RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT Manufacturing unit for Ethyl ...

July,2019

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RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

Manufacturing unit for Ethyl Acetate Plant with capacity of 25 TPD,

Formaldehyde plant with capacity of 50 TPD and API manufacturing plant with capacity of 1.2 TPD At Village- Malakpur,Lalru, Tehsil- Derabassi, District- S.A.S. Nagar, and State-

Punjab by M/s. Banstag Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd.

Manufacturing unit for Ethyl Acetate Plant with capacity of 25 TPD, Formaldehyde plant with capacity of 50 TPD and API manufacturing plant with capacity of 1.2 TPD At Village-

Malakpur,Lalru, Tehsil- Derabassi, District- S.A.S. Nagar, and State-Punjab by M/s. Banstag Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd.

RA Report

1 Consultant- M/s Vardan Environet, Plot-82A, Sec-5, IMT Manesar Gurgaon, Haryana (Mob: 09899651342)

RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RISK ASSESSMENT

Chemical industry is associated with potential hazards that effect to the employee and

environment. In the event of failure (Leak or Catastrophic rupture) will require the

assistance of emergency services to handle it effectively. The operation shall be taken

out under the well management and control by the qualified safety manager.

Disaster management plan shall be formulated with an aim of taking precautionary

steps to avert disasters and also to take such action after the disaster which limits the

damage to the minimum.

(A) Objectives of Risk Assessment

Industrial accident results in great personal & financial loss. Managing these accidental

risks in today’s environment is the concern of every industry including Chemical also,

because either real or perceived incidents can quickly jeopardize the financial viability

of a business. Many facilities involve various manufacturing processes that have the

potential for accidents which may be catastrophic to the plant, work force, and

environment or public.

The main objective of the risk assessment study is to propose a comprehensive but

simple approach to carry out risk analysis and conducting feasibility studies for

industries and planning & management of industrial prototype hazard analysis in

Indian context.

(B) Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment (HIRA)

Hazard analysis involves the identification and quantification of the various hazards

(unsafe condition) that exist in the plant. On the other hand, risk analysis deals with

the identification and quantification of the risk, the plant equipment and Personnel

are exposed to due to accidents resulting from the hazards present in the plant.

Risk analysis involves the identification and assessment of risks to the population is

exposed to as a result of hazards present. This requires an assessment of failure

probability credible accident scenario, vulnerability of population etc. Much of this

information is difficult to get or generate consequently, the risk analysis in present

case is confined to maximum credible accident studies and safety and risk aspect

related to proposed production of Formaldehyde plant.

Activities requiring assessment of risk due to occurrence of most probable instances of

hazard and accident are both onsite and off-site.



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On-site

Exposure to fugitive dust, noise, and other emissions

Housekeeping practices requiring contact with solid and liquid wastes

Emission/spillage etc. from storage and handling

Off-site

Exposure to pollutants released from offsite/ storage/related activities

Contamination due to accidental releases or normal release in combination with

natural hazard

Deposition of toxic pollutants in vegetation/ other sinks and possible sudden

releases due to accidental occurrences.

1.2 DEFINITION OF MCA

MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with

maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not

include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the

selection of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of

engineering judgement and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident

analysis.

1.2.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis

The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of

potential vulnerability. The data requirements for MCA analysis are:

Operating manual

Flow diagram and P&I diagrams

Detailed design parameters

Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals

Detailed plant layout

Detailed area layout

Past accident data

Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:

Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure cases

Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of the

hazardous material

Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind

velocities and atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and pressure

waves



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1.2.2 Pasquill Stability

One of the most important characteristics of atmosphere is its stability. Stability of

atmosphere is its tendency to resist vertical motion or to suppress existing turbulence.

This tendency directly influences the ability of atmosphere to disperse pollutants

released from the facilities. In most dispersion scenarios, the relevant atmospheric

layer is that nearest to the ground, varying in thickness from a few meters to a few

thousand meters. Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely

related to the vertical temperature gradient.

Temperature normally decreases with increasing height in the atmosphere. The rate

at which the temperature of air decreases with height is called Environmental Lapse

Rate (ELR). It varies from time to time and place to place. The atmosphere is

considered to be stable, neutral or unstable according to ELR is less than, equal to or

greater than Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR), which is a constant value of 0.98°C/100

meters.

Pasquill stability parameter, based on Pasquill – Giffard categorization, is a

meteorological parameter, which describes the stability of atmosphere, i.e., the

degree of convective turbulence. Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from

`A' (extremely unstable) to `F' (stable). Wind speeds, intensity of solar radiation

(daytime insulation) and night time sky cover have been identified as prime factors

defining these stability categories.

The following table indicates the Pasquill stability classes.

Table 1: Pasquill Stability Classes

** Class D & F are considered for modelling Worst case scenario

Sr. No. Stability Class Weather Conditions

1. A Very unstable – sunny, light wind

2. A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more

windy

3. B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more

windy

4. B/C Moderately unstable – moderate sunny and

moderate wind

5. C Moderately unstable – very windy / sunny or

overcast / light wind



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6. C/D Moderate unstable – moderate sun and high

wind

7. D Neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast /

windy night

8. E Moderately stable – less overcast and less windy

night

9. F Stable – night with moderate clouds and light /

moderate wind

10. G Very stable – possibly fog

Source: Hanna, S. R. and Drivas, P. J. (1996) Guidelines for Use of Vapour

Cloud Dispersion Models AIChE, CCPS, New York

When the atmosphere is unstable and wind speed is moderate or high or gusty, rapid

dispersion of pollutants will occur. Under these conditions, pollutant concentration in

air will be moderate or low and the material will be dispersed rapidly. When the

atmosphere is stable and wind speed is low, dispersion of material will be limited and

pollutant concentration in air will be high. Stability category for this study is identified

based on the cloud amount, day time solar radiation and wind speed.

Table 2: Weather parameters for consequence analysis

S. No. Wind Speed(m/s) Pasquill Stability

1. 2 F

2. 3 D

3. 5 D

1.2.3 Hazard Identification

Risk Assessment (RA) begins with Hazard Identification (HAZID). Hazard identification

is necessary, as hazards that have not been identified cannot be assessed. There are

many forms of hazard identification technique. Each has its particular benefits and

drawbacks when applied to different risk assessment processes. For this study, hazard

identification is required simply to identify those events, which have the potential to



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cause a significant impact on the safety of existing development concept or on the

environment. These hazards are then taken forward in the process for more detailed

analysis of their potential safety and environmental risks.

Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment as it leads to the

generation of accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for further

investigation are subsequently determined by its significance, normally using a cut-off

or threshold quantity.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of the risk it

presents to the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both

probability and consequences should be considered, but there are occasions where it

either the probability or the consequence can show to be sufficiently low or

sufficiently high, decisions can be made on just one factor.

During the hazard identification component, the following considerations are taken

into account.

o Chemical identities (MSDS)

o Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials.

o The types and design of process units

o The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release and the

nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapors or mists, fire, explosion, large

quantities stored or processed handling conditions) most likely to accompany

hazardous materials spills or releases

1.2.4 Hazard Identification as Per NFPA

Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency

Response" is a standard maintained by the U.S.-based National Fire Protection

Association. "Fire diamond" used by emergency personnel to quickly and easily

identify the risks posed by hazardous materials. The four divisions are typically color-

coded with red indicating flammability, blue indicating level of health hazard, yellow

for chemical reactivity, and white containing codes for special hazards. Each of health,

flammability and reactivity is rated on a scale from 0 (no hazard) to 4 (severe risk).

The numeric values in the first column are designated in the standard by "Degree of

Hazard" using numerals (0, 1, 2, 3, 4)

Table 3: NFPA Classification

IMPACT NFPA CODE COLOUR

Flammability

hazard

Nf



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IMPACT NFPA CODE COLOUR

Health

hazard

Nh

Reactivity

hazard

Nr

Special

hazards

W

Table 4: Explanation of NFPA classification

Classification Definition

Health Hazard

4 Materials, which on very short exposure could cause death or major

residual injury even though prompt medical treatments were given.

3 Materials, which on short exposure could cause serious temporary or

residual injury even though prompt medical treatments were given.

2

Materials, which on intense or continued exposure could cause

temporary incapacitation or possible residual injury unless prompt

medical treatment is given.

1 Materials, which on exposure would cause irritation but only minor

residual injury even if no treatment is given.

0 Materials, which on exposure under fire conditions would offer no

hazard beyond that of ordinary combustible material.

Flammability

4

Materials which will rapidly or completely vaporize at atmospheric

pressure and normal ambient temperature, or which are readily

dispersed in air and which will burn readily.

3 Liquids and solids that can be ignited under almost all ambient

temperature conditions.



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Classification Definition

2 Materials that must be moderately heated or exposed to relatively high

ambient temperatures before ignition can occur.

1 Material that must be preheated before ignition can occur.

0 Materials that will not burn.

Reactivity

4

Materials which in themselves are readily capable of detonation or of

explosive decomposition or reaction at normal temperature and

pressures.

3

Materials which in themselves are capable of detonation or explosive

reaction but require a strong initiating source or which must be heated

under confinement before initiation or which react explosively with

water.

2

Materials which in themselves are normally unstable and readily

undergo violent chemical change but do not detonate. Also materials

which may react violently with water or which may form potentially

explosive mixtures with water.

1

Materials which in themselves are normally stable, but which can

become unstable at elevated temperature and pressures or which may

react with water with some release of energy but not violently.

0 Materials which in themselves are normally stable, even under fire

exposure conditions, and which are not reactive with water.



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Table 5: Raw Materials used along with their properties

SR. NAME OF CHEMICAL

HAZARD FLASH POINT 0 C

BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C

VD SOLUBILITY WITH WATER at 20 °C

NFPA HFR

HAZARDOUS COMBUSTION

PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

1. Benzimidazole CAS: 51-17-2

C No Data Greater

than 680

°F at 760

mm Hg

No

Data

No

Data

No Data No Data Insoluble No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

2. Chloro Methyl Pyridine CAS: 6959-47-3

Corrosive No Data No Data No

Data

No

Data

No Data No Data Greater

than or

equal to

100

mg/mL

No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

3. Tetra Butyl Ammonium Bromide (TBAB) CAS: 1643-19-2

No Data No Data No Data No

Data

No

Data

1.15 No Data 600 g/L 2 0 1 Nitrogen oxides

(NOx) Carbon

monoxide (CO)

Carbon dioxide

(CO2)Hydrogen

halides

No Data No Data No Data No Data

4. Methylene Di Chloride (MDC) CAS: 75-09-2

Xn/R No Data

103.6 ° F

12 % 19 % 1.322 2.93 Greater than or equal to

100 mg/mL

2 1 0 No Data 50 ppm 2300

ppm

No Data A

potential

occupatio

nal

carcinoge



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BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C


NFPA HFR


PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

n

5. Caustic Flakes CAS: 1310-73-2

Corrosive No Data 1388°C No

Data

No

Data

2.13 No Data Easily

soluble

in cold

water

3 0 1 No Data 2

(mg/m3

) from

ACGIH

No Data No Data No Data

6. Sodium Hypochlorite CAS: 7681-52-9

Xi/Corrosive

No Data No Data No

Data

No

Data

1.093 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

7. Acetone CAS: 67-64-1

F -20°C 56.2°C 2.6% 12.8% 0.79 2 No Data 1 3 0 carbon oxides

(CO, CO2)

500

ppm

No Data 5800 mg/kg

No Data

8. Sulfide Comp. 6-methoxy-2-[[(4-methoxy-3,5-dimethyl-2-pyridinyl)methyl]thio]-1H-benzimidazole CAS : 73590-85-9


Data

No

Data

No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

9. Benzimidazole Mercapto Compound: 2, Mercapto-5 Methoxybenzimidazole CAS: 583-39-1


Data

No

Data

1.42 No Data less than

1 mg/mL




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BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C


NFPA HFR


PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

10. Chiaro Compound: 2-Chloro Methyl 3,5, Di Methyl-4 Methoxy Pyridine .HCl CAS: 86604-75-3

Xi No Data No Data No

Data

No

Data

No Data No Data No Data 1 0 0 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

11. Titanium Chloride CAS : 7550-45-0

Corrosive No Data 136.5 deg C

No

Data

No

Data

1.720 4.9 Reacts No Data No Data No Data No Data LC 50: 400

mg/m3

Non-

Carcinoge

nic

12. Magnesium Chloride Hexahydrate CAS : 7791-18-6

Xi No Data No Data No

Data

No

Data

1.56 No Data Freely soluble

1 0 0 No Data No Data No Data 7600 mg/Kg

No Data

13. Ethyl Acetate CAS: 141-78-6

F/Xi -4°C 77°C 2.05% 12.8% No Data 3.0 8.7

g/100mL

(poor)

1 3 0 No Data 400

ppm


14. Methanol CAS: 67-56-1

F 52 ° F 148.3 ° F 6 % 36.5

%

0.792 1.11 greater

than or

equal to

100

mg/mL

1 3 0 No Data 200

ppm

6000

ppm

No Data No Data

15. Potassium Hydroxide CAS: 1310-58-3


Data

No

Data

2.04 No Data 107

g/100 cc

3 0 1 No Data 2

mg/m3




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BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C


NFPA HFR


PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

as STEL

16. Esomeprazole Sulfonyl


No Data

No Data No Data No Data 2 1 0 No Data No Data No Data >1900 mg/kg

No Data

17. Esomeprazole Potassium Salt CAS: 161796-84-5


Data

No

Data


18. Tetra Hydrofuran

(THF)

F/Xi -14.5°C 66°C 2.0% 11.8% No Data 2.5 miscible 2 3 1 No Data 50 ppm No Data No Data A4

19. Di Ethyl Tartrate CAS : 13811-71-7

F 93 °C 280 °C No

Data

No

Data

1.2 7.11 No Data 0 1 0 Carbon monoxide (CO) Carbon dioxide

(CO2)


20. Titanium Iso Peroxide CAS: 13463-67-7

No Data No Data 2500-

3000°C

No

Data

No

Data

3.9 to 4.2

No Data

Insoluble in water

No Data No Data 10 mg/m

3

5000 mg/m3

No Data A4 (not classifiabl

e as a human

carcinogen)

21. Hydrogen Per Oxide CAS: 7722-84-1

T No Data

141°C

No

Data

No

Data

No Data 1 miscible 3 0 3 No Data 1 ppm

No Data No Data A4

22. Di Iso Propyl Ethyl Amine CAS : 7087-68-5

F 12 °C 127 °C

3% 17% No Data No Data 4.01 g/l No Data

Carbon oxides,

Nitrogen oxides (NOx)

No Data No Data 317 mg/kg

No Data



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BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C


NFPA HFR


PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

23. Toluene CAS: 108-88-3

F/Xn 4°C 111°C

1.1% 7.1% No Data

3.1 0.874 2 3 0 No Data 20 ppm 500 ppm No Data No Data

24. Sodium Thio Sulfate CAS: 7772987


Data

No

Data

1.66 No Data Soluble No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

25. Iso Propyl Acetate CAS: 108-21-4

F/Xi 2°C 89°C 1.8% 7.8% No Data 3.5 31 g/100

ml(poor)

2 3 0 No Data 100

ppm

1800

ppm

No Data No Data

26. Sodium Bi Sulfate CAS: 7681-38-1


Data

No

Data


27. Boric Acid CAS: 10043-35-3

T No Data 572 ° F No

Data

No

Data

1.435 No Data 5.6

g/100ml

No Data No Data 2

mg/m3


28. Propionic Anhydride CAS: 123-62-6

Corrosive 63°C 167°C 1.48

%

11.9

%

1.01 4.5 No Data 3 2 1 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

29. (S,S)-2,8 Diazobicyclo (4.3.0) Nonane CAS : 151213-40-0


Data

No

Data

No Data No Data No Data No Data Carbon dioxide,nitroge

n oxides (NOx),Hydrogen chloride gas


30. N-Butanol CAS: 71-36-3

F/Xi 29°C 117°C

1.4 % 11.3

%

0.81 2.6 7.7 g/100 ml

2 3 0 Carbon monoxide

(CO), Carbon dioxide (CO2)

1000 ppm

1400

ppm

2290 mg/kg

No Data



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BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C


NFPA HFR


PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

31. Hydrochloric Acid CAS: 7647-01-0

T/Corrosive No Data -85.1°C No

Data

No

Data

No Data No Data 67 g/100

ml

(modera

te)

3 0 1 No Data 2 ppm 50 ppm No Data No Data

32. Ammonium Hydroxide CAS: 1336-21-6


Data

No

Data

No Data 0.6 Miscible No Data No Data 18

mg/m3


33. Q Acid CAS: 58-08-2

Xn/C No Data 178°C No

Data

No

Data

1.23 No Data 2.17

g/100 ml


34. N-Methyl Piperazine CAS : 109-01-3

F No Data 135-138

deg C

No

Data

No

Data

0.901-

0.903

No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data 2830 uL/kg

No Data

35. 6 APA (6-Aminopenicillanic Acid) CAS : 551-16-6


Data

No

Data

No Data No Data No Data No Data Carbon

monoxide &

Carbon dioxide

Nitrogen

Oxides Sulphur

Oxides Possibly

Hydrogen

Cyanide


36. Amidase Enzyme No Data No Data No Data No

Data

No

Data




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BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C


NFPA HFR


PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

37. Ammonia 10% CAS: 7664-41-7

F No Data -33°C 15.0% 33.6% No Data 0.60 54 g/100

ml


38. CMIC Chloride (3-(2-Chlorophenyl)-5-methylisoxazole-4-carbonyl chloride) CAS: 25629-50-9

No Data 184.6°C

381.7°C

No

Data

No

Data


39. 2 EHS (Sodium 2-ethylhexyl Sulfate) CAS: 126-92-1

No Data No Data 205 to

219 ° F

No

Data

No

Data

1.114 No Data greater than or equal to

100 mg/ml


40. Di-CMIC Chloride No Data 184.6°C 381.7°C No Data

No Data


41. 2 EHA (2-Ethyl Hexyl Acrylate) CAS: 103-11-7

C/Xi 82°C 213.5°C 0.8% 6.4% 0.885 6.35 less than

1 mg/mL

1 2 1 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

42. 4-Bromo benzonitrile CAS : 623-00-7

T No Data

235 - 237 °C

No

Data

No

Data

No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data 237 mg/kg

No Data

43. 1,2,4 Triazole Sodium CAS: 41253-21-8

Corrosive No Data No Data No

Data

No

Data


44. P-Fluorobenzo Nitrile CAS: 394-47-8

Xn No Data No Data No

Data

No

Data




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BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C


NFPA HFR


PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

45. DMF (Dimethyl Formamide) CAS: 68-12-2

T 58°C 153°C 2.2 % 15.2

%

0.95 2.5 Miscible 2 2 0 No Data 10 ppm 500 ppm No Data A4

46. Potassium-Tert Butoxide CAS: 865-47-4

F 54 °F 275°C No

Data

No

Data

0.902 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

47. Ethyl Alcohol CAS: 64-17-5

F 12.0 °C 78°C 3.1% 27.7% 0.79 1.6 Miscible 2 3 0 No Data 1000

ppm

3300

ppm

No Data No Data

48. Cyanoacetic Acid Ethyl Ester CAS: 105-56-6

No Data 230 ° F No Data No

Data

No

Data

No Data No Data No Data 1 1 1 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

49. Hydrogen CAS: 1333-74-0

F No Data -253°C 4 % 75 % 0.071 No Data No Data 0 4 0 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

50. Ammonia Gas CAS: 7664-41-7

F/T No Data -28.03 ° F 16 % 25 % 0.6818 0.6 54 g/100

ml


51. 1-Methyl-3 Methylcarbamoylimino Methyl Urea CAS: 13114-72-2

No Data No Data 397 to 401 ° F

No

Data

No

Data

No Data No Data Insoluble No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data

52. Sodium Nitrite CAS: 7632-00-0

No Data No Data Decompo

ses at

608° F

No

Data

No

Data

2.17 No Data Greater

than or

equal to

100

mg/mL




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BP °C LE L %

UE L %

SP.GR. 20 °C


NFPA HFR


PRODUCT

TLV/ TWA PPM

IDLH PPM

LD50 CARCINO GENIC

CHARACT ERISTIC

53. Activated Carbon CAS: 7440-44-0

No Data No Data Maximum

4000ºC

No

Data

No

Data

0.25 –

0.60

No Data Insoluble No Data No Data 10mg/

m3

No Data >10g/kg No Data

54. Acetic Acid CAS: 64-19-7

F 39°C 118.1°C 4% 19.9% 1.049 2.07 Easily

soluble

3 2 0 carbon oxides

(CO, CO2)

10 ppm No Data 3310 mg/kg

No Data



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Table 6: Product Wise Health Risk Assessment and Control Measures

Hazardous Chemicals as per MSIHC Rules, 1989

SL No.

Chemical Name

OSHA PEL Cal/OSHA PEL

NIOSH REL

ACGIH Type of Hazard

Type of Storage

Fire fighting Protection equipment’s and Precautions

Mg/m3

8-hour TWA (ST) STEL (C) Ceiling Mg/m3

Up to 10- hour TWA (ST) STEL (C) Ceiling Mg/m3

TLV



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1. Acetic acid CAS: 64-19-7

10 ppm 10 ppm (ST)

15ppm

10 ppm

(ST)

15ppm

10 ppm

(ST)

15ppm

F Store in a

segregated

and approved

area. Keep

container in a

cool, well-

ventilated

area. Keep

container

tightly closed

and sealed

until ready

for use. Avoid

all possible

sources of

ignition

(spark or

flame).

SMALL FIRE: Use

dry chemical

powder. LARGE

FIRE: Use alcohol

foam, water

spray or fog. Cool

containing

vessels with

water jet in order

to prevent

pressure build-

up, auto ignition

or explosion.

Provide exhaust

ventilation or other

engineering controls

to keep the airborne

concentrations of

vapours below their

respective threshold

limit value. Ensure

that eyewash

stations and safety

showers are

proximal to the

work-station

location. Splash

goggles. Synthetic

apron. Vapour

respirator. Gloves

(impervious).



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2. Ammonia CAS : 7664-41-7

50 ppm 25 ppm 25 ppm 25 ppm

F/T Ventilation inlets should be at ceiling and floor level. Cylinders must be used on a "first in - first out" basis. Keep cylinders away from sources of heat.

Self-contained breathing apparatus. Safety gloves, Goggles and shoes, or boots, should be worn when handling cylinders.

Chemical goggles Hands - Rubber gloves Skin - rubber or plastic apron

3. Formaldehyde CAS: 50-00-0

No Data

0.3 ppm No Data 0.1 ppm F/T Fireproof. Cool. Separated from incompatible materials. See Chemical Dangers.

Shut off supply; if not possible and no risk to surroundings, let the fire burn itself out. In other cases extinguish with powder, carbon dioxide. In case of fire: keep drums, etc., cool by spraying with water.

Use ventilation, local exhaust or breathing protection. Protective gloves. Wear safety goggles or eye protection in combination with breathing protection.



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4. Hydrogen Per Oxide CAS: 7722-84-1


1 ppm

T/Xi Store in an area without drain or sewer access. Separated from food and feedstuffs. See Chemical Dangers. Cool. Keep in the dark. Store in vented containers. Store only if stabilized.

In case of fire in the surroundings, use appropriate extinguishing media. In case of fire: keep drums, etc., cool by spraying with water.

Use ventilation, local exhaust or breathing protection. Protective gloves. Protective clothing. Wear safety goggles or face shield. Do not eat, drink, or smoke during work.



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5. Hydrochloric Acid CAS : 7647-01-0

No Data No Data No Data No Data F Store in cool place. Keep container tightly closed in a dry and well-ventilated place. Containers which are opened must be carefully resealed and kept upright to prevent leakage.

SMALL FIRE: CO2 (except for Cyanides), dry chemical, dry sand, alcohol-resistant foam. LARGE FIRE: Water spray, fog or alcohol-resistant foam. Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk. Use water spray or fog; do not use straight streams. Dike fire-control water for later disposal; do not scatter the material.

Wear appropriate eye protection to prevent eye contact with the liquid that could result in burns or tissue damage from frostbite. If the chemical is in solution, the worker should immediately wash the skin when it becomes contaminated. If chemical is in solution, work clothing that becomes wet or significantly contaminated should be removed and replaced.

6. Pottasium hydroxide CAS : 1310-58-3


2 mg/m3

Xi Separated from food and feedstuffs, strong acids and metals. Store only in original container. Dry. Well closed. Store

In case of fire in the surroundings, use appropriate extinguishing media.

Use local exhaust or breathing protection. Protective gloves. Protective clothing. Wear face shield or eye protection in combination with breathing protection. Do not eat, drink, or



RA Report


in an area without drain or sewer access.

smoke during work.

7. Tetrahydrofuran CAS : 109-99-9

200 ppm 200 ppm 200 ppm 50 ppm

F May form explosive peroxides on prolonged storage. Containers should be dated when opened and tested periodically for the presence of peroxides. Should crystals form in a peroxidizable liquid, peroxidation may have occurred and the product should be considered extremely dangerous.

As in any fire, wear self-contained breathing apparatus pressure-demand, MSHA/NIOSH (approved or equivalent) and full protective gear.

Wear appropriate protective eyeglasses or chemical safety goggles. Approved respirator if exposure limits are exceeded or if irritation or other symptoms are experienced.



RA Report


8. Sodium Hydroxide CAS : 1310-73-2

2 mg/m3 2 mg/m3 2 mg/m3 2 mg/m3

Corrosive

Keep container tightly closed. Keep container in a cool, well-ventilated area. Hygroscopic. Deliquescent.

No Data Splash goggles. Synthetic apron. Vapour and dust respirator. Be sure to use an approved/certified respirator or equivalent. Gloves.

Hazardous Solvents as per MSIHC Rules, 1989



RA Report


9. Acetone CAS : 67-64-1

1000 ppm 500 ppm 250 ppm 250 ppm

F Store in a segregated and approved area (flammables area). Keep container in a cool, well-ventilated area. Keep container tightly closed and sealed until ready for use. Keep away from direct sunlight and heat and avoid all possible sources of ignition (Spark or flame).

SMALL FIRE: Use DRY chemical powder. LARGE FIRE: Use alcohol foam, water spray or fog.

Ensure that eyewash stations and safety showers are proximal to the work-station location. Splash goggles. Full suit. Vapour respirator. Boots. Gloves. A self-contained breathing apparatus should be used to avoid inhalation of the product.



RA Report


10. Ethanol CAS : 64-17-5

No Data No Data No Data No Data F Keep away from heat, sparks, and flame. Keep away from sources of ignition. Store in a tightly closed container. Keep from contact with oxidizing materials. Store in a cool, dry, well-ventilated area away from incompatible substances. Flammables-area. Do not store near perchlorates, peroxides, chromic acid or nitric acid.

For small fires, use dry chemical, carbon dioxide, water spray or alcohol-resistant foam. For large fires, use water spray, fog, or alcohol-resistant foam. Use water spray to cool fire-exposed containers. Water may be ineffective. Do NOT use straight streams of water.

Wear appropriate protective eyeglasses or chemical safety goggles Wear appropriate protective gloves to prevent skin exposure. Wear appropriate protective clothing to prevent skin exposure.

11. Ethyl acetate CAS : 141-78-6

400 ppm 400 ppm 400 ppm 400 ppm

F Keep container tightly closed and in a well-ventilated place.

Use water spray to extinguish. Dry chemical Carbon dioxide (CO2) Foam

Wear safety glasses with side shields (or goggles). Use respiratory protection



RA Report


12. Butanol CAS : 71-36-3

No Data No Data No Data No Data F/Xn/Xi Store in a well-ventilated place. Keep tightly closed in a dry and cool place. Keep away from heat, sparks, flame and other sources of ignition (i.e., pilot lights, electric motors and static electricity). Keep under nitrogen blanket.

Water spray, carbon dioxide (CO2), dry chemical, alcohol-resistant foam. Wear self-contained breathing apparatus and protective suit.

Tight sealing safety goggles. Hand Protection Wear protective gloves. Ensure that the breakthrough time of the glove material is not exceeded.

13. Toluene CAS : 108-88-3

No Data 100 ppm 50 ppm 20 ppm

F/Xn Fireproof. Separated from strong oxidants

Use powder, AFFF, foam, carbon dioxide. In case of fire: keep drums, etc., cool by spraying with water.

Use ventilation, local exhaust or breathing protection. Protective gloves. Wear safety goggles. Do not eat, drink, or smoke during work.



RA Report


14. Hydrogen Gas CAS : 1333-74-0

No Data No Data No Data No Data F Fireproof. Cool. Ventilation along the floor and ceiling. Separated from oxidizing materials.

Shut off supply; if not possible and no risk to surroundings, let the fire burn itself out. In other cases extinguish with water spray, powder, carbon dioxide. In case of fire: keep cylinder cool by spraying with water. Combat fire from a sheltered position.

Use ventilation. Cold-insulating gloves. Wear face shield.

15. Methanol (Solvent)

No Data 200 ppm 250ppm 250ppm

T/F Keep away from heat, sparks, and flame. Keep away from sources of ignition. Store in a cool, dry place. Store in a tightly closed container. Flammables-area.

Use water spray to cool fire-exposed containers. Use foam, dry chemical, or carbon dioxide. Use flooding quantities of water as spray.

Wear chemical splash goggles. Wear appropriate protective gloves to prevent skin exposure. Wear appropriate protective clothing to prevent skin exposure.



RA Report


16. MDC (Methylene Dichloride) CAS : 75-09-2

No Data No Data No Data No Data Xn Store in a tightly closed container. Keep from contact with oxidizing materials. Store in a cool, dry, well-ventilated area away from incompatible substances. Store below 40°C. Keep away from active metals.

Use water spray, dry chemical, carbon dioxide, or appropriate foam.

Wear chemical splash goggles. Viton gloves are recommended. Wear appropriate protective clothing to prevent skin exposure.

Reference- OSHA/PEL exposure limit Guide



RA Report


1.2.5 Selected Failure Cases for Chemicals Falling Under MSIHC Rules, 1989

A list of failure cases was prepared based on process knowledge, engineering

judgment, experience, past incidents associated with such facilities and considering

the general mechanisms for loss of containment. The cases have been identified for

the consequence analysis is based on the following-

-Cases with high chance of occurrence but having low consequence

-Cases with low chance of occurrence but having high consequence

(The example includes Leak and Catastrophic failure of Storage)

Table 7: Selected Failure scenario

Sl No Failure Scenario Considered Type of Scenario

1. 5 mm, 10 mm, 20 mm and 50 mm leak in

Storage of Hazardous Chemicals as per

MSIHC Rules,1989

Credible scenario

2. Catastrophic Rupture Worst Case scenario

Table 8: Damage due to Overpressures

Peak Overpressure Damage Type

12.04 psi Total Destruction

4.35 psi Heavy Damage

1.45 psi Moderate Damage

0.44 psi Significant Damage

0.15 psi Minor Damage



RA Report


Table 9: Table showing Consequence Analysis of Hazardous chemicals falling under MSIHC Rules,1989

Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for

various heat loads (m)

Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

ACETIC ACID

STORAGE_

5MM LEAK

2F 1.60759 n/a n/a n/a 17.5026 11.0287 5.18424 5.07589 n/a n/a n/a

3D 1.44368 n/a n/a n/a 17.0257 11.3879 5.21134 4.68113 n/a n/a n/a

5D 1.25676 n/a n/a n/a 17.1568 12.1056 5.35444 4.49247 n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

ACETIC ACID

STORAGE_

10MM LEAK

2F

2.82504

3.1657

4 n/a n/a 32.2503 20.3861 8.56588 10.4033 30.0229 13.8916 12.9178

3D

2.54328

2.9804

8 n/a n/a 31.2352 20.6068 8.47475 9.69589

n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

5D

2.21924

2.7458

4 n/a n/a 31.109 21.3687 8.60067 9.35489

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

ACETIC ACID

STORAGE_

20MM LEAK

2F

4.91906

6.6145

4 5.91906 n/a 60.3133 38.0369 17.543 21.2508 29.8119 13.8506 12.887

3D

4.44701

6.2064

5 4.67401 n/a 58.4053 38.0271 17.6873 20.0022 28.3068 13.5581 12.6677

5D 3.89273 5.6567 4.27435 n/a 57.8393 38.811 18.4567 19.3902 27.3275 13.3677 12.525

PROPOSED

ACETIC ACID

2F

10.2097

15.236

5 12.4232 n/a 139.134 87.5899 46.5542 54.2883 148.986 53.1258 47.3388



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

STORAGE_

50MM LEAK

3D 9.2583 14.357 11.648 10.2583 134.734 86.823 47.9103 51.5128 88.0046 33.2172 29.9097

5D 8.13476 13.188 10.6004 9.13476 133.005 87.4956 51.0881 50.1366 41.2022 16.0644 14.5468

PROPOSED

ACETIC ACID

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture

2F n/a n/a n/

a

n/a

342.

56

21

5.

83

12

5.9

25

149.

441

238.

568

99.37

06

92.

021

3D n/a n/a n/

a

n/a

344.

255

22

0.

83

9

13

4.7

11

148.

674

176.

247

75.11

22

71.

330

5

5D n/a n/a n/ n/a

346.

22

5.

14

6.9 148. 152. 59.15

54.

360



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

a 339 34

7

48 294 221 36 7

PROPOSED

AMMONIA

STORAGE_5

MM LEAK

2F

8.61979 n/a

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

3D

7.71426

8.7142

6

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

5D

6.7004 7.7004

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

AMMONIA

2F

15.2422

16.412

7

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

3D

13.641

15.428

3

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

5D

11.8482

13.957

9

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

AMMONIA

STORAGE_20

MM LEAK

2F

26.9143 30.422

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

3D

24.0869 28.408

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

5D

20.9212

25.720

8

n/

a n/a

n/a n/

a

n/

a

n/a n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

AMMONIA

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F 26.9143 30.422 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

3D 24.0869 28.408 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

5D

20.9212

25.720

8 n/a n/a

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

AMMONIA_

Catastrophic

Rupture

2F n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

3D n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No

hazard No hazard

No

hazard

5D n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 35.589 14.9734 13.7289

PROPOSED 2F 8.61979 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

SODIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_5

MM LEAK

3D

7.71426

8.7142

6 n/a n/a


5D 6.7004 7.7004 n/a n/a


PROPOSED

SODIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

2F

15.2422

16.412

7 n/a n/a


3D

13.641

15.428

3 n/a n/a


5D

11.8482

13.957

9 n/a n/a




RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

SODIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_20

MM LEAK



5D

20.9212

25.720

8 n/a n/a


PROPOSED

SODIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F

56.9598 67.568 n/a n/a

n/a n/a n/a n/a No

hazard No hazard

No

hazard

3D

50.9761

62.882

3 n/a n/a


5D 44.2764 56.868

48.0542 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

PROPOSED

SODIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture

2F n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 226.347 60.105 50.0692


5D n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

232.062 61.2156 50.9019

PROPOSED

TETRA HYDRO

FURAN

STORAGE_5

2F

4.88658

7.5950

1 5.79742 4.8783


3D

4.37324

7.0724

3 5.35298 4.24544




RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

MM LEAK 5D

3.79847

6.4266

7 4.84699 3.63883


PROPOSED

TETRA HYDRO

FURAN

STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

2F

8.65752

14.494

2 11.5321 9.65752


3D

7.74803

13.516

7 10.6594 8.81111


5D

6.72973

12.318

7 9.59736 7.8212


PROPOSED

TETRA HYDRO

2F

15.314

27.014

3 21.4816 17.8782

n/a n/a n/a n/a

146.84 76.878 72.6545



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

FURAN

STORAGE_20

MM LEAK

3D

13.7053

25.260

8 19.9254 16.595

n/a n/a n/a n/a

80.3333 31.7262 28.7918

5D

11.904

23.103

1 18.0333 14.9572

n/a n/a n/a n/a

51.798 18.1237 16.0909

PROPOSED

TETRA HYDRO

FURAN

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F 32.4768 61.01 48.0368 39.915 n/a n/a n/a n/a 335.166 153.763 142.812

3D

29.065

57.213

6 44.6578 37.0447

n/a n/a n/a n/a

209.005 88.9601 81.7132

5D

25.2451

52.483

9 40.5274 33.454

n/a n/a n/a n/a

171.306 73.5766 67.6769



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

TETRA HYDRO

FURAN

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture




601.669 205.123 186.325

PROPOSED

POTASSIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_5

MM LEAK

2F 8.61979 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

3D

7.71426

8.7142

6 n/a n/a





RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

POTASSIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

2F

15.2422

16.412

7 n/a n/a


3D

13.641

15.428

3 n/a n/a


5D

11.8482

13.957

9 n/a n/a


PROPOSED

POTASSIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_20

MM LEAK



5D 20.9212

25.720n/a n/a




RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

8

PROPOSED

POTASSIUM

HYDROXIDE

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F

56.9598 67.568 n/a n/a

n/a n/a n/a n/a No

hazard No hazard

No

hazard

3D

50.9761

62.882

3 n/a n/a


5D

44.2764

56.868

4 48.0542 n/a


PROPOSED

POTASSIUM

HYDROXIDE





RA Report


Scenario

considered

Wind

stability

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concentr

ation

distance

(m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for


Pool Fire

Damage distance for


Maximu

m Pool

radius(m)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpressu

re 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture


112.508 29.9231 24.9376



RA Report


Table 10: Table showing Consequence Analysis of Hazardous solvents falling under MSIHC Rules,1989

Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire

Damage distance for various

heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)

Late Explosion (VCE)

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

ACETONE

STORAGE_

5MM LEAK

2F

2.167 n/a n/a n/a 15.3239 10.0551

4.7016

6 4.126

n/a n/a n/a

3D

1.946 1.59815 n/a n/a 14.6588 10.0821

4.7216

5 3.706

n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

5D

1.693 1.44242 n/a n/a 14.5678 10.4878

4.8699

2 3.516

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

ACETONE

STORAGE_

10MM LEAK

2F

2.167 n/a n/a n/a 15.3239 10.0551

4.7016

6 4.126

n/a n/a n/a

3D

1.946 1.59815 n/a n/a 14.6588 10.0821

4.7216

5 3.706

n/a n/a n/a

5D

1.693 1.44242 n/a n/a 14.5678 10.4878

4.8699

2 3.516

n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

ACETONE

STORAGE_

20MM LEAK

2F

6.607 9.15083

7.6070

3 n/a 44.6597 28.6414

14.058

2 14.32 31.9026 14.2569 13.1917

3D 5.976 8.56315 6.9763 n/a 43.9467 28.9343 14.592 13.75 20.4667 12.0343 11.5252

5D

5.233 7.80565

6.0687

9 5.11979 43.6711 29.4928

15.531

1 13.46 21.7516 12.284 11.7125

PROPOSED

ACETONE

STORAGE_

2F

6.607 9.15083

7.6070

3 n/a 44.6597 28.6414

14.058

2 14.32 31.9026 14.2569 13.1917

3D 5.976 8.56315 6.9763 n/a 43.9467 28.9343 14.592 13.75 20.4667 12.0343 11.5252



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

50MM LEAK 5D

5.233 7.80565

6.0687

9 5.11979 43.6711 29.4928

15.531

1 13.46 21.7516 12.284 11.7125

PROPOSED

ACETONE

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture

2F n/a n/a n/a n/a

52.2012 32.7954

15.821

1 17.71 56.7224 19.0808 16.8084

3D n/a n/a n/a n/a

52.7572 33.9192

16.977

2 17.62 69.7203 29.6092 27.2046

5D n/a n/a n/a n/a

53.0019 34.8455

18.569

5 17.55 81.732 31.7138 28.7826



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

ETHANOL

STORAGE_5

MM LEAK

2F

1.257 n/a n/a n/a 13.1234 8.76311

5.0850

3 4.926

n/a n/a n/a

3D

1.129 n/a n/a n/a 13.4343 9.3546

5.2669

1 4.825

n/a n/a n/a

5D

0.984 n/a n/a n/a 13.7515 9.98229

5.4860

8 4.772

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

ETHANOL

2F

2.207 n/a n/a n/a 13.9003 9.33673

5.4233

8 5.196

n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

3D

1.989 n/a n/a n/a 14.2974 9.96815

5.5659

2 5.164

n/a n/a n/a

5D

1.736 n/a n/a n/a 14.6476 10.6127

5.7536

9 5.148

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

ETHANOL

STORAGE_20

MM LEAK

2F

3.829 4.11193 n/a n/a 14.292 9.66636

5.6814

9 5.278

n/a n/a n/a

3D

3.472 3.88803 n/a n/a 14.6446 10.2404

5.7442

2 5.266

n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

5D

3.041 3.5749 n/a n/a 14.9597 10.8455

5.8790

3 5.26

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

ETHANOL

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F

7.909 10.305 8.9093 n/a 14.6715 10.0104

5.9848

4 5.325

n/a n/a n/a

3D

7.191 9.68344

8.1913

3 n/a 14.9738 10.5291

5.9823

9 5.321

n/a n/a n/a

5D

6.337 8.85032

7.3373

1 n/a 15.1993 11.0434

6.0206

1 5.319

n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

ETHANOL _

Catastrophic

Rupture

2F n/a n/a n/a n/a

12.8296 8.15292

4.1093

3 5.346

n/a n/a n/a

3D n/a n/a n/a n/a

13.0681 8.61147

4.0498

1 5.338 No hazard No hazard No hazard

5D n/a n/a n/a n/a

13.2607 9.09428

4.0571

7 5.334

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

ETHYL

2F

6.415 8.79058

7.4149

2 n/a




RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

ACETATE

STORAGE_5

MM LEAK

3D

5.741 8.12622

6.7410

3 n/a


5D

4.987 7.34065

5.6349

6 n/a


PROPOSED

ETHYL

ACETATE

STORAGE_10

2F

11.36 16.6099

13.595

3 n/a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

42.4071 16.2985 14.7224

3D

10.17 15.4369

12.590

8 11.1703




RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

MM LEAK 5D

8.834 14.009

11.336

8 9.83363


PROPOSED

ETHYL

ACETATE

STORAGE_20

MM LEAK

2F 20.1 30.7348 25.147 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 112.427 46.0202 42.0113

3D

17.99 28.6326

23.344

2 19.4931

n/a n/a n/a n/a

71.6458 30.0377 27.5259

5D

15.62 26.0621

21.100

1 17.8697

n/a n/a n/a n/a

44.7058 16.7453 15.0574

PROPOSED 2F 42.62 68.7931 55.916

46.2086 n/a n/a n/a n/a 292.413 113.227 102.41



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

ETHYL

ACETATE

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

3

3D

38.14 64.2555

51.940

6 43.6744

n/a n/a n/a n/a

204.713 88.126 81.0878

5D

33.13 58.6441

47.028

3 39.7562

n/a n/a n/a n/a

168.035 72.941 67.2003

PROPOSED

ETHYL

ACETATE

STORAGE_

Catastrophic






RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

Rupture

PROPOSED

BUTANOL

STORAGE_5

MM LEAK

2F

5.468 7.67925

6.4680

5 n/a


3D

4.894 7.10367

5.4031

2 n/a


5D

4.25 6.42787

4.9014

9 n/a


PROPOSED DI 2F 9.684 14.6443 11.901

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

BUTANOL

STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

5

3D

8.666 13.604

10.988

9 9.66635


5D

7.527 12.3382

9.8619

8 8.52735


PROPOSED

BUTANOL

STORAGE_20

2F

17.12 27.1861

22.105

7 18.3274

n/a n/a n/a n/a

67.5962 21.1942 18.393

3D 15.32 25.3185 20.478

17.2226 n/a n/a n/a n/a 52.7771 18.314 16.2335



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

MM LEAK 2

5D 13.31 23.0421 18.484 15.6038 n/a n/a n/a n/a 49.0707 17.5937 15.6934

PROPOSED

BUTANOL

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F

36.3 61.0193

49.234

7 41.1744

n/a n/a n/a n/a

199.408 70.9819 63.2291

3D

32.48 56.9779

45.672

7 38.432

n/a n/a n/a n/a

149.168 53.1611 47.3653

5D 28.21 52.0011 41.314 34.7854 n/a n/a n/a n/a 147.172 60.8296 55.6172

PROPOSED 2F n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 682.648 237.411 210.533



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

BUTANOL

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture



651.611 234.448 230.832

PROPOSED

TOLUENE

STORAGE_5

MM LEAK

2F

5.09 7.80408

6.0898

9 6.08989


3D

4.555 7.25892

5.5238

8 4.44069


5D 3.957 6.59488 4.9906

3.79906 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

6

PROPOSED DI

TOLUENE

STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

2F

9.016 14.8682

11.881

1 10.0159

n/a n/a n/a n/a

48.7225 17.526 15.6427

3D 8.069 13.8521 10.978 9.06873 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

5D

7.008 12.6201

9.8796

5 8.09808


PROPOSED

TOLUENE

STORAGE_20

2F 15.94 27.6814 22.094 18.4104 n/a n/a n/a n/a 122.021 47.8849 43.4094

3D 14.27 25.8626 20.486

17.1059 n/a n/a n/a n/a 78.498 31.3695 28.5244



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

MM LEAK 4

5D

12.39 23.6342

18.527

7 15.423

n/a n/a n/a n/a

49.4761 17.6725 15.7525

PROPOSED

TOLUENE

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F

33.81 62.4329

49.353

4 41.0902

n/a n/a n/a n/a

298.972 114.502 103.366

3D

30.26 58.5026

45.856

2 38.1474

n/a n/a n/a n/a

210.962 89.3405 81.9984

5D 26.28 53.6184 41.587

34.4482 n/a n/a n/a n/a 182.934 83.893 77.9141



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

9

PROPOSED

TOLUENE

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture




PROPOSED

METHANOL

STORAGE_5

2F 1.855 n/a n/a n/a 11.3876 6.9711 n/a 5.954 n/a n/a n/a

3D 1.666 n/a n/a n/a 11.3337 7.31173 n/a 5.674 n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

MM LEAK 5D 1.451 n/a n/a n/a 11.6144 7.77955 n/a 5.535 n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED DI

METHANOL

STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

2F 3.247 n/a n/a n/a 20.5194 13.3028 n/a 12.16 n/a n/a n/a



PROPOSED

METHANOL

STORAGE_20

2F

5.612 6.61222 n/a n/a 37.7155 24.7334

15.486

1 24.73 24.2361 12.7669 12.0745

3D 5.092 5.15979 n/a n/a 37.1367 25.3697 n/a 23.95 n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

MM LEAK 5D 4.467 4.7937 n/a n/a 37.2119 26.3261 n/a 23.54 n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

METHANOL

STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F

11.49 13.5396 n/a n/a 85.6419 56.8647

34.857

9 62.89 39.3013 15.6949 14.2698

3D

10.48 12.8071 n/a n/a 84.307 57.7588

34.040

6 61.26 31.6726 14.2122 13.1582

5D

9.251 11.7334

10.251

5 n/a 84.1297 59.1709

33.635

9 60.37 25.9141 13.093 12.319

PROPOSED 2F n/a n/a n/a n/a 208.503 140.461 88.105

172.8 440.896 292.916 292.186



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

METHANOL

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture

6

3D n/a n/a n/a n/a

208.789 144.162

87.793

7 172.2 99.2184 47.8099 45.8556

5D n/a n/a n/a n/a

210.257 148.177

87.633

8 171.9 95.596 47.8104 45.8559

PROPOSED

METHYLNE

DI CHLORIDE

STORAGE_

2F 3.213 n/a n/a n/a 4.92521 n/a n/a 3.042 n/a n/a n/a

3D 2.88 n/a n/a n/a 4.93809 n/a n/a 2.708 n/a n/a n/a

5D 2.503 n/a n/a n/a 5.2168 n/a n/a 2.568 n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

5MM LEAK

PROPOSED

METHYLENE

DI CHLORIDE

STORAGE_

10MM LEAK

2F 5.667 6.66733 n/a n/a 10.1703 n/a n/a 6.827 n/a n/a n/a

3D 5.084 5.36026 n/a n/a 10.2345 n/a n/a 6.187 n/a n/a n/a

5D

4.425 4.91772 n/a n/a 10.8339 n/a n/a 5.89

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

METHYLNE

DI CHLORIDE

2F 9.933 11.8389 n/a n/a 20.1682 10.5302 n/a 15.1 n/a n/a n/a

3D 8.932 10.9903 n/a n/a 20.1879 10.0302 n/a 13.98 n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

STORAGE_

20 MM LEAK

5D

7.79 9.90733

8.7903

2 n/a 20.7809 9.84755 n/a 13.38

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

METHYLENE

DI CHLORIDE

STORAGE_

50MM LEAK

2F 9.933 11.8389 n/a n/a 20.1682 10.5302 n/a 15.1 n/a n/a n/a

3D 8.932 10.9903 n/a n/a 20.1879 10.0302 n/a 13.98 n/a n/a n/a

5D

7.79 9.90733

8.7903

2 n/a 20.7809 9.84755 n/a 13.38

n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED 2F n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 294.122 133.737 125.295



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

METHYLENE

DI CHLORIDE

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture



268.268 108.535 98.8919

PROPOSED

HYDROGEN

GAS

STORAGE_

2F

11.71 16.1844

12.074

7 n/a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

69.8519 29.6891 27.2645

3D

12.22 16.4813

12.623

7 n/a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

63.8648 28.5254 26.392



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

5 MM LEAK 5D

13.28 17.0148

14.183

8 n/a

n/a n/a n/a n/a

61.1054 27.9891 25.9899

PROPOSED

HYDROGEN

GAS

STORAGE_

10 MM LEAK

2F

19.88 32.1302

24.221

9 18.1726

n/a n/a n/a n/a

132.447 57.9678 53.4715

3D

20.69 32.2881

25.207

1 19.7037

n/a n/a n/a n/a

113.562 46.2409 42.1768

5D

22.47 32.3766

26.881

8 22.3915

n/a n/a n/a n/a

109.105 45.3746 41.5273



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

PROPOSED

HYDROGEN

GAS

STORAGE_

20 MM LEAK

2F

33.2 61.9344

45.084

3 33.5481

n/a n/a n/a n/a

237.551 102.565 94.4158

3D

34.27 61.4367

46.302

1 35.2413

n/a n/a n/a n/a

216.697 90.4552 82.8341

5D

36.87 59.2631

47.812

3 40.0578

n/a n/a n/a n/a

204.941 88.1704 81.1211

PROPOSED

HYDROGEN

GAS

2F n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

3D n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a



RA Report


Scenario

considered

Win

d

stabi

lity

class

Flash

fire

At LFL

concen

tration

distanc

e (m)

Jet Fire


heat loads (m)

Pool Fire


heat loads (m)

Maximum

Pool

radius(m)


Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 1

(0.02068

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 2

(0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind

to

overpress

ure 3

(0.2068

bar) [m]

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

4

kW/m2

12.5

kW/m2

37.5

kW/m2

STORAGE_

50 MM LEAK

5D n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED

HYDROGEN

GAS

STORAGE_

Catastrophic

Rupture




353.872 84.9422 71.1935



RA Report


Table 11: Table showing Consequence Distance of Toxic Release distance at IDLH for Hazardous Chemicals as per MSIHC Rules, 1989

Scenario considered Wind

stability

class

Concentration

of interest

[ppm]

Averaging time

selected

Distance downwind

to concentration of

interest [m]

PROPOSED ACETIC

ACID STORAGE_

5MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 217.642

3D 50 IDLH 61.7789

5D 50 IDLH 45.5677

PROPOSED ACETIC

ACID STORAGE_

10MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 398.294

3D 50 IDLH 122.888

5D 50 IDLH 97.6579

PROPOSED ACETIC

ACID STORAGE_

20MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 735.999

3D 50 IDLH 226.321

5D 50 IDLH 191.894

PROPOSED ACETIC

ACID STORAGE_

50MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 1573.98

3D 50 IDLH 522.397

5D 50 IDLH 418.184

PROPOSED ACETIC

ACID STORAGE_

Catastrophic Rupture

2F 50 IDLH 3953.25

3D 50 IDLH 1393.94

5D 50 IDLH 980.093

PROPOSED AMMONIA

GAS STORAGE_5 MM

LEAK

2F 300 IDLH 8.91

3D 300 IDLH 37.3586

5D 300 IDLH 33.5672

PROPOSED AMMONIA 2F 300 IDLH 14.4065



RA Report



stability

class

Concentration

of interest

[ppm]

Averaging time

selected

Distance downwind

to concentration of

interest [m]

GAS STORAGE_10 MM

LEAK

3D 300 IDLH 66.3175

5D 300 IDLH 68.0282

PROPOSED AMMONIA

GAS STORAGE_20 MM

LEAK

2F 300 IDLH 48.6405

3D 300 IDLH 86.3515

5D 300 IDLH 129.86

PROPOSED AMMONIA

GAS STORAGE_50 MM

LEAK

2F 300 IDLH 48.6405

3D 300 IDLH 86.3515

5D 300 IDLH 129.86

PROPOSED AMMONIA

GAS_


2F 300 IDLH 7.1076

3D 300 IDLH 89.2911

5D 300 IDLH 142.32

PROPOSED AMMONIA

10% STORAGE_5 MM

LEAK

2F 300 IDLH 8.59348

3D 300 IDLH 31.8177

5D 300 IDLH 35.6402

PROPOSED AMMONIA

10% STORAGE_10 MM

LEAK

2F 300 IDLH 26.5646

3D 300 IDLH 43.5358

5D 300 IDLH 69.0023

PROPOSED AMMONIA

10% STORAGE_20 MM

LEAK

2F 300 IDLH

3D 300 IDLH 43.3056

5D 300 IDLH 118.942

PROPOSED AMMONIA 2F 300 IDLH 5.53827



RA Report



stability

class

Concentration

of interest

[ppm]

Averaging time

selected

Distance downwind

to concentration of

interest [m]

10% STORAGE_50 MM

LEAK

3D 300 IDLH 127.232

5D 300 IDLH 160.138

PROPOSED AMMONIA

10% _


2F 300 IDLH 9.25642

3D 300 IDLH 46.7122

5D 300 IDLH 134.782

PROPOSED HYDROGEN

PEROXIDE STORAGE_5

MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 21.1152

3D 50 IDLH 51.4928

5D 50 IDLH 67.9498

PROPOSED HYDROGEN

PEROXIDE STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH

3D 50 IDLH 84.7122

5D 50 IDLH 119.222

PROPOSED HYDROGEN

PEROXIDE STORAGE_20

MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 3.51813

3D 50 IDLH 129.298

5D 50 IDLH 176.796

PROPOSED HYDROGEN

PEROXIDE STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 3.51813

3D 50 IDLH 129.298

5D 50 IDLH 176.796

PROPOSED HYDROGEN

PEROXIDE _


2F 50 IDLH 25.9842

3D 50 IDLH 38.5232

5D 50 IDLH 98.9968

PROPOSED 2F 50 IDLH 537.241



RA Report



stability

class

Concentration

of interest

[ppm]

Averaging time

selected

Distance downwind

to concentration of

interest [m]

HYDRCHLORIC ACID

STORAGE_5 MM LEAK

3D 50 IDLH 127.396

5D 50 IDLH 91.2081

PROPOSED

HYDRCHLORIC ACID

STORAGE_10 MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 983.756

3D 50 IDLH 255.383

5D 50 IDLH 198.829

PROPOSED

HYDRCHLORIC ACID

STORAGE_20 MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 1184.25

3D 50 IDLH 315.121

5D 50 IDLH 248.731

PROPOSED

HYDRCHLORIC ACID

STORAGE_50 MM LEAK

2F 50 IDLH 1115.05

3D 50 IDLH 312.109

5D 50 IDLH 249.041

PROPOSED

HYDRCHLORIC ACID _


2F 50 IDLH 888.35

3D 50 IDLH 407.495

5D 50 IDLH 440.987

PROPOSED

TETRAHYDROFURAN

STORAGE_5 MM LEAK

2F 2000 Flammable 16.5624

3D 2000 Flammable

5D 2000 Flammable

PROPOSED

TETRAHYDROFURAN

STORAGE_10 MM LEAK


3D 2000 Flammable 19.7256




RA Report



stability

class

Concentration

of interest

[ppm]

Averaging time

selected

Distance downwind

to concentration of

interest [m]

PROPOSED

TETRAHYDROFURAN

STORAGE_20 MM LEAK




PROPOSED

TETRAHYDROFURAN

STORAGE_50 MM LEAK




PROPOSED

TETRAHYDROFURAN _





Table 12: Maximum Overpressure damage Distance (Domino Effect)


stabilit

y class

Maximum Overpressure Diameter

Distance

downwind to

overpressure 1

(0.02068 bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure

2 (0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure 3

(0.2068 bar) [m]

PROPOSED ACETONE

STORAGE_

20MM LEAK

2F 43.8052 8.51384 6.38335

3D 20.9334 4.06855 3.05044

5D 23.5033 4.56802 3.42492

PROPOSED ACETONE 2F 43.8052 8.51384 6.38335



RA Report



stabilit

y class


Distance

downwind to

overpressure 1

(0.02068 bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure

2 (0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure 3

(0.2068 bar) [m]

STORAGE_

50MM LEAK

3D 20.9334 4.06855 3.05044

5D 23.5033 4.56802 3.42492

PROPOSED ACETONE

STORAGE_


2F 93.4448 18.1616 13.6169

3D 119.441 19.2183 14.4091

5D 143.464 23.4276 17.5652

PROPOSED ETHANOL _


2F n/a n/a n/a

3D 0 0 0

5D n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED ETHYL

ACETATE STORAGE_10

MM LEAK

2F 64.8143 12.5971 9.44482

3D n/a n/a n/a

5D n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED ETHYL

ACETATE STORAGE_20

MM LEAK

2F 164.854 32.0404 24.0227

3D 103.292 20.0754 15.0518

5D 69.4116 13.4906 10.1148

PROPOSED ETHYL

ACETATE STORAGE_50

MM LEAK

2F 444.826 86.4549 64.8206

3D 289.427 56.252 42.1756

5D 236.071 45.8819 34.4005



RA Report



stabilit

y class


Distance

downwind to

overpressure 1

(0.02068 bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure

2 (0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure 3

(0.2068 bar) [m]

PROPOSED ETHYL

ACETATE STORAGE_


2F 793.78 128.488 96.3356

3D 783.827 121.853 72.4803

5D 786.069 111.696 67.6404

PROPOSED DI TOLUENE

STORAGE_10 MM LEAK

2F 77.445 15.052 11.2854

3D n/a n/a n/a

5D n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED TOLUENE

STORAGE_20 MM LEAK

2F 184.042 35.7698 26.8189

3D 116.996 22.739 17.0488

5D 78.9523 15.3449 11.505

PROPOSED TOLUENE

STORAGE_50 MM LEAK

2F 457.944 89.0046 66.7322

3D 301.924 58.681 43.9967

5D 245.867 47.786 35.8281

PROPOSED TOLUENE

STORAGE_ Catastrophic

Rupture

2F 889.484 154.551 115.877

3D 870.891 139.343 104.474

5D 887.346 121.781 91.3066

PROPOSED METHANOL

STORAGE_20 MM LEAK

2F 28.4722 5.53376 4.149

3D n/a n/a n/a



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stabilit

y class


Distance

downwind to

overpressure 1

(0.02068 bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure

2 (0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure 3

(0.2068 bar) [m]

5D n/a n/a n/a

PROPOSED METHANOL

STORAGE_50 MM LEAK

2F 58.6027 11.3898 8.53966

3D 43.3452 8.42444 6.31633

5D 31.8282 6.18602 4.63804

PROPOSED METHANOL

STORAGE_ Catastrophic

Rupture

2F 601.793 5.8314 4.37216

3D 138.437 15.6199 11.7112

5D 131.192 15.6208 11.7119

PROPOSED METHYLENE

DI CHLORIDE

STORAGE_


2F 408.243 67.4735 50.5891

3D 397.151 68.0975 51.0569

5D 396.537 77.0696 57.7838

PROPOSED HYDROGEN

GAS STORAGE_

5 MM LEAK

2F 99.7038 19.3781 14.529

3D 87.7296 17.0508 12.7841

5D 82.2108 15.9782 11.9799

PROPOSED HYDROGEN

GAS STORAGE_

10 MM LEAK

2F 184.895 35.9355 26.9431

3D 167.125 32.4818 24.3536

5D 158.21 30.7492 23.0546

PROPOSED HYDROGEN 2F 335.102 65.1294 48.8315



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stabilit

y class


Distance

downwind to

overpressure 1

(0.02068 bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure

2 (0.1379

bar) [m]

Distance

downwind to

overpressure 3

(0.2068 bar) [m]

GAS STORAGE_

20 MM LEAK

3D 313.394 60.9103 45.6682

5D 289.883 56.3407 42.2421

PROPOSED HYDROGEN

GAS STORAGE_


2F 664.889 129.226 96.8885

3D 665.43 129.331 96.9673

5D 667.744 109.884 82.3871

Table 13: Hazardous Chemicals (as per MSIHC) and Their Antidotes

Sl. No. Chemicals Antidotes

As per MSHIC Rule to be used in Proposed activity

1. Acetic acid Milk of Magnesia

2. Acetone No Antidote Available



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3. Ammonia Skin: Wash with Lactic Acid, Apply Soframycin Eye: Benoxynate (Novacin 0.4% con.) Throat: Smelling Ethanol or Ether

4. Formaldehyde

No Antidote Available

5. Ethanol 2 gm sodium bi carbonate in 250 ml water. Diezipam 10 mg through injection. Injury in eye or skin wash plenty of water

6. Ethyl acetate Novesine, Eye Drops

7. Hydrogen Peroxide No Antidote Available

8. Butanol No Antidote Available

9. Hydrochloric Acid No Antidote Available

10. Toluene No Antidote Available

11. Hydrogen Gas No Antidote Available

12. Methanol Oxygen, Baking soda in a glass of Water, Ethanol, Novesine Eye Drops

13. Potassium Hydroxide No Antidote Available

14. Tetrahydofuran No Antidote Available

15. MDC (Methylene di Chloride)


16. 2EHA (2-Ethyl Hexanoic Acid)


17. N,N-Dimethyl formamide No Antidote Available

18. Sodium hydroxide No Antidote Available

1.3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HAZID-HIRA)

Main impacts on those working within the industry are identified using HIRA method. A health hazard has impact on local communities. Fire & Explosion Physical Hazards due to material handling, slip, trip & fall Fugitive Dust of Raw Material Handling at charging bay, storage yard, Collapse of Structures/Fall of Material, stacking failure during Construction Stage Loading/ Unloading failures Electrocution/ Electrical Hazards Boiler Explosion Accidental Spillage of Chemical Dust & fumes exposure

1.3.1 Impact due to Thermal Radiation Enlists damage consequences due to different Heat Loads are given below:



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Table 14: List of Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads

Sr. No.

Heat loads

(kW/m²)

Type of Damage Intensity

Damage to Equipment Damage to People

1 37.5 Damage to process equipment 100% lethality in 1 min. 1% Lethality in 10sec

2 25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite wood

50% Lethality in 1 min. Significant injury in10sec

3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation intensity allowed on thermal lyun protected equipment

--

4 12.5 Minimum energy required to melt plastic tubing

1%lethalityin1 min

5 4.0 -- First degree burns, causes pain for exposure longer than10sec

6 1.6 -- Causes no discomfort on long exposures

Source: World Bank (1988).Technical Report No.55: Techniques for Assessing IndustrialHazards, Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

1.3.2 Impact due to Loading/Unloading operation/Storage Area Approach of heavy good vehicles for unloading material Cleaning of overflows Unauthorized passages, travelling over transportation system Unclean platforms causing staggering and falls

1.3.3 Impact due to Reaction vessel operation Uncontrolled Reaction/Exothermic Runaway reaction Thermal Run-away reaction may occur Explosion due to high Temperature & Reaction

1.3.4 Impact due to Boiler Operation Table 15: HIRA Boiler Operations

Operating Hazard Cause Effect Prevention



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Steam Explosion

Defective safety valves.

Obstruction between boiler and valve. Valve damaged or corroded (internal). Lever tied down. Obstruction on valve outlet.

Will not lift to release excess pressure. Impose excess pressure on the boiler. Rupture the boiler. Cause loss of life and/or injury to personnel. Cause property damage.

Replace or repair safety valve.

Remove obstructions. Periodically test valve per ASME code.

Defective steam pressure gauges.

Broken gauge. Gauge is not in calibration. Blockage in line from boiler to gauge. Gauge cock is closed. Multiple gauges not in agreement.

Gauge is not showing the correct pressure. Boiler may be under excessive pressure. Prevents operator from being aware of true operating conditions.

Calibrate gauge regularly. Replace defective gauges. Inspect gauge connection and piping to boiler for blockage and/or closed cock.

Low water level.

Defective low water cutoff. Low water cutoff bypassed. Improper water column blowdown procedure. Equalizing lines restricted or plugged. Tampering with low water control. Defective boiler water feed system. Operator error. Defective or inoperative gauge glass.

Overheated boiler surfaces. Ruptured boiler. Loss of life and/or injury to personnel. Property damage.

Verify operation of boiler water feed system periodically. Prove low water cutoff operation periodically. Use proper water column blow down procedures. Train boiler operators. Do not tamper with low water controls. Replace defective low water controls. Inspect equalizing line (especially the lower line).

Scaled or corroded boiler internal surfaces.

Poor maintenance procedures. Inadequate inspection. Improper chemical cleaning.

Ruptured boiler. Loss of life and/or injury to personnel. Property damage. Boiler overheating.

Proper maintenance. Regular inspections by competent inspector. Keep inspection log. Proper boiler water treatment.

Contaminated boiler water. Poor feedwater control.



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Improper water treatment.

Bypassed controls.

Defective electrical wiring. Tampering with controls and electrical wiring.

Controls will not function. Boiler may rupture. May cause furnace explosion. Loss of life. Property damage.

Verify proper operation of controls periodically. Correct electrical wiring defects immediately. Do not tamper with controls.

Tampering with Controls

Deliberate action by personnel. Lack of knowledge on the part of the personnel. Inadequate training.

Improper operation of boiler. Boiler may rupture. May cause furnace explosion. Loss of life. Property damage.

Read and follow manufacturer's instructions. Prevent access by unauthorized personnel by locking equipment cabinet. Properly train operators.

Poor maintenance.

No definite maintenance policy and procedure. Lack of interest of the boiler owner. Poorly or inadequately trained personnel. No one assigned the maintenance responsibility.

Danger to personnel and property. Low operating efficiency. Eventually high repair and replacement costs. Poor operation.

Establish a definite maintenance policy and procedure. Assign maintenance responsibility. Insist on performance of maintenance functions. Keep maintenance log.

Furnace/Boiler Explosion

Inadequate pilot/igniter.

Low gas pressure. Low fuel pressure. Improperly positioned. Too small nozzle. Plugged orifice. Improper light-off damper setting.

May not ignite the main flame. Delayed ignition. Fireside explosion. Fire. Boiler damage. Loss of life and/or personal injury. Property damage.

Periodic pilot maintenance. Properly position pilot, periodic pilot verification test. Use procedures of NFPA 85 series.

Delayed ignition.

Inadequate pilot/igniter. Low fuel pressure. Insufficient fuel rate. Excessive air rate. Low oil temperature. Water in fuel.

Fireside explosion. Fire. Boiler damage. Loss of life and/or injury to personnel. Property damage.

Provide adequate pilot. Correct light-off fuel/air ration setting. Avoid excessive restart attempts. Review and follow manufacturer's instructions. Conduct pilot turndown test.



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Insufficient combustion air.

Lack of or insufficient boiler room air openings. Dirty combustion air blower. Combustion air blower running too slow or slipping. Incorrect fuel/air ration setting. Blower inlet blockage. Outlet damper blockage. Plugged boiler gas passage.

Poor combustion. Delayed ignition. Fireside explosion. Loss of life and/or injury to personnel. Property damage. Fire. Boiler damage. Increased emissions.

Provide adequate air to boiler room. Keep combustion air fans clean and run at proper speed. Periodically observe dampers,

air inlets and outlets, combustion controls boiler gas passages, hot flue gas passages, hot flue gas temperature.

Tampering with combustion safety control.

Deliberate action by personnel. Lack of knowledge on the part of personnel. Inadequate operator training.

fireside explosion. Fire. Loss of life and/or injury to personnel. Boiler damage. Property damage.

Review and follow manufacturer's instructions. Prevent access by unauthorized personnel by locking equipment cabinets. Train operators in proper maintenance procedure.

Manual operation of combustion safety controls.

Deliberate action by personnel.

May cause ignition of main flame at the wrong time. Fireside explosion. Loss of life or injury to personnel. Boiler damage. Property damage. Fire.

Do not operate combustion safety control manually. Review and follow manufacturer's instructions. Provide adequate training for operators. Prevent access of unauthorized personnel by locking equipment cabinets.

Leaking fuel safety shutoff valves.

Defective valve. Foreign matter under valve seat.

Fuel flows to the boiler. Uncontrolled ignition of fuel. Fireside explosion. Loss of life and/or injury to personnel. Boiler damage. Property damage. Fire.

Monitor valves for proper operation periodically. Replace defective valves. Leak test and verify proper operation of valves periodically.

Implosions



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Excessive negative pressure.

Flame out. Induced draft fan runaway.

Equipment damage resulting in personnel injury.

Maintain proper operation of control equipment. Do not bypass control equipment. Use procedures of NFPA 85G.

Maintenance

Equipment being serviced or repaired. Unexpected starting of remotely controlled equipment. Movement of equipment. Release of electrical energy. Release of fluid pressure.

Equipment not locked out, not tagged out, not placed in zero mechanical state, or not placed in zero energy state.

Physical injury or death.

Place the equipment if zero energy state or zero mechanical state. Establish and comply with lockout and tagout procedures. Train and alert personnel. Warning signs. Use blocking devices or ties to prevent movement of equipment.

Activities related to cleaning.

Failure to observe safety procedures applicable to maintenance cleaning.

Potential injury or death to personnel.

Observe operating and maintenance instructions for maintenance cleaning. Observe all safety regulations and normal safety precautions. Provide a safe means of access for maintenance cleaning. Provide personnel with protective

Clothing and equipment. Establish a routine procedure to clean and remove residue (ash, soot, slag) frequently to prevent excessive accumulation. Report all unsafe conditions and/or unsafe practices.

Entering a confined or

Extremely hazardous environment I.e.

Potential danger to life and health.

Observe all safety regulations and normal



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enclosed space (includes but not limited to furnace, drums, shell, gas passes, ducts, flues, bunkers, hoppers, tanks).

toxic or inflammable oxygen deficient atmosphere, hot material, darkness. Temporary internal access provisions.

safety precautions. Provide sufficient ventilation to assure fresh air quality and quantity to maintain the health and safety of personnel. Test for oxygen deficiency with field type oxygen analyzers or other suitable devices. Develop stand- by emergency plans and procedures. Report all unsafe conditions and/or unsafe practices. Work with a partner. Test for toxic or flammable gas. Provide lights before entering a confined space.

Oxygen deficiency

Confined or enclosed spaces

Potential danger to life or health.

Provide sufficient ventilation to assure fresh air quality and quantity to maintain the health and safety of personnel. Wear approved respiratory protective equipment. Test for oxygen deficiency with field type oxygen analyzers or other suitable devices. Observe all safety regulations and normal precautions. Report all unsafe conditions and/or unsafe practices.

Airborne contaminants I.e. gases, vapors, fumes, dust, and mist.

Leakage. Inadequate ventilation or exhaust.

Potential danger to life and health.

Operate ventilation and exhaust systems. Wear approved respiratory protective equipment. Wear protective clothing. Observe all safety



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regulations and normal safety precautions. Report all unsafe conditions and/or unsafe practices.

Unexpected Starting of Remotely Controlled Equipment

Expose moving equipment Guards not installed.

Bodily injury. Dismemberment.

Reinstall guards. Avoid loose clothes. Confine long hair.

Exposed fan blades. Guards not in place.

Bodily injury. Dismemberment.

Reinstall guards.

Exposed moving parts of soot blowers.

Guards not in place. Injured or lost fingers. Bodily harm.

Reinstall guards. Avoid loose clothing. Confine long hair.

Obstructed areas. Poor housekeeping. Potential injury to personnel.

Provide a safe means of access to all equipment and working places. Maintain all access ways in a clean safe condition.

Lack of access to equipment. Access not provided.

Potential injury to personnel.

Provide a safe means of access to all equipment and working places.

Accidental opening of the access door.

Failure to bolt or lock closed door.

Potential injury to personnel.

Bolt or lock all access doors.

Electrical

Exposed energized electrical wiring.

Damaged insulation or protective covering.

Electrical shock resulting in death, injury, or burns.

Use care to prevent damaging insulation. Repair damaged insulation.

Open electrical boxes.

Failure to cover boxes.

Electrical shock resulting in death, injury or burns.

Cover boxes. Instruct personnel to keep boxes covered.

Opening switch box without turning off power.

Damaged safety catch permitting opening without shutting off switch.


Repair safety catch. Turn off switch before opening box. Don't tamper with interlocks.

Working on energized electrical

Second party closing switch which energizes


Follow lockout and tagout procedures.



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equipment. equipment.

Improper use of tools and lights.

Lack of grounding. Cut off group prong. Using two wire extension cords. Not grounding "cheater" plug (adapter plug). Body contact with wet surface.


Don't cut off ground prong. Use only 3-wire heavy-duty extension cords properly grounded.

Damaged insulation. Using lights without guards.

Ground "cheater" plug if used. Use double insulated portable tools. Use low voltage trouble lights or battery operated lights. Make sue guard is installed on light.

Combustible dust entering the electrical equipment.

Not keeping dust proof equipment closed. Poor housekeeping.

Death, injury or burns. Equipment damage. Explosion and/or fire.

Keep dust proof equipment closed. Practice good housekeeping procedures. Insure proper operation of purge equipment.

Fire

Fire.

Explosion. Electrical or mechanical failure. Improper operation of equipment. Poor housekeeping.

Potential injury or death to personnel. Potential equipment or property damage.

Operate equipment in accordance with manufacturers' recommended operating procedures. Conduct routine equipment maintenance. Practice good housekeeping. Report all unsafe conditions and/or practices. Train and drill operators in emergency fire fighting and extinguishing procedures. Use fire protection systems.



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Storage yard fire (Wood Briquette)

Spontaneous combustion due to fire


Operate in accordance with the manufacturers recommended operating procedures. Practice good housekeeping. Report all unsafe conditions and/or unsafe practices. Train and drill operators in emergency fire fighting control and extinguishing procedures. Use fire protection and/or inserting systems.

Fire at burner deck, fuel stations, or other areas adjacent to the boiler.

Electrical or mechanical component failure. Fuel leaks.


Operate equipment in accordance with manufacturers recommended procedures. Locate fuel, combustible materials, and controls away from boiler surfaces. Report all unsafe conditions and/or practices. Train and drill operators in emergency fire fighting and extinguishing procedures, Use fire protection systems. Repair leaks promptly.

Wet steam during atomizing.

Steam wet from source. Steam line not insulated. Steam traps not working. Explosion.

Poor atomization. Dirty or smoky fires. Sparkles in flame. Discharge of unburned oil in furnace. Fireside explosion or puff. Fire. Boiler damage. Property damage. Loss of life and/or injury to personnel.

Insulate all steam lines. Check proper trap operation periodically. Follow manufacturer's instructions.

Worn or damaged atomizer.

Abrasive material in oil. Normal wear. Leaving out of

Fire. Incomplete or smoky combustion. Flare back.

Check tips regularly. Use copper tools to clean tips. Follow manufacturer's



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(Sprayer plate.) service burner tip in hot furnace. Tip abuse. Explosion.

instructions. Replace gaskets when cleaning or replacing tips. Do not use copper tools for cleaning stainless steel parts.

Hot Fly Ash

Hot fly ash accumulations in boiler flues and plenums. Fly ash accumulating in flues and plenums. Personnel stepping in fly ash while still hot. Fly ash

Severe burns to legs and other parts of the body coming into contact with the hot ash. Overloading support systems causing failure.

Warnings to all personnel concerning this danger. Allow sufficient cooling time before walking on fly ash. Remove the hot fly ash with caution and suitable equipment. Do not spray water on hot fly ash.

May retain heat for a number of weeks. No visible difference between hot and cold fly ash. "Quicksand" action of fly ash when stepped on. Explosive effect of water on hot fly ash.

Probe temperature of fly ash before walking on it.

1.3.5 Impact due to Chemical Exposure Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response" sis a standard maintained by the U.S.-based National Fire Protection Association. "fire diamond" used by emergency personnel to quickly and easily identify the risks posed by hazardous materials. The four divisions are typically color-coded with red indicating flammability, blue indicating level of health hazard, yellow for chemical reactivity, and white containing codes for special hazards. Each of health, flammability and reactivity is rated on a scale from 0 (no hazard) to 4 (severe risk).



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1.4 NATURAL AND MANMADE CALAMITIES WHICH CAN LEAD TO EMERGENCY

Disaster refers to a serious disruption of the functioning of a society, causing widespread human, material, or environmental loss, which exceeds the ability of the affected society to cope using its own resources. To put it in other words, it is the occurrence of a sudden mishap/calamity/grave occurrence that disrupts the basic fabric and normal functioning of a society (or community)



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Figure 1: Hazard profile (Punjab)

1.4.1 Earthquake

Many parts of the Indian subcontinent have historically high seismicity. Seven catastrophic earthquakes of magnitude greater than 8 (Richter scale) have occurred in the western, northern and eastern parts of India and adjacent countries in the past 100 years. Approx. 59 % of the land area of India is liable to seismic hazard damage. In India, seismic zones are divided into four zones i.e. V, IV, III and II.

Punjab is broadly divided in to three Earth quake Risk Zones- High Damage Risk Zone-IV, Moderate Damage Risk Zone III and Low Damage Risk Zone II. However, northern boundary of Punjab State with Himachal Pradesh is in close proximity to Zone V. District SAS NAGAR lies in the Moderate Damage Risk Zone III to High Damage Risk Zone IV.

(a) Major Earth Quake History in nearby area:

Punjab lies in a fore-deep, a downwarp of the Himalayan foreland, of variable depth, converted into flat plains by long-vigorous sedimentation. This is known as a geosyncline. This has shown considerable amounts of flexure and dislocation at the northern end and is bounded on the north by the Himalayan Frontal Thrust. The floor of the trough (if see without all the sediments) is not an even plain, but shows corrugated inequalities and buried ridges (shelf faults). Much of Punjab lies in the Punjab Shelf, bounded on the east by the Delhi-Haridwar Ridge and on the south by the Delhi-Lahore Ridge. Most earthquakes in this region are shallow though a few earthquake of intermediate depth have been recorded in Punjab. However, it must be stated that proximity to faults does not necessarily translate into a higher hazard as compared to areas located further away, as damage from earthquakes depends on numerous factors such as subsurface geology as well as adherence to the building codes.



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(b) Major Earthquake in the Punjab & nearby areas reported as:

Largest Instrumented Earthquake in Punjab

14 October 1970 - North of Firozpur (Indo-Pakistan Border region), 5.2 Mb (USCGS) 00:36:34.0 UTC, 31.26N, 74.50E, 44 kms depth

Largest Instrumented Earthquake in Punjab

4 April 1905 - Kangra (Himachal Pradesh), Mw 7.833.00 N, 76.00 E, OT=00:50 UTC. At least 28,000 people were killed in the Kangra-Dharamsala region of Himachal Pradesh. Damage and casualties also occurred in adjoining parts of Punjab including in the cities of Amritsar, Lahore, Jalandhar, Ludhiana and Sialkot. 14 October 1970 -North of Firozpur (Indo-Pakistan Border region), 5.2 Mb (USCGS) 31.26 N,74.50 E, D=044.0 kms,OT=00:36:34UTC, 21 October 1991 -Near Pilang (Uttarkashi), Uttaranchal, Mw 6.8 30.78 N, 78.77 E, OT=21:23:14 UTC Between 750 to 2000 people killed in the Gharwal region. It was also felt very strongly in Uttar Pradesh, Chandigarh, Delhi, Haryana and Punjab. Some minor damage was reported in Chandigarh and New Delhi. 17 October 1997 - North of Jalandhar, Gurdaspur District (Punjab), 5.1 Ms (EIDC) 31.616 N,75.774 E, D=38kms,OT=17:36:31UTC 29 March 1999 - Near Gopeshwar (Chamoli), Uttaranchal Mw 6.5 (HRV)30.492 N,79.288 E, OT=19:05:11UTC 115 people killed in the Gharwal region. The quake was felt very strongly in Uttar Pradesh, Chandigarh, Delhi and Haryana. In Haryana, one person was killed in the city of Ambala and 2 at Nakodar in the neighbouring state of Punjab. Minor damage to buildings in New Delhi, most significantly in Patparganj. Minor damage also reported from Chandigarh. 8 October 2005 - Kashmir-Kohistan, Pakistan-India border, Mw 7.6 34.432 N, 73.537 E, D=020.0 kms, OT=03:50:40 UTC. A major earthquake struck the India-Pakistan border on the morning of 8 October 2005. It had a magnitude of Mw=7.6 and was felt strongly in much of Pakistan, northern India and eastern Afghanistan. The earthquake resulted in more than 80,000 deaths in northern Pakistan and adjoining parts of Jammu & Kashmir, India and is by far one of the deadliest in the sub-continent. At least 10 people also died in other parts of north India (including 2 in Punjab) and 4 in Afghanistan due to this earthquake. Tremors from the earthquake were felt more than a thousand kilometres away in the Indian states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. 14 March 2010 - Near Hiranagar, Punjab, Mb=4.5 32.134 N, 75.759 E, D=58.3 kms OT=06:53:29 UTC. A light earthquake occurred in northern Punjab along the Punjab-Himachal



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Pradesh border on 14 March 2010 at 12:23 PM local time in India. It had a magnitude of Mb=4.5 and was felt over a wide area due to its depth.

Fig No 2: Earth Quake Zonation Map

(c) Before the earthquake:

Always keep the following in a designated place: bottled drinking water, non-perishable food, and first-aid kit, torch-light and battery-operated radio with extra batteries.

Teach family members how to turn off electricity, gas, etc.

Identify places in the house that can provide cover during an earthquake.

It may be easier to make long distance calls during an earthquake.

Identify an out-of town relative or friend as your family’s emergency contact. If the family members get separated after the earthquake and are not able to contact each other, they should contact the designated relative/friend. The address and phone number of the contact person/relative should be with all the family members.

Safeguard your house

Consider retrofitting your house with earthquake-safety measures\Reinforcing the foundation and frame could make your house quake resistant. You may consult a reputable contractor and follow building codes.

Kutcha buildings can also be retrofitted and strengthened.



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(d) During Earthquake:

Earthquakes give no warning at all. Sometimes, a loud rumbling sound might signal

Its arrival a few seconds ahead of time. Those few seconds could give you a chance to move to a safer location. Here are some tips for keeping safe during a quake.

Take cover. Go under a table or other sturdy furniture; kneel, sit, or stay close to the floor. Hold on to furniture legs for balance. Be prepared to move if your cover moves.

If no sturdy cover is nearby, kneel or sit close to the floor next to a structurally sound interior wall. Place your hands on the floor for balance.

Do not stand in doorways. Violent motion could cause doors to slam and cause serious injuries. You may also be hit be flying objects.

Move away from windows, mirrors, bookcases and other unsecured heavy objects.

If you are in bed, stay there and cover yourself with pillows and blankets

Do not run outside if you are inside. Never use the lift.

If you are living in a kutcha house, the best thing to do is to move to an open area where there are no trees, electric or telephone wires.

(e) If outdoors:

Move into the open, away from buildings, streetlights, and utility wires. Once in the open, stay there until the shaking stops.

If your home is badly damaged, you will have to leave. Collect water, food, medicine, other essential items and important documents before leaving.

Avoid places where there are loose electrical wires and do not touch metal objects that are in touch with the loose wires.

Do not re-enter damaged buildings and stay away from badly damaged structures.

(f) If in a moving vehicle:

Move to a clear area away from buildings, trees, overpasses, or utility wires, stop, and stay in the vehicle. Once the shaking has stopped, proceed with caution.

Avoid bridges or ramps that might have been damaged by the quake.

(g) After the Earthquake:

Here are a few things to keep in mind after an earthquake. The caution you display in the aftermath can be essential for your personal safety.

Wear shoes/chappals to protect your feet from debris

After the first tremor, be prepared for aftershocks. Though less intense, aftershocks cause additional damages and may bring down weakened structures. Aftershocks can occur in the first hours, days, weeks, or even months after the quake.

Check for fire hazards and use torchlight’s instead of candles or lanterns.



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If the building you live in is in a good shape after the earthquake, stay inside and listen for radio advises. If you are not certain about the damage to your building, evacuate carefully. Do not touch downed power line.

Help injured or trapped persons. Give first aid where appropriate. Do not move seriously injured persons unless they are in immediate danger of further injury. In such cases, call for help.

Remember to help your neighbours who may require special assistance-infants, the elderly, and people with disabilities.

Listen to a battery-operated radio for the latest emergency information.

Stay out of damaged buildings.

Return home only when authorities say it is safe. Clean up spilled medicines, bleaches or gasoline or other flammable liquids immediately. Leave the area if you smell gas or fumes from other chemicals. Open closet and cupboard doors cautiously.

if you smell gas or hear hissing noise, open windows and quickly leave the building.

Turn off the switch on the top of the gas cylinder.

Look for electrical system damages - if you see sparks, broken wires, or if you smell burning of amber, turn off electricity at the main fuse box. If you have to step in water to get to the fuse box, call an electrician first for advice.

Check for sewage and water lines damage. If you suspect sewage lines are damaged, avoid using the toilets. If water pipes are damaged, avoid using water from the tap.

Use the telephone only for emergency calls.

In case family members are separated from one another during an earthquake (a real possibility during the day when adults are at work and children are at school), develop a plan for reuniting after the disaster. Ask an out of state / district relative or friend to serve as the “family contact”. Make sure everyone in the family knows the name, address, and phone number(s) of the contact person (s).

Table 16: Emergency Preparedness for Earthquake

Step Activity Action By

Preparedness

Constitute Emergency Response Team

Plant Key Person

Identify ECC, if the identified ones are damaged

Control centers to be equipped with

Alarming

Communication facilities

Emergency vehicles/equipment

List of emergency contacts & suppliers

Medical facilities

Action during effective period

Do not panic. Raise alarm Individual(s)

Avoid standing near to windows, external



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Step Activity Action By

walls

Stand near the columns or duck under sturdy furniture.

Assemble at emergency assembly point as there may be aftershocks

Action after effective Period (Establish Emergency Control Center. Site Main Controller to direct all activities)

Assess situation and initiate shut down of plants (if required)

Main Controller, Incident Controller, Site Incident Controller, , Coordinators – Fire & Security, Safety, Material and Medical

Initiate search & rescue (if required)

Evacuation of people.

Recovery/ Rehabilitation Work

Medical care for the injured.

Supply of food and drinking water.

Temporary shelters like tents, metal sheds etc.

Repairing lines of communication and information.

Restoring transport routes

Take head count

Activate emergency plan as situation demands

Assess damage

1.4.2 Storm

The contingency actions during storm shall be based on the weather forecasts obtained from meteorological stations and the local meteorological department. Some of the important actions to be carried out are as follows: (a) Prior to Storm:

Communication with the local meteorological department.

Maintain distances from storm in order to execute preparatory actions in a shorter time.

Considering the consequences about the emergency might have on operations and personnel.

Review all operations carefully to ensure that systems in jeopardy are taken care of or shut down.

Ensure the readiness of first aiders, emergency vehicles, medical centre, medicines etc.

Metallic sheets, loose materials, empty drums and other light objects shall be properly secured.

Flush the drainage systems.



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(b) During Storm:

Remain calm.

Avoid going outdoors.

Do not seal the office completely as the suction created by the difference in atmospheric pressure inside and outside can rip open a window or door by breaking window glass panes.

(c) After the Storm:

Do not touch electric lines.

Stay away from the disaster area.

Take special precautions in driving vehicles since the under-pavement could cave in due to the weight of automobile.

1.4.3 Flood

There is no major scenario of Flood in India. Zonation Map of India are given below in

Fig .1.3 As per the “Vulnerability Atlas - 2nd Addition; Peer Group, MoH and UPA;

based on digitized data of SOI, GOI; Flood Atlas, Task Force Report, C.W.C., GOI” the project site does not fall under “area liable to flood”. Flood Hazard Zonation Map showing the plant site is given in Figure below:-



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Presently, there is no surface water drainage system present within most parts of the Greater Mohali Region. Surface water surface runoff flows freely with the terrain to be discharged into the numerous non-perennial rivers crossing. The only existing surface water drainage system is found in SAS Nagar, which has been designed to discharge into the non-perennial rivers of Patiala Ki Rao, Lakhnour Choe and Natural Choe. There are also some roadside drains serving the National Highways in Zirakpur, built by the National Highways Authority of India.

(a) Ghaggar Flood Plain:

Fig No 3: Flood Zonation Map



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The chief stream which traverses this district is the Ghaggar. It rises in Sirmaur district of Himachal Pradesh and is known by the name of Kaushalaya in the upper reaches. After flowing through Himachal territory and Ambala district of Haryana it enters plains near Dera Bassi(Mubarikpur). Thereafter it is called Ghaggar. It flows in the south – westerly direction and is joined by streams like Tangri, Patiala Rao, etc. Later outside the district boundaries it is joined bycombined waters of Saraswati and Tangri stream (emanating in Haryana). Its bed is narrow and illdefined in Banur and Rajpura areas but near Ghannaur its banks are low and the stream floodseasily. Further south the river flow provides some excellent soil. In summer only small quantity of water is available in its upper reaches, but during the rainy season the quantity of water isconsiderable which cause floods and damage to crops and property. An inundation canal called ‘Banur Canal’ has been taken out near Banur, which besides provide irrigation helps in controlling the floods. The Ghaggar after flowing through Patiala and Sangrur district traverses through Haryana State and disappears in the ‘Thar Desert’ near Hanumangarh in Rajasthan. (b) Existing Floods:

Flooding have been recorded at several locations as shown below

Table 17: Floodable Locations in Greater Mohali Region

1.4.4 Drought

Punjab State Action Plan on Climate Change has brought out some alarming facts about the water situation in the state. According to the report, the state has the highest probability of drought occurrence in the country. It also falls within areas



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having greatest climate sensitivity, maximum vulnerability and lowest adaptive capacity. The Sutlej basin with spatial variation in precipitation is shown in Figure 1.4. It is clear that towards the lower end of the basin, the precipitation is <400 mm, compared to the Shivalik region where it is greater than 950mm. There is an indication that droughts in the southwest of Punjab or at the lower end of the basin may be becoming more extreme (Source: ADB, 2011). The variation in the changes in rain fall can be derived from the observations made in Ludhiana which lies at the centre of the Basin in the Punjab region and Amritsar which lies partially within the basin at the North West end.

Figure 4 : The Sutlej basin and spatial variation of rainfall within

Source: http://www.moef.nic.in/sites/default/files/sapcc/Punjab.pdf

Punjab experienced droughts in 1987, 2002 2004, 2007, 2014 and 2015. The intensity of drought was the highest in 2002 – all districts were declared as drought affected. Occasionally, Punjab experiences hailstorms, which cause damages to standing crops.



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Apart from natural calamities, the state faces severe depletion of ground water. The agricultural sector accounts for 85 per cent of the water consumption in state. Due to increase in the demand for water and reduction in canal capacity, the area irrigated by tube wells has been increasing. As a result, ground water is being over exploited for irrigation purposes. The present ground water development in the state is 172 per cent and ground water is over exploited in 80 per cent of blocks (CGWB, 2016). While the northern and central districts of the state suffer from severe ground water depletion, the south western districts face the problem of water logging and soil salinity. The affected districts include Muktsar, Fazilka, Bathinda and Faridkot.

According to the GoI Report of the High level Expert Group on Water Logging in Punjab,

Figure 5 : Drought Prone area

The Climate Change Agenda for Punjab (CCAP) listed a set of priorities for policy and action with respect to adaptation and mitigation for 2010-2014. Keeping that in view, a steering committee has been formed, headed by the chief secretary and principal secretaries of various key departments as members to monitor the implementation of various actions proposed under the Punjab Environment Mission. None of the towns in the state, except Jaipur, have sewage collection, treatment and disposal



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system. Hence, a lot needs to be done after the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) has identified highly polluting industries in the state which includes textiles, sugar, distilleries, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals etc.

1.4.5 Fires

Annually, fires destroy thousands of houses especially in summer, in the rural areas of the State. Also fire accidents are a common occurrence in the urban areas. Hence appropriate actions will be taken to combat fire emergency situation.

1.4.6 Road and Rail Accidents

There is a no good network of road in the district. The information from the police reveals that road accidents take place on road, which are related to truck, car, buses and motorcycle. Roads are affected by these accidents; there were road jams in some cases. The accidents take place on the roads and the state highways and other roads. So to cope with such disasters in the future some safety measures must be followed. Traffic Near the plant will be monitored.

1.5 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Risk Mitigation measures for the new Installation activities require adoption of best safety practice at the respective construction zones as well as operational phase within the works boundary. In addition, the design and engineering of the proposed facilities will take into consideration of the proposed protection measures for air and water environmental as outlined in earlier Chapter.

1.5.1 Wood briquette Storage Area

Wood briquette storage area to be considered at the isolated area

Adequate dust suppression measures are provided to prevent fugitive emission and also risk of fire. Similar measures are also adopted for loading/unloading operations.

Boiler ash is transported in tankers are to be covered and closed and there is no chance of spillage during transportation.

Fire fighting measures are provided to avoid any fire case

Measures are taken to control the air pollution during loading/handling

1.5.2 Precautionary Measures for Falling material

Safety helmets to be used to protect workers below against falling Material

Barriers like a toe boards or mesh guards is to be provided to prevent items from slipping or being knocked off the edge of a structure

An exclusion zone is to be created beneath areas where work is taking place.

Danger areas are to be clearly marked with suitable safety signs indicating that access is restricted to essential personnel wearing hard hats while the work is in progress.

1.5.3 Mitigation Measures for Control Rooms at plants



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Control rooms shall be blast proof and shock proof

The building shall be located upwind of the process storage and handling facilities. The building shall not be at a lower level than the tank farm.

Adequate number of doors shall be provided in the control room for safe exit

Smoke detectors system shall be provided for control rooms at suitable locations

One hydrant (minimum) for every 45m per wall of the building shall be positioned all around the building.

1.5.4 Mitigation measure for Chemical spillage

Any accumulation of water will be prevented in such vulnerable areas.

In case of minor leakages, the flow of chemical will be controlled.

If there is major breakout, the area would be cut off and cordoned.

Vital connections e.g. water, gas, compressed air, oxygen etc., would be cut off or regulated as per requirement.

1.5.5 Precautions for storage in drums or bags

Separately stored with proper enclosures and marked, within premises in closed shed

Proper ventilation will be provided

Sufficient fire extinguishers and PPE will be provided

Flame proof fittings will be provided

Smoking will be prohibited

1.5.6 Electrical safety at Plant

Adequately rated and quick response circuit breakers, aided by reliable and selective digital or microprocessor based electromagnetic protective relays would be incorporated in the electrical system design for the proposed activities.

The metering and instruments would be of proper accuracy class and scale dimensions.

1.5.7 Electrical Hazard due to Dust

Electrical equipment such as motors, circuit breakers, transformers, and switchgear can produce sparks and ignite dust clouds and hybrid dust/air mixtures in the vicinity. Reference is taken from CCPS Guidelines for safe handling of Bulk solids.

Ingress of dust into enclosures with subsequent ignition causes smoldering or burning (fires)

Dust that enters an enclosure will settle out as layers on internal surfaces and become heated

Electrically conductive dusts causes short-circuiting when deposited on exposed electrical components and circuits

Abrasive and/or corrosive dusts damages components of electrical equipment

Electric shock



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1.5.8 General Recommendation for Fire Fighting Facilities

All the fire extinguisher system will be controlled by the Security Department. Safety department will consist of qualified safety manager, safety officer and supporting staff.

Portable fire extinguishers

Fire Buckets

Table 18: General Recommendation for Fire Fighting Facilities onsite

S.No. Name of site Type of Extinguisher

1 Cable galleries CO2 Type

2 High voltage panel CO2 & Foam type, Dry chemical powder

3 Control rooms CO2 & Foam type, Dry chemical powder

4 MCC rooms CO2 & Foam type, Dry chemical powder

5 Pump Houses CO2 & Foam type, Dry chemical powder

6 Guest houses and offices Dry chemical powder, foam type

7 Godowns, Lubrication rooms, Foam type

8 Bunkers, Silo, enclosed dust collector

CO2 type, N2 type, automatic sprinkler,

fixed spray nozzle (unless water reactive)

1.6 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)

Personal Protective equipment’s kept onsite are made readily available to plant personnel

Table 19: Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment According to Hazard

Workplace Hazards Suggested PPE

Eye and face protection

Flying particles, molten metal, gases or vapors, light radiation

Safety glasses with side-shields, protective shades, etc.

Head protection

Falling objects, inadequate height clearance, and overhead power cords

Plastic helmets for top and side impact protection

Hearing protection

Noise Hearing protectors (ear plugs or ear muffs)

Foot protection

Failing or rolling objects, points objects. Corrosive or hot liquids

Safety shoes and boots for protection against moving and failing objects, liquids and chemicals



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Hand protection

Hazardous materials, cuts or lacerations, vibrations, extreme temperatures

Gloves made of rubber or synthetic material (Neoprene), leather, steel, insulation materials, etc.

Respiratory protection

Dust, fogs, fumes, mists, gases, smokes, vapors Oxygen deficiency

Facemasks with appropriate filters for dust removal and air purification (chemical, mists, vapors and gases). Single or multi-gas personal monitors, if available Portable or supplied air (fixed lines). Onsite rescue equipment

Body / leg protection

Extreme temperatures, hazardous materials, biological agents, cutting and laceration

Insulating clothing, body suits, aprons etc. of appropriate materials

1.7 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

1.7.1 Introduction to the Term “Disaster”

The term “Disaster” refer to extensive damage of property and serious disruption both inside, outside the work system and its surrounding that can be natural or human interfered. Emergency may be caused by a number of different factors, e.g. plant failure it will normally manifest itself in three basic forms viz fire, explosion or toxic release and requires the assistance of emergency control services to handle mass devastation effectively.

1.7.2 Need of Disaster Management

The aim of Disaster management plan is concerned with preventing accidents through following guidelines of good design practice, operation, maintenance and inspection, by which it is possible to reduce the risk of an accident. Since it is known to all it is not possible to eliminate entire risk since, absolute safety is not achievable.

After Assessing and quantifying the possible scenarios, consequence analysis approach to emergency preparedness and emergency planning delineates Disaster Management Plan for both on-site and off-site. These plans are needed to be implemented in the event of a disaster.

Table 20: Identified Disaster Scenarios

S.No.

#

Name of possible Hazard

and Emergency

Source and Reasons

Effect on Persons and Environment

Place of Effect

Control Measures Provided



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1.

Fire

Transformer Transfer oil short circuit etc.

Electrical power failure Production hindrance Loss of transformer

Transformer near power control centre

* Fire Fighting Equipment's * Graved bed for oil spillage or soaking isolated fenced area * Lightening arrestor nearby * DG set for emergency power

2.

Fire & Toxic chemical spillage

Natural Disaster, Earthquakes, Lightening, war.

Production hindrance Trapping under debris, death Chemical burn Toxic chemical spillage

Whole factory & population nearby

* Hydrant system * First aid available * Smoking prohibited inside the factory * Security at all the time guarding important locations

3.

Fire, Explosion & smoke

Fire in boiler

Burns Storage tank catching fire Production Hindrance

Tank area *Adequate earthing Tanker unloading permit * Unauthorized person not allowed to enter * Breathing Apparatus for rescue operations *Alarm system for indicating unusual incidence

1.7.3 Objective of Disaster Management Plan

The objective of Disaster Management plan is to give a broad framed layout to tackle emergency situation that may lead to a hazardous situation. It defines detail organizational responsibilities, actions, reporting requirements, broad and specific key roles and responsibilities of personal with Organograms and organisation charts. The overall objectives of the emergency plan will be:

Ensure safety of people, protect the environment

To ensure localization of risk

To minimize and reduce the effects of the accident on people and property.

Immediate response to emergency scene with effective communication network and organized procedures

To obtain and mitigate early warning of emergency conditions so as to prevent impact on personnel, assets and environment

To prevent injuries by following proper onsite, offsite emergency plans that can protect personnel from the hazard



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a) National Level: The Act calls for the establishment of National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), with the Prime Minister of India as Chairperson. The NDMA has 9 members including a vice chairperson. The tenure of NDMA members is 5 years.

b) State Level: All state governments are mandated under Section 14 of the Act to establish a State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA).The SDMA consists of the Chief Minister of the State, who is the Chairperson, and no more than eight members are appointed by Chief Minister.

c) District Level: The Chairperson of District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) will be the Collector or District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner of the district. The elected representative of the area is member of the DDMA as an ex officio Chairperson.

1.7.4 Phases of Disaster

There are various phases of Disaster including pre and Post Management of Hazardous Event that may or has occurred.

(a) Warning Phase

Emergencies /disasters are generally preceded by warnings during which preventive measures may be initiated. For example uncontrollable build-up of pressure in process equipment, weather forecast give warning about formation of vapour cloud, equipment failure etc.

(b) Period of Impact Phase

This is the phase when emergency /disaster actually strike and preventive measures may hardly be taken. However, control measures to minimise the effects may be taken through a well - planned and ready-to-act disaster management plan already prepared by organization. The duration may be from seconds to days.

(c) Rescue Phase

This is the phase when impact is almost over and efforts are concentrated on rescue and relief measures.

(d) Relief Phase

In this phase, apart from organization and relief measures internally, depending on severity of the disaster, external help are also to be summoned to provide relief measures (like evacuations to a safe place and providing medical help, food clothing etc.). This phase will continue till normalcy is restored.

(e) Rehabilitation Phase



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This is the final and longest phase. During which measures required to put the situation back to normal as far as possible are taken. Checking the systems, estimating the damages, repair of equipments and putting them again into service are taken up. Help from revenue/insurance authorities need to be obtained to assess the damage, quantum of compensation to be paid etc.

1.8 KEY ELEMENTS

1.8.1 Basis of Plan

Hazard Identification necessitates preparation and planning the prevention and methods by which accidental failure can be tackled without much damage to life. HAZID-HIRA and consequence analysis combines and requires planning for the following:

Hazards from spread of fire or release of flammable from storage and process units

Hazards due to formation of pressure waves due to vapour cloud explosion of flammable gases

1.8.2 Emergency planning and Response procedure

The Emergency Response Plan is plan for dealing with emergencies are implemented immediately whenever there is a fire, explosion, or release of a hazardous substance that threatens human health or the environment. The emergency response plan is reviewed and immediately amended whenever:

The plan fails in an emergency

The list of emergency contacts change

The list of emergency equipment changes

The facility changes in its design, construction, operation, maintenance, or other circumstances in a way that increases the potential for fire, explosions, or release of a hazardous substance

1.8.3 Incident Response Plan

It is the Frame work of addressing the emergency situation arose due to failure scenario.

Incident Response Plan (IRP) and Emergency Preparedness Plan

Incident Response Team (IRT)

Emergency Response Team (ERT)

Crisis Management Team (CMT) 1.8.4 Onsite Disaster Management Plan



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Disaster management plan are prepared with an aim of taking precautionary step to control the hazard propagation, avert disaster, take action after the disaster which limits the damage to the minimum and follow the on-site emergency planning.

1.8.5 Onsite Emergency Plans

The onsite emergency is an unpleasant situation that causes extensive damage to plant personnel and surrounding area and its environment due to in operation, maintenance, design and human error. Onsite plan will be applied in case of new Project acivity. Following point are taken into consideration:

To identify, assess, foresee and work out various kinds of possible hazards, their places, potential and damaging capacity and area in case of above happenings.

Review, revise, redesign, replace or reconstruct the process, plant, vessels and control measures if so assessed.

Measures to protect persons and property of processing equipments in case of all kinds of accidents, emergencies and disasters

To inform people and surroundings about emergency if it is likely to adversely affect them

1.8.6 Disaster control Management system

Disaster Management group plays an important role in combating emergency in a systematic manner.



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Fig. 6: Onsite DMP - Disaster Control / Management System

1.8.7 Emergency Control Centre (ECC)

An Emergency Control Centre (ECC) is established from which emergency operations are directed and co-ordinated. Centre will be activated as soon as on-site emergency is declared. The ECC will consist of one room, located in an area that offers minimal risk being directly exposed to possible accidents. During an emergency, the Emergency Management Staff, including the main controller will gather in the ECC. Therefore, the ECC will be equipped with adequate communication systems in the form of telephones and other equipments to allow unhampered organization and other nearby facility personnel.

The ECC will provide shelter to its occupants against the most common accidents; in addition, the ECC’s communication systems will be protected from possible shutdown. The ECC will have its own emergency lighting arrangement and electric communication systems operation. The ECC will always be ready for operation and provided with the equipment and supplies necessary during the emergency such as:

Hazard identification chart, All Emergency response plans

Population around factory

Internal telephone connections and External telephone connections

A list of key personnel, with addresses, telephone numbers, etc.

Hotline connection to district collector, police control room, fire brigade, Hospital etc.

Public address system (PAS)

MSDS of all the materials used in Plant site

List of dispensaries and registered medical practitioners around factory

Area map of surrounding villages

Note pads and ball pens to record message received and instructions

The blown up copy of Layout plan showing areas where accident has Occurred

Undated copies of the On-site Disaster Management Plan

Emergency telephone numbers

The names, phone number, and address of external agencies, response organizations and neighbouring facilities

The adequate number of telephone

Emergency lights

List of fire extinguishers with their type no. and location, capacity, etc

Personal protective equipment(PPE)

Safety helmets

Clock

Material safety data sheets for chemicals handled at the facility



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Several maps of the facility including drainage system for surrounding area showing:

Areas where hazardous materials are stored

Plant layout

Plot plans of storage tanks, routes of pipelines, all water permanent lines etc.

The locations where personal protective equipment are stored

The position of pumping stations and other water sources

Roads and plant entrances

Assembly areas

Lay out of Hydrant lines 1.8.8 Roles and Responsibility

A team of following Essential persons shall be taking necessary action in case of emergency. The roles and responsibilities of these personnel are defined subsequently:

Main Controller

Site Incident Controller (SIC)

Incident Controller (IC)

Liaison Officer

Communication Officer

Observer

In charge (Security)

In charge (Medical)

Shift In charge (Security)

(a) Main Controller

The Primary Controller is the employee who gives the first information about the incident/accident. He will be responsible for:

To inform the Security office (Main Gate), & Engineers/Sr. Engineers / Shift In‐Charges/HOD of Section of the aforesaid Department/Section from the nearest available telephone about the location and nature of incident.

To assist rescue operation as well as clear obstruction, if any, in the same.

To carry out all instructions from Incident Controller.

(b) Site Incident controller (SIC)

The Unit Head shall have overall responsibility for the factory and its personnel. In absence of Unit Head, Chairman OHS Committee shall assume the responsibility of Site Controller. His duties during emergency shall be:



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To assess the magnitude of the situation and decide if employees need to be evacuated from assembly points.

To give necessary instructions to Liaison Officer, HOD(HR&A) regarding the help to be obtained from outside agencies like Fire Brigade, Police and Medical

To advise Liaison Officer to pass on necessary information about the incident to News Media and ensure that the evidences are preserved for enquiry to be conducted by statutory authorities.

(c) Incident Controller (IC)

The HOD of affected department shall have overall responsibility for controlling the incident and directing the personnel. Section In charge of the affected department shall assume the responsibility of Incident Controller(IC) in the absence of HOD of affected department. His duties during emergency shall be:

To inform Communication Officer about the emergency, Control Center & Assembly point.

To direct all operations` within the affected area with priorities for safety of personnel, to minimize damage to the Plant and environment and to minimize loss of material.

To act as Site Controller till the later arrives.

To advise and provide information to Fire Squad, Security Officer and Local Fire Services when they arrive.

To ensure that all non‐essential persons are sent to the assembly point.

(d) Liaison Officer

HOD (HR&A) shall be the Liaison officer. He shall be responsible for: ‐

To contact Fire Brigade, Police, and Medical facilities on intimation from Site Controller & arrange for the rescue operation.

To ensure that the casualties receive attention.

To inform relatives of the affected employee at the earliest.

To arrange for additional transport if required.

To arrange for relief of personnel & organize refreshment/catering facility, in case the duration of emergency is prolonged.

To issue authorized statements to news media and ensure that evidence is preserved for enquiry to be conducted.

(e) In charge (Medical)

On receiving the information he will reach hospital immediately and take following actions:

He will keep necessary first aid medicines and artificial respiration equipment ready.



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Inform doctors at other places to be ready, for attending serious injury, burn cases and food poisoning

(f) Observer

During Mock Drill for Emergency Situations they shall be placed at different locations in plant to note down the movement and action taken by people and give feed back to the Site Controller.

(g) Communication Officer

In‐Charge (Safety) shall act as Communication officer. He shall work from Control Centre and maintain communication between relevant personnel. He shall be responsible for: ‐

To apprise the site controller of the situation, based on the information received, suggest the evacuation of personnel from assembly points, if needed.

To arrange for suitable persons to act as runners/messengers in case of failure of communication system.

To carry out any other works as assigned by Site Controller/Incident Controller

(h) In charge - Security

The In charge (Security) shall guide the crew, according to the condition of emergency site, for the actions required to handle the emergency i.e. for fire fighting, removal of debris, arresting of dust, removal of oil soaked earth etc. He shall give instructions to Security Guards to cordon off areas as required by Incident Controller. He shall render all help to incident controller to handle the emergency and carry out the work as assigned to him.

He shall be responsible for ensuring the discipline at control points and for preventing the entry of unauthorized persons inside the affected area as well as inside the factory during emergency.

(i) Shift Incharge – Security

He will be responsible for:

To arrange the necessary help as requested by Primary Controller.

To inform Incharge (Security).

To blow emergency siren, if instructed by the HOD (HR&A)/Incident Controller.

To send Ambulance near accident area.

To rush to the accident site with fire brigade along with available trained security persons.

1.8.9 Automatic Fire Detection System



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Unattended vulnerable premises like electrical control rooms, cable tunnels, MCC, oil cellars, etc. will be provided with automatic fire detection and alarm systems.

1.8.10 Manual Call Point Systems

All major units and welfare/administrative building will be provide with manual call points for summoning the fire fighting crew from the fire station for necessary assistance.

1.8.11 Fire Station

The following equipment will be provided in the fire posts.

Water tender

Foam tender

Portable pump

Wireless set

Hoses

Hot line telephone 1.8.12 Alarm System

A hooter installed at the Security Office shall be blown alternately with high and low pitch for 2 minutes to indicate major emergency in the plant. In such case, all non‐essential employees are expected to gather at assembly point i.e. Company’s Main Gate/Time Office. Signal for the clearance of emergency shall be given by blowing the hooter continuously for one minute.

1.8.13 First Aid

Fully equipped Hospital with Ambulance Van is available. Doctors and nurse are available round the clock to handle any emergency in the plant. The Ambulance shall be periodically checked through preventive maintenance programme .To ensure that the system is strictly followed, In‐charge (Safety) shall cross check randomly once in a fortnight the preparedness of Ambulance as per the check list and counter sign

The injured shall be shifted to nearby hospital, as per the opinion of the Medical Officer.

A list of First Aid boxes is available in every department as mentioned in ECC

Medical Officer shall ensure that refilling is done on monthly basis and he shall maintain a record of refilling.

The names & contact numbers of trained First Aiders are provided the same is displayed at all the prominent locations in the premises.

In case of Injury caused due to Hazardous Chemicals, Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) available with the user department / Hospital shall be referred.



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1.8.14 Mock Drill

For reviewing and assessing the level of preparedness, In‐charge (Safety) shall conduct Mock trials twice in a year (one in each half) simulating the covered emergencies and will maintain records of the trials. The team of Prime & Deputy Responsible persons will review the records and events of the emergency preparedness trials along with the observations taken by the observer and report shall be put forward to the Site Controller. Corrective and Preventive measures, if suggested/directed, will be initiated and relevant records of the same are maintained. Fire drills will be exercised once in every six months under the leadership of Incharge (Security). The records of Fire drill will be recorded & maintained.

The findings of the mock drills shall be used for improvements in preparedness and response. All team leaders shall be responsible for implementing the suggestions based on mock drill findings within reasonable time frame.

1.8.15 Training

On a yearly basis class room training for fire fighting and mitigating measures to be adopted to reduce environmental impact & OHS risks, will be imparted covering at least 20% employee by the In‐charge (Safety) and In‐charge (Security). The records of the same are maintained.

1.8.16 Evacuation Plan

To establish method of systematic, safe and orderly evacuation of all the occupants in case of fire or any emergency, in the least possible time, to a safe assembly point through nearest safe means of escape. Additionally to use available fire appliances provided for controlling or extinguishing fire and safeguarding of human life.

Facility staff will be notified of evacuation by one or more of the following method(s): Verbal, Intercom, Portable Radio, Alarm, Other

Notification to emergency services to ECC

Staff will follow predetermined evacuation routes and assemble at designated areas.

Evacuation maps must be displayed throughout the facility.

Individuals responsible for coordinating evacuations must confirm the process

1.9 OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING

The off-site emergency plan is an integral part of any hazard control system. It is based on those accidents identified by the works management, which could affect people and the environment outside the works. Thus, the off-site plan follows logically from the analysis that took place to provide the basis for the on-site plan



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and the two plans therefore complement each other. The roles of the various parties that may be involved in the implementation of an off-site plan are described below. The responsibility for the off-site plan will be likely to rest either with the works management or with the local authority. Schematic representation of various organisation involved during emergency is shown below in Fig. 7.

Either way, the plan must identify an emergency coordinating officer who would take overall command of the off-site activities. Consideration of evacuation may include the following factors:

In the case of a major fire but without explosion risk (e.g. an oil storage tank), only houses close to the fire are likely to need evacuation

If fire is escalating very fast it is necessary to evacuate people nearby as soon as possible

In acute emergency people are advised to stay indoors and shield themselves from the fire.

Fig. 7: Various Organizations Involved During Emergency

1.9.1 Organization



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Organizational details of command structure, warning systems, implementation procedures, emergency control centres include name and appointments of incident controller, site main controller, their deputies and other key personnel involved during emergency.

1.9.2 Communications

Identification of personnel involved, communication centre, call signs, network, list of telephone numbers.

1.9.3 Special Emergency Equipment

Details of availability and location of heavy lifting gear, specified fire-fighting equipment, fireboats etc.

1.9.4 Voluntary Organizations

Details of Voluntary organizations, telephone numbers nearby of hospitals, Emergency helpline, resources etc are to be available with chief authorities.

1.9.5 Non-governmental Organizations (NGO)

NGO’s could provide a valuable source of expertise and information to support emergency response efforts. Members of NGOs could assist response personnel by performing specified tasks, as planned during the emergency planning process.

Evacuation of personnel from the affected area

Arrangements at rallying posts and parking yards

Rehabilitation of evacuated persons

1.9.6 Chemical information

Details of the hazardous substances (MSDS information) and a summary of the risks associated with them will be made available at respective site.

1.9.7 Meteorological information

There is to be arrangements for obtaining details of weather conditions prevailing at r before the time of accident and weather forecasts updates.

1.9.8 Humanitarian Arrangements

Transport, evacuation centres, emergency feeding, treatment of injured, first aid, ambulances, temporary mortuaries.

1.9.9 Public Information

Dealing with the media-press office

Informing relatives, etc.



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1.9.10 Assessment

Collecting information on the causes of the emergency

Reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of all aspects of the emergency plan.

1.9.11 Role of local authority

Local Authorities like Panchayat, Sabha, Samity, municipalities can help in combating emergency situation after assessing the impact scenario in rescue phase.

1.9.12 Role of police

The police are to assist in controlling of the accident site, organizing evacuation and removing of any seriously injured people to hospitals.

Co-ordination with the transport authorities, civil defence and home guards

Co-ordination with army, navy, air force and state fire services

Arrange for post mortem of dead bodies

Establish communication centre with easy contact with EC 1.9.13 Role of Fire Brigade

The fire brigade shall be organized to put out fires and provide assistance as required during emergency.

1.9.14 Media

The media is to have ready and continuous access to designated officials with relevant information, as well as to other sources in order to provide essential and accurate information to public throughout the emergency and to avoid commotion and confusion

Efforts are made to check the clarity and reliability of information as it becomes available, and before it is communicated to public

Public health authorities are consulted when issuing statements to the media concerning health aspects of chemical accidents

Members of the media are to facilitate response efforts by providing means for informing the public with credible information about accidents involving hazardous substances

1.9.15 Role of health care authorities

Hospitals and doctors shall be ready to treat all type of injuries to causalities during emergency.

Co-ordinate the activities of Primary Health Centres and Municipal Dispensaries to ensure required quantities of drugs and equipment’s



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Securing assistance of medical and paramedical personnel from nearby hospitals/institutions

Temporary mortuary and identification of dead bodies

1.10 CONCLUSION

As discussed in above sections, adequate risk Control measures for process needs to be considered for to say that the proposed new Project Activity is not likely to cause major significant risk to onsite, offsite & environment. Suitable Mitigation Measures will be taken by M/s. United Biotech Pvt. Ltd, Dist-SAS Nagar, Punjab to ensure complete workplace safety. In the event of disaster onsite, offsite and all the emergency planning procedures will be followed so as to minimize the impact on working personnel, plant surrounding and environment.

1.11 SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Introduction

The term “Social Impact” means all social and cultural consequences, including changes of people’s lift, production, social relations and organization pattern, brought about by any private or public activity, as well as cultural impacts, including changes of people’s behavior, the view of value and religion.

The objective of a Social Impact Assessment (SIA) is to assess the possible social impacts that may be brought about by a development project, to understand, manage and control changes, to formulate, implement mitigation measures to minimize adverse social impacts or prevent from extension. In the assessment, the most important key is to carry out social intervention to settle, mitigate and eliminate the adverse impacts and manage the social impacts rationally.

Social Impact Assessment is carried out, based on impacts to all the properties and assets identified along the project site. The socio-economic survey in the project area was carried out and the detailed relevant information.

1.11.1 Objectives of Social Impact Assessment Study

The main objective of conducting social survey is to provide inputs of social concerns and to avoid or minimize the adverse social impacts with the best possible solutions at minimum cost. The social reconnaissance exercise is intended to assess the negative impacts (direct, indirect or cumulative) and to suggest mitigating measures to avoid or at least minimize the adverse impacts on nearby communities and people. To minimize and or avoid the adverse impacts through suggested appropriate measures that can be adopted during the operation of the project.

The above objectives can be summarized as follows:

― To identify Socio economic status of the study area;



RA Report


― To collect base line demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the study area

― To gather from the villagers information on the awareness and opinion about of the project

― To know the perceptions and expectations of the respondents from the project authority

― To suggest an appropriate action plan for improving/ restoring the living standards of people in the study area

1.12 REHABILITATION & RESETTLEMENT PLAN

The proposed expansion project does not involve any displacement of persons and no rehabilitation or resettlement is necessary.

1.12.1 Reconnaissance Survey of the Project Area

The study team carried out extensive visits to collect social features within the study area. Other primary data has been collected by using structured and semi-structured questionnaires. Socio Economic survey was been carried out in all the directions within the 10 km radius of the study area to know their socio economic status that includes the basic amenities like education, health, communication and transportation, drinking water facility, sanitation facility and their views, expectation and perceptions about the project.

The consultations were carried out with both individuals and groups during the reconnaissance survey involving local people, directly and indirectly affected persons, public consultation involved information dissemination i.e. informing the people about the details of the project and to invite their suggestions and comments.

1.12.2 Analysis of Data and Reconnaissance Exercise

The data collected through the above steps were compiled to develop the social

scenario of the project area and the sensitive components within that. The collected

data was analyzed, tabulated, summarized and accordingly socio-economic features of

the project area were assessed. The analysis will indicate the feasibility of the project

and will help in suggesting various socially viable options and suggested mitigation

measures to make the project socio-economically acceptable.

RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT Manufacturing unit for Ethyl ...

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