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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Social Networks

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ower and the perception of social networks�

rent Simpson ∗, Barry Markovsky, Mike Steketeeniversity of South Carolina, United States

r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

eywords:ccuracyognitive social networksetwork perceptionerceptionowerrimingocial cognition

Previous work has led to divergent conclusions about how power affects the accuracy of network per-ceptions in groups and organizations. This paper develops and tests an argument linking higher power toless accurate network perception. Results from the first experiment showed that, relative to participantsprimed with high power, those primed with low power had more accurate perceptions of who was tiedto whom in novel networks. The second experiment demonstrated that such differences in perceptualaccuracy do not emerge for non-social relations.

© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The literature on cognitive social networks addresses the accu-acy of people’s perceptions of network ties within groups andrganizations (Bondonio, 1998; Casciaro et al., 1999; Freemant al., 1987; Johnson and Orbach, 2002). One question to whichesearchers have devoted increasing attention is how powernfluences the accuracy of perceptions of who is tied to whomCasciaro, 1998; Krackhardt, 1990). This question is importantecause, as Krackhardt (1990) has argued, accurate network per-eption is an important basis for power. Solving the puzzle of howower impacts network perceptions is therefore important for theollowing reason: if more powerful actors have more accurate per-eptions, this would provide a means through which extant powernequalities are maintained or amplified. On the other hand, if lessowerful actors have more accurate perceptions, it would pro-ide one mechanism through which social psychological processeseign-in structurally determined power processes (Simpson et al.,orthcoming).

Previous work has yielded somewhat contradictory conclu-ions about the impact of power on perception of networks:

Please cite this article in press as: Simpson, B., et al., Powerdoi:10.1016/j.socnet.2010.10.007

ome research has found a negative relationship between powernd perception of network ties (Casciaro, 1998; Simpson andorch, 2005), while other studies find no significant relationshipKrackhardt, 1990). These prior studies of power and network per-eption operated through disparate conceptual frameworks and,

� This research was supported by grant SES-0551895 from the National Scienceoundation to the first two authors.∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina,olumbia, SC 29208, United States.

E-mail address: bts@sc.edu (B. Simpson).

378-8733/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.oi:10.1016/j.socnet.2010.10.007

with the exception of Simpson and Borch (2005), investigated nat-urally occurring networks in formal organizations. The problem,as noted by classical theorists (Weber [1918] 1968) and repeat-edly echoed in more recent work (Bacharach and Lawler, 1976;Lovaglia, 1997; Thye, 2000) is that power has many correlates suchas status and wealth. As explained below, such factors may con-found the study of power and perception in natural settings. Wemay therefore observe empirical links between power and percep-tion in organizations that are due to power’s direct effects, or toindirect effects, or both. Our research utilized experiments that, bycontrolling or ruling out such correlates, help to generate a clearerunderstanding of the relations between power and network per-ception.

1. Theoretical arguments

Our arguments are centered on certain key terms, defined as fol-lows. Power is the potential to obtain favorable outcomes in socialrelations, as a result of asymmetric dependence or control of valuedresources (Emerson, 1972; Molm, 1990; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959;Willer et al., 1997). Accuracy in network perception is “the degreeof similarity between an individual’s perception of the structure of. . . relationships in a given social context and the actual structureof those relationships” (Casciaro et al., 1999:286). In our researchthe “actual structure” is created experimentally, sidestepping theinformant accuracy problem that can occur in natural contexts (see

and the perception of social networks. Soc. Netw. (2011),

Bondonio, 1998; Freeman et al., 1987).Our theoretical argument explains how low-power actors can

have more accurate network perceptions than high-power actors.The argument begins with insights from the social cognition lit-erature explaining how power affects social cognition (Fiske and

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aylor, 2008).1 A number of studies show that experiencing lowower leads to more controlled cognition, whereas the experiencef high-power leads to more automatic (heuristic-based) socialognition (e.g., Fiske, 1993a,b; Fiske and Taylor, 2008; Keltner et al.,003). Furthermore, power-induced social cognitions occur spon-aneously (see Keltner et al., 2003 for a review). As a result, thoseow in power engage in more systematic cognition even when thedditional cognitive resources cannot increase their power.2 One ofur key goals is to assess whether low power actors have more accu-ate network perceptions, even in contexts where more accurateerceptions cannot benefit them.

We extend prior work on power and perception to address howower differences and the resultant cognitions affect perceptionsf relationships and social structures. We expect that those whongage in more controlled social cognition will have more accu-ate perceptions of social ties between others. Those who engagen more automatic social cognition, in contrast, can be expected toely more on heuristics such as a balance schema (e.g., Press et al.,969).

Prior research has demonstrated that heuristics play an impor-ant role in the perceptions of social networks (DeSoto, 1960; Presst al., 1969). For instance, Freeman (1992) noted that people tend toerceive the presence or absence of social ties according to clearlyelineated groups, even though actual human social interaction isarely organized so neatly. That is, we “fill in the blanks” by per-eiving transitivity in intransitive relations. These heuristics havedvantages such as decreasing the amount of cognitive resourcesevoted to perceiving social relations. They come with a cost, how-ver: relative to more effortful social cognition, they can result iness accurate network perceptions.

Based on the forgoing argument, if those low in power engagen more systematic social cognition whereas those higher in powerely on heuristics, then we may hypothesize that low-power actorsill have more accurate perceptions of network ties than high-ower actors.3 This hypothesis runs counter to prior work that sug-ested a positive relationship between power and perception (seeimpson and Borch, 2005 for a review). For instance, Krackhardt1990:345) argued that more powerful members of organizationsave more opportunity to observe a larger share of organizationaletworks, and so have more accurate perceptions. It is reasonableo assume that greater availability of information of networks willead to greater perceptual accuracy, however this assertion may

Please cite this article in press as: Simpson, B., et al., Powerdoi:10.1016/j.socnet.2010.10.007

onfound power with opportunity for perceptual accuracy. In thexperimental tests outlined below, we thus hold constant the infor-ation available to high-power vs. low-power actors.

1 Automatic social cognition occurs rapidly. It employs routine mental shortcutsr heuristics and therefore requires fewer cognitive demands (Keltner et al., 2003).ontrolled social cognition, on the other hand, entails a more comprehensive assess-ent and analysis of stimuli (Chen et al., 1999). Controlled social cognition is more

ffortful and deliberate, and relies less on simple heuristics to form impressions andake judgments (Keltner et al., 2003).2 As an example, after priming participants with high- or low-power, Galinsky

t al. (2006) asked them to draw an “E” on their foreheads. Participants primed withow-power cognitions were more likely than those primed with high-power to drawn “E” so that it could be read by other people. Importantly, participants primed withow-power could not benefit from spontaneously taking others’ perspectives. Theirow-power cognitions simply generated systematic social cognitions that accountedor others’ perspectives.

3 Although we do not investigate mediators here, prior research suggests thathe impact of power on systematic vs. heuristic social cognition may be mediatedy affect. Briefly, experiencing low and high power leads, respectively, to negativend positive affect (Anderson et al., 2001; Molm, 1991; Willer et al., 1997). Also,s noted by Hertel (1999:232; see also Schwartz and Clore, 1996) “negative feelingtates prompt more detail oriented, systemic processing in order to cope with theroblematic situation. Positive mood, however, signals that no problem solving iseeded, so that individuals may rely on simple heuristics and save cognitive capacityntil it is needed.”

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1.1. Evidence from prior research

Consistent with our hypothesis, Simpson and Borch (2005)found that occupants of low-power positions in “exchange net-works” had more accurate perceptions of network ties thanhigh-power actors. While suggestive, the applicability of thoseresults to our hypothesis is limited for several reasons. First,although the number of ties to a network position (degree centrality)does not by itself determine power (e.g., Bonacich, 1987; Cook et al.,1983; Freeman, 1979), it was partially confounded with power inthe Simpson–Borch experiment: high-power actors tended to havemore ties than low-power actors. Thus, a kind of “information over-load” is an alternative explanation for high-power positions’ lessaccurate perceptions of network relations. They would have neededto gather, organize, and analyze more information about bargainingevents than the less central low-power actors (Shaw, 1978).

In addition, the Simpson–Borch study only addressed the impactof one source of power (structural) in one type of network (resourceexchange). Perhaps most importantly, the experiment did not allowa test of the argument outlined above that low-power actors havemore accurate perceptions even when those perceptions can haveno impact on power inequalities. Below we outline a new experi-ment designed to overcome these limitations and show that thetheorized effects of power on perception generalize beyond thepreliminary results just presented. These limitations motivate thefirst experiment outlined below.

1.2. Priming power

Both studies introduced in the sections to follow build on thegrowing literature on priming: the activation of particular cogni-tions or knowledge structures in a given situation (Bargh et al.,1996). Primes may be either subliminal, i.e., occurring outside of theparticipant’s conscious awareness, or supraliminal (e.g., Galinskyet al., 2003). Although participants are aware of supraliminalprimes, they are generally unaware of their effects on subsequentbehaviors (Fiske and Taylor, 2008:28ff).

Below we describe a commonly used method of priming power.For the high-power prime, subjects are asked to recall and writeabout an event in which they had power over another person orpersons. The power positions are reversed for the low-power prime.This procedure has generated a number of important insights(see reviews by Gruenfeld et al., 2003, and Keltner et al., 2003).For example, participants primed with high (vs. low) power takemore risks (Anderson and Galinsky, 2006), are more likely to treatinteraction partners as means to ends (Gruenfeld et al., 2008),and are less likely to spontaneously take the other’s perspective(Galinsky et al., 2006). More generally, the effects of priming arenot unlike those resulting from structural manipulations of power(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003).

2. Experiment 1

We conducted two experiments at a large public university withstudents from Introductory Sociology courses. Those who agreedto participate did so during regular class periods. Experiment 1addressed the effects of power on perceptions of social relations.Experiment 2, to be reported in the next section, was designed torule out an alternative explanation of the results of Experiment 1,and addressed the impact of power on perceptions of non-social

and the perception of social networks. Soc. Netw. (2011),

relations.Data for Experiment 1 were gathered in two classroom ses-

sions. After all subjects in a given session had read and completeda consent form, a research assistant distributed a packet of mate-rials containing condition-specific information and the dependent

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High power priming Low-power priming p (2-tailed)

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easure. Another research assistant projected the instructions onlarge screen and read them aloud. The instructions explained that

he research deals with various aspects of social relationships andhat subjects would begin by writing an essay based on a personalvent. They were then directed to the first page of their informationacket for instructions.

As noted above, the power manipulation has become the stan-ard method of priming high- vs. low-power cognitions (e.g.,nderson and Galinsky, 2006; Smith and Bargh, 2008; Weick anduinote, 2008). Following Galinsky et al. (2003), instructions forubjects in the high-power priming condition stated:

Please recall a particular incident in which you had power overanother individual or individuals. By power, we mean a situationin which you controlled the ability of another person or personsto get something they wanted, or were in a position to evalu-ate those individuals. Using the space provided below, pleasedescribe this situation in which you had power what happened,how you felt, etc.

Participants in the low-power condition were asked to writebout a situation in which someone had power over them. Subjectsad 10 min to think about an event and to describe on the provided

orm how it made them feel. They were encouraged to continueriting about the event until the research assistant asked them to

top.Following the priming manipulation, subjects completed a net-

ork perception task developed by Janicik and Larrick (2005). Therocedure builds on the classic studies of network accuracy. Itresents subjects with a novel network, then measures the accu-acy of their perceptions of the network and the types of errorshey make while learning it (see, e.g., DeSoto, 1960; DeSoto anduethe, 1959; Flynn et al., 2006; Freeman, 1992). Specifically, sub-

ects were given a description of influence relations among a groupf five scientists in a fictitious biotech company called “MedPro.”he instructions explained that the subject’s task was to learn whonfluences whom among the scientists at MedPro. Because influ-nce networks are directed graphs (e.g., Mike can influence Bobithout Bob influencing Mike), there are 20 possible influence rela-

ions in a five-person network. Of these, six actually existed inhe MedPro network. Fig. 1a shows the text given to participantsegarding the influence relations, however participants were nothown the schematic diagram that appears in Fig. 1b.

Subjects had 1 min to consider the list of ostensive “actual”nfluence relations at MedPro. They were instructed to not writenything during this period. When the minute elapsed, the researchssistant removed the MedPro influence structure from the screennd, following Janicik and Larrick (2005), each subject was directedo a response form in his or her experiment packet. The responseorm contained ten yes/no questions about the influence struc-ure in MedPro (e.g., “Does Bob influence Doug?”). Three of theseuestions measured the accuracy of subjects’ perceptions of exist-

ng ties and the remaining seven measured subjects’ perceptions ofbsent ties. Thus, given that there were 6 existing ties and 14 non-xisting ties, we have accuracy scores for half of each type. Theorrespondence between a participant’s perceived structure andhe actual structure is our dependent measure. Following comple-ion of the network perception questionnaire, research assistantsollected materials and explained the purpose of the study. Thentire procedure took approximately 15 min.

.1. Results

Please cite this article in press as: Simpson, B., et al., Powerdoi:10.1016/j.socnet.2010.10.007

A total of 97 students participated in Experiment 1. Table 1resents the results for subjects in the two conditions. Our hypoth-sis predicted that subjects primed with low power would reportore accurately on network ties in the MedPro organization. The

Absent + present ties 76% 84% ≤.05Absent ties only 70% 83% ≤.01Present ties only 88% 86% n.s.

first row of the table shows that low-power priming resulted insignificantly more accurate perceptions of the MedPro networkthan did high-power priming, 84% vs. 76% (t(95) = 1.99, p ≤ .05). Thissupports the hypothesis.

Breaking down the results into “true positives” (accurate recallof existing ties) and “true negatives” (accurate recall of absent ties)yields greater insight into the perceptual acuity of those primedwith low versus high power. We conducted a repeated measuresANOVA with tie-type (present vs. absent) and power as predictorvariables. The overall F tests showed a significant effect of tie-type[F(1, 95) = 13.60, p < .001], qualified by a tie-type × power inter-action [F(1, 95) = 7.50, p = .007]. As shown in the last two rowsof Table 1, while power did not affect the accuracy of percep-tions of existing ties (t(95) = .51, p = .62), those primed with lowpower had significantly more accurate perceptions of absent ties(t(95) = 2.51, p ≤ .01). Viewed differently, although low-power actorshad relatively accurate perceptions of both present and absentties (t(51) = .95, p = .35), participants in the high-power conditionseemed to focus their attention on ties that were present, asindicated by their greater accuracy scores for present vs. absentrelations (t(44) = 3.55, p < .001).

The kinds of misperceptions made by high-power actors shedadditional light on these results. Specifically, those primed withhigh power seemed to assume that the most influential scientistin MedPro (Ken) was universally influential, and that the mostinfluenced scientists in MedPro (Mike and Bob) were universallyinfluenced. Further analyses showed that those primed with highpower were more likely than those primed with low power to stateerroneously that non-existent ties originating at Ken, or ending atMike or Bob, actually existed (t(95) = 2.41, p ≤ .05). This suggestsa form of schematic processing of network information: thoseprimed with high power tended to “fill in the blanks” (Freeman,1992), inferring non-existent network ties in a way consistent witha fully-stratified power system.

2.2. Discussion

Experiment 1 supported our central hypothesis predicting thatrespondents primed with low power would have more accurateperceptions of social ties. While low-power actors had relativelyaccurate perceptions of existing and non-existing ties, high-poweractors systematically misperceived certain types of non-existingties. These results support our argument linking low power to moreaccurate network perceptions, but permit an alternative expla-nation: the experience of low power may have led to an overallimprovement in performance on cognitive tasks. For instance, thepriming procedure may have threatened the self-efficacy of low-power subjects, leading them to respond by putting additionaleffort into the task. According to this alternative explanation, thecontent of the task for the dependent measure was irrelevant: thoseprimed with low power would have performed better at any task.However, following Janicik and Larrick (2005) we suggest that theperception of social relations is domain specific, such that the more

and the perception of social networks. Soc. Netw. (2011),

accurate perceptions of low-power actors should be limited to theperception of social relations. If so, we would not expect to observedifferences between those primed with high and low power ina non-social network domain. We tested this idea in our secondstudy.

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rick, 2005). Node size corresponds with number of influence relations.

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High power priming Low power priming p (2-tailed)

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. Experiment 2

Following Janicik and Larrick (2005), we used traffic networkatterns to operationalize non-social relations. We administeredhe priming procedure from Experiment 1, then displayed a traf-c pattern isomorphic to the MedPro network used in the priortudy. Data were gathered in two classroom sessions. With fewxceptions, procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1.ather than describing the study as involving “social relationships,”owever, it was described as an investigation of how people formental maps of city streets and learn to navigate using direct

outes.Subjects received a list of six one-way streets, each of which

onnected two of six landmarks, e.g., a Pharmacy and a Highchool. We used one-way streets for ease of comparison withhe directed graph of influence relations from Experiment 1 (seeig. 1). Again, subjects were presented only with a text descrip-ion of the tie patterns and not an image of the network. All otherrocedures were identical, and our perception measures includednly those relations that were isomorphic to the ones includedn Experiment 1. As above, the correspondence between percep-ion of the network and the actual structure of that network is ourependent measure.

.1. Results

A total of 100 students participated. Table 2 shows the per-eptual accuracy of subjects primed with high versus low power.n contrast to the results in Experiment 1, there was no effect ofower on perceptions of non-social ties. Those primed with lowower had similar levels of perceptual acuity to those primed withigh power 80% vs. 77%, respectively (t(98) = .816, p = .42). Nor dide observe significant differences between those primed with low

ersus high power when we separately considered those ties thatid exist (“true positives” = 89% and 83% for low and high power,

Please cite this article in press as: Simpson, B., et al., Powerdoi:10.1016/j.socnet.2010.10.007

espectively, p = .63), or those that did not (“true negatives” = 77%nd 74% for low and high power, p = .22).4

4 We also conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with Study (1 vs. 2), tie-typepresent vs. absent) and power as predictors of accuracy. Most relevant for cur-ent purposes, a marginally significant interaction between tie-type and power [F(1,93) = 2.67, p = .10] was qualified by a significant three-way interaction betweentudy, tie-type and power [F(1, 193) = 5.51, p = .02]. Given that results are based onnalyses of two different experiments, they should be interpreted cautiously. Still,he three-way interaction provides additional evidence that the greater perceptualcuity of those lower in power (for absent ties) holds for social ties (Study 1), butot for non-social ties (Study 2).

Absent + present ties 77% 80% n.s.Absent ties only 74% 77% n.s.Present ties only 83% 89% n.s.

3.2. Discussion

We have addressed a longstanding issue in the social sciences:how does a person’s power affect the accuracy of her percep-tions of the social ties that exist between group members? Priorresearch (Simpson and Borch, 2005) and Experiment 1 both sug-gest that those low in power have more accurate perceptions ofsocial ties, and this effect appears across different contexts andmeasures. Results supported the argument linking low power tomore accurate network perceptions, whether the experience ofpower stemmed from occupation of disadvantaged positions ina social network or via a standard method of priming low (vs.high) power, and whether the relations being perceived wereties among members of a network in which the perceiver wasinvolved and from which he or she could materially benefit orin a network of influence relations in which the perceiver wasa third-party observer and could not benefit from more accurateperceptions.

Evidence from organizations research is also consistent with ourfindings. Casciaro (1998) assessed the impact of formal positions ina university research center hierarchy on perceptions of friendshipand advice networks in the research center. Although she expectedto find a positive relationship between power (position in the hier-archy) and perceptions of advice networks, she found that thoselower in power had more accurate perceptions of both friendshipand advice networks. In short, the finding that those low in powerhave more accurate network perceptions appears to be relativelyrobust across a range of different types of networks and bases ofpower. In line with our expectations, however, the results of Exper-iment 2 suggest that power does not lead to a general increase inperceptual acuity, as power did not affect the perception of non-social ties.

4. Discussion and conclusions

Previous work in sociology and organizational studies has led

and the perception of social networks. Soc. Netw. (2011),

to divergent explanations for whether and how power affects theaccuracy of perceptions of social relationships. Our research soughtto produce a better understanding of the impact of power on per-ceptions of social ties. The gist of our argument linking low powerto more accurate perceptions is that, compared to their high-power

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ounterparts, low-power actors will engage in more systematicetwork searches. As a result, we expected a negative relationshipetween power and perception.

The results of Experiment 1 strongly supported the hypoth-sized negative relationship. Subjects primed with low-powerognitions had more accurate perceptions of ties in a novel networkhan those primed with high-power cognitions. Furthermore, theerceptions of high- versus low-power subjects differed for verypecific types of ties: compared to their low-power counterparts,hose primed with high power tended to assume that highly influ-ntial members of the network were universally influential andhat highly influenced members were universally influenced. As aesult, they tended to overestimate the existence of ties connectinghese actors to others in the network. Thus, high-power cognitionseemed to prime participants to engage in a heuristic form of net-ork perception, whereas those primed with low power engaged

n more systematic searches. Importantly, however, results fromxperiment 2 showed that power priming did not affect the per-eptions of non-social relations.

These findings raise a number of additional questions abouthe relationship between power and perception. For instance, doow-power actors’ more accurate perceptions of networks actu-lly benefit them? A number of scholars (Krackhardt, 1990; Pfeffer,981) have answered this question affirmatively. But, in a relatedaper (Simpson et al., forthcoming), we argue and present exper-

mental evidence that having accurate network knowledge canreate a “social trap” (Komorita and Parks, 1996; Platt, 1973) forow-power actors, wherein short-term individual gains generateong-term collective losses.

The current research should also be extended to include a moreystematic investigation of the types of heuristics that high-powerctors invoke and their consequences for perceiving social net-orks. This is important because the beliefs of those at the top ofower and prestige orders are more likely to influence the behaviorf others than the beliefs of those with lower status (Berger et al.,977; Weber [1918] 1968). Thus, it is conceivable that the percep-ions of those higher in power, whether or not these perceptionsre accurate, are reified by other group members.

Furthermore, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer, futureesearch should investigate whether the effects of power on net-ork perception are mediated by culture. A. Fiske (1993) suggested

hat, while the types of cognitive schema people use to organize anderceive social relationships are relatively similar across cultures,here is appreciable cultural variation in the extent to which a givenituation leads to the use of one schema vs. another. Because mostf the participants in the studies reported above are from an indi-idualist culture, it may be useful to replicate these studies usingarticipants in collectivist cultures.

Finally, some research suggests that those high in power engagen more systematic cognitions if they feel their power is threatenede.g., Keltner et al., 2003). If so, we might expect that, during uncer-ain times such as following threats of collective action by those lown power or during organizational shake-ups high-power actors’etwork perceptions may more closely resemble those of their low-ower counterparts. Additionally, as noted earlier, some researche.g., Burawoy, 1979) suggests that high-power actors may orga-ize interaction in order to mask the relations that exist amongetwork occupants. Studying the tactics that actors use to influ-nce others’ network perceptions should yield further insights intohe relationships between power and perception in more nuancedeal-world organizations.

Please cite this article in press as: Simpson, B., et al., Powerdoi:10.1016/j.socnet.2010.10.007

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