sacrifice for a life saved. This should not be necessary if respirators and/or thyroid protection for rescue personnel are available as the result of adequate planning.



5.3 2. Dose Records

EP3:4

FPL Nuclear Division procedures provide for conducting the personnel dosimetry program. The company has the capability of determining personnel radiation exposures on a 24 hour per day basis. Dose records for all individuals exposed to ionizing radiation at FPL's facilities are maintained.

All emergency response personnel under the authority of FPL who will potentially be exposed to radiation in the course of their duties will be monitored by the plant radiation exposure monitoring program. Personnel in this category will be issued the appropriate personal dosimetry devices.

Since, by their very nature, emergency exposures requiring immediate action are not planned, they are not controlled as a Planned Special Exposure. Dose received from exposure under emergency conditions will be added to the dose received during the current year, prior to the emergency, to determine compliance with the occupational dose limits in 10 CFR 20.

Doses above regulatory limits will require reporting pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2202 and 20.2203. Any dose in excess of the annual limits specified in Section 20.1201 (a) will be accounted for in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1206(e). If an individual exceeds any of these limits, then that individual will not be available for additional dose under 20.1201 (a).

3. Contamination Control and Decontamination Procedures

A personnel decontamination washroom and shower room with chemical decontamination agents is provided on the ground floor of the Auxiliary Buildings. Except in cases of serious injury, accepted decontamination practices will be employed on-site. Life endangering injuries or injuries such as extensive burns, serious wounds, or fractures shall receive prompt attention in preference to decontamination. Personnel with injuries involving radiation or radioactive contamination will be handled as discussed in Section 2.5.1. Decontamination of uninjured personnel must be attempted at contamination levels greater than minimum detectable activity as defined in Health Physics / Radiation Protection procedures.



5.3 3. Contamination Control and Decontamination Procedures (continued)

EP3:4

Any item of equipment, once having been taken inside a controlled area, requires a survey for possible contamination prior to its removal from the controlled area. Equipment regularly required within a controlled area will be maintained within the controlled area. Areas within the Plant or items suspected of contamination will be checked before normal use is permitted. Laboratory analysis of swipes will be undertaken, and an area or item will be declared suitable for normal use if

contamination levels are less than 1,000 dpm/100 cm2. Should contaminated equipment be discovered, it will be stored and either decontaminated or disposed of in accordance with Plant procedures.

Food for emergency workers will be brought in from off-site, if necessary. The plant drinking water is obtained from the Ft. Pierce water supply. It is unlikely that ingestion of contaminated food or water will occur.

Frequent surveys of habitable areas utilized for emergency response (i.e. Control Room, TSC and OSC) will be performed to assure these areas remain uncontaminated. Special attention to drinking water and food supplies will be given to assure that these supplies remain uncontaminated.

4. Radioactive Wastes

Radioactive wastes (resins, trash, etc.) accumulated during an emergency will be handled by normal plant procedures. Any special circumstances will be handled on a case-by-case basis.


MARTIN HWY

EP3:4

FIGURE 5-2 SITE EVACUATION ROUTES

JAYCEE PARK OFF-SITE

ASSEMBLY AREA

N

ATLANTIC OCEAN

SITE ASSEMBLY STATION

(MET TOWER)

ST LUCIE PLANT

JENSEN PUBLIC \ BEACH PARKING AREA ~" OFF-SITE

ASSEMBLY AREA

(D!PS/EPLAN-F5.2-R1)


FIGURE 5-3 GENERAL PUBLIC EVACUATION ROUTES

N

(D1PS/EPLAN-F5.3-R3)



5.4 Recovery and Re-entry

EP3:4

1. On-site

Once the hazard potential has passed, steps must be taken to recover from the incident. All actions should be preplanned in order to limit exposures. Access to the area will be controlled and personnel exposures will be documented.

The Recovery Manager/EC has the responsibility for determining when the on-site conditions are stable and it is appropriate to enter the recovery phase. The Recovery Organization consists of an augmented Expanded Emergency Response Organization consisting of existing FPL emergency personnel and additional resources from both the company and contracted agencies. The Emergency Response Managers would continue their assigned duties with additional personnel to use as necessary. The Recovery Manager (or EC) will evaluate the status of the plant by reviewing all current and pertinent data available from emergency response and/or monitoring teams. The recovery phase will begin only when plant conditions are stable and the following guidelines are met:

1. Radiation levels in all in-plant areas are stable or decreasing with time.

2. Releases of radioactive materials to the environment from the plant are under control or have ceased.

3. Any fire, flooding, or similar emergency conditions are controlled or have ceased.

4. The reactor is in a stable condition.

At the time of initiating activities to enter the recovery phase, the Recovery Manager will be responsible for informing all applicable agencies (e.g., Federal, State, and local agencies) that on-site conditions have stabilized and activities for recovering from the incident can now begin. Once these agencies and the Emergency Control Officer (ECO) have been informed, the Recovery Manager has the authority to de-escalate the emergency classification.

Planned recovery actions which may result in a radioactive release will be evaluated by the Recovery Manager and his/her staff in advance. Such planning and data pertaining to the possible release will be reported to the appropriate offsite emergency response organizations and agencies.



5.4 1. On-site (continued)

EP3:4

Re-entry into an affected area may be required before entering the recovery phase. Re-entry into an evacuated area will be made by the Emergency Response Organization personnel when required for one or more of the following reasons:

1. To ascertain that all personnel who were in affected area have been evacuated, or to search for unaccounted personnel.

2. To assist in evacuating injured or incapacitated personnel from the affected area.

3. To perform operations which may mitigate the effect of the emergency or hazardous condition.

4. To determine the nature and extent of the emergency and/or radiological conditions.

5. To establish definite personnel exclusion area boundaries.

Re-entry to the affected areas on-site will take place only under the authority of the Emergency Coordinator. The TSC RP Supervisor is responsible for evaluating the existing emergency ·conditions and informing the Emergency Coordinator of the advisability of re-entry. For emergencies inside the Radiation Controlled Area (RCA), the TSC RP Supervisor will supervise the initial entry of the Emergency Response Organization personnel and all subsequent entries until radiation areas have been properly marked. More detailed guidance for re-entry teams is contained in plant procedures.

2. Off-site

State and County officials would be in control of recovery and re-entry off-site. Population exposure estimates are discussed in the State plan. Chapter 11 discusses the Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ. The State Plan (Chapter 13, Recovery and Re-entry) also discusses population dose measurement.


6. PUBLIC INFORMATION

6.1 Preparatory Public Information Program

1. Purpose

The purpose of the preparatory public information program is to inform the public of how they would be notified and what their actions should be in a radiological emergency.

2. Program Execution

Florida Power & Light Company has the responsibility for conducting the public information program with the support from the State Division of Emergency Management and the St. Lucie County and Martin County Departments of Public Safety.

Chapter 7 of the State Plan discusses the preparatory public information and education program. Education will be provided on an annual basis to local residents, transients, and news media in the manner described in Chapter 7, Section VII of the State Plan.

6.2 Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Public Information Program

This section delineates the organization, public information network, and facilities that would be made available as required in an emergency.

EP3:4

1. Organization

The members of the emergency public information organization (see Figure 6-1) and their respective responsibilities are as follows:

Emergency Information Manager (EIM)

The EIM is a senior manager or designated member of the Corporate Communications Department experienced in media relations, having knowledge of nuclear plant operations. He/she is the FPL official responsible for coordinating dissemination of information to the public via the news media. Insofar as practical, the EIM will work with the NRC, State, and local news media representatives to effect coordinated releases and public appearances. He/she will work with other company officials to develop formal statements and responses. All press releases, other than routine "updating" of data coming from the Emergency Operations Facility, should originate with or be cleared by the EIM. He/she will assure that exchange of information among designated spokespersons is accomplished in a timely manner, when possible.


FIGURE 6-1 PUBLIC INFORMATION INTERFACES

EMERGENCY CONTROL OFFICER (OFFICIAL PUBLIC SPOKESPERSON)

EMERGENCY INFORMATION MANAGER

I STAFF I I

STATE-COUNTY NRC PUBLIC NEWS PUBLIC RELATIONS RELATIONS MEDIA

(DIPS1EPLAN-F6.1-R34)


6. PUBLIC INFORMATION (continued)

6.2 1. Organization (continued)

Nuclear Information Staff

EP3:4

A staff of public information and technical personnel will be assigned as needed to the Joint Information Center. Their responsibilities will be to:

1. Provide technical briefings to the press.

2. Inform company employees through a newsletter, bulletin board statements, or other in-place networks.

3. Inform the industry, so other companies both in the United States and overseas can deal with questions as they arise from their local media.

4. Prepare background material for features, historical context, profiles, etc.

5. Handle the photographic needs of the company.

6. Record or transcribe all press conferences and other official proceedings for the benefit of company management, official agencies and the news media.

7. Accredit and escort members of the press.

8. Provide its own stenographic and typing services for news releases, photo captions, reports, transcripts, etc.

9. Provide reference services for maintaining files of releases and photos, obtaining newspapers, monitoring wire services and news broadcasts, logging all clippings.

The staff of the Florida Power & Light Company Corporate Communications Department may be augmented by personnel from other utilities, consultants, or universities.

2. Joint Information Center (JIG)

The St. Lucie Plant Joint Information Center (JIG) is adjacent to the EOF. The Emergency Information Manager will report to the EOF. A designated JIG supervisor and his/her staff will man the JIG when the EIM deems it appropriate. The JIC/EOF is located at the intersection of State Route 712 (Midway Road) and 1-95 approximately 10 % miles west of St. Lucie Plant.


- ----------------------------------------------

6. PUBLIC INFORMATION (continued)

6.2 3. News Media Provisions

Florida Power & Light Company, in cooperation with the State of Florida and the risk counties, conducts an annual program to acquaint the news media with the emergency plans, information concerning nuclear power and points of contact for release of public information in an emergency.

In the event of an emergency, representatives of the news media will be provided space in the Joint Information Center for work and interview purposes.

4. Written Message for the Public

Sample formats that may be used for release of information by FPL to the public via the news media appear in Tables 6-1 through 6-7. These releases include initial statements for each class of emergency and follow-up statements for the Alert class and higher.

6.3 Rumor Control

EP3:4

FPL will coordinate information exchange with State and County officials. This coordination will include awareness of media releases.

The timely exchange of information among designated spokespersons will aid in dispelling most rumors. In written material which is disseminated annually to the public in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ, means for obtaining timely and accurate information is provided. Chapter 7, Section VI of the State Plan also discusses Rumor Control.


TABLE 6-1 FPL PRESS STATEMENT

SAMPLE

Number: ----- Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center 9001 West Midway Road Date: / / ------Ft. Pierce, FL 34945

Time: Phone: ------

NEWS RELEASE

UNUSUAL EVENT

HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Florida Power & Light Company has alerted State and Local Officials and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that an "Unusual Event" has occurred at its St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant located south of Ft. Pierce.

According to initial reports, the event related to (give plant/unit specific data) The situation was reported at (time) .

Due to the nature of the event, FPL officials have determined that:

(Options)

a. The unit can remain operational at this time without posing a health or safety hazard to plant employees or the general public;

b. The power levels at the plant will be systematically reduced in order to investigate the extent of the problem. Full shutdown is expected later today; or

c. The unit will be immediately brought off-line and orderly shutdown procedures will be initiated.

All safety systems are operating normally and officials have stated that no (or no significant) radioactivity has been released as a result of this event. No further information is available at this time. However, news media will be kept informed of the plant's status as it becomes available.


Number: -----

Date: / / ------

Time: ------

ALERT


SAMPLE

Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Phone: ~~------

NEWS RELEASE

HUTCHINSON ISLAND - St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has declared an Alert, based on problems at Unit # ---

The unit had been (still operational), (under gradual power reduction), (in a full-scale, orderly shutdown following (give data relating to alert)

FPL officials called for the Alert and have notified appropriate State, Local and Federal Officials.

Option 1 (radiation release)

Plant operators have detected small amounts of radiation being released to the atmosphere as a result of the problem. The minor releases are confined to the plant site and pose no health or safety hazard to FPL employees or the general public. Radiation monitoring teams have been deployed as a routine precaution.

Option 2 (no radiation release)

Plant operators report that no radiation has been released from the unit as a result of the problem. Monitoring teams have been deployed at the plant site as a routine precaution.

All Safety Systems are operating and the unit has been placed in an orderly shutdown mode as officials continue to investigate the problem. FPL officials caution that no public action is required and no health or safety problem exists at this time.


Number: -----

Date: I I ------

Time: ------


SAMPLE

Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Phone: '------'-------

NEWS RELEASE

SITE-AREA EMERGENCY

HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Florida Power & Light Company has announced that a Site Area Emergency exists at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. At (a.m./p.m), all plant employees, except those with emergency response duties, were ordered to evacuate the plant site.

Plant officials called for the evacuation of non-emergency employees as a precautionary measure due to (insert plant specific data, is known). There are still approximately 90 personnel remaining on the plant site located in the Control Rooms, Technical Support Center, and Operational Support Center. This includes plant management, operators for both Units, and personnel from Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Maintenance, and

. Engineering departments. The cause and nature of the problem are being investigated and further details are not available at this time.

Option 1 (radiation release)

Monitoring equipment at the plant has detected (small/additional) amounts of radiation being released to the atmosphere as a result of the present situation at Unit# __ _

Option 2 (no radiation release)

No radiation releases have been detected as a result of the situation at Unit# ---

The plant is continuing shutdown procedures and emergency cooling of the reactor core is continuing. Persons in the immediate vicinity of the plant should continue to monitor radio and television broadcasts for the latest information.



Number: -----

Date: / / ------

Time: ------

SAMPLE

Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Phone:

'-----'-------

NEWS RELEASE

GENERAL EMERGENCY

HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Florida Power & Light Company, has notified State, County and Federal authorities, that a General Emergency exists at its St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant as a result of escalating problems at Unit# __ _

Persons within a 10 mile radius of the plant are advised to monitor radio and television stations for more information. Please follow all instructions provided through emergency broadcast services.

At this time, the plant is experiencing (significant, but controlled), (significant, . uncontrolled), (small, but controlled), (small, uncontrolled), (no) releases of radiation to the environment.

Non-essential plant personnel have left the site.

The public is advised to monitor and follow emergency broadcast messages on radio and television.



Number: -----

Date: I I ------

Time: ------

SAMPLE

Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Phone: '--___,_ _____ _ NEWS RELEASE

LOSS OF POWER/CORE DAMAGE/RADIATION PLUME

(Possible Follow-Up to General Emergency)

HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Significant equipment problems and loss of power to operate reactor core cooling systems have resulted in loss of coolant and partial uncovering of reactor fuel at St. Lucie Nuclear Unit# , FPL plant operators have reported.

Additional emergency systems are being employed. However, monitoring teams are registering radiation in the atmosphere around the plant site. Weather conditions are moving a radiological plume in a direction.

The public is advised to monitor emergency broadcast messages on radio and television.



SAMPLE

Number: -----

Date: I I ------

Time: ------

JOINT INFORMATION CENTER ACTIVATED


NEWS RELEASE

HUTCHINSON ISLAND - The St. Lucie Joint Information Center is now operating. Information about the nuclear emergency will be provided at this facility, located at Midway Road and 1-95, just west of Ft. Pierce. All affected agencies - County, State and Federal - will have representatives at the Joint Information Center to provide information about the emergency.

The Joint Information Center can be contacted by calling _______ _

EP3:4

IMPORTANT This telephone number is for news media only and should NOT be announced to the general public.


Number: -----

Date: __ / __ / __

Time: ------

MEDICAL EMERGENCY


SAMPLE


NEWS RELEASE

HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Florida Power & Light Company has reported that one of its workers at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has been injured and requires medical treatment.

Preliminary reports indicate the employee suffered (state injury) while working in the plant's (location) .

The worker has received some radioactive contamination, but further information of (his/her) condition is not available at this time.

Specialized equipment and protective procedures are in place to insure proper handling of any radioactive contamination.


7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

7 .1 Exercises and Drills

EP3:4

1. Definitions

An exercise is an event that tests the integrated capability of a major portion of the basic elements existing within the Radiological Emergency Plan for St. Lucie Plant. An exercise normally includes mobilization of State and local governmental personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to an accident scenario.

A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is often a component of an exercise. A drill should be evaluated by the supervisory personnel conducting the drill.

2. Purpose

Periodic exercises and drills will be conducted in order to test the state of emergency preparedness of participating personnel, organizations, and agencies. Each exercise or drill will be conducted to:

1. Ensure that participants are familiar with their respective duties and responsibilities.

2. Verify the adequacy of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

3. Test the communications network and systems.

4. Check the availability of emergency supplies and equipment.

5. Verify the operability of emergency equipment.

The results of the exercises will form the basis for prescribing action to eliminate identified deficiencies.

3. Planning

The site Emergency Preparedness Manager will be responsible for the planning, scheduling, and coordinating of exercises involving off-site agencies. A sample format for exercise scenarios appears in Table 7-1. All exercises and drills involving the plant are subject to the approval of plant management.


7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued)

7.1 Exercises and Drills (continued)

EP3:4

3. Planning ( continued)

When an exercise is to be conducted, the site Emergency Preparedness Manager, in conjunction with plant management, will:

1. Schedule a date for the exercise in coordination with the primary State and County emergency response agencies.

2. Obtain the approval of plant management.

3. Coordinate all FPL efforts with other participating personnel, organizations, and agencies.

4. Offer Federal, State, and local officials the opportunity to observe the exercise.

5. Assign personnel to prepare a scenario.

6. Assign personnel to assist in control and evaluation of the exercise.

7. Discuss and evaluate the exercise with observers and principal participants.

8. Ensure that for all identified deficiencies, corrective measures are recommended.

9. Prepare and submit documentation in accordance with plant procedures.

An Emergency Preparedness Coordinator may complete or coordinate completion of any of the above items. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager shall retain oversight and accountability through the requirements of EPIP-13, "Maintaining Emergency Preparedness -Emergency Exercises, Drills, Tests and Evaluations."

These exercises will simulate emergency conditions and may be scheduled such that two or more drills are conducted simultaneously. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager will normally notify the off-site emergency response organizations and agencies at least 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of an exercise.


TABLE 7-1 EXAMPLE SCENARIO FORMAT

(Page 1 of 2)

1. Basic objective(s) of exercise

2. Logistics

2.1 Date(s)

2.2 Time period

2.3 Location(s)

2.4 Participating organizations

3. The simulated events

4. Time schedule of real and simulated events

5. Narrative summary describing the conduct of the exercises

NOTE 5.1 through 5.5 are examples of subjects that might be discussed in Section 5.0 of the scenario.

5.1 Simulated casualties

5.2 Off-site fire-fighting assistance

5.3 Rescue of personnel

5.4 Radiological monitoring deployment

5.5 Public information activities

6. Duties of controllers

6.1 Specific observer assignment by area

6.2 Material provided to observers (i.e. check lists)

6.3 Pre-drill meeting

A. Date

B. Time

C. Location


7. Critique/evaluation

7.1 Date

7.2 Time

7.3 Location

TABLE 7-1 EXAMPLE SCENARIO FORMAT

(Page 2 of 2)

7.4 Suggested Participants



7.1 4. Conduct of Exercises, Drills and Tests (continued)

EP3:4

1. Exercises (Integrated Drills)

A radiological emergency response exercise will be conducted at least once every two calendar years to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. Any exercise that will provide for coordination with and participation of off-site emergency response personnel, organizations, and agencies including those of Federal, State, and local governments will escalate to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. The exercise scenario will be varied from year to year such that all major elements of the Plan are tested at least every 8 years.

The major elements that should be tested include the following:

• Off hours staffing (6 P.M. - 4 A.M.)

• Activation of Joint Information Center

• Use of fire control teams

• Use of medical support personnel

• Use of Security personnel for prompt access to emergency equipment or support

• Use of one or more portions of backup communications for notification

• Field monitoring

• Capability for determining the magnitude and impact of the particular components of a release

• Assembly and accountability

• Initial recovery planning activities




EP3:4

1. Exercises (Integrated Drills)

Additionally, in each eight calendar year exercise cycle, the content of scenarios during drills and exercises must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following scenario elements:

• hostile action directed at the plant site,

• no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public protective actions,

• an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency,

• implementation of strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under 1 OCFR50.54(hh)(2), and

• integration of offsite resources with onsite response.

This emergency response exercise will be critiqued by Florida Power & Light Company controller/evaluators and other evaluators, as appropriate, from Federal, State, and local agencies.

During the interval between biennial exercises, adequate emergency response capabilities will be maintained by conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of emergency response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency response include activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, protective action decision-making, and plant system repair and corrective actions.

During this off-year drill, activation of all of the emergency response facilities (TSC, OSC, EOF) would not be necessary, there would be an opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be permitted, operating staff would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills could focus on on-site training objectives.




EP3:4

2. Radiological Monitoring Drill

A radiological monitoring drill will be conducted at least once every calendar year. These drills will include collection and analysis of sample media (i.e. air). As an integral part of this annual drill, communications and the understanding of messages between the off-site monitoring team(s) and the TSC RP Supervisor will be tested. Radiation Protection Department personnel will participate in health physics drills semi-annually and one of the semi-annual drills may be incorporated into the radiological monitoring drill.

As indicated in Chapter 14, Section Ill of the State Plan, off-site radiological monitoring drills will be conducted and these drills will involve the collection of sample media.

3. Medical Emergency Drill

A medical emergency drill involving a simulated contaminated individual, with provisions for activation of the plant First Aid Team will be conducted at least once every calendar year. Participation by local support services (i.e., ambulance and off-site medical treatment facility) will be tested separately once per year or as part of the annual medical drill.

4. Hostile Action Based (HAB) Drills/Exercises

Hostile Action Based drills will be conducted to support the exercise (Integrated Drill) schedule.



7 .1 4. 5. Fire Emergency Drill

EP3:4

Fire drills are conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, 111.1.3. The Fire Protection Program is described in greater detail in plant administrative procedures.

6. Communications Tests and Drills

Communications with State and local governments within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be tested monthly. Communications with the NRG via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) will be tested monthly. On an annual basis, communications to the State EOG, St. Lucie and Martin County EOCs will be tested. As part of the annual test certain information will be exchanged. It will be determined whether or not the content of the drill messages was understood. The annual drill may be performed as part of an exercise.

As indicated in Chapter 14, Section Ill of the State Plan, the State conducts communications drills at least annually. These drills include "communications between the nuclear power plants, State, and local emergency operation centers and field assessment teams ... ". Chapter 6 of the State Plan indicates the equipment tested during drills.

7. Unannounced Drills

At least one communications drill per year will be unannounced. This unannounced drill will include notification to all primary off-site response agencies (i.e. DEM, Department of Health, County Departments of Public Safety) and those FPL emergency response personnel required to be notified based upon the drill scenario. The unannounced communication drill could coincide with an exercise, or an actual Emergency Plan activation.



7 .1 5. Evaluation

During a drill or an exercise, controllers may take measures in response to actions taken by the participants that might affect the planned outcome (objective of the drill or exercise). Minor errors in procedures, techniques or inappropriate prompting by controllers will be noted and discussed during the post-drill/exercise evaluation.

Following an exercise, the site Emergency Preparedness Manager, plant management, FPL controller/evaluators, and principal participants in the exercise will discuss and evaluate the exercise. Drill evaluations will also be conducted, though personnel involvement may be different.

The evaluation should be based on the ability of participants to follow emergency procedures, the adequacy of emergency procedures, and the adequacy of emergency equipment and supplies. Plant management and staff will be responsible for recommending necessary changes in the Emergency Plan and/or Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) to the site Emergency Preparedness Manager. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager or designee in Emergency Preparedness, is responsible for making changes to the Emergency Plan and/or EPIPs.

7 .2 Emergency Response Training

EP3:4

1. Objectives

The primary objectives of emergency response training are as follows:

1. Familiarize appropriate individuals with the Emergency Plan and related Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).

2. Instruct individuals in their specific duties to ensure effective and expeditious action during an emergency.

3. Periodically present significant changes in the scope or content of the Emergency Plan.

4. Provide refresher training to ensure that personnel are familiar with their duties and responsibilities.

5. Provide the various emergency organization groups with the required training that will ensure an integrated and prompt response to an emergency situation.



7.2 2. Training of On-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Personnel

EP3:4

Training programs have been established for personnel working at the plant site. The programs include initial indoctrination and subsequent retraining.

The training program for members of the on-site ERO will include practical drills, in which each individual participating in the drill demonstrates an ability to perform assigned emergency functions. Participation in a drill or exercise is not required for initial training qualification in the ERO. Training requirements are delineated in EPIP-12, "Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Radiological Emergency Plan Training."

The Site Training Manager is responsible for the conduct and documentation of initial training and annual retraining programs for on-site FPL Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel. Specific training is specified in the following subsections. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for the content and accuracy of the Emergency Plan Training. Each new employe.e permanently assigned to work at the St. Lucie Plant shall be given initial orientation training. For employees not assigned specific responsibility or authority under the Emergency Plan or Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), such training shall, at a minimum, provide information describing the action to be taken by an individual discovering an emergency condition, the location of assembly areas, the identification of emergency alarms, and the action to be taken upon hearing those alarms.

Training must be current to be maintained in the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). Emergency Plan Training records for Security personnel are maintained by the Site Training Manager.



7.2 2. Training of On-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Personnel (continued)

EP3:4

The following provides a description of the training provided to personnel filling the indicated positions.

1. Emergency Coordinator

a. Interpretation of plant and field data and how it relates to emergencies and their classification (i.e. Emergency Action Level (EAL) determination per Chapter 3).

b. Prompt and effective notification methods, including the types of communication systems.

c. Method of activating the Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization (ERO).

d. The methods used for estimating radiation doses and recommending off-site protective actions.

e. Emergency Plan familiarization.

f. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization.

g. Communications and record-keeping methods.

h. Accident assessment and corrective action (licensed operators only).

2. Shift Technical Advisor

a. Emergency Plan familiarization

b. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization.

c. Technical Specifications (in-depth understanding)

d. Specialized training in power plant and reactor specific core operating characteristics (normal and abnormal)

e. Familiarization with other related plant programs, plans, and procedures with emphasis on accident assessment techniques.



7.2 2. 3. Technical Support Center On-site Staff


b. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization.

C. Communications and record-keeping methods

d. Training for the various technical personnel that make up the TSC staff with emphasis on accident assessment and corrective action.

4. Other Emergency Responders

1. Radiation Protection Personnel

a. Use of air sampling equipment

b. Performance of radiation/contamination surveys

C. Determination of air activity levels, and stay times based on DAG hours

d. Determination of radiation levels.

e. Emergency Plan familiarization through RP Emergency Procedures

f. Record-keeping methods

g. In-depth knowledge of personnel and field monitoring/analyzing techniques

h. Communications and coordination

2. Security Personnel

a. Emergency Plan familiarization through the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

b. Personnel accountability procedures

C. Site ingress and egress control procedures

d. Deployment of Security Personnel

e. Communications and coordination



7.2 · 2. 4. 3. First Aid Team

EP3:4

a.. Emergency Plan familiarization through Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures familiarization

b. Communications and coordination

c. Description, storage location, and application of supplies and equipment

d. Sequential steps for the assessment of contamination levels and treatment of personnel injury

e. Familiarization with personnel decontamination procedures

f. Procedures for the evacuation of contaminated persons to off-site medical facilities

g. Team members will satisfactorily complete the first aid portion of the American National Red Cross Standard (ANRCS) First Aid Course or equivalent and will re-qualify every three years. Requalification does not require completion of the CPR portion of the AN RCS course.

3. Training of FPL EOF Emergency Response Organization Personnel

The Site Training Manager is responsible for the conduct and documentation of initial training and annual retraining for FPL EOF Emergency Response Organization personnel.

1 . Recovery Manager

a. Prompt and effective notification methods, including the types of communication systems.

b. Method of activating the Florida Power & Light Company off-site Emergency Response Organization.

c. The methods used for estimating radiation doses and determining Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).

d. Emergency Plan familiarization.

e. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization.

f. Familiarization with the Emergency Operations Facility and the Technical Support Center.



7 .2 3. Training of FPL EOF Emergency Response Organization Personnel (continued)

EP3:4

2. Emergency Control Officer, Emergency Information Manager, Governmental Affairs Manager, Emergency Security Manager, Emergency Technical Manager


b. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization

4. Training of Non-FPL Off-site Emergency Response Personnel

Off-site agencies who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency shall be offered briefings annually. These briefings will discuss basic concepts in radiation protection, plant operations and security, emergency classification, protective action recommendations and emergency response as appropriate. The following groups will be offered these sessions:

A. Fire and rescue

B. Police

C. Medical Support

D. Principal decision makers for State and county emergency response agencies

1. Police and Fire Fighting Support

As indicated in Chapter 15, Figure 15-1 to the State Plan, police and fire fighting personnel will receive training and retraining. Chapter 15 describes the details of training.

2. Local Emergency Management Officials

As described in Chapter 15 of the State Plan, disaster preparedness personnel will receive training and retraining.

3. Emergency Action Levels (EALs) Review

On an annual basis, the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) shall be reviewed with State and local governmental authorities.



7 .3 Planning Effort Development

EP3:4

Overall authority and responsibility for radiological emergency preparedness and planning lies with the Chief Nuclear Officer. As described below, through his/her staff (at the Plant and at Jupiter West), the FPL emergency planning and preparedness program is implemented. Major responsibility in this area has been delegated to the site Emergency Preparedness Manager and has been described throughout this plan.

1. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)

Written procedures will be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities associated with Emergency Plan implementation.

2. Review of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures

The Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will be under continuing review by the site emergency planning group. A comprehensive review of the Emergency Plan will be conducted annually. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures are reviewed during drills, exercises, and actual emergencies and revised as necessary to correct identified deficiencies. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will undergo a thorough formal review at least once every two years and be revised as necessary. Notification lists and rosters will be updated at least quarterly. If changes affecting emergency response are identified, these changes will be made as needed. The revised Emergency Plan will be distributed with the latest revision number indicated on each page. Revision indication along the right margin will be used to indicate where changes have been made. If during these annual reviews no changes are needed, this will be documented.

Changes to the Emergency Plan will be submitted, in writing or with pages marked for revision, to the site Emergency Preparedness Manager, or designee, in Emergency Preparedness. All proposed changes to the Emergency Plan shall be reviewed by the On-site Review Group (ORG) and, prior to implementation, approved by the Site Director - St. Lucie Plant, the senior executive responsible for the safe operation of the plant. Revisions to the Emergency Plan will be sent to the Corporate Functional Area Manager (CFAM).

The effective date of the revised Emergency Plan is determined by the site Emergency Preparedness Manager based on the Station work schedule and pre-implementation training, coordinated implementation with other documents and other appropriate considerations. The effective date should not exceed the approval date by more than thirty days.



7.3 2. Review of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (continued)

EP3:4

Changes to the EPIPs are performed in accordance with plant procedures. EPIPs are approved by the site Emergency Preparedness Manager unless changes are identified for evaluation by the On-site Review Group (ORG) with approval recommended to the Site Director.

Document holders will receive revisions to the Emergency Plan as they are issued. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for coordinating the periodic reviews of the Emergency Plan. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager will ensure that elements of the emergency organization (FPL, State, local, Federal) are informed of changes to the Emergency Plan.

The site Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for maintaining emergency preparedness. He/she maintains a roster of the Emergency Response Organization participants and their alternates. This roster is reviewed and confirmed periodically, typically once each calendar quarter. Each participant is responsible for advising the site Emergency Preparedness Manager when his/her duties are changed such that he/she can no longer participate. In the event of transfer or termination, the site Emergency Preparedness Manager should be notified by the employee's department head, and a replacement named and trained.

Responsibility for day-to-day emergency planning coordination lies with the site Emergency Preparedness Manager.

3. Review of Changes with On-site Personnel

The Site Training Manager will ensure that on-site Emergency Response Organization personnel are informed of relevant changes in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

4. Review of Changes with Off-site Personnel

Periodic correspondence and/or meetings will be held to inform off-site FPL emergency support personnel of changes in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.



7 .3 5. Audits

EP3:4

The FPL Nuclear Assurance Department will perform an independent audit of the Emergency Preparedness Program. The audits will verify compliance with federal regulations to include evaluation of the adequacy of the interfaces with State and Local governments, and of drills, exercises, capabilities and procedures. This audit shall be conducted either:

1) At least every 12 months, or

2) As necessary, based on an assessment against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect emergency preparedness, but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, all elements of the Emergency Preparedness Program must be reviewed once every 24 months.

The part of the review involving the evaluation for adequacy of interface with State and Local governments must be available to the appropriate State and Local governments.

Plant management, Corporate Functional Area Manager (CFAM), and the Chief Nuclear Officer will receive audit reports. Corrective actions, as delineated in the Quality Assurance Manual, will be assigned.

The audit findings shall be retained for a minimum of 5 years.

6. Document Distribution

St. Lucie Plant Document Control is responsible for distribution of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures to identified personnel and to Emergency Response Facilities. Document Control also distributes the Emergency Plan to off-site agencies and organizations. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide sufficient information to assure a thorough understanding of the various emergency response duties and responsibilities. Appendix F contains a listing of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. The locations where The State of Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan is maintained are listed in Appendix D.



7.3 7. Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Training

Most training of FPL Emergency Preparedness Coordinators is through on-the-job training related to Plan preparation, periodic revisions, and drills and exercises for two nuclear facilities. Other training may be received through seminars, meetings, and discussions with other industry groups. FPL is a member of and participates in emergency planning programs sponsored by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the Southeastern Utilities Emergency Planning I . Group (SUEPG).

7.4 Emergency Equipment Maintenance

All designated emergency equipment that is maintained in each Control Room, the TSC, OSC, EOF and the Site Assembly Station will be inventoried, operationally checked, and inspected at least once each calendar quarter and following each use.

7 .5 Letters of Agreement

EP3:4

Agreements with supporting agencies will be confirmed annually (by direct contact, telephone, or in correspondence). The Letters of Agreement (LOAs) will be updated every third year. Purchase orders/contracts will be renewed as required.


COVERPAGE REVISION: 7

EP3:4

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE

EAL - HOT BASIS EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

HOT BASIS (RCS > 200°F)

HOT CONDITIONS EAL- HOT BASIS

(APP-A-1)

ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

St. Lucie, Rev. 67


HOT CONDITIONS TABLE (RCS > 200°F)

HOT CONDITIONS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

HOT CONDITIONS TABLE INDEX .............................. ............................ . Blank Page ............. ......... ....................•............................ .. •... ....... ......... ..

INITIATING CONDITIONS MATRIX ........ ... ........ . .. . .... ............................ ..... . Blank Page ........................................ .. .... .. ...... ....•... ... ....... .... ....................

RECOGNITION CATEGORIES

R - Abnormal Rad Levels/ Radiologic.ii Effluent .... .. .............. ................... .

Radiological Effluent Basis ..... .... ........... ....... .... . .... ................................. . Radiological Effluent ......... . ... ...... ........... ........... ... .... ...... . Abnormal Rad Levels Basis .. ...... . ...... .......... ................. ............ .. ... . Abnormal Rad Levels......... . .............. •. ....... ......... ...•...... ...... ............ . Blank Page ... .......... ........ ........ ... .......... .. ....... ... ....................................... . .

F - Fi.ssion Product Barr ier Degradation ...................... . ... ........................ . .

Fission Product Ba rrier Degradation 1 / 2 / 3 Basis ................ ......... ............. ... . Fission Product Barrier Degradation 1 / 2 / J . . ................. ....... ...... ......... .. . Fission Product Barrier Degradation 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 Basis ............... ...................... . Fission Product Barrier Degradation 4 / 5 / 6 I 7 .. ....... . ........ ... .. ........ ....• ..... ... Blank Page ... ...... ....... ........... ........ .. ..... ......... ..... ... ......... ......... ... ... •.•......... ..

S - System Malfunctions .............. .. ... . ..... .. ... .... .... .. ... . .... .. ..... ..... . ....... .... .

AC Power & Failure of Protection I Criticality & DC Power Basis ....................... . AC Power & Failure of Protection I Crit icality & DC Power. ..... ............. ........... .. . Annunciators & RCS Leakage & Fuel Clad & Tech Specs Basis .... ............. ... .. . Annunciators & RCS Leakage & Fuel Clad & Tech Specs ................................ . Communications Basis . Communications ...... . ............... . Blank Page ... ... . .

H - Haz.irds and Other Conditions Affecting Pl.int Safety ........................... .

Security & Control Room Evacuation & Natural or Man-Made Events Basis ....... . Security & Control Room Evacuation & Natural or Man-Made Events ....... ......... . Natural or Man-Made Events Basis .. .... Natural or Man-Made Events..... .. . .......... ... ..... ... ................ .. ... ........ . . Fire / Explosion Basis.......... . ... .......... .......................... ...... .......... . Fire I Explosion ..... . .................. ................... . Toxic / Flammable Gas & Disc retionary Basis ... .... ....... ...... ................ ........... . . Toxic / Flammable Gas & Discretionary ... ..... . ... ....... ....................... .. Blank Page.... .................. . ....... ..... .......... ....... ................... .

E - Event.s Related to ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage lnst.:lllation) ... .

Events related to ISFSI Basis................ . .... .. .. ..... .. ... . .... . .. . .. .. . ...... ... ...... .. . Events relah,d to ISFSI .... .. .. ........... ...... ............ ..... ........ .. ... ....................... . Blank Page......... . ..................... .

PAGE REV -2-

2

2 2 3 2

4 1

5 1 6 3 7 3 8 1 9 1

10 3

11 3 12 3 13 3 14 4 15 4

16

17 1 18 2 19 2 20 3 21 3 22 2 23 2

24 1

25 1 26 1 27 1 28 2 29 2 30 2 31 2 32 2 33 2

34

35 36 37

HOT CONDillONS LIST OF EFFECITVE PAGES REVISION: 7 EAL - HOT BASIS ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-A-2) St. Lucie, Rev. 67

HOT CONDillONS


HOT CONDITIONS TABLE (RCS > 200°F)

EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2

EP3:4

HOT CONDITIONS TABLE INDEX

PAGE INITIATING CONDITIONS MATRIX..... ...... ........... ......... ......... ...... .... ... .... ... 2


R - Abnormal Rad Levels/ Radiological Effluent......... ... .......... .... ....... .... . 4-8

Radiological Elfluent... . . . . . . . . ..... .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .... ...... . . . . . . . . . .... .. ... 6 Abnormal Rad Levels ... ... ...... ... ..... ........ .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. ............. . .. ... ...... .. .......... 8

F - Fission Product Barrier Degradation... .... ........ .. .. ............... .. ... .. .... ..... . 10-14

Core Exit Thermocouple -Readings.. ...... ........... ..... ... ....... . ....... 12 Containment Isolation Failure or Bypass . .... ... ... ...... ........................ ......... 14 Containment Pressure ...... ..... ... ... .... ........ .. .......... 12 Containment Radiation Monitors ... .. .. ....... .... ....... ... ... 14 Emergency Coordinator Judgment. .. .... .. .. .... ...................... ..... 14 Primary Coolant Activity Level .. ........... ..... .. . .... .. ... ... ... ....... .. ....... . .. .... ...... 12 RCS leak Rate .. .. ........... .. ..... ..... ... .. .. .. 12 Reactor Vessel Water level.. ... ... . . . . .. . . ... . ........ .. 14 Safety Function Status.... ... .... .. ... .... ............. .. .......... 12 SIG Secondary Side Release with P - to - S Leakage .... . .... .... ... ... ..... .......... .. 14 SIG Tube Rupture . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. • . . . . . 14

S- System Malfunctions .... .. .... ........... . ... .... .. .. ... .. . .......... ....... ...... .. .. . ... . 16-22

AC Power. .. ... ... . . . .. . . . . . ........ . . . .. ................................. ............. ... ..... 18 Annunciators........ . .. ... .. ... ........... ... ... .......... .. 20 Communications............ ... ...... ...... .... ... ....................................................... 22 DC Power. .. . .. .................. ...................... ...... ............... 18 Failure of Reactor Protection / Criticality. . . . .................... ..... ......... 18 Fuel Clad...... . . . .. .... ...... .. ...... . ....................... .... .. ... 20 RCS Leakage. ..... ... ........... ... ..... ...... ......... ... . .. . .... .. ........ ......... .. 20 Tech Specs . .. .. ..... ... ... ..... ....... 20

H - H.:izards and Other Conditions Affecting Pl.mt Safety.. ..... .. . ........... . .... . 24-32

Control Room Evacuation Discretionary.. . ............... . Fire I Explosion .. ............. . Natural or Man.Made Events Security Toxic I Flammable Gas ...

26 32 30 26.28 26 32

E - Events Relilted to ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage lnstalliltion).. .. 34-36

ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSfilCATION TOOL HOT CONDillONS

(APP-A-3) St. Lucie, Rev. 67


This Page Intentionally Left Blank

HOT CONDillONS l EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL HOT CONDffiONS l



Site ArH Emergency Alert Unusual Event Sita ArH Emergency Alert Unusual Event RG1 RS I RA1 RUI HGI H!U HAA HIU

_, ~8 °'-Me Dose Resl.ftng fRm .in Off.ft Dow ReslAi,g from ;a'\ ,,.,......,..,Gaseouscrliq..,d "'1-....olGzseouscrl.tcµd

~ 1-K)SllLE ACTIC»I ~ i'l l..os& HOSTUAC!lOO- ... HOST1lE ACTION W1hn ... Confirmed SECUUlY CONDITION < ii2

0 Adu.Jlor lWJllf'ENTRele~ d Aaua a lt£ta.ENT Re.lNse d ~IDlho&,,;~ Radioacfiwy ID fW' Enwtnrrel'l :, ol l'hy'5ic,I Conool ol lho Faciliy. PROlEC1Ell AAEA O.\'IIER CONTRCU..EO AA.EA a O' Tlft& ~ lrdicas a Polerml

8 8:, ~:f=~erTl\¥l Gaseo;sl~~Thit, "'-<Than 0..-Than irl .<irlxmeA:radlllnal ~ in ... LewlolSn!yol ..,_, 200Trrres tt.OOCMror 15Mrues 2 Times the 00CM ftt 60 Miru@S r, ., lhoPlrt d 0~ rooo nnm Thy,tid COE b lho OOOnnm~CDEftlrh r,u,nge, u,nge,. e Po.. 21! Pa. 21! Po.. 21! Po. 211

18 j ~cxProji!cledOuatondh Ar=,ir,Pn,j@dOdQ,ra;m gf lho HS2 HA5

Rei.... UsirQh!JJ• ~'"'"'""cw Rel• .... ~ Pg. O Pg. O Pg. O Pg. O ., ~~ c:aivn,Rocrn~Has &en CorlTtf Room ~Ofl has bMn

RA2 RU2 ~ - a,,df'lnConool~be --~:, w ---~ ... ~ Oanage 11>~FUl!l« l.Dsl c:t lH'l.AN?-EO Rise in Fvt .. Pa, 211 Po. 21!

0~ ~ Waer lAYe M.fobs R~edor Ra<f.&n~ " HA1 HUI

~lb 'YI Resu1 n lh@ l.h::owr"'lO d z •!s• z ed Fuel OJtsde Im REXltlf I= Nao.nlQI'" Oes1n.dM! Phen:mtN N.:m.al or Destn.ietw- Phenornma

~ ~ v ..... irl ;.~~ Af~ ESSENT1Al AAEAS A.'feding 1he PROTEC~~'Xt Fe. 8 Pc. 8 ... o.- ~,a

!5 ~ RAJ ~ HA2 HU2 z " z

"' ~ ..... Rad~t.Yllh.Wthn~ ~ _ g FIRE CT EXPLOSlON >..-.g .... FIRE potemialy degrading the < i § I Facili:yllu<-~aiol I= Ope,alJi1y d Pin s..fe<y Sy,lom, level d s.fety d the plant.

"' II) S15--'Wm R~ ID Mlruii Sa"e ~ C: o. Rllqund ID Esi.iblish er Maira, < P~t 5.nty FUnct:\YIS. 1:1 Safe ShJldo,,n

f'g. 8 0 Pg. 30 Po. 30

FGI FS! FAI FU1 "' .;9 i ~ HA3 HU3

~ ~di Loss of ANY Two e,ri~ ANO Lon Loss or Poterml lms of /J.Nf two ANY Loss QI'" mv Potenul loll d ANY Lou or >J,lf Potential Lo.ss of 0 " Aootss to a, ESSENTIAL AA.EA Is Re!Nw ofTmic. O:inos.w. er Paencal Loss d lhe lhird urier. - ~ Fwl C1>d OR ~CS Ccr1.lffll!fl 0 .:;; Pn:ni:it&d OJe To Release of Toxic. ~ilnt. crR~Glses

""'· 12-14 ~ . , 2-1• ~ 11-14 Pm- n-," ~ ~~~~ DHrred~ tor•,ORMAL

SG1 SS1 SA5 SU1 "' "~ Pl.NIT ~ TIONS. >< 0 e,. gf s"'""" f!e<>.in,d 1D Mair<an 12

i ~loss cl All O!l-s:htand Al loss of Al Of..-s ii' w All Ch-ste ~~~Zl~~ Los,1,rJAI0---1i-e/1£PCWEr10 I ~ s.r. ~ O<S.hJy -- ... !he Reader. <

N:; - .. --N:, Power-to Em!rgtncy Bus.MS kr Emervency Susses. fer 15 Mm.r.es or Pa. 32 Pa. 32 :I

~ a.ues 15 rmt.USor~ ScvotFor15~crl..or(ler u,ngt!< Suen - ,,,, _ ~ Soglo I HG2 HS3 HAG HU5 rJ>

~ Fa~\"'kudResut - :,: • ~ - f OhEr Onux:ns E»s:r,g '\hdi n o.hw Corxiillons Wst~ \\lhdl n ONr Coodticm &stirv \\hdl Wl Ohr Coiciti<rlS Emtng \\l1it:h n Po.. 18 Po. 18 Po. 18 Po. 18 !IM~nidlho"'""11oncy ""' -'-'>gn,nt "' .... En'E,vency c!:..~~&::~· .. .... Juogme<t d .... Erneqjonq, E

SG2 SS2 SA2 SUS CoodnirJyW.r;n DRd...i.iro d CoordN.la"\'\'arr.r,t Oed3'.liion of Coord~W.n.n~d,1 0

Genera!E""'V'OCY Si'.e ~ Emergency ,nAA,l Noofua6cno(lkuow1E""" ~ :~t ldmac Trip and Al MYtual ALaaNtc Trip F.1fs 10 Shwlov.n lhe ~ZtF~'s,_~~~ Ndve<tenl0iwl!1y.

(NOU2[

Actions F3til to Shl.Ado¥ln tht RNCD"" Readl::r N,O M:mual J.a,ons T l!fl p . 32 p . 32 Po.. 32 Po. 32 u 1~1 Nl01ndicaticn d.w1 Enr~ fnn, ~ Reactor TllbN G«!eracu T:M.«1 from the Re.;iaOI' Turt;..rwi E..HUt

C)

; e z d O\alenge ID Ohl! Abiliy ID Cod lho Board (RTGB) .n NOT Soa:essll.l G!!n<r.oor-.ilRTGe) n ~ ea.Emu. n~Oown lhe~ 5uocflsful in ShittinQ! Dom the a- D.irrugie10.1badedcasl

R"""" !~ l:> -BOlNJARY. :!!i Po. 18 Po. IS Po. 18 Pa. 18 jrl I::

SS3 .! ~ 3: ;! 0: Pa. 30 g 8~ LoudAIVtal OCPcwerfo 15

t Mnltrs or lavar Pa. 18 z :, SS6 SM SU3

i .. ~ lnabiliiy l:> MoNar il Sq, ~louo(Sm,y!ly,t@m Ul"fl».NEO Lon d fdf!fy ~a,m

Tr.risieri in Progei;,; Anrlincu6cn r, lrdcx:o, 1n h! ~attdtc:Joonin1he

~ i ~-1-,\f\S0.., (11 • Conn:i Room for 15 fJin.m. r:,

"' s.oi~=:-" ~ ,. .. < ....... ,_ I Pg 20 Pg 2<l Pg. 2<l ..

SUS tl~ o:~ RCSwklgt

""· ,n

"'j SU4

~u Fu,i <lad Dogad-.. Po. 20

SU2

0~ = =f= I!!., ~linll>.

Pa. 20 SU6

• Lem af M On-sita! or Of...SW 8 ecm.u,......,. c,p.btiies.

Pn. 22

HOT CONDmONS 2 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL HOT CONDITIONS 2



This Page lntentionaHy Left Blank

HOT CONDITTONS 3 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL HOT CONDITTONS 3



RECOGNITION CATEGORY R

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT

R- HOT CONDillONS 4 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: l ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- HOT CONDIDONS 4



M -· . .. .. . : .. ,. . - . :. ,:

!z w => ..J u.. u.. w ..J ~ 1,2

8 ..J 0 i5 ~ § ~ w ..J C

ci ..J

~ 0: 0 z Ill ~ I

0:

RG1-Basis:

This IC addresses radioactivity re'e-lses tha1 resutt in <hsu al or beyond

~~~~W"~~~ry neceswry. ReJe.z5;esdtis m;viUfe are associilted ,-.iththefailla"eol plant system; needed for the proledion of the p<t,lic and likely ilwl"' fuel damage. l'lllile these bilun,s an, ocl:tressed byather lCs. this IC pr<M<les ~~.:..~~-=-..r::.::i:.1:.:,,1e:.,~ Ole more sewre accidents, the f'SNse may be uirmnitored er there may be lar{leU1CE<taintiesasscdaa!d wl hthe sooroe termandformeteorology •

The EPA PAGs are "'IJfl!Ssed in terms of the smi of ihoeffecwedo<.e eqijvaient (EDE) and the c,;,rmjned effedive dose e<JJiva1er,1 (CED~ or as the thyroid oormiHed dose equivaleflt (COE~ Fa 1he p.rpose cl lhe<e ICIE/ils. lhe do<.e <JJanlily 1Dtal elfedilll! dose equivalent (TEIE). as defined in 10 CFR 20. is used in lieu c1-,.... of B)E and CEDE".

The TEIJ!E tbie 15 set at fie EPA PAG. vmile l1e 5(J(J(J nnm thyroid COE was-ished in oonsideralicnofthe 1:5rat»of the EPAPAG b-TEDE and thyroid COE.

The rmnitor tisl in EAi.. #1 includes monitors on all potential refuse palm-

Since dose assessment is based on acwaJ meteaotogy. Yllereas Ile moni1or reacir9 EAi.is not. the "'5\lls torn these asse.- may indicate that 1he dassr,calian is not - or may ,ndicale lhal • higher cli5sffication is wiff.inled. Fer this reason. eme,genc.y iirplememv p,xeclres should call lo< the 1imely perform;r,oe of dose .-a,gadual ~ and releaseinlormaticn. If the f1!Slltls a h!se dose assessments are avail.ilfe Wf1 the classrfic:ation is made (e.g .• matedatakJ..W!r dassilcatia, k!vef). tfll!:dose ~ses.sme.nt results <M!fride lhe monitor readi.ng EAL

Site Area Emergency RS1 -Basis:

This IC admesse~ tadioadmty releases that result in doses at or beyond the ~le booodary f1al e.xceed 10'!. al the ErMronmemal Procectioo..,, f'nlt:ecf:w Action Glides (PAGs~ Releases cl this mag,itude an,

.. - with Ile ...... of plant syslem5 needed ""lhe protea ion cl the p.blic. Whlelheset.ues,re iidchsaie<lby- lCs. this ICpmYides ~cf-lyandoddlos>es"""'11swhichmaynotbeilble1Dbe classified an the basis ol plant....,. alone. It is ~ lo n:>te thill bthe mtft severe accident'S lhe re~ may be lnTU'lilored a there may be lar]je unoeri.inties assoc:ialed wilh lhe '°"""' term and/a ..-at>logy.

=r~~'r:'~"7~~~~0f as the f¥oid conmlted dose..µ.- (COE~ Fa the p<OJIOSI! of these tCIEALs. the dose quantity 1oti11 elfecwe dose equiv- (TEDE). as cfefned in 10 CFR 20, is used in r.eu of "Slrn cl EOE and CB)E'".

The lBlE dose is ... ill 10% cl lhe EPA PAG, -the too nnm thyro,d COEwas-ished in (X](l~-of the 1:5 ratioclttie EPAPAG ft>" TEDE and lhyn,id alE.

The fJ10ffla'" 15"1. in EAL #1 incu:tes monitors on all potential «!ease patt-o,,,.,ys.

Alert RA1 -Basis:

The Emergency Coort!Nior shoold not wait IRl the applicable 1ime h3s

=,~~=~~;.a!iitisde4enrrnedlhathe llM!-...i basis of this IC i• NOT a dose or do,;• rate. but ialher lhe ~on in lhe level or 5*ty of lhe plant inplled by the LnCOOtrolled relNse_ Tff/5 IC addresses .ilf1 aduaf or 51..miantial ?C*ntial

~~-~1:!.1!.~C .. b"!'=~~=a1 time-.

Nuclear pcwerplanls inoorpcrale lealtfts inleooed lDoontrol fle release of OOGK:live efluents iD Ile emrin:nnent. Fl.liher, llere are administracive c:on1rols. These oontrols are locah!d in the Off-<ite Dooe Calculation lllalual (OOCM). The O<XUl'ellCe cl e"""'"'<I. """"1inllled racloat£,,e re."eases to the envirorment is ndica1?W d a degradation in lhe feares and'<iroc:nrols..

The OOCM ~ ""' SjleCffied in R\JI and RA1 only lD disti'9WI between -a,r,dilions. and ltome;och - · Vlhle ...... m.,ffiples -.s1y COO'eSjlOOd to an ~site dose or dose r.lle, 1he ffl1)h.isis indassifyi,g these E'W!flts is the ~ SI t~ Jevel d safety of t,e ¢art. not lhe magnitude of lhe as.socialed dose or dose rate.

Releases shrud not be prorzed or .v..-.ged Fo, ~ • release emeed~ llOOx OOCM la' 5 mnules does nol meet the -d.

This EAL -. "'I it!lea5e ft>" which a radioacti~ty dischaige pennit was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the aJO<itions je..g., ,-nirirrun dliion flow. ma>linun d sdlaiye llcw. alarm selpoinls. etc. en 11w ilf'plioablepe,ml

EALlfl is inleooed b"sies that --ellluent monilllring at

~~~r.~:!r'..k.~~ .... "';;''r..~ times the OOCM rirrii "'100 limes lhe lhreshold vat""' used in RU1. This is lruo e>ICepl lo< 1he tmsholds b- the S1eam Generalor Bbttmn Moribs. On bolh Uril 1 and uni 2. the oalculaled values .......sed the ""'II'! of themanilor5. Therefore, a.. values used b-the Sleam Generala Bio,,down l.tJnltors an, 95% of ruu 5Calo. llis lesser value is still indcaiM, of il - of <XJl*<llcl radoadivema1£rialweil in """'5Salthat constillilg an lhlsual E~

EALll2 adcnsses raaoadivilyreleases, M b"-rNSal cause elfjJelllr.><ialicn mcni1orreodngs lo..........tthellTI!shc!dEel"ftitied in the IC esbbi,hed by the rado;,ctj'lify d """'1le p,nTit. TNs value may be asso<ialed ..th a p!amed i..trhreloase. er aCCIDUlUS-palh.

EAL #3-sses Ln>OnCR>tled n!!eases M an,de<ected byWIT1)1e analyses. panicularty.., ..-.nonitored p,,llw,ays, ""-· splls cl radioacave lilpds into stem, drains, heal exxn,nger !eat.age in mM wale,- syst..,.._ etc.

R- HOT CONDmONS 5 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL

Unusual Event RU1-Basis:

The Emergency Coordina1cf sholld not w.i\ until 11w appicable ime has elapsed. bu: shcdd dedan! the event Z» soon as it is determined th.al the oonditioo wiD likely exoeed lhe appicable f.ne.

The fundamental mgs of thi.s K: is HOT a dose m- dose r.te. tMA - the dogr.idaoon in the level of sah!ty of lhe plant impried by the uncontrol•d refe..a:se. This IC .mi:h!!.SeS a potentia'I dl!<nase in flt!: llevel of 5alelyol lhe plant as moated by a,aclolcs,c,l release thal exoeeds ~illDry commitrrents ft>" an e.xtended penod of time.

Nude.Ir pcr,-,erplants mcrpa- e featu.s intended lo C<XCld there!ease clradioac:tM,elltuentstolle-Furlie<, thereareadmrislrative oontro4s estallli5'ted to~: unintentional ~leases. or oontrof and rronitJr intentkna.l re~ These oonirds .n ~ 11 Im! Off-!iil:e Oooe Ca'ruatioo Marual (OOCM). The oca.m,nee of oxierlded. IJ!lOOr*oled ratioaebe reieases to the ~nt 5 irdcative a ~cllllese fealtresand'orocntrots.

The OOCM~ an, spe<ilied in RUt and RAI ooly lo di!ilinglash - nan-eme,genc:y cooditions..nl fromead!Olher. 'Mw!e these irultiples obviously com,spcnd ID an ofl.sjie cbse"' do,;e - . the ~ in $ssifying these even1s is lhe cfe\,adatm in the level of saleiy of the pin. not the magnitude ol lhe associa'.ed dose or dose rate.

Releases should not be prorated a averaged. Fer exarri,le. a release exceeding 4x 00CM la' :JO minlJtes does noc """ the IITI!,;hcjd_

1lis EAL includes any n!lease ID<- a radoaoli,dy disdlarge pem;t ..... not prepared. or. release Iha! e,coeeds ... cooditions 1•.g.. mininun diluiim flaw, rnDnUn discharge l<M. alann ~s. etc. m the appllcable penrii.

EAllt addressesradioaclivity..ieases. thatb-whalevHll!<iiSOO.cal6t!

~is~"'f.'=b"~Ji°.:e:;:t~~~:::=~ on ...... mur.,. release pathways lcr which a dischage permit would not nonna!y be prep,red.

EALl/2 addresses radioactive -..Sthill. b""1lill...,. """'°"· cause effuent r.vJial:icn maiior ~adings to a.oeed lhe ffnshold Kientihd in ihe IC, estil:iished byihe radioactivil)' disch"'9" pemwl This vili\Je maybe a~ 'M.1h .a plinled batch reNSe. u a corilinoous release path.

R - HOT CONDIDONS



=~·- S1te Area Emergency Alert Unusual Event RKognillon

c••"°'" RG1 RS1 Off.sit• Don fhttulbng ion, WI Act\ltl f:I IM.\<l!NENT Release of RA1 My lbfute of GlstOJs or liquid Radioactr,,Cylottt. EnWO'lfflf'nl RUI M'f Rt~ne of Gueo.,1 O' UQJ d At<lotCCMty to the

Release af Geseoos Redio.chYCyQu1er Thtr, 1000 GIHCUI R•c:loKlMCY GrHttf Tti,n 100 mr•m TEOE or 500 GrHter Than 200 Times the OOCM for 15 MtnulM or Longer EnwmiNnt C.Hte" Than 2 llfflH the OOCM for 60

'''" 11nm TEDE or SOCIO r,wem Thyroad COE for the Ac:tutl or .... nnm Thyroid COE kif th• Actu.J Of Pro,N:ttd OurttlOrt of lhc .,

'""' M1001n °' LO"lgn Pfqected OUrl!lbon ot me Reins• UMng Adutl R@leaWi Mttto-OO>Q'/ Optt aUog Mode App11uti1111v: All 0~1;1,t1na Moot AppHcablmy: All

Operating Mod• Applleablllly . All OperatJng Mod• Appl lc,1t>Ulty: All EAL ValuH: EAL Values.

EAL V ,Mu .. : EALV.tluu; l:l!l11 -- The Emt!IIO¢nt1~c,;,»1a sttouldnotwtittwtliflhe IPP#Cl1*trmeflH TheEmetr,enc, Ccord'"''°' $houkl not MIR unril the lpt:,#Ctt:,lt

.!1211 The EtnO'VfflCY eoontm,tor s1'0tAd not w,,r llnll fh6 •~•bl& wne •Yp.,ed. bu1 .shtr:xttJ ~ the ~'mt H .soon t.r tf ~ delrml#ned "''' rhtt tll'fllt IM• ~S.pl«J but .tould rkclil1e tll& IM'nt a, .JOOfJ •• II n TM En'l!Yo,ttflCJ' Coord1D11la should rKlf w•it ....iW rhe a.pp#CM>le hu Mfltt<J our thoulrf dedtte me r~ a, "'°"., It i, di!'!PnrwM!d 1rielsed1111JenhUtliCH<led, t,wAl,~eAe,eed IM1Pf;>«•l'>Wbn,c, lnltte «temw*1thl rlherdH.led11•bOnN1~NQed c,, wif"'et, lime he• ~pw:d Dut 9hot.Jld Ott,-. #,e C~I H IOOl't H I i, fMrlhf:,-aNdlnbOrtMSeJCffdr,d ordliketyr.-ceed trw •DM'rtN olti.la lotM conhry '" ,,., tl,e tt!Nse dl.retioo hH eACffdfN:1 exeft'd the app.kablt- lime In I.ht! •b.Jene'e d aa,, la lhe

d~n»ned I/la: ltll! 1e1Nu dl,H/J)(J hat exCf!eOl!!d or Wtl ·~ •~•blll~ #tbreul@s1"1lffllresu1ZsMa•vsllb6!11tr.e~ the •PPk•t* ffl'!ll'.' It en O'f9Cllnl1 '~'"' 11 dele<fed ~ thO relelse .st,,t r.,,,ii, cOl'lt,•~- •uum, ~t lf'le u.~·le•ae dtler.o,t hu eJ.ceeded lhe

e~C'f!'«I ~•PQl,(11:,,1,Jhrnl, lfdoMu•umc"ntre.s11,'la•e d decllrelJOt't dtO CMu,tiu~ "10Uld be blsed on doae tt~nown -- ,t,n ~teJH• i, dtl«IN111)d UH: rdef,e

'" .. ~ ,r the M1tl d dec:Mt,uon the Cllltslttlklrf lboilld be tneumenf ,nswd d t't1Qnltl)r l'WM'I Do not dcm1 dodw1tioo ltMI hme II IUIMCM'll

t.,t!(}OfldostflJlfllmffit.flSllredoltnOOJfl7\119WS Oonol .w,.un do# H.tulnll!!lnOC'sub 1. VAJ.IOr'Hdlntjlon ANY oflherouow,ng~uietlhanlhlRuou,gs~ b IS deJav ~Jara!.o'I 1w.t,t,m dose ,ueJ:.srtlfflf ~,1111, n-.nutu or klngt'f , . VALID , .. onv on A.NY "'tne fellowing WHlef lh.n l!le Ruong

1. VALID r.acintjl g,t ANY d tne kllowlng rllli&tk:n tnanllor1 '"a-tfl lho,;,flto,60mnutttortc,\;er I-1, VALIO,dditlgo, A.NY OClhefci!OIIMQ ttdl.t.on mo,t(ll"t "'et~ lhtntntr~~Jcir 15rntlutttOk'fMaet- UNlf1. z

lhM CM rudng lho.wi tc, 1 ~ rnl!'IUIH Of IOnQet' Mcin,t.or O!.n1t~! Pltlt#tt FIH""'9 UHIT1: w UNIT1

A•ntVe.ntlPVt Mar\illr ChartNI Palhn1 _.,., ::> UNIT1 : RSC 3-1H 9 • E--01 uQJcc -' Marvtor Channel PolnW11y

,,._ Nonnal~· PllllltV«it(PV) u.

MonllOl'ChaflPIII Pdlny R~ld;,, P>..,Ve,.cPII! R&C 28-1L

f.lQITl'ltlOps 9 • E·G) UCl!b: u.

ASC26,.1H 82£•00u0kc RSC2'-1H "'-nlWnt;P'II) 1 1 E•01 uCucc w

P,tnl Vent IPV) ,~Ol'l'ntl Opt poot-SIAS R9C 26-lH Ftfnt Vent. IPV> 1 I £.(U uCike -'

RSC 26-lH Ua:malOpt 8 2 E • 01 uClkc: Pltn1V.nccPV1 Fuel Hwu,no a,Jklno

oo,t--51AS C( RSC l6-1H

PW·StAS i 8 £ •01 uOA:t f:1$CN,.4H

IFHB> S 3 E•OOuOA:c ASC 26--tL Fud H•rw:tno BuikJlng u 5 l E•02 uevtt I-

ASC 2$- IH Planl Vtnt1PV} IH•0'2uC~ 'A" Mltn Slum lin• 2..i E•02..cur:c Rl26-62

.,.. Mtin Stt1m L;n• 21 E•O I vOkt

ASC 2&-•H fFMBt G5 i3

"""""·Sit'-$ RJ 26--82

-·"' Monitor 0 B'Mlln5'eamline e· Mt'1 Sletm liti.t: Rl26-62 A' Mt,11 St:etrn lM\o 2 ;e.01 u(.llte :l -'

UNIT2: Rl:;.'$,,SJ -·- 2 -' E'+0'2\tt'llt-e R12&.63 Monitor :z 7 E .. o, vevcc 1'rblt!cr 0 RY·2!910.I Rl2M3 8M~Setm~ u. 0 J.loniU.tCtltn.Aflf Pt1h11ty ReltdntJ ·11t&OB~ 9~E•~(tltt\ Mont.er 2 7 E.01 uCile< u.

UNITl! a.« w ~ RS !'6-&0 Plant Vent cP\h IOE •<J:t~c ~oOt.nnct Pllh•'Y RY-23920-1 , RY-239 10-1 'ASIG~ IOE•CMqm -' RMCS 622 t-lOffl'ltlOo,. "·- a. •s ·ss.G~ g~ e,osc:om °'" C( Cl)

RS 2&-90 RS2&-90 ~lfll Ven! (PV) 9 0 E•OO uOkt-RY-23920-1 ·a·w- 2'E·G<- !d -' •.. S 622 Plant Venl IP'Vl ttE•02uiCikc: RMCS 622 HormalOn, UNIT?. Cl\45 C) w

poo<-$1AS RS26-90 PltnCV .. IPVl Gj Rh'CS 623 FWJCS 8l2 """·SIAS

t & E •01 uOlcc Mo'\lor Chanrw=J PliOWBy _....., UNIT2: 0

wl FHB Otwtted to -' -' RS 3-90 Pltnl\ftr1!Y!aSh..; 12E•Ol~c RS26--to W/FHB°""'ftedto RS 26-90 ~~r~ IOE•QO\J('tt.; MonilO' CfttMft f"atbay ,,.,~ 0 RMCS 822 Sulfck,n ven111.11on Pllf,tVent~16hlek1 12E•OO~ RMCS 822 0 0

RMCS 622 [IIJlklnn Ventll.r on RS2&.i0 Pl411:11 Vent lPVl RS,._w Pltnl Ven1 (PVJ ~ AMCS 52Z nOlt-StAS 11£'•01 uc, RP~S tl,11 N<ttNI~ 10E-02u~ ~ RIMW•7l A:M~&tumun.e: l1ll RMCS 631 Mon .... 90 E•03rnRh' 'WI r HB Orwrted to RS2WO AtntVC'fll(PV) -' RS26·90 P11n1Vent,,.,SN-'d 9 • E-OluQrlcc Rl- 622 nrK!,S!A..9 1 1 E-01 uo.tc

~ J . Dote uussment """9 ect"tt mete,oroloqyiftdlleatH dMn Ala.t2~n e· M-,SteemUM 9QE•03mfttlt R S S22

RMCS 632 Mon.tcr ....... ....__Vtf'llilat,ori RS 26-90 w/fHB0rvetle<1fo Offftet Q\ln 10)0 r'l'feffi TEOE O" 5000r,wtfllhyro.dCOE Mr, RS26-12 Fuet HWICIMO 8.lttclrlg ~rttdlOPllnt RM:.$ 821 P'llnt Vffll 'JI• Shdd t' E--03 UCVcc er t)~CI Vie ll!e bound-,y

SIA AMCS 413 •FHB• VenC eu-~"'1'°" 0 RIM 26-71 'A' Mas, Steamlan. RS~12 F..ael kal'ldlng ~ilding z

24 2.. OOWJ HM:ffl'!"lenl u"ng tttuel mtleO"'Qkltjly inctutes dOMtt !7(1tter RMCS 631 Monitor-I OE•OlmRlht RMCS 41 13 (FH8t • tE,O,uC~ al

C( J, Ffdd wrwy ,nun, mckll• ctOMd tMndow dose rate, gr.at If &htn ,oonvetnTEOEOR SOOnwemlh',10tdCOE•t or be)'Ol:ldthe RIM:26-n s· Maw, Stnmltne. I O E•03 mR..tlt RIM 2$.11 . ._. Mam Stum Line

1.0£•01MRJht I lltaft tOOOmR.ahr e,:peciedto con.bnue lormo-. thtnone hour OR .,., baoo~ry AMCS on MQnltOf RMCS UI "'°"""' 1n•l~n of dd SUMrf MfT'Pe,.indlcate tn)«lld COE paler It.I SIA RS.2G-5 ·A"$1Cl,,_ 9 5 E-03 .c .... Alt.I 2&-n --u· M&msicaml.k'I• er 5000 mtctn k:11" enehwr dinhtlltM;tn et obe)'Ond f!C•~OMY RMCS 11t RS'CS 632 """""''

1 0E t 01 mRA'lt

3. field WfVfY tt'IUllt indklle dO\t!d window dos. ffll" ftet lef on "5.i~s 122 8'S1G- 95 E'OlvCl,l,il RS.2G-5 tOOmRAw ••PedeG IOCO"!lf'UHI for mottlhln on•r.cur o .. RJM::S 1:H WSIGl!iowdo,m 25 E'G< uCW>I

NI "'tl)'S«lt of field w,wy Hffipn inck1le lhyl"Old COE gretlot lttJn RS-21-8 500 mrtm fof on• llour ot inhellllon at 0t bt)'<tld tf'le tile tio,ndlry Q!!. RMCS 12'.2 ·a·S1G- 25£'00 uc;..,n,

IMMIHEffT - Miligttlen lcbt.l\S t\t\l'e Deffl lffrtreell'lt IOcl IOl'IIJ NCE 11:St flA1 AU1 1, VAJ..IOfttaftO(lil'I ANYe l'lluentmon•or tN1 o:ctedt 200W'l\ttthelltrm ldKlnt ere net Cl!Qttlt4 to be t1Jccentu1 end 1rendtd 24

info mabon nlicates lhM the ewnl oc condbcn 'Ml occur Vrbert1

' \\Nfetwod"lannll&••••td hl~~owir1ap,... wtpont nt1tmhed tor• current reoa.ctMy OK:harv• permit k>f 15 nw,utn,

IMMI IENT l11T1tftlfflff tf• spec, ltl..,s.h,lltP(lty fflOl'llo, ,-a0119 11 val•d on Mh.- d\WIMI "'"""'" 2. VAllOtudiog on A.NY eNluffll mcnl.O"" reading g11~ater lh•n 2

24 hMH lfif: tW!fm ~ estatMSl'led b)' • cuntnt rattir»Cfi\ltt';'

VALID - NI ilidie1uon 1epor1 <:, cc,idt,cin 11 con~aed1obc 7 Fe, Ur* 1 Ebefinectllt'IMlft-toottanellfffl dal• O~•rv- pe.tMI fer &O nwn,ces or lcn9ft VALIO'#hcnltllYarl edby(1)MIMlrumMtc:htnnflc:Mc4112) EtlTERlheeommo1MfO,.TAJCN,.,... IOIENlERI

3. ConffmedUr'f"Cllc..,ltyses fo, oaseciu, or~rdeasetinCklltt indic.110,1 crt reft1ed or redl.lnda!!I indicltO'S 01 l3J by ctred 24 Obsel\ltlior'lbyptlnt:1)8M!Mei tl.ld'llhtldaJbtrelltedtotne 3 UM NOO'llal OPS heth<H wnl•1 PwlC \f ..... °"" hH ~ concentrat.ons OR rdetse 11te1 grnter-than lOO brnff Ot>CM ll'l'Mtl kw IS

lndlc.eta s q,crl!briity the c<K'd11M • eXtsttno.. or lht repcrt 1 l..owln!ldduelo aJCC:e""' ~s mnutes or longff l . Conffrmed ~e ant1~ for ges,eo.,• or IQC.-d releese, 1ceurtcy ,, removed IMOltctt in lhrs de~ It the. ftt.td let OR ll'l<k:lles ccnc:,ntrabcnt OR r ease r1te11 c,,e:,tt, lhen 2 times time~ assessment . Unll 1 orfy - Rase<! dul to~I~ on FHB OOCM Lmtt k1 60 mnuttt or tonQtlr

Wt'lllflto<n to tM Plan1 Vent

PAUi•;; 6 HL \ ' ISION: J R - I !OT C:O:S,l)ITIONS l::,\L • IIOT B.\SIS ST LL' CII:: l'L\1'ff CL,\SSIFIC.\TION TOOL


1-2 w ::i _, u.. u.. w _, <( u l, 0 _, 0 0

~ Cl) _, w ;::,, w _, 0 <( a: _, <( ~ a: 0 2 m <(

I a:

P,\UE: 7

EP3:4


RE\' ISIO;,.; : 3

Site Area Emergency

ll - 110T co;,.;orrio:--s

Alert RA2 - Basls:

Thi$ IC aadC'ffttt fi$t, ti tlCIOUon dOse ftlt5 lr,-'\Uun P:tnt ~g, Ind mtY be• precw10-101 redKliad!V!ty reietSo to th• mvwonmtnt TheM ~""' 1epruent I IOf.t Of eonttOI Oril'tt rt6ole1,ve m11et111 Ind 1eoru.en1 111 •ctuel or .wbstant,ai P01entl1l dfgtadlhOI\ In the ~I of nfety ol lhepl•'ll

These ew:nis eseai11e lrc,n RU21n that futf 1c:tN!ty has betn re~Htd a, is .nt1exp1ttd d.te to ~e1 heatup lhtt IC IR)hes to \J)lnt futf r~g Wlt1er cowrege end., nQf lintenOtd to .odren ,c>ent flJel -.1-m t, ~enud .... «ytlcng<

E,&.L #2 adchsws 11d1bQn. mon,lo, 11"1d,c.al10'1S ol lltl UIICo.>ery 1ndlcr fvtC dl"'-91 ~tiOn al Un EAL rtqJirc, understll'\dng d ttMI ac:tuai raOOloQICII eon6tlont P*tenl ,n thie '40ntfY of the f'DOftCor

RIIMClvtnhltl rnc,'l~Qr fceclngsnaybeindlca!IOl'ld I rtdotCWIIY lflfHMS,O'l'\~futl . con~ffWlglF\tt~hltOCCvtrt,cll ~•IMCI becllpround 14 tne wnllllMMJn ffiClrllltor due to wlll!f ....,.I dec;rease Ml)' malti Wlc,c:utd ffl!bltlKn exh1us1 tllbomt ac;wAy end neod$ robe __ .. While 1 ,11NbM ma,111ar COJtadeted an increnew, ctos. ra1eo.ie101 (ICC, K'\ lt'lt Wlltf ~ I: tt'llglll ftef De If lblt tftelctbOn Of'IJl'fldhft Cf not tnetuet"COYt:Jed

f«••tmp• .n Nu Racblllilf'I MoliJlc:r tAAM1 reacln; mty ll'lctttse Ole to planned «vduciOftt lUd'I uh•Mt or•~• IUII anemtiybeing raised In th• mll!'IPUl•tor P'!Ul Alto 1 ~or cOllld tn f1ct be proaerty re~g to• knawn tNt.N in'o'C:Nng tt•n1fer o, ,.,1oqbO'I of• '°'-lrte saorea In or MIi' e fUtl pod or respoadlnoto, Planned l'YOklUon such 1s ''"'°"""' of lhe retdM h..O GeMt-11y Wlc:tUsed 11cHhon morinor lndllclllions"411 ntsedtobeconbmedwitn 1ncthcr1nctcato, (CW' ptrsorw,el ~pcr110f"•*'°'' ESQ&.lbal dthl1 tmfl"QmcydlS~cltbon In , ,f IWJq;intlt , WOJld be bHtd on IC RSI Of RGI

RA3-Bosls :

lln ,C addru1-n r.iwo l'IIChhCln 'ewib ltw iff1;>9d ccnlinutd q,tfataon W\ lfttl requ,(WlgeCIIUtuo.it«c11PMtyll"! C¥"dtr IO~IMI Aft operat6Qn cw to pe!",O,m • saf• \hutdl:7.m It t1 lh,s imP!Wed •biiily lo CCMAle 11'1• plant Jfltl lnultf in Int ldl.111 Cir po(et\H1 tuW1nuf det7".SM#I d \fie lwll d ufe(yofthe '°nr 'TMUUHll\dlatJMg~deoJIMflWln radletlon 1 ..... 1, 11 n.QC • c.o,ce,n oC Chi1 tC The Em~gency Cocwdinlllot muJt: cc;ft\tdef th• toul-C. a CIUN ofth• Utised raditllon le""111nd dalemllne I any Cllhf"' IC may be lft~

~ett t,o,,lflf'lo cont MJOUt ~e"Ui>tnev lnciyde v,. (;(lf'IU¢1 Room and Cfntt11 All.rm al.at tCA.Sl

EAL - 1 IOT llASIS

(APP-A-10)

Unusual Event RU2-Basls:

TN, IC ldchtMS del!lled red.than level$ IS a fffUN d'\flo'.14tr1evd to. g bul •~ the "uda Pruw.e Vn,tl lltn\11 or ~IJ thtt havt retufted or MIY re soi. ,n UNPt..AfJNEO ose ,n ttditbon dose rttH w1ll'lln plenl buid1ng, Thtte r1(Ul:i011 lents 1"'Pfesen! •~sot 4Xlftfr'd <MIi

rtdKlK:tlve maltnal tnd ITIIYt9Pl'f!'senl • t>Clltnl.itl dl9fad•b0n in the levtf orntetv<:>4 eolant

The re"4!~ ~ethway Is• comtw\llion or ctv,t~s tubH centls 11'1d ooots While • tfd:Jtrof\ MOl'lllcr couto deted •n lnir:teHe • nse in dOff t•le dJe to• drop In the wat« fevet II mi,'ftl nol be I reliable lndicllJOn of whechet' a Mlt lhe fuel~ oo,,M•CI Fer r11fuellnQ 1wn1.s '\flo ere lht- waler t."'fl dtoc,s ~°"" the Rnct« Pras~.ne V.ssel ffangs dns kaflon wwld be <wt• CUl Ttus f'\,,t:f'll eseelece, 1oel'IHHI per IC RA2 ififndl•lird fl.le4 out'Slde the rHcta wuel is unCCM!!red F« ewnt.s r,,,,,ct\,mg lrr.ot•t«t Net in lhe rud.m wswt HC•laiion would b8 ..,, tM F1Hion ProGld BlmfltTIOtefottWll!O'IOPW~ Mooet 1-4

AppljQtlOn oflhi1 E>.l. re.~ UhdtncMdingofltle•d;Utlraclolo011Ctl ccooibOnt p,eteril il'l lhe ""4)My Cf the monitor

EAL •2 tddttsMt elevated ln ·~nt raeleUctt lr-'tb. thtl reprct,tnl I lou of c~ttd of r.00tewe mttenw resutk'lo in • poc: 11 oeg,tdtticws tn the le'l'tl OI ufetyOf the P'•"' This EAl ndudes ra<111i.cn le.el tftctu,.n ll'ltl """' tram P'aM~ •ctMcles such es use of radlogr-.or.t 'SOl#CH Ind ~Mtflt offldtOiktivt Vi'HlC ffllleflll, A n,,eok ht~ ~U RtdrltiQn t,1on11crstAAMt) rt nC!I r~l!!d•s It vrmulo1e,4r1Ct tne: e~Dthlyot lite thfevidd The mteN 1, ro idenl.lf,_/ tou d CO'lttol of radoltdive ITlllletial in eny"""'4ortG,rH

F« u,~le I r•tuellngbfKii;eAAM1nonQtT111y"c'c-.a1H1 duttopfamed evdUbc:t,twehtJhudM «hflnefvti•fffflil:lf'/betngr111edlft e m1r11QU11tor mes.I Nso I m<JlltoraM:111 ftel ti. pr('Oerty~ lo1 k~~ntinWltw,gtraMftr«r~01•~e . tt01edfl'IOfndf IM fut4 pool O JUPO'lWlg lo• l)&tnfltd S\l'CM1on tuCf'I H rt'fflO'W91 ol lhe reac&er held Gener,,.,. lncreesed radlat;On rncinllCJt lnlk9ttcr'lt..,. ftffd 10 c~ed ._,,ttt am:thcf" wdcata (o, pe,SCJMIII report) d wit« Ion

'T UIC I!; l'L<\NT CL,ISSIFICATIO~ TOOL

St Lucie, Rev. 67


Site Area Emergency Alert Unusual Event .......,.,,on

l"-'>f,~

RA2 Damage ID mdialed Fuel or Los:s al W- Lewi that tta, Resu'led or RU2 lN'I..AN,EI) Ris. in P1..-.t Radiallicn lewl5. W11 Result in lhe Uloove,ing al Irr.dated Fuel ~ 1he Reactor

1o•t Vessel -Opeming -Appicability: All Oper.omg ·- Aj>plicabilily:

All

EALV•lues.: EALValuos:

1. A ...:er low! ct-op in 1he ,.actor refueling <My, 5pt<1I fuel pool OR fuel 1·~~:iOR~!1~~~.,;~ .. _....., thal .. 11 result n irradiated fuel beoorring ~ ~lhan58 fe<I).

Q!! AND

2. A VALID aliorm on /WY al 1he fcllowiog clJe K> damage lo ....ctia:ed fuel OR b. VNJJ rise n area radiatm !tiding on ANY al t,o followng: 1ossa1..--

UNIT 1 ARM Chamois UNIT1ARMChannoh !z ........ '"" Oolecu Too No. Olannel No. De5oi ...... w RElfl.3.1 13 Cootainmeno as Nfr .. os~~ =>

..J Monitor ~ I #6 Corurrnent as Menu u.

RE:le-4-1 M Ccntainmeno as Nfr Rl:26-t-1 #7 ti-- u. - "" w RE26"5-1 115 ContainrnenaS Nfr ~1 #36 . Oecll ..J

Monitor <{

t<c.<I><>-1 !!ti ......... H.df~vj,> ~ .. UNr L - · LILVVWI<;.

!1 So:! - OelectaTagNo. R~C.S

~ C)

w,-,.T lfT ·-·~ - a..me, w 0 RE26-3-1 "'8 ReNelmCanal 1'lfY RIM-211-2 GACxXl2 ~ ;-Oec:t

~ ..J

R~1 #3/l Oed. Nfr rmon '-"' ,..-u Q ... , RIM-2tl-6 GAG-006 C<>ntairment CtS Monit<>r D ..J 0 RSC26-4 -04-05 Fuel H...Ui,g 9.Jildilg HIGH

RIM-211-7 GAG-007 ~ Fuelf'ool C ~ ExhaustV ... ~ RIM-~ GAG-009 Fuel Pool u'l • RIM-211-10 GAG-010 Fuel Pool ..J ..J

Oelecta Tog No. Rll«:S c( ~ a..me, De,a.,tioo Alarm RIM-211-12 GAG-012 Fuel Pool ::E ~ RIM-211-2 GA<>oo2 Oed. N{'( RIM-= GAG-033 Re• _.....Canal a:

RIM-21>-3 GAG003 C<>ntairment CIS Monnor A Nfr 0 C z QB CD c( RIM-211-6 GAG-00:i ConwmentCtS -c Nfr c( a:

~Fue!Poo ~· 2. UN'lNINED VNJJ """1 Rad3tion - readirQs OR ..J

RIM-211-7 = 1'lfY ~ resuh incic3le a rise by~ fKtor al 1000 over ncrmal" <{ RIM-""-" GA<>OOB --- 1'lfY ::E ~ •=~•u - ~ a: Rl"'-211-10 GAG-010 Fuelf'oo Nfr 0 RIM-211-11 GAG-011 -Fuelf'oo Nfr z

17 ~· CD RIM-= GAG-033 Refuel ... ~ Nfr

<{

UNIT 2 PRM a-.,! I OERNTION eo~ ...,.,.,.., c,,-,. ,,~ =~~,,~¥ HIGH

a:

UNPLANNED-A .,.-ameler" char"QI! or~ event tha1 is not the ,.... al on in1eoded ewlutia1 iRI n,quires oorredM! or rritigalive--.s. RA3 RI .. n Roc1ation Leveh l'tlthin lhe FaciilyThat lrrpedes ~on al

~ ~red to Maintain s.ie Plant 5a1e<y r..-.. VAUD- M mication. """"1. or oondilicn. rsconsidon!d lDbe VALID """' ~ i• ,.,,;c,,,o by (IJ an m tn.ment channel ched<. (21 Opeming -Appicabiroty: ,.. 1f'.lon'NI ~ c.i be considered JS lhe hd'leSt tNdrQ in the ndicalions on relaied or redundant irdcotas. or (3) by dnd 1 For U..t 1 Eberlinechame!s- lDollcaon CUTffl d.ta: pa,1-ftu hows.-.., lhe airre!1 """" ........ d>servalion bypl..-.tpersomel, 9.dlthat<b.blrelaledto lle EALY-: ildicala's operability. the ocndilion's existence, orlhe n,pcri's ENTER the comm;nl fll"TA) d\amel ID {ENTER) ilCOACV is f'l!fT1lWd. ~ n thi5 definition ts lhe need for 1. 0,- , ... g,,ater than 15 nR,t,., f>Jjy al t,o follooing ..... ~ tin-elv..- - ocnnJW5 _., mauun planl safe4y in:lions:

• Cor*'>1 Room • GAS

R - HOT CONDIDONS 8 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSJFICATION TOOL R - HOT CONDffiONS 8




R - HOT CONDmONS 9 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- HOT CONDmONS 9



RECOGNITION CATEGORY F

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

F-HOTCONDITIONS 10 EAL - HOT BASlS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL F- HOTCONDIDONS 10



~ FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 ONLY) Cat FUEL CLAD BARRIER - Basia REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER - Basis PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BARRIER - Basis

The Fuel <lad Eli>ner is Ille ziroalloy er Slanless sll!!!j lJbes lhill.....,.. lhe fuel pel!e<. The RCS- .-,u., RCS pmary side an! d>oonnedlons up to an! The Cootainmer1 Barrier includes Ille contannent wlding an! oonnedlons up ID an! inducing fie aJlelmo5t ncludng lie pm,,u;,..-~ and reb!I valve. an! olher connection> up ID and ocntainmenl isolat>on wlves.. This bamer o1lso inclod!s the main ste.am. feedna'ler, ind bbNl:fo\m line Htensiolls

including ... pimary i>o"aboo ·- Olllsi:le fie oorit.nrnert buildng up ID and inducing Ille outenmst """""'1ary>ide 15dabon valve.

1. ~ Functioo St.tu> 1. ~ Function St.tu> 1. ~ Function sta!U>

=~;;:~kli~~ .. ;-th::~a:'e=:~w,--·_,.,...._ .. ngiDl ,, ....... 1soo ...... ~ ... ""'" ...... ~WlhlH!>fleln. 1 nere IS no l.D5s ulfl!!irUO assocuted Wil'I this nem.

Polential l.o!i>heshold 1 • RCSPh!>...., and C<na S..r.ty Funcocn not""' Cootai"""'1 T~ an! fffwn S.r.ty llrdxJn not""' incica< .. an OUl!l1ll! c:Nller,go ro1he ,afe<y ~~r.~-..;.::~a1Saleyfooc1Jcnnotmetmicale>fle-- nlic;rlesan exnmee:halle<v, to the >alotyblcliondenvedfrom~

monn-ent!Ndi,gs. ::::~ from-- """"'1ll!ttre.ading> ilrd'cr sanl*1g rMUl1s anl 1M """"""'•poll!ntial loss

Potential to,, heshold 2 · Heal Removal 5"lery """*"1 not mel imc;t.es lhe Caldiian, INding 1o • polfflial los> of containmert barrier re5III from RCS banie< and/or fuol Clad banis los>. --sd; Uldion is under eJOreme d\all""Vo- Thu,., lhi> llnohold is pin-.rily • clmnn-be!"""" Sile Ma Enie!lJency an! General Ernei!encY "IJf"05'!l1ITI

• potential lo>• of lhe tirtl bam!r.

2.. Pm1arv Coolant Actmtv uve1 2.. RCS uakRate 2.. Coobinment F'r!55lff z 0 The mJO is JOOi,Cili,n 1131 equ,valert. _ by ... EAL Ta Fon:e irlclcalo!; lhal 1his lhe '"'"'"""' 'm;JIJlfW4"\\,,,,;)l5SJ1!iftl!l'v--. LDssu-w~JUIRls 1 ar.:11-rwpg ~.anedu»QI' presswe (1.e.. ncx ifialUU'-&lllle' tocoru~ spray-or

""""" rl CDID1t odivily is - .;mow lhot e,q,eaed fer iodi1e ,pies .m oorrospand5 to less lhan --l'Ml11ory ocnrnl ~ >Ud, lh;a • lo>• of M>CC>Olrlg ha, ocxur<d. The ooodensalion .n.ct,) follom1g an initial prosS<tt ..,,, ... tom• piney or ,econda,y high ""'VY line lxealt I= ~~Barri~~olrad"ooadivily i-5ignificanldad d;anageand hi> Ille loss of-r,g is ... - inclcatiDn lhat ihe i"""*"Y con1rol •y,1Em< - indica!es • loss ol CXllUmell inlegrily. Caunnenl pn,....,, and 5lJIT1) IM!IS >hculd inaeo>e a, a 11!51.fl of the <! ~ in ""'iriaiw,g RCS presSUl! .nl """'*"Y against ... ma,> loss im>lq1 mass.nlenergy.-.., inlDooruinmentlrnm• LOCA. Thus. ""I' le,eler Pf1!S"'ft nolirl<na>ing nclcale> C ... -. oontainrrlEri bypas, an! a los>of oontainnenl in!Rg< • <! et: There is no P<Mntial l.o!is lnsllold .,,aaaled .,;tt, lhi, il<rn.

The Polenlial Lo,s 1lnshcld i> ba>ed on lhe inal>;JitJ ID maint,in normal lkf.Jid Tlis ildical..-relies on operwu~ rl an~ re,ponse lcr lhe mndition and llereloredoesra C) l"M!l11oly willm ihe Reac:b" Coolant Sysll!m (RCS) by narmal operalion of Ille have a ,peciic value associated o,ith il The lnei,pecled!t!5j)Ol15e i>iffl,o<t.ant becau>e • is iheindicalarl a w C a,.,g;ng 5y>1en1 ..tich is coo>idered to be lie flow me _.Rfll to""" charging contarmenlbypa>soondilion.

0:: ~~~~~~~:.::=~ Exislenoe of an explosM! mmre mean, a h)drogen and oxygen """""'*a/lion of at least ihe low!r delagration ~ RCS leaaage pa!h >Udi a, a Chal:gilvll..eldcwl leak exim. The intl!nt of !his canclbon !mt CUJW exists. 0:: 5 met -,/ ii~ IO isola:e lem'ffl are NOT SUCCfish.C. Addik:nal: cf1iafgng poolpS et: ~roquiredis inclcaweof a.-.iia!RCS leal<. The Clw"d l'lltential Lo,s llresllold_...,.. a potential loosol oon<ainmer1 In that 1he --

ia r1!m0Valldepn,s>uization •)'>1em an, enher lcsl or pe,fcrming in a degra<led rnamet", .. irdicatod by ax,1a.,.-pn!>SU'OIJ'!_ ..... fie ><'f>oinl al ""1ich iheequ,prnenl wa> ~ to have.-.

t:; ::> 3. COff Em ThemNJ C Dldf' Rsdinos 3. Hot Pa>ficable 3. Core Exit ThermocouDl,e, Reading

C I ne LOSS n~::,nu1u """"'~"'°' to sgn ... ngOlu~-•• .,,....... -"""'="' 11-=i~ rs no LOSS u•~"""" as50Catea ... 1 udSIW!fn.

0 The Potential Lo,s - rx>n1!5JlC'ld> iD loss ol >OOCOOtir1g. The conditions in 111e .. -. _ an IMNENT core melt~-. i,.. <Xlll"Od2d, au! lead et:

ll. ~:=~.;1=:c~=.:::s~"~i~':c.~~~::f z Q "~ ACI LEAkRATE - ~vtlOEHTIAEDlr.lll UNIDen'lflEDL.£NCl(3E • Cld:ned Emergency- io>,of twoborrien .m lie paCential loss of a !hid. 11 lhe i.r1clion ..-, pnx:edu11!S..., ., ........ _

-·"""'is re,·- pall. (/) IWMNEHT - Mog>bon ..:iicn, h.M, been lllffecho. adcll!Ollal octions ore not !Q UNIOBITFIB) LEAKA01E - lla;,e: ~ 11 IIOI EEH11REO LE.NVrGE or

Thehniion..-abcn~ .... -""""ll""'~~thatoddn!s>lhe"""""'Yoflhe ~ to be >UOOeSSful, and reoded infooration indici1les that lhe evenl or C"1dilm COHTROU.EO l.EAftN)E. LL . \llhe<e lMMll'ENT time!rames ""'specified. !hey >h WY- core coolirg aitical i.n:tion>. The procedc.re "oonsiden!d · ff ihe ~ is k>Nering er ff lie I COHTLIIOU£D LEMAOE.- kal wal2f law .,QD)ed ftam S,eR!KD' c:oatn JD"!P KM. vesselwalerlevelisriw,g.

LL FAUL TED - In a ,team--· lie exist""°" r1 >eanlary side leakage that re5Ulls loamAED LEMAOE: in .r, \DDrTil"Cled drq, i'J steam generator pre5SUl'1! a the s&tgn generilkJr being a.~{~COHTROU.EDLEMIIGE} NOdD~fYlleffll.lUCl'IU-Pl.e'IPtCJlor l'llletheJernol lhe proce<lns will be ellod>.ve should be app;,ren1 wi11in 15 .. ....._ The ~Coo<di,ata

~~ 1MA.~ ~~ letktltcat.-easpved, Wf2o:,nthlaeil1a•Wff'OcrC01ec.lirVtan ar should mate lhe dedir'»on .as soon .s it is detennned ltlat the prooedJre.s h;ave bNn, o, wi1I be ineffective

FUU TRAIN OF DEl'RESSURIZAllON EQUIPMBfT (112-EOP-03] - a.LellO IID lle~llfflff!t~lali~ ... amballtOK~klc*d md tnNn ttlMrM 11> nerttre WIii h: 011mtm t1ll9b;le dt'lltcD:lft ~ c.,r nx 11D

Two Conlainmenl Sp-~ Headers -Flow in eadl header is al ie..t 2550 (2700! bel"RE.SSUflE90UNDMt"fL~or

gpm --OR-- -. N.e.aor Coc:c.11 ~'Rffll lu•.aoe ~ • Ktam om~ to !hi! 1KOfldsr ,,....,,

FDU" CaiainmoJit Coe/er,;. Fb,ning i~Ol'IOQ ~ }.

-m-. Two ea..irmenl Cooler.;· R.lm"!I AND

01!! Cmbirrne.-.1 ~ --Flew in Ille heade,-i> a1 least 2550 [2700! gpm

F - HOT CONDffiONS 11 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL F - HOT CONDffiONS 11



FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 ONLY) ~

c.l. FUEL CL.AO BARRIER REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER PRIMARY CONT AJNMENT BARRIER

LOSS I POTENTIAL LDSS LOSS POTEff1lAL LOSS LOSS I POTEff1W_ LDSS 1. Safeti: Function Status 1. SafetX Function Status 1. SilfelX Function Sutus

'·Nio:;;~·~·~;~,s· - 1.n.~~~ru::11iuvc11~y-11..uu1nu rT,et NotAj,plicat,le 1 . = =• Not'°l>Pftcable 1 . VU-.tlllR'IIL lt!ffllel'il'[lf.ata -i~!ilf"e

AND enlry intD prooedure 112 EOP-15 met AND enlry into prooedue 112 EOP-15 Salely lunclicn NOT me! AND entry -~OL.Jrwn,.,&;...UVA -'-"'~i;.;.llf --..,. .... 4t\Jrt """"""""'"""'"'-UOJA ~ -"•rw·i;.;.,ll ·u,.,..,,_... prooedure 112EOP-15

STAlUS IN ALL THREE BARRIERS --m-- STA1US Ill ALL llilEE IINIR!ERS

! dn!Cled 1D perform..,, step in 112 EOP-15. 2. RCS Heart Remollal Salely function NOT met ! safety funcfon cannol be --in 15

Then enlry into 112 E0P'15 has been met. ANDersry in1D IX'JCedn 112EOP-15 ....-. lhen lhal safely fln:ticn is NOT met b-l'llflll]'i,psddas~

OR OR OR 2. Pnmarv Coolant klivi!l Ll!m 2. RCS Ll!ak Rote 2. Conbim,rnt Pr!:ssUll!

, . Close Eqiavalenl~;.-~~~ 1 . .,.,_; le.O r.111! ~ nan ava,...,,. 1. """le.Orate .,.,.,_,gr,,.,ter....., :,u IP" 1. A°""""""" pce551Jre nse~~· ......... ,-1mled pres'SW'eSJ'E'at.er .. _,

mak"'4) c:,paaiy as r,die.m!d by• loss ol ,1'thl...etdov«1isolzed rapid'"10Jq)lailedaopinc:onlai'rnenl PSIGandrising prooedure CY-SL-1ll8-0llK, Guide!nes for RCS rrininun !llXXJOiiJg .,..,....,,. C-Olleding Post - Sil"l)les) -m--

--OR--

I GUllANCE BOX

I 2. Ccntainmeni 1-l)dt,gen greater lhan 4%

2. Ccntaime< pressun, OR ""'ll level z : See also SU4, Fuel Oild Degr.,<S;mon. . MINIWM SUBCOCUNG - 1so!a1icn o! Leldown is lo cts&v,,ish bmeen _., NOT oonsi5tenl- LOCA --OR-- 0 Not~e Deteminalion is -u!ir,q RCS """'-and Cl/CS"""'- and is caxiilions i= F'tll(ft 1A 11 B n 112-EOP.@. perfamed - pn,cecbaly re<p1!!I.

3. Presstn greater ll1an 10 (5.4] psig g . See also SU5, RCS Leal.Q! . AND

~ a. Ll!ss 1han one Fl.ti TRAIN OF C) IJEPRESSURIZATION EQUIPMENT UJ cperaling C

.QR .QR llB 0:: UJ

3. Cal! Exit ThennocoUDle RN<in111, 3. Nol /ll!l!!ic:able 3. CC>n!' &it Thermocowle Reading ii: I. ~ri Thermoooq>les...ar,g groa\erlhan I. Con, Exit ThenmcotJples reading groale< 1. Con, Exit Thormooooples reaclng !l""'ler than cc

lhan 700' F 1200'F ca BOX I GUIJANCE BOX I I GU1DMC'£BOX

I ANO 13

I .

~Con,Exit I Allea.sttwo(2tC....Elci~ Al INsl MO 12) Con, Exit Themocx,uples m..151 emeed the a. Fooc:lmal Remve,y ( 112 ECP-15) fol' RCS ::)

rrusl exceed !he lhreoholi:t. lhreshold. and Con, Ho>al Remo¥al NOT elleaive willwl C ll'llslexoeedthelhn!shold. 15minJtes 0

cc . =~=a=.. --OR-- 11.. z (al).

2. ~ p-" Thennocol4Jles rN"'1g - than 0 iii

AND !!2 Ncoarwicab1e LL

BOTH o!lhe lollowng "A)ly: I LL

Ncl"l'!'ficable ltitapplicalie • IM.MS in<lcales SenS<n~ 1hrough B NOT CXl¥ffl!d

--OR--

T- AND REP CET difference greater than al' F (LOCA NOT in progress)

--OR--

Gnsiler lllan 'll' F superheated oo REP CET (LOCA inprogross)

Alill

• FUldDnal Rea:M!!y (112 EOP-15) fol' RCS and Qn Heal R:emJval NOT elfediw wilhin 15 ninules

!Ccntinuod~ nen ~-· !Continued~ ne,t ~, fContinU@d~ next n:anal

F - HOT CONDITIONS 12 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICAT10N TOOL F - HOT CONDITIONS 12



t<ec. FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 ONLY)- Continued Ca. FUEL CLAD BARRlER - Basis 1continued1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRJER - Basis tcontinuedl PRJMARY CONTAINMENT BARRJER-Basis fconlinued)

4. RNC!or Vessel Water t....i (. SGT ube Ruoo... 4. SG Seoondarv Side Release with P-lo-S lNbae There is no Loss threshok:I assoaated w2ll this item.

~~:i~~~=d~~~~~~~r.:'mmthe ~~~=-~~~-ge-~•bypassoflhe<XJ111aivnoot The 111d- for "1e Potential l.o5s hesllold ,epresenis • lew! ne;or the "'P of the adM! I\Jel - leaugeisl3rgoeraqt1Dcause a::tualiooof ECCS(SI). {U1-1000p,i;,andl/217Je psia). This is Reade, Vessel lewl sensa,; "°' - « THOT and REP CET diflefeoce gn,ater than 20 °F c:::on9S1.enl to the RCS leak r.ite bamer Potential Loss heshold 2. By helf. this thn!:shdd NII resutl. in The hw Loss the5hclds desaibed ocdd be coosldered redUldanl The incfusion of a tfnshdd that (LOCA NOT in ptJgJess) or ge,,ter than 22'F superheated a, REP CET (l.OCA in _..) thodedaratimof anAled. However, U,eSG is- FAUllED (i.e .• two barriers failed). "1e uses Emergeocy f'rooe'*re oomrmnly used lem5 like "RIFTUlEIJ and FAU.. TED" adds lo !he indicates smcaoling has been lost and lfJat sane dad d~ ma.y OOCU'. dedaraiim escabtes to a Site Area Emergency per Coob.nnenl barrier Loss tnshoks. .....or 1he da5'ifica1ion proce,;s and has been included based oo 1histunan raaoroo,cem.

There is ro Pctential Loss tm!5hofd ilSsoci~ted Nlh this illem. Th5 threshold results in• r,«JUE fof smaler b!e.lh ilat; (1) donol exteed 1he normal ~ng capacity lm!shold in RCS lea. rate barrio< Po4enli l.o5s lm!shord. or (2) do""' 11!51.it in E.CCS acwtioo in RCS SG ome rupwn, barrier l.o5s llnshald. Fe< larger lnaks.. RCS - llnshold c:nll!ria would resul in an Alert. Fe< SIG tiJ>e n,pti.es which ........, i1¥olve nuliple steam generators or

FAULlED- ln aste'"'1--. "1e OlOSienceof seocodary ~=~r:.~~:.==d:~~~e::~b=be side akagelhalresuh inan1#1CC111ro11edctt,pinsle.im

generator pressure or the steam genera:Jr being COIT1)~ based an ·-Lo..- of the Fuel Clad !lamer. ~zed.

Thofir>ll.o5stlnshcld-seslhoooooilialin"'1ich •RU'TlJREDsleam--isalso PROMPTLY ISOLAlED-A stsm release to "1e <fflinnneol.

~~~~=.~~:i,':;;~=r::=~i~~ ~·~:=--~~4111e~ lho dl!daratioo of •Sile"""' Eme,gency. :z PROMPTLY ISQA1ED.

0 Tho seocod l.os51hie5hold......,.,. SGtube !eats lhat """""'110flll'llin oorjt.netion l'ri1h an

F RUPTIJRED -ln a .team generna, exislence of fm'i"Y·b> l.t-llsct.Aa.E release palh to Ille <fflirtnnent fn:m Ille alh!cied s1"'"'1 generator. The llreshold for

~ =l~t=ule5'Jlfocienllarequinocrcil!l5ea esWi,ting 1he INISOIJ'&.E seoondary ~de , .. 'ease is intended to be a prolonged release of

rodioaw.rity from lheRUPTURED steam --cfrecllylD 1he enminmen1 (i.•, SG tube n¢,re

~ wii1 a>na.n<nt la5s of ofl-sio, ........-and 1he IM'TI.RED sae.m geoer.tcr is n,q.,in!d u plant

UNISOI.ABLE -A lnadl or ltoal 1hat camol be PROMPT!. Y oookk>wn« a sru:topenreiefvaJve). This.COUd be~ loocoxWlEtlthe nuil«ndenser is (!) ISOlATED. unavalable to OCC.,,C 1he oonlaminated steam W 1he ""in condeoser is available. b!fe ........, be w releases Ilia oireject,,B. glond !1611 -...S, and o1he-sirrila- con1rolled, and oflenrnamed. 0 pa1m .. ys.

0:: These palhw.,ys do"°' meel 1he ...,.. of an l.t-llSQAEU release path 1a Ille .,.;roomen1. These w

iii: mnorrele.ases are assessed ,..,....,.~Rad Levefs/Radi~• Effluent lCs.

0:: 5. Nol i'!f!l!!!cable 5. Not Aaolicablo S. CNTMT Isolation Failure or ~ss

ia Not Applicablt! [Added lo keep barrier rrurm«ing OONi,/fflj Not Applicable /Added lo l<eep barrier rrurm«ing a,n~ Ths TIRshad adckesses i~ con1aJ'ment l:Sd.abon hat a'bw dftd release ., the envirtnnent. It represeob a loss al lhe oont.irment barrier.

I-The use of the - 'di-ed" in defir*1g ihe n,fease pal, d-.S agai!1sl ll!!Nse paths (.)

::) hc<qi inlerfacov lil<rid sys1ems. The eJris1eR:e of an in-fne _..,.. filter does nol mau • 0 release path incirect since Ille li!ler is not e!Jeche at remaving fissiioo proc1.:I noble gases. T)l)ical 0

=-~~::;.:~=~=~~~~~of 0:: D. divef1 bybOlling in 1he....,..,,wssel. 1he tq, hi.midiy r, tho re!nse sln!samcanbee>pe<led la :z render the fi~ Sleffective in a short period.

Q There is no Poteriial loss ttnshold associated w'lt this itiem.

18 6. Contvnment Radiation Monitarf!!g 6. Contoinment Radiatior, Monil!!!!!fl 6. Containment Radiation Monitoring

LI.. 1 ne ~....-'l:f is a varue ........ ncici.:es 111e .' ~ - ,-=--oor ........,_ , ... v.1.111 sevareo activt_cy_ ncacaave ,ne reau.ng IS a va,ue .. , ,....,, n:llcales me re~ ... reador........_. 1 nts re .... ,y 11tr1 t::l'S OO-- -"-~·---~~nrul llls.1u::.11.

I of fuel damage, inlo 1he oornainmenl caiaJla<ed assuminjj 1he m1arflaneol,s n,lease and di_..,i of wil beless 1hilll 1hat speclied for Fuel Clad Banierttveshold 6. To.I~ !his llnshoid WOlld be

LI.. lhereadof ooolani nd>lelJ'5 and <>dine.........., assoc:iatedwilh a 5% dad fail"" rw1he indicatiw d a RCS leak only. I( 1he radialion rrooitt>r n,acing inc:n!ased lo !hat ,peci(M!d by Fuel Clad The rmi,g is a value miich indica!es significant Nlf damage wel in excess of 1he ttnsholds -~ 8.Irierhe,hold. luel clamagewwd alsobe irl<llcffd. ilSSOCiated wilh both loss of Fuel Oad and loss of RCS ElarrieB. A major release of rodioaw.rity

-ooolant otnlefllJations of !his magnitude""' ......,.i Ii,.,. lorger lhan ihe maJirrun There ism Potential lms threshold associated WIii this i!em. =::.:.e.==al~be~~:i:=::a:~~~ofiuel ooncentratia1s (inclucing iodine Sjlimg) allowed wlhin - spalications and an, h<elore indic.iM! of iuel clamage. Rogardess of v.llelher CDltairment is chalenged. !his ilflV.rtl of actMly in Cffl.li,.,,,..._ ~ ll!fNsed.

This value 15 h~ than !hat specified for RCS bamer l.o5s threshold 16. Thu~ !his tlnshold ooud h ... sud> ....... consequenoes !hat i is pu:len< lo treal lhis as. potential loss of oor<airvnenl such !hat a General 8reryency dedaralion is warranted.

indica'.es a loss of boih 1he Fuel Oad bame,; and a loss ol RCS barrier !hat OfllXOf)ri,11e~ escalates the erT1!!fJll!'lCY - levelb a Sile An!a Emergency.

~ is oo Potential loss heshoJd associated \lrith this item.

7. UDK~an- Coordimt« J~I 7. Ulllr'<IICV Coordimtor J-od2!!!!! 7. Ullff~Coordiut« ~

~~r:Y~:::,"'c:~~~=:e~.:m,, 7:~"f:!,.~~~=~~~~::!'1~~~~::=n: ... ~~~~=~~r:1:=ir:~~~~.=;~ ihe biiNTler should also be iooorporated n !his lnshold as·- in Emergency Cocnlinalof bonier should also be noorporated in1hislnshold as a faclllr in Emergeoo/~~ rrooi!Dr tho banier should also be inoorporated n this heohold as a - in Emegency Cocnlinalllr judi,nent \hat lhe ba-rie< may be con~den,d lost er potentially lost. that the barrier may be considered lost a potentialy lost. judi,ner,l 1hat the barrio< may be considered lost o, poten,ially losl

The eu.oirnrenl Bamer """'1d OOI be declared lost ot poo,n6ollylosl based a, exceeding Technical Specifica.tm adion s.1ate"neri aiteria. llliess there is an everi. in ~ requii,g rri~ by~

~Qna~~=~=s~~~~..--FuelCladandlcr

F -HOT CONDITTONS 13 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL F - HOT CONDITTONS 13



FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 ONLY)- Continued ~

Cat FUEL CLAD BARRIER REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER PRIMARY CONTAJNMENT BARRIER

LOS$ I POTBfTIAL LOSS LOSS POTEH1lAL LOSS LOSS POTElfTIAl LOSS ~ RNctor Vessel Wat« Lewi 4. SG Tube R~\111! t. SG Secondarv Side Release with P-to~S Lea~ z l _KVl.lfl!j•~ies~IXJII ;4'UJIYUij!IHnv1 1. ,~..,, . .... - ....... ..;,-.~ina.::Jc111t!1J n~""-11, 1.nvr,vn.c:u:::ii/\:,tsoll!!IU

0 - Actuation SV,al (SIAS) cfoontairrnent F

I --~-- -.!lB.- 13 I Sen,;oo.411Toug>8NOTcoteredmeais

......,,.4 Jtwo..gt, 8indusive \olli 2. T..., ANO REP CET dillen!nco ~ INn 2. Primary-ll>&ccndiry IY<r.ot• SJNier lhar, ~ 2!J'F (l.OCA NOT"' progn55} Not~e 10gpm Not'IJl)lic.!IJle (!)

-~- AHll w 0

Not~ J. G<e.ts-lhan 22'F~"'1!dmREPCET a. Ul'ISO.ABlE steanrelease fromallected 0::

(l.OCA in prog<MS) S/Glolheenviffnnent w a:

OR OR OR 0::

5. Not~abl• 5. NotiH!!cablo 1. CHTlfT l5obitim Failw-e or ~5 ~ 1 .r-.111~or.J11-~11rv, one "'~11Jaose f-

ANO (.) :::>

NotAA>ic- Not Pwicable NotAppl~able Not~ Nol AA>J"ocablo 0 .. ~ru:,,"t:;: :::~ ~

D..

00. 00. 00 z 6 .. Containme,._ R.ldiation Monitoring 6.. Containment Radiation Mentoring 6.. Containment Rild~tion Monitoring Q

1. CHRRt.l .. ac1;r,g gn,ater 1. MY CIS monilDr '"~II"'- 1- CHRRM nsidin111,eater ~ lhan 1.4 Etll2 R,1v- Not Pwioable than 1.5 E+03 mRlll, Nol~ NotAppiic,lllle 1han 2.7 E.m R/IT i:i:

OR OR OR I T . . LL

1. ANY ccndi1ia, in the - ol flo 1. ANY oondlion 11 flo opinicn cf !he I. ANY a,nciuan 11 lhe opinicn of Ile 1. Nrf ccndition in the opro, of the 1. ANY oondition in !he opinion cf flo 1. ANY condiion ., !he opinion cf flo ~ Coordinalor !hat micoles Loss of

Barrier =TI...°7~~~ ~Cocnfnalc<MindcaOes L.osscl

!he -~~u,.,,~ --Coordinator Iha! irdcate Loss d

!he Ccntoirmenl Barrier ~~~~

Guidance - Match conditions to a column to determine Emer nc Class /'~( ~ .. ; ~ ~"· ·+

:: ...... ~',.~c..~ ~, • ._.,..,,~~ -'-. ; ill: Site Area Emergency

Loss of ANY Two Berriefs AND Loss oc Potential Loss of ANY two be!Tiers. FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER STATUS Loss or Polenti Loss of the thin!

bonier.

Fuel Clad - LOSS X X X X X X X Fuel Clad - POTENTIAL LOSS X X X X X

Reactor Coolant S tern - LOSS X X X X X Reactor Coolant S tern - POTENTIAL LOSS X X X

Prima Containment - LOSS X X X X X Prima Containment - POTENTIAL LOSS X X X

F-HOTCONDIT10NS 14 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 4 ST LUCIE PLANT CIASSIFICATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-A-17)

X X

X X

X X

X X

FA1: Alert FU1: Un1111ual

Event ANY Loss oc ANY Potential Loss ANY Loss or of EITHER Fuel Clad OR RCS. ANY Potential

Loss of Contai1menl

X X

X X

X X

F - HOT CONDITlONS 14

St. Lucie, Rev. 67



F-HOTCONDillONS 15 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 4 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL F - HOT CONDillONS 15



RECOGNITION CATEGORY S

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

S-HOTCONDffiONS 16 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL S - HOT CONDITIONS 16



fg t r_,;:r,,,., ·r_ j ,i;_ ~.~ ,·"': _;1,~v~"_~· •• -

SG1 -Basis:

loss of an AC pcv,er lo eme,gency busses ~ses al plant safely

=.i::~:t===~~~~·~ Prolonged lo!is of all N; _.,o emerge,cy buseswil lead lo loss of fuel dad. RCS.and~hJswanringded..-iof•GenB.11 EmE!fVl!f1CY.

The 4 txxrl1!5!oralicn time is biased on il1e stalicn Blackout c.op;ng Analfsi'-

Ths IC is specil>ed IO assun, 1ha!., the inikely ewnt of a prdonged st,tion bbci<o<.C, limely ~lion of the ,eria,sness of il1e ewnt oocun;

=~~:::~er:~~~=~:coy.

Site Area Emergency SS1 -Basis:

t..os.s of all Af:. pawer ID ,mergen,y buses <Xlff1l"l01ises ail plan! ..Cely

~=~~~~u~"";~ncy Prnlonged loss cf al AC power to l!!llf!lVOOCY buses ..;u lead to a lo!is d fuel a.d, RCS and Coruinment. thus l1is even! can ...Ue to a GeneralEmE!fVl!'1CY.

Fifteen rTW1Ut5 was selected as a threshold 1D e:.o::k.de iransient er mcmen1ary losses cfolf-oilepcwer.

Escai!a:a, IO Gener.I &nefvency is vWI FiSSD1 ProdJcl BalTier Degitda6cn a- IC SGI. °Plol:loged less of All Ol>-w Power and Prnlonged Loss of M On..;te l<C f't>,er.•

Alert SAS-Basis:

The oord!ion indicated by mis IC is ihe ~ cf the olf-s..~e and co-

~ ~~=" ~ ~ ~t= ~to ~t:. 7'J_r' power- a CXlllClJffl!f1I faikn of al tu ono en,eryency genefokJr IO

5lq:ty power to .. --· --~-dbe the lcssd al off.sill, power and 1o .. of oo-site """"II"""~"" ..... r:,,ty one trail cf """"gency busses t>eo,g baci<fed mn the um main

:l,"'~l\:,t:,;!:;'1~~'.'t.t=' loss ol lhis ~irVe power S<UOt WOl.6::1 escaia the evel1I to• Site Nea ErnergE<,cy in ac.cortlance ,.;111 SS1.

Fifleen rrinrtes was selected .s a threshold ID exclude tran55ent « ""'11efyY losses cf off-w power.

Unusual Event SU1 -Basis:

Prolorv,d lo!is of cl-site AC --._irl!d redundancy and

~.:..~=of~~~'i!~J'..iJlll Fi\een nwues was seleaed Zi a hehold to exx:bie transienl O'" marnent,rylosoescf olkitepcv,er.

The lb!lihood of resbing at least one emergon:y bus 5hoold be biased on a ,..lislic _..... of the situalion since• dela}' in an <wade decision SS2- Basis: SA2 - Basis: SU8 - Basit>:

rn z e (.) z ::, II. ~

i ~ .... ~ rn

I fl)

ba5"d on orly a cllance d ml~ Ille ewnt COl*l ,.,utt in a Joss of -- - in Jl'.pamg and mplemEnmg pt.lJic proO!dM! -.. ~ lhese oonditions, the reaca is proru:;ng """" heal than the "lanls lip adicns lakefl at the Rear:to,-Tufbine - Boartl (RTGB)

ma,cm,m decay heal load b which the safety systl!lll5 are desvied. A. .,. any set of ar:oons i,,, the Reactor Ope,alor(s) .nm c"""" or 5haid In addition, U'ldef these anilions. lission product bamer moni~ Sile Area Emergency is in<IK:a'.ed becouse c:ondilions exiSI that lead lo cause coo1rol rods ID be rapdy insened inlo the an and ,ius dcMn Ille capatffly maybedegr.-ded. IMMINEHT lossorpott,nlial loss cf bath fuel clad and RCS. reader.

~=~...::i~~';'t!:,=~- =~~~k;:!,~!:.-~~~or a General Emergency biased on two map- oc:w1'icleraiio should cause a:rrtrol rods IO be rapdy insened inO> the oore and shuts

cbmchtreac:u,r. 1. Are lhen, any.,...- indications that core cooliog is"'"""'>' degraded

lo the~at Ul<5 or Polermal U1<S cf Fissiml Pltlductllilrrion is Autom.iic and manual actuation is,..,tconsidered successflJ i i>Ction

IMM . = -t;.,~;;r~~~~J:,~~~ 2. If then! are nopresert indications of ,uch are a>eing ~ion. how Reader Turbine GEf1eratDr Boartl (RTGB).,. successU in shutting the

lil:elyis othat pcv,ercan be ""'"'1!<1 intime IO assun,thata loss of two """*'<dcMn because the desv:>ilrilscf the luel mayhoYebeen --• pofenliat loss cf the lfiTU barrier can be pn,IIEl1ted? exceeded or because cf the gross fabe cf the Reactor- System

Thus. indication d ax,tirung core cooling degradalion rrus1 be based on to shutdown the pliri. Fission Pltlduct Samermon~wiih particula<""l'hasison Eme,gency Es<-. cf this """11.ID • Gerieral --,,,..jd be due lo a Coordnala iudlJnenl as o rE!ates lo IMf,ffNENT Loss ar Potenlial Loss cf prolonged cxniion leadiig ID an exinYne cllalenge ID either ""1><l0Cling fossion poduol barrier5 and degraded abity IO mnlor fi55ion pnxu1 or heat n,rmvaJ. -SG2-Basis:

lhlEr these c:ondilions. the reacoor is prodocing more heat than the

~~l,.,~==tt:,e.,:~-designedand The exnme chilerlgl! m the abity lo md the CXXl! is nended 1D meill'l that the oore exit h!mperahns.,. a1 or ~ng 1200 oF or lhat fle reactor .....iwater 1...i is below the lq>cf acti,efuel and is-5"d by the Core Heat Rerroval Safely Functioo.

The "1illlilty lo niolly...,.,.. heat du-~ lhe oariy stages of this sequence (i emergency h,ea,,ao,r florris insuficienllo "'"""''he illTlCUl1 of heat "'IUffl by de9gl, I-om at least one sie.m--. an l!Xll1!me challenge -.id be considered 1o exist) is acb.......S by il1e RCS HNI Removal Saloly FU'ldion.

In the ..,.. either of......, chaleoges exists at a time 1hal the re.da- has not been t.ooghl bei... the power associated wi1h the safely sys1em de.sign.iiCXJn!melt~exisls. ln thissibJaliol\core~can occur r.opdy. For this reascn the General Emergercy dedaration is intended lo be anticipaloryd Ille flSSicn pnxiJc:I barrier table dedaration ID pemit ma,mrnolf-<i0! """"'1tion line.

SS3 - Baais:

Ul<5 of all DC power <Xlff1'1lITTS05 abily lo mon<Of and oonlrol plant

=~':'=~~1.r."i.".::-, deca:t hf;.11. ind sensible heat Wl the reEtor system.

fifteen mil'llries WiilS selected tD exdJde ~en oc rmmentary pcwel" losses.

Esc"""'°" ID a Genera Emergency =Id ocwrby Alxomal R.id Levels/Radioloi,cal ElluenL F,ssionl'rocl.dBanier Tallle.

Ths oond"rtion indc>r.es faikncf the automatic protection syso,m to qi the re.da-. Ths concitt>n is nae than• polriat de!µdation ol a safely s)51em ii flat a front l ne automatic pmtection syslefT1 did net functial in n,spcnse ID a plant transient. Thus the plan! """'Y hits been ~-.. desv:i irnltscf the lJel mayh;we been eicceeded. ""-is---.. c:onditicns mayelC151 thal lead lo potenlial loss cf fuel cl.ad or RCS and because cf the liil<n of the Reador ProoedionSyst.mlo~-thepliri.

Kmanualacf100Slakenat l,eReadD-TurtineGener.rl:.-Boanl(RTGB) fail ID ""**""1 the plant. the ewnt woold escalate lo a Site hN --·

11,MIENT - Mlgation adions hiM! been inelle<:ti-,e. adcffi:Jnal actions ... ,..,t e,cpeded lo be ,wces,N, and -inbmalion i-ihat the ..... Of condition .. m ocwr. 1'11,er-e IMMNEHT linlelrames are ""'6fied, they ,hall ~ -

S-HOTCONDIDONS 17 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CIASSIDCATION TOOL

~1 .. ~=-... ~~~e;;:;;.'.c.=.,..°4:! -.00..dlhJ5'Jal Event (NOUE)clas~k:aticn. This IC exc:hle, inaclv<!rleniaiticaiili .. that cocuwmvplamed .. actr,lychanges a.-.:.d--~(e.11-criicaityeirierfhan esunaled~

The lerm -=- is used in orde,- to .no,,.- cf ""!l"ded short 1erm pos,c""' - rates from plamed oonlrol rod """"""'1lS 5UCh as ,,..,_ bri Yrithdr.iwal. These short lenn positive sfar114> rates .,. the result cf the increase in ne<Jlroo pcll)Uation due 1o swcritical nu\jlficolion.

Escalation "°'*'be IYf the f,ssion Pltlduct Banier Tallle, as ~te IO the~ mode ill the time cf the ....-i.

S - HOT CONDIDONS 17



Site Area Erner enc SG1 PtOlo'l9ed LOH cf All Off SIie tndN 0,,$1t AC Poitwer $$1 I.OU of AJ Oft $Ile ,nc, "44 (».$Ile AC Po-•re,10 EmttOttw:Y

toEffit:f9'ncyBusses Bunet:lof 1Srrmu1e10tk:nger

Optt.lllog Mod• AppllcabUlly: 1, 2, 3, 4

EAL Vailuu:

1. LMsofell Off-slle ANO ell On-site /IC poNer loA3 • 16 KV AHO 83 -4 16 KV bu'\.SH

a. ElfflER ofthe~g C1} Rtllcwtbon oflC t.HJ «tt err\tlGttftCY tM.11.n ~lt\111\ 4

hOIJf$it HOT tty

(2) RCS end Coro Hc.i R~ Sltdy fund,o,, II NOT md

.. 1, 2,3,4

EAL V.Jiluu:

&! rhc E"Jt'1V1Ml'Y COO"dmala ,roukl nol' w•il uoot the •PIJRGllbltl litne ft•r f!.#M)#d. Ol/f .,,,,uld dflCftll• ttM evetit If ,SOOn eJ If If detetnwiMtntllflecondlftlonllHexettdN orw• el)'e.tettd

.,,. --

Alert SAS AC, PowtrCao,ibUyTo ~etQen(V8vfiMJ1'edu<:ed To A $,\(lie Pl)llttr

Source Fa 1S Minu1e1 or Loogt1 SuCf'I Th&1 lvty >6;1t1an.tf &tigle Feil\tre ~ Resott ln.£:t•tlon Oladl:cut

Ooeniling Modt Appllc lblllly: 1, 2,3, 4

EAl Vtlue:

t!sUJt The Errwetoency c«,-ain.tlO' 1f'OW/rt0t w,1, uMJI tM 1ppJJt:.1t»t t,tne ,,,., f!.i.p.,,,d btJI 1hout1 d«We the e\l'e">C H •oon u ,. 1s 111!!erm•ned ,i,,r ~ cortdAfOnll11e11ceeded "'"'•¥e t~ccNrno ke.1*~

1. AC po.ref capebihty loA3 4 16 KV AND BJ t 16 KVbusSH Rductdlo1 lingJe !)(Wet loClUtee for 15 mnut,n Of longff

Unusual Event SU1 LOH~ M Oll-trte AC Pow'« 10 En\f!lgef'lt;y au,~. for 15

N',nu\es os long:er

O~:aling Modt A.PP11cablll1';: 1, 2, 3, 4

EALVJlutt:

llsllI!.

A:ec:ognmon c ....

The E'meroenc, CootdntlOf 1houfd 111::)r w•Jr Ul'l-ld ,~ 11JP1tta01e time t..1ef1p,ed but WOUlcldedate ~~vent•1 JOQl't 111t It IX deternrmd r,,,t ~ ccndcaio,, hH e{Cih!ded. er.,..,, Mrly ~-C('OCI ~ the li!tm~ s

0 1.LonohlOff.stteACpow«toA3416KV AND B34161(Vfor ~

15 minutes or longer 0 ct

IJ)

I-SG=2-""'- ,,..-,~- ,no- ,""- ,.- ... -nu-.,----,-,-.,-,-.-o,-..,-._--1-s~s~2~-...,- ..,.--,ic-,-no-,-,-.,-,.-$1M--...,,--.. -.-.-.. -""'-.. -.-o-,...- ..,-.-, -lf-S~A~2~-,,.- ..,,.--11,-,-•• -,-,-,,,-,-.-o,-... -.....,--.,-,-.-... -,.,,-.. -.-o-,-•• -,.-,-,u-,.-........,--,-,,-,,-.-+~su=s-,n-...,.-.-..,-cn-,""-,-.,----------+--1 ~ t.ne ReactCN AND IIWICI~ d an Elrtreme Ct11Hm~ lo Ac:ba'l'I Taken !tom tho RHctcw Turbine Ckoner1ttw Board frc:rn the fle1ctor Tvrt>IM Gttw,1•tor eo.rd (RTGBiert1 &Jcwsshll In Shut g J:: rne Abllt'ly to COCI tne Core u.110: !RTG8J 1,e NOT s-,ic,c1tttu1 in s,,,mrio Down me Rt• or 00'..n the Ruaor u

z 0plfJll1ng Mod• A.ppllc.1bfUty· 1 , 2 Op•itlng Moel• App4k11bHlty 1 , 2 Oper~Unu Modt Appllcablllly 1 , 2 OptfaUng MotM Af)PltcabllHy· 3 , 4 z ::>

0 ~ EAL V.alu,u,~ EAL Vtluts: EAL V .. uH! EAL V.iuts J: c:(

•· ALL Manual aci!Onl laied lo .nwJ<Mn Intl rHClOI H incklted .,. • R"dorpowltl' IS HOTciOClCMnglolf:H thin S'Mlpo,t•t • M CEM ffl! NOT inwrt.ed

b . EITltER QC the ~g ~-rt( OI hlvt «.cumd Gn1 IQ CO"ltinu~ POW'f'I' 9Mtf•laon

(1) Core Hui Rf!fflOltl'8! S. ft(y Function NOT rn«

(l} RCS Hut Retn0'1191 Stle4)! Fun~ca, NOT me!

On.site N:. po,r,er m•v be pt'oYICJed by th~ IXher Un11 s EmerOe!ncy Oieffl Geneuaa (EDGt by successlll X.-tie to

e.lthet tht A3or Bl• 16 KV but

.._ Man\Jll •ct1ou1 tel:.., at lhe Reacto, JurblM Gener,1cr Boerd tRTGB) 00 N01 "'utOOWft llt retd# H ru:kete,a D'{

• Rinc:IOf p(M91' ts NOT li'opptng to IH.$1:ttln 5~ power • A.LL lJI tlr-.f9h CEM 1ft NOTinwrttd

SS3 losior~I \/Wal OCPowtl fc.r 15M1tll.ltt10fl<ing«

Operllting M04e AppllcabHlty: 1, 2,3, 4

&! The ~Y Cooro.ND «houtJ nol Msa,t untl tM tppllc1ble I.ft¥ MJ eMp,:ed Our l/'Jouldd«fate the ew,,,r 11..oon tt it,, ~ NI dte concMion fltt e ,ceeded or v,,if tA.e~ ettff!d lho M•

1. Lenlhtn 112VOCon 112JA 11218 AND H2JA8V~•JOCbuues fo, 15 minutes a longer

1.MAul0"1atio 1ripf .. .tto~ti).rHdCW

a. Manuel atbcnt tlllt.n tt en. Rncta TurtMrle Generator &oefa IRTGB) tuCCtn:tufytJNICJOwn lht tetCICI' H lfWllelltd t,f All. o tN fcllowlnQ

• Ne.cto, PCM' Is drq>plng to Jren than 5'MJ p(7W'tl!'

• Neg,aUYe t11rt.\lp rtl• • Atl C EA$ ere 1ns.erttd or bO'llhort in p,og,ns

l'.\Of,: 18 Rr.\'ISIO:-- 2 S - I IOT CONDITIONS EAi. • IIOT B,\SIS

EP3:4 (APP-A-21)

I . UNPLANNED sullained DOSiWe SUrt·UP rate oo~e,ved on nude•r W'IWUl'Mnt.ahen

OEFINmONBOX

UNPlANNED • .-.par1rnete.reh,noe 0111\ evtnl Iha! IS nOll lhe rMUI of en i1tended evolution end 1equns correcU'Y'e or mibQative ld.iou

lrl ::.: ::;..- ::.: 11:5 ~ 11.ct IJ)

~~ ~ ~~ IJ)

w 0:

3 ~

0: w :1: 0 Q. (.) 0

ST I ,l lCIE Pl . \KT Cl .. \SSIFIC\TION TOOi

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

Ill z 0 ~ u z ::, I.I. ...J c( ~ :; w ... Ill >Cl)

I Ill


Alert SA4 -Basls:

trw, IC tt .nlendt'd lo ,ecogn1ze the dfficutl~ n,ocltled w,111 mon1to,1ng

chtnOiflg "''"' c:ondt!Ons witho.,t the uw of• mlfQ" pci.tion cl the 1nnunei1lt0n or nOC.llcn OOJc:>Menl dvring • "O'lkant tr1n$iel'IC

1---------------------l '"Plenn~d",on ct annuna,tcn or iroctt('fsncludes SCMdultd i------S.c..i.;.l.;,.e_A,;.;r..;e ... a_E;;;.mc..;.;e.;.r..._e_n.;.c.,_ _____ mainteoancc 1nd lc>stin9 ldMIIH

SS6 - Basls:

Thl,K: r~Hlh•lhrHI IOpltl'\I s1fltyH5001tfllWllh COY'pelel01s of ~W; oflhecoraoi,oomttafftoMOnilor lheplll'lt rt1?(f'lsttot 1'Qf'll~tlrwitient

"'PltMed"' and ·ur PLNUIEO- Ktions ,re not dl!t-ren ated tmee ltle k)s,

of iMlrun'ltntebon d this ffl99Ml.lde k of such s1grubnco ~ 1 1t1nwnt lhal the uuseottbeloH11noc an fll'l"dio'lbflg: IKl(lf' Oulllbkabon ts ,rttcrary tlaW'-aw1 1 •• •~led ~I If appoo,,.tety 7Wdthe AfttyyYSUrn1nnuno.1cnornckalcrs11ek>st IMl'etsan lnete1Sfd r1 thll • dtgndta plAN CO'\Olb(lf\ ca.lid go undete ed I 1, no1 intendf'dthM ~.,,, ~r!Ol'ltl'elperlcrm, 6e4akdeount di !nttMnfflllltOn ~ I but u,e lht ._,.,u, H t )'.,oc,,n~11hrffhotd IOr dtte1mn'1g lrlt HYC11ty of the t,11nl c:ondUo,s • i1 also net lr\ltndeG m,1 11\e ClSuJ)M'lsorbe-tasJledWlltlrna o•,UOO!'nfflldlas,,mH10 *11elher 1ddal00al Pet sonnet •e teQIJllffli to prCMde tne'fetsed mcnlla-.:,g of S)'ltl!:moc,watlon

11 ,, Mttu!r recognzed lh,t most JHanl devgns prov1oe redundant safl!tl system1odctltOl'I porwe1ed l'rOm 1~1tttt uo1ntcr,1,,1pt1ble powitt 14..!PPM°I 'Nhtlet n,ot•1trOtPGt'IIOJ'lof1rw.tnC:11tcrst'Jrnoteliktft;tt\111'tf Uure ott l&l'QI' PQfbCln ollindlcliiont thec~trt" tnefl.Hled ,n lhls EAl d.leto d4cult'y lll'HOcitled With HMttimttll of pleN cond.bont The IOH d tpeok a SC'\lle'fal ui.ty system 1ndclton thoufd rllf1Wln • funcbon d 0\'1 ,pe,etk t'f!tem ar com,;,onenl <ic,er1bl&ily ti.lb.ls Tr,it W'!h tte tddtnwd by lhe spec.fie Technie* Speotc1t1on The ll'til•1ton ct• Teehrlk:111 s:oeaecaionirnpos;edPlll'll $1'1Ufdoiltft ttltle4tOfnt ln"t\NftC!fll lOU••ttt rf9Q1ed \Ila 10 CrR 50 'Tl 11 IM ,tu•~ 11- nd '"c~n« ~n U'le: Te:dtnal Spe(tbbcn tidiol tfle Nc:a!tt.lto'I ot Unututl e,cnc O.OUEI 11 based on SU2 't'tllbi!I)' lo Ruch ReaulfM 9'utc,o,.,n W lect,ntce! Sp,tdkaho', Limit ~

A.Site: Net l:tn«otw:y1seontldefeotot:(ISI tftf'lecct\lrd fOCffl 11:tff cannol mcnltot saletytunUH:ns ~Md tor protection oflhe p11bllc-.hde a s,gnikan! trM1'N1 fJ In l)l'ogt6' tr2)-~100 03 Gelalll tf'lf fl'd'I 1fW'Nnuaton on tlld1 Conirol Roon oand

lntlc.MK:lrls nffded lo mo,tu Mt.I)' tundlQnt neassa,y fer prdec:IJOn d ltlfl ~ mu1l indl.lOt tontrd rocm ind,ctims, C°"1]Uler gen.er8!e<J k1dletuons tnd dedicated ennunatt1on c,,pebt.ty

"CompenMIW,ll'Mklt!OOl"lnlhtSCOtltU1 ,,e~ltf blMO.nh:tmtlion P,CMd" by OitU'iOUled Conttd Systtrn tnd ~e Outli~ed SildY P•rarne.ler OilPl•Y Sy1&1:tm Thi, should*'dude all C~tl ,y,,tans ..... Mable fer INI MM depenc;lng OI" K!tok plMI dtsll)tl lf'ld lutrl«"1tnl ttlJOl'lt\

F'IIIHn l'Nl'Vtu .. ts Wieded as• 1t1reVICJ1d to oc.tu0e 11•ns•nc 01 mornaroi.ary po.fft tossn

l'.\tiE: 19 RE\ 'ISK):sl ; 2

Jf eppromwcety 75~ d th4t safety s-plt'ffl annunoetors ot tndtc•tcn are Jost lntfe tS ,n tnttet,ec:1 n.tk 1hat • degtded plant eonO.l!M could go undetKI:~ 1(2)-AOP.100 03 details lhe st!et:y eru'tlln<l8tors on ncn Control Room panel It Is nel ln!endtd thll lhe un, SupeNis« be ltsktd with rnL'1ng a ,udgmenl dtetSICl"I H to...ttettwl, tddibontl pener,nd are requtrtd lo C,'t'cwlde -wppltmenltry fflO'lfot!ftQ of system q>eraltOn

It If furlh« recogmz.ed 1"11 most Pint dff9ls pro.,dt redunoMt s.fdy s)'$lem ~tl<.W'I PO'IINftd tom 1ep101, untnltff\l~ oowe, 1upp1tet IMlM tuore Ol • ltrOe: pOl'ttan cl tMUnelltors It men ~11.dythain • tatture of• ltr9t PotiM:111 d inctnlt0ns 1ne ~-,n 1, Included int .1 EAL du, to

ffle\!ftYI\SOCilltdW""HMftMMlOfPl•nl~)()Of ThtlOHOf 1iDl!ICtllc. ""M'Verel utety r,,tem Metitos lhoutd '""""'•function of lhal ,oeafic: sys.temorccmpo,ent opcl'lbililj $ltl.us nus ~ •ddrflkO bYl:tlt$Qte.i~ Ted'ln.ttlSpe(:lkal/Qt'I Tlttinilltbortof t 1f'Ch""II SpeaktbM wrc,owcS plant 11\oldown rdtted to"'' .. 11rument IOt, wil be rl'P(J1.t:dvi.10CFR.S072 tfthes.t,urdoflll'l'tl'Snot1ncan'4*ance"'11r\the Teehnletl spec»tcation tdlOft. lt'lt UOhftct~ d I.Jnlt'Sl.lt.l Brent tflOUE)tt ba,ed Ol'I $U2 ·1nabilCV to Retch RtqUired Shutdown Wittlin Techn.cel Speallcttion Uf!llt"

"Compewlory IMIICatlOns'" In ltwJ contu1 ,re con'l)uttr .,..Md wifcnnlti()f\ Df'O'MtO by ~nbuteo ~rel ~tem Ind tne Ou~ftflt Safety Parametet Olspl1y System tf bdf'I t "'"°' pcwt!ai ct lht tMiJnCJtber'l ,ystem tnd •• cc:fl1)1Mfmcnllomge,eun \I tble Chei'J•l~rt<1,,1ired

F!tHn mnutn was klttted H • IMl.ndd to erdude trans:t~1 er momen«ary llO-nt lmwt

Tbs Jrtttn. WII oe 1tscal1tt<1 to• 51t~ N" Emff\lency tf tf'le °"°'' g atw u,nnCII mcn,itc, the 1'tMrtfl1 tn cwooren OJ• to • CerlCL!tfent IOf.t of C~tnMtOryln<katlOMWftt'I I 5iQl\lkanl tt'llnWJnl inPfOQl"HSdl.lnngtrle lo11 Of e,,n1,,1na1bon er~

S - IJOT C:01':DITl<>NS

Unusual Event SUJ- Basis:

tl\ls,C tnd Its tssoc:l•ted EAl •1e tnttndedlortcogrliltt lfle Clfflc\lly t11oc11ted dh monrtonng cf'110Qlng plant tc:nCibctl1 ""'Ch<M lhe use d • mtj()I PQl'bon of the tnnl.lf'IOtbOn er lft6c1tl¢fl e()J~

Recogn1lton offhttvalltbllltyof conp,ce, bt~dm<leshoi Pl'CMded by Dllrtbuled Conlrd Syltem and lM Ou1H'ied Safety Plrameter Ddpt1v Sy,l•m

~~ lOH d tM.uneiet.ors a lftd.Ctto,-s MudH \dltcMecl n.Wenence and 1Hl!f19 •dMbe1

OuW1'1rc11t1on 11 arbitrary. tlowewt. I,, esttmtled thlil If ttpp"Ol..wraldy 7$'1, dtne safety s)'lttmtnnuno11a1 or ww:klltas art&ol1 lhtt"t tsan lnaetstd rt thal • df,graded plant ccndil.lon co.dd 90 undeh!cted 112)-AOP· 10003 ~ thfl safety tnnunoato's on et<::h Control Room Ptntil It K nd inttttOtd "'11 oltnl Ptf'toftMl pe,fcrm • dlt!Mtd cOUftC ct ttie IMtNl'flentlibon Jott but 11w the VINe u • IUdQmM lllfe111cid to, df!lttffnlolng tht HV'1'~ of e JHl'IC c«idlbonl

• is rec:C91u:ed thtl molt Pant dfflgns PfOOr"ldotedundrlnt s•fet:y sy,tem W'ld,;tttkin PO'Hltd fretn wpwllt UfWllctruptible pow,r twpMs ~ ,...,,e ct I tt,ge o«ticn Of tf'lf'W.lr,citl<n tt,r,or, liket)'ltlltft I llltvte ct• t«oe:~ ctlnOcetlffls theCO"tUtftltlnCIUoedinthltE.Al ().sfjtO dlfflcuny ,uod,led...,, ISJn~I d pllflt c.or)OIJQnS Th• k>s"s al speak ot uve,11 11tretv J1"ffl'I inoc.tors ShouiO 1tmt1n • ri,ncoon d 1.htl tPeanc: tYJlom ot component c:iperttliWy itatu, Thi$ ll1N t,e •Clt.iffSA!CI Dy 1h41 tpeeAlc fec:Mtc.tl SpeotklitfOfl The m1tu1ri,on d I Toehn\QI .sotafical1on lmpo,Md~nl ~hutd~ rdt!Pd to ttHt lnJtNmffll lo.st..,. l>e re.ported Yi• 10 CFR 50 72 tf Ute W'lw:Jo'Nn K nd In c:<mcf,1nce, with the TIKMiCll 6'>eo a1JOn tclion. the Not1 al:lon of Unusual Eftnt WOUEI is

tlitMd on suz ~nal*yto Re.tet, Req.ilrN SbAOOwn WIIMI Te.d1nteal SO.O!lcllioni.mt,·

Aleen mirWttl wH 'Sdected as • trrettidd to e11dude tr.n~eflt Of rnome.N.lf"Y po,we.r tone,

T'hts Hccilcttton of Unu5'1:al Evem 1nove, wit be. nctltt~ to tn Mtn beMd Ct! I CO'leun'tl'\IIOJtcl CCf'l'PWIHIOtYiinek:lillOflt O'lf t .1 Ill lttn'lfent IS in progreu di.lrlf'l9 tNI k>ls of •rw,nt.lAtkln o, w,c.i.on

SUS - Basis:

Thit ,C ~ ~eel u I Nc:(,lelliOn d 1Jnv9'111 e-..._,, 1NOUE) !>tee""• msybetcreanorofmcreser,o.,sconllt.o"sllf'!d 11-rnult tScmsiot!fed IObt. potent.I dtgttdttlon ctlhe lewl ofHfdyo4the Ptl'II lhei JOOP9' Ylhle fClf the uniden hd ind prenure balr,daryle1.H99 •H ~Id u II 1, obwfv•bfe •·Ith normtl control room linefl<*ioos len41rvatuu In.If.I gentrtJly be dcttl'tnnedlhroi91 ~tufring ~lftce lHb (t fjl rnnsbt1.ancn1

Rei/el vtlve n<wmtl Clf*I~ thOIIIO be Uctudedl tom thlt tC How~f • 1e!te'lvttve u,.a ~n1te1 and tetts 10 ctMe oe, t:le$91 thOJkfoe conslde,•d IPOk,bto IC lhts IC If lht rcl1e1 vatvt ~noc ~ l'IO!llta

The EAL kl' ldent1r.eoJe1lcaQfl 11 wt 11, Nghe,~ ~lolhelflser SitliJl!6cante o4 ~n&i1'ed lt!ahge In c.ompensm la uNdentr t.d Of pnssurt: bO!Jndlfl' lff'191 In er caw •sc•ftbelf\ a( s IC 10 the Nert i.w« tt YII J'.tfllO't Pfodld llatM, 1•blt

SU4-Ba,ls;

This EAl 11 ~dUOed becellM t 1-s a ~curlO' d mote sertou, conctl!OM tnd u 1esul 1s conitC*ed to be• PQlef'ttal dtg9debon ol tht ~ of safety of the pltrtl

This tn.reshOld aad'uses t::OOlana semptn uce:eting coeflnt T.cMteat 6oeC1fic tiOl'l"S tor lttnsient 1<:dnt spiking ffl\ds

E~1!lo, dthts ICtotheA!e« !elfet 1t ~• ttie: ;~saon PfOdJct 8amer r ... ,

EAL- 1101' U.\SIS

EP3:4 (APP-A-22)

Unusual Event SU2-Basls :

liMtlno CondlhOnt of Opereuon (l.COs) ,equ1re the p,llnl lobe br,;,ugl\l toe required°'*' ng mOde when lh• Tedln"* a,eaflce on ,oqwtd c()l'lflguttl)()r't ctnnc:t be 1estcwed Depending on the 01<:umstence, this m1y or mty ~ be en emerpency a orec~OI' to• more JtM!fe cmdllkln ln anyctH. lhe 1Miltton of plant sttuldc.n 1equ1redbytht silt Teehnlelll Speoftctl1ootrt(lrJirese four hClUr re,:>ort t.1nder 10 CFR 50 721bl N~ tl"nllrpeney e"IMls The pltnl 1s Wtlh1n h H lety enwiope whffl being shut down wittwin lhe •Ho.nblc: ac::bo, 1t1ltm~l twne tn the Technacal SpecrllcebM1 M immeo.te Noll~bon d """"su .. Ewn1 cuouE~ ,, requlre.d ~e.n IN pan1 Is ncl trrut111 to lhe r~1red op«alm9 mode wllhin lhe 110,rrabte tttien Sllt~nt I.mew, the Ttcnnictl Soeokettons OedatatJOl"I d. Nobktiton of Unusual EVl!n( i~IOUEI IS based on Ille IIIT'II ti 'lldtich the L.CO-spec1&ed •etlOn ~ateme:nt lime pe,iod elepses uftdtr the ~e Techntcel Spea6c:1llantend•snct retated tohowlc:n91 ca,d on may havemsc~d

'T J.llCIE l'L \ NT CLAS ' IFJ<:. \TIO:S: TOOL

St. Lucie, Rev. 67


UNPLANNED-A~ ch.rve or an event that is. rd the result d;a,intE!ndedE!llcilaicnandrecp""esc:c:irrec:weCl'nitigativeac:funs..

RCS l£AK RATE -Conpised of IDENTIFIED a..t Lt,IIOENTFIED LEAKAGE .. defined bv Tecmical Soeci[ocatia,s.

UNIDENTIFED LEAKAGE -Leilll<age mdl is no! IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE« CONTROU£ll LEAKAGE.

COKJROLLED LEAKAGE-Seal -- sooolied ran Ile fNC:SOI' ood.int ptl'T1) seals..

Site Area Emergency SS6 Inability 1D - • Sigrifieant Transient in Progress.

(OOJ

ei,.r.t;ng -Applicill>iilr:

EAL Values:

1. =i!"~~-ilra~""tely75'1.ofthefoboing for 15 ............

a. Coni"ol Roam Safety System annunciaticn.

Q!! b. Ccr1ltd Rooms.r.tySyslomllldicalJon..-aledwilh Ile alxM! ...-..

DOTH of the kJlbMng aJllly. • ANY at the follawin;:

• Eledrical _11!jedic>-1 _1han25%Ml-.:.lload • ReaclorTf11 • Safuty lnjecti<>1 Aciuati<>1

AND

• Dislribuled Coo1nll System (DCS) AND Oualmed Salely Par.......,. Di a S · OSPOS are tnw.ailable.

SaN!lv $'1"i,tem indcafm ~ not be lost W.thoot conc:urent loss of Satecy Svstem arn.n:iatim..

IDElfTIFIBJ LEAKAGE: .. Leakage (eJCOl!lli CONmOLLBJ LEAK/\GEI into <*»ed ,ys1ems. such as plnl> seal or valve pnjng leaks that .are caput!d. and conducted to oil SWT1J or ooHed~ td., er

b. leilliaqe into the ccntmmenl .xrmsphet'e from S(M'Ol!S that are beth !ljl<Oically kx:ilied Mid lrown ei1he<no1 lo - wl1h the cperat:on of NS!k.age ~ systems or not to be PRESSl.RE. BOUNDARY LEAKAGE. er

c. R .. ,1or Coolant SV,,.m1Nkaoe \hrcuii1 a >1eamaeneralcr 1D lhe ~ sys1,,m(~aryll!aikage~

Operating Mod• Applicability.

EAL Values:

Alert

1, 2, 3, 4

1. UNV.NNED io,sof gltilerlhan ~ 75".4of 1he fol!owi,g for 15 rnnlles Df lo<gerper 1[21-A0'-100.03:

a. Ca1'rol Room Salely Sys1Em ainncialion.

Q!l

b.. Control Roon Safety System miciltion ~socmed with lhe abcwe ..wnn:lillln..

EllHER of Ile lo'°"'1g ~ • AHYoflleloflo,,;,,g:

• Eledricallo.ldrljedions,-ea1a-than25'.41ulole<*icalloa:l • Reactir T,;> • S.r.ty~-

!ll!

• Dis11i>uied Control Sysan (DCS) NIO Ctwlified Safety p.....,.... Display S ~ ze tma'lail.ml'e.

Unusual Event

0per•ting Mod• Applicability.

EALVail!.e5: -'11"!'&1!rri1t.11CYC'Donitull'w.shol,l~11ot-rw1tttbe a,pplk"•l:ff ill'IJe" hes t";•sed, M U!'OU.ld dttien 11'/'e e~t1:1,oone.s,rrs~m11t co.,IR!ol!J11J u:cttdtd, or...Vlllt:.~ t 11c.etrlthf:~ Mmr.

1. UNV.NNED io;sofg,Nt,,,-lhan ~ 75'.4 of the ""°'"ng for 15 ninules or lo!,vet-per I (2)-AOP-100.D3:

• - Ca1'rol Room Sali!ly Syslem ainnciation.

Q!!

b. Control Roan Safety System indicaticn ~atedfflth Ile above ~ators..

SU5 RCS LeaJo,ge. -1

1--------~G~Ul~QANCE==BO=l\uFOR=~M=---- ----11 Oper,ting Mode Applic:ability.

See alsc 2. RCS Leal. R:ote in the Fission Prowcl 8.imer fFl'll) T-. EAL V•lue.: . 1. Uii-oe<IORpn,.....,bolma,yleo!tage

1,2,3, 4

-than101J1lf".

Q!!

-~------~oo=DN1CE==~eox=F011=~s~1U~--------l Oper,ting Mode Applic:abolity: 1, 2, 3, 4

Seea'>c2.PmlaryCoolantAc!MtyinlleFissianl'rodt.dllamer(FPB)T-. EALValuos:

I. RHC!creoolad ~ acliwityva!.Je indicating b,l dad dogadaticn s,-eail!r than:

._ 60.D uCi'gn Dose Eq,mleot HJ 1

.Q!!

b. Specific adiwity g-eab:!r than 518-V uCi'gn Dose • l,nl Xe-133

SU2 NbiliytoReachRequndS!uctMn Wi11in Tedrical Specification um,.

1, 2, 3, 4

EALVilfues;

I. Plant is NOT braq,t ID roqured _.ting .-wti>Tedrical~LCO Action~Tme-.

S -HITT CONDIDONS 20 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL S - HOT CONDIDONS


II)

~ :!1 (.) z ::::> z z ct

w C)

~ ct w ....I

a ct ....I (.) ....I w ::::> u.

20

~ 0

B z ::::> u. ..J ct ::.; ::.; w Iii ~ I

II)

S-HOTCONDITIONS 21


Site Area Emergency Alert

EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

Unusual Event SUS-Basis:

The purposed this IC and its ~~ EALs is to reccvw,ze ~ loss of oomnunications ~,ty·lhal eilherd<nats the plant operati:lns ..ta! ab111y lo palorm row,e lasts necessary fQ- plan q,erations or the illility IO ccrmuicate ts.sues. ml off;_le auh:fi6es. The loss of off-site oomnunications abi1y is expected ID Ile siignfficanlfy mere """1lfflll!I t,an lhe condilion acilressed by 10 CFR 50. 72.

~='e'~=~~~~~-llis 5AJ....5 imErtded to be used orly when extraordinaty rTEans (e.g .• n!lay<,v cl nlmmation ITt>m rado lransnissions, indivici&ls berq sent lo olkite locations, e<c.) an, bea,g used lo make oomnunica1ions possible.

The fist for on-site OIXTJTltOC',iltionsloss ~ the lossd ;;all means of conrnunicalicns ,oomely used tr O!Jeralions.

The isl fcrolf-oibi! CDl!TrUicalmsloss -the lo5.scl all means of ~ICrlS routii@fyused tor off-site emergencynatificdons.

S - HOT CONDITIONS 21


S - HOT CONDffiONS 22


Site Area Emergency Alert Unusual Event S U6 Loos cf M On-site..- Off.sill! Camu1icatians Capalitities.

"""

I GUIDANCE FOR SUG I 2. \m:lt~!/ lhe 1c11c,oq off-- comm.ncotJCWl-in

• Commen:ial i:ra,os - - oEI phones in lhe Conlrol Room. but notl)OBCNloeil,mnes.

L_ _____ _________ __, I Sbu! andCo<nyNotilications

Hot Ring<bfl (HRD) Commen:ial'*'°""' EMnet

NRC Notifications

EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT CI.ASSIFICATION TOOL S - HOT CONDillONS


22



S - HOT CONDIDONS 23 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCJE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL S - HOT CONDITIONS 23



RECOGNITION CATEGORY H

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS

AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

H - HOTCONDIDONS 24 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE RE\llSIO : I ST LUCIE PLANT Cu\SSIFICATION TOOL H- HOT CONDITIO S 24



~ w u. ~ ~ :'.5 ~

(!) z ~ w u. u. ct !ft

~ i3 z 0 (.)

0:: w ::c b 0 z ct V)

I I

::c

~! - , .. : "'' ' ~ ·: ... - . ' ... ¥. " . ~ ~~ ~ . . .. -.

HG1 -Basis:

EAL #I """'"l'asses a:rdlx>ns mder wlwch • flOSTILE ACTION has

~l=i~~ol<X>~~~~.=,~ -- and conrol d 1hat equipment - be trans1 .... d lo and operated from anol!ef location.

These saklyfuoclian, an,~ - RCS """'11ay. andsocordary

~~:.~J'~~"".':nss:J:=~ty isnal met.

HM - Basis:

H- HOT CONDITIONS 25 .EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISIO : 1

EP3:4

Alert Alert HA1 - Basis:

Rfflt1!llOO is made lo site specific sea.fity mft _......, beoalu5<! the5e indlv.duals ..... the designa!Rd per,onnel ona.lo qualified and - lo IXlllfirm that a sea.fity eYent is oocuring a- has OCQ'1M Tranng oo sea.fity ..,.,t dassificalion conlirmation is clo5ely c:cnrolled..., lo the sni ....-.cy controls placed on the plant Physical Sea.rily Plan.

~~=:::.:i'=""'~~~=~ty Plan. Tran,g and Cklaliicalion Plan.

EALl!2isincildodtoemun!1hat;ippopi.te~lorthe5'!Cllity

=~"'::~ti~rr.w;:',;~c"=~=n:'l~ -of an Unusual E....t.

Tho delem1nallion cl "<ndi>!o' is mode 1tYougt, use of~ found in the A,ysical Setunly Plan.

IContinUftl tn next colUfTVl}

ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL

Unusual Event HU4 - Basis (continued):

EAL #3 is to ensl.l'e that nocificatioos tJr 1w a:rcr.a" ltln!a'i are miide in a limely mamer and that Oflsile ~ Olganiz:atioos (OROs) and lllant per>OIYM!I .... at • slate of heightsned ............. regart!rv ... cn,dble tnat. It is rd the imer< dthisEAL torep;oco eJCi5mg nDl>llostile related EAL5i""""""'airo-afl.

This EAL is met ""1en a pin receiw!s inbmation regarding an iD1n1t

~~~~1y't,~1/:-=~~ ttw-eatis made need declare the l.ni5ual Ewnt.

The NRC Hfadcr,Jartl!l'S Opt,ations Olfoca-(HOO) will O<ll!1'IUlicalo 1o fie lansoeifthe1t'ftalilwdwsanailinerlarlinerismeont1obealarge -- lie potential for causing •'IJ,ificanl~ 1o lie 111an1r. The slalus and - cl the pane may be,..,.- by NORAD h<l<ql the NRC.

EscalatianloAlert""""ll"'Cl'cfawlic.-ia,-woud beviaHMW<lllld ~ if lhetmat .-an arlinerwithin JO.....,. of the

HU1 -Basis:

H- HOT CONDITIO S 25

(APP-A-28) St. Lucie, Rev. 67


Site Area Emergency HG1 HOSTILE ACTION Re5ulting in Lo5,; cl ~ Cor*1ll a HS4 H05TilE ACTlON wilhin Ille PROTECTED AREA

lhe Facility.

Opera.ting Mooe Applic•biily: All Oper.mg - Applicobtlity: All

EAL Values: EAL Values:

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has oca.orea sum ll\iil pl,ri""""'""' are I. A HOSTILE ACTION 15 oauring or has OCClsred .,;tin lhe ....-.ble lo op...i.e ecp.ripnent n,quilt!d lo rnmain safely l\n:tioos. PROTECTED AREA .as n,pcrted by lhe 5ec>l'ily Shift S<Jpervisor.

OR

2. A HOSTILE ACTION has c""""1 laiure cl 5p"1I Fuel Cooling Systoms ard IM ENT fuel d- is likt!Jy lcr a FRESH. Y OFF-lOADED REACTOR CORE IN POa...

HS2 Coolrol Room Evacualioo Has Been Initialed ;m Plant Coo1ro1 Cannot be Established.

Oper.mg - Applicability: All

EAL Values:

1. Cmhd Room evawa!ioo has been initialed.

AND

._ Oin1n,1 c1 the plan c.nu be established wtin 15 ninules.

AIRUHER-A,liner is me.Yll ID be •lorlll! airt:rall wilh lhe-larcausira-- ID lhe pl;n_

ESSEHTIAL AREAS-/\rea5..tthin lhe PROTECTED Afl£A. flatanahs ~ syslems. _-. or mateial. lhe faillR. deslN:lim. or -.e cl "l'fhidl oouk! diredly or indin!dly endanger the pu:,lic heallh ;n1 safely by t!lljlOSUl! ID .-,.

FRESH. Y OFF-LOAOBJ REACTOR CORE IN POOL - A•"""• di-loaded reacmr o,re. in lhe Soen1 Fuel Pool, exists durinQ lhe period ol tine ,men core df~Ocld beQins until OOf1! ~ is CXJn1i,e.Qe..

HOS11..E ACTION-An act iovraJd a Nuclea- Po\,er Plant (NPP) or its persomel lhal includes the use al violent boe lo de>tn,y equi:menl, take hos1ages. and'a intimidate the licensee to achiew an encl This n:rudes attack by air, land.« waler using g1.11S. expbsiwe:s. PROJE.CTILES. ""'1ides. orD111Ef de¥ices used lo cleliver deslrucliv@fcn:e. Oll..-acis 1hal satisfy lheowrall intenl may be id<!ed. HOS1I£ ACTlct,I -not be carlS1rued lo include acts ol cMI <isobedeoce or lelooious -1hat are not oiilf ol a ooooerted a1t;d on the NPP. Nan-lerrorismbas EAl5 "1oold be used lo adchss svch actitme. (i.e. !his may includeviolent-belween irdivi<llals in lheowner ctr*'>lled area).

IMi.ft~ENT - MiliQation aci!ons Ii."' been ""ffeotive. -all actions are not e,pecied ID be ..-ssl\A. ;nl lrended infa-mation micates that the """'11 « conditon ..;11 ocxu. V\here IMMINENT tirreframes are SJ)ecil,ed. they shaft ...,,.,_

owt,ER CONTROLLED AREA -Thal portion ol FPl property sumxming and inclucing lhe Sl Lucie - .. - Plant v.hich is subjed lo limited access and ""'*ol asde<med ~ by FPL (H'lan]

PROTECTED ARfA - The area (wi:hin the °"""' Controlled Alea) oc:n.,;ed bl' the nuclear mils ;m ""50Cialed eo.J"'""'1I and facilities eJJdosedwilllin h! seaailv-tence. The area ..tthin which aaxurlablllvol """"'1fll!I is manainod in an emeri,encv.

SECURITY CONDITION -Mf Secuity Ewnt as 6sled in the ~ security oonli,gency plan Iha! oons1ib.Jies • lhn,,aU- ID sle seaaity. thn!,alkisk lo site .,....,.....i. (I' a poleniiaJ deg3daoon lo the level cl safely ol the pial'II. A= COMJITION does not imolw a HOSTll.E ACTION.

~~~=~~..i:'f:"'cx!.~~·:-re'l~==~=~~e~~ inclJdes: clefurmalioo due ID heal or impact. denmg, penetration. rupue, aacking. ;m pant blisleril\). Sutace l:ienishes (e.g. painl - soralches) shrud not be inducled.

Alert Unusual Event HA4 1-KlSTILE ACTION wihn lhe OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or Ailbome HU4 Coo!rmed SECURITY COIDITION or Threa Which

A!lock Tlweat lrdic-a l'Olen1ial Degr- in Ille Lev,,J of Safetyal thePlal'II.

Operating Mode Applicability: All

EAL Values:

1. A HOSTILE ACTION IS oauring Of has occtnwd .,;tin lhe CY,fflER CONTROlLED AREAa, """'1ed bytheSeruily Slil ~ -

Q!!.

2. A valida11!d ncliic:atior, fnmtflC al an AIRI.INER aiL1ck llweat within 30 rrii1ut£!s ol lhe sie.

HA5 Corirol Rocm Evacoalion has been Initialed.

Operau,g Mode Applicability: All

EAL Values:

1. 1[2>-0NP-100.02. Coolrol Room naa:essibily. n,q,in!s Qnrol Rocm evacuatim.


EAi. Values:

1. s...mc ewm .,.-1hon ~ng S-S Earth<JJoke (OSEI as ondicated by seismicinslnrnenl.,tiot/'muncialor~))GREATERTHANO~g.

ANO

._ ~ ronlimed by ANY ol the folkn,i,g: • Earthquake r.tt in plant • US Geologicilll Su-vey (USGSJ Nalionilll Ea1hqual;e lnfu!matian c...er • Control Rocm in<i::alioo ol degraded pertoonanco ol sys"'"'5 ,equired

b-the sale shuloom cl the plant.

Q!l.

2. Tornadc slri:i,gOR!igh wndsgreaterlhan 120mplln,sulmg in VISIBLE DAMAGE ID ANY ol tile foJJowiog slnl<u'es oml.ining safety systems or ~ OR Corm! Room irdcalioo ol degraded pe,funnanoo ol llJose safely systems:

Reacmr Coolaimlent e..lding ;m !Jield Btilding

Reacmr ~ !lJilding (RAB)

steam Trestle Area

Ccnlensate SIDrage Tri (CST)

Ultimate Heal Sinl< fUHSl

lrcalte Cooling Waler (IC\V)

COfr!x,nent Cooling Wale< (CCW) p!atlom1 area

--Diesel Generah>- Eukfng

Die.el Oil storage Tri (DOST)

REfueli~W-TonklR\YTl

All

1. A SECURITY CONDITION thal does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as rEj)Ol1ed by lhe Securiy Shift ~sor.

Q!!.

2. A al!dble SI. L'-"" secl.llly lh"eat noCilicalial.

Q!!.

3. A val<laled nooficalioo lrom NRCprovidi,gncnnation al an ...-crafttlnal

HU1 N9'tral orllesvu::liw f'heoomenaMeding the PROTECTED AREA

Operating Mode Appljcability: AU

EAi.Vaiues:

1. Seismc even ideniilied by ANY 2 ol lhe illlowrg: • Sesnio event oonmred by plant seisnic monitor

instrumer11, (Amunciata-s S-46 ts-54D • Earl,quate felt st plan( • us Geological SUvey (USGS) - Earlhquate

lnbrrotian Cen'a

Q!!.

2. Tornado ,biking .,;Jhin PROTECTED AREA boondar}' OR high windsgrewrlhan 120fflllh.

Q!!.

3. lniEmal lloodi,g 1hat has lie J}Olential ID affed safely relaled "'fllpment """;""' by Technical ~6calicns !or lhe amont q,erali,g mode in ANY ol lhe -wig area,,:

Steam TresUe Ive.a

lmake Slrudure

lnlake Ccoling W-(IC\V)

Carponen Cocfing W-(CCW)

~~~~(RAB]

OR 1eontinuedOO nen ... _\

H- HOT CONDffiONS 26 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANf Cl.ASSIFlCATION TOOL H - HOT CONDmo s


0:: I.)

26

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~ Q l-o ~ Zw o ... () c( 0: (/) wt:z i= c( Q..J C a. z c(

ig

I I

:I:

H-HOTCONDIDONS 27


Site Area Emergency

ESSENTIAL AREAS - Area. .,;111;n lhe PROTECTED AREA. Iha! anaiis ~ svstems. oorrcx,nem, « material, the faikR. desln.dion. or released which could direclly 0< imedlv eodanQer lhe ..-,tic he ;m safely by .,..,.... io raclalioo.

PROTECTED AREA - The area (..;!hin lhe OWNffi CCNTROUED AREA) occupie.d by lhe nuclea- ..-iits and associa'd!d "'IJpnen! ;m facilitiesenciosedl'rithin~seoJritvperim!terfen::e.. The area within wtjtfl atlCOl.dabilirt d persoonel is mm.ailed ii an emeflleflCV.

Alert HA1 - Basis:

EAL #lad<hsse. lhe elled din1lorral flood~ caused by....,., sucfl as ~=~~=-~~~:=,haps.It inc1Jslrial safely- (e.g. eledrioal - ) !hat pn,du:le necessary aa:es,; 1o cperaoo or monilDr """'1y equipment. The inat.ity 1o a:x>e55. q>ef-.!e or rmnnor safely eqlipme,1. represent, an actual or slbslantial poler1lial degr.>dalicn of the lewl of sal<!y of lhe plant

Flooding as used in tis EAL describes a coodition when! wm is entEring lhe room fasle< th;m ilstaled eqtipr,ent is capa,le of ....-ncw,I. r.,...;,g in a rise of Yfa1er ~ within the romn. Cli65ifiCition of this EAL shomj not be delayed while CDll!dM! aaions are be~ token to isolate !hewsoun:e.

EAL M adchs.ses lhe 11.-eat lo safely relaled equj,merrt ~ by ffiQJECTILESgeoe,>lod by main lulline rotating ~t.,uos. Therein, 1his EAi. isconsiste<1 with the defriliOO of an ALERT ., thal Ile poler1lial exists b- actual or subslantial potential deg;,diiicn of lhe lew! of salety of the plant.

EAL i!5ad<hsse. whicle crashes w!lin Ille.PROTECTED "1l£A Iha! "'5<tls in VISill.E DAMAGE "' ESSENTIAi.AREAS 0< indicatior, of m,age ID safety strudln5.. systems.. or oon-1s oontairing l.rldlons and sysh,ms """red lor sale shuldcMn d lhe plrt

EAL Ml-.... alher phenortll!flil lllal res~ in VISIBLE DAW.GE io lhe ESSENTIAL ARE.AS a resuts in indication or d~ k> stn.Jcllfts.. systems. or oompcneots anairir,g f.nmns and sy,;12<,r; n,qu...S b- - of lhe pla-rt (such as luricane and slcrm suye) flal can also be preanors of l1D'e serious eYB'lts.

EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIF1CATION TOOL

Unusual Event HU1 -Basis:

EM. #4 addr ..... main ul>ine rolaiing oornponer,l lailures al suffic'Jent ~to=~~~tt;'-==t~!" generator JUlll! dbes not meet the in1l!llt of this EAL - ;i did not irr!>ad ""'"'31 cper.rlioo of the plant.

Of...,.- conoem is the pot,,nwl for leai;age al oombu,jilie fkads

~~~~=~~~~~ andHl/3.

TJi> EAi. i• consistent with lite defini1im of a Notification al UrMual E,,ent

~Jl:,.;,_=~~~~~~~=iz>v dasisiicalion lo HA I is based on damage <ilne by PROJEGll.ES generated by the t.oiu-e Of in ainjunction with • 5'eam ge,,era!or hbe "'l'I""- The5e ....,.. would be dassi6ed by the r.dologcal IC. or F"IS5ialpt>duct-1Cs.

EM.116addr"55e5nallr.!lweather~otaluricanommiog and issoci.aCed rain f~I iiOd sum siiges..

Escalationol hs """"lJ'!OCYdassilicalionlewi. l _,.ie.-id be ba>ed on VISIBLE DAMI\GE. at by-in plant condnions, wio HA,.

H - HOT CONDITIONS 27


OEAMTK>N BOX

PROJECTILE -An objea direcled tow3rd a N'udur PQ\Wr P nt tNPP} z coutd Cll.J!i l! conoem for i"s oon:inoed o,;,.~il 'ty. ,K.M>ihty. « pe,sonnel s.:t,.er,

PROTECTED AR£A- The ~.J (¥11 th!! CM'NER CONTROi.LEO AREA} OOCUOl.ci trv the JlUde.ar units and .J.ssocbtt<i tquip,Nrt and faalities enelosed 'Mmifl the HCU"'typerin'l@teffenoe ~a wt.hmwhich ~~bdity ef ~~ ls mairu..n@d nan ~ency

V1SIBLE DAMAGE - Q3,-nag,a to equ ·oment Ot l!l'VC1l..lre th.J1 IS

r'!adi observ~ble W"'.hout rneaSUl'emiena. tut.na. er .an.ltvsis Oam.&Qe is s~t to cause oonoe,m reg.irdlni:i the oontinued opMabilityorl'!'iabilr.'joftheafeaKls:ructure 1ys: or corrponam. Eump.)e darnag• 1nduci!s CHfonn.11ion due to heat or imp.ad. denting, ~.non. ruptlJre orolddng, and p.a m blis:enng Surface blemisMS {e g .• pa..nt chipping. M::r.a:ches) srould no{ be ird.Jdt'd


Site Area Emergency Alert Unusual Event HA1 (Continued) HU1 (Continued)

3. lnterrul ftooding'" N4Y o( lhe followmg struc:ur~s re-suiting m ,:1 ~:rical 4. Turbine failure result:ng in c.ung ~ooan or damag. to shook h.u.ard that pr.C,udu .:.cc.u to Of)IH".>~e or moru-.a uftt,r eouipmt:m OR turbine or gener.J:or sNls. Control Room lndie.abOn d ckgr.Jd@d P@l1ormanoe of tho~ saft-ty syst@ms

Vi Swtthgur Room

R•aao< Auxila,y ding (RAB) -0 6 'l & IQ.5 f: [email protected]'l:5

k• Cooling Wa:er (ICW)

Co""°""'" Coc,1ng Wator (CCl'I)

Emergency ~ Generator Bula""

QB.

4, Tl..ll"btM f ur~a~ed PROJECTR.ES ruub 1"'9 ~ BLE OM.'iAGE to or pen•u-aoon of ANY of tne follOrNing .s~s containing s.lft:ty .sysr.ms or ~~ OR Comrol Room indtc.ltJOn o" de,gl'adtod perfonNnce ol thos,e S.J~t)tsys~

RNCto.rCon:ainmtnt Buildmg and Sh:..idBuildi"G

Reactor Auxih 1ry Building (RAB)

ln:ake COoting Wattr (ICW}

Component Cooling W.Jiter (CCW) pla.t'orm .in!a

11"1 V1S!SLE DAMA.GE to AH'f ol the "olowing iUUCtUl'H

'e'rJ stems. or oomponents OR Corr.rel Room indication of ..moe r:l lhose u'tt-Ty syst!!ms·

~te S:ora~ Tri (CST)

Ult:ma'.e l·iut Sink UHS

l rr.a.ke Cooling Wa.tt:r (IC.V)

Co.moonem Coo!i~ Wat!!f' (CCW) pb.~Of"TI a~a

Emergency Dies Gen@rator Budding

O!'!.s.el0d ~Tri(D0ST)

Re~r Wa!flf Tank

2!!

6. Na:ural ooet.rrti"Ol:s nn.li"'.ing n VISIBLE DAMAGE 10 ANY ofN ~lowing sttvc:tures com.amg equipmert n«wss.ary for s.af~ shu':dcwn OR ha., uused damage H evM)t!noed oy Co~ Room indica:ion of degract.d ~ d ttlOW S.ystffl'I.S"'

nuo!Room

Cable Sp.'l!ad,ng Room

Vr.:al Swtct,gear Room

R~a<X<r Auxifiary Building {RABl -0 5 ft.. a. lQ.5 f': Elevabons

S:e.1m Trtstl• Ar.a

Intake~

Intake Coolffig Watu (ICV

Con~nem Cooing W:.ter (CC•,

Em:erv-ncy DieS@!!I G!~ator BUJldirig

5. N.itu~ OCCl.frT9'nOl!S a1'~t:ng m. PROTECTED AREA. A NY or b.k>ll<M,ng

• Con'mned huniCJne waming is in~ • LO\l'r in>.a.ke canal i.v~ of -10..5 fl MLW far i'-our or mDA".

• Vis sighjngs by sta'Xln personnel 'nil? watfl' lev s ¥e approaching s·ormdrain s-,stem ~ity

H - HOT CONDITIONS 28 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE R.EvlSIOX 2 ST LUC'IE PL-'\NT CLASSIFJCATIO~ TOOL H - HOT CONDITTONS


Recognition c,

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H - HOT CONDITIONS 29


Site Area Emergency Alert HA2 - Basis:

VISIBLE OM\AGE is used toid!!rrtifythe mag.nitl.Jdeof the Ft": or EXPlOSION and to disctiminate ~il'lSt minor Fl-:t"£S and EXPLOSIONS

n.. re~~ to structures containing sa'eiy s~ems or compon4t0a l!li incfuded tod1scnrnna:e .against FIRES or EXPL0Sl0hSm areH h~ a low prtlbabCity of a,ectmg s~fe opt!.rabon. The ~gnifiro.noe h~ Is 00( tha1 a safety sys:.re WJS de.graded bu1 the fact th.:11 the FfRE Of EXP\.OS~ was l.:t.rge e,nough to rouse damage to these syst!!ms,

The use r:l V1S1BLE DAMAGE ~ not be .-.t~eted as mandating a l.ngihy damage aneument prior ~o cLusi'ication. The declara:ion of an A!ert and the actwa:ion of the T@'Chn~ Support~~will pnMdeh Em@r~e:nc:y Coorctina:or wrJ1 th~ re!IOuroes needed to perfum, detailed damage assessme-nts

The Em@rgency Coordirutot also nffds to consider any se<XJITT)' .aispe-cu of the EXPLOSION

Eseal.a:ion of m~ ~ncy nification le~L If ~~e. I b@ baud on System Mal!u.ndions.. Fission Product Barri'M Degradat:Jon Of

Abnonnal Rad Levels I Radiok,giool E.ffivent ICs..

Unusual Event HU2 - Basis: (Continued)

EAl.#3 In addition to ..a FIRE addrKsed b)' EAL l"1 or EAL #2, a FIRE wi".hin the t>la.nt PROTECTED AREA ,nol: extinguished within eo .. ,nru.es may also ooterbally de,gr.Jde the lev~ al olant ufety.

EAl.#l If a FIRE wtn;n fhe n1 PROTECTED AREA 11' ~ suffioe-m s.ize to requre .a response by an offsi':e firefighting aS@ncy (e.g., a local t.own Fire Oep:fflmlffitj_ tMrl ~ fevel of pl.3Jlt S,J;fety is pc:e-nti.Jffy d.graded. Th!! dispatch of a offsite f.ref.ghting ag@OC)' to ilia, si:e requi.rM an ~I dee:b.ra':ion only i" ,t ,s ~ to .ICtlWfy support firefighting e'l'orts becau§@ th@ fre is beyond the cap.ability of the- Fin! 8og.1de to extinguish ~aration is not MOessary if the agency resovroes aP? plac-..d on standby. or su_pport;ng post .xtingws.hment reoovery or invesbgation actions.

Bnis-Rel.ate-d Rrquirements ~om Appendix R ~d NFPA-805

Appench. R ~o 10 CFR 50. sta~es 1n part ,;hat C~on 3 of~..: A to this pan. so«:ne:s. th.Jt ~res. sys:em.s and components in,por-wnt eo s.afety sh~I be dEs.gned and loc.lted to m:nirruz.e, oons.stent Wth other saf,a.ty requirements. the. probahilfy and effect of Fires and explosion!."

ThE Nudear SJ.fety Goal CNSG1 in NFPA 805 SEC'tion 1.3. 1 5-Utes. Th~ >--- --- ------ --- -------< nude..ar sa .. ety goal ts to pro<r.dP reasonable assurance that a ti~ during ._,_ _______ U_n_u_s_u_.i_l _E_v_e_n_t _______ .... anyoper;ition.ti mode .Mld ptant coofigur.iuon win not prevent ttte plm trom

s the m.a:~tude o'JJ'\d extent ct FIRES th3t m:JY be £-n':i .ll d~ ad.at on of th9 lewl al saf~ty of the plant

pt. OJ)E'f3:cn. will Uh prompt ac:ions to oonfirm the ,..alidity of an ir Wil fi~ ~rm md.1~. or~ For EAL asses.snwm PlKl>O'SeS. the ame,vency decbr.atlon clock s.t.-."U a1 thf! tlm. tha~ ~ in,1ial a~ ll"ldic.rion, or report was rece.rved, al"<I noi 1he tme tha.: .a subse,quem wnfication action was perlonned. Slmilarty, tti. fil"E' duration dock also star"~ at die tinie of reoeipl c; the in.1ial al..1.m1, indiC.l.ti:in or r-topo,t.

EALf2 Ttu EAL .Midr-esses reoe pt of ,1 sing!': firo.. al.'lrm, and the ex1s:ence of a FlREJsnoe .. ~Ml fl.e •• proved or dispn:,,led)wthin 30-minu:eso(the a:ann. Upon reoil?·pt operators will take promptactiom to oorfinn thr va i.y of a single fire a2arrn. For EAL ,1554.-s~nt purpcse,s. thf! JO.m111ute docll start) at the dm~ lh.:tt the init ial alarm was r~. and .nm the tme thal a subwq\.ent 'J'erific.aoon .iction v.'as. perfor:m!?d.

A H"Qie fir• alarm. a.bwnt cr:hlH 1J'ldiQtion(s) of ,1 FlRE. may be 1.ndiro.1ive of eq'Jipment f.ailure a a. spurious ;Jctivation, and net an actwl FIRE. For d'us reason. addfflonal time is allowed to ~·QMy the. vahdi!y of tM alann. Th@' 30-mr,1.t:e ~.riod is a ru.§ona.ble amount of tlmt to dt,erm.ne i1 ~n ;JoC1U31 FJRE exis:s: however. a,er that t:me. and absent inform.lbOn to the oorilrllry, fl Is .:1ssumed tra1 .an actu.ll FIRE: 1:1, in ~ress.

If .in actual RRE. is ~@d by .a repon from the field, tM:n EAL iii1 ts im~u,tyapp;icab&e, and the emergenc.ymust be declared i!the FIRE JS

not extinguished 'Mthln 16-minutM ofthe~port. tfr.he al.lrm isverfied to ~ due to .11'1 e,quiprneri: fa;lure or a spurious acliv.ation, and tr>is verifi.cafion occun wi1hin 30-minute:s of the receipl: of tr1e alarm '!hen this EAL is not aopl,c..abJe and no e~rgency cwda.ra~ rs.warrant'Mi.

achi~rng .1nd maintairung ~ i"u.l in a ~.:1'e and stab!• condition •

~ consid@ring 1he lh'fl!Cls off.re . those syMems a!lisoaa!ed wr. ach~ g and mu,tai g S.lf•. shutdown condition1 .1u.ume ,r ·or mpatance because a s.afe shut:down s.uocess path, fnM! cf fir~ damage. rrust b& ~va!labfe to me4!! th@ nucleJr sa~ty go.ls. objedlVes ~.nd perlormance 0'1.eri.a fur .i ti~ under .>ry plant oper.1tioo.3l mode or c:onfigurJ:.ion.

&c.luse file m.1y a!'fect s..-fi' shutdOM'I systeft's and becluse the loss DI function of sys:ems used to m-~a:e the con~s o f des~n basis ,lCJCt!ji?fllS Ul'lder oos:-fire condi:;oos doE's not per se imp.let pubhc SJ~. the, ne-i!d to l imit fire d.:1.nuge io sys1~s required lO achieve .and m.:1 n:ain 5,3fe V"Uldowfl oond:'tion.s is ,grNter than the ~ to limit fi~ d3fflage to those sys:ems req~ ed'. to mitigate the oonsequences of desJgn b.as.:s aoodents.

In ¥.tdition , Appendix R to 10 C FR &I. requires, among other cons.icHr.ations, the UH ct 1-hour t'i~ b.Jmen for the enclosure d. cable ¥Id ~pment ~nd .usoeated non-Yery circuits o! one, redundant train {G.2.c). Even .hough St Luc:,e has ~led the a!teorn.1.:e approach provided by i=PA-806 in li!!u of the determntstic f'Mll#ements of Append" R, the 30-minutn to vitrify a sing!~ 3'.larm .s used in EAL HU2 2 ,s con~ .a [email protected]~ amount of tme to detennir-e if ;an .actual FIRE e,,-,1sts without ~.e-serit:ng a ch..ollleng'!!' to me nudear s.a'ery perl"Offl\anoe mteria..

~.nding upon tM ptant mode at the tme d the e...,lklt. escalation of th@ emergency d.1SSi'°'ication [email protected] WO'Jld be via St Luci~ EAL HA2.

EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE R.E\.1SIOX 2 ST LUCIE PLA."NT CLASSITJCATION TOOL H - HOT CONDillONS 29


I


Site Area Emergency

DEFINITION BOX

ESSENTIAJ... AREAS -~,15 wthin the PROTECTED AAEA, 1hat conta1m ~u1pment 5~:err..5. oomixxients, or mJ~. the failure. des.tn.Jd.lOI\, or rtie.i~ o f ~ could dirKtly« 1r.dir~Y ~er h pubwc ~Ith and wfeoty by exposure to r~di.aX!n.

EXPLOSION - A ,...illpd. YlOleM. unoonfined oombvstioo. or cau.strophic f~h.Jl'I! of preuurizedfenerg!U<I ~uipmenl th.lt ln"f)arts ~ of s:u'fiaert forat to pot..rdally damage pe,nna~ S1ructures, Sys!@rr~ or components.

FlRE- Combusti::>n ch.iractenzed by hNt and li;lht. Sovrce.s of smok<!! such ,u; sliPPJl'IA drive belu or overheaUKI elec:r!C:.ll ~ ~Pf'TIIM'\! do not ccn.sthr.@-FIRES . Obsena.tion offf3rTM1; Is pr-.ferred but is NOT requir!Nt i'"b1'91! quarrJ-Jesolsrroke and heat.are ~ .

NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS -ActiV1:es at V'.e plant Site assooi:ated wri1 routine t'!!'s:ing, nuin:enanoi:,, or equipment opera~s. in .1COO.n:l.m0& wth norm.ii cpli(ati.ng or adfrintstr.at:lw orooedures En:ry nto abnomul oc emerge,ncy operatng procedures. r:, devi.:J"tion from nonna1 seo.eity or radiofogical controls posture. 1s .i ~paiture from NO~MAl PLANT OPERATIONS

PROTECTED AREA - The area (wihn the 0'•11iNER CO'ITROlLEO ARE.Al oc:cooted by the nuclear urtt5 .lOd OSSOQ.Jted eouiomenl facilr.ie-s endosed 'M n the security p@'ri~hl'r fenc@. ~ .lf"E!3 Wthln whtch ,>OOOlJTitab!l1ty of per..onnel 1s m.ain:.aioed in an ~y

VISIBLE DAMAGE- 0.mull@ to e,,qulOfTI@llt Of s~e fh.1• rs ~adily obseNable without me:uu~a. luting, or analysis, Damage ii sU"'fic@nt to cause coooem r~arding the CX>f"'ti.nued op.!f'abllify or a.bdhy of the aF.ec~ed s:ructu.re. system. or cxxnpooent. Example d.ynage includes: [email protected] d~ to heai or imp,>ct. denting. pt!:netratlon. ruc,turv. cracking. and p.iint blis.t~rir,g, Surf.JO!' blemhhes fe.g , oaint ehiooir\Q. scrattht!'sl should not be ~ncluded,

Alen HA2 ARE or EXPLOSION Affecting the Opera.bl.r, o~ Pl.int Sa'e.i;, Sys1.EiT'IS

Requi~d to Establi5.h or Maintain Safe Shutdcwn.

0p..-•6ng Mode Applica.bili1y: All

EALV.iil~s:

f. FIRE or EXPLOSION rHwtrlg in VISIBLE DAMAGE PHY of the ~ng structu~s containrig sa~ety sr,~ems er oonioonents OR Control Room irdcJ::ion of d@,graded performance of thase sAfe.ty sys:erru.-:

R.e.3aor tainmerit Bvtlding ,and lnuke S~e Shield Bu~ding

Control Room Intake Cooling Wat!l.f (ICW}

R.eaaor AlJ)(i!t ary 8ui.ld1~ (RAB) Corr~n; Cool.Ing Water (CCVI/)

Turtxn!!' Bullcfng if the rire precl!Jdes Emergency Diesel GMer,ltOf Buildino ~ss to the Steam Trestle. Cot'ltrol Roam Of RAB Condensate S>Cfa~ hnk (CST)

DeHI Qt Sia-age Ta.nit {OOOT) S:um f!>S ·'"" A.ea

1t.tmate He.at Si.nk (UHS} R~ing Water TaNr (RWT)

H - HOT CO~ITIO::s!S 30 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: ! ST LUC1E PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-A-33)

Unusual Event

Oper.i1ing Mode Appli~bility: All

!!Qg The Emergency CoordiirNfor ,:hou/d cJ.c:l1,rw :Ire Uoo..-wl Ew-nt promptly upon detwnunihg that the app(icab/~ 6~ hMI been • xr:ie«hd or ..,_ii lib./ be exc~.

I . a . AFIRi:1 s NOT•xt1nguishedwi1hin l~!oofANYof N follCFwY\g i l RE Oo?I.E>Ction indicJ~s:

Report from th• f.eld (i.e .. visu observa:llon) R~tofmt./t;ple (~th..Ml 1) !irea1.amuorlndbtions

• Field v-erixa:ion of ,1 single fire ala.rm

b. TN FIRE ts ~ted 'M:hin ANY of the fatowing olant roans or~r•As; • RHctor Con.uinmem Building and Shield Building • ContrdRoom • ~actor Auxiliary Buildlng (RAB ) • Tllbine bulking if 1he fi~ ~d.udu aa:ess to the Ste:,m

Trest!~. Cont.rd Room or RAB • Oiewl Oil Storage Tank (00ST) • Ultima~ ~.1: Sink (UH.S) • Im.He Structu,.. • t~ak@ Cooling Wa:tM (ICWl • Comoon.m Caoiil"Cil Wa:er (CC'N) • Emergency Dies.I Galerator Buikting • Condens.a:e Storage Tank (CST) • St!!am r~~!I• An« • RE>fueling Wa:fir T.lnk (RWT)

2. ~- Rec..::ot of ,i srngle fire .alann wtth no ~ indtc.atons of a FIRE.

b . The FIRE is klc.i1ed w:thin ANY of "lh! b'.kNring pl.ant rooms or ,reas.

, Re-actor Cottuirwnen~ Building and Shield Building , ContmRoom • ~actor Au:diary Building (RAB ) • Turbine budding if b fi~ ~UM!. acoe.ss to th• Steam

Tres f!, Control Room or RAB • Di.s~I Oil Storage Tank (DOST> • Ultimate H,e,11 s· (VH5) • Intake Structure, • Ima..~ Cooling Wa~er (ICW) • Cor'l)ooent Coofirig Wa:~ (CCW) , Emergency Diesel G-?.nerator Bulding • Coodensa11! Storage T .mk (C-> ) • Stea Tres.:le Alu • Re,fueling Wa~er Ta-nk (Rl/{r}

c. The e){!Stence of a H :~E 1s. not verified wi!hm 30-minutes of alarm reo::e-·pt.

OR

3. A Fl~ v.ithin the pbm ~OTECTE.O AREA not extlng\JlShed n 60-minutu of the Wl!':i.ll re port. al.arm or i"dicaoon

.4. A Fli~.e v.fthin the p.-lam PROTECTED AREA c:h.11 rt'QUll"M firefgh1ing supoort by an oFsite fire response agency to • >h~

H - HOT CONDillONS

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

RKXtgnition Ca 0

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30

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HG2 -Basis :

his EAL addresse-s ~n1iopa:ed conditions nol addreswd ex atty [email protected] bln that warrm dedMa:x>n of an~~ ~us.e oondibons e:it1s: \rnich are be eve-:f by the Emergency Coord:n.ator to !al under the .merger-cy cl..1.ssi;c.3jon 4evel for Genera! Em@,[email protected].


Site Area Emergency

HSJ-Basis:

Thi.s EAL adch-sses un~ted oondibcns not ad @lse'Mlere M tha'i: w.:mam declaration of an ef'T1@~

conditions e.mt which are ~ ~ie\'ed by the Emffgenc;1 Coonftna under the ~ency c:l.:usification level O!i!scription for See EJM.,vency.

Alert HAJ -Basis:

°"'ses in an ESSENTIAL AREA can .J"fect: the .abil11.y to s.afely opera~e o, s.Jfe,fy shutdown th@ A!.lCtor.

The fact th.Ji SCBA may be worn does not elim.na~e tM need to decf.1-re the evi'nt

[email protected],1,iion sho1.11d not bit delayed for confinnatkln rrorn a!ITIC:Sphenc ~s:ing if the atmosohtil! pos.es an imme-:liali! thr-eat to fe and huth or an immediate thrut or severe <t¥,posun!! to g.-i,ses. This oould bE' Nsed upon documented analysis «nchcatoo of personal rn e'fE!Cts. from ~re. or OO@rating @~O! with tll@- NZ.Yds.

f the eqvtPment 1n the stated .area WJ.S alr~Jdy 1no~rable. or out of serv,c,e. before the event occurred, then this E.aJ.. should noi: be decbr~ ,,.. ii wll h•w no aa~~ ""l)act on the .lbilrty of the plant to saf@f'J operate or yfe,ty shutd0¥t11 beyond th.a~ ::1lready owed by T edil'llC.11 Specif,catons at die time of the event

An aspt,)')Jam 1s .a gas c.apable of n!'d\Jc,ng the level of oxwen m the body to dangim,os levels Most comm::,nty • .isphy:n ams wo,1,; tr1 merefy OtS?lacing air tn an endosed en\lircrm@nt. ·s rech.JOH ~ ~tr.ada, of oxygen below the oormal le~I of around 19%, 'MllCh can lead to bre..1 ng ctffiet.fties. uncons.ciousnus. Of ~ven dea:h.-

An UllCOfl:taled release of tlarrwnab&!: ga55es 'M:hin a f.tality strucrure h.ls the po:.en.ul to affect s.Jfe operation of the pl,1n1 b:, hmitng e-.i.her opt!rator or equipmeot op,er a:ions due U> the poten~al for igni1ion ard resuffiog equipment e,'personnel if\jury Fl.lmmab&e g .. uws, such n

~row ;':tdr~~:==l~~{~7~~~s~t~s · ) This EAL assumes. conoentratioris at which gases can

r~ oombustion

h!s EAL -"dresses un..inticip.t~ condi':KJO:s not addressed e~icdy P..:H-where but th.Jt w.wr.1nt ~r.at.ton r:A an e!n!!rgency b@cau-5@ oondr.ions e1; st 'Mlich are beli<N~ by the ~q, Cooroina:or U> fall under [email protected] @mM"gency cl.J5.s6c.:1:ion fewl.

H - HOT CONDITIONS 31 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REV1SIOX 2 ST LUCIE PI.ANT C'LASSIFlCATIO:'.'f TOOL

Unusual Event HUJ - Basis :

This IC is base<! on the re1e.ise o f to-,uc, oorrosiYe, asphy.o:iant or ·bmmable gases o1 suffident quan:.ity to J..."fect NORAi1AI. PlANT OFERATION.S

The f41Ct. th•t SCBA m.3Y be, wom does not e Nte the need to de-dare h@Vffll

This IC is noc m:ende<t to reqv:re signi'icant a.ssnsnw-nt or qu..intif.caXln. !t ass.umes an uncontrolled process that h.as 1t"f! po1e!lb.M to aJ"e-ct plant op'!'fa.tions, This~ preduck Ynall or inc,d@ntal nt~ ases. or relea~s 1hat do not imp.act struc".ure.s needed for plant operation

An asphyxiam i.s a gas cap.able of ted-uc:ng die Jevel of oxygen in the body to dangerous Je.ve-Js. lv1os~ oommonly, a.sphyxiants won; by ~y displ;:1cing .a'rm an is-ndosed .rnirorrnent This ~uces the oorioen-:ra".ion of oxygen belOrN ft nonnal ~ ·..eJ of around 1~ wnich can lead to br¥athing difuJltes unconsciousness or e\'en deaiih.

Esc.al;ition at ttn IHMrgency clusification h:v@I . if app,oprta:e-. 'MXild be based on HA.3.

HUS - Basis:

This EAL addrMSK unanticspated conditions not addressed expho:11y els~ but that warrant ~laratcn of an emergency becauw ,oond}tions exist ch ar-e ~ll?Ved by die Emergency Coordlna:o< to faf! u~r the otnoation of Unus I Eve.nt INOUE} emergency cbs.s.

H - HOT C'ONDmONS 31



HG2 Other Cood~tions Exis:iflQ Whim in b Judgm~rn of Ole Emergency C.ooJdirutor W.J.rm,t Oedar.a110n ot Ge~l Emergency.

~rating Mode Applicability: All

EALValuu :

1. Ol.tiM'" OOf'ldf"jons exist which 1n tho! Judgt"r"'Mll of the ~nc:y Coordin.iu- mdicate that e\~nts are ri orog~n Of ha,oe ~ whw;ti fffi'O've actu~ Of MM NENT subsunul ~ degr,ld,at-on or ~ltng w,:h potfflti~ for loss of conU.nrNnt •nt.g,r:ty or ~5 LE ACTION lh.:!lt ~suits ffl an .J.CL~l loss t:I physical mntn:>I c' the bcif-ty R8!nes can be re.asonabfy up.a.cf to HCHd E.P.t.. PROleCTJVE AC ,Of,, GUIDELINE HJ)OSUr. •w.:S ol"·sb for ~ ttw,,he ~:. si!e .:ITU

HOSTILE ACTION - AA act towJrd .a l\ioo POWoiH Pl.mt l"'PP) or its~ tha11nctudn the~ of vick>rit taro. to 6Htn:,y equ•pmmt. t.u.ehos~s • .lf'ld.;oc ~t•N I~ to achl.~.,. ~n.nd. This inctudH at".ack by U !rd, «wa~.,- lnlng guns, '!-.1.plosives, FROJECTILES. whtdu, or odwr ~OH used to deltvw des:rvct1ve: ron». OthiH" acu that utis"y the cvetaH in~n1 may be induded. OSTILE ACTIO" should not be con.sll'\Jtd to tndude- acts ol CNi disobtditoct- or fe,'on10u1-~ that arw nae part of .l concerted .itaock on the PP Nont~rroosm-ba.sed EALs. should be uSEd to address such activlLH (i.e .• thl:1, m.ay include m.nc act5 b@twffn 1ndiV1duals in ma ~oomrolled aroe-3)

IMMINENT - '1.~rtgaoon actons h.r."!! bHn ineffeeliw, ackiilional ac:iom ar~ not !!-J?ecied to~ succesS:U , and tr.~ irJorm.a:ion indicat.M ~t ttw ~Yllnt a c:onddon wll oa::ur V~nl! ,,.,, 'INENT 11m~.arre.s Me soedfi@d. tMy s an <Jppty

PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE - ErMronmenul Protection Agonoy (EPA)--· Adion Goou (PAGs),

GrNter- than or~ to 500 nye,m Tot.al Pfec:IIW De.. Eour,alont (TEDc)

Qi

GrNt@f' than or eqlill to ·ooo mrfln Cannced OoH EquivaLont (COE)

[EP P-0&]

Site Area Emergency

GUIDANCE BOX FOR HAJ H\13

Pt.Mltll<I ca.trolled activtlH, such .u Contain1't'lent envy ;at power. do notmee-ttho:- irt~ntol rAU3or~.

HS3 OthN Conditions ElG.sting Which n lht Judgfflfflt o1 the Emergency Coord :or WM.int o.cfyat:Jon of Sne J>.re;i Emerg<nc)'

~ rating Mode Applic.lbility: All

EAL Valu.s:

1. Olh«oondi':ionse,ostwh!ch tn lht judgrneint oftME.mergency Coortinator ndic:.J:r th.Ji rven~ .J~ n progr~ss or haw ooourrr-d wnich involve .x-~ or li ely mJJOf" farl\#H d Dtant functions ~ for protection cf lht public or HOSTlLE AC ON "!tut rw~.s ., rnmnbon~ d.i.rruge or l'Nltciou.s .Jets.., {1) tc7«31d V.@ ~ aequi,:,mem.UU.t COi.Ad lud 10 the likRly '.iJu-. c:J or {2) ht pr!!wni •J!Ktv@. .XX:.H to equipmRl"'t nMCI~ fof" th@ j::!tltKtQn of ttl@ pu,4ic. Any r~a.s.s Me not •;q:,ectwd to mutt In upowrw Wtis wrich ex~ EPA PROTECTIVE ACTtON GUIDELINE ~ levels beyond th~ si:e bc::ur<bry

Alert HAJ Aoc»utoan ESSE.'lTIALAREA Is Prohbit~ Due o RMu,e of O )"IC,

Comnrve, Asphyuan or Fl~bt. G.ues 'Nhich eooardize Operaton 10&> of S~ems Reql.Ned lo M,r,ntJin Sa'e Ope-r..1t1ons or Sa'ely Shtr.down the

Re.xtor.

()pflating Mod• Applicability: All

IJote If (I.,. equrpme,nt in the .st•!eo arH ~•3 •rHdJI inoper.bie. ex out ol ~ . befon. ~ e,w,:tOCCUT~ IMn :Na &fJ.. ~not~~ a.:: ii ... mv. no ~1'mw ffll)a'rt on the ilbility of the p(•nt tQ :;•fely ~~ or afely :hr.down Myondth•t....riyallowPd by T«:hnical ~•6on.:-•tthe lirrMof the event

1. Aooe.ss to .m ESSENTW.. AREA tS FXfflb:.-d due to h>)OC, com:tiilW.

asphy:nant. oc fl..trrmab:• g.as.•s W"ich ~iu oper•t-cn of syst.-ms r.quir.d 1D rr..H1:.;,1n sat. op.r-~s or uf.ty 11hu".down h rextor

HA6 OOl«Cond.bOns Exlsting\l't1wch lntl"M-Judgrrem of the ErMrgency Coordiru:a 'NMT.ant Ckebr.luon d .an A!<ert

Opflating Modo Applical);nty : All

EAL ValuH :

·1. Other oondit!ot\s eJ:11-1. - in tM ,uOgnwu of the ~fflCY C,oo,drutor indiaa:e Ul.Jt ~ e in ~~5 or have OCCllTed wtich involve aQ.lal or pot~ :1ubs dabon of 1M i.wl of safety ol the plant or a ~ ~t 'Clut I i.1,r. th~.1teni~ risk"> site penonnel or dam.lrQI' to site equi~ o' ~STILE ACTION. Any r~e,.ist.'s are ~pec:«<f to bl! fi '-, , of tho EPA PROTECTIVE ACTIO~ GUI a lf<E

~-

H - HOT CONDITIONS 32 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE RE\ 1SI0X 2 ST LUCIE PLA.t'IT CLASSIFICATIO~ TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-A-35)

Unusual Event HUJ R@(useofTo:oc. C'.orroswe, Asohy)(hl.nt or Flammable

Gan,s Deemed Oe-trmert.lt to NORMAL ?l.AN'i (Oil OPERATJO'llS.

Opuo1Ung Mode Appli~bility. All

EALV.alun:

1. Toxic. oorrosive 11.sphy::.Jan1 or flammable g.>.sH in .amounts Nt N\'e or could ad'1@rfffy af~ NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

Qi 2. Report by local. County ot S tate O'fioals for ev:twaton or

lhf. .enng d s.it4!: PftB()flO@I ~ on ;an df.sft• .vent.

HUS 01,e(- Candi".ions Existing 1Much ., the JudgmRnt of t:M Emarvenq Cocrd :er W.arr.11nt o.chrabon af ,1

Not.1i~tion ct Unuswl Evffl (NOUE).

Operating Mode A4)pli<:.abitity: All

EAL Values:

1. Othe-r oondi110nseX1stwhdl 1nthe]Udgmentofthe ~ CioclnjnalOf indtca:e thJt e·.ief\ts a!! m progress or~ ooa..trr~ which indtca,e a po!!!l"ltlal degrad.JX!f'I of th. 1-wl of s..afetyofthe pla.n! or inclic.lte•seouri~thre.il to f 1ty ~ h..1s been init. .1:ed. Ho rt!Ht.HH of radioacttv. m.J:.eri.al r~uiring otf.s;t~ tesponse or rnontaring a.-. •xpected unlHs 11.#thef" ~dation of sa~'!)' syste!T'.S occurs

H - HOT CONDITTONS

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

Recognition c.

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This Page lntentionaUy L ft Blank

H - HOT CONDffiONS 33 EAL - HOT BA5IS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE Pl..AJ.'IT CLASSIF1CATIONTOOL H- HOT CONDffiONS 33



RECOGNITION CATEGORY E

EVENTS RELATED TO ISFSI

E- HOT CONDillONS 34 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E- HOT CONDIDONS 34


I L __ _

E -HOT CONDillONS 35



EXPLOSIOO-Arapid. violen, lnlll1finedocrroustion. or cataswo,,hiclailnol~equ-lhat.._is ene!llV of sutricier& fon>! ID l)Ole<aal1vdamaQe pennanm Yldlns, "'51'm5. or~

FIRE -Canbustion characierized by he<lt and lghl So<.n:es of smote such as slil:<lino drive boas or...- electrical -do not cooslitule FIRES. Obserr.moo ol ftame is orefelred bYt is NOT A!QUired l 1~ quantities of srncke and hNl are ob5er\led.

PROJECTlLE-An olJjeCI di'eded- a Nucle.arl'am!r Pin [NPPI Iha! oould cause coocem for its IXll1lir,.J<d - lily, reiallililv. ar"""°"""'saletv.

EAL-HOTBASIS PAGEREVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CIASSIF1CATION TOOL

Unusual Event E-HU1 - Basis:

A Nolilicalioo of lk,.w.Jal Bnn (NOUE) in this IC is categaiz2d a, the

~s~~~~~=~-~= c:lasslttation based a, a loaded luel s1orage c:ask COFINEMENT BOUl>OARY loss loadirQ lo the d<qadaiion of 11,e fuel~ storage or posing ... cper.wonal salely ~ - respect lo its rerr,oval lrnm sb:age •• rnfical.od by elev.a1ed ra.lalicn ,.adngs Imm the loaded f\Jel sur.,ge cast.

The results of l>e lSFSI Safety Analysis Report {SAR) pe< l«JREG 1536 or SAR """"1oed in lhe cask's Certific.i.. of Carj,iance and the related HRC Safely Evaluation Report identify nahn phenomena evmts and aooident om:liticns 11...t aud pctentially effect the CCJIIFlNB.ENT BOUNDARY. Tlis EAL addn!s5es a dn:Jpped cast. • lf>lled .,.,.-cast. EXPlOSl<J'I. PROJECTILE damage, FlRE dan"l/0 or naanl phenomena al!eding a "'st (1!.11., seismc ....,l tomacb. etcJ

E- HOT CONDITIONS 35


E - HOT CONDITTONS 36


Site Area Emergency Alert Unusual Event E-HU1 Damage 1D • lood!!d cast CONFINEMENT

eoutnl\RY.

r-, ------,,OEF""'"'IN"'IUl,.,...IIOX....--------,,1 Openting ModeAppllcability: Natapplicalile

CONFIIEMENT BOUNDARY - The bame<1•) be<ween ...... oontannu EAL Vo/uos: radioacliw!5iOlSlanc:osill1dtie-'------------------'I 1. 0am;ige to a loadedcasl<OONFINEIIENTOOUNDARY.

EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E - HOT CONDITIONS


36



E-HOT CONDITTONS 37 EAL - HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E - HOT CONDITIONS 37


APPENDIX B EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER CHART

Evaluate each barrier for Loss or Potential Loss and circle the aDDlicable condition FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1 2 3 & 4 ONL Y1

t------:F"'u"'E"°L°"C"°L°"A°"D"""' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS LOS.S LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS

1. Safetv F t . Core H,pa; R;emo,rat s:.t'~y

lunch(l'l; NOT m1C AND en1ry iinto proc:,e,:;1vr. 1/2 EOP. t.$

1 . 1. Codffl A.dMt'j greaer !ban

JOO~m OowEqlJl\911nl 1-131 (H o.t.mned b)' proo.chn CY·Sl.· t06«l04. Guld1h,,.,fcrC~gP9tl Acod9't S;a,mp1•J

GUI IIC)I

l . COf• Ewlt , . Core Eide Th•nn~le-1,

rqcfing groat• ~n 12009-F

I >: IMM two(2) C<ft E:xit Therfflooouple~ mutt eKOMd the threshold.

s.n.or.. • through a NOT O(J,llr•d n'IAl'I WI~ .4 thfwgh I ird,si.,.. <•I}

OR

H••RO"llc;M111 Qifecy fund1on NOT m• AND entry 1110,..oc:edure 1/2 EOP.15

1, Cote Elot ThSTl'loccuplH r•din9 gruter th.n 700-- F

At lebt t-.o 12) Cott Exit 'TNtmocouplH m,,rst .xi::t!ed thethrestiold.

1. RVUJIS indllC:•H SMton • through 8 NOT C"""9fed

-ll.!t-

2. TMOI' AHD REP CET tl'fferanc:~91ealertha.n2fi'F (LOCA NO T In pn:,gres•)

- ll.!t-

1 Gre;t1111"1h., 22" F ...,peme;,ted on REP CET ILOCA in nrNrefl ,.

!o. Not ADDUcM>le

Nd Applicable Not Applicable

ontalnment R dlaUnn Monlt0tlnn 1. CHRRM reading greater than

1.4 E+02 R/hr

1. ANY condition in the opinior, of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates Loss ofthe Fuel O..Ba-

C

Not Applicable

1. ANY condition in the opinior, of the Emergency Coorrlinator that indicates Pccenbll LOH of lhe Futf Ctad 8.affltf"

1. ~fel'Y Function !llatus

GUmANCI IIOX FOlt unTV fUNC1ION

STATUI .. AU TMftll IIAIIIIDI

!fdl1'1Ktedtoperiontl•"Y lolep ., 1/2 EOP..15. I!m). .,..Ir)' in10 t/2 EQP,, l~ tin b..-.m.t

1. RCS leak rateo,e.Merthan ..... .._ft\8et4)caJ>Ac::tt)' a,aGCIHCll>ylkl&Jof RCS mlnimwn Wbcoding

• MtNIMUM .SUICOOLNO Oetennina6crt i. m~, ullng Fi.gur, 1A. I 1 e in ,r,a. EOP.99

0

ft

1. RCS P.-oUU1"9CQn10! Salcty func:bcn NOT rTLet AN D encry lrco~e1QEOP...15

--ll.!t-

2. RCS He.at .Rttmor.il Saf"41ly funcbon NOT mtt a,nd .,try ireo~112EOP..15

t . RCS 16111 ra11!I ndteilll~ ,, ..... tMtl so OPl'ft....., utdONn tf.Claed

lso&ataonoft.llllct°"'"i$1J) Clistlngutsh between RCS leakll~ •nd eves 1tllk119e anctKp«fOffl'led~ p,C>OM.traly r.ciui'ed

'.\ , No lnn11cabte

Not appl icable

• • SG 1. RUPTURED SIG re:,uu tf\ •

Saf~ l"teic:tion Actuation Sign.: (SIAS)

Nd app~cable

OR

Not Appltc:able

)ft

5. Nol .nollca~•

Not Applicable Net Applicable

0 6. Containment Rad iation Monttnrtnn

1. ANY CIS mor,itor reading greater than 1.5 E+D3 mR/hr

1, ANY condition in the opinior, of the Emergency Coorrlinator that indicate L.Off du,,. RCS Ba"*

OR

Nd Applicable

1. ANY condition in the opinior, of the Emergency Coordinator that indicate Pdential loss d lht RCS&anw

1 S:a.fetw F

OUID--FOA &AFSTY

STATUSN ALL 11taa ........ J! NftitY MQJcn c::a1nn~ b • re-stared 'Mltlin 15 mrn.ites,

!!!I!!: th-It a1tlty furJQion '" NOT met bt piffpOMti al c:f•Milic.a1ion

' 1. A. cort.1111\ment #l(K!Ure n,e ~b.,.~ un.'4)~u»d drop in conairmant presture

--ll.!t--

2. CctitalnMM!l PN!S!lu~ OR Ill,,. ..... ,e-,a,11e NOT CCltlti'ltenl Wlh LOCA oonotioM

• AllNM two l21Core Exit Th~$fnl,I$(

exoeed Ow threshold.

Sensors 4 through 8 NOT oovered mean1, senscrs 4 through 8 indusiYe (al).

Not applicable

, SGS.con

1. RUFTUR.EO SIG i~ el&<> FA.UL TED out•de d oonllllnment

--2!.--

2. Prirttary,-IO.S6otnlaty IMknlle QtellS lhaft 10 ;pm

a. UNIS0LA8LE llum rM-.. tram aff.c:aed Si'G to tht ..-.ilronmenl

OR

Inn Status 1. Cc:wq,nr'l'l.,-t T""'~• •nd

Pref...., Salllly Mction NOT met AND el'ltr)S'IIOpt"OC: .. e 1/2 EOP-15

1. Ccintainmetlt ptHSUl'I!

9'Ml• than 44- PSIG a'ld

"""' --ll.!t--

2. Caitainmffl Hydrogen OfealllttMn4%-

- 2.Bc-

l. Pret,,ure cir.at« than 10($4)pfll;

&ill

a. less. than crw ruu TAAtf Of 0£PR£SSiJR.IZATION EQUIPMENT --...

t. Core Exit ThMn~ ,nd~ gr11al• than 1200"F

a. FW1a.onat Rec:o,,ery ( 1/2 EOP..l5J kl" RCS and C<n Heat Remov.11 NOT ef'fectlve within 15 minU:es

--ll.!t-

2. Core Exit Thermocouples rHding greatar than 70<1' F

BOTH of the following apply:

• RVLMS indicates Sensors 4 throofl, 8 NOT co.,ered

--2.Bc--

T lt01 AND REP CET difference greater than 2<r F (LOCA NOT in progress)

--OR-

Greater than 22" F superheated en REP CET (LOCA in progress)

• fu,c:tional ReCO\,'llry (112 EOP..15) for RCS a'ld Core Heat RemO'lo'iW NOT effective v.il:hin 15 minutes

R lea!:a ~ th P-to-S eak'lll<MI

,. ~- CNTMTlsolatlon Fallure or

1. f"alureotlll.....,..in NiY one line to dose

a. Direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after CISICIAS

Not Applicable

OR 6 -:nnt lnm"n Radiati on Monllor1nn

Not Applicable

1. ~Y condition in lhe opinion o flhe Emergency Coordinator that indicates LOH of the Co,ca;nn,,wt

B•"*°

OR

1. CHRRM reading greater than 2 .7 E+03 R/hr

1. ANY condition in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator that indicates Potential loss of tne Contalffle,t Barn.-

0-nnlne Emeraencv Classlftcatlon based on Barrier Status

EP3:4

ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss o( EITHER Fuel Clad OR RCS. ALERT: FA1

Loss or ~I Loss Ill ANY Two Barriera. SITE AREA EMERGENCY: PS1

ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of Conlainment UNUSUAL EVENT: FU1

E L- FISSION PROD CT BAR RI ERS PAO REVISIO:sl: 5 ST LUCIE PL..\NT CLASS1FICA TION TOOi. FPBCHART

(APP-B-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 67

APPENDIX B EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER CHART

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE !APPLICABILITY: Modes 1 2, 3 & 4 ONLY) BASIS

FUEL CLAD BARRIER REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BARRIER The Fuel Clad S.meds the zircallo, a st•inien 5te.l tut>H lhal "' a1-• •--1 4 """'- • •1--

~==··:"':"':":":":':"°~'1"[.~15ai!l!!Mij:::l•FJjuniij"iljt1[9'°"'il§iSt[iat~·-=====:t:N:'"::::~'.'.'.:ll:c:ob]~C. ~-~,a~,nm~Jo~k;-~nl[E:=~,"iij,,':::~;~.".~"';.~,"::_~•~-l!~o~r':°"~'="=""'='=j ;::;:r::w~~:;~i;z~:~t:b~;:,eer~:.-~::nalOHOI Loss threshold -Co-• Heet Remove! Safety Fun obon MJt me:t The: ft!".ad.ing Is a w\ue ~lch inel.cates lhe releaH of ,eactor the RCS bani« inOIC9te~ S1gnifican1 SYl)elfteating and core unCOYery and~ c0011n1 lo the contanment This ~•ding WIii be loe'Ss than that cc,ns/dered 10 rtdlcate Jols o1 the Fuel Oed s.n;e, speclflec:I for ti.lel oaci Bani« tNHhakl 6 . Thus, trlls lhresnor.d

Pc:tential LOS$ threshdd • RCS i-te,c Re"'°"'*! Stfety Fun«.ori not meit irldlcate$ lhe t,,1ll1m1~e hell s.nk function 1s under ll!lrtferne Cftelenoe.

, •-a'"''" -·-1

would be in~HVe ol • RCS klak onty. H lhe radietictl monttor re8ding mereesed to that Spocffied by F"uet Clad S.rlit:1 threthdd tvel damage would also be Indicated

There rs no Potential Loss threshold usoc11ted wilh thtS ltem.

The two Loss threshdds desalbed could be oonMoered r~nde.nt The fl"ld:us.ion Of a thresttdd that uses Emergency Procedure ccmrnonPy u~ terms like "RU PTUREO and FAUL TED' aOOS tcthe eue of the dnsificat1on proceu and hn been included based on this human facta- concern .

The vahJ• ,s. 300p!C""'11131 •qu1valent As~ssmenl bytne EAL Task Foret" lndtee1N that this amount er cOOlent actMty Is -.well aboYe thlil l el(pedecl for iodine spkes 1nd conesponds to ten thin 5% flJe:1 did datnac,& This amount d tt,ChOlc:IMty indic1tes 'MQl'lfficant dad damage •net thus the Fuet Clad S.rncr rs conSideted lost

1. 11.m.t .. •ne.,, 0 .... di ... "'I"" Jud This threShdd re-wits in• NOUE for smelt.er brelk'5 thll. (1) do This lhfeshold eo«nses any other 11ctcn u,111 atie 10 e,,e used by nd iex.eeed the normll ~arglng cep•ctty thteSholcl in RCS letk the Emerg,ency Cocrdfnetar In c,e1ermm1no wnethet the RCS 1et11t btrrie1 Pdan1J11111..o,.s thrieshdd.. or (2) 00 net ruull in ECCS bflrrief is los.t or potentiely~ 1n tdd icn . the iMbitityto monalfor ectuatiai .._ RCS SGtube rupt\lre bNfict l..on thruhold. For the barrier Sboutd Ol$0 be lnccirpcotedin this threshold n 1 11,ocr breaks RCS banJC!:r thrnhold critcrit would tttUl in an

:t:.!:='i~ c=:~::~.!~ent th1t tho b1,ricr rNY ~!!!t~ S: ~=sci~c~~~~ ~.:::=='.~~~t~~;"sr,()kj Tt,ere I,; no Patmtial Los,; thre-shOld uSOdated With thf,;; item. PRIMARY CONTAINPJENT BARRIER W<ltlld exb.r In ccntunctlon ...u-t RCS barrlet thfesho(ds and would t::=====~4iiu:J, »~t Jiiiii;ijiiiiij:ii]iuiuiiii:==::j~Thihcocc.n;;;;t,.;;;,n;';;mc~"iiSam~;;.,~.,.,~u~dM~lti;;•~•;;;on;r.,.,i;1n;';;.,..;i,~ou~•iii<>;;;og~•n;;;oi"'"'"j ~~f~~:e~~~a~"!~~~!'s~:"1:

1Fud Clad

Th• Lo,;s thret,hdd COff'eSPOnds to $1gni1ia.~ SVpC1fhe1t1ng oflh• ecnnectk>ns up lo and inct,1ding the oulcrmost oontafflrncnl Bwrior cootant tK111t10n vaMs Thls b8m91" also ~des uu1 main steam,

There is no Loss threshold associated with this item.

teeltilta~r. ano blowoown ltne lf'JC1ensions outsloe the conteinmffll bidding up to end lnctlJding !he cuterrnost sec:on.0."" side isclal'ion ~ ,

There is no Loss threshold associated with this Item.

The indicatlo, for the Potential Loss threshold represents a level Containment Temperature and Pressure Safety fundion not met

The 11rst Lou 1nrestiok1 addresses lhe condftian 1n WhK:h a RUPTURED steam generator 1s ats.o FAUL TED This condition t~t>seMs • bypass Of the RCS encl oonttinment blrriers and 11 a subset of the second threshold. In conjunction with RCS barrier toss threshold. this would always result in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

near the top of the adive fuel - Reactor Vessel level sensers not Indicates an extreme challenge to the safety fundlon derived The second 1..oss threshold eddresses SG tube leaks that exceed cOYered er THOT and REP CET difference greater than 20 DF from appropriate instrument readings and/or sampling resu lts and 10 gpm in conjundion with an UNISOI..ABI..E release path to the (LOCA NOT in progress) er greater than 22DF superheated on thus represents a potential loss of containment. environment from the affected steam generator. The threshold for REP CET (LOCA in progress) indicates subcOOling has been lost establishing the UNISOLABLE secondary side release is and that some dad damage may occur. Conditio,s leading to a potential loss of containment barrier result intended to be a prolonged release of radioectlvil:y from the

.-------~~~~--------l from RCS barrier and/er fuel Clad berrier loss. Thus. this RUPTURED steam generator d"rectly to the environment (l.e., SG h-N-o,-A-,n-nlll,-a-b l_a_A_dde_d~~""•"":"',n"'':::1';;= J:;"'~"'~"':-.. -,;-·~ -

000-,-;,-,.-n-, --I threshold is primarily a discrimineter between Sile Area tube rupture with concurrent loss of off-sle power and the t..c==="c'~==="c"'c"''-"'~="-='=="--l Emergency and General Emergency represenllng a potential loss RUPTURED steam generator is required for plant cooldown or a

h ===.,.;• ... _,~~·o.,nt"al"in'!'m'!'e'!'nt_,R .. a~d l.,.al""lown.:,M~o"'n"'llo","!'"",.,." =--lf-'af"-"'th.._e,elh,eirde.!be,a.,,n!!·•c.'· ~~=~~==------l stuck open relief valve). Th is could be expected to occur when The reading ls a va lue which indicates the release of reactor ._ _____ ... , ..,. ,.co,;;n,.1a.,1n..,m:.:,e,:.n,_1 e..,,.;:.•• .. •:,;u.,,e'------1 the main condenser is unavallable to accept the contaminated coolant , with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, Into the Loss thresholds 1 and 2 - Rapid unexplained loss of pressure steam. If the main condenser ts available, there may be releases co,tainment calculated assuming the instantaneous release and (I.a .• not attributable to containment spray or condensation via air ejectors , gland sea1 exhausters. and other similar dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory effec:ls) fdlowing an initial pressure increase from a primary or contrdled , and often monitored. pathways. associated with a 5% clad failure into the containment secondary high energy line break indicates a less cf co,tainment atmosphere. Integrity. Co,talnment pressure and sump levels should increase

Reactor coolant co,centralions of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (includin g Iodine spiking) allowed within technlcal spectflcalions and are therefere Indicative of fuel damage.

This value is higher than that specified for RCS barrier Loss threshold #6. Thus , this threshOid Indicates a loss of both the Fuel Clad barrier and a loss of RCS barrier that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency.

There is no Potential Less threshold associated with this item.

This threshc:td addranes any oth..- t.ctors lhat are to be us«'!d by the Emergency Coordinator in <lcteonin ing Whether the Fuct C1ad bamer is ~ or pote:nuany lcsl. In Id~, the: Inability to monitor the ba.mer shcukl also be ~ed 1n this thrHhOld a,;• tiicl« In Etnergeney COOrdinatQI' judgment thet the berrl,e, may be catSick!red lost °' poteC'd1any toa.

as a result of the mass and energy release Into containment from a LOCA Thus, sump level or ptessure not Increasing indicates containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity.

This indicator relies on operator recognition of an unexpected response for the condition and therefore does not have a specific value associated with it. The unexpected response is important because it Is th e Indicator of a containment bypass condition .

Existence of an explosive mixture means a hydrogen and oxygen concentration of at least the lower deflagratio, limit curve exists

The third Potential l..oss threshold represents a potential loss of containment in that the containment heat ~aval/~reuu~tiOft mteM 1te eiil\er 10$1 Qt ~~ng in • de0tadet<1 rn&nner. as indKllleci by ccotainment pr.swre greater lh•n the sctpoinl 11 which the cq..,lpmenl was SUl)pOSCld to have .ctuated

,-,,,n,-,-"""~";"""a.~c~n~~~~~~ ..... ~c~~~?~;"~.~:"cT"'s~!'-'Jmo~s~~~ .. ~d~e~~~~d~~~~~l~E~R'-_, ~=~:.,~~.~~C:.:~::O',:~~;'!,~r,.';;. «innechcnJ up 10 1nd in duding 1he preHut\Z:er ufety •nd relief .nd .n increased pcten1lat for cont1lnm~ failure. In cori1unction vatves, and CCl'le.r conned1on$ up 10 •nd .ncludin(I the pnmtry with the Core Cccling end RCS Le,kage atteri• tn th• Fuel end 1solib0n YWIICls RCS betfle.r eolul'l'W'IS. lhls lhlHhcild WOUid re:sull 11"1 t.ne

ThlCf"e ,s no LoH lhrelihcld anOQatod w,o~ tt11s ii.cm

dedaratlon of• Cener.i ~rg,ency - loss Of rwc Darners and the potential IOtS c,t. • third ft' lhe fl.incticn rolQl'lt•on pto«dl.tre:s ate l~ftei:11ve. there i t ftO "Success"' path .

Pdentiaf Loss threshold 1 • RCS Pressure: and Control Sa1e:1y Th• function rHloraUon procedUres en U.OS. eme,g,ency Function nc;t md anckates an e.X1ame dla.,_nge to lhe s.atety operating proceo.ires 1h11 aoar-ess the recovery Of the cere functicn ctetived from ape,rcpnate W'lstrvrnffll teeding1 cooltf'li1 Cl'itic.J '8Jcty functx,ns, The procefA.lrc ,s eona~

cffa-cttve tf the 1~ra1ure Is lowelW"IQ or if the vessel ....,.te, l evel F>denllal Loss threlho4d 2. Heat Removal S..t.ty Function not ,s. riSlng met enaicates the- Ultimate hea1 sink tuftChon k under extreme

These pathways do not meet the intent of an UNISOI..ABlE release path to the environment . These minor releases are assessed using Abnormal Rad Levels/ Radiclcgical Effluent ICs .

5. C NTMT lsolatlon Fallura o r Bvaass This Threshold addresses incomplete co,talnment isolation that allONs dired release to the environment. tt represents a loss of the containment barrier.

The use of lhe modifier "direct" in defining the release path discriminates against release paths through Interfacing liquld systems. The existence of an in-line charcoal filter does not make a release path indirect since the fl lier Is not effective at remOYing fission product noble gases. Typical filters have an efficiency of 95-99% rem0\181 of Iodine. Given the magnitude of t he coce inventor)' of iodine. significant releases could still occur . In ad(jjtiOl"I, ~ce tht\ f'tsSKJn product ,elease would be dn\l"en by boillfto in the feadQt veuet . the high humielty 1n the ,~ease s.tream cen be: ex:pecte,410 rend~ lhe Mers il"leffeetive in• shOrl oenod

There " no Potenlial los<s threshOld aucnated W11h this item

There Is no Loss thresllotd aHOctalKI With this ileM,

The teMil"I; is• value whidl indicates s,grutk:ant fuel damage well m excess of the threshdd5essoci1tc<tw1Ch both los• of Fuel Clad •ncl loss OI RCS SarrlffS. A maJct telease d tedlmdfVII)' ,eq1.unng olf·$11e pratecllve: •Cbcn1i trorn care csameg• is nc11 pOHible unless a major f•iture o1 ft.lo! dadong •IOws 1'9Ckillct1ve marerlaf lobe rtleH~from the co,e Into the reactor cOOienl .

Regardns of wheth« oonl•nmeot Is chalanged. lh1s amounl d. actMtyin contaJnrnent , ifreleased, coulclh.w such uver• consequences tt\al It ts prudent to ~at U\is as• potenllal loss of conlalnmeN, tueh thet • General Emergehey ded111tt0n Is w•rran1ed

d\tll enoe-. V\lhether or net the procedUfes will be effectNe should be-

t,,,~.~-~ ... ~.~ .. =.=-==.= ... ::•f:•J .. ss,l..,,~.,i"""ui:j'ij""'L•:,.:,: .. :,: ... =.= .... =,,..=J =:~'! :::,:~;1:

1:an~~ :r::~:;~;:.:tr: g,oulCS Tt\lt lhtfJthd;,o~eS$t':1 any olhel ffelo<$ th*! .':'e7'o1bl; used by

RCS Is g,ealer than avalllbio mvenlo,y cont.rd capec:ity such that Pt"ocodures hive boen. QI' will~ ineffoctlYe the &nsrgency Coo,dnatcw in dotermaning wh9'hCf the

t:!::!n~a=~.~:n~::w~~~~;;~o:::::e h-----·e:.·1·~-,-'i;·,';."•0-"1·~·1~-Z:-,"'~8~'!,~"n~f!~-----l ~~"':::!::e;h: !=:'~~~.~~~th; this

il"l•dequate in m1mt•!f'lil"lg RCS ptessure and Inventory agail"lst lhreShotd as• factor.,, Emeroe,ncy ccoro.n110t Judgment tha1 the u,e mass loss through IJ'le leak barrier may l)re C01'1Sidefed lost or p()(entlalty lost

The Plotenlial l-0$S lhrelhOid ,s btsed en the inabihty 10 mainltil"I norm,l ltql.,icl +nwntcry Within U\e Reacto, Ccotaint Syslrm (RCS) by normal ope-tati<W'I ct thiL" Ch•rging System whiGtl Is conwoeted to be the 110,,., rate eqU'Vllenl to one ch11olno pump dl$Charging 10 lhe Ch&Il)ng header, tsdald'tg lddo',rttl, rS a stenoard abl"ICffl'\111 opera1,ng procodUte ac1iOl'l •nd mey pr~C unnec;es-ury Clas.siflcetlons When• non·RCS leakage path sucn as• C,,aroinS>'t,..etdown leak ex:isb. The inltnt d this- condlbon Is mfll if a11emp1s lotscl81e Littdown lr'e' NOT SUCCffSf\JI Aad.l!hOl"III charging pump,s being reqoired ti lndlcatNe Cf a substanllll ACS ... ,

"'· ""' ·--nrabll Not A0Dllcabl1 'Addt.ta to .koe-n bllfrllt< r,um conSJs~ntJ

This tht~Okf addresses lhe tul spectrum ot Steam Geftera!or (SG) Wbe ruptUre event~ in con,unClion with Containment Barrier 1..oss thteibdcts It lddress:es RUPTIJREC SGCS) for ..tttd'I lhe 1e:111.1~ is ,.,s,e anougr, to c.uftle 1C1.u11icn of eccs (SI) (Uh 1600 PSt• and U2 1736 psiaJ This Is conS11stenl to the RCS leak r•l e barrier Potential Less threshold 2 ev nsert lhis lhreShold Wlll 1e1U1 In tM Ck!da1at1on d. an Men Howevoer, i1 the SG ts aiso FAUL TEO (I.e ., two batriers talle:dl. the dederallon e-sce111u 10 a Site N~ Em~cncy per Con1ainmen1 i:.mer Loss th1eshotds

Rucrnr COOiant §ysl.m e arrl..C90Untamt lo nut sP11mn

E I~ FISSION PROD CT BARRIERS

EP3:4

JIAULTl!D - ~ • st-~atof, U•hlu.nc.•ofHC.Ollduy •da IHlll;-t,a that ,...,lh, inc all ui,,c,a,n•ohd drop at steam .....,.tor pr.uure ar ttle 1fNtn v-ator ~ e:cmplatet/ oes,ffswri2.ad.

l"UU ~AIN CM' OEPR;ESIUfUZATIOtl EQUIPMENT (1 D«OP•03) -

r- curne~ Sp-.y HH.s.r.- "'°"' in <teeh head.r" •1 ... $4 25SO [2700] C*lffl

--!!!!..-Faur C-t.nm.nit cooi.r, • Ft.mn1n1J --1!1!..--r-caot~~· R.u-i

41111 Ona ContaiN'nafte S,,-•y l-laadef" - i::,_. In th.• ti-• ~ at IH$l ?S50 (270QJ Wfl

IMMINENT - M11911ti°"" aa:..i, h- ...... ir,•l'Klive. Mldlihonll ectsont. •• flot ~ad toM sc,c;-sslul,. and t,.,.de,dw,fornMlilo!, W'tCk_. .. th•IN .... entorcMCJll•l'I• OCCll,lf , VIIMf• llitMNENT i-rr• - .,. ~leod,~Lh•I....,.

~OMPTl Y tsOLA ~O - A :a.1Hrn ,. ... to th• emrRnmant... from • lellk1119or11111hHad s.G. !Mt i$ stCfPP"O M "- e:ompWo,, al1he SIG i.oi.a'°" ~• Comrd Room •895. ~ been PAO MTl Y IOOLATEO

RUPT\JRJt'O - Ill a $Wollffl vec,•MCW, a'II-.,_ of Oonl'IMl,Y,.to-teeOl'l'dtl,Y lealt-i,a of• magnitude ...,&o;.,.. to~ cwc:•11• • ,-cto, ~ and a.Jaty.,;.cicn

UNISot..ABLE -A .,,...et!, CII' IM.11 thlll cal'I~ be PRQMPTl,.Y IS0t.ATEO

The Cont,mment B,ar,ktr Should n ot be declared lotl cc pct.enlieltytOSl bllsed oo exceeding Titehnicat $>ecificabon ~on statement cr•en• . unless there is an event in progress requlnng miti1>9lion bylhe Conl•inment bamer When noeYt"nt i s in progries~ (Lott or Potenlial l..OH of l!lffloe, Fuel Cl.ct endklr RCS) I.he Containment Berrief 1,tetus fl, adc:hssed by Tedmic,1 c:;,.tcif\cetions.

lltC-S IAM ~Tl - COl'flprit .. cl IDalTIFIIED Md lHl>EHTiflfO la~ n ctaflnllct by 'f•ctrtle:III Spacllntton,

~-OUl:MA.Oa -L~""'1J0111M4t00m,.ICOU!AKAGE " o, OONmot.lED LEAKAGE.

COHTIIOC..LlfO LI.AK"4E • S..~Wlllfl "-~ rt.- 1M JNCIOI' CMiM:,wr!PSHl:I

IOliNlll'laOLIIAJC.AOE: .. L•~• c•11ct,p1 COHTlltc>U.eO LIIAKACM) 11110 °''" 'YII-•· -.Ctl HIIUffl;IIMal ........... p,ee.idfle .. llkSlll.t .. c-l#M, _,.,~1•• """"'Gf<-OliadlnQt-*. o,

ft,,L•~ll"lloa,,.c:on1__..antaJlll~--•-••thlll_..Nllh tpadk:~ iou!IMI ISiet ~ *""'' nol lCI WUffwe Wlltl V. •PM•Oon af .. -..g. eMKfloll sys!.,,,, or no1 kl be F'R£SS1.IRE IIOUNOARY LEA-AAOE:, •

c . ft..cioreoo4anll:yJ1'4111~ .......... s1:e-...-,atvr .. .,. 1a<onds'Y~-(PYtnl~-Kancla,ylNlll:1011)

PAGE REVISION: 5 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL FPBCHART

(APP-B-2) St. Lucie, Rev. 67

COVERPAGE REVISION: 5

EP3:4

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE

EAL - COLD BASIS EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

COLD BASIS (RCS S 200°F)

COLD CONDillONS EAL - COLD BASIS ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

(APP-C-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 67


COLD CONDITIONS TABLE (RCS ~ 200°F)

COLD CONDITIONS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

COLD CONDITIONS TABLE INDEX ........................................................... . Blank Page .....................•...... ... .. .....•....... ........... .•. .. .....•. ...•.................. .. ...

INITIATING CONDITIONS MATRIX .......... ..... .......... ..................... . ............ . Blank Page ..................... .


R- Abnorm.:11 Rad Levels / R.:1diologica l Effluent.. .......................... ........... .

Radiological Effluent Basis .. ..... ...... .......... ....... . ....... .... ..... . Radiological Effluent.. ...... . .................................... . Abnormal Rad Levels Basis... . • ........................•• Abnormal Rad Levels ......... .......... . Blank Page......... ...... ....... .......... ... .. . .......................... .

C - Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction ................. .. ................ .

RCS Leakage I Inventory & AC Power Basis ..... RCS Leakage I Inventory & AC Power .. Decay Heot & DC Power & Criticality Basis Decay Heat & DC Power & Critica lity .. Communications Basis. . ... Communications ... _.............. . .................... . Blank Page..................... . . .............. ..... . ................... .

H - H.iz.irds .ind Other Conditions Affecting Pl.mt Safety .......... . ......... .

Security & Control Room Evacuation & Natural or Man-Made Events Basis ... Security & Control Room Evacuation & Natural or Man-Made Events ....... . Natura l or Mon-Mode Events Basis ..... . Natura l or Man-Mode Events .. Fire I Explosion Basis .•............... ....... Fire I Explosion . . . ............ .. . . ........................ . Toxic / Flammable Gas & Discretionary Basis ... . Toxic I Flammable Gas & Discretionary ..... . Blank Page. ...... ... ..... . ............ .

E- Events Related to ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) ....

Events related to ISFSI Basis ...... ..........•.............. .... .. ........................ .. ..... Events related to ISFSI.. . Blank Page ...................• ..........

PAGE REV -2-

2

2 2 3 2

4

5 1 6 3 7 3 8 1 9 1

10

11 1 12 2 13 2 14 1 15 1 16 3 17 3

18

19 1 20 1 21 1 22 2 23 2 24 2 25 2 26 2 27 2

28

29 30 31

COLD CO [)ffiONS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REV1Sl0N: 5 EAL - COLD BASIS ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-C-2) St. Lucie, Rev. 67


COLD CONDITIONS TABLE (RCS ~ 200°F)

COLD ONDillONS EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2

EP3:4

COLD CONDITIONS TABLE INDEX

PAGE INITIATING CONDITIONS MATRIX ... . ... ........... .. ... .. .. ..... ..... ....... ... ... ... ... ..... 2


R - Abnormal Rad Levels / Radiological Effluent . ... .. .... ............ ... ...... . ... ... . 4-8

Radiological Effluent.. Abnormal Rad Levels.......... . ...•.... .

6 8

C- Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction ................. ... . ....... ... .. ... 10-16

AC Power .. .... . ·•·· .............. . 12 Communications.. .. ... ......•........ . •. ...... ...... ...•.............................•.. • .... .•...... 16 Criticality ... . 14 DC Power ....... ... ......... .. ... ..... ... .............. ... 14 Decoy Heat. .... ......... .. . ........................................•...... RCS Leakage I Inventory

14 12

H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety......... .. ... ...... . .. . .... 18-26

Control Room Evacuation .. . .. ... ........ .. .. . .. .. .................. .. 20 Discretionary. .... ....... .. . . ...... . ... . ...... ...... ... ....... 26 Fire I Explosion.... ...... ..... .........•...... 24 Natural or Man-Made Events................. 20.22 Security. ... .....•.......... ..... 20 Toxic / Flammable Gas. . .. ... ............ . . ........ . .. ...... .. . 26

E - Events Related to ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Stor.ige lnstall.ition). .. 28-30

ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSlFICATIO, TOOL COLD CONDillONS




COW CONDillONS 1 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASS.IFICATION TOOL COLD CONDillONS



·:.: ,;; Site Area Emergency Alert Unusual Event '!• ... Site Area Emergency Alert Unusual Event

RG1 RS1 RA1 RU1 HG1 HS4 HA4 HU4

~ J Off-sbe Dose Resulting from iln Off-"Site Oose Resul15ng from an Any Released Gas.eoos or Any R@ie-ase of Gaseous or ~ HOSTILE ACTION R@sutting in HOS TI LE ACTION w:thin the HOSTILE ACTIO 'Mthin the Con!rmed SECURITY UJ < .,. Actual or IMt.fNENT RMa.se d Ac>.Jal rx IMMINENT Rel .. se of liquid Radio.3c1hlr.y 10 the LiQukl Radioaccivity to the Ir Loss ol Physical Control of 1he PROTECTED AREA OWNER COITTROUED AREA COND4TION orTlYea1 V.'hidl ::, (5 ili :,

-t GaS@OUs Radioocti..,.;t/ Greater Ga~s Radiroctivity Gtut...r EnvironffilH"lt Gre.ater Than Enwl:lnm!nt Gr~at!! Th3 u facility. Of' Aifbome. Atuck Threat lndie.ite,s a Pa:ential

la O::> Than 1000 mrem TEDE or Than 10-0 mrem TEDE or 200 Tinl4!s the OOCM for 1, 2 nrnei th,e, ODCM for OO ll! Degradation in ~ Leffi of ~-t 5000 mlliMJ'I Thyroid COE for 1N! ~ mrem ThyTOld COE for1he P.llnlt.esor~. Minutes or Longer. Safety of 1he Pl.ant

~ p Actuaf or Projected Dur.V:on of Actual or Projected Dur~tion of Pa . 20 Po. 20 Po. 20 Po . 20 ll die Release lJsing Ac<ual the Release. HS2 HAS 8 MeteC>IOiogy . 0 ..,

Po. 0 Po. ff Po. 0 Po G 6 <

0 lli Control Room Evxuabon H.n Conb'd Room Ev~.1~ion h.n

~ RA2 RU2 Been l niti.1t~ and Pl.1m Con'.l'OI ~lnitia:ed. ~ "' C.innot be EsUbf'shn .,

~~ to l.rradi.J:ed Fuel er UNPLANNED Ris": in Pl.int "' u

iii '" ~ Po.20 Po. 20

iii LO§s of Water Level th.l1. Has. Radiajon l@veo1s . HA1 HU1 lli ~

R!!:sul~ed or WiU R esult in the j !;. -' Unooveri~ at lrradia!~ Fuel .. 0 " ~>Ii 3tural ar Destructive Natural or Destructive

~ ~ Outside the Re'3Clot' Vessel. i Pheoomen.J AffM'ling Pheromena Ar.ctinQ the Pa. 8 Pa. B t ii!

~ ESSENTIAL AREAS. PROTECTED AREA.

i RA3 "' ... Pg,. 20-22 Pgs. 20-22

"' ~ HA2 HU2 0 "' Rise· n Radiabon L~ls Within z 0 "' m z 1he Facilily Thal Impedes ~ ~ < " Operation of S15~ems Required FIRE rx EXPLOSION Aff1!Cling ARE poten:i y dogradng the

' < E ~~ the Ope..at,;ity di Pl>n! Safe,ty l@,.J di s.af•ty of the plan!. a: to Maintain Safe Ptan Safety 0 Funcborls ~ ~~ Systems Requ~ to Est.ablM

~ Po. 8 u ~

or M.11ntain Safe S down. 0::

CG1 CS1 CA1 CU1 15 ~ Pg. 2.4 Pg. 24 < :r :Ii UJ I-

I "''" Loss. of RCS Inventory Affecting LO§S of RCS ln"9!'1tory Aeect!ng Loss of RCS Inventory. RCS Le.akage. 0 HA3 HU3 !!! ~l!i 0 ~ uel Oad ln:~rity vrah ea.. Oec>y ~tRemoval Pa. 12 :z

~ffi Conta:nment Challenged. Capability. <( " Acc:wn to an ESSENTIAL Release of Toxic, Corrosr..-e. Q CU2 "' ii AA.EA Is Prohibfled Due To Asphyxiant. er Flammable !:: 0

~~ ; ~~ R'!'kaseofToJOC. Corroswe, Gases De-emed Detriment.JI to ~ a: UNPlANNED Lo» of RCS

... Cl A~hy.dant or Flamna.ble NORMAL PLANT 0 "' Po 12 Po. 12 Pa 12 lnvOn'.ary. Pg.12 ;:; ~ses WhidiJ'10p,lrtiiZ!? OPERATIONS. 0 z

CA3 CU3 I Operation of Systems. Re,quiad Cl 0 R I= :t

::? to Mai:nt.lin Sa"e Opefations or el: u Safely Shutdown th~ Ruclol'" ~ :z t Loss r;/ AU Off~i":e ~ AU On- AC Power Capability To ::, Pa. 20 Pa. 26- g "l sit~ AC Power to Emergency Emergency Busses Reduoed to

HG2 HS3 HA6 HUS 2 Busse-s For 15 trinvtu Or .3 Sinole- Powe-r Sourt:.e r 15 ~ Longer. M'1nu:es or long<?r such th.a, Arry I

el: u Otner cona.,~ons Existing VVhich Other CaldilOns Enstiog Whl<ti Other Conditions Existing ¥'t'hich Other Conditions Existing Whtch :i; <( Addi"jonal Single Failure Would

~ R.u,olt in Station Blackout. in the Judgment of the .., the Judgment 0-f the in the Judgmemof tt"le th@ Judgment of the

>- pn_ 1? Pn. l2 i Eme~cy Coordinator Warrant Eme,rgency Coordin.atcWW.arTant Emerg«iey Coordina:or Warrant Em@.;rge:ncy Coordinator Wan-ant

1/) CA4 CU4

Declaration o( Gener.al Declaration ol sr.e Area Dec1arat1on of an Alert. Dedaration of .J Nof.fiC3tlon r:A

" ... Emergency. Emergency. UnusuaJ ~nt (NOUE) • z < :J UJ Po. 2!J Po. 26 Po. 2G Pa 2G .. ,: Inability to Maintain Plam in UNPLANNED l.o>> of Deo.,y

~ ,.. Cold Shu'.rlown Heat Rerncwal Capability with ~g E-HU1 < UJ i.l Irradiated Fueh n ~ Re~

"' Ve5.s_ 501& Dam.lg-e to a loaded c.nk - 0 iii§~ z Pa . 14 Po. 14 confinemtfll BOUNDARY

! CU7 ' w W o, 0 i Pa :lO ,-::> Loss d R.quired 0C PoNer for ,:

~ I~ · u:e-s Or Longer. 1/)

g 0 ... :s Pg. 14

' CU8 u ~

I lnacfwrt:ent Criticality.

Pg. 14

o:i CU6 ... ~

-

COLD CONDITIONS 2 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSiflCATION' TOOL COLD CONDITIONS 2




OLD CONDITIONS 3 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL COLD CONDITIO S 3



RECOGNITION CATEGORY R

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT

R- COLD CONDITIONS 4 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- COLD CONDffiONS 4


!z w :) .., ... ... w .., ~ 8 .., 0 i5 ~ ~ ~ w .., 0

~ .., ~ er 0 z ID <( I

er


RG1 -Basis:

llis IC addresses radioactivity n!leases that result in cbses .oi or be)<x,:f

~~~~.._d.~~=•~Y necessary. ReJNses d tis magniuje ~ assotmed with the faikn d plant syslems noeded lo' the pn,ledion of the public and likely i'Mllw luol damago. l'lllile lllese lailtns ilrt! acttes&ed by other lCs. 1his IC povidos ~d~~~-=-~..=~=:..~ h mcn 5e¥ere ~ the t'8NSe rN.:1 be UlmJnib'ed or llere m;q be ta,ve w.cen.inties aS50Cialed wlh the.....,. tem,ond/ormelooro!ogy.

TheEPA PAGs are """"'5sed in 1em5 cll>e Sim ol ... e!!eciwdose e<µAlef,I (EDE) and the conmlted elfedive dose....- (CEDE). IX os lhe lhyroid cammed dose equivalent (COE~ For.,. pL<J>OSa cl t.ese 101cAl.s. lhe dose <Jlanlity - effective dose eqtl'l>lent (THE), as defined in 1DCFR21l, is u,od in lieucl"Slrnc18lE and CEDE".

The TEDE dose is set at l1e EPA PAG, v.hle lhe 5000 ,m,m lhj,oid COE W>S estabished in consideralicn cl lhe 1:5rorocl lhe EPA PAG for TEDE and lhyroid COE.

The monimr ~st in EAL 11 includes moniars on aP polll!mil release pathl'l'ays.

Site Area Emergency RS1 -Basis:

~=~"'!.ciT~.~~=~~IX '5 lhe ll)foid ocrrrrilled dose eq.ivalenl (CDEJ. F« lhe - of these 101cAl.s, lhe dose quantity lwl olJICtiw dose equivallont (TEDE). as clemed in 1DCFR21l. is u,od In liou of""-"" cl EDE andCBlE".

The lEDE dose is ... at tll'X. d lho EPA PPG. -the 5'XJ rm,m 11,yro,d aJE ,...estil,fisl,ed in con~-ofthe 1:5 ratio of lhe EPAPAGfor TEDE an! l>),ad COE.

The mcritor hi in EAi. #1 in<utes mcnilors en all potential re'.ease pall,ways.

Since dose iilS5e5SmeJi: is based on ilCNal meleofdogy, whereas fhea monita rearing EAL is noc. the results fn:m these asses'Slllt!ffli may indi-M lhe classification is nctmnanled, or may irdcalethal •

~~~~.'!"~~%.. """'5SITil!f 115"11 actual mo!eorology an! ........ inlorrnation.11 lhe resuts d these daR irSSeSsmerts are ~abr.e .tlifl the cla5sifcatal is macle (e.11,. initialed al o lowe< da.ssfficatioo level~ fie dose assessment re5Uts <M!Jllde.,. monitcrreodi,g EAL

Alert RA1 -Basis:

The Emergency Coordir.-shoold not wat '"111 the applicable Im! has e~. but should declare the IWnll as 5000 as it is deSemined ha the oondiicn Qely exceed the applcal,le time,

The lund:amoneol bosisof lhis IC is NOT adoso 1Xoosera1<, but ralher the de.gradation in the leftl of safely of the plant ...,tiod by the oocontrolod releose. This lCadhssesan adual IX-.ipole<llgl

=~-~C:.1!:el::'!.~':~=:',i.,,.. lim!.

--pl-.noorpcrale-...S n<r1ded 1Doonlrol 11e re1e .... of rodioaclive-lo l>eenvinnnent F'"111er, 11ere ore-...ative ccnlrols. These oontmls .... localed in the Off-w Dose Calwloticn Mnlal (OOCM). Theocxun,noecl..:er,ded, '""""*'>ledracioacti,,o -..S lo lhe omri........t is indic&ive cl• degradation in lhe lo-.s _..,,...,.,. The OOCMrrulpes are sp,cilied in RUI an! RA1 only lo cislirv,,sh between l1D!H!f1ll!flllocndlicns. and from each other. Vllile ..... rrultiples obviously CDITMj>Cf1d ID an ofl.site dose IX dose rate .... ~sindas5ifying,_....,..;. lhe ~.,the lewlcl safety ol f>o plant. not fie magnitude cl ... associated d:>se "'dose - -

- shcud not be prorated or a'tEfagec1 FIX .,..,,,le. a reiexceedng 600x ODCM far 5 minules does not meet 1he lhreshcld.

This EAi. includes any release for whdl • radioactillily discharge pennil was. nat ~ or a nijease that exceeds the oondlfions je..CJ.. mininvn dil*x1 flow: maxinun dlsdlarge flew, Hm sq,oinls. et,:. on fie ;q,licable pemil

EAi. 11 is irl1eooed for su,; lhat ha>eeslabished effuml moniloringa,

=t~~..:...~~-~~ limes the COCM ltnil cw 100 limes h? IYe5hald values used in RU1 . This is~--,,tlorf>ottn.hJl~lo'the~-Generak,rlltlffllt,m Ml:rilln. On bdh \.nl 1 and Uni 2. the --uceedtd 1he ._ofthemonlcn. Therefofe, l>ev.wesused lorlhe Sbeam_, Minilln are 95'4 cl ~n scale. llis les<ervalue is still inclcalnle d a loss cl COl1lrOI cl radioai:l,wefflO'.enal wol n """"55 of 1hal

constiUing ... lbJsual -

EALW:l. o>ddressHf3dioact..;;y..Je'505. llal lor-,.ascn. cause eff!.Jeol ratiaiicn monitor readings IDeJO:eed lhe lhresho!d ldemifted in the IC est.bkwd by the radloilctiv.,Y di~ pem;t. llis valuomay be associated with a pAamed bitd\fel'ease, or a contRJCU5 r1!''9se pdl.

R - COLD CONDITIONS 5 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISIO : 1 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL

Unusual Event RU1 -Basis:

The Emergency Cocxdin-shoold not wail until Ille ~ ..,. has =.~~~.:-..i:== .. ~isdotl!rmnedlhallhe

The fundamonl.>I basis o( this IC is NOT • dose oo- dose role, but - the degr.tda6on in the - of safely cl the pla,t implied by Ille unoontrolled n!leose. This IC addresses • polential deaease in l1e level

~~~~~:i:.i-::J',;;:"'"1halexx:eeds

- power plants incaporate leahns inlendod lc>COlllrOI there!fose clra<ioactiveellluenlslDl>e..............iF1mer. lhereareadmrislralive =;=",:1 .. ~==';.,~~~ Oooo Calallation Morua! (OOCM). The ocwrrenoe cl OJdl!nded, l.llOOIWeled ~A!feaseslOthe ~IS ~;w a dl!!,adalion o( ,_ -...S ond/or oonlrols.

The 00CM mK'*'5 are spcilied in RUt and RA 1 enly to dislingu,sl1

betwee, non-...-..-ocndib"cns. an! from ----m,ltiples ol:Niously conMj)OOd lo an dl-sflO dose or dose rate. lhe

Ofl1)hasis in das>fying these -· is fie degr- in 1he - of salely cl the pin. not the magni- of.,. ossociilled d:>se a dose rate.

Releases ,t,c,Jd n:,t be prorated or ....-aged. FIX u.arrple, •,.,..... """""°r,q4,00CM lor30......ie.doesnco meetlhettroo.hold.

llis EAL includes any rei'sse lor-a~ dischaoJlo pem;1 was nee ~«a release thal exceeds fN! conditions \e.g.._ mnmm dilution llow', nwmun di5c1"'11'! - · alarm selpor<s. eic. a,(he ai,plc:ablepermi.

EAL #2 ~ses radioic:tiw re6NsH that. b Mat..,. !1Y5CO, cause effluenlraaatioollDlilDr,.~IDecx,eed lhetln5holdidoneif.edin fie IC, -shed byl>e radioactivi!y discha!Vo permil This- may be associilied Will a pkn1ed birid1 ~se. or a a:wiimJJUS release pad\.

EAL #3 addresses uncorirolled releosti 1hat are detected bys~ ana.)sis. pa,lictlarly en """"*>red pathways. e.JI .• Sjlills cl radioactiw ~ if1lo sbm ctans, heJI ellCNrlgEJ [email protected]@ 1n rM!I" WiUef" s)'5lerns. et.::.

R- COLD CONDIDONS



RG1 Off-~t Dok, Rtdingtrom N't Actv.11let IMMIUENT Reff!'•w d Gneous R1dk:lectwtyGreate, Then 1000 mr-em TEOE or SOOO rnrem Th)'l'Old COE fOI' tM Ad\111 a Prqecicd Our11ioo of the Rclet,e UW!g A.r;t1111l Mttec:n::ilog;

1:ALVafOU: -TM f:me,ge,q,C«11d<ffftor lhouldnQl'l'ftitvnU,,_ #ll>ltel'>fi" LWn8 h,i,1 et.p,M!!d b(if lhocJkl ~·· 1'HI i!I~ H aootJ •• C JS dt1:t!!11WJe'd fh•l h rw/l!eHt di,1ton hH e~ o, vtll l'-e~ e~ttJNJ t11,upp1,tat111et.1me lf~aneJJ/'111!:nfie.t;;JU•~ l'qHb.b 1: lhct ~ oldei.r,,1t,ot\ the ~.,.ur.ic:,tion $h0"1dbc bi11edood!Hc 1.Sl'1Suntt0fmw:.dofmorntorwlws Oonot dM d«tat·•Lbn~w.,t dos-e>•1tt.Ut1'1Nttrt!.ru#t

t , v ... uo flll,OID(I 01 MtY fJl llUI lolkM'tng ,.d,llen montc:r, t,Hler 1hln tne: rt ld"9 thCMN f(t' IS flW'IIJt" Of fongH

UHIT t ;

MorulcrChwtMI Pat.hwty

ASC26-Ht Plent\lf'N tPVJ liO'mlllOos.

RSC.26-lH ~tVMt I

-S1AS

UNIT2:

Mon11orC~nef P1th•1

AS26-1i0 PlantVenttPVJ RMCS 622 llom>tl()ps

RS29-90 PltnlVenttPVl RMCS 622 --SW! RMC4 613

RS26-90 w/FHBDl~edto

RMCS 622 PlwttVtol\/ttS,.lekl 8uiidf'I Vennl.iMXi

1. CJrof..e HUStn'ltft IIJIMU l:Chial nwloordOQ'1 indlC.al I doMI gre:11.ef·tn,n 1000 mtctn TEOE OA 5000~ lh,roidCDE II o, Deyand the Sile IKM!ctaty

211 l , FlfflO iUIVltJfHUtlJ lncklteciosf'O'MndoWOOHfet.sQrHltr

U1,1n 1000mftmr cu>l'dtrlloccntinuelormaethan oot: boor OR •nllf)'Sfl ofleld tN/l'>lfi'/ Mn"()le1; !Nltelle tlt10id CDEC,..1le1 tl\W'I SOOQ rtrt:'I' kr cne hM Qf1t1h•MtKYJ 1l c.rbsyorid Ill• boundtry

IMMINENT - tAlio,~ t~Sht""'t ~e'tl ~Nt t~loMI ecttoo, ert na expected to be succeuf1A, Hd 11t:ndfll infOUTllllt!Otl 1ndle1te, lhet lhe ~ Of condt1on..,.. occur Whtre IMMINENT lmtfr,mtt tr, t?e¢'fied !hey IShtlJ M>rft

VAUO-Mindtcltlon 1eP011 or<:ondllkln 1scon1il<JetWtobe' VAUO when it,, VNl~ed by ( 1 J 1n tnstrume-.nt channel clu~ck. l.?t 1tidut1«1, on rti,1INjo, tf'duridar.l ww,1calet1 0t(l1 i,y&ect obfet'll9l!Oll by tfff\C peno11t1 .. , sutti lhet dollb4 rdtt~ lo ltte induklt's operabirt'/. the CONJillQl'I s e.ic1~eflc~ a !he repo1 s ecCtlfacyl"Jt«nOt,fN 1mpU tnlhls«nn1tto11s1tienffdtor Umefjusessrne.r11

Site Area Erner ency RS1 ()!'f.llfe ~ Rf/M,111,ng l'fc:rtl '" ~h.l~I r, IMMINEUT Reteo, QI'

0.S.tt"Us Ra<l~y Glnlei Th.an 100 nnm TEOE 01 500 eoa1 nnm Thyroid COE for the Adutl or Prqccted Our.hon of lhe

RdHM

OpenUng Modt ApPllc:.tbUlty: All

l1211 The Cnlt'~ Coordit'i•6't lhofAd not w•if unll rtw •A"*fille r,n.,,-, NJ>.11:(! til,l~(N1CM~theO'l11'm'H.JOO"l.ll(isdel'efttWW!'d ltNlthe,~JlltdlHl.ton ""•l!lett"dN, 0twl/Jlil<~fyftettd dle' ~ble &Jmt, ffdol:e H.Jeffmlfflt,e,ulu 111t •n'-bft! a: tJ,i, tmi,

Of di!('ler•rot VIC!' da.rJlfileaP4't •hOult! be NU!CI Ott CIOJI! H,C:,~nfin1lefdQ/,non1fo, i,wk,e-1 OtJPOfdfffaydti<',.,.•t,o,, ffllP Me •uc,~n, rewJfa

1, VALIOrttOlr\DertoANYrll~~G,..,,•~~QOVfltet ltlartlh1tt1ttdir,Q'lh0,rtnfcr t!,t"M'111le'iotlcnQ•

Monltcr Channlll

RSC 26-1H

FtSlG-90 RMCS 622

AIM26-11 RMCS 63i

RIM:ZfH2 AMCS 632

UNIT 1

Plilhway

Plant Vent IPVI Ncw"1110ps

2. Dose as,e,,tnent u~ etl\lal rnet:eerdoQtt Ntc:tlt!"J GOMl'I r,ealM IM" 100mtemTEDE Oft )OQr,nmtfl;1"1>dCOE1I 0tbtyo,,<1tne ~ebo.mdlltv

3. F'~d M.lf'i«)lre'Wl!l~Cflt« ~d .. ~~ rtl6Gfi'•ltrtfltl'I 100 mRl'hr •loected to cQN,nue for fT'ICQ "'"' O'lt t,ou, OR IOalyi,el olfleld KIM)'~ indct1f: lh~CldCOE grHlef than 500'1'1'-,, Jo, Cl'le PIOUI Cf' lf'lht\l(iOJ\ ii C'I bt-,ondtht 1ft boul\dtl,y

u

'Mwr•lwo~ .. 1s,.o ltl•~,r,ges~ the ffiON.Olt .. dirJQlitV,.idOft~h-Cftn\111

2 J'cr Uhit 1 Ebetina d\#'IC'lels:-10 abtan CUl'ffl(1l dal.a EHfEAthtCM'lma\GjDATAlcfliarvitttOfENlEl'J

J UMN<:fflllfOPS Plf!HftoldllftletsAlntVM IOff ,...,HM L~r~ !Ne 10 tut:O"-S,._ SIAS

00 Unil lo,·•,- 111:iliiied \.oduelOwa:ti~ °""9f!illJOOfl fH! ¥Ml lol.Wl!O~A,JnlV..-it

l'AUE: 6 RE\' ISION: J R - COLI) co:-. DITIONS

Alert RA 1 My Rdeoe Qf 0.kflllt or LIQl.llld R~0rtarvtv 10 lhe &iwr,runent

Qute.- Than200 llmttthe OOCM lor ,s Ma.ltesorLangl!t'

Os>•at.lng Mod• A,ppllcab4111y: All

/Ju. 11'0 E:,,,WQie<,eyG'Oad-MtOI sl'IOuldn(JlWt/lU,,"'~~f/Mbt!¥M.f ~/ap#d, fxA Jhou/d (l«fare the~~ H SOM •t If J.S cfe)!r/ttlnl!'d !NI Ille 1efNJed11tboo hu~c~ed. "~<JIHcet,,tM.cffd Utetppl,c,bkbmoo lntm tbfiM«'Of~l•tolht'-'Ont•y ...,.,um,thttit;ierdN#d1111tionht1cil~ t1»1Pl)llc1tiltlbmell.1n~,«*dlt',..,~a.l'Jdl.l'IOu!IHM,!frllim.'I ll1.1n.linown

1. VALIOruruigon ANY or the fOlto,,ff'lg grtaterttlfft tn,e Re•d1ng ,hO'M"l fer 1$ nwiutet Of lcnge,

UNtT I ,

Monitor Chann.tl Palh'ny

RSC28·1H Rani Venf(PV)

N...,.I

~SC26-1H Rant Vent(PV)

pos:t,.SIAS

RSC?8--<IH Fuel Htt1c,tt,g &likl,tg

<F HBJ Rl1S.62 AIMl'\6' .. rnun« ........ Rll&,.63

.. 8.Mari&eam~ ......... RV•2391 0-1 "A'MlElowdtN.w ChU RY,2l92G- e· ~ 9owdowft ChO- 9!1£•0Scpm

UHIT7

Mo111Gf Channel

2B 1. VALID readng on AN Y d'llufflt mon•a 11'191. e.iu::eed, 200 times lhe 111t1m

1,dp;;:iu,teJt•bil.Jl>e'df«• cuncN,tdOKtlVCycbtttlt-';il'Ptmiit tor 15rnim.ltes

"''°"'l"

3. Cooftmedst"""'ttan11yHsf01 paseous oricJ,,1cJ1rif:11uwickatN C<l'IC~ll•tlon~ OR 11!1eH-et1!ttgre.ier tnan i'O()ttrnHOOCMLimit~kf 1S rrmuto « IOfJOff

E. \ L · COLD UAS IS

EP3:4 (APP-C-9)

Unusual Event R U1 Alfy Rf/I'·" Of GHeOI.IS er Liquid R•et-otct,vtty 10 ltle

Ertwonff'INil Gt"ttlM Thtn 2 Time, in,e OOCM IOt' 60 IGf.l Y..rMJIH or longer

Operallng Mode Apc,lleabltlty: All

EAL VillUH '

l1211 1M E~ CocrdNkr fhtnAd l10I Waif unfl II» 1p,,ltc•bllt lime hU e<,P.sed, but fhOuldcfe'(fft" lht, ~nt•,$0('Wt•fifi, dl:tP'f'~lhtttl>t1elt:fwd11•flOrlhut,<~ O"W'6h~ !!,-reeo me -,,,,«11:r1e r tn 1111!' .o,ence old.al• ,o ht COlllfe,y, H$JJme fh•t tm r•litue ~,.bolt ttu eteffdml the ~'r.tb'e bdlt JI an °"908'0 ,~1se a dtet«IN •rtd tne r'*t• ,11rtf/fr,tl$11,,.~·n,

1. VM,.lO re•ck,g o, AH Y d lh.e lcll<HMOQrHltr lh•n It!• Re.~ ,ho-¥n fQt IO minute,; q k¥19tt

UNIT L

MonilCW" Chlnn.J lie .. "!/

RSC26-1L 14 E-OluClkc:

RSC26-1H 1 I E-0'"'°CUl:c:

RSC2'1-• L. Fu~ HI~ a.d1no R$C2$.-.fiH ffHB•

53 E-02v~,

A'M11nStuml,ll\t Rl2fl.62 27 e..Jt uClkc .........

' 8 ' M.att'I S1etM l1M R12M3 21 E-01~Cllc:c ........ W SIG BlowckMn l O E•04 c:pm

·e·s,o:~,. 25E•04GOm

IJ NITl.

Mo1111cr Ctla1111e Potl>Qy R .. ""'1 RSllf.90 ~tllVenltPVl

RMCS 62, ""-' IOE-t»uCl/tc

R816-90 PJa.ctVtnltPVJ RMCS 672 ,si,.s I 1 E-01 uCil'ce.

RS1lJ.90 .,..,nrn, Ol\-et1td ro Rt«:S &it Pt1ntven1~~ t•E·OhCl."tc:.

1111 r) 'Vt"t•!fQ't RS'26-12. F\lel H~~ 9.Jlk;frig

-i B E.OhC\.u RMCS oil ) cFHB ~ RIM 71 ·A• Malt\ $1.eiM llM

1 0 E•OI mR.tir RMCS 631 Moni!O< RIM4'f.72 B MMt~tmL~

AMCS 632 ,..,,,. .. 1 OE•OI mRA'I,

RS.26·5' ' A ' SIG~O"*'do,frt 2 5 E-04 ..om. RMCS t2f ~S-29-6 '8'5,1(.~ B E-04 ..om. RMCS 122

1 W•110 rte.dng <n AH V '""'~ MOt'lltet teadrtg g,ie:•1e. 11\11" 2 limn lhe lilwm setoont eta:ab11Shectby1 currcnl radioectMty di~arQe Ptrmt for 60 mmlllH a lonQff

3 Conflml.ed ~ an,tysn far OHtOJ'I er-I.quid rtkues lnclcetes c~rah0t11 OR 1~ne .-.1.s greeler th&.n 2 11mes OOCM Umils for 60 llllnule-s °' tong,ar

Rtcognftloo cac, 1

... z w ::) _, u. u. w _, <( ... 0

ffi <3 0

::) _, ..J 0 u. i5 u. w ~ _, <( iii 0 iil 8 ~ _, 0 C i5 <(

~ er _, <( ::. er 0 z m <(

I er

ST LCCIE l'L \ NT CL,\ S 'IFIC:. \TION TOOL

St Lucie, Rev. 67

Rt<. C.I.

1-z w :::, ...J u. u. w ...J <t u 5 g 0 a ~ (/) ...J w > ~ 0

~ ...J

~ a: 0 z [I]

<t I

a:

I'. \OE; 7

EP3:4


RE\' ISION: 3

Site Area Emergency

ll - COi .i) C.:O:S:DITIONS

Alert RAZ- Basis :

This tC ad:Sftn..s rl~ n radaoa, dOse r&les Within plainl buddin~ and rnty be• pttCUftor 10 • tlldlcech>M-1 retetse totnt tn'llfronment Thtte events represtne a lOt, d con1tCII r,,er rtOQlcttve m,tenal ltld rep1effftt •n ae1u1ICf subslantial DOCcnt1a1 dt-gradal!Onin the ~I of salctycfthe p/anl

The,e: evero e,c .. tte frffll Aul .n tnM fuel actf'Ylty nu been 1etit11ed or Is aMeipeted dut to ft.lei hettuo This +c applies to spenl fuel requlnno wale, covtfaoe and is nOll intondod to eddrus ,cent IIJcl which Is tic::cn1ed for dfY11<,qge

EAL 111 adaessn racfation mcrv1or inckaooi't oC tuti un~ry and/er ~ef dll'!Wpe AJ'dicabcn d 1t.t EAl teq.,tttt undc,rst1nding o1 fttt actu .. ,.OdOGc:111 cc,,,c:lit , Pfttetll In tht "4CIM\I of Int rnonito,

R11wd wm11t1:1a, mo-wtor readllng-1 tNY ba i\diabon d. • redlotd.i~y reletw trc:rn thf "~ CCl\tm, "O Ihle dlm,ve nai oca,neO lncretM!d backg,cund at the wnbl.t.on rnmlCII' di.le to watet tew-1 d!crnte may mall(l'ICfttMd ...-.nblltk:rl txhtust wbomt acwtyanonttds-tobt con.idered

Whtie a tadliat1on mcnltO' COJld oat.a an mcnaw tn do5a ralt ci,e to a t;J"op~I ewt!erl"""' ll;f'NONnccbeardlel:IH:if'ldiclQOflO,whf'lherernot lheAJd~coverea

For nwnP• •n AIH Radi1bon Moruto (ARM11eadn9 may anc,u1e We 1o"tinne<Jevolut1ou1,...,chlthetd ft o,even•lutltstemt,tybe:ing ra,sed In Che m9n1c,..Allct me,t ,fJ,io • ~ar coutd lr'I feet be pr~rty rnpotidnr, lo • knoNTI o,1en1 lnvd'itlng t,an.s1«1 Of rel()(4111CW'I of t 1,0Ufce stortO 11 ~ nu, ttte futt PCl(II a r~g10 • pl1t1nfd ~ tucti H reffl0¥tll d the re Of he.a Gl!Off.it, 111ae1Md r1<111lon mcnl(Jr

~tion, need to Dt como.ned ~ encehet inckl«or 1cr PtrtOl"lntl rt!PClf'Oclw1 eoon

EscattlJOn of uut emerQenc;y dnsitc1tton levd d 1opropiate wOJkS b• blHd Cll'I IC RS1 °' RG1

3 - Basls :

n,i, IC addretttt ratted r11dlabon leftll tl\M Wl"C)lct ccntlftued ~'ICJO'\ 1n lffll leoun°lg continWJUs OOCUf)Mcytn or~ to ~I.in ur. q,er.ttcn Of IOpet'IOtm I Nie ShUt~ • rltMt'""P!kfedlblliC,' IOCC>eftle lfle plenc lhtt re11.1lt, In lf'ltl 1ctuel or OOI 1~ 1ubtfanliJI d.eQl'ldiltlon Of tl'le leYe.l d serct1 of ttte !)Inf ~ c.uw 1M/u tMgr,AuC. of the nw .n milboli levc!li" not I ttftttm of lh,t IC Ttle Emt'l'ge!H;"YCoordriat« ,m,tfi,(

con""1c!r lt'l• sourct1" cauw of the raised tadieUon levels and delermina if •ri:, cthK IC rn1y be W'!wived

hHt ttc,.h,mg co,ttnuous occw•nw lt'M::tud• lhe Coibd Room and Cenlral Alam, SllllOl'I (CASI

EAi . • CO! .ll IJASIS

(APP-C-10)

Unusual Event RUZ- Basis:

Th11 IC lddn:ine.s elevated ra<lat1on klffls as t rnul of waler le\let Jowenng but 1b<M: ~e Reactor Pressure ves,ei ~enoe or ewnls thtt ~eve rewfttd 0t ,,,.y,ewt WI UtlP\AtJHEO rise W'l fadl!'IJOn dote ,teet ""'llhln ~ant buld•n~ These rtdiatton Hrvt11, represcn: •'°''of cont,d OY"tr rtd1ott11ve m•lttill and may reprefff'll t l>Cfenllal dtg!ada on tn !ht le\'91 °'"''etyoflhe.ptw

lh• rel\Jellftg ptltrny ts. cant>lnMIQtl of CtVIHH IUbtS '*'~ •M pools V'lhil• • rtdahoo moniCor could df'ltc:t tn increue • nw., 00k rtte OJ• to• a,cp in the wtttr levtl it t'flllj'II not be • rehat>lti itld•cltien d Whdh« and Che tvt,1,s «r¥er-td fer rttueliing evtnts wher-e I~ ..cer itVd OfOPS bflONlhe Re1ttt0t Ae:$,ure Vtffe:4 u-oe dtstik:abon wo.ild be..,, CU2 ThlS ~nt ttellates loan Atffl ~r IC RA21fwradlatedtuel outskic l:he rnclcr vnsel Is un<:Olferld Fer ew,nts IOYC'.IMng u1d11ted fuef 111 the react0tVflM'I HCtilttlon wo.ild be ""t lMI Fi"StOn A!oclKC a.me, Ttbtc IOI ewntt., oper.tino t..lodiH 1~•

"'4;>pkc.oon of mi, EAL r6c,.iwff undent~ of !ht 1ctu1t reddogletl condibortspreMOtilt tr.. ~Of"1ernor'llfO#

EAL #21ddrentf e~to'Wt·l)t•flll rtellltton 19'o'tls thll "''"'"''' Ion ol contrd of niOO.cfiw matf1f1.i 1uoll111g In• polenb~ dtgiede!lco in the ~vefotufetyoltheplant nu, EAL v:dudl'1 rtdal.o. leYt4 inCfHMK th1t ,..slit rran pla,vied ecilYlll.H ,ucn H uw o1,,~,~ toUtt:u ,rta mcwen'lenr. Of 11dlott:tive w•~ ""'tcrlllt A $0edk itt cJ !Vn Reoie1,o,, Mon.11or, fARMs)t• l'lot re,qulred n I woutct 1tjf11d u~ •wlit1blhty o( tne: fhrevldd The inl l!'nt is.ro ldrnMy lo,s OIi ccnlrol ofradoaatv\'I malenllln •ftY mcnlt.cnd area

For ex•"1)1e • ,eruelng briogeARMrHdlftOtn1Ylncnnedue 10111annt:0 •lfCllu11ons such H hod 1ift or ew,n • fud tl.w:ml:tybetrigttl.sedfn1he maniJ)Ulll(I' mut Also a mcnilor CWld In ,ee1r:.e p,opertyrtt()(IOding10• known ewnt lnVO"llnQ ltander or 1etocallc:J1 cl• soun:e ltCQd in Of nH!' !he '* pool or retpci,u:tno to, pl11'1ffecl eV(lfiAJori lUCh e,: rtmOY91 of ~e 1Hdor he.ad Genffalfy vu:reawd ,tdietton monccw W'liktJl<!flJ d nH'.d 10 carbtned with ,r.oefl« llldK:alar tor Dtoannei repi,t, d 'IINter '°'"

ST J ,l lCIE l' I. \ NT Cl.,\SSIFIC. \ TION TOOi.

St. Lucie, Rev. 67


UNPLANNED -A p;irne1l!r charue or an l!Yel1! thal is not the re5UI al an rrtended """1ution ind req.ses COITI!dive or nitigative actions.

VALID - M ondication. n,port. or ocn:litian, is c:msidered ID be VALID men ii is wrilied by fl! an instnrnent - check. (2) mi cations en reta:.!d or ll!dundant indicaias, or 13) by dnd obsErvalion by pl.n persar,el. Sidi Iha! - related 1D the i,cic:;ior's cperal>iity. the oonditioo"s oi5tence."' 1he report's aoancvis,.,,..,....,. i~fl lhis definition ,slheneedfor timetv..........n

Site Area Emergency

ENTER the a,nmm (IY<TAj d\annel ID (ENTER!

Alert RA2 Don\ilge ID mdla!ed Fuel"' Loss d Waler i,,.,,i that Has Resu:'led or

Wil Result in the l.nc:overing d lrradiah!d F<,e1 Outside the Roada iGII Vessel

Ope<ating Modo Appieabiiity: All

EAL V.iues:

1. A water le¥el m,p in 1he reoctxJr refueing cowly, spe,i fuel pool OR fuel -canal that lllill re<IJlt 11 mdiotedluel becarmg '""""""1!d

OR

2-A VALIOalarmcn fWY allhe ~cb!ID damage IDirr>dia:l!dluel OR lossdwm-

ec:u R~I

REZfl.4.1

RE:16-5-1

RIM-26-3

RIM-~

RIM-20-7 RIM-2tl-8

RIM-20-10 RIM-20-11

UNIT 1 ARMC...,.._

!I(! Contairmonas ,wy -"' Contaime1IC1S Nf'( -16 Conlaime110S Nf'(

Moniior

HIGH

RAJ RI"" 11 Ridalion t.e..15 l'llllin the f acii1y That lfTlledes Opeririicr, d Sy5tems Reqo.ired ID Maintain Sale Plant Safely F!l'ldicns..

Ope<.ting -Appicability: ,.,

EAL Values:

1. ~-greater than 15 ITfllhrSI NIY d 1he ful1oNl,g areas ""P'TQ --ancy ID mantain pl.-.t safely lunc:tia5: • Qnrol~ • CAS

R - COLD CONDITIONS 8 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-C-11)

Unusual Event

... Operating Modo Applicability: All

EAL. Values:

Al{I)

b. V>LE rise in ~ <adiaticn re.idir,g en N1Y d 1he ltlGowr,g:

OR

2-1.ff'lAN,IED V>LE- Radaticn -INIX'V' OR .....,.-.m indicate a rise by a la-d 1000 '"'"'nama1' lellels.

'Ncnnill lewls call be considered ilS the fid)est f'NdQI SI the oast twenv-roo, oon emuc1.., the CUTl!l1I oea ,atue.

R - COLD CONDITIONS

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

!z w => ..J ... ... w ..J <(

~ !:2 8 w

~ ..J

Q ..J C 0 ~ ~ ii5 ..J ..J <( ~ :::;; w a: ..J 0 0 z m <( <( a:

..J <( :::;; a: 0 z Ill <( I

a:

8



R- COLO CONDITIONS 9 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISIO : I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- COLO CONDITIONS 9



RECOGNITION CATEGORY C

COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

C- COLD CONDITIONS 10 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL C- COLDCONDffiONS 10


(/) z s ~ ::> ... ...I

~ :E w t; iii C) z ::; w ::> ... w Ir

z

~ ~ ::c (/)

0 ...I 0 u I

u


Site Area Emergency CG1 - Basis: CS1 - Basis:

This IC n,pre,er<s lhe inability il resloo! and maintain Reaclcr Pressure l.m<ler the ocndilion• ,pecibed by this JC, coolMd ~ in RCS ie...! Ve,sel l...,J lo alKM! theilp of octiYe l\lel wilh""'11amlent dullenged. is i-e of a loss clinwnlcry corarol. ~ los• may be cise ID.,. HJel damage is probab!o i Reacocr Pn!soure Vessel level cannot be RCS bn!ach, fft55"" bxroda<y leakago. or continued boiling in U1e reSU'l!d. as avollllabie ~ hNt fflU cause boing. fur1her reduc:iog the Re..teklJ Pfesswe Vessel_ Thus.. dedaratioo d o1 Site Are.a Emergency 15

Re;a,rPressureVesoel level WiihUieCONTAINMENTbreadledor warranled.

==~h~ ~..,,:~~~~ i!':\:~ac:e~ The EAL•t value of 10 inl:he5 iswolboj()\•hmimnmie.¥<1for lo be-feleased io the en~romienl 1lis is oonsfsk!n Wth the defiri€c:ln of a ~ cooting s)'51em opera 000. GE. The GE is dod.red on the OCClllTtnee cl the loss a lt/lMJNENT loss of funclion of~. The EAL #2 .,.Jue of O inche• 15 the do,eSI .,,,.,s,nment il U1e lcp of

acffvefuel. A runber d variab!Jes can haw a signific:an ~ on heat remcJYal capabilty d!alJenging U1e fuel dad bani er. Exan1)ies inc\Jde mid-b:,p. F« EAL #3, as \valer level in U1e Reaclcr Pn,s....., Vessel I°"""'- U1e dose reduced ~'flange level. head in pbce, cavity ftooded, RCS venting r.t.e above fie ccre wl nc:rtise. The dose rate due to tis core shnl' ,trat.ogy, decay heat ......,.i system~. ""'1exing pn,-disposiion. a should resul in Containns< Hgh Range Radalian ~- (CHRRM)

Alert CAJ -Basis:

Loss of ;II ,v;; power <Xlfr4l'OIT1ises al plant safely s)'lems ~riog eledric pawe< nclcdng soc. ECCS. Containment Heal Removal, Sf,ent Fuel Heat Removal ;and U1e Ulma:e Heat Sint.

Tot!! event can be cbs:sified ;is an Ntft when in cokS shutdt:Mn. refueftro,

==~i::~~=~~:,.":1,."'J'u,. emergency bYsses. relative il Iha! ,pecif...i fer the sae Ina Emeti,ency EAL Fit,een mnites was sefected as a~ IC exdudf tran2ent or ,,.........,,.1os ... c1off--.

Escalali,g ID Site kea Emergency, i ~ - is by i>bumill Rad Levels I Radlclog<:al Effluen.

Unusual Event CU2-Basis:

Thi's IC is a pn!<U50I' d more serioos concftions aid is considered to be a poll!r<ial~ cl the ll!Yl!! of safety cl the plant.

-ing e,ct,ms M lower RCS ... 1er1eve1 below lhe Reacia' Pn!s,...., Vessel flange are corelully planned and prnoed,nlly cxinmled. An lJN'I.AN,jED...,.. d1al """"in....,. IP,ef clecn!asing belowlhe Reacocrl'tesSln Vessel flange. or below Ile planned RCS ,vat« l....i for IN! given """"'icxl fd lhe planned RCS waler iellel is already below the Reacocr l'tessln Vessel tangei warrants dedaralion of a Notil,cation cl ln!suill Ewrll (NOUE) <lJe ID the reduced RCS inllerocry U,at is avalable 11D keep the oon, oowred.

The ~kM.n::e of 15 rrinul.es was chosen bec.t&Jse it~ reasonable to aSS\ffle ti.t level can be ~ fflihin this. tme frame using me « more cl the n!dJndant meia:ISclrefill lhat shcud be •••Hable. If ;eveJ oannot be

s!eam generan U-rubedrain~ indi<atioo andpos5illle alarm. NcrmaJ RCSi....! and Re;ac1or?n,s....., Vessel leot!il .iisillmentation systems will usuai be ava1abJe. Rech..ncfant

>--------U-n_u_s_u_a_l_E_v_e_n_t _______ _, :xi~ in lhis 6me trame !hen ilmayincl)Ca'te a rn:ire serious oondmn

>-------~===~==-------Alla'y•i• micales thal an damage may OCCUf wiltin an ho,, loltMiog means cl - Pn!S5lr1! Ve,sel ll!YI!! indication wil usually be inslafed ccntnued an '"""""'Y themcn!. 30 rnn.Jles wa,; ainser...tiwlychosen. finduding the ability I:> mcnitor level ,;,,.,ity) ID asSln lhal lho ability lo

monilcrlevel will ml be intem,pled. Ha.wver, ll all leVl!I inacationwe,e ID

~~~~=ti:~.~=lorRCS =~-=~~~~·::.::=n~edbyllD "'"'10Yfulction5. cb5eMl1JI "'"1' and laok 1 ... 1 changes. Sun-., ;and lari: l...,J rises lrll5I

be ev.¥uated acpinst o1hef-potential SOU1:e5 cf leatage 5VCft as ooot.ig kl the e.aty ~ cl a core uncovery event, it is unlitl:ely that hym>gen WM S<UOeS inside the contilirmeot to enSU"e they are n:kit-ve cl RCS buM.Jp we 1o;, core 1.11CCM?ry oould result in an explosive nixhn of fik.o@. The ~ clr.ation ab'l'S sufficien ijme tor actions ID be dissolved ~asses in Ccnlainment. HowevE,. Ccnl.oinmenl oronitoring performed to reaM!f needed cooling equil<nenl andlar sampling """Id be pefforrned 11D wriy !his ~ and~ General Emergeocy~.nd lil is determined that an explosive mixue E.scmion IC a General Etnergency is via CG1 or RG1. - Additionally. post-Three M!e l~>nd W<foes incicaled 1hal 1he insta:Jed

CU 1 - Bos is:

This IC is included as a Nollfication of lJoo5wl Event (NOUEJ because rt is considered 11D be a potential deg.dation cl U1e ll!YI!! o/ safety of the planl The inability to maintain a<reslon! iellel is m<fuive cl kls,s of RCS .......,. . Relief 1"11ve narma1 operation shwd be exdJded from lhs IC. H<Mwer. a

==~~~.:;~~~sha\Jldbeoonsiderad

F'rofar1ged loss of RCS IIM!nD)' may reoul in escalalim lo the Alert level Yia erthEr IC CA1 or CA4.

~.==~~~ali'!':~~IID~~~~ ==:-:..i~ouen,:ca~~~ !:t=:=--~=~~.,::..~~..:== >---------~~------ - ----< the RCS is nolintact and Read<rl'n!ssln Vessel level and irM!r1lory an,

EAL#t.ll ~ the inability to n,store nmaintaio Reaclor l'n!ssln Alert monilcred bycilferentn-..ans. ln c:old shuiloo,,,nlhe RCS wl! oonnat, be ===:~t~:PI:~~;~!=~~ M l-c=A~1--~Bac--s~is-,-------------- - --< :..1:. s.taoo.an:J RCS invenoyandleveimtnkrirlQ meilJl5 are,

=--,,.!~~~=l=~~'tl~ These EAlsser¥eil5_.....,.to.lossclabiliytoi!doquillelycool Ille level. PosFllvee ~file l~and studies incicaled u,,1 lhe ins1al'ed nuc1ea- fuel. The magnitude cf this loss cl waler indic,iles lhal ma!<..., S)'lemo

insNn!ntatioowillcper.,teerraticailymenllecxreis-. =~ ...... ~":,,i~.:;-.,..:.,"="1~ llis condition will resutt n .a minrrun emergency CDSSification of Alert

Sump and tanl< 1....i rises lrllSI be ..,.lualed against cihef potential souroesof le._ sudl as cooling wa'a..,..,,.. inside 1he OCJOtlm1ent 1o......, lhe}' ,re micawe of RCS leakage.

As wa!e< iellel in U1e Re;aclor Pn!s,..,, Vessel lowet-s. the dose rate above the- oore wil ncJl!lase. The dose rate due to this. cae 5hWle should resul in Ccntainmera High Ra!ve Radalicxl Monilcr (CHRRM} mication and possit>,e alarm.

X

IMMINENT - Miligalicxl adions have been inetledi,e. od<ilicxlal actioos .re llO't expected IO be succes:s,U .10d trended infonnation in<fical.es lhat lhe ......rt a concltion wR OOCIA'. IM>ere IMMINENT iimelr.ames are specified. lley shat apply.

EAL #1 a<itesses the inability 1D resbe and maintain lewl after INCling this ,...n1 would be inooalive of afaiue of the RCS bonier. 23.2 inche5 m icates u,at the loss of suction to decay heat"""""" syst.ms has oaured.

EAL #2 is "l'picallle """1 all iellel mc:aiicn is lost Ii.mg a loss of RCS inwnto<y ..ent. the aper-. wwd need to detennine U,al -

~~~=i:::i~t'i.~'":~= potential ,,,un:es of leabge sudl as cooli,g .-. '°'"""" inside the -il""""' hey iiR!nlicaheof RCSfeakage.

In the aild .i..txb"' rrode. normal RCS lellel and Reada' l'n!SSUl! Vessef lewl- syst.m;wiD usuoly be ..-ile. ln the reNeh~ mode. OO!Tllal me~ d ReicD" Presswe VeW!t lewl ndication may nc:( be availallfe. ReclJnd.¥,t means d Reacior Pressue Vessel level mioation will usualy be installed fod.di,g the abiily 11D rrooitor level visuiily) 11D ....... lhat lhe abiiy lo --wil ... be intem,pted.

The 15-<Tirue dwatxin fer the losscllevel _, was chosen because i is half of the CSI SIie kea Emergency EAL,......,_ Sc,,ificant fu<f damage is nat e,pecced ID OCC1Jr "11il lhe ccn, has been- for i,,,-Uian 1 hcuperthe;analysisfElereoced in the CG1 basis. lhlmore ltisEALmeetsthe defntianfcr .-,Alert.

W Reada' Pn!sst.re. Vessel - oonlnue< ID lowet-then eocalalm ID Site An!a 8nergencywil be via CSI.

Cootinoed ilss of RCS lnvenlo<y wi!I resul in escalalion il lhe Alert eneroencY classikalion etef via elhet'" tC CA 1 or CM.

The dillerence between cut ;and CU2 - wiU1 the RCS cmditions that exist be!...,... c:old s/1\AdaHland refueling~ In lhe refl.eling mode Ille RCS is not inLact ;and Reactor Pn!ssure Vessel IP,ef ;and i1venlay are rroniindby d-.._.,.. In a,Jd srutdor,n the RCS wilncm,ally be inbd: .and mndatd RCS ftYentory and level monllcmQ means are ~lable.

EAl.#1 irMllwsa lowemg in RCS level bel<N¥the top cl the Reactor Pressure Vessel flange ~ oontinues for 15 minutes due toan ~ED ewnt. This EAL is not applicilble il loweriog levels in Ile lloodedre;a,r ""'ity IP,el. which is -sed byRU2 EAL I, ,rill such Cine as U1e ll!YI!! decreases lo h! lewl cl U1e vessel ffange.

I Reacia' Pre55ln Vessel level conJinues lo IJ\ver and readies the part at YOCh a loss of suction t, decay heal removal systems has. oocurre.d. lhen escalation IIDCAI -Id be~-

EAL 112 addresses cmditions in lhe n!fueling rmde V\hen namaJ means cl oore ~ ndicatson and RCS level i:dcalion may net be iNilibble. Redundant means of Reacb Pn!ssl.re Vessel lewl indication will normally be installed f rdJding the abir,ty 11D monilcr fevol vi>uilly} il a,.,... U,at the abiilylom<nilar leoelwilnot be inlem,pted. -. lail iellel irdc.lic,n were to be fosl dlrng a lo&s of RCS inwnto<y ....t. Ille opera1a5 "°'*' needto delt!,mno tha1 Readcrl'tesSU1! Vessel irM!I*")' lass was !XXllTil'1 by cb,,ning 5UTl) and - iellel char,ues. Smv and Jank -increases rru>I be ..-d againsl oUie,-pco,ntial .....,.. of leakage =~ CX:~ W::;oes nsoe thecmtannent ID ~they are

Escalation lo Alert emergency dasoiflcatia>-wcud be vi., eitherCAl or RCS healup ,ia CM.

CUJ-Basis:

The ocnditicn incicaJed by Uiis JC is the ~ion cl the olki1e and m,iie NJ pow!!< 5)'5tB1l5 sudl U,al an, additional ,ii,gle failln 'l'IDrAd result ina.staliar1-. Thisoondli:lncwdoauclJellDalassofofl-<111! power with • Clll'lClffl!l1 faihn cl all but one ertlBJlellCY generallDf il ==~ .. ~i=!:':n~~u:~ Flteen miUes was. se1ec1ed as a lreshokl i> exd.Jde tr.:mKri armmentay losses of-.

C-COLD COND!TlONS 11 EAL-COLD BASIS PAGEREVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSillCATION TOOL C - COLD CONDillONS 11



CG1 Loud RCS lnventay AfftdWIO fut! Cled lnte,g,ity'Mlh ContanmPnl CllaHtng,ed

0pMatlng Mode A.ppllubllhy: 5, 6

/:JJ!a Thie E~ Cocnf,nab 1houid no, M<fif um// l>6 «Pt*•bltt t!fflftha,rlti,$.0 butmoulad«.1411tt,,.ft'efllu.soon••lf i, d~ tl»I the eond.tion wtl 11111r1 e~ceed me •l¥)il:•~ ....

1. Cent~ ChlleftOe aoc:ated by ANY of Inc &db. g • CONTAJNME.NT CLOSURE NOT eMM>bhed • ur.,PLAUHEO rtw 1ft COO:laitlffltnl P"fSSUft • Containment Jfy(lfog,en "eater thtn •1'

ANY OM d tht folo#lnQ 10P1a1

ACSJewl !tts than • Otfk:f'lesonll-1117 0R ll•1117-1

b. RCS~ eannct be mMl!Of&O With ccte UMD'4'e,ry I\Ckated b'f AN'f ollhel k:!ikiwfflOIOf')OmltMeso, klrtgtt

• ConlUJl'fllt~ High Rlf'IIJI Rad on "''°""°' rnck>g otetlertti1"•1E••RN

• EtJ1tiC touf¢41 tet!QC rno'lilO in<klbcn • UNPlNJNEO Mwl rtse n ANY ol tl'le tollOrf,M'Jg

• Cont.a~'II s,~ • ReactorCa~SI.N'np • Safeg1tlt'dS 8ufflo • J.fo&ci,p Tanh • Rtfuelng W.t• l•AA

CONTAINMENT ClOSUR.£ - Tht' c,,ottdut1Uy0t-n~ ect,cn:i 1aken lo sec:11 11 ccnt.inmant and s HIOCMlle<I strudurn 1)'l1tm..- lf'IO CC1n1)0!1ft'th Ht ~(tK;lttll c,.,.-1.., 1ot,1,ilcn prod.Jct rffll,s.e un<Mf ftf\lnQ' pfll'i cor,dltlals

UNPlANNED -Ap,werriete1 ch1r,oecr.,, twlll ltl1t tsnolth« ft!'Mlft gf911 lnttif\ded evdUl,on andrSQUIIHCCllr«bw OI

~trYekllettt

Site Area Emergenc CS1 loss c:I RCS lnwt1tcry Affechng Ccre DKay H•al Remo,al"

CapabMy

5,6

ll2t!: The Em«p,:r,c-f CoorrJ,n•bt lhrold no, welf uml tl1f1 1Pf'ltet1bie vm, IJH 91,ps«J buf should d«la/e IN ewnl •• IOOIJH Ill ,a ft6ff,mied ltMt h c:ond\llo11 wiJt bA't ('~cef"d the, • lc:abfe tme

1, W.h COUTAIUME"Jfl' CLOSURE NOT utabhhecJ RCS !eve less

""" • 10V'IC::MscnLl-1117 0R U· 1117-t

2. n CONTAtt-lMENT CLOSURE •statiithed RCS level .. H lh1t1 • O~t OALJ.1t17 0fl LJ.1117•l

) , RCS-ve!Clnnd b<"mcni!oredfof 30tnlfM.lf,s Of IC,,Qef with •lo»d Read« Pt·usu,~ Vessel lnvffltcry H lnck11tc:1 by ANY cl l'he -·· • Ccn~ ~ Range fb(bl1cin Mcr1fo, rud,\g 9tt:attt

lh1tit .3E•4 A:~ • Err•llc soorce 11noe moNlot #'ldicetiO'l • UnfllJ:iWl-, level ltM in ANY Of IM fclk>Mng

• Conl~l Sump • Reader C.11\Cy sumo • S.foguardl &.lrrci ·-l .... • It~ 1n"W11e,l1J11t

R.lnncd 1YQlu1Joni 101u1 m•n"l)Wl1tt, ''°"'' pertc,mma.mtftlncc Cl' m,:Jd;klfions toJy,,ttfflt and eqviprnenl tflM rffUII In an EAi. .... -t!MO l'I\C'I Of til<ffdtO .,. nd ""~·cs 10 CIH"'lielt>Orl liftd td.i'll.!iaft requnmc,ru.s u lo'lg n the wduuon p1oc:Nds as ptaMtd wd Is '..tt.t'iln 11\4 CIPClflhCMI llfmtllOnt il'T'(>OMld b)' Ille ipCIC•'-c opttahng ticfflH f9 lutte l tochftal Bfftw Sed,on 3 fl

OUIOANC! BOX ro" CV)

Powet source means e~er th« A3 o, Bl• 18 KV bus- iS-beng f«d tom eny •1:11t $0.lt«

~"~ N; po.rift m1y be p,<Mdect by Iha OCMr UM s Emergency l>fte' ~1'11t.:r IEOG} by IUCCts'Jf\A X·l•eloNhef tht AlOt a, 4 16KVbut

Alert CA 1 Loss of RCS ln'*ll.ory

Operating Mod• Appllclblllty: 5, 6

lt!tt Tile E~encr CocwdlntlOr' "'10ultl not wttf utttil lh& IIJ:)p«;,tw '""" ,,., e41p&«J but ttould dK'MI• rhrt .wllf u aoon H if 11cl.-.""'*1 lhet fM ronctd.10l'I -vi.Ill Ir~ exCffd lhtt • lc:ebill!I tin'!'

1. RCS1eV1111us-tn1n • 2321nchnatLl-1117 0R U.tt17-t

a.. LossdRCSinwnlc,y Hlftclcai dbY"9'•uuincdllllWI rtM In ANY of&t11 .. ,....,. • ecin, .. ~1Sump • Rc1dc:rC•"1f)'S1J~ • Slt~rd59'n-., • Hddup Tanks • ReiuellngWaterlttu1

CA3 loss ot•ott-.ce •rtd•• On-S,;,fe /lit; Power IO 6'nerg,encyBvssn For 15 m1nuce, o Longe,

Optu flog Mode AppOcabltlfy

EAL Villue s·

6, 8, Defuo led

l'.\O E· 12 RE\'ISIO, 2 C - COLD CONIXl10NS 1,1'11'-0 l -F03

EP3:4 (APP-C-15)

Unusual Event CU1 RCS LHli:tQtt

Opttallog Mod• AppUcllbllll}': 5

EAL Values ·

um The' Emcrgeney C~tlOt thOcJd no4 WM c,nfl ,- tPOf'¢'tb# b,nn, has &J"J~. !wt should dedatl!I rhe e•1ml •• "10I'* u if I• Wbrmted lhfr U,acond,k:in wff llelfe•Cff'd fhe •ppl;cabte . .. t. RCS lukags ,nulls "' the in (y to metnlWI c:r ,ntc,c PZR

tml 1'2ft 12 J:S1h f£t 15 axmncs octooPrr

CU2 UNPlNmED Loss o1 RCS tiwnto,y

Op••lng Mode Appllcllblllly; 6

&Js The E~ Cootd.ntlOt s/kXJld ool wH/1 UINI thtt -,,pbbilil, ~ hH -.p,a:1 but lhouiS Ot!dw~ Ule ft'l!tnt H SOOl'J' H It B O.tffmlnNI U.t tf'le conctifJon wll t!lf fl.-.:ceec/ PfH!! 1PPf,t1Dtl! lone

1. um~.ANNEO RCS lifM,I d'op 11 ~eo by BTME .. ol !tie kilow•ng

• RCS wate, }ewl drop bekr# t9 inChn on ll-11 '7-1 tor 1 ~ mnu1n 01 IO'\Qcr ,men &h« RCS level t>1nd ts tstabll5htcl abo,,e the Re«:tc:r P'feuure, Vtssel WIQ•

• ACS water level dtoo belo«the RCS!e:\/t!IOMd f~ 15 tnttuln a kaiger wMQ • RCSM!\'ti btnd«1nl1bl1hN bdowme Retetct PftSMeVus~ lleftQlt

1. RCS lt'ltll ctnnd be m,cntgqd WUt1 • 1CK1o 01 RCS 11tWnto,y u 1n0<:,1edtr,1ouf\e.l:f,.ltd'ttd .. ~,,M:., AN Y dthe !Qllowing

• CCl'll~1Sumo • Reactc, CIYitvWn'II • St .......... a."" • Holdup Ttnkt • Rdl~Wtt r Tenk

CUJ N:. l'~er C•o,bitity To Efllt:fgency Bunn Reduo:ed 10 1

&n~• ~er Sourt1 lc:w 15M;nuletor'°"por tuththat NJ Ally Adcfrti<ntt &,,gi1 F1Ji.n Would Result in Sllliort

D11tk0llt

EAL Valuts .

~ The EITW'1fflCY COOrdtif'l•tw $/'IOIJltl l'OI ~1.,t "'141 tM w,lelbllt frrtict ,,., rfapSed oc,r thot14.,ld d«IMe ~ ew:nf 11 ,oon ••ii;, o.ltltmtnltd ~I tht condAIOn wJI MeJy eKCe«t the applica~ -1. AC po,;tr c1pabftltj10AJ 4 16 KV AND 93 4 16 KVreOJ«d lo

• Wlgk Pt7#W" 10UICC for 15 IT'llnUIH Cl' kJng«

A. ANY ~onal ~e p(M'« sour« t1dUre Vt rHUll rt Stetion Bl1ci1;0Jt

Rec.ognlllon Calt

> a: 0 I-z w

~ w (!)

~ ~ Cl) u a:

a: w

~ 0.. u <t

Cl) z 0 I'.= u z :::, IL ..J

~ ::E w I-Cl)

> Cl)

(!) z :; w :::, IL w a: z ~ 0 0 I-:::, :r Cl)

9 0 u I

u

ST Ll 'CIE l'L\NTCl.,\SSll'IC,\TION TOOi .

St. Lucie, Rev. 67


Roe. C.I,

IJ)

2 Q ... u z :::, ... _, ~ :. ~ IJ)

>IJ)

Cl z ::; w :::, u. w a:

2

~ I: :::, :c IJ)

0 _, 0 u

I u

CONTAJNMENTClOSURE - Tht prot~th,1ttlydelnto tdions laken to t.eeurg conlalnrnenl and Its associeled wuctures systems tnd c:omponents H I lvndlQnN bttf)t'I' 10 hSfOI\ prOOUct retu~ unotr ~~1stmg plan! conObot)s

IMMINENT - tMlgaliOl'I IClicrlS haw b,een fl\erfKtMt 1ddt6Cltl1! ad.1001, ue nQ e.11prcted lo be succenM. end trende>d 1nk:tmitlion lndcttet. lhM ti\~ eYl'nl CK c:ood•bcn •II occur W'l\ere IMMINEIH tmeh~ are: Sf)l!'.t:1fied they ~all appty

l'J\GE: IJ RE\' ISION: 2

EP3:4

Site Area Emergency

C - COLI) CONDITIONS

Alert CA4 - Basis :

F<Y EAL #t , !he RCS Rehetl Dur1t1on Thfc.~dd ltble acldru..es C«nl)ldt Ion~ fund.1on1 r~weo to, oore cooling tor greatflf 1h•n 60mwMe-s dvrin9 rcfucl•ng and cdd shuld<Jffl modes ...t'itn RCS 1ntegnly ti lnC1ci AC$ Integrity stloUld be eons«:lered 10 be In plati!- wh~ the RCS pre:nJ.Jrl!i boundt.1y is in Ill\ rtttmel coodlKln b lhe ctlld YJUtdown mode d overauon (e g no freue SHls or notM dam~l The slalut dCONT"'NMENT CLOSURE ,n lhti C(ll"l()t10, is ,nmatenal QtWn ftl•l the RCS is~ t1 high prenure bMnerlo lisSKn S)foduct releaH to the enYl,onmenl The 60 r'r'm.ute bme i:af'l"te ShOJld •~°"' sutklent lin'Pe' to rtst.Ofe eool!ng w1 eut lh~e hNng • \OOSlanhal d~hc:o in ~anl safety

Tt>e RCS Ret!HI Dur1t1cn TbrHtlald l,11* al~ adO'essu lhe compi.te IC$$ off\ll')Cti(lnt:teGJlred rot core eoc:finaf«OfHlet thtn lOm.tlllltts dUnng refuelt'lg ind cold :viutdown mot1,n "'Tien com AIWAENt CLOSURE IS HllbllshedbU! RCSll'lltgrityts not Hl&tjlishedocRCS invtntory1' t&l;ll«O ce Q ,WO.IOop CC*Mkln ill P\NRst A, dittYHtd ltlavt ACSll'lte~y~ldbe #HUffied IObe., pl•eti ""hen ltle RC$ Pftt'Wtt t:oil\dary 1, an lctnct1'\tl c.cn4ft!(:n IQr lh<e cdd 1,huldown modi6 ot QJ>fflltien {e v no treeu teal, o, ~e dtmtJ fl\fl •!I~ lO ITWt'IIJte tJrrMt ttame wa!i lnduded to 1ito..o coer1tci adtOn 101e~Ofo I~ h~tl rtrno,.'lffl,lni:;tJon ff~e The1110--.dt"1'ltft1Nttlteof'IJ1~~t'i\llhmt. gi.,1d¥lupr~by~Mntl«ter at-17 Loss olOec.y H••1 Remc)ll'9!" l"'KVJWd lat• In"'" bl1'i) Ind,, btflev'ed to bt C<mervtttvcl ~ tt'lal • to. Ql'ti'Wf'e CCtlt.Jlnment ~"'*' 10 h~ CWCOld tl!fetM 1, Ht~sh~

NM>1drhs1edls • '°11P•l•~sdfwtctiai~niQUlled f« to:e COOWl9 Wtlog refu•ff'loand cdd 1,,WtdQ*"TI modHWhf:fl nt1tber CONTAJNMEHT CLOSlJREncr RCS lnt~"tryare establiJl'led RCS'°tf!Q/'1')'11 if'\jj!ace 'lfrllt;n lh• RCS pre1Mt b«lndsry" in It 1, normal cond.Uoi l<r lh• cold

:,:::.:::.:e~t=!e:, ;;_::,e.~:O~:!r:rnC:::n~:~~; b• r.tusedtnloltleContltnmenl dunng tt\l!ihct:1.1.Pcondllkln CWld 91wbe dirf'Clty r~nffd to the ,en""cr1men1

The: n<.te t "J lnd<:11" !hat , EAL tt not arpllc~ 1f ed1ons •• wccnsl.11 ti 111:~ SOC to~ratlm and RCS 1.tmr-R<ure is bc!an,g redJceo w.tn!" 1tte ~~ 1im. rtllme

In~ l'2" lhe 10 pt, PtUMt ..c,n,. adchun lieultlont whe ... . au,, to hlgti <1ec.y hll!III Jold:J ui,e tf'N! orOVlded 10 t~tlr,• t~r11\at1t .control stH>uld be lot thart 80 m.nv'ln

E1oa11a11cn to Si e /tt ea Eme,p,ncy would ba .,.,.. CS 1 '1hwld botllng rl'W!l ltl s~fittl'I f{e1cror PfttW.tt'I VtJW Jt,vtf IOU. le,O.,o IO(ote Ufl(~

Tr\!:,. tC anc:ltt IHOOalcd EALt Wt! 1»11,,tdon«necrn11flll~ byatnet'lc l~t1tr8o.17 '"I.OIS OfOtuyHul Rtmo,.,tl "Anun'()efOf Pf'lt'tlCWTI~· sothHCRHUflZatioo YOReXing s.nmoen11Jatorl.J.lubechin1n9 RCS levtcl dfferencn 'Wflcn ooerattng 11 1 lffd-'°°P contMlol deeay tlHi removal syst"" desl~. Ind 1.4!\o'el lnstrumenlaboo prctkms c:art lead to coidi\KM't1,~re tk!etyhut re~,sfo.1 an.dcon, Ul"l«w'ffY can occur NRC al'\llfyM!t~ow that t.ner• are 5e(JtM!QeS n,14 can c9l.lW c«e oocOW!rym 15 lo 2-0 mrnu!H and~ ccre-damt,ge wtUWI an hour 11lr, deCl;I' hHI ltffl0'41 IS lost

4 toH d T«hntn l ~eabbor, conponMH 1lone 8 nci Kltendtd lo omS11tv1i, 1n Alf'ft The ume k. trve c,( 1 moment try VNPLANNEO ncwsion •t>ove !he TedH1Kal Sp~a!lm cdd shuld0111n t~atufe~ whtn lhe- htll r«nOVII fl,Jnc on t, JV'I able

The ~eyCOQtd,itto, mute rtMtttt -•t 10 ev.nt, or~• lt,tt lead to tfte conclutten lhll ff(H(lng tt>t EAL iS IMf.'lNENT If In 11\e iuds,nent ofttle Emergtoc:y Coo,dnttOf. an lMMINENT ~uttll«i ii at h•nd lhe dos.r.cttion Shcdd be made a,. It !be lhf,nl'ldd hH t>ttn uc'"eded

El'IP-01-FOJ

(APP-C-16)

Unusual Evenl CU4 - Basis:

n1111Cmayt..apreQJrt,'Cl"ofm01e"'1enou:1condtion,and 11.t!lrts.llft d ccrisidffl!d 10 be a pottnue! o,e,pr1dliltton of lhe level d satety d the plant lri cold shut~'ft the ebilrtyto rtrnOle dcayNI I 1dlH t)l'Wnetfyon lorct-d cocting ilow Operabcn of lhe systems that prO\llde this fCJ'ced ooding may bo je.opatdzed due to the ooh aly k>s<i d eledncel puw« ex RCS anventay &nee the RCS uw ,mnam1, lntad: tn lhe cc»d shutd<:M1' mocfe • large 1nYentor; of wtl« 1s 1v111ltbllt lo keep lfle c:o,,e covered

F.ntry1n10 told 'Shutdown ~s maybe &Uaitnedw1tl11n hOurs d ~•ling ti pow~ Entry into lhe refue~ng mode procedurally m1y net «cur ta 12 hour, or lcnotf an.er the ttldO" nn bf,en Shutt;k'IWft Tttu, the l!t.ahc> thre~ ,na thel"*fO"e the lhrul co dem19ng th@ Nd dad maybe ~er tor evtn!S lhat occw in 1M ,tflJehng mode WJ;Ct, "'•Ol•ted Jud in I~ Rttcior Pwenur,e vuut (ncte 1h11 the hHtup 1rtreac CaJ!n bf io,,,er kr cdd shutdom cond1tlms if th• entry tnto cold shulcfoM\ was fdlOWJng a rttveMal tnld<lition l~QPtf'l1ocsstl(MIObttni.tofflOl"l1tor RCS 1emp,e,11u1e tnd Reader PresS41tlt V,eu.e1 Jf!\h!!I so ui11.1 ese .. ation 10 uu, ,1ert ltvel ~•CM<, CA1 ""'OCC:wt If fltQ\Wtd

Dunno ref\.leMQ the 10'\ld'" IJ'le Reactot Pfet:Wle Vt-1;.e1 wwl not'ITIIIH)' ~ M.-,n11W,t<1 •txwe IJl4 Reado- PretM,o VeHel llnQe Re-.e«no ~iH)'IS ~, decn:•~ '6'1ler level below rtte Ruaor Ptessur~ VuW ff#to• e,e careMly o&annod and proc,eG,nly eo,,t,dltd lo,s, ot lo'"4 GC!Cly Mtl removtl .. •t~.u:C!d i,wtt11c,ym1y fll!:W" tn mere ratlld Stat1H1 .,, RCS teff1)t11twn deot-rdnq on 1h11' 1im. w,c:o ttMdown

Nmnal me.ns d c<re 1e1,,.,tAture 1nek:111.10n al'd A:CS li!vel indtetlo, may not be •"*'ab!eir'lthe r ruetmgmodt Rflklno.r1t mean,oe RH'-10' Ptessure: Vessel IN'el Mcte~ are tr,e,efcre p,oceduralty tnW:ailed lo 1ssu,ethac lhe 1bili:tytomo,itc:rlelft'lwlilnoc b•tinlrrrucled Hoo.t-eWt , ir ah kMt.1 •no 1,em~·ilfute 1nocattM •we io M lost in ~her th• cd..1 ~iluldo,,m d 1e:kleling modlrs , EAL 2 would fHu11 tn ded•ttJKl"I of• t4d16clUQ"I ~ \klu.wal e ....... 1 tNOUEl tt'bcdt temr,cratvre &ndtowl truicaboocanndbt: re\l~wlttWt i5mlnutu•om thek>st of bdh m.-.n1 Ofln0tt:1b0n Etcal:lti<Jli lo Alert 'tWO.IIO be~• CM t,1,ed O"I 1n Wlv.ffllaytofs ot CAA based en ,nee,e.()no Ill le~er,n.e crderte

CU7 - Bosls:

To. puft'OS,t ol lhl, tc af'd Ill HtOQ~l!'d e.-u ts 10 r't«lgllze • Ion cl DC ,>o,.~ com(}ton,i~lf'I• t.t.ilit; to~°' •McOtllrd lhe ,~1 Old~y hetl OJ,ww;;I Cold 9'utdo#n or Ref\Je~~ ~eboos

The lots olthe opeut1Jng f~at11e,trlbft fslob41 conit'Oe.1ed 1r1111s klU raJUll, in tN 11\tibilify to maint#t cotd sb\lltlovlon the e:K9.laliO"I to 1n Alit!fl doeoer CA•

The ~tl'd bus YO!taot is based C1'I the mmi murri btn voltage n,cesS11ry for the q,erauon d Mlet>;relalei:I eQIJlpmen{ Thi, YOU.a91!! \lllj~ shcllJld lnoo,porate • mwgm o( al lNit 1 ~ nWJutN rl ope,•t!on be Itta lh• cnsel d lntbilily 10 ~ Mt mow lotib

fifteen ffllMUltt ...... kleded U t lhttthd4 It> tf(ClUde liltltttftl ot momtnte,y powtlf los,e,-

CUB - Basis:

Tots IC adchssH ertl.1CMty evanh thal oocur In Cdd Sbuldoi!«I or Rd.it: o modH sueh u k.ttl rrws-k>ed!ng e-wnl:1, MG 1111d\l'fflff'lt dMlffl e'lfflls Tok IC fOdicates 11 polenllal d~adallon d the ~Id wfdy ol'lhe plant. wair•ntmg e f~ifictu<n of Unusual Even! (t'lOUE) d usi1icttJOn

lhe tt'fm "su1.19ined" is u'ied lfl ordM lo 1llow ..xclusioo of t:11p,tcted shoo 1,erm pos.tlve tllltUP hllU aom plan~ fUel bundle Of eo'llrOI rOd m~ment,durino co,e .. •ration These~ le1m po,1~ flr1up rain 11e 1he resull of the w:tetS6lft neutton pofll.llttton Ole to, tuOer\bett mu!l4>1C'a1tan

ST Ll ICIE l'Li\1\T CLASSIFIC\TI01' TOOL

St. Lucie, Rev. 67



INTACT - J!the RCS oan be Jre5suriz£dvdl rrinimaloperalrnctions (wlhin 10 rrinutes), Then the RCS is INTACT.

RB>UCEO r:NVENTORY - A~ oocl~ coodbon v.hen fuel is in the Reactor Vessel and the Reactor Vessel water leo.el is betv,een 3 reei below the IDo of tho Reac:torVessel -ill'ld °""""*'the ocoathe .,.,.,.. of the RCS hot le<lsnozzles at lleReaclorv.s.el (33' Oo31"3"bvT\'IIOfll.ll\D,l-09.t4!

SOI.ID PUWT OPERATIONS - 'll!1en thepres,uizef is filled anl /he RCS is in a ..,1er-<did ccndi icncbing heahlp andarlcbwn between hot shuklov,n and reruea,g ccnditioos. lOBl>RCS-112)

UNPLANNED - A parameter charge a, an event rhal is not tho reslA of an tnlended '""*-' and....,.,.. com,ciiw c, m'lil,aiive actions.

CA4 In 1y IO Mairllain Plan/ in Cold Sludown.

5, 6

EAL Values:

1. An UNPUINNED.,..,. resulis in RCS~ i,,,* than 200"F br ~th.mthe specifieddr.mon ootable.

Table: RCS R.oheal Duration Thrt!ibolds

RCS Integrity - ,-n .. ~- ll\nlion Oosur• INTACT flO (bul NOT RCS REDUCED NIA minutes•

INVENTORYl

Eslal>lished ,/.V

NOT INTACT OR RCS REDUCED mnu1es• INVENTORY

NOTEsiailished 0 mnJles

• • SOC is in ope,aton .,;,t,;n lhis time m,e ,nd RCS lelrp!rahR is l>eing redooed, thoE/>J.. is NOT ~ .

Q!!

2.An UNPLANNED everi resuls in RCS - rise ~lhan 10 psi due to a los> of RCS coding. (This EAL does NOT apply in SOLID RANT OPERA=)

C - COLD CONDITIONS 14 EAL -COLD BASIS PAGEREVIS10 N: I ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIF1CATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-C-17)

Unusual Event C U4 UNPlANNED Loss of Dec'} Heat Rerroral Capal,Jly wlh

lrradated Fuel in h! Readm" Vesset

Ope~ting M-Appr.cabii ty: 5, 6

EAL Volues:

1. M UNPLANNED ... nt r..uts in RCS iempera\ul1! exoeecing 200'F

ill!

2. Loss of ail RCS temperarure AND RCS lewl indication fer 15 ...,.. .... ...__

CUT Loss a Roqui'ed DC Power l'or 15 r.fnJles Or Longe,-.

Operating ,._ Appr.,..,.lily: 5, 6

EAL V,1lues:

1. less than 112Von 1[21o' AND 1(2'JBr£'1'Ji'ed 1251/DC busses fcr 15....-.orlonger.

CU8 lnadverten!Criicaliy.

Oponting M-Applicabilily: 5 , 6

EAL Volues:

1. UNPLANNED 5U5lained pow,e s!artup --a, l"U2¥ instn..merbti<n

C - COLD CONDJTIONS

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

~ w :c >-

~ 0

a: w

~ u 0

14

II) z

§ z :::::,

~

~ ::i;w Iii ~ C> z :::; w :::::, ... w a: z

~ 5 :c (/)

0 ...J 0 0

I 0

C-COLDCONDITIONS 15



EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-C-18)

Unusual Event CU6-Basis:

~=~=r=~=,~~~u:s. lbs EAL is i1lended lo be used only when eidraadinary l1'll!iYlS (e~ relayi,g cl normalico from radio lransm.,ions, indNdJals be;,g sent ID oikite looalions, ei:.) are being ulil1zed ID make ocmru,icolioos possible.

The r.s1 ror O<Kile camuicalions bss enoor!l)a5Se< lhe lossd all means oloorm,unicaljcnsroufi1elyused kirClf)Efo!iom..

The Rs1 for oikite oormuicaoons loss eooorT1)'1Sses lhe loss d all means o!COTIITl.mlaliooroumelyused aoff-siteemergeooynotifi-._

R- COLD CONDITIONS 15

St. Lucie, Rev. 67


Site ArN Emergency I Alert Unusual Event """'¥""°" r""~ CU6 lass d All On-site a at-Carrmricaf..-.s Capabilities.

""I :::. w

Opeming Mode Applicabiity: 5, 6, Defueled I-U)

>-EAi. v.iues: U)

1. loss of ALL d 1he lcllowv,g m-sile oormmi:a!ion methods C) :z

affedir1g fhe ability to pe,bm ....... operalicns: U) :i • Plan! Pago z w Ul

• Plan!Radios s ir ~ • C<nmerci.,I Phones' W-

.QB < er i-~

_ u 2.1..oos of All of the fcllowir,g cff-oile <DmlUf"8:aron methods in zZ

I GU,-, FOR CU6 I ::, ;= ir

I BTHERbm: :::. I 'Canmerciiil ohones ildude installed cell llhones in the QinJrol Ram but

I St.t,, and Courtly Notifocations

I :::. g--1

rd persooal ceD phones.

8 I- ~ Hot Ril,gdoN, (HRD) ::, . Canmetcial pllone' J: . Elm!t U)

.llB C -I 0

I HRC Notifications

I u . EmerijencyNotifica1ia1Syslem(ENS) I . ~~t u

C - COLD CONDIDONS 16 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL C - COLD CONDIDONS 16




C -COLD CONDITIONS 17 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIF1CATION TOOL R- COLD CONDillONS 17



RECOGNITION CATEGORY H

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS

AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

H-COWCONDIDONS 18 EAL-COW BASIS PAGEREVISION: I STLUCIEPLANfCLASSIFICATIONTOOL H- COLDCONDITIONS 18


~ u.. ct fl)

~ :5 D.. C) z ~ UJ u.. u.. ct fl) z 0 ,=. l5 z 0 ()

a:: w ::c b C z ct fl) C a::

~ ::c I

::c


EAL #1 ...,...,,..,es oonci5cns under"""'*' a 1-0STILE ACTION has

~~i=~~~~am~:~~~ Junctions and "°'*'>I cl that equipnent cannot be transfemd IO and operated lrom anoCher locaticn

These silfely functions are raaciivity oamrol. RCS .....,1ay, anl sec<nfary

~~":":"'~!":.:.....~~~=~ is net met.

Alert HA4-Basis:

EAl.112 _se, fan of spent fuel ax,ing systems as a result d HOST!LE ACTION ff IMMNEHT·fuel dilmOll" is likely, S\d1 as""""1 a ~olf-loadeo reaclor oon, is in the spel1I fuel pool

The fact lhal lhe sile is ,mer sericu, att.d or is an idenlilied attad< taryet wilh mininal time airai-lcr rurthe,: pn!ll,llalion or-..i assiis1ance

+------ ----~------------1 to arrive requires a~ statedreadness and i~ d 1-,-,,,,.,--,,,.....,...--=S"i~te"-'-Ar=-=e-=a"E=-m=e,.,r=e"nc=._------1 :=• ;"sh=at can be elll!diYe (!iUCh as on-site evacuation.

HS4-Basis:

Tlisconci..., repn,serrts an esciila!od lhreal lo plan! solely above Iha! ocnbined in the A\ert in that a """1,e force has progressed from lhe OfflER CON'TRCJI.LBl AREA lo t,e PROTECTED AR£A

Tlis EAL addresses the ocomgency b- a very r.,pd prog<ssicn cl """'1is. !Ufl as Iha! e,q,erienced on September 11. 2001 . It is nol prarised sole!y co t,e potential f<l< a radiolcgical -.._ Rather the issue ind.- !he

=.,~d~l!mldue~~~:-=::!i.~ The fad 1'"11 the site is under serious ailact with minimal ane avalable tr:,, ftA1hef p-ep.arabon or adclbona1 assistance tc ill'TM? requin!s Ohde Resf>onse Cl<ganizalion (ORO) readiiess anl p,eparation for Ille irr!>lenierulion d j>Oledive ............

This EAL adcnsses the potential b" ~ very rapid Pf'[email protected] of evem due ID a HOSTI£ ACTION. It is nol ~ IO address incidenls Iha!""' aoode<1lal """"1s a acts cl CM disdJedieflce, such as smal am.ill "'l)acl. tu,la,;, or """""1 d'5j)Uh,s t,er-.....,, employees .,;itin lhe PROTECTED AREA. lbose """"1s a.-e adequalely -sed by other EAls.

Escalation of this enagency classificalion level, d ~ ¥«>Uld be based an acwal ffant status alter irrpaa or ll"'Q'l>Ssio, of o<tacil.

Alert HA1 -Basis:

The deii!frnNlicn of "aedtie" 15 mP!' through use of nonna&:,n bJ'ld in lhe Physical Sea.wily Plan.

(Cantinurd in nexl col1m1nl

H-COLDCONDIDONS 19 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PlANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL

Unusual Event HU4 - Basis (continued):

EAL #3 is to enSI.X'e lhat noc.fications ir Ile an::r..in lhrea1 a~ made in a lmely....,,..... and that Oflsite Rospcnse ~ (OROs) and <(ant ~ el are at ii state of heigh\ened atNart!fll!S'S regard~ he crMh,e IITNt. II is not the inten1 of this EAL to replilce exi5mg ncr>-hostile rela:e<l EALsi~-

Tlis EAL is mel """"1 a planl recen,es inbma1ia1 n,ganli,g an ain:ra1t

~~~~y,:'~t.=;:.= treat is node need dedan,""' lkuwal &en!.

The NRC Headquart..., Operalioos Off,cer (HOO) wll ~ .1D lhe ficensee if the~ ~ ~ adnef (aitiner tS rTllSN"lt k» be a large aircraft wi!h lhe potential f<l< c""'5ing s.v,ificant damage to lhe plan!). The s1alus and size of the plane may be po,ided by NORAD hough the NRC.

Escalalial IDAlerl l!f1ll!flll!OClda"51icalimlew!Wlllid be via HM woold ~lthe.ihre;atirl\d,esanairiinerwi1hin31lminulesof ihe

HU1 - Basis:

The US Geological Survey (USGS) Nalional Earthquake l'*<malioo CE<ur can confim l an eorhJ.,ake has oocurred in the .,.... d lhe plant.

EAl.112 is bosed oo the as"""!'lion lhal a - slri~ (touching dew,) or high - .,;lhin PROTECT Bl AREA.

EAl.#3 Tlis EAL -. .... the elled of intemal llooding caused by ...,.s such as~ iailult!s, equ~ rnisal~ or<Mage adMy rri,haps.

H - COLD CONDITIONS 19



Site Area Emergency HG1 HOSTILEACTION Resuffing in Loss d Pt,y,icalCorm,ld HS4 H06TllE ACTIONYrithin lhe PROTECTED AREA

!he Facility.

Operalilg Mode Applicabifily: Al l Operating Mode ApplicabiUly: All

EAL Values: EAL Values:

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has OOC\ffl!d 5Ud1 lhal pl;rt pe,,onnel are 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is OCCUTrQ er hiis ooam!d wilin lhe la1ilble to operale £<JJpnm1 _,;red lo monain safely functions_ PROTECTED AREA as "'l'(lried by 1he Se<laity Shift SUpervisor.

gi

2- A HOSTILE ACTION has CiRJ5Ed lalure d Spen Fuel Cooling Systems ard !Mh ENT Juel dam;,;ie is likely b- • ITI!shly offloaded - con, in pool.

HS2 Contru1 lbim Evawalim Has Been Initialed and l'1anl Cantrnl

Cannot be --


EAL Values:

1. Ccrirol Room evacuation has been initialed.

AND

AIRLINER-Aimer is nv,ant to be • 1""'" ain:raft ,'lith 1he pocenlial for Cill/"11 sialilicarc damage io lhe plant.

ESSEHTIAL AREAS - Areas Yrithin 1he PROTECTED Af>:EA, lhal oont.n. eqlipmen. s)51em5. ~ a material. !he 1,.;1...,_ dl!slruclioo. a release d whim oould dir1!dty <>< indin!dJy endange, 1he pmlic bealih and safety by eJll'05UI" io ra<ialion.

FRESH.. Y Off.l.OADED REACTOR CORE IN POOL - A re<lvy al-loaded react« coo,. in lhe Soer< Fve! Pool. exi5's d\mQ the period d 1irne ffl1Efl core off..Joad beQnS Ul'til oore reloiJd is a:ndefe..

HOSlllE ACTION- An ad t""'1fd a NucJe.,r Po\"" Plant (NPP) a its persomel lhal irdJ<les Che use of Yiclenl lorce lodesln7f e<j\Jipment. take hostages. andJCI" inlimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This inclJcies ~ by ar. tand, er W3fer usilg ~ expmiw:s, PROJECTIL.Es. whicles, a olher -ces used to deiver deslructi"" lm:e. 01her ads that satisfy the °"""' in&efO rrav be include<I. HOSTLE ACTio.l sholM not be ccnslrued to include - d aw dsclledience er lelonicus acts that are no< pan d a °"""'"ed atlacf< on the NPP. Ncn<em>rism-based EAls 5hJuld be used to adit1!ss such actMties (i.e. ths may include vime!lt ads be!ween indMcblls in tt,e °"""' OOflD<Jlledarea).

IMMINENT - r.tt,palioo actions hiive been inellec&,e. addmnal acticns ;ire nol ex,,eded., be successU. and 1rl!nded infcrmalion indicates lhal !he ewnt orcoodition ,.,;11 oau. 1Mlere lMMINENTtimelrames are soeciied. they wn aoi>I'/.

owtER CONTROLLED AREA - That pcl1ioo d R'L properly SUITO<l'ldilg .ind inctuclng lhe Sl Lucie - .. - Pin .tiich is •ubied to limited access..-.! ocniJd .. deemed approprialo by FPL (EP\an)

PROTECTED AREA- The araa (within tt,. Ol'\INER CON1ROLLEDAREAJ ooct.<>iedbvlte rudearims .ind associated.....,_. and lacill!ies enclosed within the seainty-lenoo. The .... wllhin mich ilCOOlrial,iljty cf persan,1 is marianed in .. ""'"""'"''·

SECURITY CONomoN-Any 5eourity E.,.. as USU!d ., the_.., seariy conu,gencyplan that cmstillJtes a lhn!atl~ 1osAe ..,...;ty. lhn!al/risk to site personnel. a a potenlial degradation to the lewl d salety d 1he plan. A SECURITY COIOTION does nol inwlve a HOSTILE ACTION.

VISlBlE DAMAGE-Damaoe lo --a slrualft flal isreadlvobservable "'bxrt- tesliu a: analv>i'- llamaQe is suffioi!ot to cause ooncem "'ll"rding 1he corinled operat,ity or reliability d h! afedl!d slructlJre. system. a <lOIT,x,nenl Ei<arrv,, clamage idJdes: deloonation due to heal <r mpact. denti,g, penetration. ~ cracking. and pan bli5tErirv. Slriace tlenishes (e.g. pan cno,,iru saaiches) - nol be induded

Alert Unusual Event HA4 HOSTILE ACTION 'ldlin lhe CMNER CONlRl'.JlllD AREA er Airborne H U4 Coofirmed SEOJRITY CON)ITION or Threal Whdl

Alt>cl< Tinat Indicates a l'l>tential Degrada1ion in the L ... 1 of Safety of thef'l;n.

Operating Mode Applicabilily: All

EALVah . .11ts:

I. A HOSTILE ACTION is ocam,g « has OOC\ffl!d ..,;n lhe O\'INER CON1ROllED AREAas""'°""d bylhe Seo.Jrity Sffil ~ -

Q!!

2-A validaledooliic:atianfroml\RC dan AIIUNERalla<:k-withn30 rrinutes d the e..

Operating Mode Applicallilily: All

EALValuos:

HA 1 Natural"' Deslrudive Phenanena Allecting ESSENTIAi. AREAs.

Operating Mode Ajlplic.11lilily: All

EALValuos:

1. Seisnicevenl1J1!alerthan Operating Basis Eartb:J,,*e (OBE) asindicated by seismicrutn.nema!ioo(Amoociator5-36{SMJ)GREATERTH.6.ND.ll!ig.

AND

a. Elilfthquae ronlnned by ANY d the folllJWilQ: • 8ri1qual;e r.11 in plant • US Geological S..V.., (\)SGS) National Earthqt.lale lnfonnation Cenfer • Coolrd Room indi,alion a degraded perfmNme"' S)'5lems required

forlhesafe shu1xlown cf lhel'D'l

Q!!

2- Toma:lo sr irQORhi!1lw.nds 1J1!alerthan 1201T¢resultng i1 VISIBLE OMIAGE to ANY d lhe lcllowing s1ructns C<riaffling safety systems« oorrpooenl OR Coolrd Room indlc.alion ddegraded p<!ffamanced those salety systems:

Reaclcr Cootaimient Eluildr,g .ind Slield Buiding

Reaclcr Puz.uy Euldilg (RAB)

steamTrestteAn,;,,

Condensate S~ Tank (CST)

lntalle Cooli1g Wale< (10.Vt

Co<rplrett COOiing Water (CCVI) platbmarea

Emergency Diesel Generator BlildirQ

Diesel Oil storage Tri (DOST)

Ultin\lle Heal Sn UHS Relueli

Q!! Continued on next a e

Operating M-1\pplical>lity: All

EAL Values:

1. A SECURITY CONDITION lhiil does NOT involve a H0STL£ ACTION as repo,1ed by lte Sea..riy Shift S\4>eMsor.

.Q!!

2-AcndbleSll.uoieseaa,'lytlreat"'1ilicilli<n

.Q!!

3. A -..I nolilicalion lrom NRC provi,mg normalioo of an ai'tr.lfllhreat

HU1 Nall.la! or Oes1rwive f'hemmena Meeting lhe PROTECTED AREA.

Opeming M- Applicability: A [I

EALValuos:

.Q!!

2- T«nadc s1rilting within PROTEClcD AREA bouldary 00 hi{II windsgreaterflan 120....._

.Q!!

3. lnll!n:lol lloodirQ that has Cho poter,oal to affed safety relaled e<JJipmmt n,q.,ired by T echoical Specika!ions lor 1te ot.lTOnl operali,g mode in Alff d lte -wig areas:

Cantrnlfbxn

Cable Speadilg Room

Vital s,~tdlgear Room

Steam Trestle Ma

Intake ShJchre

lnlal<e Coolr,g W""1< (1CW)

~CbOlingW-{CCW)

~~~;~:~(RAB)

H- COLD CONDffiONS 20 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H - COLD CONDITIONS


z e c( ::, u

~ ex: u

~ ~ w w 0 c(

~ z i ex: 0 ..J

~ ::, I<( z

20

E u. c( (/)

~ s a. c., z j::

frl u. u. <( (/) z 0 E 0 z 0 u ex: w ::r. lo 0 z <(

~ ex:

~ ::x:: I

::x::

Cl z § w u.. u.. <(

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~~ zw Ou.. (J < 0:: !/)

wr:r z l:;'.3 C a. z <(

r:! 0::

~ I

:r

H - COLD CONDITTONS 21


Site ATeo Emergency

ESSENTIAL AREAS - AINs ,,lhin the PROTECTED AREA. Iha! -~SV>lems.CXlfTCICO<llls.«material, thelaan, de5'ruc6m, or release d .,t,ich ooulddn!dlv cr irdredlv~ the public hedl an! safely by._ 1o r.oc1-,.

PROTECTED AREA - The anY (1'ithin the OWNER CONTROUED AREA)~bylhe nuclear...ts and-~and facilities enclosed within lhe seariv perirreter Ienco. The ...,. wilhin -~lilvofoe,,a,nelismantain<d11a1u•T1e<llEflCV.

Alert HA1 - Basis:

EAL '3 _..s.sos lhe ellect of internal flooding caused by evsis sud, as ;:"~"'::;,~~:~---~:511~.H in<llstrial sar.ty hazards (e.g. eleclrical ,i,ocl) Iha( pn,cule ,-y access to- crmoritol'saletyequ;p,n,nt. The ir1illliily to"""'""" operate or rn:>nilcr safety eqiipmenl repn,sents an actual er -tial pcienllal degrad_, of ... - of safely of the plant.

Fladng as used 11 llis EAL desaibes • condition ..i-..- is en1emg the room r. «lhan IIStlFed-"""'15 capat,le o/.,,.,.,..,_ r...tling ,n a rise of....,. lewelmth11 lhe room. <hssifioalion of fhil EAL shcud nol be dl!l"!'d .-CQ11!Ctive ac1oons..,, ~ 1a1<en 1o iscln lhe Wllll!r sourco.

EAL M _..,.... lhe lmallo salety-edl!<JJ,pm,nl in_.i by PROJECTIL.Es generall!d by main llmne roiating "°"""""" failLns. lherrin, lhisEAL is consostent ,o'fl the demilicn of .-,ALERT 11 lhal flo polen0ol em1s for .......i or subsbnlial potential degada<at of lho - o/ ..r.tyoffloplant.

EAL115_..,... vehicle l7aShe!i "'bn lhe PROTECTED"8£Alhal - 11 VIS&E DAMAGE to ESSENTlALN'!E>Scrndication of ~ to safety 5UUcllRs. systems. ... ~ oontaini,g lr1tiions and sys1ems ,e<Jired for ..,. shuibMl of lhe pin

EAL Ml_..,.... olher """""'""' Iha! res<il 11 VISIBLE OAAIAGE ID the ESSENTlAL MEAS or IMUts in indication d damage ID struchns.. s)'lems. or c:ar,ponems corunng l\n:tions and systems l1!qUftd b --of the pin (such as luricane and sbm suve) NI can iilso be pnarsoB of nae Sl'f'OJs events.

EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL

Unusual Event HU1 - Basis:

EALMad<nssesmain llmneroiatingocrnpcnenl lail\ns of swli<:!ent ~"'=:::..~~~~=~~ ---cl:les nol meet 1he inlml o/ lhis EAL because I did not irrpact nc<mal operalioo of lhe plant.

Of map-ooncem is the pci,rial larioakage of corrlJustlllofluids

~~~~~~::~Mt .. and HU3.

Ths EAL is COl1SISU!fll with lhe definition of• Nofificatioo o/ Urmual Ewnt c>~~~-==~=izrg dasslJCalioo lo H.\ 1 is basod on don,ago done by PROJECTl.ES gener>ted byflo faiklre or in ccnjunctionwith a sloam gener-lUbe JU!)l1n. These .,..... wculd be dassiliod by lhe ra<iolcgical ICs or Fissicn product Barier lCs.

EAL 115 addn!sses nahr.ll ...-phencmena of a luricane w,mng an! .associated rain rai ind saorm sll'gll!S..

Escalation o/ tis ......._dassilicaion lewl, l~e, would be based a, \IISllll.E ~ or by cchef in plant oondlion5. ,ia H.\ I.

H - COLD CONDITIONS 2 1



IIEfNTlOII BOll

PROJECTILE- An object dirl!C'ted toward a Nude.at Power ~ {NPP) tha.t could c.,use conoem for its contim.d operability, tefilrbiUty, or JM!"Ofll"I-' ut.ty.

PROTECTED AREA - The ~a (wilt'i, the ONNER COtfl"ROlLED AREA) oocuoied by the nudear I.M'lils and a5sodated equiprr,!!:nt ilnd f~lit>H ~ within 1he secunty peimeter fence. The area within which accountability of penorv,el is maintained in an emergency.

V1SIBLE DAMAGE - 0.1i11"1aQe IO ~t or 5lruC'bxe that ts

r?adity obsefvable wfttloul me,iSl.-efflffllS, testmQ. or- an.a.1'¥5is 0am.J.Re is sufficient to cause concern ~ril'IA the ca,tinue,d operabiity or r..tiability of the affected WVciLn. system. « ~nt. Exampl@ damage indudes: defonNtion due to Mat or ~ denting. penetration, rupture. oraddng. and paint btistenng. s...tace blemish..s (e.g .• paint chipping, Scr,J.tch@s) should OOl be irdJded.

H - COlD CONDITIONS 22 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2

EP3:4

Alut Unusual Event HA 1 (Continued) HU1 (Continued)

3. lntemal ~ing f'I AH Y olthe fcUo;n'lg structures fesuttingin an efeccrica '- Turbine failure rM-Ulting in CHenQ pen@lra on or damage to shod! h<Uard that p,redi.des access to operate or monitor safety equipment OR turbi ne or generato,- seals. Control Room ind,cation of degr.aded performance of those safety s~t«TIS:

R•actot Auril,ry 8Yildir,g (RAB) -0 6 ft. & t g_5 ft E.1e .. •ation1

S:eam Trestl! Area

Intake Structure

Intake Coofing Wa:er (IC'N)

~nt Cooling Wat.r (CCW)

~ OiM@IGenrff".ator Butir,g

4. Turbine f ~a:ed PROJECTILES re:sur.ing 10 VlS!BLE DAMAGE to or ~hbon of ANY of the following s:ructLns conuining safety systems or oompone,nts OR Col"'trol Room indication of degr-~ ~ of those s.£etysys:~

Re.lCCOI Con:..Jinrnef"t Build.-.g and Sreeld Butkti~

Re3Ctor Auxibry Building (RAB)

Steam Trest» Area

ln:.JM Goofing Watar (ICW)

eo.r,,cnent Cooling W""' !CCW) pfatfurm area

. HI Oil Stofag• Ta (DOST)

Refueli Wa!«T.ank

5. Vehicle, er.ash ulttng in VISI BLE DAMAGE to AHY of tne tonowing ~t,.arH containing s.a'e-ty 'Fj~rm. or oompontiU OR Control Room indica~ d ~ DQffomuooe d~v s.Te.y iystem5

Re Con~ Buidng .1.nd Shaeld Bui !ding

Re~or Auxili11ry BIAdrc;I (RAB)

I~ Cooling Walat" (ICW)

~ Cooing W.atM" (CCVV) piatform area

Emef'Qency Dies~ Gener.110r Building

Condensate S;or ·~Tank (CST) Oles~ Oil Storage Tank (DO Sn

6. Natural DCCUrtM''ICH resulting tn VlSIBLE OM'AGE to ANY of the folkw.ing structur@s contail'Wlg ~uipmerrt [email protected],Y for safe shu:.down. OR h.a5 c.>uMd daim.1g,t as evict&nced by Con· Room indic.Jtion of dt:gr~ed ~e ol ~liysl@mS"

C.-.ble Spff.JdinQ Room

Vr.al~Room

Reacu,, Auxiio,y Building (RAB) --0.5 ft. & 1Q.5 ft E~ations

Ste.3m T~sU• lvea

ST LUCIE PIANT CLASSIF1CATION TOOL

(APP-C-25)

ln~e 1nJCl\.«'e

lntMe Cooling Wat~ (tCWl

~Cooling W,ter (CCW)

Eme'VfflCY Dfesel Generator Build!""

5. Natural occurrences a...,.ectr.g 1M PROTECTED AREA: ANY d the foll0'\4.;ng:

• Contirrned hurricane waming is in flfea. • Low irnake canal !eve{ of· 10.5 ft. MLW for 1 hour or mere. • Visu.11 sightings by st.iticn personnel that water levels YW

approac:ha'lg storm drain !l)'N'm cap.acrty.

H - COLD CONDmONS

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

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H - COLD CONDITIONS 23


EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2

EP3:4

G

Alert HA2 - Basis:

VISIBLE DAMAGE i5 uwd to identity the magnitudR of th@ FIRE Of

EXPLOSION and to disaiminale against minor FIRES and EXPLOSIONS.

The reference lo structur@s containing safe ty systems or arnponems is induded to discriminate against FIRES or EXPLOSIONS in m!ll h.a,mg a low prob.ibiity of affecting safe op9ration. Th@ significanoa h..-e is no11ha1 a ufety system was ~raided but the fact th.at the FJRE or EXPl.OSiON wn large enough co cause damage u, these systems.

Th. use of VtSlBLE DMtAGE YlCMd not be Jl"1terpre~ .as mandating a l9ngthydNn.age HHHl'Tll!ntprior clas.si#jcajon. Th~ded.ara:jonofan A1@rt and the actJv.r.xn d tM TechntCJJ Support C@nt@r win pro,.ide 1he ~ Coordiiawr witll th~ l"MOUtCl!s needed to~ detailed damage a.ssessml!nti.

Thi Eme"gel"lcy Cooniiiutor also~ to oonS1der clf1I/ serurity aspli'CtS cl the EXPLOSION.

Escalation of thts amefVt!ncy dusifi~ficrt l@wl, If~:•~ I t>. b.aud on Sys1em Mal!unclions, F'ssion Product B.lm&f Degl'3dabon or Abnorm~ Rad LPvels / R.adiologic..'11 EfflU@flt IC--s.

Unusual Event HU2 - Basis: (Continued)

EALl3 In addition to a FIRE addressed by EAL # 1 er EAL #2, a Fl RE within 1he plant PROTECTED AREA not .xtinguished within 00-mim.r.es may aJso po<entiatly degrade the level of plant nfety.

EAL#4 If a FIRE "'than the plant PROTECTED AREA is d suffidene SW! 10 requiA! a response by an off5ite fi.~ting agency (e.g .• a local town Fire ~t). then thto lev9' of Jbr,t s.at.,ty ii. pot8'0tialty degraded. The dispa1Ch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an ~ deda<•*'° only W•is neoded .,actively ,uppon Infighting o11oru; because the fire is beyond th. ~bility ofU'M! Fire BrQadetoeXbnguish. Dedarabon is no( necessary if the .agency ~s are placed on s~ by. o, supporting post ~hment rKOYery or invutig.J1ion actions.

Ba:sis-Rel~t@d ReqlirHMnts from Appendix R .nd NFPA-805

App.ndix R to 10 CFR 50, NtH in ~rt th~ Cmarion 3 of AWMdx A» hs ~ !H>ecifin that "Strucb.1-es, systems. ~ components~ ID s.if.ty sh.11 be desigDIMf .and ~t@d tc minimiz:•. consist.nt Wlh other u f~ rwquirwnwnts. the probabifity and •ffect of firH and • xplosions.•

f--------U-n_u_s_u_a_l _E_v_e_n_t _______ --1 ~~~:;:= ;:' :;!5!7e~=:eS:~~ ~:-~ ;:::ri: f-,,.,-,,..--=--,.---'-'==.:...::=='----------1 any op.rationail mode .nd plant oonfig~ wiK not prevent the plant horn

HU-2 - Basis: ach~v,r,g Yid maintaining the fuel in a safe and suble condition.•

nu lC addtes'M!:s the m.a,gnitude and extent of FIRES that may be indicativ• of a poten · degrad.nion of the le~ al s.af~ty of th9 plant

EAL #1 TI,e.,:entollhe 1~nut~dur.aticn is tosia th4!: FlREandto~te

S1 .511l.lll FIRES 11'\Jt are readily extingU!Shed (e._g , 5t110idenng w.nl~ paper skel) In add°ltl<ln ;o alainns. other R :bc~.1ions of a P.RE ClQl,.jkf be a d."Op n fire main pressure, au:omatc actrva:.ioo of a suppre..ssion systffl1. 01.C.

Upon reoeipc. operaxn: wil tah prc:mpt actions to confwm h vafdty of .,, I fire abrm. tndicabon, or r1!pOrt.. For EAL .use,smen; purposes. the ~ ckoc::iaration clock suns at the t!me that the · • al al.arm. indie.ation. or .-.pot1 was r~ and not the time th.a1 a suhsequ.nt ..... nlicatJon ac1ion w.u p«fom»d. Similarly. the Ml' dlx.atlOO doc:frl; also sbrts at the 11me of r.eoeipt ol the Initial 31.im,, Indication or report.

EAL"2 lhi5 EAL addrasses reoe·pt d .a single fire ~.rm. ard the e.ds:eno.2 d .ll

FIRE is net Y@rified (i.~ .. proved or disproved) w,thin 30-minut.H of h alarm. Upon receipt. operators will take prompt actions to confirm the v.Jidrty of ,1 single tint .al~ Fa- EAL u!iffsment purposes.. the 30-minvte dock s.tafb .at the time that the initial alarm was: r.ea,iw-d. and nae the t;me th.J.l 11 51.Jbsequent wrification ~ w:n perfunnotd.

A Sfl"Ve tire a\.Jnn, absent d'Jl@f NcatHns) d a ARE. may~ 1.nd1rut1ve of equipment faiture or .a spurious activabon. and not an .ac:tu.JI FIRE. For this re..JSOO. addmorol time is allow'id to verify the v,1hdity ot the .iJ.lrm. The 30-mnute period 1s .:a re.Jsonable amount ot time to de~erm:M if an actual FIRE ex.,sts; how'l!vw. ~erth,>[email protected]~t infomuoon tciw: oontr.ary. ft is .usumed th.at an actu FIRE is in progress

If .1n actual ARE is .. ~@d by a report from the 6elcl, th.n EAL #1 Is irnrMd~~ ~~. and the emergency mus: be~ rf h FIRE ,s

rot ~n~ v.i'hn 1~minutes of the repon. ff th~ alarm is verified to be due- to an equipmwrt fa:lur• or a spurious activation.. and 1h11 ~ ooo.n wilt'wn 30-minutes. of the receipt of the alann. then chis EAL is not applica~ and ro emergency dedaration ts warranted.

~ oonsideri~ the effects of fn. those sy§t.lnls as50aated with ~g and maintdlinrtg safe shutdown conditions assume major irnpc::,rur,nc. beciluse a safe sh.rtdown suooess path. free d fire d~~. rn.1st ~ .available to tnMI the nudear safety goals, objectives and ~ criteria for a tire~ any plant oper.ation.11 mode or con'igura.:.ion.

Becaus.e may affect safe shutdOM"I systems .and because the loss d M"ICtlOn of systems used to rrilig.ate the con.wquenoes of design basi<I ~l'S under post.fire conditions ck>es not per se i"l)aCt public safety, h t1ff<f IO limt fire damage ID systems r4!ql.lnd 'iO adffve and rroi:nt.aiii 5.1fe shutdown conditions is gr-Rater than tt'lre need to limit firw damage 10 t-ose sys::ems req\,a"ed to mitig:ate the oonwquences of ~n b.lsis acode.nts.

In addition. Appendix R IO 1 O CFR 00. requrru. among other consklera.tions.. th@ used 1~ tire barri«'s for the- eoclosl.ft c1 cabh! and eq..r.prnent and as.sociated ~safety circub done rwdundant train {G 2..c). E~n though St Lucie h.n .adop~ the a.!tem.J.te a ppro.:teh provided by NFPA-00!5 in lieu of the detfflritw51.ic ~ uhments d Appendtll. R. the JO-minutes to verify .a single alarm as used In EAL HU2.2 is considered a reasonable amount of time to de1ermine if an .actual FIRE i'xiS1' without presenting a cha!lqe to the nuclNr saf@fy perfonnanoe <::r'Mria.

~ng upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalabon of the ~ d.ass~tion level would be via St Lucie EAL HA.2.

ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H - COLD CONDITIONS 23



DEFNT10N BOX

ESSENTIAL AREAS -Areas wiihin the PROTECTED AREA. that contains equpmMt. sys:ems, oomponents., or m.1terial , the failure. des1TUCrion. or retea.:se ofwhidi could dire,cdy or indirectty end.309~ the public hHtth and s.af~ty by Hl)O!i~ to raciation.

EXPLOS IO N -A rapid. viotent. unconfined combustion. or c..nas:rophtc failure cl pres..suriz@dienergized equipment 1h.at rnparts energy of sufficient force to pote,ntially damage permanent structurH. sys:ems.. or oomponenlS.

FIRE - CorrbJstion ch..taaenzed by heat .ind Uahl Source,s of smoke such as sl:icoma drive belts or 0Yefhea1ed elearic.at e<Jwpmeni do not constit~e FIRES. Observation of flame is i;n;ferred but is NOT reouirHI iflaroe ouantr.les rA ~e and hut.we obs.et'\~.

NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS -Activities a t the pt.vrt site ,1s~ted \MU'! rou:ine testing, maime.nance, °' e,qu;pment operams. in aca>fdanoe 1Mth normal operating Of .idmiristrafM! prooedufes. En!ry in:o abnonnal or emergency operating procedures, or deviation from nonnal seaxity or radiologicaJ controls poslUr-e. tS a departure from NORMAL PLANT QDERA TIONS

PROTECTED AREA - The are.J (witrir, the O'NNER CONTROLLED AR~ oceupied by the .nocieY \.Wt.5. .ind a:ssoci.iad eouiomem ard facilities @-fldosed W1hin the Hcurity [email protected] ,~. The area 'Mt.hin whidi .lOOOUOtabflity of personn'!I is maintained in an~-

VISIBLE DAMAGE- O.vnage to equipment or suvcture that is readily observabfe without me.asoreroents. t~sung. or analysis. Oam:tge is sufficient to cause oonoem regarding the continued operability Of r abtlity of the .tf!ected suvaure, system. Of component. &ampk> damage indudes: de-formation due 10 heat or iTipact., denting, peoe1Tabon. rupture. aacld.ng. and paint bisterinw. Surface blemishes \e_g .• p,mt chippirlj;j, scratches} shoi.Ad not be included.

Alert HA2 ARE °' EXPL0Sl0'1 Affecti"" lhe Operab<ily of Plant Safely Syslems

Requir.d to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutc:taMl.

C>p@rating ~ Applic~r,ty: All

EAL V.aJues :

1. ARE or EXPLOSfON 11!Sulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE so ANY of tM following structures conuining safety systems or components OR Control Room indication of degraded pt!rformance of those safetf systems.:

Rexwr Contalnl'Mnt Budding and Intake SGuctur@ S~d Building

Control Room Intake Cooling W•ter (tCW}

Reattor Auxili.ary Building (RAS} Corrponem Cool.-ig WattM (CCI/{)

Turb!U!• Building if the f~ p!"Kiudff ~rg.ncy C,,.sel Generatt Building .coess to tM Steam Trestle. Control Room or RAB Condensate S:orage Tank (CSTI

Dle-se/ OIi Storag• T.ink {DOST) Stum T"'st!ek:eJ

e Hut Sink (UHS Re~ Water Tank R

H - COLD CONDillONS 24 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PIANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-C-27)

Unusual Event H U 2 FIRE potentially degrading 1he 1e-.o~ of safety of lhe ~ant.

Operating Mode- ApplicatMlity: All

rlote The E,nre,rgre,ncy Coon:finafor dtould declare fhe Unusual Event fXD"J'lly ._, detenming lhal the applfoab/e 6me ha:> been •xoeeded orwil #kei" bee~.

1. ~- A FIRE is NOT extinguished withii 15-minutes of ANY of tt,.e f'OUOWYlg ARE detection indications:

Repor1 from the field (i.e .• visu~ observ..ltion) Reo!:ipt of rnJtiple (more th.31'1 1) fire ~arms or indications Field verification of a single fire alann

b . lh!i! Fl RE ts ~led within ANY ot th@ fellowing plant rooms Ol'"..lreH: • Reactor Containmem Bui1dir,g and Shield Building • Control Room • Reactor AulONary Building (RAB) • Turbine boikiif"41 if the fire pn!'dudes aooe.ss lo the [email protected]

Tres11e. Control Room or RAB • Oi~sel Oil Storage Tank (DOST) • Utim.ite H@ar Sink (UHS) • Intake Structure • Intake Cooing Wa.tti (ICW) • Corrponent Cooling Water (CCW) • ErnergEnCy Die~ Ge1er.ator Buikhng • Condensate Storage Tank (CST) • Steam Trest!@ Area • R~fu ng W.ue-r Tank (RI/fl)

Q!i

2. a. R1teP!pl of a s!ngle fi~ alarm 'Mtt1 no other indicabon.s of .a FIRE.

b . The FIRE ts located within ANY ot the following plant rooms or.are-as· • Reactor Containment Building .and Shield Building • Control Room • Reactor Auxili.llY Building (RAS) • Turbine building if the fiie predudes aooess IO the S~am

Tres"tle, Control Room« RAB • ChselOIStorargeTank (DOSn • Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS} • lntak<?Struc:ture • In~ Cooling Wal.ti (ICW} • Component Cooling W.at!!r (CCW) • Emergency OiHel Generator Building • Condensate Storage Tank (CST} • St~amTres.lehea • Refvefi.ng Water Tank {RWT}

c . lhe existence of a FIRE is no1 verified 'Mthin 30-rnir..r.K of alarm recefpL

Q!i

3. A FIRE 'Mthm the pbnt PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within BO-minutes of lhe S'litial report. alann or indiciition.

4_ A FIRE '!Minn the plant PROTECTED AREA lh.lt requires firefighting support by an offsite fw"e response agency 10

extingush.

H - COLD CONDillONS

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

Recognition Ca

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HG2 - Basis:

This EAL addressM unanticipa~ conditions not addressed e'q)iotly else'MWre but that wa,rant dedaration of an emergency bla<:aU:St!

condibons eJ11ist which are beli~ by the Emergency Coordin.ator to f.ll under th@ @'fTlef'g@OC)' cl.lssific.atian levt!t fer General Emetvency.

Site Ana Emergency

HS3- Basis:

Thi$ EAL .address,es urtan ted oondibons not addressed e icidy efS@'V!o'here bu\ th.Jt warrant ded.aration of an eme-rgency b@caus,e

OCll"'dition.s eJUS.t lM'lich a1e be1ieve-d by the Emerg~ncy Coordin~tor to fall urdet the emergency da.ss~caiion iewl description for Si:e Area Emergency.

Alert HAJ-Basis:

Gases in an ESSENTIAL. AREA can affect the abitity to safely operate Of

safety shutdown the n!actor.

The fact that SCBA may be worn doe.'!i no1 ei:mi:nale ttle' need to declare lheevent.

Oedaration should not be d@layed for conl'innalion from atmospheric testing if the atmosph@fe poses an immediate threat to life and health or an immediate threat of severe etposul'1!' to g.ues. This could be based upon documented analysis, ind:ication d pe-sonal ib effects from e:xpos!..IN!', or 00&rating expef'J@f}(:e With Ole hazards.

If the eqUlpfT'lEi"lt 1n the suted ar@a was alreaoy tn0~r.able. or out of serv.ce. before the event OCOJrred, then thts EAL should ~ bt! de<bred as ii wiH have no adli,e~ imp.act on the abi6ty of i:tM p ant to wfely cperat@ °' safeY shutdCMn beyord th.1: already allowed by T ~ • I Specffieatlons .1t UM' time of the PVenl

AA .asphyxiant ,s a gas capable- of ~ocng the level d ox~~ llf'I the body to dangerous levels Most corrrnonly. asphyxiants 't'fOl'il: by~ drspl.JtOng air r+ an endosed fflVironmem. TI-.is rl'!duoes the oonoentraXln of oxyi;i':n betoYtth@ rionn.:.llevel d around 19%, 'Ahlch can I.ad to U'Nih:ng ctffi - 5 . unccnsoousness or e\~ d!!a.h

AA uncontroUed releue of l'l.a:rrmab4e g.isses wi-:hin a faa6ry struc::ure has ehe po:en11al to .affect safe operation cl the plant by lmitng ether operator or eqli:pmMtl ope,ra:ions d ue to the potenti~ for filnition and resulting equipment damage.1pe"SOf'lnel ifiury Flammable gasses, such .a.s hydrogen and .:,oet)f@n.. are routinely used to maintam pl.mt syst!!'mS (hydroge"l) or to repair equw~nt'~t:5 {~eie • used in wekting) This EAl assum'l"S oancantr~tioos a: which 11~ses c.tn ign~!!lsuppon combustion.

EscaJ,3tio,n to a higher em.«g:HIC)' dass.ficat!cn level, if appropriate. wil be based on System Ma~.nction. Fiss.on P'ft>duct Barri~r T ~ °' Abnonnal R~ Leve-1s, Radioac:Cive Effluent ICs.

HAG - Basis:

Th!s EAL .addresse s unanticipat'l!'d oondiXlns not addressed .xplicitly ets~ but that watTant dedaratioo of an e.merg@ncy because condi!ions exiS't 'Nhit:h are belitrv~ by the Eme~c, Coordina:or to fall undf!f" the /J.Jert emergencyclass~tion leve1.

H - COLD CONDITIONS 25 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSITICA TION TOOL

Unusual Event HUJ- Basis:

This IC is based on the reiease of tolOc. corrosive. asphyxiant or flammable gases CX sufficient quantity to affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

The fact that SC8A m.lf be wom does not eliminate the need to dedare the '!Vent..

This IC is nal intended to require significant assessm@ffl or qu3ntification. tt anumes an uncontrolled process that M the potential to affect plant operations. This would predude small or inoi~tal retease.s, or rele.lse§ that do not im~ structures needed lot plani operation.

An asphyxiant is a gas capable of A!ducing lhe level of oxygen In the body to <Ungerous levels. Most commanfy, asphyxiants wort by merely displ.acrng .lir in an endosed environment This reduces the concentration of oxypen below the normal level of around 19%. which can ~ad ta breathi~ difficulties. unconsoiou.soess or even death.

Escalauon of tt.s emergency classification levef. if appropnate. 'M>Utd be bas@'don HA3.

HU5 - Basis:

This EAL ~ses unanticipated 0Dfldl1ians net addressed e.xpl.icilly els-~ but that warrant declaration of an emergency b@cause conditions exist ~ are believed by the Emergency Coordinator 1D fall under the Notification of Unusual EYMt (OOUE} emergency da.ss.

H - COLD CONDillONS 25



HG2 Olh@rCondifions E,asting VVhich in the Judgment cf th• ~ Coordinator w~ant Oedar.rion of Ge~I Emo<gency.

Operating -Applic•bil;ty: All

EAL Val~s:

1. Other oonditions exist whH::h in the judgnwnt of tM ~ncy Coordin.uor indicate that @Yll!nts an!' ii progr-.ss or haw occumtd whicn involv1! actual or- IMMJNENT subs&antial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of DOl"Ulnmant iit~ Of HOS LE ACTION that results tn an ac:IUal loss of physical oontrol of I.ht: facility. Re~ases can be reasonably expected to exONd EPA PROTECTrvE ACTK>N GUIDELINE nposu~ ,~is off-site for more than 1he immediate site area.

HOSTILE ACTION- All ao: toward a Nudear Power Plant (N"PP) or i1s pe~ that incfudu the UH of violltnt ten:. &o d@stroy equipment, take hostages. ana'or 1'1tlmid.Jte the licensee to actveve an end. This includes att.Jdl by air. land. orwa~ using guns, expk>sives, PROJECTILEs. vfflldes. or othe-r dr.ices used to deiver des1ructive foroe. Other acts that sabsfy the ovenll intent may be inducted. HOSTILE ACTION 1hol.Ad not be construed IO indude aas of civil disobedience a< fetonious acts that are not part of a conoerted .a~ on the NPP. ~ tem::wism-based EAl..s should t>. used to .address such activibu (i..e .• this may include vblent acts between individuals in thP owner controlled arN}.

IMMINENT -Mitigation actions have been ineffKCive, additionJI acdons are not expected to be SUCOl!SsfuL and nrded information indicates that the event or a>ndi'tion w,:n oocur. VV'here IMMINENT 1imeJrames Me s;pedfied, they shall appfy.

PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE - Enwt:lnrnfflbt Prolection AQe«:f (EPA) Prc<ective Adion G<Jides (PAGs)c

Gre,ater man or eqw, to 500 mrem Taul Effective Dose Equivalont (TEDE)

OR

Greater th.an or @<1~ co 1000 nYem ConYnitted Dose Eqwvalti1t (COE)

[EPIP-08j

GU~ IIOll FOR 1W ..n Pl~nned controlled a ctMtiH, such .:n Containm@f'lt W'l1ry at po#@r, do not meet IM intem of ..._,3 or HAJ.

HSJ am.r Conditions Existing 'Nhchin h Judgnwnt oltM EmergencyCoon:t :orWa1T.ant o.clMation of Sit.Ana Emo,gency

Operating Mode AppUc.t»l;ty: All

EALV.iil~s:

1. Other conditions e:mtwhtch in th. j~ of the~ Coordina>f indic.J:e tlut ewnts •n1 m progress. or h.Jll'e oocurn!d which involve actu.ll or likely major f11lkxes d Dim tunctiom: ~ for Pl"CMCtlon ot h public or HOSTILE ACTION Nt r.su tJ. in

~oo,na d-.lrNge or maffdous .1<U,. \ 1) taN3rd st..e peBOnnel er "'(ll.lipm.n~ that could Ind to the ~k.ty faih,n r:lor; t2}iiatpRY2'nl efectw access co equipmerit l'lffd.ct for tht p-otedmn of tht pl..blio Any l"W.a.ws at• not •xpeded to ~suit i.n nposu111 i.v.is which ucee-d EPA PROiECTIVE. ACTK>N GUIDELl'lE Uf)O"MXI! l@Wls ~yood th@ sit. bound.Jry

Al@rt HAJ Access lO an ESSENTIAL AREA Is Prohibited Due To ~ase of Toxic,

ComnN•. Asph)'mm or A~bie G.nes 'Nhich J.opan:ize Operation 1a•, d Systems Reqund to M.aintiin Son Operations or SaMty Shutdown ~

RNC1o<

Operating Modo Applica1>m1y: All

~ If the equi,>mMt in 1M &t~ a/N wa3 alrHdy hoperabl@, or ou1 of~. ~fen~ ~nt oca,rrpd, bn tin EAL ch<:tud nd. ~ decfa~ :a:i I wit have no~ iffl:>,ict on the abiJty of the plant to 3ife.ly c,,t'(illtt °' safely :Jhv:down t>.yond lh•f alrNdy allowN by T.chniCdl Sp«i6caJiom: •t lhe tjn,. of thePVMf

1. Aooento an ESSENT1ALAREA is prohtbr..eddue to toxic. corTOSIW!.

i1Sphyxla.nt Of b.nYnab(e QUK ~h j.ap,.vdae QOM'"ilbQn of S)IIWffil r.qutr9d to maintain ufe OJ)4ilra.:ions or urRty shutdc:JMl the ~ -

HA6 0th« Condbons E.Justin9 Which in &le Judgmem of the Emerg&ncy Coordin.a'hf Warrant Dedara.tian ol an Alen.

~ting MOCH' ApP,icability: All

EAL V.iilues :

1. ~ condibOns us: which in the judgment ol the Emergency CootdiNIIOr ndi~:111 lh;Jt eV9flt5 ;are in ptQgress or h.1ve OCClJO"ed-wtlich irnol\ie .)((U.11 or pctM:i Sl.bst.an:i~~dation of the<levelorsafety oft.he pl.ant or a seo..wity .vent th.it invofvu prob.abt. I.de threatening risk :.o si!e penonnel o, dam.age to site equipmenl MeatJse d HOSTILE AC ON. My r.i~ses are e~ed to ~ lirrut9d to S/lUtl bon.s of the EPA PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE ._. .....

H - COLD CONDffiONS 26 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSmCATION TOOL

EP3:4 (APP-C-29)

Unusual Event HUJ RefHse of Toxic., Corrosiw, Asphyxi.a.11, or Aarrrnable

Gases DHm.d Oetrirr.-nbl 1o NORMAL PLANT io•J OFERATIONS.

Oponting Modo Appli~my. A ll

EAL Villues;

1. ToXtC. oonosiw, asphyxiant or lianvnal:»e gases in amounts 1hat have or could adversely .affect NORMAL Pl.ANT OPERATIONS.

OR 2. Re,port by l.ocal, County or State Officials for ~vaaJation or

Wt g d site. personnel based on an off-site event.

'HU5 Ohr Conditions Elosting 'Miich ri h.JudgmentdliheE~ Coordl'WOr Warrant Dedaration ct a

otrriOJotion ct U"luswil Event (NOUE).

Openting Mode Appli~lity: A II

EAL VaJuu :

1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator iodica·e that events a~ in progress or haw ooc:orred which indicate: a potential degradation of th@ lewl al 5."ft.ty of the plam or indtca.te a HO.lrity threat to f.-ciity ~ hn been initiated. No releases of r.adioactive m.1~1 requiring otf"·silf! response or rronitoring are exped.ed unl.n furtMr cS.gr.adation of SZe()I syst@ms occurs .

H - COLD CONDffiONS

St. Lucie, Rev. 67

Recog,,ition C

~ :I 0

ffi a: u Ill ci

26

>tw LL. < Cl)

!z j a. C, z ~ &l LL. LL. < Cl)

z 0 ~ ci z 0 u a: w :t: to 0 z < Cl) 0 a: ~ ~ I

:t:



H - COI.DCONDITIONS 27 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCJE PlANT CLASSJFIC ATION TOOL H - COLD CONDITIONS 27



RECOGNITION CATEGORY E

EVENTS RELATED TO ISFSI

E -COLD CONDIDONS 28 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANr CLASSlFICATION TOOL E- COLD CONDIDONS 28


vi u. !!I

~ 0 w

5 w IX

~ w (i I

w

E- COLD CONDillONS 29



EllPLOSl~ - A rapid. vio1en. """"1fined <DTw.iim. er ca!asWOllhic (alun, of --l!neo,iz,!d =iomenl that...,.,,. enerpyolsutr-foo:elo-lydamapeperm,neni swcilns, sv,;b!ms, er...,...,._

FIRE - Canbustion characleri2"<1 by heal and lghl. Soo.nes ol smot,, sud1 as ~"'nQ drive bel>orowerhealed eleclrical ......,,.m do not oon51itule FIRES. ctJservatioo of flame is orefe,red but is NOT reQUiA!d I la,pe -,lilies ol ,moke and i-are-.

PROJECTILE - An d>jecl directed toward a Nuclear""'""" P1.n (NPPI that oould cau.. ooncem for ils """'1ued o,,erability, roiallilitv, er per,oonel safely.

EAL - COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL

Unusual Event E-HU1 - Basis:

ANciificatic.1 ollnlS<Jal Event (NOUE) in this IC is c:ategcmedco the =·cmm~~=~=~-~=:. dassificatioo based on ;a loaded fuel smrage cast OON'INEMENT BOUNOARY loss leatfnQ lo the dei,-ada!ion ol lhe fuel <Ming stor.,ge or posirg an c:peralional sar.,y prolllem w<h r"'P@d ID its...,,..,.. iran slorage as Mx:ated by elevaled r.diltioo rea<ir1gs Iron. 1he loaded fuel stcr-u,,oast.

The result> ol lhe ISFSI Safety Analysis Report (SAR) per -EG 1536 or SARrelt!renoed in lhe~'s Cer1ifioale ol~andlhe relalsl t.llC Safely E¥>1uatian Report identify nahr.11 J1!encmen• l!V91ls and aa:ident Ollflditions lhal COlkl potentially efteci lhe CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. This EAL adcnsses a d!q,ped casl, a !wed"""' ca~ EXPlDSIGfi, PROJECTILE damage, FIRE clarroge er natural phenomena affeding • oast (e.g .. seisnic....,l lomado. elc.}

E - COLD CONDmONS 29



Site Area Emergency Alert Unusual Event E-HU 1 [);image k> a loaded cast CONFINEMENT

BOUNDARY.

I

DEl'N I IOII Bo)( I Operating Mode Applicabiity: Not applicable

~~~ CotFIIEMENT BOUNDARY - The batrierls} betwoen an,as IXlflianng radioacti"" ""51ance5 and the """"'11111! 1. Damage ID a laadedoaskCON'ltEIIENT B0Uf',()ARY. ~--------------~,

E- COLD CONDffiONS 30 EAL - COLD BAS1S PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANf ClASSIFICATION TOOL E - COLD CONDffiONS 30




E- COLD CONDmONS 31 EAL - COLD BASIS PAGEREVISlON: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E- COLDCONDmONS 31


APPENDIX D THE STATE OF FLORIDA RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

The State of Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan is maintained on file in the following locations:

1. St. Lucie Unit 1 Document Control Center

2. Technical Support Center

3. Emergency Operations Facility

4. Site Emergency Preparedness Manager

EP3:4 (APP-D-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 67

APPENDIX E TECHNICAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS

The Annual Confirmation Letters and the current Letters of Agreement with each of the agencies, which under earlier revisions resided in this appendix, have been removed. These documents are now maintained in the Emergency Planning Department files. FPL maintains agreements and/or contracts with the following organizations in support of St . Lucie Plant emergency response.

1. Westinghouse Electric (ABB/CE) ABB/Combustion Engineering (CE), now Westinghouse Electric, is the Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor for the St. Lucie Plant. Westinghouse Electric can supply emergency technical services and resources as provided by the Purchase Order.

2. AECOM AECOM is the Architect/Engineer for the St. Lucie Plant. AECOM can supply emergency technical services as provided by the Purchase Order.

3. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) maintains industry source lists for personnel and equipment which can be made available for support services during an emergency.

4. U.S. Coast Guard The U.S. Coast Guard can provide maritime, air and security support. Can establish a safety or security zone preventing vessel movement into U.S. navigable waters. Can transport response personnel , equipment and injured personnel.

5. Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) FDLE, by statutory authority is the agency responsible for the coordination of state law enforcement resources. FDLE is responsible for the command, control and coordination of all state law enforcement personnel and equipment to support local law enforcement agencies.

6. St. Lucie County Sheriffs Department Provides initial containment of incident, traffic control and site security. Support teams include Special Weapons and Tactics, Bomb Team, Crises Negotiations team, Dive Team, Aviation Unit and Maritime Unit.

7. St. Lucie County - Ft. Pierce Fire District St. Lucie County Fire District is the primary responder for Fire Rescue and Emergency Medical Support. Other specialized services and equipment include hazardous material, foam and foam applicators, mobile SCBA refill, ventilation equipment, lighting equipment and monitor nozzles.

8. City of Ft. Pierce - Police Department Ft. Pierce Police Department can provide traffic control, security at Jaycee Park, marked police units and support a multi-agency mobile command post.

9. City of Ft. Pierce - City Manager City of FT. Pierce has authorized the use of Jaycee Park for emergency parking in the event of an emergency.

EP3:4 (APP-E-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 67

APPENDIX E TECHNICAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS

10. Martin County Sheriffs Department Provides resources and support for law enforcement functions, including traffic and crowd control.

11. AREVA NP Inc. (Framatome Technologies) AREVA can provide engineering, technical support and field services to assist FPL in the management and control of an emergency.

12. U.S. Department of Energy (Savannah River Operations) This division provides advice, detection and identification of radioactive materials, and/or monitoring and assessment actions essential for the control of the immediate hazards to health and safety.

13. U.S. Department of Energy (REAC/TS) Provides backup support for the definitive care and treatment of seriously irradiated persons. The ORAU Medical and Health Sciences Division operates the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the U.S. Department of Energy. It studies radiation and radioactive materials in diagnosis, therapy, and research . Its specialized facilities are available for the care and treatment of possible radiation accident victims.

14. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center The facilities are equipped and staffed with physicians and nurses capable of treating a contaminated injured individual(s). The physicians will provide for medical examinations, treatment, and laboratory services for those employees and other persons, designated by Florida Power & Light Company, who have been involved in a radiation accident.

15. Martin Memorial Medical Center The medical facilities are equipped and staffed with physicians and nurses capable of treating a contaminated injured individual(s). The physicians will provide for medical examinations, treatment, and laboratory services for those employees and other persons, designated by Florida Power & Light Company, who have been involved in a radiation accident.

16. Bechtel Power Corporation Bechtel can provide engineering, procurement and construction operations support for FPL in the management and control of an emergency.

17. Martin County Fire Rescue Provides Fire Rescue, Emergency Medical Services, Hazardous Materials Response Team and Technical Rescue Team resources.

18. Martin County Department of Emergency Services Authorization to use Jensen Public Beach parking area as a staging area during an emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

EP3:4 (APP-E-2) St. Lucie, Rev. 67

PROCEDURE NUMBER

EPIP-00

EPIP-01

EPIP-02

EPIP-03

EPIP-04

EPIP-05

EPIP-06

EPIP-07

EPIP-08

EPIP-10

EPIP-11

EPIP-12

EPIP-13

EPIP-14

RP-SL-105-1005

RP-SL-100-1005

RP-SL-101-2000

RP-SL-102-2005

RP-SL-101-2001

RP-SL-102-2002

RP-SL-102-2003

RP-SL-102-2004

RP-SL-101-2003

RP-SL-101-2004

CY-S L-108-0004

CY-SL-108-0007

O-AOP-72.01

SFl-6307

EP3:4

APPENDIX F EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

TITLE

Discovery and Identification of an Emergency Condition (Including Chemical , Fire, and Natural Emergencies)

Classification of Emergencies

Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator

Emergency Response Organization Notification/ Staff Augmentation

Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center

Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center

Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility

Conduct of Evacuations/Assembly

Off-site Notifications and Protective Action Recommendations

Off-site Radiological Monitoring

Core Damage Assessment

Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Radiological Emergency Plan Training

Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Emergency Exercises, Drills, Tests, and Evaluations

Dose Assessment Using the Unified RASCAL Interface

Emergency Equipment

Radiation Protection Emergency Organization

Emergency Personnel Exposure Control

Environmental Monitoring During Emergencies

Personnel Access Control During Emergencies

In-plant Radiation and Contamination Surveys During Emergencies

Emergency In-plant Air Sampling

Analysis of Emergency In-plant Air Samples

Monitoring Evacuated Personnel During Emergencies

Personnel Decontamination During Emergencies

Guidelines for Collecting Post Accident Samples

Establishing Remote Laboratory for Analyses of Accident Samples

Response to Security Events

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures

(APP-F-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 67

St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, Radiological Emergency Plan

Documents

Transcript of St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, Radiological Emergency Plan