The Battle of Cannae: 216 B.C.E.

Tom Degenhart Hist-611 A001 Sum 13September 14,2013

“It is inevitable that some defeat will enter even the most victorious life. The human

spirit is never finished when it is defeated...it is finished when it surrenders.”

~ Ben Stein

1

Near the Ofanto River on the south-east ridge of the Italian

peninsula, one can stand above the hill where the ancient town of

Cannae once stood and gaze out at the tranquil plain that

separates the knoll from the tributary. Such a scenic view makes

it difficult to fathom that this same ground was once center

stage to a theater of mass carnage and savagery. On August 2, 216

B.C.E., the Roman legions under consuls L. Aemilius Paullus and

C. Terentius Varro, suffered a devastating defeat at the hands

Hannibal Barca of Carthage, who would be remembered as Rome’s

greatest adversary for centuries to come. The Battle of Cannae

stands as a testament for two distinct attributes: on the one

side is the tactical genius of the Carthaginian general Hannibal,

whose army single handedly annihilated several Roman forces; on

the other side is Rome’s unwavering resolve and fortitude in what

can be considered the Republic’s most desperate hour. For

centuries, Rome had imposed her will against a multitude of

enemies among the Italian peninsula, overcoming and intimidating

her foes into submission. She also had her way with Carthage

following the first Punic War, dilapidating Carthage dominance

over sea trade. Yet, through Hannibal Rome would experience, if

only for a short while, what it had inflicted on so many others-

a sense of impending doom. However, the ancient words attested in

the Book of Sirach 2: 4-6, in the Old Testament may best describe

Rome’s condition following Cannae, “Accept whatever befalls you, in

crushing misfortune be patient, for in fire gold is tested, and worthy men in the crucible

of humiliation…” For in defeat, Rome stiffened and learned a pivotal

lesson on warfare- the value of generalship.

During the first Punic War (264-241

B.C.E.), Rome gained the benefit of a stout navy when they were

initially outmatched by the superior Carthaginian fleet. After

developing their vessels based on a captured ship of the enemy

and equipping it with the corvus, Rome turned the tide of the

war. Following the war, Carthage was severely hampered

economically and in manpower through indemnities owed to Rome.

Further, they had lost previously owned territories of Sardinia

and Corsica through a violation of the peace treaty by Rome.

What’s

2

worse, Carthage’s navy was destroyed and trading fleet reduced,

resulting in near economic ruin. However, Carthage discovered a

sense of resiliency through their exploitations in Spain, led by

Hamilcar, who initiated Carthage’s attempts to subjugate Spain to

the level of a protectorate. Through Hamilcar and his succeeding

commander Hasdrubal, New Carthage was proclaimed in the Iberian

territory and Carthage found new life once again with Hannibal as

its leading commander. Yet, disputes rose over a nearby territory

of Saguntum, who feared Carthage expansion and sought Roman

protection. Rome, observing the Carthaginian power swelling in

Spain, accepted Saguntum’s plea and warned Hannibal to refrain

from any military action against the city. Hannibal viewed Rome’s

decisions dealing with Saguntum as a violation of their peace

agreement, as well as Rome’s killings of Carthage supporters in

Saguntum as an additional crime. With the backing of the

Carthaginian government, Hannibal was free to take whatever

action he sought necessary. This decision was one that would

alter the course history of both Rome and Carthage permanently,

as well as much of the Mediterranean World; in the spring of 219

B.C.E, Hannibal and his forces attacked Saguntum.1

Following an ominous silence from Rome after many

1 Richard A. Gabriel Hannibal [electronic resource] : the Military Biography of Rome's Greatest Enemy. (Washington, D.C. : Potomac Books, 2011). http://www.apus.eblib.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=864597, (accessed August 4, 2013), 72.; Ibid., 76-78.

months, an embassy finally arrived in Carthage with an ultimatum:

Deliver Hannibal or risk war. The Roman advisor is said to have

clutched a fold of toga in his hand, stating that he could hold

peace or war within its grasp; the choice was left to Carthage.

Carthage elected to have the advisor choose, since Rome would

ultimately do as they pleased regardless, to which the advisor

released his grip and advised that it would be war.2

Hannibal had also made

his choice, and this time around it would Carthage, not Rome, who

would bring the fight abroad. However, many monumental challenges

laid ahead for him; the sea was now riddled with Roman vessels

and a march east would place Hannibal’s army into the hostile

territories of Gaul. Moreover, obstructing the entrance to Italy

was the Alps

3

mountains. In any event, Hannibal elected to proceed with the

journey; his overall strategy appears to not have been the utter

destruction of Rome, but rather to pound them into submission by

annihilating their armies and stripping them of their allies.

Doing so would place Carthage in a favorable position to make

demands on Rome, who would have no option but to comply. It is

estimated by Polybius and Livy that when Hannibal originally left

2 Ibid., 80.

from New Carthage, he possessed a force of 90,000 infantry and

12,000 thousand cavalry. However, through hardships of combat

through hostile regions, disease, and desertion, he arrived at

the Alps with only 38,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. After the

crossing over the Alps, he was left with only 20,000 infantry and

8,000 cavalry, suffering devastating setbacks. Crossing the icy

summit through the trials of winter claimed even more of

Hannibal’s men and in the end he reached Italy with a shell of

the forces he commenced with, say some 22,0000 infantry and 8,000

horse, with 37 war elephants. Vastly deteriorating, half-starved,

and facing the might of the Roman war machine, Hannibal needed

allies desperately. It must have seemed foolhardy for anyone to

join such a rag tag rabble of men considering their opposition.

Fortunately, Hannibal would find such a reckless lot in the

Celtic tribes of Gaul in Northern Italy. The Gauls hatred for

Rome stemmed back well over a century from the time they sacked

its heartland in 390 B.C.E. With promise of plunder and

liberation from Rome, some were willing to take up arms if the

Carthaginians could prove their metal against the Roman legions.3

This would not be a

novelty for a Carthaginian commander however, as Carthage

comprised it’s armies of mercenaries from varied regions and

cultures for centuries. Hannibal’s army may have been somewhat 3 Gabriel, Hannibal, 113-114.

dubious, but not delicate. From the Libyans and Moors, he

possessed an allotment of light infantry; from Spain he recruited

a strong infantry and cavalry core designed as a shock force.

Guarded in chain mail, an oval shield, and armed with javelins

and the short Spanish iron sword known as the falcata, the Spanish

were a formidable and flexible force on the battlefield.

Hannibal’s forces also boosted some of the best and most

4

reliable cavalry in the Numidian mounted forces. Relying on short

javelins and light spears, the Numidians acted as a quick strike

force that could move in and back out of position quickly. For

Carthage, it was a give and take relationship with the Numidians,

who would happily accept payment from the enemy as well and act

as an adversary to the Carthaginians. Also housed in stables

since youth were the war elephants. Requiring delicate care and

years of training, the elephants were prone to running amok in

battle but could prove to be a devastating force when used

effectively. Anchoring Hannibal’s army was the elite African

phalanx infantry. Considered a Carthaginian unit, these warriors

were styled from the Greek tradition of Alexander and Pyrrhus of

Epirus. Donning metal helmets, greaves, linen cuirasses, two

handed pikes, a round shield, and two short swords; the African

infantry were Hannibal’s most reliable and elite force against

the Romans. Added to the melting pot of warriors was the Celts or

Gauls; not quite as conditioned as the rest of Hannibal’s troops

and known to wear little to no armor, the Gauls were still a

fearsome foe. Brandishing their long slashing swords, flowing

hair, and towering physiques, they possessed a reputation for

intimidating Romans and a nasty habit of severing heads for their

personal collection.4 With such an array of units, Carthaginian

armies were very dependent on strong generalship, as they usually

allowed each force to fight with their respective peoples. In

all, the army of Hannibal was very multifaceted and could

threaten an enemy in a variety of ways.

Conversely, Hannibal’s enemy was no

stranger in the Mediterranean World and hardly the hodge-podge

heap of warriors that crossed over the Alps to confront them. In

fact, Rome did not even possess a standing army at this juncture

of their existence. Nevertheless, it was their citizen army that

would ultimately conquer much of their empire to come. Not to say

that Rome did not possess some mercenary forces; they would often

incorporate many of their Italian allies into their ranks.

Additionally, the Roman cavalry men were not considered a strong

point,

4 Richard A.Gabriel, Scipio Africanus ,[electronic resource] : Rome's Greatest General, (Potomac Books, 2008), http://www.apus.eblib.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=864614 (accessed September 4,2013), 55-57. ; Ibid., 58-60.

5

therefore, many times throughout its history, Rome relied on

mercenary units to bulk up their mounted troops. As discussed

earlier, the shifty Numidians would also aid Roman armies under

Scipio in the Battle of Zama in 202 B.C.E. In any case, the main

component of the Roman army was their infantry. Their soldiers

were not necessarily brought up as warriors, but received

training most likely through their family. A conscription for

soldiers of one thousand men of each tribe would usually occur

under a military tribune, who would then train them for several

weeks on the Roman art of war. They would then be assigned to a

legion commander for further training. Interestingly enough, the

original army of the Romans in the early republic mirrored that

of the Greek hoplites; using long spears and a phalanx formation.

However, one of Rome’s greatest attributes was her willingness to

adapt and learn from her enemies. Through suffering defeat

against enemies as the Gauls and Samnites, Rome eventually

altered the strategy to the maniple formation. Maniple, meaning

“handfuls,” were separate units comprised of originally 100

soldiers called a century. Normally, 30 maniples would be

assigned to a single legion, with each century supervised by a

lead officer called a centurion. The centuries would form into

three lines or echelons: The velites, who were a light infantry

armed with javelins, sword and a small shield, acting as

skirmishers; the hastati formed the first line of defense, equipped

with an oval shied (scutum), two throwing spears (pila), and a

short thrusting sword (gladius); The principes were the more

experienced second line, followed by the eldest of the infantry

known as the triarii, usually armed with a long spear. The maniples

would line in a staggered, checkerboard formation, with gaps

between each unit; the maniple to the rear would cover the gaps

of the maniples in front of them (see Fig.1). By using this

formation, the first line could charge and retreat if necessary,

in good order through the gaps of the maniples behind them. They

could then reform, and conduct another surge.5 Even if the enemy

could repel the main line advancing, another one would appear,

followed by others. Fighting against such an array would often

wear down an enemy, like cutting the head off a beast, only to

have another head appear.

6

Consequently, fighting the Romans in a head-on engagement

could prove futile; their organization and flexibility made

combating them a daunting affair. Moreover, Rome had the

forethought to extend their citizenship to much of their

conquered regions in Italy and established allies throughout the

5 Gabriel, Scipio Africanus, 64-66.

peninsula; subsequently, they possessed an overwhelming pool to

recruit from, placing them in the advantage should a war of

attrition take place. This is exactly what occurred in Rome’s war

against King Pyrrhus of Epirus beginning in 280 B.C.E. Pyrrhus

defeated the Romans in two engagements with his highly touted

Hellenistic army of pikemen and elephants, but the losses he

suffered were severe and Rome’s reservoir of troops allowed them

to recover from their own casualties. Pyrrhus ultimately elected

to retreat from Italy, coming to the conclusion that he could not

win a war of attrition against the depth of the Roman legions. 6

Therefore, Hannibal realized he would need not only one, but

several victories against Rome without losing too many of his own

men, a mountainous task indeed. However, he had already conquered

one summit in the literal sense of the word, and now faced an

even greater one- the menacing eminence that was the Roman army.

To accomplish this task,

Hannibal opted to make foregoing engagements into a chess match,

rather than a contest of physical bravado. Following a clash of

skirmishing cavalry units at Ticinus, Hannibal enticed the Romans

to battle near the river Trebia by dispatching his Numidian

cavalry to harass the Roman field camp. When the Romans crossed

the icy Trebia River in December in 218 B.C., they found

6 M. Cary, and H.H. Scullard. A History of Rome, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1975), 94-95.

themselves struck from the rear by a hidden cavalry force held in

concealment. The elephants also hammered into the Roman flank

sending their forces into a route. As if this defeat wasn’t

humbling enough; Hannibal then baited the Roman legions under C.

Flaminius through a defile at Lake Trasimene, leading Flaminius

to believe that a small segment of Hannibal’s army at the end of

the defile was the last ranks marching away from the approaching

Romans. When Flaminius moved to attack the supposed rear line, he

was struck in his flank and rear by the main brunt of Hannibal’s

forces waiting in misty hills opposite

7

of the river. Flaminius’ army was annihilated, as was Flaminius,

sending Rome into a fit of desperation. In a period of crisis,

Rome would allow for a single dictator to be appointed as opposed

to the two consul system. Quintus Fabius Maximus was provided the

task of dealing with Hannibal, being appointed for a six month

tenure. However, his policy was not in tradition with Roman way

of dealing with an enemy. Rome’s keen sense of virtus, or warrior

ethos, demanded swift, military response. Maximus elected for

quite the contrary solution, to refrain from fighting Hannibal

all together and gradually wear down his hoard of warriors. The

plan was rather effective, but after his sixth month stint,

Rome’s patience was wearing faster than Hannibal’s army, and a

policy of seek and destroy was implemented. 7 To accomplish this,

Rome raised one of the largest armies it had ever placed on the

battle field; a recorded eight legions of 5000 men each, coupled

with other allied units, the army stood at an imposing 80,000

strong. Under the newly elected councils, L. Aemilius Paullus

and C.Terentius Varro, the crimson-clad army set out to track

Hannibal near Apulia, where he been ravaging the lands.8 The

Romans desired an open field where Hannibal could not lure them

into another ambush; this time, the Carthaginians would have to

face Rome muzzle to muzzle. Oddly enough, Hannibal provided the

Romans with such a terrain, on the open plain near the small town

of Cannae. The town was perched on a hill top

near the river Aufidus (Ofanto), which lay off to the west. This

proved an ideal geography for Varro, who’s cavalry was heavily

outnumbered, therefore Varro could protect his flanks from being

enveloped protected by the river to the west and hills to the

east. It is estimated that Varro’s cavalry with his allied

contingent possessed a total of 6000 horse compared to Hannibal’s

10,000. However, the Roman’s need only but hold off the

Carthaginian cavalry while their superior infantry slashed their

way through Hannibal’s center. Varro also made one critical error

in his deployment; he arranged his infantry in deeper, tightened

7 Charles Freeman, Egypt, Greece and Rome: Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean, (Oxford University Press, 2004), 387.8 M. Cary, and H.H. Scullard. A History of Rome, 128.

ranks with a shorter frontage. Much of Varro’s army had been

recently trained and

8

possessed little to no battle experience, so in deepening his

files Varro hoped to increase the weight of the charge and make

it increasingly difficult for his men to flee. Yet, in doing so,

he lost much of the flexibility and versatility of the maniple

formation. In any event, the Roman army was going to rely on

brute force, like that of a blunt instrument, it would descend

straight down to shatter its projected target. If Rome’s army

could be compared to a hammer, then the Carthaginian hoard

resembled more of a bow- flexible, and designed to withstand

great pressure. Hannibal’s army was heavily outnumbered, but

stronger in cavalry. Subsequently, he took to a direct opposite

approach of his adversary; he had to quickly route the Roman

cavalry flanks and hope his infantry could hold long enough for

his horse to swing round and strike the Roman rear. Thus,

Hannibal drew his Spanish and Celtic horse to the left near the

river. Next he lined his heavily armed African infantry followed

by the Spanish and Celtic troops. The last line of infantry was

the other half of his elite African guard, flanked by the

Numidian horse. He then took the center lines of the Spanish and

Celtic infantry and advanced forward, having the rest of the

units keep in contact with them but gradually drifting off; the

whole of the infantry formed an outward crescent shaped

formation. The two African phalanx units were left to the rear on

each flank as a reserve force 9 (See Fig. 2).

The battle began with the

advance of the light infantry of both sides clashing, while the

Roman mass moved steadily forward. With no clear victor in the

initial engagement, the corps of cavalry began their charge

toward one another; the Spanish and Celtic horsemen the first to

collide with the Roman mounts. Polybius described the fighting as

“barbaric,” as the cavalrymen dismounted as began hacking at one

another mercilessly until finally the Spanish and Celtic warriors

gained the ground, cutting down the feeling Roman constituents.

By this juncture, the weight of the Roman infantry crashed into

the Hannibal’s bowed line consisting primarily of Celts. The

overwhelming weight in the deepened ranks of the legions began to

impose their will upon the Carthaginian front line, forcing them

further and further backward. This point of the

9

battle must have given the Romans encouragement, as they were

driving the enemy back, but in becoming blood drunk, they lost

9 Polybius. The Histories. Translated by Aubrey De Selincourt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/3*.html (accessed September 4,2013), 281-283.

their formations and became massed together so tightly that they

could not retreat in good order. What’s worse is they had

advanced so far as to expose their flanks to the elite African

infantry waiting in the wings, which turned and collapsed upon

both ends of the Roman infantry. By this time, Hasdrubal had

defeated the Roman cavalry and swung back around to aid the

Numidian force, sending the remaining Roman horse to flight. Now

the entire rear of the Roman infantry was exposed to the

thunderous charge of Hasdrubal’s cavalry; compacted too densely

and surrounded on all ends, the Roman infantry was completely

engulfed.10 The troops standing helplessly in the middle of the

melee could do little more than watch as the Carthaginian force

cut down their comrades with impunity and drew ever closer toward

them. When the dust settled, the slain numbered over 50,000;

spread amidst a field the size of Central Park. Reports form Livy

describe a battle field where the wounded, in fear of the fate

that awaited them, dug small pits into the ground to bury their

own heads in, suffocating themselves to death. Others had cut

open their thighs and hams, or bid their enemies to open their

throats to drain their blood; such was the brutality of Cannae

and ancient battle. 11 Regardless of the horrors committed

in the heat of the battle, Hannibal refrained from further

10 Ibid., 285-287.; 288-289. 11 Gabriel, Hannibal, 155.

brutality and sought a diplomatic end to the destructive

conflict. It is at this juncture, that historians have been set

in a prolonged debate regarding the decisions Hannibal elected

following Cannae. To state it simply, it appears that Hannibal’s

overall strategy was not the destruction of Rome, but rather its

submission to Carthaginian sovereignty. However, his credibility

has come into question by some as to why he would not attack Rome

following Cannae, thus eliminating Rome all together. Historians

such as B.D. Hoyos have not only challenged his overall plan, but

also the manner in which he conducted it. In Hoyos’ “Hannibal:

What Kind of Genius?,” he points out that Carthage was in no

position to fight a war, being heavily outmatched in naval

vessels. He also challenges Hannibal’s decision to march across

the

10

hostile land of the Gauls, as well as crossing the Alps during

the harsh winter season. Additionally, Hoyos states that when

Rome refused Hannibal’s conditions for peace following Cannae, he

was left with insufficient supplies or troops to force the issue.

In the end, the objective of the Italian campaign failed when the

expected negotiations did not come to fruition. 12 However, it is

12 B.D. Hoyos, “Hannibal: What Kind of Genius?, Greece & Rome,” Second Series, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Oct., 1983), http://www.jstor.org/stable/642568, (accessed September 3,2013), 173-175.

always easier to scrutinize in retrospect; much of what Hannibal

ultimately elected to do was not out of incompetence, for he was

a product of his environment. Hoyos pointed out himself that

Hannibal came from a Hellenistic tradition that involved

defeating one’s enemy on the field, with the purpose of seeking

the advantage for terms of peace. The only fault on Hannibal’s

end was not to have taken notice of past attempts of this same

strategy by Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus attempted negotiations with the

Romans following his victories, only to be rebuffed on all

occasions.13

Ultimately, Hannibal failed to understand the nature of

Rome’s resolve. Roman’s did not compromise on their opponent’s

terms; it was absolute victory or nothing. Cannae marked a fork

in the road for Rome’s future; one path led to the subordination

to another faction whose victory may very well have meant the

rise of an empire, and the other path sprung Rome to establishing

an empire of their own over the Mediterranean World. Cannae was

the ultimate test of Rome’s character and perseverance in a time

of great peril. Instead of collapsing under the pressure, they

bided their time and learned from their enemy. Their fortitude

and adaptation to their crisis was embodied by one of Rome’s

greatest commanders, Publius Cornelius Scipio (236-183 B.C.E.),

13 Mary,R.Leftowitz, “Pyrrhus' Negotiations with the Romans, 280-278 B. C.,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 64, (1959), http://www.jstor.org/stable/310940, (accessed September 4,2013), 162-163.

who’s personal experience against Hannibal taught him the

invaluable lesson of battle field tactics. Rome’s army would now

combine might with guile, as Scipio trained his armies to be much

more than a mere machine of brute force. In the Battle of Zama

(202 B.C.E.), Scipio would turn the tables of Hannibal, defeating

his cavalry units on the flanks and overtaking the

11

Carthaginian infantry in the rear. 14 It is not without a sense

of irony that Cannae marked an end for Carthage dominance and a

rise of Roman sovereignty. Perhaps it best serves as a lesson

that the strength of one’s metal cannot be fully realized until

placed under the burden of great stress.

14 Gabriel, Scipio Africanus, 196-197.

Bibliography

Cary, M. and H.H. Scullard. A History of Rome. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1975).

Freeman, Charles. Egypt, Greece and Rome: Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Gabriel, Richard A. Hannibal [electronic resource] : The Military Biography of Rome's Greatest Enemy. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2011).

http://www.apus.eblib.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=864597. (Accessed September 4, 2013).

Gabriel, Richard A. Scipio Africanus [electronic resource] : Rome's Greatest General.(Potomac Books, 2008).

http://www.apus.eblib.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=864614. (Accessed September 4,2013).

Goldsworthy, Adrian. Roman Warfare. (Smithsonian Books, 2005).

Hoyos, B.D. “Hannibal: What Kind of Genius?”. Greece & Rome , Second Series, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Oct., 1983), pp. 171-180. http://www.jstor.org/stable/642568. (Accessed September

3,2013).

Leftowitz, Mary,R. “Pyrrhus' Negotiations with the Romans, 280-278 B. C.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 64, (1959), pp. 147-177. http://www.jstor.org/stable/310940. (Accessed September 4,2013).

Patavinus, Titus Livius. History of Rome, Book 22, 49. Translated byRev. Canon Roberts, (Everyman’s Library). http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/livy/Livy22.html. (Accessed

September 5, 2013).

Polybius. The Histories. Translated by Aubrey De Selincourt. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/3*.html (Accessed July 6, 2013).

Appendix

Figure 1. The Roman Maniple Formation. (roman-formation2.jpg. devenneyteachinghub.net. (Accessed September 13,1013).

(Continued on second page)

Appendix

Figure 2. Battle of Cannae, Hannibal’s Tactic. (hannibalthewarrior.com. 766 × 1405 - Battle of Cannae and Hannibal. (Accessed September 13, 2013).