Soames on Descriptive Reference-Fixing

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Philosophical Issues, 16, Philosophy of Language, 2006

SOAMES ON DESCRIPTIVE REFERENCE-FIXING

Robin JeshionUniversity of California, Riverside

Scott Soames thinks that one of our linguistic practices is too wild. Leftunchecked, it generates “mysterious” and “absurd” results. He thinks it needsto be tamed.

The practice is the descriptive reference-fixing of names. An agentintroduces a term and lays down that the term’s reference is to be thatindividual that satisfies a certain definite description. As a result of thisact, the term is a name and its reference is whatever individual satisfies thedefinite description.

Soames maintains that we get mysterious and absurd results if the agentdoes not have independent knowledge which object satisfies the definitedescription.1 To avoid the absurdities, he holds that descriptions cannotsemantically fix the referent of a name unless the agent independently knowsor believes of the individual that satisfies the name introducing definitedescription that it does satisfy the description.2 [Soames, 2003, 414] So,for example, the introduction of “Jack-the-Ripper” is, according to Soames,problematic because those who introduced the name had no independentevidence to believe of any specific person that the names’ reference-fixingdescription applies to that person. [406]

For Soames, such instances of unrestricted descriptive reference-fixinggenerate absurd results if we couple such linguistic acts with a plausible prin-ciple of Weak Disquotation [WD] that links agential sentence understandingand acceptance with proposition believed.

Weak Disquotation: If a sincere, reflective, rational individual i who understandsa sentence S is disposed to accept S, and believe S to be true, then i believesthe proposition semantically expressed by S, and thereby satisfies the formula xbelieves that S. [406]3

The basic worry is that if descriptive reference-fixing is left unrestricted, itseems that by a little “verbal ceremony” an agent can come to know a fact


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that she was previously ignorant of. [411] For as a result of introducing thename, the sentence “N is the D” expresses a proposition p that truly says ofthe individual that satisfies the description ‘the D’, that it is the D. Since theagent understands the sentence and is disposed to accept it and believe it tobe true, by [WD], the agent believes that p. Yet the agent didn’t know thisfact previously. Soames maintains that this is mysterious and so rules outunrestricted descriptive reference-fixing.

Soames claims that this basic worry gains further support from anargument due to Kripke.4 Though there is little discussion of the argumentin the literature, it has become rather influential. My aim in this article is toarticulate this argument, disarm it, and scrutinize Soames’ way out.

The Kripke/Soames Reductio

The strategy of the Kripke/Soames argument is to generate a reductio adabsurdum from the coupling of [WD] and unrestricted descriptive reference-fixing. Let A be any agent who has a least one false belief, which is expressedby the sentence S. Now consider the following description:

Description: The x: (if S, then x = Princeton University) & (if –S, then x = SaulKripke’s left thumbnail).

This description refers to Kripke’s left thumbnail because, by hypothesis, S isfalse. But A believes that S is true and so will take the description to refer toPrinceton University. Consequently, A will believe that the following sentenceexpresses a truth:

Description Sentence: The x: (if S, then x = Princeton University) & (if –S, thenx = Saul Kripke’s left thumbnail) is an institution of higher learning.

Soames claims that, thus far, there is nothing off-kilter in the scenario. A’sfalsely believing S leads to A falsely believing the Description Sentence.The phenomenon of one false belief leading to another is entirely commonand general. The problem presents itself only if it is possible for A to usethe Description to fix the reference of a name, and do so without “anyindependent evidence that it’s actual denotation, Kripke’s left thumbnail,satisfies the description” [412]. Supposing that A does so with the name ‘N’,then A would then accept and believe true another sentence:

Sentence N: N is an institution of higher learning

Sentence N, unlike the Description Sentence, expresses a singular proposition.It says of Kripke’s left thumbnail that it is an institution of higher learning.


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Appling [WD], we have the result that A believes the proposition expressedby Sentence N.

A’s Belief: A believes that N is an institution of higher learning

The result is this:

Result: There is a certain object o such that o is Saul Kripke’s left thumbnail,and A believes that o is an institution of higher learning.

Soames claims that this result is a reductio ad absurdum of the conjunctionof [WD] and unrestricted descriptive reference-fixing. In assessing possibleways out, he argues that [WD] should be embraced because it forges anatural link between sentence understanding and grasp of the propositionthe sentence expresses.5 His overall conclusion, then, is that unrestricteddescriptive reference-fixing is the source of trouble that leads to the absurdityand so must be abandoned. Descriptive reference-fixing must be restricted:name introduction requires some variety of known acquaintance betweenthe namer and the object named and knowledge that the object satisfies thename-introducing description.

What’s So Absurd About That?

What exactly is the alleged absurdity at issue supposed to consist in?Soames does not tell us. He leaves matters simply with the Result that thereis an object—Kripke’s left thumbnail—that our rational agent A believes tobe an institution of higher learning. This is, no doubt, a strange belief for arational agent to have, but what exactly makes it the case that this Result isso odd that it should be a reductio of the coupling of unrestricted descriptivereference-fixing and [WD]?

Is it the mere fact that a rational agent A believes of a certain leftthumbnail that it is an institution of higher learning? That is, is the absurditysupposed to consist in the fact that a rational agent A has a belief witha content expressing a gross and fundamental category error? Or is theabsurdity supposed to be that a rational agent A thinks her belief is abouta certain university when in fact it is about a certain left thumbnail? Thatis, is the absurdity supposed to consist in the fact that a rational agent A ismistaken in what her belief is about—some kind of fundamental failure ofself-knowledge? Or does it consist in something else altogether?

I doubt that the absurdity at issue is the former one in which a rationalagent has a belief with a content expressing a gross and fundamental categoryerror. For if an agent introduced a name into the language in this fashion butit did not generate a belief with a content expressing a gross and fundamental



category error, I expect that Soames would still find the reference-fixingunacceptable. So, for example, substitute “Stuyvesant” for “Kripke’s leftthumbnail” in Soames’ case above. Then the agent believes of Stuyvesant—ahigh school in New York City—that it is an institution of higher learning.This is false, but not wildly off. Still, I take it, Soames would regard this asunacceptable.

But one might worry that the absurdity consists in the fact that with un-restricted descriptive reference-fixing, one can generate beliefs with contentsexpressing gross and fundamental category errors. To lay this to rest, I wishto show that the very same result can be secured if we couple a false beliefwith demonstrative reference-fixing and [WD]. The central strategy here is togenerate the same result with demonstrative reference-fixing and so show thatSoames has mistakenly lay the blame on unrestricted descriptive reference-fixing.

Let A be any agent who misidentifies (grossly and fundamentally) what acertain demonstratively identified object is. For example, suppose that A takesthat large brown rock on the freeway to be a person. The demonstration thatis part of this misidentification can be captured by the circumstance in whichA points to and visually attends to a certain large brown rock, intending topick out that physical object there, whatever it is.

Demonstration: That (pointing to the rock)

The mistaken belief can be captured by A’s asserting or assenting to what I’llcall the Demonstration Sentence.

Demonstration Sentence: That (pointing to the rock) is a person.

Consequently, A will accept another sentence that we can call the Demon-strative Sentence.

Demonstrative Sentence: It (pointing to the rock) needs immediate medicalassistance.

Just like in Soames’s case, there is nothing paradoxical about this circum-stance. A’s false belief expressed in the Demonstration Sentence leads to thefalse belief expressed in the Demonstrative Sentence. If we suppose that Auses this demonstration to fix the reference of a name ‘N∗’, then A wouldaccept and believe true the following sentence:

Sentence N∗: N∗ needs immediate medical assistance.

Sentence N∗ expresses a singular proposition that says of a certain rock that itneeds medical assistance. If we apply [WD], we have the result that A believesthe proposition expressed by Sentence N∗:


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A’s Belief∗: A believes N∗ needs immediate medical attention.

Overall, then, we have the following:

Result∗: There is a certain object o such that o is a rock, and A believes that oneeds immediate medical attention.

By intermixing demonstrative reference-fixing with a false belief, we cangenerate the same type of “absurd” result involving a belief with a contentexpressing a gross and fundamental category error.

It would be natural here to protest that there is a crucial asymmetrybetween the two cases. In Soames’s case, the absurd result is due essentiallyto the use of the unrestricted descriptive reference-fixing (plus [WD]). Afterall, as Soames points out, the absurd result does not surface in his reductiountil the agent uses the Description Sentence to fix the reference of ‘N’.Prior to that, there is nothing absurd about A’s belief states. Contrast thiswith A’s belief states prior to her demonstrative reference fixing of ‘N∗’.Before she introduces the name ‘N∗’, A believes the Demonstrative Sentence:It (pointing to the rock) needs immediate medical assistance. Once we applyweak disquotation, we already have the Result∗ that there is an object o suchthat o is a particular rock and A believes that o needs medical assistance.

It is correct to identify this as an asymmetry between the two reductios.But this in itself does not exonerate Soames. For it makes good sense to arguein the other direction that it only shows that the very same absurd resultcan arise from perceptual misidentification of an object’s basic propertiescoupled with [WD]. I take it that we would not want to restrict demonstrativereference (and demonstrative reference-fixing) just because it leaves roomfor radical misidentification of properties. Likewise, we should not restrictdescriptive reference-fixing just because it too can lead to false beliefs withcontents expressing fundamental category mistakes. (To feel the force of thispoint, you must remember that in the foregoing argument, we are supposingthat the alleged absurdity consists in the facts that the process can generatecircumstances in which rational agent has a belief with a content expressinga fundamental category error).

∗

Now let us consider an alternative and more plausible analysis of thealleged absurdity. Suppose that the absurdity consists in the fact that arational agent thinks her belief is about one individual when in fact it isabout another.6 On this supposition, I shall argue against the reductio inlike fashion, by showing we can generate the same type of failure of self-knowledge without descriptive reference-fixing. Such a result can come about



from changes in our perceptual environment that go unnoticed to an agentwho engages in an act of demonstrative reference-fixing.

Suppose that Ann has just given birth to twin boys. At present, she isfully rational, and her cognitive and perceptual powers are normal. But Annwill soon need to be whisked away for surgery that will take several weeksrecovery time, during which she will not see her children. Ann’s relatives arethere and will care for the babies in her absence. Her relatives have explicitinstructions for their care and intend to carry out Ann’s instructions andwishes. Ann knows these facts.

Before she departs for surgery, Ann wants to name her children. Shewishes to name the blond boy “Alex” and the brunette boy “Sam.” At themoment when she decides to announce their names, the lighting conditionsin her room alter enough so that the sun glows over the brown-haired baby,making it appear blond, while a shadow is cast over the blond-haired baby,making its hair appear darker than its sibling’s hair. Ann declares “This babyis Alex” while pointing to the brunette and declares “This baby is Sam” whilepointing to the blond. Her intention in her demonstrative reference to eachbaby is to pick out the baby directly, in this case by visual perception, andnot by concepts (e.g., not the smaller baby or the baby to my left or the babywith the blond hair).7 The problem of course is that because she unknowinglymisidentifies their respective hair colors, her naming intentions do not lineup with her actual demonstrative naming actions. Consequently, the babythat she intends to name “Alex” is named “Sam” and the baby she intends toname “Sam” is named “Alex.” Very shortly following this naming event, Annis whisked away for surgery. Her relatives care for the babies and use “Alex”for the brunette and “Sam” for the blond. Friends, nurses, pediatricians, anddistant relatives use the names in like fashion.

Now we can imagine Ann, post-surgery, talking to one of her doctors,saying

“Alex got my golden hair.” Since Ann makes this assertion, she accepts thesentence “Alex has golden hair,” and so, with [WD], we have

Ann’s Belief: Ann believes that Alex has golden hair.

But Alex is the brown-haired baby. So we have the following

Result∗∗: There is a certain object o such that o is the brunette baby, and Annbelieves of the brunette baby that it has golden hair.

More specific to our present concerns, Ann thinks her belief is about theblond, the one she named “Sam,” while it is in fact about the brunette. Thisis the same result as the one Soames sketches in which a rational agent thinksher belief is about one thing, a certain university, while it is actually aboutsomething else, a certain thumbnail.8 The result ensues without the use of any


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descriptive reference-fixing at all. It is generated, rather, from a situation inwhich a run-of-the-mill visual error is coupled with demonstrative reference-fixing, thereby creating a gap in an agent’s knowledge of which individualher words refer to. With [WD], the result is a gap in the agent’s knowledgeof which individual her belief is about.

Both cases have the same form. In Soames’s case, the agent has a beliefthat she would express as “N is an institution of higher learning.” In mycase, the agent has a belief she would express as “Alex got my golden hair.”In both cases, the agent thinks her belief is about a different object than itis actually about. Both cases result from the fact that a false belief interfereswith an agent’s ability to know which object her newly introduced name refersto. In consequence, the agent does not know which individual her belief, asexpressed with the name, is about.

Let’s consider a couple of objections to my claim that these cases are, inall relevant respects, on a par. First, one might think that there is a significantasymmetry in the two cases due to the fact that in the moment she names thebabies, Ann can know that Alex is this one (pointing) and Sam is that one(pointing). The idea is that Ann forms a visual fix on the babies in the momentin which she names them and this fix grounds all her future beliefs about herbabies. And this doesn’t obtain in the descriptive reference-fixing case.

This is not a relevant difference. For one, it is psychologically unrealisticto suppose that the agent’s perceptual fix in the act of naming is somehowmore significant in her cognitive life than other fixes that she has had on thebabies, and somehow purges her thought that she named the blond “Alex”and the brunette “Sam.” If one is not persuaded by this, however, we canwork it into the case that Ann does not have any distinct lasting cognitive fixon the babies at all at the moment she names them. Moreover, the fact thatour subject could at that time know that Alex is this one (pointing) and Samis that one (pointing) does not effect the fact that her post-surgery beliefs aresuch that she is wrong about who they are about. That is exactly what is atissue.

Here’s a second, stronger, objection. One might think I’ve erroneouslydescribed what would occur in the case I’ve sketched. When Ann says “Alexgot my golden hair,” she has linguistic intentions to use “Alex” in such a wayso as to track her intended referent in the naming event: the blond baby. So,“Alex,” in Ann’s mouth, refers to the blond baby. The idea here is that thesocial facts about naming are trumped by her “private” intentions, and soshe sidesteps the interference of the strange lighting conditions that causedher false perceptual beliefs. Consequently, the object she thinks her belief isabout is in fact the very same object that her belief is about, and this will notcount as a case that delivers the same absurd result as in Soames’s case.

My reply here is that if we choose to say this about my demonstrativereference-fixing case, we can say exactly the same thing about Soames’sdescriptive reference-fixing case. The socially determined referent of ‘N’ as



given by which individual satisfies the Description Sentence—Kripke’s leftthumb—is not in fact the referent of ‘N’ in the agent’s mouth. Since the agentbelieves that sentence S is true, she’ll have linguistic intentions to use ‘N’ forPrinceton University. So ‘N’ in her mouth refers to Princeton University andthere is no failure of knowledge of what her words and beliefs are about.We can parallel the very same story as in the demonstrative case: the agent’sbelief that S is true determines her intended referent and so manages to keepin line what her belief is about and what she believes her belief is about.

It’s easier to see this point if we switch from Soames’s rather inaneexample to a more realistic one.9 (we’ll soon see there are other reasonsto articulate a more plausible case.) Suppose that I want a new bulldog andam keen for my new dog to be big and tough. When I hear that a litter ofbulldog puppies has been born to the dog down the lane, I visit and findthat all the puppies are to my liking. There’s a black puppy, a white puppy, abrown puppy, and a spotted puppy. Unfortunately, I can’t pick one and takeit home yet because they’re still too young. I have to wait a week. So I tellthe owner of the dogs that I want the bulldog puppy that is the heaviest ofthe litter.

As it happens, I’m completely convinced that the spotted puppy is theheaviest. It appears heaviest by a longshot when I picked it up. As it happens,I was wrong. When I had lifted it, I neglected to factor in the weight of thebone in its mouth and so misjudged its comparative weight.

I go home excited and eager to decide on a name for my puppy-to-be.Here’s a formal characterization of my act of naming:

“Rocko” is the x such that (If the black one is the heaviest, then x is the blackone) and (if the white one is the heaviest, then x is the white one) and (if thebrown one is the heaviest, then x is the brown one) and (if the spotted one is theheaviest, then x is the spotted one)

In my enthusiasm, I call the owner and report on the name I’ve chosen. SinceI wish to politely reurge the owner to weigh the pups, I also make a point tonote that “Rocko” is the name of the heaviest of the litter.

The owner has indeed weighed the pups and has carefully determinedthat the heaviest pup of the litter is the black one. But he’s busy, or a bitgrumpy from all my prompting, and so does not tell me which one is theheaviest. He just hears me out, and then hangs up saying “See you in aweek.” From then on, he and others in his family use “Rocko” to refer tothe black puppy.

Now, when I say to my friend, “Please come with me to buy Rocko acollar,” there are two ways of understanding what I refer to and what is thecontent of my belief. One, the referent and content of my belief might be whatis socially determined by what I say to the owner, including what I say to himabout how I fixed the reference of “Rocko.” Then, by [WD], my words and


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my belief content are about the black puppy and, since I am fully convincedthat the spotted puppy is the heaviest, I don’t know what my belief is about.Two, and here we have the parallel with the objection, my words and thecontent of my belief are about the spotted puppy. The social features of mynaming activity are trumped by my conviction that the heaviest puppy is theone with spots.10

What this case shows is that there is no reason to think that our accountsof reference and belief content determination must be treated differentlydepending upon whether the reference-fixing is demonstrative or descriptive.In the demonstrative and descriptive reference-fixing cases, the subject’s beliefmay be about the socially determined referent or about the agent-intentionsdetermined efferent. They can and should be treated symmetrically.

The overall point that I am making should be clear: it is possible togenerate the “absurd” result without the services of unrestricted descriptivereference-fixing. If one is tempted to restrict descriptive reference-fixing so asto prevent the possibility of these so-called absurdities, one has the very samereason to restrict demonstrative reference-fixing. But few would embrace arestriction on demonstrative reference-fixing so as to prevent the possibilityof false perceptual beliefs generating failures of self-knowledge like those wehave discussed. Likewise, few should regard the possibility of such failuresof self-knowledge as a basis for a strong restriction on descriptive reference-fixing.

This brings me to a final objection. One might be tempted to de-fend Soames by arguing thus: though I have exhibited some scenariosin which demonstrative reference-fixing generates the absurd results, theKripke/Soames argument points out problems specifically with descriptivereference-fixing precisely because it is completely general. It works for anyfalse belief that an agent has. And, as Soames emphasizes, it can be executed“for virtually any agent, object, and property.” [412] By contrast, I had tocherry-pick cases by carefully selecting the relevant false beliefs. And in myexamples, the agent, object and properties were all tied together in a situatednexus.

I believe that this point is misconceived, and for two reasons. First, thereis no real asymmetry between demonstrative and descriptive reference-fixingin connection with how general the argument is. Soames takes himself to havegiven a “formula” for obtaining the absurd consequences, yet the argument’scomplete generality is illusory.

The best way to bring this out is to note that although I have beenemploying Soames’s own Princeton University/Kripke’s left fingernail ex-ample throughout this discussion, my doing so has been an indulgence. Inmy view, this case—as described—does not merit counting as descriptivereference-fixing. For Soames tells us nothing about why the subject introducesthe name ‘N’ with the “disjunctive” description sentence. He tells us nothingabout the relationship between the agent, her false belief, and the disjunctive



description sentence—since he left the content of the false belief unspecified.To be sure, he did so to try to reveal the “general” form of the case. Butall instances of name-introduction need to be embedded within stories thatmake sense of the agent’s act and respect the norms of naming. 11

The case I gave about the dog selection does this. The false belief (thatthe spotted puppy is heaviest) is tied to the act of naming, and, togetherwith the whole story, explains why I have the resultant belief that I do aboutRocko. This has the same form as Soames’s case, and thereby shows thatgenuine cases with this form are possible. But the contrast between the twoindicates that genuine cases of disjunctive descriptive naming, like genuinecases of ostensive naming, must be tied together in rational situated nexuses.The upshot is that genuine cases of disjunctive descriptive naming must becarefully selected, “cherry-picked,” just like the baby and rock examples, andhence that the alleged complete generality in the Soames/Kripke descriptivenaming argument is illusory.

The second reason why the alleged complete generality is not a problemis that an asymmetry about generality still would not show that descriptivereference-fixing stands in need of restriction but demonstrative reference-fixing does not. It would show only that if we must excise the possibility ofthe so-called absurd results, then we need to restrict descriptive reference-fixing and demonstrative reference-fixing in just those contexts in which onemight be mistaken in the beliefs that are involved in one’s act of naming.Consequently, we still need to treat these two classes of cases (demonstrativeand descriptive) involving reference-fixing in parallel. It’s just that we mightwell have a wider range of cases to exclude for descriptive reference-fixingthan for demonstrative reference-fixing. The main point still stands. For thedemonstrative-reference-fixing cases I chose, and like cases, no one wouldwish to institute an epistemic restriction on name introduction to preventfailures of knowledge of reference and self-knowledge. The same should holdof cases involving descriptively introduced names.

Soames’s Solution

I think I’ve shown that the Kripke/Soames argument fails. But I wishto deepen our understanding of what is amiss by considering and evaluatingSoames’s own solution for avoiding the so-called absurd result.

Soames holds that the coupling of unrestricted descriptive reference-fixing with [WD] is the source of the absurdities. He claims that we areleft with just two possible alternatives, what he calls View 1 and View 2.View I affirms unrestricted descriptive reference-fixing and restricts [WD].It allows that we can fix the reference of names by description withoutpossessing independent knowledge which object satisfies the description. Forsentences containing such names, [WD] will fail: there will be circumstances


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in which a competent speaker understands a sentence but fails to graspthe proposition that the sentence expresses. [414] On View 2, “a descriptioncannot semantically fix the referent of a name for a speaker unless the speakerindependently believes of the object which is denoted by the description thatthe description applies to it.” [414] It retains a restriction on descriptivereference-fixing but affirms [WD].

These are the only two options that Soames considers. Given his beliefthat he has derived absurd results that are due, at bottom, to unrestricteddescriptive reference-fixing and [WD], this is to be expected.

Soames plumbs for View 2. His rationale is, essentially, that [WD] is toogood to give up. In evaluating Soames’s proposal, I shall simply grant that[WD] should stand unrestricted.12

Three problems infect Soames’s proposal, and they are all related toone another. One concerns properly specifying exactly what sort of epistemicacquaintance condition is required for descriptive reference-fixing. The sec-ond concerns how we are to understand the nature of the restriction quarestriction. The third concerns the consequences of restricting descriptivereference-fixing. To facilitate understanding of how these three problemsintersect with one another, I will quickly articulate the three problems and,only later, will proceed to analyze and elaborate a series of difficulties thatensue.

The first problem is that it is difficult to know exactly what restrictionSoames favors. When he spells out View 2 he claims that a description cannotfix the referent of a name for a speaker unless the speaker “independentlybelieves of the object which is denoted by the description that the descriptionapplies to it.” [414] Immediately after, he says that if this condition is satisfied,a speaker who understands the sentence can entertain the proposition thatthe sentence expresses. So it seems that he is proposing the condition asboth a necessary and sufficient condition for descriptive reference-fixing. Inother places, however, Soames talks as if the speaker must have “independentknowledge” that the object satisfies the description [413, 414]; elsewhere, hesays the speaker must possess “independent evidence” that the relevant objectsatisfies the description; [412] and in other places yet he says that speakersmust be “in sufficient contact with the object denoted by the description tohave independent beliefs about it—including the belief that the descriptionapplies to it.” [416] Perhaps Soames intends for all of these formulations tocome to the same thing. Although I will not try to nail down what Soamesintends, I will use what he does say as a guide in considering a variety ofways of interpreting the restriction.

The second problem is that in advancing a restriction on descriptivereference-fixing, Soames has not specified the exact nature of the restrictionqua restriction. Does Soames intends for the restriction to be a new normthat can impinge upon the standing practice of introducing names intothe language with a reference-fixing description? That is, is the restriction



supposed to be a new proposal for guiding the actions of potential name-introducers? Or, alternatively, is the restriction supposed to somehow codifydescriptive naming in our actual current linguistic practice? Or is there somealternative way of construing the restriction? Is it some kind of idealization?Since Soames does not tell us how to construe the restriction qua restriction, Iwill flesh out these three main interpretations and will use them in evaluatinghis suggestions.

The third problem is that there are consequences of embracing a restric-tion on descriptive reference-fixing. Soames ignores this matter. I close thecriticism of Soames’s view by discussing the consequences of a restriction andthe linguistic and cognitive function of descriptive reference-fixing withoutan epistemic acquaintance restriction.

A Variety of Restrictions on Descriptive Reference-fixing

What sort of epistemic restriction on descriptive reference-fixing isSoames after? Consider the following. Letting ‘N’ be a name that agentA introduces into the language by fixing its reference with the description‘the D’,

[K] Knowledge of O that it is the D: Agent A may introduce ‘N’ into the languageonly if A independently believes of O that it is the D, A is independently justifiedin believing of O that it is the D, and O is the D.

[E] Evidence that O is the D: Agent A may introduce ‘N’ into the language onlyif A possesses independent evidence E for believing of O that O is the D, wheresuch evidence falls short of the justificatory standards required for knowing ofO that it is the D, A believes of O that it is the D and A’s belief is based on E,and O is the D.

[B] Belief that O is the D: Agent A may introduce ‘N’ into the language only ifA has an independent belief of O that it is the D, and O is the D.

These three conditions seem to me to be the most plausible candidates forcapturing what Soames is requiring.

Three other restrictions to consider are:

[JMB] Justified Mistaken Belief that O∗ is the D: Agent A may introduce ‘N’into the language only if A has justification for believing of some object O∗ thatit is the D, and A believes of O∗ that it is the D, and O∗ is not the D.

[EMB] Evidence for mistaken belief that O∗ is the D: Agent A may introduce ‘N’into the language only if A possesses independent evidence for believing of someobject O∗ that it is the D, where such evidence is insufficient for being justifiedin believing O∗ is the D, and A believes of O∗ that it is the D, and O∗ is notthe D.


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[MB] Mistaken Belief that O∗ is the D: Agent A may introduce ‘N’ into thelanguage only if A has an independent belief of some object O∗ that it is the D,and O∗ is not the D.

I doubt that Soames intends any of these, but they will facilitate ourdiscussion.

Note that all of these formulations leave unanalyzed the crucial notionof an agent having an “independent belief” of or about O that it is the Dor “independent evidence” for thinking of or about O that it is the D. Whileproviding such an account is an extremely important matter—really the mostcentral one—I will not try to do so here. These analyses will be sufficient forevaluating Soames’s view.

Restrictions Qua Restrictions

Let’s bracket for now these issues about the exact form that the epistemicrestriction is to take. How should we construe the restriction qua restriction?There seem to be three natural candidates.

One is that the restriction is supposed to be a new normative action-guiding rule. It is not to be seen as a norm that is found in our current,ordinary name-introducing practices. Rather, it is supposed to be a new rulethat can and should impinge on our name-introducing practices. The ideais that agents should introduce a name with a reference-fixing description ifand only if they satisfy the relevant epistemic restriction. And following thisnew epistemic rule will be a way to avoid the results that Soames regards asabsurd.

The second way of understanding the restriction is as an attempt toarticulate a norm that already exists within our linguistic practices. Therestriction is supposed to describe an epistemic stricture that already governsour existent naming practices. On this interpretation, it is a fact aboutour current actual name-introducing practices that individuals that fail theepistemic restriction will not have introduced a bona fide name into thelanguage.

The third way of understanding the restriction is as a rule in anideal epistemically sensitive linguistic theory. One who puts forward sucha principle might recognize that the principle would not or could not beaction-guiding; and might realize that it expresses a rule that is not to befound in ordinary practice. But the restriction is expressly idealized: it isregarded as what should be adopted if our linguistic practices were, in effect,perfected. It differs from the first way of construing the restriction in thatit does not require the possibility of being implemented. This understandingof the restriction allows that it can only be embraced in an idealized settingand may have little contact with how language actually functions.



I’ll call these three ways of interpreting the restriction the Revisionist,Descriptive, and Idealized understandings of the restriction, respectively.

Unviable Restrictions on Descriptive Reference-Fixing

Having articulated various epistemic restrictions and various ways ofunderstanding the restriction qua restriction, I will try to show that there isno viable candidate as an epistemic restriction on descriptive reference-fixing.The overarching plan is to show that as revisionist restrictions, the knowledge[K], evidential [E] and belief [B] restrictions are useless, because they cannotbe perfectly implemented; as descriptive restrictions, [K], [E], and [B] arefalse—they fail to accurately represent how descriptively introduced namesoccur in natural language; construed as idealized restrictions, [K], [E], and[B] all fail to answer our concerns about natural language. Any of the weakerrestrictions adduced above—[JMB], [EMB], [MB]—will be unable to preventscenarios that generate the same so-called absurd results that inspired therestriction in the first place.

Let’s start off by considering [K], the strongest restriction. If [K] isconstrued as a new action guiding, self-regulating rule for potential name-introducers, it cannot be perfectly implemented. And Soames needs forhis restriction to be perfectly implemented if it is to help him avoid themysterious results that inspired the restriction. Here’s why: The restrictionspecifies that an agent must independently know of O that it is the D. Itdoes not require that an agent knows that she knows of O that it is the D.The KK principle is pretty much dead in contemporary epistemology, soI assume that Soames does not regard the knowledge restriction to entailsuch iterated knowledge.13 But if an agent can know of O that it is the Dwithout knowing (or believing with justification that) she knows of O thatit is the D, then [K] cannot be perfectly used as a means of semantic self-regulation—as a means of deciding when it is legitimate to fix the referenceof a name descriptively. For one would need to know whether one satisfiesthe restriction in order to implement it. Furthermore, to implement it, onewould also need to know when one does not satisfy the restriction. After all,one would need to be in position to determine when one does not have therelevant knowledge in order to withhold from introducing the name in suchcircumstances. But, I claim, we often lack such knowledge. But then therewill be circumstances in which agents will not know whether to introducea name, or will mistakenly assume they satisfy the restriction when theydo not. Such circumstances will be ripe for generating (allegedly) absurdresults.

But now, what if the normative restriction is weaker? Let’s consider [E]and [B]. Everything I say about one will apply to the other. As new action–guiding principles, these restrictions will again not insulate Soames from


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problems. Although potential name-introducers will (typically) be able toknow that they believe of O that it is the D, and might know the basis oftheir belief (their evidence or justification or even any non-rational grounds),they will not be in position to definitively discern whether O is in fact theD. And they will typically not know when they do not satisfy the restriction.So the point is basically the same as for [K]. The only difference is that onemight be tempted to think that epistemic assent comes along for free with[K]—that one will know that one knows that p. If we deny that, what iscommon to [K], [E], and [B] is plain: to the agent, everything will seem to bethe same whether the belief is about O, which is in fact the D, or about O∗,which is not the D. By and large, others in the linguistic community wouldbe in no better position. So the restriction cannot be perfectly implementedand so cannot effectively prevent the “absurd” scenarios.

What if we weaken the revisionist restriction even further so that it canbe perfectly implemented? A natural candidate would be that the agent has abelief (or a justified belief, or evidence for a belief) of some particular objectthat it is the D, and that object may or may not in fact be the D. That is,the restriction will in effect express the disjunction of [B] and [MB] (or thedisjunction of [K] and [JMB], or [E] and [EMB]), which can be put muchmore simply thus: an agent must think of some object that it is the D.14

But if this is the relevant restriction, it still will not perform the functionthat Soames wishes it to perform. It will not rule out circumstances in whichagents introduce names but fail to know or even believe which individual is infact the one that satisfies the description. The so-called “absurd” results arenot ruled out. An FBI agent might have firmly (and even with solid evidence)believed of Joe Schmoe that he is responsible for the university bombings andso, by this restriction, been in position to introduce “Unabomber” into thelanguage. But then that agent will not at that point know who her beliefis about. She’ll think it is about Joe Schmoe, but really it will be aboutKaczynski.15 The result is that if the [K], [E], and [B] restrictions are intendedas revisionist action-guiding rules, they will be unserviceable because they arenot perfectly implementable. Yet weakening them to allow for mistaken beliefundercuts the point of the restriction to rule out the agent not knowing whoher belief is about.

Let us suppose now that [K], [E], and [B] are taken rather as descriptiverestrictions that codify our actual naming practices. The idea here wouldbe that if these restrictions go unsatisfied, then the relevant term is infact not introduced as a name into natural language. But this is just false.Whether a term is introduced as a name and comes to function as aname does not depend upon whether the agent independently knows, hasevidence for thinking, or believes of the object that it satisfies the description.Counterexamples abound: “Jack-the-Ripper,” “Unabomber” (and the wholeslew of descriptively introduced names for criminals), “Neptune.” In all ofthese cases, the term functioned as a name even though it was unknown to



the reference-fixer and the masses who or what satisfied the reference-fixingdescription. In all of these cases, the name-introducer, and indeed, most ofsociety, failed conditions [K], [E], and [B]. (In the following section, I furthersupport this claim and, moreover, point up problems that Soames will haveif he denies it.)

It is worth mentioning a related, but more abstract point, one that isbest initially presented rhetorically: what sort of mechanisms could possiblyprevent the introduced term from functioning as a name? Any such mecha-nism would have to accurately track the name-introducer’s epistemic state. Itwould have to track whether that agent independently knows/believes of Othat it is the D. If the agent did not independently know/believe of O that itis the D, then this mechanism would somehow have to prevent the introducedterm from functioning in the way that the agent intends for it to functionand the way that others will receive the name. I know of no such cognitiveor semantic or social mechanisms that could do the job. It is implausible tosuppose one exists to “protect” natural language from epistemic quandaries.

Let’s now consider [K], [E], and [B] on the assumption that they areidealized restrictions. The problem here resides in the idealization and isquite general: it offers us no help in understanding how descriptive reference-fixing in fact operates in natural language and it tells us nothing abouthow it ought to operate. It is hard to even get a grip on what it doesaccomplish insofar as it is only applicable to or only characterizes an idealizedsettling for linguistic discourse. But even if there is some intellectual valuein sketching the epistemic restrictions applicable to idealized language-use,idealized restrictions cannot settle our debate. We are still left wonderinghow to understand the competence conditions and semantics of descriptivelyintroduced names as they occur in natural language.16

The upshot is that none of the restrictions considered is viable. Obviously,I’ve only canvassed three ways of interpreting the restriction. Perhaps there isanother way of understanding the restriction qua restriction that makes oneof them plausible and serviceable. At present, I’m dubious.

Consequences: Alternative Semantics and Psychosemantics

Embracing epistemic restrictions on descriptive naming creates severalproblematic consequences. Some are associated with the fact that one stillneeds a theory of how to understand terms in natural language like “Jack-the-Ripper,” “Son of Sam,” “Unabomber,” “Neptune.” What is the semanticsof such terms that at least appear to be introduced into the language and tofunction as names, though the name-introducer does not possess independentknowledge, evidence, or belief of the object that satisfies the description tothe effect that it does in fact satisfy the description? And what sort of thoughtdoes one have when one uses that term assertively in a sentence?


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One thing Soames cannot say is that no term is introduced into thelanguage. That would flat-out contradict basic linguistic data. Also, he cannotsay that the term that is introduced is a name. For that is ruled out by hisepistemic restriction. One natural (and well-worn) path is to maintain thatthe term has the semantic content of its referent-fixing description or a rigid-ification of that description, and that one who thinks with the term thinksthoughts that are purely conceptual.17 On this view, sentences containingthe term are semantically equivalent to sentences with the reference-fixingdescription (or a rigidification of that description) substituted for the term.A belief expressed by an individual who asserts a sentence containing the termis identical to a belief expressed by that individual who asserts a sentence withthe reference-fixing description (or its rigidification) substituted for the term.

There are three basic problems with this view. First, it seems that speakersare competent with the term even though they lack knowledge of its reference-fixing description. One could use the name “Son of Sam” competently, evenif one knew little more than that it named a certain serial killer. Anyonewho is moved by the semantic argument against descriptivism must take thispoint seriously. The semantic argument about ostensively introduced namesaims to show that such names do not have semantic descriptive content.It appeals to our ordinary judgments that one can be competent with aname without possessing any uniquely identifying descriptive informationabout the name’s referent. To take Kripke’s well-known example, one can becompetent with “Feynman” even if all one knows is that he is a physicist. Mysuggestion here is that the appeal to “linguistic data” is just as legitimate fordescriptively introduced names. The second problem is that the view makesit mysterious why the term is introduced in the language in the first placewhen it is semantically and psychosemantically equivalent to its reference-fixing description. It is highly implausible to think that it is introduced toexpress modal facts about the named object, to avoid ambiguities due to wideand narrow scope readings of definite descriptions in subject position, or tofunction as an abbreviation. I don’t have space here to develop these twoproblems, but I discuss them at length in Jeshion [2004]. Three, and here Ireiterate a point made earlier in connection to the descriptive interpretation ofthe epistemic restriction, postulating that the introduced term is not in fact abona fide name presupposes that there is some kind of epistemic scorekeeperin our language. It keeps track of a potential name-introducer’s epistemicstate, determines whether she in fact satisfies the relevant epistemic conditionand, if not, somehow ensures that the term is not a name but rather equivalentto its reference-fixing description. But what structures or mechanisms in ourlinguistic community do that? What mechanisms in our linguistic communitycould do that? It seems to me that none do. And I doubt that there are any thatcould. If Soames regards descriptively introduced names as synonymous withtheir reference-fixing descriptions, he needs to explain these three problemsaway.



Consequences: Misunderstanding the Function of Descriptive Names

Another consequence of embracing epistemic restrictions on descriptivenaming is that it collapses any important difference between ostensive namingand descriptive naming. If one needs to be acquainted or “in contact” withthe individual so that the namer will know which individual it is that herthought and assertions are about, what function would descriptions serve inreference-fixing? It is difficult to see what distinctive linguistic or cognitivefunction they could serve. Suppose I am already in a substantive acquaintancerelation to an individual, and know this fact. If I want to speak about thatindividual by name, I would normally either use a name that the individualalready has (or that I think it has) or I would name it by ostension. To be sure,identifying descriptions are sometimes used in such circumstances to drawothers’ attention to the relevant object when ostension is currently impossible(“Remember that pig I cuddled yesterday? I’m naming it “Wilbur””) orinsufficient (“The length of stick s at t” alters focus from the stick itself toits length). But then—at least in most such circumstances—the descriptionmainly serves to focus attention on a certain object, not to determine itsreferent. It is rather the focusing that determines the referent.18

If this is right, then it seems that for Soames there is no distinctivefunction or role for descriptions in securing reference. Perhaps this is preciselywhat Soames thinks is or ought to be the case: that descriptions only assistin isolating objects to attend to such that the attending enables the namer toknow which individual is to be named. There is just one way of introducingnames, via acquaintance relations tight enough to ensure knowledge which.

The problem with this is that it does not reflect the linguistic facts.Soames has things backwards. It is precisely when namers do not satisfythe strong epistemic restrictions that they resort to introducing names bydescription.

Conclusions

I have argued that the Kripke/Soames reductio does not provide agood reason for thinking that there is something amiss or illegitimate aboutunrestricted descriptive reference-fixing. The very same results can be securedif false beliefs are implicated in acts of demonstrative reference-fixing.

Soames claims that the reductio supports the original worry aboutdescriptive reference-fixing to the effect that it creates new belief states “with alittle verbal ceremony” or, in Grice’s words, “the stroke of a pen.” He’s wrongabout this. The reductio shows only that if a false belief is tied up with an actof reference-fixing, one can come to have beliefs with a content expressing afundamental category mistake and also fail to know which object it is thatone’s belief is about—assuming here that there are some cases in which an


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agent’s naming intentions do not trump the socially determined referent. But,as I’ve argued, this holds quite generally, for descriptive and demonstrativereference-fixing.

Soames introduced his epistemic restrictions as a way to avoid theconsequences of the Kripke/Soames reductio. I’ve argued that of all therestrictions I considered—the knowledge, evidence, and belief restrictions,none is viable. Moreover, given the problems just summarized with theKripke/Soames reductio itself, Soames, and anyone partial to an epistemicrestriction on descriptive reference-fixing, needs a new rationale and a clearmotivation for that restriction, and a principled way of making sense ofdescriptive names introduced by agents who fails the restriction.19

Notes

1. All of my discussion here will be concerned with Chapter 16 of (Soames, 2003)so I will just cite page numbers.

2. I give the disjunctive formulation—knowledge and belief—because Soames givesboth. As we’ll see, he gives other formulations as well. One project here will beto get clear on what sort of epistemic restriction is being required.

3. Within this principle, the boldface functions roughly as corner quotes do. Theprinciple, and slight variations of it, is familiar from the vast literature on thepropositional attitudes. Cf., especially, (Kripke, 1979).

4. Soames notes that as far as he knows, Kripke never published this argument.5. In (Jeshion, 2001), I argued that a committed Millian should embrace a thesis

that I called Accessibility of Content: For all expressions E in the language L,and all sentences S in L expressing some proposition P, if agent A understandsall of the expressions E contained in S, then if A were apprised of all the relevantcontextual information, then A could have an attitude having P as its content byunderstanding S. This is very similar to Soames’s weak disquotation thesis.

6. There may be some evidence that Soames himself thinks that this is what theabsurdity consists in. For he notes at one point that the agent wrongly takesthe introduced name to designate Princeton when it designates Kripke’s leftthumbnail. [415] But I am just speculating. Certainly this understanding of what is“absurd” jives more with the worry that name-introducers lack knowledge-which.

7. I think that most demonstrative reference to objects involves an inexplicit ordefault intention to select an object attended to (focused on), and usually doesnot involve a conceptual mode of identification. But I realize that this view iscontroversial. In any event, this will not matter here since I am only tryingto fashion a circumstance in which the absurd result comes about throughdemonstrative reference-fixing, and do not aim to show that all or even mostdemonstrations select their referents nonconceptually, via visual attention. Thosethat hold an alternative view may alter the story and suppose that Ann has anexplicit intention that her identification of her babies be determined perceptually,not conceptually.

8. It does not matter at all that in Soames’s case the agent is radically misguidedabout the kind of thing her belief is about, whereas in our case both objects



are of the same kind. That concern is associated with the first analysis of whatthe absurdity consists in—having a belief whose content expresses a fundamentalcategory mistake.

9. Thanks to Larry Jorgenson, Sam Newlands, Geoff Pynn, Janum Sethi, andMichael Della Rocca for pressing on me the viability of some disjunctive acts ofdescriptive naming. I believe it was Sam who suggested a dog-selecting scenario.I am inclined to think that the analysis of “disjunctive” descriptive naming actsin which one has a series of salient plausible candidates as the referent shouldprobably be distinguished from non-disjunctive naming acts. The conditions forintroducing the name may well differ. But all of this needs further exploration.

10. Perhaps there are other ways of understanding the case as well—e.g., that thereis no determinate reference. But I think we’ll be able to say the same aboutdemonstrative and descriptive cases.

11. I have argued that there are norms on descriptive reference-fixing—that we arenot “free” to introduce names willy-nilly—in (Jeshion, 2002), (Jeshion, 2004). ButI did not there touch upon the special issues about the “disjunctive” descriptivereference-fixing. This is much more to be said and explored about norms onnaming.

12. I have written elsewhere about why a Millian should accept a principle that isvery similar to weak disquotation. Cf., footnote 5 above. The basic reason foraccepting it is that it gives expression to a very natural thesis about the tightrelationship between sentence understanding and capacity to entertain the contentof what a sentence expresses. Full sentence understanding (including awareness ofall the relevant contextual factors) should be sufficient for entertaining and havingattitudes toward the proposition the sentence expresses. Otherwise it would seemthat there are propositions of our language that, in effect, escape our grasp.

13. Soames clearly introduces the restriction as a necessary condition on descriptivereference-fixing. He is much less definite as to whether it is also intended as asufficient condition. (There is only one place that I noted that suggests that thecondition is sufficient for descriptive reference fixing.) So perhaps Soames couldskirt the criticisms above by maintaining that the knowledge condition should besupplemented with a further condition that the agent knows that she knows ofO that it is the D. But this too will not do. Though it is not in principle uselessas a self-regulating principle, it is ad hoc to add the separate iterated knowledgecondition as a constraint here without adding it wholesale to one’s epistemictheory. As a descriptive principle governing our name-introducing practices, theprinciple is way too strong and is entirely implausible. I imagine that Soameswould be in agreement here.

14. And even this is too strong, for the formulation at least seems to imply thathaving the belief of an object entail that that object exists. But an agent cannotdefinitively discern whether the object exists. So the restriction, if it is to be action-guiding, must allow for circumstances in which it seems to the agent that there isan object which she thinks is the D, but there is in fact no such object.

15. Another easy way to see the absurd result is by just reconsidering Soames’sown example amended with the supposition the subject has good evidence orjustification for her false belief that S. Then she has good evidence or justificationfor believing that she has named a certain university and not a certain thumbnail.But her belief will be about the thumbnail, not the university.


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16. Note that an idealized restriction would be at odds with Soames’s broader com-mitments to be examining and explicating the semantics of natural language, notan idealized language or a language for use only in ideal epistemic circumstances.Consequently, it would be ad hoc for him to favor idealized restrictions fordescriptive names and non-idealized conditions for other names.

17. This is the route taken most famously by (Evans, 1985), but also by (Reca-nati,1993) and (Reimer, 2004), and many others. Soames strongly suggests, butnever says outright, that this is his favored view.

18. This oversimplifies a complex matter, of course. There is much more to be saidabout the conditions for introducing such “assisting descriptions.”

19. Thanks to Geoff Pynn and David Chalmers for helpful critical comments on anearlier draft. Thanks also to Michael Nelson for lively exchanges over the yearsabout the Kripke/Soames argument, and to the participants in my seminar onsingular thought at Yale University in autumn 2004. I wrote this paper while afellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I wish tothank the ACLS for its support and the University of California at Riverside forallowing me time away to do this work.

References

Evans, Gareth. (1985) “Reference and Contingency,” in his Collected Papers, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Jeshion, Robin. (2001) “Donnellan on Neptune,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,63, 1:111–35.

———. (2002) “Acquaintanceless De Re Belief,” in Truth and Meaning: Investigations inPhilosophical Semantics, Campbell, O’Rourke, Shier, eds. New York: Seven BridgesPress.

———. (2004) “Descriptive Descriptive Names,” in Descriptions and Beyond, Marga Reimerand Anne Bezuidenhout, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kripke, Saul. (1979) “A Puzzle About Belief,” in Meaning and Use, A. Margalit, ed. Dordrecht:Reidel.

Recanati, Francois. (1993) Direct Reference: From Language to Thought. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Reimer, Marga. (2004) “Descriptively Introduced Names,” in Descriptions and Beyond, Marga

Reimer and Anne Bezuidenhout, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Soames, Scott. (2003) Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 2, The Age of

Meaning, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Soames on Descriptive Reference-Fixing

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