Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar

Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar

M A Y 2 0 1 4

Above: Behsud Bridge, Nangarhar Province (Photo by TLO)

A T L O M A P P I N G R E P O R T

ii

Justice and Security

Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in

Kabul and Nangarhar

May 2014

In Cooperation with:

© 2014, The Liaison Office. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, The Liaison Office. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected]

iii

Acknowledgements

This report was commissioned from The Liaison Office (TLO) by Cordaid’s Security and Justice

Business Unit. Research was conducted via cooperation between the Afghan Women’s

Resource Centre (AWRC) and TLO, under the supervision and lead of the latter. Cordaid was

involved in the development of the research tools and also conducted capacity building by

providing trainings to the researchers on the research methodology.

While TLO makes all efforts to review and verify field data prior to publication, some factual

inaccuracies may still remain. TLO and AWRC are solely responsible for possible inaccuracies

in the information presented. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the

report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Cordaid.

The Liaison Office (TL0)

The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization established

in 2003 seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and

institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society

groups. TLO’s mission is to facilitate the formal integration of communities and their

traditional governance structures within Afghanistan’s newly emerging peace, governance

and reconstruction framework.

TLO main areas of activity are Research/Analysis using the do-no harm approach; Dialogue

facilitation and participatory peacebuilding, access to justice and livelihoods.

Visit: www.tloafghanistan.org

http://www.tloafghanistan.org/

4

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... iii

The Liaison Office (TL0) ................................................................................................................. 3

List of Acronyms and Non-English Terms ....................................................................................... 6

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 11

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 28

A. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN BEHSUD DISTRICT OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE ......... 31

1. Background: Behsud ............................................................................................................... 32 1.1. Geography .............................................................................................................................. 32 1.2. History .................................................................................................................................... 32 1.3. Demography ........................................................................................................................... 36 1.3.1. Ethnic Composition ............................................................................................................. 36 1.3.2. Migration Trends ................................................................................................................. 37 1.4. Economy ................................................................................................................................. 39 1.5. Services ................................................................................................................................... 40 1.6. Governance Structure ............................................................................................................ 41

2. Security and Access ................................................................................................................ 43 2.1. General Security Situation ...................................................................................................... 43 2.2. Feelings of Security ................................................................................................................. 44 2.3. Practices for Addressing Security in Behsud .......................................................................... 46

3. Landscape of Conflicts in Behsud ............................................................................................. 51 3.1. Main Conflict Trends .............................................................................................................. 51 3.2. Land-based Conflicts and Land Grabbing in Behsud .............................................................. 54

4. Access to Justice and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms ............................................................. 57 4.1. Conflict Resolution Processes: The Predominance of the Informal System .......................... 57 4.2. The Role of State Institutions in Justice Provision .................................................................. 59 4.3. Barriers to Access to Justice ................................................................................................... 60

5. Overview of Development Programming ................................................................................. 63

B. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN BAGRAMI DISTRICT OF KABUL PROVINCE ................. 65

1. Background: Bagrami ............................................................................................................. 66 1.1. Geography .............................................................................................................................. 66 1.2 Demography ............................................................................................................................ 66 1.3 History ..................................................................................................................................... 68 1.4 Governance Structure ............................................................................................................. 72 1.6 Services .................................................................................................................................... 80

2. Security and Access ................................................................................................................ 83 2.1. Criminality .............................................................................................................................. 83 2.2. Capacity of Security Forces ..................................................................................................... 84 2.3. Citizen Response ..................................................................................................................... 86 2.4. Armed Opposition Groups and Insurgency ............................................................................ 87

3. Landscape of Conflicts in Bagrami ........................................................................................... 89 3.1. Main Conflict Lines ................................................................................................................. 89 3.2. The Prominence of Land Grabbing ......................................................................................... 89

5

3.3. Major Conflicts by Area .......................................................................................................... 91

4. Access to Justice and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms ............................................................. 95 4.1. Preferred Justice Mechanisms ............................................................................................... 95 4.2. Access to Justice ..................................................................................................................... 97

5. Overview of Development Programming ................................................................................ 102

C. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN KAMA DISTRICT OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE ............ 103

1. Background: Kama ................................................................................................................. 104 1.1. Geography ............................................................................................................................ 104 1.2. History .................................................................................................................................. 104 1.3. Demographics ....................................................................................................................... 107 1.4. Economy ............................................................................................................................... 109 1.5. Access to Services ................................................................................................................. 110

2. Security and Access ............................................................................................................... 113 2.1. General Security Situation .................................................................................................... 113 2.2. Feelings of Security ............................................................................................................... 114 2.3. Addressing Security Threats in Kama ................................................................................... 117

3. Landscape of Conflicts in Kama .............................................................................................. 120 3.1. Main Conflict Trends in Kama............................................................................................... 120 3.2. The Centrality of Land .......................................................................................................... 121

4. Access to Justice and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms ........................................................... 123 4.1. Preferred Justice Mechanisms ............................................................................................. 123 4.2. Access to Justice ................................................................................................................... 127


D. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN ISTALIF DISTRICT OF KABUL PROVINCE .................... 131

1. Background: Istalif ................................................................................................................. 132 1.1. Geography ............................................................................................................................ 132 1.2. History .................................................................................................................................. 132 1.3. Demography ......................................................................................................................... 134 1.4. Economy ............................................................................................................................... 135 1.5. Access to Services ................................................................................................................. 136 1.6. Development Interventions in Istalif .................................................................................... 138

2. Security, Governance Structures, and Access .......................................................................... 139 2.1. Security Situation in the District ........................................................................................... 139 2.2. Perceptions of Security Threats and Responses to Them .................................................... 140 2.3. Balance of Power and Governance Structure ...................................................................... 142

3. Conflicts Landscape and Access to Justice ............................................................................... 146 3.1. Main Sources of Conflict ....................................................................................................... 146 3.2. Major Conflicts ..................................................................................................................... 147 3.3. Justice Processes .................................................................................................................. 148 3.4. Access to Justice ................................................................................................................... 150 3.5. Challenges and Outside Interventions ................................................................................. 152


Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 155

Appendix I: Interviews for This Report ....................................................................................... 158

6

List of Acronyms and Non-English Terms

ADVS Afghan Disabled and Vulnerable Society

Alaqadari /

Alaqadar

Sub-district / Leader of a sub-district

Ajnabi Outsiders

ALP Afghan Local Police

ANA Afghan National Army

ANBP Afghan National Border Police

ANP Afghan National Police

AOG Armed Opposition Group

Arbakai Generic term used to signify militia, usually pro-government

ARC Afghan Red Crescent

AWRC Afghan Women’s Resource Centre

Baad The practice of giving women as “payment” for an injury inflicted on another

party.

Badal In the context of marriage, an arrangement in which one family sends a child for

marriage to a second family, in return for the second family sending a child for

marriage to the first family.

Bâlâ High (part of the village/area)

BPRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration of the U.S. Department of State

Bumi Locals

Burqa Also known as a chadri, a women’s garment covering the totality of the body and

face with a mesh screen in front of the eyes

CARD-F Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility

CDC Community Development Council

Chadri Perhaps better known as burqa, a women’s garment covering the totality of the

7

body and face with a mesh screen in front of the eyes

CID Criminal Investigation Department

CSO Central Statistics Organization

DACAAR Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees

DCOP District Chief of Police

DDA District Development Assembly

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program.

DG District Governor

DnH Do No Harm

DoEc Department of Economy

DoEd Department of Education

DoLSA Department of Labour and Social Affairs

DoRR Department of Refugees and Returnees

DoWA Department of Women’s Affairs

DoYA Department of Youth Affairs

DRRD Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Edare Omur Presidential Office of Administrative Affairs

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FRU Family Response Unit

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Haq ‘ul abd Literally, “the rights of man”; as opposed to the “rights of God” (Haq-ullah) The

former generally overlaps with Western legal concepts such as civil law, i.e.

disputes between private individuals. The latter generally overlaps with Western

legal concepts such as the rights of the state, and the criminal law enforced via

state prosecution.

Hawze Geographical designation, larger than a village or neighborhood, but smaller than a

district or municipality.

8

HIG Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin

HIK Hizb-e Islami Khales

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IMF International Military Forces

IP Implementing Partner

IRC International Rescue Committee

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

Jerib Traditional unit of area measurement, in Eastern Afghanistan equivalent to 0.2 ha.

Jihad

"Holy" war against the Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan, and subsequent Afghan

Communist state; 1979-1992.

Jirga Traditional ad hoc conflict resolution mechanism

Jirgamar Person acting as a mediator in the jirga process.

Karez Traditional underground irrigation channel

Kuchi Pashtun (semi-)nomadic group

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

Machalgah As part of non-state dispute resolution processes, guarantee in cash or kind

provided by the dispute parties and returned to them once the dispute has been

resolved and both have agreed to the outcome of the resolution

Madrassa Islamic School

Mahr Dowry

Mahram Chaperone, usually a male relative, to accompany a woman on trips outside the

home

Malik Traditional village/community leader serving as representative for outside

interactions (e.g. with the state)

MoE Ministry of Education

MoRR Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation

9

MoWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs

MP Member of Parliament

MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Mujahideen Fighters in the jihad

Mullah Islamic clergy usually attached to a mosque

Naqilin Resettled populations

Nahiya City precinct

Namus The notion of namus encompasses considerations of honour, respect and modesty. In

Pashtun society, it is strongly associated to the chastity of women (as well as the

protection of one’s land), and by extension, to the honour of a household and/or extended

family, which the male head of household is responsible for protecting.

NDS National Directorate of Security

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NRC Norwegian Refugee Council

NSP National Solidarity Program

Pâin Low (part of the village/area)

PG Provincial Governor

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

Qawm Solidarity group. This term, most commonly translated as “tribe”, may describe

units usually considered smaller than tribes as such, up to, in a more recent

formulation, the entire Afghan nation.

Shafa Roughly “right of first refusal”: in some rural communities, neighbors or other

persons biologically or physically proximate to a person selling land must be given

the opportunity to buy the land in preference to other persons.

Shura Community council

SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

TLO The Liaison Office

Ulema Religious cleric or scholar

10

UN-Habitat UN Agency for Human Settlements Providing Adequate Shelter for All

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Waak Decision-making authority given by dispute parties to jirga members before the

initiation of subsequent jirga processes.

WASH Water Sanitation and Hygiene Education

WFP World Food Programme

11

Executive Summary

In order to assist Cordaid’s Security and Justice Business Unit (BUCSJ) in informing community-driven

projects in Bagrami and Istalif districts of Kabul and Behsud and Kama districts of Nangarhar, this

research focuses on justice and security issues, their relationship to one another, and, at least

indirectly, their impact on the target populations’ well-being. This report thus encompasses two

rapidly developing peri-urban areas: Bagrami, on the outskirts of Kabul, and Behsud, on the outskirts

of Jalalabad; and two rural districts, Kama and Istalif, that have reasonably easy access to major

urban centres.

In preparing this report, The Liaison Office (TLO) led the research and writing process, with assistance

from the Afghan Women’s Resource Centre (AWRC). Specific data on each district’s dispute

resolution and security systems, security and justice issues, major conflicts, and significant

stakeholders was collected between November 2013 and February 2014. TLO and AWRC conducted a

total of 70 interviews with community leaders influential at the district level (32 in Kabul, and 38 in

Nangarhar), 24 women’s leaders (six per target district), 24 development actors (six per district), and

20 government officials (12 in Kabul, 8 in Nangarhar).In addition, TLO and AWRC conducted four

FGDs in each Kabul district (two with men’s community leaders, two with women’s leaders), and five

FGDs in each Nangarhar district (three with men’s community leaders, two with women’s leaders) on

security and justice issues. In Kabul (but not Nangarhar, where TLO already possessed reliable data),

the research team conducted an additional 26 individual interviews and four FGDs per district,

primarily on district background (demographic, economic, etc.) and minority issues.

As much as possible, the research team endeavoured to select a panel of individuals from different

ethnic and professional backgrounds, and residents of distinct geographical locations inside the

districts. District officials and development were also interviewed extensively on a range of issues (7

interviews per district, 28 total), and the research team supplemented individual interviews with

surveys covering disputes experienced within the past year (25 locations in each district), major

disputes, shuras present in the district, and capsule biographies of major district stakeholders.

With this background in mind, the research team offers the following Conclusions on the target

districts, to be followed by summaries of findings in each district, as well as programming

recommendations:

In both peri-urban and rural areas, disputants at this time prefer non-state forums for

dispute resolution. Throughout the four districts, elders and religious leaders seem to

address the substantial majority of disputes, and most interviewees expressed more faith in

these sources of dispute resolution than they did in state processes. However, two caveats

apply. First, non-state dispute resolution practices are not uniform across the study area. For

example, tribal jirgas appear more prominent in Nangarhar areas, while tribal/area shuras

are more prominent in Bagrami, and individual maliks and religious leaders in Istalif. Second,

one should not mistake the current prominence of non-state forums for a strong normative

endorsement of their use. Rather, most interviewees, while expressing a current preference

for non-state forums, also expressed a desire for a stronger and less corrupt state apparatus

and, if such an apparatus existed, might prefer it to non-state forms of dispute resolution.

At the present time, however, most persons only use state dispute resolution services if

12

certain specific conditions obtain. In particular, disputants most often involve the state if

violence resulting in the loss of life has occurred, or if non-state processes have repeatedly

failed. This observation appears generally true across the study area, the only partial

exceptions occurring in Behsud and Bagrami, where power holders may be blocking some

persons from accessing state dispute resolution forums at all.

Within the study areas, insurgent presence is limited. Among target populations (including

some power holders) insurgent connections certainly exist, but no area hosts a long-term or

large-scale insurgent presence. Rather, according to the accounts of multiple interviewees

from diverse backgrounds, the main security threat in all study areas probably arises from

nominally pro-government power holders undermining both security and justice institutions.

Though present in all report areas, this threat appears notably more severe in Behsud and

Bagrami than in Kama and Istalif.

Along the same lines, within peri-urban areas, alleged land grabbing by power holders, or

with their backing, appears the most common cause of major disputes. In rural areas,

disputes over agricultural land and water are more common, seeming to comprise an

outright majority of all disputes. A minority of family disputes is taking place throughout the

examined districts, with disputes over inheritance appearing particularly numerous.

As with state dispute resolution institutions, respect for state security institutions was, in the

abstract, fairly robust. Indeed, many interviewees expressed support for the Afghan National

Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and other security services. However, under

present conditions, and particularly in peri-urban areas, interviewees also seemed to doubt

the ability of these institutions to function in an effective and impartial manner. In rural

areas, police capacity seemed better-respected, but clearly depends on community

cooperation, with the police otherwise having little ability to operate independently.

In all areas, women face dramatically higher barriers to accessing security and justice

institutions than do men. Although women in Kabul areas appeared to enjoy greater

freedom of movement, and hence institutional access, than did women in Nangarhar,

nowhere can women’s access be considered equal. Even in more permissive areas, families

often restrict young women to the home after puberty, and women almost always need to

rely on an intermediary in order to access justice and security institutions. Male relatives

probably most often fulfil this role, but a number of women’s institutions, in particular

women’s shuras, also exist in the target areas. These institutions appear effective in certain

circumstances, but many women do not have access to them, and their effectiveness very

much depends on the goodwill of male power holders.

There have been limited prior related interventions in these areas. Exceptions include

dispute resolution awareness-raising/training by Checchi Consulting in Nangarhar, and the

facilitation of women’s shuras by AWRC and Equality for Peace and Democracy in Kabul

province.

13

Behsud

Behsud district is located in the North of Nangarhar province, to the north and east of the provincial

capital, Jalalabad. Behsud benefits from strong connections to both the provincial centre and

Pakistan, as it sits astride the main highway leading to Torkham border and into the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as well as the paved highway to Kunar province.

The demographic composition of Behsud is heterogeneous, with a majority of Arabs divided into nine

sub-tribes (approximately 60%), who settled in the area centuries ago, followed by a variety of

Pashtun tribes (an estimated 31%, including Ahmadzai, Safi, Mohammadzai, Sahak, Chulazai,

Adrimzai, Bakhuan Kheil, Kakar, Mohmand, etc.), and with a minority of Kuchi nomads. The small but

influential Pashai minority is located in the village of Daman.

Between 300 and 500 families (2,100-3,500 individuals) primarily from neighbouring districts and

provinces are mentioned to have settled in the district recently (though this is perhaps an

underestimate of the total influx). Their relations with long-time residents were reported to be

generally good, though some conflicts related to migration have emerged.

History of Behsud

Before the Saur Revolution, the area of Behsud was known to be close to the government. With a

substantial number of relatively large landowners, the rise to power of the Communists was by and

large not well perceived in Behsud and the Saur Revolution enjoyed little support outside of the

areas closer to Jalalabad City. However, until 1992, the government maintained control of the

district.

During and after the Soviet war, the strongest Mujahideen faction in Behsud was the Hizb-e Islami

Gulbuddin (HIG), controlled by Engineer Ghaffar with a force of over 30 armed lieutenants. After the

fall of Najibullah, Behsud was then taken over by a combined force of commanders coming from

neighbouring districts. Under the heavy influence of the Nangarhar Jihadi Shura, the Mujahideen era

was reportedly a violent period in Behsud. Regular checkpoints were set up across the district,

controlling Jihadi Shura identity documents and gun licenses, without which one could neither

circulate freely nor hold a weapon.

The takeover of Behsud by the Taliban and the consequent transfer of power occurred with some

level of violence and bloodshed, especially around the airport, which had been under the control of

Haji Hazrat Ali, who remains a major power holder in Behsud to this day. Haji Hazrat Ali is

unanimously considered as the only commander to have substantively resisted the Taliban, before

fleeing the area. Smaller commanders remained in the district, and now constitute most of Behsud’s

maliks.

With the American takeover of Jalalabad in 2001, all Taliban “took their blankets and fled to Pakistan

[at the] Parachinar crossing”, without considerable resistance and no bloodshed. Since that time, ex-

Jihadi power holders have reasserted themselves and now constitute Behsud’s governing class.

Governance in Behsud

At the district level, existing government institutions include the District Governor’s Office, a District

Primary Court, and the District Police Office. Justice and security services are provided by the District

Court, the Huqooq Department, and the Chief of Police. All mentioned lacking staff and sufficient

facilities.

14

The only Government registered shura in Behsud is the District Development Assembly (DDA), de

facto responsible for monitoring the work of the Community Development Councils (CDCs). The DDA

is composed of 30 members – mainly maliks and local elders, including 10 women, representing

different tribes present in the district. That being said, the electoral process appears quite obscure,

as DDA members freely admit no competitive election took place. Rather than an election as such,

the Behsud DDA’s composition appears to be based more on a system of cooptation rooted in an

elite consensus.

Major Nangarhar power holders also exert a strong influence on Behsud’s governance, reportedly

preventing both formal and informal governance and dispute resolution mechanisms from operating

in an impartial manner, and provoking conflicts via the grabbing of land. At present, Behsud’s major

power holders include former Nangarhar Police Chief and current MP “Haji” Hazrat Ali and his now

brother-in-law Gul Karim (Pashai), Jawad Zaman (Khogyani), Zaher Qadir (MP from Surkh Rod and the

son of Haji Qadir, assassinated leader of the Nangarhar Jihadi Shura), Engineer Ghaffar (Arab, MP and

former mayor of Jalalabad), and Mirwais Yassini (from Kama district, First Deputy Speaker of the

Lower House of Parliament) – who notably supports the new governor of Nangarhar, Mawlawi

Ataullah Ludin.

Security in Behsud

Behsud district is overall considered secure from an insurgency point of view and is almost entirely

under government control, as there is no day-to-day active insurgency in the district. That being said,

there are strong indications of a deterioration of this situation in the past two years, with the

government having reportedly lost control of some limited areas, such as Malawi Khales Family, or

having only partial control over other locations, with variations according to the time of the day.

Respondents also reported night letters, occasional IEDs, and periodic rocket attacks on the airport.

Nevertheless, large numbers of government employees and pro-government power holders continue

to call the district home, indicating that such insecurity is the exception rather than the rule.

The Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and Afghan Local Police (ALP) are all present in the

district – though some respondents considered the number of police forces to be insufficient as

compared to the district population. There are several small ANP checkpoints spread out across the

district and three larger checkpoints on Kama Bridge, in Farm-e Ada, and in the district centre.

International security forces are further present, at the Jalalabad Airfield and Nangarhar PRT.

Murder, theft, mugging, and kidnapping for ransom, including kidnapping of government officials,

were mentioned as occurring on a regular basis in the district (though TLO does not have access to

independent reportorial or statistical sources to verify this claim). Broadly speaking, Behsud residents

attributed insecurity to two causes. On the one hand, interviewees relate most day-to-day criminal

incidents to adverse economic conditions. On the other, they tend to attribute more severe criminal

incidents less to insurgents than to criminal networks tied to the government itself

Justice in Behsud

Most disputes in Behsud are reportedly over land, followed by conflicts over women and family

related issues (including disputes over inheritance), minor criminal cases such as theft, and major

criminal cases. Out of the 268 disputes surveyed for this study in 25 villages, 79 were reportedly over

land, 56 cases were both criminal and civil disputes, and 54 were family disputes; the remainder

being commercial, over water, and major criminal disputes (understood as cases where murder is the

15

only root of the conflict, as opposed to cases where murder is induced by another more minor

offense).

The fact that a significant proportion of disputes were mentioned to be “both criminal and civil” can

be explained by the apparent high rate of conflict escalation, with disputes between children and/ or

women reportedly often deteriorating into violent disputes between families, involving injuries and

death. The importance of networks of power and solidarity in the district are a potential factor of

further escalation of initially minor disputes into violent conflicts, as disputants sometimes invoke

their supporters or protectors, turning a personal dispute into a struggle for influence.

Out of the 268 disputes which have occurred in the past year surveyed for this study, 259 (over 96%)

were reportedly addressed and solved by the village shura/jirga, five by the District Shura (DDA),

three addressed by the District Governor, and one by the District Court. The two cases surveyed

which were first addressed to the Chief of Police were more or less automatically sent back to elders

for resolution. This was a trend confirmed by the Chief of Police himself, who explained he was

referred an average of 20 cases a month, and sent most of them back to elders for resolution. For

small conflict and family issues, particularly, respondents thus indicated they first went to family and

tribe members – notably in order to avoid publicizing the case. Interestingly, the head of Court

himself emphasized that elders had a higher capacity for dispute resolution and underlined the

“vital” role of jirgas in justice processes.

That being said, and as has already been tackled above, the satisfaction with the functioning of the

informal justice system in Behsud needs to be nuanced. There were mentions of corrupt practices

and nepotism, notably among maliks who are among the main informal justice providers –

something on which women particularly insisted.

The impact of the influence of powerbrokers and groups associated with them on the access to

justice of residents was underlined on several occasions. This reportedly constitutes the main

obstacle to access to justice for men, as interference by third parties in conflicts disturbs justice

mechanisms and preserves their supporters from potentially adverse outcomes.

Concerning women’s access to justice and security services, and despite accounts by male

respondents that women had direct access to all justice forums in the district, female respondents

insisted they not to have direct access to jirgas, the police, or other government officials. Women

notably first have to go through male family members exclusively (including only going to

governmental offices with a chaperone, or mahram), facing the risk of suffering from mistreatment if

they do not, as doing so would be considered as a breach of the honour of male relatives in the

family.

16

Bagrami

Bagrami district is located to the east of Kabul Province, 20-30 minutes by car from Kabul City. It is

bordered to west by Kabul City, to the north by the Kabul River, Surobi to the east, and the Shakh

Baramta mountains to the south. Given its proximity with Kabul (Bagrami centre is located 6 km

away from the outskirts of Kabul City, and 15 km from the centre of the capital) and increasing

demographic pressure, the district faces a shortage of land. The district population is composed of

approximately 50-60% of Pashtun tribes, and 40%-50% Tajik residents, with a small minority of

Turkmen tribes (less than 5%).

Pashtuns are located mainly in the east of the district (Lata Band, Alu Khail, Hussein Khail, Gosfand

Dara) and divided into a variety of tribes and sub-tribes of which the Ahmadzai are the largest (about

60% of the Pashtuns, which notably has a small Kuchi subtribe, the Musa Khail), followed by the Tara

Khail. Other Pashtun tribes include the Sahak, Dawlatzai (also with Kuchi), Babakar Khail, Hussein

Khail, Yusoufzai, Mohammadzai, Mamozai, Marufzai, Alu Khail, Miah Khail, Hod Khail, Niazi and

Noorani.

Tajik residents are settled in Shiwaki, Qala-e Hassan Khan, Qala-e Ahmad Khan, Beni Sar, Qala-e

Neman, But Khak, Sheena, and are divided between Tajik ‘Am (“regular Tajiks”) and Tajik Babraki

(from the tribe of Babrak Karmal, president during the Communist government). The small minority

of Turkmen tribes are located in the central part of the district.

Bagrami witnessed significant immigration after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and more than half of

the population is considered to be ajnabi (outsiders) who migrated in search of land for housing in

the vicinity of Kabul and economic opportunities in the capital. In-flow includes refugee returnees

coming back from abroad, and persons originally from the provinces of Laghman, Kunar, Nangarhar,

Kapisa, Logar, Paktia, and Khost, among others, as well as 200-300 Pashai families from Nooristan.

Kuchis from Loya Paktia and Nangarhar are additionally buying land and settling. Different tribes and

ethnic groups reportedly cultivate good links (“like brothers”) and live in a rather mixed environment.

Despite accounts of good relationships between immigrants and locals, a recurrent and strict

distinction appeared in interviews between the ajnabi and the bumi (locals). That being said, tribal

affiliations (mostly Ahmadzai – particularly Musa Khail and But Khak), reportedly help in easing

relationships. This presence of tribal solidarity groups, however, can in some circumstances cause

disputes to quickly escalate, particularly conflicts over land.

History of Bagrami

Bagrami has been strategic for the control of Kabul during the various regimes. When the People’s

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power in 1978, the government enjoyed a

comfortable support base in the district, with several high government officials, and the

aforementioned President, coming from the area.

Given the strategic location of Bagrami, the Mujahideen soon tried to control the district, which was

heavily contested and experienced a great deal of fighting. The Mujahideen, however, were unable

to take control until 1992, and soon thereafter fighting broke out between the two most prominent

Jihadi parties in the area, the Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and the Jamiat-e Islami. Several of these

commanders would come to gain significant power during the current government, using their tribal

17

and factional networks, and taking advantage of the weakness of the Karzai administration to

allegedly grab land.

In 1996, the Taliban took over control of the district shortly after Kabul, with some of the prominent

Mujahideen commanders defecting to them. Others joined the oppositions or went into exile.

During the US-led intervention in 2001, the district was taken over by Commander Ehsan (Jamiat-e

Islami), who took position as District Governor for three consecutive years. In the context of the

district government having rather loose administrative control of the area, former commanders and

powerbrokers re-settled in the district and engaged in large-scale land grabbing1 and the forging of

land documents.

Governance in Bagrami

Government institutions present in Bagrami include the District Governor’s Office, a District Primary

Court, and the District Police Office, as well as the following line departments: Finance, Religious

Affairs and Haj, Interior, Education, Agriculture, Irrigation and Water, Justice, Counter Narcotics,

Central Statistics, National Directorate of Security, and the Attorney General (Prosecutor).

The significant influence of power holders, most prominently MPs, has a strong impact on the formal

district government, as the space for manoeuvre of district officials is often shaped by their links with

specific powerbrokers. Bagrami thus has witnessed a high turnover of district officials. The current

Chief of Police and the District Governor were appointed in the beginning of January 2014. All

previous district governors were allegedly removed due to their involvement in cases of land

grabbing.

Currently, Kuchi MP Mawlawi Tara Khail is probably Bagrami’s most significant power holder, as well

as, reportedly, land-grabber. His main rival, and occasional collaborator, is Allah Gul Mujahid, also an

MP. Both appear to be occupying thousands of jeribs of dubiously acquired land both in Bagrami and

around Kabul. They, along with other major Bagrami power holders, have constructed shahraks

(townships) on the land they control, set up manned checkpoints not under police command, and

appear to monopolize dispute resolution provision in their areas of influence.

Informal governance structures include a Malik Shura, an Ulema Shura, and a District Development

Assembly, said to be in charge of supervising projects funded under the National Solidarity

Programme (though this would actually exceed the DDA’s formal mandate). The DDA is composed of

30 members – mainly maliks and local elders, including 10 women, representing different tribes

present in the district. As in Behsud positions on the DDA seem to have been allotted based on elite

consensus, with no competitive election taking place.

Main functioning governance structures at the sub-district level are reportedly the village shuras,

primarily involved in dispute resolution - including criminal cases for some - and projects such as

provision of electricity or rehabilitation of roads. Though most CDCs have reportedly not remained

functional at the village level, “cluster CDCs”, grouping several villages together around a project, are

still operating. Youth shuras and women’s CDCs have also been established and are still functioning.

1 For this report, TLO has not offered an ex ante definition of land grabbing. We have not done so because, for

present purposes, the perception that a certain action or actions constitutes land grabbing is probably more important than applying a rigorous definition of the term, in that it is this perception that shapes community response.

18

That being said, women’s CDC members reported having little capacity of choice or decision-making

power regarding the programmes to be implemented and remain under the strict control of men’s

CDCs.

As with official government officials, the margin of action of specific shuras, their capacity to carry

out projects and work independently from the district authorities, seems to be strongly correlated to

the power networks of their individual members. For example, of the tribal and village shuras, one of

the most prominent is the Babakar Khail Shura of Nawabad (Karte Ghaffar Khan), which benefits

from high connections through its members to power holders.

Security in Bagrami

Unlike in neighbouring districts there seem to be few reported Taliban activities in the area, with

primary problems of security including both small scale criminal activities (petty theft, mugging when

travelling in public transport) and major criminality – including murder, robbery, drug dealing,

kidnapping, and the settling of personal scores via bloodshed. The occurrence of crimes allegedly

increases during the night. Most respondents emphasized the insufficiency of security forces to cover

the district and efficiently address security threats. Entire areas are out of police control, and, as

above, local power holders have set up their own checkpoints around their shahraks and the land

they are said to have grabbed.

As they reportedly do not trust the capacity of the police to intervene efficiently, residents have set

up their own security system, assisting the police in conducting patrols, or conducting patrols

themselves with light weapons or hunting guns. In at least one village local residents reported having

set up a 15 member arbakai in charge of ensuring the security of villagers. Other arbakai also seem

to be in existence, and there are rumours of forced recruitment of young men who have no other job

opportunities. Many villagers, especially women, appear concerned about the increasing

proliferation of armed groups in their area.

Justice in Bagrami

The most widespread types of disputes in Bagrami were mentioned to be over family and inheritance

issues, with land – given the significant occurrence of land grabbing in the past decade – at the heart

of the most serious and longstanding conflicts in the district.

The most widespread forums for dispute resolution by far in Bagrami are informal mechanisms at the

village level. This includes first community or tribal shuras, individual elders or religious leaders, and

the Ulema Shura. Many villages reported resolving cases exclusively through their local shuras in the

past year.

Taking into account all forums, justice actors in Bagrami include, among state actors, the District

Attorney, the Judge, the Head of Huqooq, the Provincial Council, the District Governor and the Chief

of Police. An additional, qualitatively distinct, sort of informal justice in Bagrami is the intervention in

dispute resolution and provision of justice by local power holders in the areas they control.

Indeed, a main concern for justice in Bagrami is the perceived impunity of criminals and private

militias due to widespread corruption, interference and protection of power holders and high-

ranking government officials, enhancing a general feeling of powerlessness and profound distrust in

the government. Similarly, throughout the research, respondents gave numerous accounts of corrupt

practices by the court and district officials when involved in justice procedures, including a high level

19

of involvement in land grabbing, and attempts to disrupt justice mechanisms.

Female respondents further explained their access to justice was limited throughout the district,

notably as the main forums of resolution are informal ones almost always barred to women. Women

are not able to participate in dispute resolution, and are only able to access men’s justice forums

with the permission of, and if represented by, a male family member. Although a number of forums

targeted specifically at women exist, such as women’s shuras, their utilization seems limited.

20

Kama

Kama district is located in the east of the oriental province of Nangarhar, 45 minutes away by car

from Jalalabad, and four hours from Kabul. It is bordered by Jalalabad and Behsud to the west and

south. Physically, the district is cut in half along a diagonal running northwest to southeast, with a

fertile valley spreading between the Kabul and Kunar rivers in the southwest of Kama – where the

majority of the district population is concentrated

There are an approximate 180 – 250,000 people living in the district, distributed across 59 village

clusters which constitute Kama’s main social units. Kama is majority Pashtun, the most important

tribes (in terms of population) being the Mohmand (20%), Ibrahim Khail (12%), and Umer Khail

(10%); the rest being divided into Ludin, Akhundzada Khail, Amar Khail, Bajauri, Miran, Kharuti, Malla

Khail, Afridi, Arbaban, Niazi, Abdul Rahimzai, Naseri, Safi, Mita Khail, Chiqtai, and Soltan Khail (settled

Kuchis). There is also a minority of Arabs (1%) and Tajiks (0.5%).

Over the past couple of years, Kama district, like Behsud, witnessed immigration from insecure

Nangarhar districts (Chaperhar, Khogyani, Hisarak; Cipay from Bati kot; Mohmands from Goshta and

Mohmand Dara), and also from neighbouring provinces such as Kunar and Laghman, as well as from

Bajaur Agency across the border in Pakistan. Though most respondents mentioned the relationship

between long settled population and newcomers was overall good, there were some expressions of

concern about the length of the latter’s stay, the importation of their rivalries, and the possibility of

infiltration of insurgents from insecure areas.

History of Kama

Kama has historically been very close to Jalalabad, and, aside from the Communist era, did not

display particular resistance to successive Afghan governments. After the Saur Revolution in April

1978, the PDPA did not at first encounter any significant resistance, and reportedly enjoyed a small

support base in Kama. However, after this brief spell of peace, anti-PDPA resistance erupted. The

district fell out of government control by 1980, and thereafter suffered from regular, heavy aerial

bombardments.

These bombardments prevented Mujahideen factions from establishing any stronghold in the area,

while the Mujahideen maintained enough presence to exclude government elements. Hizb-e Islami

Gulbuddin and Hizb-e Islami Khales (HIK) established themselves as the two strongest Jihadi factions

in Kama. After the fall of the Najibullah government, these factions appear to have more-or-less

united and governed Kama in a fashion less abusive than seems to have been common elsewhere,

though not to the extent that residents of Kama wanted Mujahideen governance to continue.

Indeed, the arrival of the Taliban in 1996 triggered the flight of the Jihadi commanders, while smaller

sargroups (lieutenants) were disarmed and remained in the district, or jailed if they opposed

disarmament. While the population did not oppose the Taliban with significant resistance the

implementation of their rather strict code, as well as a continuously poor economic situation,

gradually turned the population against the new power holders, triggering civil disobedience and the

flight of much of the population to Pakistan an approximate six months after the fall of the

Mujahideen.

After the US invasion and the fall of the Taliban regime in Jalalabad, Taliban elements in Kama

reportedly left the district peacefully, with some remaining in the district and dropping weapons.

21

Currently, former Jihadi commanders have regained influence in Kama. Mawlawi Ataullah Ludin –

Kama native, local HIG Commander, former MP and member of the High Peace Council and current

Governor of Nangarhar – still enjoys a high reputation in the district and conserves significant

influence. The current District Governor, Haji Zalmi (Kuchi), is also a former HIG Commander.

Security in Kama

In terms of insurgency, the security situation in Kama is considered to be good, with government

control and reported police access to the entire district. All male respondents mentioned there were

no times of the day when they did not feel secure, no area in the district where they were unsafe,

and that all roads were open and free for circulation of people and goods.

There were some occasional accounts of passive Taliban support in the district, especially on behalf

of some of the women respondents. Some women respondents gave accounts of potential insecurity

and presence of insurgents in the villages of Mama Khail, Mirza Khail, Zakhil, Darbang, Shirgar, and

Zarshoi, where a young man was recently arrested on suspicion of being a Taliban supporter.

However, the police have reportedly managed to gain control over these areas. Kama also

experiences, regularly if not frequently, IED attacks against police vehicles.

Along the same lines, there were unanimous reports of increasing small criminality, such a theft, as

well as occurrences of kidnapping for ransom, and occasional murder. Violent confrontations often

derive from rivalries among and between families, which the District Chief of Police reported to be at

the root of as much as “85%” of security problems.

The ANP and the ANA are both present, with the ANA in the District Centre and in the area of Ghakhi,

and three ANP posts on Kama Bridge, in the District Centre and in Gerdab. Police forces in Kama

count a total of 46 policemen and 8 police lieutenants, a staff considered by both residents and the

District Chief of Police to be insufficient to cover Kama’s 59 villages.

The first source people turn to for protection was thus mentioned to be tribal elders and members of

the community. In case of harassment of girls on the way to school, for example, the first step would

be to contact the family of the boy, in a second instance the head master of the, and only as a last

resort the police. Police and district authorities were notably said to be contacted “as the law

compels us to”, but rarely on a preferential basis.

Several respondents mentioned “tribal treaties” used to set a framework for cooperation and a base

of procedures if a dispute should occur, but added that their application is undermined by the lack of

capacity to enforce them. They were further presented as a temporary alternative to lack of

community-government cooperation, with signs of a strong openness to government intervention in

security issues.

Finally, reports emerged of criminals arrested but then released without being punished if they

benefit from some sort of support or can afford bribes, creating a feeling of injustice among the

population. However, these practices do not appear to be as institutionalized as in Behsud, for

instance, and there were no mentions of networks of support allowing organized bands of criminals

to perpetrate crimes with impunity.

Justice in Kama

The overwhelming majority of conflicts in Kama include considerations over land, which was

reported as the cause of 36% of the 186 disputes surveyed at the village level – with respondents to

22

individual interviews and focus group discussions mentioning proportions as high as 60-80% of all

cases in the district. Land also remains at the centre of most longstanding conflicts, with some dating

back several decades – the resolution process being impeded by the size of the disputed area at

stake (over 20 jeribs), and the reported involvement of power holders in the conflict.

Based on data collected for this study, the preferred resolution mechanisms remain informal (jirgas,

elders, maliks). That being said, the proportion of cases referred directly to elders, though they enjoy

a higher rate of resolution, remains significantly lower than in other areas of the province, and the

proportion addressed to the government higher. Unlike in Behsud, where most respondents

explained being dissatisfied with formal processes, there were some occurrences of satisfaction with

the formal system among Kama residents.

Out of the 186 cases recorded as part of the village survey for this study, a little over 50% were thus

addressed to jirgas – with a 100% rate of resolution, 26% to the District Governor, 10% to the District

Court (more than half of which are still awaiting resolution), 9% to the District Chief of Police (most

of which were automatically transferred to the District Attorney or the court) and 5% to the DDA.

The decision to refer a case to a specific organ or authority appears to depend upon the type of case,

with jirgas being addressed mainly conflicts over land, water and family disputes (though the latter

remain within the family whenever possible). Along with family elders, ulemas are referred

inheritance cases. District authorities, by contrast, are addressed in priority for minor and major

criminal cases, though the DG is also involved in the resolution of some land cases.

Finally, women’s access to justice and security services seems to be primarily impeded by their lack

of liberty of movement. As underlined earlier, a woman by herself filing a case in a government office

would be considered shameful and inappropriate. Women can further not access informal forums of

justice provision, and can neither attend a jirga, nor otherwise participate in the dispute resolution

process (except perhaps by private lobbying of their male relatives). If involved in a dispute, they

have to send a mahram to represent them – hence depending on the acceptance of their male family

members to report an exaction or a crime.

23

Istalif

Overlooking the vast Shomali plain from the western foothills of the Hindu Kush, Istalif district is

located in the northwest of Kabul province. Villages appear to be considered as relatively important

economic and social hubs, placed under the control of a malik in charge of maintaining relations with

district authorities and responsible for coordinating and redistributing assistance among the families

he oversees.

According to information collected form respondents on the field, Istalif district has a population of

approximately 60 – 70,000 persons, of which close to 90% are Tajiks (including a small minority of

Shia Tajiks), less than 10% Sunni Hazaras, and the rest Pashtuns. There is reportedly one Pashtun

village, Shuraba, located in the north of the district, and three Hazara villages in the West of Istalif:

Karkut, Kalan Chatri and Kutalak. Shias are settled in the village of Bâghi Taqie in the southwest, and

Tajiks spread out throughout the entire district.

Though Tajiks acknowledge forming a single tribe, two Tajik groups can be distinguished: Sâadat (or

Sayyeds2, an approximate 40%) and ‘Âm (an approximate 60%). Among the Hazaras, there are 10%

Khuja, and 90% ‘Âm. Pashtuns are divided into two sub-tribes, the Shinwari (30%) and the Kharuti

(70%), both concentrated in the same area and cultivating strong links.

Overall, very little inward movement of population was reported to be currently taking place in the

district. Conversely, high seasonal variations of income notably triggers the winter migration of most

of the male population – especially youth – to Kabul, and there were reports of increasing permanent

migration out of the district to the capital or abroad, in search of better livelihoods opportunities.

History of Istalif

Due to Istalif’s geographical location on the “skirts of the mountain” (Koh Daman) its control has

historically been strategic to holding the region of Kabul, which goes toward accounting for its

tumultuous history. After the Saur Revolution, the PDPA’s control over the area was restricted to the

surroundings of Takht-e Istalif, in the current district centre. In 1982, given the perceived

ineffectiveness of keeping troops in Istalif, the PDPA government called back to Kabul its soldiers

posted in the area, who were escorted by Mujahideen to the nearest PDPA checkpoint on the north-

south highway.

Jamiat-e Islami was the strongest Jihadi faction in Istalif, followed by Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin. After

the fall of the PDPA, and under pressure from Ahmad Shah Massoud, Istalif Mujahideen commanders

committed to put an end to their rivalry and joined a newly created military regiment, headed, with

Massoud’s support, by Sufi Razzaq, who was seconded by Haji Mohammad, former Harikat-e Inqilab

commander who defected to the Jamiat in 1992.

In September 1996, the Taliban progressed swiftly across the northern part of Kabul province,

reaching Istalif through Shakar Dara and Farza districts two days after their capture of the capital,

and continuing towards Panjshir without meeting significant resistance. This resulted in the flight of

most Istalifi Jihadi commanders to Panjshir, while two Pashtun commanders and one Tajik HIG

commander joined the Taliban. Eventually, United Front forces ejected the Taliban from Istalif. The

second Taliban attack on Istalif devolved into revenge on the local population for their assumed

support to anti-Taliban forces. Villages were looted and burnt down, causing the flight of the majority

2 Considered as descendants of Prophet Mahomet through his daughter Fatima and Ali Ibn Abi Talib.

24

of the population to Panjshir, as well as Kabul, Pakistan and Iran.

With the fall of the Taliban, past commanders took back their influence in the district. Commander

Sufi Razzaq, probably Istalif’s main power holder, returned to the area, whereupon he joined the

National Directorate of Security (NDS), while also reportedly enjoying the backing of influential

elements in the Jamiat-e Islami political party. Kabul MP and former adviser to the President

Amanullah Gozar is also said to retain a high degree of influence in the district.

Governance in Istalif

At the local level, village shuras appear to be the main decision making and governance bodies,

involved in most aspects of social life, from conflict resolution, to reporting security threats and

drawing assistance to specific villages. Village shuras reportedly cultivate close ties with government

authorities – mainly the District Governor and the Chief of Police. “Aside from security”, reported

one of the participants in a Focus group, “all the problems are solved by the shuras.”

At the district level, the district counts an Ulema Shura, a Community Shura, a Women’s Shura, and a

Malik Shura. The District Development Assembly is in charge of planning and distributing assistance

in coordination with district officials. There were some reports of DDA members misusing their

influence, and of corrupt practices to attract assistance to specific areas.

With that said, the role of these local shuras is dependent on, or counterbalanced by, the influence

of some maliks (often shura members themselves, though they assume individual responsibility in

decision making) and former Jihadi commanders who still enjoy a high degree of influence in the

district.

Security in Istalif

General security in Istalif district is reportedly good. Respondents mentioned there being no

insurgency in the district, and no drug trafficking. There were no mentions of political assassination

or rivalries between tribes – though some individuals gave accounts of persisting old rivalries

between Jihadi commanders.

Neither international security forces nor the Afghan National Army forces (ANA) is officially present

in Istalif, and the Afghan National Police (ANP) shoulders the burden for peacekeeping and

maintenance of security.

Respondents expressed unanimous satisfaction with the performance of the police. Based on

recurrent accounts by both male and female interviewees, district residents and the ANP appear to

collaborate to a significant extent. However, satisfaction expressed with the ANP is reportedly recent

and tied to the arrival of the current Chief of Police a month ago – thus calling for caution in

interpretation of these reports

Though respondents insisted there were few security threats in the district, they did note occasional

night robbery – the causes of which were mentioned to be rooted in poverty and unemployment,

and delinquent activities perpetrated by young men. Practices such as gambling and drug

consumption (mainly hashish, though there were occasional mentions of opium use as well), were

notably mentioned by women as harmful to their security.

Justice in Istalif

Data indicates disputes in Istalif are mainly over land, water rights and inheritance. Given the high

25

reliance on agriculture for income for most Istalifis, these three causes are often intertwined, with

the majority of inheritance disputes being over land shares distributed between brothers, for

instance, or disputes over water shares deriving from the necessity of properly irrigating agricultural

land. Most of these disputes arise between individuals, though a few of them do involve entire

communities

Poverty, harsh living conditions, and alleged promiscuity are also counted as responsible for the

development of disputes within and between families. At the same time, water is at the root of more

serious conflicts. Most such conflicts derive from disagreements over whose turn it is to use water

for irrigation.

Conflict resolution is highly reliant on traditional elders and maliks who are reportedly involved in the

resolution of 95% of conflicts. Village shuras constitute the main dispute resolution institution, and

were described as following by one of the interviewees: “A combination of elders, mullahs and

maliks who resolve conflicts for disputants in a third place or location [i.e. not in any of the

disputants’ houses]; after that the parties go, accompanied by the jirga/ shura members, to each

other’s houses.” A significant characteristic of dispute resolution in Istalif appears to be the

importance of the role of mullahs, mawlawis and mosques. Both male and female respondents

insisted that consulting the local mullah was one of the initial steps in resolving a dispute, and

religious figures are almost systematically involved in shuras when discussing the resolution of a

dispute.

Interviewees described the process for the resolution of a conflict in Istalif as the following: a case is

first addressed to the elders, who, in consultation with the local mullah, gather in order to find a

solution based on conciliation between the two parties. If the parties disagree with the solution

proposed, and several attempts at resolution fail, the case is then transferred to the District

Governor’s office and the Huqooq. Conflicts referred to the District Governor are almost

systematically referred back to elders’ shuras for resolution, and the DG reportedly cultivates strong

links with most of the maliks and district elders.

It is therefore only in cases when conciliation between disputant parties failed, both after

consultation of tribal elders and the district office, that the court is mobilized through the Huqooq in

civil cases, or through the Police in criminal cases.

As in the other districts examined here, several factors impede women’s access to justice:

particularly their limited freedom of movement, the importance of notions of honour, and the

prevalence of biases against women on behalf of male justice providers. As women related disputes,

or conflicts in which one of the disputants is a woman, seldom exit the family’s or community’s

boundaries, women’s channels of information and access to justice also remain fairly limited.

26

Recommendations

With this information and analysis in mind, TLO thus offers the following recommendations:

For Implementing Organizations:

As a general proposition, security and justice programming appears possible in all target

areas. All areas are accessible to both national and international personnel (although,

especially in Bagrami, local intermediaries should be consulted before travel to the area).

Further, there does not appear to be any population segment which would, in the abstract,

oppose such programming, although implementers should expect substantial variation in

community acceptance depending upon the precise content of programming.

For this reason, international organizations should work to identify local partner

organizations with long experience in the target areas and close relations to community

leaders. Although no substitute for community consultation, working with local partner

organizations can serve as a valuable bridge to identify local stakeholders and then

implement in a way sensitive to ground realities. Working with local partners also holds the

potential to enhance program or project sustainability, as these partners are probably more

likely to maintain on-the-ground presence than are non-Afghan organizations.

Several interviewees also expressed a desire for the provision of legal training/awareness-

raising. In TLO’s experience, community acceptance of this sort of programming is also

relatively painless. With that said, any implementer should only proceed after systematic

community consultation.

For the Afghan Government

Continued engagement with local leaders outside of the government is key. Research for this

study strongly indicates that local government is most effective when it partners with local

community leaders, for example to enable increased police patrolling. By contrast, no local

government examined here appears to have the ability to impose its will unilaterally, and

only a limited ability to carry out basic governance functions without more or less explicit

community acquiescence.

With that said, all community governance structures examined here also appear capable of

abuse and corruption, albeit some more than others. However, given the limitations on the

power and authority of local government detailed throughout this report, simply attempting

to go around local leaders outside of government does not seem a realistic possibility.

Rather, the amelioration of abusive and corrupt practices will need to take place via dialogue

and voluntary action.

For International Organizations and Foreign Governments

Evidence developed here, although limited, indicates that the presence of foreign military

forces has probably harmed the reputation of international and foreign entities more

generally. This is especially so as international military forces seem to operate with sub-

optimal unity of command, and often at cross-purposes. International or foreign intervention

at the sub-provincial level thus appears very problematic, and should be avoided. If for any

reason deemed essential, this intervention should take place in as low-profile a manner as

possible, and, as with interventions more generally, only after having identified a reliable

27

local intermediary, such as, but not limited to, a local non-governmental organization.

For All Stakeholders

Within each district, any intervention should be balanced by tribe/ethnicity and geographic

area of intervention. This is so both because community rivalries at the sub-district level are

common, and programming in one area, but not the other, might exacerbate them; and

because some areas have received a notable dearth of prior donor intervention.

Finally, power holder interference in programming is possible. Deliberately trying to exclude

power holders would be fruitless, and possibly counter-productive. Rather, it is here where

identifying trusted intermediaries with target communities becomes crucial, so that dialogue

between implementers and communities occurs on a regular basis, and, if interference in

programming should occur, disruption can be minimized through proactive engagement.

28

Introduction

In many aspects, justice mechanisms and security of persons and communities are intrinsically linked.

Functioning and efficient justice mechanisms ensure the population can address its grievances,

minimize tensions within and between communities, and contribute to protecting citizens from

crime, external aggression, and intentional incidents putting at stake the physical, and to some

extent, the psychological security of citizens. A secure environment, promoting freedom of

movement and enhancing trust in local institutions, also contributes to the proper functioning of

justice mechanisms.

In order to assist Cordaid’s Security and Justice Business Unit (BUCSJ) in informing community-driven

projects in Behsud and Kama districts of Nangarhar, and Bagrami and Istalif districts of Kabul, this

research focuses on justice and security issues, their relationship to one another, and, at least

indirectly, their impact on target populations’ well-being. While recognizing the complexity and

interdependence of a wide range of factors, the present report does not have the ambition to

encompass all environmental, socio-economic, or political aspects which might impact the well-being

of communities. “Justice” will here be understood as processes intended to peacefully resolve

disputes between persons or groups of persons, and presided by a purportedly neutral entity.

“Security“ is likewise addressed in the strict sense of protection against threats and intended

incidents causing, or intended to cause, physical and/or material damage. Thus the term here used

will not embrace broader aspects of human security, ranging from emotional security, economic

stability and predictability of income, to national/international governance issues.

With these points in mind, the specific objectives of the present study are to:

1. Understand conflicts and the ability of local resources (particularly formal or informal justice

institutions) to address those conflicts.

2. Understand district security, sources of district insecurity, and the ability of local resources to

address any insecurity that might be present.

Given the importance of developing a general understanding of the intervention context in which

programming might occur, a presentation of the socio economic background of each district will first

be provided. For each district, subsequent sections will then move on to describe the security

situation, including perceptions by local residents, the current landscape of conflicts, mechanisms

used to resolve them, the challenges that face these mechanisms, and, finally, past development

interventions.

Section A of this report covers Behsud district; Section B covers Bagrami district; Section C covers

Kama district; and Section D covers these issues in Istalif District. Overall conclusions and

recommendations then follow.

Data Collection

For this report, The Liaison Office (TLO) led the research and writing process, with assistance from

the Afghan Women’s Resource Centre (AWRC). Specific data on each district’s dispute resolution and

security systems, security and justice issues, major conflicts3, and significant stakeholders were

3 For purposes of this report, defined throughout as conflicts implicating significant resources, high levels of

violence and/or that have resisted several attempts at resolution.

29

collected between November 2013 and February 2014. In particular, TLO and AWRC conducted

interviews with 38 influential men’s community leaders in Nangarhar (19 per district), and 32 in

Kabul (16 per district), along with six women’s leaders in each district. These interviews gathered

specific information on conflict trends and justice mechanisms, as well as community feelings of

security. As much as possible, the research team endeavoured to select a panel of individuals from

different ethnic and professional backgrounds, and residents of distinct geographical locations inside

the districts

District officials, including the District Governor, the Chief of Police, the Judge, and the Head of the

Huqooq, were also interviewed on the challenges faced by their respective offices, as well as the

general security situation and functioning of justice in their areas. In order to gather additional

information on security perceptions, justice challenges, and experiences of development actors in

the target districts, TLO and AWRC also conducted six individual interviews per district with

development actors.

As mentioned above, given the interdependence of a wide range of factors when considering both

security and justice in a given area, and the subsequent necessity of understanding the general socio-

economic and political context in the focus districts, the research team additionally collected data on

the historical background, geographical features, and demographical trends in each district. It then

focused more specifically on a given district’s security situation; the district’s existing types of

disputes and conflicts disturbing social organization; and the means used to address both security

and justice issues.

Background economic, geographic and demographic trends presented in this report build up on data

collected by TLO through fieldwork conducted in Nangarhar in 2011. Because TLO did not possess

such background data for Kabul areas, the research team conducted additional interviews (26 per

district) and FGDs (four per district) in Kabul province to fill this gap.

Appendix I provides a further breakdown of interviews and FGDs conducted for this report.

Selection of Target Districts

Considering the pilot nature of the security and justice projects intended by Cordaid, and the

sensitivity of issues addressed, Cordaid, AWRC, and TLO selected the four target districts based on a

combination of factors, including access for research and implementation teams (both national and

international, and male and female), prior AWRC and TLO experience in the districts, and the

existence of a network of experienced field researchers. The relatively scant presence of active

insurgency in the target districts was considered as crucial in order to minimize interference and

promote the efficient collection of data on a short time-frame and, subsequently, allow pilot

activities to be undertaken.

Research Challenges and Limitations

Overall, the research conducted for this study went smoothly and faced few significant challenges

that could be considered as limiting research findings. The research team notably faced no security

problems, and researchers were able to access a variety of locations in the chosen districts, and to

interview residents from varied backgrounds.

That being said, the tight time frame for research was insufficient to conduct an in-depth

assessment, and this report should be seen as a first overview of security considerations of residents

30

in Kama, Behsud, Istalif, and Bagrami, broad trends of conflicts in the aforementioned districts, and

justice mechanisms currently in use.

The framework of research further required the research team to access interviewees through Focal

Points – necessary for the smooth proceeding of research, yet introducing bias in the selection of

respondents. This was minimized by a thorough explanation of the objectives of the research prior to

fieldwork, and readjustments in respondent selection whenever bias was detected, or it was felt, for

any reason, that the perspective of a different respondent would be beneficial. To the extent

possible, the research team relied on Focal Points who had, in past research, demonstrated their

integrity and independence. In the few cases when the research team thought a Focal Point

potentially unreliable, it involved additional institutional resources to gather information, including

consulting with alternative Focal Points.

Last but not least, the sensitivity of issues addressed occasionally triggered a reluctance to openly

express themselves on behalf of respondents. However, researchers endeavoured to get as honest

responses as possible and data were cross-checked several times in order to avoid misinterpretations

and bias in data analysis. This limitation particularly applied to focus groups, while respondents were

significantly more forthcoming in individual interviews.4

4 Particularly sensitive were questions relating to relations/conflicts between groups, and the actions of

individuals perceived as main community power holders.

31

A. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN BEHSUD

DISTRICT OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE

32

1. Background: Behsud

1.1. Geography

Behsud district is located in the north of Nangarhar province, to the north and east of the provincial

capital of Jalalabad. It borders the Nangarhar districts of Kuz Kunar and Khas Kunar to the northeast,

Kama to the east, Rodat and Chaparhar to the south, Jalalabad city and Surkh Rod to the west, and

shares its northern border with Qarghayi district of Laghman province.

The district itself acquired its present administrative status a few months after the fall of the

Communist regime and the subsequent takeover by the Mujahideen in 1992, when it was separated

from the current district of Surkh Rod. The initiative - supported by Afghanistan’s interim president,

Sigbatullah Mojadidi - was reportedly due to the district’s large population, and the complexity of

administrative management so induced.5 Behsud district is one of the most populous districts in the

province, with approximately 500,000 inhabitants dispersed in 60 villages.6 As of 2011, it

accommodated 8.86% of Nangarhar’s population7 and at least 20 villages reportedly accommodate

over 12,000 dwellers (at least 1,700 families8). The district itself is subdivided into five manteqas:

Neher Shahi Awal, Neher Shahi Dawayem, Saracha, Walaya and Qasimabad, though these appear to

be of little relevance to residents, who rather identify areas in terms of village clusters.

Behsud district benefits from a strong connectivity to both the provincial centre and Pakistan, as it

sits astride the highway leading to the Torkham border crossing and into the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas (FATA), as well as the paved highway to Kunar province; these two roads constitute the

main axes of transportation in the district. Though the network of roads is relatively well developed,

there were repeated mentions of degradation due to lack of maintenance, which impedes mobility of

residents to secure livelihoods, and impacts the access to health facilities, such as the newly built Shir

Ali Clinic. Residents noted the degredation of the highway to Asadabad (Kunar), as well as roads

which had been paved a few years ago, such as the road from Qasimabad to Qaria Malakh, or that

from Killa Khyali to Maqam, rehabilitated eight years ago.

1.2. History

Under Zahir Shah and before the Saur Revolution of 1978, the area of Behsud was known to be close

to the government, which enjoyed the support of tribes (qawms9) including the Mohammadzai,10

5 This notably impacted administrative processes, with people required to go all the way to nowadays Surkh

Rod to get a Tazkera, for instance. 6 Figures are derived from field research conducted by TLO in 2011.

7 Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility, 2011 (cf. Tommaso Giovacchini, Governance and

Representation in the Afghan Urban Transition, AREU, 2011) 8 This report will assume a family size of seven persons throughout. The basis for this assumption is the Central

Intelligence Agency’s estimate of five children born per woman, plus two living parents. (see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html). 9 Solidarity group. This term, most commonly translated as “tribe”, may describe units considered smaller than

tribes as such, up to, in a more recent formulation, the entire Afghan nation. Readers should thus be aware most often terms such as “ethnic group”, “tribe” and “subtribe” all mirror the use of a single term in Dari and Pashto. However, for purposes of this report, “ethnic group” generally encompasses a broad category of persons who perceive themselves as having common language and culture and with an ancestral presence in several regions of Afghanistan; “tribe” a section of persons smaller than an ethnic group, who perceive themselves possessing common language and culture, and generally spread across more than one province, but not nationwide in their ancestral place of origin; and “subtribe” a section of persons smaller than a tribe,

33

who composed the majority of the government employees in the area at the time. With a substantial

number of relatively large landowners, the rise to power of the Communists was by and large not

well perceived in Behsud and the Saur Revolution enjoyed little support outside of the areas closer to

Jalalabad City.11 On the one hand, Communist land redistribution schemes12 triggered opposition – as

reportedly nearly 450 landowners had over 30 jeribs of land and were thus required to surrender

“excess” holdings. On the other, many of the new measures the Communists introduced were

considered un-Islamic, against Shari’a principles, and thus unacceptable – notably concerning

limitations on women’s dowry. Resistance against the Communist regime began gradually in the

district, with the most excentred areas (Bela, Samar Khail) having Mujahideen presence. The Samar

Khail mountains constituted the de facto front line, though at no time did Mujahideen forces control

any part of Behsud. In 1989, concurrent with the withdrawal of Soviet forces, three violent battles

occurred at the door of Jalalabad, when a cross-party Mujahideen force laid siege to the city. The

first of these battles constituted one of the Mujahideen’s earliest efforts to, as a combined force,

capture a major Afghan city. Consequently, their abject failure to do so may be considered an early

sign of the inability of these groups to cooperate in any kind of sustained effort. Behsud thus

remained in government control until the 1992 fall of the Najibullah government.

Most Mujahideen factions (including Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), Ittihad-e Islami, Harekat-e

Inqilab-e Islami, Hizb-e Islami Khales (HIK), Mahaz-e Milli, and Jabha-e Nejat-e Milli) were

nevertheless present in the district, with reportedly no generalized tribal or social pattern for joining

a specific faction. That being said, the strongest faction was the Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin, controlled

by Engineer Ghaffar with a force of over 30 armed lieutenants (sargroups).13 After the fall of

Najibullah, Behsud was then taken over by a combined force of commanders coming from the

neighbouring districts of Khewa, Chapadara, Shinwari, Khogyani and Kama.

As mentioned above, it was under the Mujahideen that Behsud acquired the status of district and

was separated from the administrative unit it formed with Surkh Rod. It was immediately appointed

a District Governor, who then had to be replaced by a district shura, given the permanent necessity

of the DG to work with maliks when conflicts arose.14 The Mujahideen era was reportedly a violent

period in Behsud. Regular checkpoints were set up across the district, controlling for Jihadi Shura

identity documents and gun licenses, without which one could neither circulate freely nor hold a

weapon.15

and who perceive themselves as possessing common language and culture, while generally being confined to an ancestral area of one province or less, or a few districts or villages only. 10

The Mohammadzai had migrated to Nangarhar with Habibullah Khan’s support and bought 3,000 jeribs of land in the area. 11

These delimitations between PDPA supporters around Jalalabad / Mujahideen supporters elsewhere, however, were reportedly not clear-cut, and partisans of both sides could be found living in the same neighbourhood. 12

The starting point of such schemes was assigning a maximum number of jeribs that an individual landholder could have. The government would then distribute any “excess” land to the previously landless. The maximum number of jeribs allowed by the government varied from place to place, without any obvious reason for the variation. 13

This notably represents a difference with trends in Nangarhar Province, where the HIK was overall stronger, followed by the HIG. 14

the importance of the maliks and their shura in conflict resolution will be developed further on when addressing resolution mechanisms in the district 15

Jihadi Shura Identity documents were issued separately by each of the Jihadi factions for their supporters.

34

The district itself was divided in zones of influence between different Jihadi factions. As is largely the

case today, the main power holders in Behsud overlapped with main power holders in Jalalabad: the

district was governed in some respects as an extension of the city, but with certain factions also

controlling territory in the district. For instance the Farmanda area was held by Hizb-e Islami Khales,

Samar Khail by Haji Zahir (HIG), the airbase by Haji Hazrat Ali (HIK), the District Governor’s compound

by Qumandan Malinyar (Ittihad), Qasimabad by Engineer Ghaffar (HIG), and Qal-e Chanda by the

HIG. While, at the provincial level but exercising major influence in Behsud, the Governor’s house

was held by Haji Qadir (HIK), and the Intelligence apparatus (former KhAD16) by Qumandan Shamali

Kuchi.17 However, as above, the HIG enjoyed the strongest support, followed by the HIK, Mahaz, and

Ittihad. It was not until Mawlawi Khales defected to the Taliban, prompting Haji Hazrat Ali to switch

his allegiance from HIK to Jamiat-e Islami18, that the Jamiat gained strength in the district.

The takeover of Behsud by the Taliban and the consequent transfer of power occurred with some

level of violence and bloodshed, especially around the airport, which had been under Haji Hazrat Ali’s

control. Though there were disagreements among respondents over which Mujahideen faction

played the biggest role in the resistance against the Taliban at this time - with some emphasizing the

importance of the Jamiat-e Islami, whereas others insisted the Jamiat-e Islami never had a strong

presence in Behsud - Haji Hazrat Ali is unanimously considered as the only commander to have

substantively resisted. Indeed, as Pakistan and (it is locally believed) Britain shifted their support to

the Taliban, most major Jihadi commanders fled the area, with a few defecting to the Taliban (such

as Asif Khan and Mawlawi Ahmad Khan), leaving behind smaller or mid-level commanders. The latter

remained in the district and handed in their weapons with no significant reprisals. These former mid-

level commanders now constitute the bulk of the current maliks present in the district, having joined

the Karzai government after the fall of the Taliban.

Throughout the Taliban era, the previous government structure stayed more or less unchanged.

There seem to have been no highly visible Taliban power holders or commanders19 in the district,

though the Taliban controlled district administration, and local respondents stated the rules handed

down by Mullah Omar were respected. This pattern is consistent with Nangarhar as a whole, with the

core Taliban leadership exercising a relatively light touch, for fear of alienating local allies.

With the American takeover of Jalalabad in 2001, all Taliban “took their blankets and fled to [Pakistan

at] the Parachinar crossing”20, without substantial resistance and no bloodshed. Security at the time

was reportedly good. However, the departure of the Taliban did not immediately trigger a

considerable return of refugees from Pakistan, who rather trickled back in subsequent years. The

The main advantage of owning a factional card was reportedly that it allowed its holder to carry a gun without the need for an additional license – a difference with the Tazkera, which granted liberty of movement but did not allow its owner to carry weapons. 16

KhAD stands for Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati, and refers to the Communist-era security service trained by the KGB. 17

Later killed by Haji Hazrat Ali, which propelled the latter to his first fame 18

It was mentioned by respondents to a discussion on history held on December 23rd

2013 in Behsud that the reason of Haji Hazrat Ali’s change of support was his “personal interest – after arrival of TB he could no longer grab land”. 19

There was a mention of an individual named Omar Gul, though, according to the accounts of some respondents, he did not appear to have a significant influence, even as he did appear to be the most prominent Taliban commander in the district. 20

Interview on District History, Behsud, 23/12/2013.

35

district itself was immediately recaptured by Jihadi commanders coming from the north, such as

Engineer Ghaffar, Haji Hazrat Ali and Haji Qadir. Eng. Ghaffar then served as Mayor of Jalalabad,

while Haji Qadir was prominent on the revived Nangarhar Jihadi Shura, which governed Nangarhar

after the fall of the Taliban, until his assassination in 2002. For his part, Hazrat Ali first led the Afghan

National Army in Nangarhar and then served as Nangarhar Chief of Police. Within the district, they

did nevertheless continue to exercise a large amount of control, along with Gul Karim (an ally and

relative of Haji Hazrat Ali) and Dodak Zalmai (an ally of Eng. Ghaffar) – the latter being the first

district governor of the post-Taliban Era.21

Currently, several commanders cultivate strong networks of influence and support in the district. As

will be developed in following sections, these commanders regularly intervene in conflicts –

especially land-related conflicts – and play a significant role in the booming speculation over land in

Behsud. Important commanders at the present include many figures mentioned previously, such as

“Haji” Hazrat Ali and his now brother-in-law Gul Karim (Pashai), Jawad Zaman (Provincial Council

member, Khogyani), Zahir Qadir22 from Surkh Rod (current MP and the son of the assassinated Haji

Qadir), Engineer Ghaffar (now an MP), and Mirwais Yassini (from Kama district, First Deputy Speaker

of the Lower House of Parliament) – who notably supports the new governor of Nangarhar, Mawlawi

Ataullah Ludin.

Of these commanders, Haji Hazrat Ali probably remains the most influential, for reasons explored in

Box 1 below.

Box 1. Haji Hazrat Ali and the Influence of the Pashai in Behsud

United behind Commander Haji Hazrat Ali, the Pashai constitute one of the most powerful groups in

Behsud. Representing an approximate 5% of district residents according to different accounts –

though there are doubts about their proportion in the district – they arrived in the area from Dar-e

Noor with Hazrat Ali after the fall of the Taliban, and constitute a strong network of support for him.

Originally from neighbouring Laghman province, “Haji” Hazrat Ali was a Jihadi commander allied

with Sar Moallem Akhtar, prominent commander of the Hizb-e Islami Khales in the early years of the

Jihad. At first a rather uninfluential commander, he gained true notoriety by assassinating

Qumandan Shamali Kuchi (Mahaz-e Milli) during the Mujahideen era, when the latter had triggered

the opposition of most of the 22 members of the Nangarhar Jihadi Shura. At the time, the

Nangarhar Dar al Moalemin (religious education centre) in Jalalabad came under the control of

Hazrat Ali, who secured his networks of influence in the province. After the defection of Mawlawi

Khales to the Taliban in late 1990s, Hazrat Ali joined Ahmad Shah Massoud (Jamiat-e Islami, though

operating with a notable degree of independence from party control). According to interviewees,

Hazrat Ali did not see his interests served in joining the Taliban, who would have impeded the land

grabbing in which he was said to be engaged. In any event, with the arrival of the Taliban, Hazrat Ali

retreated to the mountainous district of Khewa and organized resistance from there, in coordination

with other United Front23 forces. After the Taliban’s fall, he thus gained considerable support and

21

Dodak Zalmai is now the current district governor of Kama district. 22

This is the same individual as the “Haji Zahir” mentioned above. Upon the assassination of this father in 2002, Haji Qadir, Haji Zahir added his father’s name to his own. 23

An anti-Taliban military organization, whose most prominent member was Ahmed Shah Massoud. Jamiati

36

managed to secure the control of the airport in Behsud. Elected to the Parliament with the votes of

his support base during the first Karzai era, he became one of the most influential personalities in

the province, and institutionalized his power in Nangarhar.

Currently, Hazrat Ali and his relatives remain very powerful in the entire province. His brother in law

Gul Karim, for instance, owns property and is said to occupy government land. Hazrat Ali continues

to enjoy the almost unconditional support of the Pashai tribe, as he helped raise the Pashai from the

marginal position they occupied before the Jihad – living in mountainous areas and only managing

to do daily work in the city. As Hazrat Ali gained power, he introduced some of his supporters in

various sectors of the government: army, police, post offices, etc.; secured businesses and jobs on

International Military Forces’ (IMF) bases for others; and secured land deeds to support their

occupation of land in the district, notably thanks to his networks of support from former United

Front members in ministries and the cabinet in Kabul. As reported by a local resident during an

interview held in Jalalabad, “If he asks to fight, they [the Pashai] fight, if he asks to stop fighting,

they stop fighting, if he asks to vote for so and so, they vote.”24 The Pashai vote is thus secured by

Hazrat Ali, putting him in a comfortable political position. He was additionally one of the most

powerful supporters of Zahir Qadir, who, along with the broader Arsala family, constituted the main

power network in opposition to Nangarhar’s recently departed provincial governor, Gul Agha

Sherzai. Of note, Haji Hazrat Ali initially allied with the latter, before the two had a falling out

(explored below), prompting Sherzai to replace all of his Pashai security guards.

Hazrat Ali himself saw his personal reputation damaged in a feud, involving the abduction of

persons close to him. Hazrat Ali is said to, for reasons not entirely clear, blame this incident on

Governor Sherzai; it either caused their split, or at least occurred contemporaneously with it. That

being said, Hazrat Ali has managed to institutionalize his power, with relatives and supporters

present at every level of the state. In one particularly well-known example, they control the

electricity networks in Behsud, selling it to those who support them only, and thus making residents

dependent on him – one of the reasons which state electricity is highly limited in the district.

1.3. Demography

1.3.1. Ethnic Composition

The demographic composition of Behsud is heterogeneous, with a majority of Arabs divided into nine

sub-tribes (approximately 60%), who settled in the area centuries ago, followed by a variety of

Pashtun tribes (an estimated 31%, including Ahmadzai, Safi, Mohammadzai, Sahak, Chulazai,

Adrimzai, Bakhuan Khail, Kakar, Mohmand, etc.25), and with a minority of Kuchi nomads. The small

but influential Pashai minority is located in the village of Daman.26 Since the fall of the Taliban and

commanders formed a significant part of the UF, but commanders from numerous other factions (included ex-Communists) also played a prominent role. 24

Report Author Field Notes, 22 December. 25

The most important tribes in terms of population include the Ahmadzai (9%), the Safi (7%), the Mohammadzai (5%), and the Sahak (5%). Ahmadzai are located in the villages of Taghro, Zangoi, Khoshokombat, Payandi village, Abdiyan, Qasimabad, Walayati Kala Arbab; the Mohammadzai in Jamali and Boland Ghar; the Sahak in Lajgar, Behsodo Khas and Zangvi; and the Safi in Las Wiala, Wach Tangi and Miran. 26

Population figures are estimates derived from field research conducted by The Liaison Office in Behsud in 2011.

37

the beginning of the Karzai government, migrants and displaced populations from neighbouring

districts have settled in Behsud, due to its secure environment (see next chapter) and the economic

opportunities offered by the proximity of the provincial centre of Jalalabad. These include people

from Kunar, Laghman, and Nuristan provinces, and the Nangarhar districts of Kot, Bati Kot, Shinwari,

Chaperhar, Khogyani and Khewa.

The relationship between tribes was also mentioned to be good, including between long-time

residents and newcomers, though further scrutiny shows that networks of solidarity linked to

influential individuals lead to tensions between specific groups – notably with the Khogyanis,

perceived as trouble-makers given their reported propensity to grab land and the support they enjoy

from powerful commanders, especially Jawad Zaman (son of Jihadi commander Haji Zaman). An Arab

elder interviewed for the study notably explained:

Now nobody wants to sell or rent land to the Khogyanis because they end up claiming the land.

They come here because the security is good and it is calm, overall.27

Moreover, an elder from Qasimabad reported that in the area of Saracha, land disputes between

Shinwari and Arab tribes have escalated, with two deaths and two injured among Shinwaris, and four

injured and 25 houses burnt down on the Arab side, and that there were occasional armed conflicts

between villages and tribes.28

Finally, there is a small population of “Arab Kuchis” - they are said to have grabbed land in the area of

Daman in the beginning of the Karzai era, and their women continue to migrate to Kabul with their

livestock in the summer. However, there are no firm grounds on which to base their ethnic affiliation,

and doubts were expressed about their claims. Interviewees recalled the Kuchis in Mohmand Dara,

who affiliated themselves with the Mohmand tribe in order to occupy land in its name, and raised

the possibility that the same dynamic may be at play among the Arab Kuchis of Behsud, i.e. seeking

to benefit from Arabs’ demographic dominance without, in fact, having any genealogical basis for the

affiliation – all the more as, unlike Behsud Arabs who are Farsi speakers, “Arab Kuchis” are Pashto

speakers.

1.3.2. Migration Trends

There have been important influxes of population in the district in the past two years, with migrants

settling from the districts of Bati Kot, Khewa, Chaperhar, Shinwari and Khogyani, and the provinces of

Laghman, Kunar and Nooristan. Between 300 and 500 families (2,100-3,500 individuals) from various

backgrounds are mentioned to have settled in the district recently. However, this might be an

underestimate, as, when respondents were asked to break these migrants down by area of origin,

they mentioned between 300 and 500 families came from Kunar, 50-120 from Laghman, 100-150

from Nooristan, and accounts vary from 15 to 300 for the each of districts of Chaperhar, Shinwari

and Khogyani, along with some number of persons from Bati Kot and Khewa.29 Given no new village

was said to have emerged recently, and based on accounts by respondents, these newcomers either

settle with relatives, or, more commonly, rent land and houses in already established areas, close to

hubs of activity. There is reportedly no specific location where newly arrived tribes settle, and

residents were said to intermix, with a few cases of intermarriage reported. Nevertheless, some

27

Individual interview with an Arab elder, Behsud, 23/ 12/2013. 28

Male Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 12/12/2013 29

Ibid.

38

areas appear to attract more migrants than others, such as Daman, Saracha, and Bela. These are the

fastest developing areas, and with comparatively good access to services, as they are also the sites

which appear to receive the most assistance.30 Table 1 shows a breakdown of the repartition of

migrants in the district, as reported by respondents.

Table1. Settlement of Migrants by area of Origin

Area of Origin Area of settlement in Behsud

Kunar Daman, Tangai, both sides of Behsud bridge,

Saracha, Bela (bank of the Kunar River,

spreading towards Behsud bridge)

Laghman Daman, Farm-e Ada, Saracha, Qaria-e Malik and

Qasimabad, Central areas (Chamyar and Qala-e

Hussein)

Nooristan Daman, Wach Tangai

Neighbouring districts (especially Chaperhar,

Shinwari and Khogyani)

Dispersed in several villages

The reasons for migration mentioned by respondents are insecurity in neighbouring districts and

provinces (Kunar, Laghman, and Nooristan provinces; Bati Kot, Kot, Chaperhar, Khogyani, and

Shinwari, districts in particular), economic instability, and lack of agricultural land. Insecurity can

further be divided into that caused by insurgent activities and that caused by personal or inter-tribal

enmities (the latter more prevalent in Laghman, Chaperhar, Khogyani, Khewa and Shinwari).

That being said, dissociating economic and security motivations appears artificial, as insecurity and

economic instability were often mentioned to be interrelated, an insecure environment preventing

people from securing a stable income. Migrants who were mentioned to be coming to Behsud for

economic reasons are thus often coming from areas where insurgency is currently active: Kunar,

Laghman, Nooristan, Bati Kot, Shinwari, Chaperhar, Khogyani.31

Migration itself can be explained both by “push” and “pull” factors – which are often de facto

inseparable in the perspective of migrants themselves. On the economic side, motivations for

immigration to Behsud can thus be explained as much by the economic attractiveness of

neighbouring Jalalabad, as by a disastrous economic situation in districts/ provinces of origin. While

insecurity explains migrants’ motivations for leaving their areas of origin, the economic opportunities

in Behsud, due to its proximity to Jalalabad and its position at the crossroads of Nangarhar’s two

main transportation axes, combined with the overall secure situation in the district, contribute to

30

Ibid. 31

Male Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 12/12/2013; See also, Individual Interview with a Tribal Elder, Payendee Village, 23/12/2013.

39

explaining the choice of Behsud as a destination.

Lack of agricultural land and housing was also mentioned as a reason for migrants to leave Kunar

province and the districts of Chaperhar and Khogyani and settle in Behsud, where they can either

work as daily labourers, or –more commonly, as some respondents allege – grab land with the

support of networks of influence headed by local commanders.

Emigration from the district was also mentioned to happen for both economic reasons, and following

natural disasters. Residents thus migrate to Jalalabad and Kabul most commonly in search of better

economic opportunities – but on a smaller scale than immigration to the district. Reportedly 100

families in total are affected by such displacement, the bulk of these being individuals who then send

remittances to members of their families who remained in Behsud. The flood of 2012 also caused the

displacement of 100 to 300 Zangoai families to Jalalabad and Kabul Camp in Nangarhar.

Migrants’ relations with long-time residents (or residents from prior to the rule of the People’s

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), i.e. Communists, which witnessed a wave of emigration to

neighbouring Pakistan) were reported to be generally good, to the extent that there are

intermarriages between migrants (on a small scale) and old time residents. These groups also attend

each other’s wedding, funerals etc.. That being said, there were mentions of conflicts with specific

individuals, and the Kunar and Khogyani migrants were explicitly mentioned as the ones having the

worst relations with the local population – notably because of land grabbing (ghasb)32 and support

from a local Khogyani commander for the latter.33

1.4. Economy

The majority of the district’s inhabitants (approximately 60%) work in the agricultural sector –

Behsud being one of the main providers of agricultural products to Jalalabad and Kabul. Benefitting

from the water supplied by both the Kabul and Kunar rivers, most residents in Behsud thus draw the

main part of their income from irrigation-based agriculture. Crops are rotated on a seasonal basis,

with wheat harvested in the summer and fields used for the plantation of vegetables including

cauliflower, okra, and potatoes in the fall and winter. People employed in agriculture mostly derive

their income from small plots of land they rent or own. In addition to yearlong district residents,

additional migrants come from Kabul in the winter to work in the fields as daily labourers.

Due to the proximity of the provincial capital, an increasing part of the district population

(approximately 30%) derives its livelihood from daily labour in Jalalabad, commuting there while

continuing to live in Behsud. A minority reportedly works in the administration or owns private

businesses (10%). Remittances from family members in Pakistan were also mentioned to constitute a

significant part of the income of many families in the district.34

Unemployment was noted as one of the greatest concerns of district residents. Nevertheless, the

extension of markets in Shamran Agha, Walayato, Tamirato, Qasimabad and Daman to meet the

needs of a growing population may represent a sign of economic dynamism, though this should not

32

For this report, TLO has not offered an ex ante definition of land grabbing. We have not done so because, for present purposes, the perception that a certain action or actions constitutes land grabbing is probably more important than applying a rigorous definition of the term, in that it is this perception that shapes individual/community response. 33

Men’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, December 12, 2013. 34

Interviews with Behsud Leaders, 2011.

40

be over-interpreted.

1.5. Services

1.5.1. Water

70% of the population in the district reportedly has access to drinking water through wells. Though

locally considered to be safe, wells are reportedly not reliable sources of water as they depend on a

variable water supply.35 However, for agricultural purposes, the water supply from the Kabul and

Kunar rivers, and Behsud’s well-developed irrigation system does not require residents to use the

water turn or mirâb systems, unlike some other areas in the country. However, major floods in 2010

and 2012 led to considerable damage and the displacement of several hundred families from the

district following the destruction of their homes.

1.5.2. Electricity

Despite the existence of an electric dam at the border with Surkh Rod, near the province of Laghman,

state electricity remains unreliable in the district. Its access is notably limited to those who can afford

to pay bills to the state and, as above, have not garnered the enmity of Haji Hazrat Ali and his

supporters. Most families depend on solar panels or privately owned fuel generators for electricity –

though these, much like state electricity, are not available to everyone and are reportedly only

accessible to the wealthiest.

1.5.3. Education and Health

Behsud benefits from a relatively good access to education facilities, which can be viewed in the

context of Nangarhar in general, and Jalalabad in particular, having been for some time a centre of

education in Afghanistan. Proximity to Jalalabad thus positively affects education rates in Behsud,

which appear high for both girls and boys. School attendance was estimated at 90% for children, the

main obstacle to education being poverty. Elementary, middle and high schools are all available at

the district level, though access to schools was mentioned to be impeded by the relatively low

number of schools as compared to the number of students, causing the enrolment of a significant

number of students in Jalalabad. There are 16 schools in Behsud overall, eight high schools and eight

primary/middle schools, along with an additional four madrassas.

During the research TLO encountered repeated mentions of growing needs in terms of education

facilities.36 In the past two years, new school buildings for girls have been constructed for Qilla Janan

Khan, Nahid Shaheed and Ghazi Amanullah High Schools. Two other buildings are under construction

for schools in Qilla Malakh and Daman. That being said, these efforts remain concentrated in areas of

Qasimabad and Daman, and do not affect all parts of the district. There was further mention of

specific assistance in the education sector with the establishment of classes by a Swedish NGO in

Char Mesri, Shekhanoo village and Haji Sakhi Dad, and by the Social Volunteers Foundation (SVF) in

Daman, Behsud Khas, Kakran, Tangi, Qaria-e Malik and Qala-e Pir Saheb.37

As with education facilities, health facilities were mentioned to be insufficient to meet population

needs, and health care to be mainly provided by privately owned pharmacies, of which there were an

35

Ibid. 36

See, e.g., Focus Group Discussion on Background, 12/12/2013; Interviews with Community Leaders, 20 December 2013. 37

Focus Group Discussion, 12/12/2013

41

estimated 100. A new private clinic, Shir Ali Clinic, has been constructed in Qala-e Janan Khan village,

though access to it is reportedly impeded by the poor state of roads in the district.

1.5.4. Access to Media and Communications

Radio represents the most widespread media source, with the entire population reportedly having

access to a wide range of stations, and the coverage is good across the district. The most popular

stations are Sharq, Salam Watandar, Killid, Azadi, BBC, and Voice of America. Television comes

second, with approximately 40% of the population with access to it, but with poor electricity supply

mentioned as one of the main obstacles for regular television access.

Print media, on the other hand, are very seldom consulted, with reportedly less than 5% of the

district population consulting them despite the availability of several print media due to the

proximity of Jalalabad, such as the dailies Wahdat and Nangarhar, as well as weekly publications.38

1.6. Governance Structure

At the district level, existing government institutions include the District Governor’s Office, a District

Primary Court, and the ANP Headquarters. State justice services delivery is offered by the District

Court, the Huqooq Department, and the Police. All mentioned lacking staff and sufficient facilities,

including electronic capacities, regular electric power, and reportedly lack proper filing and

registration systems. More extensive information regarding these entities’ (and others’) involvement

in security provision is provided in Chapter 2 of this report; and their involvement in dispute

resolution will be discussed in Chapter 3.

The only government registered shura in Behsud is the District Development Assembly (DDA),

established under the National Area Based Development Program (NABDP), de facto responsible for

monitoring the work of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) established under the National

Solidarity Program (NSP). The DDA is composed of 30 members – mainly maliks and local elders,

including ten women, representing different tribes present in the district. That being said, the

electoral process appears quite obscure, as most candidates reportedly faced no competition for

election to the DDA, which appears to be based more on a system of cooptation rooted in an elite

consensus. Current leading members of the DDA are presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Current Leading Members of Behsud’s DDA

Name Area of Origin/ tribe Position Background

Niamatullah

Nahri Shahi Doham (Arab)

Head of

Shura

45 years old. No education. Niamatullah

fled to Pakistan after the Russian

Invasion. He is well connected to power

holder Engineer Ghaffar (HIG), with

whom he allied during his stay in

Pakistan during the Jihad. Faced no

competition during the election at the

38

Interviews with Community Leaders, 2011.

42

Head of the DDA.

Malik Nawab

Qasimabad (Pashtun –

Salozai)

Assistant

Head

60 years old. Uneducated. Malik Nawab

fled to Pakistan after the Russian

Invasion, where he resumed his role as a

local elder. Had one competitor,

Walayat Khan, during the DDA election

process.

Zamary

(Pashtun – Ahmadzai)

Secretary

42 years old. High School Graduate.

Zamary considers himself as a mujahid

and circulates with bodyguards. Faced

no competition during the election for

the DDA.

Farman Shah

Zangoai (Arab)

Treasurer

Graduate of 14th grade. Farman Shah

fled to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion

and joined the Mahaz-e Milli. Faced no

competition for his election as Treasurer

of the DDA.

43

2. Security and Access

2.1. General Security Situation

Behsud district is overall considered as secure from an insurgency point of view and is almost entirely

under government control; there is no day-to-day active insurgency in the district. That being said,

significant indications exist of a deterioration of this situation in the past two years, with the

government having reportedly lost control of some limited areas, such as Malawi Khales Family, or

having only partial control over other locations, with variations according to the time of the day.39

Some respondents indeed explained insurgents were present after dusk in areas such as the 10th and

11th Wialas, Haddi village, Saracha, Farm-e Ada, Qala Ashaq, Kuchian, and Samer Khail.40 Gerdi Khas

has faced insurgent attacks from the neighbouring Bati Kot and Chaperhar districts, including a

suicide bombing recently. Furthermore, there were reports of intrusion of insurgents “on

motorcycles” in the afternoon41, threatening the local population. In such cases, the efficacy of the

police is considered as limited, as they either have left the area, or return once “everything is

finished.”42 In specific areas mentioned to be particularly insecure, such as Gerdi Khas and Mawlawi

Khales, residents were further mentioned to be receiving threat letters.43 Insurgents additionally fire

rockets at the Jalalabad Air Field with some regularity, and also plant IEDs, most notoriously on the

bridge between Behsud and Jalalabad proper.

Despite the fact that all roads in the district were mentioned to be open and safe to travel, there

were further accounts of recent deterioration of the security situation on the Behsud-Kunar highway

where insurgents have been placing IEDs. At the beginning of December 2013, an explosive device

placed on a motorcycle reportedly targeted an ANP caravan in front of the Directorate of Border and

Tribal Affairs, killing three police officers and one civilian. Three month earlier on the same road, IEDs

had also detonated, though no victims were reported.

The Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) are all

present in the district – though some respondents considered the number of police forces to be

insufficient as compared to the district population. There are several small ANP checkpoints spread

out across the district and three larger checkpoints on Kama Bridge, in Farm-e Ada, and in the district

centre. The ANA base is located in the area of Benaga. Checkpoints are particularly considered as a

source of security by both men and women respondents. For example, one of the community leaders

interviewed, resident of Daman, explained that this had had a positive impact on the security

situation in his area.44

NATO and ISAF are present at the JAF, with a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) settled in Qol-e

Urdu. IMF also reportedly conduct regular operations in the area and are described as the only forces

over which the local power holders do not have leverage.

The main security problems faced by communities in the district are however not related to the

39

E.g., NGO Interview, 21 December 2013; Interview with a Community Leader on Security and Access, 20 December 2013; Interview with a Community Leader on Feelings of Security, 15 December 2013. 40

Individual Interview with Community Leaders: Daman area, 16/ 12/2013; 20/12/2013 41

Individual Interview with Community Leaders: Naher Shahi area, 15/ 12/2013. 42

Ibid. 43

NGO Interview, 21 December 2013. 44

Individual interview with a (Kuchi) community leader, Daman area, 16/12/2013.

44

presence of insurgency, but to widespread criminality. Murder, theft, mugging, and kidnapping for

ransom, including kidnapping of government officials, were mentioned as widespread in the district.

Criminality is reportedly particularly high in the areas of Daman, Khas Behsud, Samar Khail, Saracha,

Bara Banda, Kandoo, and the 10th and 11th Wialas, though theft and kidnapping were characterized

as widespread across the district. One respondent even noted that, after dark, he did not dare to

travel to the district centre lest he should be accompanied by “ten to fifteen persons.”45That being

said, aside from robbery and kidnapping, which are more endemic, general insecurity is in fact

strongly influenced by the landscape of conflicts in the district– described in further details in the

next chapter dedicated to main dispute trends and major conflicts.

2.2. Feelings of Security

2.2.1. Perceived Threats to Communities

Broadly speaking, Behsud residents attributed insecurity to two causes. On the one hand,

interviewees relate most day-to-day criminal incidents to adverse economic conditions.46 On the

other, they tend to attribute more severe criminal incidents less to insurgents than to criminal

networks tied to the government itself.47 Perceptions of international forces are also, in the main,

strongly negative. Criminality (mainly theft, robbery, kidnapping) has reportedly been on the raise in

the past months – a fact attributed to unemployment, congestion due to increasing arrival of

migrants, and protection of criminals by local power holders.48 There was particularly strong

insistence on the economic roots of insecurity (“as we know, the biggest threat to security is

unemployment”49, mentioned one of the community leaders interviewed – a comment that was

systematic in all interviews on security), and on the intersection of different elements affecting

general security of residents, including access to livelihoods, education, and infrastructure. As

reported by one of the tribal elders interviewed:

These crimes happened not because of government opposition but because of unemployment

and economic issues. We can safely say that, as the living standard of the people improves, the

security situation will be directly affected in a positive manner.50

Residents further attribute violent disputes, especially between communities, to the influence of

Jalalabad powerbrokers. This is considered as particularly true of land conflicts, in which

powerbrokers are said to often interfere, notably using their connections within the government. As

described by one of the participants in a focus group: “The biggest threats to our security are the

government and its authorities, as they hold a strong position in the government and break or foster

the unity among tribes.”51 Though this specific account must be placed back in the context of

significant tensions with district and provincial authorities when addressing the issue of land, it is

indicative of a trend that was reflected in several comments throughout the study: that well-

connected individuals have sufficient leverage to manipulate justice processes. This can create a

45

Individual interview with a Community leader, Naher Shahi, 15/12/2013 46

Individual interview with a Community leader, Naher Shahi, 15/12/2013; Interview with a Daman Community Leader 20/12/2013; Focus Group Discussion on Feelings of Security, 12/12/2013. 47

Ibid. 48

Ibid. 49

Individual interview with a (Kuchi) community leader, Daman area, 16/12/2013. 50

Respondent to a Focus Group, Tribal Elder from Qala-e Janan Khan, 12/12/2013.

45

highly tense situation between communities when the less-connected one believes the better-

connected community has usurped its rights. There were also several reports of high ranking

protection of criminals engaged in robbing and kidnapping (though TLO could not independently

verify these claims):

They [criminals] benefited from [the support of] some government authorities, Parliament and

Provincial Council members. These connections are used for personal and political purposes and

also create insecurity in the district. There are some thieves who could not support themselves,

and get support from power holders [who are] government authorities. And also they paste the

picture of a Parliament member, for example, on their cars, to gain advantages from it.52

Insecurity is further blamed on the intrusion of outsiders coming from neighbouring districts

(Chaperhar and Bati Kot, notably) to commit crimes in Behsud – with murky accounts as whether

these are delinquents or insurgents. There were also accounts of panic caused by the firing of

missiles at the Airfield by armed opposition groups (AOGs), sometimes missing their targets and

injuring or killing

civilians.53

Lastly, as above,

military operations,

especially those

carried out by

foreign troops, are

perceived negatively

and cultivate a

feeling of injustice and insecurity. According to most respondents, these forces are identified by the

population as “Americans” (with interviewees explaining they did not differentiate between different

foreign troops and forces) and the objectives of such operations seem to be little understood by

residents who regard the arrests of civilians that go with them as arbitrary. A development worker

explained that only roughly 20% of the population knew who ran bases and what they did in practice.

In the account of respondents, IMF interventions are considered as harmful and are feared by the

population – especially as there were reports of harassment and “torture” of civilians. Some

explained that they considered operations by foreign troops to be at best useless, and occasionally

worsened the security situation (notably by attracting suicide bombers), while others recognized

they had a “slightly positive impact on security.”54

2.2.2. Specific Threats Faced by Women

Though some women insisted they had a degree of liberty of movement, explaining they could travel

everywhere in the district as long as they were accompanied by a male family member, they also

expressed concern about harassment and kidnapping, and mentioned this often prevented them

from leaving their homes. They explained that, while they were allowed to go to nearby bazaars for

shopping, clinics and health facilities, and women-permitted gatherings (weddings, funerals), going

to offices (police, district) was ruled out for most, as it is considered shameful and damaging to the

53

Reported in two individual interviews with Community leaders, Naher Shahi, 15/12/2013 54

Individual interview with a (Kuchi) Community Leader, Daman Area, 16/12/2013.

“There are ISAF and PRT forces and some of them carry out operations in the area. Many people have been jailed and others were tortured without committing any sort of crime. People cannot distinguish between them [the armed forces] and all the people think they are controlled by America and also say that they came here to achieve their personal interests. They have been worsening the security situation; they are the main factor for insecurity. Their presence here is useless and they have failed to bring security. We cannot distinguish between them and we just call them Americans.“ - Kuchi Community Leader, Daman area, 16/12/2013

46

reputation of their male relatives.55

It must be mentioned women had difficulty conceptualizing security as something they could be

faced with on a daily basis, constantly putting it back in a more generalized conflict context,

particularly with regards to the war, and insisting there were no more insurgents in the district

thanks to police checkpoints. They were moreover reluctant at first to expose family problems, which

were mentioned rapidly and in passing on several occasions but only developed after several further

questions. Ultimately, though, main problems mentioned faced by women were family related

disputes, children-related disputes, and domestic violence. The fact that due to cultural

considerations, these are considered as being strictly private and should not exit the family or close

circle of relatives, led women to explain that they had little recourse, as “tribal elders cannot

interfere in someone’s personal affairs”56 and women remain under the control of their male

relatives.

As will be developed in the section dedicated to conflict resolution mechanisms and access to justice,

women’s security and personal safety is more generally impeded by the fact that they have limited

access to justice forums, whether informal, or to an even greater extent, formal.

2.3. Practices for Addressing Security in Behsud

2.3.1. Police Performance and Community Relations

Accounts on the police’s performance were mixed. There were accounts of police addressing

criminality swiftly, and insistence on the fact that checkpoints helped in preserving overall security in

the district. The recently appointed Chief of Police is reportedly appreciated by district residents, and

he insisted that he regularly coordinated with tribal elders to resolve cases and arrest criminals.57

However, other respondents insisted the number of security forces in the district remained

insufficient and that they were not well equipped. Lack of staff is notably attributed to the fact that,

despite its increasing population due to high immigration rates, the district remains ranked in

“category two” by provincial authorities when it deserves to be “category one.”58

One respondent further emphasized that the police force is misused, as some personnel are assigned

for the personal security of government officials rather than for the benefit of the general

population.59 Respondents further appear to draw a clear distinction between higher-ranking

authorities covering up for influential people, and ordinary police officers, whose main fault is lies in

being insufficiently aware of legal dispositions and justice process. As above, cooperation with the

police and community vigilance are considered as a relatively efficient, if flawed, means to maintain

an overall secure environment. There were particular requests for increased cooperation between

55

Individual Interview with a Women’s Leader 17/12/2013 (stating that women could visit offices if accompanied by male relatives); Female Focus Group Discussion on Feelings of Security, 12/12/2013 (stating that women could not visit offices, due to the shame it would bring to their families). Here one might keep in mind that the individual women’s leader interviewed was significantly younger and better-educated than the women present on the FGD. This pattern suggests a generational, or social-status, shift, but the present data does not illuminate the depth or breadth of any such shift. 56

Female Focus group Discussion, Behsud, 11/12/2013. 57

Individual Interview with the District Chief of Police, Behsud, 12/01/2014. 58

Interview with the Behsud Chief of Police, 12/01/2014. 59

Individual interview with a Community Leader, Naher Shahi, 15/12/2013.

47

communities and government authorities to address threats.60

However, several data points indicate that police-community relations are not wholly positive. To

begin, there were reports of occasional nepotistic and corrupt practices (the latter being a recurrent

accusation when addressing government performance in general), with police officers not addressing

complaints unless they were paid a bribe, and unwilling to address issues in areas where

powerbrokers have influence:

The police behave very well with the people and also address people’s cases very well but,

sometimes, when someone presents a reference or gives a bribe to them, then they rule in his

favour.61

Moreover, and as will be developed in the section dedicated to justice mechanisms, there is an

overall reluctance to approach the formal system to deal with criminality due to its reputation for

slowness and the corruption of government justice institutions:

The biggest threat to our security is theft, as some outsiders come and disrupt security. Now we

cannot go out of the house after 7:00pm. A few days ago, the Masjid Qari was heading home

from the mosque. On the way, his personal mobile and some amount of cash were grabbed

from him. In fact, no one can approach government authorities for such crimes. The reasons for

not approaching them are the government process is very slow, on the one hand, and, on the

other hand, they also ask the plaintiff and defendant to come to court. Ultimately, illegal

money is demanded from them. Because of this, people are not interested in registering their

cases in the relevant government departments.62

There were also accusations of police complicity with criminals in the district. A female respondent

gave the following account of corruption:

A driver from Boland Ghar village was kidnapped by the people of the Adramzai tribe and

killed. The police came and took the dead body and also arrested the murderer. In the

aforementioned conflict the government authorities took a bribe and freed the murderer.

When the family of the victim filed a case again, then the police again jailed the murderer. Now

the people do not trust the government’s decisions because the government’s decisions are not

just and satisfactory to the people. The conflict between these families is still going on.63

Another respondent in the same focus group insisted:

The criminals benefit from the protection of government authorities. If someone complains to

government authorities regarding a criminal act, government authorities approach them and

hold a verbal discussion with the complainants and criminals. Then the government authorities

take bribes from criminals. The authorities don’t punish the criminals.64

There were also several reports from development actors that money was occasionally illegally

60

Interview with the Behsud Judge, December 2013; Focus Group Discussion with Community Leaders on Feelings of Security, 12/12/2013. 61

Individual Interview with a Community Leader, Naher Shahi, 15/12/2013. 62

Male Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 12/12/2013. 63

Female Focus Group Discussion, Behsud 11/12/2014 64

Female Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 11/12/2013

48

extorted by police officers at checkpoints at the Samar Khail, Kama and Behsud bridges.65

Last but not least, one of the main problems mentioned in correctly addressing criminality was the

lack of awareness of citizens of the penalization process, and the general lack of understanding of the

law both on behalf of civilians and police officers. A youth representative participating in a focus

group reported: “Neither the people nor the government know the law and the criminals do not get

punished according to the law.”66 There was therefore strong insistence on the need for increased

awareness of legal procedures and concepts.

That being said, government involvement in addressing criminality was mentioned as desirable, to

the extent that it is done in consultation with community leaders, as above. Despite allegations of

corruption, there appeared to be a general consensus on the fact that communities need to be

consulted regularly by district authorities:

The authorities know the restive areas and measures should be taken by them. But

intentionally they do not want to do this. I previously mentioned the story of my son; later I

approached the government to probe the case. There I was asked for 20,000 AFA in bribes so

they would investigate it, [but] at the end nothing was done about the case. We are asking the

government to support the unity of the people and the police should patrol through areas and

also arrange meetings during special occasions, such as on Friday and Eid days.67

This was also underlined by female respondents, notably as women’s access to the police remains

low due to their limited liberty of movement and cultural considerations of honour (namus68):

Women are mostly faced with family problems so it is necessary for the government to get

information on women’s problems and co-operate with them in their resolution […] No

measures have been taken by the government until now. It should try to become aware of

women’s problems and make peace programs for the future.69

2.3.2. The Role of Communities

Though community members interviewed generally acknowledged the government’s role in

addressing criminality, for example via the arrest of thieves, they unanimously insisted that tribal

cohesion and elders were the best safeguards to community members’ security.70 Firing in the air, for

instance, is considered as a nuisance that elders were able to bring to a stop through community

mobilization, and, in addition to arrest, theft is addressed by organizing community patrols in

villages.71 In Bara Banda and Kandoo, the involvement of elders in investigation reportedly helped in

65

Reported in two individual interviews with NGO/Implementer Employees, Jalalabad, 21/12/2013. 66

Male Focus Group Discussion, Youth Representative, Behsud, 12/12/2013. 67

Male Focus Group Discussion, Respondent from Qala-e Janan Khan, 12/12/2013. 68

The notion of namus encompasses considerations of honour, respect and modesty. In Pashtun society, it is strongly associated to the chastity of women (as well as the protection of one’s land), and by extension, to the honour of a household and/or extended family, which the male head of household is responsible for protecting. The notion retains a strong prevalence in rural Afghanistan, across all tribes and ethnicities. The behavior of women, their protection from outside threats may thus have strong repercussions in rural communities. 69

Female Focus Group Discussion, Beshud, 11/12/2013. 70

E.g., Individual interview with a Community Leader, Naher Shahi, 15/12/2013; Male Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 12/12/2013; Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 11/12/2013. 71

Individual Interview, Daman Arabano village, 20/12/2013; Male Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 12/12/2013

49

the arrest of criminals. The following quote from a respondent at a focus group on Feelings of

Security provides an example of these community mobilizations:

Now local people in the area have unified to eliminate insecurity from the district. Whenever an

issue arises, the local elders gather every Friday to solve it and make a decision regarding the

arisen issue. If anyone resists the decision he may bear a fine. For example, recently, a young

person who fired in the air had to pay 20,000 AFA.72

These points were emphasized by both male and female respondents, who expressed wishes for

tighter collaboration between the government and tribal elders to address criminality. A woman

participant to a focus group thus declared “the government can root out these threats [i.e.

criminality] with the help of the jirga and tribal elders.”73 A male participant in a focus group further

insisted:

The people have unified. However we want the government to focus on the community and

they government forces should patrol and also the people must contact them in a timely

fashion regarding their problems.74

However, underlining the fact that community cohesion, unlike what reports by male respondents

emphasize, might not be not as strong as it is portrayed, “tribal disunity” was also mentioned as a

threat to security in the district, especially by women.75

2.3.3. Access to Police Centres

Accounts on access to police offices differed depending on the sex of the interviewee. Men indeed

reported having an overall good access to the police, while women’s limited liberty of movement

seriously impairs their access.

However, physical access to

the offices and contact with

police officers does not mean

citizens necessarily have

access to the justice and

security services contact

might imply, as shown by the

following quote:

Yes we have access to

the police, and also

contact them when

someone breaks the law or steals. However, our police officers are not professional, and the

people’s expectations are higher than what they the police can do. Moreover, the people

don’t know the law or to whom they should refer their cases.76

As for women, most respondents emphasized going to police centres placed them in a very sensitive

72

Male Focus group Discussion, Behsud, 12/12/2013. 73


Male Focus Group Discussion, Behsud 12/12/2013. 75

Women’s Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 12/12/2013; Women’s Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 11/12/2013. 76

Men’s Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 12/12/2013.

“We have no access to police offices; we fear defaming. The

police who are our relatives, we file cases with them, but in such

situations our representative goes instead of us.“

“The women have no access to police offices because they have

no permission from their families to visit the police. Even if the

police officer is her relative, she still has no permission to visit the

police office. Only the males can visit it.”

- Respondents to a Focus Groups Discussion, Behsud,

11/12/2013

50

position and put the honour of their male relatives at stake, with their access to the police further

impeded by the reluctance of their family, even in cases when police officers are relatives.77

It is thus considered the men’s prerogative to go to police centres and file cases. Women explained

their protection was first ensured by family members, followed by elders, and only as a very last

resort, by district authorities –and the latter in a more vague way, understood as a safeguard against

criminality in general but not of specific assistance when dealing with personal safety. The district

Chief of Police explained his office registered an average of five women’s cases per month (a quarter

of the number of men’s cases), but almost only on inheritance disputes. There are notably only three

female police officers for the entire district, two for searching (‘talâshi’) and one in the district

centre. However, none of the women interviewed were aware of their existence, and there are no

particular officers in charge of registering women-related cases.

There are further no Department of Women’s Affairs, EVAW Unit and Family Response Unit (FRU) in

Behsud, though these are available in Jalalabad. Women respondents showed they were familiar

with the Family Response Unit78, though they were little aware of the other above organs. That being

said, it seems women seldom make the initial step to contact even the Family Response Unit, and it

is, as with cases more generally, considered the role of tribal elders or male family members to bring

cases to its attention. Only once this has been done can female members of the unit approach

women in the community, while male employees of the FRU hold discussions with male members in

the family.

However, overall, female respondents expressed a desire for greater intervention of government

authorities in justice processes, provided, as for their male counterparts, they are less corrupt and

“cooperate” with the people – i.e. take their problems into account and listen to them. Unlike men,

women respondents notably insisted the decisions of maliks were occasionally unsatisfactory and

that they “sometimes make the wrong decision, and make a right decision wrong for the sake of

money. Therefore the government should directly ask the people to maintain peace.”79 Their

complaints thus derived from the fact that neither formal nor informal authorities pay attention to

regular citizens. But, at the same time, women respondents, like men, saw informal leaders, not

government authorities, as a first recourse to address security issues.

77

Female Focus Group Discussion on Feelings of Security, Behsud, 12/12/2013. 78

Interview with a Women’s Leader from Chahar Mesri, Behsud, 17/12/2013. 79

Female Focus Group Discussion on Feelings of Security, Behsud, 12/12/2013

51

3. Landscape of Conflicts in Behsud

3.1. Main Conflict Trends

Most disputes in Behsud are reportedly over land, followed by conflicts over women and family

related issues (including disputes over inheritance), minor criminal cases such as theft, and major

criminal cases. Out of the 268 disputes surveyed for this study in 25 villages, 79 were reportedly over

land, 56 cases were both criminal and civil disputes, and 54 were family disputes; the remainder

being commercial, over water, and major criminal disputes (understood as cases where murder is the

only root of the conflict, as opposed to cases where murder is induced by another more minor

offense). Rights of passage and commercial issues over money (absence of payment by one of the

disputants) were also mentioned by respondents as a common source of dispute.80

Overall, although land cases still appear to be a plurality, or even majority, of disputes, a lower

proportion of Behsud’s disputes appear to concern land than TLO has found to be the case in more

rural areas, while a higher proportion concern family issues.81 Such a pattern is nevertheless

consistent with dispute resolution findings from Jalalabad itself82, perhaps suggesting that, for the

average person, possession of land is of less economic importance in urban or peri-urban versus

more rural areas; while the ability, and willingness, to access authorities (whether state or non-state)

to resolve family disputes is relatively robust.

Women respondents specifically insisted on the widespread character of inheritance and family-

related conflicts. For instance, these might occur when a woman asks for her inheritance rights, a

request in which she is almost systematically opposed by her male relatives. Conflicts inside the

family, such as between mother and daughter in law, can also trigger strong enmities between

families, and there were several occurrences of verbal disputes between women escalating into

more violent conflicts between families after husbands got involved.

3.1.1. Profile of Dispute Parties

Conflicts were mentioned to involve mostly individuals, not tribes or communities, though there are

some reports of serious inter-communal conflicts, notably for control over land. That being said,

longer, protracted conflicts can escalate into rivalries between two communities, when two

disputants mobilize their networks of solidarity. Though there were only a few reported occurrence

of a large scale tribal conflict in the district, such as between settling Kuchis and local Samar Khail,

the tribal component cannot be excluded, since – as mentioned previously – there were occasional

accounts of specific animosity against Khogyanis and Kunaris, who, while allegedly grabbing land,

benefit from the support of commanders influential in the district. By contrast, at other times,

conflict solidarity groups seem to follow geographic, not ethnic, lines, with villages acting as conflict

parties. With that said, in a situation where each village is usually comprised of only one ethnic

group, and notions of geography and descent overlap (e.g. treating Kunaris as a tribe in themselves),

disentangling the nature of the solidarity networks at issue can be difficult.

80

25-village survey, November-December 2013. 81

See Formal and Informal Justice in Paktia and Nangarhar: a TLO Working Paper, TLO & USIP 2011. 82

Ibid.

52

3.1.2. The impact of Migration on Tribal Relations and Conflicts

Though most respondents insisted that relations between long-term settled population and recent

migrants are good83, several accounts indicate that this is probably not the case, or at least needs

substantial qualification. Women respondents particularly highlight the fact that the arrival of new

tribes created tensions, especially as there is an increasing pressure on housing space and land more

generally.84 This was something which was confirmed by the District Chief of Police. The following

example was reported by a member of the CDC in Qasimabad:

The relationship [between long settled residents and migrants] is bad. For example, in the area

of Saracha, there is a land-based dispute between the Shinwari and Araban tribes. In the

mentioned conflict two people were killed and two others were injured from the Shinwari tribe.

At the same time, four people were injured and almost twenty-five houses of the Arab tribe

were lit on fire.85

Interestingly, women emphasized relationships between tribes had been worsening in the past years

due to increasing economic differences between some and others creating competition and rivalry to

secure wealth: “relationships […] are deteriorating because of the good financial situation of the

people.”86 TLO could not substantiate a worsening relationship between tribes, per se, but this

perception plausibly reflects strained relations in the present.

3.1.3. A High Potential for Escalation

The fact that a significant proportion of disputes were mentioned to be “both criminal and civil” can

be explained by the apparent high rate of conflict escalation, with disputes between children and/ or

women reportedly often deteriorating into violent disputes between families, involving injuries and

death. Respondents insisted personal enmities and conflicts over women could become particularly

serious. The mistreatment of women exchanged in badal87, for instance, can escalate when her

family members decide to take revenge.88 This was notably mentioned by women as a serious cause

of enmity between families, and one of the reasons for the decrease of such practices. There were

also reports of fights between children becoming extremely violent after their parents got involved,

as shown by this account of one of the maliks interviewed:

Mazar Khan, an Arab Kuchi resident of Arabano village, is involved in a dispute with Gul

Afghan, resident of Qala-e Malik. Initially the conflict was started by the children, then involved

their parents. Eventually two persons were killed in the conflict.

There was another conflict between Abdul Rahman’s sons (Chalozai), residents of Shiakhano

village, and Haji Hayatullah’s sons (Chalozai), residents of Shiakhano village. It first started with

a verbal conflict between them; then it escalated to bloodshed in which two people were killed

83

E.g., Individual Interview with Community Leader from Payendee Area, 19/12/2013; Focus Group Discussion on Background, Behsud, 12/12/2013. 84


Focus Group Discussion on Background, 12/12/2013. 86

Focus Group Discussion on Conflict Trends and Access to Justice – Women, Behsud, 12/12/2013. 87

In this context, a marriage arrangement in which one family sends a child for marriage to a second family, in return for the second family sending a child for marriage to the first family. Because each family is gaining a member, they do not need to exchange any dowry. 88

Female Focus Group Discussion – Behsud, 12/12/2013

53

on each side and two injured on each side. The conflict started four years ago, but was solved

seven days ago by district elders who got 700,000 AFN from each of the disputant parties as a

machalgah.89 Then they accepted the resolution of the conflict.90

Similar cases are reportedly not exceptional, given the honour of families is taken extremely

seriously, and the interference of networks of protection impedes the due course of justice. Verbal

confrontations can quickly turn into physical conflicts, which escalate when they result in injuries,

and, apparently quite often, death.

The importance of networks of power and solidarity in the district are a potential factor of further

escalation of initially minor disputes into violent conflicts, as disputants sometimes invoke their

supporters or protectors, turning a personal dispute into a struggle for influence. This is notably the

case in one of the most violent conflicts reported in the district, which was triggered by the son of a

Jalalabad businessman named Haji Atiqullah tipping over a pail of acid belonging to Behsud resident

and businessman Ahmadi Gul with his bicycle. Ahmadi Gul’s son beat the boy for his transgression –

an insult taken badly by the Haji Atiqullah’s family, which engaged in a fight the next day, in which

both Atiqullah and his son were stabbed to death. The fact that Ahmadi Gul is a well-connected Hizb-

e Islami power holder in Behsud further prevented the case from being brought to formal judicial

authorities, and impeded the jirga process, as Ahmadi Gul refused to give his waak91 to the jirga,

benefitting in his refusal from the support of Zahir Qadir.

The conflict has been ongoing since 2011, creating a situation of high tension between the families

and their related networks. This is all the more the case as there is a strong feeling of injustice on the

side of the victim. This case further sheds the light on the impunity of local power holders in the

district, which was mentioned by several community leaders interviewed as one of the main factors

impeding the rule of law in Behsud, as explained by the malik who reported the conflict:

The existence of power holders, the arbitrariness of crimes and the absence of implementation

of the law are the reasons for such crimes. This is especially true for the existence of power

holders and their followers, who are the main factor in the increase of these crimes in the

community. If someone perpetrates any crime, he is not punished and [this] clears the way for

further crimes. The rule of law must get stronger, until each and every one can have access to

justice and this definitely [will] reduce the level of such crimes.92

3.1.4 Power Holder Involvement in Dispute Resolution

One of the main problems often brought up by respondents in Behsud is indeed the importance of

political considerations and networks of influence in disputes. There were several mentions of

involvement of the government and the support of MPs, such as Zahir Qadir, as above, for one of the

disputants. As part of the protection he provides to his supporters, a given power holder will ensure

his supporter remains above the law, seriously impeding justice processes. It was indeed noticed

during the study that district officials were often confronted with calls from higher ranking officials

89

As part of non-state dispute resolution processes, guarantee in cash or kind provided by the dispute parties and returned to them once the dispute has been resolved and both have agreed to the outcome of the resolution 90

Individual interview with a Malik, Arabano village, 16/12/2013. 91

Decision-making authority given by dispute parties to jirga members before the initiation of subsequent jirga processes. 92

Major conflict Survey, 22/12/2013

54

asking them to release or bail out certain individuals – a practice that was confirmed by community

members interviewed.

The high level of involvement of third parties and influential individuals in conflicts is therefore a

characteristic of the landscape of conflicts in Behsud. This is especially the case for land-related

conflicts, as will be described in further detail below. As the Head of the Court put it:

Most of the cases are based on land. In such cases one conflict side is a power holder and

another is powerless. Usually the powerless people don’t file cases against power holders as

they know about the consequences of their case [i.e. how the case will come out].93

There are also reports of the existence of what residents describe as a “land mafia”:

There is a land mafia group which is not originally from this province [Nangarhar], and the local

people are supporting them. This mafia group has been grabbing government as well as private

land, and no one can say anything to them. This group does not consist of ordinary people, but

they are very powerful. Some of them belong to Kunar, Nuristan and Laghman provinces. […]

These criminals have hands [i.e. connections] with the government and get support directly

from the government and MPs. They are the cause of insecurity and land grabbing.94

3.2. Land-based Conflicts and Land Grabbing in Behsud

Land indeed appears to be the nexus of many disputes and conflicts in the district, further

aggravated by the fact that very little land documentation is available. Reportedly only 20% of the

land was formally documented under Zahir Shah, which respondents explained being due to illiteracy

(though without drawing a more precise causal connection) and attempts to avoid taxation – with

landowners thus claiming fewer jeribs than they actually held. The increasing pressure for housing

induced by the growing flow of immigrants from neighbouring provinces and districts and the rapid

expansion of Jalalabad city has led to a rise in land prices, and increasing speculation over land.

Conflicts over land reported in the district thus include conflicts between individuals, often

neighbors, over small parcels of land (less than five jeribs), and the occupation of land by entire

communities or land grabbing. One should note that the local definition of the latter appeared quite

vague, ranging from illegal occupation of a space by migrants, to one community usurping another’s

shafa rights, to forceful land acquisition by power holders. In their majority, land grabbers reportedly

benefit from the support of tribal and political networks, as above. Because the proffered definition

is so vague, it is somewhat beside the point to state definitively whether land grabbing is or is not

occurring. What can be said with certainty, however, is that numerous, competing interests overlap

in Behsud, leading to both highly complex land case histories, and the widely shared perception that

injustice is occurring in the acquisition and use of the district’s land.

With that caveat in mind, local communities do perceive land grabbing, particularly when power

holders might be involved, as one of the most important sources of disputes in Behsud. Previous

reports have underlined the violence that usually accompanies protracted conflicts linked to land

occupation and involving local strongmen, with a proliferation of weapon and escalation due to

involvement of third parties who try to manipulate such conflicts to their advantage.95 There

93

Individual Interview with the district Head of Court, 22/01/2013. 94

Male Focus Group Discussion, 12/12/2013. 95

TLO NRC CSPM Assessment

55

appeared to be a significant consensus among respondents that these persons are often at the root

of insecurity and violence in disputed areas. This is said to especially be the case for members of the

Khogyani and Pashai communities who benefit from the support of local strongmen based in

Jalalabad but maintain significant political and economic influence in the district. An elder from Qala-

e Janan Khan underlined:

In appearance, they do not get any sort of protection from anybody, but government

authorities are involved, and also they are supported by some MPs. Those who grab land are

backed by the government because they [government officials] are shareholders in this and

misuse their position.96

The practice of forcibly occupying land started on a wide scale at the beginning of the Karzai era,

when land gained considerable value, but government capacity was minimal. With the support of

former Jihadi commanders, local communities and newcomers started occupying government land

and expanding their prerogatives over areas neighbouring their villages and settlements. In an

individual interview with the Chief of Police, the latter mentioned that he had managed to reduce

such practices by conducting regular meetings with residents, attending the resolution process of

every case he is addressed (though, as discussed below, he almost systematically refers cases back to

informal justice forums), and assisting in the registration of resolved cases with the Land

Administration (Amlak97). According to interviewee accounts, and based on their experience of land

occupation in the past 13 years, residents have become extremely sensitive to land occupation, and

communities are keen to “secure” the areas surrounding their villages and make sure nobody settles

on them. A family settling in Behsud now reportedly either needs to buy their land, or to get it from

the government according to a settlement plan – the latter remaining problematic, as areas planned

for settlement have also been occupied.

The case of Qasimabad, studied by Wamiqullah Mumtaz98, exemplifies the complexity of land issues

related to illegal settlements. Located five kilometres to the north of Jalalabad, the township

(shahrak) of Qasimabad was developed as part of a master plan conceived under the Prime Ministry

of Daud Khan in the 1970s, in order to absorb Jalalabad’s growing population. The project itself,

however, was not carried out. Following the fall of the Taliban and as returnees increasingly settled

in the vicinity of the provincial capital in search of labour opportunities, three local ex-Jihadi

commanders supported the illegal settlement in the area, distributing land to their supporters and

encouraging them to take control of the township. In parallel, the government planned for the

distribution of the land to government employees, religious scholars, teachers, and disabled people,

failing to take into account the ongoing illegal occupation of the area and selling of plots which were

already occupied and claimed by illegal residents. As local residents noticed the ongoing occupation

of the area, they brought up claims of shafa99 and also captured a significant amount of land in

Qasimabad. This led to a currently inextricable situation, where different interests intermingle,

96

Focus Group Discussion, 12/12/2013 97

In theory, the Afghan Land Authority – ARAZI – should have absorbed all Amlak offices. However, TLO has observed their occasional continued existence both in Nangarhar and in other areas (The Liaison Office, Major Land Disputes and Titling Systems of Khost Province (Kabul: USIP & The Liaison Office, forthcoming 2014). 98

MUMTAZ Wamiqullah, Three faces of Shafa, REMM, 2013. 99

Roughly “right of first refusal”: in some rural communities, neighbors or other persons biologically or physically proximate to a person selling land must be given the opportunity to buy the land in preference to other persons. The concept appears particularly prevalent in Eastern and Southeastern Afghanistan.

56

including those of the Provincial government, former Jihadi commanders, and middlemen involved in

land speculation. The population of Qasimabad is to this day composed of reportedly 80% informal

settlers, with no viable process of formalization of land claims, or even settlement of disputes, in

sight.

Box 2 provides further information on another species of land conflict in Behsud, that involving

Kuchis.

Box 2: Conflicts involving Kuchis

Disagreements over the occupation of land between nomadic Kuchis and local residents is at the

root of two protracted conflicts in Behsud: the Banda village v. Painda Khail Kuchi conflict which

started in 2010 over 500 jeribs of pasture land, and the Samar Khail tribe v. Kuchis from Paktia,

Khost and Logar over pasture land, a conflict which has been lingering since Taliban times (1996-

2001).

In the first case, residents of Banda village started distributing pasture land to landless people

settling in the area. The Painda Khail Kuchis, who had the habit of using the land for pasture,

resisted the initiative, and the dispute escalated into a fight resulting in the death of one of the

Kuchis. The police immediately occupied the area and imposed a ceasefire to both parties. A jirga

was then formed, comprising several local commanders, including Qadar Kuchi, a former MP, and

Engineer Ghaffar, along with members of the District Community Council.100 However, their decision

to divide the land between the communities was rejected by the residents of Banda who claimed

they owned the entire disputed area, and that the Kuchis did not belong there. The conflict has

remained unresolved and members of both communities continue to oppose each other, even

refusing to attend the same mosques. The involvement of powerbrokers, as described previously,

also represents a serious obstacle to the settlement of the conflict.

In the second case, the roots of the conflict reportedly date back to the settlement of 40 Kuchi

families from Paktia, Logar and Khost in Behsud under the Taliban, triggering the opposition of the

local Samar Khail residents. The case was immediately referred to district and provincial authorities

who got a written agreement from the Kuchis stating they would only remain temporarily during

their migration period in the winter, and would not cultivate crops or construct houses. However,

the Kuchis started settling with the support of the Taliban Provincial Governor, Mawlawi Kabir. After

the fall of the Taliban the case was referred by the Samar Khail to Haji Qadir, the new governor of

Nangarhar, who ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the Kuchis. Using his networks in the

government, Haji Qadir brought the case to the attention of Hamid Karzai. Ali Ahmad Jalali, Interior

Minister 2003-2005, later also became involved. A commission examined documents from both

parties and ruled the land was government land, ordering the expulsion of both disputants in 2011.

The Kuchis rejected the decision and a fight ensued, resulting in the death of one Kuchi and the

injury of two members of the Samar Khail tribe. Further escalation has occurred since then, with

regular deadly confrontations between members of both tribes.

100

District Community Councils (DCCs) received funding from the Afghan Social Outreach program until 2012. The DCC in Behsud appears to have been defunct since funding ceased.

57

4. Access to Justice and Dispute Resolution

Mechanisms

4.1. Conflict Resolution Processes: The Predominance of the Informal System

In accordance with the general trend of dispute resolution processes in Afghanistan, most disputes in

the district are addressed by informal justice forums, such as jirgas, shuras, or individual tribal elders.

Again as elsewhere in Afghanistan101, the formal justice system in Behsud is perceived as slow,

inefficient and plagued by corruption:

“Those organs [formal justice forums] waste their time. They search for a way of resolution for

years, but they can’t find the way of resolution, [and] after that they eventually refer the case

to jirgamaran [persons acting as mediators in the jirga process], who find the way of resolution

and they [the parties] accept the final resolution of the conflict.”102

“In fact, no one can approach government authorities for such crimes. The reasons for not

approaching them are the government process is very slow, on the one hand, and, on the other

hand, they also ask the plaintiff and defendant to come to court. At the end illegal money is

demanded from them. Because of this, people are not interested in registering their case in the

relevant government department.”103

By contrast, the jirga system appears more efficient and the compromise it results in more

acceptable – as opposed to the punitive nature of the formal justice system. For small conflict and

family issues, particularly, respondents thus indicated they first went to family and tribe members –

notably in order to avoid publicizing the case.

Out of the 268 disputes which have occurred in the past year in the villages surveyed for this study,

259 (over 96%) were reportedly addressed and solved by the village shura/ jirga, five by the District

Shura (DDA), three addressed by the DG, and one by the District Court. The two cases surveyed

which were first addressed to the Chief of Police were sent back to elders for resolution. This was a

trend confirmed by the Chief of Police himself, who explained he was referred an average of 20 cases

a month, and sent most of them back to elders for resolution.104 The Chief did not specifically

elaborate on why he did so, but stated that he relied on elders’ cooperation to maintain good order

in the district.105 Consistent with other TLO research, this response indicates that the Chief feels

elders better capacitated to deal with many day-to-day matters, preferring to reserve active

government intervention for more serious issues.106

Referring disputes to tribal elder from the district government indeed appears as a relatively

widespread practice, as elders are considered as having more information on the actual dispute than

the government does. The Head of the Court explained often referring back family disputes to elders

“Because they have more information in the area about […] the right person [involved in the

101

Formal and Informal Justice in Paktia and Nangarhar, TLO, USIP, 2011. 102


Youth representative from Shura Ghundai, participant to a Male Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 11/12/2013. 104

Interview with the Behsud Chief of Police, 14 January 2014. 105

Ibid. 106

Formal and Informal Justice in Paktia and Nangarhar: a TLO Working Paper, TLO & USIP 2011.

58

dispute]”107 and their capacity of investigation inside the community is greater.

The Head of the Court further emphasized that elders had a higher capacity for dispute resolution

and underlined the “vital” role of jirgas in justice processes.108 When a case is brought to the court or

to district officials, it is often directly referred to elders and jirga members in the community, and for

inheritance issues, to religious scholars, given their relative technical legal proficiency. Cases can

therefore go back and forth between several times before finding a satisfactory conclusion:

There was a land-based conflict between two families and both families made claims over a

wall. Initially, we referred it to our tribal elders, but we were not satisfied with their decision

and then we referred the case to our relatives’ elders, but, again, they didn’t convince us. So,

finally, we referred it to district authorities, who appointed a jirga to solve the conflict, [and]

so they did.109

Along the same lines, the District Governor indeed further insisted that informal processes were

more efficient in resolving disputes, as “Afghanistan is the home of jirgas. If the mediators are

sincere and neutral, then the jirga system is better than most government laws.”110 As can be seen,

this position is however not uncommon among district officials, some also insisting they only had a

superficial understanding of Afghan Statutory Law.111

Elders referring cases to the state is rarer, though appears relatively common as compared to other

areas of Afghanistan, with a reported 20% of unresolved cases brought to district authorities. This is

particularly the case whenever influential personalities are involved in a conflict and the jirga is both

unable to find a satisfactory resolution, and wants to dissociate itself from the case.

Nevertheless, and as has already been tackled above, the satisfaction with the functioning of the

informal justice system in Behsud needs to be nuanced. There were mentions of corrupt practices

and nepotism, notably among maliks who are among the main informal justice providers (see Box 3

below) – something women especially insisted on.112 Jirga members also reportedly sometimes use

the referral of a conflict to the court as a threat to have parties agree to their decision. There was

indeed one mention of threatening the party who refused to comply with having his case sent to the

court and being introduced to the judge by elders as a “cruel person”113, hence influencing the judge

against that party: an indication of the low regard in which the court is held and the lack of trust in its

capacity to conduct impartial investigations.

Box 3: The Role of Maliks in Dispute Resolution

Maliks enjoy considerable influence in Behsud. This is of course a trend that can be observed

province wide, with maliks in Nangarhar, unlike in many other areas in Afghanistan, often holding an

official letter of acknowledgement from the state. Similarly, getting a letter from the local malik to

verify a person’s identity is reportedly a compulsory step for rural residents to obtain a tazkera.

107

Individual Interview with the District Head of Court, 22/01/2014. 108

Interview with the Behsud District Judge, December 2013. 109

Female Focus Group Discussion, Behsud, 11/12/2013. 110

Interview with the Behsud District Governor, 13/1/2014. 111

Interview with the Behsud District Judge, December 2013. 112


Interview with a Community Leader from Qala Janan Khan, 18/12/2013.

59

Maliks were mentioned to be elected because they were well respected, and know the jirga process

and customs of hospitality. However, the position of malik appeared to be more an institutionalized

status deriving from personal influence and power, and the formation of a malik shura less an

electoral process than a form of general elite consensus. As mentioned above when addressing

district history, maliks have historically played a major part in conflict resolution and enjoyed a

considerable role in district affairs, for example triggering the replacement of the first post-

Communist District Governor by a shura shortly after his appointment. Their influence survives to

this day, as they are considered, like elders in general, to be better in touch with the local

population. Most are also former mid-range commander during the Jihad, who remained under the

Taliban, and still cultivate links with other former commanders as well as erstwhile Jihadi patronage

networks.

For instance, in an individual interview held in Jalalabad on December 23rd, the interviewee insisted:

“it was the maliks who informed us of your [the research team] coming.”

4.2. The Role of State Institutions in Justice Provision

Notwithstanding previous remarks, criminal cases (notably murder), inter-ethnic and inter-tribal/ sub

tribal conflicts which are more resistant to resolution, and cases where powerbrokers are involved,

are reportedly referred to district officials and/or the ulema with greater frequency than are other

disputes. There did not seem to be any particular pattern for addressing cases to a specific

institution/individual: “The District Governor, the Senior Judge of a court, Head of the Huqooq

Department and other responsible [persons]“114 as well as the Chief of Police and members of the

Provincial Council, were all mentioned as potential authorities for the referral of disputes. Judicial

processes, as such, appear to be generally avoided, and preference given to the Huqooq Department

among official dispute resolution institutions, given the expense and length of court adjudication

(with these factors also implying a level of corruption). According to District authorities, cases are

referred to separate departments before being transferred to the court or back to elders. Haq ul

‘abd115 cases, for instance, first go the Huqooq, property cases to the Amlak, and criminal and

inheritance cases to the court. But in practice, this seems to concern only a minority of cases, with

the majority remaining in the formal system only in case non-state mediators fail to find a

satisfactory resolution to the case. Some interviewees also mentioned addressing more “serious”

conflicts – i.e. conflicts implying a high degree of violence (murder and serious injuries), or where

powerbrokers are involved – to government institutions.

However, these institutions’ involvement seems to be less linked to the status of their institution,

than to the personal influence of institutional leaders and the power they derive, in part, from their

position in that institution. This helps account for government officials often addressing conflicts via

the informal jirga process rather than the formal judicial one. This account by the District Governor

himself is representative:

I have personally been involved in the resolution of a dispute, which was a conflict among the

114


Literally, “the rights of man”; as opposed to "the rights of God.” The former generally overlaps with Western legal concepts such as civil law, i.e. disputes between private individuals. The latter generally overlaps with Western legal concepts such as the rights of the state, and the criminal law enforced via state prosecution.

60

Salozai tribe’s people. The mentioned conflict had a great deal of fighting and [many] murders.

I myself met with tribal elders and both conflict parties gave us waak by their own volition.

Both of the parties told us to resolve [their] problems for the sake of Allah. So this was the

reason that a long lasting conflict is resolved with the grace of Allah.116

The process described above is typical of the jirga process, with the District Governor sitting among

elders as a jirgamar (the single form of jirgamaran), and receiving waak from both disputant parties

before proposing a resolution to the dispute. This is a strong indication of the resilience and the

prominent role of informal processes underlined earlier.

4.2.1. The Role of the Court

The District Head of the Court reported 75 conflicts had been addressed to it in the past year, of

which he reported 58 have been resolved - a significant inconsistency with the dispute survey. Out of

these, an approximate half are reported to be theft cases, a tenth murder cases, with the rest being

family disputes and other offenses (such as alcohol and drug consumption).

The average time frame given by the District Judge for resolution of criminal cases is a month and a

half, though reports from residents contradict this estimate, emphasizing, as mentioned earlier, that

formal justice processes are particularly lengthy and inefficient. The District Governor further

explained that most cases transferred to the court took an average of six months to be resolved, and

could take much longer. Keeping in mind the inconsistency of these accounts (and the seeming

tendency of the judge to understate the amount of time needed to address cases), the judge himself

explained that cases related to Haq ul ‘abd, take more time to address, given the time needed for

investigation, and that he preferred referring them back to elders given their knowledge of their

communities.

The judge further emphasized, as is discussed below, that powerbrokers impeded justice processes

and that cases in which they interfered often lingered. He additionally mentioned that powerbroker

intervention was one of the reasons for the ongoing decrease in the number of cases addressed to

the court, as these interferences prevented the formal system from addressing the cases correctly.

When viewed alongside the comments of elders that they also lack the capacity to resolve such

disputes fairly, and preferred to refer powerbroker disputes to the government, these disputes,

perhaps more than any other, seem to lack a viable forum for resolution. .

Last but not least, lack of facilities might represent another obstacle to the swiftness of formal justice

processes, with no proper court building, and poor electricity supply. The District Judge further

insisted that he was faced with security problems, though without further elaboration.

4.3. Barriers to Access to Justice

The impact of the influence of powerbrokers and groups associated with them on access to justice

for Behsud residents was underlined on several occasions, as above. This reportedly constitutes the

main obstacle to access to justice for men, as interference by third parties in conflicts disturbs justice

mechanisms and protects their supporters from potentially adverse outcomes.117

116

Interview with the Behsud District Governor, 13/1/2014. 117

Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 12/12/2013; Interview with Qala Janan Khan Community Leader, 18/12/2013; Interview with a Daman Community Leader, 18/12/2013; Focus Group Discussion on Conflict Trends, 30/12/2013.

61

Jirgas are reportedly also faced with problems of corruption and nepotism, and are not preserved

from the influence of powerbrokers. This was underlined on several occasions by respondents. For

example:

The main problems in dispute of resolution for community elders are power, weapons, state

actors and some authorized [i.e. their behaviour is permitted] people especially Jihadi

commanders.118

The personal involvement of power holders in conflict resolution was exemplified earlier In the case

of Banda village vs. Painda Khail Kuchis, with the involvement of Eng. Ghaffar and Qadar Kuchi as

jirgamaran, though their involvement in this

instance does not necessarily seem to have

been malign.

Concerning women’s access to justice, and

despite accounts by male respondents that

women had direct access to all justice

forums in the district, female respondents

insisted they do not have direct access to

jirgas. Women, as above, first have to go

through male family members exclusively,

facing the risk of suffering from

mistreatment if they do not, as going

without the permission of male family members would be considered a breach of the honour of the

family. If their request is accepted, a male relative is sent to the jirga to represent them.

A limited exception is widows or women whose male relatives are absent or dead (it is extremely

rare, however, that women are left outside of a male family network). Nevertheless, in the event,

should she not have a family member to represent her, community leaders often elect a

representative for her. Female respondents were further unanimous on the fact that women do not

have equal rights to men in the jirga.

In the light of the above, respondents emphasized the need for female justice organs or forums that

would be sufficiently respected and would be able to receive complaints from women and advise

them on how to resolve their problems, in consultation with the aforesaid body. These, however,

cannot be set up without prior consultation with male members of a community and, to the extent

possible, ex ante assurances of full respect by community leaders and their constituents.119

There were, moreover, several accounts of ongoing practice of baad and badal, though there were

mentions that these had decreased recently, due to education, more information on Islamic norms,

and the disastrous effect of such practices on relations between families and tribes, as mentioned

above concerning the escalation of women-related conflicts.120

There were mixed accounts concerning inheritance rights, though the general pattern seems to be in

disfavour of women, who appear to only get inheritance on very rare occasions. Some women

respondents reported they did get their rights to inheritance, while other explained they did not, or

118


Women’s Focus Group Discussion, 12/12/2013. 120

Ibid.

“If a woman became compelled and asked

permission from her husband to approach these

organs then she would face many problems

there, because she has never gone out of the

house, and also because these organs are

strange for her and she feels shame. [So] how

can she do it?”

- Female Respondent to a Focus Group

Discussion on Conflict Trends and Access to

Justice, Behsud, 12/12/2013.

62

only “by the force of the court” – the Head of Court indeed explained the majority of cases he

received from women were cases of inheritance. However, current evidence indicates that, even

here, women still need the support of a male family member to present a claim, in particular

women’s husbands in this regard.121 Asking for her inheritance rights was also mentioned as a source

of shame for a woman.122

Similarly, women are not involved in conflict resolution, or only indirectly, by, for instance,

persuading their husbands to drop a fight, or other private lobbying of male family members.

121


Female Focus Group Discussion, Behsud ,12/12/2013

63

5. Overview of Development Programming

Several NGOs have been active in the district over the past years in various sectors, including public

health, agriculture, livelihoods, education and provision of energy (e.g., solar panels in Boland Ghar

village, Qala-e Hussein, and Perawar village). Development agencies and NGOs active in the district in

the past twelve months include BRAC, UN-Habitat, IRC, JICA, NRC, DACAAR, CARD-F, SVF and Checchi

& Company Consulting. The UNHCR also conducted its Shelter programme in Saracha and other

villages. The National Solidarity Programme in turn provided loans to women for raising chickens,

through the Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (DRRD). There has notably been a

drop in assistance in recent years. Of these projects, those by Checchi probably have the greatest

relevance to security and justice activities, as Checchi’s program focused on the provision of Afghan

statutory law and Sharia trainings, initiatives to better link state and non-state justice providers, and

similar.

NABPD has a permanent office in the district, reported to be monitoring and supervising projects

under the NSP, though such supervision would exceed NABDP’s formal mandate. The NSP started its

projects in the district in 2006, with the support of BRAC, establishing 100 CDCs between 2006 and

2011. In 2013, UN-Habitat and BRAC instituted 18 additional CDCs in Behsud, raising the total

number of shuras to 118. Projects include rehabilitation of road infrastructure and culverts –

currently ongoing in Miran, Boland Ghar, and Shekhan, and planned in Qala-e Hussein. A project for

the construction of retaining walls under the NSP is planned for 2014 in Zangoai.

Table 3 further details development interventions in the district.

Table 3: Overview of Recent and Ongoing Development Projects in Behsud

NGO/ Agency Project Area of Implementation

UN-Habitat Ongoing NSP project with UN-

Habitat funding –establishment

of shuras.

10th Wiala, 12th Wiala, Saracha

NRC Shelter programme for

returnees

unknown

WFW (Women for Women) Livelihood programmes unknown

IRC Building of containing walls Samar Khail, Gerdi Khas

JICA Building of containing walls Behsud Khas, Qala-e Janan

Khan

DACAAR Digging of wells and installation

of Water pumps.

Throughout the district

BRAC Literacy promotion and

establishment of a 118 shuras

Bez Akmalati, Zangoi,

Khoshgombad and Behsud Khas

64

under the NSP

Checchi & Company Consulting

(closed in the past months)

Rule of Law and Stabilization –

Informal Component

Beniga Sarak, Saracha Ali Khan,

and Qasimabad.

That being said, though residents interviewed mentioned being overall satisfied with the projects

implemented123, there were several complaints, with respondents emphasizing that development

actors did not take into account the actual needs of the people, and that development aid was

captured by specific communities and maliks. They also emphasized that Behsud was left aside as

compared to more insecure districts.124

123

Men’s Focus Group Discussion on Background, 12/12/2013. 124

Ibid.

65

B. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN BAGRAMI

DISTRICT OF KABUL PROVINCE

66

1. Background: Bagrami

1.1. Geography

Bagrami district is located to the east of Kabul Province, 20-30 minutes by car from the capital. It is

bordered to the west by the 8th Hawze125 of Kabul, separated from Deh Sabz District to the north by

the Kabul River, rimmed to the east by Surobi district, and shares its border to the south, across the

Shakhi Baramta Mountains, with the districts of Khak-e Jabbar, Musahi and Chahar Asyab. Flowing

through Bagrami into the Kabul River, the Logar River irrigates the centre of the district and

represents the main source of water for agriculture. However, given its proximity with Kabul

(Bagrami centre is located 6 km away from the outskirts of Kabul City, and 15 km from the centre of

the capital) and the increase of demographic pressure, arable surfaces have significantly reduced due

to galloping urbanization. Agricultural lands are currently located in Shiwaki, Sahak, Noh Borje,

Sheena, But Khak, Kamari, Qala-e Neman and Sheik Adel Baba villages, clustering near the southern

segment of the Logar River.126

The two main axes of transportation running through the district are highways which, first, connect

Kart-e Naw in Kabul City to Chahar Asyab to the south, and, second, run from west to east across the

centre of the district towards But Khak. The Kabul-Jalalabad road, which rims the district to the

north, through Arzan Qeimat and Pol-e Charkhi, constitutes Bagrami’s third important axis of

transportation. The only other paved road in the district connects the Chahar Asyab and But Khak

highways, running from Bagrami district centre to the south. According to residents, lack of

maintenance has caused the speedy degradation of the rest of the transportation network.

There are 75 villages in the district, under the supervision of 39 maliks and 15 Sar Khails (heads of

Kuchi subtribes). The most significant villages include the district centre, Sahak, Shiwaki, Sheena, But

Khak, Kamari, Qala-e Ahmad Khan, Noh Borje, Hussein Khail, Qala-e Adam Khan, and Alu Khail.

1.2 Demography

When asked directly, residents estimate the population of Bagrami at 120,000 – 150,000. That being

said, when mentioning access to electricity, there were reports of 90,000-110,000 families present in

the district, suggesting a population size of more than half a million.127 The district population is

composed of approximately 50-60% Pashtun tribes, and 40%-50% Tajik residents, with a small

minority of Turkmen tribes (reportedly less than five percent). Pashtuns are located mainly in the

east of the district (Lata Band, Alu Khail, Hussein Khail, Gosfand Dara) and divided into a variety of

tribes and sub-tribes of which the Ahmadzai are the most prominent in terms of population128,

followed by the Tara Khail. The Ahmadzai reportedly constitute 60% of the Pashtuns, including a

small Kuchi subtribe, the Musa Khail, composed of 300 families migrating to the district from

Nangarhar and Kunar in the summer, and then settling in Bagrami’s southern foothills. Other Pashtun

tribes in Bagrami include the Sahak, Dawlatzai129, Babakar Khail130, Hussein Khail131, Yusoufzai,

125

Geographical designation, larger than a village or neighbourhood, but smaller than a district or municipality. 126

Key Informant Interview, 12/02/2014. 127

Based on the accounts of residents, this figure is difficult to verify, all the more as many of the district residents do not hold tazkeras from the area and are not taken into account in surveys. 128

Subdivided in Isa Khail, Karo Khail, Suleiman Khail, Hassan Khail, Tota Khail, Musa Khail, Stanikzai and Aliddin Khail. 129

The Dawlatzai, like the Ahmadzai, have a Kuchi section in Bagrami.

67

Mohammadzai, Mamozai, Marufzai, Alu Khail, Miah Khail, Hod Khail, Niazi and Noorani.132

Tajik residents are settled in Shiwaki, Qala-e Hassan Khan, Qala-e Ahmad Khan, Beni Sar, Qala-e

Neman, But Khak, Sheena, and are divided between Tajik ‘Am (“regular Tajiks”) and Tajik Babraki

(from the tribe of Babrak Karmal, president during the PDPA government). The small minority of

Turkmen tribes are located in the central part of the district.133

Different tribes and ethnic groups reportedly cultivate good links (“like brothers”134) and live in a

rather mixed environment. That being said, some villages are more homogenous in terms of tribal

composition than others. The village of Qala-e Mohsen is entirely Ahmadzai, for instance, while

Kamari and But Khak remain mainly Tajik.135 However, ethnic and tribal divisions appear to play less

of a role than networks of power based on factional interest from the Jihad period.

1.2.1. Migration Trends

Bagrami witnessed significant immigration after the fall of the Taliban, and more than half of the

population is considered to be ajnabi (outsiders). In the previous decades, however, there had been

little immigration to the district. Under Dr. Najibullah, a small number of naqilin (resettled

populations) moved to the village of Haji Wali Saray136, and the Aliddin Khail, Niazi and Nooristani

from Kunar and Laghman are said to have migrated to the district under the Taliban and settled,

while local families fled the district to Pakistan.137

Main waves of migration were thus noted at the beginning of the Karzai era, both with returnees

coming back from abroad, and newcomers. These newcomers hail from the provinces of Laghman,

Kunar, Nangarhar, Kapisa, Logar, Paktia, and Khost, among others, as well as 200-300 Pashai families

from Nooristan who settled in Hussein Khail, close to Dawood Zazi’s shahrak (see below). The

immigrant population further includes Kuchis from Loya Paktia and Nangarhar buying land and

settling. Despite accounts of good relationships between immigrants and locals (bumi), a recurrent

and strict distinction appeared in interviews between the ajnabi and the bumi. That being said, tribal

affiliation (especially Ahmadzai – and particularly Musa Khail and But Khak), reportedly helps in

easing relationships. Conversely, the presence of tribal solidarity groups can in some circumstances

cause disputes to quickly escalate, particularly conflicts over land.138

Several factors intertwine to explain migration towards the district. Among these, housing and the

speculative purchase of land in the vicinity of Kabul are reportedly the most prominent, associated

with the attractiveness of Kabul as an economic hub, and the engorgement of the capital preventing

settlement in Kabul city itself.139 Push factors from areas of origin further include insecurity, poor

economic conditions, and lack of land.

130

Subdivided in Omar Khail and Babakar Khail 131

Including Mula Khail, Kakar and Niazi. 132

Key Informant Interview, 12/02/2014; Focus Group on Bagrami Tribal System, 22/01/2014 133

Focus Groups on Bagrami Tribal System, 22/01/2014-23/01/2014 134

Individual Interview on Tribal Remits and Relations 1), Bagrami, 03/02/2014. 135

Focus Groups on Bagrami Tribal System, 22/01/2014-23/01/2014 136

Focus Group on Bagrami Tribal Systems, 23/01/2014. 137

Focus Group on Bagrami Tribal Systems, 22/01/2014 138

Key Informant Interviews, 27/02/2014 139

Key Informant Interviews 27/02/2014; Interviews on the Geography and Economy of Bagrami, 27/01/2014; Interview on the Demography of Bagrami, 23/01/2014.

68

Important waves of migration have considerably changed the sociological and demographic profile of

the district, with the arrival of new tribes (Zadrans, Mangals, Zazi, and Stanikzai from Loya Paktia and

Logar, and Pashais from Nooristan, for instance). Villages which used to be homogenous in terms of

tribal composition have thus increasingly become mixed though, in these circumstances, a distinction

often seems to develop between the “high” (bâlâ) and the “low” (pâin) part of the village – such as in

Gosfand Dara, where the indigenous Kata Khail tribe lives in Gosfand Dara bâla and immigrants from

Khost, Paktia, Logar, Kapisa and Nangarhar have bought land from the latter and settled in Gosfand

Dara pâin.140

Due to the lack of economic opportunities, there has been increasing economic emigration from the

district to the UAE, Pakistan, Iran, and Europe in the second Karzai era. This is mainly the case for

young adult men, who contribute to their families’ income by sending remittances.141 There were

further mentions of families leaving the district due to the degradation of the security situation,

particularly the prominence of land conflicts and the influence of power holders against whom they

have no effective recourse.

1.3 History

Until 1992 and the administrative reforms of the Mujahideen Government, Bagrami and

neighbouring Khak-e Jabbar district were part of a single administrative unit – with Khak-e Jabbar

considered as an Alaqadari (sub-district) of Bagrami.142 Both areas have thus historically cultivated

strong ties – and continue to do so – with movements of populations back and forth between both

areas throughout the century143, as well as tribal ties between the Hussein Khail, Karo Khail, Miah

Khail and Babakar Khail settled in both areas.144

When the PDPA arrived to power in 1978, the government enjoyed a comfortable support base in

the district.145 High government officials, including second PDPA president Babrak Karmal (at least

now considered Babraki Tajik)146 and the Minister of Foreign affairs Abdul Wakil (Ahmadzai) were

from the district (Kamari village), as were prominent personalities such as General Kabir (Tajik, from

But Khak), Engineer Aziz (Tajik, from But Khak), and General Khalil (Pashtun, from Hussein Khail).

That being said, given the strategic location of Bagrami for the control of Kabul, the situation

remained tense and there was ongoing fighting between government forces and Mujahideen

factions who united against the PDPA until the winter of 1983, when all Jihadi forces present in the

district were forced to retreat across the mountains to Khak-e Jabbar, from where they operated

throughout the remaining Jihad. Until then, Mujahideen factions (including Jamiat-e Islami, HIG,

Harekat, and Ittihad, among others) held the southern area of the district, all the way until the area

of Bagh-e Afzal and the Logar River. The line of demarcation between Communist and Mujahideen

140

Ibid. 141

Interviews on the Geography and Economy of Bagrami, 27/01/2014; Interview on the Demography of Bagrami, 23/01/2014. 142

For reasons of convenience and geographic specificity, this report will discuss Bagrami and Khak-e Jabbar as separate entities, including during the period in which Khak-e Jabbar was an Alaqadari. 143

This was particularly the case at moments of political antagonism, with opponents to the PDPA moving to Khak-e Jabbar under PDPA government, for instance 144

Key Informant Interview, 12/02/2014; Focus Group on Bagrami Tribal System, 22/01/2014; Focus Group on Bagrami Tribal System, 19/01/2014. 145

Interviews on Bagrami District History, 04/02/2014. 146

Key Informant Interview, 12/02/2014.

69

forces thus ran along the Logar River until Qala-e Hassan Khan, then bifurcated south of Minari

Chakari, held by the Mujahideen, and Kamari, held by the PDPA, running along the chain of

mountains rimming the south of the district. The Mujahideen base in the district was located in Yakh

Dara, which received support in men and arms from Khak-e Jabbar across the Shakhi Baramta

Mountain and dispersing into Sahak, Miah Khail, Karizha, and the plain of Sheikh Adel Baba. In turn,

PDPA forces held Kabul to the west, the neighbouring district of Chahar Asyab to the southwest, the

plains to the north of the Logar River, including the district centre, and the area around Kamari

village in the southeast of the district and the entire area to the north of it. At night, however,

Mujahideen fighters reportedly had access to almost the entire area up until Sheena, in the northern

area of the district.147

Until November 1983, the district witnessed active Mujahideen-PDPA combat, with attacks carried

out by PDPA forces by land and air from the east, south and west of the Mujahideen territory, and

regular incursions of Mujahideen infantry into PDPA areas to the north. The areas of Shiwaki, Miah

Khail, Yakh Dara, and Sheikh Adel Baba thus suffered from heavy bombardments throughout the

period. Based on the account of former Jihadi fighters, the Mujahideen lost a total of 300 men

throughout the Jihad, including 72 men during a single battle in the area of Sahak and Miah Khail (in

1361/ 1982).148

Government forces progressively took over Mujahideen territory and advanced inside Khak-e Jabbar,

through the Amir Ghazi Dam, which allowed them to access Khord Kabul, and secured their hold on

Bagrami. The Communist forces set up post seven posts in the district, including three on the

surrounding hills, one in Misi Aynak, and a base in Kharutiha at the delimitation of Bagrami. In the

winter of 1983, the retreat of Mujahideen forces from their mountain stronghold allowed PDPA

forces to gain control over the entire area.

From then on and until 1992, Bagrami thus remained under government control, facing no significant

resistance from the population, as a significant proportion of residents were employed in

government service or were small land owners and peasants who welcomed the administrative

reforms of the Communist government. For their part, most anti-PDPA elements had fled the area,

primarily to Khak-e Jabbar.149

On April 30th, 1992, the Mujahideen took over Bagrami without facing resistance, on the same day as

they seized Kabul. Given the strategic importance of the district, after the PDPA’s fall fighting almost

instantly broke out between the two most prominent Jihadi parties in the area, the HIG and the

Jamiat-e Islami.150 The Jamiat forces – mostly from Bagrami and Khak-e Jabbar – were located in

Nasaji, and shared control of Sheena with the HIG, which held central Bagrami and were led by

commanders from outside the district, notably Sharafat151, originally from Surobi (Miah Khail tribe).

Aside from this distinction between insiders (from Bagrami and Khak-e Jabbar152) and outsiders,

factional ties reportedly superseded tribal affiliation, with different Pashtun clans and Tajiks on both

147

Key Informant Interview, 12/02/2014. 148

Ibid. 149

Ibid. 150

Key Informant Interview, 12/02/2014; Interviews on Bagrami District History, 04/02/2014-05/02/2014 151

Currently settled in Surobi, he is the nephew of Nasrat, the overall commander of the HIG in the area, and is connected to Sayyed Hassan Gul 152

Given their strong ties, persons from Khak-e Jabbar are not considered as “outsiders” per se by Bagrami residents.

70

sides. The front line of the fighting went through the District Centre, Qala-e Ahmad Khan, Qala-e

Neman, Sheena, and Nasaji Factory. The HIG at this time controlled the area going from the District

Centre to But Khak.153

The Hizb-e Islami, under Sharafat, received support from commanders in neighbouring Deh Sabz,

Surobi, Musahi and Chahar Asyab districts, and controlled most of Bagrami for three consecutive

years, until the Jamiat-e Islami, led by Dost Mohammad Khan (Tajik, But Khak)154 and supported by

Ittihad-e Milli and Jamiat forces in Khak-e Jabbar, took over in 1995. Other factions present in

Bagrami included the Nejat-e Milli, controlled by Commander Didar Shalezai (from Khord Kabul,

Khak-e Jabbar), and the Harekat, controlled by Commander Mussa (Mia Khail, Shiwaki village).

Of these commanders, several would come to gain significant power during the current government,

using their tribal and factional networks, and taking advantage of the weakness of the state in the

first Karzai era to grab land and extend their networks of power inside Bagrami. This is allegedly the

case for Mawlawi Tara Khail (Harekat during the Jihad, based in Deh Sabz), Allah Gul Mujahid (HIG,

also based in Deh Sabz), and Aref Khan (HIG, based in Surobi during the Jihad), as will be developed

further down. Table 1 provides additional information on Bagrami commanders.

Table 1: Influential Commanders in and around Bagrami155

Prominent

Commanders

Tribe/ Area of Origin Faction and Area of Influence

Sayyed Maqbul Pashtun (Safi)/ Kuh Safi,

Pol-e Charkhi.

Harekat (Deh Sabz, Bagrami)

Mawlawi Tara

Khail

Pashtun (Tara Khail)/ Deh

Sabz

Harekat (Deh Sabz, Bagrami)

Sufi Khak Sar Tajik / But Khak, Bagrami Harekat (Deh Sabz, Bagrami)

Joined the Taliban in 1996. He is said to continue

these links, and be the current representative of

the Taliban in Bagrami. .

Allah Gul Mujahid Pashtun (Ghilzai Katakhail)/

Deh Sabz district

Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (Deh Sabz, Bagrami)

Aref Khan Pashtun (Hod Khail), Hod

Khail, Bagrami District.

Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (Surobi, Bagrami, Khak-

e Jabbar, Chahar Asyab)

District Governor under Rabbani.

153

Interview on Bagrami District History, Shiwaki village, 04/02/2014. 154

Interview on Bagrami District History, Qala Ahmad Khan, 04/02/2014 155

The background of some of these former commanders still retaining power currently in Bagrami will be discussed below when addressing main current power holders.

71

Qari Zmaray Tajik, Sheena village,

Bagrami

Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (Deh Sabz, Bagrami,

Surobi, Chahar Asyab)

Head of Intelligence for the faction.

Engineer Afzal

Ahmadzai

Pashtun (Ahmadzai, Musa

Khail)/ Khak-e Jabbar

Ittihad-e Milli (Khak-e Jabbar and Bagrami)

Didar Shalezai Tajik (Babraki) Khord Kabul

in Khak-e Jabbar.

Nejat-e Milli (Khak-e Jabbar and Bagrami)

Defected to the Taliban in 1996. Currently retains

his political power and influence dating from the

time of the Jihad. He is reportedly armed and

connected with Afzal Ahmadzai. Supported

Commander Alem in Bagrami.

Commander Aref

Khan

Pashtun (Hod Khail)

Bagrami District/ Hod Khail

Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (Khak-e Jabbar,

Bagrami).

Arsalah Kharuti Pashtun (Kharuti)/ Khak-e

Jabbar

Hizb-e Islami Khales (Chahar Asyab, Khak Jabba,

Bagrami)

Sadiq Chakari Tajik/ Khak-e Jabbar Jamiat-e Islami (Khak-e Jabbar, Bagrami, Kabul))

Served as Minister of Information and Culture

during the Mujahideen government.

Dost Mohammad

Khan

Tajik/ But Khak, Bagrami Jamiat-e Islami (Khak-e Jabbar, Bagrami).

Bismillah Khan Tajik/ But Khak Commander of the Jamiat-e Islami in Bagrami

and Khak-e Jabbar.

General Aslam Pashtun/ Logar (Safi Sang) Jamiat-e Islami

Sharafat Pashtun/ Surobi Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (Surobi, then Bagrami

when Mujahideen took over Bagrami in 1992)

Nephew of Commander Ezat and is connected to

Sayyed Hassan Gul. Currently in Surobi.

The period running from 1992 to 1996 was thus a murky era in Bagrami. Circulation of weapons was

widespread, Mujahideen factions each held several checkpoints, and extorted money from wealthier

residents.156

In 1996, the Taliban came from Chahar Asyab through Shiwaki village and Sang Nawishta, and took

156

Interviews on Bagrami District History, 04/02/2014-05/02/2014.

72

over control of the district shortly after Kabul, reportedly peacefully and without any significant

bloodshed or resistance. Some of the prominent Mujahideen commanders joined the United Front,

such as Dost Mohammad (Jamiat-e Islami), while others fled abroad (Engineer Afzal, for instance,

went to Turkey, others to Pakistan), and some submitted their weapons and stayed in the district

(such as Qari Dawlat, from Ittihad).157 A significant number of Bagrami’s Jihad-era commanders,

however, defected to the Taliban. This is notably the case for Mullah Khaksar, Miah Mohammad

Agha (Miah Khail, from Khak-e Jabbar), Didar, Mawlawi Tara Khail, Allah Gul Mujahid, Sayyed

Maqbul, and Mussa, who all became significant Taliban commanders in the area, and mostly retain

significant influence to this day.158

During the American invasion in 2001, the district was taken over by Commander Ehsan (Jamiat-e

Islami), who took position as District Governor for three consecutive years.159 In the context of a

rather loose administrative control of the new government over the district, former commanders

and powerbrokers re-settled in the district and were alleged to engage in large-scale land grabbing

and forging of land documents, securing their power base close to the capital.160

1.4 Governance Structure

At the district level, existing government institutions include the District Governor’s Office, a District Primary Court, and the ANP Headquarters. In turn, line departments present in the district include: Finance, Hajj and Religious Affairs, Interior, Education, Agriculture, Irrigation and Water, Justice, Counter Narcotics, Central Statistics, NDS, and the Attorney General (Prosecutor).161

The significant influence of power

holders, most prominently including

MPs, further has a strong impact on

the formal district government in

Bagrami, as the space for manoeuvre

of district officials is often shaped by

their degree of acquaintance they

have with specific powerbrokers. Bagrami thus witnessed a high turnover of district officials under

the current government. Both the Chief of Police (Hashem, a supporter of MP Amanullah Gozar (see

Box 1)162, and the District Governor (Shams) were appointed in the beginning of January 2014. All

previous district governors were allegedly removed due to their involvement in cases of land

grabbing. This is notably the case of Jawed Delawar, recently replaced as District Governor due to

157

Ibid. 158

When asked if any significant commanders joined the Taliban, interviewees tended to reply in the negative. However, when discussing the history of individual commanders, it readily emerged that a significant number of commanders defected to the Taliban, even as most then defected again to the Karzai government. 159

Interviews on Bagrami District History, 04/02/2014-05/02/2014. 160

See, e.g., Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 11/02/2014. 161

Interviews on Bagrami Governance Structure, 05/02/2014. 162

Interviews on Bagrami Governance Structure, 05/02/2014.

Box 1. Commander Hashem – District Chief of Police Originally from Se Aab Gozar village in the district of Mir Bacha Kot (Kabul Province), he was appointed DCOP in Bagrami in January 2014. A graduate from the Kabul Academy of Police under Najib, he was appointed Head of the Criminal department of Hawze 4 in Kabul. He emigrated to Pakistan in 1992 when the Mujahideen came to power, where he worked for the organization Avesan. Hashem returned to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban and was appointed in Kabul for three years, before being appointed Chief of Police of Istalif district. Transferred to Hawze 15 in Kabul last year, he was appointed in Bagrami with the support of MP from Shomali Amanullah Gozar.

73

what some saw as his blatant connections with the area “land mafia” (reportedly led by Tara Khail

and Allah Gul) and his involvement in the Onyx Corporation land grabbing case (described below), as

a part of which Jawad, as DG, is locally said to have received a bribe from Azizi Bank. Appointment of

government officials on the basis of the support of local MPs and other power holders further

reinforces this pattern, or at least the perception of it.

State structures are further complemented by a Malik Shura, an Ulema Shura, and a DDA, said to be

in charge of supervising projects funded under the NSP. The DDA is composed of 30 members –

mainly maliks and local elders, including 10 women, representing different tribes present in the

district.163 That being said, the DDA’s electoral process, as in Behsud and elsewhere, appears

somewhat undemocratic, with positions on the DDA allotted based on elite consensus, with no

competitive election, as such, actually taking place.

Main functioning governance structures at the sub-district level are reportedly village shuras164,

primarily involved in dispute resolution165 -including criminal cases for some - and projects such as

provision of electricity or rehabilitation of roads. Though most Community Development Councils

have reportedly not remained functional at the village level, “cluster CDCs”, grouping several villages

around a project aimed at benefitting the population form a given area, are still operating. Youth

shuras and women’s CDCs have also been established and are still functioning. That being said,

women’s CDC members reported having little capacity of choice or decision power in the

programmes to be implemented and remaining under the strict control of men’s CDCs. In a focus

group conducted in Bagrami District Centre, members of a women’s CDC explained that they not

been handed the money they were allotted, nor consulted on the implementation of projects (a

women’s hall – currently used exclusively for mourning ceremonies – and the digging of wialas).166

The margin of action of specific shuras, their capacity to carry out projects and work independently

from the district authorities, seems to be highly reliant on the networks of power of their individual

members. Shuras which are reported to function completely independently form district authorities

or institutions are notably shuras with members with high connections in the government, or which

include influential former Jihadi commanders. This is especially the case not only for the District

Development Assembly167 but also for a number of sub-district shuras.

Of the tribal and village shuras, one of the most prominent is the Babakar Khail Shura of Nawabad

(Karte Ghaffar Khan), which benefits from friends in high places through its members General

Asadullah, former commander Haji Zmarak, and influential businessman Haji Ghulam Ghaws. It

further has regular links with MPs Liaqat Babakar Khail and Najiya Babakar Khail. The Hussein Khail

Shura additionally cultivates links with MP Qais Hassan and Haji Yar Mohammad (Head of the

Counter Narcotics Department). The highly independent shura of But Khak village, for its part, is

headed by Sufi Khaksar, former Harekat and Talib commander. Other shuras, including those in

Welayati168 and Qala-e Neman169 villages, were also mentioned as working independently of any

163

Interivews on Bagrami Governance Structure, 05/02/2014. 164

Some of these may have originated as CDCs, but CDCs as such in Bagrami do not seem to have remained functional. 165

See, e.g., Women’s Focus Group in Bagrami, 09/02/2014; Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 05/02/2014. 166


Headed by Qari Dawlat, former Ittihad commander. See Interview on Bagrami District History, 05/02/2014. 168

Interview on Bagrami Tribal Shuras, 25/12/2013.

74

formal authority.

1.4.1. Networks of Power in Bagrami

1.4.1.1 Primary Power Networks

As Kabul city sprawls towards Bagrami and urbanization intensifies in the district, land and

speculation over it have exploded during the Karzai era. Taking advantage of the weakness of the

new state and relying on their political influence and network of armed fighters, former commanders

allegedly grabbed hundreds – occasionally thousands – of jeribs in the district, securing their

occupation through a combination of the use of armed force, political networks (sometimes receiving

the support of government members, including local officials).

More broadly, there are currently several very large landowners in the district, who are also the main

power holders in the area, often prominent businessmen and hold significant political leverage in the

current government. Most derive their influence from their former role in various factions during the

Jihad, under the Mujahideen and the Taliban. This is notably the case for Mawlawi Tara Khail (former

Harekat and Talib commander and current MP), Allah Gul Mujahid (current MP) with whom he is in

conflict in Sheena, Dawood Zazi (by turns Ittihad-e Milli, HIG and Talib commander), Afzal Ahmadzai

(Ittihad-e Milli), Didar Shalezai (Nejat-e Milli and Talib commander), and Commander Aref Khan

(HIG).

Other prominent land grabbers include men who did not participate in the Jihad to the same extent

as the above. Attracted by the economic and political advantages of owning land in the vicinity of

Kabul, they got engaged in large scale settlement projects in the first Karzai era. This is notably the

case of Haji Nowruz Ahmadzai, one of the main competitors of Allah Gul Mujahid in Sheena and the

founder of the shahrak of Nowruzabad, Haji Munji in But Khak, and Qais Hassan (current MP) in Qala-

e Khandar.

Table 2 provides additional biographical information on Bagrami’s main power holders alleged to be

involved in land grabbing, while Table 3 provides information on other significant land-owners, who

are themselves major power holders but not alleged to have grabbed the land they occupy. Although

each power holder listed in both tables certainly maintains a constituency, the latter group seems

overall better regarded in the eyes of the population. Relatedly, while many of the alleged land-

grabbers maintain private militias, none of the large land-owners are reported to; while, at the same

time, several of the large land-owners were reported to be well-regarded as resolvers of conflicts –

which was not the case for any of the alleged land-grabbers.

169

Interview on Bagrami Tribal Shuras, 23/12/2013.

75

Table 2: Power Holders Alleged to Have Grabbed Land

Mawlawi Tara

Khail

Pashtun (Tara

Khail)/ Deh Sabz

District

Born in Deh Sabz district of Kabul in the early 1970s, Mawlawi Tara Khail Kuchi is the most prominent leader

of the Tara Khail tribe. He undertook religious studies both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which he completed

in 2006. He allegedly engaged in widespread land grabbing in the first Karzai era, forging documentation in

his name, and currently occupies several thousands of jeribs (accounts go up to 25,000 jeribs) across

Bagrami, Deh Sabz, and Kabul (Pol-e Charkhi). He is notably said to occupy land owned by the Ministry of

Defence in an area which includes the Afghan military’s training centre in Bagrami. He managed to secure

the support of his tribal members by distributing land to his Tara Khail supporters. Previously landless Kuchis

with little political and economic leverage, the Tara Khail thus reportedly support him without precondition.

Commander of the Harekat-e Islami alongside Sayyed Maqbul in Deh Sabz during the Jihad and Mujahideen

period, Mawlawi Tara Khail defected to the Taliban when they came to power in Kabul in 1996 and served

as a commander. In 2001, he joined the new coalition-backed Karzai government, participated in the

Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 and the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003. Elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2005,

he was appointed Head of the Committee on Nomads, Tribal Affairs, Refugees and Migration, was re-

elected in 2010, and was a member of the Committee on Narcotics, Toxic Substances and Ethics in 2011 and

2012.

Mawlawi Tara Khail reportedly holds significant leverage inside President Karzai’s government, and is said to

have the tacit protection of the President himself, for the benefit of whom he is suspected of having

organized the stuffing of thousands of ballots in Pol-e Charkhi during the 2009 Presidential election.

Nicknamed “Crazy Tara Khail” by his opponents, he is said to be protected by several dozen armed men,

who carry out their own “rule of law”, have their own checkpoints, and remain out of the security forces’

reach. Through his governmental connections, Mawlawi Tara Khail has allegedly intervened in the liberation

of several of his men and supporters arrested for exactions ranging from abduction of businessmen, to

murder of police officers – though most of these are carried out without coming to the attention of the

broader justice system. His large-scale land grabbing and land speculation has put him in open conflict with

other power holders, including Allah Gul Mujahid, Qais Hassan, and Haji Munji, as well as the people of But

76

Khak and Pol-e Charkhi, who contest his ownership of land there.

Allah Gul

Mujahid

Pashtun (Ghilzai -

Kata Khail)/ Deh

Sabz district

Born in Deh Sabz district in the late 1960s, Allah Gul Mujahid is a member of the Kata Khail subtribe of the

Ghilzai. One of the most significant power holders in Bagrami, he allegedly grabbed thousands of jeribs in

the areas of Pol-e Charkhi in Kabul and Sheena in Bagrami in the first years of the Karzai regime, and is in

direct competition for power with Mawlawi Tara Khail. A substantial businessman, he owns five brick kilns

and a fuel station in Deh Sabz district.

Allah Gul Mujahid joined the Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin faction of the Mujahideen in 1983 at 16 years of age

and rose to the position of District Commander of Deh Sabz after the death of his elder brother Hazar Gul. In

1996, he defected to the Taliban, and engaged in land grabbing and speculation in the first years of the

Karzai regime. Elected in the Wolesi Jirga in 2010, he is a member of the Saba Parliamentary bloc led by

Mohammad Almas Zahid, former commander of the HIG in Parwan during the Jihad, then Jamiat-e Islami

during the civil war, and prominent businessman. .

Reportedly leader of private militias constituting several dozen armed men, he is said to remain above the

law, has allegedly intervened in the liberation 57 prisoners, and is said to have been involved in several

cases of kidnapping and murder. As with Mawlawi Tara Khail, his territory is a state within the state. In July

2012, his men were involved in a gun battle against those of Mawlawi Tara Khail.

Haji Nowruz

Ahmadzai

Pashtun (Ahmadzai,

Isa Khail), Paktia

Province, Ahmad

Aba district

Prominent businessman and land grabber. Owner of 950 jeribs of land, he has a shahrak in his name in

Bagrami (Nowruzabad) in the area of Sheena – he bought part of it and grabbed the rest (approximately 200

jeribs in total). Currently involved in a conflict with Allah Gul Mujahid in Sheena. He was in Kabul during the

Jihad, legitimately bought some land under the Mujahideen and the Taliban, and grabbed additional land

under the Taliban the first Karzai administration. He is armed and has connections in the government.

Commander Aref

Khan

Pashtun (Hod Khail)

Bagrami District/

Hod Khail

Former commander of Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin. Used to be at the head of 10-12 troops in Khak-e Jabbar

during the Jihad against the Soviets, and former district governor under Rabbani. He has reportedly

grabbed government land in Bagrami during the Karzai era, though to a lesser extent than other

commanders - approximately 20 jeribs. He went to Pakistan during the Mujahideen era and came back to

77

the district two years ago. He cultivates strong links with the District Governor and Chief of Police.

Haji Munji Pashtun (Ahmadzai-

Musa Khail)/

Nangarhar

Former Commander of the Mahaz-e Milli in Nangarhar. Arrived in Bagrami during the Karzai era. He

reportedly grabbed between 4,000 and 5,000 jeribs of land in But Khak.

Dawood Zazi Pashtun (Zazi -

Hashem Khail)/

Paktia, Zazi Aryub

District

Former Jihadi commander affiliated with the Ittihad-e Milli, until 1992, when he defected to the Hizb-e

Islami Gulbuddin, then to the Taliban in 1996. Under the current government In 2005, he became a

member of the Wolesi Jirga, though was not reelected. He currently owns a shahrak in Bagrami in the area

east of Hussein Khail, and has several armed men at his disposal. Partner of the Onyx Company reportedly

involved in significant land grabbing.

Qais Hassan Pashtun (Hassan

Khail) / Khak-e

Jabbar district,

Baghgai village.

His father was a prominent businessman. He himself has elementary education. Allied with the PDPA under

Najib, he controls a shahrak in the area of Qala-e Khandar and Benihisar, and wields significant influence

throughout Charkh Ab. He is also involved in a conflict with Mawlawi Tara Khail in Charkh Ab, and

reportedly killed three of his men recently. Qais Hassan is additionally, like many other Bagrami power

holders, a sitting MP.

Table 3: Power Holders Not Alleged to Have Grabbed Land

General Akbar

Ahmadzai

Pashtun (Suleiman

Khail)/ Khak-e Jabbar)

Owner of 300 jeribs of land in Bagrami. Former PDPA partisan, he fled to Pakistan in 1992. His brother,

Habib Ahmadzai, joined Jamiat-e Islami after the Soviet retreat. Controls a shahrak next to Shahrak-e

Kamniat in the area of Sheena.

General Aslam Pashtun/ Logar (Safi

Sang)

Currently member of the Presidential Office of Administrative Affairs (Edare Omur), and hence cultivates

strong links in the current government. Aslam is a former Jihadi commander affiliated to the Jamiat-e Islami

(his brother, though, was with Mahaz-e Milli).

78

Haji Dost

Mohammad

Tajik/ But Khak,

Bagrami

Landowner. Former Jihadi commander affiliated to the Jamiat-e Islami. Owner of 500 jeribs of land.

Dost

Mohammad

Khan

Tajik/ But Khak,

Bagrami

Former commander in the Jamiat-e Islami for Bagrami and Khak-e Jabbar, who joined the United Front in

Panjshir when the Taliban took over. He came back to the district in 2001. Owner of 600 jeribs of land

inherited from his father, including 80-85 jeribs in But Khak. Participates in dispute resolution.

General

Bismillah Khan

Tajik, But Khak Former NDS officer and Commander of the Jamiat-e Islami in Bagrami and Khak-e Jabbar under the

Mujahideen. In the time of the Taliban, he joined the Northern Alliance in Panjshir. He returned to the

district in 2001 and presented his candidacy for Parliament but was not elected. He is not perceived as

nefarious or as a land grabber. He reportedly only owns 4-5 jeribs of land and is appreciated for his role in

conflict resolution.

Afzal Ahmadzai Pashtun (Ahmadzai,

Musa Khail)/ Khak-e

Jabbar

Received his education in Saudi Arabia. Nephew of Engineer Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, and deputy of Sayyaf

in the Ittihad-e Milli, he was at the head of a troop during the Jihad and controlled large areas of Khak-e

Jabbar. During Karzai’s first term, he was selected for the Mashrano Jirga (upper house of Parliament) for

one term. He is currently the owner of 1500 jeribs of land in Deh Sabz and several hundred jeribs in Bagrami

(Kamari, Shahrak Nazir Mina). One of the conflicts he had with the people of Kamari was recently solved by

his arrest for ten days and his promise to buy back the land from local residents. However, only part of the

land has been bought until now and there remain competing claims over the rest of the land.

79

1.4.1.2 Secondary Power Networks

Though networks of influence are reportedly more rooted in factional alliances than tribal affiliation,

the Ahmadzai are de facto the most influential group in the district, with the affiliation to a given

commander and tribal identification often overlapping. The case of Mawlawi Tara Khail is interesting

in this regard, given his method of distributing land as a means of gaining tribal support.

As will be developed when addressing security, despite the fact that anti-government activities have

only very marginally spilled over into Bagrami from neighbouring districts, Taliban and HIG forces

retain networks of support in the district. Connections of former commanders with HIG and Taliban

anti-government elements thus allegedly endure to this day, with reports of Mawlawi Tara Khail,

Allah Gul, Qais Hassan and Haji Munji, and perhaps others, passively supporting the Taliban. Though

this information remains unverifiable and cannot taken at face value, recent uncovering of artillery in

Sheena and Sahak goes towards indicating that AOGs have managed to maintain some connections

in the district. These networks are reportedly headed by Sufi Khaksar. He is said to be the

representative of the Taliban in Bagrami, served as High Commander of the Harekat Islami for the

four district of Bagrami, Musahi, Khak-e Jabbar and Chahar Asyab in 1979-1992, and joined the

Taliban in 1996. For his part, the representative of the HIG is reportedly Qari Ahmadzai, currently

settled Shamshatoo Refugee Camp in Pakistan.

Some prominent religious figures also constitute key informal leaders in the district. These notably

include Hazrat Saheb (Tajik, But Khak), probably the most prominent religious scholar in the area,

descendent of the Prophet and from a well-established religious family; Mawlawi Shakur (Ahmadzai,

Hussein Khail); the religious preacher Saheb Zada (Sahak, Sahak village); Mawlawi Din Kabir (Sahak,

Sahak village) who leads a madrassa in Sahak; and Malawi Aref (Tajik, Yakh Dara), head of a madrassa

and holder of an Imamat.170

1.5 Economy171

Bagrami seems to exhibit a high rate of unemployment or unstable daily jobs, with a great disparity

between those who own either significant portions of land or benefit from power networks, and

those who do not. An increasing number of young men commute to Kabul on a daily basis, or migrate

to the capital for employment, with a significant number of families earning their income from

members working in the capital.

Of those remaining in the district for work, main sources of income come from government positions

(benefitting from the district’s proximity to Kabul), including within the army, the police and the

administration; agriculture (a majority being small family farms, but with about 10% of farmers

engaged in sharecropping), and ownership of small businesses in clusters of shops across the district.

Rapid urbanization in recent years resulted in a shortage of arable land in the area, and in a decrease

of agriculture-based income, though this remains a significant part of livelihoods for many residents

who provide Kabul with fresh fruits and vegetables.

The average monthly income for the majority of families in the district (a reported approximate 80%)

revolves around 8,000-12,000 Afghanis, with seasonal variations, given the reliance of a significant

part of the population on agriculture for income. There is reportedly no bazaar, per se, in the district,

171

Interviews on Bagrami Economy, 27/01/2014.

80

aside from a cluster of shops in the district centre, and no weekly or other periodic bazaar. For daily

items, most people go either to the district centre, or to Kabul city – notably Arzan Qeimat (former

Ahmad Shah Baba Mina) for residents in the north and west of the district; those engaged in

agriculture often have to go to Kabul’s central market to sell their production. This was notably

reported as problematic by farmers, due to transportation costs, payment of commissions at the

Kabul bazaar, and damage of the crops during transportation. There is no organization to facilitate

transport of crops to the capital, and each producer individually arranges for the transport of his

production for sale on the Kabul bazaar.

Crops cultivated in Bagrami include wheat, corn, tomatoes, potatoes, turnip, spinach, and other

vegetables cultivated on a rotative basis, and a few orchards producing apples, almonds, apricots,

mulberries which are almost all sold, only a reported 5% being kept for personal consumption. A

small number of inhabitants also keep cows and poultry, mostly for subsistence, though cows can

also be used for additional income from the manufacture of dairy products. A few Kuchis herd sheep

in the mountainous areas south of the district, mainly for their meat, as there is allegedly no tradition

of wool carding or leather work in the area.

That being said, the agricultural land in the district faces considerable water shortages, as most of

the irrigation water is made available through diesel water pumps, which can have a higher cost of

use than the actual profit derived from the production of the fields they irrigate. As a result, many

small landowners are compelled to sell their agricultural parcels for construction, and revert to daily

labour or work as drivers.

Finally, while the majority of land owners own 2-20 jeribs used for agriculture, one should not forget

Bagrami’s aforementioned land-grabbers and land-owners as an economic force. They often combine

income from land speculation, profitable industrial enterprises and businesses, and high government

positions. Bagrami’s location has notably made it attractive for industrial parks and implementation

of settlement plans – though some of these are legally questionable and at the heart of land

conflicts. The district in turn presents several prominent businessmen who, aside from the power

holders discussed above, derive recognition and status from their economic well-being, with some

also participating in conflict resolution. This is the case for Mohammed Zaher (Hussein Khail), Nader

Zaref (Tajik, Qala-e Hassan Khan), Haji Shoaib (Tajik, Shiwaki), and Haji Mohammad Ali (Kamari).

1.6 Services

1.6.1. Education

According to respondents for this study, approximately 90% of children attend school, the main

obstacle for school attendance notably being economic well-being of their families. Those who

cannot afford private support classes expressed fears of being left behind, since the educational staff

in public state schools is insufficiently skilled to provide classes in more technical subjects, including

mathematics and English at the middle and high school levels. Girls further face specific problems

such as the unavailability of dedicated schools or female staff in some areas, and security–related

issues, with family members reluctant to send their daughters to school in fear of harassment172 after

puberty (approximately grade seven to eight173), and not sending them after their engagement.

172

Women’s Focus Group on Conflict Trends, 09/02/2014; Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 05/02/2014. 173

Women’s Focus Group in Bagrami, 09/02/2014.

81

Illiteracy was additionally mentioned as a serious problem among the female population, especially

in more conservative areas such as Gosfand Dara.174

That being said, education services are reportedly widespread in the district, with elementary and

middle schools for both boys and girls in almost every village cluster, and high schools in most of the

bigger villages (Pohand Irshad, Qala-e Neman, But Khak, Qala-e Ahmad Khan, Kamari, Shiwaki), four

of them being mixed and having female teachers available.

There are also prominent madrassas in Bagrami district centre, Qala-e Neman, and the renowned

Madrassa Abu Hanifa in Shiwaki, dating from the time of Zahir Shah and where several prominent

individuals have studied – including recently-deceased vice-president Marshal Fahim and his

replacement Yunes Qanuni. A reported 600-700 male students currently attend, taught by a staff of

20 mullahs.175 In Tapa Nawabad the Madrassa Onasiya Naaman also teaches 100 female students,

and a new madrassa for girls recently opened in Bagrami district centre, though taking only 60

students after selection176, and only having classes above the elementary level. In addition to these

official madrassas, every village also holds unofficial classes in mosques, which male students can

attend outside of regular school hours.177

1.6.2. Health

As with education facilities, health facilities are accessible in the district and reportedly available and

well-staffed, though they are said to lack quality treatment and medicine and are mainly used for

first aid and vaccines. There are two clinics available in the district centre and Alokozai, and health

centres available in But Khak, Sheena, Gosfand Dara, and Kamari. Due to the general lack of

efficiency of the services, however, district residents travel to Kabul for more serious health

considerations, with those living in the north of the district going almost systematically to Arzan

Qeimat, which has a well-equipped clinic.178

Private clinics have been constructed in recent years, including one constructed by Mawlawi Tara

Khail in the district centre.179

That being said, access to health care remains limited due to lack of awareness of residents about

health considerations, as well as the difficulty of physical access for remote areas.

1.6.3 Water

The main source for drinking water is wells. Access to clean drinking water is reportedly widespread

and wells are regularly cleaned. The mirâb system is functioning in the district, with mirâbs in charge

of checking the water supply and distributing water turns to village residents.

As mentioned previously, lack of water for irrigation represents one of the greatest challenges for

agriculture in Bagrami, with only diesel-fuel pumps widely available, at high cost. Water shortages

have become increasingly critical as the district has regularly been affected by droughts in the past

five years. Villages located on the foothills of the mountain are also subject to regular floods which

174

Ibid. 175

Key Informant Interviews, 27/02/2014. 176

Women’s Focus Group in Bagrami, 04/03/2014. 177

Ibid. 178


Ibid.

82

destroy crops and habitations. There reportedly exists no efficient prevention system for flooding

and retaining walls built to protect villages are ill-adapted to the nature of the floods.180

1.6.4. Electricity

State electricity imported from Tajikistan is available throughout the district, though some villages

are not completely covered by the state power grid (Aka Khail, Sahak, Qala-e Hassan Khan, and Qala-

e Mohsen/ Alu Khail and Hussein Khail), with their residents relying mainly on private fuel

generators. Making state electricity available to their villages was notably an achievement mentioned

by CDC members interviewed for this study and one of their main areas of focus, along with the

provision of solar panels in more remote areas, such as Yakh Dara.

1.6.5. Communication and Media

Most mobile telecommunication companies reportedly cover the area, with the notable exception of

Roshan in But Khak. Radio and television are the main source of information for a reported 95% of

the district population, with print media marginal.

180

Interviews on Bagrmi Geography and Economy, 27/01/2014.

83


2.1. Criminality

Bagrami is reportedly accessible district-wide, though travel to areas distant from the district centre

might warrant precaustions, such as travel with local intermediaries. Contrary to the neighbouring

districts of Chahar Asyab, Musahi, Khak-e Jabbar, and Surobi, local sources reported no active AOGs

in Bagrami.

Problems of security are in fact mainly related to small scale criminal activities (petty theft, mugging

when travelling in public transport) and major criminality – including murder, robbery, drug dealing,

kidnapping, and the settling of personal scores in bloodshed. More than the frequency of the latter

(no precise data could be gathered on the actual rate of crime in the district), the main source of

concern, according to accounts by residents, appears to be the blatant impunity of criminals and

private militias due to widespread corruption, and protection by power holders and high-ranking

government officials, enhancing a general feeling of powerlessness and fostering a profound distrust

in the state’s capacity to address local concerns.

The occurrence of crimes allegedly increases during the night, with expressions of concern for

mugging and attacks after dark across the entire district, and as a result limited movement of

residents after nightfall:

Day is better than night. Even in our village if we go out of the house during the night we will

be killed, [and] in the evening we cannot go anywhere. In the place that I mentioned [Gosfand

Dara], girls can go out neither during the day nor during the night: only the people from those

places can go.181

That being said, some areas were mentioned to suffer from higher rates of criminality than others,

with the district centre relatively safer, while areas neighbouring Chahar Asyab, and excentred places

such as Yakh Dara and Gosfand Dara, in the mountainous zones southeast of Bagrami, face greater

problems. A DRRD staff member, for instance, reported their not being able to carry out projects in

these areas due to fear of having their vehicles and goods stolen.182 This is also the case in the towns

of Sheena, Shiwaki, Hussein Khail, Sahak and Kamari, where the ANP has no or limited access and

capacity of investigation, and which residents from other villages reported avoiding – especially

women. Widespread violence in Kamari was particularly attributed to the sensitivity of land grabbing

issues, prompting dispute parties against both one another and individuals who might in the way of

one of the dispute parties. The following account of the murder of the head of the village shura for

opposing alleged land grabbers Karim Wahdat and Habib Saraf, exemplifies this scenario (and which

is further discussed in Chapter 3 of this report dealing with major conflicts in the Kamari area):

Six months ago, a person called Sufi Zamaray from the Tajik tribe and Kamari village, who was

the head of the shura of Kamari, was murdered. He was killed because he did not want to take

government land and the murderers fled the district.183

Last but not least, there were accounts of circulation of armed criminals mugging and robbing local

181

Individual Interview with DRRD staff, Chahar Qalai, Qala-e Ahmad Khan, 16/02/2014. 182

Individual Interview with DRRD staff, Chahar Qalai, Qala-e Ahmad Khan, 16/02/2014. 183

Individual interview (District History 3), Bagrami, 05/02/2014.

84

residents, in areas including Qala-e Ahmad and Nasaji. Hashish dealing was also reported as

widespread in the district, with extensive production of hashish traded in most villages, and with

Qala-e Neman as the local platform for distribution.

Lack of economic opportunities, unemployment and idleness were mentioned by respondents as the

roots of insecurity, with concurrent speculation that youth find an outlet for their frustrations in

violence and criminality. That being said, respondents placed significant insistence on the

responsibility of local land grabbers feeding violence, prompting their men against one another, and

cultivating networks of small criminal groups. Local conflicts in Sheena between Haji Nowruz and

local residents, or in But Khak between Mawlawi Tara Khail and villagers, among others, reportedly

have a significant impact on the general security situation in these areas, with settling of scores in

broad daylight, retaliation, and pressure exerted on local residents. The security situation in the

district is further disrupted by the exclusion of entire areas and militias from the rule of law, and with

armed men and local power holders believed to be engaged in kidnapping, mugging and murder.

This general lack of security and the impunity of well-connected criminals seem to be seriously

impacting the well-being of the local population, discouraged as it has limited recourse to official

bodies plagued by corruption. Consequently, there were accounts of displacement of families from

the district, notably in areas where land conflicts are widespread and the interests of powerbrokers

are at stake:

Around ten percent of the people have fled the district because of being in a dangerous

situation and enmity. This is because, in most villages, the conflicts are over land, and therefore

enmity increased. Some time ago a person by the name of Aimal from Islam Khail village shot

someone else in front of everybody and no one has held him accountable for it yet. This event

happened in front of the District Chief of Police. In this past year, I have witnessed these kinds

of events every day.184

2.1.1. Specific Problems Faced by Women

Women mentioned being faced with similar problems of mugging and robbery as men. They further

insisted on specific threats – mainly within the household. These threats include domestic violence

(including murder), pressure from male members of their families and in-laws, crimes of honour,

harassment of girls on the way to school, and kidnapping of girls. The research team also received

several reports of rape – something rather unusual to mention in the Afghan context.185

2.2. Capacity of Security Forces

Most respondents emphasized the insufficiency of security forces to cover the district and efficiently

address security threats.

The Highway Police186 are by far the best staffed force, with a reported 200 men concentrated on the

184

Individual Interview, community Leader, Qala-e Neman, Bagrami, 23/01/2014. 185

Interview with a Women’s Leader on Feelings of Security, 10/02/2014; Women’s Focus Group in Bagrami, 09/02/2014; Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, Bagrami, 09/02/2014; Women’s Focus Group in Bagrami, 03/02/2014. 186

Although in theory dissolved, respondents were unambiguous that the Highway Police continue to operate in Bagrami. Respondents may simply have been unaware of the administrative subordination of the Highway Police to the National Police, although TLO cannot exclude the presence of de facto independent Highway Police operations in Bagrami.

85

portion of the road running from But Khak to Surobi. For its part, the ANA has one checkpoint in But

Khak, and one base in the desert of But Khak, to the east. The NDS was also mentioned to be present,

with a force of 20-25 men in Bagrami in order to deal with cases of kidnapping, robbery, and

suspected insurgency. A Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was further recently appointed to

the district and resumed night patrols, with accounts of relative improvement of the security

situation in this regard, though the department was also described as too understaffed to be

effective.

The NDS and the CID, however, are the only security forces with which residents mentioned being

relatively satisfied. The ANP, conversely, is quasi-unanimously considered as ineffective,

understaffed, undertrained, and subject to power holder manipulation. There are approximately 22-

30 police officers to cover the entire district187, with six checkpoints located in Sheena, Shiwaki, But

Khak, Central Bagrami, Polygon (close to Kamari), and Mohmadzia.188 Checkpoints further surround

the district in the neighbouring Hawze 8, 9 and 12 of Kabul, and along the highway to Jalalabad.

District residents appear to consider these measures as insufficient to ensure the security of the

whole of Bagrami. They present the ANP as being unable to access most areas, and having little

oversight and investigation capacity even in some areas it can access (such as secondary roads189, or

areas controlled by prominent land grabbers). In all parts of the district, the police are reported as

mostly absent after dark, the police maintain no presence, day or night, in Kamari, Sahak, and

Hussein Khail, and there is no government presence at all in Gosfand Dara.

At the same time, local power holders have reportedly set up their own checkpoints around shahraks

they control and the land they have grabbed. Power holders, including Haji Nowruz, Allah Gul,

Dawood Zazi, Mawlawi Tara Khail, and Engineer Afzal, thus allegedly maintain their own militias, and

reports indicate at least ten powerbroker checkpoints across the district, including five around

Shahrak Onyx, one checkpoint controlled by Allah Gul Mujahid in Sheena, one by Dawood Zazi in

Hussein Khail, at least one by Mawlawi Tara Khail in But Khak, and two controlled by Haji Nowruz

around Nowruzabad.

As previously mentioned, the main grievance of residents with security forces concerns widespread

practices of nepotism and corruption, with criminals often released from jail after the interference of

maliks, local power holders, or government authorities:

“They are ineffective, corrupt, and cannot do anything without the help of the people. The thing

is, the police themselves are involved in criminality and corruption.”190

“I have been to the police office but I am not happy with the performance of the police because

the maliks and the government authorities have better relations with them. When they capture

a criminal they take money from him and let him get away […] When we report or turn in a

request to the police, we do not have any [positive] expectation of them because they are not

working properly and there is corruption at the government level.”191

In addition to the problems already noted, respondents manifested dissatisfaction with the

187

Individual Interview with Former Government Official, Bagrami, 26/02/2014. 188


Individual interview with Community Leader, (Feelings of Security), Bagrami centre, Bagrami, 12/02/2014. 190

Individual Interview with Head of Yakh Dara Shura, Arzan Qeimat, Kabul, 27/02/2014. 191

Individual Interview with Community Leader (Feelings of Security), Bagrami centre, Bagrami, 12/02/2014.

86

procedural aspects of the performance of the police. There were reports of inefficiency of filing

procedures, with one account of a man hurrying to the police centre to declare his house was being

robbed, and being compelled to file a complete declaration for an hour before the police eventually

took action – too late to stop the robbers.

We have access to the police but the police do not work properly and are not enforcing the law.

[When] we turn in a request it takes a long time for them to process it.192

Moreover, in cases where complaints are filed against an individual, the latter often seeks revenge

and, after his liberation, threatens the plaintiff – which deters many from filing complaints.

That being said, women respondents mentioned being by and large satisfied with the police, notably

in safeguarding girls’ security on the way to school and in being accessible for women – whenever

they are present.193 The latter represents a serious caveat, since, as mentioned above, the police are

judged to be too understaffed to cover the entire district and remain by and large out of reach after

dark. Moreover, despite the positive accounts mentioned above, none of the female respondents

explained having ever directly filed a complaint in a police office, and there is reportedly only one

female police officer in the entire district194, of whom female respondents were not aware, and who

is mainly confined to petty administrative tasks.

2.3. Citizen Response

As they allegedly do not trust the capacity of the police to intervene efficiently, residents have set up

their own security system, assisting the police in conducting patrols, or conducting patrols

themselves with light weapons or hunting guns:

“In each police station there are two to three police officers and the people are helping them on

patrol. The youth shura and the elders’ shura are patrolling together. […] The youth shura is

armed and the people take turns patrolling with guns while the police are just in their station.

They are taking too much time [so] the people are mostly trying to solve their problems

through the shura.”195

“If the people don’t collaborate with the police, they are nothing. […] Security is ensured by the

people themselves and organized through the shura. In Yakh Dara, a group of people take turns

patrolling in a car and asking about the whereabouts of newcomers.”196

In areas such as Kamari, where ANP forces are completely absent, local residents reported they had

set up a 15 member arbakai in charge of ensuring the security of villagers. Some mentioned being

opposed to police presence in their area as they have the feeling that the police actually attract

insecurity, and that ANP officers are insufficiently trained to address serious threats. This is notably

the case in Sheena, where unknown elements attacked the police and took their weapons:

The ANP is present, but, despite that, the area remains insecure. There is robbery, murder, and

there was even an attack on the police in Sheena. The aggressors took their weapons, and it is

192

Individual interview with villager, Hesa Awal, 12/02/2014. 193

Women’s Focus Group, Bagrami, 09/02/2014. 194

Interview with Women’s Leader on Feelings of Security, 10/02/2014. 195

Focus Group Discussion, 196

Individual Interview with the Yakh Dara Head of Shura, Arzan Qeimat, Kabul, 27/02/2014.

87

still not known who killed them.197

2.4. Armed Opposition Groups and Insurgency

Though insurgency presence is allegedly residual198, and insurgent activities from neighbouring

districts have reportedly only marginally spilled over into Bagrami, there were accounts of the

existence of underground AOG networks, reports of uncovering arsenals of weapons, including IEDs,

and the arrest of suspected AOG fighters. As reported by a resident of Qala-e Neman:

The insurgency is present here; the government doesn’t have any control. Groups which have

relations with the Taliban are also present here. The people don’t have the ability to oust them.

The people want to live in peace. And now myself as well, I want to go to Pakistan because

there are no jobs available here, no security, and the people do not trust the government.199

All districts surrounding Bagrami indeed host strong Taliban presence, including Khak-e Jabbar, Deh

Sabz, Surobi, and especially Chahar Asyab and Musahi. The latter two districts are Bagrami’s main

Taliban entry points, including for Taliban elements from Khost and Paktia; in these cases,

respondents stated that entry occurred through Sahak and Yakh Dara. AOG from Laghman, Logar

and Surobi also reportedly enter the district via the eastern Lata Band road, avoiding the main axis.

In 2013, explosives, including rockets, were found by the NDS in Sahak (on two occasions), Sheena200,

Qala-e Mohsen and But Khak, as well as neighbouring Hawze 8. In September and November 2013,

two individuals were also arrested in Alu Khail and Qala-e Mohsen, based on suspicion of AOG

activities. This is reportedly recurrent, indicating infiltration of AOG elements in the district,

endeavouring to build up forces in the vicinity of Kabul.

According to accounts by an interviewee involved in counter-insurgency, current passive Taliban

supporters include some of the major power holders in the area. As above, the Taliban further are

said to have an unofficial representative in the person of Sufi Khak Sar, in But Khak, managing

networks of influence within the district. Although allegations of insurgent connections cannot be

taken uncritically, widespread reports of such connections among Bagrami’s power holders, and the

better-established facts surrounding, for many of them, their role with the Taliban during the 1990s,

plausibly point toward sections of the local elite not striking an aggressively anti-AOG posture.

That being said, AOG support among the local population is reportedly weak201, as local residents

retain painful memories of the Taliban presence in the district, though provision of payment is

considered as a major incentive and potential leverage used by Taliban and HIG elements to recruit

supporters. Local respondents further characterized AOG elements as being mainly from outside

Bagrami: Khak-e Jabbar, Laghman, Logar, Khost, and Paktia. However, this information needs to be

taken cautiously, given the apparent opposition between ajnabi and bumi residents underlined

earlier.

Finally, respondents mentioned monthly ISAF patrols, arresting local residents and searching their

houses, activities which have to a degree alienated the local population. Respondents indicated that

197

Individual interview with DRRD staff. 198

There were different accounts on this point, with the police overall reluctant to mention insurgency, while some residents explained Taliban were occasionally present. 199

Individual Interview, community Leader, Qala-e Neman, Bagrami, 23/01/2014. 200

Individual interview with a member of the Criminal Department 201

See, e.g., Key Informant Interviews, 27/02/2014.

88

search and arrest operations had taken place most recently in Qala-e Ahmad Khan.

89

3. Landscape of Conflicts in Bagrami

3.1. Main Conflict Lines

The most widespread types of disputes in Bagrami were mentioned to be over family and inheritance

issues, with land – given the significant occurrence of land grabbing in the past decade – at the heart

of the most serious and longstanding conflicts in the district.

Put another way, though land conflicts take considerable proportions202, they do not represent the

majority of conflicts overall. Data collected through the dispute survey conducted in 25 villages

indicates that, among 817 conflicts surveyed, 286 were over family issues, and 97 over land, followed

by minor criminality, mainly land grabbing.203 The discrepancy between these numbers and the

accounts given by respondents to the qualitative research, enhancing the importance of land, may be

explained by the fact that the scope of land conflicts, notably land grabbing, and the high stakes

implied, gives them considerable importance in the eyes of district residents out of proportion to

their purely numerical weight.

Putting aside the prominent cases of conflicts involving power holders grabbing several hundred

jeribs to build a shahrak, most conflicts over land are between individuals in large part due to a spike

in the price of land – which can trigger disputes between heirs, conflicting claims of ownership, and

falsification of documents. Conflicts over agricultural land represent only a marginal portion of these

disputes, constructive areas being the main focus of both long-term residents and newly settled IDPs.

Indeed, with the arrival of new migrants in the district throughout the Karzai era, both local

villagers204 and land grabbers illegally sold government land to new settlers, speculating on the rise

of the value of desert zones suitable for construction, and occasionally providing purchasers with

legally dubious titles. Box 2 on the following page explores how these events have affected the land

title situation in Bagrami.

3.2. The Prominence of Land Grabbing

At the root of many conflicts between power holders and local residents is the issue of land grabbing.

As mentioned above, this is reportedly due to the rising value of land given the district’s proximity

with Kabul. A contributory factor was also the weakness of the government in the first Karzai era,

which allowed powerbrokers to settle their supporters or otherwise grab land by force without

threat from the government. In a significant number of cases, these power holders then used their

connections to arrange government recognition of their ownership.

Land grabbing in Bagrami was reported to take several forms:

202

Land conflicts between individuals have a tendency to quickly escalate into violent confrontations involving

village networks, armed groups affiliated to one of the stakeholders in the conflict, and tribes. Given the high

stakes they imply in terms of resources, the crucial importance of land for housing, and the involvement of

influent power holders, land conflicts are indeed the most resistant to resolution. This is further complicated by

the involvement of high-ranking government authorities siding with one of the parties and intervening in the

course of justice. 203

Here, categories of “major” and “minor” as always need to be treated cautiously. As described throughout this report, land grabbing would certainly seem a “major” problem. However, in Bagrami local perception, it is not a “major crime” unless accompanied by death or serious bodily injury. 204

In Gosfand Dara, for instance, local residents sold government land surrounding the village to migrants from the South and East

90

- Shahrak settlement plans by individuals and/or private companies on government land –

often with the perceived support of influential members of the government. This is notably

the case for the Onyx Company, which started building a shahrak with, allegedly, the support

of Anwar Ul Haq Ahadi (former Minister of Finance).

- Occupation of land pursuant to the 2012 Presidential decree on Kuchi allotments, though in

reality under a rather murky legal framework (reportedly facilitated by Mawlawi Tara Khail

and Haji Munji in But Khak – thanks to their connections with the president; and Mawlawi

Kabir Shah in Alaudin Khail).

- Illegal occupation of land by tribes or other groups, due to increasing demographic pressure

and the district’s proximity with Kabul.

Of these, land grabbing involving local powerbrokers and government authorities appears to be at

the root of the most longstanding conflicts. There were, as noted above, mentions of several

important “land mafias” in the district, all of which forge circumstantial alliances based on their

interests in a given area. Munji, Tara Khail and Allah Gul thus reportedly unite against Haji Nowruz in

the area of Sheena, though they compete for influence on a personal basis and are involved in

conflicts against each other in other areas of Bagrami and Deh Sabz. Each prominent land grabber is

said to have a network of smaller henchmen who grab land for them across the district and ensure

their area of power is safeguarded.

Box 2: A Complex Land Documentation Situation

Conflicts over grabbed land in Bagrami also come with a substantial history, reflected in a very

murky land title situation. Current conflicts over alleged land grabbing thus seem to be stymying

older disputes over the same parcels, which might very well re-emerge if the dynamics of power in

Bagrami change (e.g. after the 2014 elections). According to accounts by long-settled residents, an

approximate 80% of district residents held land documents from the time of King Zahir Shah.205 With

the land redistribution under the Communist government many lost their land, but kept their

documents, which they got out again in the time of the Rabbani government. In turn, in the Karzai

era, large-scale falsification of land title is said to have occurred, with both the local court and other

government authorities accepting this documentation in return for bribes, but without reconciling

previous government documentation. What is more, grabbed parcels (falsified documentation or

no) have frequently changed hands, often being sold to persons new to the district.

People have forged documents and settled on government land, with the collaboration of

government employees; and managed to have their land recorded in the court [qawala]. So

there is conflicting documentation everywhere, but those who have the right documents

cannot uphold their rights.206

Others, such as Mawlawi Tara Khail and Haji Munji, are said to have used the 2012 decree by

president Karzai allotting areas to Kuchis to grab thousands of jeribs of unoccupied government land

in Bagrami, acquiring firmans over the grabbed parcels, and reselling the plots to incoming migrants

and members of their tribe. This leads to a situation where a piece of land presents several

205

Individual Interview with the head of the Yakh Dara Shura, Arzan Qeimat, Kabul, 27/02/2014. 206

Individual Interview with the head of the Yakh Dara Shura, Arzan Qeimat, Kabul, 27/02/2014.

91

conflicting statuses and documents of ownership, with forged documents conflicting either with the

governmental status of the land, or the private title of a long-time resident unable to have his title

recognized due to lack of sufficient connections within the administration.

According to accounts of by local residents, most of the constructible land in the district – both

government and private - has thus been grabbed in the past decade, with power holders

circumscribing significant areas and keeping them out of state control, often leaving local residents

without any leverage to uphold their rights.

3.3. Major Conflicts by Area

Here, as throughout the report, TLO in its field research defined major conflicts as conflicts

implicating significant resources, high levels of violence and/or that have resisted several attempts at

resolution.

Though, as above, the most common types of dispute are over inheritance and family issues, major

conflicts in Bagrami are in their great majority over land, and include interference of power holders

or networks of influence impeding the conflict resolution process. In most cases, accounts provided

to the research team include connection with government authorities backing land grabbing or illegal

appropriation and speculation over land. Table 4 below provides a breakdown of major conflicts by

area.

92

Table 4: Breakdown of Major Conflicts by Area - Bagrami

Location Nature of Area Conflicts

Kamari The village of Kamari has been at the heart of a decade long conflict over land.. The conflict traces its roots to 2003, when the businessman Habib Saraf (Zazi) allied with local trader Karim Wahdat to forge documents and grab agricultural land belonging to local landlord Khandan Hussein (Tajik Babraki). Habib Saraf procured the investment, while Wahdat was in charge of liaising with the administration to have the documents falsified and the land sold at the best price. Five years later, when the value of the land skyrocketed, they sold it to newcomers and shared the profit between themselves. The conflict emerging from this land grabbing prompted the people of Kamari against one another, with the family and relatives of Khandan Hussein on one side, and the people who had been sold the land on the other. The conflict quickly escalated to high levels of violence, with local powerbrokers taking sides for one party or the other (Ashraf notably supporting Saraf and Wahdat). The case was brought to the District Centre several times, to no avail, and, some have alleged, resulted in the above-discussed assassination of Sufi Zamaray, candidate for the Provincial Council, and Safiullah who were opposing Saraf and Wahdat, though TLO cannot verify this claim independently. In any event, the district authorities were ineffective in arresting the murderers, which resulted in another uprising of Kamari residents who demanded the departure of the then-district governor Jawed Delawar.

Sheena In the northern area of Bagrami, what is said to be massive land grabbing by Haji Nowruz and Allah Gul Mujahid in order to build shahraks has resulted in an open conflict with the villagers of Sheena, and between the power holders themselves, resulting in fighting and injuries on all sides. According to the accounts of respondents, Haji Nowruz indeed grabbed land for the construction of his town Nowruzabad ten years ago in the neighbouring Hawze 12, progressively extending his holdings over the neighbouring land of Sheena, grabbing hundreds of acres and selling them for construction. His initiative was followed by that of Allah Gul Mujahid, who grabbed the neighbouring desert land for the same purpose, setting up unofficial checkpoints to protect his de facto property. In Tapa-e Lewai Rocket area of Sheena, Allah Gul Mujahid’s men207 are in turn reported to be involved in a three year long conflict, after they put on sale a piece of land at the bottom of the hill, triggering the opposition of local residents who claimed it as their own. These residents reportedly feel powerless due to the armed capacity of Allah Gul’s men and his connections within the district and national government: “with the government, police, weapons and power the people cannot do anything.”208

207

Respondents first mentioned these as police forces, however, it became clear after cross-cutting information that they were talking about an unofficial check points set up by Allah Gul Mujahid to protect the land he grabbed in the area, headed by one of his commanders, Abdul Rahman. 208

Survey on Major Conflicts, December 2013.

93

Hussein Khail

The Onyx Company land grabbing in the area of Hussein Khail remains one of the most prominent causes of grievance over land in the district and is constantly cited as an example of political implication, high level corruption, and lack of rule of law by respondents. In 2010, land was sold to the Onyx Company in order to build an industrial park by alleged land grabbers, including Dawood Zazi, partner in the project, in the area of Kamari and Hussein Khail, triggering the opposition of local residents who claimed the sellers had no rights to alienate the land. This included 800 jeribs of Defence Ministry land said to be grabbed under the protection of high ranking government officials, including the former Minister of Finance Anwar ul Haq Ahadi, and the former Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, as well as the Azizi Bank. The government initially complained about the grabbing, claiming documents had been forged. Eventually the government retrieved its complaints, after, according to respondents interviewed at length by TLO, the respective interventions of Minister Wardak and then-DG Delawar, and spurred by a bribe from Azizi Bank. The most prominent power holders in the area are Dawood Zazi and Allah Gul Mujahid. Though they continue to hold personal grievances against one another and compete for influence, they managed to come to an agreement over land, with Dawood Zazi paying off Allah Gul Mujahid, and in return getting to keep the land he had grabbed without further complaint from Allah Gul. Dawood allegedly collected the money from the settlers in his shahrak – a reported $200,000 commission.

But Khak There is currently an ongoing dispute involving Mawlawi Tara Khail, who acquired land via his government connections, and is currently facing the opposition of village residents. The latter demonstrated in front of the presidential palace to express their discontent and denounce the implication of government officials, to no avail. On the initiative of Mawlawi Tara Khail, most demonstrators were arrested and jailed upon their return. Given the large areas of dessert land available in the vicinity of But Khak, the area is at the centre of competition, including occasional fighting, between Mawlawi Tara Khail, Allah Gul Mujahid, and Haji Munji.

Gosfand Dara

There are problems in Gosfand Dara between Allah Gul and Haji Munji. The local people of Gosfand Dara themselves sold government land to IDPs from Khost, Paktia, Logar, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Laghman, and Kunar. The aforementioned power holders are now trying to acquire this land for their own ends.

Charkh Ab A land conflict emerged in Charkh Ab between villagers and two power holders, Mohammed Sadiq, member of the PDPA intelligence service and Mohammad Kabir, who allegedly forged land deeds to grab the land under Najib. However, the villagers claim they have been occupying and owning the land for the past 200 years and have religious deeds for it. They were supported in their allegations by the Ministry of Justice and the Amlak department. The conflict was not resolved under the Mujahideen or the Taliban. The people staged demonstrations, blocking the road to Kabul, Logar and Khost, but to no avail. Qais Hassan is the prominent power holder in Charkh Ab. He allegedly forged documentation over 2,000 jeribs in the vicinity, and is engaged in a conflict with Mawlawi Tara Khail, which recently caused three casualties on Tara Khail’s side.

94

Qala-e Neman

There is a two-year-old conflict between two individuals (Alem Khan and Asad) in the area of Qala-e Neman. Asad’s ancestor had received land from Zahir Shah as a gift, and during the first Karzai era, expanded his property by occupying neighbouring land, on which he started speculating. However, Alem Khan started construction on the occupied land before Asad could dispose of it. Jirgas failed to resolve the problem, which escalated when Asad is said to have killed two persons connected to Alem Khan and rejected the decision of the jirga. Apparently Asad, although not a main district power holder, benefits from more connections than does the comparatively lowly Alem.

95


Mechanisms

4.1. Preferred Justice Mechanisms

Justice actors in Bagrami include, among state actors, the District Attorney, the Judge, the Head of

the Huqooq, the Provincial Council, and a variety state actors intervening outside of their official

capacities such as the District Governor and the Chief of Police. In addition to state capacities, the

District Shura (DDA), the Ulema Shura and local or village shuras – the latter functioning according to

informal reconciliation mechanisms – are also active. An additional, qualitatively distinct, sort of

informal justice in Bagrami is the intervention in dispute resolution and provision of justice by local

power holders in the areas they control.

Both qualitative and quantitative data indicate the most widespread forums for dispute resolution by

far in Bagrami are local shuras and informal bodies at the village level. This includes first the

community or tribal shuras, individual elders or religious leaders asked to arbitrate a dispute, and the

Ulema Shura. Out of 817 disputes surveyed across 25 villages, close to 80% (648 conflicts) were

reportedly addressed to village level shuras, against 72 to the District Shura (8%), the rest going to

the District Governor, the Chief of Police, the Court, and the Provincial Council for a very small

minority of land cases. Some villages, including Hussein Khail, Charkh Âb, Nawabad, But Khak,

Gosfand Dara and Yakh Dara reported resolving cases exclusively through their local shuras in the

past year, and with Qala-e Mohsen, Kamari, and Sahak only exceptionally referring cases to the court

or the DDA (one or two cases over the past year). As stated by one interviewee:

We don’t inform the government at all if there is a problem in the village. If the disputant

wants to bring the case to the government, it’s his decision. But most of the time, the case is

just referred back to us [tribal elders/shura members] for resolution.209

In practice, village level shuras are at present still considered to be competent in addressing all types

of cases – including criminal cases. Indeed, though criminal cases were reported by some

respondents to be automatically transferred to the District Attorney or the court, other accounts and

data collected during the survey showed a different picture, with over 80% of the minor criminal

cases and 50% of major criminal cases dealt with at the village shura level; and the DG and the court

dealing with respectively 6% and 2% of minor criminal cases, and 9% and 18% of major criminal

cases.

There were further accounts of the participation of local influential individuals in traditional forums,

or arbitrating on an individual basis, but in a way that seems broadly consistent with the social norms

surrounding dispute resolution. It is not uncommon that a respected landowner or wealthy trader,

for instance, be asked to mediate between two parties. As mentioned previously when describing

district governance, some well-respected and influential local individuals are recognized for and

involved in dispute resolution, based on their personal reputation. This is notably the case for Haji

Mohammad Ali, a businessman from Kamari and owner of 150 acres land, in the following example:

When it comes to solving conflicts, he is good. Some time ago there was a conflict on land in

the village of Kamari. He solved it without any problem. And also there was another murder

209

Individual Interview with the head of the Yakh Dara Shura, and member of the District Shura, 27/02/2014.

96

case between two villages. He and the shura together solved that problem and he is taking a

significant part in work for society.210

Most conflicts are thus resolved at the village level, and in case a shura (or shura working with other

respected intermediaries) fails in resolving a conflict, it is first referred to another shura for help in

the resolution of the conflict:

All problems are resolved at the shura level. If the shura cannot solve it, [the shura]

collaborates with other shuras.211

For their part, power holders are further mentioned to be habilitated to carry out their own forms of

dispute resolution in the areas they control. Residents in shahraks under the domination of a specific

power holder thus bring their cases directly to him for resolution, rather than going through

traditional shura mechanisms, out of fear that the decision should remain without effect if not vetted

by the powerbroker or his henchmen. Militias of the former are notably said to have a free hand in

exerting power and are not held accountable for their crimes, creating a situation where justice is

implemented through force and not through law: “The person who is supported by weapons has the

law on his side. No one accepts the law and no one cares about the law.”212

As mentioned previously, there appeared to be a widespread distrust of government institutions and

authorities, considered as corrupt and inefficient.213 Thus, only in cases where one of the disputants

feels confident about the positive outcome of the case would he refer his case to an official

authority. Such referral to state institutions, as indicated by the low number of cases in the court,

only occurs in exceptional cases.

Government officials referring cases to non-state capacities appear relatively more common. The

District Chief of Police and the District Governor are the two main entities consulted for disputes

resolution outside of shuras – though in a marginal proportion of cases. They intervene mainly in

grave criminal cases for the DCOP, and cases where power holders are involved for the DG – with

mixed results, given numerous reports of the implication of former DGs with power holders and the

partiality of their decision. A government interviewee explained that the majority of cases referred to

him were cases of land grabbing, in which he could use his personal status and connections to help

ensure a fair decision (though this formulation should be taken with a grain of salt). The interviewee

further explained that he referred most of the cases addressed to him to a pool of maliks with whom

he cultivated good relations, referring only major criminal cases back to the police headquarters for

investigation. Indeed, TLO even received reports of murder cases referred from the police to elders.

The Huqooq Department and the Court were further reported to be understaffed and ill-equipped,

and mostly referring back disputes to village shuras, due to the government’s incapacity to

investigate and quickly resolve disputes. Despite Bagrami’s generalized distrust of government

institutions, there were several reports of satisfaction with the work of the District Attorney, who

was however mentioned to have little power at the district level.

210

Individual Interview (Key actors), Bagrami, 03/02/2014. 211

Individual Interview with the head of the Yakh Dara Shura, and member of the District Shura, 27/02/2014. 212

Individual Interview with maintenance director of the district, Qala-e Mohsen , 12/02/2014 213

See, e.g., Interview with a Community Leader on Conflict Lines and Dispute Resolution, Bagrami, 12/02/2014; Interview with a Community Leader on Feelings of Security, Qala Muhssian, Bagrami, 12/02/2014; Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 05/02/2014;

97

The District Attorney is an active person and he works hard at trying to control all the

corruption which happens in the district and preventing it. The District Attorney is called Haji

Muhabat Khan Masood. He is a Pashtun from Logar province and he needs to be supported by

the government because he is a good person [...] The District Attorney is the only hard worker

in the district, and the DG was recently replaced, so we’ll see in the future, but the District

Attorney is the only person in the district which tells the other government authorities to work

according the law, and we should give thanks to the District Attorney so he works even better

in the future.214

4.1.1. Processes of Informal Justice Forums

When enquired about mechanisms of dispute resolution at the village level, respondents insisted

shuras constituted a fixed body of recognized members chosen by the people and dedicated to

dispute resolution. Jirgas are considered more as a mechanisms used by the shura, than an

institution in themselves. When it deems a conflict has a certain level of complexity, a shura can thus

ask for the assistance of other recognized jirgamaran to resolve a dispute. As described by

respondents consulted for this study:

“A jirga is a combination of mullahs, elders and maliks who come together and resolve people’s

conflicts according to religious law.”215

“If the case is not solved at first by the shura, both parties bring their jirgamaran and the case is

judged in a third area [i.e. an area not related to either conflict party].”216

Though many parties expressed a strong normative insistence on the use of Shari’a, the system

actually used for resolution more closely resembles case to case conciliation, with Shari’a only

exceptionally used in cases of inheritance, when a knowledgeable person is available. Some tribes

and villages are further known for being more conservative, such as the Mohammadzai tribe (Yakh

Dara, Mamozai), and the inhabitants of Hussein Khail and Sahak. These tribes orareas are said to be

reluctant to use Shari’a where it conflicts with Pashtunwali, or other prominent social mores.

The use of machalgah is reportedly controversial. Some respondents indicated that it was not

widespread except in jirgas of Pashtun tribes which have recently settled in the district, and only in

cases where the parties are not trusted to accept resolution; while others insisted machalgah was

the only way to make sure decisions were accepted by both parties:

Mostly the jirga’s decision is accepted because the jirga enforces punishment and tax. They say if

anyone refuses the jirga’s decision, he has to pay some amount of money so the jirga’s decision is

mostly accepted by the people.217

4.2. Access to Justice

Main obstacles to access to justice in Bagrami and impediments to the impartiality of decisions

brought to a justice forum are allegedly the widespread corruption at every level of the state

apparatus – spilling over into informal forums -- high degrees of nepotism, and a general lack of

awareness among citizens of their rights and of justice processes. In turn, women face additional

214

Individual Interview with maintenance director of the district, Qala-e Mohsen, 12/02/2014. 215

Individual interview with community elder, Hussein Khail, Bagrami, 12/02/2014. 216

Individual with Yakh Dara Head of Shura and member of the District Council, 27/02/2014. 217

Individual interview with Community Elder, Bagrami Centre, Bagrami, 12/02/2014.

98

barriers to accessing justice, largely related to their more constrained social role.218

4.2.1. Dysfunctional Justice Mechanisms

Throughout the research, respondents gave numerous accounts of corrupt practices on the part of

the court and district officials when involved in justice procedures, and of their high level of

involvement in land grabbing. Interviewees further complained about attempts at disruption of

justice mechanisms:

“When the dispute is referred to government actors [District Governor, Judge, Prosecutor,

Huqooq] they are not solving it fairly; they take money.”219

“There is corruption at the government level and people are not happy with government

authorities because of their corruption and they do not care about people’s problems. Our

District Attorney works in a better way, but higher authorities do not care about the law and

people’s problems.”220

“We had a DG named Mohammed Zahir [who] was affiliated with the land mafia and he did

not work for the people. The district situation was not good and the previous Chief of Police

and District Governor were against each other because the DG grabbed government land. Since

the DG and Chief of Police have been changed, the situation is better and people’s voice is

heard by the key people in the government. There is too much corruption at the government

level and we can say that the Parliament is the main source of corruption. They are land

grabbers so people do not like them.”221

Previous District Governor Jawed Delawar reportedly often interfered in conflicts to support one

party or the other. In the case of a conflict between two individuals (Naik Mohammad and Tamim) in

Qala-e Ahmad Khan, for instance, first resolved through traditional mechanisms, the District

Governor was reported to have intervened in support of Tamim.

Indeed, persons characterized as powerful land grabbers reportedly cultivate strong links with

District officials – one of the factors for the high turnover of District Governors and Chiefs of Police,

as they become involved in land grabbing and illegal extortion of money after getting support,

protection and bribes from the different land mafias said to be present in the district. The past three

governors were allegedly removed because of their involvement in illegal land grabbing and

corruption. This is the case for Shahabuddin, removed because he sold agricultural land, Haji

Mohammed Zahir, because he built an illegal township, and Jawed Delawar, said to be involved in

the Kamari conflict and the Onyx Company land grabbing case.

This culture of corruption and nepotism further reportedly spilled over into informal forums of

resolution, with reports of maliks taking bribes to intervene in favour of criminals and the police

collaborating in such practices:

In the past two years I have not been the victim of a crime, but my son was. Six months ago

218

See, e.g., Interview with a Community Leader on Conflict Lines and Dispute Resolution, Bagrami, 12/02/2014; Interview with a Community Leader on Feelings of Security, Qala Muhssian, Bagrami, 12/02/2014; Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 05/02/2014 219

Individual Interview with a female respondent from Bala Qala-e Bagrami, 12/02/2014. 220

Individual Interview with Community Leader, Bagrami Centre, Bagrami, 12/02/2014. 221

Individual Interview (District History 2), Bagrami, 04/02/2014.

99

robbers took my son’s money and phone but the maliks kept coming to me and they told me to

sign a clearance paper for the robbers. So they are released from jail, because the maliks were

bribed and got some money from the robbers.222

There were further accounts on behalf of female respondents of the partiality of traditional justice

forums – especially with cases involving women but also with cases involving men – due to

widespread practices of corruption.

4.2.2. Women’s Access to Justice

Female respondents further explained their access to justice was limited throughout the district,

notably as the main forums of resolution are informal ones which bar women. What is more,

although a number of forums targeted specifically at women exist, such as women’s shuras, their

utilization seems limited.

Overall, women are highly dependent on male relatives for accessing justice forums – both formal

and informal – and then only with the permission of, and if represented by, a male family member.

Women can only very seldom take the initiative in justice processes, all the more as they mentioned

being unaware of judiciary procedures. Men’s and family’s interference was notably mentioned as

one of the main impediments for accessing justice, and women reported their voices were seldom

heard, including with regard to their rights, such as those to dowry and inheritance:

There was a conflict in a family where a woman wanted her dowry and her dowry was a piece

of land, but her father-in-law didn’t give her rights to her and [instead] built a house on that

land. She went to the district but no one heard her voice and nothing happened there. When

there is a conflict no one hears the voice of women. Even when [a woman goes] outside the

home for solving a conflict she will be threatened and her name blackened.223

The same respondents explained traditional justice forums were not impartial towards women and

required bribes in order to give out decisions in their favour. They further insisted there was a need

for greater government involvement and support in the realm of women’s access to justice and

defence of their rights:

Their decision is unfair. To date we have not given them anything as they will not help the

women properly. In my thinking, bribes should be eradicated. Government offices should pay

more attention to the problems of women. There should be a woman police officer in the

district so that the criminal cases which belong to women can be addressed correctly and

checked well.224

Though there have been reports of women asking for their inheritance rights, nothing in the data

significantly indicates that they effectively receive them. Male respondents, after first insisting that

women could get their inheritance rights, recognized that this was seldom the case as women were

not aware they had rights and would only claim them in very rare occasions. Female respondents

themselves insisted lacking awareness about their rights, but also explained there was a general lack

of awareness of women’s rights in Shari’a on behalf of male members in their community. There

were notably several accounts of rights of mahr (dowry) not being given to women, forced marriage

222

Individual interview with Community elder (Feelings of security), Bagrami centre, Bagrami, 12/02/2014. 223

Individual Interview with Female respondent from Qala-e Bala Bagrami, 12/02/2014. 224

Individual Interview with Female respondent from Qala-e Bala Bagrami, 12/02/2014.

100

and abduction of girls by power holders, as well as also ongoing – though marginally decreasing –

instances of baad and badal. One respondent in particular gave an account of a two and a half year

old girl given in baad after her sister fled to escape a forced marriage.225

Access to Women-Targeted Forums

Respondents further had no awareness of the existence in the district or its vicinity of a Department

of Women’s Affairs (though the latter is reportedly available in the District Centre), an EVAW unit, or

a Family Response Unit.

Women’s shuras were mentioned as one of the only bodies to which women are able to address

cases of violation of their rights, though this was almost systematically counterbalanced by mentions

of families preventing women from accessing such forums. There are reportedly 26 women’s shuras

in Bagrami with representatives from most tribes, including Pashtun, Tajik, and Turkmen, depending

on the proportion of tribes and groups in the area. These shuras appear to mainly play a role of

conciliation between family members, especially in defence of a woman said to have been affected

by domestic violence:

There was a case during the past year, for example, of a woman who could not bear a child.

She went to the doctor many times, but her problem was not solved. Eventually her husband

decided to put her out of the home. The woman begged her husband not to put her out, but her

husband didn’t accept what she said and the husband’s family wanted to put her out of the

home as well. She came to us and, with the help from Fazila and Parwin, I talked with her

family and in the end her husband agreed not to put her out of the home. Now they have a

good life.226

These forums, however, can seldom take independent initiatives, and mostly revert to men’s village

shuras for assistance. This is illustrated by the following comment which reflects most of the

accounts of female respondents in a focus group:

In my opinion first the shura is trying to solve a problem, and if they cannot, the tribal jirga and

tribal elders solve that problem.227

More generally, due to social and family pressure as well as cultural considerations, women’s

freedom of movement in most of the district is limited, with several reports of women not being

allowed outside their homes, or dependent on their male relatives. In turn, some reports surfaced of

women being forbidden to participate in the electoral process, and of girls being prevented from

attending school. The latter was notably the case in Qala-e Ahmad Khan, Gosfand Dara, and Yakh

Dara, with respondents from Hussein Khail and But Khak, for instance, saying that girls could attend

school only until puberty. These limitations in access to education almost certainly carry over to

access to rights, with women generally lacking sufficient personal liberty, and knowledge of

institutions outside their close circle of relatives, to bring cases to the attention of justice forums.

Women living in areas closer to the district centre are reportedly freer than women living in

excentred areas or notably conservative villages, such as Sahak, Sheena or Hassan Khan, where

women are not allowed to see men except for close relatives or accompanied by a mahram.

225

Female Focus Group Discussion, Bagrami, 05/02/ 2014. 226

Female Focus Group Discussion, Member of the Qala-e Ahmad Khan women’s shura, Bagrami, 03/02/2014. 227

Female Focus Group Discussion, Bagrami, 03/02/2014.

101

“The people of Sheena are discriminatory people and the degree of freedom depends on the

men. For example in the husband’s house all authority rests with the father-in-law and in her

father’s home it’s related to the father and brother.”228

“In the village of Hassan Khan women do not have any freedom. The girls cannot go to school

after grade six or seven. After that her father and her brothers do not let her to go to school

and when she reaches puberty she should go outside with a chadri229.”230

This has a notable impact on women’s participation in mediation in conflicts, as they are, for

example, only on rare occasion allowed to visit their neighbours’ homes to address family or children

–related problems. Lack of freedom of movement was further mentioned as impeding participation

in development programmes, with male members of the community refusing to let “their” women

attend trainings or seminars.

228

Female Focus Group Discussion, respondent from Sheena, Bagrami, 05/02/2014. 229

Perhaps better known as burqa, a women’s garment covering the totality of the body and face with a mesh screen in front of the eyes. 230

Female Focus Group Discussion, Female respondent from Sahak, Bagrami, 05/02/ 2014.

102


In recent years, main sectors of development assistance in Bagrami have been rehabilitation of water

infrastructure and education. NGOs recently or currently active in the district include CARE, Save the

Children, Equality for Peace and Democracy (EPD), and AWRC. Maliks were notably mentioned as the

main and almost inevitable entry points for NGOs in every area of implementation. Table 5 lays out

the activities of these NGOs in Bagrami.

Table 5: NGO interventions in Bagrami

Organization Description of Projects

AWRC Active in Bagrami since 2012, building female CDCs’ capacity and encouraging women to participate in the electoral process of CDCs, as well as providing awareness courses on juvenile and women’s rights, and civic education in the villages of Qala-e Neman, Qala-e Ahmad Khan, and Sabzabad.

CARE Since 2012, CARE has carried out a number of infrastructure activities, including rehabilitation of irrigation structures, karez cleaning, construction of culverts and improvement of canals. In the past year and a half, CARE has also notably been implementing a programme on awareness of women’s rights in Bagrami District Centre and Welayati. Though they reportedly faced opposition from men in the beginning, CARE employees explained they overcame the difficulty by explaining classes were grounded in Shari’a and by working with husbands to understand the content of their programs, an approach which also contributed to constant and high participation in the programme to this day.

Save the Children

Active in the education sector, Save the Children provides classes to children unable to attend school or to afford private support classes.

EPD EPD has been active in Bagrami district through both its ACTA (Afghan’s Coalition for Transparency and Accountability) and PWN (Provincial Women’s Networks) platforms, each of which comprising about 30 active members. ACTA has been focusing on anti-corruption and monitoring service delivery regarding roads, electricity, and water supply, which EPD identified as the main problems faced by local residents. The PWN platform focuses on trainings and capacity building for women, seeking to increase women’s advocacy, promoting participation in elections, etc..

103

C. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN KAMA

DISTRICT OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE

104

1. Background: Kama

1.1. Geography

Kama district is located in the east of the oriental province of Nangarhar, 45 minutes away by car

from Jalalabad, and four hours from Kabul. It is bordered by Jalalabad and Behsud to the west and

south, with the districts of Kuz Kunar rimming it to the north, and Goshta to the east. Flowing from

the north, the Kunar River runs along the western border of the district, and joins, further to the

south in Behsud district, the Kabul River, which itself demarcates the southern border of Kama,

running towards Pakistan to the east.

Physically, the district is cut in half along a diagonal running northwest to southeast, with a fertile

valley spreading between the two rivers in the southwest of Kama – where the majority of the

district population is concentrated; while the eastern part of the Hindu Kush mountains covers the

northeastern part of the district (Shinka Ghundai and Matarkhail mountains). Aside from a few

villages scattered in the north (Tangy, Naray Obeh and Mama Khail), the latter remains mostly

uninhabited.

Stemming from the highway to Jalalabad, the district has a network of three main roads: one running

along the mountains in the northern part of the valley and going through Derbarak, Shirgar, and

Mangoli; the second, further south, running through Landar Buch towards the district centre of Kama

Sangar Saray; and the last bifurcating towards the south, running through Qala Akhund, Deh Araban

and Jamali, before connecting with the District Centre in the south-central part of the district and

joining the northern road in Dar Mirza Khail (this is the only paved road of the three). The re-joined

road then continues via Goshta district towards Gandahab in Mohmand Agency (Pakistan), and

further on to Peshawar. These three axes are connected by a network of paths running between

clusters of villages, though, as in other study areas, the transport infrastructure has reportedly been

deteriorating in recent years due to lack of maintenance.

1.2. History

Kama has historically been, in a social and political sense, very close to Jalalabad, and, aside from the

Communist era, did not display particular resistance to successive Afghan governments. In the time

of Zahir Shah, the appointment of the Shinwari and Mohmand tribes to control the border and the

subsequent advantages they received from this status secured their general support to the central

government. Indeed, they were not required to hold tazkeras, held specific documentation which

allowed them to cross the border as they pleased, received invitations to receive education in Kabul

at institutions such as the Khushal Khan High School, and benefitted from health care in the capital.

During that time, 80% of the land in the valley was mentioned to be documented – a significant

exception in the Afghan land tenure landscape, and a contrast to even the land tenure situation in

Behsud.

After the Saur Revolution in April 1978, the PDPA did not at first encounter any significant resistance,

and reportedly enjoyed a small support base in Kama. The redistribution of land, as in Behsud,

nevertheless turned landowners, which represented a significant force in Kama, against the

government. Landowners indeed resented the rule of a maximum of six jeribs per person, and

disregarded what they saw as the disrespect of the Communists for tradition and local elders, saying

105

the Communists “tried to replace God and were unbelievers.”231 Of historical interest, the reported

six-jerib maximum in Kama can serve as a simple, fairly clear illustration of the variation of PDPA land

reform: in Behsud, of course, a landowner could keep up to 30 jeribs. This variation plausibly relates

to the differing economic condition of the districts, with a “large landowner” in Behsud holding

substantially more property than a “large landowner” in Kama. Though Kama’s economy remains

better than that of many Afghan districts, its relative poverty compared to Behsud persists to this

day.

With that said, despite initial support by landless peasants, the PDPA was quickly faced with a

general uprising in the district, as the Imam of Qala Akhund called for resistance during Friday prayer,

triggering the revolt: “all local people stood up simultaneously and marched towards the centre of

Kama”232 where they were immediately faced with armed resistance of PDPA. The defection of an

entire PDPA tank unit to one of Kama’s two main Jihadi commanders, Mawlawi Shakur – reportedly

due to tribal links between him

and the PDPA tank commander –

represented a turning point in the

struggle, with most Communists

killed or fleeing the area.

Within one year of the Saur

Revolution, the Communists thus

lost control over Kama. Unable to

enter the area, PDPA and Soviet

forces would conduct regular

operations, bombarding the

district. Kama suffered from

heavy destruction and witnessed

the flight of most of the district

population in the 1980s, with

PDPA supporters leaving for

Jalalabad, while the rest of the

population fled to Pakistan to avoid enrolment in government forces and continued bombing. At the

same time, these bombardments prevented Mujahideen factions from establishing any stronghold in

the area, over which none of the rival parties managed to secure control. Nevertheless, Hizb-e Islami

Gulbuddin and Hizb-e Islami Khales established themselves as the two strongest Jihadi factions in

Kama (see Box 1). They were led respectively by Khodai Dost and the aforementioned Mawlawi

Shakur. After the first uprising, Shakur (HIK) and Khodai Dost (HIG) retreated to the mountains with

groups of 30-40 fighters each, returning to the plains area at night.

In addition, according to the report of an interviewee who had participated in trainings led by

Pakistani intelligence forces, HIG and HIK were both supported by Pakistan, an important factor of

their significant influence in Kama. Pakistani Intelligence services would indeed provide them with

weapons and organize trainings for their supporters in Islamabad. 233

231

Individual interviews with tribal elders, Kama, 24/12/2013. 232

Ibid. 233

Individual interviews with tribal elders, Kama, 24/12/2013.

Box 1: Organization of Jihadi Factions in Kama

During the Jihad, the strongest Mujahideen groups present in the district included the Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin, followed by the Hizb-e Islami Khales, with smaller support groups for the Jamiat-e Islami and the Ittihad.

Each faction would stand behind a commander who would have a myriad of lieutenants (sargroups) supporting him. The HIG was thus led by Khodai Dost, and after he was killed in the early 1980s, by his younger brother Mawlawi Ataullah Ludin who became the main power holder in the area. His lieutenants included Mawlawi Ataullah Mangal, Hamid, Rauf, Hazrat, Mohammed Saeed, Askar, Khan Zaman, Giyas, and Lal Saeed.

The HIK, on the other hand, was headed by Mawlawi Shakur, and his lieutenants Shahpur, Mohammad Gul, Abdul Baki Baloch, Juma Gul, Salim, Ahmad Sangar, Samiudeen Khalidi, Saifur Baz, and Isa Omar Meta Khail.

106

After the fall of the Communist regime in 1992, all Jihadi factions reportedly united, at least briefly.

Mawlawi Shakur took over the administrative control of the district and was appointed District

Governor with the support of Haji Qadir (HIK as well) and the Nangarhar Jihadi Shura in Jalalabad.

However, as his appointment triggered disunity among Jihadi factions and he only seldom came to

the district from his residence in Jalalabad, Shakur resigned one year later, and a shura dominated by

HIG commanders was appointed, headed by Mawlawi Ataullah Ludin (HIG), Nangarhar’s current

provincial governor. As the situation was overall calm in Kama under the three years of Mujahideen

government234, some district residents who had left to Pakistan and had sufficient resources

reportedly came back. However, the bulk of the population remained abroad as district

infrastructure (notably the water system) had been destroyed and the economic situation in Kama

remained dire.

The arrival of the Taliban in Kama greatly resembles their arrival in Behsud. The arrival of the Taliban

in 1996 triggered the flight of the Jihadi commanders, while smaller sargroups were disarmed and

remained in the district, or jailed if they opposed disarmament. While the population did not oppose

the Taliban with significant resistance (as there was alleged resentment of the Jihadi commanders;

the Taliban were considered too strong to oppose; and there were hopes of no bloodshed), the

implementation of their rather strict code as well as a continuously poor economic situation,

gradually turned the population against the new power holders, triggering civil disobedience and the

flight of many to Pakistan an approximate six months after the fall of the Mujahideen. The Taliban

rule was largely perceived as too restrictive with accounts of people rejecting what they considered

as abusive regulations (such as, in a diagrammatic example, forcing people to conduct two rounds of

prayer instead of one, for the benefit of Taliban overseers who had not happened to see the first

round of prayer). There was, however, no large scale opposition, and the population’s resistance

largely remained within the boundaries of small-scale disobedience to Taliban rules.235

After the US invasion and the fall of the Taliban regime in Jalalabad, Taliban elements in Kama left

the district peacefully, with some elements remaining in the district and dropping their weapons.

Jihadi Commanders Mawlawi Shakur and Malawi Ataullah Ludin returned, the latter joining the new

government along with former sargroups from both HIG and HIK, who benefitted from his support to

acquire government positions. That being said, Kama was mainly under the control of the new

Provincial Governor Haji Qadir, who appointed most district officials, and was a relative of Mawlawi

Ataullah Ludin.

The beginning of the first Karzai administration was also characterized by an inflow of development

aid, and the rehabilitation of water system, with most water pumps and canals (re-)dug and

rehabilitated in the early 2000s.

Currently, former Jihadi commanders retain influence in Kama. Mawlawi Ataullah Ludin – the

aforementioned Member of Parliament in 2005, former member of the High Peace Council and

current Governor of Nangarhar – still enjoys a high reputation in the district and conserves significant

influence. The current District Governor, Haji Zalmi (Kuchi) is also a former HIG Commander.

Mawlawi Shakur, however, now exiled in the United States, appears to have lost his support base in

Kama. Local respondents state that he is ensnared in the US legal system and now just “waiting to

234

Unlike in Behsud, there were no checkpoints during those years in Kama, and residents could circulate freely without carrying identity documents. 235

Individual interviews with tribal elders, Kama, 24/12/2013.

107

die.”236

Other influential individuals include Dr. Abdul Qahar, and Muhammad Abrar (Mohmand), both

members of the Provincial Council, and Ehsanullah (Ibrahim Khail), the former Head of the Nangarhar

Customs Office, who all reportedly have a good access to NGOs and can thus attract assistance.

1.3. Demographics

1.3.1. Population and Tribal composition

There are an approximate 180 – 250,000237 people living in the district, distributed across 59 village

clusters. These constitute the main social units in the district, characterized by names based either

on tribal composition (Deh Araban: “The Village of the Arabs”), the heritage of a famous figure (Malik

Shereen), or the reputation of a given area: “For example in Qala Akhund there is a big Qala, that’s

why people called it Qala Akhund. In some places like in Bajauru village most of the Bajauri people

are living – that’s why it is called Bajauru village.”238 In the past two years, and given the inflow of

migrants, there has been significant expansion of villages, along with the apparition of at least seven

new settlements, with Kunariano village in the area of Bela reaching close to 600 families, and the

population of Muslimabad rising to 300 families. Also notable is the mushrooming of new

settlements in Safdari Dagh, Mirza Khail, Sangar Saray, Qala Akhund, Qaria-e Malik, Deh Araban,

Ahmadzai Banda, and Naser Khan.

With a majority of ethnic Pashtuns, Kama’s population reflects the demographic pattern of

Nangarhar. These are subdivided in different tribes, the most important (in terms of population)

being the Mohmand (20%), Ibrahim Khail (12%), and Umer Khail (10%); the rest being divided in

Ludin, Akhundzada Khail, Amar Khail, Bajauri, Miran, Kharuti, Malla Khail, Afridi, Arbaban, Niazi,

Abdul Rahimzai, Naseri, Safi, Mita Khail, Chiqtai, and Soltan Khail (settled Kuchis). There is also a

minority of Arabs (1%) and Tajiks (0.5%). Most do not have specific areas and live in a tribally mixed

environment, though Arabs are mainly located in Sadar Kalay and Qala Akhund and Tajiks in Qala

Akhund and Dar Kalay. A small group of nomadic Kuchis reportedly come to the district in the winter

from Kabul, crossing the Kama Bridge, and staying in Kandu, Qala Akhund, Za Khail, Sangar Saray and

Mirza Khail for a period of three months. As reported by a district elder:

We have both settled Kuchis and nomadic Kuchis. The latter settle here during winter, when

there are no crops in some of the fields, and then they leave when we need to plant. There are

no particular tensions with these groups. It is not like in Mohmand Dara where the Kuchis end

up claiming the land they seasonally settle on.239

In Kama, the Mohmand are considered as the most powerful group, as they own land, and count

among themselves influential ex-Jihadi commanders, followed by the Ibrahim Khail due to

demographic considerations, and the Ludin, as members of the latter tribe have traditionally been

well represented in the administration.

At first, respondents emphasized accounts of different groups cultivating good relationships, as they

reportedly share the same shuras and there were mentions of intermarriage between different sub-

236

Individual interviews with tribal elders, Kama, 24/12/2013. 237

Accounts on the number of residents differed significantly, ranging from 120,000 according to a vaccine survey, to 285,000 according to the District Chief of Police. 238

Data collected by the Liaison Office in Kama district in 2011. 239

Individual Interview with district elder and judge of Bati Kot, Kama, 24/12/2013.

108

tribes and ethnicitie. However, several reports also surfaced of increasing factionalism and

degradation of relations between groups, mostly based on politics.

In an individual interview, a Mia Khail local tribal elder further emphasized:

The relationship between tribes has deteriorated in the past two years; the tribes have enmity

between them. This enmity becomes the reason for the bad security situation in our district.

Most of these conflicts are hidden and one enemy comes to the district secretly and attacks its

enemies. This becomes the root cause to start armed conflict.240

That being said, data collected by USAID on the security situation in Kama in the past five years

shows a significant proportion of feuds241 (as opposed to inter-district enmity), as will be developed

in the section dedicated to conflicts. Though the data give no clear indication that these have a tribal

or ethnic background, the above comments by residents could indicate that disputes occasionally

degenerate into cycles of revenge between families and larger groups – including tribes/ sub-tribes.

1.3.2. Trends of Migration

Over the past couple of years, Kama district, like Behsud, witnessed immigration from insecure

districts in the province (Chaperhar, Khogyani, and Hisarak; Cipay tribals from Bati kot, Mohmands

from Goshta and Mohmand Dara), and also the neighbouring provinces of Kunar and Laghman, as

well as from Bajaur Agency across the border in Pakistan. Members of the Safi, Mohmand, Khogyani,

and Pashai tribes, among others, from neighbouring districts have also settled in the area. Though

exact figures are difficult to evaluate, in the past two years, there were reportedly an approximate

400 families settling in the district from Laghman (Safi), 400 from Kunar, 200-300 from Khogyani,

150- 300 from Bati Kot, 100 from Chaperhar, 40-80 families from Azra district of Logar province

(including some seasonal migrants), and 100 from Bajaur.242 Families of mullahs from Swat also

settled in the neighbourhood of Karkhaka, giving classes to local residents in Islam, and giving

sermons at the local mosque.243 A small proportion of residents from Mazari Cheena (the border

crossing to/from Pakistan at Goshta district) also reportedly arrived in Kama both due to insecurity in

their region of origin, and to floods, which had destroyed their housing and sources of income.244

There were said to be no specific location for migrants to settle. There is no IDP camp in the district

and most newcomers rent rooms or land from local residents. Immigrants are thus settled across the

district, albeit mainly in the following areas: Dahe Ghazi, Za Khail, Sangar Saray, Mirza Khail, Gayeek,

Dagh, Araban, Kandu, Shirgar, Bila, Qala Akhund, Mastalay, Muslimabad and Mama Khail. These are

also the biggest and most developed clusters of villages, suggesting that newcomers are probably

attracted by the existence of infrastructure, services, and potential livelihood opportunities. Migrants

were mentioned to be usually poorer than the settled population, working as daily workers in the

240

Individual Interview with a district tribal elder, Musta Ali Village, Kama, 10/01/2014. 241

IMMAP – USAID, “Nangarhar Province – Kama District : Security Profile Based on Observed Security Incidents for All Categories Monitored from 2008-2013”, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kama%20District%20security%20profile%20based%20on%20observed%20security%20incidents%20for%20all%20the%20categories%20monitored%20from%202008%20to%202013.pdf. 242

Interview with Kama Community Leader, 1/1/2014; Interview with Kama Community Leader, 1/6/2014; Focus Group Discussion with Kama Community Leaders, January 2014. 243

These numbers are less indicative of the effective number of migrants which arrived in the district, than of the resident’s perception of the proportion of migrants from each group. 244

Focus Group Discussion with Kama Community Leaders, January 2014

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kama%20District%20security%20profile%20based%20on%20observed%20security%20incidents%20for%20all%20the%20categories%20monitored%20from%202008%20to%202013.pdf



109

agricultural sector.

As for the pattern described when addressing migration in other areas, main motivations for

migration in Kama include a combination of economic and security considerations which are difficult

to dissociate – notably as insecurity is preventing people from securing a stable income in their

districts of origin. Push factors thus include deterioration of security due to insurgent activities and

military operations (ANA, IMF, and Pakistani army), and dire economic conditions. The availability of

cultivable land in Kama was reportedly a strong motivation for immigrants from Laghman, where

arable land remains rare.

Though most respondents mentioned the relationship between long settled populations and

newcomers was overall good, there were some expressions of concern about the length of the

latter’s stay, the importation of their rivalries, and the possibility of infiltration of insurgents from

insecure areas. There were additionally distinctions drawn, as in other areas, between bumi and

ajnabi. For example, a participant in a focus group discussion stated:

Until now we have had good relations but we are concerned about the future because they do

not originally belong to this district. As far as we know, most conflicts and insecurity come into

existence because of them [outsiders]. And they come to our weddings ceremonies without

being invited.245

The latter point, notably, emphasizes that newcomers have not been integrated into the local

communities, as tradition in rural Afghanistan does not require the issue of invitations for a wedding,

and members of the community may show up and benefit from the hospitality of the host – who is

honoured and respected for being able to provide hospitality to all.

There were also reports of emigration from the district to Kabul in search of better livelihood

opportunities, though these were mentioned to keep strong links with their district of origin and

regularly coming back, having only left temporarily.

1.4. Economy

As in most of Nangarhar, the main currency used in Kama is the PKR, followed by the Afghani. There

are reportedly no money exchanges in the district, and no hawala system.

Most district permanent residents derive their livelihood from the agricultural sector, working as

daily labourers on the irrigated arable land in the valley covering most of the southwest of Kama, and

a small proportion of residents work in the transportation sector, commuting between Kama and

Jalalabad.

Crops cultivated include wheat, rice, watermelon and tomatoes in the summer; while sugar cane,

corn and seasonal vegetables such as cauliflower are cultivated in the winter time. The production of

vegetables and fruits (apricot, orange and plums) concerns only 20% of the land, while the remaining

land is used for cereals and sugar cane production. All are sold on district markets and in the

provincial market of Jalalabad from where they are sent to Kabul, primarily.

Bovines and poultry are mostly used for their meat in household consumption, as the manufacture of

dairy products for commercial purposes is reportedly rare. These animals are thus mostly for

subsistence use, and do not constitute a considerable source of revenue for their owners as

245

Male Focus Group Discussion – Tribal elder/ Teacher form Hazar Bik, Kama.

110

compared to crops, though the animals themselves are occasionally sold to increase income. The

average household income is reportedly 4,000-6,000 PKR, with seasonal variations given the reliance

of the population on agriculture and on market outlets for livelihoods.

A significant characteristic of the district is the high proportion of district natives working in the

government administration (30%; reported to be mostly members of the Ludin tribe), in the army,

and in NGOs (20%). This has notably been explained by the high rate of education in the district, but

also the fact that tribes in Kama have traditionally been close to the government since at least the

time of Zahir Shah. Most of these, however, are not permanent residents of the district and have

often resettled in Jalalabad or Kabul when engaged in the administration or the development sector,

though they regularly commute back to their place of origin. There are also a significant number of

landlords renting land for agricultural exploitation and housing while living outside the district, in

Jalalabad, Kabul, or Pakistan.

Research further uncovered indications of small scale development, with the apparition of new small

markets, a bubble gum factory, a small dairy farm and fifty or so poultry farms (the latter due to

development assistance). That being said, reports surfaced of unemployment and over concentration

of labour in the agriculture sector – with expressed desire of a diversification of employment in the

district.

1.5. Access to Services

1.5.1. Water

Access to water is not a problem in the valley in the southern part of the district, where most the

population is concentrated. For irrigation, residents use wialas which distribute the water from the

Kabul and Kunar rivers across the valley. Wells constitute the main source of drinking water for most

residents – though these are reportedly lacking to ensure access for the entire population, notably as

they are expensive to dig and difficult to maintain.

The mirâb system ensures that residents get their share of water, and the mirâb is responsible for

informing elders and maliks, in charge of maintenance, when the irrigation network is damaged.

That being said, some of the areas in the district, such as Shirgar Sabz Dara, Mirza Khail, and Baziz

Khail are regularly affected by floods which remain difficult to contain, despite regular assistance in

the construction of retaining walls.

1.5.2. Energy

Main sources of electricity are solar energy, fuel generators and hydroelectric generators. There is no

access to state power in the district. Electricity provision projects have reportedly been funded under

the National Solidarity Program, providing mini generators in Kabu village for instance, and solar

panels in Qala Akhund, Qandahari and Hazar Bik.

1.5.3. Education

According to data collected in Kama in 2011, there is a 70% school attendance in the district, with 14

546 boys attending, and 8 332 girls – an approximate 40% lower attendance for girls, if the

population of boys and girls is considered equal. Main obstacles to education were mentioned to be

poverty, with the necessity of keeping children at home to help in securing income, and distance

from villages to schools.

111

The district counts a total of 21 schools, all of which are mixed until high school, including four mixed

high schools, three boys’ high schools, and three girls’ high schools. An additional school of 16

classrooms was further mentioned to have been constructed in Qaria Jamalo in the past two years.

There are an additional three madrassas in the district: two in Sangar Saray, one counting 658

students of which 100 are girls, and the other 291 male students, and one in Gaj, with 50 male and

50 female students.

Most schools are located in the largest villages (Qala Akhund, Gaj, Jamali, Sangar Saray, Kandil, Malik

Shereen, Musa Shafiq, Ghazi, Mirza Khail, Hazar Bik, Muslimabad, and Nadar Khan Mohmand). Male

interviewees did not mention security as a problem prohibiting girls from attending school, with girls

able to travel by foot during the day without encountering undue difficulties. There was little data

available on the degree to which girls are restricted from going to school based on cultural

considerations. However, female interviewees gave several reports of men refusing to allow their

girls to go to school, reportedly because of problems of harassment and fear of kidnapping, and also

because of a lack of female teachers and the subsequent reluctance of fathers to have their girls

educated by male strangers, which could explain girls’ lower rate of attendance. As related by one

interviewee:

There is no security for women, which is why men don’t let our girls attend school. In the

schools the teachers are also male and our men say that the security outside [the home] is not

good and women are not supposed to go out. 246

1.5.4. Health

There are four health facilities in the district, one Public Health Centre in Makhdum Baba (two female

doctors, two male doctors, six male nurses, and four female nurses in 2011), one comprehensive

health centre in Sangar Saray (one male doctor, one female doctor, one male nurse, and one female

nurse), one basic health centre in Landa Buch (Landa Buch Clinic), and one NGO health centre in

Mastalay. 75 pharmacies are also available in Kama.

Only a reported 40% of district residents have access to health care, with most serious injuries and

diseases requiring travel to Jalalabad. Main obstacles to access to health are said to be the lack of

clinics, the distance between health centres and residence areas, the high pressure placed on the

existing facilities, and the lack of medicine available.

1.5.5. Communication and Media

Most of the district is reportedly covered by telecommunication companies, including MTN Areeba,

Roshan, Afghan Mobile and Etisalat, and call centres are available in the villages of Qala Akhund,

Arab Khail, Sangar Saray, Landa Buch, and Dam Kalay, at the least.

Radio is the most popular source of news and is used by 70% of district residents, with access to

stations such as the BBC, Azadi Radio, Voice of America, Nangarhar Radio, and Sharq, of which the

BBC and Voice of America are the most popular. The rate of access to print media is higher than that

usually observed in the rest of the country, with a reported 50% of residents regularly reading the

press, which is available in the villages of Qala Akhund, Sangar Saray, Landa Buch, Ghazi, Shirgar, and

246

Female Focus Group Discussion, Haji Baba, Kama, 29/12/2013.

112

Murad Ali High School. Television, on the other hand, is available to only 10% of the population.247

Kama is also one of the only districts in Afghanistan to have its own cricket stadium, built with

funding from a local businessman in 2012.248

247

Interviews with Kama District Leaders, 2011. 248

Babrak Amirzada, Pajhwok Afghan News, “New Cricket Stadium to Build in Jalalabad” (at http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/05/07/new-cricket-stadium-build-jalalabad-video) (please note that, notwithstanding the title of the piece, both the article and accompanying video clarify that the stadium is in Kama, not Jalalabad proper). ,

http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/05/07/new-cricket-stadium-build-jalalabad-video

113


2.1. General Security Situation

In terms of insurgency, the security situation in Kama is considered to be good, with government

control and reported police access to the entire district. All male respondents mentioned there were

no times of the day when they did not feel secure, no area in the district where they were unsafe,

and that all roads were open and free for circulation of people and goods. It is reportedly safe for

both local and international NGO staff to travel in the district. However, as will be developed below,

one should not assume that the apparent safety of the general population means that Kama entirely

lacks insurgent presence.

The Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army are both present, with the ANA in the

District Centre, in the area of Ghakhi, in Gerdab, and with three ANP posts on Kama Bridge. Police

forces in Kama count a total of 46 policemen and eight police lieutenants, a staff considered by both

residents and the District Chief of Police to be insufficient to cover Kama’s 59 villages. Though many

interviewees from a variety of backgrounds insisted the establishment of these checkpoints had

proved beneficial for security in these areas249, there was a wide consensus on the fact that the

number of checkpoints and the extent of police presence remain wanting.250 Despite the fact that

there has been little or no overspill of active insurgency from neighbouring insecure districts, this was

mentioned as a point of concern with the increasing arrival of IDPs from areas where AOGs are

active, as noted in the previous section. There further appears to be significant worry about the

degradation of the security situation in the context of the transitional period in the coming months.

This is particularly the case as there were some occasional accounts of passive Taliban support in the

district, especially on behalf of some of the women respondents. Some women respondents gave

accounts of potential insecurity and presence of insurgents in the villages of Mama Khail, Mirza Khail,

Zakhil, Darbang, Shirgar, and Zarshoi, where a young man was recently arrested on suspicion of being

a Taliban supporter. However, the police have reportedly managed to gain control over these areas.

Kama also experiences, regularly if not frequently, IED attacks against police vehicles, though in at

least one case local residents seem to have apprehended the person responsible and remanded him

to police custody.

According to the District Chief of Police, these accounts of AOG presence in the district derive from

rumours after the appearance of threat letters sent to wealthy residents and government officials at

night, which he attributes to small criminals endeavouring to get status by pretending to be Taliban.

However, the insistence of some respondents on the effective – though passive – presence of Taliban

supporters in their area and specific villages in the district, as well as the fact that many of the

migrants come from areas with strong Taliban support, inclines one to believe that some level of

Taliban presence is more than a simple apparition of the mind. It would be perhaps unsurprising that

some among the latter migrants would not be strong opponents to the Taliban, if not in favour of

them, or even that Taliban elements migrated with them and would revert to active support of the

249

Interview with Kama Development Organization Employee, 9/1/2014; Interview with Kama Women’s Leader, 7/1/2014; Focus Group Discussion with Kama Women’s Leaders on Feelings of Security, 29/12/2014; 250

Interview with the Kama Chief of Police, 12/1/2014; Focus Group Discussion with Community Leaders on Feelings of Security, 1/1/2014; Focus Group Discussion with Community Leaders on Feelings of Security, 20/12/2014.

114

Taliban in case the balance of power was to shift in their favour. This notably appears as a plausible

scenario in the case of IDPs who have fled their district not due to the pressure of insurgents, but

who have been compelled to leave their homes by operations conducted by the Afghan and

international forces against AOGs. The explosion of four IEDs in the district over the past six months

(including one of February 1st, 2014 in Deh Ghazi), and the defusing of six others in the district,

further supports the hypothesis of occasional insurgent infiltration in Kama.

A female respondent from the village of Qandahari further explained Taliban elements were present

at the village level, and despite not being currently, actively engaged in anti-government activities,

could become so when their interests would be at stake.

The biggest threats to our community’s security are Taliban, especially to women […] I feel that

the authorities cannot address these threats because here in every street one person is related

to the Taliban, while another is [related] to the government, and they don’t oppose one

another because of their relations, and there is their personal interest involved on both the

government and Taliban sides […] No measures are taken at the community level to prevent

these threats but the people should be united in the future and choose the right party for them

so that they can work with them in order to root out the conflict between government and

Taliban and work for their people.251

Along the same lines, there were unanimous reports of increasing small criminality, such a theft, as

well as occurrences of kidnapping for ransom, and occasional murder. Violent confrontations often

derive from rivalries among and between families, which the District Chief of Police reported to be at

the root of as much as “85%”252 of security problems. However, these crimes appear to be occurring

on a rather modest scale, as none of the respondents reported him/herself or his/her family and

close relatives as having been directly faced with such threats.

Now there is also some small theft going on which didn’t happen in the past, but it’s minimal.

Like, somebody leaves his generator outside and it disappears overnight. But it’s rare. There is

no large scale robbing of houses, for instance. I go home from the office at 10 pm and I don’t

have any specific fears.253

2.2. Feelings of Security

As in Behsud, district residents consider the above to be primarily caused by the lack of livelihood

opportunities and the idleness of young men, unable to secure a stable income and gain status in

their community.

However, men and women’s accounts on security threats in the district are significantly different,

with men more reluctant to bring up problems concerning anti-government elements or narcotics,

among other issues. Women indeed further emphasized problems created by smuggling and

consumption of narcotics, both of which reportedly have negative repercussions on security and

increase small-scale criminality. Women respondents also provided accounts of significant levels of

violence in the community, with occurrences of death threats to prevent someone from filing a case

in the district, to, in a prominent example for this cohort, ask for inheritance rights.

251

Individual Interview, Qandahari village, Kama, 02/01/2013. 252

Interview with the Kama Chief of Police, 12/1/2014. 253

Individual Interview with district elder from Qala Akhund and current Head of the Court in Bati Kot, Kama, 24/12/2013.

115

Though it was seldom spontaneously brought up, another significant concern for security among

respondents was a decrease in tribal solidarity, and deteriorating relations between tribes, sub-

tribes, and other communities more generally. This is notably a problem both in terms of increasing

inter-communal disputes, and in terms of the effectiveness of traditional mechanisms of dispute

resolution, which are grounded in a level of trust in communal authorities to properly resolve

problems within and between communities. Although the research team could not independently

substantiate a decrease in community trust, this perception plausibly reflects some degree of social

dissent.

Similarly, the widespread desire for the establishment of new checkpoints and increased police

patrols seems yet another indication of a growing worry among residents concerning their security

situation in the coming months.

2.2.1. Specific Threats Faced by Women

Based on the degree of conservatism of communities and of the extent of police presence, there

appear to be differences in the degree to which women feel secure in different parts of the district.

One respondent from Qandahari explained government presence was notably minimal – or non-

existent – in her village, which represented a threat for women. In this specific case, government

presence – in the form of police patrols – is perceived as desirable to prevent women from facing

threats such as harassment or abduction. The same respondent emphasized women could only

resolve cases among their family members, had no access to shuras, and that, in any event, there

were no shuras in her neighbourhood.

There is a general consensus on the fact that,

outside the home, women can only circulate

in the presence of a male relative, especially

when going to places outside the village, and

are required to wear a chadri. Women’s

liberty of movement is allegedly limited by the

opposition of male members of their family,

who bring up both security considerations and

questions of honour and reputation:

Women have access to nearby places

like clinics, schools and close relatives’

homes for marriage ceremonies. They

cannot travel out of the village and

province without being accompanied by

a male relative because the men don’t

allow women to travel to distant places,

first because if a woman is faced with

an accident she cannot rescue herself,

and, second, if a woman goes out alone

then the people back-bite her. Here

people don’t let women wear a light veil

Given the highly patriarchal nature of society,

women living on their own with no male

relatives notably have little leverage to defend

and support themselves:

“My husband has another wife in Peshawar and

works in Mazar. I have two children, one is a girl

and the other is a boy. I was given on the badal

of my brother. My husband doesn’t meet the

overall needs of my home and I also don’t have

any men in my home. If a problem took place, my

son would not be able to solve it, and I also don’t

have someone to guard my home. I send my

daughter to school along with other girls but I

fear that something may happen to her on the

way to school because lots of boys are sitting

near the lanes and streets.”

- Female Respondent during a Focus Group

Discussion on Feelings of Security, Haji Baba

Village, Kama, 29/12/2013.

-

116

and give priority to the burqa254.255

Kidnapping and harassment were notably mentioned as serious areas of concern, and one of the

reasons for preventing girls from exiting their homes and going to school:

The biggest threat to our community’s security is kidnapping and that’s the reason why we

cannot send our girls to attend school, because we fear that they will be faced with a problem

on the way to school.256

Overall, when tackling women-related threats, particularly domestic violence, bringing out concerns

or problems is perceived as shameful and damaging for the reputation of the family or community,

something all female respondents emphasized. Problems are thus kept secret and, ideally, resolved

within the family and circle of close relatives.

No steps have been taken at the village level about domestic violence because here people

don’t want to discuss domestic matters outside [the home]. They resolve problems with family

members and if these are not resolved then they tell [the problems] to their close relatives and

they solve them. They don’t tell their domestic problems to district authorities or the shura.257

Access to police offices is limited by similar considerations of reputation258: “Women don’t have

access to police offices because it’s shameful that a man lets his woman to go to the police. They

resolve every problem in their homes.”259

One of the respondents in a focus group further gave the following account, quite striking in terms of

the consequences faced by women in case they take the initiative to get involved in the resolution of

conflicts and approach the police:

A conflict took place between brothers in Haji Baba village about one year ago. In the

aforementioned conflict five brothers were one party while their one brother was the other. As

she felt threatened, the wife of that brother, who was alone, went to the district and filed a

case against her husband’s brothers. The police came on the spot along with the woman and

stopped the fight. Until now, people taunt that woman who went to the police and they hate

her for that action. So, here women don’t have permission to approach the police and if women

approach, then they will be faced with the aforementioned problems.260

There are additionally no women police officers available at the district level261 and no other

governmental organ women could turn to. There was one mention262 of a Family Response Unit,

though none of the other respondents263 or the district officials264 appeared to be aware of its

254

Also known as a chadri, a women’s garment covering the totality of the body and face with a mesh screen in front of the eyes 255

Individual Interview, Karkhaka village, Kama, 06/01/2014. 256

Female Focus Group Discussion, Haji Baba village, Kama, 29/12/2013. 257

Individual interview, Karkhaka village, Kama, 06/01/2014. 258

The Chief of Police nevertheless reported 3-4 cases were filed by women per month, mainly over domestic violence. 259

Ibid. 260



Interview with a Kama Women’s Leader on Feelings of Security, 7/1/2014. 263

See, e.g., Interview with Kama Women’s Leader on Feelings of Security, 2/1/2014; Women’s Focus Group Discussion on Conflict Trends and Access to Justice in Kama, 30/12/2013.

117

existence. Some respondents at least expressed a strong desire for more involvement of women in

addressing their own issues.265 The establishment of a women’s shura was notably mentioned as

having begun a couple of years ago, an initiative which failed due to the opposition of some elders.

In order to improve women’s security, women should be hired in the district offices and women

should be given a part in other activities. The security organs should be increased and they

should deal fairly with women. Women should be educated in order to get jobs.266

2.3. Addressing Security Threats in Kama

Tackling of security threats in Kama appears at present to be a three-fold process: at the family and

village level; at the inter-communal level through the set-up of “tribal treaties”; and finally through

the police and official institutions.

The first organ people turn to for protection was mentioned to be tribal elders and members of the

community. In case of harassment of girls on the way to school, for instance, the first step would be

to contact the family of the boy, in a second instance the head master of the school if no solution has

been found, and only as a last resort would the police be informed. Police and district authorities

were notably said to be contacted “as the law compels us to”267 (a recurrent comment among both

participants in focus groups and in individual interviews), but rarely on a preferential basis. Women

also insisted police officers should be more in touch with the people and their concerns, and there

was unanimous expression among respondents of the need to increase cooperation between

communities and police forces.

Community mobilization is considered as the best safeguard against insecurity, and mechanisms at

the inter-communal level were said not to be sufficiently operational. Several respondents

mentioned “tribal treaties” used to set a framework for cooperation and a base of procedures if a

dispute should occur, but added that their application is undermined by the lack of capacity to

enforce them. Data appear to indicate that these remain wanting and insufficiently functional, as

illustrated by the following quotes:

“There are some tribal treaties but some village committees should be established to empower

these treaties.”268

“Checkpoints, police patrolling, committees and tribal treaties should be established in order to

prevent security threats.”269

Tribal treaties were further presented as a temporary alternative to a lack of community-government

cooperation, which could signify a stronger than usual openness to government intervention in

security issues. There were repeated mentions of the need to strengthen committees, at the village

or district level270 (though without seeming to have a precise idea regarding the structure or function

264

See, e.g., Interview with the Kama Chief of Police, 12/1/2014. 265

See, e.g., Interview with a Kama Women’s Leader, 2/1/2014; Women’s Focus Group on Conflict Trends and Access to Justice, 30/12/2013. 266

Individual Interview, Nari Wiala village, Kama, 07/01/2014. 267

See, e.g., Individual Interview, Qandahari Village, 5/1/2014. 268

Male Focus Group Discussion, Kuza Der Gali village, Kama, 20/12/2013 269

Ibid. 270

Interview with Community Leader, Mama Khail Village, Kama, 1/1/2014 (recommending district-level committees to deal with justice issues); Male Focus Group Discussion, Kuza Der Gali village, Kama, 20/12/2013 (recommending strengthened village committees).

118

of the committees), and significant insistence on the need for greater cooperation with district

officials.271 There was further insistence on the role of the youth in building contacts with district

authorities, considered as an essential component in safeguarding security in the district (again

without the nature of this cooperation being precisely defined).272

In turn, the capacity of the police, as an armed force, to intervene and stop the short-term escalation

of conflict, was characterized as relatively efficient and effective. However, respondents were far

more sceptical of the capacity of the police to address other criminal and security threats, and of

their ability to engage fairly and effectively with the community:

There was a conflict between Khan Zaman Khan and the people of Kama district which

occurred ten days ago. In the mentioned conflict Khan Zaman Khan wanted to build a shop

near the land of the cemetery. When he placed a container for the shop, he was faced with the

opposition of all the people in this area. When the police were informed about the conflict, they

intervened and stopped the escalation of the conflict. Our operation was that we can control

the area by police, and we have put a stop to the conflict. After this, the conflict was resolved

by DDA members, and the disputants accepted the resolution of the conflict.273

Access to police offices is reportedly good for men. The police seem to also be considered relatively

efficient in arresting criminals, though they are mentioned to be understaffed and there were some

reports of police officers not being able to patrol at night. The cooperation of elders and their

assistance to the police in accessing areas at night was notably mentioned as crucial by the DCOP:

For example, recently, we were ordered by the provincial administration: “there is a house of

an army-related person that is under threat; please take measures for the operation.” But we

can’t take measures at night, because of the unpaved road. So we called the elders to control

the security situation on the road. The elders warned their tribesmen, then the tribes controlled

the security situation on the way, and we approached the mentioned house without any

problems, thanks to cooperation between elders and the police.274

Put another way, this quote also appears potentially significant in its implication that, without

specifically appealing to the tribes, the police might have been attacked along the way.

Aside from preventing the short-term escalation of conflicts, there appears to be a general lack of

trust in government institutions and their capacity to address security threats correctly. Kidnapping

and theft, in particular, were mentioned to receive too little attention from district authorities,

especially when the latter concerns women. Respondents reported a disconnect between security

institutions and the preoccupations of communities – hence a preference for reliance on family and

community mechanisms. The government was mentioned to “create problems” more than it solved

them, with the necessity to resort to ulemas and village leaders to address what the government

could not:

The government does not resolve criminal issues. It creates problems for tribes, [so] then the

271

Interview with Community Leader on Feelings of Security, Shelam Raghati village, Kama, 2/1/2014; Interview with Community Leader on Feelings of Security, Mama Khail village, Kama, 1/1/2014; Male Focus Group Discussion, Kuza Der Gali village, Kama, 20/12/2013. 272

Interview with Community Leader on Feelings of Security, Shelam Raghati village, Kama, 2/1/2014. 273

Individual Interview with the Chief of Police, 12/01/2014. 274

Individual Interview with the District Chief of Police, Kama District Centre, 12/01/2014.

119

people and the ulema resolve the problem.275

As will be described in further detail in Chapter 4 of the Kama section of this report, dedicated to

access to justice, due process and application of the law were further said to be impeded by the

interference of political factions, corruption and nepotistic practices:

They [the police] address criminal issues very well and they behave with people really well but

sometimes connections and bribes make them the companion of cruel persons.276

Criminals arrested are thus sometimes released without being punished if they benefit from some

sort of support or can afford bribes, creating a feeling of injustice among the population. However,

these practices do not appear to be as institutionalized as in neighbouring Behsud, for instance, and,

unlike in Behsud, there were no mentions of networks of support allowing organized bands of

criminals to perpetrate crimes with impunity.

275

Male Focus Group Discussion, Kama, 20/12/2013. 276

Individual Interview, Mama Khail village, Kama, 01/01/2014.

120

3. Landscape of Conflicts in Kama

3.1. Main Conflict Trends in Kama

Kama has allegedly been witnessing an increase in the number of conflicts recently, due to rising

demographic pressure and subsequent increasing value of land, as well as growing tensions between

and within communities.277 The main sources of disputes reported in the district are land, water

rights278, competition for influence or political power, and inter-personal issues including inheritance

rights, women-related conflicts, children-based disputes, and a small minority of commercial

disputes. This categorization, however, overlooks the complexity of most conflicts in rural Kama,

where different causes can be intertwined. A land case also can thus also comprise issues of access to

water, rights of passage, or inheritance, for instance; and competition for influence or power can

itself trigger minor (or major) criminal offenses.

In their great majority, disputes in Kama oppose individuals, rather than villages or tribes, though, as

underlined in the previous section, there are reports of increasing inter-communal enmities in recent

years. One of the major conflicts in the district thus has opposed the Mitta Khail and Baziz Khail tribes

since 2007. That being said, when considering the nature of conflicts, tribal connections appear to be

less important than political and factional ones – which could be explained both by the profusion of

tribes and sub-tribes living in mixed settlements, and the relatively high proportion of district

residents holding positions inside the government. Indeed, there were several reports of conflicts of

influence – e.g., between two individuals competing to be at the head of the village shura.279 The

interference of the Provincial Council in the election of the Mama Khail shura was thus mentioned as

one example, with PC members mobilizing networks of supporters among tribesmen in order to

uphold the candidacy of a specific individual.280

Last but not least, women-related conflicts – notably due to ongoing practices of badal – trigger

enmities between families, in a way quite similar to what had been described in other districts, and

which can quickly escalate due to the high degree of honour and reputation at stake.

3.1.1. Levels of Violence

Overall, conflicts mostly remain “verbal” – meaning they involve heated argument but do not involve

significant levels of violence – with a significant minority nevertheless evolving into physical fights. In

addition, about 20% of conflicts involve injuries caused by light weapons (e.g. knives) or fire arms,

sometimes leading to casualties, as displayed by the following quote by a tribal elder from Masta Ali:

We have conflicts like women-based issues, land-based conflicts and the aforementioned

conflicts also sometimes result in murders and injuries of the disputants.281

In cases where a dispute results in the accidental death of one of the disputants, there are high risks

277

Concerns about the degradation of relationship among and between tribes are common. That being said, they need to be taken cautiously, as this is supported by evidence and could be based on idealized perceptions of tribal unity in the past. 278

Given the high reliance on irrigation for agriculture, and the centrality of the respect of water shares for the good functioning of the mirâb system, conflicts over water were also said to be quite widespread. 279

Male Focus Group Discussion, Za Khail area, Kama, 30/12/2013. See also Major Conflict Survey #3. 280

Male Focus Group Discussion, Za Khail area, 30/12/2013. 281

Individual Interview with a district tribal elder, Masta Ali Village, 10/01/2014.

121

of further escalation. In several instances, the entire family of the murderer fled the district following

such a case in order to avoid revenge by the victim’s family.

According to the USAID Kama District Security map, however, most security incidents recorded in the

past five years in the district, aside from IED clearance, originate from feud clashes – which are

notably responsible for the highest number of injuries and casualties. Between 2008 and 2013, there

were thus reports of 13 feud clashes, which resulted in the death or injury of over 30 people. That

being said, the data are insufficient to determine the cause of the feuds, and if they imply individuals,

families, tribes, or political factions. Moreover, the number of feuds – less than three a year --

remains relatively low, indicating a generally secure situation. Likewise, there were few reports of

high levels of violence impeding the resolution of conflicts in Kama.

3.2. The Centrality of Land

The overwhelming majority of conflicts in Kama include considerations over land, which was

reported as the cause of 36% of the 186 disputes surveyed at the village level – with respondents to

individual interviews and focus group discussions mentioning proportions as high as 60-80% of all

cases in the district.282 The fact that a conflict rarely rests on a single cause, but often combines a

variety of roots and causes, might go toward explaining the discrepancy between these figures, as

would land conflicts occupying a (perhaps justified) outsize place in the public imagination, as in

Bagrami.

In any event, land-based conflicts were thus subdivided by respondents into three broad categories:

- ghasb (land grabbing),

- ta’aroz (lit. “aggression”, i.e. infringing on one’s rights by preventing him from accessing a

piece of land or blocking his access to water), and

- shafa (the right of pre-emption over a neighbouring piece of land, according to Shari’a).283

Of these, land grabbing is often considered as the most serious, whether it be the undue occupation

of a piece of land by an individual with sufficient connections to secure his occupation of the given

area – including by government officials (a recurring complaint of respondents throughout the

research) -- or conflicting claims over a portion of land between neighbours and family members. The

latter is the most widespread, and can be illustrated by the example below, which includes

considerations of inheritance (hence the reference to the Shari’a, all the more as the respondent is

himself a judge educated in Shari’a):

There is an ongoing case between an uncle and his nephew over inheritance rights over land.

The nephew insists he has the right of inheritance from his mother over the land. This is a

case of ghasb, as the uncle is unduly occupying the land according to the Shari’a. Shari’a is the

main system used in these cases to resolve disputes.284

Ta’aroz can include cases of rights of passage, access to water, but also unclear delimitation of

boundaries creating a murky situation where none of the parties manages to find agreement over

the demarcation of their parcels. In Qayum and Shenkami villages, for instance, the flooding of an

area by the Kunar River erased traditional markers of boundaries between two neighbouring fields,

282

See, e.g., Individual interview with a district tribal elder, Shialam village, 2/1/2014. 283

Individual interview with Bati Kot district judge and tribal elder of Qala-e Akhund, 24.12.2013. 284

Individual interview with Bati Kot district judge and tribal elder of Qala-e Akhund, 24.12.2013.

122

triggering a conflict based on competing claims between the owners when the water retreated. The

land not being literally “occupied” by either of the parties, this is not considered as a case of land

grabbing, but of competition/ aggression, or ta’aroz. Another example would be the following case,

where access to water constitutes the major point of discord between the disputants:

One party blocked a wiala, while he didn’t have rights over that wiala. This is a dispute between

cousins. The land is inherited land and they both received their share, but the father of one of

them bought additional land, which is not part of the inherited land. Therefore, the opposing

party says he has a right to the water for the land his cousin’s father bought as the water

shares were part of the inheritance. We opened the water source for the moment and the case

is being discussed in the jirga.285

One of the most serious conflicts in the district, implying significant land resources and presenting

high resistance to resolution processes, is based on claims of shafa. Dating from the time of the

Taliban, it currently opposes two individuals over 30 jeribs in the village of Shialam, one of the

disputants being the occupant of the land (Mirbash - Kharuti), and the other that of the neighbouring

parcel (Shirzad -Kharuti) – who rejects his rival’s claims based on his rights of pre-emption. In 2009,

the conflict was brought to the government, who claimed the land as its own and then granted a

lease to Mirbash, a decision rejected by Shirzad, who systematically uproots the crops of his

neighbour. After another attempt at resolution by the District Governor failed, the conflict was

transferred to a jirga. However, given Shirzad’s claim is based on shafa, Mirbash refuses to give his

waak to the jirga, fearing the case will be judged to his disfavour. The main disagreement lies in

which system of law should prevail: statutory Afghan law based on the fact the land is officially

government owned, or Shari’a in which claims of shafa are rooted.

Land also remains at the centre of most longstanding conflicts, with some dating back several

decades – the resolution process being impeded by the size of the disputed area at stake (often over

20 jeribs), and the reported involvement of partial stakeholders in the conflict. One such case is that

opposing Nazak Mir (Miran) and Surgul (Niazi) in the area of Shenkami and Kuchiano south of Zaha

Khail, over 24 jeribs of land, which has been ongoing since the time of the Mujahideen. Both dispute

parties claim they have valid documentation over the land, and several jirgas (said to be over ten)

have failed in finding an acceptable solution, reportedly as there have been involvement of outside

stakeholders and the jirga has been “taking sides“ (more information about which side the jirga was

taking and why was requested from the elder, but he appeared reluctant to express himself on that

point286). Also impeding resolution, one of the disputants – Surgul – is currently living in Peshawar.

285

Individual interview with Bati Kot district judge and tribal elder of Qala-e Akhund, 24.12.2013. 286

Individual interview with an elder from Kama, 24/12/2103 .This dispute was also reported in a Focus Group Discussion in Zia Khail on 30/12/2013.

123


Mechanisms

4.1. Preferred Justice Mechanisms

Based on data collected for this study, Kama’s preferred resolution mechanisms remain informal

(jirgas, elders, maliks), though there appears to be a significant level of cases addressed to individual

district officials for resolution. Indeed, the proportion of cases referred directly to elders, though

they enjoy a higher rate of resolution, remains significantly lower than in some other areas of the

province. Unlike in Behsud for instance, where most respondents explained being dissatisfied with

formal processes, there were some occurrences of satisfaction with the formal system among Kama

residents, as illustrated in the quote below:

One year ago a conflict took place between doctor Azizullah and his cousins over the

boundaries of land. Later on the mentioned conflict was referred to the district for resolution.

The district made a right decision for us, which was acceptable for us.287

An elder in Qala Akhund who is also the Head of the Court of Bati Kot district made the following

comment, insisting both on the relative trust of Kama residents for district authorities, and the

reliance of the latter on informal mechanisms:

In terms of justice, the issue is very different here and in Bati Kot. In Bati Kot, most of the

people go directly to the Taliban courts. Here in Kama, most of the people refer their cases to

the district and the court. Then the District refers the case back to elders who solve the

problem. Elders get consensus from the disputants, which helps in dispute resolution.288

Out of the 186 cases recorded as art of the village survey, a little over 50% were thus addressed to

jirgas – with a 100% rate of resolution, 26% to the District Governor, 10% to the District Court (more

than half of which are still awaiting resolution), 9% to the District Chief of Police (most of which were

automatically transferred to the District Attorney or the court) and 5% to the DDA.

The decision to refer a case to a specific organ or authority notably appears to depend upon the type

of case, with jirgas being addressed mainly conflicts over land, water and family disputes. More

particularly, family related issues mostly remain within the family and family elders, and ulemas are

referred inheritance cases, the rest being addressed mostly by tribal elders. District authorities, on

the other hand, are addressed in priority minor and major criminal cases, though the DG is also

involved in the resolution of some land cases.

The District Governor further appears to be the government official with the greatest involvement in

cases in the district, often intervening on a personal basis more than an institutional one.

The court reportedly addresses both criminal and civil cases. The judge explained having received an

approximate 60-63 criminal cases (murder cases in their great majority) and 27-32 civil cases,

including land grabbing, domestic violence289, and inheritance cases. Civil cases brought to the court

are usually, although obviously not always, referred to the Huqooq Department, which then refers

287

Female Focus Group Discussion, Haji Baba Village, Kama, 29/12/2013. 288

Individual interview with Bati Kot district judge and tribal elder of Qala-e Akhund, Kama, 24/12/2013. 289

Locally perceived as more akin to a type of family dispute than a criminal matter.

124

them back to elders.

For its part, the Huqooq mentioned having filed 47 cases over the past year, 25 of which are ongoing,

whereas the remaining 22 cases were allegedly dropped by the plaintiffs – which could be due both

to discouragement when facing the length and complexity of the formal justice process, and to

practices of “forum shopping”, with one of the parties finding a more satisfying forum for resolution

(such as a shura or jirga).

4.1.1. Jirga Processes and Mechanisms

As described by respondents to the study, the jirga process in Kama is as follows: when a case is

referred to them, the jirgamaran take written waak from all parties, as well as machalgah. After

consultation, and based on norms rooted mainly in the Shari’a and the Pashtunwali290 (with a

preference for Shari’a for cases involving inheritance rights and shafa – in which ulemas are then

involved with a mandate to share their knowledge of the Islamic Law and contribute to the

conciliation process). The decision is then registered on a written form, a copy of which is given to

both of the disputants and one consigned in the Huqooq Department or another government entity

for further reference in case the conflict re-emerges.291 If this account is accurate, it would indicate a

higher level of government involvement than in other study areas, where this registration within the

Huqooq Department, or other government organs, remains an exception.

There thus appears to be a widespread use of writing throughout the process: with both the waak

and the decision recorded. There were indeed mentions of decision forms – possibly a legacy of past

justice programmes in the district, such as Checchi’s RLS-I programme, which disseminates

standardized “Decision” and “Authority Books.” If this is in fact the case, it might serve as a strong

indication that the district is amenable to justice programming. Cases solved by the jirgas are notably

registered in the Huqooq and the land administration (ARAZI) in order to recive official registration of

the decision made:

We don’t register cases in the court. We only register them in the Land and Huqooq

Departments and it’s a positive step if in future [the parties] again quarrel, there will be proof

in the district about the guilty party.292

Interestingly, the use machalgah – well instituted in jirga processes – was condemned by district

authorities with both the District Chief of Police and the District Governor insisting that this practice

had a tendency to induce escalation of conflicts rather than assisting in their resolution, perhaps

because the loss of the bond could create an additional issue between parties. Overall, however, and

keeping in mind the previous caveat, both district authorities and district residents more generally

appear to consider informal forums for dispute resolution more efficient than, and, in most

instances, preferable to, state capacities.

4.1.2. The Role of the Formal System

With that said, data for this report still indicate an approximate 45% of the cases surveyed are

referred to district authorities at some point in their resolution.

290

There were also some mentions of use of the Afghan Statutory law, though the data available does not specify in which cases each of these systems of norms is preferred. 291

Individual Interview, Qandahari, Kama, 05/01/2014. 292

Individual Interview with the Head of Court, Kama, January 2014.

125

Though disputants themselves seem to make little distinction between different formal forums and

governmental authorities, and mentioned referring cases more-or-less indiscriminately to the District

Governor, the DCOP, or the court – the important issue in their eyes being having an official stamp or

record – the following logic in repartition of cases described by Kama’s judge indicates choice among

state-based forum is less on the initiative of the disputant than that of the district authorities, mainly

the District Governor. The latter indeed appears to keep a high hand with regard to the routing of

cases – whether it be a specific jirga or shura, or a formal government organ.

In every jirga, if the decision is not acceptable to one disputant then they refer it to the

government. They refer it to different government organs, among which the one who is the

most consulted is the District Governor and punishment cases for criminals are referred to the

intelligence service. The District Governor can refer a case to any organ.293

As mentioned above, the DG further often intervenes on a personal level to resolve cases. This was

notably underlined by both the Head of the Court and the Head of the Huqooq Department as an

obstacle to the due course of justice.294

With that said, the just-described process seems to apply more for civil than criminal disputes.

Criminal cases particularly appear more likely to go to the court than do other sorts of dispute. The

District Governor thus described Kama’s judicial process as follows:

At the district level the petitioner should be present in the district centre. If it is a criminal issue,

the district centre authorities order the police to catch the accused, and then the police arrest

the accused. After the investigation they are introduced to the Attorney Department [Attorney

General]. The Attorney Department collects information about the involved persons, and sends

it to the court for resolution after the completion of the file. The court decides according to this

information and announces its decision to the parties. If the parties accept the resolution of the

conflict, there will be no [more] conflict, but if they don’t accepted the resolution, then they

have the right of [appeal to the] provincial court […] The process takes an average of nine

months.295

This seems broadly consistent with both accounts of the DCOP and data collected during the village

survey, which show the DCOP sends most of the criminal cases he is addressing to the district

Attorney General. That being said, the DCOP himself is only referred a small number of cases, two to

three per month, according to his own report. Overall, cases referred to district authorities do not

seem to follow judiciary processes, especially given the significant predominance of the District

Governor in state-based dispute resolution in Kama.

Finally, when asked about which actors intervened in dispute resolution, respondents from the

community also mentioned the current Provincial Governor, Mawlawi Ataullah Ludin, originally from

the district. His intervention, though, appears to be an exceptional, rather than a regular, feature of

Kama’s dispute resolution system.

293

Individual Interview with the Head of Court, Kama. 294

The fact that the district governor denied any implication in conflict resolution further inclines to think that his interference in some of the cases is partial – though no evidence supports this assumption. 295

Individual Interview with the District Governor.

126

4.1.3. Relationship between Formal and Informal Justice Processes

In case the jirga process fails to find an adequate resolution to a conflict, disputants then have the

option of turning to the formal system. However, this is often used as a last resort, as formal judiciary

processes are perceived as time consuming and costly. Data for this report also revealed several

accounts of cases reverting back to the elders after the parties had been discouraged by the length,

cost and administrative complexity of the formal process:

In our district when a conflict occurs it is first referred to tribal elders for resolution. If the

disputants do not accept the resolution of the conflict, then it is referred to the judiciary and

justice systems of the district, but the justice and judiciary systems waste a lot of the

disputants’ time; they search for a resolution of a conflict for years. When the disputants are

disappointed by the justice and judiciary systems, then they refer their case back […] to the

jirgamaran for resolution. Eventually the jirgamaran find the way of resolution, and resolve the

conflict. Usually the disputants accept the resolution of the jirgamaran.296

Indeed, whereas the resolution of a case by the court is mentioned to take an approximate six to

nine months, if not over a year, the general average for the informal system in Kama is reportedly

one to three months, consistent with other areas of Nangarhar.

Based on the consideration by government officials themselves that elders are more capable of

addressing cases within their communities and have a greater capacity of investigation, any cases

initially addressed to district authorities are also often systematically referred back to jirgas. This is

especially the case for conflicts outside the family, inheritance and criminal cases, family conflicts

only being addressed to the district if several attempts at resolution within the family and community

have failed (meaning that non-state options for dispute resolution have already run their course).297

The relationship between formal and informal justice providers thus appears to be rather positive

and well-established – a somewhat exceptional circumstance in the landscape of justice mechanisms

in Afghanistan. Elders reportedly cultivate individual relations with district officials, whether the

judge, the DG or the DCOP, and these links are considered as beneficial in order to make sure

decisions are made in accordance with the Shari’a and Afghan Statutory Law.298

However, these relations are mainly a one way street, as cases are often referred back to elders by

district authorities or organs, whereas the opposite process appears to be much rarer and only

concerns complex cases which imply murder or which have resisted several resolution attempts. This

is especially the situation for cases in which power holders are involved, as these individuals were

said not to comply with jirga decisions, making non-state justice providers more inclined to refer

such cases to government authorities.

There were further mentions of dissymmetry in relationships between a specific government official

and some elders, based on political considerations and networks:

Both tribal elders and government authorities give importance to factional ties. If someone in

the government is hired based on an affiliation to a given faction, he will have good relations to

296

Male Focus Group Discussion, Kama, 30/12/2013. 297

Interview with the Kama District Governor, 21/01/2014; Individual Interview, Karkhaka village, 06/01/2014; Individual interview Qandahari village, Kama, 05/01/2014; Individual Interview, Shialam village, 02/01/2014. 298

Ibid.

127

those tribal elders who belong to the same faction.299


A Primary Court is available in the district centre, but was mentioned to be plagued by lack of

adequate facilities, and defective and insufficient material (no law books, no access to rules and

regulations, no computer, no electricity, etc.).There were further mentions of insufficient police staff

impeding the investigation and prosecution of criminals in front of the judiciary.

That being said, the biggest obstacle to the access to justice for the general population appears to be

the interference of influential individuals:

The government cannot address such [security] threats because of the references from the

provincial centre. When the district authorities arrest a thief then the provincial authorities

released the thief [based on his] references.300

As reported by the DCOP:

Most of the land grabbers are government authorities in our district but the other authorities

sent their arrest warrant to us, which is useless. They are supposed to take practical steps.301

Outside interference by third parties was likewise mentioned as the biggest challenge faced by elders

in the resolution of conflicts by community members, who explained power holders, state actors,

and former Jihadi commanders sometimes tried to influence decisions. However, data from Kama

are consistent in portraying the above obstacles to dispute resolution as significantly less of a

problem than was seen in Behsud or, certainly, Bagrami.

The lack of capacity of police forces to address security threats within communities was also reported

as a significant impediment for regular citizens to access their rights, especially when there is an

imbalance of power between disputants. Threats therefore often prevent people from filing cases, all

the more as they are not confident in the capacity of security forces to protect them during and after

the judiciary process. A report from a woman respondent highlights this reluctance to turn to the

formal system out of fear of reprisals:

My daughter’s father in law, who died, possessed 80 jeribs of land. All of his sons divided the

land among themselves but they threatened my son-in-law that, if he filed a case in the

district, they would kill him. My son-in-law went to the Surkh Rod brick kiln for work along

with his children and wife and he cannot do anything because of the fear of his brothers. If

the government tightened the people’s security then the people could get their rights.302

As outlined for Behsud, another important obstacle to access to justice is citizens’ lack of awareness

of their rights and of justice processes – something underlined both by community members and the

judge. Some combined workshops on rights have reportedly been provided to both residents and

police forces in the past, but respondents almost unanimously emphasized these had been

insufficient and their effects short-term.

299

Individual interview Qandahari village, Kama, 05/01/2014. 300

Female Focus Group Discussion, Haji Baba village Kama, 29/12/2013. 301


Female Focus Group Discussion, Haji Baba, Kama village, 29/12/2013

128


Similar to other study areas, women’s access to justice in Kama seems to be primarily impeded by

their lack of liberty of movement, and the more general concerns underlying these restrictions. As

underlined earlier, filing a case in a formal office is considered as shameful and inappropriate.

Women can further not access informal forums of justice provision, and can neither attend a Jirga,

nor otherwise participate in the resolution process (except perhaps by private lobbying of their male

relatives). They also have to send a mahram to represent them – hence depending on the acceptance

of their male family members to report an exaction or a crime.

Women’s access to their inheritance rights was further mentioned as complex, as female

respondents explained being threatened by male relatives when they claimed an inheritance share:

Because of the lack of peace, if someone asks for her inheritance rights, she is faced with

security threats.303

However, growing awareness among women of their rights reportedly has increasingly encouraged

them to address their issues to district authorities, and inheritance cases were thus mentioned as the

most common case brought by women to the court, or the Huqooq – though such cases remain small

in number, and still require the support of the woman’s husband:

“Women mostly bring inheritance rights cases because the people don’t give them inheritance

by their own volition. Some ten percent of people give inheritance to women by their own

volition.”304

“There was a woman who had brothers and her inheritance share was given to her by them.

When they returned back to the country they then took her inheritance share back from her, so

her case is now ongoing and the court has ruled in favour of the woman.”305

Though baad has reportedly disappeared form the district, badal, on the other hand, still happens

occasionally. One of the respondents mentioned he had refused to give his daughter in badal, and

had to face the opposition of his uncle.

That being said, even badal appears to be steadily decreasing, notably due to rising levels of

education, migration to other countries, such as Pakistan, where such practices are rarer –

particularly in urban areas – and, last but not least, because of the conflicts these practices tend to

create between families, often implying significant levels of violence.

303


Individual Interview with Head of Court from Kama, January 2014. 305

Individual Interview with the Head of the Huqooq Department, Kama, 20/01/2013

129


As mentioned earlier, Kama witnessed a flow of assistance after the fall of the Taliban, with NGOs

and the NSP carrying out programmes in livelihoods and infrastructure, mainly.

Overall, the district has benefitted from significant development assistance in the past two years.

CDCs notably participated in the rehabilitation of canals, culverts, and water pumps, the construction

of schools and health facilities, and in helping in the set-up of small scale poultry farms. Development

agencies further assisted in actions including the rehabilitation of the water system and retaining

infrastructure, the construction of health facilities, the provision of literacy and livelihood

programmes for women, the establishment of a new radio station, the distribution of chickens across

the district, and the construction of shelters for migrants.

Main needs are reportedly in the development of an industrial sector, as most of the sources of

livelihood currently come from agriculture, which has also remained the main area of focus of most

development programmes so far.

There were further expressions of desire for a more structured system of development assistance, in

close cooperation with communities and the government:

The government should establish committees for tribal elders and they should have an office in

the district centre for conflict resolution so that this committee is aware of the people’s

problems. Then this committee will know why the people’s problems are not resolved.306

5.1. Recent and Ongoing Development Programmes

Ongoing programmes include provision of shelters for returnees by NRC, IRC and UNHCR, emergency

assistance in food and clothing by WFP and ARC, assistance in agriculture by FAO, and various micro

credit operations, rehabilitation of water infrastructure programmes (NRC, IRC, UNHCR), and

livelihood programmes through distribution of poultry (CARD-F).

Organizations active in the district in the past year and whose activities were mentioned by

respondents on several occasions include NRC and IRC constructing shelters for returnees, DACAAR

for WASH programmes (digging and rehabilitating wells, installing pumps and rehabilitating

containment walls), and CARD-F for livelihood programmes supporting the development of small

scale poultry farms, through DRRD. The NRC shelter programme has reportedly been ongoing in the

district for six years, and the IRC programme for four years. The NRC programme notably

encountered criticism as it specifically targeted returnees, leaving out of beneficiary selection long-

term residents facing similar or worse economic problems. This method of selection created tensions

among villages, with non-beneficiaries additionally criticizing maliks for orienting assistance to

specific returnee populations. IRC seems to have avoided this difficulty, and included a number of

long-term local residents among its beneficiaries.

Kama has also received – and continues to receive- assistance in both justice and peacebuilding. The

time frame for research did not allow the conduct of a thorough study of these programmes.

However, given Cordaid’s intention to implement projects in similar sectors, project planning in the

district would thus require getting in touch with organizations previously and currently engaged in

justice and peacebuilding programmes in order to assess lessons learnt, determine areas of progress,

306

Individual interview, Mama Khail, Kama, 01/01/2014.

130

and avoid duplication. This would also call for an assessment of the impact of such programmes on

target and non-beneficiary communities, and an evaluation of community perceptions.

Checchi & Company Consulting reportedly implemented its RLS-I programme in the district in 2010,

providing trainings in justice issues to local residents and endeavouring to build links between the

formal and informal justice systems through coordination meetings. Respondents explained district

residents had benefitted from the general awareness of Shari’a and Statutory law provided by these

trainings, though they insisted that these need to be expanded to a wider audience.

The Jalalabad based Afghan NGO ADVS (Afghan Disabled and Vulnerable Society) is also said to be

undertaking seminars in conflict prevention and peace building/ stabilization. Last but not least,

Save the Children is currently implementing workshops on legal topics in the district. The previous

provision of these various trainings could explain the general awareness of respondents about the

importance of knowing one’s rights and the numerous expressions of interest for extended and more

systematic trainings on rights and judiciary processes.

131

D. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN ISTALIF

DISTRICT OF KABUL PROVINCE

132

1. Background: Istalif

1.1. Geography

Overlooking the vast Shomali plain from the western foothills of the Hindu Kush, Istalif district is

located in the northwest of Kabul province. It borders the districts of Qarabagh to the east, Gul Dara

to the south, and leans against Parwan Province to the north and west. Approximately an hour by car

from Kabul, the district centre is connected through Qarabagh bazaar to the main northern highway

running from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif by a recently paved road, which constitutes the main axis of

transportation in the district. A second route, unpaved, passes through Sabz Sang before joining the

highway. A third axis to Farza Bazaar is currently under construction. Istalif itself is divided into five

hawzes, organized around networks of villages. The district counts approximately 30 villages, the

most important of which – comprising over 300 families – are Istalif Bazaar, Hasar Khail, Khwaja

Hassan, Dara-e Istalif, Ghindab, Bala Gozar, and Khwaja Mirak.307

Main geographical boundaries are drawn by rivers and streams. The Istalif River, for instance,

separates Khwaja Hassan village from Nur Alam, and a spring marks the distinction between Tangi

Miyana and Ghindab. Though the division into manteqas did not seem to be relevant to

interviewees, who made little distinction between their village and the manteqa it is located in308,

villages appear to be considered as relatively important economic and social hubs, placed under the

control of a malik in charge of maintaining relations with the district authorities and responsible for

coordinating and redistributing assistance among the families he administers. Based on accounts by

respondents, the identity of an area appeared in significant part based on access to services and its

reputation in terms of education. As reported by one interviewee:

The area of Qabre Malik, for example, has a good road, high schools and secondary schools for

boys and girls. Most of the people of this village are educated and the culture also has

improved in this village. Similarly, there is a bridge in the village of Bala Gozar, and small

bridges and canals were built for people to use for irrigation. There are schools for boys and

girls; its people are open-minded and social relations are very good.309

1.2. History

Due to Istalif’s geographical location on the “skirts of the mountain” (Koh Daman) its control has

historically been strategic to holding the region of Kabul, which partially accounts for the district’s

tumultuous history. By contrast with its current calm and its long reputation as the “Kabul

guesthouse” of past kings, the district was indeed repeatedly attacked and plundered over the

course of centuries, with the last – and still visible – destruction of the central town under the

Taliban.310 During the Jihad, its access to the Shomali plains to the south, and the strategic Ghorband

307

Individual Interview, 16/12/2013 308

Of course, a manteqa and a hawze appear to be largely similar concepts. Having both, though, is not particularly unusual in the Afghan context – they just represent different ways of characterizing the same on the ground geographical reality. 309

Individual Interview, 16/12/2013. As will be developed below, the inhabitants value access to education and hold in strong belief that it has a direct impact on the well-being of a community and the harmony of social relations. 310

COBURN Noah, Bazaar Politics : Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town, Stanford University Press, 2011

133

Valley to the north, made Istalif valley a critical axis of passage for fighters. Istalif Bazaar was notably

one of the only operating markets in the region.311

Until it was officially designated as a district under the Karzai government, Istalif was an Alaqadari. At

the rise to power of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1978, it was placed under the

supervision of a PDPA supporter named Mir Ahmad Shah, from the local village of Qabre Malik. The

PDPA’s control over the area, however, was restricted to the surroundings of Takht-e Istalif, in the

current district centre. According to reports by inhabitants, at the onset of the Jihad, as neighbouring

Shakar Dara became one of the frontlines of the conflict between the PDPA and the Mujahideen,

PDPA officials in Takht-e Istalif and Mujahideen factions in control of most of the surrounding villages

concluded a co-existence agreement, with Mujahideen agreeing to supply PDPA men and the

approximate thirty families in Takht-e Istalif with food and basic commodities in exchange for their

non-involvement. In 1982, given the perceived ineffectiveness of keeping troops in Istalif, the PDPA

government called back to Kabul its soldiers posted in the area, who were escorted by Mujahideen to

the nearest PDPA checkpoint on the north-south highway.

Aside from the surroundings of Takht-e Istalif, the Alaqadari of Istalif was thus divided between rival

Jihadi factions (detailed below in Box 1) engaged in internecine armed struggle.312 With the capture

of Kabul and the rise of the Mujahideen to power in 1992, Dr. Ghulam Hazrat, commander of

the local Jamiat-e Islami faction, was appointed at the head of the Police Hospital in Kabul. This

opened the way for his lieutenant Sufi Razzaq to assume power in the area. Indeed, under pressure

from Ahmad Shah Massoud, Istalif Mujahideen commanders committed to put an end to their rivalry

and joined a newly created military regiment, headed, with Massoud’s support, by Sufi Razzaq, who

was seconded by Haji Mohammad, a former Harikat-e Inqilab commander who defected to the

Jamiat in 1992.313

Box 1: Main Jihadi Factions in Istalif During the Jihad (1978-1992)

- Jamiat-e Islami: approximately 1,000 fighter commanded by Dr. Ghulam Hazrat

(Tajik/Ghindab village), and his sub-commander Sufi Razzaq (Tajik/Gudara Ahanin village).

The Jamiat-e Islami was the most influential faction in Istalif.

- Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG): approximately 600 fighters

commanded/led by Nasim Agha (Tajik/Maidan Ra’is village). Strong influence in Shuraba and

Ghindab villages/areas.

- Harekat-e Inqilab-e Islami: 500 fighters led/commanded by Haji Mohammad

(Tajik/Khwaja Hassan). Strong influence in Khwaja Hassan village.

- Ittihad-e Islami: 300 fighters commanded/led by Sayeed Abdullah (Tajik/Shenaki

village). Strong support base in Shenaki village.

- Jabha-e Nejat-e Milli: 200 fighters led by Sufi Gul Mohammad (Tajik/Khwaja Hassan).

311

As reported by former Jamiati fighters from Shakar Dara, Mujahideen from neighbouring districts would walk several hours across the mountain to supply themselves in weapons and basic necessities at the bazaar. 312

Interviews with Community Elders on District History, 23/12/2014-24/12/2014. 313

Ibid.

134

Influence in Noor Alim and Khwaja Hassan villages.

In September 1996, the Taliban progressed swiftly across the northern part of Kabul province,

reaching Istalif through Shakar Dara and Farza two days after their capture of the capital, and

progressing without meeting significant resistance towards Panjshir. Held back at Hussein Kot, the

Taliban retreated towards Kabul. Given its strategic position at the crossroad of the Shomali plain

and the Ghorband pass, Istalif was at the forefront of the Taliban struggle with the United Front. This

resulted in the flight of most Istalifi Jihadi commanders into Panjshir, while two Pashtun commanders

form Shuraba village, Amir Hakam and Haji Mehraj, joined the Taliban, as did the former head of the

HIG, Nasim Agha (Tajik). Zarif Jân, a Jamiati commander, was appointed as Alaqadar (leader of a sub-

district). The second attack of the Taliban on Istalif triggered revenge on the local population for their

assumed support to the United Front. Villages were looted and burnt down, causing the flight of the

majority of the population to Panjshir, as well as Kabul, Pakistan and Iran.314

With the fall of the Taliban, past commanders took back their influence in the newly created district.

Despite governmental injunctions to submit all weapons as part of the Disarmament, Demobilisation

and Reintegration (DDR) programme, most commanders reportedly only submitted defective arms,

keeping most of their functioning weapons. Zarif Jan, former Alaqadar, was appointed as District

Governor, a position he held two years before being transferred to neighbouring Farza, and

succeeded by the current District Governor, Shah Rasool, appointed with the support of late Mullah

Taj Mohammad and Ustad Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf. Former Taliban commanders Amir Hakam and

Haji Mehraj returned to Istalif after a brief exile in Pakistan and have currently resettled in their

village of Shuraba. Sufi Razzaq, probably the most influential commander during the Jihad years,

joined the National Directorate of Security, and reportedly retains major influence to this day.315

1.3. Demography

1.3.1. Population and Tribal Composition

According to information collected from respondents in the field, Istalif district has a population of

approximately 60 – 70,000 inhabitants, of which close to 90% are Tajiks (including a small minority of

Shia Tajiks), less than 10% Sunni Hazaras, and the rest being Pashtuns. There is reportedly one

Pashtun village, Shuraba, located in the north of the district, and three Hazara villages in the West of

Istalif: Karkut, Kalan Chatri and Kutalak.316 Shias are settled in the village of Bâghi Taqie in the

southwest, and Tajiks spread out throughout the entire district.317 A small group of Kuchis

(approximately 20 families according to reports) migrate seasonally to the district between the

Afghan months of Hamal and Mizan318, coming from the South and Southeast of Afghanistan,

through Nijrab, Tagab and Qarabagh districts. Their relationship with the settled population is

reportedly good.

Accounts from interviewees revealed few open tensions between communities, though the Pashtuns

appear to constitute a separate entity – notably as Pashtun tribes took sides with the Taliban in the

314

Interviews on Istalif Demography, 16/12/2013. 315

A detailed profile of Sufi Razzaq can be found in the section on influential actors in the district. 316

These village clusters also include other villages, such as Hasar Khail and Mazar-e Mitharlam. 317

Interviews with Community Leaders on Istalif Demography, 16/01/2014. 318

Approximately equivalent to the months of March to September in the Gregorian calendar.

135

1990s, as above.319 “We are all Tajiks, because we are 99% Farsi-zabân [Persian-speaking]. The rest

are Pashtuns” reported one of the respondents, including Hazaras, Shia and Sunni Tajiks in the same

category. Moreover, distinctions were made by Tajik respondents between the strict behaviour of

Hazaras and Pashtuns towards women in the district and the attitude of the Tajiks, considered more

“open-minded” and more educated. Though Tajiks acknowledge forming a single qawm, two Tajik

groups can be distinguished: Sâadat (or Sayyeds320, an approximate 40%) and ‘Âm (an approximate

60%). Among the Hazaras, there are 10% Khuja, and 90% ‘Âm. Sayyeds (both Shia and Sunni) and

Khuja were also mentioned as distinct qawms – though the construction of the notion of qawms

needs to be taken cautiously in Istalif, and respondents themselves were reluctant to use the term.321

Pashtuns are divided into two tribes, the Shinwari (30%) and the Kharuti (70%), both concentrated in

the same area and cultivating strong links.

1.3.2. Trends of Migration

Overall, very little inward movement of population was reported to be currently taking place in the

district. Depending on the security situation in neighbouring districts, small clusters of families have

reportedly temporarily settled in past years, subsequently leaving, and there appears to have been

no specific tensions with local residents. Currently, the great majority of Istalif residents are long-

settled inhabitants who returned after the fall of the Taliban.

As will be developed in the following section, migration in Istalif district is mainly motivated by

economic conditions. High seasonal variations of income notably trigger the winter migration of most

of the male population – especially youth – to Kabul, and there were reports of increasing permanent

migration out of the district to the capital or abroad, in search of better livelihood opportunities.

1.4. Economy

Main economic activities in the district derive from agriculture and crafts. Crops produced include

mulberries, grapes, plums, sour cherries, apples and walnuts, sold in the district and provincial

bazaars, with corn, wheat, apples, peaches and vegetables mostly produced for family use. Livestock

also ensures an additional income for an approximate 20% of the population, mainly through sheep

and cow herding and the dairy products derived from it. A small percentage of the population (below

5%) also owns horses and donkeys for conveyance purposes, and chickens are raised for subsistence

use. The majority of Istalif inhabitants are self-employed, either working their own fields, in family

workshops, or as shopkeepers, with some – though a limited percentage – employed as daily

labourers in agriculture and transportation.322

Renowned for its pottery and crafts, Istalif’s workforce also encompasses a significant proportion of

craftsmen whose production is sold on the local bazaar in the district centre, along the Kabul-Mazar

highway, and, for a limited number, in Kabul markets. As highlighted by Noah Coburn in his Bazaar

Politics, potters constitute a distinct social network with a hierarchized structure and a strict division

of labour, jealously keeping secret their methods of production and behaving as a distinct qawm.

Becoming a master potter, for instance, is strictly limited to the eldest son in the family, and

women’s role restricted to glazing and decorating pots – one of the reasons mentioned for the failure

319

Interviews with Community Elders on District History, 23/12/2014-24/12/2014. 320

Considered as descendants of Prophet Mahomet through his daughter Fatima and Ali Ibn Abi Talib. 321

For developments on the notion of qawm in Istalif, see COBURN Noah, Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town, Stanford University Press, 2011. 322

Interviews with Community Leaders on Istalif’s Geography and Economy, January 2014.

136

of the attempts of past livelihood projects to create income opportunities for women though the

creation of pottery workshops. Other craft production includes tanning and carpet weaving. Though

these activities ensure a high income for a very small minority of wealthy merchants – mainly based

in Kabul – interviewees reported income derived from craft activities remains low, with the average

monthly income of Istalifi families (including those involved both in the agriculture and craft sectors)

revolving around 5,000 Afghanis – about half of the average wage in Bagrami.323

Moreover, both agriculture and pottery production are highly influenced by seasonal changes, with

most of the population inactive in the winter, when crop production drops: making pottery is

impeded by cold weather, and the flow of Kabul visitors who come to the main bazaar for leisure in

the spring and summer runs dry, depriving shopkeepers of one of their main source of income.

Significantly, average family income is then cut at least by half, reaching a 66% drop for poorer

families (from 3,000 to 1,000 AFA per month).324

This economic distress is further aggravated by the fact that there are reportedly few outlets for local

production. The Istalif Bazaar, located in the district centre, now faces competition from the

Qarabagh and Farza bazaars, which are closer to the main road, bigger – Qarabagh bazaar counts an

approximate 1,000 shops, as compared to the 200 small shops available in Istalif bazaar – better

provisioned, and cheaper. Respondents insisted Istalifis themselves often preferred heading to

Qarabagh for shopping, given the diversity of choice and lower prices. Two smaller bazaars are

located in Tangi Miyana and Khwaja Hassan. Weekly Bazaars are held in Istalif on Fridays, and there

are two weekly bazaars on Monday and Thursday in Qarabagh.325

Unemployment was specifically mentioned as a rising concern in the district, with reports of up to

75% unemployment among men. Though this figure needs to be taken cautiously, it reflects the

acuteness of the problem of unemployment as perceived by district residents. This is particularly true

during the cold season, with unemployed youth increasingly leaving the district for short periods of

time to find work in Kabul or abroad. Due to the lack of economic opportunities year round, many

young men thus commute to Kabul for work on a daily basis, or spend the week in the capital and

return to their villages on Fridays. Economic migration has reportedly increased in the past years,

with a reported hundred families leaving Istalif to settle in Kabul for economic reasons, and some

youth have migrated to Iran326, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Dubai. Remittances from family members in

Kabul, Iran and Pakistan were further mentioned as one of the main sources of income for families in

the district.327

1.5. Access to Services

After unemployment, the main concern expressed by Istalifis was the lack of access to proper

services, notably in terms of education and health.

1.5.1. Education

According to accounts by respondents, approximately 20% of Istalif’s population is literate.328 There

323

Ibid. 324

Ibid. 325

Interviews with Community Leaders on Istalif’s Geography and Economy, December 2013. 326

That being said, many young men returned from Iran due to its restrictive policy towards Afghan migration. 327

Interview on Istalif Demography, 16/12/2013. 328

Interviews on Istalif Demography, 26/12/2014.

137

is a widespread belief that higher education increases job opportunities, and the level of education of

villages, including the access of both boys and girls to schools, is an important component of the

reputation of its inhabitants, as underlined earlier.

Most schools are located in the district centre and in larger villages (Ghindab, Hasar Khail, Khwaja

Hassan). Istalifis interviewed expressed pride in the quality of the education provided in the district –

when it is provided, as they do insist on the lack of educational facilities. For instance, the girls’ high

school in Istalif bazaar does not have a proper building, many schools lack yards, and most have no

access to clean water.

Overall, the district counts seven high schools (four for boys, three for girls), two secondary schools,

four primary schools, and three madrassas – including one with a few girl students in Kolalan village.

There was some discrepancy in the figures for attendance, but an estimate of the student population

indicates there are approximately 3,000 male students and 2,000 female students in the district.329

Close to 90% of children are mentioned to attend school – though one should bear in mind the

aforementioned discrepancy in figures.330 While teachers interviewed reported very high levels of

attendance for both boys and girls, women respondents qualified this rosy picture, insisting most

girls were prevented from attending school in Hazara and Pashtun villages, and that it was a

widespread practice in the entire district to remove girls from school after puberty.331 Main obstacles

for attendance further include harsh economic condition, including that children often contribute to

their family’s income, distance from school, and lack of trained staff.332

1.5.2. Water

Sitting astride the Istalif River, Istalif benefits from an overall good access to water. However, given

the substantial reliance of the economy on agriculture and the importance of water turns for

irrigation, access to water is also a preoccupation of inhabitants and the source of many conflicts in

the district. The position of the mirâb, responsible for distributing water in periods of water shortage

(summer and fall), is notably a prominent one and a source of power and influence.333

There are approximately 20 wiala, 3 karez, and many springs in Istalif. The main source of drinking

water is a water tank constructed in 2009 through NSP funding and located on Takht-e Istalif,

providing water to approximately 60% of district residents. Remaining sources of drinking water are

springs and karez, though, unlike the tank, these sources are not considered safe.

1.5.3. Health

Lack of access to health services is one of the most serious preoccupations of district residents.

Respondents insisted on the absence of proper health facilities and specialized staff. There is one

clinic with a male doctor in the district centre (with mixed reports on its capacity to provide residents

with satisfactory services), and two pharmacies which also serve as alternative health centres. There

is notably no hospital in Istalif, no “professional doctor” (meaning a doctor considered as highly

skilled) and no proper dentist. District inhabitants therefore travel to Qarabagh clinic (three hours by

329

Interviews with Community Leaders on Istalif Services, 17/12/2014-19/12/2014. 330

Ibid. 331

Women’s Focus Group in Istalif, 26/12/2014. 332

Ibid. 333

Interviews with Community Leaders on Istalif’s Geography and Economy, December 2013; Interviews with Community Leaders on Istalif Services, 17/12/2014-19/12/2014.

138

foot, 20 minutes by car), and for more serious issues, to Kabul – which entails significant expenses,

and sometimes indebtedness. Access to proper health services is therefore highly dependent on

wealth – as only 30-40% of district residents can reportedly afford to travel to those facilities.

Furthermore, access to some villages is difficult and complicates evacuation of patients, with

repeated accounts of the death of women when giving birth, for instance. The issue of health was

underlined by women to be one of the most serious issues they were facing at the moment.334

1.5.4. Electricity, Media, and Communications

There is a general lack of access to electricity in the district. The Chief of Police and District

Governor’s Headquarters were themselves mentioned to have an uneven access to power sources,

and most inhabitants have no access to regular electricity, with differences in terms of access based

on wealth, especially given a rise in the price of fuel for generators. Most persons rely on

hydrodynamic generators, private generators (10% in 12 villages) and increasingly on solar panels –

which concerns 700 families settled in big villages (Shinaka, Istalif Bazaar, Dara-e Istalif, Godara,

Kolalan, Farghana). A power station was built with Korean funding but has reportedly been inactive

for the past year. Another station constructed through NSP funding provides electricity to 120

families in Masjid-e Ahanposh.

Villagers all insisted that lack of access to electricity impeded their access to media sources. In this

regard, the main source of information for district residents is radio (over 50% of the population has

access to radio, and a limited number of wealthy villagers can afford televisions) and there is no print

media in the district. Most have access to cell phones, though coverage in only ensured by Roshan

and MTN operators.335

1.6. Development Interventions in Istalif

There has been a drop in development assistance in Istalif in the past few years, with only three

NGOs active in the whole district: Mothers for Peace, BRAC, and AWRC, primarily focusing on

(generally small-scale) health, education, and livelihoods programmes. These programmes are mainly

restricted to the district centre – despite the launching of a shepherding project for women in

Shuraba. There further seems to be little coordination between district NGOs, though maliks (see

below) are sometimes playing a more informal coordination role.

Table 1: NGO interventions in Istalif

Organization

Description of Projects

AWRC Literacy classes, livelihood support (provision of bee hives, sheep herds), with a focus on vulnerable women.

Mothers for Peace

Literacy, sewing and pottery classes; bee keeping (interrupted), provision of sheep, clinic.

BRAC Awareness-raising on health issues.

334

Interviews with Community Leaders on Istalif Services, 17/12/2014-19/12/2014 335

Interviews with Community Leaders on Istalif Services, 17/12/2014-19/12/2014

139

2. Security, Governance Structures, and Access

2.1. Security Situation in the District

General security in Istalif district is reportedly good. Respondents mentioned there was no

insurgency in the district, and no drug trafficking.336 There were no mentions of political assassination

or rivalries between tribes - though there were some individual accounts of persisting old rivalries

between Jihadi commanders. The fact that insurgency in neighbouring Ghorband valley (Parwan

Province), and Tagab and Nijrab districts (Kapisa Province) has not spilled over into Istalif is attributed

to the role of the police in maintaining government presence and surveying the whereabouts of

outsiders.

There are no international security forces or Afghan National Army forces officially present in Istalif,

and the Afghan National Police is the most prominent institution formally in charge of peacekeeping

and maintenance of security. There are reportedly three police check points in the district, in Khwaja

Hassan, Gardi Fazara and Shuraba, and a force of approximately seventy men, of various origins337 –

or about twice the number of police for Bagrami, a much more populous district. Checkpoints at the

entrance of the district controlling the whereabouts of visitors and regular patrols of police troupes

were specifically mentioned as assisting in the preservation of security.

There were unanimous expressions of satisfaction with the performance of the police. Based on

recurrent accounts by both male and female respondents, there further appears to be a high degree

of collaboration between district residents and the ANP. Respondents mentioned they were

currently cooperating with the police on a regular basis, and several interviewees explained village

shuras had taken the initiative to systematically inform the police of any threats and crimes and

collaborate with police officers, and the DCOP insisted he conducted weekly consultation of elders on

Sundays to hear their complaints and address their problems. Women reported the police had both

officers circulating in civilian clothes, and informants in various villages.338 The details of an outsider

spotted in Istalif outside of the traditional visiting season are inevitably taken and reported to both

police officers and civilian “peacekeepers.”339

However, satisfaction expressed with the performance of the ANP is reportedly recent and tied to

the arrival of the current Chief of Police a month ago – thus calling for caution in interpretation of

these reports. These positive accounts stem from initiatives taken by the new DCOP upon his arrival,

such as preventing local commanders from circulating with weapons, whereas the previous DCOP

was said to be in connivance with influential commanders in the district:

When this new DCOP came into this position, the security situation became very good. In the

336

Concerning drugs, women respondents held a distinct discourse from that of men. While the latter insisted

opium was inexistent in Istalif, women interviewed did mention its existence, underlining the impact it had on

family and social relations, with drug consumption having an impact both on family resources and violence

against women and children. Compare Men’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, Istalif, 29/12/2013 with

Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, Istalif, 20/01/2014. 337

Interview with University Student on District Security, Istalif, 12/01/2014; Interview with Development Worker on District Security, Istalif, 12/01/2014; Interview with Development Worker on District Security, Istalif, 01/02/2014. 338

Interview with a Women’s Leader on Feelings of Security, Istalif, 20/01/2014. 339

Interviews with District Leaders on Istalif Governance Structure, 24/12/2014.

140

time of the past DCOP, his brother Zaman and also followers and bodyguards of commander

Abdul Razzaq could walk around freely but now, if any of them wants to come to Istalif, all

their cars are checked and they are asked where they are going.340

The fact that the new Chief of Police, Zulmay Khan, is originally from neighbouring Qarabagh district

is probably another factor of satisfaction.341 This is indeed perceived positively by Istalifis who explain

his familiarity with district residents through his origins (a change compared to the previous Chief of

Police).

It must be noted that the position of Chief of Police in Istalif rotates rapidly, with accounts of eight to

ten different DCOPs since 2001.342 It was further observed by research personnel employed for this

study that the Chief of Police himself was not in the district on a permanent basis.

2.2. Perceptions of Security Threats and Responses to Them

Though respondents insisted there were few security threats in the district, they did note occasional

night robbery – whose causes were mentioned to be rooted in poverty and unemployment – and

delinquent activities perpetrated by young boys. Practices such as gambling and drug consumption

(mainly hashish, though there were occasional mentions of opium use as well), were notably

mentioned by women as harmful to their security. As discussed above, the new Chief of Police enjoys

a high reputation. Access to police offices is reportedly easy, though it often does require going

through shura members and maliks, as described by this participant in a focus group:

We all have access to the police very easily and there is a hierarchy that allows us to have

access to the police: for example [first through] the [village] shura, after that the village

leader, and at the end the District Governor and Chief of Police. Moreover, we have access to

the police directly. The unity of tribes and villages and also the trust we have in the police

enables us to have access to the police.343

That being said, district residents mentioned the police lacked “education” or awareness of legal

dispositions and insisted on the necessity for both villagers and police officers to understand criminal

law generally and the legal provisions concerning the police’s role in particular. This is a recurring

statement in both focus groups and individual interviews, in Istalif as in other districts for this study.

In turn, commanders were also mentioned to have played a crucial role in the past in maintaining

security and preventing robbery or dealing with cases of murder. This is particularly the case for Sufi

Razzaq, the most prominent commander in the area, though precise details on how commanders

investigated and resolved disputes, and the extent they continue to do so, were not forthcoming.344

Finally, along with police intervention and the activities of commanders, village solidarity and

vigilance were also reported as safeguards against criminality.345

340

Focus Group Discussion 1, 29/12/2013 341

Interview with Women’s Leader on Main Conflict Lines and Dispute Resolution. 02/01/2014. 342

Interviews with District Leaders on Istalif Governance Structure, 24/12/2014. 343

Focus Group Discussion 2013 12 29. 344

See Ibid. (mentioning Sufi Razzaq’s involvement in the investigation and disposal of a murder case, but without specific information on his course of action). 345

See, e.g., Focus Group Discussion, 29/12/2013.

141

2.2.1. Women’s Perceptions

Despite initial accounts of higher liberty of movement for women, as compared to other areas of

Afghanistan, research showed expanded liberty of movement is restricted to a small group of

educated and influential women. More generally, it was mentioned that after reaching puberty, girls

in the district are often barely allowed outside their homes or only wearing chadris to safeguard their

families’ reputation, and forbidden to go to school – especially after marriage, which happens in the

later years of education.346

Women’s freedom of movement further appears to vary according to the hawze or area of

residence. In Pashtun and Hazara communities, for instance, women are rarely allowed to go out of

the house. For other women, travelling outside the district is mentioned as a possibility, as long as

permission is asked from their families. This travel mostly requires the presence of a mahram, though

some women did mention being able to go to Kabul for shopping and education purposes, as long as

they are accompanied by female relatives, and if their family members are informed in advance of

their whereabouts.347

Limited freedom of movement was additionally mentioned as a problem in accessing the police.

Most women are reportedly not allowed to go to police offices without prior permission of their

male family members, and mostly have to send a representative – though some women (elder

women, teachers, some shura members, and residents of a few villages) appear to enjoy a greater

ability to access the police independently.348 There are no female police officers in the district and

women’s security issues are mainly addressed by women’s shuras. The influence of the latter,

however, was mentioned as quite limited, and their role being mainly an intermediary to contact

men’s shuras.349 The local head of the district Women’s Shura is reportedly responsible for the entire

district and reporting problems faced by women to the DDA, where she is the only female

member.350 Throughout research, she repeatedly mentioned that she was the only point of reference

for women in the entire district, and had to deal with facing both men’s and district authorities’

occasional lack of interest in women-related issues.351 Women respondents indeed mentioned that

security threats faced by women were not sufficiently understood by authorities who mainly consult

men.

There were also several reports of violence against women by husbands and brothers, and continued

practices of baad and badal.352 “Most injustices for women come from their husbands”, explained a

respondent, whose sentiments were approved by other participants in a focus group. There were

indeed repeated accounts of conjugal violence.353

Some respondents particularly mentioned the biggest threat to their security was relatives and other

men and the pressure they exercise on women to prevent them from circulating freely or sending

girls to school. This was notably confirmed by NGO workers in the district. Programmes have

346

Interview with Development Worker, 06/01/2014; Women’s Focus Group, Istalif, 26/12/2014. 347

Ibid. 348

Ibid. 349

Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, Istalif, 20/01/2014. 350

Men’s focus Group on Feelings of Security, Istalif, 29/12/2014; Women’s Focus Group, Istalif, 26/12/2014. 351

See, e.g., Men’s focus Group on Feelings of Security, Istalif, 29/12/2014. 352

Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 02/01/2014. 353

See, e.g., Interview with Women’s Leader on Feelings of Security, 20/12/2014 (echoing sentiment on negative aspects of husbands)

142

reportedly been set up informally to address this issue, in the form of private visits by aid workers to

families where violence had been identified.354 However, these activities barely go beyond individual

advice to families. There appears to be no thoroughly-planned programme to effectively address the

problem of violence within the family, and no monitoring of the results of such interventions.

2.3. Balance of Power and Governance Structure

The balance of power in the district follows the demographic repartition of ethnic groups. Tajiks are

the most powerful group, as they have more people, more literati (roshanfekran), and count among

themselves influential ulemas, traditional leaders, commanders, khans and landowners in the

district. It would be wrong however, to assume balance of power in Istalif is ethnically based per se.

Accounts show that the main structures of power rest on village council (shura) members and maliks

at the local level, and, more broadly, are strongly influenced by a few powerful individuals –who

often benefit both from the survival of war-time power structures, and from more recent

acquisitions, such as wealth or government position.

At the local level, village shuras are reportedly the main decision making and governance bodies,

involved in most aspects of social life, from conflict resolution to reporting security threats and

drawing assistance to specific villages. Village shuras reportedly cultivate close ties with government

authorities – mainly the District Governor and the Chief of Police. “Aside from security”, reported

one of the participants to a focus group, “all the problems are solved by the shuras.”355 A few

women’s shuras additionally operate at the village level, though not with the ubiquity of men’s

shuras.356

At the district level, Istalif counts an Ulema Assembly, a Community Shura, a Women’s Shura

dedicated to women’s issues, and a Malik Shura. The District Development assembly is in charge of

discussion about and distributing assistance in coordination with district officials. There were some

reports of misuse of their influence by DDA members, and of practices of corruption to attract

assistance to specific areas.

However, the role of these local shuras is dependent on, or counterbalanced by, the influence of

some maliks (often shura members themselves, though they assume individual responsibility in

decision making) and former Jihadi commanders who still enjoy a high degree of influence in the

district. Whether it be concerning distribution of assistance or justice provision, it came out in

interviews with district residents that influence lay more in the hands of a few powerful individuals –

ex Jihadi commanders and maliks – than in a structured governance system. As expressed by

onerespondent, they are considered as “a bridge between the people and the government.”357

Maliks are notably the main point of entry for assistance and its distribution among the residents

under their control358, and reportedly cultivate close relations with the District Governor, who

directly appointed eleven of his supporters as village maliks. Development actors explained going

through maliks was indispensable in order to secure the implementation of a given project, and that

this implied constant negotiation and surveillance, as some tried to divert assistance to relatives or

specific people in their communities. As mentioned by an NGO worker:

354

Interview with a Development Worker, 06/01/2014; 355

Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 29/01/2014. 356 Women’s Focus Group on Feelings of Security, Istalif, 20/01/2014. 357

Focus Group Discussion, 2013 12 29. 358

See COBURN, 2011, for further developments on the influence and role of maliks at the local level.

143

The problem with maliks is they intervene in the selection [of beneficiaries] and want us to

select people who are related to them or members of their family. […] My advice is to go first

through the DG, then through the maliks. You need both of them to approve your projects and

be involved in them. Then you can start and won’t encounter any problems. Otherwise it’s

useless. If a malik understands you started a project without his permission, then you’re in

trouble and your project will not go forward.359

That being said, there was little transparency in the description of power relations and which malik

enjoyed what type of influence as compared to another. One community member further

complained that assistance remained under the influence of a few powerful men in the district, and

that goods brought360 for assistance would disappear overnight, or would be diverted by these power

holders. There were mentions of eight “wolves” (though their names were not specified) who divert

all assistance towards their partisans.361 The District Governor himself contributes to the

maintenance of this dissymmetric power structure, granting privileges to some of the maliks and

elders he supports, as above. For example, there was an account of the release of a Shuraba resident

arrested by the NDS with weapons and mines upon intervention of the DG after tribal elders from

Shuraba contacted him and paid for his liberation.

Structures of power thus appear to be less based on the authority of elders to maintain social peace

and resolve conflicts, than reliant on a range of influential actors – possibly a sign of the effects of

war and displacement, with both the survival of war-time power structures and the weakening of

traditional governance structures. Indeed, though elders were mentioned to remain referents for

villagers, their power is counterbalanced by outside interventions and influence of other actors:

established maliks, wealthy merchants, mirâbs, as well as the Chief of Police, the District Governor,

and, quite importantly, commanders who continue to exert considerable influence. The fact that the

DG repeatedly insisted that elders neither have the power to resolve some conflicts nor have their

decisions enforced could be in this respect quite significant.362

The role of district authorities – mostly the DG and Chief of Police (see Table 2 below for background

on these actors) – is therefore exercised less through well-defined bureaucratic channels than

through informal channels, bolstered by the power gained from district office. Requiring an

intervention from the DCOP to get the agreement of the DG for the construction of a road, for

instance, appears a common practice, as is requiring the intervention of maliks for favourable

outcome of justice decisions.

Table 2: Influential Government Officials in Istalif

Name Position Background

Shah Rasool District Governor Appointed at the District Governor eight years ago, Shah Rasool

is originally from neighbouring Shakar Dara. A former Jamiat-e

359

Individual Interview with a development worker, December 2013. 360

Informal consultation with community residents during field work. 361

. Ibid. 362

Interview with the Istalif District Governor, December 2013.

144

Islami supporter, he reportedly owes his position to support

received from Mullah Taj Muhammad and Ustad Abdul Rab

Rasool Sayyaf. There were several account of dissatisfaction

with his performance due to his disconnection from the

people’s effective needs and the privileged relationship he

cultivates with some elders but not others.

Haji Zulmay Chief of Police Originally from Qarabagh district, Haji Zulmay is former Jamiati

commander who fought in Panjshir and Charasia and was

appointed Chief of Police in the winter of 2013 with the support

of his uncle Haji Safi, head of Pol-e Charkhi prison in Kabul and

responsible for prisoners in Bagram Airfield. Before Istalif, he

served in Maidan Shahr, Shindand, Helmand and Ghazni.

Though respondents were overall cautious when reporting about them, there were private accounts

of the influence of commanders who continue to sustain groups of armed men and networks of

support. Women notably were more prolix on this issue, insisting some power holders could bypass

laws and keep control over strong networks of support, concentrating assistance, economically

supporting members of their group, and manipulating justice in their favour. The number of

“bodyguards” surrounding a commander is notably interpreted as a sign of power. Sufi Razzaq (see

Box 2) is thus considered as one of the most powerful men in the region, with six bodyguards and

large networks of support, whereas his competitor Haji Mohammad reportedly has “only” two

bodyguards at his service.

The significance of water for agriculture and income also provides the mirâb, in charge of distributing

water during the dry season, with considerable leverage. In women’s focus groups, it appeared that

specific mirâbs thus used their power to pressure inhabitants into complying with their decisions or

preferences. Below, at Section 3.4.1, this report further discusses an example of this behaviour: more

specifically, a mirâb who exploited his influence to avoid paying for a delivery of grapes.

Box 2: Commander Sufi Razzaq

Successor of Ghulam Hazrat at the head of the Jamiati faction in Istalif after the rise of the

Mujahideen to power, Sufi Razzaq is currently the most influential commander in Istalif. As a

commander in the United Front, he played a significant role in recapturing the area from the Taliban

in 2001, entering the district through Tangi Miyana and pushing back the 300 Taliban still positioned

in Istalif.

Currently positioned at the NDS, he has six bodyguards and the support of Jamiat-e Islami elements

and Kabul MP and former adviser to the President Amanullah Gozar. During the course of research,

Sufi Razzaq was building a meeting hall in Istalif Bazaar in anticipation of the upcoming election

campaign.

He cultivates a rivalry, dating from the Jihad years and his appointment as the head of Jihadi

regiment by Ahmad Shah Masood, with Haji Mohammad, a former Harekat commander – who has

145

two bodyguards. In 2011, Haji Mohammad was thus arrested by the Afghan National Police for

setting up a mine under Sufi Razzaq’s car, detained for two years in Pol-e Charkhi Prison, and freed

after the mediation of local tribal elders. However, Haji Mohammad’s attendance at the funeral

ceremony of Sufi Razzaq’s brother in late December 2013 reportedly put an end to their long rivalry.

146

3. Conflicts Landscape and Access to Justice

3.1. Main Sources of Conflict

Data indicates disputes in Istalif are mainly over land, water rights and inheritance. Given the high

reliance on agriculture for income for most Istalif residents, these three causes are often intertwined,

with the majority of inheritance disputes being over land shares distributed between brothers, for

instance, or disputes over water shares deriving from the necessity to properly irrigate agricultural

land. Most of these disputes arise between individuals, though some of them involve entire

communities, in the case when the construction of a bridge on a river impacts the provision of water

for an entire area. However, significant levels of violence (deaths and injuries) are rarely mentioned

to take place in these conflicts – though, again, the tendency of respondents to emphasize the highly

secure environment of their district might induce some bias in the data, as there were some

contradictory reports on this point. In a pointed contrast to other study areas, Istalif interviewees did

not mention land grabbing to be a source of conflict, though this source of conflict cannot be entirely

ruled out.

Poverty, harsh living conditions, and alleged promiscuity are also reported to be responsible for the

development of disputes within and between families.363 This is the case when merchandise is not

paid for, for example, or when fights between children escalate into disputes between neighbours

due to minor property damage. The fact that women are often left on their own during the winter to

assume the responsibility of managing and providing for the family while men are working in Kabul or

elsewhere also creates additional tensions. One female respondent explained: “mostly, the reason

for disputes is poverty. There are families who live together and they cannot feed themselves.

Whatever money they get, they give the money to [their] elders and they can’t meet their

expenses.”364

Water is at the root of more serious conflicts, given its importance in agriculture. Most such conflicts

derive from disagreements over whose turn it is to use water for irrigation. The system of water

distribution is indeed organized in such a way that inhabitants drawing irrigation or drinking water

from the same source take turns in provisioning themselves. This can be the case both for individuals

and for communities. In the area of Sami, the construction of a slough by villagers to bring water to

their farms triggered a conflict between three families, as the slough in question diverted water from

going through other farms.365 There is also an ongoing serious dispute between the neighbouring

villages of Khwaja Hassan and Sanlakh over water shares, which required government intervention

after the people from Sanlakh village attacked Khwaja Hassan residents, whom they accused of

taking water out of turn.366 Interestingly, the case has reportedly been addressed to Sufi Razzaq, an

indicator of the influence of local commanders on the outcomes of justice, a point explored in

greater depth below.

Concerning inheritance, respondents notably emphasized the importance of increasing awareness of

363

See, e.g., Focus Group on Feelings of Security, 29/12/2013. 364

Focus Group Discussion Women Conflict Trends and Access to Justice 2013 12 31. 365

Conflict Survey, December 2013, Interview with four villagers from Sami. 366

At the time of research, this case had been transferred to government authorities on the last week of December and the District Governor was involved in the negotiation.

147

proper inheritance procedures to adequately address such disputes.367

Women-related conflicts are also mentioned to be quite widespread in the district, with several cases

of girls “escaping” (the girls being referred to as farari or “escapees”), with notably serious

consequences in relationships between families given the high importance of namus. Women

interviewed attributed this phenomenon to the seclusion of girls and lack of education in general,

and insisted these had dramatic impacts on the future of the concerned girls, now considered as a

cause of shame for their family and village. There were also accounts of rape – incidents which are

not addressed as crimes due to questions of honour, and often end up in the girl being mistreated

and forcibly married to her rapist.368

Other types of conflicts include struggles for influence, creating competition among villagers, such as

the case reported by a woman over the naming of a mosque.

3.2. Major Conflicts

Major conflicts, as throughout the report, are understood here as conflicts which experienced high

levels of violence, implicate major resources, and/ or have resisted several attempts at resolution.

In his Bazaar Politics, Noah Coburn, quoting Burnes, recounts a history of blood feuds and

factionalism in Istalif: ”Tajiks in Istalif, unlike Tajiks in other areas, were remarkable by their tendency

to factionalism, feudism and violence”, with repeated disputes around land and women.

That being said, nowadays, in line with the frequency of disputes reported around irrigated land and

the apparent importance of securing water resources for agriculture in the district, major ongoing

conflicts involve rights (or their usurpation) over water. This is the case for the conflict already

mentioned between Khwaja Hassan and Sanlakh. Another conflict over water shares in the area of

Khwaja Mirak was mentioned to have been ongoing since the time of Daud Khan, with the more

recent involvement of local power holders:

There is a river between the Khwaja Mirak village and the two sides of the river are

agricultural land. One side of the river is controlled by one of the former commanders, and he

takes water from the river for his farms. Because of his power, the people cannot do

anything.369

Though most conflicts in Istalif are reportedly between individuals or families, major conflicts, as in

the case of Khwaja Mirak, can be a combination of several inter-individual conflicts between one

powerful individual and several individuals from a same community.

There were also mentions of protracted rivalries between individuals – mostly over water shares,

though it was reported the roots of the disputes and the reasons for the failure of resolution

attempts go back to historical rivalries between families – such as one case between two individuals

in Godara over a source of drinking water which has resisted interventions from the village shura.370

367

Women’s Focus Group in Istalif, 26/12/2014 368

Individual interview – Main Conflict Lines and Access to Justice – Women – 12/01/2014. 369

Survey on Major conflicts, Individual interview with a leader from Khwaja Mirak, (Abdul Bassir), December 2013. 370

Survey on Major conflicts, Individual interview with a leader from Godara, (Nazri Mohammad) December 2013.

148

3.3. Justice Processes

Conflict resolution is highly reliant on traditional elders and maliks who are reportedly involved in the

resolution of a reported 95% of conflicts. Village shuras are thus the main dispute resolution

institution, and were described as following by one of the interviewees: “A combination of elders,

mullahs and maliks who resolve the conflicts for disputants in a third place or location [i.e., not in

the disputants’ houses] after that the conflict parties go with the jirga/ shura participants to each

others’ houses.”371 As in other areas of Afghanistan, traditional conflict resolution is perceived as

generally preferable, since it is based on conciliation, remains within the community and preserves

the reputation of disputants, and is swifter than court processes, taking a reported average of two to

three days for resolving a conflict in Istalif.

3.3.1. Common Practices for Conflict Resolution

As described by village residents, the process for the resolution of a conflict is thus the following: a

case is first addressed to the elders, who, in consultation with the local mullah, gather in order to

find a solution based on conciliation between the two parties. If the parties disagree to the solution

proposed, and several attempts at resolution fail, the case is then transferred to the District

Governor’s office and the Huqooq, who lead an investigation in collaboration with elders, based on

their knowledge of their community, and eventually decide whether or not to submit their findings to

the court or to register the decision taken by elders.

There was someone, Farhad Khan, who fought with his cousins and went to Bagram to

[procure a weapon to use] against his cousins. We tried to resolve the conflict through

shuras. If there is a problem we go to tribal elders first then to mullahs and elders. If they are

able to resolve the conflict, that is good. Otherwise we send it to the district first, and later to

the Huqooq.372

As in other areas, conflicts referred to the District Governor are almost systematically referred back

to elders’ shuras for resolution, and the DG reportedly cultivates strong links with many of the maliks

and district elders. The DG himself also explained he sometimes resolved the problem using

traditional resolution mechanisms, without sending the case back to elders or to state organs. This is

especially a common practice in cases where questions of honour are at stake, such as pregnancy

outside of marriage.373

Nevertheless, elders mentioned cases resolved in accordance with the Shari’a were not registered –

as the Islamic Law is considered as sufficient in itself to enforce a decision on disputants. There was,

at the same time, notable insistence on behalf of respondents on the importance of using a clear set

of laws, such as Shari’a – hence the involvement of mullahs.

3.3.2. Formal Justice Involvement in Conflict Resolution

Judiciary processes in Istalif have the reputation of being excessively lengthy and corrupt. General

distrust toward formal judiciary processes is a recurrent observation in Afghanistan and can be

illustrated by an argument narrated by one of the participants in a focus group:

There was a conflict between two people. One claimed his truck should be loaded first, but

371

Individual Interview, Istalif, 31/12/2013. 372

Focus Group Discussion 2, 2013 12 29 373

Interview with the Istalif District Governor, December 2014.

149

the other refused, saying his truck should be loaded first. This triggered a conflict and they

both went to provincial authorities to address their conflict. After one year I saw one of them

and asked him “is your conflict solved?” He said that he had spent four hundred thousand

Afghanis, and that the case was still pending.374

It is therefore only when conciliation between disputant parties failed both after consultation of

tribal elders and the district office, that the court is mobilized through the Huqooq, or through the

police in criminal cases. Going directly to the court does not appear to be common practice among

district residents. As one resident elaborated, “If there are criminal and civil conflicts in the district,

and if the shura or people cannot solve the conflict, [only] then is the conflict addressed to the

court.”375

Similarly, cases addressed directly by maliks and community members are rarely reported to the

court, again mainly due to the high expense and time consumption implied by formal justice

procedures. The court was very seldom mentioned with regard to the resolution of conflicts, and the

judge himself underlined that he mostly deals with criminal cases, referring others back to elders or

to the Huqooq. Criminal cases are reportedly most often addressed to the police and district

authorities, though there is an involvement of elders during the investigation and for the resolution

of the case. For example, one elder in a focus group held on December 29th, 2013, explained he

participated in a murder investigation, and then handed off matters to the district authorities to

exact punishment. However, the category of “criminal” appears to encompass only cases resulting in

injuries and deaths. There is an overall reluctance to involve formal authorities in the resolution of

conflicts, or only If the malik remains the main focal point for resolution, as underlined by some of

the participants in a focus group: “the malik should not be under pressure.”376

Cases referred back to elders by district authorities are then registered at the district level.

Community leaders also reportedly have books in which they register their decisions, before bringing

them to the district for registration. .

3.3.3. Personal Involvement of Government Actors

It is important to note that Istalif residents do not seem a priori reluctant to go to government

officials in the district to uphold their claims, if first attempts at resolution have failed. As mentioned

above, though these are in their great majority referred back to local elders, bringing a case to

district authorities appears to increase pressure for the resolution of the conflict. Land conflicts,

given their sensitivity and the economic implications, are thus the most common type of conflicts

referred to district authorities, as elders reportedly “do not have the action forces” to enforce their

decisions.377 The DG in particular mentioned recognizing decisions only if elders have a “stamp” and

are officially habilitated to make decisions, though he did not provide further information as to how

this stamp could be acquired and what criteria made an elder capable of rendering officially

recognized justice.

3.3.4. The Role of Religious Figures

A significant characteristic of dispute resolution in Istalif is the importance of the role of mullahs,

374

Focus Group Discussion, 2013 12 29. 375

Focus Group Discussion, Istalif, 29/12/2013. 376

Ibid. 377

Individual interview with the District Governor, December 2013.

150

mawlawis and mosques. Both male and female respondents insisted that consulting the local mullah

was one of the initial stages in dispute resolution, and religious figures appear almost systematically

involved in shuras when discussing the resolution of a dispute. The Ulema Shura itself is regularly

consulted in the first place for the resolution of conflicts, especially when involving significant levels

of violence, as displayed by results from the major conflicts survey. This is especially true concerning

inheritance rights, often addressed in accordance with the Shari’a. Respondents maintained that

most conflicts are resolved according to the Shari’a, though they also gave scattered reports of

ongoing cultural practices in tension with Afghan and Islamic Law, such as baad and badal.


Access to justice is distinct for men and women. While men address their complaints directly to

elders and maliks, women’s access to justice is restricted by their limited liberty of movement and

considerations of namus.

3.4.1. The Importance of Networks

Men respondents explained they resolved most of their conflicts through village shura and maliks –

underlining the importance of establishing good relationships with individuals involved in conflict

resolution. Access to fair and equitable justice thus seems to be impeded by the power structures

mentioned in the previous section. The case of Khwaja Mirak above is reportedly not isolated and the

power and influence of one man can prevent villagers from addressing complaints to the shura or

district authorities. Though respondents remained very discreet regarding the exercise of influence

by individuals to impede access to justice and corrupt the outcome of justice processes, there were

accounts of influential individuals exerting pressure on villagers, and leaving them without recourse

for their complaints. Interviewees gave the example of a powerful shopkeeper in Qabre Malik, who is

reportedly armed and derives part of his influence from his position as a mirâb, deciding on the

distribution of water depending on who supports him, or who opposes him. As a result, residents of

the area refrain from complaining about his exactions:

We had sold grapes to him, but the buyer did not want to give us our money. He is a mirâb

and because of that we are afraid we cannot get our money from him because that man is

influential and people are afraid of him. He also has weapons and has killed people. He lives

in the area close to Qabre Malik […]. He sells water to people and now he is a shopkeeper.378

Being related to justice providers was also mentioned as promoting favourable dispute resolution

outcomes for both men and women, with emphasis placed on the importance of networks of

support and family relations. Along the same lines, one interviewee insisted that district authorities

be appointed from outside the district in order to avoid, at the district level, pressure on dispute

parties, while providing disputants with an alternative solution in case they are unsatisfied with the

local shura’s decision.


Women’s access to justice is impeded by several factors: prominently including their limited freedom

of movement, the importance of the notion of namus, and the prevalence of biases against women

on behalf of male justice providers. Relatedly, as women-related disputes, or disputes in which one

of the parties is a woman, seldom exit the family’s or community’s boundaries, channels of

378

Focus Group Women Conflict Trends and Access to Justice 2013 12 31.

151

information and access to justice thus remain fairly limited for women.

Though elders interviewed did insist women had access to them and could refer their cases when

necessary, women de facto have very little latitude in case referral. Female respondents confirmed,

in line with other research districts, that they primarily addressed their complaints to their families,

and only with the permission of male relatives can they then turn to outside authorities such as

shuras, including the Women’s Shura. Women’s access to shuras is further limited by the fact that in

most villages, they have to send a male representative.

Interviewees did not entirely agree on the correct order of authorities for addressing women’s

disputes, particularly regarding the role of shuras. However, they did agree that women’s disputes

do, and should, remain mostly within the family pureview. One woman interviewed for this study

explained: “I first address my complaint to family members, then to elders and village leaders. If they

cannot solve the problem, then it is referred to the district authorities. But we do not have access to

shuras.”379

Another interviewee, while disagreeing on the role of shuras, still described a family-centered

process:

As a first step, the family tries to solve the problem, then local elders, mullahs, women’s

shuras, [and] at last the district. Most families solve their problems inside the family because

they don’t want others to know about their problems […] In some cases the decision is clear

but in most cases the decision is not clear. I think they [conflict parties] pay money or use

their connections, or it’s because that’s the way people think in Istalif, the boys are never

guilty and all the vice and fault fall on the shoulders of the women and girls, meaning that the

women are completely responsible for the vice. If we want a conflict to be resolved correctly,

women should be in charge and raise awareness among illiterate and poor women about

their rights.380

As implied by these accounts, in some instances of failure to resolve a dispute, the case is addressed

to the district authorities. In practice, this intervention often occurs through the intermediation of

the Head of the district Women’s Shura, or in the presence of a male relative – but the question of

reputation remains a serious motivation not to take this route, on top of the lack of comprehension

showed by (male) district authorities. A participant in a focus group explained: “Sometimes women

are afraid and they do not tell their problem to any body and the district authorities do not pay

attention to them.”381

Female interviewees further indicated most were overall reluctant to participate in justice processes

or follow up cases to avoid putting at stake their reputation and that of their family, while also

mentioning a general lack of awareness of their rights and of the process itself. As a result, most

problems are solved at home or between women, though the Head of the Women’s Shura explained

having taken upon herself to resolve several issues pertaining to women, insisting on the lack of

comprehension she experienced from men’s shuras and district authorities regarding women’s

issues. One of her accounts is the following:

A woman was sent out of her house and abandoned by her husband, because she was

379


Individual interview with female School principal, - Main conflict lines and Access to Justice, 02/01/2014 381

Women’s Focus Group on Conflict Trends and Access to Justice, 31/12/2014.

152

bearing the child of another. I went to the elders first, but they are men, so they decided to

solve it between men. They couldn’t find a satisfying solution for this girl, so I went to the DG

myself. So the DG called me. I struggled but in the end he decided that the father of the child

and his relatives should have no right to interfere in her life, to keep the honour of the

family.382

This example, as others, underlines the complexity of justice processes, and the fact that access to

justice is mostly based on a constant negotiation between parties and different justice actors. In this

respect, the importance of reputation and honour places women in a weaker position, as these

considerations will usually be prioritized over individual rights of women in order to maintain social

order. Cases of girls running away – which were mentioned to be quite frequent – are notably

problematic.

That being said, in most of the district – and with the significant exception of the Pashtun-dominated

Shuraba area – women are said to be aware of their inheritance rights, in accordance with Shari’a

principles. However, the fact that women can theoretically get their inheritance rights does not mean

they actually do, since they have to stand up for them. Pressure can reportedly be exerted on them

to give up their rights to their brothers, for instance. Again, women’s access to their inheritance

rights depends on their area or village of residence, and on the individual behaviour of family

members. With that said, it appears that a significant proportion of Istalifi women do have access to

their Shari’a inheritance rights, compared to other research areas.

3.5. Challenges and Outside Interventions

As can be expected, the existing power structure in Istalif seems to have a significant impact on the

delivery of justice. Local former Jihadi commanders appear to be regularly involved in conflict

resolution. Though villagers were reluctant to elaborate on this, it was clearly reported by the District

Governor, and confirmed throughout field research with several occurrences of involvement of a

commander in the resolution of a conflict (by women respondents for instance, but also when

discussing specific conflicts). As mentioned above in the case of the District Governor, bringing a

case to the attention of an influential community member is considered as a means to place

additional pressure and is sometimes used by disputants as leverage for their case: “If elders are able

to solve the conflict, then they do it. If not, then we call the influential leaders or commanders to

solve the conflict.”383 This was notably the case for a conflict between two individuals from Sanlakh

and Istalif bazaar over land, in which both Sufi Abdul Razzaq and Qari Pacha Jan, the latter also a

former Jihadi commander, were involved along with local mullahs.

Respondents further reported that, when involved in dispute resolution, power holders often misuse

their influence in order to build or maintain networks of support. Moreover, power holders have a

tendency to impede, as above, the access to justice of inhabitants under their influence. There was

thus a report of an attempt by a local commander to hijack the distribution of tractors, triggering the

intervention of the DG and Chief of Police; although not an intervention in conflict resolution, per se,

this pattern of behaviour would almost certainly continue with regard to justice provision.

Another area of concern is the reported increase of corruption in justice processes at the shura level.

Respondents attributed this increase to shura members not being remunerated for their role as

382

Discussion with Women’s Shura Representative during Field Visit, December 2013. 383

Focus Group Discussion, 29/12/2013 .

153

justice providers – plausibly another sign of the weakening of traditional structures in the district, or

at least their being held in lower regard.

154


There reportedly have been no development programmes dedicated to security and justice in Istalif

in past years. That being said, women reported that, as part of the setting up of CDCs, several

received trainings in women’s rights, which they deemed useful in raising their awareness. As

underlined by one of the participants in a focus group discussion:

The shura actually brought us closer together, closer to our neighbours. Before that we didn’t

share our problems with people and didn’t know about their problems. The good thing about

the shura is that everything is shared. We understand what the life of our neighbours is like,

[and] what our rights are. We received trainings on the rights of women and went to trainings

in Kabul.384

Inhabitants’ main interests in assistance, are, as reflected in discussions for this report, education,

livelihood programmes (given the high rate of unemployment), awareness of rights and Islamic Law

for both men and women – a point stressed by female respondents – and hygiene. The fact that

many girls are prevented from attending school by their brothers and father is notably of high

concern. Education, as mentioned earlier, is perceived by most respondents as a potential remedy to

the drastic unemployment in the district. Concerning girls, education and confrontation with the

outside world was also mentioned by female respondents as an efficient mean to prevent the flight

of girls to Kabul – reportedly a common practice in the district, with harsh repercussions for the girls

themselves and their families, as well as the boys and their families.

There was general insistence on the need to have trainings involving both government authorities

and local elders in order to strengthen the relationship between the two and raise awareness about

legal rights and legal provisions in areas of concern (including land law, inheritance, criminal law,

property law).

Women further insisted that there was a lack of understanding of the law, and of women’s rights in

particular, both by men and women inhabitants of the district. Raising awareness about rights, law,

and legal processes for both men and women was notably something on which women insisted, as

they reported lack of awareness remained the main obstacle to access to justice for women in the

district. There were several accounts of specific instances of violence against women due to ongoing

harmful cultural practices and traditional biases. The head of the Women’s Shura requested that

awareness workshops on women’s rights be provided to both men and women in the district centre,

as well as specific workshops in the Hazara and Pashtun areas, where women enjoy less freedom.

The women should be aware and the men should be aware. If a man knows the rights of a

woman it is better because women never say anything about their rights, as it is too difficult for

men to accept. So the men should be made aware and women’s access to justice should

increase.385

384

Focus Group Discussion, 26/12/2013. 385

Individual interview with female School principal, - Main conflict lines and Access to Justice, 02/01/2014

155

Conclusions and Recommendations

This report has examined security and justice in two peri-urban, and two rural, districts of Kabul and

Nangarhar provinces. This examination in turn allows the development of provisional conclusions

and recommendations with regard to security and justice programming in these areas.

Conclusions

In both peri-urban and rural areas, disputants at this time prefer non-state forums for

dispute resolution. Throughout the four districts, elders and religious leaders seem to

address the substantial majority of disputes, and most interviewees expressed more faith in

these sources of dispute resolution than they did in state processes. However, two caveats

apply. First, non-state dispute resolution practices are not uniform across the study area. For

example, tribal jirgas appear more prominent in Nangarhar areas, while tribal/area shuras

are more prominent in Bagrami, and individual maliks and religious leaders in Istalif. Second,

one should not mistake the current prominence of non-state forums for a strong normative

endorsement of their use. Rather, most interviewees, while expressing a current preference

for non-state forums, also expressed a desire for a stronger and less corrupt state apparatus

and, if such an apparatus existed, might prefer it to non-state forms of dispute resolution.

At the present time, however, most persons only use state dispute resolution services if

certain specific conditions obtain. In particular, disputants most often involve the state if

violence resulting in the loss of life has occurred, or if non-state processes have repeatedly

failed. This observation appears generally true across the study area, the only partial

exceptions occurring in Behsud and Bagrami, where power holders may be blocking some

persons from accessing state dispute resolution forums at all.

Within the study areas, insurgent presence is limited. Among target populations (including

some power holders) insurgent connections certainly exist, but no area hosts a long-term or

large-scale insurgent presence. Rather, according to the accounts of multiple interviewees

from diverse backgrounds, the main security threat in all study areas probably arises from

nominally pro-government power holders undermining both security and justice institutions.

Though present in all report areas, this threat appears notably more severe in Behsud and

Bagrami than in Kama and Istalif.

Along the same lines, within peri-urban areas, alleged land grabbing by power holders, or

with their backing, appears the most common cause of major disputes. In rural areas,

disputes over agricultural land and water are more common, seeming to comprise an

outright majority of all disputes. A minority of family disputes is taking place throughout the

examined districts, with disputes over inheritance appearing particularly numerous.

As with state dispute resolution institutions, respect for state security institutions was, in the

abstract, fairly robust. Indeed, many interviewees expressed support for the Afghan National

Army, Afghan National Police, and other security services. However, under present

conditions, and particularly in peri-urban areas, interviewees also seemed to doubt the

ability of these institutions to function in an effective and impartial manner. In rural areas,

police capacity seemed better-respected, but clearly depends on community cooperation,

with the police otherwise having little ability to operate independently.

156

In all areas, women face dramatically higher barriers to accessing security and justice

institutions than do men. Although women in Kabul areas appeared to enjoy greater

freedom of movement, and hence institutional access, than did women in Nangarhar,

nowhere can women’s access be considered equal. Even in more permissive areas, families

often restrict young women to the home after puberty, and women almost always need to

rely on an intermediary in order to access justice and security institutions. Male relatives

probably most often fulfil this role, but a number of women’s institutions, in particular

women’s shuras, also exist in the target areas. These institutions appear effective in certain

circumstances, but many women do not have access to them, and their effectiveness very

much depends on the goodwill of male power holders.

There have been limited prior related interventions in these areas. Exceptions include

dispute resolution awareness-raising/training by Checchi Consulting in Nangarhar, and the

facilitation of women’s shuras by AWRC and Equality for Peace and Democracy in Kabul

province.

With these conclusions in mind, TLO thus offers the following Recommendations:

For Implementing Organizations:

As a general proposition, security and justice programming appears possible in all target

areas. All areas are accessible to both national and international personnel (although,

especially in Bagrami, local intermediaries should be consulted before travel to the area).

Further, there does not appear to be any population segment which would, in the abstract,

oppose such programming, although implementers should expect substantial variation in

community acceptance depending upon the precise content of programming.

For this reason, international organizations should work to identify local partner

organizations with long experience in the target areas and close relations to community

leaders. Although no substitute for community consultation, working with local partner

organizations can serve as a valuable bridge to identify local stakeholders and then

implement in a way sensitive to ground realities. Working with local partners also holds the

potential to enhance program or project sustainability, as these partners are probably more

likely to maintain on-the-ground presence than are non-Afghan organizations.

Several interviewees also expressed a desire for the provision of legal training/awareness-

raising. In TLO’s experience, community acceptance of this sort of programming is also

relatively painless. With that said, any implementer should only proceed after systematic

community consultation.

For the Afghan Government

Continued engagement with local leaders outside of the government is key. Research for this

study strongly indicates that local government is most effective when it partners with local

community leaders, for example to enable increased police patrolling. By contrast, no local

government examined here appears to have the ability to impose its will unilaterally, and

only a limited ability to carry out basic governance functions without more or less explicit

community acquiescence.

With that said, all community governance structures examined here also appear capable of

157

abuse and corruption, albeit some more than others. However, given the limitations on the

power and authority of local government detailed throughout this report, simply attempting

to go around local leaders outside of government does not seem a realistic possibility.

Rather, the amelioration of abusive and corrupt practices will need to take place via dialogue

and voluntary action.

For International Organizations and Foreign Governments

Evidence developed here, although limited, indicates that the presence of foreign military

forces has probably harmed the reputation of international and foreign entities more

generally. This is especially so as international military forces seem to operate with sub-

optimal unity of command, and often at cross-purposes. International or foreign intervention

at the sub-provincial level thus appears very problematic, and should be avoided. If for any

reason deemed essential, this intervention should take place in as low-profile a manner as

possible, and, as with interventions more generally, only after having identified a reliable

local intermediary, such as, but not limited to, a local non-governmental organization.

For All Stakeholders

Within each district, any intervention should be balanced by tribe/ethnicity and geographic

area of intervention. This is so both because community rivalries at the sub-district level are

common, and programming in one area, but not the other, might exacerbate them; and

because some areas have received a notable dearth of prior donor intervention.

Finally, power holder interference in programming is possible. Deliberately trying to exclude

power holders would be fruitless, and possibly counter-productive. Rather, it is here where

identifying trusted intermediaries with target communities becomes crucial, so that dialogue

between implementers and communities occurs on a regular basis, and, if interference in

programming should occur, disruption can be minimized through proactive engagement.

158

Appendix I: Interviews for This Report

Nangarhar Schedule of Interviews

Province Nangarhar

District Behsud Kama

Focus Groups

Community Leaders 3 3

Women’s Leaders 2 2

Total FGD district 5 5

Individual Interviews Government Officials

District Governor 1 1

Judge 1 1

Chief of Police 1 1

Huqooq 1 1

Total 4 4

Total Province 8

Individual Interviews Community Leaders

Background 3 3

Security Assessment 3 3

Feelings of Security 3 3

Main conflict Lines and Dispute

Resolution

3 3

Development Actors and Past

interventions

3 3

Tribal Shuras 4 4

Total District 19 19

Total Province 38

Individual Interviews Development actors

Development Actors and Past

interventions

3 3


Total 6 6

Total Province 12

Individual Interviews Women’s Leaders


Main Conflict Lines and Dispute

Resolution

3 3

Total District 6 6

Total Province 12

Total FGD Province 10

Total ind. int. district 35 35

Total Ind. int. Province 70

159

Kabul Schedule of Interviews

Province Kabul

District Bagrami Istalif

Focus Groups

Community Leaders 2 2

Women’s Leaders 2 2

Total FGD district 4 4


Individual Interviews Government Officials

District Governor 1 1

Judge 1 1

Chief of Police 1 1

Huqooq 1 1

Total District 4 4

Total Province 12

Individual Interviews Community Leaders

Background 0 0



Main conflict Lines and Dispute Resolution

3 3

Development Actors and Past interventions

3 3

Tribal Shuras 4 4

Total District 16 16

Total Province 32

Individual Interviews Development actors

Development Actors and Past interventions

3 3


Total 6 6

Total Province 12

Individual Interviews Women’s Leaders


Main Conflict Lines and Dispute Resolution

3 3

Total District 6 6

Total Province 12

Additional interviews for Kabul Background

District Background 21 21

Focus groups 4 4

Total Ind. Int. District 21 21

Total Ind. Int. Province 42

Conflict Surveys

Village level dispute survey 1 1

Major Conflict Survey 1 1

Total district 2 2

Total Province 4

160

Total FGD District 8 8


Total ind. Int. district 60 60

Total ind. Int. Province 120

Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar

Documents

Transcript of Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar