1

Rediscovering the Battle of Craney Island

Christopher Pieczynski

Presented at the 10th Maritime Heritage Conference

Norfolk, VA, September 18, 2014

On June 22, 1813, a British landing force of approximately 1,500 soldiers, marines,

and sailors attempted to reduce the American defenses on Craney Island in order

to attack Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia and destroy the Gosport Navy Yard

and Frigate Constellation. The British were repulsed by less than 800 personnel

from the American Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Virginia Militia. The cities,

ship, and shipyard were saved. End of story. If only it were that simple.

The Battle of Craney Island has an identity crisis. Part of that lies with the physical

attributes of the island today resembling nothing of its shape 200 years ago. The

other part was due to timing. Good news of this victory would normally be

welcomed by the American public, by it was quickly overshadowed by two other

military disasters on the heels of the battle that diminished its significance. One

was the British occupation of Hampton, Virginia, and the atrocities committed

against its citizens.1 The other was the emerging news of the defeat of the Frigate

Chesapeake and the death of its Captain, James Lawrence.2 Add to this the delay

in submitting the much sought details of the battle in the report of the island’s

1 Hampton was attacked and occupied on June 25, 1813. Sse the accounts of the battle in The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, Vol. II, William S. Dudley, ed., Washington, DC: 1992, p. 361-65. Hereafter DH 1812. 2 HMS Shannon defeated and captured the USS Chesapeake on June 1, 1813. Particulars of the battle started reaching newspapers, particularly in the south, around the time of the Battle of Craney Island. See DH 1812, p. 126-34.

2

commander, LtCol Henry Beatty, and you quickly have old news.3 As such, the

battle is all but footnote material in those works that acknowledge the battle at

all.

Fortunately, perhaps, a number of recollections of the battle, from participants on

both sides, emerged in the mid-1800s that kept the spirit and memory of the

battle alive. These accounts, however, appeared to be extremely biased toward

the group affiliated with the writer, be it militia, or navy, or Royal Marine, and

simple details were often in great conflict from account to account. One of the

most minutely detailed and vivid accounts often cited by historians and history

writers came from a Private in the Virginia Militia who was not even on the island

during the battle.4

Rather than mythbusting the battle, let us look at the battle from the perspective

of a critical decision made by the senior commander on each side. It is the results

of these decisions that enable us to identify this battle as a strategic game

changer.

It is almost too easy to assume that the Americans, as the victors, made all the

right decisions in preparing for battle and were thus victorious due to their

foresight and action. The truth is the Americans almost committed one single

fatal error that may have had lasting repercussions on the remaining course if not

3 Beatty’s report, while dated June 25, was not submitted to Taylor until July 4, 1813. See National Intelligencer, July 10, 1813, p. 3. 4 James Jarvis was a Private in the Portsmouth Rifles during the War of 1812. His “Reminiscences, 1846 February 22, of the War of 1812 and of the American Revolution,” Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, College of William and Mary, were specifically presented to Arthur Emmerson, Jr., the son of Capt. Arthur Emmerson, commander of the Portsmouth Artillery Company during the Battle of Craney Island. Jarvis’ fascination for Emmerson may stem from the fact that upon Emmerson’s death, the position of County Clerk fell to his son, Arthur Emmerson, Jr. which left the Assistant Clerk position vacant. Jarvis, in presenting the younger Emmerson the memoir and extolling the great service that Emmerson’s father performed may have been seeking that Assistant Clerk position.

3

outcome of the war. That fatal error was the decision to abandon Craney Island

on the eve of the attack by British forces.

On June 18, 1813, a force of 13 British ships carrying about 2,400 British Soldiers,

Marines, and two companies of Independent Foreigners arrived in Lynnhaven

Bay.5 Word of this force quickly spread to Brigadier General Robert Taylor of the

Virginia Militia, commander of all ground forces in the Hampton Roads area.

Taylor convened a War Council of his top commanders on June 19 and posed one

simple question: “Under present circumstances, is it proper to evacuate the Post

at Craney Island, if the disposition of the Enemy, should indicate an attack on the

Island or on the Forts on the Harbor of Norfolk?”6 Unanimously, all thirteen

commanders present at the War Council voted to abandon the island. This action

alone would have left the entrance to the Elizabeth River unguarded and open for

attack by the British.

The importance of Craney Island was recognized as early as the Revolutionary

War. It was believed back then that had a battery been erected on the island, it

would have been sufficient to stop Lord Dunmore’s ships from bombarding

Norfolk from the Elizabeth River.7 Taylor and Capt. Charles Stewart, who ran the

Constellation into the safety of Norfolk on February 4, 1813, recognized it as well

5 Norfolk Gazette-Publick Ledger, June 23, 1813. The paper lists the force as “four sail of the line, six frigates, two sloops of war, and one schooner.” 6 Report of a Council of War, June 19, 1813, James Barron Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, College of William and Mary. 7 General Harry Lee described the British movement in and around the Elizabeth River and Hampton Roads as experiencing “No difficulty interposed but the annoyance to be expected from one of those slight forts…” See: The Revolutionary War Memoirs of General Henry Lee, Boston, MA: 1998, p. 135.

4

and sought the approval from their respective chains of command to fortify

Craney.8

Taylor supported the vote on abandonment citing his adversity to hazarding the

forces there on the island, primarily minimally trained and largely untested militia,

in the face of an overwhelming threat. One officer, however, not present at the

War Council, Col Walker K. Armistead, had a difference of opinion with Taylor’s

order to abandon the island.

Armistead was an Army Engineer, the third graduate of West Point, and architect

of the defenses on the island. Armistead had developed plans for fortifying

Craney Island as early as 1809 and was the undeniable expert on the island’s

defensibility.9 Presumably on Craney Island overseeing construction of the

defenses during the first War Council, Armistead convinced Taylor that the island

could be held with as few as 300 men utilizing the defenses already in place.10

Taylor convened another War Council on June 20, allowing Armistead to plead his

case on the strength of the defenses on Craney Island. The second War Council

included two additional officers invited by Taylor, Commodore John Cassin,

Commander of the Gosport Navy Yard and the senior Navy officer in the region,

and Capt. Joseph Tarbell, current Commanding Officer of the Frigate

Constellation.11 The Navy had just returned from a successful gunboat attack on

8 Robert Taylor to Governor James Barbour, May 1812, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, vol. 10, H.W. Flourney, ed., Richmond, VA, 1892, p. 148-52. Captain Charles Stewart to Secretary of the Navy Jones, March 22, 1813, DH 1812, p. 316-17. 9 Walker K. Armistead to Col. Jonathan Williams, Chief Engineer, March 26, 1809, Jonathan Williams Manuscripts, The Lilly Library, Indiana University - Bloomington. Armistead stated “I expect orders to erect a work on Craney Island.” 10 Robert B. Taylor to James Barron, December 24, 1813, James Barron Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, College of William and Mary. 11 Ibid.

5

the HMS Junon in Hampton Roads, and coupled with Armistead’s testimony on

the defenses, the War Council took on a very different tone.12 The question now

put to a vote asked: “Whether under present circumstances it be advisable to

withdraw the Forces from Craney Island.”13

The results this time were 12 in favor of maintaining the defenses, two in favor of

abandoning the island, and one on maintaining them, but only if they were

reinforced. Cassin promised gunboat support in the waters surrounding the

island and Tarbell sent 100 sailors and 50 Marines from the Constellation to assist

in manning the island defenses. The sailors were all gunners from the

Constellation – they were trained and knew how to handle the 18 and 24 pound

cannon on the island.

The result was a reversal of the original decision, made perhaps without the full

awareness or understanding of the defenses, but one that could have easily

spelled doom for the cities of Norfolk, Portsmouth, the Frigate Constellation, and

the Gosport Navy Yard. Maintaining the island defenses, reinforcing it, and

adding the Navy support was enough to counter the lackluster British

performance in their attack on Craney Island.

If the Americans were lucky enough to reverse a poor decision and hold the island

to victory, there were also lucky enough to be aided by large British egos, an

indifference to the American fighting man, and one very poor decision on the part

12 Newspaper report in Niles Weekly Register, June 25, 1813. Official report by Cassin: Cassin to Secretary of the Navy Jones, June 21, 1813 in DH 1812, p. 358-59. See also “A Seaman’s Notebook: The Travels of Captain George de la Roche,” Maryland Historical Magazine, vol. 42, no. 4 (Dec 1947), p. 265. 13 Report of a Council of War, June 20, 1813, James Barron Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, College of William and Mary.

6

of Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, commander of all British naval forces in the

Americas.

Operations along the Atlantic Coast in 1813 were primarily a diversion to help

draw American troops off the campaigns along the Canadian border.14 The

general lack of defenses around many coastal cities, particularly during many of

the early raids conducted by Admiral Sir George Cockburn, coupled with the tepid

response by local militiamen were enough to convince the British that attacking

Norfolk with the goal of destroying the Constellation would be easy.15

Cockburn was undeniably the expert on amphibious operations in North America.

His past experiences in this method of warfare enabled him to develop a certain

assault methodology that was uniquely his. Earlier raids around the Chesapeake

Bay were characterized by overwhelming force, early morning, or first light,

landings for the element of surprise, armed boats for fire support against artillery

or coastal defenses ashore during the assault and the integration of Congreve

Rocket boats leading the assault waves and striking terror into both defender and

citizen alike.16 In larger cities where a more robust network of defenses

prevented immediate attack, he conducted extensive reconnaissance of the

defenses, sounding water routes and prospective landing areas, collected

intelligence on the strengths and design of the defenses, and determined the

number, and readiness, of the defenders.17

14 Earl Bathhurst to Colonel Sir Thomas Sidney Beckwith, March 20, 1813, DH 1812, p. 325-26. Rear Admiral George Cockburn to Admiral Sir John B. Warren, March 23, 1813, DH 1812, p. 326-329. 15 See “Admiral Sir George Cockburn, G.C.B.,” in Royal Naval Biography, vol. III, John Marshall, ed., London, 1831, p. 289. In one depiction of the U.S. militia forces, Cockburn states that they “fled with his whole force to the woods, and was neither seen nor heard of afterwards.” 16 See Cockburn to Warren report of May 3, 1813 and May 6, 1813, DH 1812, p. 341-46. 17 Rear Admiral George Cockburn to Admiral Sir John B. Warren, April 19, 1813, DH 1812, p. 340-41.

7

Cockburn’s plan for attacking Norfolk was comprehensive and based on his

months of preparation and probing of the area. Using overwhelming force, he

would reduce the defenses on Craney Island, land forces on the east and west

banks of the Elizabeth River, and proceed on land to attack Forts Norfolk and

Nelson from their undefended rears, and by sea up the river to attack the

Constellation.18 Using the well trained forces on the ships under his command

combined with the troops under Brigadier General Sir Sidney Beckwith aboard

Warren’s ships, the destruction of the area was all but assured.

Cockburn, however, would not have an opportunity to lead this operation

following his months of planning. Warren was censured by the Admiralty for

allowing his commanders, like Cockburn, to focus more on raiding insignificant

coastal towns than on maintaining the blockade.19 Cockburn was placed on the

frigate Barossa to provide support from the frigates for the landing.20

While Beckwith landed about 800 troops to the west of Craney Island “in

tolerable confusion” the amphibious assault on the island was left to Capt Samuel

Pechall of the San Domingo.21 Even Warren’s barge, nicknamed the Centipede,

and commanded by Capt John Hanchett of the Diadem equipped with a brass 3

pound cannon, parasol, and pet dog, was used to lead the boats containing about

700 men to shore.22

18 Cockburn to Warren, March 23, 1813, DH 1812, p. 326-29. 19 John W. Croker to Admiral John B. Warren, May 17, 1813, DH 1812, p. 356-57. 20 Warren to Cockburn, June 21, 1813, Maryland State Archives, Stan Quick Collection. Cockburn’s orders were to “cover the troops in their disembarkation and the other points of service to which they are destined at this anchorage.” 21 “Journal June 22nd,” Life and Opinions of Charles James Napier, Vol. 1, William Napier, ed., London, 1857, p. 217. 22 “Memoir by Captain Robertson,” quoted in ibid., p. 213.

8

The results of the attacks on both land and sea were a series of missteps that

combined resulted in an abysmal failure. Beckwith’s attack from the landward

side was stifled by high tide preventing the crossing of the “thoroughfare”

between the island and the mainland. Sustained artillery fire from the Americans

inflicted heavy casualties and most the British Congreve rockets fired from this

position landed harmlessly in the water.23 Without any artillery, the British were

unable to counter the American artillery barrage. Chaos, insubordination, and

desertions from the Independent Companies led to a hasty retreat back to the

boats.

Out on Hampton Roads, several hours later, the boats began their approach as

the tide was ebbing and grounded well off shore, but well within range of

American cannon. Several boats were destroyed since the troops did not know

that wading the final distance ashore was required.24 Even if they knew to

disembark upon grounding, the new troops did not even rehearse loading and

unloading boats. No one appeared to be in charge. The boats mounted with

cannon and Congreve rockets were in the rear and their weapons could not be

brought to bear.25 Eventually the boats turned and retreated back to their

vessels.

The difficulty in understanding these factors, and implementing a plan to mitigate

them, was known, but apparently only to Cockburn. Whether Cockburn tried to

communicate with, and was marginalized by Warren on these factors, or willingly

decided to withhold them upon being removed from leading the operation, is a

23 Ibid., p. 213. 24 Captain James Scott, R.N., Recollections of a Naval Life, vol. III, London, 1834, p. 141, 144-45. 25 “Craney Island,” in Sea Soldier, An Officer of Marines with Duncan, Nelson, Collingwood, and Cockburn: The Letters and Journals of Major T. Marmaduke Wybourn, RN, 1797-1813, London, 2000, p. 190-194.

9

matter of speculation. The operation, however, was very atypical to any

operation that Cockburn led to success before or after Craney Island.

Three days later at Hampton, the operation led by Cockburn, a simultaneous

assault, with overwhelming firepower reducing the primary defenses, and the

quick capture of the town, was a complete success.26 It was the behavior of the

Independent Companies after capturing the town that marred the victory for the

British.27 One might speculate that the only reason for capturing Hampton was to

have a victory to make up for the loss at Craney Island. That might be the case

since Hampton had minimal value as a military target.

The loss at Craney Island began a shift the overall British Strategy along the coast.

The day after the battle, Warren, in a letter to John Croker, Secretary of the

Admiralty, stated that capturing Norfolk area objectives “cannot now be affected

with less than 5 or 6,000 men.”28 By August, raids on towns and military objects

greatly diminished and all but ceased for the rest of 1813 and the first half of

1814. Greater enforcement of the blockade and landing only to water or forage

appeared to be the primary operations during this time. One reason for this was

the loss of the forces designed to conduct these raids – namely the Independent

Companies of Foreigners. With British forces fighting Napoleon in Europe, it

made sense to try a bold experiment and utilize French prisoners to fight in

America. Less than two weeks after Craney, Warren indicated that “the state of

the Foreign Company is such as to render their longer continuance with the

troops here impossible.”29 The small number of regular British forces indicated

26 Beckwith to Warren, June 28, 1813, DH 1812, p. 363-63. 27 See “Outrages at Hampton,” in Barbarities of the Enemy, Worcester, MA, 1814, p. 99-122. 28 Warren to Croker, June 23, 1813, Warren Letter Book 2, Maryland State Archives, Stan Quick Collection. 29 Warren to Melville, July 6, 1813, ibid.

10

they were “apprehensive that if they are landed the men would seize them and

deliver them to the enemy.”30 Beckwith had expressed such apprehension even

before the forces arrived in Bermuda in May.

The loss of a significant portion of their landing force was certainly an impact on

continued operations in the coastal areas. Cockburn, through his meticulous

planning, had designs on Annapolis, Baltimore, and even Washington, DC in 1813.

He recognized the small numbers of Marines, artillery companies, and trained

sailors he had aboard his ships were not enough to takes such large cities. He

would have to wait until the situation changed in Europe or when more reliable

forces were dedicated to the American theater. He continued to have his sights

on the Constellation reportedly boarding the vessel in 1814, disguised as a

fisherman.31

While Craney Island may not have eliminated the threat of further British attacks

along coastal areas of the United States, it did significantly stifle the British

momentum and initiative in the region and create a certain trepidation with the

British forces when they did land. Meanwhile, it gave the Americans time to

increase and strengthen defenses in many areas. Fifteen months after the Battle

of Craney Island, British forces marched on and burned parts of Washington

where militia forces defending the route into the city behaved as Cockburn hoped

they would, and fled. The British did not remain in the city very long fearing a

counterattack. Later, they tried to take Baltimore but were unable to penetrate

the defenses protecting the city and water approaches and just simply gave up.

30 Beckwith to Sherbroke, July 5, 1813, ibid. 31 Robert Greenhow to Governor Barbour, February 24, 1814, in Calendar of Virginia State Papers, Vol. 10, p. 304-05.

11

Is it possible, perhaps before the attack on Baltimore, that Walker K. Armistead,

designer of the defenses at Craney Island, compared notes with his brother

George Armistead, designer of the defenses at Baltimore? I’ll let you decided on

this aspect of the legacy of Craney Island.