Public Sector Transformation, Racial Inequality and Downward Occupational Mobility

© The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of north Carolina at Chapel Hill. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected].

Social Forces 91(3) 975–1006, March 2013doi: 10.1093/sf/sos178

Advance Access publication on 9 December 2012

Public Sector Transformation, Racial Inequality and Downward Occupational Mobility

Public Sector Transformation, Racial Inequality and Downward Occupational Mobility

george Wilson, University of MiamiVincent J. Roscigno, Ohio State UniversityMatt l. Huffman, University of California–Irvine

new governance” reforms entailing shifts toward privatization have perme-ated the public sector over the last decade, possibly affecting workplace-based attainments. We examine the consequences of this reform for African

American men, who during the civil rights era reached relative parity with whites. We analyze race-based inequities on one socioeconomic outcome–downward occupa-tional mobility–among professionals, managers and executives. Results from a Panel Study of Income Dynamics sample indicate that the “new government business model,” characterized by increased employer discretion has disproportionately disadvantaged African Americans. narrower racial gaps in the incidence, determinants and timing of downward mobility found in the public sector, relative to the private sector, during the pre-reform period (1985-90) eroded during the reform period (2002-07) because of widening racial gaps in the public sector.

Sociologists have documented that throughout the post-1965 civil rights era, the government—in an effort to address discrimination in the private sector—provided favorable employment opportunities for African Americas and, in doing so, made public sector employment an “occupational niche” (Farley and Haaga 2005; Model 1985; Steinberg 1981; Waldinger 1996). Significantly, one manifestation of this niche in government work is that African Americans have achieved relative parity with whites in proportional representation within well-rewarded, “upper-tier” managerial, executive and professional slots (Lee 1999; Model 1985; Waldinger 1996). In fact, this trend in public sector representation has been synonymous with the rise of the “new black middle class” (Landry 1987), which is characterized by its favorable socioeconomic attainments, unprecedented size and growing influence in structuring national and state-level economic and sociopolitical policy (Brown and Erie 1981; Lacy 2007; Landry 1987).

Significantly, stability and security, including the avoidance of downward mobility, reflects a “key dimension” of “niche” representation (Spalter-Roth and Deitch 1999). In this regard, African Americans in public sector employ-ment have fared well during the civil rights era. First, they have achieved

“

Public Sector Transformation, Racial Inequality and Downward Occupational Mobility 975

relative equality with whites in the incidence of downward mobility within the public sector. Between 1970 and 1990, for instance, the racial gap in job tenure (average years with present employer) among managers, executives and professionals was reduced by nearly twice as much in the public compared to the private sector (Glass Ceiling Commission 1995; Jaynes and Williams 1989). Second, among those in the census-designated managerial/administrative ranks, African Americans’ path to downward mobility during the 1980’s was more similar to whites’ in the public sector than in the private sector. Moreover, and consistent with a relative absence of discrimination, downward mobility in public sector work during this earlier period is nearly entirely explained by tra-ditional stratification-based causal factors such as human capital, background socioeconomic status and job/labor characteristics (Elvira and Zatick 2002). Third, among managers and professionals, African Americans employed in the public sector experience fewer relative handicaps in the temporal sequencing of downward mobility than those in the private sector. Specifically, during the 1980’s, the narrower gap with whites in timing to mobility from job outset within the public sector translated into greater equality in the amount of time spent reaping socioeconomic rewards from upper-tier positions (Jaynes and Williams 1989).1

Despite relatively positive relative assessments of the public sector, there is reason to suspect that the racial gaps in important outcomes, such as job stabil-ity, have begun to widen. Especially central in this regard is the influence of rap-idly accelerating “new governance” (Light 1999) reforms at the state and federal levels over the last decade and a half.2 New governance reform represents an extension of the social organization of work that has historically been the basis of deep-rooted African American disadvantage in the private sector (Kamarck 2007; Wilson 2006). Its implementation, grounded in the logic of “privatiza-tion,” is associated with managers’ and employers’ increased onsite discretion to determine major stratification-based aspects of work, including two important elements of downward mobility, job displacement and postdisplacement hiring. This increased onsite discretion unfolds with the deformalization of rules and bureaucratic procedures that govern employment conditions and, when occur-ring within an ideological context of limited government, curtails traditional rights and protections at a time when workers are most vulnerable to down-ward mobility (Bowman and West 2007; Condrey and Maranto 2001; Kalleberg 2009).3

New governance-like rules, regulations and associated discretionary practices are often blamed for racial inequalities in private sector employment (Brown and Erie 1981; Wilson 2005; Lacy 2007). Has public sector movement in these regards, especially over the last decade, affected African Americans relative to whites, thereby eroding decades-old gains? This study constitutes the most detailed examination of this crucial race-based stratification issue to date. Specifically, we draw on a sample of men from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to compare African American/white differences in the incidence, determinants and timing of downward occupational mobility from upper-tier occupations within the public sector relative to the private sector between the “pre-reform”

976 Social Forces 91(3)

(i.e., pre-new governance) and “reform” (i.e., new governance) periods. Our results yield new and important insights into changing patterns of racial stratifi-cation in the American labor market.

Transformation of the Public SectorDuring the post-1965 civil rights era, relative racial parity in socioeconomic rewards, including downward mobility, within public sector workplaces was achieved in the context of a “career system” of employment relations (Brown and Erie 1981; Kamarck 2007). At the height of this system in 1990, over 75 percent of the 18.5 million full-time public sector employees in the United States were designated “nonexempt” (Kamarck 2007), which subjects stratification-based aspects of work to formal bureaucratic procedures, rules and adminis-trative oversight (Condrey and Maranto 2001; Kamarck 2007). Nonexempt workers also held “property rights” in their jobs, meaning they effectively have tenure. This restricts termination to “just cause.” Moreover, workers had rela-tively elaborate protections to contest decisions by employers that threaten their property rights (Bowman and West 2007). Figures for federal employees illus-trate these widespread public sector protections: By 1990 over 70 percent of employees had rights to an evidentiary hearing as well as at least one level of appellate review for resolving unfair treatment claims that encompass not only retention—which directly affects dynamics of downward mobility—but also recruitment, promotion, harassment and pay (Kamarck 2007; Werhane, Radin and Bowie 2004).

The last several decades have seen progressive acceleration of reform of gov-ernment work—reform that has moved the public sector toward privatization and that, in doing so, has dismantled the rights noted above at a time—during a period of government retrenchment—when such rights are particularly impor-tant. Beginning in the early 1990’s and steadily building momentum throughout the last decade, over 40 states and a majority of branches of the federal gov-ernment implemented new governance measures intended to increase perfor-mance, efficiency and results (Bowman and West 2007; Hays and Sowa 2006). Incentivizing public sector work while concomitantly reducing the size of its workforce, it is maintained, enhances individual-level and department-level pro-ductivity and increases the flexibility of employers to make efficiency mandated personnel adjustments, particularly when a more fluid and trim public sector is perceived as a necessary response to the rapid pace of social change (Condrey and Maranto 2001; Hays and Sowa 2006). By 2006, some aspects of new gov-ernance are estimated to have been applied to 55 percent of full-time state and government workers nationwide, though effects have been felt more strongly by new workers (Kamarck 2007).

The new governance model is predicated on the logic of “privatization” and includes a range of free labor market principles that are responsible for relatively pronounced levels of racial inequality in the private sector (Farley and Allen 1987; Farley and Haaga 2005; Kuykendahl and Facer 2002; Wilson 2006). A hallmark that may portend “the end of government work as we


know it” (Kamarck 2007:126) is the transformation to a workplace environ-ment characterized by “de-bureaucratization” and virtually unfettered, non-reviewable onsite managerial discretion in determining stratification-based aspects of work (Bowman and West 2007; Leicht and Fennell 2001).4 Overall, this increased discretion decision making assumes a pronounced stratification-relevant significance: It emerged concomitantly with another fundamental tenet associated with privatization—namely, declining legal opportunities and rights to contest employment-based decisions (Kamarch 2007; Bowman and West 2007).

In the context of downward mobility, employees—pursuant to new gover-nance—are classified as “exempt,” meaning they work “at-will.” This means that, absent narrowly carved judicial and legislative exceptions, workers can now be terminated for “any or no reason at all” (Bridges and Villemez 1994) and have few due process rights to contest employers’ decisions regarding major aspects of employment (Bridges and Villemez 1994; Wilson 2006). Crucially, the scope of employer discretion extends to the most traditionally inviolate employ-ment practices: Perhaps, most notably, it supercedes long established senior-ity systems. It thus leaves employers with increased power to determine, for example, whom to terminate pursuant to accelerating contraction of govern-ment undertaken as a strategy to enhance efficiency and “bottom-line” perfor-mance (Lawthler 2003; Werhane and Radin 2004). Accordingly, public sector contraction—which would generally be disproportionately harmful to African Americans because, for example, they are more likely to lack seniority—is par-ticularly pernicious as increased discretion fails to protect those who previously had attained a level of protection (Kamarck 2007).

Public Sector Reforms, Racial Inequality and Downward MobilityPrior sociological research on downward mobility in predominantly white owned and managed private sector firms informs predictions regarding racial stratifica-tion and the implications of recent public sector reforms. This research includes approximately 20 survey-based analyses and case studies and empirically cen-ters on race-based patterns of job displacement through firings, involuntary fur-loughs and layoffs pursuant to downsizing, retrenchment and reorganization and prospects for reclaiming an upper-tier positions (Elvira and Zatick 2002; Field and Winfrey 1997; Fairlie and Kletzer 1998; Fernandez 1981; Hipple 1999; Mar and Ong 1994; McBrier and Wilson 2004; Roscigno 2007, Roscigno, Garcia and Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007; Spalter-Roth and Deitch 1999; Wilson 2005; Wilson and McBrier 2005).

Such research on private sector dynamics establishes that racial patterns of job displacement should be understood in organizational context. Employers, first, are “active agents” (Bielby 2000; Roscigno 2007), with considerable discre-tion in deciding who will be displaced “with relatively few constraints imposed by formal bureaucratization to regulate stratification-relevant treatment of employees” (Wilson 2006:180). Further, displacement decisions occur in work-


place settings governed by an ideology of meritocracy and abstract notions of economic liberalism and “fair play” (Light, Roscigno and Kalev 2011). Such decisions are characterized by the subtleties of “modern racial prejudice” (Pettigrew 1985) and encompass, for example, the perceived need to achieve “bottom line financial” results (Pettigrew 1985), to maintain a stable and pro-ductive workforce (Wilson and McBrier 2005), and to allow distortions inherent in cognitive bias, such as “self-serving attribution bias” (Pettigrew and Martin 1987) and “statistical discrimination” (Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 1999). Overall, these biases render African Americans disproportionately vulnerable to downward mobility without requiring the blatant discriminatory intent associ-ated with traditional “Jim Crow” racism.

A subset of these studies highlights the susceptibility of African Americans in upper-tier slots to unfavorable performance evaluations. Importantly, such evaluations are a “proximate cause” (Fairlie and Kletzer 1998) of job dis-placement and “travel with an employee” (Wilson and McBrier 2005; see also Tomaskovic-Devey and Stainback 2007) informally, by way of reputation, and formally, via employment records, making it difficult to reclaim an upper-tier position (Fairlie and Kletzer 1998; Spalter-Roth and Deitch 1999). Overall, these studies highlight the difficulty African Americans have in demonstrating the informal or “particularistic” (Kluegel 1978) characteristics such as loyalty, trustworthiness and leadership potential that underlie the employers’ evalua-tions. For example, Fernandez (1981) argues that allocating African American managers to racially delineated work/task groups that are supervised and eval-uated by fellow racial group members leaves them prone to “informational bias,” a form of statistical discrimination in which their character, judgment and job performance past and present are seen as less credible than their white peers’. Further, Pettigrew (1985) and Fairlie and Kletzer (1998) maintain that African Americans’ reliance on segregated job networks renders them suscep-tible to cognitive distortions such as “attribution bias” (Pettigrew 1985). As a result, their performance even when comparable to whites’ is devaluated based on preexisting stereotypes about their productivity and suitability for work. Finally, work in relational demography (e.g., Tsui, Xin and Egan 1995; Tsui and O’Reilly 1989) suggests that the tendency for African Americans to be subordinated to whites in authority hierarchies—even when they have similar upper-tier job titles—limits “informal interaction” and opportunities to dem-onstrate “soft skills.” These skills include the ability to relate interpersonally with customers and clients, as well as other personal attributes that signal pro-ductivity and reliability to employers (also see Kalev 2009; Moss and Tilly 1994).

A second, smaller subset of studies focuses on discriminatory allocation prac-tices. Specifically, Collins (1997, 1993) and Fernandez (1981) document that—as has also been demonstrated in the public sector (see Brown and Erie 1981; Durr and Logan 1997)—African Americans at the white-collar level are dispro-portionately channeled into a narrow range of politically mediated, “racialized” jobs oriented toward providing services to African American customers and cli-ents. Such positions have long been vulnerable to job displacement pursuant to


a sectoral-specific “business oriented culture” (Edsall and Edsall 1991) char-acterized by (1. opposition within upper-level management and ownership to maintaining these jobs as firms strive to enhance firm efficiency and cost effec-tiveness and (2. relatively narrow scope and lax enforcement of equal employ-ment policies related to racial equity in the workplace. In addition, one of these authors, Collins (1997), maintains that these circumstances make it difficult to reclaim a racialized upper-tier slot because both the retreat from equal employ-ment policy and the premium put on cost effectiveness reduce the number of available racialized upper-tier positions.

Research QuestionsPrior work on race-based dynamics of downward mobility in the private sector provides a solid basis for predicting that new governance-induced privatization during the reform period should cause African Americans in upper-tier slots to lose their relative parity with similarly situated whites. Specifically, during the reform period, heightened employer discretion coupled with the disman-tling of traditional equal employment opportunity protections will (1. increase the inability of African Americans to “demonstrate the right stuff” and, conse-quently, be assessed unfavorably and (2. heighten both the incidence of and the negative consequence associated with the allocation of African Americans into racialized jobs pursuant to the encroachment of “business oriented workplace culture and practices” (Kamarck 2007:111). Accordingly, we predict that during the reform period, compared with the pre-reform period:

1. Incidence of downward mobility: African Americans will become more vul-nerable to downward mobility. Conversely, whites, who do not face increased impediments to receiving favorable assessments, and are not placed in racial-ized positions, will be less vulnerable to downward mobility.

2. Determinants of downward mobility: African Americans will experience downward mobility on a more generalized and diffuse basis, which is less structured by variation along a traditional range of stratification-based causal factors that encompass human capital credentials, background socioeco-nomic status and job/labor market characteristics. In other words, among African Americans there should be a relatively “caste-like” (Wilson 2005) effect characterized by relatively small variation across discrete values (e.g., college degree vs. noncollege degree—education; member of union vs. non-union member—union status) along the traditional stratification-based causal factors. Conversely, among whites, who do not face increasing impedi-ments to receiving favorable assessments, and are not placed in racialized slots, downward mobility will be more structured by variation in traditional stratification-based causal factors.

3. Timing of downward mobility: African Americans will experience downward mobility earlier in their work careers. This results from two factors. First, their increased reliance on acquiring the requisite formal criteria, such as human capital credentials to achieve favorable evaluations and retain positions can be a time-consuming process. Second, the increasing expendability of politically


induced and inherently unstable racialized slots (Collins 1997:54) will make African Americans more vulnerable. Indeed, privatization and pressures to downsize the public sector place an increasing premium on maintaining per-sonnel and positions that are deemed efficient and cost effective. Conversely, for whites, who can demonstrate the requisite characteristics from career out-set and are not placed in racialized jobs, downward mobility should occur later in the work career.

Data and MeasurementWe use a pooled sample of individuals who are “heads of household” from the PSID at two 6-year time periods, the “pre-reform” period, 1985-1990 and the “reform” period, 2002-07 (for a discussion of the PSID data set see Hill 1985).5 As an examination of the public sector as a hospitable niche for African Americans designates economic well-being relative to other labor market seg-ments, it is necessary to assess the racial dynamics of downward mobility from upper-tier occupations in the public sector, relative to the private sector, during both the pre-reform and the reform periods.

The two cohorts, pre-reform and reform, were selected on the basis of tempo-ral considerations. The pre-reform cohort comprises those between 20 and 50 years of age who were employed full-time and not self-employed between 1985 and 1990, before new governance reform had taken hold at the state or federal level (Leicht and Fennell 2001). The reform cohort includes workers between 20 and 50 years of age who were employed full-time in a nonself-employed capacity between 2002 and 2007, after new governance reform at both state and federal levels was most widely diffused (Leicht and Fennell 2001). Second, to best assess sectoral-specific effects, all individuals included in the sample worked in either the public or private sector throughout the years we analyze. Those who switched sectors during the years we study were excluded. Third, only individuals who worked at the state or federal levels were included in the public sector sample. Fourth, our concern with involuntary downward mobility led to the inclusion only of individuals who were downwardly mobile due to being “fired,” “laid off” or “locked out, from their jobs. We excluded those who “quit” their jobs, became self-employed or are members of the armed forces. Utilizing these criteria, the sample size for the pre-reform cohort is 360 African Americans (184 public sector, 176 private sector) and 525 whites (220 public sector, 305 private sector). The reform cohort includes 386 African Americans (209 public sector, 177 private sector) and 551 whites (247 public sector, 304 private sector).

Dependent VariableUpper-tier occupations encompass the Managerial/Administrator and profes-sional/technical census-based occupational categories. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for staying in the managers/administrators or professional/ technical occupational categories and 1 for moving down in the occupational


structure into other census-based occupational categories or experiencing “involuntary unemployment.”6 Across both time periods there is almost perfect correspondence in the detailed jobs that comprise the managers/administrators and professional/technical occupational categories in private and public sectors.7

Independent VariablesOur models include a diverse set of factors that are likely to affect the down-ward occupational mobility among African Americans and whites.

Race and period: Race is coded as 1 = white, 0= African American. Period is coded as 1 = reform, 0 = pre-reform.

Background Socioeconomic StatusBackground status is measured with two variables. The first is mother’s educa-tion, coded as a dummy variable, with 1 signifying receiving at least a college degree and 0 signifying less than a college degree.8 The second is family struc-ture, which is measured by whether both parents were in the household until the respondent reached 16 years of age (1 = yes, 0 = no).9

Human Capital CredentialsWe include several key human capital attributes in our models. The first is level of educational attainment, represented by two dummy variables: “college degree” and “postcollege degree.” Respondents with less than a college degree serve as the reference category. Coding education as a series of dummy variables allows for the possibility of nonlinear relationships with the dependent variable. Second, consistent with prior research, attendance at work is used as an indica-tor of job commitment (see Mueller, Wallace and Price 1992). Specifically, job commitment is operationalized as the number of job absences among respon-dents in their third year of being tracked. Job absences are reverse-coded so that higher scores reflect greater job commitment (i.e., fewer absences) and lower scores reflect lesser job commitment (i.e., more absences). Third, time spent with present employer is measured by the number of months sample members have worked for present employer. Fourth, prior work experience is measured by the number of years of full-time work since 18 years of age.

Job and Labor Market CharacteristicsEqually important may be attributes of jobs and labor markets. First, union status of job is measured by 1 = yes, 0 = no, capturing whether the workplace is organized and, arguably, whether workers have formalized protections. Second, we include finer delineations within the private sector, and in a manner consistent with recent labor-market analyses, delineate industries into “service” and “non-service” segments (see Neumark 2000). Specifically, the categories of (1. finance, insurance and real estate, (2. transportation, commerce and public utilities, and (3. business, personal, entertainment and professional services are classified as


services and coded as 1; the categories of (1. mining, (2. durable goods produc-tion, (3. nondurable goods production, (4. construction, (5. forestry, and (6. retail and wholesale trade constitute at least two recognized types of indus-tries—manufacturing and extractive—that are classified as nonservices and coded as 0. Finally, because privatization may operate differently across upper-tier positions, the managers/administrators occupational category is included in the statistical models.

Analytic StrategyDownward occupational movement from upper-tier occupations is identified by tracking respondents’ occupations across survey years. We use a discrete-time hazard rate model—a form of event history analysis—to track career experi-ences (Allison 1984; Castilla 2007). The dependent variable in event history analysis is the hazard rate, an unobserved variable capturing the instantaneous probability that a person will experience an event at a particular time given that the person has not yet experienced the event (Allison 1984). The hazard rate is denoted by Pit, where subscripts i and t denote individuals and time periods, respectively. The logistic regression function describes how the hazard rate is related to time and the predictor variables. The complete discrete-time hazard model is represented as:

logit P 1 1it t it it jit jitX X( ) = + + … +α β β

Where logit (Pit) is the log-odds of the hazard rate, and αt represents a set of intercepts for the specified time periods. Finally, β1 through βj represent the net effects of the j predictor variables, X1 through Xj, on the log-odds of the hazard rate. As a group, the intercept parameters represent the baseline logit hazard function, and the slopes (β1 through βj) represent the shift in the baseline logit hazard function corresponding to unit differences in the associated predictors.

Our models estimate the probability of becoming downwardly mobile for each person-year of exposure to the risk of experiencing the event. This entails treating each person-year of exposure to the risk of moving downward from white-collar occupations during the 6 years for each cohort as if it were a sepa-rate observation. After pooling the 6 years of observations (1985-90, 2002-07), a logistic regression equation is specified in which we model the odds of being downwardly mobile between yeart and yeart+1. As tenure is controlled, the model estimates the likelihood of becoming downwardly mobile, given the failure to have been so at an earlier point. Results from this model approximate a discrete-time hazard rate model, which accommodates time-varying covariates (Allison 1984; Teachman 1983).

Workers are defined as being at risk for becoming downwardly mobile if they worked in an upper-tier occupation and were paid by an employer. Beginning in 1985 and 2002, workers in each of the two cohorts were followed until they experienced two forms of career transition, moving to a lower status occupation or experiencing involuntary unemployment. When experiencing a job loss from


an upper-tier occupation, the worker is no longer in the risk set and is dropped from the analysis. Thus, the number of cases in the pooled data set decreases each year. Respondents excluded from the initial sample in 1985 or 2002 (non-working respondents or those exclusively self-employed) could enter the risk set in later years if they met the selection criteria (working in an upper-tier occupa-tion for pay with an employer). Like those selected in 1985 or 2002, these work-ers remained in the risk set until they experienced a career transition. Overall, the total number of person-years in the pre-reform cohort was 2,136 for whites and 1,160 for African Americans; the total number of person years in the reform cohort was 2,246 for whites and 1,238 for African Americans. Finally, sampling weights are used to compute point estimates of population parameters. These weights serve to ensure representativeness across cohorts and sectors, thereby precluding the possibility that findings were driven by compositional differences in the PSID sample.

ResultsDescriptives for Incidence and Timing of Downward MobilityTable 1 reports the incidence (Panel A) and timing (Panel B) of downward mobil-ity from upper-tier occupations among African Americans and whites across the public and private sectors during the pre-reform and reform periods. Descriptive statistics for the sample appear in the Appendix.

Results reveal that the substantially narrower racial gap in the incidence of downward mobility in the public sector than the private sector during the pre-reform period eroded during the reform period primarily because of widen-ing racial gaps in the public sector. During the pre-reform period in the public

Table 1. Rates and Timing of Downward Occupational Mobility from Upper-Tier Occupations

A. Rates (In Percent)

Pre-Reform Reform

Afr. Am. White Difference Afr. Am. White Difference

(N = 360) (N = 525) (N = 386) (N = 551)

Public 24 20 2.04 34 20 6.23**

Private 34 21 6.51** 37 24 6.80**

B. Timing (In Months)

Pre-Reform Reform

Afr. Am. White Difference Afr. Am. White Difference

Public 26 28 2.02 17 25 5.16**

Private 15 24 6.33** 16 26 6.33***

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001.


sector, 24 percent of African Americans and 20 percent of whites experienced downward mobility (this difference is not statistically significant). In the public sector during the reform period, however, the proportion of African Americans experiencing downward mobility jumped to 34 percent while remaining con-stant for whites (p < .01). In contrast, there is an identical gap in the incidence of downward mobility across time periods in the private sector: During the pre-reform period, 34 percent of African Americans and 21 percent of whites experienced downward mobility (p < .01), while during the reform period in the private sector, 37 percent of African Americans and 24 percent of whites expe-rienced downward occupational movement (p < .01).

Panel B of Table 1 shows a similar pattern regarding the timing of down-ward mobility. The substantially narrower racial gap in the timing to downward mobility in the public sector than the private sector during the pre-reform period eroded during the reform period primarily because of widening racial gaps in the public sector. During the pre-reform period in the public sector, African Americans experienced downward mobility, on average, 26 months into their job, while whites experienced downward movement 28 months into their job (the difference is not statistically significant). In the public sector during the reform period, however, the racial gap in timing widened: African Americans experienced downward mobility approximately 17 months into their job, on average, while whites experienced it approximately 25 months into their job on average (p < .01). In contrast, there is an identical gap in the timing to down-ward mobility across the two periods in the private sector: During the pre-reform period, African Americans experienced downward mobility, on average, approximately 15 months into their job, while whites experienced downward movement 24 months into their job (p < .01); during the reform period, African Americans experienced downward movement 16 months into their job, while whites experienced it 26 months into their job (p < .001).

Multivariate Analyses for Incidence and Determinants of Downward MobilityTable 2 reports the results from our multivariate models.10 We can most directly test specific theoretical predictions by stratifying the PSID sample by sector. Accordingly, the main effects of race (stage 1) yield the incidence of downward mobility among African Americans and whites by sector; when race is subse-quently interacted with period (stage 2) we can assess whether race operates differently across time periods within the public and private sectors. Finally, interacting race and period with each of the independent variables (stage 3) yields how the race-period relationship operates across values of the indepen-dent variables.

The main effects indicate that, in both sectors, race predicts the likelihood of experiencing downward mobility. Specifically, in the public sector, whites are 12 percent less likely (p < .05) than African Americans to experience downward mobility from privileged occupations. In the private sector, the racial gap in the incidence of downward movement was almost twice as large: Whites are


Tabl

e 2.

Lo

gist

ic R

egre

ssio

n fo

r Inc

iden

ce a

nd D

eter

min

ants

of D

ownw

ard

Mob

ility

from

Upp

er-T

ier O

ccup

atio

ns

Publ

icPr

ivat

e

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

MA

IN E

FFE

CT

S (M

OD

EL

)

Asc

ribe

d an

d te

mpo

ral

Whi

te-.

12*

.88

-.12

*.8

9-.

11*

.89

-.23

**.7

5-.

22**

.77

-.22

**.7

7

(.06

)(.

06)

(.06

)(.

09)

(.03

)(.

03)

Ref

orm

per

iod

.17*

1.18

.17*

1.18

.16*

1.16

.18*

1.18

.18*

1.18

.17*

1.17

(.08

)(.

08)

(.07

)(.

08)

(.08

)(.

08)

Bac

kgro

und

Mot

her’

s ed

ucat

ion

-.08

.92

-.07

.93

-.06

.94

-.06

.94

-.06

.94

-.05

.95

(.05

)(.

05)

(.04

)(.

04)

(.04

)(.

03)

Fam

ily s

truc

ture

-.15

*.8

6-.

14*

.87

-.14

*.8

6-.

08.9

2-.

05.9

5-.

03.9

7

(.07

)(.

07)

(.07

)(.

06)

(.04

)(.

02)

Hum

an C

apit

al

Col

lege

-.07

.93

-.06

.94

-.05

.95

-.05

.95

-.05

.95

-.05

.95

(.04

)(.

04)

(.03

)(.

04)

(.03

)(.

03)

Post

colle

ge-.

15*

.85

-.15

*.8

6-.

15*

.85

-.12

.88

-.11

.89

-.01

.99

(.07

)(.

07)

(.07

)(.

08)

(.07

)(.

01)

Com

mit

men

t-.

01.9

9-.

01.9

9.0

11.

01-.

01.9

9-.

01.9

9-.

01.9

9

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)


Wor

k ex

peri

ence

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

.01

.99

-.01

.99

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

Tim

e w

ith

empl

oyer

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

Job/

Lab

or M

arke

t

Uni

on-.

11.8

9-.

10.9

0-.

08.9

2-.

17*

.82

-.16

*.8

4-.

15*

.85

(.06

)(.

06)

(.05

)(.

08)

(.08

)(.

06)

Serv

ice

.10

1.10

.10

1.10

.08

1.08

.08

1.08

.07

1.07

.06

1.06

(.07

)(.

06)

(.05

)(.

05)

(.05

)(.

04)

Mgs

./adm

ins.

.03

1.03

.02

1.02

.01

1.01

-.02

.98

-.02

.98

-.01

.99

(.02

)(.

02)

(.01

)(.

02)

(.02

)(.

01)

TW

O W

AY

INT

ER

AC

TIO

NS

WIT

H R

AC

E A

ND

PE

RIO

D

Ref

orm

per

iod

––

-.30

***

.74

-.30

***

.74

––

.07

1.07

.06

1.06

(.09

)(.

08)

(.05

)(.

04)

MO

DE

L

INT

ER

AC

TIO

NS

WIT

H R

AC

E

Tem

pora

l

Ref

orm

per

iod

––

-.30

***

.74

-.29

***

.70

––

.07

1.07

.06

1.06

(.09

)(.

09)

(.05

)(.

04)

Con

tinu

ed


Tabl

e 2.

co

ntin

ued

Publ

icPr

ivat

e

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Bac

kgro

und

Mot

her’

s ed

ucat

ion

––

.06

1.06

.05

1.05

––

.04

1.04

.03

1.03

(.05

)(.

05)

(.04

)(.

02)

Fam

ily S

truc

ture

––

.18*

1.20

.17*

1.18

––

.15*

1.16

.15*

1.15

(.07

)(.

07)

(.07

)(.

07)

Hum

an C

apit

al

Col

lege

––

.06

1.06

.05

1.05

––

.04

1.04

.03

.97

(.04

)(.

04)

(.03

)(.

02)

Post

colle

ge–

–.1

8*1.

20.1

6*1.

16–

–-.

23**

1.25

-.22

**.7

7

(.07

)(.

01)

(.08

)(.

08)

Com

mit

men

t–

–-.

02*

.98

-.02

*.9

8–

–.0

11.

01.0

11.

01

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

Wor

k ex

peri

ence

––

-.01

-.99

.01

1.01

––

.02*

1.02

.02*

1.02

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

Tim

e w

ith

empl

oyer

––

.02*

1.02

.02*

1.02

––

.02

1.02

.01

1.01

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

Job/

Lab

or M

arke

t

Uni

on_

_.1

01.

10.1

01.

10–

–.1

6*1.

17.1

5*1.

16

(.06

)(.

06)

(.08

)(.

07)


Serv

ice

_–

.04

1.04

.03

1.03

––

.07

1.07

.06

1.06

(.03

)(.

02)

(.04

)(.

06)

Mgs

./adm

ins.

––

.01

1.01

-.01

.99

––

-.02

.98

-.01

.99

(.01

)(.

01)

(.02

)(.

01)

MO

DE

L

INT

ER

AC

TIO

NS

WIT

H P

ER

IOD

Asc

ribe

d an

d T

empo

ral

Whi

te–

–.0

81.

08.0

71.

07–

–.0

51.

05.0

41.

04

(.05

)(.

04)

(.03

)(.

03)

Bac

kgro

und

Mot

her’

s ed

ucat

ion

––

.04

1.04

.03

1.03

––

.02

1.02

.01

1.01

(.03

)(.

02)

(.02

)(.

01)

Fam

ily s

truc

ture

––

.08

1.08

.07

1.07

––

.16*

1.17

.14*

1.15

(.05

)(.

04)

(.07

)(.

07)

Hum

an C

apit

al

Col

lege

––

1.15

*1.

16.1

3*1.

14–

–-.

02.9

8-.

02.9

8

(.07

)(.

06)

(.02

)(.

02)

Post

colle

ge–

–.0

71.

07.0

61.

06–

–.0

21.

02.0

21.

02

(.04

)(.

04)

(.02

)(.

02)

Com

mit

men

t–

–.0

11.

01.0

11.

01–

–-.

03.9

7.0

2.9

8

(.01

)(.

01)

(.02

)(.

02)

Con

tinu

ed


Tabl

e 2.

co

ntin

ued

Publ

icPr

ivat

e

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Coe

ff.

Odd

s R

atio

Wor

k ex

peri

ence

––

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

––

.01

1.01

.01

.99

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

Tim

e w

ith

empl

oyer

––

-.01

.99

-.01

.99

––

.02*

1.02

.02*

1.02

(.01

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

Job/

Lab

or M

arke

t

Uni

on–

–.1

11.

11.1

01.

10–

–.0

41.

04(.

03)

1.03

(.06

)(.

06)

(.03

)(.

02)

Serv

ice

––

.17*

1.18

.15*

1.16

––

.01

1.01

-.01

.99

(.08

)(.

07)

(.01

)(.

01)

Mgs

./adm

ins.

––

.03

1.03

.02

1.02

––

-.02

.98

-.02

.98

(.02

)(.

01)

(.01

)(.

01)

TH

RE

E W

AY

MO

DE

L

INT

ER

AC

TIO

NS

WIT

H R

AC

E A

ND

PE

RIO

D

Bac

kgro

und

Mot

her’

s ed

ucat

ion

––

––

.04

1.04

––

––

.02

1.02

(.03

)(.

02)


Fam

ily s

truc

ture

––

––

.30*

**1.

35–

––

–.2

1*1.

23

(.06

)(.

09)

Hum

an C

apit

al

Col

lege

––

––

.10

1.10

––

––

.06

1.06

(.06

)(.

04)

Post

colle

ge–

––

–.2

8***

1.33

––

––

.17*

1.18

(.07

)(.

08)

Com

mit

men

t–

––

–.0

51.

05–

––

–.0

31.

03

(.03

)(.

02)

Wor

k ex

peri

ence

––

––

-.01

1.01

––

––

-.01

.99

(.01

)(.

01)

Tim

e w

ith

empl

oyer

––

––

-.01

.99

––

––

-.01

1.01

(.01

)(.

01)

Job/

Lab

or M

arke

t

Uni

on–

––

–-.

32**

*.6

5–

––

–.0

71.

07

(.06

)(.

05)

Serv

ice

––

––

.09

1.09

––

––

.04

1.04

(.06

)(.

03)

Mgs

./adm

ins.

––

––

.02

1.02

––

––

-.02

.98

(.02

)

Con

stan

t-3

.42

-3.2

6-3

.11

-2.8

4-2

.68

-2.6

2

Log

-lik

elih

ood

-239

-237

-234

-277

-271

-268

Pseu

do R

2.1

68.2

23.3

02.1

48.2

06.2

84

*p <

.05

**p

< .0

1 **

*p <

.001

.


23 percent less likely (p < .01) than African Americans to experience downward mobility. Findings from the two-way interactions (all two-way interactions are presented) between race and period are consistent with predictions from theory. Specifically, in the public sector, whites, relative to African Americans, are 30 percent less likely to experience downward mobility in the reform than the pre-reform period.11 Further, in the private sector, the race-period interaction is not statistically significant, indicating that race does not exert a differential effect across periods.12

The three-way interactions tap how values of one variable operate in interac-tion with a second at discrete levels of a third variable. Findings from the three-way interactions between race, period and independent variables reported in Table 2 provide additional support for predictions regarding the race-specific incidence of downward mobility and also support predictions regarding the race-specific determinants of downward mobility. These complex three- dimensional relationships are seen with most clarity when the three significant interactions in the public sector, postcollege degree, family structure, and union status as well as the two significant interactions in the private sector, postcol-lege degree and family structure, are plotted. Along these lines, Figure 1 graphs the predicted probabilities of experiencing downward mobility (transformed from predicted odds) across values of the independent variables that are signifi-cant in interaction with race and period in either the public sector or private sector. Accordingly, for each significant variable—based on the coefficients in Table 2 and using average values for all independent variables—we “plugged” into the regression equation values by race each of the significant variables, period, and the interaction term to create eight data points, four for each of the two periods.

Several findings are noteworthy. First, among African Americans in the public sector, the predicted probability of experiencing downward mobility—at a minimum—virtually doubles across values of the three variables from the pre-reform to the reform period (postcollege degree—0 [less than-college degree] = .32 to .58, 1 [postcollege degree] = .19 to .52; family structure—0 [nonintact family] = .29 to .54, 1 [intact family] = .21 to .51; union status—0 [nonunionized] = .33 to .55, 1 [unionized] = .24 to .51). Second, among African Americans in the public sector, the predicted probability of experiencing down-ward mobility during the reform period closely resembles that experienced by African Americans at both periods in the private sector. Along these lines, for example, the predicted probability of experiencing downward mobility across values of the two variables that are significant in both sectors (postcollege degree, family structure) does not vary between the reform period in the public sector and either period in the private sector by more than .02.

Specifically:

• Postcollegedegree—lessthancollegedegree= .58 in reform, public sector, .58 in pre-reform, private sector, and .56 in reform, private sector.

• Postcollegedegree—.51inreform,publicsector,.52inpre-reform,privatesector, and .53 in reform, private sector.


Figu

re 1

. Pre

dict

ed P

roba

bilit

ies

of E

xper

ienc

ing

Dow

nwar

d M

obili

ty fr

om U

pper

-Tie

r Occ

upat

ions

Post

-Col

lege D

egre

e

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Less

than

Colle

geDe

gree

Post-

Colle

geDe

gree

Less

than

Colle

geDe

gree

Post-

Colle

geDe

gree

Less

than

Colle

geDe

gree

Post-

Colle

geDe

gree

Less

than

Colle

geDe

gree

Post-

Colle

geDe

gree

Downward Mobility

Publ

ic

Pre-

Refo

rmRe

form

Whit

eBl

ack

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Downward Mobility

Priva

te

Pre-

Refo

rmRe

form

Whit

eBl

ack

.32

.24.19 .15

.58.52

.34

.22

.58.53

.37.27

.56.51

.36.26


Figu

re 1

. con

tinue

d

Fam

ily S

truct

ure

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Non-

Intac

tInt

act

Non-

Intac

tInt

act

Non-

Intac

tInt

act

Non-

Intac

tInt

act

Downward Mobility

Publ

ic

Pre-

Refo

rmRe

form

Whit

eBl

ack

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Downward Mobility

Priva

te

Pre-

Refo

rmRe

form

Whit

eBl

ack

.29

.21.27

.17

.54.51

.38

.24

.55.52

.36

.23

.56.53

.37.26


• Familystructure—nonintact= .54 in reform, public sector; .55 in pre-reform, private sector, and .56 in reform, private sector; intact = .51 in reform, public sector; .52 in pre-reform, private sector, and .53 in reform, private sector.

Third, among whites in the public sector, the predicted probability of experi-encing downward mobility increases by a smaller percentage–approximately one-third–between the pre-reform and reform periods (postcollege degree—1 = .24 to .34, 1 = .15 to .22; family structure—0 = .27 to .38, 1 = .17 to .24; union status—0 = .25 to .34, 1 = .15 to .21).

Several findings indicate that in the public sector the experience of African American downward mobility, relative to whites, is more generalized and dif-fuse during the reform than the pre-reform period. African Americans experience downward mobility on an increasingly unstructured basis characterized by lack of variation in predicted probabilities along values of the statistically significant interactions. First, for African Americans during the pre-reform period, each of the three interaction-based variables exhibit pronounced variation across val-ues in rates of downward mobility (postcollege degree, .13 difference—.32 less than college minus .19 postcollege degree; family structure, .08 difference .29 nonintact family minus .21 intact family; union status, .09 difference—.33 non unionized minus .24 unionized), while during the reform period, variation across values of the three variables in downward mobility is reduced (.06 for postcol-lege degree [.58 minus .52], .03 for family structure [.54 minus .51], and .04 for union status [.55 minus .51]). Second, in the public sector, the relative lack

Figure 1. continued

Union Status

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Non-Union

Union Non-Union

Union

Down

ward

Mob

ility

Pre-Reform ReformWhiteBlack

Public

.33

.25.24

.15

.55.51

.34

.21


of variation in predicted probability of African Americans’ experiencing down-ward mobility across values during the reform period closely resembles the pat-tern found during both periods in the private sector. For example, the amount of variation in the variable that measures postcollege degree versus noncollege degree (i.e., postcollege degree) in the reform period in the public sector does not exceed the private sector by more than .01 in either period (.06 variation in public sector, reform period [.58 minus .52]; .05 variation in private sector, both periods [.58 minus .53]; private sector, pre-reform .56 minus .51 private sector, reform period).

Further, the amount of variation in the predicted probability of experiencing downward mobility among the variables that measures intact versus nonintact family (i.e., family structure) between the reform period in the public sector and both periods in the private sector is identical .03: (.54 minus .51) in pre-reform, public sector, pre-reform, private sector (.55 minus .52) and reform, private sec-tor (.56 minus .53). Third, among whites in the public sector, variation across values of the three significant variables in the incidence of downward mobility are relatively robust and increase slightly from the pre-reform to reform periods (postcollege degree, .09 in pre-reform, .12 in reform; family structure, .10 in pre-reform, .14 in reform period union status, .10 in pre-reform, .13 in reform).

Multivariate Analyses for the Timing of Downward MobilityFigure 2 reports the timing of downward mobility among whites and African Americans. The timing of mobility is determined by substituting the race- specific means on predictor variables from Table 1 into the models in Table 2. By allowing tenure to vary, the models predict the odds of experiencing down-ward movement at each year of tenure. After transforming the predicted odds to predicted probabilities, the cumulative product of 1 minus the duration-specific downward mobility probabilities yields a survival curve (Teachman 1983). Plotting the survival curve against duration in the job will show how long the typical respondent in the PSID sample waits before becoming down-wardly mobile.13

Part A of Figure 2 documents that during the pre-reform period, in the pub-lic sector there was near parity in the timing of downward mobility by race. Specifically, it is predicted that after 6 years 25 percent of African Americans and 21 percent of whites will have left the risk set and experienced downward mobil-ity out of privileged occupations. In the private sector, by contrast, the racial gap is substantially larger. After 6 years it is predicted that 36 percent of African Americans and 22 percent of whites will have left the risk set and experienced downward mobility from upper-tier occupations.

Part B of Figure 1 documents the important shift in racial inequality that occurs into and during the reform period. The predicted racial gap in the pub-lic sector increased sharply. After 6 years, 37 percent of African American and 23 percent of whites will have left the risk set and experienced downward occupational mobility; in the private sector it is predicted that after 6 years 33 percent of African American and 23 percent of whites will have left the risk


set and experienced downward occupational mobility.14 The public sector, via the reforms of the past decade, is increasingly mirroring the private sector relative to racial inequality in general and, specific to our analyses, race-specific vul-nerability to downward mobility.

ConclusionOur analysis of a PSID sample of men reveals several new and substantively important findings regarding the racial dynamics of downward mobility. Specifically, in terms of representation in upper-tier positions, African Americans may be losing the public sector as their long-standing occupational niche in the post-1965 civil rights era. Recently adopted new gover-nance-induced privatization char-acterized by increased employer discretion in determining job sta-bility has disadvantaged African Americans relative to similarly situated whites. In particular, we find that narrow racial gaps in the incidence, determinants and tim-ing of downward mobility found in the public sector during the pre-reform period (1985-90) became more pronounced during the reform period (2002-07), bringing the public sector closer to the pri-vate sector in terms of race-specific vulnerability.

African Americans’ increasing susceptibility to downward mobil-ity in terms of its incidence, rela-tively rapid temporal sequencing, and broader and more generalized route that is relatively impervious to traditional stratification-based causal factors constitutes—as has

Figu

re 2

. Tim

ing

to D

ownw

ard

Mob

ility

Fro

m U

pper

-Tie

r Occ

upat

ions

50556065707580859095100

12

34

56

% Of Not Downwardly Mobile

Year

s of T

enur

e with

Em

ploy

er

Pre-

Refo

rm

Publi

c Seto

r Afric

anAm

erica

nPu

blic W

hite S

ector

Priva

te Se

ctor A

frican

Amer

ican

Priva

te Se

ctor W

hite

50556065707580859095100

12

34

56

% Of Not Downwardly Mobile

Year

s of T

enur

e with

Em

ploy

er

Refo

rm

Publi

c Sec

tor A

frican

Amer

ican

Publi

c Whit

e Sec

tor

Priva

te Se

ctor A

frican

Amer

ican

Priva

te Se

ctor W

hite


been demonstrated in the private sector—is a form of “race-based injustice” (Roscigno, Garcia and Bobbitt-Zeher 2007). Indeed, these findings suggest increasing precariousness for African Americans in public sector employment: Even a privileged background status, the accumulation of significant human capital, and a prestigious job title with accompanying reward-relevant job tasks (e.g., job authority) no longer necessarily insulate African Americans from downward mobility as in the past, and certainly not to the same degree as they do for whites.

These findings regarding African Americans in the “new public sector” likely translate into forms of socioeconomic disadvantage that increasingly mirror those found in the private sector. First, increasing susceptibility to downward mobility in the public sector results not only in loss of the symbolic and mate-rial benefits but also imposes limitations on resources—both materially and by way of social and cultural capital—to ensure the intergenerational transmis-sion of occupational standing. Second, the loss of socioeconomic benefits is tan-gible even if an upper-tier slot is eventually reclaimed; the new premium put on “working better and costing less” (Lawther 2003) results in—similar to the private sector—reemployment with inferior reward packages (Neumark 2000; Spalter-Roth and Deitch 1999). Third, similar to the private sector, downward mobility occurs earlier in African Americans’ career, resulting in less time to enjoy the varied benefits of incumbency in an upper-tier occupation. Finally, as has been demonstrated in the private sector, early exits from the public sector should serve to inhibit reclaiming a comparable position as the downwardly mobile are placed low in hiring queues which are often seniority based (Baumol, Blinder and Wolff 2005; Mar and Ong 1994).

No less noteworthy relative to the socioeconomic implications noted above is that middle-class downward mobility poses a disproportionate negative penalty for African Americans relative to similarly situated whites. First, recent research has documented that over the course of recent decades the family structure of African American middle class households—even more so than white house-holds– is increasingly assuming a “single and living along” (Marsh et al., 2007) form. As such, a single breadwinner who experiences downward mobility lacks the necessary cushion provided by additional revenue sources to sustain a cus-tomary and viable lifestyle. Second, the well-documented wealth gap places the African American middle class in a weak position for coping with the dimi-nution of resources accompanying downward mobility. Therefore, downward mobility has a disproportionately negative effect on African Americans across a range of socioeconomic outcomes. Specifically, it creates a relative inabil-ity to ensure a customary standard of living (Conley 1999), or invest in one’s children’s education and long-term economic well-being (Oliver and Shapiro 1995). Moreover, it can weaken one’s ability to stave off home foreclosure, an emerging “deep-rooted disadvantage” for African Americans in the new mil-lennium as home ownership is more often, than for whites, a primary source of wealth.

The forms of disadvantage experienced by African Americans in the public sector that we have documented may be long term as new governance reform


does not appear to be a transitory phenomenon. Indeed, these reforms have increasingly received bipartisan political support as witnessed by the grow-ing number of Democratic politicians and policy makers who have “jumped on board” the “reinventing government” movement (Hays and Sowa 2006). In fact, if privatization becomes entrenched, it could have dire stratification-related consequences, including, most importantly, a threat to the existence of the African American middle class. The ensuing acceleration of downward mobility may, in fact, result in a reversal of the positive occupational gains for a significant portion of the African American middle class, a disproportionate percentage of whom have not only attained their occupational standing in the public sector during the civil rights era (Collins 1997; Landry 1987), but also—because of low rates of intra-sector mobility among African Americans (Elvira and Zatick 2002)—have remained there. In addition, there may be a ceiling on the occupational attainments of future generations of African Americans who previously would have found their way to the middle class in the public sec-tor. In this regard, sociologists have begun to document that a racialized “glass escalator” (i.e., limited access to, and retention of, privileged positions) operates when there are dwindling sponsorship ties to provide access to these positions and support for incumbents in them once they are attained (Spalter-Roth and Deitch 1999).

Based on the negative race-based consequences that will likely flow from the continued implementation of new governance-based privatization, it is important to propose policy solutions to ameliorate documented racial dispari-ties including but not limited to downward occupational movement. To be via-ble, such policies must be “packaged” as not materially affecting “bottom-line” cost effectiveness and efficiency. Along these lines, certain types of formalization may pass muster: Clearly delineated guidelines should be established that facili-tate both the placement of African Americans in “mainstream” jobs (i.e., those involving tasks that service racially undifferentiated customers/clients) and inte-grated work groups—work groups that can enhance their opportunities to work with majority group customers/clients and to work more closely with majority group employees.

Further, strategies should be implemented that diminish African Americans’ reliance on segregated formal and informal job networks. In this vein, recent research suggests that “loosening” work boundaries to increase African Americans’ exposure to a larger range of coworkers increases access to strategic ties and enhances the visibility of job tasks (Daday and Buriss 2002; Kalev 2009). Finally, employees should be given greater opportunities to appeal displacement decisions. Establishing internal review boards with authority to reconsider deci-sions as well as to adopt and implement policy stances related to displacement constitute important steps toward reducing racial disparities in the dynamics of downward mobility.

It is also worth underscoring that there are many unanswered questions regard-ing the effect of new governance reform on race-based dynamics of downward occupational mobility from upper-tier positions. Specifically, more definitive con-clusions would be reached if these dynamics were more directly captured. In the


case of our study, for instance, the causal significance of discretionary-laden evalu-ations and racialized slotting in structuring downward occupational movement is inferred from the effects of objective characteristics such as human capital, back-ground status and job/labor market characteristics. Unmeasured variables may be driving some of the observed relationships. Therefore, it would be prudent to supplement analyses of large data sets containing representative samples with case studies of specific organizations where practices shaping race-specific dynamics of downward mobility across economic sectors can be directly observed.

Downward mobility is merely one outcome necessary to resolve a larger theo-retical question: whether African Americans in privileged slots are in the process of losing their decades-old ethnic occupational niche. Research on a wider range of workplace-based socioeconomic outcomes, such as wages, access to super-visory responsibility and even additional mobility dynamics, are thus needed to determine whether our findings represent broader stratification trends. Answering this question is key to identifying the short-term and long-term pros-pects of the African American middle class. Our work represents a substantial step toward resolving this fundamental question.

Notes1. The average timing to downward mobility for both African Americans and whites is

slower in the public than the private sector (Jaynes and Williams 1989).2. It is important to point out that even in the “halcyon days” (Zipp 1994) of pub-

lic sector employment during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s racial inequities were present. For example, in the context of job loss/downward mobility, Fernandez (1981) documents that in both decades, the “last hired/first fired” seniority doctrine was at times violated if adherence to it advantaged African Americans. Further, sev-eral studies (Zipp 1994; Cotton 1990) document that racial gaps in income in the public sector persisted in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s probably because of “occupational crowding” (Gibson, Darity and Myers 1998), a form of segregation experienced by the African American middle class.

3. The number of, for example, federal government employees began to decline in the early 1990s and this decline accelerated in the early 2000s. In this regard, for exam-ple, the proportion of federal employees during the administration of George Bush Jr. declined by 13 percent over his two terms as President (Kamarck 2007).

4. The privatization associated with new governance reform encompasses two phenom-ena: (1. the transformation in conditions of employment among those who remain employed full-time with the government and (2. the outsourcing of administrative/government functions to private firms. The focus of this study is evolving gaps in mobility dynamics among those who are full-time workers.

5. The PSID uses the 1970 census-based occupational classification scheme.6. Evidence from a range of indices of socioeconomic status support the view that

across both the pre-reform and reform periods in both public and private sectors, movement from the two upper-tier categories to the other census-based occupa-tional categories constitutes downward mobility. We addressed this issue in two ways. First, we ran correlations between being downwardly mobile out of upper-tier occupations and measures of position and receipt of socioeconomic rewards across time. Findings below indicate that across both periods being downwardly mobile is


negatively associated with socioeconomic status (Duncan SEI scores), the receipt of benefits packages, and income. Finally, within both periods, results were similar in the public and private sectors.

Pre-Reform SES Income Benefits Packages

Downward Mobility -.53 -.47 -.56

Reform SES Income Benefits Packages

Downward Mobility -.56 -.49 -.54

Second, we examined how incumbents in upper-tier occupational categories, relative to those not in upper-tier categories, scored along these measures. Findings indicate that incumbents in upper-tier occupations had higher socioeconomic status and incomes and were more likely to receive a benefits package. Finally, within both periods, results were similar in the public and private sectors (results available upon request).

7. Specifically, virtually all 196 three-digit detailed jobs comprising the professional/technical broad category could be held in either sector, with the exception of “judges.” Similarly, of the 45 three-digit detailed jobs comprising the managers/administra-tors category, all save “buyers and sellers,” “buyers, wholesale and retail,” “funeral directors,” “postmasters” and “sales managers,” can be held in either the public or private sector. Analyses were undertaken to determine if this variation affected the findings from this study. In this regard, a complete set of analyses was performed in which individuals in these categories were excluded. Findings regarding the determi-nants of, and timing to, downward mobility by race were virtually identical to those reported in all tables and figures.

8. Large numbers of missing cases on father’s education for African Americans neces-sitated the use of mother’s education. Sociological research has found there is a high positive correlation between measures of educational attainment for mothers and fathers (Parcel and Mueller 1983).

9. Bivariate correlations and collinearity diagnostics indicate there is no multincol-linearity among the independent variables in the model. In addition, the Cook-Weisberg test of the assumption of constant error variance across predicted values for the dependent variable was performed and the X2 value of .01 (p = .675) indi-cates that there is little heteroscedasticity in the statistical model.

10. A complete set of analyses were also performed without sample weights. Across all multivariate analyses the findings were virtually identical to those reported in the tables and figures in this paper. Results are available from the authors upon request.

11. While only scant attention has been paid to the two-way interactions, one finding deserves mentioning, particularly in the private sector. Specifically, three of the four statistically significant variables, family structure, work experience and union sta-tus, act in the expected direction, i.e., they facilitate downward mobility for whites more than African Americans. The lone outlier is postcollege degree, which insulates whites from downward mobility more than African Americans. We suspect the high-est level of educational attainment signals credentialing and a source of entrée into upper-tier occupations but—net of all else—is not a fundamental source of evalua-tion as is the case with the majority of stratification-relevant variables, so the coef-ficient is a reflection of race-based privilege for whites.


12. A complete set of two-way interactions encompassing main effects x period and period x race were also run. These additional two-way interactions are available upon request.

13. Sample sizes permitted such relatively pure/uncontaminated analyses of sectoral dynamics in which individuals analyzed were employed in either the public or the private sector, but not both, through the years tracked. Nevertheless, we ran additional analyses to assess the effect of switching, i.e., moving from one sector to another during the years tracked. Specifically, we ran a complete set of additional discrete-time, logistic hazard analyses in which samples were expanded to include switchers with the inclusion of a time-varying independent variable for sectoral change (sample size increases ranged from 11 to 17 percent across models; in terms of the incidence of switching, across periods in both economic sectors, whites were more likely than African Americans to switch sectors, particularly, moving from the public to the private sector with p-values ranging from .01 to .05). In all mod-els, the variable measuring switching was not statistically significant as a main effect or in interaction with race and results closely mirror those reported in this study: narrower racial gaps in the incidence, determinants and timing of down-ward mobility found in the public than the private sector during the pre-reform period eroded during the reform period primarily because of widening racial gaps in the public sector.

14. We were concerned with the issue of repeated mobility in our analyses. Repeated events, in this case, can take two forms. First, those who experienced subsequent mobility back to upper-tier positions can lose them for a second time. The percent-age of the PSID sample experiencing this was very small, particularly, 2.3 and 2.5 percent in, respectively, the pre-reform and reform periods. Second, individuals can experience a further drop in occupational positions within the nonupper tier occu-pational structure. While it is difficult to judge what constitutes downward mobility from a nonupper tier position, we relied upon the mean income and socioeconomic status of incumbents in the discrete census-based occupational categories. Again, findings indicate that a very small percentage of the PSID sample—5.4 percent in the pre-reform and 6.8 percent in the reform period—experienced this occupational movement.


ReferencesAllison, Paul. 1984. Event History Analysis. Boulder, CO: Sage.Baumol, William, Alan Blinder, and Edward Wolff. 2005. Downsizing in America: Reality, Causes, and

Consequences. New York, NY: Russell Sage.Bielby, William T. 2000. “Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias.” Contemporary Sociology

29:120-29.Bowman, James, and John West. 2007. American Public Service: Radical Reform and the Merit System.

New York, NY: Taylor and Francis.Brown, Michael, and Steven Erie. 1981. “Blacks and the Legacy of the Great Society: The Economic and

Political Impact of Federal Social Policy” Public Policy 29:299-330.Castilla, Emilio J. 2007. Dynamic Analysis in the Social Sciences. London, UK: Academic Press & Elsevier.Collins, Sharon. 1997. Black Corporate Executives: The Making and Breaking of a Black Middle Class.

Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.Collins, Sharon. 1993. “Blacks on the Bubble: The Vulnerability of Black Executives in White Corporations.”

Sociological Quarterly 34:429-47.Condrey, Steven, and Robert Maranto. 2001. Radical Reform in the Civil Service. New York, NY: Lexington.Conley, Dalton. 1999. Being Black But Living in the Red. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics for PSID Sample

Pre-Reform Reform

Whites African American

Whites African American

(N = 525) (N = 360) (N = 551) (N = 386)

X SD X SD X SD X SD

Background Status

Mother’s ed. 11.8 2.2 11.5 2.1 11.9 1.6 11.7 2.0

Intact family 74% 66% 72% 65%

Human Capital

College 41% 42% 42% 43%

Postcollege 52% 53% 50% 51%

Commitment 7.4 1.4 7.0 1.7 7.5 2.3 7.1 2.0

Experience 13.8 2.4 13.4 2.5 13.1 2.8 13.3 2.6

Time w/empl. 77.9 9.7 75.5 9.3 83.4 12.4 81.8 11.8

Job/Labor Market

Unionized 31% 27% 30% 25%

Public 42% 51% 45% 54%

Service 24% 23% 26% 22%

Note: SD = standard deviation.

Appendix


Cotton, Jeremiah. 1990. “The Gap at the top: Relative Occupational Earnings Disadvantages of the Black Middle Class.” Review of Black Political Economy 18(3):21-38.

Daday, Gerhard, and Beverly Burris. 2002. “The Effects of Teaming Structures on Race, Ethnicity, and Gender Differences in a High-Tech Corporation: A Case Study.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meetings of The American Sociological Association.

Durr, Marlese, and John Logan. 1997. “Racial Submarkets in Government Employment: African Americans Managers in New York State.” Sociological Forum 3:353-70.

Edsall, Thomas, and Mary Edsall. 1991. Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics. New York, NY: Norton.

Elliott, James, and Ryan Smith. 2001. “Ethnic Matching of Supervisors to Subordinate Work Groups: Findings on “Bottom-Up” Ascription and Social Closure.” Social Problems 48:258-76.

Elvira, Marta, and Christopher Zatick. 2002. “Racial Composition and Voluntary Turnover in a Multiracial Setting.” Academy of Management Meetings Best Papers Proceedings 22:38-56.

Fairlie, Robert, and Lori Kletzer. 1998. “Jobs Lost, Jobs Regained: An Analysis of Black/White Differences in Job Displacement in the 1980’s.” Industrial Relations 37:460-77.

Farley, Reynolds, and John Haaga. 2005. The American People: Census 2000. New York, NY: Russell Sage.Farley, Reynolds, and Walter Allen. 1987. The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America. New York, NY:

Russell Sage.Fernandez, John. 1981. Racism and Sexism in White Corporations. New York, NY: John Wiley Press.Field, Andrew, and Warren Winfrey. 1997. “Job Displacement and Reemployment in North Carolina: The

Relative Experience of the Black Worker.” Review of Black Political Economy 25:57-75.Gibson, Karen, Darity, William, and Samuel Myers. 1998. “Revisiting Occupational Crowding in the U.S: A

Preliminary Study.” Feminist Economics 4:73-95.Glass Ceiling Commission. 1995. Good for Business: Making Full Use of the Nation’s Human Capital.

Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.Hays, Steve and Jessica Sowa. 2006. “Changes in State Civil Service Systems.” Review of Public Personnel

Administration 26:102-17.Hill, Martha. 1985. User’s Guide to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Survey

Research.Hipple, Steven. 1999. “Worker Displacement in the Mid-1990’s.” Monthly Labor Review, 22:15-32.Jaynes, Gerald, and Robin Williams. 1989. A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society. Washington,

DC: National Academy Press.Kalev, Alexandra. 2009. “Cracking The Glass Cage: Restructuring and Ascriptive Inequality at Work. “

American Journal of Sociology 72:353-97.Kalleberg, Arne. 2009. “Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Transition.”

American Sociological Review 74:1-22.Kamarck, Elaine. 2007. The End of Government as We Know it: Making Public Policy Work. Boulder, CO:

Lynne Reinner.Katz, Michael, Stern, Mark, and Jamie Feder. 2005. “The New African American Inequality.” Journal of

American History 92:75-108.Kluegel, James. 1978. “The Causes and Cost of Racial Exclusion from Job Authority.” American Sociological

Review 43:285-301.Kuykendall, Christine, and Rex Facer. 2002. “Public Employment in State Agencies: The Elimination of the

Merit System.” Review of Public Personnel Administration 22(2):133-45.Lacy, Karyn. 2007. Blue Chip Black: Race, Class and Status Among the New Black Middle Class. Berkeley,

CA: University of California Press.Landry, Bart. 1987. The New Black Middle Class. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.


Lawthler, William. 2003. “Privatizing Personnel: Outsourcing Public Service Functions.” Pp. 113-151 in Public Personnel Administration: Problems and Prospect, Hays, Steven and Kearney, Robert. (Eds.). Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Lee, John. 1999. “Niche Dominance Among African American, Jewish, and Korean Entrepreneurs: Competition, Co-Ethnic Advantage, and Disadvantage.” American Behavioral Scientist 42:1398-1416.

Leicht, Kevin, and Mary Fennell. 2001. Professional Work: A Sociological Approach. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Light, Paul. 1999. The New Public Service. Washington, DC: Brookings Press.Light, Ryan, Vincent J. Roscigno, and Alexandra Kalev. 2011. “Racial Discrimination, Interpretation and

Legitimation at Work.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 634:39-59.Malamud, Deborah. 1995. “The Last Minuet—Disparate Treatment After Hicks.” Michigan Law Review

8:2229-2324.Mar, David, and Peter Ong. 1994. “Race and Rehiring in the High-Tech Industry.” Review of Black Political

Economy 22:43-54.Marsh, Kristin, Darity, William, Cohen, Philip, Casper, Lynne, and Danielle Salters. 2007. “The Emerging

Black Middle Class: Single and Living Alone.” Social Forces 86: 735-62.McBrier, Debra, and George Wilson. 2004. “Going Down? Race and Downward Occupational Mobility for

White-Collar Workers in the 1990’s.” Work and Occupations. 31:283-322.Model, Suzanne. 1985. “Economic Niches Among Immigrants.” Pp. 85-135 in The Historical Origins of the

American Underclass, edited by Steven Katz. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Moss, Philip, and Chris Tilly. 1994. “Soft Skills and Race: An Investigation of Black Men’s Employment

Problems.” Work and Occupations. 23: 252-76.Mueller, Charles, John Wallace, and James Price. 1992. “Employee Commitment: Resolving Some Issues.”

Work and Occupations 19:211-36.Neumark, David. 2000. Is Job Security a Thing of the Past? New York, NY. Sage.Oliver, Melvin, and Thomas Shapiro. 1995. Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial

Inequality. New York, NY: Routledge.Parcel, Toby, and Charles Mueller. 1983. Ascription and Labor Markets: Race and Sex Differences in

Earnings. New York, NY: Academic Press.Pettigrew, Thomas. 1985. “New Black-White Patterns: How Best to Conceptualize Them?” Annual Review

of Sociology 11:329-46.Pettigrew, Thomas, and Joanne Martin. 1987. “Shaping the Organizational Context for African American

Inclusion.” Journal of Social Issues 43:41-78.Phillips, Sandra. 2010. “The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and African Americans. “Review of Black Political

Economy 27:20-33.Roscigno, Vincent. 2007. The Face of Discrimination: How Race and Gender Impact on Work and Home

Lives. New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield.Roscigno, Vincent, Lizette Garcia, and Donna Bobbitt-Zeher. 2007. “Social Closure and Processes of Race/

Sex Employment Discrimination.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 609:16-48.

Spalter-Roth, Roberta, and Cynthia Deitch. 1999. “I Don’t Feel Right Sized: I Feel Out Sized: Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and the Unequal Costs of Displacement.” Work and Occupations 26:446-82.

Steinberg, Stephen. 1981. The Ethnic Myth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Teachman, Jay. 1983. “Analyzing Social Processes—Life Tables and Proportional Hazards Models.” Social

Science Research 12:263-301.Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald, and Sheryl Skaggs. 1999. “An Establishment-Level Test of the Statistical

Discrimination Hypothesis.” Work and Occupations 26:422-45.


Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald, and Kevin Stainback. 2007. “Discrimination and Desegregation: Equal Opportunity Progress in U.S. Private Sector Workplaces Since the Civil Rights Act.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 609:49-84.

Tsui, Anne S., and Charles A. O’Reilly. 1989. “Beyond Simple Demographic Effects: The Importance of Relational Demography in Superior-Subordinate Dyads.” Academy of Management Journal 32:402-23.

Tsui, Anne S., Korl Xin, and Thomas Egan 1995. “Relational Demography: The Missing Link in Vertical Dyad Linkage.” Pp. 97-129 in Diversity in Work Teams: Research Paradigms for a Changing Workplace, edited by Steven Jackson and Michael Ruderman. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Waldinger, Roger. 1996. Still The Promised City: African Americans and Immigrants in Post-Industrial New York. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Werhane, Patricia, Tara Radin, and Norman Bowie. 2004. Employment and Employee Rights. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

West, Jonathan P. 2002. “Georgia on the Mind of Radical Civil Service Reformers.” Review of Public Personnel Administration 22:79-93.

Wilson, George. 2005. “Race and Job Dismissals Across the Early Work-Career.” American Behavioral Scientist 48:1153-78.

Wilson, George. 2006. “The Rise of At-Will Employment and Racial Inequality in the Public Sector.” Review of Public Personnel Administration 26:178-87.

Wilson, George, and Debra Branch McBrier. 2005. “Race and Loss of Privilege: African American/White Differences in the Determinants of Job Layoffs from Upper-Tier Occupations.” Sociological Forum 18:301-22.

Zipp, John. 1994. “Government Employment and Black-White Earnings Inequality, 1980-1990.” Social Problems 41:363-81.


Public Sector Transformation, Racial Inequality and Downward Occupational Mobility

Documents

Transcript of Public Sector Transformation, Racial Inequality and Downward Occupational Mobility