The Battle of Chancellorsville 1863.

HY 673 69250810 Stephen Gill

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The Battle of Chancellorsville 1863

This essay explores the two different approaches taken by two generals during the American

Civil War. These two approaches are (i) meticulous planning and secrecy on the part of Major

General (Fighting) Joe Hooker and (ii) seizing the initiative and reacting to your enemies manoeuvre

of forces as displayed so successfully by Confederate Generals Robert E Lee and (Stonewall) Jackson.

The Battle of Chancellorsville highlights the way that the two sides prosecuted the war during the

early stages, most Union generals erred on the side of extreme caution whereas the Confederate

generals were bold aggressive and displayed great fighting spirit.

As the American Civil War approached the anniversary of its second full year in January 1863

the Union Army of the Potomac was encamped at Falmouth on the North bank of the Rappahannock

River just north of Fredericksburg. After two years of hard campaigning in the east, it had little to

show by way of hard results. Its soldiers had fought hard and done more than had been asked of them

but now the troops of the army were worn out and fatigued. Following the outbreak of the war the

Union Army of the Potomac was involved in most of the major battles in the east but found itself

either outfought by the Confederate forces or let down by its commanders, who consistently failed to

seize the initiative.

From the Union point of view the war was being fought to preserve the homeland that had

been founded by the American Revolution in 1776. The slave owning Confederacy view was that

they had been backed into a corner by the election of Abraham Lincoln, and had been left with no

choice but to secede from the Union in order to preserve their culture, economy and political

establishment. Both sides felt that a quick decisive victory would achieve their goals and preserve

their way of life, values and socio-economic norms.

The Union side felt that the majority of the ordinary people in the south were hoodwinked by

morally bankrupt political leaders, and that inflicting a decisive defeat upon them would shock the

people and bring them to their senses so that they would demand an end to the war. The

Confederacy’s goal was to defend its territory and achieve international recognition as an independent

state from the European states. The Confederacy confidently believed that international recognition

was only a matter of time if they could hold on and inflict a decisive defeat on the Union in the

eastern theatre. Such a campaign victory would help them gain international recognition and shock

the Union leadership and people into suing for a settlement.

Among the military leadership of the time there was the chimera of the ‘decisive battle’, a

battle that was so devastating to the enemy army that it would bring about the total defeat of the

enemy’s army and the downfall of its political leadership. This belief in the power of the ‘decisive

battle’ compelled the commanders of both armies to achieve a decisive battle in the early campaigns


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in the east. What leaders on both sides failed to realise at this stage in the war was that the citizen

armies they had created were so highly motivated and politically in tune with their societies that it

would take more than a military defeat to destroy their will to fight. As things turned out, it would

take the defeat of the supporting society before a military victory could be realised.

The eastern theatre was strategically important in the war because the capitals of both

sides were located there. Just one hundred miles separated Washington D.C and Richmond. There

were also other large population centres in the eastern theatre. Both sides put an emphasis on the

capture of each other’s capitals, therefore the defence of both capitals was of primary importance and

the threat of the enemy army approaching the capital could not be ignored by either side. The military

goals of the armies in the eastern theatre were heavily focused on offensives and counter offensives

threatening both Washington and Richmond.

The first major battle of the Civil War was the First Battle of Bull Run on 21st July 1861. The

Union Army of North Eastern Virginia under Brig. Gen. Irving McDowell faced Confederate forces

commanded by Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard and Brig. Gen. Joseph. E. Johnston. The Union was

expecting an easy victory. However the tide of battle turned against the Union army when

Confederate General Jackson famously stood fast with his Brigade and was aided by the timely arrival

of reinforcements from the Shenandoah Valley by rail. The Union forces were forced to flee the

battlefield retreating towards Washington. Although the Confederates had won the battle, the view

among the army was that they had narrowly avoided defeat and were unable to pursue the Union

army, or threaten Washington1.

The Union Army in the east was next involved in Major General George McClellan’s

Peninsula Campaign from March – July 1862 in an effort to seize the Confederate capital of

Richmond. Following a promising beginning the campaign ultimately failed because of a lack of

aggressive action, constant poor intelligence, indecisiveness and poor decisions by Major General

McClellan, especially during a series of battles known as the Seven Days 26 June-1st July 1862. The

Union army performed well during the campaign and won a tactical victory at Malvern Hill on 1st July

1862, but McClellan incorrectly thought he was outnumbered and facing vastly superior forces and

decided to withdraw his forces from the campaign. This provided a strategic victory to the

Confederate forces under Robert. E. Lee, and so removed the threat to the Confederate capital

Richmond.

After his victory in the peninsula Lee who was now commander of the Confederate army in

the east. Lee saw an opportunity to draw the two Union armies into a decisive battle and defeat them

separately. The Confederate forces inflicted another defeat on the Union at the Second Battle of Bull

1 John, Keegan, The American civil war, (London 2007) p.106.


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Run 29th August 1862 when the Union Army under Major General John Pope was sent reeling back

towards Washington. The victory at Second Manassas encouraged Robert. E. Lee to invade Maryland

and threaten Washington as well as other northern cities with the intention of keeping up the pressure

and draw the Union army of the Potomac into a decisive battle. General Lee thought that if he could

inflict a decisive defeat on the Union on its own territory it would strengthen their claim for

international recognition.

The armies next clashed at Antietam 17 September 1862 which is known as the bloodiest day

in American military history2. The fighting was very brutal and casualties were heavy on both sides.

At the end of the day Lee decided to withdraw his army across the Potomac yielding the battlefield to

the Union forces. Displaying his usual lack of aggression McClellan delayed his pursuit of the

Confederate army as it was retreating and was removed from command of the army by President

Lincoln. He was replaced by Major General Ambrose Burnside.

The new commander of the Army of the Potomac, Ambrose Burnside, decided to renew the

offensive against Richmond and marched the army southward into Virginia. This campaign is the

precursor to the battle of Chancellorsville in April and May of 1863. On 15th November 1862

Burnside began to move his army south towards Fredericksburg where he planned to cross the

Rappahannock River. The pontoon bridging needed for the crossing of the river was delayed. This

allowed Lee to reinforce the high ground that dominated the southern side of the river. By the time

the pontoon bridges arrived and Burnside got his army across the river the Confederate defences on

the heights were formidable. A Confederate artillery officer Colonel E. Porter Alexander remarked to

General Longstreet before the battle.

‘General, we can cover that ground... so well as we cover it with a fine

toothcomb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open [fire] on it’3.

When the Union army crossed the river and assaulted the heights on December 13th 1862 they

were cut down by the well entrenched defenders as the Minié bullets fired from the rifled barrels of

the defenders and well sited artillery sliced into the tight ranked lines of advancing Union infantry. At

the end of the battle the Union suffered 12,653 casualties while the Confederate forces suffered just

4,2014. The disparity in casualties and the shocking effect of the slaughter was testimony to how

futile it was to try and advance troops in Napoleonic battle lines against prepared defensive positions.

The effects of well-aimed rifle volleys from rifled weapons which had greater range ensured that the

advantage lay clearly with the defending army.

2 Keegan, The American civil war, (London 2007) p.167.

3 Carl, Smith, Fredericksburg 1862, Clear the way, (Oxford 1999) p.46

4 Smith, Fredericksburg 1862, Clear the way, (Oxford 1999) p.89


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After the defeat at Fredericksburg Burnside wanted to continue the campaign and brought a

large part of his army on a march to outflank Lee’s army. However the weather and conditions

deteriorated and so this campaign was abandoned. At this stage General Burnside had more than this

defeat to contend with. Ever since he had been appointed commander of the army a number of

Generals undermined his authority because they believed that they were better qualified to command.

Bickering and division among the senior Generals of the army were the order of the day. Two

especially disgruntled Generals were William Buell Franklin and (Fighting) Joe Hooker who both

thought they would make better commanders. Joe Hooker even gave an interview to the New York

Tribune which openly criticised Burnsides’ generalship before the battle at Fredericksburg5.

As a result of a revolt among the Generals of the army - especially the actions of Joseph

Hooker and others - Ambrose Burnside presented the president with a choice of action – oppose the

dissenters or accept his resignation. It was under this cloud that Major General (Fighting) Joe Hooker

was given the command of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker was a brash, self confident and boastful

officer who was openly critical of his brother officers. In a candid letter to Hooker upon taking

command Lincoln admitted that he had some doubts about Hooker’s past actions and character.

However Lincoln was prepared to forgive these actions if the general would provide the victories that

the country needed6.

On taking command of the army Hooker was in no doubt as to its sorry state. It had been in

almost constant action since 29th August at Second Manassas. There were a number of significant

problems within the army: the rate of desertion was very high in most units; the troops were not

receiving regular leave or pay; and the standard of food getting through to the men was also very bad.

The new commander knew these problems had to be fixed if morale was to be restored. General

Hooker began sorting, reorganising and reequipping the army. He reorganising the daily and training

routines, ensuring soldiers got paid and that regular leave for hard working units were organised. To

solve the desertion problem an amnesty was given to deserters if they returned voluntarily.

Improvements were made in sanitary conditions, food and medical facilities. The army was re-

organised into a Corps system with individual badges of recognition for the different Corps. The

problem of poor intelligence which had hindered the army in the past by the establishment of a

Bureau of Military Information under the direction of Colonel Sharpe. These measures introduced by

the new commander of the army, ‘Fighting’ Joe Hooker, greatly improved the morale and confidence

of the ordinary soldiers in the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1863.

As the army was reorganising General Hooker set about planning his offensive operation to

destroy General Lee’s army on the other side of the Rappahannock. Both armies held the positions

5 Stephen, W, Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) p.11.

6 Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) pp. 57-58


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they had prior to the Battle of Fredericksburg and both armies were encamped within in sight of each

other. The Union army listed a strength of 130,576 and the Confederate force was 62,682. The

Union held a two to one advantage. The choices for an offensive were limited to

Crossing at Fredericksburg and attacking the defended heights where Burnsides offensive

was decimated.

Forcing a crossing of the river with pontoons further south. However, Lee’s troops had

been erecting defences on the high ground above the river further south and these he would

have to face in frontal assaults after crossing so this option was dismissed.

Moving west of Fredericksburg and crossing the Rappahannock behind Lee’s army. This

would be difficult to achieve without the Confederates noticing and the ground on the

south bank of the river in this area was an area known as the ‘Wilderness’ which was

young woodland where the ground was soft underfoot, with thickets and vines growing

between the trees that would make the going tough for any army.

The Bureau of Military Intelligence under Colonel Sharp was at work assembling very good

intelligence and had learned that Lee was having problems keeping his army supplied. The

Confederate army was short of food and rations were barely above subsistence level with rations

drawn on a daily basis. Sharpe concluded that the Confederate supply system was near to collapse7.

The supply problem of the Confederate army was seen as a key weakness that could be exploited in

the coming campaign by cutting the Confederate army off from its lines of supply.

The plan presented for the offensive involved utilising the newly formed Cavalry Corps under

Major General Stoneman in its opening gambit. The cavalry was to move west feigning a move

towards the Shenandoah Valley where they would then turn south and move swiftly across the

Rappahannock and the Rapidan rivers to the rear of Lee’s army at Fredericksburg. The instructions to

be given to Stoneman were to cut the supply lines of the Confederate army, with the priority being the

Richmond Fredericksburg & Potomac railroad between Fredericksburg and Richmond as well as the

army supply depot at Hanover Junction. After cutting the supply line Stoneman was to harry the rear

of the Confederate army aggressively.

While the cavalry was at work disrupting Lee’s supply lines, Hooker planned to leave half his

forces facing Fredericksburg under General Sedgwick. At the same time, operations to cross the

Rappahannock at different points using pontoons were undertaken. Fires were lit at night to give the

impression that the army was on the march thereby fixing Lee in place. At the same time Hooker

planned to take half the army on a flanking move following the cavalry’s route, crossing the river to

the west and bringing half his force around behind the Confederate force at Fredericksburg.

7 Stephen, W, Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) p 118


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It was hoped that this elaborate plan would force Lee to contemplate his choices which would be

restricted by having his supply line and communication cut by Union cavalry. Hooker saw Lee’s

choices as (1) to fall back on his supply line towards Richmond where he would be harried by

Stoneman’s force, or (2) Lee could face Hooker’s army and Sedgwick’s command which would close

around him from both sides like two jaws of a vice. Joe Hooker had good reason to feel confident

since he had reinvigorated the morale of the army by his reforms in a few short months and he was

now preparing to give the President a great victory. With morale restored in the army and ready to

begin a well planned offensive based for the first time on very good intelligence, Hooker felt so

confident that in a briefing to a number of his officers he boasted -

“My plans are perfect, and when I start to carry them out, may God have mercy on

General Lee, for I will have none8”.

There is no doubt that Hooker’s plan was novel and well thought out. None of his

predecessors had come up with anything comparable, and the plan may well have worked if he faced

Confederate generals of ordinary ability, but this was not the case. Hooker was facing Lee and

Jackson who in the recent past had brought other Union Generals to grief by their unpredictable and

unorthodox strategies in battle. Hooker’s confidence was exaggerated and ill-founded. The plan was

complex and to work it required that his subordinate commanders act independently and seize the

initiative when opportunity presented. However, General Hooker never made this clear to his

subordinate officers. So confident was Hooker of his plan that there was no secondary plan to fall

back on if things did not go as anticipated. Hooker’s absolute confidence in his plan was a fatal

weakness in the whole operation.

General Lee, on his side of the river, could not make a plan until the Federal army made its

move. Lee was fully aware of his supply problem’s but in his appraisal of Hooker, or as Lee called

him ‘Mr F. J. Hooker’, he believed Hooker was an inadequate opponent and that he had nothing to

fear as he had defeated all the other Union Generals who had confronted him and that Hooker would

be no different. General Lee, being an avid reader of the northern newspapers, garnered the

information that the Union army had greatly over estimated the size of Lee’s forces in the previous

campaigns. Lee also learnt that among the Union army many nine month and two year volunteers

would soon to be discharged and that they would be replaced by inexperienced conscripts provided by

a conscription bill passed the previous March. Lee decided that Hooker would not make any

offensive before the discharged troops had been replaced by the new conscripts so he was not

expecting an early move9.

8Stephen, W, Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) .p. 120

9 Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) .p. 113.


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On 13th April the Union cavalry under Stoneman of 9,895 moved out with strict instructions

to destroy the Richmond Fredericksburg & Potomac railroad. In his instructions to Stoneman HE??

made it clear that a lot would be depending on the cavalry raid and Stoneman was to ‘fight, fight,

fight,..10

. Stoneman was instructed to destroy bridges, railway lines, telegraph communications,

rolling stock, engines, and depots and to bring whatever he needed to achieve this goal11

. Stoneman

had no sense of urgency in his opening movements and moved out slowly. However, the weather

turned to heavy rain on 14th and the rivers in the area swelled and became impassable for two weeks.

The cavalry did not commence to cross the Rappahannock River until the 28thApril.

The lack of urgency by Stoneman has been viewed as one of the contributing factors to the

overall result of the battle, however it was careless of Hooker in planning that he had no contingency

to deal with unforeseen circumstances such as this. The cavalry raid was such an important part of the

plan that there should have been no move before it had commenced its operations and there were

obvious signs that it was having the desired effect. There was no alteration in the timetable for this

delay and Hooker started his movement on 27th April before the cavalry had made their crossing.

The first movement of the army went according to plan and on 29th April successful crossings

were made across the Rappahannock River at different fords. There was no warning on the initial

movement of the army because civilians were confined to their homes so they could not warn the

Confederate forces. Very conscious of security Hooker gave his Corps and Brigade commanders very

limited information, but just as much as he felt they needed to know. On the morning of the 29th April

1863 in coordination with His commander’s movements west of Fredericksburg General Sedgwick

had commenced a crossing of the river below Fredericksburg (See Map. 1.).

10

Ibid, p. 121 11

Stephen, W, Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) .p.121


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MAP 1 Opening Movements 27-29 April 186312.

Hooker planned for his columns to converge at the crossroads at Chancellorsville on the 29th April

1863 and it seemed everything was going to plan.

General Lee was alerted to the movements of the Union army crossing at Fredericksburg but

he was puzzled because they were not making any aggressive movement forward even though they

had crossed in force. Later in the day Lee received word from Jeb Stewarts cavalry detachments who

had captured some prisoners that there was a large Union force after crossing the river and was

moving behind the main Confederate army. It became clear to Lee that Sedgwick’s force was a

distraction and that the main force was Hooker’s force closing from Chancellorsville. With

approximately 60,000 under his command he was now at a dilemma as he faced two Union forces of

equal strength to his own. General Lee weighed his options for two days and decided to attack

Hooker while his forces were divided. Leaving a screening force to contain Sedgwick who still made

no aggressive action, Lee moved the remainder of his army to intercept Hooker to the west.

On encountering the Confederate army Hooker pulled his army back and started constructing

defensive positions around Chancellorsville crossroads. At Chancellorsville Hooker was to wait until

Lee realised that his supply lines were cut by Stoneman’s Raid which he hoped would force Lee to

retreat. As Stoneman was in the wrong location and was not carrying out his mission to the letter the

Confederate supply depot at Hanover Junction remained intact and the railway was only superficially

damaged by Union attacks so Lee never had the problem to contemplate.

12

www.militaryhistoryonline.com/civilwar/chancellorsville/


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Lee’s Confederate cavalry on a reconnaissance of the Union positions discovered that

Howard’s XI Corps on the right flank of the Union army was not anchored to any natural obstacle and

had few defensive positions constructed on that flank. Lee had a conference with General Stonewall

Jackson to decide on their options. The erection of defences was an indication to Lee that Hooker had

halted for the moment. The outcome of the meeting was the plan of a bold decisive flanking attack to

strike Howard’s XI Corps the next day. Having split his army once Lee was now taking a very bold

risk by splitting his army again and allowing Jackson to march 28,000 men across the front of the

Union army using a local forest track to strike the Union right flank. This was exactly the bold type

of unconventional movement Jackson was renowned for and it should not have come as the surprise it

did to the Union army.

Jackson’s flanking move was late in moving out and was spotted by Union pickets and a

Union force under General Sickles was despatched to attack the column but only managed to engage

its tail end. Hooker remained cautious and Jackson kept his nerve, if the Union realised the true state

of affairs it would have been catastrophe for Lee and Jackson. However the reports of Confederate

movements were thought to be a possible withdrawal towards Gordonsville 15 miles to the west.

Meanwhile Lee’s force pressed the defences at Chancellorsville in a feint preparation for assault to

keep the Union on their guard.

On the morning of 2nd

May General Hooker inspected his positions and expressed

dissatisfaction with the gaps in the line and lack of prepared defensive positions at XI Corps, he also

asked Howard what he would do in a flank attack, and to make necessary precautions13

. Howard was

dismissive of the Generals orders and no proper defences were erected as he felt that it was very

unlikely that an attack would come through the thick woods.

At approx 1700hrs the vast majority of the troops of Howards XI Corps were preparing their

evening meal or relaxing with most of their weapons stacked when they notice a rush of deer and

small animals from the forest. Then suddenly they were startled when they heard the high pitched

rebel yell followed by Confederate troops bursting out from the forest firing, before they could reach

their arms the rebels were among them. See Map 2.

13

Carl, Smith, Chancellorsville, Jacksons lightning strike, (London ,1998).p.50.


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MAP 2 Jacksons Flanking Move and Assault on XI Corps 2nd May 186314.

The XI Corps tried to make a stand and General Howard tried to rally his troops but a panic

had set in as the troops caught without their arms tried to flee the battlefield. Such was the nature of

the fighting with darkness falling, and the nature of the woods that Confederate forces lost their

cohesion and could not press the attack fully. The confusion was such that when General Jackson was

returning from a battlefield reconnaissance he was shot by his own pickets and was removed from the

battlefield. By nightfall the Confederate assault had pushed the Union army back two miles towards

Chancellorsville forcing the Union army into a U shaped defensive position. See Map 3.

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Map 3 Union & Confederate Positions early May 3rd 186315.

On May 3rd

Sedgwick having earlier had his force reduced to 23,000 by Hooker as

reinforcements, moved from his position at Fredericksburg. After encountering initial opposition at

Marye’s Heights, his force overcame the defenders with heavy casualties. Delaying to reorganise his

forces after sustaining heavy losses, it gave the Confederate forces time to mount delaying actions

against him which held up his advance towards Chancellorsville where General Hooker sent a

message urging Sedgwick to come to his aid. A Confederate force prepared defensive positions at

Salem Church stopping Sedgwick’s advance five miles from Hooker at Chancellorsville. Even when

Hooker could hear the sounds of Sedgwick’s forces guns firing, Hooker made no move to aid

Sedgwick, and was prepared to sit with his force of 75,000 and expect Sedgwick with 20,000 troops

to come to his aid.

At Chancellorsville Lee’s further attacks against Hooker made him withdraw his forces from

Hazel Grove, a hill that was the best artillery site on the battlefield. The Confederate artillery was

then able to bombard the Union artillery positions on Fairview which came under fire from 3 sides

and the position became untenable. General Hooker was leaning against a pillar at his

Chancellorsville house HQ when a confederate cannonball struck the pillar knocking him

unconscious. At this stage the battles outcome was still in the balance, however critical and decisive

decisions had to be taken to rescue the situation. When Hooker came to his senses it was obvious that

he was suffering from concussion and was incapable of making rational decisions.

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12

It seems that Hooker had already made up his mind that he had been defeated on the 3rd

May

and that the concussion compounded this defeat. Hooker decided to withdraw from his defences

around the Chancellor house and withdrew to a new HQ falling back towards the river; in reserve he

had the two Corps of Reynolds and Meade ready in an ideal position to initiate a flank attack on the

Confederate left flank. When this suggestion was made by General Meade on the evening of the 3rd

May at his field HQ it was dismissed out of hand by Hooker16

. The concussion may have rendered

General Hooker incapable of making a rational decision; however none of his staff were prepared to

discuss and force this point with him at such a critical stage. In General Hooker’s defence it must be

said this is a poor reflection on the senior commanders in the Army, that they were prepared to let

their obviously dazed and confused commanding general bear the burden and stress of command in

such a distressed and dazed state.

Map.4 Situation 1800hrs May 4th 186317

With Hooker’s force withdrawing, General Lee decided to take 21,000 men from his force

and attack Sedgwick and by noon Marye’s Heights was taken back into Confederate hands. When

16

Stephen, W, Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) .p. 358. 17

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm


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Sedgwick came under pressure and withdrew into a perimeter horse shoe defence with his back on the

river defending his escape route at Banks Ford. See Map 4. As Sedgwick held against Confederate

attacks he appealed to Hooker for help, Hooker replied that he could expect no help even though his

large force of 75,000 faced a Confederate force of 25,000. Unknown to Sedgwick Hooker was

withdrawing, with a retreat towards Fredericksburg blocked, Sedgwick decided to withdraw his force

to the north bank and safety that night18

. Under the circumstances Sedgwick was left with no choice

at this stage, if the two forces had been more coordinated in their attacks and if Hooker had not

removed so many troops from his command Sedgwick would have very possibly had enough of a

force to link up with Chancellorsville.

As Sedgwick was fighting it out General Hooker called a conference of his senior generals to

ask their opinion on the situation and whether they should fight on or withdraw. Of the five Generals

present Meade, Reynolds and Howard wanted to fight on, Couch and Sickles wanted to withdraw.

Hooker informed them lamely that he had decided to withdraw as he wanted to ensure the safety of

Washington19

. The Union army had withdrawn across the river by 0900 on 6th May 1863 the great

planned offensive had failed to achieve anything for the Union other than a long casualty list.

From the very start Hooker’s plan had not gone well, starting with the late deployment of

Stoneman’s force. The cavalry raid was one of the biggest let downs for Hooker it never carried out

his instruction to fight, fight, fight. Stoneman’s force never threatened the supply depot at Hanover

Junction or burned one of the four bridges that would have cut this tenuous supply line to Lee’s army,

trains still arrived as scheduled and on time so Lee never had to contend with problems with his

supply lines. The plan may have succeeded without the cavalry raid and it did go well for Hooker

until he made contact with Lee’s army.

Hooker was also badly let down by some of his other commanders during the battle. The

failure of Howard to secure the right flank of the army when operating against Stonewall Jackson was

at the very least gross negligence. The failure of Sickles to press home and engage Jacksons flanking

column and the message that the Confederates were retreating caused much confusion among the

Union command20

. When General Hooker was managing his battle he kept too much of the details of

his intentions to himself and tried to micro manage the battle. This was a grave error because when

he was rendered incapable by the cannonball there was no one to carry out his intentions. When

choosing the commander for the independent force at Fredericksburg Hooker made a grave error

choosing a cautious man like Sedgwick especially when there were more capable and confident men

like Meade and Reynolds available. Though Hooker had stuck as well as he could to his plan the run

of luck went totally against him at every turn, and as things started to go wrong and when Lee did not

18

Carl, Smith, Chancellorsville, Jacksons lightning strike, (London, 1998).p.82. 19

Stephen, W, Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) .p.422. 20

Sears, Chancellorsville, (New York 1996) .p.437.


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react as predicted Fighting Joe Hooker lost confidence in himself and his plan to bring Robert E.

Lee’s army to defeat in decisive battle.

Lee also failed to strike the decisive defeat he hoped on the Union army as it moved away

from his force to the north bank of the Rappahannock River. At Chancellorsville Robert E. Lee

achieved his greatest victory of the Civil War, however it was a heavy price he had to pay. On May

10th Stonewall Jackson died of complication that had set in after his wounding at Chancellorsville.

The loss of a confident aggressive unconventional commander like Jackson was a heavy blow to Lee

and his army. But the price of victory for the Confederate army was even higher if you compare the

casualties.

Fig. 1 Casualties Battle of Chancellorsville

Though the Union suffered higher overall casualties this can be offset by the higher amount

of Union missing who would have become POWs. Even if you do not take account of the missing as

a percentage of forces the Confederate forces had a loss percentage rate of 21.49% compared to the

Union loss rate of 13.25%. While Confederate troops were well motivated and believed strongly in

their leaders this was no substitute for the loss in manpower that the South was suffering. Whereas

the Union had a vast resource in manpower that it was only starting to tap into in 1863 the

Confederacy were starting to get desperate for manpower.

The great victory at Chancellorsville spurred General Lee and the leadership into making a

decision that they could achieve an outcome from a renewed invasion of the north. This decision was

borne from overconfidence and arrogance and great self belief. Just as Hooker suffered defeat after

great confidence General Robert E Lee would suffer his greatest defeat at Gettysburg in July 1863 at

the hand of Major General George Meade who replaced Hooker as the General in command of the

Army of the Potomac.

Strength

April

1863

Dead Wounded Missing Total Casualties as %

of Total Forces

deployed

Union Army 130,576 1,694 9,672 5,938 17,304 13.25%

Confederate

Army

62,682 1,724 9,233 2,503 13,460 21.49%

Difference 67,894 30 439 3435 3844


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Bibliography

Primary Sources

Memories and histories written by contemporaries

Dodge, Theodore, The campaign at Chancellorsville at http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5715

Doubleday, Abner, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg: campaigns of the civil war-vi.(London 2007).

Secondary Sources

Doughty, Robert, and Gruber, Ira, (eds), Warfare in the western world, volume 1 (Lexington1996).

Langier, John, Second Manassas 1862: Robert E Lee’s greatest victory (London 2002).

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http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5715

The Battle of Chancellorsville 1863.

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Transcript of The Battle of Chancellorsville 1863.