PostmodernAristotles:Arendt,Strauss,MacIntyre,and

theRecoveryofPoliticalPhilosophy

NathanPinkoski

DPhilPolitics:PoliticalTheory

StEdmundHall

UniversityofOxford

Trinity2017

WordCount:99,772

iii

Abstract

PostmodernAristotles:Arendt,Strauss,andMacIntyre,andtheRecoveryofPoliticalPhilosophy

NathanPinkoskiStEdmundHall

ThesisSubmittedforDPhilinPolitics:PoliticalTheoryTrinity2017

Whatispoliticalphilosophy?Aristotlepursuesthatquestionbyaskingwhatthegoodis.IfNietzsche’spostmoderndiagnosisthatmodernphilosophicalrationalismhasexhausteditselfistrue,itisunclearifananswertothatquestionispossible.Yetgiventheprevalenceofextremistideologiesin20thcenturypolitics,andthepoliticallyirresponsiblesupportofphilosophersfortheseideologies,thereisanurgentneedforananswer.Thisthesisexamineshow,inthesephilosophicalcircumstances,HannahArendt,LeoStrauss,andAlasdairMacIntyreconcludethatakeyresourceintherecoveryofpoliticalphilosophy,andinshowingitscontemporaryrelevance,liesintherecoveryofAristotle’spoliticalphilosophy.

ThisthesiscontendsthathowandwhyArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyreturntoAristotle,andwhattheyfindinAristotle,dependsontheirvaryingcritiquesofmodernity.Convincedthatthephilosophicaltraditionisshatteredirreversiblyaftertheeventsoftotalitarianism,ArendtarguesforaretrievalofAristotleandhisunderstandingofpoliticsfromthefragmentsofthattradition.StraussisimpelledtoturntothepoliticalphilosophyofAristotlebecauseofthecrisisofradicalhistoricism,torecoverclassicalrationalism’sanswertowhatthegoodis.MacIntyreturnstoAristotletofindthemoraljustificationforrejectingStalinismthatcontemporaryphilosophicaltraditionsfailtoprovide;hereconstructsanAristoteliantraditionthatcananswerthequestionofwhatthegoodisbetterthanhiscontemporaryrivals.

Althoughthesethinkersmayappeardisparate,thisthesisarguesthat

eachaddressesthequestionofwhatthegoodisbyofferingavisionofpoliticalphilosophyasawayoflife,whichAristotlehelpsform.Thiswayoflifeprobestherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandpoliticsaspermanentproblemforhumanexistence.InrecoveringthistraditionofthinkingwithAristotleaboutthecharacterofpoliticalphilosophy,thisthesisaimstocontributetotheunderstandingofeachofthesethinkers,aswellastothepracticeofpoliticalphilosophyinmodern,post-Nietzscheantimes.

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TableofContents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................................................3

LISTOFABBREVIATIONS..............................................................................................................6

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................8

I.HANNAHARENDT’SDIALOGUEWITHARISTOTLE........................................................27

II.LEOSTRAUSS’SARISTOTLEANDTHERETURNTOCLASSICALPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY................................................................................................................................123

III.ALASDAIRMACINTYRE’SRECONSTRUCTIONOFAREVOLUTIONARYARISTOTELIANTRADITION....................................................................................................231

CONCLUSION:POSTMODERNARISTOTELIANISM...........................................................339

BIBLIOGRAPHY...........................................................................................................................373

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AcknowledgementsMygratitudemustgofirsttomysupervisorMarkPhilp,whokeptmeonashisstudentwhilstbearingthewhipsandscornsoftime.IalsowishtothankDominicBurbidge,NadiaHilliard,GeoffreySigalet,MollyGurdon,andTerenceMarshallforreadingandcommentingonsectionsofthethesis.CreditforthethesistitlemustgotoAlexanderDuff.IthanktheresidentsofGrandpontHousefortheirvisibleandinvisiblesupportthroughoutthestagesofwriting.IamgratefultotheDepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,theEdmontonWinstonChurchillSociety,theUniversityofAlbertaFacultyofArts,andtheRothermereAmericanInstitute,forprovidingfinancialsupportthroughoutmydoctoralstudies.Thisthesisisdedicatedtomyparents,withoutwhoseloveandsupportnoneofthiswouldhavebeenpossible.

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ListofAbbreviations

FriedrichNietzscheBGE BeyondGoodandEvilGS TheGayScienceTSZ ThusSpakeZarathustraUDHL OntheUsesandDisadvantagesofHistoryforLifeAristotleEN NicomacheanEthicsThomasAquinasST SummaTheologiaeHannahArendtBPF BetweenPastandFutureEIU EssaysinUnderstanding:1930-1954EJ EichmanninJerusalemHA ‘OnHannahArendt’HC TheHumanConditionLOM TheLifeofMind,VolI.ThinkingLSA LoveandSaintAugustineMDT MeninDarkTimesOrigins TheOriginsofTotalitarianismPP ThePromiseofPoliticsRev OnRevolutionRJ ResponsibilityandJudgmentLeoStraussCG Churchill’sGreatnessCM TheCityandManFPP FaithandPoliticalPhilosophyJPCM JewishPhilosophyandtheCrisisofModernity LAM LiberalismAncientandModernNRH NaturalRightandHistoryOT OnTyrannyPAW PersecutionandtheArtofWritingRCPR TheRebirthofClassicalPoliticalRationalismSCR Spinoza’sCritiqueofReligionSPPP StudiesinPlatonicPoliticalPhilosophy

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TM ThoughtsonMachiavelliTWM ‘TheThreeWavesofModernity’WIPP WhatisPoliticalPhilosophy?AndOtherStudiesAlasdairMacIntyreASA AgainsttheSelf-ImagesoftheAge:EssaysonIdeologyandPhilosophyAMEM AlasdairMacIntyre’sEngagementwithMarxismAV AfterVirtueCNS ‘EpistemologicalCrises,DramaticNarrativeandthePhilosophyofScience’ECM EthicsintheConflictsofModernityEP EthicsandPolitics.SelectedEssays,Vol.IINMW NotesfromtheMoralWildernessTP TheTasksofPhilosophy.SelectedEssays,Vol.ITRV ThreeRivalVersionsofMoralEnquiryWJWR WhoseJustice?WhichRationality?

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Introduction

Ἀλλὰζητηέοντίναχώρανὁφιλοσοφῶνἐντῇπόλεικαθέξει;Butonemustseekthis:whatplacewillthephilosopherhaveinthecity?1

Onréfléchitassezrarementsurcequ’estenelle-mêmelaphilosophie.2

HannahArendt,LeoStrauss, andAlasdairMacIntyreallbroadlyagreewith

Friedrich Nietzsche’s proclamation that modern philosophy, premised on a

problematic conception of rationalism, has exhausted itself. They all share the

conviction that modern philosophy has buried and obscured the insights of pre-

modern philosophy. They argue that those insights, including the insights of

Aristotle, can overcome modern philosophical exhaustion. From pre-modern

philosophy,theyaimtoreconceivethecharacterofWesternphilosophicaltradition

asawhole,discoveringwhatphilosophyis.

I call these thinkers ‘Postmodern Aristotles’ for two reasons.3First, I am

arguing that all three accordAristotle a role in overcomingmodernphilosophical

exhaustion. Their understanding of Aristotle is a central factor in their thought.

Thesethinkersareinterestedinthecharacterofphilosophy,investigatetherootsof

philosophical activity in pre-modern philosophy, and pass their investigation

throughAristotle.Otherstudies focusonhowthesethinkersaimtodiscoverwhat

philosophy is from the reading of other figures of the canon—such as Plato. This

studyexaminestheunderstandingArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyregainfrompassing1Simplicius(1996),XXXII,64.2Hadot(1995),1.3ThestructureofthisdissertationisdeeplyindebtedtoZuckert(1996).WhereasZuckertinvestigateswhyNietzsche,Heidegger,Gadamer,Strauss,andDerridaturntoPlato,IexaminewhyArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyreturntoAristotle.

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their investigation through Aristotle. Above all, this is an understanding of what

politicalphilosophyis.

Second, I call these thinkers ‘Postmodern Aristotles’ because they look to

Aristotle’spoliticalphilosophyfroma‘postmodern’position.Although‘postmodern’

is a termwithmultiplemeanings, I am taking ‘postmodern’ in its literalmeaning,

‘after the modern.’4Arendt, Strauss, and MacIntyre are all ‘postmodern’ because

they are convinced that modern rationalism has exhausted its promises and

possibilities. 5 As postmodern critics of modernity, they seek to make a new

beginning beyond modernity and to discover something better. As postmodern

Aristotles, they turn toAristotle for anunderstandingof howpolitical philosophy

canmakeanewbeginning.

Since their projects claim that vital insights of Aristotle have been lost to

modernity, these thinkers read Aristotle against the spirit of modernity. This

involvesanun-traditionalandinsomerespectsanti-traditionalreadingofAristotle.

ButasanexerciseinreadingAristotle,twopossiblereadingsarenotatworkhere.

First, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Alasdair MacIntyre are not engaged in a

contextual study of Aristotle, where one is trying to reconstruct the historical

motivationsand intentions forAristotlewritingashedid, topursue thehistorical

contextunderlyingAristotle.6ThesethinkersallagreethatlaterreadersofAristotle

interpretandappropriatehisworkinadifferentcontext.Thecontextofthemodern

4Foradiscussionofthisandothermeaningsofpostmodern,seeZuckert(1996),279.Additionally,mymeaningof‘postmodern’opposesthosewhodefinepostmodernismastheabsenceofgrandnarratives(Lyotard,1979).ForArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyre,being‘afterthemodern’doesnotentailabandoninggrandnarrativesbutreconceivingtheirpurpose.5Zuckert(1996),1.6E.g.Jaeger(1948).

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philosophical crisis presents a certain opportunity to read Aristotle in a different

way,whichtheyintendtoactupon.Noraretheirreadingsprimarilyanexercisein

theanalyticalextractionofcertainphilosophicalpropositionsfromAristotle,where

a thinker interested in a contemporary philosophical debatemight develop these

propositionstoaddressthatdebate.7

Instead, these thinkers read Aristotle to reconceive the meaning, purpose

andpracticeofpoliticalphilosophy.HowtheyinterpretAristotledependsheavilyon

what they criticize in modernity, what new beginning beyond modernity they

believeispossible,andwhatkindofrecoveryofpre-modernityispossible.

In that respect, their reading of Aristotle is a key component of their

thought.8Arendt, Strauss, and MacIntyre are trying to understand the activity of

philosophyinadifferentway,andtheythinkthattosituateproperlytheactivityof

philosophy, they must understand the activity of political philosophy. For them,

reading Aristotle enables a heightened moment of self-awareness concerning

politicalphilosophy,andthisself-awareness isessential forarticulatingadifferent

conceptionofpoliticalphilosophyandultimately,philosophy.

By ‘philosophy,’ Imean the general activity of thinking and the search for

understanding.Thisactivityofthinkingrelatestoan‘existentialoption,’achoicefor

aparticularwayof lifeandavisionof thewholeof reality.9Idonotuse the term

‘philosophy’ univocally. Indeed it is an assumption of this dissertation that the7ThisistheprojectofAnglo-AmericanappropriationsofAristotleviatheanalyticphilosophicalmethod.Initsmostinfluentialdomains,moralphilosophyandphilosophyofaction,itisinitiatedbyAnscombe(1958).E.g.Foot(1978);Irwin(1989).8Idonotclaimtodownplayordiminishthemanyotherauthors,ancientandmodern,whoshapethethoughtofArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyre.IaimtodrawoutthethemesthatarisedirectlyfromtheirinterpretationofAristotleandhowthatrelatestotheiroverallproject.9IamindebtedtoHadot(1995),17-20.

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history of philosophy has provided different conceptions of the activity of

philosophy. This assumption bears upon the thinking of Arendt, Strauss, and

MacIntyre.As‘philosophers,’thesethreehavedifferentwaysofunderstandingtheir

‘philosophy,’theiractivityofthinking,andtheappropriatewayof liferelatedtoit.

WhileIusetheterm‘philosophy’insuchaway,Arendt,Strauss,andMacIntyredo

not adopt an identical use. All three take a critical attitude toward aspects of or

otherthinkerswithinthehistoryof ‘philosophy;’ thiscriticalattitudedefinestheir

ownactivityofthinking.Nevertheless,allagreethatinthinking,theyareengagingin

auniqueactivitydistinctfromotherhumanactivities.Sodespitethewarinessofthe

termallthreeshare,Iusetheoneterm‘philosophy’tomaintainconsistencyandto

unitetheconcernsofallthree.

InclaimingthatArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyrehaveaparticularinterestin

theactivityof‘politicalphilosophy,’Irecognizethatthetermisacontestedconcept

in academic practice. The dominant academic consensus is that thinking about

politics at any conceptual level is ‘political theory,’ while the justification and

clarification of normative political reasoning is ‘political philosophy.’ 10

Nevertheless, neither of these terms satisfactorily describes how Arendt, Strauss,

and MacIntyre understand their own activity. Departing from the dominant

consensus, I unite the concernsof all threeunderadifferentmeaningof ‘political

philosophy.’

AsIuseit, ‘politicalphilosophy’broadlyconceivedistheactivityseekingan

answertothequestionoftheendsofhumanlife,orthequestionofthegood.Inso

10SeeFreeden(2004),3.

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doing, political philosophy articulates a comprehensive account of the good: ‘a

totalized view, an all-encompassing horizon for reflecting on the ends of human

life.’11Of course, each thinker develops their understanding of the good, their

‘political philosophy,’ in different ways. Nevertheless I submit that seeking an

answer to the question of the good is the bestway to characterize their projects,

pointingtoacommontraditionofthinkingwithinwhichtheyallparticipate.12

HealingtheAcademicDiscipline

As my study adopts this understanding of political philosophy, it opposes

itself towhatprevailingcurrents intheacademicdisciplineofpoliticalphilosophy

assert political philosophy to be. Moreover, I select three thinkers from the

peripheryoftheacademicdisciplineofAnglo-Americanpoliticalphilosophy.Asthis

approach offers an implicit criticism of the academic discipline, it is necessary to

provide some justification of what I hope this study provides for the academic

disciplineofpoliticalphilosophy.

A familiar story in theacademicdiscipline is that the latterhalf of the20th

centurywitnessedarenaissanceof theacademicdisciplineofpoliticalphilosophy.

ThisstoryistoldasJohnRawlssinglehandedlyrevivingthedisciplinewiththe1971

publication of A Theory of Justice, and led to attempts to narrow the activity of

political philosophy to the Rawlsian activity. Consequently, it marginalized any

11Beiner(2014),14.12IthereforefollowBeiner(2014),whoarguesthatthepoliticalphilosophyofArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyrecanallbecharacterizedinthisway.Neverthelesstheirdifferencesshouldberecognized:MacIntyreadoptsthelanguageofthegoodandpursuesafinalanswerdirectlyandexplicitly.Arendtisdecidedlyuncomfortableinusinglanguageofthegood,andStraussisuncomfortablethatafinalanswertothequestionofthegoodcaneverbeachieved.

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activity of political philosophy that did not offer systematic theories of justice.13

More recent reflections on 20th century political philosophy take care to note the

rangeof 20th century contributions to the activity of political philosophy.14 Yet if

those interested in the peripheral thinkers of political philosophy once suffered

undertheproudRawlsian’scontumely,theynowsufferfromthepangsofdiversity.

More and more approaches are acknowledged under the heading of ‘political

philosophy,’ with the effort to understand these approaches subordinated to a

determinationtoavoidrankingandorderingthem.15Oneisleftwiththeimpression

of incommensurability on a vast scale, leaving a variety of camps incapable of

properly understanding one other, let alone debating one other. It is hard to

disagreewiththeclaimthatthispluralityexacerbatesthediscipline’s‘descent’into

insularityandirrelevanceinsideandoutsidetheacademy.16

Resolvingthisproblemintheacademicdisciplineisaherculeantaskbeyond

this dissertation, but I can indicate two ways forward and how this dissertation

proceeds in that direction. The diversity in the academic discipline is a twisted,

veritably Gordian knot of incommensurable concepts, yet here I follow Ronald

Beiner tocut through it. Indefiningpoliticalphilosophyas theactivity seekingan

answer to the question of the good, Beiner provides a way to evaluate political

philosophers.ForBeiner,thereisanepiccharactertopoliticalphilosophy,asitisa

contestofgrandvisionsorreflectionsontheendsoflife.Politicalphilosopherswho

donotprovidethisgrandreflectionarenotfulfillingtheirjobdescription.Ofcourse,

13E.g.Kymlicka(1990).14E.g.Vincent(2004).15Vincent(2004),319;c.f.Jaffa(2012),45-48.16Gunnell(1993,2011,2012).

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many20thcenturyphilosophershavedeniedthattheyneedtoprovideareflection

ontheendsofhumanlife.Theyarepreciselytheproblem.Beinerarguesthattheir

accounts inevitably takeastanceon thegood,so thatneutralityabout thegood is

untenable. If Beiner’s approach is taken seriously, it provides a way to evaluate,

rank,andorderthediverseapproachestopoliticalphilosophythathavefoundtheir

wayintotheacademy.17Todothis,however,onehastoknowwhatthealternatives

are.Thepriorsteptothiscriticalexerciseisfirsttolistentothegrandreflectionon

theendsoflifepresentedbypoliticalphilosophers.Theaimofthisdissertationisto

listen to Arendt, Strauss, and MacIntyre, to grasp fully the fruits of their grand

reflectionontheendsoflife.

Thesecondwayforwardhastodowithhowlisteningprioritizesahistorical

exegetical approach. The academic discipline of moral philosophy also faces

seeminglyirreconcilabledividesbetweenfixedcamps,havingbeendividedintothe

threecampsofutilitarianism,deontology,andvirtueethics.Moralphilosophersare

thendefinedbyreferencetothesecamps.Yetevenashortanalysisoftheirtheories

showsthattheselabelsareinadequate.ForMarthaNussbaum,theselabelsmislead

by segregating the history of philosophy. Figures associatedwith the deontology,

likeKant,are indeedconcernedwithproblemsrelatedtovirtueethics.Thosewho

rely extensively on these labels betray a poor understanding of the history of

philosophy.Nussbaumcontendsthatawayforwardisto labelmoralphilosophers

with reference to the thinker in the history of the philosophy they purport to

interpret or criticize. Instead of speaking of virtue ethicists, one should speak of17Beiner(2014),232-33.Inhisevaluationoftwelve20thcenturythinkers,sevenfailtotakeanexplicitstanceonthegood,andthreefailtopresentpositivepoliticalvisionsofthegood.

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neo-Humeans, neo-Aristotelians, and anti-Kantians, and discuss and debate these

positionsaccordingly.18

Nussbaum’sinsightisthatphilosophicalactivityisboundupwithitshistory.

Only by turning to the history of philosophy can we understand and evaluate

substantive philosophical theories. Moreover, we understand substantive

philosophical theories not just by turning to the history of philosophy, but to the

traditionalcanonof thehistoryofphilosophy.What is trueofmoralphilosophy is

also trueofpoliticalphilosophy,even themostRawlsian theory.AsRawlshimself

said: ‘we learn moral and political philosophy, and indeed any other part of

philosophy, by studying the exemplars.’ 19 The study of these ‘exemplars,’ the

traditionalcanonofpoliticalphilosophy,canbeaccusedof theoreticalabstraction,

culminatinginarhetoricdisplacedfrompoliticalparticularitiesandthereforefrom

political philosophy. 20 Yet I contend that that it is an indispensable rhetoric,

contributingtotheself-awarenessofpoliticalphilosophy.Allpoliticalphilosophyis,

to a greater or lesser degree of self-awareness, historically informed political

philosophy. 21 To contribute to that self-understanding, it is fruitful to follow

Nussbaum’ssuggestionandstudypoliticalphilosophersinrelationtothe‘exemplar’

they hope to interpret and criticize. I therefore explore how three 20th century

politicalphilosophersinterpretoneparticular‘exemplar,’Aristotle.

18Nussbaum(1999),201.19Rawls(2007),xiv.20E.g.Gunnell(1986,1993,2011).21Whiletherearethosewhocontendthatascholarlyhistoricalrecoveryofthemeaningoftextsinthehistoryofpoliticalphilosophymustbedevoidofpoliticalevaluationsofhistory(Skinner1969;Pocock1975;Tully1988),thisrecoveryisoftenparadoxical.Afterthemeaningoftextsisestablishedtoscholarlysatisfaction,politicalevaluationscreepbackintothehistory.e.g.Skinner(1998).Thehistoryofpoliticalphilosophyisneverdevoidofevaluation,butpresupposesorcontributestoanaccountofpoliticalphilosophy.SeePerreau-Saussine(2007).

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Thesearethedeeperconcernsatstakefortheacademicdisciplineofpolitical

philosophy,yet in thisdissertation I limitmyapproach in the followingmanner. I

make no claim as to the veracity of the interpretation of Aristotle that Arendt,

Strauss, andMacIntyreoffer.To this end, I offerno independent interpretationof

Aristotle. I amconcernedwith the interpretationofAristotle thatArendt, Strauss,

and MacIntyre provide, and how it shapes the thought of each. In the following

chapters,itisArendt’sAristotle,thenStrauss’sAristotle,thenMacIntyre’sAristotle

who speak, not Aristotle himself nor my interpretation of Aristotle.22Thus this

dissertation is not a study belonging to the disciplines of ancient philosophy or

classicalstudies,butisastudyinthehistoryof20thcenturyphilosophyandpolitical

thought.To clarify the ‘historical’ sense ofmy study,mymethod is not to offer a

contextualstudyoftheworkofArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyre.23Inexaminingeach

thinker,Iseektounderstandhoweachonesituateshimselforherselfinrelationto

abodyofliterature.ThatbodyofliteratureisprimarilytheworkofAristotle,yetit

includes other prominent figures within the history of philosophy and political

thought. I adopt an exegetical approach for readingphilosophical texts, in light of

thephilosophicalissuesArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyreraise.24

22Thisalsoappliestotheotherauthorstheyinterpret.23Tully(1988),Skinner(2002).ForstudiesofStraussorArendtattentivetotheircontext,seeLazier(2008),Keedus(2015).Perreau-Saussine(2005)alsopartiallyadoptsthisapproachforhisstudyofMacIntyre.24Someexegeticalstudiesexamineacombinationofthetwobutnotallthree.Bartlett(2001)considerstheresponsesofStraussandMacIntyretocritiquesofreason.Breen(2012)considershowMacIntyreandArendttreatphilosophicalissuesraisedbyWeber.AsIamfocusedonexegeticalstudies,ImustpassoverthenumerousstudiesthatareinspiredbyArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyre.ThisabsenceisperhapsmostunfortunateforStrauss,asmanystudiesinspiredbyhisanalysisofAristotlehavecontributedtoAristotlescholarship.E.g.Jaffa(1952),Salkever(1990),Nichols(1992),Benardete(2002),Burger(2008),Pangle(2013).

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NietzscheandAristotle

Their starting point is a perception that a crisis of modernity is itself a

philosophicalissue,shapingthetaskofpoliticalphilosophy.ForArendt,Strauss,and

MacIntyre, it is Friedrich Nietzschewho draws attention to a crisis inmodernity

throughthedoctrineofhistoricity:namely,thatthehumanbeingishistorical.Inthe

classical text for the discussion of this problem, The Uses and Disadvantages of

HistoryforLife,Nietzscheaddresseshowmeaningemergesfromtherelationofthe

human being to history.25This historical sense delivers a form and horizon to a

human life and is the condition for sustaining a meaningful life. What enables a

meaningfullifeisabalancebetweenthesenseofhistoricalawarenessandtheneed

torisebeyondit.26

Yet Nietzsche describes the modern situation as an excess of historical

awareness. The awareness of what seems true or has seemed true to other ages

overwhelmsthemodernhumanbeingwithconflictingworld-views.Hehasnoclear

criteria forassessingandchoosingbetweenthesedifferentviews.This inability to

chooseparalyzeshim,sothathecannotfindanymeaningorexistenceforhimself.

Consequently, he drifts toward a philosophical andmoral relativism.27Nietzsche’s

burninganxietyovermodernity, andhis characterizationofmodernityas a crisis,

stems fromhis sense that the unprecedented increase in historical awareness for

thehumanraceisdrawingthehumanraceintoanunprecedenteddecline.

25SeeSalkever(1990),157-58.26UDHL,I.62-63.27UDHL,I.64;IX.115-16.

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Hencehistoryrepresentsapredicament,feltmorekeenlyinmodernitythan

in any previous age. 28 This predicament is certainly serious. Yet it is not

insurmountable.Theactivityofphilosophy,initsveryancientformofmetaphysics,

claimstoovercomethepredicament.Itassumesthat, inpursuingmetaphysics,the

humanbeingcanriseabovehishistoricalsituationtograsptimelesstruth.Butthe

activity relies upon the assumption that metaphysical truth transcends history.

Whatifmetaphysicaltruth,ratherthantranscendinghistory,isessentiallytiedtoit?

Whatifthehumanbeingisnotjusthistorical,butessentiallyhistorical?

Nietzsche intensifies the predicament by holding that the human being is

essentiallyhistorical.Herevolutionizesthewholeconceptionofphilosophy.Instead

ofbeingawaytoescapefromhistory,philosophyisboundtohistory.Theactivityof

philosophy only expresses one’s historical situation. Philosophical questions are

supersededbyhistoricalquestions,sothatthereisnoessentialdistinctionbetween

them.Thisistheprimarymeaningofhistoricism.29

SoforNietzsche,theenquiryintotheactivityofphilosophyisboundupwith

the study of the history or tradition of philosophy. As the newly recognized

importance of our historical situation shows we moderns are products of the

tradition,Nietzsche thinks that to understand ourselves,wemust understand the

tradition.Moreover,wemusthaveacriticalunderstandingofthetraditionthatfrees

usfromthe‘pieties’thatinhibitunderstanding.30Nietzschelookstoexposethetrue

28Fackenheim(1961),1.29Fackenheim(1961),61.30Zuckert(1996),17-18.

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activityofphilosophy.Todothis,helooksbackthroughthehistoryofphilosophyto

itsoriginsinthepre-modernGreekworld.

Nietzsche’s preoccupation is with Plato’s portrayal of philosophy and the

wayoflifeassociatedwithit.Platomakesphilosophyintoanactivitythatevaluates

theworld,expressedbyhowherenderstheideaoftheGoodastherulingprinciple

of reality inhisRepublic. Philosophyposits values to rule reality, aswell as other

humanbeings.HencePlatopoliticizes philosophy.31However, Plato’s politicization

comesatthepriceofhonesty.WhilePlatoconceptualizedthemorallyperfectstate,

at the same time, he ‘considered it necessary that the first generation of his new

society(intheperfectstate)shouldbeeducatedwiththeaidofamightynecessary

lie.’ 32 Deception, then, underwrites Plato’s activity of philosophy. From his

interpretation of Plato, Nietzsche thought that philosophers do not discover

meaning. They legislate out of the will to power, wanting to impose their own

meaning onto the world. Political philosophy manifests this legislative act most

publicly.LikePlato inhisRepublic, it is anattempt to create theperfect state, the

attempt to impose one’s own values onto other people and whole societies.

Modernity exposes philosophy as a legislative act, laying bare its deception. But

when philosophy is exposed for what it is, it hastens the collapse of the whole

tradition. Sources of meaning that once persuaded whole societies are no longer

convincing. Rationalism appears deceptive, and anti-rationalism gains strength.

Nietzsche anticipated that once human beings became aware that they were the

onlysourceofmeaningintheworld,andthattraditionalphilosophywasdeceptive,31Zuckert(1996),17.32UDHLX.118.

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theywouldseektoimposetheirownmeaningacrosstheworldthroughtheforceof

theirwill.Outofthiscrisisofphilosophywouldcomeacrisisofpolitics,leadingto

incessantbattlesbetweenopposingpowers.33

Arendt, Strauss, andMacIntyreareall hauntedbyNietzsche’s thinking.For

allthree,Nietzscheraisesthecentralityofthepredicamentofhistoryformodernity

anditschallengetotheactivityofphilosophy.AllthreeagreewithNietzschetothe

extent that to understand the activity of philosophy, we must gain a critical

understandingofthetraditionofphilosophy.Allthreeagreethattheexhaustionof

the traditionofphilosophyprovokesorexacerbatesapolitical crisis.All threeare

thenimpelledtoturntothetreatmentoftheactivityofphilosophyinpre-modern,

Greekthought.Thisraisesthestatusofactivityofpoliticalphilosophy.

Theso-called ‘Platonic’ ideaof theactivityofpoliticalphilosophydiscovers

whatthegoodisandattemptstolegislateitinpolitics.Thewayoflifeofphilosophy

istorulethecity.Inthispicture,‘politicalphilosophy’hasanairoffinalityaboutit.34

Societies will continue to be imperfect until rulers become philosophers or

philosophersbecomerulers.35Philosophyandpolitics, theoryandpractice, canbe

unified.Nietzschecanexposetherationalfoundationsofthisprojectindiscovering

what the good is as an illusion. It can be celebrated or deplored. But unless

Nietzsche’s ‘Platonic’conceptionofpoliticalphilosophyischallenged,philosophers

arelefttoachievetheunificationoftheoryandpracticethroughargument;orwhat

is more likely given the prominence Nietzsche places on historicism, through

33EcceHomo,WhyIamaDestiny,§1;Zuckert(1996),3.34C.fHadot(1995),124-25.35Republic473d.

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historical events.36Is that understanding of political philosophy correct? Arendt,

Strauss,andMacIntyrealldisagree.37

Arendt, Strauss, and MacIntyre find resources in Aristotle to develop a

differentaccountofpoliticalphilosophy.Aristotle seeks toanswer thequestionof

political philosophy: what is the good?38In seeking an answer to this question,

Aristotle considers theways of life thatmight achieve the good.He discusses the

relationship between philosophy and politics as a contrast between two different

waysoflife.Aristotleweighsphilosophyasoneamongthreewaysoflifefromwhich

a free man may choose: the life of enjoyment, the political life; and finally, the

contemplative life, the philosophical life.39Since only the vulgar pursue the life of

pleasure, Aristotle reduces these three possibilities to two: the ‘practical’ life of

politics,andthe ‘theoretical’ lifeofthephilosopher.Inthatway,Aristotlebecomes

thefirsttocontrast‘theory’and‘practice.’40

But this leaves unaddressed the issue as to whether the life of political

activityorthelifeofphilosophicalactivityisthebetterlife.Aristotle’sanswerisby

no means straightforward. Aristotle definitively argues for the superiority of the

philosophicalcontemplativelife,becausetheessenceofmanistoriseabovehimself,

todivinizehimself.41Yetitisunclearhowthisismeanttorelatetothepoliticallife,

sinceinsomerespectspoliticallifeandpracticeremainsindispensable.42

36BartlettandCollins(1999),xii-xiii.37Allofthemdisagreewiththisview;notallofthemagreethatitisactuallyPlato’sview.38EN1094a23-25.39EN1095b14-19.40Lobkowicz(1967),4.41EN1177b27-1178a5,Hadot(1995),126-27.42Lobkowicz(1967),26;Hadot(1995),129.

22

As compared to the straightforward ‘Platonic’ account, Aristotle leaves a

seriesofquestions.What istherelationshipbetweentheoryandpractice?What is

therelationshipbetweenthephilosophicalwayoflifeandthepoliticalwayoflife?

What is the relationshipbetweenphilosophyandpolitics?Theseareallquestions

exploredbyArendt, Strauss, andMacIntyreas they interpretAristotle todiscover

whatpoliticalphilosophy is. In lightof thedemandsthecrisisofmodernityplaces

uponthem,theyseektodescribewhatthegoodis,andwhatpoliticalphilosophyis

asawayoflife,possiblythebestlife.

TheArgumentoftheDissertation

Inthefollowingthreechapters,IprovideanaccountofwhyArendt,Strauss,

andMacIntyreturntoAristotle,howtheyinterpretAristotle,andwhattheyfindin

Aristotlethathelpsthemjustifytheirconceptionofpoliticalphilosophyasawayof

life.AsallthreeareunitedbyasympathywithNietzsche’sdiagnosisofmodernity,

what they find in Aristotle cannot be separated fromwhat limitationsmodernity

imposesonhowtointerpretAristotle,andwhatmodernproblemsjustifywhythey

turn back to him. All three, therefore, develop a critique of modern political

philosophy,withthreethemes.Firstisaconcernaboutpoliticalirresponsibility.All

three draw attention to the extremist ideologies of 20th century, Nazism and

Stalinism,whichconfirmNietzsche’sprophecyaboutacrisisofpolitics.Secondisa

concern that modern political philosophy worsens political irresponsibility,

compromising liberal democracy. Third is a historical explanation of when and

wheremodernityhasgonewrong.Yetifallthreethinkersbelieveintheurgencyofa

23

recoveryofpoliticalphilosophy frompre-modernity, theydisagreeas towhat the

characterofthis‘recovery’canbe.

Inchapterone,IexaminethethoughtofHannahArendt.ForArendt,political

irresponsibility takes the formof totalitarianismand thewidespread support and

cooperation of philosophers with it. This led her to conclude that there was a

problemwith the traditional activity of philosophy inmodernity. Arendt sees the

tradition’s three strands,metaphysics, religiousbelief, andpoliticalphilosophy, as

havingcometoadecisiveend.Modernityhasutterlytransformedtherelationship

betweenphilosophy andpolitics, so that the possibilities for humanmeaning and

purposeoncedisclosed inpoliticsareobscured.Arendtasks thequestionofwhat

the ‘good’ is through the lens of ‘meaning.’ Because the tradition has come to a

decisive end, Arendt does not believe a recovery of the tradition’s insights on

politicalphilosophy ispossible. Instead, sheargues foraretrieval of the insightful

fragmentsleftoverfromthetradition.

Arendt’s retrieval takes her back to the fragments of Aristotle. Aristotle

demonstrates thevalueandmeaningfulnessofaction,and in turnpolitical life, for

disclosing human meaning. Yet Arendt sees a threat to political life from the

traditional validation of the life of metaphysical contemplation above the life of

action. It leads to thesupremacyofphilosophyoverpolitics.Aristotle’s thought is

culpable for promoting this supremacy, which prevents the full meaning of the

politicallifefrombeingseen.Nevertheless,Arendt’slastwordtoAristotleisnotan

accusation.Drawing fromAristotle’s insights, shedevelopsherownconceptionof

the importance of the activity of thinking, with its own meaningfulness, which

24

Arendtcontrastswithpoliticalactivityandprovidesthecharacterofheractivityof

politicalphilosophy.

InchaptertwoIexamineLeoStrauss.Straussidentifiesthecrisisofmodern

philosophyandpoliticsinthetheoreticalassumptionofradicalhistoricism.Radical

historicismmakesphilosophyimpossible;itparticularlymakesoneunabletojustify

the question of the good. Political irresponsibility takes the form of radical

historicists abandoning the capacity to distinguish between good regimes and

tyranny. It provokes a loss of confidence in liberal democracy and culminates in

someradicalhistoricistsendorsingtyranny.Straussrejectsradicalhistoricism,but

seesitasdevelopingthroughmodernphilosophy.Hisreadingofthetraditionleads

him to conclude that genuine philosophy is only possible if one recovers political

philosophy. To combat radical historicism, Strauss’s recovery takes the form of a

return to pre-modern, classical political philosophy. Classical political philosophy,

starting with Socrates and carrying on with Aristotle, first turns to political

phenomena.Itseesthisstudyasanecessaryfirststepfordisclosingthetruenature

ofreality.Aristotle isdistinctbecausehedevelopsthesystematicstudyofpolitics,

political science. Strauss wishes to show how Aristotle’s political science helps

disclose the whole of reality, how it relates to philosophy. But Aristotle is also

concernedwith the health of the city. Strauss tackles political irresponsibility by

providing a defence of the best regime through Aristotle. In Strauss’s argument,

Aristotle proposes a practically realizable best regime that in modernity,

correspondstoliberaldemocracy.

25

In chapter three, I treatAlasdairMacIntyre,whose complicated intellectual

trajectory requires a more biographical treatment. MacIntyre’s initial intellectual

formation as a Marxist meant he developed a critical eye not just on liberal

democracy, but on the roots of liberal democracy found in modern liberal

individualism. MacIntyre’s outlook was very much that of a political radical,

believingthattheonlywaytoovercomemodernliberalindividualismwasthrough

revolution. Yet while many Marxist revolutionaries were tempted by politically

irresponsible support for Stalinism,MacIntyre recognized Stalinismwas immoral;

however,hisMarxist intellectualformationcouldnottellhimwhyitwasimmoral.

Thus began MacIntyre’s journey through the ‘moral wilderness’ to justify why

Stalinism was immoral. Dissatisfied with modern liberal answers, MacIntyre

developsadiagnosisof thecrisisofmodernphilosophy inpartialagreementwith

Nietzsche’s critique of traditional philosophy. Modern philosophy did try to

legislate,MacIntyreholds, and it failed.ButMacIntyre contends that this isonlya

failureofthemoderntraditionofEnlightenmentphilosophy.Itispossibletorecover

Aristotle’s pre-modern tradition. MacIntyre’s recovery is a reconstruction of an

identifiable Aristotelian tradition in the face of modern philosophical problems.

Rather than Aristotle per se, it is this Aristotelian tradition that provides the

intellectual resources to overcome the crisis of modernity by reconstructing a

plausible account of what the good is. This account justifies why Stalinism and

liberalindividualismarewrong,andofferstherevolutionaryprojecttoachievethe

commongoodthatMarxismfailedtoprovideeffectively.

26

Arendt, Strauss, andMacIntyre are three distinct thinkersmanifesting real

differences in intellectual starting points, assumptions, and methods, which lead

themdownverydifferentroutes.Nevertheless,theirdecisiontopasstheirthought

throughAristotle leads them all to related philosophical projects,which raise the

complexityofthequestionofthegoodandexaminetheproblemoftherelationship

between philosophy and politics. In the conclusion I turn to what their projects

indicate about the character of Aristotelian political philosophy, one ‘existential

option’fornavigatingpostmodernity’suncertaincurrents.

27

I.HannahArendt’sDialoguewith

Aristotle

AConversationwiththeFragmentedTradition

Circumventing more usual philosophical approaches, Hannah Arendt

developsherownuniqueapproachtophenomenologythatisuniqueintermsofits

object of study, and unique in terms of itsmethod.1InTheHumanCondition, her

object of study is human activity, the facets of the vita activa. Philosophers, she

argues, have not properly addressed it.2In studying the vita activa, the three

activitiesthatconcernArendtarelabour,work,andaction.Arendtdescribeslabour

as the activity corresponding to the biological processes of the human body

necessary for survival. Arendt contrasts labour’s concern with the necessary,

natural aspects of human existence with work, which concerns the artificial,

unnatural world of things surrounding a human being. In Arendt’s specific

formulations, the basic human condition of labour is ‘life itself,’ while the basic

human condition of work is ‘worldliness.’3Arendt’s special concern, however, is

withconceptualizingwhat is ‘authenticallypolitical,’whichshe thinksneeds tobe

thoughtaboutinitsownterms.4

1Buckler(2011),6;Parekh(1981),66-75.2HC,12-21.3HC,7.4Kateb(2000),131.

28

Thatconcerntakeshertoexamineaction.InArendt’sphenomenology,action

has twofundamentalaspects thatdistinguish it fromlabourandwork.The first is

that it is the only activity that goes on directly between men.5The second is its

correspondencewith the human condition of plurality. Plurality is the underlying

conditionforallpoliticallife,withoutwhichpoliticallifeisimpossible,andthrough

which political life must be possible.6Action causes a particular individual to

becomepublicallymanifest toothers,or toappeartoothers. Inthatway,action is

the life of someone shown to others. Since this action implicates others, it also

concerns communication with others. This way of communicating with others

creates a common and shared space of appearances, in which a certain form of

communication is nourished and safeguarded. Action occurs in the public sphere,

thesphereofpolitics;andthewayoflifecorrespondingtoactionisthepoliticallife.

In this way, action is what is authentically political. Crucially, however, Arendt

wantstocommunicatetheimportanceandvalue—themeaning—ofpoliticalaction

forhuman life.7Arendt’s insight is thatpoliticalactiondiscloses the importanceof

freedom.Withoutfreedompoliticallifewouldbemeaningless.8

Moreover, Arendt’s thought is a response to the crisis of modernity. 9

Modernity has lost sight of themeaning of freedom in thepolitical realm. ‘To the

questionofpolitics, theproblemof freedom is crucial, andnopolitical theorycan

afford to remain unconcerned with the fact that this problem has led into ‘the

5HC,7.6HC,7.PluralityiscentraltoArendt’saccountofworldliness.SeeBenhabib(2003),50.7The‘essentialdimension’ofArendt’stheoryofpoliticalactionisthatofmeaning.SeeVilla(1995),10-11.8Kohn(2000),114-15,127;BPF,145.9SeeCanovan(1994).

29

obscurewoodwhereinphilosophyhaslostitsway.’10Modernity’scrisisisacrisisof

thepolitical,acrisisexperiencedastheerosionofthecommonhumanworldandof

theunderstandingoffreedom.

WhatisuniqueaboutthemethodofArendt’sphenomenologyisthat,totrace

thiserosion,sheturnsherattentiontothehistoricalinheritance.Hermethoddefies

straightforward explanation.11Amost difficult problem is relating her analysis of

thecrisisofmodernitytoheranalysisofpasthistory,sinceitappearseclecticand

arbitrary. Arendt describes past history and past philosophy in terms of ‘the

tradition.’Butsheassumesthatthecrisisofthepresenthumansituation,caughtup

in thepredicamentof the lossof thecommonworld, isdecisivelyand irreversibly

separatedfrompasthistoryandpastphilosophy.Forher,astraightforwardhistory

or history of ideas is impossible. The inability to draw in straightforward fashion

from the tradition problematizes our ability to understand our predicament.

Nevertheless, the fragments of the philosophical tradition persist, and any

understanding of the present human situationmust start by a conversationwith

thesefragments.

I examine Arendt’s critique ofmodernity, as well as what she retrieves in

Aristotletorespondtomodernity.Ifocusonhowsheconverseswiththefragments

ofthephilosophicaltraditionsoastounderstandthesituationofthehumanbeing

inmodernity.What interestsArendt is how this situation emerged.Consequently,

shelookstothethinkerswhocomeattheendofthetradition.Sheseesthetradition

asendinginthecriticalworkofNietzsche,Kierkegaard,andMarx.Theyregardthe10BPF,144.11Arendtisreticentindescribinghermethod.Buckler(2011),4-5.

30

tradition of philosophy as having reached a point of exhaustion, and attempt

thereupon to overturn the tradition. Through these three thinkers, Arendt shows

howthetraditionsofphilosophy,religion,andpoliticalphilosophyhaveeachcome

toanend.Despitetheirinsights,however,thesethreefailtoprovideanaccountfor

thepresenthumansituationbecause theymisdiagnosemodernity,andexacerbate

certaintrendsthatunderwritethepresentcrisis.

Arendt’s concern, I argue, is that a perverse conception of history kills the

common human world, driving civilisation toward the un-worldly attempts at

resolving contemporary problems. For Arendt, these attempts to resolve

contemporary problems culminate in the totalitarian movements of the 20th

century.Thedistortedconceptionofhistorydiminishesthe importanceofpolitics,

promotes prejudice against politics, and intensifies the catastrophe of the

contemporary human situation. Yet it also provides the opportunity to think in a

differentway.Arendtseesaneed toexamine theolder fragmentsof the tradition,

especiallythosecontainedinAristotle,touncoverthephilosophicalinsightsthatthe

prejudices of the present obscure, ultimately to articulate the importance of a

commonworldandthemeaningoffreedom.

I.Arendt’sApproachtotheHistoryofPhilosophy

BeforeexaminingArendt’streatmentofparticularfiguresinthetradition,it

is important to conceptualize her approach to the study of the past tradition of

philosophy. ForArendt, the fragmentsof thepast tradition arenot graspedby an

intellectualhistory,butaspartofourpoliticalhistory,discreetlyshapingthe lived

31

reality of the present. 12 Intellectual history is about thinkers addressing one

another. Ideasspeak inresponseto ideas,not topolitical,real-worldevents. Ideas

implicatepoliticaleventsonlyasarelationofcauseandeffect:ideasinfluenceand

shapepoliticalevents,ina‘pre-establishedharmony’betweenthoughtandaction.13

Arendt’spreference forpoliticalhistoryproblematizes thiscausalapproach

for understanding the relationshipbetweenpast ideas and contemporarypolitics.

Arendtdoesnot thinkonecandeclare thatacertain ideaor thinker ‘causes’or ‘is

responsible for’ a series of political events, either because it adheres to a

deterministicnarrativethatdenieshumanfreedom,14orbecausetheimplicationsof

the events are usually far beyond the most radical predictions or ideas of the

thinkers.15Nevertheless,thesearchfortheoriginsofaneventispermissibleandit

isherethathistoryshouldbecomprehensible.Thesearchfortheoriginsofanevent

isanattempt,aftertheeventhastakenplace,toidentifyitsdifferentelements.16To

comprehendpoliticalhistory,wemustidentifythe‘subterraneanstreams’inhistory

that have finally come to the surface in the contemporary moment.17It is here

wherethestudyoftheideasofpastthinkersisimportant.

Yettheactivityofthesepastthinkersmustbeunderstoodproperlyaswell.

ForArendt,philosophizing is inpartabout receiving ideas,but it especiallyarises

andtakesitbearingsoutoftheincidentsandeventsoflivingexperience.18Arendt’s

view is that events, more than ideas, change the world. Philosophy registers the12LOM,212-213;MDT,203;Benhabib(2003),88,94.13EIU,431.ArendtisthinkingofHegel.14BPF,26-27.15EIU,325;Benhabib(2003),71.16EIU,325.17Origins,ix.18BPF,14.

32

shock of the event.19History in turn is a ‘story,’ not of ideas but of ‘events.’20

Philosophyisaresponsetohistory,areflectiononthechanging,developingworld,

ratherthanareflectionproceedingwithoutreferencetotheworld.Thehighregard

Arendt has forNietzsche, Kierkegaard andMarx is due in part to their particular

conceptual innovations upon the tradition of philosophy, 21 but also to their

philosophy being at heart a recognition that their world was being invaded by

specificproblemsarisinginmodernhumanhistory.22

If philosophy is a response to events, then one can make sense of one of

Arendt’s most dramatic claims: that the political experience of totalitarian

domination is sounprecedented, it cannotbeunderstoodeitherby the traditional

conceptionsofpoliticalthoughtorphilosophy,anditsactionscannotbejudgedby

thetraditionalconceptionsofmoralphilosophyorlaw.23Consequently,thewisdom

ofthepast,thetradition, ‘dies’inourhandswhenwetrytoapplyittounderstand

theeventsofourtime.24Theactionsoftotalitarianismaresofarbeyondthedesign

ofanyphilosophicalidea,thattheyrenderthetraditionalcategoriesofthoughtand

moral judgement impotent.25Hence, thedefinite factofthecontemporarymoment

isthatthereiscompletebreakfromthetradition.26

In insisting that the tradition is broken, Arendt insists that contemporary

thinkersareunable tograsp inanyconsistentunitywhat the thinkersof thepast

19HC,273.20HC,252.21BPF,37-38.22BPF,27.23BPF,26.24EIU,309.25EIU,339-40.26EIU,309;BPF,26.

33

traditionunderstood.Therupturebetweenthepastandcontemporarymoment is

toogreat.Onecanonlypickupthesegmentsofthethoughtofthepast,withoutany

certaintyaswhattheoriginalintentionsbehindthesesegmentswere.Nevertheless,

the interesting feature of the contemporarymoment is that the fragments of the

thought of the past, separated from the intention of their creator, shape and

influencethecontemporarymoment.Arendtexpressesthisinterpretiveassumption

byreferencetoShakespeare:

Fullfathomfivethyfatherlies,Ofhisbonesarecoralmade,Thosearepearlsthatwerehiseyes.NothingofhimthatdothfadeButdothsufferasea-changeIntosomethingrichandstrange.(TheTempest,I.ii.)27

In thinking about the history of philosophy, Arendt’s task is to draw out the

fragments that still shape and guide the contemporary age. In that respect, the

fragments ofNietzsche,Kierkegaard, andMarx expose three exhausted aspects of

thetradition,guidingArendt’sunderstandingofthecrisisofmodernity.

II.Nietzsche,Kierkegaard,Marx:ThreePerspectiveson theEndof theTradition

In Arendt’s interpretation of Nietzsche, modernity is a world-historical

experienceofphilosophicalexhaustioncharacterizedbytheendofmetaphysicsand

degenerationinthehumancondition.Hegelistheimmediatepredecessoroftheend

of the tradition. Hegel claims that world history is a continuous philosophical

developmentatwhichthesystemicthoughtofHegelhimselfstandsattheend.28By

mergingtogetherall thedivergentstreamsofphilosophical thought intoaunified,27LOM,212;LSA,4-5.28BPF,27.Hegelseeshimselfastheculminationofphilosophicaldevelopment.LOM,96.

34

consistent development, Hegel designs a system with three features. First, his

system historicizes past philosophers, making them servants to the prevailing

historical forces their times.29Second, by declaring his own time as the one that

realizesphilosophicaltruth,notthepast,Hegelrepudiatestheauthorityofthepast

traditions of philosophy and the philosophers therein. They are to be read as

obsoleteandultimately incorrect.Third,Hegeltransformsphilosophyintohistory.

Thecriticalfeatureforunderstandingrealityisnotbygraspingeternal,unchanging

ideas, but by grasping the meaning of the time-process itself, the philosophy of

history. Philosophy of history replaces metaphysics as the primary activity of a

philosopher.30

Hegel, then, precipitates the collapse in authority of the past tradition of

philosophy asmetaphysics,whichNietzsche pithily calls ‘the death of God.’31This

signifiesahistorically transformativeevent: in itsaftermath, thequest foreternal,

unchanging ideas, metaphysical philosophy, is no longer persuasive.32With the

death of God, the religious and spiritual unity Christianity once provided has

vanished.33ThecontemporaryageisamomentwheretheinefficacyofChristianity

is catastrophically evident.34Arendt emphasizes the implications this has in the

moral realm,where the former standardsof valuehavebeen irrevocably lost and

29HC,294.30BPF,29,68.31LOM,7.Arendtisinterpretingthe‘deathofGod’throughMartinHeidegger’sannouncementoftheendofonto-theology.ForHeidegger’sinterpretationofNietzsche’sdeathofGod,seeHeidegger(1977).32Arendtthinksthequestfortheeternalunchangingideasismetaphysicalphilosophy.SeeHC,20;LOM,7-8.33Origins,208.34Origins,195;HA,313-14.

35

moralcommitmentslackclearjustification.35Thishistoricalsituationaffectsnearly

everymodernhumanbeing—allexperiencetherepercussionsofthedeathofGod.36

Thisexperienceofthecollapseofthemetaphysicaltraditiongivesshapetoa

unique sense of time inmodernity,which forArendt shapes the lived reality of a

thinking human being.37The human being is caught between two periods. He no

longerbelieves intheoldorderbuthasnosenseofdirectiontodiscoverthenew.

Foralongtime,thetraditionbridgedthisgapbetweenpastandfuture,concealingit.

Its exhaustion, despite Hegel’s efforts, has severed the continuity of time.38So in

modernity,withthebreakdownofthetradition,thegapbetweenpastandfutureis

notsimplyaproblemexperiencedbyphilosophers,butapoliticalproblem,areality

andperplexity foreveryone.39Arendt thinks therecannotbeareturn to the ‘good

old days,’ wherein one might attempt to retry the tradition, or an ‘arbitrary

promulgation’ofnewvalues to fill thegapbetweenpresentand future.40Sinceno

escapeispossible,Arendt’sintellectualconcernis‘howtomovewithinthisgap.’41

Living in the interval between past and future breaks up the apparent

continuumoftimeandcreatesthisstrugglebetweenpastandfuture.42Thisstruggle

transformshowthehumanbeingthinks.Arendtcontendsthatthinkingisboundto

this struggle,dispelling the image that thehumanbeing canescape toa ‘timeless,

35PP,104;Origins,299.36LOM,11.37BPF,12.38BPF,5,8.39BPF,13.40PP,104;BPF,14.41BPF,14.42LOM,204.ArendtdrawsfromHeidegger.C.f.BGE,§224.

36

spaceless, suprasensuous realm as a proper region of thought.’43The distinction

betweena sensuous realmof appearances and a suprasensuous realm ladenwith

meaning hereby dissolves. 44 Thinking, based out of the ‘now’ of the human

condition,isinescapablyhistorical.

For Arendt, the human being is a being conditioned by his history.45The

historical event of the ‘death of God’ conditions the human being to assume a

degenerate, unhealthy existence, metaphorically described as an animalized

existence.46ForNietzsche,thisanimalizedexistencetakestheformofthe‘lastman.’

The last man, effectively a bourgeois moral relativist, is only concerned with

physicalpleasures,anddoesnotlongforagreaterormorechallengingwayoflife.47

ForArendt,thedangerisviewingtheworldintermsofhistorical‘development’or

‘processes,’seeingthelawofhistoricaldevelopmentasanalogoustoDarwin’slawof

natural development.48The historian, as Hegel taught with the concept of ‘the

cunningofreason,’neednotpayattentiontotheaimsandawarenessoftheactors

to identify thewholehistorical trend.49In thatway, the actiondoesnothave any

meaningfulsenseuntilitisplacedwithinauniversalprocess,irrespectiveofwhich

43BPF,11.44LOM,10.45HC,9-10.46HC,322;c.f.BGE§62,203.47TSZPrologue5.48PP,75;EIU,378.Arendtnotesthatthenotionof‘process’and‘development’inhistoryareinheritedinpartfromCharlesDarwinandhistheoryofevolutionasthelawofnature.Arendt,however,otherthanbrieflyexaminingthesimilaritiesbetweentheDarwinianconceptionofhistoryandtheMarxistconceptionofhistory(Origins,463),hasnoexplicitdiscussionofDarwin’sinfluenceonmodernityandhisconceptionofhistory.Darwin’sinfluenceonthetheoreticaldevelopmentoftotalitarianism,moreover,islimited(Origins,159,171,330).TheprimarypoliticaleffectofDarwinismis,asnotedabove,inthegenealogyofmanfromanimallife(Origins,178-79).Arendt,however,regardstheconceptofhistoryasfullydevelopedinthethoughtofHegelandMarx.Consequently,IfocusmytreatmentonthesefiguresratherthanDarwin.49LOM,95-96.

37

account of universal process, whether it be scientific or historical. This historical

outlookultimatelyfailstoprovidemeaning,andonlyobscuresthemeaningthatis

possiblefromunderstandingtheparticularactionsofagentsintheworld.50

Failingto findmeaning inhistory, themodernhumanbeing looksforother

sources of meaning, which turn him away from others and toward himself, like

Nietzsche’s last man.51Arendt concludes that the modern human individual is

isolated: he has nomeaningful relationship to theworld, towhat lies outside the

self.Heisalsoisolatedfromotherhumanbeings,andthefeelingofbeingdeserted

ofallhumancompanionshipiswhatArendtcalls‘loneliness.’52Inthecontemporary

moment, loneliness has become an everyday experience in culture and society.53

When loneliness isaneverydayexperience, thehumanbeing takeson the formof

existenceknownas‘massman,’asmallcomponentof‘masssociety.’‘Massman’isa

human being marked by a ‘self-centred bitterness,’ ‘repeated again and again in

individual isolation.’ ‘Mass men’ have no common economic, social or political

interest with one another.54This self-centred isolation dissolves the significance

thatindividualdifferencesmighthavebetweenotherhumanbeings.

This utter isolation alters the way ‘mass man’ relates to himself. His self-

centredness weakens his instinct for self-preservation, as he neither believes the

search for meaning nor his particular life matters.55This has two consequences.

First, his thought drifts away from his particular sensible experiences toward

50BPF,89;HC,322-23;EIU,339.51HC,115,309;MDT,23.52Origins,474.53Origins,478.54Origins,315;EIU,356-57.55EIU,359.

38

generalizednon-sensibleconcepts.Itisaflightintoabstraction.Massmanisripeto

thinkhecanknoweverythingapriori.56Second,massmanisnolongerinterestedin

himself.Thedesireforself-preservationerodes,andisreplacedbyasenseoffeeling

expendable. What this exemplifies, for Arendt, is the un-worldy and even anti-

worldlycharacterofthemassman.Extendedacrossawholesociety,thefeelingof

being expendable becomes not just restricted to a few particular cases, but a

phenomenonstrikingwholesocietalstrata.57

Arendtdeparts fromNietzsche’sportrayalof themodernhumanbeingasa

self-centred, pleasure-seeking bourgeois relativist. Instead, she portrays a self-

hating, quasi-nihilistic being attracted by theoretical abstractions. In its origins,

massmanisnotonlyaproductofan intellectualculturebutalsoaproductof the

breakdownoftheclass-riddensocietyofthenation-state;massmovementsattract

boththevulgarandthecultured.58Massmanisespeciallyvulnerabletobesweptup

bythepoliticaleventssurroundingtotalitarianism.By focusingonthesignificance

oftheseevents,Arendt’scritiqueofmodernityadvancesinaverydifferentdirection

than that of Nietzsche. Nevertheless, what unites Nietzsche and Arendt is a

conviction that the shared cultural experience of philosophical and religious

exhaustion, the collapse of the authority of the old tradition, is not amoment to

celebrate. Instead, it is a crisis thathasemptied thehistorical cultureofmeaning,

turned the search for meaning inward, and conditioned the human being for a

diminishedformoflife.

56Totalitarianmovementsexploitthispresumption.EIU,356.57Origins,315-16.58Origins,316-17.

39

If Arendt were simply continuing her narrative of modernity from where

Nietzsche left off, she would be susceptible to the same criticism she makes of

Nietzsche: she would see the past history of philosophy as ‘one dialectically

developed whole,’ and therefore propose a universal Hegelian history.59To show

thatthenarrativeofmodernitycannotbereducedtoasingletheme,sheidentifies

the insights other thinkers make about the exhaustion of the tradition. To

emphasize this exhaustion in religious thought from a different angle than

Nietzsche,shedrawsattentiontoKierkegaard.WhileNietzscheinterprets‘thedeath

of God’ asmetaphysical exhaustion, it is Kierkegaard who actually addresses the

centralreligiousphenomenon,belief.InArendt’sinterpretation,theradicalcriticism

ofreligiousbelief,prevalentsincethe17thcenturywiththenaturalsciences,makes

it a characteristic of the modern age to doubt religious truth.60Yet believers,

equippedwith the concepts of traditional theology, especially the complementary

relationshipbetween faithand reason,hadamore thanadequate response to the

frequently vulgar criticism thrown by the natural sciences or materialism. 61

Kierkegaard,however,carriesthatattitudeofdoubtintoreligiousexperienceitself.

Heunderstandsreligiousexperienceasastrugglefromdoubttobelief,whereinthe

recognition of the rational absurdity of the human condition and one’s belief

constitutepartofthedecisiontobelieve.Hethereforereversesthecomplementarity

offaithandreason,settingthemagainstoneanother.62

59BPF,28.60BPF,94.61HC,319.62BPF,28-29.

40

For Arendt, Kierkegaard has two great effects. As with Nietzsche, an old

anthropological conceptualization is weakened. Kierkegaard challenges the

traditional concept of the human being as animal rationale with the concept of

doubting,struggling,sufferinghumanbeingsindividuatedbytheirlivedexperience

offaith.63Thesecondisatransformationofreligionitself.ImpelledbyKierkegaard’s

conclusions, the modern experience of religion becomes one of doubt. Genuinely

religious men are now preoccupied with doubt, which is what decisively

undermines faith.64The framework of doubt that Descartes once voiced—that

everythingmustbedoubted—hastriumphed,sothatnothoughtorexperiencecan

escape it.65The result of this triumph in the sphere of religious belief is that it

demonstratesdefinitely that the religious traditionhas collapsed.On the fringeof

society, modern religious believers are the simple-minded, like Dostoevsky’s

AlyoshaKaramazov,orMyshkin,‘theidiot.’66

Ifthefirstaspectoftheexhaustionofthetraditionistheendofmetaphysics,

andthesecondtheweakeningofreligiousbelief,thirdaspectistheendofpolitical

philosophy. It is Marx who achieves this in three ways: by ordering the highest

human activity as labour rather than reason, by altering the conception of

meaningful action in the public sphere away from rational discourse toward

violence, and by transforming the relationship between politics and philosophy,

revising the activity of political philosophy. Marx argues for an anti-traditional

anthropology. By declaring, ‘labour createsman,’ he challenges the religious idea

63BPF,34-35.64HC,319.65HC,275.66BPF,29.

41

that God creates man and insists that man’s humanity is the result of his own

activity. He opposes the conception that man’s capacity for reason makes him

different from animals. Labour, traditionally the lowest human activity,67replaces

reason, until then the highest attribute of humanity. The human being is not an

animalrationale,butananimallaborans.68

Arendt, forherpart, appreciates thatMarx challenges thedefinitionof the

essenceofhumanityascontemplationanddefineshumanityintermsofaction.Yet

Arendt disputes whether labour can constitute human meaning. Although Marx

glorifies labour, he also glorifies the future society free from labour, when the

productivity of labour becomes so great that labour itself withers away. Arendt

thinks that a simultaneous attempt to define humanity by labour and valuing

production,while at the same time idealizing a stateof freedom from labour, is a

tremendous inconsistency. It suggests an alternative between productive,

meaningfulslavery,andunproductive,meaningless freedom.69Labour, forMarx, is

no more than the biological life-process of keeping alive.70 Labour cannot be

separated from the other biological life-process, consumption, so that each life-

process constitutes the activityofanimal laborans. Since this is the essenceofhis

activity,heconcentratesprimarilyonthiskindofaction.

Arendt’sviewisthatthe leisuretimeofanimallaborans, therefore, isspent

not on higher activities, but in consumption, in attempting to satisfy newly

developingdesires. It reinforces the internalizedsearch formeaning.Happiness is

67HC,83-84.68BPF,21-22.69HC,104-105;BPF,24.Ultimately,modernityisaboutvictoryoftheanimallaborans.HC,320-25.70HC,98-99.

42

only possible when ‘life’s processes of exhaustion and regeneration, of pain and

release from pain, strike a perfect balance.’ 71 When the human being is

conceptualizedasanimallaborans,thesebiologicalprocesses,whatMarxcalledthe

‘metabolismofnature,’governhimexclusively.Theconsequenceisthatheiscutoff

from theworld, as his life is of concern to no one.72He exists in ‘mass culture,’ a

consumersociety.73Feelingasifone’slifeisofnoconcerntoothersdriveshiminto

loneliness.74Marx’santhropology, then,perpetuates thephenomenonof loneliness

thatisthemarkofcontemporaryhumanexperienceandhumansociety.

Marx’s political philosophy also declares that violence instigates political

change. For Marx, the meaning of history concerns the development of human

productivity,andpoliticalchangeisanimportantsignofthetransformativeforces

advancing human productivity. Marx sees the causes of political change as the

violence of wars and revolutions, illuminating the causes underlying the

developmentofhumanproductivityandinturnthecausesunderlyingthemeaning

ofhistoryasawhole.Violenceiscrucialtothemeaningofhistory.Totheextentthat

the meaning of history depends on free and conscious human action, therefore,

meaningful human action is violent action. This overturns the traditional exalted

placegiventorationalspeechasthemostmeaningfulconceptionofhumanaction

between persons. The inter-personal space, the political sphere, changes from a

placewhereoneactsmostmeaningfullythroughrationallypersuadingothers,toa

71HC,134.72Origins,475.Itistheconceptualizationofactivitythathomofaberaccomplishesthatfirstisolatestheactivityofonehumanbeingfromothers,inexcludingthepoliticalrealm.SeeHC,160-67.73HC,134.74Origins,475.

43

placewhereviolenceisthemostmeaningfulwayofrelatingtoothermen.Because

theexerciseofviolent coercion is thepreciseoppositeof rationalpersuasion,and

onlytakesplacewhererationalpersuasion fails,Marx isdevaluingthemeaningof

rational persuasion. Hence his view decisively undermines rational speech,

traditionally the most human way of relating to another person. Violence, not

rationalspeech,constitutesthepoliticalsphere.75

Having transformed the meaning of politics, Marx also transforms the

activity of political philosophy, changing ‘the attitude of the philosopher toward

politics.’76Marx interprets the history of philosophy as one where philosophers,

occupying a place distinct from the political world inhabited by human beings,

disputeabouthowtointerpretcorrectlythatpoliticalworld.Thisdebatelocatesthe

truth about theworldwithin a realmof ideas, separate from the commonhuman

world. UnderMarx’s interpretation, philosophy fromPlato toHegel is ‘not of this

world.’77Marx sets out to end this separation of philosophy from the world. He

famouslydeclaresthatthepointofphilosophyisnownottointerprettheworld,but

to change the world. Philosophy now becomes a project for the whole common

humanworldtorealize.Marxpredictsthatthephilosophicalgoalswillbecomethe

reality of the common human world. At that moment, philosophy itself will no

longerbenecessary,andwillbeabolished.

By merging philosophy with political life, Marx overtly challenges the

tradition, for the tradition has kept philosophy and politics as distinct spheres of

75BPF,21-23.76BPF,17.77BPF,23.

44

activity. But Arendt concludes that Marx’s thought on this matter is full of

inconsistencies. ‘When philosophy has been both realized and abolished,’ asks

Arendt, ‘whatkindofthoughtwillbe left?’78Intermsoftraditionalconcepts,Marx

asserts practice against theory. But this decision to abandon theory is itself

theoretical.79It importsMarx’smost systemic philosophy, the theory of dialectics,

into practice. Since one can only understand the activity of the politicalworld by

means of dialectics, political practice becomesmore theoretical than ever before.

Furthermore, Marx carries Hegel’s philosophy of history, with all its theoretical

baggage concerning the concept of history, into the understanding of political

practice.Consideringthelawsofhistoryisaprerequisitetounderstandingpolitical

action. Philosophy and politics are now functions of history.80The world is only

understoodthroughhistory.SoMarx,ratherthanmakingpoliticalactionsupreme,

has made history supreme. But history makes the political actors and their

particularactionsintheworldirrelevant.Theworld,ashumanactorsexperienceit,

is irrelevant. Nietzsche’s cry that theworld has been ‘abolished’81rings true, and

historyistheculprit.

III.TheTriumphofHistoryandtheLossofHumanMeaning

Arendt’s interpretations of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, andMarx help coalesce

her disquiet aboutmodernity into several key themes. First, there is her concern

about cultural disintegration. The failure of Hegel’s project of philosophical

unificationpromptstheunravellingoftraditionalsourcesofmeaningbyerodingthe

78BPF,24.79BPF,17.80BPF,29.81BPF,30.

45

authorityofpastphilosophy.TheculturalcollapseofChristianityexposesnotonly

that religious belief is almost impossible in modernity, but also that the

metaphysicalsystempursuingeternaltruthisnolongerpersuasive.Second,thereis

aheightenedconsciousnessof thehistoricalcharacterofhumanexistence.Hegel’s

philosophyreplacesmetaphysicswiththephilosophyofhistory,seekingtouncover

meaning in time-processes rather than eternal truth. As meaning is drawn from

history,itisthememoryofthepastthatimposesaformandhorizononhumanlife

toprovidemeaning.InNietzsche’sview,Hegel’sfailuremeansthatthenarrativeof

thepastcannotprovideaspecificformandhorizon:oneiscaughtinthefluctuating

moment of the ‘now,’ compelled forward by no concrete intention, but

uncomfortablyawareofthevastnessofpasthistory.

These two themes yield a third: in the activity of thinking, there is a

dissolution of the distinction between sensory and suprasensory, between sense

perceptionandaworldbeyondthesenses.This isacorollaryof thedeathofGod.

The quest for the knowledge of the eternal, unchanging ideas found in the

suprasensory realm, which constitutes metaphysics, is no longer a persuasive

intellectualeffort.Consequently,Arendtseesthinkingasboundedtothathistorical

momentof the ‘now’ inwhich thehumanbeingexists. It is thehistorical thinking,

thinking about a memory of the past, which imposes a form and horizon on the

human life and ultimately provides meaning. This anticipates a fourth theme:

modernityismarkedinlargepartbyananxietyoverhowtoactmeaningfully.The

deathofGodremovestraditionaljustificationsformoralaction.Themodernhuman

being paces about, uncertain as to what is right, with a heightened historical

46

consciousness. The cultural ideals that form him threaten moral relativism. The

deathofGodalsounderminesbasicmetaphysical assumptions.Thedissolutionof

thesuprasensuousrealmwhere truthdwellsalsoabolishes thesensuousworldof

appearances,leavingoneuncertainastowhatisreal.Thespectreofnihilismhaunts

philosophy.

Next, there is the questioning of the ‘traditional hierarchy of human

qualities,’attemptingtofindanewinthefluxofmodernity,‘whatthespecifichuman

quality of man’ is.82An attack is directed against the traditional philosophical

conceptionofman.ForNietzsche, theattackagainstanunchanginghumannature

leadshim to characterize themodernhumanbeingas ‘the lastman’ and seek the

‘superman.’ For Kierkegaard, the attack is on animal rationale, by emphasizing a

doubting believer who struggles against his reason in order to have faith. Marx

revolts against theprimacyof the contemplative character ofanimalrationale, by

promoting the primacy of action as labour in conceptualizing animal laborans.

Arendtcriticizeseachoftheseapproaches.Nietzsche’s‘superman’willsforthesake

of life, but thishighly individualizedapproach to theproblem leavesunaddressed

thebreakdownof theworldbetweenhumanbeings.83Kierkegaardconceives faith

asachievedthroughdoubt.Butthisdefinesarealitylivedbyfaiththroughtheprism

of Cartesian doubt. Kierkegaard’s knight of faith remains trapped within the

Cartesian structuring of the world. His mind is the only possible grounding for

certainty, fully internalizing the search for meaning.84Marx, by idolizing labour,

82BPF,38.83PP,201.84HC,284.

47

idolizesa formofaction,which, insofarasoneacts,doesnot involveotherhuman

beings. As a result, the victory of the animal laborans as a conception of man

exacerbates the problem of loneliness that marks contemporary existence.

Consequently, humanity’s pursuit of meaning is marked by an internalized, self-

centred search for alternate sources, which increasingly takes on abstract forms.

Worldliness as a ground for human meaning is categorically obscured. In that

manner, the historical process becomes the only refuge for consolidating human

meaning.

Moreover,thedominationofhistoricalunderstandingshacklesthinkingtoa

series of abstract concepts. These concepts are drawn not from the reality

experiencedbyparticularhumanbeings,but fromone’s conceptionof the lawsof

history. Consequently, theoretical abstractions are more illuminating than the

particularrealityofhumanbeings.This informs ‘distorted’attemptstoexplainthe

‘historicityofman.’85Understandinghumanmeaningthroughhistory,asMarxdoes,

signifiesthattheaimsandawarenessofparticularhumanagentsarenotessential

for grasping theirwholemeaning.Action, in that view, is notmeaningful in itself.

Thinking, philosophizing, is understood through history. It is the triumph of

historicismoverthought,philosophy,politics,andtherealityoftheworld.

IV.HistoryagainstPolitics

Thetriumphofhistoricismattheendofthephilosophicaltraditionprovides

the subterranean current for Arendt’s more typically identified concern about

modernity, expressed in her insistence that the crisis of the modern world is

85EIU,320-21.

48

‘primarilypolitical.’86ItisacorecomponentofArendt’sthoughtthatthisinfluence

ofthetraditionunderwritesheraccountofthecrisisofthepolitical.Thetriumphof

historicism has profound repercussions for how one understands the political

sphereandhowpoliticalirresponsibilitybecomespossible.Politicalactiononlyhas

meaning as part of a historical process—and only certain kinds at that, such as

revolt and revolution.87For Arendt, this devaluation of action for the sake of

historicism turns history against politics.88Arendt thinks that this underwrites

muchoftheprejudiceagainstpoliticsthatmarksthecontemporaryage.

Arendt sees several forces in the contemporary world that try to rid the

world of politics, and the historical understanding motivates much of it.

Totalitarianismtriestoenslavehumanbeingstotheserviceof‘historicalprocesses,’

sacrificing freedom to a strict conceptualization of historical development.89The

concept of historical development interprets history as preordained to follow

certain fullyknowable laws. Inevitably,subsumingallhuman lifeunder these iron

laws,historykillsfreedom.90

Butthereactionagainsttotalitarianismcanalsomistreatpoliticsandfurther

political irresponsibility. In lightof theconcern that theworldwarswerebrought

aboutbystateantagonism,thereisthehopeofriddingtheworldofpoliticsthrough

world government, purging the world of individual, antagonistic states.91Yet the

centralprobleminthisviewofworldgovernmentisitsrelianceuponaconjectured86BPF,140.87PP,121.88PP,95.89PP,98,120.90Itremovesanyconceptorspaceforspontaneitythatcouldprovokeadifferentdirectionoroutcome.SeePP,126-27.91PP,97.

49

visionof a futureworld, anendofhistorywhere troubles assailinghumanitywill

havevanished.Itisthekindofthinkingtowhichmassmanisespeciallyvulnerable,

andArendtthinksitculminatesinanotherformoftotalitarianism.92

In modernity there is an imperative to think about politics, but thinking

incorrectlyaboutpoliticsexacerbatespoliticalirresponsibility.Someconcludefrom

theexperienceoftotalitarianstatesthatpoliticsiscontrarytofreedom.Theirview

would be that to preserve freedom, politics must be separated from freedom.93

Another is that the state’sacquisitionof suchdestructive technologiesmeans that

politics isagreatdangertohumanlife,not just forsocietiesbut forthecontinued

existence of the whole human race.94In light of modern events, politics seems

incompatible with freedom and with the existence of life. This poses a drastic

question: Does politics still have any meaning at all? If so, can it transform the

meaninglessnessofthecontemporaryageintomeaning?

ForArendt,answeringthisquestioninmodernity isthesummitof thought,

tobeattemptedinspiteofallthechallenges.Butitisnotanascenttobeattempted

withdespairoverthemoderncondition.Therearealsohopefulopportunitiesthat

spuroneupwards,brought in largepartbytheendof thetradition.95There is the

opportunitytothinkfreefromtheconstraintsofthemetaphysicaltradition.There

alsoistheopportunitytodissolvethedistinctionbetweenprofessionalthinkersand

themany.Everysanepersonmustbeable to think,and identifywhat isrightand

92PP,97,176.93BPF,148.94PP,108-09.95LOM,12-13.

50

wrong.Thinkingcannotbelefttospecialists,andArendtcanthereforehelpinitiate

theclimbthatothersmayalsojoin.

Arendt believes that politics does have meaning, and that it can help

overcomesomeofthemeaninglessnessinmodernity.Itcanchallengethedegrading

anthropology of the mass man. It can provide the human being meaning and

directionwithouttheexpiredauthorityofthemetaphysicaltradition.Itcancounter

thesupremacyofhistoricalprocessesbyprovidingaspaceandmeaningforhuman

freedom. It can rebuild the lost sense ofworldliness. And it can also provide the

groundwork for a newway to think about the activity of philosophy, and how it

ultimatelyrelatestopolitics.

But to do all this, Arendt must rethink the meaning of politics. This

rethinking, having started with the last act of the tradition in 19th century

philosophy, moves back to the first act in ancient Greece and considers the

fragments of Aristotle. Arendt finds in Aristotle the insights that situates her

understandingofthemeaningofpolitics.

AristotleandPoliticalAction

I.Arendt’sApproachtoReadingAristotle

Arendt’s enquiry into the contentofpolitics looksback, very selectively, to

the ancients. It is not an arbitrary beginning. In Arendt’s phenomenology, to

understandpolitics,onefirstmustunderstandthatthepronouncementoftheword

‘politics’evokes theexperienceand inheritanceof itsetymological root, theGreek

term polis.This linguistic inheritance, echoing the experience of those who lived

51

within the historical polis, also includes the philosophical and political meanings

imparted to the term.96It necessarily includes the original connotation, aswell as

whatotherwritersorpoetsinthepasthavespokenonthethemeofthepolis,andby

consequenceshapedtheunderstandingof ‘politics.’97Moreover,theexperiencesof

thepeoplesofthepast,theGreeksandRomans,areworthgivingspecialattention

to, on account of how highly they think of the political realm. 98 Arendt’s

phenomenology concludes that the tradition is the primary source for helping

discoverthemeaningof‘politics.’

But the stumbling block to understanding the phenomenon evoked by the

word‘politics’isthatitsauthenticallyinheritedmeaninghasalsobeendistortedby

the philosophical tradition, initiated by Plato. The phenomenon cannot be seen

properly.The task, therefore,working fromthesamesourceof the tradition, is to

identifythedistortionofmeaning,whilealsoidentifyingtheauthenticallyinherited

meaning.Arendt’s studyof theoriginsof the tradition seeks tobalance these two

divergenttasks.Keytothesuccessofthisbalancingact isherreadingofAristotle,

for within his work she identifies the authentic meaning of politics and its

distortions.

In claiming that Arendt interprets Aristotle in these contradistinctive

manners, I am taking two interpretive stances. First, I recognize that Arendt’s

multifacetedconversationwith theGreeks isnotreducible toastrict treatmentof

thefiguresofthephilosophicaltradition.Iamconcentratingonhertreatmentofone

96BPF,153.97HC,64,183.98BPF,153.

52

figure from the origins of the philosophical tradition in Greece. I do not take the

viewthatArendtreadstheGreekphilosophicaltraditionascriticizingGreekpolitics

withonevoice,andsimply inverts thereading tocriticize theGreekphilosophical

traditionfromthestandpointofGreekpolitics.99Arendtthinksthatthetraditionis

much more complicated than a single narrative of the Plato’s and Aristotle’s

philosophy distorting politics. Instead, Arendt is in search of the fragments,

scatteredthroughoutthetotalityofthehistoricalpast,whichdiscloseanauthentic

meaningofpolitics.Arendtdoesthinkthatreflectionsonpolitics,politicalthought,

precede the philosophical tradition. 100 She can then search for the authentic

meaningofpolitics inwritersthatprecedethephilosophicaltradition, likeHomer,

Herodotus and Thucydides, and in Greek tragedians.101 But to find the authentic

meaning of politics, she also relies heavily on Aristotle. This is because Aristotle

offersthefirstsystematicreflectionuponthephenomenonofpolitics.Aristotlecan

bebothaparticipantinthephilosophicaldistortionofpoliticsaswellasasourceof

disclosureduetothedistinctapproachesAristotlehasinthinkingaboutpolitics.102

It isnecessary,then,totakeasecondinterpretivestanceonhowtoresolve

what those distinct approaches of Aristotle are, and how they then map onto

Arendt’s critique of the tradition. FollowingMichaelMcCarthy, I hold that Arendt

finds in Aristotle two approaches to political thought: the ‘descriptive’ and the

‘revisionary.’ The descriptive approach draws from existing political practice,99SeeEuben(2000),151.100PP,81.101ForanaccountofArendt’sHellenismbasedonherappropriationofdramatictragedy,seeEuben(2000).102ThisdualcharactertoArendt’sreadingofAristotleiswhyitisincorrecttoplaceheroutrightwithinanAristoteliantradition(Habermas(1987),48),ordenyoutrightsheisAristotelian(Beiner(2014),5).

53

honouring the language, customs and opinions of the political community under

investigation.Therevisionaryapproach, incontrast, ismorenormative,seekingto

reverseoropposeexistingpoliticalpracticeswithnew,loftierstandards.Itisinsofar

asAristotleisarevisionarythinker,orientinghiscriticalthoughtwiththehelpofthe

Platonic categories disparaging politics, that he distorts the authenticmeaning of

politics.103It is insofar as Aristotle is a descriptive thinker, orienting his political

thoughtfromextantGreekpoliticallife,thatheisabletohelpdisclosetheauthentic

meaningofpolitics.ForArendt,AristotlerecordsthehistoricalexperienceofGreek

life:

AristotlewasprovidingnotsomuchhispersonalopinionashewasreflectingaviewsharedwithallotherGreeksof theperiod,even if thatviewusuallywentunarticulated.ThuspoliticsintheAristoteliansenseisnotself-evidentand most certainly is not found everywhere men live in community. Itexisted, as the Greeks saw it, only in Greece—and even there for only arelativelyshortperiodoftime.104

Consequently,Aristotle’swritingsarearemarkabletransmissionofpoliticalinsights

fromtheGreekworld.Theyprovidetheopportunitytodisclosemorefullytherare

and often unnoticed experience of political action, as it uniquely developed in

Greece,andthereforeguidethesearchforthecontentandmeaningofpoliticallife

forthehumancondition.

II.AristotleandthePriorityofActivity

If Arendt’s distinction between work and labour owes itself to Indo-

European etymology, then thedistinctionbetweenwork and actionowes itself to

103McCarthy(2012),134.104PP,116;HC,24.

54

Aristotle.105Arendtseesworkasakintomakingorfabrication,andrelatesitdirectly

to the Greek verb ponein and the noun poiēsis. The act of poiēsis, of making an

artificialobject in theworld,hasadefinitivebeginning, in themindof themaker;

andadefinitiveend,whenthemakerfinishestheobject.Itisinstrumental,‘entirely

determined by the categories of means and ends.’106Arendt is in search of a

differentkindofact:praxis,whichshethinkscannotbecapturedbythecategories

ofmeansandends.

One influential reading of Arendt sees as her highly critical of Aristotle’s

articulation of praxis. While she borrows the poiēsis-praxis distinction, she sees

praxisasalreadyladenwiththecategoriesofmeansandends.Thisreadingargues

that Arendt believes Aristotle excessively emphasizes the goal-oriented or end-

orientedcharacterofpraxis.Theteleologicalframeworkinvokedatthestartofthe

NicomacheanEthics, that every action and choice ‘is held to aimat somegood,’107

means thatallactivitymustbesubsumedunderagoalor functionexternal to the

activity. Praxis, on its part, must have as an end another good beyond its own

activity.Thisgoodisultimatelythemorallygoodlife,andsothemorallygoodlifeis

theproperfunction(ergon)forman.Thevirtuesatworkinpraxis,asgoodhabitsor

traits (hexeis) help actualize that good and constitute the morally good life. This

morally good life is the good that all action and choice aimat, and is the ‘highest

good’ofman.108Inpolitics,itisrealizedasthefinalgoodofthestate.109Inthisway,

105HC,48n,195.106HC,143.SeeEN1139b1-5.107EN,1094a1.108Villa(1995),45.109Villa(1995),46.

55

Aristotle’steleologicalunderstandingofpraxismakesactionameanstoamoralistic

goalorend.110Thiswouldsubjectpraxis toapredetermined,definiteend,defined

bythegoodofthestate,andtherebyobliterateitsdistinctiveness.

The implication is that forArendt, the introductionof thenotionof ‘end’ is

itself problematic, because it instrumentalizes all acts under the static end of the

morally good life. But this is not exact. Arendt in fact sidesteps this reading of

Aristotleentirely.Asweshall see, sheassociates thiskindofreadingwithvarious

distortions within the tradition, reaching their philosophical zenith in medieval

scholasticphilosophy.ToappreciatethesubtletyofArendt’streatmentofAristotle,

onemustdrawuponthepassagessheemphasizesaboutthe‘end’ofaction.There,

Arendtsupportsaconceptionof‘end,’notasanexternal,staticandpredetermined

end but a fluid and undetermined end, intrinsic to the action. Moreover, Arendt

supportsaconceptionof‘goodlife,’notasafixedmoralpotentialbutunderstoodas

the most meaningful life for the human being. This conception underwrites how

Arendtwantsustothinkofthecontentandmeaningfulnessofactionandpolitical

life.

ThedecisivecluetohowArendt,inherinterpretationofAristotle,sidesteps

the conception of ‘good life’ as a predetermined ‘morally good life,’ is her

conceptualizationof‘virtue.’Arendtappropriatestheterm,butemphasizesitinits

originalGreekderivation,aretē.111Inthatlight,shesuppressesaninterpretationof

virtueasahexisoracharactertrait,andemphasizesvirtueasanactivity,performed

inpublic, bywhichonedistinguishes one’s self fromanother. Forher,aretēmust110Villa(1995),42-52.111HC,207.

56

first be understood in its primordial meaning of excellence. The contrast is then

betweensomeonedoingexcellentactsandsomeonedoingmorallygoodacts.The

essentialcharacteroftheact isdifferent.Arendtseestheparadigmaticexampleof

thisdoerofgoodworksasJesusofNazareth. JesusofNazarethdoesnotteachthe

activity of excellence but the activity of goodness, and the essential character of

goodness is that to be good, one be neither seen nor heard.112The activity of

Christian moral goodness emphasizes that the agent must preserve his

anonymity.113The activity of virtue, however, as Arendt understands it, is the

opposite, a deliberate individuation of one person from another. Arendt adopts a

differentarticulationofthe‘good’andthegoodlifefromthemorallygoodlife.

Arendt finds in Aristotle’spraxis a legitimateway of thinking about ‘ends,’

whichdoesnotsuccumbtoinstrumentalization.ForArendt,thecrucialpointabout

action, imported directly from Aristotle, is that the end is the act itself.114The

meaningandpurposeof theact is inseparable from theact.Consequently,Arendt

thinks the fullmeaningfulness of action is realized in the performance of the act

itself. 115 But to understand this conception of meaningful action requires

clarification of what Arendt supports when she approvingly cites Aristotle’s

conceptionoftheendofaction.Thisapproval,sinceitconceivesofpurposivenessas

intrinsic to the action, and permits the concept of end to describe the content of

action, might seem to concede too much to the categories of means and ends

thinkingthatArendtissupposedtobeavoiding.Arendt’sfurthercommentsonthat

112HC,74-75.ArendtreferstoMatthew6:2-4.113HC,180;LSA,18,95.114EN1140b6;1094a1-5.115HC,206.

57

subjectmight take her away from this approving citation of Aristotle on ends. At

times, Arendt does seem to say that any reflection on the purpose of action is

misguided,constitutingactionatonepointinTheHumanConditionas‘spontaneity

and practical purposelessness.’116 In that kind of phrase, Arendt seems to be

rejecting any role for ends. But this exposesArendt to a theoretically substantive

charge,deliveredbyHabermas,whichaccusesArendt’stheoryofpoliticalactionof

excludingpurposiveorgoal-directedactivityfrompolitics,providinganimplausibly

narrowconceptionofpolitics.117CanArendt’spositiononendsbeclarified?

Arendtdeniesthatonemustcategoricallyexcludeanyformofgoal-directed

activity. She explicitly declares that goals, like motives or aims, factor ‘in every

singleact.’Thedifference forArendt is thatgoalsarenot ‘determining factors’ for

action. 118 Arendt is not excluding or dismissing purposive activity from her

conception of politics.119In that respect, Habermas’s charge does not reflect a

rigorousgraspofArendt’sthought.Arendt’sownstrongerremarksconcerningthe

‘purposelessness’ of action can be interpreted in this context, as a rejection of a

predeterminedendforaction.

However, theconceptof ‘end’herehastobeexplained. Insteadofrejecting

theconceptofteleologyoutright,Arendtisrejectingtheconceptionofteleologythat

arrangesorconceptualizesfixedendsthatareexternaltoanddeterminativeofthe

action. In her view, it is this kind of teleology that is corrupt. But for Arendt,

116HC,177.117Habermas(1977).InHabermas’sview,strategic‘social’actionandinstrumental‘asocial’actionareexcludedfromArendt’saccount.118BPF,150.119Cane(2015),62.

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Aristotle’s etymology does not point in the same direction. In Aristotle, theword

usedforteleologicalendisatermofhisowninvention,entelecheia.Itisacomposite

of three words: echein, to have; telos, end; and the prefix en, in. Attentive to the

etymological meaning, entelecheia signifies echei to telos en: to have an end in

[itself]. As a result, Arendt thinks that Aristotle’s concept of actuality (energeia)

designates activities that achieve entelecheia. They have an end in themselves,

therebyexhaustingtheirfullmeaningintheperformanceitself.120

Thisnotionof ‘performance’ relates toArendt’s repeated themethataction

should be understood as ‘virtuosity.’ Although Arendt relates this term to

Machiavelli’svirtùasthebestexampleofwhatkindofactionsheisdescribing,she

doesnotmeanitasarejectionoftheancientAristoteliantradition.121Sheholdsthat

the appropriatemetaphors for understanding action as virtù are drawn from the

Greeks: flute-playing, dancing, healing, and seafaring.122These are the metaphors

that Aristotle uses to describe the concept of energeia, as they are activities that

realizetheirendintheactivityitself.123WhileArendtmayappreciateMachiavellifor

describingactionasvirtù,therebygivingactionitsproperpoliticalcontext,shefinds

120HC,206n.ArendtcitesMetaphysics1050a23-24.ArendtdrawsherunderstandingofenergeiafromHeidegger.Benhabib(2003),114-15.121C.f.Villa(1995),45.Hesaysthe‘self-containednessofactiondoesnotrefertosomedeterminingtelos(e.g.virtue,thegoodforman),rather,itisexpressedsolelyintermsofthevirtuosityofperformance.’Butthedichotomyisunnecessary.Itispossibletoaffirmthatvirtue,aretē,isrealizedintermsvirtuosityofperformance.WhileVillarecognizesthepotentialcompatibilityinAristotle,hesaysthatAristotlecanneveraffirmthequalityofperformancealoneasacriterionforeupraxis,alwaysemphasizingthe‘unityofperformanceandvirtue,ofgoodactionandcharacter(hexis)’(45).YetifIamcorrect,Arendtalsowantstouniteperformancewithvirtue(understoodasaretē).Whatsheleavesoutisananalysisofhexis.ButVilla’sefforttocontrastperformanceasfreedomagainstthegood,virtuousactiondistortsArendt’sappropriationofgoodas‘meaningful’forthesakeofVilla’sagonistic,Nietzscheanreading(Benhabib(2003),197-98).Performingfreeactionsrealizesthegood,mostmeaningfullife.122BPF,151-52.123HC,206n.

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thatthecontentandmeaningofthisactionisinitsfoundationsapproachedthrough

Aristotle. Action can in this way have an end. This preserves its meaningfulness.

Arendt thinks there is an important semantic distinction between two different

waysofdescribingteleology,‘inorderto’and‘forthesakeof.’‘Inorderto’concerns

the ideal of utility, implicating the categories of means and ends. It is the

instrumental conception of teleology that Arendt criticizes. But ‘for the sake of’

concerns the expressive ideal of meaningfulness.124It is in that latter sense that

Arendt thinks the concept of ‘end,’ evenwith its teleological implications, has an

importantplaceintheunderstandingofactioninpolitics.

As an ideal of meaningfulness, it is now possible to speak of the proper

function of man (ergon), but not as a fixed, determined, and limiting function as

sketchedearlier.Themeaningfulpossibilitiesrealizedforthehumanbeinginaction

areonlydisclosedinpolitics.Politics,forArendt’sAristotle,isergontouanthrōpou,

‘the work of man qua man.’125Arendt thinks that this observation underlies the

importance of political activity for human being, and why it is worth examining

what is unique about political activity. As Arendt interprets the phrase, ergon is

suggesting some unique activity. Although there is an etymological relation with

ergon toergazesthai,whichArendtassociateswith thephenomenological senseof

‘work’ as a categoryof thevitaactiva,126Arendt thinks themeaningofergonhere

should not be mistaken with that sense of ‘work.’ Instead, Arendt thinks that

Aristotleisreferringtoaparticularkindofergon.Inherview,ergon isatermthat

124HC,154.125HC,206-207.ArendtcitesEN1097b22.126HC,80.

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doesnotdistinguishbetween‘works’and‘deeds,’butordersthemtogether,sothat

ergon signifies the works and deeds that are ‘durable enough to last and great

enoughtoberemembered.’127Whatisatstakeisauniqueactivityprovidingasense

ofaction.

Thisactioncharacterizesthemeaningfulnessofpoliticallife,andtherebythe

meaningfulnessforhumanlife.Ergonismeaningfulifitenablesonetolivewell(eu

zēn). Living well is then what ergon is ‘for the sake of.’ It stands outside the

categoriesofmeansandendsthatArendtavoidsbecauselivingwellexistsinsheer

actuality (energeia), expressed as an end in itself, an entelecheia. What about

Arendt’s earlier insistence on the activity of the virtues: even understood as

excellences,could theynotbedescribedasmeans,mere instruments, toachieving

‘’thework ofmanquaman’? In fact, Arendt’s abstention fromdescribing themas

traitsorqualities, for thesakeofdescribing themasactivities,helpspreserveher

orderingofactionhere.Thearetai,asactivities,areperformedfortheirownsake,

and so are themselves actualities. Arendt writes, ‘the means to achieve the end

wouldalreadybetheend;andthis‘end,’conversely,cannotbeconsideredameans

insomeother respect,because there isnothinghigher toattain than theactuality

itself.’128Theproperworksanddeedsofmenareendsinthemselves.

III.PoliticsasaWayofLife

Arendtdoesnotsimplyemphasizethevalueofanalternativewayoflife,the

lifeofaction,bywhichonemightlive,whileatthesametimewithholdingreflection

onthiswayoflifeasbeingmorevaluablethanothers.AlthoughArendtiscarefulnot127HC,19n.128HC,207.

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tosuggestthatthereisafixedendandpurposetohumanlifededucedbyreflection

on human nature, she does think that action in the public realm has a uniquely

meaningful connectionwith aspects of the human condition. As such, there is an

inherent dignity in action that can lead to amoremeaningful,more complete life

thanotherpossibilities.

Arendt’scritiqueofmodernity is,asshownearlier,anextendedmeditation

ontheinsufficiencyofalifeinvolvinglabouralone,andhowashrunkenviewofthe

possibilitiesinherentinthehumanconditioncaststhehumanbeingintotheabyss

ofnihilism. Inparticular,sherepeatsthattheproblemwiththe lifeof labouring is

that there is no publicworld inwhich the human being can livemeaningfully.129

Cognizantofthatabsenceinmodernity,Arendtistryingtoarticulatethewayoflife

that includes the public world. It is a life worth aiming at, a ‘good’ life, a life

intrinsicallydifferentfromotherpossibilities.130

In Arendt’s conversation with the tradition, her treatment of eudaimonia

providesanimportantclueinhersearchforawayoflifeworthaimingat.Although

themeaningofthisterminvokesavenerablephilosophicaldisputationconcerning

theaimofahumanlife,whichextendsthroughoutthehistoryofphilosophy,Arendt

emphasizes its original Greek meaning against its later medieval meaning. In its

medievalmeaning,eudaimoniacorrespondswiththeCatholictheologicaldefinition

ofthetotalhappinessorbeatificstatebefittingwhat thehumanis,whichistosay

129HC,208.Arendt’sparticularconcernsaretheatrophyingofa‘spaceofappearances,’aswellthecommonsensethatfitstheselfintoreality.130SeeBeiner(2014),4,14,16.

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onewhose nature is to be created in the image and likeness of God.131But in its

original Greek meaning, eudaimonia is a lasting yet distinct state of being of an

individualvisibleonlytootherhumanbeings.Arendtdescribesitastheessenceof

whosomebodyis:bestunderstoodwhentheydieandleavenothingbehindbuttheir

story, which gains them immortality.132Arendt’s exposition on the meaning of

eudaimoniaallowsher,byimplication,toaffirmonewho‘consciouslyaimsatbeing

essential,’ as long as one understands ‘essential’ in its original Greek sense.133

Arendtconcludesthatforonetoaimateudaimoniaisforonetoaimtorealizeone’s

essence, particularized for the human individual and not universalized for the

pursuit of a fictitious natural end. Like Aristotle, Arendt seeks what enables an

individualhumanbeingtolivewellandactwell.134Thequestiontobearinmindis

whereArendtdistinguishesherself fromAristotle inwhat is themoremeaningful

life.

ForArendt,tounderstandwhatthepublicrealmisfirstrequirescontrasting

ittowhatit isnot,theprivaterealm.IntheGreekciviccommunity,thecontrastis

bestexpressedasthedividebetweenthepoliticalrealmandthehouseholdrealm.

The household is the realm where people live together for the sake of their

biological life, satiating their wants and needs.135Consequently, it contains the

activityoflabour.Inthisrealm,ruleoverothers,whichincludesservantsandslaves,

131HC,192;PP,95-96.132HC,193;183-84;MDT,104-5.FortheimportanceofstorytellinginArendt’sthinking,seeDisch(1994);Benhabib(2003),91-95.Forthediscussionofimmortalityandmeaning,seeHC,55-57.133HC,193.134EN,1095a20.135HC,30.

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ispermissible, sostrict inequality isalsopermissible.136Theoverarchingprinciple

directing this sphere is necessity. For the human being, who undeniably has

biological wants and needs drawn from the world, it is crucial that necessity be

given its due. Necessity underwrites eudaimonia. 137 Total independence from

necessity,totalindependencefromtheexternalworld,isimpossibleifonewantsto

lead a meaningful, fulfilling life. Siding with Aristotle, Arendt thinks that having

some basic external goods is a requirement for eudaimonia; one cannot achieve

eudaimoniaifoneisill,ortoopoortoeat.138

Thissphereofnecessitycontrastsdirectlywiththepoliticalrealm,wherethe

principle is freedom.This contrast,Arendt suggests, isnotabout twoequally self-

sustaining spheres of existence, but is about one sphere being recognized as

inadequate.Recognizingthisinadequacy,oneseeksoutamorecompletewayoflife

in the world. A life governed by necessity is for the Greeks a pre-political

phenomenon, an incomplete life. 139 The result of mastering necessity in the

householdrealmisthatitpermitsonetobeindependentfromnecessity.Fromthis

newposition,onecanfollowAristotleandrecognizetheincompletecharacterofthe

household realm, and choose, in freedom, a way of life that better realizes

eudaimonia. 140 The emphasis is on freedom: Arendt describes how Aristotle’s

NicomacheanEthics draws attention to three freely chosen ‘ways of life’ that are

concernedwiththings‘neithernecessarynormerelyuseful’:thethreepossiblelives

136HC,32.137HC,31.138HC,31.SeeEN,1099a30-b8;Politics1253b25.C.f.Beiner(2014),16:hepassesoverthisaspectofArendt’sreadingofAristotle.139HC,31.140HC,31.

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thatmightrealizeeudaimonia.141Theyarethelifeofenjoyingbodilypleasures,the

lifedevotedtomattersof thepolis, inwhich ‘excellenceproducesbeautifuldeeds,’

and the life of the philosopher devoted to the contemplation of things eternal.142

Setting aside the life of the philosopher for now, Aristotle holds that the life of

enjoymentfailstoattaineudaimonia.Yetthepoliticallifedoes.IntheNicomachean

Ethics,Aristotledescribesat length thecontentandvalueof thepolitical life.This

discussion fascinatesArendt, and she pursueswhat preciselymakesbiospolitikos

morevaluable.

AristotlepromptsArendttoconceptualizewhatactionis,andtheimportance

of action for realizing the meaningfulness of political life. But Arendt also

conceptualizesactionasthehighestrealizationoffreedom.Inherview,freedomis

inherent in action; men are free as long as they act.143The kind of freedom that

Arendtisseekingtodescribeisthefreedomthatrequiresacommonpublicspaceto

meet and connect with other human beings.144The freedom of the public realm,

public freedom, is interconnected with politics and makes political actions

meaningful. Arendt argues that public freedom is the raisond’être of politics, and

that the fieldofexperienceof freedomisaction.145Thepoliticalrealm, then, is the

realmwhere freedom is experienced.However,Arendt’s insistenceon freedomas

the raison d’être of politics appears distinctly modern and un-Aristotelian.146On

someinterpretationsofAristotle,freedomhasnoindependentprideofplaceinhis141HC,12-13.AsArendtnotes,Aristotlerejectswaysoflifethatare‘undertakenundercompulsion,’suchasthelifeofthemoney-maker.EN1096a5.142HC,13.143BPF,151.144BPF,147.145BPF,145.146Villa(1995),44.

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framework, as freedom is apparently ‘subsumed by the moral purposes of the

state.’147But this is notArendt’s reading ofAristotle. Arendt finds inAristotle the

meaningofpoliticallifeaspublicfreedom.

IV.PublicFreedomastheMeaningofPoliticalLife

Arendtbelievesthatonedepartstheprivatesphereandentersthepolitical

sphereinpursuitofthemorevaluablelife.ShecitesAristotle’sremarkthat‘thepolis

comesintoexistenceforthesakeofliving,butremainsinexistenceforthesakeof

livingwell.’148Arendtemphasizesaparticularfeatureoflivingwell:withinthepolis,

livingwellisaboutthepresenceoffreedom.Arendtexploresthereasonwhyalife

devotedtothepolis isa lifemostcloselyassociatedwith freedom.Thedecisionto

live in thepolis is a free decision: thepolis is the ‘very special and freely chosen’

formof organization. In terms of the human activity, the unique character of this

politicalrealmmakespoliticallifethefreestandmostdignifiedformofhumanlife.

Atthesametime,Arendtcontinuestoemphasizeheroppositiontoa fixednatural

humanend,denying that thepolitical realm isanaturalendornaturalessenceof

human life.149In choosing this language, Arendt is not denying that a greater

meaningforhumanlifeispursuedinthepoliticalrealm.Rather,sheisemphasizing

aqualitativedifferencebetweentheprivateandthepublicrealm.Innowaycanthe

political realmbeconcernedwith thenecessitiesof life,norcan theoriginsof the

political realmbe connectedwith pursuing the necessities of life. No activity that

147Villa(1995),44.148Politics1252b29;HC,183.149PP,95.

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serves necessity can constitute the political realm.150The fundamental qualitative

difference between thepublic and theprivate realm is, negatively, the absence of

actsdrivenbybiologicalnecessity;andpositively,thepresenceoffreedomasa‘fact

ofeverydaylife.’151

What precisely is this kind of freedom that Arendt considers a fact of

everyday life in the public realm? The contrast with necessity, where one is

beholden to life processes, might lead one to think that freedom is living as one

likes,afreedomofthewill.YetArendtseesthisas ‘innerfreedom’andrejectsthis

definitionbyagreeingwithAristotle,whosaysthatthisistheconceptionadvanced

by someone who does not knowwhat freedom is.152There are several problems

with inner freedom. It is wholly individualistic, an internal feeling devoid of any

outermanifestations.Thismeans ithasnorelationshipto thepublicworld,and is

indeed a retreat from the public world. Crucially, inner freedom requires no

connectionwithotherhumanbeings.153

Moreover, Arendt rejects the association of political freedom with moral

freedom, seeing thesourceof the latterdistortionof freedom in thephilosophical

conceptionoftheStoics.Theyseefreedomasachoicebetweengoodandevilaction

withina clearlydemarcated realmwhereonehas thepower toact.154In rejecting

theStoicconception,Arendtrefusestoconnectfreedomwiththeactionofthewill

outofaparticularmotiveorforaconsciouslyintendedgoal.Anactthatconsciously

150HC,37;PP,95.151BPF,144;cf.147.152BPF,146.ArendtcitesPolitics1310a25ff.153BPF,145,147.154BPF,146.

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presumes a certain goal, judges that goal to beworth pursuing, and then follows

through on it by means of the faculty of the will, is not for Arendt a matter of

politicalfreedom,butof‘rightorwrongjudgement.’155Shedrawsastrongcontrast

between two different conceptions of freedom. On the one hand, there is a

conceptionofmoraljudgementthatstemsfromanunderstandingofmoralitylinked

to a conception of inner freedom. This begins with the Stoics, is set ablaze as a

‘religious predicament’ by Pauline Christianity, and culminates in medieval

Scholasticformulations.156Thisconceptionemphasizesanactwithaparticularpre-

formulatedobjectofcognition,whichthewillthenpursues.Freedomisaboutbeing

abletochoosebetweendifferentobjectsofcognition. Ontheotherhand,actionis

freeonlyifitcancall‘somethingintobeingwhichdidnotexistbefore’asanobject

ofcognition.Ittranscendstheguidanceofanobjectofcognition.Itis,ultimately,a

higherparadigmoffreedom.

Instead of a choice between good and evil acts in the faculty of the will

constitutingthehighestparadigmoffreedomforthehumanbeing,Arendtfindsthis

byreflectingontheAristoteliandefinitionofthehumanbeingaszōonpolitikonand

zōonlogonexon.Thesedefinitionshelpdescribewhat featuresof thebiospolitikos

make life more valuable. Bios politikos realizes such high possibilities because it

provides an opportunity to conduct human affairs by the faculty of speech in a

place—the polis—where human beings live together.157What is at stakewith the

definitionofthehumanbeingAristotledeploysisnotmeanttoindicateanessential

155BPF,150.156BPF,150,56,59,288;RJ,115-19.157BPF,22-23.

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human faculty, but a particular way of acting. To interpret zōon logon exon as

‘rational animal,’ as the Latin philosophical tradition does, is to misinterpret the

facultyofspeechasthefacultyofreason,andrisksobscuringthepromisingwayof

lifethatthehumanuseofspeechindicates.Thewayoflifeisonewheretheuseof

wordsbyonecitizentopersuadeanothercitizendecidesanoutcome.Itismeantto

stand against away of lifewhere one uses force and violence against another to

decideanoutcome.158Thatactionconstitutes thehumanbeingaszōonpolitikon,a

specifically political animal and not social animal.159In Arendt’s view, Aristotle’s

definition and his restriction of the scene of the actualization of this definition to

inside theGreekpolis indicates that thoseoutside thepolis, slavesandbarbarians,

donotshareinthiswayoflife.160

Speech,however, isonlyonecomponentof thebiospolitikos.Arendt thinks

thatintheGreekworld,speechandactionwere‘coevalandcoequal.’161Eachbelong

together, as in theparadigmaticexampleofHomer’sAchillesas ‘thedoerof great

deeds and speaker of great words.’162Why do speech and action belong so close

together, and why is Achilles honoured for doing each? Aristotle provides a clue

when he writes that it is the ‘sharing of words and deeds’ which makes it

worthwhile for men to live together in the polis.163In Arendt’s view, the Greek

reasoning(whichAristotletransmits)liesinhowtoanswerthequestion,crucialto

158HC,26;BPF,22-23.159HC,23-24.ArendtblamesSenecaandThomasAquinasforthedistortionoftheterm,censuringtheStoicsandScholasticsalike.160HC,27.Arendtthinksthatthedenialofspeechtocertainmembersofthehumanrace,bymakingthemlegalaliensfromeverycountry,iseffectivelytoexilethestatelessfromthehumanrace.Origins,297.161HC,26.162HC,25.163EN1126b12.

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achieving eudaimonia,ofwho the human being is. Speech and action disclose the

uniquecharacterofparticularhumanbeingtootherswhoarepresent.164Notonly

are they coequal, they also require one another.Without a deed, therewould be

nothing to speak about. But without speech, a deed would remain unintelligible.

What happens by, with, and through the deed is identified by the doer who is

speaking,announcing‘whathedoes,hasdone,andintendstodo.’165Takentogether,

actionandspeechgivethehumanbeingahumanidentityinahumanworld.

V.MeaningfulnessandMoralityinPoliticalLife

Arendt’sconceptionofactionassharingofwordsanddeedsiswhatdefines

thebiospolitikos, and the opportunity to realize action and speech as the distinct

praxis of the vita activa provides bios politikos with its meaning. Yet Arendt’s

expungingfrombiospolitikosoftheintentionalactsthatchoosebetweengoodand

evil, aswell asher attributing somuchvalue to thekindof actionpossible in the

politicalagainstmoremoralisticconceptionsofactionopenshertoaseriouscharge

thatcouldundermineArendt’stheoryofactionprovidingmeaningforpoliticallife.

Specifically,thechargeisthatArendtdividessomeacts,whicharedefinedby

their motives and aims or intentions, from political acts. Since she explicitly

associates moral activity with intent, she implies that the conception of political

activity is empty of moral content. For some of Arendt’s critics, it appears she

celebratesimmoralityorpromotesactionunhingedfrommoralconstraints.166Even

one of Arendt’s most articulate defenders, Seyla Benhabib, has taken these

164HC,178-79.165HC,179.166Kateb(1983),32-33;Jay(1978);Beiner(2014),12-13.

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criticisms as valid to some extent, and tried ambitiously to ‘think with Arendt

againstArendt,’ providingaprocedural conceptionof ethics fromsome themes in

herwork,assetagainsttheallegedlyamoralstrains.167

This objection, however, ignores Arendt’s insistence—a quiet and rare

insistence,butoneshestillconsidersvital—thatactionspringsfromaprinciple.A

shortpassagein‘WhatisFreedom?’highlightshowArendtthinksthattheprinciple

canprovidetheethicalsignificancetoaction.Shethinksthatvirtueistheprinciple

underlying meaningful action; Arendt sees three fragments from the tradition

providingevidence.Montesquieuspeaksof‘virtue,’andtheGreeks,throughHomer,

speakof ‘excellence.’168ButMachiavelli’svirtùprovidestheclearestexample.With

referencetotheAristotelianmetaphorsthatcorrectlyemphasizehowactioncanbe

anendinitself,ArendtthinksthatMachiavelli’svirtù‘bestillustrates’excellenceasa

principle, as thatwithwhichman answers the opportunities of theworld before

him.169Principles, in Arendt’s view, provide the ethical orientation. At the same

time,recallingArendt’sdistinctionbetweenthemeaningful‘forthesakeof’andthe

instrumentalist‘inorderto,’actingonaprincipleisnotactingtobringaboutvirtue,

butasalreadyactingvirtuously,asactingforthesakeofvirtue.Norisoneactingout

ofapsychologicalmotivethatoriginatesandconcernstheself.170Arendt’sfearhere

is that thiskindof conceptionofprincipleplaces theethical significanceof action

whollywithinthepsyche. Itsets thestage forawholly internal,wholly individual,

167Benhabib(1988),31;Benhabib(2003),123ff.168BPF,151.ArendtreferstoHomerIliad,VI.208.SeealsoHC,41n.169BPF,151-52.170Cane(2015),63.

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conception of morality as a duel between different faculties within the will.171

Moralityofthissortisconcernedwithself-purification,ofregulatingandmonitoring

one’spurityofintention.172Itiswithinthe‘horizonofChristiantraditions’thatthis

conception takes hold, suppressing a conception of freedom and of ethical

evaluationthatis,asArendtwrites,‘anaccessoryofdoingandacting.’173Ifthisisthe

exegeticalsubstanceofArendt,itremainstojustifyitstheoreticalsubstance.Howis

itpossibletoprovideethicalevaluationofdeeds,withoutreferencetotheintentions

andinnermotivationsofanactor?Thewaytoseehowdeedsserveasasourceof

meaningistoturntoArendt’smostnotoriousexample:Eichmann.

Arendt’sEichmanninJerusalem isnotjustareportonthe1961trialofOtto

Adolf Eichmann. Instead, as she privately admitted, it is ‘an approach toward the

groundwork for creating new political morals.’ 174 To do so, Arendt set aside

considerations and speculations on Eichmann’s motives or intentions. In what

remains the subject of persistent controversy, she did not concern herselfwith a

close examination of the extent to which anti-Semitism motivated Eichmann’s

actions.175Instead, Arendt’s text focuses on describing the operation and scale of

theThirdReich’sFinalSolution.Aspartofthatdescription,herreportonthetrial

drawsattentiontoEichmann’sroleandparticipationintheShoah.176Consequently,

theconcentrationonEichmann’sdeedsinpropagatinggenocidedisclosesthesheer

171BPF,157.172Cane(2015),63.IamindebtedtoCane’sanalysishere.173BPF,163.174Robin(2015).175E.g.Benhabib(2014).176EJ,83-111,151-219.

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enormity of his crimes against humanity.177Given that scale, Arendt implies, the

reflectiononhismotivationsorintentionstodeterminemoralculpabilitydoesnot

matter. No motivation or intention, however benign or malignant, can alter the

significanceof thedeath tollof theFinalSolution.Eichmann, in trying to showhe

wassympathetictoparticularstoriesfromtheFinalSolution,thatheneverborethe

Jews any ill-will, never ‘personally’ had any problemswith the Jews, and thereby

was not a fanatical anti-Semite, highlights the contrast between intention and

action.IfEichmannwastellingthetruth,andreallyboretheJewsnoill-will,hewas

playing a role in a macabre comedy, where the mass-murderer insists he never

meant to hurt anyone. This was the comic element in Eichmann’s trial to which

Arendt drew attention. If Eichmann was lying, and trying to excuse himself by

sympathetic fictions, hewas refusing to confront the enormity of his deeds. This

correspondstoEichmann’s‘thoughtlessness.’178

ForArendt,Eichmannisanexampleofthelimitsoftheorizingaboutmorality

based upon consideration of intention. Any attempt to formulate Eichmann’s

intentions for the public by traditional juridical procedure is a side issue to the

moral problem at hand. Eichmann’s moral culpability cannot be lessened by

showinghedidnotreallyintendthefullextentoftheFinalSolution,norcoulditbe

increasedbyshowinghewasafanaticalanti-Semite.Itishisdeedsthatdamnhim.

Eichmann’s deeds showhim to be amassmurderer.His speech shows him to be

someoneunwillingtoconfrontthemoralimportofhisdeeds.Itisonthatbasisthat

177Benhabib(2000),76-82.Drawingattentiontothesecrimesas‘crimesagainsthumanity’iscentraltoArendt’spoliticalthinkinginEJ.178Benhabib(2014).

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Arendt judges him. It is also on that basis that Arendt shows her theoretical

consistency,andshowsherselfcapableofprovidingastern,uncompromisingmoral

judgementinevaluatingtheactionsofparticularactors.179

Actionrevealstheworthoftheactor.Thatis,ultimately,whatArendtthinks

is at stakewithpolitical action, andwhy, given its public character, itmoves in a

realmwhollydifferent from the realmwhereoneevaluates intention.Byentering

into thepublicsphere, thedoerofdeedsandspeakerofwordsmustbewilling to

riskthedisclosureofhimself.180Heproveshimselfopentothepossibilitiesofglory

and of excellence, but also open to judgement and condemnation.181It is the

possibilityandperilofpublicfreedom.

VI.ThePolisanditsPurpose

Alifethatparticipatesinpublicfreedomrequiresthepresenceofothers,and

one requires a realm to guarantee the existence of public freedom, and a place

wherepeoplecancometogether.182ForArendt,thatconstitutesthepurposeofthe

politicalrealm,reflectedinthenatureoftheGreekpolis,thequintessentialexample.

The raisond’être of thepolis is ‘to establish and keep in existence a spacewhere

freedomasvirtuositycanappear.Thisisarealmwherefreedomisaworldlyreality,

tangible inwordswhich canbeheard, in deedswhich canbe seen, and in events

whicharetalkedabout,remembered,andturnedintostoriesbeforetheyarefinally

179Seeherrejectionofcollaborationorconsequentialism:‘thosewhochoosethelesserevilforgetveryquicklythattheychooseevil.’RJ,36.Arendt’srejectionofinstrumentalismisalsoaboutrejectingthiskindofreasoningaboutethics.180HC,180.181Forthisreason,Arendtrejectsnotionsofcollectiveresponsibilityasadiminishmentinthepersonalresponsibilityoftheactor.SeeRJ,19-23,28-29,59,97,147-58.Arendt’smoraljudgementcouldwellbesummarizedbyaremarkofNietzsche’s:‘Shetoldmeshehadnomorality—andIthoughtthatshehad,likemyself,amoreseveremorality.’RJ,104.182Rev,31.

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incorporated into the great storybook of humanhistory.’183This reflection on the

purpose of the polis provides Arendt with the chance to describe the essential

featuresofthepoliticalrealm.ForArendt,itisarealmofequality,ofplurality,and

ofappearances.

Asnotedabove,Arendt’saccountofthebiospolitikosemphasizesthiswayof

lifeasthemost‘good’ormeaningfullife.The‘goodlife’oftheNicomacheanEthicsis,

inArendt’sreadingofAristotle,thelifeofthecitizen.Itconcernsthelifeofonewho

is no longer bound to labour and work, and so is freed from the necessary life

processes thatmarkbiologicalexistence.184In the lifeof thecitizen, theactivityof

speakingholds a special importance.Thosewhopartake inbiospolitikos, citizens,

musthaveas their central concernspeakingand talking toothercitizens. Speech

becomes a way of life. When one takes up speech as a way of life, one opts for

persuasion rather than violence. Because one speaker must persuade his fellow

citizensinorderthathisfellowcitizensobeyhim,andhecanbepersuadedbyother

citizens toobey them,noonecitizen is in commandofanother.A citizen, then, in

Aristotle’sformulation,isonewhorulesandisruledinturn.185Aristotle’sideahere

is that the activity of speaking, shared amongst all citizens, gives each citizen the

chance to rule. But contrary to a model of ruling that persists in the household

sphere, where obedience to the command of the head of the household is

unquestioned,total,immediate,andpermanentlyarranged,themodelofrulinghere

entailsadynamicinvolvementofallfreecitizenswhocanexercisetemporarilythe

183BPF,153.Politicalactionthusproducesthestoriesthatassureoneofimmortality.SeevonHeyking(2016),168.184HC,37.185Politics1277b13-16.

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roleof commandas longas theypersuadeothers to accept them in thatposition.

Once they are unable to persuade, another takes their place. Ruling, then, in the

senseitpersistsinthehousehold,doesnotexistinthepolis.

ItisforthatreasonthatArendt,adjustingAristotle’sformulationtocontrast

itfromhouseholdrule,butexpressingthesamethought,writesthatthefreecitizen

is onewho neither rules nor is ruled by others.186Arendt also explores a further

implicationofthisconcept.Citizensmoveinaspherewheretheyobeyoneanother

byfirsthavingbeenpersuadedlive inarealmofequality.To live inthissituation,

she thinks, is another facet of public freedom. Freedom is possible only among

peers.187Itmakesthelifeofthecitizenmoreworthwhile.Inthissense,asAristotle

notes,thelifeofthecitizenisbetterthanthelifeofsomeonewhosimplyrulesover

others, like a despot. 188 By conceiving of such a close, mutually supporting

relationship between freedom and equality, Arendt is contesting the modern

concern,articulatedbyAlexisdeTocqueville,thatequalityisadangertofreedom.189

Publicfreedomdemandsequality.Yetitisacertainkindofequality.

Arendt insists on the equality of thosewho participatewithin the political

realm as citizens; who, in other words, share the association of citizenship. As

citizenship depends upon the performance of an activity, not on nature or social

class,Arendtthinksthattheassociationofcitizenship,andtheconcomitantpolitical

equality, unites persons of diverse natures and social backgrounds. It is very

different fromotherkindsofequality thatmayemphasizeassociationsdependent

186HC,32.187Rev,31.188Politics1325a4.HC,32n.189Rev,30.C.f.Villa(1995),44.

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onsamenessofnatureorsocialbackground.Twoofthesameprofessionals,united

and equal in social class, do not necessarily express political equality. Claims to

unitethehumanraceinequalityunderasharedessence,suchbeingcreaturesmade

in the image of God, or sharing in the same sinfulness, are not expressions of

political association. Arendt agrees with Aristotle that citizenship is not an

association based on shared natural traits.190The challenge of a true political

associationisthatitmustuniteandmakeequalinthepublicrealm‘peoplewhoare

differentandunequal.’191Thisequalizationbetweendifferentandunequalcitizens

takes places through friendship (philia). 192 Justice, in the sense of material

distribution,isonitsowninsufficient.ForArendt,thecrucialinsightconcerningthe

true character of a community comes fromAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics, rather

than Plato’s Republic. It is Aristotle who identifies that friendship is a necessary

component of a community. Friendship builds the community bond between

citizens. It provides a shared understanding of the opinions of others, despite

whatever differences may exist between persons.193This shared understanding

tempersandmoderatesthepursuitofgloryandexcellencethatcharacterizesGreek

life,settingonecitizeninanunceasingcontestwiththeothers.Friendshipleadsthe

citizensfromcontesttocommunity.

Inthisway,politicalequalityhelpsbuildacommonworldofequals,butalso

embraces and encourages difference. The embrace of difference constitutes a

recurringthemeinArendt.Inherownlanguage,thepoliticalrealmmustguarantee

190Politics1275b23-34.191HC,215.ArendtcitesAristotle,EN1133a16.192PP,17.193PP,18.

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plurality. It is consonantwithAristotle’s own emphasis. ForAristotle, a truepolis

must ensure a unity, but if it is too much of a unity, it becomes more like a

household.Whatpreservesthisunityandatthesametimepreventsthedestruction

of the polis and its replacement by a familial unit is the presence of plurality

(plēthos) in thepolis.194Through that lens, it ispossible to see the logic informing

Arendt’sassertionatthestartofTheHumanCondition,thatpluralityisthecondition

of all political life.195This condition has two senses: conditio sine qua non and

conditioperquam.196Asconditiosinequanon, thepolismusthavepluralitytobea

politicalsphere,tobedifferentfromnon-politicalspheres.Asconditioperquam,the

actionsundertakenwithinthepolismustemphasizeandsustainthisplurality.The

speech of citizens serves to distinguish one citizen from another, revealing the

uniquedistinctivenessofauniquebeingandthereuponactualizingplurality.197

Atthesametime,theactualizationofpluralitythroughspeechmustbedone

amongstothermen,whoareaffirmedasequals tooneanother.198Thisequality is

closelyrelatedtoplurality.Asnotedearlier,equalitymeansthatthepolissharesthe

rule-ruledrelationamongstall its citizens. If a single individualorcollectivebody

sets themselves forward to be rulers over the others, then one-man-rule, ‘mon-

archy,’ results.ForArendt, this isAristotle’sconcernover theproblemof tyranny.

‘Mon-archy’ is apossibledescriptionof severaldifferent regimes: a regimewhere

oneman rules as anoutright tyrant against all, to abenevolentdespotism, all the

194Politics1261a18-25;Frank(2005),143-47.195HC,7.196HC,7.197HC,176-78.198HC,7-8,175-78.

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waytoaformofdemocracywherethepeopleformacollectivebodytoruleasone

against others.199What unites all these regimes is not necessarily how poorly or

howcruellytheyrule—somecanruleverywell, infact.Instead,theyall insistthat

only‘therulershouldattendtopublicaffairs.’200Intheseregimes,theruleddonot

participate in common affairs and are relegated to private life. The ruler then

deprivestheruledoftheirchancetodistinguishthemselvesinthepoliticalsphere

andactualizetheirplurality.One-man-ruleabolishesplurality,butbecauseplurality

isthesinaquanonofthepoliticalsphere,italsosucceedsinabolishingthepolitical

sphere.201One-man-ruleistheabolishmentofthepolis.

Thefinal,andmostexplicitlyontological,featureofthepolisArendtoutlines

is that the polis is the space of appearances. 202 Arendt defines appearances

linguistically.What from the world ‘appears tome,’ (dokeimoi), is formulated in

speech as doxa (opinions). Appearances are opinions. In this sense, the world

reveals itself differently to different people. Moreover, as doxa also means

‘splendour’and‘fame,’toassertone’sownopinionisalsotoshowone’ssplendour

andfame,toshowwhooneis.Everymanhashisowndoxa,hisownopeningtothe

world that is fame.Sinceamanopenshimself to theworld throughspeakingand

acting, the space of appearances comes into being ‘wherever men are together’

through speech and action, where their different doxai meet and interact.203This

interaction is through persuasion. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle identifies the art of199HC,221n.ArendtseesAristotleasemphasizingaregimewherethemanyhavepower‘notasindividuals,butcollectively,’Politics1292a13.200HC,221.ArendtcitesAristotle,AthenianConstitutionxv.5.201HC,220-21.202Disch(1994),56.AsDischnotes,somemetaphysicalassumptionsunderwriteArendt’saccountofthepublicrealm.203PP,13-15;HC,199.

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persuasionasthestrictlypoliticalartofspeech.Persuasioncomesfromtherealmof

opinions,doxai.204Itrecognizesits inherent limits, inthat,meetinganotherhuman

being, one is always speaking to another unique person. It therefore reaffirms

plurality.Inpersuading,oneoffersanopinionamongstotheropinions.Thatiswhy

plurality underwrites the space of appearances. 205 Arendt links the space of

appearancestothepoliticalcharacterofthepolis.‘Whateveroccursinthisspaceof

appearances,’ she writes, ‘is political by definition.’206The space of appearances

makes thepolis.More than justaphysical location, thepolis is theorganizationof

peoplewholivetogetherandappeartooneanother.207

Arendt’s explicit ontological thesis is that Being and appearance coincide.

Thehumanreality,suggestsAristotle,isthesameasappearance:‘forwhatappears

toall, thiswecallBeing,’208This thesishas important implications.First, reality is

guaranteed by the presence of others who act and speak in the same realm. As

‘appearing’ is always an ‘appearing to,’ Being always presupposes a spectator.209

Second,thethirstforknowledgeneverleavestheworldofappearancesaltogether.

Both common sense and comprehensive scientific knowledge rely on evidence,

‘inherent in theworld of appearances.’210Thus reality is theworld of experience,

with no transcendent beyond: only what appears to all, only this we call reality.

Third is the implied rejection of what Arendt calls ‘metaphysical fallacies.’211A

204PP,12-13;HC,26.205HC,220.206BPF,153.207HC,198.208HC,199.ArendtcitesAristotle,EN1172b36.209LOM,19.210LOM,54.211LOM,15.

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metaphysical fallacyisafallacythatattemptstotranscendtheworldofexperience

into a comprehensive theory of the whole. As a fallacy, it has constituted an

inheritanceoftheerrorsofpastphilosophers,bywhichwehavedeceivedourselves

deeply,almostnaturally.212Themetaphysical fallaciesArendtrejectsare thekinds

thatcoalescetosustainanontologywhereappearancesarenotreallyreal,butonly

a partial representation of a veiled realm of Being. Arendt definitively rejects the

two-world metaphysical dichotomy, between the world of appearances and the

worldofreality.

Arendt’sontologicalclaimalsohelpsidentifytwoofthethreatstopoliticsas

challenges to that ontological thesis. The existence and purpose of the polis, the

existence of the political realm, is dependent upon a people engaged in a certain

activity. It resides in action and speech. If words no longer ‘disclose realities,’ if

deedsno longer ‘createnewrealities,’ then the spaceof appearancesatrophies.213

The polis vanishes. Any way of thinking that disbelieves the reality disclosed in

doing great deeds and speaking greatwords is ipso facto a threat to the political

realm.Thethreathereisawayofthinkingthatdevaluespolitics,criticizingitasa

realm of contingencies, uncertainties, and imperfections. The implicit contrast is

between this political realm, and a non-political realm of stability, certainty, and

perfection.

There is, moreover, a second threat: ignoring appearances altogether. If

beingandappearanceare totallydivided,everything thatappearscanbedoubted

on thegrounds that itmaynotbe—that is, itmaybeadelusion.This assumption212Burch(2011),19.213HC,200.

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underwritesmodernscience.214Thedomainsofknowledgethatcannotbedoubted,

such asmathematics,mustnotbe concernedwith appearances at all.215This is in

partthedirectionandimpetusofthemetaphysicaltradition.Appearancesarenota

worthyobjectofstudy,ultimatelybecausetheyarenotreal.Oneisagainleftwitha

dichotomybetweentwoworlds:one,theinvisiblereality,andtheother,thevisible

unreality. Plato’s initiation of the tradition of political theory makes these two

threatsreal.

AristotleAstray:ContemplationandtheThreattothePolitical

DespiteAristotle’sinsights,heiscaughtupwithinPlato’sthought.Critically,

he re-presents the Platonic relationship between philosophy and politics, the

dichotomybetweenphilosophical lifeof contemplationandunphilosophical lifeof

action.Thisimplicitlydevaluespoliticsandsolidifiesthetwo-worlddichotomythat

seizes thought and obscures the phenomenon of politics. Consequently, as the

traditionofpoliticaltheorymarchesonacrosstime,thefateofthepoliticalistolose

itsinherentdignity.

I regard the implicationsofPlatoandAristotle’sprioritizationof the lifeof

contemplation against the life of action as Arendt’s focus. The prioritization of

philosophyoverpoliticsisthedecisiveissue.216AtthestartofTheHumanCondition

Arendtclearlyidentifiestheprimarychallengetounderstandingthevitaactiva:

214HC,275.215HC,266.216Bernstein(2000),280;Dolan(2000).C.f.Habermas(1985),171;Villa(1995),42.Theconceptofteleologyandtheblurringofthedistinctionbetweenpoiēsisandpraxisdoofcourseplayarole,justasecondaryrole.

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The termvitaactiva is loadedandoverloadedwith tradition. It isasoldas(butnotolderthan)ourtraditionofpoliticalthought.Andthistradition,farfrom comprehending and conceptualizing all the political experiences ofWesternmankind,grewoutofaspecifichistoricalconstellation:thetrialofSocratesandtheconflictbetweenthephilosopherandthepolis.217

The issue for Arendt is this conflict. The place to start is with the event that

originates this conflict: the trial and death of Socrates, the ‘turning point’ for the

historyofpoliticalthought.218ArendtseesthetrialasonewhereSocratesisunable

topersuadehis judgesofhis innocence,and is therebyexecuted.TheyoungPlato

was scandalized by this event. Socrates relied on the primacy of persuasion and

doxa.ForPlato,Socrates’sfailuretopersuadehisjudgescastdoubtonthevalidityof

persuasion, thespecificallypolitical formof speech,hitherto thehighestart in the

Greekworld.Italsocastdoubtondoxa,opinion.Socratessubmittedhisowndoxato

thedoxaoftheAthenians,butthemajority,withtheirirresponsibleopinions,voted

tocondemnhim.Forsuchaninjusticetohappenbymeansofdoxashowedthatdoxa

was a grossly unreliable standard for politics. Plato then yearned for an absolute

standardbeyonddoxathatcouldserveasareliablestandardforpolitics.Finally,the

irresponsible actions of the city had killed the finest example of philosophy the

world had yet seen. In Plato’s view, it could happen again. For philosophy,

irresponsiblepoliticiansareanexistentialthreat.Itis‘badmanagement’ofpolitical

affairs that makes the philosopher unable to pursue philosophy.219But from the

pointofviewofthecity,thephilosopherisa‘good-for-nothing,’someonewhodoes

217HC,12.218PP,6.219PP,82.

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notactinthebestinterestsofthecityandmakesothersunfitforpoliticallife.220Out

of these twoopposingviews isborn theconflictbetween thephilosopherand the

polis.

I.Plato’sFatefulInfluence

FromSocrates’strial,Platodrawstwofatefulconclusions:one,metaphysical,

andtheother,political.ThemetaphysicalconclusionofPlato,‘themostanti-Socratic

conclusion,’ is to oppose opinion to truth.221 Plato’s demand for an absolute

standard in politics finds a convenient alignment with his doctrine of ideas.

AlthoughArendtdoesnotthinkthattheoriginofthedoctrineofideasisprimarily

political, she does think it had some influence over the development of his

philosophicaldoctrineofideasinsofarasonerecognizesitspoliticalimplications.222

Arendtinterpretstheallegoryofthecavetocontaintheseimplications.Thecentral

lesson of the allegory of the cave ismetaphysical. On account of theworld of the

cavebeingunreal,thephilosophermustnotbecontentwiththeworldofthecave-

dwellersandmustseekadifferentworld.Thedoxaiwithinthecaveareadistortion

ofreality.Instead,thephilosophermustseekthecauses(archai)ofwhatthingsare.

Outside the cave of appearances, alone, he discovers causes and the essences of

things. The essences are the ideas (eide), and the study of them makes the

philosopher.Finally, thephilosophermustreturntothecave,butonlytoconvince

thosewithinthattheirworldisnotthetrueworld.223

220PP,9-10.221PP,8.222PP,8.HC,226n.223PP,29.

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In rejecting doxa, Plato creates another world devoid of doxa, a world of

truth.One is the realmof human affairs: the other, the realmof ideas.One is the

realmofpolitics: theother, the realmofphilosopher.One is the realmwithother

human beings: the other, a realm outside the plurality ofmen. Plato opposes the

contemplation of the eternal outside the cave to life in the cave. In so doing, he

portrays the life of the philosopher as inherently contradictory to the life of the

citizen, the bios politikos.224Moreover, the latter can never disclose reality. Only

contemplation of eternal ideas can. In thatmove, thevitacontemplativa triumphs

overandisdeclaredmorevaluablethanthevitaactiva.

ForPlato,theconflictbetweenthephilosopherandpolis,andtheconsequent

dangertothephilosopher,leadshimtoconcludethatpoliticsmustchangetokeep

philosophysafe.225Tosolvetheconflict,heproposesaradicalpoliticalsolution:that

thephilosopherrulesthepolis.Plato’ssolutionisradicalbecauseheinsiststhatthe

philosopherisstillconcernedforemostwiththeeternal,non-changing,non-human

affairs;buthealsoargues,contrarytotheperspectiveofthepolis,thattheconcern

with the eternal actually makes the philosopher fit to play a political role. The

philosopher’sconcernfortheeternal ideasdoesnotmakehim,asthepolis thinks,

‘good-for-nothing.’226 Plato wants to make philosophy useful for politics.227 He

thereforetransformstheideasintostandardsforpolitics,asvariationsonthemost

importantidea,theideaofthegood.Inthatwaytheeternalideascanbeappliedto

politics,andtheseeternalideascantheneliminatetheuncertainandcontingentin

224HC,20.225HC,229.226PP,10.227PP,37.

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humanaffairs.InArendt’sinterpretationoftheallegoryofthecave,Platoexpresses

theuseofphilosophy forpolitics.ForArendt,by teaching this lesson, theallegory

showsthatphilosophyis‘designedforthesepoliticalpurposes.’228Thephilosopher

ruleristheonlyonewhoknowsthehighestidearequiredforpoliticallife,whichis

foundoutsidethecave:theideaofthegood.229Theideaofthegoodthencompletes

the city, via the philosopher as the only onewho knows it. The idea of the good

providesthephilosopherrulerthenecessarystandardforrulinghumanaffairswith

objectivecertainty.230

There is a particular method to realize this standard in political life. The

ruler, in the Platonicmodel, is the onewho knowswhat is. Someonewho knows

what something is, grasps the ideaofwhat something is.Applied topolitical rule,

thephilosopherrulerknowstheidea(eidos)ofwhatis-to-beinpolitics,theideaof

thegood,thenorganizesthemeansandexecutesthemtobringabouttheidea.This

isthesamestructureofactionaspoiēsis:oneperceivestheimageorshape(eidos)of

the product-to-be, then organizes the means to realize it.231Themodel of poiēsis

provides the objective certainty that Plato seeks. The city is the statue,while the

philosopherruleristhesculptor.232

Imagining political action as poiēsis transforms the concept of relation

between men in the political realm. If certain, clearly indicated standards must

result frompolitics,mencanonly livetogether lawfullyandpoliticallywhensome

228PP,31,56.229HC,226.230HC,226.231HC,225.232HC,226-227.

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rule and some obey.233The philosopher ruler is the one who dominates others.

Arendt thinks the philosopher ruler, as a form of one-man rule, is technically

tyranny. Yet it is not necessarily an evil regime; thephilosopher ruler as a tyrant

could still be benign.234Consequently, one must be wary of claiming that Arendt

seescontinuitybetweenPlato’sRepublic, theconceptofphilosopherruler,andthe

historyoftyrannyintomodernity.235MoreatstakeforArendtistheconceptionby

which the philosopher ruler commands the city and brings permanent order to

human affairs. In that conception of rule, there is no place for action.236The

conceptionof command required to underwrite thedemand for permanent order

mustcomefromasourcebeyondthepoliticalrealm.ForPlato,itishowthemaster

ofthefamilyacts.Platotherebyimportsintopoliticsthecategoriesrecognizedfora

well-ordered household. Plato’s Republic is actually an attempt to extend the

conceptofthefamilyuntilitembraceseverycitizen,sothatthepoliswouldbethe

same as one family, with a clearmaster of the householdwho commands and is

obeyed.237

In Arendt’s reading, the influence of Plato upon the tradition is subtle but

formidable.Practicallyspeaking,Plato’s‘cityinspeech,’thecommonwealthruledby

philosophers, never was taken seriously. The prospect of the philosopher ruling

tyrannicallywastherebyneveraliveconcernforpolitics.238Moreinfluentialisthat

Platopresentsthecityinspeechforthesakeofpreservingthesafetyandflourishing233HC,222.234HC,221.235Plato’sconceptionarisesfrom‘theearnestdesiretofindasubstituteforactionratherthanfromanyirresponsibleortyrannicalwilltopower.’HC,222.C.fMcCarthy(2012),132-33.236HC,224.237HC,223-24.238PP,27,84.

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ofthephilosophicalwayoflife.239Whatlingersisindifferenceandcontemptforthe

political world, as the political world can interfere with the flourishing of

philosophical activity. Plato terms the politicalworld ‘the realm of human affairs’

and connotes it as the realmof troubled, futile actions that shouldnot be treated

withgreatseriousness.240Diminishedinseriousness,thepoliticalrealmissubjectto

a further theoretical transformation. Although political activity had once been

worthyofdignitybecauseitwasconceivedasfreefromnecessity,nowallpolitical

activity is reduced to the level of mere necessity, the lowest level of human

activity.241

Plato’s thoughts over the trial of Socrates have a critical effect for the

developmentofpoliticaltheory.Heintroducestheconceptofrulerandruledasthe

most important political relationship. He lowers the dignity of the political realm

metaphysically, by declaring that the political realm is only the world of

appearances, which he contrasts to the non-political world of eternal Being. He

disbelieves that there is any seriousness in theworld of appearances, so it is not

worthyofcareful theoretical study.Heconstructsanactivityof contemplating the

worldofeternalBeing, thevitacontemplativaandcontrasts itunfavourably to the

vitaactivathatiscaughtupintheworldofappearances.Finally,hesetsinmotion

the gradual diminishment of the vitaactiva as a life concernedwith the realm of

merehumannecessities.Consequently,heintroducesaconceptionofthevitaactiva

andpoliticallife,which,workedoutintime,eventuallyleavesnoplaceforfreedom.

239BPF,107-115.240HC,19,185.241HC,85,314.PP,82.

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II.Aristotle’sDevelopmentoftheContemplativeLife

Aristotle not only passes on these Platonic thoughts, he gives them a

particularformandarticulation.Thecoreofhis ‘revisionary’teaching,hiseffortto

redirectthenormsandgoalsofexistinghumanpractices,istoanswerthequestion

as towhat is the best human life, the life that best realizes eudaimonia. As noted

earlier,Aristotle’sNicomacheanEthicsdrawsattentiontothreefreelychosen‘ways

oflife’thatmightrealizeeudaimonia:thelifeofenjoyment,thepoliticallife,andthe

contemplativelife,thelifeofthephilosopherdevotedtothecontemplationofthings

eternal.242DespiteAristotle’slengthyanalysisofthevalueandworthofthepolitical

life, which Arendt finds to be a great treasure, Aristotle concludes that

contemplativelifeisthebestlife.

Aristotle emphasizes thateudaimonia is an activity thathas to accordwith

thehighesthumanvirtue.243Thisvirtue,heargues, is theoreticalwisdom(sophia).

Thespecificactivityoftheoreticalwisdomisforthemindtobeconcernedwiththe

mostexcellentof things, thearchai.Themind’s concern for thearchai, themind’s

contemplationofthearchai, isthemostself-sufficientactivityonecanimagine:the

wise person can contemplatewithout any other personpresent. It is also praised

because it is a solitary activity. Additionally, Aristotle associates leisure (scholē)

witheudaimonia.AlthoughinArendt’sviewtheGreekconceptionofleisureinitially

correspondswith the liberation from life’snecessities,Aristotlenowextends it.244

Allpersonsare inneedof thenecessitiesof lifeasaprerequisite to free,virtuous

242HC,12-13.SeeEN1096a5,1095b14-19.243EN1177a12-14.244PP,117;LOM,92-93.

89

action.Butoncebasicnecessitiesaresatisfied,thevirtuousstillneedotherhuman

beings toward whom to act virtuously. For example, the just man needs others

toward whom he will act justly.245Since the presence of other human beings

constitutesthepoliticalrealm,andisarequirementforanyvirtuouspoliticalaction,

the man in the political realm who acts virtuously needs the presence of other

persons: he is never truly free from necessity. He is never truly at leisure, and

thereforenevertrulyhappy.Onlythemanwhodoesnotneedthepresenceofothers

toactisfreefromnecessity.Leisure(scholē)isthereforeredefinedasfreedomfrom

therealmwhereothersarepresent.Itisnow,inArendt’sinterpretationofAristotle,

freedomfromtherealmofpolitics.246Theconclusionisthatonlythemanwhoexits

thepoliticalrealmisreallyatleisure,andreadytopursueeudaimonia.

Eudaimonia, according to Aristotle, rests upon fully exploring the

implicationsoftheactivityofthemind(nous).ThisbringsAristotletoconsiderthe

gods.Thegods,completelyself-sufficient,engageinapure,uninterruptedactivityof

the mind, undertaken for its own sake, which looks upon the unchanging and

eternal,thearchai.Theirsisthefreestlife.Humanbeingsalsohaveamind,andso

canandshouldengageinthedivineactivityandemulatethefreest,divinelife.This

is the best and happiest life for the human being. Although Aristotle, recognizing

thatpolitical activitiesare characteristicallyhuman,doesnotargue to forgo these

activities entirely, he thinks they are secondary to the contemplative activity.247

245EN,1177a30-33.246PP,82.247LOM,163.ArendtreferstoEN,1177b26-1178b18.

90

Definitively,thehighestpurposeofhumanlifeisnotpoliticalactivity,butthedivine

activity,contemplatingtheeternal.248

AsArendtseesit,Aristotle’sattempttofixdefinitivelytheendofhumanlife

as contemplating the eternal is where his conception of teleology does its most

damagetothepolitical.Happinessresidesinleisurefreefrompolitics,thepurpose

of action is advance into a state of leisure where one is free from political

obligations,andfreetocontemplate.Politicsisnowameanstoanend,andthatend

is leisure. Effectively, this is declaring that the proper end of politics is to cease

participating in politics. Leisure is also the precondition of a life devoted to

contemplation. Broadly speaking, then, the condition for the possibility of

philosophy is todiscover theoppositeofpoliticalactivity.Politicalactivity isanti-

philosophical.249Thecontrastbetween these twowaysof life isblunt,andblunter

still iswhichofthetwoisbetter.Vitacontemplativa isahigher,happier,andfreer

life. Arendt sees no other conclusion: according to Aristotle, contemplation is the

supreme way of life. As Aristotle writes, ‘One should either philosophize or take

one’sleaveoflife.’250Thetriumphofphilosophyoverpoliticsiscomplete.

Aristotle’s reinforcement of the hierarchy culminating in contemplative

philosophy distorts some of the ways he understands politics, leading him away

from his original insights. Like Plato, Aristotle naturalizes the political realm.

Aristotle argues that vita contemplativa is the freest, most self-sufficient life, and

thus implies that bios politikos is in some way not free. Refining the Platonic

248LOM,136.249PP,82-83.250LOM,I134.ArendtcitesAristotle’sfragmentarydialogueProtreptikos,Düringed.,B19andB110.

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argument,Aristotle suggests that thepolitical realmhasanaturalorigin.Notonly

doesthefamilyandthecooperationoffamiliesarisefromthedemandsofmaterial

necessity, but political communities arise out of them aswell. Aristotle of course

emphasizestheradicaldistinctionbetweenpolisandfamily,butinArendt’sviewhe

doesnotdoentirelyenoughtodispensewiththenotionthatpoliticsexiststosatisfy

material concerns.251 In that way, the free character of political action is not

adequatelydefended.

Aristotledoesspeakof thepolisasavoluntaryassociationofcitizens living

togetherinfreedom.Buthefurtherunderminestheimportanceoffreedomwhenhe

carries on from Plato and distinguishes between the forms of government by

analysingwho is rulingandwho is ruled: theone, the few,or themany.Although

Aristotle justifies the concept of rule by an appeal to his conception of material,

‘natural’necessity—whichestablishesthedifferencebetweentheyoungandoldfit

and unfit to rule—his conclusion is very Platonic.252Aristotle affirms that the

conceptofrulingisfundamentaltopoliticalanalysis.Thiscontradictionundermines

thepreviouslyexploredviewoffreedomArendtfindsinthePolitics,emergentfrom

thereflectiononthepolisasarealmofequalswhereallcitizensshareinrulingand

being ruled. Rather, in Arendt’s view, it shows another feature of the Platonic

inheritance.Inprioritizingtheconceptofrule,whatmotivatesAristotleiswariness

for the unpredictability of praxis,with its constant potential for new beginnings.

251HC,37,183;PP,17.252BPF,116-17.

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Correspondinglyhedesirestoreplacethatuncertaintywiththeconceptsthatevince

thecertaintyofthemasterissuingorders.253

Plato’s suspicion of the unpredictability of action impels him to describe

actionthroughconceptsdrawnfrompoiēsis,humancraftsmanship,wheretheterms

aremoresecure.Aristotle,although‘toalesserdegree’thanPlato,alsosuccumbsto

this temptation.254For Arendt, Aristotle’s motivations for doing so are primarily

metaphysical.Desiringtorankcontemplationasthehighestactivity,Aristotle, like

Plato, finds thatboth contemplationand theworkof the craftsmanare guidedby

beholding the ideaormodel—bothmeaningeidos.Recognizing this ‘inneraffinity’

betweencontemplationandpoiēsis,Aristotleranksthekindsofcognitionthusly.At

thebottomrankheplacespracticalinsight(dianoia)andpoliticalscience(epistēmē

praktikē); next, he places the science of fabrication (epistēmē poiētikē); finally,

followingoutofpoiēsis,heplacestheōria,thecontemplationofeternaltruth,asthe

highestkindofcognition.255Throughthattaxonomy,Aristotleprovidespoiēsiswith

agreatermetaphysicaldignitythanpraxis.

InthePlatonicmanner,Aristotle’smetaphysicalviewscontrastappearances

toreality, transmittingandsolidifying the two-worlddichotomyofmetaphysics.A

subtleindicationofthisishowAristotle’smetaphysicsaffecthisconceptionoffree,

virtuousaction,anddevelopitinadirectionArendtdoesnotrepeat.ForArendt,the

essence of freedom is located in the realm of appearances. In evaluating action,

Arendtthinksitshouldbeassessedasitappearstoothers,soforher,theGreeksare

253HC,222.BPF,118-19.254HC,230.255HC,301-302.ArendtreferstoMetaphysics1025b25,1064a17.

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troubled by whether an act is really just if it is seen by no one else.256Aristotle

emphasizes thateveryperformanceofactionrests in character (hexis), something

that cannot ever appear to another. For this reason, character is a theme absent

from Arendt’s articulation of action. But Aristotle, for his part, is concernedwith

tryingtodistinguishactions thatarereallyvirtuous fromthosethatonlyhavethe

appearanceof virtue.His solution to thatproblem is to argue that really virtuous

actions are grounded in character, which intensifies the dichotomy between

appearance and reality in the field of action. 257 Aristotle’s treatment of

communicationalsoemphasizesthedichotomy.Althoughhesystematicallyanalyses

thepoliticalartofpersuasion,heisguilty,likePlato,oftheun-Socraticmanoeuvre

of comparing unfavourably political speech to an invented philosophical speech.

After all, Aristotle’s systemic analysis of speech demarcates the political art of

speech, rhetoric, from the art of philosophical speech, dialectics.258This approach

showsthatAristotlecarriesonthedivisionbetweenanartofspeakingopinionsand

anartofspeakingtruth.HesharesthePlatonicsuspicionoftherealmofopinionand

appearances, and desires to replace a form of communication that yields

unpredictableoutcomeswithonethatcompelsknowledgethroughproof.259

Finally,Aristotlepracticesaphilosophythathasnosenseofrelationshipto

politics, but is a retreat from politics. To repeat, despite Plato’s insistence on the

importanceofthephilosopherrulingthepoliticalrealm,thepracticaleffectwasnot256PP,21-22.257C.f.Villa(1995),45.TherealissueisthatArendtnevermentionshexis—asIarguehere,theabsenceofanefforttoconstitutegenuinelyvirtuousactionsasopposedtoapparentlyvirtuoussuggeststhatArendt’sconcernisthemetaphysicalassumptionssustainingadichotomyofappearanceandreality.258‘Theartofpersuasionisthecounterpartoftheartofdialectic.’Rhetoric1354a1.PP,12-13.259BPF,219.

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toinitiateatrendofphilosophersattemptingtoseizecontrolofthepoliticalrealm,

buttoinitiatephilosopher’sdislikeanddisinterestinthepoliticalrealm.ForArendt,

it is anotherevent that showshowAristotle inheritsandpropagates thisattitude.

When Aristotle, like Socrates, was threatened with persecution for impiety, a

consequence of his philosophizing, he decided not to face his accusers in a trial.

SocratesstillobeyedthelawsofAthens,and,becausehefeltresponsibleforthecity

of Athens, he remained in the city. Aristotle did not. He fled the city of Athens

entirely.Aristotle’sjustificationwasthathedidnotwantAthenstosintwiceagainst

philosophy.ForArendt,Aristotle’sactionistelling:

WithAristotlethetimebeginswhenphilosophersnolongerfeelresponsibleforthecity,andthisnotonlyinthesensethatphilosophyhasnospecialtaskintherealmofpolitics,butinthemuchlargersensethatthephilosopherhaslessresponsibilityforitthananyofhisfellowcitizens.’260

WhatAristotlewantsfrompoliticsis,aboveallelse,safety.Intermsofhowthecity

is supposed to behave, what philosophy wants, in the last analysis, is to be left

alone.261The good philosopher turns entirely away from politics. The result is

apolitia. 262 Philosophy is characterized by an indifference to politics. 263 The

degradation of philosophy ‘depends entirely’ on separating the few who act

philosophically from themanywho act politically, and ensuring that the few are

neitherharassedbythemanynordrawntowardthemany.264Leftalone,philosophy

is a solitary activity that leaves behind the very exercise of speech. Philosophical

truth,inAristotle’saccount,isatruthwithoutword(aneulogou),atruththatcannot

260PP,26.261PP,26.262PP,26,133.263PP,133.264PP,135.

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be expressed in speech.265The contemplative way of life is an escape from the

commonworldofhumanbeings,anillusoryattempttoescapethehumanworldfor

something deemed more certain and more real.266In the last analysis, it is this

ultimatelymetaphysicalattitudethatconstitutesAristotle’sthreattothepolitical.

AristotleandThinking

InArendt’sview,howshouldphilosophystandinrelationtopolitics?Which

ismoremeaningfulforthehumanbeing?Oneviewisthattheactivityofphilosophy

should take a determined second place to political action, so that political action

assumes ‘existential supremacy’ over all other human activities.267For Arendt,

political action certainly illuminates a crucial, and traditionally underappreciated,

facet of human existence. But if one thinks it is the ‘supreme’ activity for

illuminating human existence, one runs into a paradox. Hannah Arendt does not

practiceasshepreaches.Shedefinesherselfasathinker,andsheisclear:whenshe

thinksaboutpoliticalaction,shedoesnotdopoliticalaction.Doesshereallyintend

tounderratethemeaningfulnessofherownactivityofthinking?

Arendt primarily explored the activity of thinking in the last years of her

life.268Her suspicion of ‘professional thinkers’ meant she was very wary about

offering self-reflections on her activity of thinking, including its content and

meaningfulness, until her Gifford Lectures.269Although her unexpected death did

265LOM,114.HC,20.266PP,203.267Kateb,(1983),6-7.268SeeBernstein(2000)forassessingArendt’sexplorationofthinkingearlierinhercareer.269LOM,3.

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notgiveherachancetocompletethisworkentirely,sheleftsomeclearsignpostsof

her position on the activity of thinking. The manner in which Arendt described

herself is important. She eschewed the label of ‘philosopher,’ seeing it associated

withthetraditionshehaddeclaredexhausted.Yetshestillwantedtoholdtosome

aspect of ‘philosophical’ activity. She therefore described herself as a ‘thinker,’ as

distinguished froma ‘philosopher.’ In thatvein,Arendtmadea furtherdistinction.

Shewasemphaticthatshewasathinker,notapoliticalactor.Arendtdidnotdesire

to act.270As an acutely self-aware thinker, Arendt recognized that she had spent

much of her work criticising those who considered the activity of philosophy, at

least insofar as it was informed by the notion of vita contemplativa, to have an

inherentlyhigherdignitythanpoliticalaction.

Asaresult,someinterpretationsofArendtarguethatsheintendedtoreverse

that traditionalprioritization, insteadprovidingpoliticalactionwithahigher level

ofsupremacy.Heractivityofthinking,then,couldbeseenasawaytohelpothers

act in politics, where the highest level of human meaning is disclosed. There is

somethingof thatstrain: thegoalofArendt’s thinkingaboutpolitics is tomakeus

betterawareof thepromise inherent inpolitics fordisclosinghumanmeaning, so

thatwecanactbetterinpolitics.271

But does Arendt simply see her thinking as classe préparatoire for future

political actors? If thatwere so, shewouldbevery close toviewsheattributes to

KarlMarx.ForMarx,whoseviewbringsthetraditionofpoliticaltheoryto itsend,

the purpose of philosophy is to orient and transform political action. Meaning is270HA,303,306;Young-Bruehl(1982),450-451.271Gottsegen(1994),10.

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realized not in philosophy, but in politics. Arendt, however, as noted above, has

muchtocriticizewiththeMarxiststance.Ultimately,itonlyreversesthecategories

of the tradition. But Arendtwants tomove beyond them, giving her thought this

paradox:Arendtpraisesaction,butshedesirestothink,anddoesnotdesiretoact.

One must dispense with any quasi-Marxist resolutions to Arendt’s activity of

thinking,andengagedirectlywiththeparadox.

Arendt is clear that for her, thinking is an activity.While the philosophical

tradition has assumed that thinking culminates in passivity, receiving reality in a

state of meditative, contemplative rest, Arendt disagrees. She uses Cato’s famous

tag, ‘neverisamanmoreactivethanwhenhedoesnothing,’toindicatethatwhile

thinkingmayappearpassive, it is infactnot.Thinkingisanactivity.Thisprovides

thebasicassumptionforherGiffordLectures,inwhichsheexploresthequestionas

topreciselywhatwearedoingwhenwearedoingnothingbutthinking.272Arendt’s

answer to thequestion is lessclear,particularly in terms the issue Iamexploring

here,ofhowshedistinguishesthinkingfromaction.AlthoughArendtisnebulouson

whatshethinkssheisdoingwhensheisthinking,onecandowelltofollowinthe

footstepsofherinterlocutors.TheCanadianpoliticaltheoristC.B.Macphersononce

pressedArendtontheveryparadox,questioninghowshecoulddesiretothink,yet

notdesiretoact.HearguedthatArendthadarbitrarilydividedthetwo:thinkingor

‘theorizing’isacting.Arendtrepliedasfollows:

272LOM,6-8.

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Thinking in its purity is different—in this Aristotle was right…all modernphilosophers have somewhere in their work a rather apologetic sentencewhichsays:‘Thinkingisalsoacting.’Ohno,itisnot!Andtosaythatisratherdishonest. Imean, let’s facethemusic: it isnotthesame.Onthecontrary, Ihavetokeepbacktoalargeextentfromparticipating,fromcommitment.273

HowdoesArendtunderstandthedifferencebetweenthinkingandacting?Here,for

the final act of her intellectual life, she turns back to Aristotle. Her considered

positionisauniqueaccountoftherelationoftheactivityofthinkingtotheactivity

ofpolitics.Bearing inmind thatallpoliticalphilosophyhasanattitude topolitics,

whatArendtdoes,inthelastanalysis,istakeanironicattitudetowardpolitics.This

attitude means that, while she does not rank thinking as ‘higher’ than political

action,shedoeshintatthelimitsofpoliticallife.Consciousofthelimitsofpolitical

life,thethinkeris inaprivilegedpositionforseeingthemeaningofhumanaffairs.

Assuch,viaherironicattitude,Arendtaffirmsthedignityofthelifeofthethinker.

I.AristotleonThinking

ArendtsaysthatAristotleis‘right’aboutthepurityofthinking,sosheagrees

with Aristotle’s account of distinguishing between thinking and acting. Her

agreement, however, is not straightforward. As indicated above, Arendt’s quarrel

with Aristotle is over his conception of the vita contemplativa. Following that,

Arendt cannot accept the specific grounds Aristotle provides for distinguishing

betweentheactivityofthinkingandacting.ForAristotle,whathedescribesasthe

activity of thinking, theorizing, is contemplation of the eternal and unchanging

archai.

273HA,304.

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Aristotle’s position only has meaning by holding the view that there are

thingsunchangingandeternaltocontemplate.YetforArendt,asdiscussedearlier,

inmodernitythisviewisnolongerfeasible.Arendt’sdefinitiveoppositionistothe

viewthat ‘thedistinctionbetweenthesensoryandsuprasensory…thatwhateveris

notgiventothesenses—GodorBeingortheFirstPrinciplesandcauses(archai)or

the Ideas—ismorereal,more truthful.’274Incontrast toAristotle,Arendt’sview is

decisively post-metaphysical. So while Arendt criticizes Aristotle’s vita

contemplativaforitshierarchicalprioritizationovervitaactiva,herobjectionisnot

just about the concept of politics implied. It is also aboutmetaphysics. From her

post-metaphysicalstance,ArendtconcludesthattheclassicalAristotelianaccountof

thepurityandmeaningfulnessofthinking,astheorizing,isnolongerpersuasive.

Nevertheless she does not abandon the account of the purity of thinking

entirely:Aristotleis‘right’aboutsomething.ForArendt,itisstillpossibletosalvage

a fragment illuminating the meaningfulness of thinking, and build up a different

conception of the activity. Arendt finds that fragment at the start of Aristotle’s

Metaphysics, translating the first phase literally: ‘Allmenbynaturedesire tohave

seen.’275 The literal translation has three important implications. One is that the

desiretoinvestigatetheworldarisesfromwhatisseen,whatisgiventooursensory

apparatus.‘Thequestionsraisedbythedesiretoknow,’shewrites,‘areinprinciple

allanswerablebycommon-senseexperienceandcommon-sensereasoning.’276For

Arendt, thisgroundsthedesire toknowfirmly in theworldof thesenses.Second,

274LOM,10.275LOM,58.ArendtcitesMetaphysics,980a22,usuallytranslatedas‘allmenbynaturedesiretoknow’[eidenai].276LOM,58.

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thereisadelightinseeingforitsownsakecommonto‘allmen.’Seeing—something

easily attainable by everyone—makes things intelligible to human beings, and so

humanbeingsdelightinintelligibilityforitsownsake.Thedesireforintelligibilityis

an inextricable feature of the human condition. As allmen share it, the desire to

knowcannotonlybeactualizedbythefew,byanelectof‘professionalthinkers’who

arespecialistsinanotherworldlyrealm,butmustimplicateeveryhumanbeing.277

Third, every human being is implicated, for Arendt, bymeans of a very different

facultyfromthatinvolvedwithaction.The‘purity’ofthinkingispossiblebecauseof

the desire to know for its own sake.278Armedwith this insight, Arendt develops

how she understands thinking. In The Human Condition, she had assumed that

thinkingculminatesinrest,andisultimatelycontemplative.279Butrealizingthatthe

activity of thinking is not the same as the activity of contemplation, she can

articulate the meaning and content for the activity of thinking in a different

directionfromPlatoandAristotle.280

ForAristotle,andPlatobeforehim,thethinkingcharacteristicofphilosophy

developsoutofaconcreteanduniqueexperience:asenseofwonder(thaumazein)

at thatwhich is. This sense ofwonder is experienced as speechlessness, implying

thatultimatetruthisbeyondwords.ForAristotle,therecipientoftheexperienceof

wonder is mind (nous), which is without speech (aneu logou). The essence of

philosophical thinking, in the accountofPlato andAristotle, is awithdrawal from

277LOM,13.278AlthoughArendt,thankstoaninsightfromKant,distinguishesthefacultyofthinkingfromtheactivityofcognition.Consequently,shedoesnotthinkthatthinkingandknowingarethesameactivities.SeeLOM,57,61-62.279LOM,6.280Taminiaux(1997),18-19.

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the public, political world; to find the experience of speechlessness, onemust be

removed from the experience of speech that sustains the political life.281 The

removal of the experience of thinking from politics is also a removal of the

experienceofthinkingfromtherealmofappearances;asPlato’sallegoryofthecave

shows,thinking inthecaveonlydiscoversthattheappearancesare illusory.From

Plato’sallegory,theexperienceofwithdrawalspecificallyconcernsthewithdrawal

fromtherealmofappearancesintotherealmofBeing.Thephilosopherthinksina

worldapartfromappearances.IftherealmsofBeingandappearancesdivide,then

philosophicalthinkingconcernstheotherworldlyrealmofBeing.Finally,itdevelops

intoawayof life,vitacontemplativa.As awayof life, philosophical thinking is an

activitywhereonedevelops a languageof realitybasedona conceptionofBeing,

withoutreference to theworldofappearances.Whenone takes this languageand

applies it to the realm of appearances, then one frequently speaks not in terms

commonlyrecognizabletothosewholiveintherealmofappearances,butinterms

ofnon-sense.282

II.TheThinkerasSpectator

Toescapethatresult,Arendtrebuildstheaccountoftheactivityofthinking

into a differentway of life. To start, Arendt does not deny that there is a fleeting

experience of wonder.283 But she is impressed by the interpretation Aristotle

providesforthisexperienceofwonder.Aristotleidentifiesthesenseofpuzzlement

(aporein) in which one becomes aware of one’s ignorance, and tries to progress

281PP,33;EN1142a25.282PP,36.283PP,38.

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beyondit.284Thedesireforintelligibilityimpelsonetoovercometheexperienceof

wonder.Thechallenge,however,istoaddresstheexperienceofwithdrawal.Inthe

vitacontemplativaaccount,thepursuitoftruthpromptsonetowithdrawfromthe

world of appearances to a realm of Being. In Arendt’s account, the desire for

intelligibilitypromptsthethinkertopursuenottruth,ladenasthattermiswiththe

metaphysicaltradition,buttopursuemeaning.

Toelaborateherpost-metaphysicalaccountofthinking,Arendtproposesto

replacethemetaphorofthecaveofPlatowiththetaleofPythagoras.Life,inthetale

of Pythagoras, is like the Greek festival, the great Pan-Hellenic games thatwould

draw all the Greeks together for religious rituals, competitions, and celebrations.

Pythagorasconsidersthedifferenttypesofpeoplewhogotothegames,anddivides

themintothreegroups.Somegotothefestivalinordertoparticipateintheathletic

activities,competingforaprize.Othersgotothefestivalasshopkeepers,wishingto

sell their wares. These two represent the ways of life of those motivated by

competitive glory or material advancement. But the best way of life, thinks

Pythagoras,isthatofthespectators(theatai).Inhisview,theyhuntnotforfameor

gain,butfortruth.285

For Pythagoras, the spectator represents the philosopher, driven by the

desire for truth.Arendt downplays the role of truth for thephilosopher, saying it

does not signify an other-wordly, ‘invisible’ truth.286 Instead, she examines the

philosopherinhisroleasspectator.Thenobilityoftheactivityofthespectatorsis

284LOM,114,121.285LOM,93.286ForafulleraccountofthepathArendttakes,seeBurch(2011),19-20,22.

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that they do not participate in the games but instead, ‘look on it as a mere

spectacle.’287Whatpreciselyisthe‘it’theylookingupon?Ratherthanlookingupon

thewholeofreality,thekosmosofthecontemplativephilosopher,theyarelooking

upon the various actorswho are competing, or ‘performing,’ in the festival. Here,

Arendtexploresthecharacterofaction,previouslydescribedas‘performative,’and

extends themetaphor. As the spectator sees all the different performances of the

variousactors,thespectatorseestheirwhole‘play.’Alltheactorsenacttheirparts,

buteachactor,bydefinition,isonlyapartofthewhole.Hefindshismeaningsolely

asaconstituentofthewhole.288Tofindthewholemeaningoftheplay,onemustbe

in the position of thinking spectator, not actor. Therefore, if one is to pursue

meaning,onemustbeinthepositionofthespectator.ItisherewhereArendtthinks

thereisatrade-offbetweenactionandthinking.‘Asaspectatoryoumayunderstand

the‘truth’ofwhatthespectacleisabout;butthepriceyouhavetopayiswithdrawal

fromparticipating in it.’289Withdrawal, forArendt, is thecondition for finding the

meaning of the whole play. The nature of the activity of thinking is that it is an

interruption fromtheordinaryhumanpoliticalactivities, a ‘breakingoff’ fromthe

public sphere. It is a movement out of the order of politics.290For this reason,

althoughthereisamovementintoanotherworld,Arendtcharacterizestheactivity

of thinking by ‘the fact of withdrawal.’291As Arendt’s response to Macpherson

287LOM,93.288Inthisway,thesearchformeaningreplacesthesearchfortruth.SeeBurch(2011),19.289LOM,93.290LOM,197.291LOM,199.

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suggests, it is this fact that Aristotle understands to constitute the activity of

thinkinginitspurity.

Arendt provides a further qualification to the activity of thinking’s

withdrawal from the world, drawn from Pythagoras’s metaphor. There, the

spectatorsarepartofanaudience,whodeliberateanddiscuss themeaningof the

performanceswitheachother.Theverdictofthespectatorsonthemeaningofthe

whole, ‘whileimpartialandfreedfromtheinterestsofgainorfame,’isnotformed

independentof theviewsofothers.Althoughthespectator isdisengagedfromthe

particularity of the actor, he does not therefore act in complete isolation. Hence

unlike the vita comtemplativa, who flees from the company of men and their

uncertain opinions, the spectator remains among them. While the spectator

withdrawsfromtheworldtothink,histhinkingisnotasolitaryactivity.292

Arendt’s denial that thinking is solitary is a radical denial, extending even

intotheself.BorrowingfromSocrates,whodemandsthatamanspeakhisopinion

only when he is ‘in agreement with himself,’ Arendt understands thinking as a

conversationwithone’sself,asifoneweretwo.Soinwithdrawingfromtheworld

intomyself,Iencountermyself,anddialoguewithmyself.Inthinking,Idiscoverthat

Iam‘two-in-one.’293ForArendt,thisestablishesjusthowdeeplyrootedpluralityis

in thehumancondition. It isapersistentpresence inhuman life,andescape from

pluralityisillusory.Ifthinkingisalwaysadialoguewithanother,evenintheself,it

is never in its essence, as Aristotle thought through Plato,aneu logou. It requires

292LOM,94.293PP,19-21.

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speechtobeactivated, tosoundoutandtobemanifested.294Inwithdrawing from

the world to think, the thinker discovers the correspondence of plurality and

speech.Aspluralityandspeechconstitutetheactivityofthinking,Arendtcanthen

argue how thinking involves other human beings. The presence of other human

beings,whospeaktothethinkerandtowhomthethinkerspeaks,innowaytaints

thepurityofthinking.Rather,thereisananticipatedextensionfromthinkingwith

one’sself, to thinkingwithothers.Aristotleprovides the link.Thevitalcoreofhis

theoryof friendship is that ‘the friend is another self.’295ForArendt, this signifies

thatafriendisthatwithwhom‘youcancarryonthedialogueofthoughtwithhim

justaswellaswithyourself.’296

III.FriendshipandThinking

Arendt finds three important implications for the theory of friendship in

understanding thinking. First is a therapeutic implication. When thinking is

conceived as an activity undertaken with fellow human beings, it weakens the

tendency of thinking (a tendency built into the activity), to drift toward

metaphysical fallacies.Arendtissympathetictothedevelopmentofthesefallacies,

suchasthetwo-worlddichotomy,sincetheyareconclusionsderivedfromauthentic

experiencesofthethinkingself.Thereasonwhythesefallaciousconclusionsemerge

has to do with one particular aspect of thinking, which prepares the ground for

thesefallaciestoseemlikenecessaryconclusions.Asthinkingisawithdrawal, the

withdrawal often proceeds into solitude. The experience of solitude overturns

294LOM,121.295EN1166a30.296LOM,189;PP,20.

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common sense, andmakes it seem that onlywhat is thought is real, and all else

seemsillusory.Butfriendshipprovidestheremedy.Thepresenceofothersbreaks

downtheexperienceofsolitudeandpreservescontactwiththeworld.297

Second is thepolitical implication.Theactivityof thinking continues in the

companyofothers,soastounderstandtheopinionsofothersandunderstandhow

theworld appears to others. The experience of plurality, extended now to actual

human beings, continues to subsist. Rather than about developing a single view,

thinking with other human beings is about understanding the variety of human

opinions, so that the commonness of the world becomes apparent.298The goal,

throughthisdialogue,istosustainacommunityoffriendswhereacommonworld

beginstoshowitself.Inthisway,thinkingrelatestothepublicsphere.

Recognizingthatthinkingrelatestothepublicspherehelpsidentifythethird

implicationofthetheoryoffriendship,itsmoralimplicationforthinking.Whatboth

SocratesandAristotlesuggestisthatlivingtogetherwithothersbeginswithliving

togetherwithmyself.299Asnotedearlier,Arendtthinksthatfriendshipplaysarole

in establishing the common world of the polis. Yet this was only explored as a

phenomenonwithinthepublicsphere,andsoonlyasacorollaryofaction,interms

ofhowindividualsappeartooneanotherthroughtheiractions.Butbyemphasizing

that in theactivityof thinking, evenwhen it is internal to the self, one stillmeets

another self, Arendt says that in thinking, one appears to one’s self. If there is a

disagreement, one has to resolve this before one can live with others. ‘Living

297LOM,197-199.298PP,18.299PP,22.

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togetherwithmyself’requiresthatI firstbeinagreementwithmyself.Couchedin

thelanguageofappearances,itrequiresthatthroughtheconversationwithmyself,I

appear to myself as I would want to appear to others. For Arendt, this insight

implicates the very meaningfulness of politics. It informs the possibility as to

whether morality has any earthly reality. Crucial for Arendt, there is here a

conceptionofasecular ideaofconscience,whichcouldshowhowsomeonewould

wanttoactjustlyeveniftheyareunseenbyothers.Socrates’sadviceisto‘beasyou

wouldliketoappearforothers;’butsinceIfirsthavetobeinagreementwithhowI

appeartomyself,ItestifyfirsttomyselfastowhatIreallyappeartobe.Putmore

starkly,oneshouldneverkill,becauseinthedialoguewithyourself,youwilltestify

tothefactthatyouhavekilled.Youwill thenappeartoyourselfasamurderer,as

longasyou live.300In theabsenceofgodswhoseeall andpass judgementonour

actionsinthepublicsphere,theawarenessofhowwemightappeartoourselvesif

we act unjustly is, in the last analysis, what impels us to act justly in the public

sphere.

Socrates believed this awareness couldbe learned.AlthoughArendt is less

sureof that, forher, thecrucialSocratic teaching is the importanceof thinking for

living justly.301‘The underlying assumption of this teaching is thought and not

action, becauseonly in thought can thedialogueof the two-in-onebe realized.’302

What is unique about thinking is that the presence of thinking can be among the

conditionsthatassisthumanbeingsindoinggoodandavoidingevil.Therearehere

300PP,22.301LOM,5.302PP,23.

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further intimations of Eichmann. For Arendt, the one noticeable characteristic of

Eichmann is his thoughtlessness, his absence of thinkingwhich condemns him as

politicallyirresponsible.ThecaseofEichmannisexemplarybecauseitconnectsthe

problemof good and evil directly to the activity of thinking. Eichmann’s case is a

warning for modernity, demonstrating that modern political irresponsibility

happenswhen thinking is absent. It provides the imperative to understandwhat

thinkingis,andwhatroletheactivityofthinkinghasformorality.303Tosummarize,

thegoalofpoliticalaction is tobuilda realmof friendship fromwhicha common

humanworldbeginstoshowitself.Butthisrequiresthinking.Thinkingprovidesthe

impetustoactjustly,bydemandingthatanindividualbeinagreementwithhimself

beforeheactsinrelationtoothers.Oncehelearnstodothat,hecanlivewithothers

infriendship.Throughtheactivityofthinkingwithotherhumanbeings,thethinker

helpsestablishacommonworldbuiltonthesharedunderstandingoffriendship.

Nevertheless,whilethereisthispositivelinktothepoliticalsphere,thinking

exists independentlyofpolitics.Entered into, thinking isanoasis thatgives life to

politics, yet considered as an activity in itself, thinking is free from politics.304So

despite the link to politics and the public world provided through friendship,

thinkinghasitsownontologicaldignity.Itconstitutesthehumancondition.Arendt

already has argued that all human beings have a desire for intelligibility. But she

refusestorankthissphereoflifeashigherorlowerthanthepoliticalsphere.Inthat

sense,sheishelpedbyAristotle’sdiscussionoftherelationshipbetweenlanguage,

303LOM,3-5.Thisroleforthinking,however,isnottoproduceusablepracticalwisdom.SeeBernstein(2000),284.304PP,202-203.

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the faculty that implicatesotherhumanbeings, constitutes thepublic sphere, and

impels one to act in theworld; and thought, the faculty that is implicated in the

desire for intelligibility, the activity of thinking, and ultimately some form of

philosophy.Aristotle refuses todecidewhether thinking is the origin of speaking,

which would make the activity of thinking prior to political activity; or whether

speaking is the origin of thinking, which would make political activity prior to

thinking.Arendtseesbothaspectsaspartofthefundamentalconstitutionofhuman

existence.As thinking isnotasolitaryactivity, it involvesspeech: ‘thinkingbeings

haveanurgetospeak,speakingbeingshaveanurgetothink.’305

Yet Arendt provides a different kind of priority to thinking. As described

above,inrejectingmetaphysics,Arendtaffirmsabasicontologicalthesis:thatBeing

and appearing coincide. There are important implications. Theword ‘appearance’

wouldmakenosense if therewerenoone toacknowledge theappearance.Every

‘appearing’ofsomethingisalwaysan ‘appearingto’someone.FromArendt’spost-

metaphysical view, for something ‘to be,’ it must appear to a spectator.306Arendt

concentrates upon the activity of speculation in her interpretation of the tale of

Pythagoras, and, she calls the highest form of speculation, the speculation on

meaning,theactivityofthinking.Thinkinginitspuritybecomesthehighestformof

speculation.Forsomethingtoberequiresthattherebeathinkingspectatortoseeit.

Being requires thinking, and thinking is never apart from Being.With that view,

ArendtechoesaclassicformulationofParmenides:thatthinkingandbeingarethe

305LOM,99.306LOM,19.

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same.307Arendt therefore privileges thinking. Thinking is the way to make what

appears in theworld intelligible.Arendtdescribesnootherway todo this: inher

view,theactor’sperspectiveisalwaysinasignificantwayincomplete,andrequires

thespectatortobuilditup.AlthoughArendtdoesnotsayitexplicitly,itisnogreat

stretchtoconcludeasaresultthatthinkingisthefundamentalwayofbeing.308

Likepolitical action, thinking is anactivity thathas its end in itself.Arendt

finds that view in Aristotle. Although Aristotle argues that thinking is ultimately

contemplative, and so culminates in quietude or rest, Arendt’s close reading of

Aristotle notices a passage where Aristotle implies a very different outcome.

Aristotle describes philosophical thinking as an energeia, the ‘perfect and

unhinderedactivitywhich[forthisveryreason]harbourswithinitselfthesweetest

of all delights.’309There is for Arendt a contradiction between the ‘quietude’ of

contemplation and energeia, especially one that has no culmination beyond the

activity but is an end in itself. Thinking produces no definite, end results. As

Aristotle says, it is ‘unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle.’310Being a

repeatingcircle,thinkingdoesnotendintruth,nordoesitbuildconclusivesystems

ofthought,butswingsbacktoaddressthesamequestionswithwhichitbegan.311It

remainsinitscontentelusiveandineffable.SinceArendtbelievesthinkingneither

pursuesaneternaltruthnoradefiniteworldview,theactivityof thinking isabout

perpetually sharing opinions between friends, which remain scattered307ForParmenides,andforArendt,onewillnotfindthinkingapartfromBeing.Onecanonlythinkwhatis.AsaresultParmenidesconcludes,‘itisthesamethingtothinkandtobe’DKFragmentB3;c.f.B6.Burch(2011,23)notestheHeideggerianimplicationsofArendt’sview.308Burch(2011),23;HA,303.309LOM,123.ArendtcitesProtreptikos,Düringed.,B87.310LOM,124.ArendtcitesMetaphysics1072a21.311LOM,124.

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fragmentations.312What does thinking do? Aristotle provides the metaphor: ‘the

activityofthinkingislife.’313Theonlymetaphorthatcandescribewhatitdoesisthe

sensationofbeingalive,ametaphorthatatoncepointsatthemystery,vitality,and

importanceofthinkingunderlyingthehumancondition.

IV.ThinkingandPolitics

With what attitude does Arendt’s thinking relate to politics? Arendt’s

thinkingpraisespolitics.Sherejectstheconceptionofthinkingasorientedtoward

thecontemplationofeternalarchai,andturnstheactivityofthinkingawayfromany

fallaciously conjectured otherworldly realm toward the realm of this world.

Groundedinthisworld,thinkingrevealsthephenomenonofpoliticsandilluminates

itsmeaningforthehumanbeing.Arendt’sthoughtaboutpoliticsarguesthatpolitics

is inneedof redemption,and that this redemptionofpolitics in turnredeems the

humanworld.

ButArendtdesirestothink,anddoesnotdesiretoact.Herargumentforthe

purity of thinking fundamentally constitutes thinking as a withdrawal from the

worldofpolitics.AsthetaleofPythagorasshows,onemustrecognizethelimitsof

theworldofactorsperforming,sincethemetaphorof ‘performance’ indicatesthat

eachactoronlyplaysapartof thewhole.Thecharacterofaction is tobe limited.

Consequently, political action can never wholly constitute meaning. To ground

meaningcompletelyinpolitics,tofindtotal‘homeliness’inpolitics,isimpossible;in

politics,Beingandappearancedonotcoincide.314

312E.g.Lessing,MDT,8;andArendtherself.Jones(2013).313LOM,123.ArendtcitesMetaphysics1072b27.314Villa(1995),203,205.

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The spectator identifies the limits of politics; not acting, looking upon

politics, he recognizes that political action is but a part of the whole. While the

spectatorrecognizeshowimportanteachactorisforconstitutingmeaning,healso

sees that eachactor cannot constitute allmeaning. Inwithdrawing fromaction to

lookuponit,andseeingitslimits,thespectatorcultivateshissenseofirony.315Only

inwithdrawingfrompoliticstothink,onlyinthepureactivityofthinking,doesthe

gap between Being and appearance resolve itself. ‘I don’t know of any other

reconciliationbutthought,’saysArendt,showinghowsheprivilegesthinking.316

Arendtemphasizestheimportanceofthinking,andfurtherhintsatthelimits

of politics, when she associates thinking with freedom. Although freedom and

politicalactionareinseparable,freedomisnotexclusivetopoliticalaction;‘thinking

is anothermode ofmoving in theworld of freedom.’317While Arendt describes a

retreat into the freedom of thought exhibit during the ‘dark times’ of impending

totalitarian rule, she also describes the possibility and need for free thinking in

these ‘dark times.’ The free character of thinking suggests independent thinking.

Independent thinking needs ‘no pillars and props, no standards and traditions to

move freelywithout crutchesoverunfamiliar terrain.’318Theunfamiliar terrainof

which Arendt speaks is the modern moment, where the radical break with the

traditionhastakenplace.Onlythepureactivityofthinking,genuinelymovingfreely,

can respond to the threat of totalitarianism. 319 When old categories of

315IowethetermtoTaminiaux(1997),2-3.316HA,303;Burch(2011),23.317MDT,9.318MDT,10.319Bernstein(2000),278-79.

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understanding and value have been swept away, when the political realm is

breaking down, and genuine political action is no longer possible, the activity of

thinking takeson a fierceurgency.At thatmoment,Arendt implies, itmaybe the

onlyactivitythatcanstruggleagainsttotalitarianism.

Thinking’sactivityofwithdrawalfromthepoliticalworldexposesatension

that further intensifies the irony. One the one hand, the spectator is part of an

audience,sohe,alongsideothers,looksupontheactors.Thinkingstillrelatestothe

commonworldinwhichhumanbeingsinteractandtakeinitiatives;bythinkingwith

friends, fellow thinkers judge specific events.320The withdrawal from action to

thinkingshows that the thinkerstillbelongs to thecommonhumanworld.On the

otherhand, thinkingmakesonehomeless.AlthoughAristotle’sdecisionto flee the

citywhenthreatenedwithpersecutionsignifieshisindifferencetopolitics,ithasfor

Arendtanadditionallevelofmeaningabouttheessenceofthinking.Itindicatesthat

thinkingisnotathomeinthepoliticalrealm.321Whileitneednotbeanexitintoa

realmofBeing, it isalwaysawithdrawal fromtherealmofappearances. Itplaces

the thinker in a different relationship topolitics. The activity of thinkingputs the

thinkerinaplaceofnowhere.ThewayofthelifeofthinkingremainswhatAristotle

callsthe‘lifeofastranger’(biosxenikos).322ForArendt,thethinkerisneverentirely

athomeinthecommonworldofhumans.Thethinkerpermanentlybearstheaura

of an exile.323In the last analysis, Arendt strengthens her paradoxical account of

320Taminiaux(1997),21.321LOM,199.322LOM,53.ArendtcitesPolitics,1324a16.323Arendt,self-consciousofherselfasathinkerandaJew,explorestheJew’sstatusasa‘pariah.’SeeBernstein(2000),278-79.

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thinkingandpolitics.Ratherthanresolvingtheproblemofhowthinkingrelatesto

politics, Arendt problematizes that relation. Conscious of its incompleteness, the

thinker views the meaning of the political realm ironically. Arendt describes

thinking as a simultaneous withdrawal from and belonging to the world of

appearances, and so exposes the tension directly.324Aware of this, the thinker

maintains an ironic relation to the political realm, because of the tension in his

involvementtowardit.Arendt’scautionindescribingherrelationtopoliticsisher

understandingthistension,andunderstandingthatitcannotbeexplainedaway.Yet

in leavingherreaderwithanaccountof the importanceof thinking,Arendt isnot

cautiousbutdaring.Ifsheinspiresherreaderstoredeempolitics,shealsoinspires

herreaderstothink.Shedaresherreaderstoworkoutwhataredeemedactivityof

thinkingwouldmean,andwhereintheworlditwouldplacethem.

Conclusion

Arendt’sinterpretationofAristotleisanefforttothinkwithAristotleagainst

Aristotle. In thinkingwith Aristotle, Arendt finds in Aristotle a great treasure of

insightson thephenomenonofpolitics.SheuncoversAristotle’sconceptionof the

activityofvirtueorexcellence(aretē),performedforitsownsake,whichconstitutes

politicalaction(praxis).Praxis,inturn,constitutesthecoreofthepoliticallife(bios

politikos).Aristotle eloquentlydemonstrates the value andmeaningfulness ofbios

politikos for the human being. Arendt goes further. Following Aristotle, she

emphasizes that the meaningfulness of bios politikos is characterized by public

324Taminiaux(1997),21.

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freedom, expressed in the sharing of words and deeds in the polis. She finds

Aristotle’s conception to be an insightful contrast to the individualized, internal

freedom of the will, which concerns interior struggle between good and evil.

Arendt’s ordering of deeds over intentmeans she evaluates themoral content of

public freedom by how one person appears to others. Her emphasis on a realm

where free action can occur draws her to take up Aristotle’s articulation of the

meaning andpurposeof thepolis. Thepolis is the realmwhere citizensmeet and

interactbymeansofpersuasivespeechratherthancoerciveaction.Citizenscanrule

onlyas longas theypersuade theothers toallowthemtorule; ifanother ismore

persuasive,anothermayrule.Citizens,inAristotle’sformulation,ruleandareruled

inturn,sothatthereisnofixedorderofrulerandruled.Citizensmeeteachotheras

equals.

In opposition to modernity’s Tocquevillean anxiety about equality being a

threat to freedom, Aristotle provides a conception of public freedom for citizens

inextricablylinkedtoequality.Thepolis,moreover,differsfromthefamilyinthatit

must unite distinct and different citizens, building an association not through

natural ties or sameness of material conditions, but through friendship. From

Aristotle, Arendt discovers the insight into plurality that constitutes the

phenomenon of politics. Lastly, the polis is the realm where particular persons

appear in their distinctiveness to one another, and this appearance underwrites

one’sconceptionofwhatisreal.ArendttakesupAristotle’sphrase,‘whatappearsto

alliscalledBeing,’andgivesitaspecificontologicalformulation.Forher,Beingand

appearance coincide. As the realm of appearances, the polis is the realm that

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constitutesthetotalityofhumanreality.Arendtrepeatsheroppositiontothetwo-

worldmetaphysical dichotomy, which denies Being is discovered in the realm of

appearances, attempting instead to place Being in a distinct realm beyond

appearances.Anyattempttoescapefromtherealityofappearances,anyflightintoa

transcendentbeyond, isan illusion.Moreover,assuchametaphysicalviewdenies

the realitydisclosedbyhumanactivity in thepolitical sphere, it is a threat to the

dignityofpolitics.

‘Political philosophy,’Arendtwrites, ‘necessarily implies the attitudeof the

philosophertowardpolitics.’325InArendt’sview, it isPlatowhoproposesthetwo-

world metaphysical dichotomy, in the form of contrasting the uncertain opinion

foundintheworldofappearancestocertaintruthfoundintheworldofreality.In

this way, political philosophy is supreme over politics, and guides and directs it

through the termsprovidedby political philosophy.With his political philosophy,

then,Platodevelopsanattitudetowardpoliticsthatthreatenstheirinherentdignity.

Aristotle fatefully inherits this attitude. Despite Aristotle’s insights into the value

andmeaningfulnessofbiospolitikos,heranksitasmerelysecondarytoahigherway

of life. Aristotle upholds Plato’s divide between truth and opinion; he associates

political persuasion with uncertain opinion, while philosophical dialectics he

associateswithcertaintruth.Aristotlealsofindsanaffinitybetweencontemplative

thought and fabrication (poiēsis). Like Plato, Aristotle considers poiēsis as higher

than praxis. This view inevitably devalues praxis as the core of the political life,

further diminishing the dignity of politics. Aristotle also argues that the vita

325BPF,17.

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contemplativa,asthebestlife,correspondstothefreestlife.Tojustifyhisposition,

hehastoshowthewaysinwhichbiospolitikosisassociatedwithalackoffreedom.

So despite his previous rich articulation of public freedom, he undermines it by

naturalizing the political realm, and making the concept of ruling the essential

political category for comparing different kinds of regimes. Aristotle’s

demonstrationoftheinadequaciesofbiospolitikosencourageshimtodevelopaway

oflifeindifferenttopolitics.Thecorecontentofthevitacontemplativaisforthefew

to liveseparate fromthepoliticalworldof themany,andengage inanessentially

solitary activity, isolated from other human beings. Aristotle therefore initiates a

view of the political sphere where it is characterized by lack of freedom, and

encourages an activity,which, taken as away of life, is a flight from the common

human world. It is in opposing these positions where Arendt must, with great

fervour,thinkagainstAristotle.

Havingdiscoveredarangeof insightsconcerning themeaningofpolitics in

Aristotle, but having discovered Aristotle’s fateful inheritance that distorts the

meaningofpolitics,itmightseemthatArendtdepartsfromhimintheend.Butthis

is to sever the conversation prematurely. Arendt’s project thus far is to value

politicallifeagainstthedominationofthevitacontemplativa.Buttheparadoxisthat

Arendt embraces a life of thinking, not a life of politics. As she articulates her

understanding of thinking, Arendt draws herself into a final conversation with

Aristotleconcerningherownactivityofthinkinganditsrelationtopolitics.

The shift for Arendt is her assertion that thinking is a wholly different

activity from political action, with its own independent dignity. Due to her post-

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metaphysical stance, Arendt cannot accept that thinking is oriented toward

contemplating eternal principles. But it is possible to draw fromAristotle a post-

metaphysicalsetof insights.Aristotle’s justificationfortheimportanceofthinking,

‘allmenbynaturedesiretoknow,’literallymeans,‘allmenbynaturedesiretohave

seen.’ ForArendt, the literal translationestablishesadesire, sharedbyallmen, to

understand fromthroughtheirsenses.Fromthis,Arendtconcludes that there isa

desire for finding intelligiblemeaning in theworld. FromAristotle to Arendt, the

‘purity’of thinking ispossiblebecauseof thedesire for intelligibility implicatinga

wholly different faculty than that concerned with action. This interpretation of

AristotlehelpsArendt think againstAristotle’smetaphysically ladenphilosophical

way of life. By emphasizing the desire for knowing as the desire ‘to have seen,’

Arendtgroundsthedesireforintelligibilityintheworldofthesenses,commontoall

human beings, and not in anotherworld. As it implicates a desire inherent in all

humanbeings,thinkingneednotberestrictedtoafew‘professionalthinkers,’butis

anactivitythatallhumanbeingscanandshouldpractice.

HelpedbyAristotle’stheoryoffriendship,Arendtarguesthatthinkingneed

not be conceived of as an essentially solitary activity. Thinking, even within the

individual self, is always a dialogue with another self. Friendship, for Arendt’s

appropriationofAristotle, is a relationshipwith another self,withwhomone can

carryonthedialogueofthoughtjustaswellaswithone’sself.Thusthepurityofthe

activityispreservedandstrengthenedinthecourseofthedialoguewithone’sself

extending to one’s friends. Thinking with friends helps ward off the threats

metaphysicalphilosophypresentstothepolitical.Itkeepsthethinkergroundedin

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the common world, resisting the tendency to drift into metaphysical fallacies. It

nourishesplurality inpolitics,strengtheningthepoliticalrealm.Finally, thenotion

of thinkingwith others shows that the presence of thought impels human beings

whothink toact justly.Ultimately, in thinking,onerecognizes theboundariesand

limitsofpolitics.WhileArendtdoesnotarguethatthinkingissupremeoverpolitical

life,Arendt’semphasisontheimportanceofthedesireforintelligibilitymeansthat

forher,thinkingistheonlywaytodisclosemeaning.Onegraspsitsimportancenot

byAristotle’staxonomy,butbyAristotle’smetaphor:thinkingislife.

So although Arendt criticizes the form thinking takes in Aristotle’s vita

contemplativa, she argues for the independence and dignity of the activity of

thinking.Herthinkingaboutpoliticsshowstheimportanceofpoliticstohumanlife,

but also reveals the limitations of politics.Her conceptionof thinking emphasizes

the persistence of the common humanworld through friendship, but also shows

that withdrawal from politics essentially constitutes thinking, meaning that the

thinker is a stranger to those in politics. The reader is left to puzzle over these

conflicts. In thinking about politics, Arendt exposes the tension between thinking

and politics. The reader is left recognizing that politics, despite its redemptive

qualities, isnot theonlysourceof redemption for thehumanbeing.One learns to

distance oneself frompolitics. The attitude of the ‘political philosophy’ ofHannah

Arendttopoliticsis,ultimately,oneofirony.

Arendt’s ironic attitude enables her to oppose two streams in political

philosophythatthreatenthedignityofpolitics.Byrefusingtodeclarethatthinking

is supreme over politics, she stands against the Platonic stream of political

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philosophy, which aims to resolve definitively the problem of the relationship

between thinking and politics. Plato resolves the problem by finding, through

philosophicalthinking,theconceptstodirectandgovernpolitics.Itisaconceptthat

isfatefulfortheshapingtheactivityofphilosophyinmodernity,andwouldaccount

for philosophers presuming they can direct and govern totalitarian movements,

leading to their cooperation with these movements.326The path of the Platonic

thinker is to withdraw from the world of appearances; alone, he claims himself

capableofultimateunderstandingoftruth.ThePlatonicthinkertriestoclaimtotal

devotion to the thinking activity. But he then claims a right of return from the

thinkingactivitytotheworldofcommonappearances,theworldofpolitics,where

hethenassertstherightofregulatingallotheractivities.327Eitherhe, intriguedby

the concept of the philosopher ruler,wants to advise the tyrant or be the tyrant,

aspiring to contribute a new solution for human affairs.328Or he viewspolitics as

inherentlyflawed,becomesindifferenttoit,andretreatsintohisowncontemplative

practice.Arendtshowshowthinkingalways implicatesthecommonworld,andso

affirmsthedignityofpolitics.

Theother streamArendtopposes is the tendency todeclare thathistory is

supremeoverpolitics.Arendt’sattitude toward theconceptofhistory isnuanced,

since she thinks the path of modernity inclines the human being to historicism.

Previously,onecouldreplytohistoricismbyanappealtometaphysics.Metaphysics

assumedthatinthinking,humanbeingsgrasptimeless,eternaltruths.Thesetruths

326E.g.MartinHeidegger.SeeDisch(1994),14-18;Taminiaux(1997),21.327Taminiaux(1997),21.328Taminiaux(1997),20.

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are independentofanyhistoricalperiod.Theveryactivityof thinking risesabove

history, and so refutes historicism. But for Arendt, historicism is an issue for

modernity becausemetaphysics is no longer persuasive. The demise of the belief

thatthereareeternaltruthsmeanstheessenceofthinkingcannolongerbeabout

rising above history to grasp eternal truths. Historicism cannot be decisively

refuted. Modernity turns history into the predicament that it is, and it means

modern political philosophy, notably Marxism, sees history as supreme over

politics.Arendt’sreplyistothinkaboutpoliticalaction,whichexposesthelimitsof

historicism.Arendtarguesthataction‘createsthecondition’forhistory.329Thefree

actions of human beings direct and make history. For an act to be free in this

political sense, itmust transcendmotivesor consciously intendedgoals, andhave

thepotentialtocallsomethingintobeingthatdidnotexistbefore,somethingwhich

couldnotbeknownbeforehand.330The implicationsof freedom, forArendt,mean

thatonecanneverdefinitivelyknoworpredictthecourseanddirectionofhistory.

Tothemodernsystemsofthoughtthatdeclareaknownoutcometohistory,Arendt

provides the resources for resistance. Novelty, the constant possibility of new

beginningsentailedbythecorrectunderstandingoffreeaction,decisivelyoverturns

historicism.Mancanriseabovehisowntimes,becausetheconceptionof freedom

demandsit.Whenthedignityofpoliticsisgivenitsduerecognition,historycannot

claimitselfsupremeoverhumanlife.

Arendt’s thought addresses the question of the meaning and purpose of

politics.Heranswerisfreedom.Yetshesketchestwomeaningfulactivities,political329HC,9.330BPF,150.

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action and thinking, which discloses a mode of freedom. Each sketch resists a

modern danger, a source of political irresponsibility. Against a danger to

characterizethinkingasunworldly,Arendttestifiestotheimportanceoftheworld

forthinking.Againstadangerofsubsumingfreedomunderhistory,Arendttestifies

totheimportanceof freedomforunderwritingthemeaningofpolitics.ButArendt

alsotestifiestothe importanceof freedomforthinkingafreshinthedarktimesof

modernity. Her path of thinking is to emphasize the themes of political action,

worldliness,andfreedomassheleadspoliticalphilosophyoutof‘theobscurewood’

of the tradition wherein it ‘lost its way.’331In her political theory, then, Arendt

showsherselfengagedinprojectgreaterthantheboundsofpolitics.Sheisathinker

onagrandscale,reimaginingandreorderingallhumanactivities.Buttheresult is

deliberately ambiguous. Arendt shuns a definitive conclusion on a new order of

things, particularly in how thinking relates to politics. While she provides her

readerswithafresh,post-metaphysicalaccountofthinking,andafreshaccountof

politics,shealsoexposesafundamentaltensionbetweenthinkingandpoliticsthat

cannotbuthauntallhumanactionandallhumanthought.

331BPF,144.

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II.LeoStrauss’sAristotleandtheReturntoClassicalPolitical

Philosophy

Strauss’sCritiqueofModernity

LeoStrauss’sprincipalphilosophicalthemeistherationaljustificationofthe

activityofphilosophyasthebestwayoflife.Hisattempttojustifytheactivityof

philosophyasthebestwayoflifearrivesatanimpassewhenitmeetstheclaimof

religiousrevelationtoofferthebestwayoflife.Theprincipalphilosophicalproblem

forStraussisthetheologico-politicalproblem,playedoutacrossthelastfive

hundredyearsofmodernhistory.Modernphilosophyattemptstoresolvethe

theologico-politicalproblemthrougharadicalemphasisonpoliticalphilosophy—a

politicizedphilosophy.Theresultisafailure.Itexhaustsmodernrationalism,

bringingaboutthedominanceofpositivismandhistoricism.Theseforcesrender

impossibletherationaljustificationofphilosophyasthebestwayoflife,andclaim

thatphilosophyitselfisimpossible.Withhistoricism,notrationalism,guiding

philosophy,modernphilosophersbecomepoliticallyirresponsible.Strauss,

therefore,seeksareturntoclassicalpoliticalphilosophy,tounderstandand

respondtothefailureofmodernpoliticalphilosophy.

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ForStrauss,classicalpoliticalphilosophyprovidesanalternativeto

positivismandhistoricism:apoliticallyresponsiblephilosophy,whichcanrationally

justifyitselfasthebestwayoflifeandundertakethequestfortheknowledgeofthe

whole.InStrauss’sreturntoclassicalpoliticalphilosophy,thestudyofAristotleisa

crucialstep,followingfromStrauss’sstudyofSocrates.ItisAristotlewhoexamines

politicsonitsownterms,showingitsworth,limitation,androleforpolitical

philosophy.

I.Strauss’sArtofWriting

WhydoesStraussstudytheancients?IntheopeningofTheCityandMan,

Straussdeclares:

Itisnotself-forgettingandpain-lovingantiquarianismnorself-forgettingandintoxicatingromanticismwhichinducesustoturnwithpassionateinterest,withunqualifiedwillingnesstolearn,towardthepoliticalthoughtofclassicalantiquity.Weareimpelledtodosobythecrisisofourtime,thecrisisoftheWest.1AnxietyaboutthepresentimpelsStrausstostudythepast.Inrecountingthe

historyofpoliticalphilosophy,Straussisnodispassionateexegete.Onthecontrary:

Strauss’sphilosophicalprojectistoengagewiththeproblemsofmodernity.In

turningtothepast,however,Straussdeploysanunusualstyleofwritingthat

obscureshisownscholarlyvoiceandhisphilosophicalproject.Theconsequences

igniteintheStrausswars.2ThisrequiressomeinitialexplanationaboutStrauss’s

chosenmannerofwriting.

1CM,1.2ControversiesdatebacktoStrauss’searlywritings.SeeMajor(2013),5-6.ThemostfamiliarchargesagainstStrauss,thatheisguiltyofoutrightbadhistoricalscholarship(e.g.Burnyeat(1985))orplaysatbeinganintellectualguruforselecteddisciples(e.g.Skinner(1969))areaddressedinZ&Z(2006).

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Strauss’swritingsaretheessentialvehicleforcommunicatinghis

philosophicalteachings.3Whilehearrangesmostofhiswritingsasexegetical

commentariesofearlierthinkers,theyshiftbetweenhistoricalexegesisand

personalphilosophicaljudgement.Strauss’spedagogyistodesignhiswritingsasa

debatebetweenthepastandthepresent,tryingtopersuadethereaderofthe

debate’svitality.Strausswillintimatecertainpositionsthathehimselfholds,but

pastthinkers,notStrauss,havethestage.Strauss’sprimarygoalistopersuadethe

readertolearnfromthehistoryofphilosophy,inordertoaddresstheconcernsof

thepresent.4Theresultisprovocative.Strauss’sconceptionofthepurposeofan

exegeticalcommentaryisambitious,anattempttohaveaphilosophical

conversationwiththepresentbylearningfromthepast.Strauss’smodelisthatof

themedievalcommentator,whouseshisdialoguewithahistoricaltexttoarticulate

philosophicalviewsthatengagehiscontemporaries.5

Strauss’spedagogyalsoincludesakindofesotericwriting.Butthisdoesnot

meanheconcealssomethingscandalousormorallydisturbing.6Therearedifferent

versionsofesotericism;Strauss’sisconcernedprimarilywithdeliveringasubtle

andreservedmannerofargument.Itisofthefollowingkind:

3Meier(2006),xix;Lampert(1996),67n.Straussdoesnotcommunicatehisphilosophicalviewsthroughanoralteaching.Neitherthestudyofhisclasstranscriptsnortheviewsofhisstudentswillyieldhisphilosophicalviews.4Major(2013),13;Tanguay(2007),1-2.5C.f.PAW,16;Lampert(1996),146.6Landy(2014),9.

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Trulyphilosophicalauthorswritenottosomuchtopropagatedoctrinesastoencourageyoungerreaderstofollowtheminalifeofinquiry.Suchauthorsartfullyattempttoarousequestionsinthemindsoftheirmostattentivereadersandthenprovidehintsconcerningthewaythosequestionsmightbeanswered;buttheseauthorsleavetheirreaderstothinkouttheanswersandtheproblemswiththesepossibleanswersforthemselves.7ThusStrauss’ssubduedargumentsareaconsciousdecisiontoexercise

restraintinexpressinghisphilosophicalviews.8ToseeStrauss’sargumentclearly,

onehastopaycarefulattentiontohis‘veiling,’inhisargumentativeandrhetorical

strategies.Followingthesestrategiesleadsfromthesurfaceexegeticalcommentary

tothecoreofStrauss’sargument.9Oneaddressesinterpretivedisputesbyproviding

thebestjustificationasonecan,byreferencetoStrauss’swrittenworks.10

II.TheJustificationofthePhilosophicLifeandtheTheologico-PoliticalProblem

WhateverStrauss’sambiguities,thereisonenoteonwhichheisveryclear.

Heseesmodernityasaphilosophicalandpoliticalcrisis.AsaGermanJewcomingof

ageinthe1920s,Strauss’swritingsshowanabidingconcernwiththepolitical

experiencesofhisgeneration,notablythedeclineandfalloftheWeimarRepublic.11

Hesawhowhisgenerationfirstabandonedliberalism,andwasthenseducedby

variousformsofpoliticalextremism.Straussanxiouslyobservedthestrengthand7Zuckert(2011),26.Elsewhere,Z&Z(2006)provideadetailedargumentforStraussnotwritingesoterically,butwritingwith‘pedagogical’reserve.Theirdistinctionishelpfultoshowthegreatdifferencebetweenscandalousesotericteachings(likeMachiavelli’santi-Christianesotericteaching)andStrauss’sdirectdiscussionofesotericism.IttherebyhelpsrefutetheideathatStrausshasamorallyscandalousteachingaboutpolitics.NeverthelesstheymakethisdistinctiontoostronglyinZ&Z(2006).Asthecitationshows,Zuckertiswellawarethattherearedifferentversionsofesotericism.8This‘restraint’ismostevidentinthepaucityofautobiographicalremarksfromStrauss,andtheabidingcontroversyconcerningStrauss’sowntheologicalviewsandstancetowardcontroversialphilosophers.SeeMeier(2006),3,23;Lampert(1996).9Tanguay(2007),3;Lampert(1996),13-14.LampertisattentivetoStrauss’smannerofwriting,buthestillassumesthatStraussadoptsthestyleofesotericismconcealingascandalousteaching.10InconcedingthatStrausswritesesoterically,IadmitthatsomeofStrauss’sviewsremainelusive.11Preface,SCR,1.

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tenacityoffascismandcommunism.Theseideologiescouldnotbesetasideasalien

forcesthatassaultedWesterncivilisation’senlightenedliberaldemocraciesfrom

without.Moredisturbingly,theyarosefromwithintheWest.Howevermuch

communistorfascistregimesrepresentedahostiletakeoverofcivilizedWestern

states,theyhadtheirapologistswhoworkedwithintheframeworkofWestern

liberaldemocracies.Evenifbythe1950stheseextremistideologiesdidnotquite

representaclearandpresentdanger;evenifoneformhadbeendecisivelybeaten

onthebattlefieldandtheotherwasheldoffbyWesternmilitarymight,theywere

indeedrealforces.12Thepoliticsofthe20thcentury,thepoliticsofmodernity,were

atangledconstellationofliberaldemocraciesandextremistideologies.Butfor

Strauss,thepoliticalfactorsarenotthefundamentalissues,onlysymptoms.

Strauss’sviewisthatthecrisisoftheWestisnotapoliticalcrisisbutan‘intellectual

crisis,’alossoftheWest’ssenseofpurpose.13Modernitycertainlyhasitspolitical

components,butitsessencewillbefoundinneitherthegulagnortheconcentration

camp.

Inthisveryimportantway,LeoStraussimitatesFriedrichNietzsche.Strauss

sidestepstheparticularsofmodernpoliticstogoinsearchoftheunderlyingideaof

modernity.Strauss’scontentionisthattheessenceofmodernityliesinaseriesof

intellectualpresuppositions.Thesepresuppositionsareadvancedandpromulgated

byphilosophersandaretraceabletocertainhistoricalmoments.14Modernityisan

12CM,5.13CM,3.14CM,7.PaceBeiner(2014),52-53,Straussisnotblindtotherolesociologyandhumanactionplayinmodernhistory.SeehisaccountoftheNazirise,Preface,SCR,1.Hisinterestiswiththeintellectualcharacterofmodernity.

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intellectualorphilosophicaltransformationthatchangesthewayhumanbeings

understandandliveintheworld.Straussidentifiesahistoricalmomentwhere

modernphilosophyseizesthestageofWesternhistoryfromancientphilosophy,

andshapesWesterncivilisation.LikeNietzsche,Straussregardsmodernityasa

problem,andturnstothatwhichisnotmodern,theancients.Hisreadingofthe

ancientsisinformedbyacritiqueofmodernity.LikeNietzsche,Strausswants‘to

repeatantiquityatthepeakofmodernity.’15

Straussorientshisphilosophicalaccountofmodernitywithonefundamental

philosophicalproblem:thetheologico-politicalproblem.InStrauss’swords,itis‘the

themeofmystudies.’16

Whatdoesthisformulationmean?Itisabouttheconfrontationbetween

philosophyandfaithinrevelationontheonehand,andtheconfrontationbetween

philosophyandpoliticsontheother.Theformerconfrontationconcernstherational

justificationforthephilosophiclifeinthefaceofthechallengeposedbyrevelation.17

Thelatterconfrontationconcernshowphilosophycandefenditselfpolitically,

againstthelawsandconventionsofthepoliticalcommunity.SinceStraussdoesnot

definetheseconfrontationsdirectly,theyrequirefurtherexplanation.

Whyisrevelationsuchachallengetophilosophiclife?Thatrequires

answeringapriorquestion:whatisthephilosophiclife?Straussanswersthis

questionthroughhisNietzscheanrepetitionofantiquity.ButStrauss,unlike15Zuckert(1996),105.16PrefacetoHobbesPolitischeWissenschaft,inJPCM,453;Preface,SCR,1.Meier(2006),4;Tanguay(2007),4-5.C.f.Beiner(2014,41)makesesotericism‘theheartofStrauss’spoliticalphilosophy.’ThismistakesStrauss’smeansforreachinghisthemewithhistheme.Straussdidnotchallengeustorereadthetraditionofphilosophytorecoveresotericism;esotericismisameanstorecoverhowthetraditionofphilosophytreatsthetheologico-politicalproblem.17Batnitzky(2009),45.

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Nietzsche,wantstorepeatthemodelofSocrates.InSocrates,asheispresentedin

thehistoryofphilosophybyPlatoandXenophon,Straussfindsthedefinitivemodel

ofthephilosopher.Hewantstolegitimizephilosophy‘initsoriginal,Socratic

sense.’18Ofcourse,Strausshastorevealwhatthis‘original,Socraticsense’of

philosophyactuallyis—hencetheneedtoturnbacktoantiquity.Fornow,itis

possibletopresentStrauss’sprovisionalunderstandingofphilosophy.

ForStrauss,philosophyisthequestforknowledgeof‘nature’or‘thewhole.’

‘Thewhole,’forStrauss,signifies‘allthings.’ItisthequestfortheknowledgeofGod,

man,theworld,forthenatureofallthings.19Asanattempttogainknowledgeofthe

whole,philosophyistheattempttoreplacetheopinionsaboutthenatureofthe

wholewithknowledgeofthenatureofthewhole.ThenatureofGod,man,andthe

worldarethefundamentalquestionsforphilosophy.Thephilosopherwouldcease

beingaphilosopher‘byevadingthequestionsconcerningthesethingsorby

disregardingthembecausetheycannotbeanswered.’20

Thismaysoundlikeaninvitationtometaphysicaldogmatism,yetStrauss

emphaticallydeniesthis.Hearguesthatphilosophyisnotaboutthequestforthe

possessionofthetruthofthewhole,butratherisaboutthequestforthetruthofthe

whole.Undertakingthisquest,ratherthanthesuccessfulcompletionofthequest,is

thestandardforestablishingifoneisgenuinelylivingasaphilosopher.Itmaybe

thatphilosophycannotfullyanswerthesefundamentalquestions.Indeed,Strauss

doubtsphilosophy’scapacitytorealizeknowledge.Subjectivelyspeaking,Strauss’s

18NRH,32.ThiscontrastsStrausstoNietzsche,whodelegitimizesSocrates;aswellastoHeidegger,whoneglectsSocrates.Velkley(2011),39,46.19WIPP,11.20WIPP,11.

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philosophercannoteverdeclaredefinitivelythathehascompletelyrealized

knowledge.Againstscepticism,however,Straussembracesthepossibilityofan

answer.Strauss,therefore,describesphilosophyas‘zetetic,’seekingtoanswer

fundamentalquestions.Buteverytentativeanswerfurtherexposeswhatonedoes

notknow.EchoingSocrates,Straussholdsthatphilosophy‘isnothingbut

knowledgeofone’signorance.’21Philosophyhastobealwayspracticedwiththis

‘subjectivecertainty’takenas‘objectivetruth.’22Philosophymustbeattractedto

answerswithoutsuccumbingtothem.23

Definiteanswersremainelusive,butthisdoesnotmakephilosophyfutile.

Theobjectofstudy,nature,istooimportant,sothatevenamodicumofawareness

ofnatureisbetterthannone.24Thecrucialaspectismaintainingthestudyofthe

mostimportantthings.SinceStrauss’articulationofphilosophyassumesthe

elusivenessofdefinitivephilosophicanswers,heplacesgreatemphasisonthe

presenceoftherightphilosophicquestions.ForStrauss,thekeyisawarenessof

thesequestionsaboutnature:aboutGod,man,theworld,andthenatureofthings.

Genuineknowledgeofafundamentalquestionisbetterthanblindnessor

indifferencetoit.25

Whatwouldjustifyachoiceforthiswayoflife?Theanswertothisquestion

raisesthefundamentalquestionoftheplaceofknowledgeofthegoodinhumanlife.

Broadlyspeaking,knowledgeofwhatisgoodmakeshumanbeingsgenuinelyhappy.

21OT,196.22OT,196.Zuckert(2009),551.23OT,196.24WIPP,11.25WIPP,11.

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Humanliferequiresknowledgeofwhatisgood.Thewayoflifethatprovides

knowledgeofwhatisgoodwouldbethebestwayoflife,solvingtheproblemof

humanhappiness.Tosatisfytherequirementthatitbeknowledgeofwhatisgood,a

claimaboutwhatisgoodmustbelearnedthroughone’sownnaturalpowers,and

notacceptedthroughanother’sauthority.Theonlyactivitythatcandefinitively

acquireknowledgeofthegoodisthefree,unaidedinvestigationaboutwhatisgood,

independentfromanyauthority.26Thisiskindofactivityphilosophyclaimstobe.So

theprovisionaljustificationofphilosophyasthebestwayoflifeholdsthatitalone

providesthefree,unaidedinvestigationintowhatisgoodforhumanbeings.27

Philosophyalonesolvestheproblemofhumanhappiness.28

Bydefiningtheactivityofphilosophyastheunaidedinvestigationintothe

knowledgeofthegood,Straussdoestwothings.First,hisemphasisonan‘unaided’

investigationraisestheissueofwhat‘aids’totheinvestigationexist.These‘aids’

couldactuallybecompromisingphilosophicactivitybymakingtheinvestigation

dependentonanauthority.Second,Straussembedstheactivityofpolitical

philosophyintothebroaderactivityofphilosophy,toworkoutafullerdefinitionat

alaterpoint.Allpoliticalactionisguidedbyathoughtofwhatisworseorbetterfor

society,andthisimpliesthateverypoliticalactisinformedbysomeopinionabout

thegood.29Byarguingthatthepursuitofthegoodisubiquitousinhumanlife,and

definingpoliticalactionintermsofseekingthegood,Straussmakesanobjectiveof

philosophyandpoliticalphilosophythesame:togainbetterunderstandingofthe

26NRH,84.27NRH,74.28RCPR,181;Zuckert(1996),114-15,148;Vekley(2011),143.29WIPP,10.

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good.Moreover,Strausselaboratesthatthequestionofthegoodraisestheneedfor

animmutablestandardforhumansociety.

Inthemselves,thelawsandconventionsofpoliticscannotconstitutethe

standardforthegood,becausetheyaremutableandconventionsdifferacrosstime

andplace.Thephilosopherhastoadjustthedirectionofhisquestforknowledge

awayfromtheconflictinglawsandconventionsheencountersinpolitics.Themore

hegrowsawarethatconventionsdeterminepolitics,andthemorehediscoversthat

conventioncannotbeanimmutablestandardforwhatisgood,themorehe

discoverstheimportanceofnatureastheimmutablestandardforwhatisgood.30

Straussdiscussesthisneedforanimmutablestandardforwhatisgoodas‘natural

right.’31Henceanessentialtaskofphilosophyistogainagreaterunderstandingof

whatnaturalrightis,aspartoftheunderstandingofwhatthegoodis.Philosophy

setsouttopursueabetterunderstandingofnature,astheonlygroundingforwhat

isgood.Knowledgeofpoliticalthingsbecomes,inacertainway,secondarytothe

knowledgeofthewhole.Thephilosophictemptationistodisparageandignore

politics,towhichIshallturntolater.32

ThisisStrauss’sprovisionalaccountofthephilosophiclife.YetStrauss’s

demandforjustificationofthiswayoflifeiscomparative.Thephilosophiclifemust

facedownotherpossiblewaysoflifethatmightmakemangenuinelyhappy,and

mustdemonstrateitssuperiorityinthefaceofthesealternatives.Straussseesthree

otheralternatewaysoflife:thepoeticlife(thelifeoftheartist),thepoliticallife,and

30NRH,92-93.31NRH,2,9.32WIPP,81;Meier(2006),96-97.

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thereligiouslifeinformedbydivinerevelation.Straussthinksthatneitherpoetry

norpoliticscanjustifythemselvesasprovidinggenuineknowledgeofthegood.

Poetryaddressesthemesofvirtueandviceandsomustmakesomeclaimabout

whatthegoodis.Itisreallysubservienttophilosophy.33Thepoliticallife,

characterizedbyconflictingopinionsbetweencitizensaboutwhatthegoodis,relies

onphilosophytosettletheseconflicts.34Inthedemandforjustification,philosophy

scoresdecisivevictoriesagainstpoetryandpolitics.Butnosuchvictoryispossible

againstrevelation.

Revelationchallengesphilosophyatitsverycore,replacingphilosophy’s

claimfortheauthorityoftheknowledgegainedthroughunaidedhumanreason,

withtheauthorityoftheknowledgerevealedbydivinerevelation.Thecentralclaim

ofdivinerevelationisthatitprovidesknowledgeofthegood.Ifitdoes,manmustbe

obedienttodivinerevelation,andserveitcompletely.Thepossibilityofdivine

revelationinvokeswhatStrausscalls‘thefundamentalquestion:’doesmanacquire

knowledgeofthegoodonhisown,orishedependentforthatknowledgeon

revelation?35Eithermanhimselfguideshisreasoning,orGodguidesit.Thereisno

otheralternative.Thebasic,irreduciblechoiceofhumanexistenceisforeitheralife

offreeinsight,oralifeofobedientlove.

33CM,135-37.ForStrauss,thequarrelbetweenpoetryandphilosophyismorecomplexthanIcanpresenthere,asthereisapoeticdiscoveryofnature(NRH,90n).Poetryrevealsthe‘cardinalproblemofhumanlife,’therebypreparingoneforthephilosophiclife.RCPR,182;Marshall(2007),243-47;Velkley(2011),150-54.34WIPP,80-81.35NRH,75.Strauss’sunderstandingofthetheologico-politicalproblemdevelopsoutofhis‘Farabianturn,’hisstudyofIslamicandJewishmedieval.Tanguay(2007),7.AlthoughIcannottreatithere,InotethatStrauss’s‘FarabianTurn’helpshimdevelophistheoryofesotericism,hisconceptionofphilosophy,politics,revelation,andtheirrelationship.Batnitzky(2009),48-60.

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Thismaybethebasicchoice,butStraussdoesnotthinkthatonesimply

‘decides’foroneortheother.36Asnotedabove,Strauss’saccountrequiresthateach

wayoflifecompareitselftoanother,anddemonstrateitssuperiority.Butbetween

philosophyandrevelation,Straussthinksitcannotbedone.Thetensionbetween

philosophyandrevelationisthatneithercansucceedindemonstratingits

superiorityovertheother.‘Allargumentsinfavourofrevelation,’Strausswrites,

‘seemtobevalidonlyifbeliefinrevelationispresupposed;andallarguments

againstrevelationseemtobevalidonlyifunbeliefispresupposed.’37Atfirstsight,

theinabilitytodecisivelyrefutetheotherappearstosetastalemate.Philosophyand

revelationfightforsmalltacticaladvantagesfromentrenchedpositions,butthey

essentiallyacknowledgethatcompletevictoryisimpossible.Consideringthis

stalemate,onecouldsueforpeace,affirmthefrontiers,anddeclarethatboth

revelationandphilosophyarepossible,justifiablewaysoflife.ButStraussshrewdly

seesaprobleminagreeingtodisagree.Supposeonegrantsthatareligiousclaim

maybetrue.InStrauss’sview,onceonegrantsthispossibility,theconflictchanges.

Thetrenchwarfarebetweenrevelationandphilosophyisnotbrokenoutright—but

theforcesofrevelationbleedphilosophywhite.

Onceonegrantsthatrevelation’schallengestophilosophymaybetrue,it

gainstheupperhand.Itpresentsthetheoreticalchallengetophilosophy.Revelation

agreeswithphilosophythatthegreatesthumandesireistoknow,butitarguesthat

36FortwoassessmentsofStrauss’sapparent‘decisionism,’seeMeier(2006),23-24;Batnitzky(2009),55-56.Bothagreethateachwayoflifemustprovidearationaljustification,butdisagreeaboutwhetherStraussthinksarationaljustificationofrevelationispossibleinthelastanalysis.MichaelZuckert(2009),267-69.37NRH,75.

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accesstoknowledgeisnotpossiblebyunaidedhumanreason,andisonlypossible

byacceptingdivinerevelation.Revelationsubmitsthatphilosophydoesnotprovide

knowledge,anddoesnotreallysatisfythegreatesthumandesire.38Revelationis

alsotheexistentialchallengetophilosophy.Philosophyisawayoflifethattakesits

meaninganddirectionfromfreeandunimpededquesttopursueknowledge.If

philosophyissubordinatetoanyotherauthority,itsquestforknowledgeis

compromised.39Yetrevelationsubordinatesthisquestforknowledgetoanother

authority,God,uponwhomtherealizationofthequestforknowledgenow

depends.40OnlyGodcangrantwhatphilosophywants,sohemustbetakenasthe

ultimateauthority.Sothereligiousclaimisvindicated.Becauserevelationseemsto

beabletodobetterthanwhatphilosophyclaimstodo,philosophyisinsecond

place;atbest,itiswaitingforGod;atworst,itisdefyinghim.Ifrevelationis

possible,philosophycannotjustifyitselfasthebestwayoflife.

Norcanonearguethatrationalphilosophycandemonstratethe

impossibilityofrevelation.Naturalreasonbeginsfromignorance,toseek

knowledgebynaturalmeans.Butrevelationisinprinciplenotavailabletonatural

reason.Rationalconsiderationsoftheworldcanneverrefuterevelation,sincethe

essenceofrevelationistobenotoftheworld.Soreasoncanneitherconfirmnor

refuterevelation.Butthisentailsthatreason,onitsownterms,cannotjustifyitself

asthesoleexclusiveformandstandardoftruthabouttheworld.Thisgrantsthat

38Meier(2006),7.39PAW,21.40Meier(2006),7.

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thephilosophiclife‘isnotnecessarily,notevidently,therightlife.’Straussgoesonto

say:

Philosophy,thelifedevotedtothequestforevidentknowledgeavailabletomanasman,woulditselfrestonanunevident,arbitrary,orblinddecision.Thiswouldmerelyconfirmthethesisoffaith,thatthereisnopossibilityofconsistency,ofaconsistentandthoroughlysincerelife,withoutbeliefinrevelation.Themerefactthatphilosophyandrevelationcannotrefuteeachotherwouldconstitutetherefutationofphilosophybyrevelation.41

Philosophycannotdecisivelyrefuterevelationwithoutbeggingthequestionas

towhichlifeisbetter.Thechoiceforphilosophyagainstrevelationrestsonanactof

thewill,justasfaith.Thedifferenceisthatthefaithofphilosophyrevealsitslackof

probity.42Themorephilosophytriestoassertthatitcanrefuterevelation,themore

itrevealsitsarbitrarycharacter,andthemoreitexposesitslackofprobity.To

summarize,Straussseestheprobleminthetermsofthefollowingargument:

1. Philosophyisarationallyjustifiablepursuit;2. Ifphilosophyistobearationallyjustifiablepursuit,itmustbeabletorefute

revelationwithoutbeggingthequestion;3. Philosophycannotrefuterevelationwithoutbeggingthequestion.4. Philosophyisnotarationallyjustifiablepursuit.43

Thisisthetheologico-politicalproblem:philosophy’sattempttorefuterevelation

culminateswithphilosophyappearingnottobearationallyjustifiablepursuit.It

callsintoquestionthecapacityofphilosophytojustifyitself.Itisaproblemofthe

mostfundamentalanddramaticproportions.Moreover,itispreciselythisproblem

thatunderminestheprojectofmodernity.

41NRH,75.42Meier(2006),16.43ImodifyasimilarsyllogismfromMichaelZuckert(2009),267.

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III.Strauss’sCrisisofModernity

ItisimportanttograspStrauss’sconceptoftherightrelationshipbetween

philosophyandthehistoryofphilosophy.Strauss’sdramaofthehistoryof

philosophyisbasedonchoicesmadewithrespecttocommonphilosophical

problems.Historyhasnophilosophicalpredeterminationor‘fate.’44Nordoesthe

courseofpoliticaleventsfollowthelogicofphilosophicalthought.45Although

historydoes‘expose’philosophicalproblems,theseproblemsarealwaysin

principletheoreticallyaccessible,evenifinpracticetheyarenot.Historydoesnot

‘disclose’aphilosophicalproblem.46Historydoesnotdetermineorlimitthecapacity

forphilosophy.WhileStraussarguesthatthehistoryofphilosophyhelpsexposethe

foundationsofmodernphilosophy,heisemphaticthatphilosophyisnotahistorical

discipline.47ThequestionforinterpretingStraussishowandwheretheneedtodo

thehistoryofphilosophyarises.

Modernphilosophyemergesfromaquarrelwithancientphilosophy,andso

constitutesamodificationoftheconceptsofancient,orpre-modern,philosophy.

44PaceBeiner(1990),243;(2014),49-50.BeinermakesStraussmimicHeidegger’shistoryofphilosophy.WhereasHeideggerhaseverythinggowrongwhenPlatonicphilosophyreplacesParmenides,StrausshaseverythinggowrongwhenMachiavelli’spoliticalphilosophyreplacesPlatoandAristotle’spoliticalphilosophy.BeinerthinksStraussholdsthatallmodernityiscorrupt,sohecannotexplainwhyStraussdefendsaspectsofmodernity(2012,54n,56n).YetforStrauss,historicism,nothim,assumesthereisan‘absolutemoment’inhistoryfromwhichallunderstandingunfolds.NRH,29;Zuckert(1996),118-21.45AshisdiscussionwithKojèvedemonstrates,StraussrejectstheHegelianconceptionofhistory.InStrauss’sview,theestablishmentoftheuniversalandhomogenousworldstatemightbeapossiblepoliticalevent.Butitisnotinevitable.OT,207-12;Zuckert(1996),119,304.46Althoughthedistinctionbetween‘expose’and‘disclose’seemsobscure,itisimportanttograspforStrauss’sconsideredstancetowardtheproblemofhistory.ForStrauss,itisimportanttoraisetheawarenessofhowhistoryintroducesstancesintophilosophy,buttomaintaintheemphasisonphilosophyastrans-historical—philosophy‘exposes’whathasalwaysbeenpresent,anddoesnot‘disclose’somethingcompletelynew.Philosophicalandtheoreticalinsight,nothistory,isthesourceofmeaningaboutthenatureofthewhole.ThisisStrauss’sdisagreementwithHegelandHeideggeronthemeaningofhistory.Velkley(2011),156-64.47WIPP,56;MichaelZuckert(2013),166.

138

Modernpoliticalphilosophyisatradition,andStraussseesthatitis‘theessenceof

traditionsthattheycoverorconcealtheirhumblefoundationsbyerecting

impressiveedificesonthem.’48Themodernproblemisthatmodernphilosophyhas

soconcealedthefoundationsofphilosophicactivity,andhassotransformed

opinionsandhabits,thatphilosophicactivityisnotstraightforward.A

straightforwardascentfromopiniontoknowledge,astraightforwardascentfrom

thePlatonic‘cave’tocomeoutintheopen,isnotpossible.Modernityhasartificially

createda‘secondcave’lyingbeneaththefirstcaveofopinions.Ifsomeoneascends

outofthecave,henowmusttravelalongerstretchthanbefore,alongadifferent

route,withtherighttools,toarriveathisdestination.Philosophyrequiresan

alteredintroduction.Thatalteredintroductionisthestudyofthehistoryof

philosophy.Tobeagoodphilosopher,onemustbeagoodhistorian—without

forgettingthatphilosophyisessentiallydifferentfromhistory.49

Strausspresentsmodernphilosophyastheresultofthreedistincthistorical

‘waves:’movementsinthehistoryofmodernphilosophy,which,whiledefinite,

independent,andnotpredetermined,helpbringaboutthepresentcrisis.50

Machiavelli’sradicalisminitiatesmodernity—forStrauss,itisMachiavelliwho

teachessomethingwhollynew.51YetStraussinquiresintothe‘decisionsandmissed

questions’containedinthehistoryofmodernity,tobetterunderstandthe

philosophicalissueatstake.52IshallsetthedetailsofStrauss’shistoryasidetofocus

48NRH,31.49NRH,32.FortheplaceswhereStraussusesthisanalogyofthesecondcave,seeMeier(2006),56-57.50TWM.51Pangle(1983),25.52Meier(2006),62.

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onthephilosophicalissuecharacterizingmodernity.AsStraussargues,themoderns

thinktheycansolvethetheologico-politicalproblem,andthisassumptionradically

changesphilosophyandpoliticalphilosophy.

Straussis‘devotedtotheissue’thatiscontroversialbetweentheancients

andthemoderns.53ForStrauss,thehistoricalmovementfromantiquityto

modernity,whichStraussframesaslaquerelledesanciensetdesmodernes,is

primarilyabouthowphilosopherschoosetorespondtothetheologico-political

problem.Laquerelleisaboutwhichresponseisbetter.‘Aphilosophywhichbelieves

thatitcanrefutethepossibilityofrevelation—andaphilosophythatdoesnot

believethat:thisistherealmeaningoflaquerelledesanciensetdesmodernes.’54

Strauss’sphilosophicalobjectiveistodrawattentiontothisdebateasitarisesinthe

historyofphilosophy.

InStrauss’sconsideration,modernityisanaccountofhumanthinkingwhere

amomentousshiftofemphasistakesplace.Theshiftistoattendtothenatural

needsofmen.Incontrastwithpreviousphilosophy,modernphilosophyemphasizes

asingleoverridingpriority,whatFrancisBaconcalled‘thereliefofman’sestate.’

Thegoalisto‘satisfyinthemostperfectmannerthemostpowerfulnaturalneedsof

men.’55Hencemodernphilosophytargetsthehostileforcesofnaturethatsooften

ruinhealthandbringdeath.Natureisanenemytobeconquered.

Thisprojecttransformsphilosophy.Modernphilosophytakesupthe

assumptionthatthereareimmutableprinciplesofjustice,ornaturalright.Itargues

53Meier(2006),62.54‘NotesonPhilosophyandRevelation,’inMeier(2006),177.55CM,7.

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thatthemostimportantnaturalrightisthatallmenhaveanaturalrightto

comfortableself-preservation.56Hence,itcreatesanewmoralimperative.Itcreates

anewuniversalconsciousness:asthenaturalrightbelongstoeveryoneandisowed

toeveryone,thesatisfactionofthisnaturalrightmustdevelopalongsidethatof

everyoneelse.Itisanargumentforcollective,universalprosperity,implyingthe

developmentofauniversalsocietytoworktowardrealizingthatcollective,

universalprosperity.57Itimpliesanewconceptionofphilosophicalandscientific

activity:philosophicalactivityandscientificactivityarevaluablewhentheywork

towardrealizingthatrightgoalofcollective,universalprosperityintheuniversal

society.Tobringaboutthiscomprehensiveprogramconqueringnature,

philosophicalandscientificknowledgemustbepopularizedandspreadtoasmany

peopleaspossible.58Atitscore,modernthoughtisdeterminedbytheideaof

progress:scientificprogress,moralprogress,materialprogress,andpolitical

progress.59

Soasmodernthoughtpromisestotransformphilosophy,italsopromisesto

transformpoliticalphilosophy.InStrauss’seyes,theradicaltransformationof

politicalphilosophyconstitutesmodernity.60Inmodernpoliticalphilosophy,there

isachangeintheunderstandingoftheoryandpractice,ablurringofthedistinction

56CM,4.Velkley(2011),65.57CM,4.58Modernityhastwodefiningbeliefs.Thefirstisthe‘unlimitedprogressinthe‘conquestofnature’whichismadepossiblebymodernscience.’Thisprojectdrivesthe‘thepopularizationordiffusionofphilosophicorscientificknowledge.’OT,178.59WIPP,76.Velkley(2011),149.60TWM,83.

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betweenthetwo.61Modernpoliticalphilosophyholdsthattheoriesshouldbe

practicalandachieverealpoliticalchangeaffectingthegreatestnumberofpeople

possible.Whateverthedifferencesinthepracticalprojectsofmodernpolitical

philosophers,Straussthinkstheyareallunitedbytherejectionofthephilosophical

schemesoftheclassics,becausetheyappearimpractical,orunrealistic.62

Toinitiatethisproject,however,requiresthrowingofftheauthorityof

revealedreligion.InStrauss’sassessment,modernityreallybeginswhenthe

intellectualsoftheWest,notablyMachiavelli,addressthephilosophicalandpolitical

authoritiesofrevealedreligionandcrynonserviam.Whatmotivatestheirwritings

isagreatanti-theologicalpassion.63Theywanttodemolishreligionentirely,and

fightthephilosophicalandpoliticalforcesofrevealedtheologywithferocious,

mockingpolemics.64Whiletheyofferphilosophicalcriticismofrevealedreligious

theology,theydonotattemptapiece-by-piecerefutationoftheiropponents.

Instead,mockerybecomestherefutation.AlthoughStrausscomparesthestrategyof

EnlightenmenttoNapoleon’sstrategy,acleareranalogyforthepresentisthis:the

strategyofEnlightenmentisakintotheMansteinplanfortheinvasionofFrancein

1940.Ratherthanengagetheentrenchedarmiesofreligiousorthodoxyontheir

Maginotlineofscholasticapologetics,involvingstatic,drawn-outbattlesof

disputation,onebypassesthelineentirely.Philosophyfightsthewarnottorefute

revelationperse,buttoshowsomethingelse:thatitisphilosophy,notrevelation,

61StrausswritestoEricVoegelin:‘therootofallmoderndarknessfromthe17thcenturyonistheobscuringofthedifferencebetweentheoryandpraxis.’LettertoEricVoegelin,March14,1950,inFPP,66;Zuckert(1996),121.62WIPP,40;NRH,169.63WIPP,44.64Preface,SCR,29;TM,231.

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whichcanachieveanewer,betterworld.Onetruststhattheenergyofthecampaign

forthenewworldwilleventuallymakethedefensivelinesofreligiousorthodoxy

irrelevant,consigningrevealedreligionstothedustbinsofhistory.65

Insum,thewholeanti-theologicalenterpriseofmodernityispolitical.66

Togetherwithitscommitmenttoprogress,Straussarguesthatmodernitymarksthe

radicalpoliticizationofphilosophy,andthereforeashiftintheconceptionofthe

activityofpoliticalphilosophy.Ithasgreatpoliticaleffect.Butmodernphilosophy

overstretchesitself.Itclaimstobearationallyjustifiablepursuit,andthatitcan

defeatrevelation,killingGodbyoutflankinghim.Yetitattemptstorefuterevealed

religionwithaferociouspolemicratherthanphilosophicaldisputation.Inspiteof

thesoundandthefuryofmodernphilosophy,itdoesnotrefuterevelation

philosophically.OnStrauss’sview,thisweaknessisfatal.Itdoesnotsolvethe

theologico-politicalproblem.

Uponcloserexamination,thechoiceformodernphilosophyoverrevealed

religionappearsarbitrary.ForStrauss,modernphilosophycannotconceal‘thefact

thatitsbasisisanactofwill,ofbelief,and,beingbasedonbelief,isfataltoany

philosophy.’67Modernphilosophy’srefutationofrevelationbegsthequestion.Its

arbitrarycharacterisrevealed,anditslackofprobityisexposed.Modern

philosophy,then,cannotprovidearationaljustificationfortheabandonmentof

revealedreligion.ThebasisofEnlightenmentphilosophycannotprovidearational

justificationforitself.Modernity’sconfidenceinitsownrationalsuperiorityis

65Meier(2006),14;Tanguay(2007),100-101.66Preface,SCR,29.67Preface,SCR,30.

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decisivelyundermined.Sothescenefollowingmodernphilosophy’sassaulton

revealedreligionissomethinglikethis.Initsinitialphase,theMansteinplanfor

advancingEnlightenmentsucceedsspectacularly:muchoftheterritoryofrevealed

religionisnowoccupied.Cependant,rienn’estperdu.Revealedreligionpracticesa

vigorousresistance,aresistancethaterodesatthestrengthoftheoccupyingforces

andquestionstheverylegitimacyoftheoccupation.

Godisnotdeadafterall.Inholdingthisposition,Straussdepartsfromthe

substanceofNietzsche’saccountofmodernity.ForNietzsche,thequestionof

whetherGodexistshaslostitsimportanceinmodernity,indicatingGod’s‘death.’

ThedeathofGodisanecessaryassumptiontoovercomingmodernity.ForStrauss,

anissueinmodernityisthepersistenceofthequestionofwhetherGodexists,an

issueoverwhichmodernenlightenmentstumbles.68

Thereisasecondissuethatiscontroversialbetweentheancientsandthe

moderns:theunderstandingofthegoodthroughnaturalright.Inthewaymodern

philosophytreatsthisissue,itunderminesitsclaimtorationalismbyremovingthe

capacitytojustifywhatthegoodis.Whilemodernityinitiallymeasureditsmoral

progressthroughanunderstandingofnaturalright,itendsupturningmorality

againstnaturalright.Thisleads,Straussholds,tothelukewarmjustificationsof

moralityinpositivism.Withthequestionofthegoodunabletobejustified

effectively,thestageissurrenderedtohistoricismandaconcomitantcollapseinto

politicalirresponsibility.

68Zuckert(1996),106.StraussdisagreeswithNietzsche’sviewthatthefundamentalhistoricalfactproblematizingmodernlifeisthedeathofGod.TSZPrologue2-3;C.f.Lampert(1996),168-73.

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Howdoesthishappen?Modernpoliticalphilosophymeasuresprogressin

humanwelfarebytheextenttowhichitconquersnature.69Initially,thisprogressin

humanwelfaretakesitsbearingsfromnaturalright,meaninghumannaturalneeds.

Humannatureisthestandard.70Thiscreatesaninconsistency,asanunchangeable

humannaturesetsalimittotheconquestofnature.Progresswouldthenbe

significantlyrestricted.Ifmodernityistosustainthemissionofprogress,itmust

extenditsconquestofnaturetoconquerhumannature.Butthisimpliesthathuman

natureischangeable.Sothemissionofprogressmustrecognizethatthenatural

needsofmen,apurportedunchangeablehumannature,cannotactuallydirectthe

conquestofnature.71Intheend,naturecannotprovidethestandardforprogress.

Thenewstandardforprogressisreason.Asthisisapracticalproject,the

kindofreasonimplicatedismoralreasoningormorality.Formoderns,morality

entailsautonomy,notbowingtoanylawthatamanhasnotimposeduponhimself.72

Toenactthemorallawautonomouslyrequiresdemonstratingthatoneisthemaster

overallotherpossibleinfluencestoaction.Themorallawmustthereforeshapethe

naturalwithinmanandoutsideofman.73Byreorientingprogressawayfromnatural

humanneedsandtowardrationalmorality,adivisionemergesbetweennatureand

reason.

Thisdivisioncorrespondstothedivisionbetweenthemorallyrational

‘Ought’andthemorallyneutral‘Is.’Underthisdivision,philosophystudiesthe

69CM,7.70Thisbecomesthemodern,Hobbesianteachingonnaturalright;seeTanguay(2007),102-109.71CM,7.72CM,40.StraussseesthecontentofmodernmoralityasfullyworkedoutinKant’sphilosophy.Kantthereforepreparesthewayforhistoricism.Marshall(2009),221,237,253,274-78,318.73CM,40.

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‘Ought,’whilesciencestudiesthe‘Is.’Bydividingthe‘Is’ofnaturefromthe‘Ought’

ofmoralreasoning,oneseparatesthescientificstudyofnature(fact),fromthe

philosophicalstudyofmoralreasoning(value).Inanimportantclaim,Strauss

chargesthattheincreasingseparationbetweenfactsandvaluesunderminesthe

rationaljustificationforscienceandphilosophy.Itleavesscientificprogresswithout

amoralcompass.74Moreover,itleavesmoralreasoningwithoutafirmrational

foundation.Evaluativestatementsarenotdescriptionsofnature,butare‘values,’or

subjectivepreferences.Conflictsbetweendifferentvaluesareconflictsbetween

differentsubjectivepreferences,andarethusinsolubleforhumanreason.Correct

valuescannotbeknown,butcorrectfactscan.Onlyscientificknowledgequalifiesas

knowledge.Whenitnowcomestothephilosophicaljustificationofmorality,no

scienceispossible.Theimplicationisstark:nogenerallyacceptedbodyof

knowledgeconcerningmoralobjectivityexists.

Basedonthedividebetweenfactandvalue,positivismaspirestodevelopa

newstudyofpoliticsandsociety,asocialandpoliticalscience.Sinceonlyscientific

knowledgeisgenuineknowledge,positivismaimstopurgethestudyofpoliticsof

anythingunscientific.Asitassertsthatonlydescriptivefactsarewithinthe

competenceofascience,thenewpoliticalscienceforcesallevaluativestatements

foundinthestudyofpoliticstotaketheirquietus.Thenewpoliticalscience

proclaimsitselfvalue-freeorethicallyneutral,astheonlydisciplinethatprovides

genuineknowledgeofpolitics.Italoneprovidesthesystematicstudyofpolitical

reality.

74CM,7;SPPP,190;Zuckert(1995),196.

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Straussfamouslythinksthatpositivismanditsnewpoliticalscienceare

philosophicallyuntenable,forfourmajorreasons.First,Straussarguesitis

impossibletostudysocialphenomenawithoutmakingvaluejudgements.Value

judgementsarepresupposedinwhichpoliticalphenomenaapoliticalscientist

decidestostudy.75Ifvaluejudgementsarenotexplicitlyacknowledged,political

scientistsimporttheirownprejudices,whichmakeitimpossibletounderstand

societyasitunderstandsitself.76Despiteitsintentionstobeobjective,avalue-free

politicalscienceendangersobjectivity.77Positivismdistortspoliticalreality.Second,

Straussdisputesthatonlyscientificknowledgequalifiesasknowledge.Claiming

scientificknowledgeasthehighestformofknowledgedepreciatesthepre-scientific

knowledgethatisnecessarytoformscientificknowledge.Giventhepractical

necessityofpre-scientificjudgements,politicalscienceimplicitlyoperateswith

thesepre-scientificjudgements.Yetpoliticalscientistsignorethem.78

Third,Straussattackstheassertionthattheconflictsbetweendifferent

valuesareinsolubleforhumanreason.Inhisview,thiscannotbeproved.Thispoint

isimportantforStrauss,ashethinksitdrawspositivismintoapolitically

irresponsiblerelativism.Itcannotevaluatethedifferencebetweengoodregimes,

likeliberaldemocracy,andbadregimes,likeNazismandCommunism.79Tobeclear,

Straussdoesnotthinkthatthepositivistsarecrypto-communists.80Positivist

politicalscientistsdohaveademocraticheart,yettheyaresingularlybadat75WIPP,21-22.76NRH,50,52,55,56;WIPP,21.77NRH,61.78WIPP,23-25.79WIPP,22-23.80Straussacknowledgesanaffinity‘betweenpresent-daypositivismandacertainkindofdemocracy,’duetothe‘notmerelymethodological’contextoutofwhichpositivismarises.LAM,26.

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justifyingtheirdemocraticcommitments.Theycannotidentifywhatmakesaliberal

manliberal.81

Strauss’sfourthconsiderationagainstpositivism,however,isthemost

important.Hearguesthatpositivismnecessarilytransformsitselfintohistoricism,

whichexpressesanevenmoreegregiouscaseofpoliticalirresponsibility.82For

Strauss,thistransformationoccursintwostages.Inthefirststage,thepolitical

scientistrecognisesthathisperspectiveishistoricallylimited,thatheisindangerof

mistakingpeculiaritiesofcontemporarylifeforessentialcharacteristicsofhuman

society.Tooffsetthatdangerhestudiesotherculturesofthepastandpresent.Being

agoodpositivist,heperformshisstudyonawhollyempiricalbasis.But,ifhe

maintainshisparadigmthatimportsvalue-judgementsfromotherparadigmsto

interprethisempiricaldata,herunsintotheproblemexpressedbyStrauss’sfirst

objection.Heimposeshisownviewofhumansocietyonanotherculture.Hedoes

notunderstandthecultureasitunderstandsitself.Ifhewantstogetbeyondthis

parochialism,hemustdeployhistoricalunderstanding.Hetherebyraiseshistorical

understandingtogreatheights,attheexpenseofempiricalscientificstudies.83

Theascentofhistoricalunderstandingleadstothesecondtransformationof

positivism.Politicalscienceclaimstoprovideasetoftruepropositionsabout

politicalphenomena:trueanswerstothequestionsofpoliticalscientists.Butthe

questionspoliticalscientistsaskdependuponthedirectionoftheirinterests:in

short,theirvalues.Thesevaluesare,asthefact-valuedistinctionasserts,subjective

81LAM,28.82WIPP,25-27.83CM,8.

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preferences.Yettheyprovidethefundamentalconceptsofpoliticalscience.

Seeminglyobjectiveanswersarethenregardedassubjectivepreferences,which

cannotgivearationalaccountoftheirownbasis.84Thevaluesthatembodypolitical

sciencearedependentonthesocietytowhichthepoliticalscientistbelongs.He

owesthosevaluesnottorationalconsiderationbuthistoricalcontingency.Strauss

concludes:‘notonlyissocialsciencesupersededbyhistoricalstudies;socialscience

itselfprovestobe“historical.”’85Politicalscienceisrelativized:theseemingly

objectiveanswersaresubjectiveandcontingent.Politicalscienceisnotinprinciple

superiortoanyalternativewayofunderstanding.

IV.TheEmergenceofHistoricism

Positivismhastransformedintohistoricism.ForStrauss,historicismis‘the

assertionthatthefundamentaldistinctionbetweenphilosophicandhistorical

questionscannotinthelastanalysisbemaintained.’86Forexample,ittakesthe

attempttoofferaphilosophicaldefenceofthegoodmethodsofpoliticalscienceas

reducibletoitshistoricalcontext.Byarguingjudgementsofgoodandbadvary

accordingtohistoricalcontext,historicismchallengesthepossibilityofphilosophy.

Thischallengeisextremelyserious.ForStrauss,itisthereasonthathistoricism,

ratherthanpositivism,isthethreattophilosophy.

Strauss’sstanceonthismatterbearsdirectlyagainstthemostarticulate

spokesmenofhistoricism:MartinHeideggerandAlexandreKojève.WhileStrauss

explicitlydebateswithKojèvein‘RestatementonXenophon’sHiero,’hisletters

84NRH,72.85WIPP,26.86WIPP,57.

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makeitclearheconsidersthepositionsofKojèveandHeideggerasrepresentingthe

modern,historicistposition.87

ItisKojèvewhocriticizesStrauss’saccountofthephilosophiclifedirectly,

accusingStrauss,andclassicalphilosophy,ofupholdingan‘Epicurean’idealof

philosophy.ForKojève,Strauss’sphilosopherrenouncesallpoliticalaction,livinga

strictlyisolatedlife,inordertodevotehimselfcompletelytothequestforthe

knowledgeofthewhole.88Kojèvemakesthenatureofthewholeintoanissue.For

Kojève,anyattempttoholdphilosophyaswhollydistinctfrompoliticsmustbe

assumingthatphilosophyisthequestforknowledgeofanimmutablewhole.89This

accountistheisticanddiscredited.Instead,onemustadoptahistoricalconception

ofthewhole.90

Basedonhishistoricism(groundedinhisreadingofHegel),Kojèvegoeson

toclaimthatthephilosophermust‘“participate”inhistory,anditisnotclearwhyhe

shouldthennotparticipateinitactively,forexamplebyadvisingthetyrant.’91For

Kojève,philosophy’smostcompleteactivityistoprovideideasthatguidepolitics.

Ononehand,politicsisderivativefromphilosophy.92Philosophyisessentially

politicalaction.Butontheotherhand,politicalevents—history—arenecessaryfor

thephilosophicalideatorevealitselffully.Inthatsense,philosophyisderivative

frompolitics.Kojève’shistoricismjustifiesthephilosopherabandoningthequestfor

87StrausswritestoKojève:‘Iamgladthatfinallysomeonerepresentsthemodernpositionintelligentlyandinfullknowledge—withoutHeidegger’scowardlyvagueness.’CorrespondenceSep.4,1949,inOT,244.88Kojève,OT,150-51.89Kojève,OT,151.90Kojève,OT,152.91Kojève,OT,152.92Kojève,OT,173.

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knowledgeofthewhole,andreplacingthisquestwithpoliticalobjectives.

Ultimately,forKojève,thepoliticalandphilosophicalobjectiveapplicableforour

historicaltimeistheideaoftheuniversalandhomogenousstate.93

Straussseesthishistoricized,politicizedversionofphilosophicactivityas

denyingthepossibilityofanyrationalevaluationofthegood,leadingtothemost

egregiouscaseofpoliticalirresponsibility.Ifpositivismleadstohistoricism,

historicismleadstonihilism.94Historicismrejectsanypermanenciesinhuman

society,suchasapermanentquestionaboutthegoodsociety.A‘goodsociety’would

beevaluatedwhollyonaccountofhistoricalcontingencies—inpractice,some

mysteriousdispensationoffate.Thehistoricalcontingencyofcharacteristicslike

‘noble’and‘base’preventsanyrationalevaluationofgoodandbaddispensationsof

fate.Historicismdoesnotandcannotassessgoodandbadpoliticalregimes.It

acquiescesbothtothepoliticalbreezesandpoliticalstormsofhistory.In‘Whatis

PoliticalPhilosophy?’Strausswrites:

Itwasthecontemptforthesepermanencieswhichpermittedthemostradicalhistoricistin1933tosubmitto,orrathertowelcome,asadispensationoffate,theverdictoftheleastwiseandleastmoderatepartofhisnationwhileitwasinitsleastwiseandleastmoderatemood,andatthesametimetospeakofwisdomandmoderation.Thebiggesteventof1933wouldratherseemtohaveproved,ifsuchproofwasnecessary,thatmancannotabandonthequestionofthegoodsociety,andthathecannotfreehimselffromtheresponsibilityforansweringitbydeferringtoHistory.95The‘radicalhistoricist,’thecausecélèbreofGermany’strahisondesclercs,is

MartinHeidegger.WhileKojève’spoliticalirresponsibilityisnotimmediately

evident,Heidegger’sis.ForStrauss,Heideggerisastudyofwhathappenspolitically

93Kojève,OT,173.94NRH,42.95WIPP,27.

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whenone’sthinkingiscommittedtoradicalhistoricism.Heideggerdeniesthereare

immutableprinciplesintelligibletohumanbeings.Hedeniesthatonecando

metaphysics—thatistosay,studyimmutableprinciplesofnature—aswellas

philosophicalethics—thatistosay,studytheimmutableprinciplesofnaturalright.

Heideggerthereforegivesuppursuingthequestionofthegoodsociety,the

fundamentalquestionofpoliticalphilosophy.

ThisbearsdirectlyonHeidegger’spolitics.Straussrejectsanyinterpretation

ofHeideggerwhichattributeshispoliticalstancein1933to‘amereerrorof

judgement’;HeideggersupportedtheNazisbecauseofthedirectionofhisthought.96

StrausssituatesHeidegger’sownthinkingasareactiontoHusserl,whowashimself

reactingagainsttheMarburgschoolofneo-Kantianism.Initsaccountofscience,

Husserlaccusesitofsubstitutingthescientificaccountofthingsforthethingsin

themselves:theseneo-Kantiansmakethemistakeofbeginningwiththeroofrather

thanthefoundation.Phenomenology,aturn‘tothethingsthemselves,’isrequiredto

getagenuineaccountofreality,lookingthereforeforthepre-philosophic

foundationsofreality.Inhisphenomenology,Husserlobservesthatscienceis

derivativeoftheprimaryknowledgeoftheworldofthings.Apre-scientific

understandingoftheworldofthingsistherealfoundationofknowledge.Therefore,

Husserlconcentratesontheanalysisofthesensiblyperceivedthing.97

Husserl’sstudentHeideggerassumestheideaofphenomenologyandits

slogan,‘tothethingsthemselves.’ButHeideggeraccusesHusserlofnotbeingradical

96RCPR,30;JCPM,461:‘ThereisastraightlinewhichleadsfromHeidegger’sresolutenesstohissidingwiththeso-calledNazisin1933.’97SPPP,31.

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enough:liketheneo-Kantiansbeforehim,Husserlalsobeginswiththeroof.For

Heidegger,thesensibleperceivedthingthatHusserlbelievestobethefoundationis

itselfderivativefromwhattheGreekscallpragmata.Thesearethingsready-at-

hand,theimmediateobjectsofourinterestandengagementorthepractical

engagementwiththings.Onlytheexaminationofthesethingswilldisclosethe

foundationsofreality,whichHeideggerturnsintoasearchforthemeaningof

Being.98Heidegger’sphenomenologyproceedstorejectthephilosophicaltradition,

especiallyasitasdevelopedsinceAristotle.99Forthedevelopmentofmodern

philosophy,thecorrectinterpretationofAristotleistheissue.AsStrausswrites,it

presentstwopressingquestions:

Modernphilosophyhascomeintobeingasarefutationoftraditionalphilosophy,i.e.oftheAristotelianphilosophy.HavethefoundersofmodernphilosophyreallyrefutedAristotle?Havetheyeverunderstoodhim?100ItisHeidegger’sfreshinterpretationofAristotle,standingagainstmodern

misunderstandingsofAristotle,whichStraussfindstrulyremarkable.101Heidegger

reinterpretstheoreticalandpracticalreasoninginAristotleinordertoblurany

sharpdemarcationbetweenthem.Specifically,StraussobserveshowHeidegger

interpretsthefirstsentenceofAristotle’sMetaphysics,‘Allmenbynaturedesireto

know.’102Heideggertakesthe‘desiretoknow’asarejectionofadisinterestedquest

forobjectiveknowledge.Hereplacesthisdisinterestedquestwithhisconceptof

‘care,’whichstresseshistoricallylocated,concerneddecision-making.Byarguing

98RCPR,28-29;JCPM,460-61.99RCPR,38;JCPM,462.100‘TheLivingIssuesofGermanPostwarPhilosophy,’inMeier(2006),134.101JCPM,450,461;O’Connor(2002),165;Velkley(2011),67,126.102JCPM,461.

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thatthisdesireinitiatesphilosophy,Heideggerbringsphilosophicalthinkingor

theoreticalreasoningintohistoricallylocateddecision-making.Hearguesfor

despisingobjectivecertaintiesinfavourofriskingone’sselfresolutely.103He

therebyelevates‘projectordecision’abovetheoreticalknowledge.104Ratherthan

beingseparate,theoreticalreasoningarisesfromthedemandsofpractical

reasoning,fromthedemandsofresoluteaction.Resoluteactionthengivesdirection

tophilosophy,sothataphilosophercantakedirectionfromthosecommittedto

resoluteaction,evenrevolutionaryaction.StraussseesHeidegger’spraiseof

resoluteactionasunderwritinghisdecisiontobecomeaNaziin1933.As

Heidegger’spoliticalirresponsibilitystemsfromhisphilosophy,Straussencourages

thescrutinyofthephilosophicalreasonsHeideggergivesforsupportingNational

Socialism.ThisturnstheattentiontoHeidegger’s1933RectoralAddress.105

InhisRectoralAddress,Heideggerfurthershisfusionoftheoreticaland

practicalreasoning.LikeKojève,hearguesthatphilosophyisessentiallypolitical

actionandderivativefrompoliticalaction.Heideggerhopesthathisphilosophizing

willgivedirectiontoandtakedirectionfromtheNationalSocialistrevolution.

HeideggerjustifieshispositionthroughAristotle.Heredefinestheōriafroma

contemplativeattitudepursuedforitsownsake,toapassionateactivity.Using

Aristotle’stermenergeia,Heideggerdefinesitas‘being-at-work,’andcallstheōria

thehighestformofenergeia.106Heidegger’sargumentisthatphilosophyis

continuousfrompractice,especiallypoliticalpractice.Moreover,ithasa

103RCPR,36;JCPM,461:‘Thekeytermis“resoluteness.”’104RCPR,45.105RCPR,30.106Heidegger(1985),472.

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responsibilitytopoliticalpractice.Aconcerned,committed,revolutionary

resolutionreplacesacademicfreedom,bindingtheactivityoftheuniversitytothe

peopleandGermannation.107Heidegger’sphilosophyisessentially‘practical’and

‘patriotic.’108

Tosummarize,HeideggerisforStrausstheexampleofthedangerphilosophy

posestopracticallife,andpracticallifeposestophilosophy.Heidegger’sfusionof

theoryandpracticeexposeshowserioustheproblemoftherelationbetween

philosophyandpracticallifeisinmodernity.109ItisbecauseofHeidegger’s

conceptionofphilosophythatStrausscriticizeshim.RecallingStrauss’sown

conceptionofphilosophyasthequestforfullknowledgeofnature,Strausscharges

Heideggerasthemanwhobringsnature‘fullytodisappearance.’110

Nevertheless,refutinghistoricismisextremelydifficultandcannotsimplybe

accomplishedbywishingforthenaturalrightitabandoned.111Ashistoricismarises

fromparticularmodernpresuppositions,Straussadmitshecannotdisprove

historicismwithoutacompletecriticalanalysisofmodernphilosophy.112Afterall,

Straussembedshisaccountofhistoricismwithinthepathofdevelopmentof

modernphilosophy.Therelevantissuefortheemergenceofhistoricismismodern

107Heidegger(1985),476.108SeeO’Connor(2002),168.StraussisawarethatHeideggerchangeshisthinkingconsiderablylaterinlife,SPPP,30,34.Heidegger’sreflectionsarecaughtinthemoderntrapoffusingpracticetotheory.InthecaseoftheearlyHeidegger,itisphilosophicaltheory;inthecaseofthelateHeidegger,itisdivinerevelation.SeeVelkley(2011),55,116.109Velkley(2011),115.110Velkley(2011),50.AlthoughStraussisconcernedwiththerelativisticimplicationsofHeidegger’shistoricism,hisclaimthatHeideggerhasnoroomforpoliticalphilosophyshouldnotbetakentoreferwhollytothislevel,buttoHeidegger’smisunderstandingofphilosophicactivity.Velkley(2011),161.Heideggerisnotcompletelyoffthemark;StrausssharesaconsiderablekinshiptoHeidegger.Velkley(2011),46,57-58,61.111NRH,6.112WIPP,60.

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politicalphilosophy’smodificationofpre-modernpoliticalphilosophy.113For

Strauss,thehistoricaldevelopmentofmodernpoliticalphilosophyhasobscuredits

basisasamodificationofconceptsofpre-modernpoliticalphilosophy.114This

modificationconcealsrealphilosophicalchoices.SoStraussarguesthatthefusionof

philosophicalandhistoricalquestionsisonlyinevitableonthebasisofmodern

politicalphilosophy.Buttheproblemisthat,fromthepointofviewofmodern

politicalphilosophy,modernpoliticalphilosophyissimplybetter.Duetomodern

politicalphilosophy’sattachmenttoprogress,itassumesitcanbuilduponthe

foundationsofthepastwithoutnecessarilyexaminingthetruthandvalidityofthese

foundations.Initsfinal,historicistform,modern‘philosophy’definesitselfinterms

ofasuccessful,superiorfusionofhistoryandphilosophy.Thereinlieshistoricism’s

threattophilosophy.

Moreover,historicismisnottheonlychallengetophilosophy,asStraussis

alsothinkingoftheologico-politicalproblem.115Recognizingthatmodern

philosophicalreasoninghasfailedtoprovidearefutationofrevelation,Straussis

alsoinsistingthatanotherpower,revelation,cannotbegiventhevictoryover

reason.116WhatStraussseekstoprovidenotjustacaseforclassicalphilosophy

againsthistoricismanditsNazisympathizers,acaseforAthenstoresistthe

113‘Accordingly,whatiscalledthe‘discovery’ofhistoryisthework,notofphilosophyingeneral,butpoliticalphilosophy.’NRH,34.114WIPP,77.115SeeWIPP,77;Behnegar(2013),27-29.116Strauss’scritiqueofSchmittisanexampleofthisinsistence(seeSchmitt,2007);Meier(2006),84.ThisalignsStrausstoSchmitt’scritiqueofliberalism,becausemodernliberalismalsoholdsthattherationaljustificationofthebestwayoflifeisimpossible.Meier(1995),42.NeverthelessStrauss’sandSchmitt’scritiqueofliberalismisonverydifferentgrounds.Z&Z(2006),184-94.

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seductionsofNuremburg,butalsoacaseforAthenstorespondtothechallengeof

Jerusalem.

V.AReturntoAthens?

Nevertheless,StraussqualifieshiscaseforAthens,breakingfromstandard

classicalphilosophicrevivals,particularlyNeo-Thomism,inthreeways.First,he

steersawayfromarguingforaspecificcosmology;second,hedeniesthatclassical

politicalphilosophyisdirectlyapplicabletomodernity;third,heseekspre-scientific

knowledgeofpoliticalthingsfromclassicalpoliticalphilosophy,embracingthe

classicsnotbecauseitisatradition,butbecauseinitsbeginningitisnotatradition.

Considerthefirst.Straussarguesthattheabandonmentofthelastingand

perennialhasadramaticeffectonthepossibilityofphilosophicalethics,ornatural

right.Heprovokeshisreaderoverthepoliticallyirresponsibilityofthosewho

disregardnaturalright.Bothpositivistsandhistoricistssuppressthequestionofthe

goodsocietythatenablespoliticalphilosophytoaskwhatisgoodandwhatisevil.

Strausswrites:‘itwouldseem,then,thattherejectionofnaturalrightisboundto

leadtodisastrousconsequences.’117Hesuggeststhattheabandonmentofnatural

rightleadsdirectlytonihilism.Moreover,StraussisfascinatedwithHeidegger’s

turntotheclassics,demonstratingthedecisiveroletheirinterpretationhasin

recoveringphilosophicalquestions.YetStraussidentifiesHeidegger’s

misappropriationofAristotleasacentralflawinHeidegger’shistoricistaccountof

philosophy.ThecorrectinterpretationofAristotleisatissue:fortheunderstanding

117NRH,3.

157

ofthewholeofnature,fortherightrelationshipbetweentheoryandpractice,and

fortheunderstandingofnaturalright.

Thislastpointisapricklyone.Onemightthinkthat,throughAristotleand

otherclassicalpoliticalphilosophers,Straussisattemptinga‘straightforward’

revivaloftheprojectofnaturallawandnaturalright,assertingtranscendentvalues

inthemannerof‘theclassicaltradition.’118Isthiscorrect?Strausscallstheissueof

naturalrightanissueof‘partyallegiance,’dividingintotwoprincipalparties.119

Contemporaryliberalsrejectit,whiledisciplesofThomasAquinasareforit.In

being‘for’naturalright,Strausshasacommoncausewithneo-Thomism.Buthe

distanceshimselffromtheneo-Thomists.

Straussrecognizesthatapowerfulobjectiontoclassicalpoliticalphilosophy

isthatitlinksnaturalrighttoateleologicalconceptionofhumannature,linkedin

turntoaspecificallyteleologicalcosmology—nowdiscredited.TheBaconian

investigationofnature,anditspropagationofscience,hascalledthatintodoubt.

Thus‘right-thinking’peopledisregardtheteleologicalconceptionoftheuniverse,

intowhichateleologicalconceptofhumannatureoncefittedeasily.120Anewnon-

teleologicalcosmologyreigns,whichimpliesthatanewnon-teleologicalconception

ofhumannaturereigns.Ifonewantstorecoverateleologicalconceptofhuman

nature,whichwouldpermitconsideringnaturalright,whatcanonedo?

Neo-Thomistsconcedethevalidityofthenon-teleologicalcosmologyand

argueforateleologicalconceptionofhumannature.Yetbybreakingthelink

118AnearlywayofunderstandingStrauss.Major(2013),5-6;Tanguay(2007),123-24.119NRH,7.120NRH,7-8;WIPP,39-40;c.f.Lampert(2008).

158

betweenthetwo,theirpositioncarriesapotentialcontradictionaboutthenatureof

thewhole.Moreover,theysurrendertheattempttoprovideacomprehensive

presentationofthewhole.Theirposition,then,‘presupposesabreakwiththe

comprehensiveviewofAristotleaswellasthatofThomasAquinashimself.’121

Whileneitherunreservedlyagreeingwiththemodernnon-teleologicalcosmology

norresuscitatingtheclassical,Strausstakesthepositionthatonecannotknow

whichcosmologyiscorrect.EventheBaconianproject,withallitssuccesses,does

notprovidecompleteknowledgeofthecosmos.Humanknowledgeislimited.

Straussseesthemodernscientificclaimasanotherformofmetaphysical

dogmatism,aboutwhichheremainsextremelywary.122AsStraussargues,

philosophyneednotdemandanyparticularsystemofdoctrineofthewhole.For

example,Farabi’streatiseonAristotle’sphilosophy‘doesnotdiscussAristotle’s

metaphysics.’Philosophyisthewayleadingtometaphysicsratherthanmetaphysics

itself.123RatherthanrepeatingthesometimesdoctrinairepositionsofAristotelian

metaphysics,Strausspursuesanon-doctrinairequestforunderstandingthenature

ofamysteriouswhole.124

Strauss’ssecondqualificationconsistsinhowhespeakscriticallyofattempts

toreviveawayofthinkingaboutthepastthatattemptstomakeclassicalpolitical

121NRH,8;WIPP,285-86.122Tanguay(2007),129-30;Landy(2014),14:PartofStrauss’swarinessstemsfromhissympathieswithNietzsche’sandHeidegger’scritiquesofmetaphysicaldogmatism.ThereallessonofthediscrepancybetweentheargumentStraussmakesinthemainbodyofthetextatNRH,8,andthecitationsfromAristotle’sPhysics196a30ff;199a3-5,istobewaryofdefinitiveaccountsofthewhole.SeeSalkever(1990),50;Velkley(2011),128;Marshall(2007),295-96.123Zuckert(1996),116.124Velkley(2011),47,54,69.Velkleyobservesthatinaffirmingthemysteriouselusivenessofthewhole,Straussisinthissensepost-Kantian.ItisonthispointwhereStraussdoesnotpursueAristotelianmetaphysics,butdistinguisheshimselffromit.

159

philosophydirectlyapplicabletocontemporarylife.125Forexample,hecritiquesan

interpretationofThomasAquinasthatattemptstodrawoutegalitarianpremises

forobviatingthegapbetweenthemodernandancientaccounts.126Strausswill

emphasizethathisstudyoftheclassicsdiffersfromtheseversions,neo-Thomistic

orotherwise.Hedoesnotembraceatraditionofclassicalphilosophyforitsown

sake.Thiswouldprivilegeaparticularhistoricalperiodaboveallelse,eitherlapsing

intothehistoricismheseekstorefute,orexalting‘theWesterntradition,’which

Straussthinkscannotwithstandpreciseanalysis.127

Strauss’sthirdqualificationarisesfromthisdesiretoavoidembracinga

‘tradition.’Strauss’semphasisisinsteadonpre-traditional,pre-scientific

knowledge,tostandagainstpositivismandhistoricism.Hiscritiqueofpositivism,

anditsconceptionofpoliticalscience,isonphilosophicalgrounds:itdoesnottake

pre-scientificknowledgeseriously,sodistortspoliticalthings.AsStrausssees

positivismasdistortingpoliticalreality,abetterconceptionofpoliticalsciencewill

provideafaithfulaccountofrealpoliticallife.Asfarashistoricismisconcerned,and

itsdistortionofthewhole,Straussthinkstherearegoodphilosophicalreasonsnot

totakeitssoundnessforgranted.128Butthegenuinerefutation,thatwouldpresent

theauthenticaccountofthewhole,willhavetoinvolveamoreradicalrecoveryof

non-historicistphilosophy.SinceStrauss’scritiqueofmodernphilosophy

emphasizesitsdistortionofpoliticalphenomena,heseeksanaccountofpolitical

phenomenathatattemptstounderstandthepoliticalphenomenaastheypresent

125Tarcov(1991).126WIPP,308-9.127‘Permitmetodeclarethatitisimpossibletodosointhelastanalysis.’RCPR,73.128NRH,9-34;WIPP,56-77.

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themselvestothenaturalorpre-philosophicalconsciousness.Forthatreason,

Straussturnstopre-modern,classicalphilosophy,thecaseparexcellenceofnon-

historicistthought.129

Inthis,StraussdrawssomeinspirationfromEdmundHusserl.AsHusserl

urged,Straussgoes‘tothethingsthemselves’torecoveranaccountofthewhole.

StraussdiffersfromHusserlinthathe,likeHeidegger,emphasizesthepragmatic

humanpracticalengagementwiththings:specifically,thepoliticalthings.Thisis

Strauss’sSocraticpathtorecoveranaccountofthewhole.130Togainclarityabout

thepoliticalthings,oneneedsapre-scientificviewofpoliticalthings;ortoputin

anotherway,acommonsenseviewofpoliticalthings.Whomakesthat

understandingprimary,asksStrauss?HisanswerisAristotle.131

Moreover,StraussturnstoAristotleonthegroundsthatheisnon-

traditional.Aristotlemakesanattempttounderstandpoliticalrealityonitsown

terms.Seeingpoliticsafresh,Aristotleprovidesadirectrelationshiptopoliticallife

thatisnotmediatedbyatradition.132Thepossibilityofthisnon-traditionalreading

ofAristotleisapropitiousfeatureofthemodernscene,enablingonetounderstand

ina‘freshmannerwhatwashithertounderstoodonlyinatraditionalorderivative

manner.’133

Straussdoesnotreturntoclassicalpoliticalphilosophybyadirectroad,but

hisdetoursshouldbetakenassignofhisphilosophicalseriousness.Theconcern

129NRH,33.130Velkley(2011),72.131CM,11-12.132Tarcov(2013),66.133CM,9.

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withclassicalpoliticalphilosophyarisesoutoftheconcernforthepresent.

Appropriationofthepastdoesnotsupplyreadyrecipesforthepresent,whichis

partofhisrejectionofneo-Thomism.Modernsocietyis‘whollyunknown’tothe

classics.134But,ifoneistounderstandandrespondtothepresentpredicament,

Straussthinksclassicalpoliticalphilosophyisindispensable.

Strauss’sassignmentisbold.Theenemyishistoricism.Thefriendispolitical

philosophy,whichmustaskwhatthegoodsocietyis.Politicalphilosophyhasanally

inAristotle.SoStraussreadsAristotletohelphimstudypolitics,tohelphimfind

thatprimaryunderstandingofpoliticalphenomena.Hereadshimtoshow,against

value-freepoliticalscience,whatanalternativeconceptofpoliticalsciencewould

looklike.Hemustalsoshowthatthisalternativeconceptofpoliticalsciencedoes

notleadoneintopoliticalirresponsibility.Forthepresent,itmustencouragegood

citizenswhoarealsogoodliberaldemocrats.YethemustreadAristotleinanon-

historicistwaythatdevelopsabetterawarenessofthewholethanhistoricism.This

awarenessofthewholeprovidesabetterconceptionofpoliticalscience,and

preparesthewayforjustifyingphilosophyasthebestwayoflife.

Strauss’sAristotle

Inovercomingmodernity’sfashioningofthe‘secondcave’,Strauss’sproject

addressesthreedistinctconceptsthroughhisinterpretationsofthreedifferent

historicalfigures.WithSocrates,Straussidentifiesaconceptionofphilosophyand

raisestheproblemofpoliticalphilosophy.WithPlato,Strausshonesthat

134CM,9.

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conception.WithAristotle,Straussidentifiesaconceptionofpoliticalscience.But

AristotleappearstodivergefromSocratesandPlato.Tograsptheinherentunityof

Strauss’sturntoclassicalpoliticalphilosophy,IarguethatStrauss’streatmentof

Aristotlehelpsestablishtheintegrityofhisproject.Itshowstherelationship

betweenphilosophy,politicalphilosophy,andpoliticalsciencewithoutdiminishing

thevalueStraussfindsinallthree.

StraussfindsinAristotleanelaborationofSocrates’saccountofthewhole,

focusedonpoliticalscience.Intheinitialstage,Aristotleextendsupontheinsights

ofSocrates’s‘secondsailing,’Socrates’sturntothestudyofthehumanthingsor

politicalthings,todeveloppoliticalscience.Strauss’spositionisthatwhileSocrates

isthefounderofpoliticalphilosophy,Aristotleisthefounderoftheclassicalpolitical

science.Elaboratingonthepoliticalthings,Aristotleoutlinestheimportanceof

moralvirtue,thecity,andthebestregime.Incontrasttopositivismandhistoricism,

Aristotledevelopsapoliticalsciencethatfosterspoliticalresponsibility;Strauss

arguesthattheapplicationofAristotle’spoliticalsciencetothepresententailsthe

supportofconstitutionalliberaldemocracy.Aristotle’spoliticalsciencealsohelps

revealkeyfeaturesofthewhole:first,howtounderstandtheproblemofnatural

right;andsecond,howthephilosophiclifecanbedefendedfromhistoricism.

Aristotle’spoliticalscienceincreasestheself-awarenessofthephilosopher,enabling

abetterunderstandingofthephilosopherasapoliticalphilosopher.

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I.FromPhilosophytoPoliticalScience

Asnotedearlier,thephilosophicaltemptationistodisparageandignore

politics.InStrauss’saccountofhistory,philosophyprecedespoliticalphilosophy.135

Philosophy’sconcernisthestudyofnature.Thedistinctstudyofhumanthings,

includingpolitics,wouldappeartobeadistractionfromthestudyofnature.A

specialeffortwouldberequiredtopersuadephilosopherstostudypolitics;fromthe

pointofviewofphilosophy,politicsdoesnotappearserious.136Historically,therole

ofSocratesistomakethatspecialeffort.Unlikethepre-Socratics,Socrates’sinsight

isthatpoliticsisserious.InSocrates’s‘secondsailing,’heturnsfromthestudyof

naturetothestudyofhumanthings:politics.Againsttheviewsofhispredecessors,

Socratesarguesthatthepoliticalthingsarebothworthyofseriousstudy,andthat

seriousstudyofthepoliticalthingsisnecessaryforunderstandingthewholeof

nature.137Emphasizingwhatisrequiredtogaingreaterknowledgeofnature,rather

thanthesystemicknowledgeofnatureitself,Socrates’sphilosophypreservesits

initialzeteticimpulse,andisindependentofanyspecificcosmology.138

Nevertheless,Socratesalsodevelopsaschematicontologytorejectthepre-

Socratics.AristotlethenrefinestheSocraticresponsetothepre-Socratics,to

developaprecisestudyofpolitics.Hefoundspoliticalscience.AsStrausspresents

thisrefinement,itenablesacontemporaryresponsetohistoricistcontentionsabout

nature.

135NRH,82.136CM,13-14.137NRH,122.138Velkley(2011),20,78.

164

Strauss’saccountofthepre-Socraticphilosophersobservesthattheystudy

whatis‘bynature.’Theyexaminethe‘firstthings,’whichareresponsibleforthe

comingintobeingandperishingofeverything.139Becausetheystudythesethings,

theyarephilosophers.StraussappropriatesAristotle’sformulationthatphilosophy

searchesforthecausesor‘principles’ofallthings,the‘firstthings’(archê).140

StrausslinksthesearchforthefirstthingstoAristotle’sdescriptionofthefirst

philosophers,‘whodiscoursedonnature.’141Philosophyisthequestforthethings

thatconstitute‘nature,’andthethingsthatconstituteconvention.Nature,the

eternal,ishigherthanconvention,thecontingent.142Thetaskofphilosophyisto

separatenaturefromconvention,andinvestigatenature.143

Thepre-Socraticsmakethisbasicdistinctionbetweennatureand

convention.144Yetthepre-Socraticsalsodisparagethehumanthingsforthesakeof

thepermanentfirstthings.Thelatterisgenuinelyrealandworthyofseriousstudy,

whiletheformer,havingnothingtodowithapermanentnaturebutwith

convention,withchangingcontingencies,isnotseriousandultimatelynotreal.The

139CM,14.Thepre-Socraticsareindeedphilosophers,andsodespitetheirdisagreementswithSocratestheydonotthreatenSocratesasthecitizensdo.SPPP,88.140NRH,82.StrausscitesMetaphysics981b27-29.141NRH,82.StrausscitesMetaphysics982b18:thefirstphilosophersaresimilartoloversofmythinthattheywonderattheworld.YetStrausssuggestsphilosophersaredifferentonaccountoftheirinterestinhigherthings,ratherthantheloversofmythwhoindulgeintrivialthings(citingEN1117b33-35).142NRH,90.143NRH,82.Straussusesthishistoricalaccountoftheoriginsofthedistinctionbetweennatureandconventiontoclarifyhisphilosophicalaccountoftheimportanceofthedistinctionbetweennatureandconvention.Hewantstoshowthatasfarasonegrantsphilosophicalactivity,aquestforknowledge,onehastoshowwhatisessential,i.e.natural,towhatphilosophyseekstoknowaboutthetotalityofreality.SeeNRH,95-96.144NRH,90.Straussimpliesthatthepre-SocraticsdonotadequatelyengagewiththeprinciplethatnobeingemergeswithoutacauseinNRH,82n.Thefirstphilosophersstudy‘firstthings,’buttheyarematerialists(StrausscitesMetaphysics983b7).Theirerroristhattheydonotaskwhatmovesmatterorwhatisitscause(Strausscites1071b26-27).Theythusmisunderstandthenatureofthewhole.

165

pre-Socraticsmakethreeconclusions.First,theyconcludethatwhathumansfind

goodorjustismerelyconventional.145Second,theyconcludethatthepoliticalartor

politicalscience,whichcontainshumanspeechesaboutwhatisgood,howone

shouldact,andwhatlawsshouldgovernhumancommunities,isimpossible.It

treatscontingencies,notpermanencies,andasciencemusttreatpermanencies.146

Third,theyconcludethattherecanbenonaturaljusticeorright,becausejusticeor

rightchangesfromtimeandplace.147

Strauss’sSocratesrejectsalltheseconclusions.148Critically,hefindsthe

sourceofhisdisagreementwithhispredecessorsintheirassumptionsaboutthe

natureofthewhole.Preservingaconcernwiththestudyofnature,Socrates

maintainsthebasicdistinctionbetweennatureandconvention,butappliesitina

differentway.149Hearguesthattherearethingsthatarejustbynature.Asjusticeis

thecommongoodparexcellence,Socratesdefendstheideathatthereisacommon

good.150Byrecognizingtherealityofanaccountofjusticeandthecommongood,

onerecognizesthedistinctivecharacterofpoliticalthings,sincetheclaimof

politicalthingsisthatthereisacommongood.Socrates’spositionaffirmsthatthere

isanessentialdifferencebetweenthingsthatarepoliticalandthingsthatarenot.151

145NRH,93.146CM,14.147NRH,97.148Socratesofcoursedoesnothavehisownwork,butStraussseestheAthenianStrangerofPlato’sLawsasprovidingtheviewsofSocrates’spredecessors,aswellastheSocraticobjectionstotheirviews.CM,14.149NRH,122.SeeMetaphysics1078b9–16.IfAristotleholdsthatSocratesonlystudiesmoralquestions,StraussdisagreeswithAristotle.ButAristotlesaysthatSocratesexamines‘tāsethikāsaretās’:moralvirtues;not‘only.’C.f.Zuckert(2004),89-90.150CM,16.151RCPR,132.

166

Thismeritsseriousstudyofthepoliticalartorscience.Assuch,Socratesisthefirst

toarticulatetheideaofnaturaljusticeorright.152

Toarriveatthesepositions,Socratesseesthatthefundamentalissuerestsin

theaccountofthehumanmindorsoul.Socrates’spredecessorsdonotbelievethat

therearejustthingsbynaturebecausetheyarematerialreductionists,makingthe

soulderivativefromthematerialbody.153Byreducingthesoultothebody,whatis

mostone’sownandmostprivate,theyseeeverythingintermsofprivategoods.

Theymaketheexistenceofacommongoodimpossible.154Asjusticeisthecommon

goodparexcellence,theythereforeconcludethatthereisnothingjustbynature.155

Ifsomeoneistospeakofjustice,itisonlyaboutusingotherstoachieveone’sown

privategood.Asthesophistsargue,theartnecessarytodothatistheartof

persuasion:rhetoric.Thesophiststhenbelieveintheomnipotenceofspeech,

subordinatingpoliticalsciencetorhetoric.Bybeingmaterialreductionists,theyfail

toseeanessentialdifferencebetweenthecommongoodandtheprivategood.So

theyfailtoseethedifferencebetweenpoliticalthingsandnon-politicalthings.156

Socratesarguesthatthesoulisdistinctfromthebody.157Thesoulthen

directs,rules,andgovernsthematerialbodybynature,inordertopursuethejust

thingsandavoidtheunjustthings.158Itdoesthisthroughreasoneddeliberationor

speech.Fromthestudyofthesoul,Socratesobservesthatman’snaturallydefining

characteristicisspeechorreason(logos).Thisimpliesthatreasoned152NRH,120.153CM,16.StrausscitesLaws891c1-4.154CM,16-17.155CM,16.156CM,17.StrausscitesEN1181a12-17;CM,23;SPPP,228.157NRH,127.158CM,16.StrausscitesandechoestheargumentofLaws891e5-892b1,896b10-c3.

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communicationwithotherhumanbeingsaboutthecommongoodisconstitutiveof

humannature.

AsStrausspresentshim,AristotlecompletesSocrates’sargument.159

FollowingSocrates’sassumptionsconcerningthenatureofthewhole,Aristotle

believesthatjusticeisbynature,andbynaturecommon.Hebelievesthaton

accountofthespecifickindofnaturewhichhumanbeingshave,certainthingsare

justorgoodforhumanbeings.Sincetheuniquenessofthehumanbeingdoesnotlie

inthebodybutthesoul,Aristotle’staskistoidentifywhatisdistinctaboutthe

humansoul.

ForAristotle,thatisthecapacityforspeechorreason(logos).Itisthis

capacitywhichdistinguishesthehumansoul,andtherebythehumanbeing,from

thesoulsofanimalsandotherlivingthings.Thisnaturaltraitprovidesthebasisfor

naturaljustice.160Asspeechiscommunication,manissocialinamoreradicalway

thananyotheranimal.Everydistinctlyhumanactmustrefertootherhumanbeings.

Becausemanisbynaturesocial,theperfectionofhisnaturemustincludethevirtue

thatcanonlyberealizedincommon,justice.161Speechunitesmentogetherin

commonassociationsforcommonpurposes,whichincludespursuingwhatisjust

andgood.Asmenarenaturallydrawntolivetogether,Aristotlearguesthatthe

commonassociationmadepossiblethroughcommonnature,theassociationforthe

purposeoflivingwell,isbynature.Thisisthepoliticalassociation.Somanisby

natureapoliticalanimal.Thestudyofhumanity,thehumanthings,demandsthe

159E.g.‘Aristotlegoestotheendofthisroad…’CM,16;‘TheassertionoftheAthenianstrangerisconfirmedbywhatAristotlesays…’CM,17.160NRH,127.161NRH,129.

168

studyofpolitics,thepoliticalthings.Tothepre-Socraticphilosophersuspiciousof

politicalphilosophy,whoarguesthatstudyingpoliticsisadistractionfromthe

studyofnature,Aristotleprovidestherefutation:politicsisbynature.

ThisishowStrausspresentsthefamousAristotelianteachingthatmanisby

natureapoliticalanimal:theelaborationofthenatureofthesoultocorrectthepre-

Socratics.YetStraussimmediatelyfollowsitwithafurtherconsideration.The

politicalassociationorunionisnotthehighestormostperfectunion.Instead,

Strausswritesthatthemostperfectorintimateunionwithotherhumanbeings

possibleis‘theunioninpurethought.’Ifspeechimpliestheactivityofpolitics,it

alsoimpliestheactivityofthinking.162Speech,orreasonorunderstanding,would

bedirectedtowardconsideringanddiscussingcommonopinions.Thepurposeof

thiskindofspeechistoreplaceopinionswithknowledge.Speechdoesnotjust

denotetheactivepursuitofjusticeinpoliticalassociation;italsodenotesthe

thoughtfulpursuitofknowledgeorwisdom.

Thehumansoul,initscapacityforspeech,disclosestheimportanceof

philosophyandpolitics.Thisprovidestwodivergentpathsinthewoodofthe

humansoul.Onepathconcernsspeech.Relatedtopoliticalactivity,itimplicatesthe

commongoalsofhumanbeingswhoshareacommunity.Fromdiverseinterests,

ambitions,passions,andprofessions,humanbeingsdeliberatetogetherinorderto

act.163Thisispracticalreasoning.Thesecondpathconcernsthought.Itaddresses

162CM,17.StrausscitesAristotle’saccountofmanasapoliticalanimalinPolitics1253a1-18,andPolitics1281a2-4,whereAristotleindicatesthatthepoliticalcommunityisnotsimplyforthesakeoflivingtogether,butforthesakeofnobleactions.Whileneitherofthesepassagesmentionsthinking,Strausstakesthesecondpassagetoimplythatthenoblesthumanactionwouldbeunionwithanotherinpurethought.NRH,127.163EN1126b11-12.

169

thetasktoascendfromopinionstoknowledge,andexpressesitselfasphilosophy.

Thisistheoreticalreasoning.Thesetwopathscutthroughthesoulofthehuman

being,andmarkabasictensionforhumanlife.164Atthispoint,however,onecan

onlynotethistensionandreturntotheimportanceofpoliticsforphilosophy.

Politicsisimportantforphilosophybecausereasoningcanonlybe

elaboratedwithotherhumanbeings,sophilosophyarisesoutofpoliticallife.

Reflectiononhumannaturerevealsthat,onaccountofthedualcharacterof

reasoning,thehumanbeingrequiresthecity,politics,toachievethemostintimate

unioninthought.165

Socraticphilosophyrecognizesthatthe‘core’ofthestudyofnature,

philosophy,isthestudyofpolitics.Socratesstartswiththestudyofthelaw,asthe

lawdeclareswhatoneoughtandoughtnottodo.Thestarting-pointforanalysing

politicsisthephenomenonoflaw.Onethenascendsfromthestudyoflawto

nature.166Pacethepre-Socratics,thestudyofpoliticsdoesprovidesomeimportant

knowledgeofnature,becausepoliticalthingsareessentiallydifferentfromnon-

politicalthings.Additionally,Socraticphilosophydeploysthemethodofdialectics.

Socratesstartsfromthecommonsenseembodiedintheacceptedopinions,and

seekstotranscendthem,butwithacautionprincipallyfoundedontheknowledgeof

hisownignorance.Thismeansheneverceasestoconsidertheopinionsaboutthe

lawandjustice.WhileSocrateshasparticularconsiderationsaboutnatureandthe

164Straussexposesthisfundamentalproblem,andwrestleswithhowtoreconcilethisdualityinman.SeeVelkley(2011),77-79.165‘Withoutthecity,nophilosophers.Theyaretheconditions.’JPCM,465.166RCPR,143;CM,20.

170

whole,heremainschieflyconcernedwiththehumanthingsofpolitics.167Thus

Socratesintroducespoliticalphilosophyas‘firstphilosophy.’168Itis‘first’becauseit

isanecessarysteptoascendtotheknowledgeofnature,anditis‘first’becauseit

disclosestheschemarequiredforagenuineknowledgeofnature.

Amomentousquestionarises.Whatismeantby‘political’?Itisnecessaryto

addressthecontentofpoliticalphilosophy,orwhatoneisstudyingwhenone

studiespolitics.ForStrauss,theseriousnessofpoliticalphilosophyhingeson

whetheranorganizedbodyofknowledgeofpolitics,a‘science’ofpolitics,is

possible.169Thepre-Socraticsholdthat‘political’istherealmofparticular

contingenciesratherthanpermanencies,soapolitical‘science’cannotbeaserious

proposition.Torefutethemdecisivelyandestablishpoliticalphilosophyasserious,

itisnecessarytoshowhowapoliticalscienceispossible:howthestudyofpolitics

canbethestudyofpermanencies.Yetcontrarytowhatthepre-Socraticsthought,

thestudyofpoliticsisnotrestrictedtomerecontingencies.Itimplicatesthepolitical

orderthatisjustbynature.Aristotlearguesthatwhatisjustbynaturemust

everywherehavethesamepower.170Politicalphilosophyseekswhichpolitical

orderisbesteverywhereandalways.Inthismanner,itseekswhatispermanently

just.Hencethestudyofpoliticscanbeastudyofthepermanenciesofnature.A

political‘science’ispossible.AsSocratesarguesthatthejustthingsarebynature,

Aristotleseesthatthestudyofthejustthingswouldentailthescientificstudyofthe

167CM,20.168CM,20.169Inthissense,scienceisidenticalwithphilosophy.Itisthemodernphilosophicrevolutionofthe17thcenturythatdividesthetwo.SeeLAM,205.170NRH,100.StrausscitesEN1134b19.

171

justpoliticalorder.Aristotlethereforetreatspoliticalphilosophyasthequestforthe

politicalorderwhichisbestaccordingtonature.171

Butthisconceptionofpoliticalphilosophyisincomplete.Itimpliesthatthe

knowledgeofnaturewouldprovidetheknowledgeofthebestpoliticalorder.One

mightassumethatthestudyofthepermanenciesofnaturewouldprovide

knowledgeofthewholeofnature;equippedwiththisknowledgeofnature,one

couldthenhaveknowledgeofthepermanenciesofpolitics.Thestudyofnature

wouldbepriortoanddirectlyapplicabletothestudyofpolitics.Thescienceof

naturewouldbethescienceofpolitics.

Ontheseassumptions,thepre-SocraticHippodamusexperimentswith

politicalphilosophy.172Basedonhisinterpretationofnature,wherethekeytothe

knowledgeofnatureisthenumberthree,heprovidesasimpleaccountofthebest

politicalorder.Thereoughttobe10,000citizensdividedintothreeparts.Theland

oughttobedividedintothreeparts;andthelaws,lawsuits,andlegalverdictsought

tobeallsortedintothreekinds.

Despiteitssimplicity,AristotlenotesthatHippodamus’saccountdegenerates

intogreatconfusion.173Hippodamusthinksthatbyhavingtherightaccountof

nature,hecouldplanthebestpoliticalorder.AristotlecriticizesHippodamusnot

becauseofhisinterpretationofnature,butbecauseofhisinterpretationofthe

political.Hippodamusfailsbecausehedoesnotfirstaskthequestion,‘whatis

171CM,17.172CM,19.173CM,19.StrausscitesPolitics1267b30-1268a6.FortheconfusionresultingfromHippodamus’sproposal,Strausscites1268b3-4,11.

172

political?’174ThisdevelopsanotherinsightthatAristotledrawsfromSocrates.In

Strauss’sterminology,thatinsightis‘noeticheterogeneity,’atermrequiringfurther

elaboration.

IntheSocraticpresentation,toask,‘whatissomething,’istoaskwhatisthe

‘essence’ofthething.Whetheroneasks,‘whatiscourage?’or‘whatisacity?’or

‘whatisatree?’oneisaskingaboutwhatsomethingessentiallyis.Thisquestion

addressestheshape,form,orcharacterofathingthatcomestosightfirstand

distinguishesitfromotherthings.Itpointstohowtheseessentialdifferencesshow

themselvesfirsttous,tohumanbeings,withwhatwesayaboutthemorwhat

opinionswehaveofthem.Itistoask‘whatistheidea(eidos)’ofathing.Here,‘idea’

signifiesonlythemostaccessible,commonlyheld,lookorsurfacemeaningofthe

thing.175Asitaddressestheessenceofonethingasdistinguishedfromanother

thing,itpointstoessentialdifferencesbetweenthings.176Tostudynature,Socrates

holdsthatitisnecessarytostartwiththestudyofthesedistinctthings.Specifically,

oneproceedsthroughdialectics:onestartswiththeopinionsthatareheldasto

whatthesethingsessentiallyare,andtriestogainknowledgeofwhatthey

essentiallyare.174CM,19.175NRH,123;CM,119-120.Straussdoubtsthemeritofthetraditional,‘Platonic’interpretationoftheideas(eidê)asself-subsistingformsdwellingoutsidetherealmofhumanbeings;‘itisutterlyincredible’and‘appearstobefantastic…noonehaseversucceededingivingasatisfactoryorclearaccountofthisdoctrineofideas.’CM,119.ButIarguethatStraussaddressestheideasintwostages.First,healignshiscritiqueofthe‘Platonic’ideastoAristotle’scritique.Thisistoshowtheirinadequacy(Zuckert(1996),154).Oncetheideasareexpungedoftheir‘Platonism,’Straussinitiatesthesecondstage,wheretheideashelpdisclosetherealityofnature.

ForamoredetailedexplanationofStrauss’sinterpretationofthedoctrineofideas,seePangle(1983),2-5.YetpacePangle,thedoctrineofideas,interpretedasthesurfaceobservationofdifferencesdisclosingessentialdifferencesbetweenthings,isactuallyasoundwayofconceivingofthenatureofthings.Itvindicatesnoeticheterogeneityasavalidontologyopposedtothehomogeneityofpre-Socraticcosmology.176CM,19.

173

Contrarytohispredecessors,Strauss’sSocratesidentifiesthestudyofnature

withwhattheessenceofeachbeingis.177Natureisnotessentiallyonebeing.Itis

essentiallyheterogeneous,whichistosaythatthereisanessentialdifference

betweeneachkindofbeing.Thewholecomestolightastheheterogeneityof

essentiallydifferentparts.Itisnoeticheterogeneity,inthateachbeingpresents

itselfthroughtheideacommonlyheldaboutit.Dialectics—proceedingfromthe

opinionsaboutthethingtoknowledgeofthething—permitsabettergraspofthe

idea’sessence.Thiswoulddistinguishnoeticfromsensibleheterogeneity,which

wouldattributetheessentialdifferencebetweenthethingstothematerialelements

outofwhichtheyareformed—suchasfire,air,water,andearth.178

Noeticheterogeneity,asStrausspresentsit,hasdecisiveimplicationsfor

whatthewholeofnatureis,andhowoneunderstandsit.First,itrejects

explanationsofthingsbyattemptstofindwhatisafirstthinginitself,orwhatis

firstbynature.Thediscoveryofnoeticheterogeneityvindicatescommonsense.It

letsthingsbeastheyarefirstunderstood,bythephenomena,ratherthantryingto

explainawayessentialdifferencesasillusorybyreferencetoapriorprinciple.179

Thephenomenaarethefoundationforunderstandingnature.Moreover,noetic

heterogeneityletsoneknowthatthereisnospecialorimmediateaccesstothe

knowledgeofthewhole.AsAristotleteaches,thereisnonoeticunderstandingthat

cangraspthefirstthingsorthewholedirectly.180Pursuingknowledgeofathingis

177NRH,122.178CM,19.179NRH,123-24.180Smith(1994),193.StraussimitatesAristotle,forwhomnousdoesnotgraspfirstthingsorthewholedirectly.ThisimitationisnecessarytorefuteHeidegger’shistoricism,whichaimstoexposeasinglemetaphysicaltraditionanditspremiseaboutthewholebeingintelligibleandknowableasan

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topursueknowledgeofapartofthewhole,notthewhole.Itisthenecessary

precursortopursuingtheknowledgeofthewhole.Asthewholeisessentially

heterogeneous,knowledgeofthewholeisonlyprovidedthroughtheknowledgeof

theparts.Thisleavesknowledgeofthewholeunavailable,soweonlyhavepartial

knowledgeoftheparts.181Nevertheless,itispossibletogainbetterunderstanding

ofthewhole,meaningthatknowledgeofthewholeshouldstillbepursued.182There

isaperceptionofthenatureofthewholethatsituatesthepartsofthewholeintheir

properplace.Thepartsarenotlooseanddisconnected:theyhavetheirmeaningby

theirplaceinthewhole.183Itis,therefore,onlypossibletopursueknowledgeofthe

partbyhavingsomeunderstandingofthewhole.

Noeticheterogeneityissuchaninsightintothewhole.ItallowsSocratesto

holdthatthe‘thescienceofthewhole’is‘whateachofthebeingsis.’184Itfavours

thestudyofpoliticalthingsassuch.185ItalsoallowsAristotletoshowhow

Hippodamusismistaken.Hippodamusmakesthemistakeofaspiringforthekindof

clarityandsimplicityalientothesubjectmatterofpolitics.186Hetakesthekindof

object,asDescartesthought(SPPP,144).SeeNRH,30-31;Kenington(1981),67;Velkley(2011),122.Strauss’simitationofAristotleallowshimtoaddresstheproblemheoutlinesinNRH,30-31.ThroughAristotle,hecansaythatthewholeisintelligible,yetdirectknowledgeofitisunavailable.HecanthenavoidCartesianassumptionsaboutknowledge,articulatedifferentassumptionsaboutknowledge,andemphasizeDescartes’sbreakwiththeancients(CM,45;‘TheLivingIssuesofGermanPostwarPhilosophy,’inMeier(2006),136).AgainstHeidegger’shistoricism,Strausscanclaimthereisaquarrelbetweentheancientsandthemodernsoverhowtoaccessknowledgeofthewhole.181WIPP,39.182CM,20-21.Bycontrast,positivismandhistoricismdogmaticallyinsistthatabetterunderstandingofthewholeisimpossibleandthepursuitshouldbeabandoned.183‘tounderstandthewholemeans…tounderstandtheunitythatisrevealedinthemanifestarticulationofcompletedwhole.’NRH,123.184NRH,122.185NRH,123.186CM,19.StrausscitesEN1094b11-27;RCPR,142.

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reasoningappropriatetotheproductivearts,thetechnologicalandscientificarts,

andincorrectlyappliesittopolitics.

Straussframestheissueintermsofthekindofreasoningassociatedwith

effectiveimprovement,orinnovationorprogress.Believingthelawisthesameas

everyotherpartofnature,hethinksthekindofreasoningappropriatetothe

scientificandtechnicalartsisalsoappropriatetothelegislativeart.Hippodamus

assumesthatinnovationinthetechnologicalandscientificartsisthesameas

innovationinlaw.Heassumesaharmonybetweentechnicalandscientificprogress

ontheonehand,andpoliticalprogressontheother.ForHippodamus,reasoning

aboutthetechnicalandscientificartsissusceptibleto‘infiniterefinementand

progress.’187Histaskistocompletethescienceofnature.Thisstudycouldthen

applytoknowledgeofanypartofnature,includingpolitics,andthusprovidethe

knowledgeofpolitics.Politicalsciencecouldbepursuedonlyafteronehas

knowledgeofthewhole.188

Aristotleshowsthatthereasoningconcerningthelawisdifferent.An

effectivelawdependsnotonitsrationalcontent,butonitscapacitytobeobeyed.

Obediencetothelawarisesentirelyfromcustom,andcustomisamixtureofreason,

passions,andtheancestralopinionsfosteredthroughpoetry.Incontrasttothekind

ofreasoningdeployedtomaketechnicalandscientificartseffective,reasononlyhas

alimitedroleinmakingthelaweffective.189Ifthetechnicalandscientificartsare

187CM,22.188Bernadete(1978),2-3.189Strauss’sversionofAristotle‘deniestothelawtheverypossibilityoffullrationality.’SeeBartlett(1994),145.

176

deducedfromrationalknowledgeofnature,andlawisnot,politicsisnot

homogenousbutheterogeneoustotherationalknowledgeofnature.

Byframingtheissueintermsofprogress,Strausshintsatthecontemporary

issue.190Toassertthattherecanbereconciliationbetweentherationalknowledge

ofnatureandpoliticsassumesthattheinitialheterogeneitybetweenpoliticsand

natureisnotpermanent.Progressmakesharmonypossible.Tojustifythisassertion

inturnrequiresthecategoryofhistory.191Theparticularhistoricistassumptions

wouldbe:theassumptionthattheheterogeneitybetweennatureandpoliticscannot

reallybepermanent,theconfidencethathistorycanabolishthisheterogeneity,and

thatthereconciliationofnatureandpoliticswouldbringgoodresults.Toestablish

Aristotle’scaseagainstthereconciliationofnatureandpoliticsthroughhistory,itis

necessarytoemphasizethedifferencebetweenreasoningaboutscientificand

technologicalarts,andreasoningaboutthelaw.192

Itremainstoaddresswhocanbepoliticalphilosophers.Theneedfor

understandingthedistinctandindependentcharacterofreasoningaboutthelaw

wouldatfirstsightfavourthosewhodeploytheirreasoningaboutthelaw:the

statesman,thelegislator,orthefounderofapoliticalcommunity.Thisiswherethe

virtueofjusticewouldshowitself,andtherebythebestpoliticalorder.193Butthe

visionoftheseagentsisrestrictedtowhatmustbedoneinthehereandnowof

politics.Beinginthethickofit,asitwere,theirsenseofwhatispermanentis

190‘Onthebasisofsomeobservationsmadenearerhome,onemightsuspectaconnectionbetweenHippodamus’unbridledconcernwithclarityandsimplicityandhisunbridledconcernwithtechnologicalprogress.’CM,22.Myitalics.191Bernadete(1978),3.192Jaffa(2012),62.StraussechoesAristotleatEN1094b23-25.193NRH,133-34.

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deficient.Ifthestatesmanweretorepresentipsofactotheperfectpolitical

philosopher,itwouldrepresenttheraisingofthecontingentoverthepermanent,

andspelltheendofapolitical‘science.’Consequently,menwhoareimmersedin

andlimitedtothecontingenciesofpoliticallifecannotundertakepolitical

philosophy.194Thestudyofpoliticsrequiresthosewhoarenotengagedinpolitical

life.Thepoliticalphilosophercannotbethesameasthestatesman,legislatoror

founder.Thisinsightpreservespoliticalscience,butitdividescommunities.There

arenowthosewhoareimmersedinpoliticsandaimtoactjustlyintheircontingent

circumstances(statesmen,legislators,founders)andthosewhoareoutsideof

politics,butwhoinvestigatesthepermanentlyjustpoliticalorder(political

philosophers).Thesetwofactionseyeeachotherwarily.

ForStrauss’sAristotle,Hippodamus’sattemptatpoliticalphilosophy

providesanapplicablelesson.WhendescribingHippodamusinPolitics,Aristotle

addsapersonalremarkaboutHippodamus’slifestyle.Hippodamusisvainand

extravagant,livinginanoverdonemannerandpayingtoomuchattentiontohis

clothing.Straussnotesthatthispersonalremarkistheonlyoneofitskindin

Aristotle’swork.195Sensible,temperatefreemenfindHippodamus’sextravagance

ridiculous.Thelessonisthatwell-bred,morallyvirtuousfreemen,thekindwho

wouldbestatesmen,legislators,andfounders,findpoliticalphilosophersandtheir

politicalphilosophyridiculous.Aristotlethereforeindicatesthatpoliticalphilosophy194CM,17.StraussinvitescomparisontoEN1135a4-5;whereaspoliticalsystemswhichareenactedbyhumansdiffer,onesystembynatureisthebesteverywhere.C.f.WIPP,31,wherethehabitsofobedientcitizenspreventthemfromseeingwherethelawneedstoimprove.195CM,18.Strausscites1267b22-30.HecomparesittoAristotle’spositiveremarkaboutthehighqualityofSocrates’sspeeches(1265a10-13).TomakeitclearthatAristotle’saudiencevaluesmoderation,StrausscitestwootherasidesofAristotle:thepraiseoflawsconcerningmoderation(1263b15-22),aswellasofthemoderationofEudoxus(EN1172b15-18).

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isaquestionablepractice.Aristotleiswellawarethathehastodefendpolitical

philosophybeforethecourtofwell-bredfreemensuspiciousofit.196Butthereisa

complication.Bydeliveringthiscriticalremarkoftheintemperatelifeofapioneer

ofpoliticalphilosophy,Aristotleisvisiblytakingthesideofthefreemen.Aristotleis

doingthiswhileatthesametimeaffirmingthatonlyapoliticalphilosophercan

investigatethepermanentlyjustorder.LikeSocrates,Aristotleisawarethathehas

tocompelphilosopherstotakepoliticalphilosophyseriously.Otherwisetheywill

think,asPascaldid,thatphilosopherswritingpoliticalworksarepracticing‘the

leastseriouspart’oftheirlives.197Soontheonehand,Aristotlemustpractice

politicalphilosophyandshowtheneedforascienceofpolitics,whileontheother,

hesympathiseswiththecitizenwhothinkspoliticalphilosophyludicrous.

Thequestionofwhocanpracticepoliticalphilosophyisthendirectlyrelated

tothequestionofhowtopresentpoliticalphilosophytothepublic.Aristotlehasan

answer.Knowingthatpoliticalphilosophyisaquestionablepracticeforthewell-

bredmeninpoliticallife,hesideswiththem,teachinghispoliticalscienceonlyto

suchwell-bredmen.198Nevertheless,givenhisSocraticphilosophicalcommitments,

whichdrawonetostudythewhole,partofAristotle’steachingistopersuadethese

well-bredmenofthemeritsofphilosophy.Indeed,thisisafurtheranswertothe

momentousquestionposedearlier:‘whatismeantby‘political?’Whiletheearlier

answerdealtwiththecontentofpolitics—whatonewouldstudywhenonestudies

politics—thisanswerconcernsdiscreetcommunication.AsAristotleiscarefully

196CM,18.197CM,18.198CM,25.

179

selectinghisaudience,andcraftingamessagesuitedtothem,heisdoingpolitical

philosophy.Thismeaningisunderstoodasphilosophy,practicedasguardedpolitic

orcautiouspoliticking.Bymixingbothcontentandmanner,Strauss’sAristotle’shas

anequivocalunderstandingoftheterm‘political’inpoliticalphilosophy:an

essentialcomponentofAristotle’steaching,andoftheteachingofclassicalpolitical

philosophy.

Insum,thecentralissuemotivatingStrauss’sSocratestoundertakehis

‘secondsailing,’toturnfromthestudyofnaturetothehumanthings,istobetter

understandthewhole.Correctingtheassumptionsofhispredecessors,Socrates

recognizeshowstudyingthehumanthingsrevealthenatureofthewhole.Properly

understood,philosophy,thestudyofthenatureofthewhole,isanascentfrom

politics,thestudyofhumanthings.Yettherearetwocomplicationstoastraight

ascent.

First,Socratesaddressesthecharacterofthehumansoul,aninsightAristotle

develops.Thehumansoul,initscapacityforspeech,furtherrevealsitsbasic

ontologicalcompositioninitstwoformsofreasoning,theoreticalandpractical

reasoning.Withtheoreticalreasoning,thehumansoulactsuponhisdesireto

understandthewhole.Bytheinsistenceontheelevatedstatusofthehumansoul,

Strauss’sSocratesandAristotleareopentotheideaofanorderedwhole,andofa

humansoulthatisdirectedtowardthatorderedwhole.Withpracticalreasoning,

thehumansoulactstorealizethecommongood,justice,inthepoliticalassociation

withotherhumanbeings.Thisshowsthedualimportanceoftheactivityof

philosophyandpoliticstohumanity,yetatthesametimethattheyaredistinct

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activities.TheerrorofHippodamusservesasawarning.Tounderstandpolitics,it

mustnotbeunderstoodasdependentonthepriorstudyofnature.Itmustbe

understoodinitsownterms,inthetermsofpracticalreasoning.Bystudyingpolitics

distinctlyandonitsownterms,Straussholdsthat‘notSocratesorPlatobut

Aristotleistrulythefounderofpoliticalscience.’199

Second,noeticheterogeneitydisclosesthatthewholeisonlyknownthrough

itsparts.Thepartsappearasphenomenaaboutwhichhumanbeingsshareideasor

opinions,inpoliticallife.Philosophywouldproceedfromthekindofreasoning

associatedwithpoliticalactiontotheoreticalreasoning,inordertogainabetter

senseoftheparts.Butthedependenceofthewholeuponknowledgeoftheparts,

theopinionssharedinpoliticallife,showsthatpoliticalphilosophyis‘first

philosophy.’Thepoliticalthingsareof‘decisiveimportanceforunderstanding

natureasawhole.’200Aristotledevelopstheseassumptionsaboutthewhole,and

clarifiestheinsightintothewholebypursuingscientificknowledgeofthepart.This

isthephilosophicalimportanceofhispoliticalscience.

Thesetwocomplicationstotheascentfrompoliticstophilosophyshowthe

needforAristotle’spoliticalscience,studyingpracticalreasoning(praxis)initsown

terms.ForAristotle,politicalscienceisthequestforthepermanentlyjustpolitical

order.Politicalsciencemustbetaughtwhilecultivatingthesympathyofwell-bred

mensuspiciousofpoliticalphilosophy.KeepingtheSocraticawarenessofthe

humansoul,onemustacknowledgetheinherentdistinctivenessofpractical

199CM,21.200RCPR,126.

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reasoningandtheoreticalreasoningthatcharacterizesthehumansoul.201Aristotle

pursueshisenquiryintopracticalreasoningwithoutlosingsightoftheroleof

theoreticalreasoning,norsubsumingpracticalreasoningintotheoreticalreasoning.

ItistothethemesofAristotle’spoliticalsciencethatInowturn.

II.Aristotle’sPoliticalScience:MoralVirtue

Strauss’sreflectiononpracticalreasoningexposesthethemesofpolitical

science.Thefirststepisthediscoveryofmoralvirtue,andthehumanexcellenceor

perfectionitentails.Moralvirtueisrealizedinsociety;specifically,itisrealizedina

closedsociety.Thisleadstothesecondstep:thediscoveryofthecity.Toachieve

perfectioninthecity,onemustliveinthebestcity.Thebestcityisthebestregime.

Hencethetruestthemeofpoliticalscienceisthestudyofthebestregime.

Torepeat,Strauss’sstarting-pointforanalysingpoliticsisthephenomenon

oflaw.InordertoexpressAristotle’sresponsetohowthepre-Socraticsand

historicistsobscurethedifferencebetweennatureandpolitics,Straussarticulates

thedistinctandindependentcharacterofthereasoningaboutthelaw,termedthe

legislativeart.Thelegislativeartisdistinctfromthekindsofreasoningassociated

withotherartsbecausetheefficacyofthelawdependsoncustom—amixtureof

reason,passion,andpoetry.Moreover,theefficacyofthelawdependstoacertain

extentonitsstrength—thelawneedsteeth.Inpolitics,persuasionthroughreasonis

onlyeffectivewithalimitedaudience.Forthelawtobefullyefficacious,itmustalso

instillrespectandfearfromthoseinpoliticswhoareonlydisposedtoobeythe

201Marshall(2007),257.

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stronger.Aristotleteachesthatthenatureofpolitics‘oftendefeatsreason.’202On

accountofthenatureofpolitics,thefulllegislativeartwillincludetherespectand

cultivationofcustomthroughpoetry,theabilitytopersuadethroughreason,but

alsotheabilitytodisciplinethroughforce.203

Straussnowspeaksofthelegislativeartasthehighestformofpractical

reasoning(praxis).Praxisissuperiortopoiēsis.Whilepoiēsisaddressesthepartial

goodsofparticulararts,praxisaddressesthegoodofthewholeofsociety,the

commongood.Itispreciselyinordertomeetthecommongoodthattheconception

oflegislativereasoningmustbemoreexpansivethanthatassociatedwithpoiēsis.204

Moreover,theconcernwiththecommongoodmakesthelegislativeartthehighest

formofpracticalwisdom,orprudence.Straussreformulatesthelegislativeartas

prudence.Prudenceisconcernedwiththewholehumangood.Theconnection

betweenthelegislativeartandprudenceconnectspoliticstothepursuitofthegood

life.Tobeprudentistoleadagoodlife,makingone’sowndecisionswell.Inthat

way,prudenceisthekindofknowledgeinseparablefromtherighthabitof

choosing—moralvirtue.Asprudenceisinseparablefrommoralvirtue,thisconnects

thelegislativearttomoralvirtue.205Thecloseconnectionbetweenprudenceand

moralvirtueisanotherdifferencebetweenpraxisandpoiēsis.Itisalsofurther

evidenceofthehigherdignityofpraxis,becausepoiēsislacksthisconnectionto

moralvirtue.ForStrauss’sAristotle,artisans,actingasartisans,requirelessmoral

202CM,22.Lawalsodefeatsrationalpersuasion;thesophistsareblindtothesternnessofpolitics.203CM,23.Zuckert(1996),267.204CM,24.205CM,24.

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virtuethanslaves.206Prudenceandmoralvirtueunitetoenableonetoleadagood

life.Thatistheultimateendofprudence.Withinthesphereofhumanthings,

prudenceaddressesthewholehumangood,andissupreme.

ForStrauss,thesphereofhumanthingsisalso‘closed’byprudence.The

endsguidingprudence,ortheprinciplesofprudence,areknownindependentlyof

thetheoreticalsciences.Thesphereofprudenceisdeiureindependentofthe

theoreticalsciences.207Straussmeansthattheknowledgeofthetheoreticalsciences

isnotnecessaryforunderstandingandactingupontheseprinciplesofprudence.

Whatisnecessaryforunderstandingtheprinciplesofprudenceistobemorallyself-

conscious.Theindependenceofprudenceispreservedbecauseitsprinciplesare

knowabletomorallygoodmen:whatStrausscalls‘gentlemen’(kaloikagathoi).208

Affirmingthisindependence,Aristotledescribesthemoralvirtuesastheyare

knownandagreeduponbythemorallyvirtuousmen.Aristotledemarcatesthelimit

ofthesphereofhumanthingsastheconventionsthatthemorallyvirtuous

gentlemenacknowledge.209

Tosupporttheindependenceofthesphereofprudence,Straussinsistson

theintelligibilityofmoralvirtueinitsownterms.Insodoing,Straussintensifiesa

tensioninAristotle.Ontheonehand,Aristotlearguesthattherequirementfor

genuinelymorallyvirtuousactionsistodonobleandjustdeedschosenfortheir

ownsake.Ontheother,Aristotlespeaksofmoralvirtueasameanstootherends,

seemingtoinstrumentalizemoralvirtuetootherends.WhatdoesAristotlemean?

206CM,25.StrausscitesPolitics1260a33-41.207LAM,206.208CM,25.209CM,26.

184

Straussexplorestwopossibleexplanations.FollowingAristotle’sopinion

thatthehighestendofmanistheoreticalunderstanding,onecouldsaythat

theoreticalunderstandingisthenaturalendtowardwhichmoralvirtuetends.But

thenthephilosopherwouldchoosemorallyvirtuousactionsas‘meremeanstoward

hisend’oftheoreticalunderstanding,instrumentalizingmoralvirtue.210

Tocounterthisposition,Straussconsiderswhethermoralvirtuewouldseem

tobemoreintelligibleifittendedtowardthenaturalendofsociallife.Yetthemoral

virtuescannotbeunderstoodasbeingforthesakeofthesociallife,whichistosay,

forthesakeofthecity.Thepurposeofthecity,afterall,istobeforthesakeofthe

practiceofmoralvirtue.211Ratherthanattemptingtosolvetheseproblemsby

arguingtowhatnaturalendmoralvirtueisameans,StraussthinksAristotle’s

insightliesinshowingthatboththeseexplanationsareneeded.Moralvirtueisin

somesense‘absolute:’somethingessentiallyintelligibleonlyonitsownterms.This

isAristotle’sgreatdiscovery.Withoutthisdiscovery,itwouldnotbepossiblefor

himtoarguepoliticsisindependentfromnature,andthattheknowledgeofpolitics

doesnotdependontheknowledgeofnature.Hecanthereforefoundpolitical

scienceasanindependentdiscipline.212Atthesametime,however,moralvirtueis

insomesense‘incomplete:’itpointsbeyonditself,beyondthelifeinthecity.213

Nevertheless,thisadmissiondoesnotdiminishtheimportanceofmoralvirtue.Even

210CM,27.211CM,27.StrausscitesEN1095b30-31:virtueissuperiortosocialhonour.EN1099b29-32:thegoalofpoliticalscienceisprimarilydevotedtothecharacterofitscitizens,forthesakeofmakinggoodmenwhodofineactions.EN1178b5:Asmanliveswithothers,heactsvirtuously.Politics1278b21-24:Asitfallstoeachmantolivefinely,commonadvantagebringsthemtolivetogether.212Aristotle’semphasisofthisfeaturecontrastshimtoPlato,whopassesoverallvirtuenotgroundedinphilosophicalknowledgeasvulgarvirtueCM,27;O’Connor(2002),185.213CM,27.

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ifmoralvirtuecanbepursuedforthesakeofsomethingbeyonditself,itisstillgood

initself.214

Thediscoveryofmoralvirtuetransformspoliticalscienceintoapracticethat

seekstorealizemoralvirtueinthecity,particularlyintheaudiencethatpolitical

scienceaddresses,thegentlemen.Politicalscienceseekstoeducatethegentlemen

inmoralvirtue.Strausselaboratesthisplaninhisappraisaloftheancient

understandingofliberalism,whichprovidesthepropergoalofa‘liberal’education.

Straussseestheoriginalunderstandingofa‘liberal’asafreeman,distinguished

fromaslave.Ithasapoliticalmeaningandwhatonemightcallan‘internal’

meaning.215Itsinternalmeaningreferstotheorderofthesoul,amanwhoisin

controlofhispassions—almosttheoppositeofthemodernmeaningof‘liberality.’

Intheancientsenseof‘liberality,’theinitialmanifestationisexactlyhowAristotle

identifies‘liberality:’themanwhogivesgladlyfromhisownproperty.Inthissense,

the‘liberal’manshowsheisnotgreedyandnotaslaveofhispassions.216Strauss

takesthisAristotelianinsightasastartingpointforidentifyingthefullcharacterof

theliberalmanandthepoliticalmeaningof‘liberal.’

Bybeingfreeofhispassions,theliberalmanuseshisleisuretimeandwealth

tobecomea‘cultured’humanbeing.217Heis‘concernedwiththemostweighty

matters,’thegoodorderofthesoulandthecity,andformshisaestheticandmoral

214O’Connor(2002),185-86.Rosen(2003,129)thinksStrauss’sdefenceofmoralvirtueisexoteric.ButseeCM,27.Strauss’semphasisonthegoodnessofmoralvirtuereliesonhiscontrastbetweenAristotleandPlato.SoStrauss’sanalysisofthedistinctionbetweenAristotleandPlatowouldhavetobeexoteric,implyingthatalltechnicaldiscussionsphilosophersofferareexoteric.ButthisisnotreallyStrauss’sposition—asRosenacknowledges(2003,121).215LAM,10.216LAM,28.217LAM,3.

186

judgementthroughreading,conversation,andlearning.218Hetakespartinpolitical

life.Hedesirestobevirtuousandexcellentinpoliticalaffairs.Hispoliticalfreedom

isafreedomforrealizinghishumanperfection.Hisrealizationofexcellencemust

notbethwarted,ruledorcontrolledbythevulgarwhohavenograspofhuman

perfection.219Asanindependent,freeperson,thegentlemancaninturnhelpothers

inthecommonpursuitofexcellence,promotingtheformofgovernmentthatbest

permitsmennottobesubjecttoanymaster.220Heencouragesotherindividualsand

theirgovernmenttobemoreliberal.Forthatreason,Strausswritesthat‘liberal

educationintheoriginalsensenotonlyfosterscivicresponsibility:itiseven

requiredfortheexerciseofcivicresponsibility.’221

Thegentlemen’scultivationofmoralvirtuemakesthembettercitizensand

moreperfecthumanbeings.Ifagentlemanknows‘that’thejustthingsareand

‘what’theyare,hedoesnotneedtoknowthe‘why’inaddition.222Nevertheless,the

educationtheyreceivethroughpoliticalsciencealsoappealstothosefewgentlemen

whowanttoknowthe‘why’inadditiontothe‘that.’Aristotle,forexample,corrects

erroneousconceptionsofvirtueandvicethatmaypredominateinthecity.223Inthis

project,hiseducationimplicitlyinvitesthequestioningofthosewhowanttoknow

the‘why.’Ifthiswerepursued,itwouldtakethegentlementophilosophy.The

educationofpoliticalscienceshowsthatthegentlemanisnaturallyaffectedby

philosophy.Althoughthisisnotitsproximategoal,Aristotle’spoliticalscienceis218LAM,11.219LAM,12.220For‘allpracticalpurposeshewillbearepublican.’LAM,29.221LAM,13.222CM,25-26.SeeinparticularEN1095b4-7(Strausscitesthelongerpassage1095a30-b8in25n).223Forexample,StraussseesAristotle’somissionsofshameandpietyfromthelistofvirtuesasevidencefortryingtocorrectthegentleman’sconceptionofvirtue.CM,28;WIPP,94.

187

alsoanattempttoactualizethispossibilityofphilosophyinthegentleman.224As

longasgentlemendonotpracticephilosophy,theyare,fromthepointofviewof

philosophy,imperfecthumanbeings.Theydonotspeculateonthewholeoflife.

Strauss’sinterpretationisthatdespiteAristotle’sdefenceofindependenceofthe

sphereofprudenceandofthepoliticallife,hedoesnotassertherethatitisequalto

orsuperiortothephilosophiclife.225

III.Aristotle’sPoliticalScience:TheCity

Moralvirtueaddressesthewholenaturalhumangood,agoodrealizedin

society.Naturalhumanperfection,includingtheconceptionofpoliticalfreedom

outlinedabove,canonlyberealizedinsociety.Thissociety,however,mustbea

smallsociety,andaclosedsociety.Itneedstobeasmallsocietybecausethesociety

capableofachievingacommongoodmustcultivatetrust.Trustpresupposes

acquaintancewiththeothermembersofsociety.Thusmutualtrusthelpscultivatea

societywhereapersonisresponsibletoandresponsibleforothers,intheshared

pursuitofhumanperfection.Strausslinksthefruitsofmutualtrusttopolitical

freedom,thefreedomtopursueexcellenceincommonwithothers.226

Thisalsoexplainswhythesocietymustbeaclosedsociety.Politicalfreedom

requiresthecultivationoftherighthabitsofvirtue,andsotakesgenerationsto

buildup.Notallhumansocietiescanrealizethemostmatureexpressionofpolitical

freedomatthesametime.Consequently,thesocietythattriedtobeatotally

inclusive‘open’societywouldactuallybeamixtureofdifferentsocietiesat

224CM,28.Strauss’sseriousnessforeducatinggentlemenshowsthatthisargumentcannotsimplybewrittenoffasanexotericteaching.C.f.Rosen(2003),136.225NRH,51.226NRH,130-31.

188

differentlevelsofpoliticalmaturity.Thelowersocietieswoulddragdownthe

higherones,andpreventtheopensocietyfromeverrealizinghumanperfection.As

aclosedsocietyisrequiredtorealizehumanexcellence,thedivisionofhumanity

intodifferentgroupsisalsoaccordingtonature.227

Itisclearoneisspeakingaboutaparticularkindofsociety,limitedbya

certainsize,essentiallycivilisedandurban,andwithameasureofpoliticalfreedom.

InAristotle’sterminology,thiskindofsocietyisneitheranempirenoratribe,but

thecityorpolis.228Onlyinthecitycanhumanperfectionberealized;onlyinthecity

doesindividualmoralvirtueflourishenoughtoachievehappiness.Aristotlethereby

arguesthatthecityisthemostcomprehensiveandhighestsociety.Thehighestgood

oftheindividual,thepracticeofmoralvirtuethatachieveshappiness,isexactly

whatthecityaspiresfortheindividual.Inthatway,thehighestgoodofthecity

coincideswiththehighestgoodoftheindividual.

Astheperfectionofthecitydependsontheperfectionofitsmembers,

Straussidentifiesthechiefpurposeofthecityasthecultivationofthevirtueofits

members.Straussthereforeidentifiesliberaleducationasthecity’scentral

concern.229Bymakingthecitythethemeofhispoliticalwork,Aristotlefurther

developspoliticalscienceasthedisciplinethattransmitstheliberaleducationthat

fostershumanexcellence.Itevincestheaction-guidingcharacterofAristotle’s

politicalscience.Thecityisdescribedasakindofpoliticalorder,andevaluatedas

227NRH,131-32.Howse(2014)arguesthatStraussmovesinthedirectionofliberalinternationalismnotunlikethepost-MaastrichtEuropeanUnion.However,HowseseverelymischaracterizeshowStrauss’sinterpretationofAristotlegroundshisunderstandingofpolitics.Howse(2014,11);c.f.CM,1,10-12.Strauss’sreflectionsdonotfavourliberalinternationalism,butrepublicanism.LAM,29.228NRH,130;CM,30.StraussthinksofPolitics1326b3-5.229CM,31.

189

thebestpoliticalorder.Politicalscientistsmustacknowledgethatthecityisgood,

andtheyandtheirstudentsmustpursueitsgood.Aristotle’spoliticalscienceis

practical:itdescribes,evaluates,andencouragesactionspursuedforthesakeof

whatisgood.

The‘city,’however,isnotathemeofcontemporarypoliticalscience,so

Strausshastojustifyhis(andAristotle’s)interestinit.Theinfluenceofhistoricism

raisestwoobjectionsagainstAristotle’spoliticalscience.Thefirstobjectionisthatit

privilegestheGreekunderstandingofpoliticsaboveallothers.Asthepolisisthe

mostcommonpoliticalorderamongsttheGreeks,Aristotleissimplyenshrining

Greekbiasesastothebestpoliticalorderwithinhispoliticalscience.Tothis

objection,StrausscountersthatAristotledemonstratesgreatrespectforanon-

Greekpolis,Carthage.AristotleranksCarthageas‘hardlyless’thanthepolisof

Sparta,andbetterthanthepolisofAthens.230Aristotlethereforerespectsthepoleis

amongstGreeksandnon-Greeksalike.

Thesecond,moreprofoundobjectionisthathistoricismmakestheconcept

ofthecityobsolete,byreplacingitwiththeterm‘culture.’Atfirstsight,thefocuson

thehighest,mostmeaningfulordermightsuggestanagreementbetween‘city’and

‘culture.’Yethistoricismtransformsthemeaningofculture:expungingany

evaluativecontent,itremovestheimpressionofanorderorrankinasingleculture,

aswellasbetweenonecultureandanother.Whatisleftisapurelydescriptive

accountofculture.Fromthepointofviewofhistoricism,Aristotle’sassertionthat

thepoliticalelementisthehighestelementinhumansocietyappearstobearbitrary

230CM,31;WIPP,87-88.

190

oratbesttheexpressionofonecultureamongmany.’231Hisaccountappearstoo

value-ladenandobsolete.Historicism’srelativismofculture,however,failsonits

ownterms:itcannotadequatelydescribeothercultures.Indeclaringallcultures

exactlyequal,historicistsmeantoprovideanadequatedescriptionofallhuman

societies.Yettheirviewbetraysthatitisaproductofoneparticularculture,modern

Westernculture.TheydescribeallculturesthroughthelensofmodernWestern

culture,imposingaparticulardescriptionfromonecultureontoallothercultures,

distortingthedescriptionofthem.232

Strausscontraststhewhollydescriptiveapproachtopoliticalscience,the

approachofpositivismandhistoricism,withthepracticalapproachtopolitical

science,theapproachofAristotle.Aristotlewouldhaveknownaforerunnerofthe

descriptiveapproachintheworkofHerodotus.Herodotusstudiesasocietyby

focusingonthenatureoftheirland,theirarts,theircrafts,theirunwrittenand

writtenlaws,andtheirstories.Aristotleseestheseasconditionsimposedona

society,conditionswhichshapeandlimitthesocietybutdonotinthemselves

constituteit.Ifonewantstounderstandwhatconstitutesaculture,oneshouldsee

whatidealitsownmemberslookupto.StatedwithamoreAristotelianvocabulary,

oneshouldfocusonhowasocietypresentsitselfasitaspirestoanswerthe

questionsofthegoodsocietyorthegoodlife.Aristotleobserveshowasociety

answersthequestionofthegoodsocietyandgoodlifebydevelopingitspolitical

order.ThedescriptiveapproachofHerodotusappearsasconditionsofpolitical

order,whilethepoliticalorderappearsastheintendedresult.Onlywiththelatter231CM,34.232CM,34.

191

canthecultureorsocietyactuallybeunderstood.233Sofarfrombeingobsolete,

Aristotle’sapproachanticipatesandrepliestohistoricism’sversionofpolitical

science.

Strauss’sconsideredassessmentisthatmodernsdonotpayadequate

attentiontothequestionofthegoodsocietyandthegoodlife.Theyholdthatit

cannotbethetaskofthestatetopromotevirtue,makingthestateindifferentto

virtueandvice.234Yettheirexhortation‘doesnotpaysufficientattentiontothe

importanceofhabituationoreducationfortheacquisitionofvirtue.’235Byavoiding

thepursuitofexcellence,modern‘liberal’educationparadoxicallyturnsintoa

‘ferocioushatred’ofthosewhostatethattherearestandardsofexcellence.The

resultisasavagedegradationofeducation,preventingstudentsfromachieving

excellence.236

Thecounteristopursueexcellencefromthestart.TheAristotelianliberal

educationconcentratesonhabitformationdirectedtowardexcellence.Ithelps

peoplerealizethegoalofexcellence.Oneversionofeducationseekshappiness

howeverunderstood;theotherversionofeducationseekstruehappiness.237Thisis

anotherbattlefieldinthequarrelbetweentheancientsandmoderns.Neverthelessit

isonewheremodernliberaldemocracydoeslogicallyrequirespecifyingthegoalsof

education:soitisopentorecognizingandincorporatingthewisdomoftheancients.

233CM,34-35.234CM,33.235CM,33.236LAM,28,63.237CM,49.

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IV.Aristotle’sPoliticalScience:TheBestRegime

Strauss’spresentationofAristotleelevatesthedignityofthecity:distinct

fromotherkindsofassociations,thecityisthenaturalassociation,which,through

politicallife,leadstohumanexcellence.238‘Politics,’writesStrauss,‘isthefieldon

whichhumanexcellencecanshowitselfinitsfullgrowthandonwhoseproper

cultivationeveryformofexcellenceisinawaydependent.’239Inordertoreach

excellence,ahumanbeingmustliveinthebestpoliticalorder,thesociety‘most’

conducivetohumanexcellence.240ImplicitinStrauss’sdiscussionofthecityisan

emphasison‘politicalorder,’whichreferstothesizeofthesociety,and

government’slevelofcentralization.241Thecityissmallandclosed,withcitizens

whoareacquaintedwithoneanother;thecloserelationshipbetweenthecitizens

developsahighlycentralizedgovernmentwhosepresenceisfeltthroughout

ordinarylife.Yetthereare,ofcourse,manydifferentkindsofgovernmentthatcould

rulethecity,assistingorhinderinghumanexcellence.ThisraisesAristotle’s

questionofthebest‘regime’(politeia).

ForStrauss,modernityhasobscuredthesignificanceof‘regime,’requiringa

reminderofitssignificance.242Withinagivenpoliticalorder,suchasthecity,

‘regime’refersprimarilytothedistributionofpower.Itidentifiesthebasicpolitical

authoritythatorderssocieties,‘theformofgovernment.’243Onthisdescription,one

238CM,45.239NRH,133-34.240NRH,135.241PierreManent’sreflectionsonpoliticalorderorformmakeexplicitwhatStraussimplicitlyrecognizes(2013,4-10).242NRH,138.243NRH,136.StraussparaphrasesAristotle:‘thegoverningbodyistheregime.’Politics1278b11-13;and1289a12-20.

193

mightthink‘regime’synonymouswith‘constitution,’butStrausselaborates.

‘Constitution’referstothefoundationallawsofapoliticalsociety,butitdoesnot

addressthedeeperpoliticalorder.Theinitialpoliticalphenomenamaybethelaws,

butthelawsarenotindependent.Theydependonhumanbeingstoadoptand

administerthem.Humanbeings,andthepowertheyexercise,whichisnot

necessarilywhatiswrittenintheconstitution,directthelaws.‘Regime’referstothis

deeperpoliticalorder:theactual‘formofgovernment’addressesthosewhoreally

holdpoliticalpower,whoreallyshapethelaws.Theregimeistherebythecauseof

thelaws,sothelaws,whileimportantpoliticalphenomena,arenotthefundamental

politicalphenomena.244

‘Regime,’however,isnotwhollyconcernedwiththebrutefactofpolitical

power.Aparticularregimeprovidesthecitywithaparticularconceptionofjustice,

whichtheninformsthelawsandconstitutespublicmorality.Forexample,thereare

distinctconceptionsofjusticeinademocraticregime,anaristocraticregime,anda

monarchicregime.245Straussspeaksofeachregime’sconceptionofjusticeas

providingandelaboratingacertainlegitimatingprinciple.Thelegitimatingprinciple

istheultimateprinciplewhichisthesourceofpublicmorality,laws,andthe

constitution,theprinciplebywhichthosearedefendedandupheld.ForStrauss,

thereisnotonelegitimatingprinciplesimply.Differentregimeselaborateaspecific

legitimatingprinciplebasedontheirparticularconceptionofjustice.AsStrausssees

it,thisinsightstemsfromordinarypoliticalexperience.Ignoringthisvarietyin

legitimatingprinciplesistoignoretheperspectiveofthecitizen,whoconcerns244NRH,136.Strausstakesthehabitstobeauthoritativeoverlaws.HecitesPolitics1292b11-18.245CM,48;NRH137;StrausscitesPolitics1288a23-24.

194

himselfwithaparticularpublicmorality.246Politicalsciencemustbecognizantof

differentlegitimatingprinciplesandhowtheyemerge,therebyrequiringthestudy

ofdifferentregimes.247

Theregimealsoshapesthewayoflife.248Particularregimesmould

particularhumanbeings,determiningthedominantandauthoritativewayoflifein

acommunity.Everycommunity,inespousingacertainpublicmorality,values

certainhabitsandattitudes.Theythenrecognizethesuperiorityofthehumantypes

thatbestembodythesehabitsandattitudes,regardingacertainhumantypeor

characterasauthoritative.249Thisauthoritytakestwoforms.Oneisintermsof

socialnormsandpressures.Everypracticeisjustifiedbyhowtheauthoritative

humancharacterwouldjudgeit;thosepracticesthatcannotbejustifiedbecome

suspect.Sostrongisthispressurethateventhosewhodonotexplicitlypasstheir

practicethroughthisprocessofjustificationarestillshapedbyitsjudgements.250

‘Citizen’isrelativeto‘regime,’inasmuchastheregimeinevitablyshapesthehuman

beingwithinittobecomeacertainkindofcitizen.251Thesecondformconcerns

thosewhoaremorelikelytogovern.Tobeauthoritative,thesehumancharacters

musthaveadecisivesayinthecommunity,formingthegovernment.Thepersons

whobestexemplifythesecharactersendupparticipatingingovernment.252

‘Citizen,’then,isrelativeto‘regime’inasecondsensetoo,asacitizenwhowould

246CM,48.247C.f.Williams(2005),4;Larmore(2013),280,291.248NRH,136.StrausscitesPolitics,1295b1.249NRH,137.250NRH,137.251CM,45-46.252NRH,137.

195

enduprulinginoneregimewouldnotbelikelytoruleinanother;fewdemocratic

citizenswouldbeableparticipateinanoligarchicgovernment.253

Theregime’sroleinpubliclifeissocomprehensive,Aristotleholds,thatifa

givencityweretoundergoachangeofregime,itwouldactuallytransforminto

anothercity.Onceacitychangestheendtowhichitisdedicated,itsformand

purposechanges—ifnotitsmatterorinhabitants.Themostacuteargumentin

favourwouldbeseenintermsoftheessenceofpolitics,thecultivationofhuman

excellence.Ifacityweretoabandonitsdedicationtohumanexcellenceandturnto

baseness,nogreatermoralchangecouldtakeplace.254

Alltheseelaborations—thearrangementofpoliticalpower,thespecification

ofjusticeandmorality,theidealizationofcertaincharactertypesthatshapetheway

oflife,transformthecitizenandeffectwhoislikelytogovern—demonstratethat

theregimeisthefundamentalpoliticalandsocialphenomenon.255Itmakesman

whatheispolitically,anditmakesthecitywhatitisessentially.ForStrauss,

‘regime’isthetruethemeofpoliticalphilosophy.256

Nevertheless,theseelaborationsexposethatthereisavarietyofconceptions

ofjustice,publicmorality,waysoflife,andaccountsofthegoodcitizen:inshort,a

varietyofregimes.Aspoliticalphilosophyisevaluative,theseelaborationsbrand

thetruethemeofpoliticalphilosophyasthequestforthebestregime.Thisisthe

guidingquestionofAristotle’sPolitics.257Straussappropriatesthisquest.Providing

253CM,45.254CM,46-47.255NRH,137.256WIPP,33-34.257CM,48-49.

196

hisownpresentationofAristotle’steaching,StraussadviseshowAristotle’spolitical

sciencecanbeappliedtocontemporarypolitics.

AccordingtoStrauss,whatisAristotle’steachingofthebestregime?Strictly

speaking,Aristotle’sbestregimeistheruleofthe‘bestmen,’makingthebestregime

anaristocracy.Thebestmenrulebecausetheyarethebestinmoralvirtue.Moral

virtuedependsuponwisdom,sotheruleofthebestmenistheruleofthewise.The

aristocracyrulesabsolutely.Forifthearistocracyisindeedtheruleofthewise,

then,‘itwouldbeabsurdtohamperthefreeflowofwisdombyanyregulation…the

ruleofthewisemustbeabsoluterule.’258Theruleofthewiseisneitherdependent

onelections,noronconsentofthegoverned,norlaws.259Sinceitsrealization

requiresonlywisemen,neitherdemandinga‘miraculousornonmiraculouschange

inhumannature,’northeabolitionofevil,itispossible.Sinceitisinaccordance

withtherequirementsof‘excellenceorperfectionofhumannature,’itisdesirable.

Theabsoluteruleofthewiseisbothpossibleanddesirable.260

ToStrauss’scritics,thispositionisascandal,asitseemsheendorsesthe

classicaldefinitionoftyranny:monarchicalrulewithoutlaws.261Whilethiscriticism

hasbeeneffectivelyrefutedelsewhere,itisusefultonotehereishowtherefutation

relatestoStrauss’sappropriationofAristotle.262Onecanbetterunderstand

Strauss’steachingbyjuxtaposingittoAristotle’sdefinitionoftyranny.263For

Aristotle,tyrannyisadeviationfrommonarchy.Itisthemonarchrulingtothe

258NRH,140-41.259NRH,141.260NRH,139;WIPP,85-86.261OT,69.262Z&Z(2006),155-59.263Z&Z(2006),161.

197

advantageofhimself,themonarch,ratherthanrulingtowardthecommon

advantage,theadvantageoftheothermembersofthecommunity.Strauss’saccount

ofthebestregimeemphasizesnotalawlessabsoluteruler,butajustabsoluteruler.

ForStrauss,itislogicalthattheabsoluteruleofthegenuinelywiseandjust,ruling

forthesakeofothers,wouldbejustforall.264Thatistheaccountofthebestregime

Straussthinksisbynature,andtherebypossibleanddesirable.

Thebenefitsanabsolutelywiseandjustrulemightbringcouldneverjustify

theabsolute,lawlessruleoftheunwiseandunjust.265Hencethesecondhalfof

Strauss’steachingonthebestregime:thatthepracticallybestregimeistheregime

governedbytheruleoflaw.Whiletheabsoluteruleofthewiseandjustmaybe

possibleanddesirable,itsactualizationisbynomeansnecessary.Drawingfrom

Aristotle,Straussarguesthattheactualizationofthebestregimedependsona

seriesoffavourableconditionsthatcanonlyarisethroughchance.266Thebest

regimemayneverhavebeenactual,anditmayneverbecomeactual.267Strauss’s

interpretationofAristotlearguesthatasthebestregimeislegitimateorjustonly

underthesemostfavourableconditions;underlessfavourableconditions,onlyless

imperfectregimesarelegitimateorjust.Strauss’sconclusionisthattheclassical

understandingofthe‘bestregime’promotesavarietyoflegitimateorjust

regimes.268

264WIPP,86;Z&Z(2006),163.265Z&Z(2006),162-63.266NRH,139.StrausscitesPolitics1331b18-23.267NRH,139,StrausscitesPolitics1296a37-38.SeealsoLAM,15.268NRH,140.StrausscitesseveralpassagesofAristotletomakehisargument.Onhowjusticediffersfromplacetoplaceonaccountoftheirbeingdifferentpoliticalregimes,seeEN1135a5.Aristotleconsiderswhyitisimportantforthesamesciencetostudythebestregimeandthebestpossibleregime,Politics1288b10ff.Onhowpolityandaristocracyfallshortofthemostcorrectregime,see

198

Onecouldconjectureanumberofconditionsunderwhichthebestregime

shouldnotbeimplemented,butStraussidentifiesthebasicproblemintermsofthe

semblanceofwisdomvis-à-visgenuinewisdom.Forthewisetorule,theymust

persuadetheunwisethattheyare,infact,wise.Yettheabilityofthewiseto

persuadeisextremelylimited,andgenuinewisdomisalmostimpossibleforthose

whoarenotwisetoidentify.Ifoneallowsthewisetoclaimarighttoruleoverthe

multitude,themorelikelyoutcomeisanunwisemandeceivingthemultitudethat

heis,infact,wise.Onaccountofhisfeignedwisdom,hewillpersuadethemultitude

thathehasarighttorule.Itislikelythatthispersonwouldruleabsolutely,forthe

sakeofhimself,andsoestablishatyranny.269Tyrannyistheveryproblem,the

‘cancer,’whichStrausswantspoliticstoavoid.270Strauss’spoliticalsciencemustbe

abletoidentifythecancercorrectly,andpreventitsemergence.

Consequently,thethreatoftyrannyistoogreattopermitthosewhoclaimto

bewisetoruleabsolutely.Strauss’sconclusionisthattheallegedrightofthewiseto

rulemustbequestioned.Itcannotbeabsolute.Thedemandforwisdommustbe

qualifiedbyconsentofthegoverned.271Theregimemeetstherequirementof

wisdom,aswellastherequirementofconsent,throughthewisemanprovidinga

codeoflaworconstitutiontoapoliticalcommunity,whichthecitizensofthe

politicalcommunity,persuadedofitsimportanceforlimitingpower,freelyadopt.

1293b22-27.Onhowademocracycanemergeinthecityandbeinaccordwithnature,see1296b25-35.269NRH,140.270‘Asocialsciencethatcannotspeakoftyrannywiththesameconfidencewithwhichmedicinespeaks,forexample,ofcancer,cannotunderstandsocialphenomenaaswhattheyare.Itisthereforenotscientific.’WIPP,95.271NRH,141.Jaffareversesthis(2011,235).HetherebydepartsfromStrauss.Kraynak(2011),215-219;MichaelZuckert(2011),250-53.

199

Thiscodeembodieswisdom,sothatittakestheplaceoftheruleofmen,however

wisetheymightbe.Administrationofthisconstitutiontakesplacethroughthe

‘gentlemen’describedabove.Althoughthisprovidesacertainadvantagetomenof

leisure,andtherebythewealthy,thereasongentlemencanrulewellisthroughtheir

desiretobevirtuousandexcellentinpoliticallife.Asdescribedabove,theyare

‘liberal’gentlemen,republicaninoutlook.Theirsharedpursuitofvirtuegives

societyitscharacter.Thepracticallybestregimeisarepublicwherethesewell-bred

andpublic-spiritedgentlemengivesocietyitsrepublicancharacter.272

TheapplicationofAristotle’steachingforthepresent,then,istoadvocatefor

‘amixtureofdemocracyandaristocracy’thatcorrespondstomodern,constitutional

liberaldemocracy.273Todrawinthedifferentkindsofcitizenswhocomposethese

differentregimesandtemperthehazardsofthesegroupsrulingtyrannicallyonlyto

theirownadvantage,Aristotlearguesforthismixtureofdemocracyandaristocracy.

Thisisthemixedregime.Itbringsinfeaturesofbothinordertobeconducivetothe

ruleofthebest,undertheoverarchingruleofconstitutionallaw.274Notonlyis

Aristotle’spoliticalsciencenotanattackonmodernliberaldemocracy,his

discussionofthebestregimeisanargumentforthismixtureofdemocracyand

272SeeMarshall(2007),302-10.273CM,35-36.274NRH,143.Tomakethisconclusion,StraussdrawsfromanumberofpassagesofAristotlebutdoesnotestablishhisreasoningstep-by-step.Hisevidenceisasfollows.ForAristotle’srankingofthedifferentregimes,andthecharacteroffriendshipineach,seeEN1160a32-1161a30.Onaneedforsharedrulingbetweenequals,seePolitics1261a38-b3.Onthecaseforamixedregime,see1265b33-1266a6.Ontheproblemsofanauthoritativegovernmentalinstitutiondrawnfromthepoor,see1270b8-27.Ontheseveralkindsofcitizensprevalentindifferentregimes,see1277b35-1278a22.Onthedistinctionsbetweendifferentmodesofrule,see1278a37-1279a17.Onwhyaregimemightbeconcernedaboutsuperiormenaspossibletyrants,see1284a4-b34.Ontyrannybeingtheworstdeviationfromaregime,andonwhichkindsofregimesarethemostchoiceworthyforcities,see1289a39ff.

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aristocracy.Aristotle’spoliticalscienceisactuallyanargumentformodernliberal

democracy.

Insum,StraussthinksthatAristotleteachestwobestregimes.Thesimply

bestregimeistheabsoluteruleofthewise,butitsrealizationisimprobable.

Becauseofitsimprobability,itcannotandmustnotbepracticallypursued.Strauss’s

reflectionontheproblemoftyranny,andhisdefinitionoftheonlyconditionunder

whichthebestregimeispossibleanddesirable—whenthejustmanrulesjustlyfor

all—showstheattractionofthewiserulingabovethelaw,butwhyitwouldmore

likelythannotresultintyranny.Thetwoteachingsofthebestregimescementthe

overridingpracticalimportanceoftheruleoflawinthefaceoftemptationstowaive

theruleoflaw—temptationsexacerbatedbyextremistideologies.275Thepractical

answertothequestionofthebestregimeis,therefore,nottheruleofthewise,but

theruleofthelawinthemixedregime.Modernliberaldemocracy,whereruleis

definedandlimitedbyaconstitution,effectivelymixesaristocracyanddemocracy.

Itmostcloselyapproachesthemixedregime.Itisthispracticallybestregimethat

politicalscienceshouldtrytoencourage.Ultimately,StraussusesAristotletohelp

establishamorenuancedunderstandingoftheclassicalpoliticalphilosophy’s

qualifiedpositiveviewofdemocracy,completingtherehabilitationofclassical

politicalphilosophy.FromhisreadingofAristotle,aswellasPlato,Strausscloses:

‘liberalandconstitutionaldemocracycomesclosertowhattheclassicsdemanded

thananyalternativethatisviableinourage.’276

275Z&Z(2006),161.276OT,194.ForStrauss’sinterpretationofRepublic473d,seeCM,124-25;OT,193.StraussdeclaresthatPlato’spoliticalworkparexcellenceisnotRepublic,butTheLaws.WIPP,29.

201

Strausswhollyrejectsallextremistpoliticalresponsestotheproblemof

modernity.277UnlikeSchmittandHeidegger,Strauss’spoliticalresponsetothe

problemofmodernityistodefendliberaldemocracy.278AristotleisStrauss’sguide

torecovertherealmeaningofpolitics,preparingaradicalphilosophicalresponse

towardtheproblemofmodernity.ButheisalsoStrauss’sguidetopromotea

moderateandnontyrannicalpolitics:tobuttressliberal,constitutionaldemocracyin

thefaceofitschallengers.279

V.AristotleandTheProblemofNaturalRight

Recallingthatthegoodlifeisinaccordancewithnature,thecityisthe

associationinaccordancewithnature,andthebestregimeistheregimein

accordancewithnature,itremainstoidentifyhowStraussunderstandsthe

relationshipofnaturetopolitics.Aristotle’spoliticalsciencestayswithinthesphere

oftheconventionsthatgentlemenagreetobemorallyvirtuous,notseekingtheir

justification.Aristotle’sapproachtherebyemphasizesthatpoliticalsciencestudies

theseconventions,andisindependentfromthescienceofnature,avoidingtheerror

ofHippodamusandotherpre-Socratics.Nevertheless,therearetwoaspectsofthe

relationshipbetweentheparticularconventionsofpoliticsandnaturethatthis

approachoverlooks.

Thefirstconcernsthejustificationofmoralvirtue.Prudenceisoriented

towardthegoodlife.Astheendofprudenceisthegoodlife,andthegoodlifeis277Velkley(2011),114.Altman(2011)isanunverifiableconspiracytheory.278Smith(1994),192.279Jaffa’sobservationthatStrauss’spoliticalphilosophypointstotheAmericanarticulationofdemocracy,is,inthissense,correct.However,JaffaissurelyoverstatinghiscaseifheimpliesthatAmericaisthetheoreticallybestregimeactuallyrealized(cf.Jaffa(2012),30-33).Asnotedabove,Strauss’steachingofthebestregimeisacitythatappearsinspeech,notasanactualcity.Z&Z(2006),242-43.

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accordingtonature,natureisconnectedtoprudenceandthereforetomoralvirtue.

Foramoralvirtuetobegenuine,itmustbethemeanstothegoodlife,orin

accordancewiththenaturalendofman.Tojustifyparticularmoralvirtues,one

mustshowthattheyinclinetowardthenaturalendofman.Forthisjustificationto

succeed,itwouldrequirethatmanknowhisnaturalend—knowledgeacquired

throughthescienceofnature.280Theostensibleindependenceofpoliticalscience

fromthescienceofnaturemustbequalified.Straussobservesthatpoliticalscience

isvulnerabletofalsetheoreticalopinionsaboutthenaturalendofman,

particularly—asseenwiththepre-Socratics—falsetheoreticalopinionsaboutthe

soul.Politicalsciencereliesuponthetheoreticalsciencestodefenditselfagainst

falseopinions.Sowhilepoliticalscienceisdeiureindependentfromknowledge

obtainedthroughthetheoreticalsciences,Strausssaysitisdefactodependenton

knowledgeobtainedthroughthetheoreticalsciences.281

Thesecondaspectthatthisapproachdownplaysistherelationshipbetween

lawandnature.Aristotle’sviewisthatprudenceinpoliticsistheruleoflawin

accordwithnature,whichdirectsalltheotherarts.Likethepre-Socratics,then,

Aristotle’staxonomyplacesnatureinthefirstplace.Butinthesecondplacefallsthe

law,ratherthantheartsasforthepre-Socratics.Theartstherebyassumethethird

place,inferiortothelaw.282Theruleoflawisinaccordancewithwhatisbynature

thegoodlife,thewholehumangood.Itdirectsandsituatesalltheotherarts.

280CM,26.281LAM,206.282CM,25.

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Aristotlemakesnaturethestandardforthemoralandpoliticalsphere.This

raisesthequestionofnaturaljusticeornaturalright.However,therearetwo

differentwaystoconceiveoftherelationshipbetweenlawandnaturaljusticeor

right.Inonethelawsaresecondarytonature;intheother,thelawsarefusedwith

nature.Theformerisclassicalnaturalright,andthelatterisnaturallaw.Criticizing

thelatter,StraussinterpretsAristotletosidewiththeformer.283

AsStraussnotes,Aristotle’sNicomacheanEthicsisverybriefonnatural

right.284Aristotlesaysthefollowing:

Ofthejustinthepoliticalsense,onepartisnatural,theother,conventional.Thenatural[partofpoliticaljustice]isthatwhichhasthesamecapacityeverywhereandisnotdependentonbeingheldtoexistornot,whereastheconventionalpartisthatwhichatthebeginningmakesnodifferencewhetheritisthusorotherwise,butoncepeoplehavesetitdown,itdoesmakeadifference.285

Fromthispassage,naturalrightappearstohavethesamecapacityeverywherein

politics.ThisinitiallycorrespondswithAristotle’swriting,butAristotlethenadds

thatnaturalright‘…isaltogetherchangeable.’286Aristotleseemstodenythat

naturalrightisunchangeable,andthereforedeniestheverypremiseofnatural

right.Itwouldappearthatinreality,naturalrightisconventional.Ifmaintained,this

positionwouldleaveAristotlewithlittledefenceagainstthemodernoffensiveof

relativism.Aristotleneedsaninterpreter.

TheinterpretationofThomasAquinasattemptstobuttressthedefencesby

qualifyingAristotle.WhatAristotlereallymeansisthattheprinciplesofnatural

283Aristotledoesnotfollowan‘extremeview,’where‘natureandlawbecomefused.’CM,25.284NRH,156.285EN1134b18-22.286SeeEN1134b25-30.

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right,theirbasicaxiomsorrules,areuniversallyvalidandunchangeable.Thesecan

beunderstoodasthebasisofanaturallaw,asopposedtonaturalright.Anatural

lawis‘alawwhichdetermineswhatisrightandwrongandwhichhaspoweroris

validbynature,inherently,henceeverywhereandalways.’287ForAquinas,thereisa

habitusofpracticalprinciples,whichinformpracticalreasoningandprovideuswith

knowledgeofthenaturallaw.IntheThomistvocabulary,thishabitusisthedoctrine

ofconscience(synderesis).288Thenaturallawsolutionisneat,savingthedayfrom

theattackofrelativism.289

StraussobjectstothisinterpretationasadeparturefromAristotle.Aristotle

doesnotqualifyhisstatementthatnaturalrightischangeable.Heimpliesthatall

naturalrightischangeable,whileThomasAquinasonlymakespartofitchangeable.

Moreover,ThomasAquinasusessynderesistoexplainwhythenaturallawis

availableandcommunicabletoallhumanbeings,unchanginganduniversally

obligatory.ButsynderesisisaPatristicterm,notanAristotelianone.Theconceptis

foreigntoAristotle.StraussthusarguesthattheThomisticnaturallawteachingcan

onlyexistthroughtheinfluenceofbiblicalrevelation.Naturallawasaseriesof

universallyvalid,unchangeable,andexceptionlessrulesisnotnaturallawstrictly

speaking,i.e.alawknowabletounassistedhumanreason.Forexample,accordingto

Aquinasbreakingthenaturallawsupposedlyyieldsdivinepunishment;yet‘itisnot

entirelyclearwhetherhumanreasoncanestablishthefactofsuchpunishment.’290

287SPPP,137.288NRH,157.289StrausssaystheStoicsoriginatethenaturallawteachinginSPPP,141.C.f.NRH,146,whereherejectsthenotionthattheStoicsintroduceanewteaching.c.f.Tanguay(2007),118.290SPPP,142;NRH,163-64.

205

InStrauss’saccountofthenaturallawtradition,naturallawbecomes

indistinguishablefromdivinelaw.Initiallyheldtobedistinct,thetwoformsofthe

higherlawbecomeoneandthesame.Thebasictensionthenisbetweennatural

rightandnaturallaw.Straussexposesnaturallawasrevelation.Achoicefornatural

lawmaybecorrect,butitisachoiceforreligiousrevelation,notachoicefor

philosophy.291

TorecoverAristotleforthesideofthephilosophers,Straussoffersadifferent

interpretation.292TheoriginalGreekphilosophersdonotstudynaturallaw—for

themitisacontradictioninterms.Instead,theystudynaturalright,definedas‘what

isbynaturerightorjust.’293Theclassicalnaturalrightteaching,accordingto

Strauss,answersthequestionofwhatisnaturalrightbythequestionofwhatisthe

bestregime,becauseitisherewherejusticefindsitscompleteanswer.294Thebest

regimeistheperfectlyjustregime.Itisthereforetheregimethatperfectlyrealizes

thecommongood.Itsrulersareperfectlywise,andthelawstheypromulgatewould

beperfectlyjustlaws.Yetnoactualpoliticalregimeisthebestregimethat

representstheabsoluteruleofthewise.Howthentoassessnaturalrightinactual

regimes?

291ThisconclusioncoincideswithwhatStrausswritesinthenewprefaceto1971edition,NRH,vii.Straussdefendsclassic‘naturalright’againsthistoricism,butqualifiesthisdefense‘toavoidacommonmisunderstanding…thedivinelawisnotthenaturallaw,letalonenaturalright.’InhisdebatewithPangle,JaffaiscorrecttouseNRH’snewprefaceinordertodrawattentiontoStrauss’scontinuedcommitmenttoclassicalnaturalright(2012,70,90-92).Butheneglectstoconsiderthiscitationfromthenewpreface.RatherthanindicatingaStrausswhodrawsreasonandrevelationtogetherintheirunderstandingofnaturalright(c.f.2012,98-101),itindicatesthatStraussintensifiesthedividebetweenreasonandrevelation.292TheAverroists,includingMarsiliusofPadua,areonthesideofAristotle,whichisthesideofphilosophy.SPPP,165,226;PAW,96-98,140.Strauss’sLockefollowsthesideofphilosophy.SeeWIPP,220;MichaelZuckert(2013),162-71.293SPPP,138.294NRH,144;Tanguay(2007),118.

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Fromthepointofviewofthewise,thepositivelawsinactualpolitical

regimesarenotperfectlyjust,butadilutionofjustice.Thereisthusaproblematic

charactertothem.295Nevertheless,inthecircumstanceswhenthebestregimeisnot

possiblebutonlysecondarilyimperfectregimesarepossible,theseimperfect

regimesarelegitimate.Thustheselawsarelegitimate,andmustberegardedas

preservingthecommongoodandjustice.Theypreservethecommongoodinpart

becauseStrauss’steachingofthebestregimeconcludesthatitisunjusttoimposea

moreperfectregime,andthereforemoreperfectlaws,incircumstanceswherethe

bestregimeisnotpossible.

ItisbecauseAristotleevaluateslawsinthesesecondarilybestregimesthat

heconcludesthatinpoliticsthereisnaturalright.Therelationsbetweenfellow-

citizensarethemostfullydevelopedexpressionofnaturalright.Naturalrightis

partofpoliticalright;itisnotopposedtoit.Politicallifeisinaccordwithnature.296

Nevertheless,inactualpoliticalregimesthelawsneverfullyaccordthemselvesto

nature.Bymakingthelawssecondplacetonature,theclassicalnaturalright

teachingentailsthatthelawsofactualregimesareopentomodificationand

refinementtorealizejusticeinaccordancewithvaryingcircumstances.Classical

naturalrightflowsfromAristotle’steachingonthebestregime.Aristotle’snatural

rightdelineatestheminimumconditionsofpoliticallifeaswellasthebestregime.It

describestheminimumconditionandmaximumpossibilityofpoliticalsociety,but

295OT,99;SPPP,139.296NRH,156-57.

207

leavesthedetailstopositivelaw.Inthissense,Aristotleteaches‘thatallnatural

rightischangeable.’297

Thedangerwiththispositionisthatitimpliesthedenialofnaturalright,

weakeningthedefenceswithrelativismadportas.298YetAristotle,onStrauss’s

reading,thinksofnaturalrightnotas‘generalpropositionsbutratherofconcrete

decisions’inparticularsituations.299Throughthisformulation,Straussmeansthat

thevirtueofprudencerealizesnaturalright.ForStrauss,prudence,thelegislative

art,practicalreasoning,andnaturalrightallrefertothesamecapacity:todecide

whatactionrealizesthegoodinlightofchanging,contingentcircumstances,which

canneverbeoutlinedfullyinadvance.300Onelearnswhatitistobeprudentnotby

studyinglaws,butbystudyingexamplesofpersonswhoactedwellinparticular

circumstances.Henceonestudiesthe‘gentlemen,’thewell-cultivated,well-

mannered,andtemperatemenofthecity.301

ForStrauss,therefore,studyingstatesmenhelpsusbetterunderstand

prudence,aswellastheothervirtues.302Theyservetomanifesttheheightsof

humanachievementandexcellenceinvaryingcircumstances.303Nevertheless,this

297SPPP,140.298NRH,158-59.299NRH,159.300Marshall(2007),300-301;Marshall(1993),67;EN1139a5-32.301PaceVilla(2001),289,whoregardsitasastrangeexultationofvirtuosity.Straussisonlyaskinghisreadertoconsiderexemplarycasesofprudentpersonstohelpactprudently—identifyingvirtuousactionbyreferencetothevirtuouscharacter.SeeEN1105b5,EN1140b5-13.302SeeCG.ChurchillalsohelpsStraussbetterunderstandAristotle’sconceptionofthevirtueofmagnanimity.SeeJaffa(2012),188.303WIPP,86.

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leavesopenaquestion:arethemanifestationsofprudenceeverlimitedby

exceptionlessmoralrules?304

Aristotle’sreplyisanambiguous‘perhaps’(isôs).305ForStrauss,Aristotle

doesnotdoastheThomistsdo,andargueinfavourofexceptionlessmoralrules.

Instead,StrausstakesAristotletosuggestthat‘thereisnotasinglerule,however

basic,whichisnotsubjecttoexception.’306TheproblemwiththeThomistpositionis

thatitpresumestohavesufficientknowledgeofallrequisitecircumstancesto

definethelawwithsufficientadequacyanddetailtomeetallrequisite

circumstances.Strauss’schargeisthatreasoncanneveraccomplishthis;extreme

situationsthatmightrequireexceptionscanneverbedescribedbeforehandin

detail.307

Whenthesafetyofcivilsocietyisthreatened,suchasinwar,oneneedsto

cultivateflexiblejudgements.Straussagreesthatitissometimesnecessaryto

disregarduniversalsrulesforthesakeofthecommongood.Theseexceptionsareas

justastherules.308Straussiswellawarethattodistinguishbetweenthenormaland

extremesituationisnoteasyforstatesmen,buttherearerightandwrongwaysto

approachit.TheMachiavellianstatesmantakeshisbearingsfromtheextreme

situationandreducesjusticetonecessity,blurringthedistinctionbetweenwhatis

goodforthepoliticalcommunityandwhatisgoodforhimself.TheAristotelian

statesmandeferstothenormalsituationandwhatisnormallyjust.Heonly304SeeJaffa(2012),22-23.Jaffagraspsthechangeabilityofprudencewell,withoutlosingsightofitsorientationtomorality.Hisoversightisthathedoesnotconsiderthecontroversialstatusofexceptionlessmoralrulesinthevarioustraditionsofexaminingprudence.305‘somethings,perhaps,itisnotpossibletobecompelledtodo.’EN1110a27.306NRH,160.307NRH,161.308NRH,160.

209

reluctantlydeviatesfromwhatisnormallyjust,inordertosavejustice.The

commongoodremainshisstandard.309Whetherhisdecisionwasgenuinelyprudent

issubjecttotheverdictofthehistorian,whojudgeswhethertheextremeactions

werejustorunjustforthecourtofmankind.310

Strauss’saccountsetsupaquarrelbetweenphilosophicalnaturalrightand

theologicalnaturallaw.Naturallawassumesthatonecangainperfect

understandingofauniversallyvalidandunchangeablelaw,applicableinall

circumstances.Strausscountersthathumanreasoncanonlyrealizethisperfect

understandingwithdivineassistance.Naturallawreliesonrevelation.The

consequencesofadoptingthisunderstandingisthatnaturallaw,asperfectlaw,

takesprecedenceoverthebestregime.Naturallawappliesirrespectiveofthe

circumstancesthatwouldmakethebestregimeapplicable.311Consequently,

Aquinasweakensthepoliticalcharacterofnaturalright,separatingitfromthe

questionofthebestregime.312

Naturallawalsodistortstheascentfrompoliticstothenaturalhumanend.

Thepursuitofthebestregimewashithertoinaccordancewithnature:thebest

regimewasanecessaryconduitforrealizingthegoodlife.WithThomasAquinas,

thecharacterofthegoodmorallife,realizedinaccordancewiththenaturallaw,

309NRH,162.ThisrefutesacommonchargedirectedagainstStrauss,thathepromotesanamoral,‘Machiavellian,’politics(e.g.Devigne(1994),42-47;Villa(2001),289-90.)Strauss’sAristotleandMachiavelliagreetherearenoexceptionlessmoralrules.Theydisagreeaboutbywhichthingstheexceptionstaketheirbearings.ForStrauss’sAristotle,itisjustice;forStrauss’sMachiavelli,itisnecessity,whichusurpsjusticeandrulesthemoraluniverse.SeeZ&Z(2006),183-84.PaceVilla(2001,353),Straussisnotdenigratingconstitutionallawandordinarymorality—heisshowingwhyordinarymoralityandsoundconstitutionaljurisprudenceproduceanawarenessoftheexception.310NRH,161;CG.311NRH,144.312NRH,144-145.

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doesnotchangeitscontentforanyregime.Itcanberealizedirrespectiveofthe

politicalcommunitywithinwhichonelives.Ifnaturalrightcannotbejustified

throughpoliticalexperience,itneedsanewgroundofjustificationbeyondpolitics.

StraussthinksthattheThomistaccountofnaturallawattemptsthisjustification

throughanargumentabouttheinsufficiencyofahumannaturalend,which

intimatesadivineend.Thisviewnotonlyobscuresthenaturalhumanendof

philosophy,italsoco-optsphilosophytotheprojectofrevealedtheology.313The

initialwaveofmodernityreactsagainstthisinordertoseparatethetwoagain.314

VI.FromAristotelianPoliticalSciencetoPlatonicPoliticalPhilosophy

WhatdoesStrauss’sreadingofAristotleprovideforStrauss’spolitical

philosophy?First,itelaboratesStrauss’sstancetowardmetaphysics,cosmology,

andultimatelytheology.Strauss’sanalysisofthe‘Socraticturn’emphasizesthathis

philosophyisnotanoutrightrejectionofcosmology,butanontologicalaccountof

natureandthehumansoulthatisdistinctfromthepre-Socraticaccount.When

philosophyadoptstheaccountofnoeticheterogeneity,itdoesnotdissociateitself

fromhumanthingsorpoliticalthings;rather,itseesthemintheirdistinctiveness,

raisingthedignityofpoliticalthingsinordertostudythemintheirdistinctiveness.

Hence,forphilosophy,thereisaneedtoturnfromSocratestoAristotle,andpursue

politicalscience.Bytakingpoliticalthingsseriously,onedisclosestheimportanceof

threethemes:moralvirtue,thecity,andthebestregime.Thesethreethemespoint

backtothequestionofhowpoliticsrelatestonature,raisingthequestionofnatural

rightasposedbyAristotle.StraussusesAristotletocontrastthephilosophic313CM,44.314NRH,164.

211

understandingofnaturalrightwiththetheologicalunderstandingofnaturallaw.He

therebypreservesanaccountofnaturalrightaccessibletohumanreason,

unassistedbythedivine.Thedemarcationbetweenthesetwoversionsofnatural

rightrestsonadisagreementoverinterpretingAristotle.Moroever,itraisesthe

theologico-politicalproblem,Strauss’slifelongpreoccupation.

Second,itelaborateshowStraussfirmlyestablishestherealdignityof

politicsandmoralityagainstrelativismandpositivism.Indefendingexceptions

fromlaws,doesStraussonlyexotericallymantherampartsoftheWestagainst

relativism,whileesotericallyopeningthegatesoftheWesttorelativism?No.

Strauss’sdefenceofthecaseoftheexceptionisbasedonjustice.Onlybytaking

justiceseriouslycanoneseetheinstanceswhereanexceptiontotherulejustly

arises.Straussobjectstothepositionthatnaturalrightisreducibletoexceptionless

moralprecepts;heisnotutterlyrejectingnaturalright.Strauss’sAristotle

emphasizesthatnaturalrightandmoralvirtueareintelligibleandmeaningfulof

theirownaccord,andarepartoftheexplanationforlegitimatelyupholding

heterogeneitybetweenpoliticalandnon-politicalthings.Toupholdthat

heterogeneity,politicsandmoralitycannotbenullorillusory.Straussdoesnotape

Nietzsche.315TheesotericismStraussdeploysishisreticentdefenceoftheAverroist

interpretationofAristotleovertheThomistinterpretation.IftheAverroisttradition

isambiguousonspecificanswerstospecificmoralquestions,itshouldnotbetaken

315Velkley(2011),74.

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asarelativisticreflection,butasazeteticreflection—befittingStrauss’sSocratic

presentationofphilosophy.316

Third,byestablishingthedignityofpoliticsandmoralityintheirownterms,

Straussprovidesthedeiureindependenceofpoliticalscience.Prudenceorpractical

reasoningdoesnotdependontheoreticalreasoningforitsorientationand

meaningfulness.Practicalreasoningisnotgivensanctionbytheoreticalreasoning.

Practicalreasoningpreservesitsownobject,rightactioninrightcircumstances;and

theoreticalreasoningpreservesitsownobject,knowledgeofthewhole.Neitherare

fusedtogether.Strausstherebykeepstheorywhollydistinctfrompractice.He

refusestomakeeitherpoliticsderivativefromphilosophy,orphilosophyderivative

frompolitics.

ThisispartofStrauss’sresponsetothosemostarticulatespokesmenof

historicism,MartinHeideggerandAlexandreKojève.Tosomeextent,Straussagrees

withHeideggerandshareshisstartingpoint.LikeHeidegger,Straussiscriticalof

approachestounderstandingtheworldthatweremodelledonthenaturalsciences;

Strauss’sconcerniswiththemodelofthenaturalsciencesthattakesoverpolitical

science.LikeHeidegger,StraussdrawsinspirationfromEdmundHusserl’s

phenomenologicalapproachandslogan,‘tothethingsthemselves,’tolookforpre-

philosophicfoundations.LikeHeidegger,Strauss’sphenomenologylookstothe

immediateobjectsofourinterestandengagementandrecoversapre-philosophic

understandingoftheseobjects.ForHeidegger,thisphenomenologylookstothings

ready-to-handorpragmata;forStrauss,itfocusesontheconceptsandconcernsof

316Tanguay(2007),125.

213

ordinary,everydaypolitics.Onlybytakingone’sbearingsfromtheseprephilosophic

conceptsandconcernscanpoliticalthingsbeunderstood.Atthelevelofpolitical

things,Straussestablishesafundamentalcontinuitybetweenpre-philosophic

understandingandgenuinephilosophy;forhispart,Heideggerestablishesa

fundamentalcontinuitybetweenpre-philosophicunderstandingandauthentic

concernforBeing.

WhataboutHeidegger’sviewofphilosophyas‘practical’and‘patriotic?’By

regardingpoliticalthingssoseriously,andtherebytheconceptsandconcernsof

practicalreasoning,StraussseemstoinvitetheHeideggerianclaimthatthinkingis

‘practical,’requiringresoluteengagementwithaction.Strauss’sappropriationof

Aristotlecertainlyrejectsakindofdetachmentfrompolitics.ForAristotle’spolitical

scienceisnecessarilyevaluativeofpoliticalthings:itistheessenceofpolitical

things‘nottobeneutral’buttobejudgedintermsoftheirgoodnessorbadness.317

Moreover,Strauss’spoliticalscienceemphasizesthatthepoliticalassociation,inthe

formofasmallclosedcommunity,isthemostcomprehensiveassociation.Itis

‘patriotic’inthesenseofprioritizingthiskindofassociationforhumanexistence,

forunderstandinghumanthings.318Strauss’sphilosophydefendsthedignityof

politics,buthisdefencealmostprovestoomuch.Ifphilosophysharessomuch

groundwithpolitics,thenitmightsuggestthatpracticallifeiscontinuouswith

philosophy—justasHeideggerdid.Philosophycouldthendirectpolitics,and

317WIPP,12;O’Connor(2002),167.318WIPP,13;O’Connor(2002),170.Theparallelisnotexact,becauseStraussemphasizesthesmall,closedcommunityofthecity.Butheneversaysthatmodernityhasnogenuinepoliticalassociations.Byreferringtomodernstates,Straussimpliesthatthemodernpoliticalorderofthestatehasatleastpartiallyfulfilledthedemandsrequiredforagenuinepoliticalassociation.

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politicscouldthendirectphilosophy,invitingpoliticalirresponsibilityanalogousto

Heidegger’s.

Strauss’sreplyistodevelopphilosophyandpoliticsasseparatespheres.This

iswhyheemphasizesthatthecharacterofmoralvirtueisabsolute,andthesphere

ofpracticalreasoning,prudence,isclosed.Thepoliticallifeneedsnoadditional

justification.Itispracticalandpatriotic,butbaseduponanunderstandingofmoral

virtuethatprioritizesmoderation.StraussemphasizesthatAristotleonlyaddresses

hispoliticalsciencetothegentlemen,thosewhoalreadylivevirtuously.These

gentlemenneednoadditionaljustificationforwhattheydo.Throughtheirlife,they

alreadyexemplifythecorrectunderstandingofnaturalrightandthevirtues.By

closingthesphereofprudenceoff,Strauss’sAristotlegivesthesophistsandmorally

dubiousintellectualsnotheoreticaljustificationfortryingtosupplyanadditional

understandingofvirtuetothegentlemen,therebycorruptingandupsettingtheir

moraldecency.Theirunderstandingofvirtueisalreadycomplete.Strauss’sAristotle

givesthemreasonstopreservetheirmoderationinthefaceoftheimpassioned

speechofintellectuals.

Philosophy,foritspart,seespoliticsasadecidedlyinferiorsphere,fullof

individualswhomayactrightly,butlackself-awarenessonthereasonsforacting

rightly.Straussemphasizesthiswhenhewritesthatfromthepointofviewofthe

philosophiclife,‘themanwhoismerelyjustormoralwithoutbeingaphilosopher

appearsasamutilatedbeing.’319Bystarklydescribingthepoliticallifenotasan

imperfectlifeonagradualascenttophilosophybutasamutilatedlife,Strauss

319NRH,151.

215

removesanystartingpointforpracticetobecontinuouswithphilosophy.320Pace

Heidegger’sRectoralAddress,thephilosopherdoesnotneedtolooktopoliticsfor

guidanceorleadership;politicscannotguidehiminhisownactivity.321The

consequenceswouldbedireforphilosophy.WhenStraussdiscusseswithKojèvethe

consequencesofphilosophymarchingtothedrumofpolitics,hedescribeswhat

happensifthepoliticalidealistakenasessentiallytrue.Philosophicactivity,even

takenonlyinthesenseofanactivityofquestioning,mustsubmittothispolitical

ideal.Thepoliticalleaderwillhavetosuppresseveryactivitywhichmightdoubtthe

essentialsoundnessofthepoliticalideal,whetheritbetheuniversaland

homogenousstateorNationalSocialism.Hemustthereforesuppressphilosophyas

anattempttocorrupttheyoung.Ifphilosophycomplies,itabandonsitsactivityof

questioning,andceasestobephilosophy.Ifitdoesnotcomply,itfacesannihilation.

Whentyrannyclaimstorepresentanessentiallytruepoliticalideal,forcingastance

fromphilosophy,itdestroysphilosophy.Thisisthedangerpoliticsrepresentsto

philosophy.WhileStrauss’sremarksaddressbothHeideggerandKojève,inatleast

onesenseitisKojève’sformulationwhichisthemorepernicious.Onecanatleast

fleeNationalSocialistGermanytoanothercountry.Butfromthetyrantofthe

universalandhomogenousstate,thereisnostatetofleeunto.‘Thereisno

escape…thecomingoftheuniversalandhomogenousstatewillbetheendof

philosophyonearth.’322

320O’Connor(2002),186-87.321O’Connor(2002),187.322OT,211.

216

Strauss’sresponsetothefusionofphilosophyandpoliticsisprimarily

prudential.Heraisesawarenessoftheproblemoftyranny,andshowshow

philosophycancorruptpoliticsandhowpoliticscancorruptphilosophy.Butinhis

replytoKojève,hedoesnotaddresstheontologicalissueoftheimmutabilityor

mutabilityofTruthorBeing.323Thisisaweakness:afterall,Kojèvearguesthatonly

bypresumingtheimmutabilityofBeingcouldStrauss’saccountofphilosophymake

sense.Kojèvesimplytakestheoppositepresuppositionandarrivesathis

conclusion.StrausscanuseprudentialreasonstogiveKojèvepause,butKojève

identifiesthedeeper,ontologicalissue.Straussismindfulofthisdifficulty.He

writes:

ForwebothapparentlyturnedawayfromBeingtoTyrannybecausewehaveseenthatthosewholackedthecouragetofacetheissueofTyranny,whothereforeethumiliterserviebantetsuperbedominabantur,wereforcedtoevadetheissueofBeingaswell,preciselybecausetheydidnothingbuttalkofBeing.324

Thelastlines,areferencetoHeidegger,raisetheissueofBeingdirectly,and

moreoversuggestthatHeidegger’sphenomenologywentawry.Straussmust

considerBeing,butBeingcanonlybeunderstoodthroughanaccurate

phenomenology.ThisiswhyStraussturnsfullytotheproblemofSocrates,and

undertakesadeeperexaminationofSocratesinXenophon’swritings.325Ultimately,

Strauss’sexaminationofthe‘Socraticturn’towardshumanorpoliticalthingsentails

aviewofBeing,anontologythatdisclosesthecosmos.326

323O’Connor(2002),177.324OT,212.325OT,105.326Velkley(2011),71-72.

217

Straussplacestherootsofallthoughtandallscienceinthesamepre-

philosophic,naturalawareness.InStrauss’saccountoftheoriginsofphilosophy,

Socratesprovidesthefirstabstractionfromnaturalawareness.Headvancesthe

accountofnoeticheterogeneityandtheaccountofthehumansoulthatelevatethe

dignityofpoliticalthings.Thisiswhyhefoundspoliticalphilosophy.Todevelop

thatdignitymorefully,andopposethehistoricistaccountofpoliticalreasoning,

AristotleabstractsfromSocrates’saccount,makinganabstractionfroman

abstraction.327Aristotle’sabstractionfoundspoliticalscience,establishesthe

moderateteachingofthebestregime,andreinforcesthedistinctionbetweentheory

andpractice.Moreover,byelaboratingonthepoliticalthingstowhichtheSocratic

turndrawsattention,Aristotlealsoplaysaroleintherightarticulationofthe

cosmos.

However,‘toarticulatetheproblemofcosmologymeanstoanswerthe

questionofwhatphilosophyis,whataphilosopheris.’328HowdoesAristotle’s

abstractionrelatebacktotheideaofphilosophy?HowdoesAristotle’spolitical

sciencerelatetophilosophy?TheanswerliesinAristotle’smannerof

communicatingtohisaudience.Atfirstsight,Aristotle’spoliticalsciencereinforces

thedefencesgentlemenhaveagainstpoliticalphilosophers.Aristotleindulgestheir

suspicionofpoliticalphilosophers,andshowswhytheydonotneedpolitical

philosophytojustifytheirpoliticalwayoflife.Thisishisexotericteaching.Yet,

esoterically,Aristotleshowsthatthepoliticalwayoflifeisnotcompletelyclosedoff.

Byencouragingthegentlementoperfecttheirjudgementonnaturalrightandmoral327Smith(1994),194.328WIPP,39.

218

virtue,bygivinggreatprecedenceandesteemtothestatesmenwhoexemplify

prudencemostexcellently,Aristotleencouragesallgentlementoperfecttheir

practicalreasoning.Theythenseekthewisdomtheylack.Thislackcanonlybemet

bytruewisdom,notacounterfeitwisdom.Asmentionedabove,Aristotle’spolitical

sciencepursuesaneducationintruehappiness.‘Mantranscendsthecityonlyby

pursuinghappiness,notbypursuinghappinesshoweverunderstood.’329Inthat

manner,naturalrightandmoralvirtueshow‘thatthecitypointsbeyonditselfbutit

doesnotrevealclearlythattowardwhichitpoints,namely,thelifedevotedto

philosophy.’330Strausswrites:

WhenthephilosopherAristotleaddresseshispoliticalsciencetomoreorlessperfectgentlemen,heshowsthemasfaraspossiblethatthewayoflifeoftheperfectgentlemanpointstowardthephilosophicwayoflife;heremovesascreen…Themoral-politicalsphereisthennotunqualifiedlyclosedtotheoreticalscience.331

Althoughpoliticsisnotcontinuoustophilosophy,andphilosophyisnotcontinuous

topolitics,politicsisanalogouslyrelatedtophilosophy.Ifitispracticed,itallows

thegentlemanpoliticiantocatchaglimpseofabetterself;itchangestheself-image

ofthegentleman.332Inseekingwisdomthattheylack,thegentlemencanbecome

moreself-aware,andknowthattheyknownothing.Inthatself-awareness,they

begintophilosophize.Thisisofcourseveryrare,becausethegentlemenwhoare

disposedtoactualizethatphilosophicself-awarenessarerare.

329CM,49.330CM,27.331CM,28.332Conversely,thephilosopherdoesnotseeabetterselfinthepoliticalman.Asthisanalogyonlyworksinonedirection,itdoesnotfallbackintoHeideggerandKojève’scontinuitybetweenphilosophyandpolitics.SeeO’Connor(2002),188-90.

219

Bystructuringhispoliticalscienceinthisway,asanencouragementto

philosophize,Aristotleshowsthatheanswersthequestionofthebestlifebythe

philosophiclife.Hispoliticalscienceproceedsontheassumptionthatthe

philosophiclifeisthebestlife.Now,Aristotleelevatesthedignityofpoliticallife.

Recognizingthedignityofthecityisanecessarypreconditionforthedefenceofthe

philosophiclife.Butitdoesnotconstitutethedefenceassuch.Infact,itshowsthat

thedefenceofthephilosophiclifecanneitherbedemonstratedbypolitics,nor

explainedbypolitics.Aristotle,inthelastanalysis,holdstothesuperiorityofthe

philosophiclifeoverthepoliticallife.Straussagrees.Inasmuchasmodernity

conflatesthetwo,sothatitreallyassertstheprimacyofpracticalreasoningover

theoreticalreasoning,ofpoliticsoverphilosophy,StraussproposesanAristotelian

alternative.Thequarrelbetweentheancientsandthemodernsisaquarrelover

whichhasprimacy:theoreticalreasoning,orpracticalreasoning.Byemphasizing

thequarrelintheseterms,StraussisinthissenseAristotelian.333

Nevertheless,asStrausspresentshim,Aristotledoesnotprovidearational

justificationfortheprimacyoftheoreticalreasoning.Providingrationaljustification

forphilosophyasthebestwayoflifeiscriticaltoStrauss’sproject.Thisisbecause

thequarreloftheancientsandthemodernsalsobearsonthequarrelbetween

AthensandJerusalem,overtheveryquestionofwhetherreasonorrevelation

providesthebestwayoflife.StrausscannotbeacompleteAristotelian.Onecan

acceptAristotle’saccountofthesuperiorityofthephilosophiclifeoverpoliticallife,

butthereisadangerofpositivizingthisforthetradition.Withoutarational

333EN1176a30-1179a32.SeeTanguay(2014),49-50,65-66.

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justificationofthecontentofthephilosophiclife,thephilosophiclifecannotjustify

itselfinthefaceofalternatives.Strauss’sinsistencethatthepost-classicaltradition

synthesizedthephilosophiclifewithrevelation,tothelossofphilosophy,indicates

hisconcernoverhowtheclassicaltraditionofphilosophydeveloped.Heismore

sympathetictothemodernresponsetotheclassicaltraditionthanisgenerally

assumed.334

Moreover,modernity’shistoricismandrelativismisacomprehensive

rejectionofthephilosophiclife.WhetheritisinKojève’sorHeidegger’sversion,

historicismdenouncestheessenceofthephilosophiclife.Relativism,initsvarious

modernversions,rejectsnaturalright.Itschallengecanonlybemetwitha

fundamentalrationaljustificationofnaturalrightandthephilosophiclife,which

Aristotlehimselfdoesnotprovide.FortunatelyforStrauss,classicalpolitical

philosophyprovidesthisfundamentaljustificationinitsresponsetoradical

scepticismconcerningthebestwayoflife.

Strauss’saccountoftheimportanceofthelifelivedwithinthemoral-political

sphere,thepoliticallife,reliesonanaudiencewhichisalreadypre-disposedtotreat

themoral-politicalsphereseriously,beingmorallyvirtuousmen.Itdevelopsan

accountofjusticeornaturalrightwhichisindependentofphilosophicalprecepts

yetserious,butitisvulnerabletotheradicalscepticsofjusticeornaturalright.

Aristotle’spoliticalsciencecannotreplytotheseradicalsceptics.Afterall,thereare

thosewho,likeGlauconorAdeimantus,donottakegoodnessforgranted.Risking

theappearanceofbeingungentlemanly,theywoulddarequestionthevery

334Nadon(2013),81.

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goodnessofmoralvirtueandnaturalright.335Ifnaturalrightcannotbededuced

fromphilosophicalprecepts,andpoliticsissochangeablethatadeductionof

naturalrightfrompoliticsisimpossible,isnaturalrightdeduciblefromanything?336

Strauss’sansweristhatnaturalrighthasatrans-politicalroot.Thisis

discoverednotinrevelation,butinthehierarchyofendsfoundwithinthehuman

soul.337Strausslookstothenaturalhumanendthatconfirmsthebestlife.Butthisis

onlydivulgedthroughtheexaminedlife,thephilosophiclife.Thereplytotheradical

scepticistotakethemfromtheendofBookIofPlato’sRepublic,intoandbeyond

BookII.Ultimately,StraussturnstoPlato.ForPlatoalwayskeepsinthemindthe

question,‘whatistherightwayoflife?Againstallitschallengerspresentedinhis

dialogues,Plato’sansweristhephilosophiclife.338Toprovidethejustificationofthe

philosophiclife,anddefenditagainstcontemporarychallenges,requiresthe

readingofPlato.ItisPlato,notAristotle,whoprovidesthecompletedefenceof

philosophy.StraussisPlatonicbecausehewantstofollowPlatointhatdefence.The

completestudyofLeoStraussisthereforethestudyofPlatonicpolitical

philosophy.339

335CM,26.StraussinvitesthereadertoconsidertheendofRepublicIinhisfootnote.336NRH,145.337Tanguay(2007),132,228.338NRH,156.339ForamoredetailedtreatmentofwhyStraussisnotanAristotelian,seeZ&Z(2014a),144-166,esp.166.

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Conclusion

Whatthen,doesStraussmeanbypoliticalphilosophy?Acompleteansweris

impossiblehere,buttherearefourwaysStraussdefinestheterm.340Thefirst,most

provisionaldefinitionisthatpoliticalphilosophyexaminestheactionsofman;as

manisapoliticalanimal,theactionsatissueforunderstandinghimarepolitical

actions.Oneobservesthatallpoliticalactionsassumeanopinionaboutthegoodlife

andthegoodsociety.Uponreflection,thisopinionprovesquestionable.Yetthe

seriouspoliticalanimaldoesnotwanttopursueactionsthatonlyseemtobegood.

Heneedstosolvetheproblemofwhatisgood.Hepursues,therefore,thequestion

ofthegoodsocietyandthegoodhumanlife.Inthissense,politicalphilosophyarises

directlyoutofpoliticallife.Itsobjectofstudyispoliticalthings.Beginningfrom

‘politicalthought,’thestudyoflaws,codes,storiesandpublicspeechesfoundin

politics,politicalphilosophymovesbeyondtheconventionalsurfaceofpoliticsto

discoverwhatistrue.Politicalphilosophyisdefinedintermsoftheproblemit

attemptstosolve:whatisthegoodsociety?341Itisthepursuitofwhatistrulygood

fortheindividualandsociety,whatconstitutestruehumanperfection.342Insearch

ofananswer,politicalphilosophytakesitscuefromAristotle’spoliticalscience,and

focusesonmoralvirtue,thecity,andthebestregime.Byfocusingonthesethings,

thepoliticalphilosopherintersectswiththepoliticalscientist,whoisconcerned

withthehereandnow,thegivenpoliticalsituationwithinwhichheexists,and

340IamindebtedtoZ&Z(2014b).341Behnegar(2013),22-23.342WIPP,12.

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realizingthegoodlifeandthegoodpoliticalorderorregimeinthehereandnow.343

Theyengageinafundamentallyevaluativeandpracticalactivity.

Intheseconddefinition,politicalphilosophyistheattempttoreplace

opinionsaboutthenatureofpoliticalthingswiththeknowledgeofthenatureof

politicalthings.Definedinthisway,politicalphilosophyisabranchofphilosophy,

whichisanattempttoreplacetheopinionsaboutthenatureofthewholewith

knowledgeofthenatureofthewhole.Whenthepoliticalphilosopherinthefirst

sensebecomeslessconcernedwiththehereandnowandbecomesmorefocusedon

politicallifeorhumanlifeassuch,hegoestotherootofpoliticsandbecomesmuch

morecomprehensive.Gaininggreaterunderstandingofpoliticalthings,herealizes

thathecannotunderstandthegoodsocietywithoutunderstandingthetrulygood

humanlife,aswellastheworld.344Hedevelopshisviewonthenatureofthewhole

andmovesintoamorepoliticalphilosophy,implicatingtheknowledgeofGod,the

world,andthehumanbeing.345HowevermuchStrausswritesonpolitical

philosophy,onemustneverlosesightofStrauss’sinsistence:politicalphilosophyis

butabranchofphilosophy.Intermsoftheobjectofstudy,politicalphilosophy

culminatesinphilosophy.346ThisiswhatAristotleindicateswhenhe‘removesa

screen’betweenpoliticsandphilosophy.

Thecomprehensivecharacterofthispursuitchallengestheopinionsofthose

inpolitics.Itsetsupawayoflifethatcompeteswiththepoliticallife.Now

philosophyhastojustifyitselfbeforethetribunalofthecity.Ifnot,itrisks

343WIPP,14.344WIPP,11.345WIPP,11,16.346Tarcov(2013),75-76.

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prosecution.Soarisesthethirddefinitionofpoliticalphilosophy:political

philosophy.Theissuehereisthepreservationofphilosophy.Itisthefacethat

philosophypresentstothecity,inordertopreserveitselfagainstpersecutionfrom

thecity.Itsprimarytaskistopresentitselfinsuchawayasnottoarousethe

suspicionofpoliticalmen.Yetitissimultaneouslytryingtoinvitethemostreceptive

ofthesepoliticalmentolivephilosophically.Aristotle’spoliticalsciencedelicately

balancesthesetwotasks,notforgettingtheunavoidabletensionbetween

philosophyandpolitics.

Itisimportanttoseethatthisthirddefinitionofpoliticalphilosophy,which

Straussseesasarisingfromtheseriousnessofthephilosophiclifeitself,doesnot

discountthefirstandseconddefinitions.OnemightthinkthatStraussdiscounts

Aristotle’spoliticalscienceashavinglittleuseforthephilosophiclife,except

throughitsesotericinvitationtophilosophize.Thetruephilosopherwouldceaseto

haveregardforpoliticalthings,exceptforensuringself-preservation.Political

philosophywouldonlybeaboutpoliticalphilosophy.347Thisisincorrect,

discountingStrauss’sotherdefinitions.Straussisclearthattheseotherdefinitions

havearoletoplayinfullyunderstandingpoliticalphilosophy.Hewritesthat

‘politicalphilosophyistheattempttrulytoknowboththenatureofpoliticalthings

andtheright,orthegood,politicalorder.’348Theinsightsintothemoral-political

spherethatpoliticalscienceprovidesremain,notablyconcerningtherightorgood

politicalorder,thebestregime.Boththepoliticalscientistandthepolitical

347C.f.Rosen(2003),109,111.348WIPP,12.

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philosopherregardthemasimportant,althoughtheyreceivegreaternuanceinlight

ofthegreaterunderstandingofthewhole.

Strauss’sAristotleillustratesthispointinhowhehandlestheteachingofthe

bestregimefromthepointofviewofthephilosopher.Nowfromthepointofviewof

thecitizen,politicalsciencemuststoptyranny.Thatmeansexplicitlyendorsing

liberal,constitutionaldemocracyasthepracticallybestregime.Butfromthepoint

ofviewofthephilosopher,thephilosopher’sunequivocalconcernisforaregime

sympathetictophilosophy.

Fromthatperspective,thephilosopherwillexpresscertainreservations

aboutdemocracy.ThisishowStraussinterpretsAristotle’sownreservationsabout

democracy.StrausstakesAristotle’spreferenceformonarchyoverdemocracyasan

indicationofhisdecisivepreferenceforaregimesympathetictophilosophy.A

monarchcan,rarely,beagentlemansympathetictophilosophy.349Bycontrast,itis

almostimpossiblethatthepeoplebecomesympathetictophilosophy.ForAristotle,

peoplearenotreceptivetophilosophy,butarebynatureopposedtophilosophy.350

HereStraussemphasizesthedifferencebetweenAristotleandthemoderns.

Aristotleseesthepeopleasopposedbynaturetophilosophy.Takingthepointof

viewofphilosophy,Aristotleranksphilosophyasmoreimportantthandemocracy.

If,outofthenaturaltensionbetweenthedemosandphilosophyonemustchoose

eitherdemocracyorphilosophy,onemustchoosephilosophy.

Modernspresupposeafundamentalharmonybetweenthepeopleand

philosophy.‘OnthebasisofabreakwithAristotle,’modernsbelieveinthe349CM,37.StraussthinksofPolitics1284b25-34.350CM,37.

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possibilityofasimplyrationalsociety.351Theythinkonecanintegratephilosophy

intothecity.Themeanstodosoareforphilosophytorelieveman’sestate,takenup

asthepoliticalprojectofEnlightenment.Modernsthinkthatthisdilemmabetween

philosophyanddemocracyisresolvedinhistory:historyovercomesnature,soone

canchoosebothdemocracyandphilosophy.Theancientdistinctionbetweennature

andconventionisreplacedbythedistinctionbetweennatureandhistory.History

opposesandaimstoovercomenature.352

Sothequarrelbetweentheancientsandthemodernsshowsitselfagain,over

whatrelationphilosophyhastopolitics.Aristotleremindshisreaderofthelimitsof

thepoliticaldemocraticregime.AsAristotlearguesthat‘mantranscendsthecity,

Aristotleagreeswiththeliberalismofthemodernage.’353Fortheunderlying

assumptionofmodernliberaldemocracy,asinclassicalpoliticalphilosophy,isthat

individualperfectiontranscendspolitics.Aristotlediffersfromliberalismby

‘limitingthistranscendenceonlytothehighestinman’—thatis,philosophy.354With

thesethoughts,Strausscomparesmodernpoliticalphilosophyandclassicalpolitical

philosophy.Thephilosopherisbetterawareofthequarrelbetweentheancientsand

themoderns.

Nevertheless,inpracticalterms,thisdoesnotmeanthephilosopherdespises

democracy.Aristotle’sphilosophicalreservationsaboutdemocracy,forthesakeof

preservingphilosophicalperfection,strengthentheargumentsomeonepursuingthe

philosophiclifeinthemodernworldcanmakeforliberaldemocracy.Atthepoint

351CM,37.352CM,38.353CM,49.354CM,49.

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wheretheindividualpassesoutofpoliticsandintopursuinghisownperfection,

liberaldemocracyissupposedtofixtheboundariesofgovernment.Liberal

democracyenablesindividualperfectionofanysort.Thatincludesphilosophy.

Liberaldemocracycanderidephilosophy,butitcannotdestroyitwithout

oversteppingtheboundariesofgovernment,ceasingtobealiberaldemocracy,and

driftingtowardstotalitarianism.RecallthatStrauss’srejectionofKojève’suniversal

andhomogenousstaterestsonhowit‘endsphilosophyonearth.’355Straussthe

philosophersupportsliberaldemocracy,notonlybecauseitpreservesphilosophy

onearth,butalsobecauseit—likeclassicalpoliticalphilosophy—emphasizeshow

individualperfectiontranscendspolitics.356

Whateveritsflaws,then,liberaldemocracyistheregimemostsuitedto

philosophy.StraussalsoobservesthatSocratesnotonlygrewupindemocratic

Athens,butalsopracticedphilosophythereforseventyyearsbeforehewas

executed.Thissignificantsuccessforphilosophy,practicinguninterruptedfor

seventyyears,couldnothavebeenreplicatedelsewhere.357Thosewhowant

philosophytoexist,then,shoulddefendliberaldemocracy.

Thereare,then,twoapplicationsofAristotle’sbestregimetomodernity.The

first,fromthepointsofviewofthegoodcitizentaughtbypoliticalscience,isto

fostertheruleoflaw,tosupportconstitutionalism.Thisentailsdefendingliberal

democracypolitically.Thesecondapplicationistofosterphilosophy.Fromthepoint

ofviewofthephilosophiclife,philosophymustberenewedfromwithintheorder

355OT,211.356RCPR,161;Velkley(2011),137.357WIPP,36.

228

thatliberaldemocracyoffers.Thisprojectwillhavetofightagainstliberalism’s

vulnerabilities,whichincludeencouragingindifferencetothefeaturesand

conditionsofpolitical,civiclife,aswellassofteningthepeople’snaturalhostilities,

byensuringapresentationofphilosophyfavourabletoliberaldemocracy.This

mannerofrenewingphilosophywithinliberaldemocracyconstitutesStrauss’sfull

understandingofthisthirddefinition,politicalphilosophy.358

Concomitantly,Strausshastwoargumentsinfavourofliberaldemocracy.

One,fromthepointofviewofpoliticalscience,explicitlyendorsesliberal

democracyasthebestprotectionagainsttyranny.Thesecond,fromthepointof

viewofphilosophy,prudentlyendorsesliberaldemocracyastheregimeinwhich

philosophyhasthebestchanceofsurvival.Moreover,liberaldemocracyreminds

oneofthelimitsofpoliticallife,andhowindividualperfectionmusttranscend

politics.Itremindsonethattheaccountofthewholeisonlypossiblethroughan

accountofthetensionsofpoliticallife.Thisobservationonthequestionofthebest

regimeshowstherelevanceofmoralityandpolitics.Asthequestionofthebest

regimeisalsoanexpressionofnaturalright,itshowsthatthecontentofnatural

rightisimportantfromboththepointofviewofpoliticsandthepointofviewof

philosophy;thereisnodevaluationofmoralityandpolitics.359Itsobjectisthesame,

evenifthemodeofjustificationisdifferent.

Finally,thereisafourthdefinitionofpoliticalphilosophy.Thisispolitical

philosophyas‘firstphilosophy.’Itis‘first’intheorderoflearning,becauseitisa

necessarysteptoascendtotheknowledgeofnature.Itis‘first’intheorderofbeing,358SeeVelkley(2011),138.359C.f.Tanguay(2007),132-33.

229

becauseitdisclosestheschemarequiredforagenuineknowledgeofnatureor

being.Itseeksanewpointofdepartureforphilosophy.Contrarytootherpossible

approachestophilosophy,whetherpre-Socratic,Cartesian,Kantian,Husserlian,or

Heideggerian,philosophybeginswithastudyofthehumanorpoliticalthings.The

studyofpoliticsdisclosesthetruenatureofthewhole.Accesstothewholeis

throughtheproblemsdiscoveredinpoliticallife.Reflectiononthepoliticalthingsin

turndisclosestheimportanceofreflectiononthesoul.Politicalphilosophyprepares

theproperunderstandingofthenatureofthewholeandthenatureofthesoul.

Throughitsfourdefinitions,politicalphilosophyallowsthephilosopherto

betterunderstandthetensionwithinhisownsoul,whichinturntugshimbetween

theoreticalreasoningandpracticalreasoning,betweenphilosophyandpolitics.

Graspingthistension,politicalphilosophyshowstheimportanceofthehuman

things,butalsothattheyarenottheonlyimportantthings.Itpresentsanaccountof

thehumanbeingattractedbytheloveofwisdom,butitistheloveofwisdomwhose

self-consciousnessaboutpoliticsteachesitthevirtueofmoderation.Through

moderation,theloveofwisdomneitherdissociatesentirelyfrompoliticalthings,

norculminatesinpoliticalthings.360Practicedasasearchforthebestlife,loveof

wisdompreparestherationaljustificationofthephilosophiclifeinthefaceof

perennialconflicts.Likemuchofhiswork,Strauss’sstudyofAristotleservesto

clarifyanddrawattentiontothetensionbetweenphilosophyandpolitics,aswellas

thetensionbetweenAthensandJerusalem:thetwofacetsofthetheologico-political

problem.Tograspthisandotherproblemsrelatedtothewhole,Straussshuns

360LAM,24;Marshall(2007),326-27.

230

developingorrecoveringanAristoteliansystem,butinsteadoffersphilosophy.For

Strauss,philosophyis‘meant—andthatisthedecisivepoint—notasaseriesof

propositions,ateaching,orevenasystem,butasawayoflife,alifeanimatedbya

peculiarpassion,thephilosophicdesire,oreros.’361

361RCPR,259.

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III.AlasdairMacIntyre’s

ReconstructionofaRevolutionaryAristotelianTradition

MacIntyre’sCritiqueofModernity

For theentiretyofhis intellectual life,AlasdairMacIntyrehascriticized the

failuresanddeceptionsofliberalism,understoodasmodernliberalindividualism.1

Inhismature intellectual life, he turns toAristotlebecausehe finds thatAristotle

provides the best theory to explain the failures of liberalism and to offer an

alternative to liberalism. Yet to treat MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism properly, it is

necessary to grasp the unique epistemology his philosophical argument

presupposes, and how he situates his own turn to Aristotle within that

epistemology.2

I.RationalityandtheConceptofaTradition

Any inhabitant of the contemporary world can note that to any given

philosophicalquestion,therearearangeofalternativeandincompatibleanswers.3

Rationalenquiryseeksthecorrectanswer.Thisraisesafundamentalphilosophical

questionpertainingtotherequirementsofrationality:whataregoodreasonsfora

1MacIntyre(1994b),258;MacIntyre(2011b),329;Lutz(2012),30-32.2SeeMacIntyre(1994b),265.CNS,publishedin1977,providestheoutlineofMacIntyre’sepistemologypresupposedinAV.WJWRworksitoutinmoredetail.3AV,6-11;WJWR,1-3.

232

humanagentengagedinrationalenquirytojudgeoneanswertobecorrectoverthe

otheranswers?Inthecontemporaryworld,thedominantapproachtoassessingthe

requirementsofrationalityistopursueaneutralandimpartialidealofrationality.

To achieve this ideal requires divesting oneself of any allegiance to a particular

theory,orthesocialrelationshipsthroughwhichweareaccustomedtounderstand

ourresponsibilitiesand interests.4Yet this idealofrationalitysuffers fromserious

internal contradictions. First, it is only neutral in appearance, presuming the

partisan position of liberal individualism.5Second, it relies on formulating self-

evident principles akin to the laws of logic, but the proponents of this position

cannot agree on what these supposedly ‘self-evident’ principles are.6For that

reason, this ideal of rationalityprovidesno solution to theproblemof alternative

andincompatibleanswers.Theagentengagedinrationalenquirywillthusbeginto

doubt whether these philosophical questions can ever be resolved and whether

thereareanygoodreasonsforjudgingoneanswertobecorrectoveranother.7

Tocounterthisepistemology,MacIntyrearguesthatrationalityisembodied

in a tradition of rational enquiry. There is no tradition-independent answer to a

philosophical question. Each tradition offers its own answers, and its own

conception of rationality. An agent judges the answers that other traditions of

rationalenquiryoffer,and theirconceptionsof rationality,by thestandardsofhis

owntraditionofrationalenquiry.Anagentjudgestheanswershisowntraditionof

rational enquiry offers by its capacity to make the world intelligible. The agent

4WJWR,3.5WJWR,4.6WJWR,4,6.7AV,11.

233

judgeshis tradition to succeedor fail because it is better orworse atmaking the

worldintelligiblethanothertraditions.

MacIntyre relies on the concept of a narrative to make this argument. He

holdsthatthebasichumanrequirementistomakesenseoftheworldinwhichwe

live: ‘manisessentiallyastory-tellinganimal.’8Narrativeisthishumancapacityto

tellstoriesabouttheworld, inordertounderstandtheworld.MacIntyrelinksthis

activity of understanding to the concept of intelligibility; human agents adopt

narratives that are true to their own experience.9 Narrative is the means to

intelligibility and thereby to truth.10The application of narratives in human life

extends from fairy tales and stories to include intentions, actions, autobiography,

history,doctrine,myth,andscientifictheory.11

Why might an agent change his narrative? MacIntyre argues that it is on

accountofexperiencinganepistemologicalcrisis:whensomethingthatseemstobe

thecasetoanagentisnotinfactthecase.MacIntyrecontendsthatordinaryagents

easilyrecognizetheexperienceofanepistemologicalcrisis:whentheirschematafor

interpretinglife,hithertostable,leadthemintoerrorordeception.Forexample,the

child learns that the fairy taleabout thegiantwhoholdsup theworld isnot true.

This discovery disrupts the intelligibility of their narrative. At this point, the

narrative fails, and the child needs to adopt a new one. 12 To resolve the

8AV,216.Tocritiquethetellingofstoriesasaninauthentichumanpracticefailstoprovideanaccountofwhathumanlifewouldlooklikewithoutnarratives.AV,214-15;ECM,236-37.9CNS,4.SeeLutz(2004),45.10CNS,7-8;AV,207-10.11CNS,7-8;ECM,237;Lutz(2012),5.MacIntyreaddressesthisaswellinhisearlyworks;seeD’Andrea(2006),94-95.Autobiographyisacrucialcomponentfortheagent’sself-understandingandevaluationofhisownpositionsandlife.SeealsoECM,238-42.12CNS,4.

234

epistemological crisis, the new narrative must allow the agent to recognize both

howhe couldhave intelligibly heldhis original beliefs; and second, howhe could

havebeensodrasticallymisledbythem.13Thusitispossibletoimproveanarrative;

somenarrativesarebetterforassessingthetruthorfalsityoftheworld.

Atraditionofrationalenquirysucceedsinjustifyingitselfinthesamewayas

a narrative, by its capacity tomake theworld intelligible.14A tradition of rational

enquiryisaspecifickindofnarrative,whichdevelopscertainepistemologicalideals

or standards of rational justification: what constitutes ‘appropriate reasoning,

decisiveevidence,andconclusiveproof’forresolvingaproblem.15Thesestandards

developinresponsetochallengesandepistemologicalcrises,sothattheconceptof

rational justification is essentially historical. ‘To justify is to narrate how the

argumenthasgonesofar.’16Thesalientcomparisonforunderstandinghowrational

justification takes place comes from ‘research programmes’ in the philosophy of

science. A research programme consists of a set of core theories surrounded by

auxiliarytheories,whichexplainanddefendthecore.Themarkofagoodresearch

programmeisnotmerelyitscapacitytodefenditself fromchallenges.Italsomust

beabletoextenditself,predictingotherwiseunexpectedevents.17Itistheresearch

programmeitselfthatsuppliesthestandard.Aresearchprogrammeisjudgedtobe

better than its alternative research programmes by the success or failure of the

standardsofrationaljustificationitprovides.Thesearenotfixedbutareinasingle

13CNS,5.14Lutz(2004),43.15CNS,11-12.16WJWR,8.17Lutz(2004),48.

235

strand of continuous improvement vis-à-vis failed alternatives. 18 Yet rational

justificationtakesplaces inthetermsofferedbytheresearchprogramme.What is

true for scientific enquiry appliesa fortiori to all philosophic and ethical enquiry.

Rationaljustificationtakesplaceinthetermsofferedbyparticulartraditions.19

Asrationaljustificationisessentiallyhistorical,itcannotbejudgedaccording

toneutral and timeless conceptionsof truth.Oneneednot go in searchof a fixed

series of rationally justifiable rules that link observations to generalizations ‘once

andforall.’20Thiswouldmistakehowrationaljustificationtakesplace.Instead,the

concepts of rational justification are understood in their historical context.

Theoreticalprogress,justifyingtherationalsuperiorityofoneaccountoveranother,

is understood by the distinctive historical encounter the new theory haswith its

predecessors. Thenew theory succeedswhen at a particular historicalmoment it

solves theproblems inareaswhere thepredecessorscannot.21Hence thestudyof

historicalexamplesisdecisiveforestablishingtherationalsuperiorityofonetheory

over another.22 History helps expose philosophical truth, yet also limits what

philosophical knowledge is available. As timemoves on, new problems arise that

requirenewepistemologicaljustifications.

MacIntyre’s version of historicism, in which he places the standards of

rationalitywithinhistoricallydevelopedtraditionsofrationalenquiry,isvulnerable

18CNS,18-19.19WJWR,8.Lutz(2004),57.ForMacIntyretherearetwomisunderstandingsoftradition,attributedtoEdmundBurke:first,asstablesourcesofmeaningcontrastedtoconflict;andsecond,assomethingcontrastedtorationality.SeeAV,221-22;D’Andrea(2006),65-66;Knight(2007),132-33.20CNS,19,23;Lutz(2004),57.21AV,265-68;WJWR,9.22IncludingMacIntyre’sowntheoryofrationality.SeeWJWR,10;Lutz(2004),58.

236

to various chargesof relativism.23In themost important senseMacIntyre is not a

relativist,becausehegrantsthattherearetimelesstruths.Thegoalofanycoherent

traditionofenquiryistoseektimelesstruthabouttheworld,andeachnewtheory

tries to formulate a better approximation of that truth than its predecessor. Yet

theories,evenscientifictheories,areneverperfectlytruebutonlythebestsofar,so

thereisakindofrelativismthatispartofthehumancondition.24Theyalwaysleave

roomforfurtherrefinement.25

ForMacIntyre’s theory of rationality, it is impossible for human agents to

adopt a neutral standpoint that iswholly divested from their social relationships.

MacIntyre’s crucial maxim is that a philosophy, including moral philosophy,

‘characteristically presupposes a sociology.’26A human agent always deploys the

philosophical resources found and used in society in order to develop a better

understanding of the world. There is a tight relationship between the way of

thinking in a society and its way of life: each embodies the other. A tradition of

enquiry is constitutiveof thewayof life of a society, andhelps its agentsachieve

theirgoals.Yet the traditionofenquiry isalsoconstitutedbythesociety,associal

23Haldane(1994).MacIntyredistinguishesbetweenrelativism,whereoneholdsthatrationaldebatebetweenconflictingtraditionsisirresolvable,andperspectivism,whereonequestionsthesignificanceofanytruth-claim.SeeWJWR,352.Herelatesthechargeofperspectivismtomoralrelativism,theclaimthatthereisnoobjectivetruthinmoralpractice.FormoredetailedaccountsofhowMacIntyrerespondstothesecharges,seeLutz(2004),66-111;D’Andrea(2006),403-9;Lutz(2012),176-79.24Lutz(2004),43,47.AsMacIntyrethinksphilosophy’sobjectofenquiryistheworldexternaltoatradition,heisincipientlycommittedtophilosophicalrealism.FollowingAVandWJWR,MacIntyredevelopsthispositionintoThomistmetaphysicalrealism.Foradetaileddiscussionofthecompatibilitybetweenhistradition-constitutedrationalityandThomistmetaphysicalrealism,seeLutz(2004),113-60;D’Andrea(2006),410-14.25CNS,5;AV,270.26AV,23.

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developmentdeepensthetraditionofenquiry’sunderstandingofthosegoals.27The

philosophicaldevelopmentofanagentistradition-constituted,passingthroughfour

stages. First, an agent inherits a culture, which includes the tradition of rational

enquiryintowhichtheyareborn.Second,onegrowsfromthisculturalinheritance,

which provides the categories to organize knowledge and experience. Third, new

experiencesorrivalconceptsofrationalitychallengethiscultureinwaystheagent

cannotexplain,provokinganepistemologicalcrisis.Fourth,theagentresolvesthis

crisisbytheimprovementoftheresourcesoftheirtraditionofrationalenquiry,or

abandoning that tradition for a rival tradition of rational enquiry that provides a

betterresolution.28

MacIntyre argues that his concept of a tradition provides the best way of

attendingtotheproblemofalternativeandincompatibleanswers.Itsuggeststhese

radical disagreements arise from disagreements in the narratives of human life,

which traditions have provided. The societies formed by these traditions are not

locked into permanent disagreement. By understanding the nature of these

disagreements as disagreements between traditions, solutions are possible. 29

Traditions must show themselves to be adequate in the face of alternative

traditions. As a philosophy ‘characteristically presupposes a sociology,’ an

investigation into the adequacy of a given tradition of rational enquiry is also an

investigation into the adequacy of how its concepts are embodied in society. To

27WJWR,349;Perreau-Saussine(2005),104,113.28Lutz(2004),10-11.29WJWR,9-10;Lutz(2004),58.

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achieve that justification requires bringing together the disciplines of sociology,

history,andphilosophy,althoughthespiritoftheagepreferstokeepthemapart.30

To characterize MacIntyre properly, it is important to see how his

philosophicalactivityfitsintohisaccountofatraditionofenquiry.MacIntyrethinks

ofhisphilosophicalactivityintheseterms.First,hereadilyadmitsthathe,likeevery

personengagedinaphilosophicalargument,isa‘partisan:’hearguesfromwithina

traditionofenquiry.31Thejustificationofhisviews,bothcriticalandconstructive,is

comparative,takingplacethroughanexplicitengagementwithrivalpositions.32

Next, he narrates his own philosophical enquiry as a tradition-constituted

philosophical development. 33 It can be characterized as passing through four

stages.34In the first and second stages, MacIntyre’s philosophical development

startswithhisMarxistinheritance.AsaMarxist,hedoesnotseekonlytointerpret

theworld,butalsotochange it.Neverthelesshe findsthatall thepoliticaloptions

hiscolleaguesontheleftconsidertochangetheworldtofail.Inthethirdstage,from

thelate1950sto1971,heentersintoadeepepistemologicalcrisis:promptedbyhis

failure to find a justifiable critique of Stalinism, he steadily recognizes the

theoretical reasons for Marxism’s failure. From 1971 to 1977 he undergoes a

‘painfulself-reflection’toaccountforthisfailure.From1977onwardsheentersthe

fourth stage, and since then has been ‘engaged in a single project’ towhichAfter

30SeeAV,23.C.f.TRV,2,8.Knight(2011),24.31TRV,117;DRA,77;Perreau-Saussine(2005),104.32ECM,88.33MacIntyre(1991),267-269.34SeeLutz(2004),10-32.

239

Virtue,Whose JusticeWhichRationality? andThreeRivalVersionsofMoralEnquiry

arethecentralworks.35

Finally, MacIntyre’s ‘single project’ from 1977 onwards should be

understood as a research programme or tradition in its own right. The central

worksare foundational fordefiningthecorethesesofhisresearchprogramme, to

whichhehasremainedcommitted.36Yettheseworksarenotthewholestory. Ina

tradition, concepts undergo further refinement and development in the face of

challenges in order to satisfy the requirements for adequate explanation and

justification.MacIntyre’sself-narrationofhis tradition thus includeswherehehas

refinedanddevelopedhisviews,aswellaswheretheyremainopen-ended.37

I characterize MacIntyre’s work, therefore, as a unified enquiry, in which

progress can be told as a continuous story. 38 The aim of his enquiry is ‘to

reconstructthemoraltheoryandcommunalpracticeofAristotelianisminwhatever

version would provide the best theory so far, explaining the failure of

Enlightenment as part of the aftermath of the breakdown of a tradition.’39From

1977onwards,hisprojectisthisreconstructionoftheAristoteliantradition.Ithasa

criticalandconstructiveargument,wherethecriticalargumentexplainsthefailure

ofEnlightenmentandmodernliberalindividualism,andtheconstructiveargument

explains why the Aristotelian tradition is the best theory so far to correct the

Enlightenmentfailure.

35MacIntyre(1991),269.36AV,ix.37D’Andrea(2006),397-402;Knight(2007),224-25.38Lutz(2004),7.39MacIntyre(1994b),263.

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I first address MacIntyre’s critical argument. I can only provide a partial

narrativeofMacIntyre,soIfocusprimarilyonthefourthstageofhisphilosophical

development; I involve the first three stages to showhowhedevelops thecritical

argument in the direction he does. MacIntyre develops his critical argument to

explainthefailureofliberalism,withhiscritiqueofliberalismdevelopingapolitical,

philosophical, social, and theological component. In each of these domains he

considers—and rejects—rival solutions to liberalism. His inability to find an

adequatesolutiondeepenshisepistemologicalcrisis.Toescapeitheseesonlytwo

alternatives:NietzscheorAristotle?

II.ThePoliticalCritiqueofLiberalism

The young MacIntyre’s principal cultural and philosophical inheritance,

which provided the categories to organize his knowledge and experience, was

Marxism. 40 From reading Marx, MacIntyre concluded that modern liberal

individualismpreventsthediscoveryofthegenuinehumanessence.Tounderstand

thegenuinehumanessenceisforhumanagentsto‘understandthemselvesinterms

oftheiractualandpotentialsocialrelationshipsandembodythatunderstandingin

their actions as well as in their theories.’41In Marx’s understanding of social

practice,itisespeciallythroughskilledlabourthathumanagentsunderstandtheir

ownactivityandtheirsocialrelationships.42Thesubsequentonsetofcapitalism is

40MacIntyre‘wasandremainsindebted’toMarx’sandMarxism’s‘critiqueoftheeconomic,social,andculturalorderofcapitalism.AV,xvi.IsummarizehowMacIntyrenarrateshisowndebttoMarxism(MacIntyre(1994a)),andwhataspectinformstheprojectinitiatedinAVandcontinuedmostrecentlyinECM.41MacIntyre(1994a),229.42Socialpracticeseducate,enablingtheindividualmembersofacommunitytodiscoverwhatisgoodandbestforthemselves.MacIntyre(1994a),231.MacIntyrearguesthatforMarx,medievalpeople‘sawthingsastheywere’becauseoftheirpracticeofskilledlabour.ECM,95-96.

241

damagingtosocialrelationsbecause,throughthecommodificationoflabour,itdoes

not allowworkers to recognize their ownactivity of skilled labour. Consequently,

capitalismdisguises the truemeaningof social relations, so that the actuality and

potentialityofsocialrelationshipsarenotunderstood.Ascapitalismprogresses, it

takesworkersawayfromtheirsocialrelationships.Membersofcommunitiesbegin

to think of themselves in isolation from their social relationships. They think of

themselves as individuals entering into contractual relationships with others for

instrumentalgains.43

Awholepoliticalsystemdevelopsbasedoninstrumentalreasoning.Itsbasic

features can be identified and criticized. The concepts of utility, contract, and

individual rights all rule.44Individuals consider the utility of other individuals to

realizingtheirownprojects.Themostappropriateapplicationsofthisapproachare

to financial transactions or ‘contracts.’ Defining every human relationship in

contractualtermsattachesapossiblepricetoit,deprivingitofotherthanmonetary

meaning.45Oneentersandexitscapitalistcontractsbyone’schoice,understoodas

autonomy.46Formodern liberal individualism,autonomy is theessenceofhuman

freedom,butitneedstobedefended.Modernliberalindividualismmakesanattack

uponanysocialstructurethatinhibitsautonomy,whetheritisone’sfamily,friends,

community, religion, or government.47To carry out this attack, modern liberal

individualismseizesupontheconceptofindividualrights,whethertheyare‘natural

43ECM,96-97;MacIntyre(1994a),223;Lutz(2012),33.44MacIntyre(1994a),223.45ECM,97;Perreau-Saussine(2005),24.46MacIntyre(1994a),223.47MacIntyre(1994b),258.

242

rights’ or ‘human rights.’ For example, modern liberal individualism asserts that

individuals possess property rights against one’s community, religion, or

government;oritassertstherighttodowhateverIwishaslongasitdoesnotharm

others, emphasizing a right of privacy against one’s community, religion, or

government.ForMacIntyre,theseconservativeandliberalstrandsofrightsdebates

showthatbothsidesagreeontheimportanceofindividualautonomy,onlyfocusing

on different aspects of it.48For Marxism, liberalism and conservatism offer no

genuinepoliticalsolutionstotransformthesocialrelationsdamagedbycapitalism.

Marxism needs a genuinely revolutionary political project to transform social

relations.

Fromthe1940stothe1970s,MacIntyredrewfromhisMarxist inheritance

to consider but reject three leftist political projects, that of social democracy,

Stalinism, and May 1968. Their failures prompted his epistemological crisis,

bringinghimtore-examinehisownMarxistphilosophical inheritance.49likemany

communist intellectuals in themiddleof the20th century, hewasdismayedwhen

theMarxistpoliticalprojectofeliminatingmaterialpovertyblendedwitheconomic

determinism, replacing the Marxist humanism that prioritized social relations.50

This speaks to the development of the so-called ‘Atlee Consensus’ or ‘end-of-

ideology’ in post-war British politics, leaving Britain’s main political parties

endorsingandsupportingsocialdemocracy.FromthepointofviewoftheOldLeft,

48AV,222.Both,MacIntyrenotes,cannotconsideraroleforatraditionofrationalenquiry,sincetheircommitmenttoindividualautonomyisbasedontherejectionofthephilosophicalresourcesacommunitymightpossess.Seealsothefifthcharacterizationof‘Morality’inECM,115.49MacIntyre(1994a),232-33.50FromMarxism:AnInterpretation,inAMEM,1-11;Perreau-Saussine(2005),23.

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post-war economic growth was leading to the emergence of a vast middle class.

Marx’s theories on violent class struggle appeared to have lost their meaning,

removing the need for revolutionary practice. 51 Emphasizing the rational

managementoftheeconomy,thepoliticalprojectofsocialdemocracyarguedthatit

couldmanagethebehaviourofotherhumanbeingsinordertorealizehigherlevels

ofmaterialwealth.Allonehadtodowasdiscovertheobjectiveandunchangeable

laws of history, aswell as provide a class of bureaucratswith that knowledge so

theycouldsetouttomanipulatehumanityinordertoachievethoseends.

Arguingthatsocialdemocracyhadlostsightofitsorigins,theNewLeft,and

the young MacIntyre, fervently rejected this view.52 To recall socialism to its

revolutionary task required showing that the Old Left’s materialist reconciliation

with capitalism did not bring about human unity, but rather increased social

division.TheNewLeftshiftedthelocusofthecritiqueofcapitalismawayfromthe

argumentthatcapitalismwasthesourceofpovertytotheargumentthatcapitalism

destroyed the social relations essential to human flourishing.53Social democracy

ignored how capitalism destroys social relations. It could not be an authentic

Marxist political project, as it quite literally sold out the revolution to liberal

individualism.Itwasanotherversionofliberalism.

Rejecting social democracy out of a commitment to revolutionary politics,

MacIntyrecouldhavebeenseducedintopropagatingtheSovietcause.Hewasnot,

51ASA,3-5.52‘The“NewLeft”,’inAMEM,88-89;Blackledge(2007);BlackledgeandDavidson(2008),xx-xxxvii.53‘The“NewLeft”,’inAMEM,90-93.

244

forthesecondMarxistpoliticalprojectherejectedwasStalinism.MacIntyredefined

Stalinisminthefollowingway:

Stalinists 1) believed in the possibility of ‘socialism in one country,’ ratherthaninthemakingofsocialismasaworld-revolutionaryenterprise;2)madetheworking class serve theneeds of theparty and the bureaucracy ratherthanviceversa;3)wereguiltyof‘thecultofpersonality’;4)believedthattheendofachievingcommunismjustifiedunlimitedterrorandunlimiteddeceitas means; 5) accepted Stalin’s crude mechanistic versions of dialecticalmaterialismandhistoricalmaterialism.54

Stalinismisthesupremecaseofapoliticalsystembuiltoninstrumentalreasoning,

astheendsofcommunism,the interestof thegreaternumberof futurehumanity,

justifies the means, the immolation of a smaller number of human beings.55The

Gulagisadirectproductof(4)and(5).NorissocialdemocracyfreefromStalinism’s

worst characteristics. With (2), MacIntyre identifies a trait common to social

democracy(asnotedabove,reallyaversionofliberalism)andStalinism.Bothgive

powertobureaucrats,whopurporttohavespecialknowledgeforachievingcertain

ends. They direct human and non-human resources to achieve these ends. These

bureaucratsarevaluedforhoweffectivetheyareasmanagers. JustasMaxWeber

described, the bureaucrats justify their authority by their success in using their

power to achieve the value of effectiveness. 56 By calling these bureaucrats

‘Weberian,’ MacIntyre indicates that they use instrumental reasoning.57 Once in

political power, liberals, Marxist social democrats, and Stalinists all become

Weberianbureaucrats.58

54Lutz(2012),20.LutzisquotingfromhiscorrespondencewithMacIntyre.SeealsoNMW,32.55Perreau-Saussine(2005),66;Lutz(2004),35-36.56AV,25-27;MacIntyre(1998),64-66.57AV,86;Knight(2007),126-29.58AV,109,262.

245

The challenge, then, is to reject both Stalinism and social democracy.

Communist intellectuals of MacIntyre’s generation failed to meet this challenge.

Writing in 1960, MacIntyre identified three versions of a communist intellectual.

First, therewere thosewho give up their brains and become Stalinists.59Second,

therewere thosewhobecamesocialdemocrats, showing theydidnotunderstand

the necessary relationship between socialism and revolution. Third, there were

thosewhoquitthepartytobecomerevolutionaries,showingtheircommitmenttoa

moral principle.60MacIntyre chose the third option, but it left him with few live

politicaloptions.Meanwhilethroughoutthe1960s,manyofhisleft-wingcolleagues

whorejectedStalinismdidsothroughthelanguageofliberalindividualrights,and

becamesocialdemocrats.

Further developments in politics only exacerbated divisions in the left.

MacIntyre met the third major version of leftism in May 1968—and completely

denouncedit.Theseleftistswereverygoodatfindingformsofauthoritytoprotest

against,buttheylackedthecapacitytogiveanaccountofwhattheywereprotesting

for.61Indeedas they taught their colleagues todespiseall formsofauthority, they

lost themselves in ‘irrationalisms.’ 62 Teaching their colleagues that individual

consent was the absolute, these leftists deepened the commitment to liberal

individualism.63Withthelefteitherconcedingtoomuchtoliberalism,orlosingitself

in‘irrationalisms,’MacIntyredriftedawayfromhisleftistcolleaguesandabandoned

59SeeMacIntyre’sobservationsonGeorgLukács,TP,137-39.60‘CommunismandBritishIntellectuals,’inAMEM,121-22;Perreau-Saussine(2005),29.61AV,71.62AV,114.63MacIntyreconcludesthatMay1968‘absolutisesindividualconsentbydespisingallauthority.’Itisaformof‘collectivehysteria.’Perreau-Saussine(2005),30-31

246

theMarxist political project.64InAfterVirtue, he preserves theMarxist critique of

capitalism and liberalism, for he adamantly affirms the need to critique

individualized, instrumentalized social relations to recover the genuine human

essence.Neverthelessheconcludesthatthereisnolivepoliticaloptionavailablefor

Marxism.Itis‘exhausted’asapoliticaltradition.65

III.ThePhilosophicalCritiqueofLiberalism

In rejecting Marxist political projects as failures, MacIntyre looked to the

theoretical errors thatunderwrote these failures, toovercomehis epistemological

crisis.First,hecriticizedtheturninMarxisttheorytowardeconomicdeterminism,

which ends up furthering Weberian politics in the mode of social democracy or

Stalinism.Second,heseizeduponhisleft-wingcolleagues-turned-social-democrats,

whoused the languageof liberal individual rights to critiqueStalinism.MacIntyre

reflectedonhowMarxistcriticsdependonliberalmoralitytocritiqueStalinism,so

that they presented their critique of Stalinism through the liberalism they once

ostensibly rejected. These failures impelled him to go beyond Marxism’s

philosophical inheritance—not to abandon it but to correct Marx’s philosophical

errors.

For MacIntyre, Marx relied too extensively on economic determinism to

claim scientific status for his theories. As Marx saw it, the deterministic

understanding of human behaviour and the revolution entailed by this

understanding provided laws of history: a working-class revolution in an

64MacIntyreandhisleftistcolleaguesbecameincreasinglydismissiveofoneanother.SeeBlackledgeandDavidson(2008),xvi-xviii,xxxvii-xlix.65AV,262.

247

industrialized countrywas inevitable.Marx’s argumentdependsonwhetherhe is

right about discovering predictive laws on human behaviour.MacIntyre’s ‘hidden

agenda’ in After Virtue is to show that Marxist theory is wrong in this respect.66

Marxisttheorywaswronginhavingfailedinitsspecificpredictions:revolutionfirst

took place in an unindustrialized country, Russia, and the working class did not

instigate it. Marxist theory is thereby unscientific. Yet arguing in that mode, one

could conclude that the only problemwithMarxism is that it grasped thewrong

predictivelawsofhumanbehaviour.Forthatreasonitsmeansdonotproducethe

predictedends.Bycontrast,theliberalbureaucratoffersadifferentsetofpredictive

laws,anddifferentmeanstoachieveit.67Instrumentalreasoningsurvives.68

MacIntyre thus argues that a Marxist or liberal theory can never discover

predictive laws that encompass all human behaviour. These theories fail as an

account of human action.69During his period of epistemological crisis, MacIntyre

searched for some of the resources for overcoming determinism in Marx.70Marx

raised the question of how humans act. In aiming to help workers think of

transforming themselves and their social conditions,Marx conceived of society in

terms of human agency, and of alienated human powers.71By focusing on the

powersofhumanagencyandhowtheymightbethwarted,MacIntyrehopedtoturn

Marxawayfromeconomicdeterminismandtoplacearenewedemphasisonhuman

66Wartofsky(1984),237.CitedinLutz(2012),35.67MacIntyrecouldevenmakethisobservationforthemostHayekiancirclesofthepoliticalright;seeKnight(2007),129-30.68NMW,36.69AV,88-108.70‘CommunismandBritishIntellectuals,’inAMEM,118-19.71NMW,41;‘BreakingtheChainsofReason,’inAMEM,142,150-51;Knight(2007),113.

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freedom,understoodasthedesiresofagentstoactualizethesocietytheywantand

becomethesortsofpersontheywanttobe.72

Nevertheless, to develop this account would require a philosophical

psychology of human agency or practical reasoning, which Marxism does not

provide. Moving beyond Marxism, MacIntyre sought to develop an account of

practicalreasoningthatdidnotseewantsanddesires inmechanisticor irrational

terms.73Rather,wantsanddesireswouldprovidereasonsforactions.Inthecritical

argument ofAfter Virtue, MacIntyre criticizes the accounts of human agency that

separatemorality,what‘ought’tobedone,fromtherestofhumanaction,aswellas

accountsthatseparatemoralityfromdesire.74

MacIntyrewrestledwiththesecondgreattheoreticalprobleminMarxismby

scrutinizing how communist intellectuals engaged with Stalinism. For any

communist intellectualwhohadnotgivenuphisbrain, therewasapressingneed

for a moral theory providing a rational, justifiable rejection of Stalinism. So

MacIntyreexclaimed:‘apositionintowhichwearealltemptedintoisthatofmoral

criticofStalinism.’75Becominga‘moralcritic’ofStalinismwasatemptation,notan

imperative, because while Stalinism must be rejected, it must be rejected for a

reason.76The temptation was to reject it arbitrarily.77During the period of his

72‘FreedomandRevolution,’inAMEM,129;Lutz(2012),25.73Knight(2007),131.74Lutz(2012),82.MacIntyre’streatmentofintractablemoraldisagreementsemphasizeshowimpersonalrationaljudgementsappliedbybothsidesinthesedisagreementsdividedesireandduty.AV6-9.75NMW,31.76Lutz(2012),22.77NMW,37.

249

epistemological crisis, MacIntyre’s preoccupation was to find the moral

philosophicaltheorythatcouldprovidethereasonsforrejectingStalinism.78

Inthelate20thcentury,threephilosophicaltheoriespurporttoofferreasons

forrejectingStalinism:thatoftheEncyclopaedist,neo-Kantianliberalism,thatofthe

genealogist, Nietzchean postmodernism, and finally that of the Thomist, neo-

Aristotelianism.79Many communist intellectuals chose the first theory, rejecting

Stalinism on the grounds of liberal individualism supported by Kantian

justifications.80ForMacIntyre, they fell into temptation.Kantianmoralphilosophy

attempts toprovide liberalismwith impersonal andobjectivemoral standards for

determiningwhat shouldbedone.One recognizes these impersonal andobjective

moral standards and legislates them for oneself as themoral law.Here arises the

principal critique of Kantianmoral philosophy. G.E.M. Anscombe’s essay ‘Modern

MoralPhilosophy’attackedtheconceptof‘legislatingforoneself’as‘absurd.’As‘the

concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator,’ Kantian moral

philosophymakes the subject of the law simultaneously themaster of the law.81

MacIntyre acknowledges his debt to Anscombe inAfterVirtue,82and takes up her

critique to emphasize that the Kantianmoral agent has no criterion to justify his

choice for the moral law other than his own autonomous choice.83The Kantian

78AV,xviii;ForafullertreatmentofthispreoccupationseePerreau-Saussine(2005),63-79.79ReadingTRVaspartofMacIntyre’scriticalargument.SeePerreau-Saussine(2005),76.80E.g.JurgenHabermas.SeePerreau-Saussine(2005),76;Sayers(2011),80.81Anscombe(1958),2.82AV,86.83AV,44-46.Lutz(2012),86-87.

250

moralagentcanonlycondemnStalinism‘inthenameofhisownchoice.’84Thisisno

justification.

InemphasizingthatKantianismleavesmodernmoralagent ‘criterionless,’85

MacIntyre applies the critique of Kantianism provided by Nietzschean

postmodernism. The critical argument of After Virtue holds that Nietzsche’s

diagnosis of contemporary morality is essentially correct. Morality could be a

response to some truthdiscovered through the studyofnature.But if one rejects

thatthestudyofnaturecanrevealanythingaboutmoralstandards,thealternative

istoarguethatmoralstandardsexistbecausewechoosethattheydo.86Nietzsche’s

critique regards the concept of the autonomy of the will as a deeply flawed

component of modern morality. It means that the concepts associated with

liberalism, contract, utility and individual rights, must also be rejected as

criterionless.87

Long before composing the critical argument of After Virtue, MacIntyre

concluded that the moral reasoning of Stalinism and the moral reasoning of

liberalism were mirror-images of one another in their account of practical

reasoning.Theycreateadichotomybetweenwillandnature.88Boththeliberaland

Stalinist see the will as the source of ‘morality,’ and contrast it with nature—

specifically, natural human desires. The liberal, being a good Kantian, chooses

moralityagainstdesire.TheStalinistchoosesdesireagainstmorality,yet renames

84NMW,37.85AV,33.86Lutz(2012),24-25.87AV,69-70.88Lutz(2012),25.

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desire—intheircase,thedesireforpower—thetruemorality.89WhiletheStalinist

andliberalinventtheirvalues,atleasttheMarxistdiscoversthemthroughthestudy

ofnature.90This insightprepared theway forMacIntyre to look foranalternative

theoryofpracticalreasoning,whichdidnotpresupposethedichotomybetweenwill

andnature.

IV.TheSocialCritiqueofLiberalism

Duringtheperiodofhisepistemologicalcrisis,MacIntyrealsoevaluatedthe

social culture that liberalism produced, coming to the conclusion that this flawed

social culture emerged from certain philosophical assumptions of the

Enlightenment.MacIntyrewasledtoevaluatethesocialculturebecauseheheldthat

the easewithwhich somany of his communist contemporaries transformed into

good liberals couldnot simplybeexplainedanalytically as a caseof flawedmoral

reasoning. MacIntyre settled on a social explanation, holding that modernity is

defined by a social culture wherein the understanding of morality as ‘choice’

dominates.

In the critical argument of After Virtue, MacIntyre associates this

preoccupation with choice to the theory of emotivism that arose in early 20th

century moral philosophy. Emotivism argues that moral judgements are only

expressionsofpreferences,attitudes,andfeelings.Amoraljudgementexpressedin

asentence,suchas‘thisisgood,’meansthesameas‘Iapproveofthis,dosoaswell’

or‘Hurrahforthis.’Nootherrationaljustificationcanbeprovided.Foranumberof

89NMW,49.90NMW,47.

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reasons,moralphilosophersgenerallyagreethatemotivismasatheoryofmeaning

formoraljudgementsisfalse.91

Yet MacIntyre argues that it is a cogent theory about the use of moral

judgements in society.92Most people use what they present as objective moral

judgementstoexpressthearbitraryattitudes, feelings,preferences,andchoicesof

their will. In society, emotivism transforms moral discourse into the will of one

personattemptingtoalignthepreferences,attitudes,andfeelingsofotherperson’s

will to theirown.93Whenexpressingmoral judgements, emotivists encourageand

even manipulate others to follow their arbitrary preferences and choices.94The

manipulativecharacterofemotivismarisesnotbecauseemotivistsareparticularly

oppressive. Instead, it is because the emotivist believes that the values and

principles are only authoritative by one choice to value them. In society, moral

disagreements are clashes of thewill; they have no resolution except in onewill

aligningtheirchoicewithanother.Thesocialcultureofmodernityisthe‘cultureof

emotivism.’

What makes the moral culture manipulative is that the characters who

inhabit it judge their success solely by how effective they are in adding others to

theirprojects.95Thecultureofemotivismleavesindividualschoosingendsthatthey

agree are essentially arbitrary, so all differences are understood as struggles for

91AV,12-13.MacIntyrereferstoC.L.Stevenson.MacIntyrereengageswithmore‘philosophicallysophisticatedforms’ofthetheoryofemotivisminECM,underthenewterm‘expressivism’(17).ForthesakeofcontinuitywithAVIusetheterm‘emotivism.’92AV,13-19.93AV,24;Lutz(2012),90-91.94Lutz(2012),56.95Lutz(2012),57-58.Thecharacterswhoinhabitthecultureofemotivism,therichaesthete,themanager,thetherapist,andtheconservativemoralist,alldeployparticulartacticstogetotherstoaligntheirwillstotheirprojects.AV,xv,26-31;Lutz(2012),58;McMylor(2011),230-31.

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power. In that way, the key to this social culture is the ‘obliteration of any

distinctionbetweenmanipulativeandnon-manipulativesocialrelations.’96

Searching for the roots of the emotivist social culture, MacIntyre adopts

another feature of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity, making a genealogical

argument.97MacIntyrecontendsthattheemotivistsocialcultureemergesfromthe

Enlightenment project. 98 Although the Enlightenment project advances an

impressivemoral philosophy, it is ultimately unable to justify its vision of ethical

practice except as a choice for certain values.As ever, this is no real justification.

‘WhytheEnlightenmentprojectofjustifyingmoralityhadtofail’isakeycomponent

of the critical argument of After Virtue. The Enlightenment project of justifying

moralityhadtofailbecauseitremovestheroleofteleologyfromethics.

MacIntyre conceives of the Enlightenment project as a rejection of the

teleological ethical framework that Aristotle provides in theNicomachean Ethics.

Aristotle’sframeworkisa‘threefoldscheme:’

1. Aconceptionof‘untutoredhumannature.’2. ‘Thepreceptsofrationalethics.’3. A conception of the human good as that of ‘human-nature-as-it-

could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos.’

Thegoalofethicsistotaketheagent,withhisimperfect,untutoredhumannature,

from (1) to the perfected nature of (3), with the help of (2). Each of these three

96AV,23.97MacIntyreacknowledgesthatthisstrategyisNietzschean,inseekingtounmaskanideology,buthisconsideredreasonsincludeaThomisticjustification,identifyingintellectualblindnessinmoralerror:thesinofpride.SeeTRV,147.98MacIntyreiswellawarethattherearedifferentversionsofEnlightenment:seeEP,172.Yethisemphasisisontheproject:Enlightenmentthinkers,suchasDescartesadvanceaseriesoftheoreticalideas‘almostasanelectoralplatform.’SowritesCharlesPéguy,citedinPerreau-Saussine(2005),57.

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points require reference to the other two if their status and function is to be

intelligible.99

MacIntyreclaimsthatAristotle’s framework is ‘notessentiallyaltered’until

the lateMiddleAges.100Then the framework is subject to twogreat attacks. First,

Luther, Calvin, and Jansen launch a series of theological attacks. They deny that

‘human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos’ is something available to the

power of human reason. Original sin has destroyed the power of human reason.

Second, Enlightenment science launches an attack on Aristotelian natural

philosophy.Attaching severe limits to thepowerofhuman reason,Enlightenment

sciencecontendsthatanyconclusionastowhat‘human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-

realized-its-telos’isunscientific.Inthewakeoftheseattacks,modernphilosophers

remove(3)fromtheinheritedethicalframework,leaving(1)and(2).

The new moral system addresses untutored human nature or imperfect

humanbeings,whomustobey(2),reconceivedastherulesofmorality.101InEthics

andtheConflictsofModernity,MacIntyregives thenewmoral system thenameof

‘Morality.’ The rules of morality for ‘Morality’ have the following characteristics:

theyaresecular;theyareuniversallybindingonallhumanagentsandknowableby

all;theyconstrainindividualdesires;andtheyareframedinabstracttermsanddo

notmentionsocialroles.102

99AV,52-53.100AV,53.ForanaccountofhowAristotle’sframeworkmeetschallengesfromothertraditions,notablytheAugustiniantradition,seeTRV,105-26.101MacIntyreconsiderstheassertionthatmoralityisadistinctandautonomouskindofethicalpracticeasanassertionofmodernity.AV,38;TRV,28.MacIntyreintroducestheterm‘Morality’inECM,65;itisthe‘moralsystempeculiartoandcharacteristicofearlyandlatecapitalistmodernity’(114-15).102ECM,115.C.f.TRV,26.

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Moreover,‘Morality’rejects‘anyteleologicalviewofhumannature,anyview

ofmanashavinganessencewhichdefineshistrueend.’103Thisattackalsodenies

thatonecaninferone’strueend,thehumangood,byconsideringone’sowndesires

forwhat isgood,andthemoralprecepts thatmighthelprealize this trueend, the

humangood.Itseparatestherulesofmoralityfromdesire.104Therulesofmorality

are thereby deprived of their purpose. Morality’s basis becomes increasingly

obscure,althoughvariousmodernphilosophersattempttojustify(2)from(1).105

However, thisexposes therulesofmorality toa famousattack fromHume,

arguing thatonecannot inferan ‘ought’ froman ‘is.’Later,MoorecodifiesHume’s

observation in logic as the naturalistic fallacy. ButMoore is incorrect: theway to

move from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ without committing a logical fallacy is through a

functional concept, defined as the purpose or function the concept is expected to

serve.Forexample,awatchisagoodwatchifitservesthefunctionofkeepingtime

accurately;andafarmerisagoodfarmerifheservesthefunctionoffarmingwell.

Forthenaturalisticfallacytoapply,moralphilosophyhastoassumethatthehuman

personisnotafunctionalconcept.106

Modern ‘Morality’ provides a concept of the human person that is neither

functionalnorteleological.Thisconnectstotheearlierobservationsoncivilsociety

presuming no essential social relationships. MacIntyre observes howmodern life

compartmentalizes social life into various social roles that are separate and

sometimes in conflict with one another in terms of what they should do. When

103AV,54.104Moralityconstrainsindividualdesires,ECM115.Knight(2007),140.105AV,55;Breen(2012),158.106AV,58.

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compartmentalized,thehumanbeinglacksaunified,integratedlife.107Arguingthat

the self assumesvarious social rolespresumesadividebetween the true self and

thesocialrolestheselfmightplay.Everymoralactioncanbeevaluateddifferently

fromwhatever social role the self has adopted, including the choice to assume a

particularsocialrole.Moralcriteriacanbeexchangedwitheachsocialrole.Theself

then,neverfullyidentifieswithanysocialrole;correspondingly,noethicalprinciple

exercisesitsauthorityovertheself.Theessenceoftheindividual ishisautonomy.

The self chooseswhat ethical principle to value.108Unable to reason teleologically

fromasocialroleortoaconceptionofhumangood,theself istheghostly ‘I’.109It

chooseswhichmoralrulestovalue,butlacksanycriteriatoprovideabasisforits

choicesorapurposefor itschoices.110‘Morality’abstractsthehumanpersonfrom

socialroles,relationshipsorresponsibilities,andinventstheindividual.111

Toemphasizethattheabandonmentofteleologyanditsreplacementwithan

abstractindividualisalossforthesocialculture,notaliberation,MacIntyreinsists,

withthehelpofAnscombe,thattherulesofmoralitystandingontheirownmakeno

sense.Anscombearguesthatanyconceptofamoralrule, ‘yououghttodoso-and-

so,’ whether taking a utilitarian or Kantian form, is a holdover from medieval

theories justifyingmoralobligationintermsofGod’scommands.Intheabsenceof

thatparticulartheisticframework,Anscombeconcludes,theconceptofamoralrule

ismeaningless.MacIntyreaddsthatthemoralrulesprevalentinmodernity’ssocial

107ECM,228.E.g.VasilyGrossman.SeeECM,248-49,264.Lutz(2012),123.108AV,26.109AV,32.110ECM,134.111AV,60-61;TRV,192.

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culture are unclear concepts decoupled from the original context that gave them

meaning. From a sociological perspective, ‘Morality’ is a collection of fragments

handed on from scattered social roles and predecessor cultures. Moral rules are

‘formsofexpression’fortheemotivist,buttheemotivistlacksanyrealawarenessof

the background beliefs thatwould be required to justify their use of thesemoral

rules.112In the culture of emotivism, moral rules are akin to the ‘taboo’ rules of

Polynesians, prohibitions on awhole range of actions. The Polynesians originally

hadaseriousofbackgroundbeliefsbywhichthosetabooruleswereunderstood.By

1776, the time of Captain Cook’s voyage, they had forgotten those background

beliefs and no longer understood what purpose the taboo rules served. In 1819,

KingKamehamehaIIcouldthenexposethetaboorulesaslackingjustification,and

abolishthemwithminimalcontroversy.113

In our European-based culture of emotivism, says MacIntyre, Nietzsche is

KingKamehamehaII.In‘fiveswift,wittyandcogentparagraphs’ofTheGayScience,

NietzschearguesthatallthevariousattemptsoftheEnlightenmentprojecttofinda

rational basis for morality fail.114When Nietzsche considers modern morality’s

socialculture,heconcludesthatthewaymoralityisusedistomasktherawstruggle

forpower.MacIntyreagreeswithNietzsche.Recalling that theobjectivehere is to

find a principle for refuting Stalinism, MacIntyre concludes that neither

Enlightenment culture nor Enlightenment moral philosophy has the resources to

112AV,60;MacIntyreishelpedbyAnscombe(1958),5-7.113AV,112;c.f.TRV,27-28;178-86.114AV,113;seeGS§335.

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refuteStalinism.Liberalismdoesnothavethephilosophicalandsocialresourcesto

refutepoliticalirresponsibility.Indeed,itinvitesit.

V.TheTheologicalCritiqueofLiberalism

Addressing a further Weberian feature of modernity, MacIntyre had long

criticizedhowliberalismtransformedthemodernwayoflifeintoasecularwayof

life.115InAfterVirtue, thediminishmentof religion is another characteristicof the

cultureofemotivism.‘Allfaiths,andallevaluationsareequallynon-rational;allare

subjectivedirectionsgiventosentimentandfeeling.’116Thisclaimabout ‘all faiths’

develops MacIntyre’s concern, explored throughout his work, that the

compartmentalization of modern life damages religion. Compartmentalization

divides religious activity from one’s work, politics, and leisure. It takes what is

supposed to be the ultimate, authoritative meaning of life, directing all other

activities, and turns it into one optional activity amongst others. So

compartmentalization strangles religious life. 117 Secularization’s broader social

effectdeepenstheemotivistculture,as it turnsthequestionaboutthemeaningof

life into an embarrassing one, better not asked for fear of being labelled

psychologicallydisordered.118Theconsequenceofavoidingthisquestionistheloss

of moral conscience and of the capacity to distinguish between good and evil.

Liberal individualisminhibitsthemoral life.Lefttohisowndevicesandtosecular

115MacIntyre(1991),267-68;Perreau-Saussine(2005),131;D’Andrea(2006),95-96.116AV,26.117ForMacIntyre’searlytreatmentofthistopic,seeMarxism:AnInterpretation,inAMEM,12-14.ForafulleraccountseeMcMylor(2011),234-36.118TP,126.

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institutions, the individualhasnoresourcesto justifyhismoralorspiritual ideals,

leavingtheseidealsimpoverished.119

AsayoungmanandaChristian,MacIntyrethoughtthatChristianitycouldbe

a resource for renewingmoral life,butevenwithinChristian theology the taintof

liberalism had spread. Liberalism transformed Christianity from an authoritative

declaration of particular revealed truths into a socially respectable system

describing human needs.120Christ comes to tells us the same thing that liberal

Enlightenment tells us:we can all just get along. For liberal theology, it is liberal

Enlightenment that effectively has the authority. The most famous theological

critiqueofthecomfortablealliancebetweenChristianityandliberalismcomesfrom

the Protestant theologian Karl Barth, who emphasizes the definitive authority of

Christian revelation. Accusing liberal theologians of conforming faith to

Enlightenmentreason,Barthseparatesreasonfromrevelationsothattheauthority

ofrevelationcannolongerbesubordinatedtotheauthorityofreason.Thisposition

appealedstronglytotheyoungMacIntyre.HesawhimselfsurroundedbyAnglican

liberal theologians who make Christianity either trivial or false.121Nevertheless,

Barth’s separations demarcated theology from philosophy. It is an either-or.

MacIntyrewas interested in howboth theology and philosophy could deepen the

understanding of practical reasoning. Perreau-Saussine pithily states the dilemma

fortheyoungMacIntyre:

119ECM,136-38.MacIntyreopposeshimselftoCharlesTaylor,seePerreau-Saussine(2005),135-41.120ASA,13.121‘ThecreedoftheEnglishisthatthereisnoGodandthatitiswisetopraytohimfromtimetotime.’ASA,26;7-8;MacIntyre(1994b),257.

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Eitherpractical reasoning isautonomousandmenhavenothing todowiththeology…or themoral life is a function of the commandments of God andmenhavenothingtodowithpracticalreasoning…inthefirstcase,thereisnoreligiousmorality,andinthesecond,thereisnoreligiousmorality.122

MacIntyre sought a rational justification formorality,whichBarthdenied religion

can offer. On this point Barth agreed with the liberals, and so ironically he

strengthened the liberal dominance of Christian theology. 123 Dissatisfied with

Barth’s understanding of religious belief, and left with no alternative answer,

MacIntyre losthis faith toward1960.Nevertheless, theproblemofhowliberalism

distortsreligionstillpreoccupiedhim.124

VI.TheModernCatastrophe

ThenarrativeofMacIntyre’s lifeupto theAfterVirtueprojectstarts froma

Marxist tradition of enquiry, with which MacIntyre defines and seizes upon the

problems of modern liberal individualism. As a Marxist, he sets out to find a

revolutionary political solution that transforms the deficient social relations of

modernliberal individualism.YeteachpossibleMarxistpoliticalsolutionfails.The

political solution of social democracy is indistinguishable from modern liberal

individualism, and concedes that politics is to be dominated by Weberian

bureaucrats claiming authority by their grasp of deterministic laws governing

humanbehaviour.ThepoliticalsolutionofStalinismconcedesthesamedomination

ofWeberianbureaucrats,addingthemoralhorrorsofGulag.MacIntyreknowsfull

wellhemustrejectStalinism,butinhissearchforamoralreasontorejectStalinism,

122Perreau-Saussine(2005),146-47.123ASA,15-16.124ForafullertreatmentoftheearlyMacIntyre’sinterestsinthephilosophyofreligion,seeD’Andrea(2007),123-63.

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he is dissatisfied with the predominance of liberal moral reasoning. The most

articulate version of liberal moral reasoning, neo-Kantianism, only manages to

justifyitselfthroughanarbitrarychoiceforcertainmoralstandards.

According to the research programme of After Virtue, the roots of

modernity’s failure to provide reasons for rejecting Stalinism lies in the

Enlightenment project’s production of ‘Morality,’ and the failure to justify it. The

Enlightenment project failed because it severed moral rules from their basis in

naturalteleology.Itdenouncedanyattempttoconsiderthetelosofrationalhuman

desiresorsocialroles,butthisleftthemoralrulesittriedtodefendasbaseless.125

ThecruxofMacIntyre’s sweepingcritiqueof liberalism takes the formofa

‘disquietingsuggestion’atthestartofAfterVirtue:‘imaginethatthenaturalsciences

were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe.’ This catastrophe is the widespread

destruction of the natural sciences, leaving only fragments. Later, some try to

recover the natural sciences from the fragments, but, ‘Nobody, or almost nobody,

realizesthatwhattheyaredoingisnotnaturalscienceinanypropersenseatall.’126

MacIntyre’sclaimisthatintheactualworld,ethicalpracticeisinthesamestateof

disorder as the natural sciences are in this imaginedworld. The social culture of

emotivism that underwrites the politics, philosophy, and theology of liberal

individualism is a description of this state of disorder. Yet what is the actual

catastrophe?Tofindthecatastrophe,hewrites:

125Knight(2007),140-41.126AV,1.

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weshallhave to looknot fora fewbriefstrikingeventswhosecharacter isincontestably clear, but for a much longer, more complex and less easilyidentified process and one which by its very nature is open to rivalinterpretation.127

MacIntyre does not associate the catastrophe with the Enlightenment project or

with Protestantism.128Although these do contribute, their common feature is to

understand ethical practice as an act of the will, an offshoot of a theory of

voluntarism,ratherthanwithinateleologicalframework.MacIntyre’scatastropheis

the slow turn away from the Aristotelian tradition of natural teleology toward

voluntarism.129Thismovementmakesethicalpracticeaboutthewillfollowingrules,

andunabletoanswerthequestion,‘whatkindofpersonshallIbecome?’130

Asnotedearlier,MacIntyre considers three traditionsof enquiry atplay in

thepresent:neo-Kantianism,Nietzscheanpostmodernism,andneo-Aristotelianism.

MacIntyre’s critique of the Enlightenment project relies heavily on Nietzschean

postmodernism,beingNietzscheaninmethodandsubstance.Inmethod,MacIntyre

deploys a genealogical, historical argument looking for the flaw of the

Enlightenment project. In substance,MacIntyre followsNietzsche and argues that

thegenealogyoftheEnlightenmentunmasksEnlightenment’srationaljustifications

127AV,3.128C.f.Beiner(2014),169n,186-88.BeinerfretsthatMacIntyreisanti-Enlightenment,yetMacIntyre’squarrelwithEnlightenmentisthattheyinheritanddevelopatheoreticalerror.TothechargethatMacIntyreignoresthepositiveeffectsoftheEnlightenment(elaboratedinSayers(2011)),MacIntyrehasthreeanswers(MacIntyre(2011b)).First,MacIntyreacknowledgesthattheEnlightenment’semphasisonnegativefreedom,freedomfrominterferenceandinterventioninreactiontotheabusivecoercivepowerfrequentlyexercisedinthepre-modernworld,shouldbegivenitsdue:Enlightenmenthassomepositiveoutcomes(325-27).Yetsecondly,grantingthatmanyofthehopesoftheEnlightenmenthavenotbeenrealized,MacIntyre’scritiqueofthelackofjustificationbehindEnlightenment’sclaimsarguesthatEnlightenment’sunfulfilledhopesoccurnotinspiteofEnlightenmentvalues,butbecauseofthem(326).Third,MacIntyrewouldarguethatsomeofthepositiveoutcomesattributedtoEnlightenmenthavetheiroriginsinothersources(c.f.329).129‘thelatemedievalpredecessors’ofLuther,Calvin,andJansen‘embodyanewconceptionofreason.’AV,53;TRV,155;Lutz(2012),44-46.130AV,118.

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ofmoralityasdependentonarbitrarychoice.131Inmoralphilosophy,theclaimsof

neo-Kantianism to provide rational justification fail. In politics and society, these

failed claims show that ethical practice is a collection of fragments, in grave

disorder,servingtomaskthewilltopower.Inthisatmosphere,voluntarismrisesto

the fore.132The self is a ‘ghostlywill’whohas no criteria to justify its choices for

actions.Itassumesandsurrenderssocialrolesasitwishes.

Nietzsche, however, offers a rival interpretation of the catastrophe. His

solution to the disorder ofmodernity is to embrace voluntarism.Moderns should

redefinewhatisgoodandbadbasedontheawarenessthatweareself-legislators,

choosing our values for ourselves without attempting rational justification.

MacIntyre makes this position appear compelling—unlessone can show that the

Enlightenment project’s rejection of the Aristotelian ethical practice was a

mistake.133Consequently,MacIntyreposesthequestion,‘NietzscheorAristotle?’134

MacIntyre has reasons to be uneasy with Nietzschean postmodernism.

Nietzscherepudiatesanyrationalbasisforethicalpractice,notablydenyingthatthe

‘self’candiscoveritinsharedsocialactivity.135ThesocialcultureofNietzscheanism

is Weberian, obliterating any distinction between manipulative and non-

manipulative social relations. It leaves power as the sole means of evaluating

success: the successful characters ofWeberian politics and society are thosewho

131TRV,39-40.D’Andrea(2006),346.132MacIntyreseesvoluntarismasthecommonfeatureofsuchdiversethinkersasHare,Rawls,Gewirth,Nietzsche,Sartre,Weber,C.L.Stevenson,andErvingGoffman.AV,21,26,35;D’Andrea(2006),230.C.f.Weaver(1948).133D’Andrea(2006),249.134AV,109-120.Theoppositiontorationalismisexpressedasaproscriptionagainstmetaphysicsandaunifiedself,aproscriptionwhichtheNietzscheanholdsinconsistently.TRV,46,53,54,207-14.135AV,257-58.

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areeffectiveingettingthewillsofotherstoaligntotheirownwill.Itistrappedin

theironcageofinstrumentalreasoning,withnojustificationfortheendsforwhich

oneacts.Politically,NietzscheanismhasnoreasontorejectStalinism,oranyother

deceitful political ideology. It takes the form of the protesters ofMay 1968: they

cannot give an account of their principles, so collapse into collective hysteria.

Theologically,Nietzschedeniesoutrightthatreligiousquestionspersistinthepost-

Enlightenmentworld,buthissavageattacksagainstChristianityarealsoanattack

on rationalism. By assuming that theism and rationalism are joined together,

Nietzsche inadvertently strengthens the case for reasonable religious belief.136

Therecanbegoodreasonstosustainreligiousbeliefoutsideofliberaltheology.

In brief, neo-Kantianism is complicit in the disorder of modern ethical

practice, while Nietzschean postmodernism embraces it. By contrast, neo-

Aristotelianismcouldresolvethedisorderinmodernethicalpractice.Thefailureof

liberalismandStalinismalikerestson theirassumeddichotomybetweenwilland

nature.Theyrejectnatureasthebasisforethicalpractice,placingit insteadinthe

will.Incontrast,MacIntyrenotesthattheMarxistissupposedtodiscoverthebasis

of ethical practice.Moving forward fromMarx, can ethical practice be discovered

throughthestudyofnature?InlightofhisclaimthattheEnlightenmentproject‘had

to fail,’ MacIntyre concludes that any successful justification for ethical practice

must take the form of Aristotle’s ethical framework.137 Taking telos seriously,

expressedinnaturalhumandesiresandsocialroles,thequestionofethicalpractice

wouldnotbeaboutwhatruletofollow,butwouldbeaboutwhatsortofpersonone136TRV,66-67.137AV,52-55;Knight(2007),141.

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shouldbecome.Itwouldprioritizethedesiresofagentstoactualizethesocietythey

want and become the sorts of persons they want to be. It would require a

philosophicalpsychologyofhumanagencythatdoesnotseparatemoralityfromthe

restofhumanaction.Theseareimportanttheoreticalcorrectives,butit isonlyfor

thephilosophertointerprettheworld.Thepointistochangeit.MacIntyreaccepts

the problems modern liberal individualism produces for social relations, in

capitalistmarketsandWeberianpolitics.Acompellingcaseforneo-Aristotelianism

would alsohave to rehabilitate the revolutionarypromise for a transformationof

social relations, to create a ‘revolutionary Aristotelianism’ that goes beyond the

exhausted traditions of Marxist politics.138 The constructive argument of After

Virtue’sresearchprogrammeaimstomeetalltheseobjectives.

MacIntyre’sAristotle

MacIntyre’s constructive argument is that when Aristotle is interpreted as

partofa tradition,hecanprovideall these things.MacIntyredescribeshimselfas

aiming‘toreconstructthemoraltheoryandcommunalpracticeofAristotelianismin

whateverversionwouldprovidethebesttheorysofar.’139Providinga‘besttheory

so far’ within a tradition means that ‘reconstruction’ is an on-going, open-ended

process.ThiscorrespondstoMacIntyre’sphilosophicalenquiry.Althoughthereare

numerous‘Aristotelian’featuresofhisthought,Ifocusonthemainobjectiveofhis

reconstruction. I argue thathisphilosophical enquiry is aunifiedquest to explain

and justify teleology inpractical reasoning.Thisquestpromptshim towriteAfter138SeeKnight(2007),224;(2011).139MacIntyre(1994b),263.

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Virtue, commencing theprogrammeof reconstructing theAristotelian tradition of

practicalreasoninginthefaceofmodernchallenges.

MacIntyre’squestadvancesthroughseveralstages.Hisinitialreconstruction

of the Aristotelian tradition in After Virtuemakes severalmajor departures from

Aristotle. His philosophical quest to justify teleology leads him to deepen his

commitment to Aristotelianism. In describing MacIntyre’s philosophical quest, a

controversial issue ishowheproceeds fromAristotelianism toThomism.Someof

hismost influentialcriticshaveseenasudden,perhapsideological,ruptureatthis

point.Againstthisposition,IarguethatMacIntyreadoptsThomistformulationsof

Aristotelian positions: he sees continuity between Aristotle and Aquinas on the

unity of the virtues, the role ofmoral absolutes as natural law, and the need for

metaphysicalexplanations.AsaThomist,MacIntyreprovideshisunderstandingof

the human telos and the life of philosophical enquiry. He draws insights from

Aristotle,butrecognizesthattherearedeficienciesinAristotle’saccountofthebest

lifeandthecontentof thevirtues.OnthesepointshebreakswithAristotelianism,

andsideswithAquinasagainstAristotle.Finally,MacIntyre’saccountofthebestlife

combines philosophical enquiry and political activity. Since he intends a

reconstructionofthe‘moraltheory’andthe‘communalpractice’oftheAristotelian

tradition,Ioutlinehis‘revolutionaryAristotelianism’ashis‘communalpractice:’his

practicalchallengetothesocialandpoliticaldominanceofliberalism.

I. The Programme of After Virtue: Reconstructing the AristotelianTradition

TheobjectiveofMacIntyre’sresearchprogrammeistoreconceivethewhole

study of human agency or practical reasoning to vindicate the Aristotelian

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tradition.140The‘theoryofthevirtues’heseeksinAfterVirtueispartofthatlarger

study.MacIntyre’straditionofthevirtueslookstofindexcellenceinhumanagency,

addressing habits of desiring, choosing, and acting. The Aristotelian form of the

traditionofthevirtuesisthathumannaturedetermineswhatthehabitsare,sothat

developing thesehabits is theessentialgoalof thegood life.MacIntyreprioritizes

the theory of the virtues in After Virtue because showing what the virtues are

demonstratesthathumanactionisteleological,andcorrectsthebasicmistakeofthe

Enlightenmentproject.

In After Virtue, MacIntyre gave Aristotle’s account of the virtues a central

place. NeverthelessMacIntyre disagreedwith some of Aristotle’s positions. So he

treatedAristotleaspartofatraditiononthevirtues.MacIntyrecouldthenclaimto

besomeonedevelopingthistradition,andcouldextrapolatefromAristotleaseries

of ‘Aristotelian’ positions. With this approach, MacIntyre distanced himself from

Aristotle.MacIntyrefullyacknowledgedthattotreatAristotleaspartofatradition

is ‘a very un-Aristotelian thing to do.’141A tradition leaves present philosophical

positionsopentothepossibilityofcorrection,givingthephilosophicalpositionsan

incomplete character. By contrast, Aristotle did not explicitly think of himself as

contributingtoatradition;heintendedtoreplacetheerrorsofthepastbyhisown

comprehensivelytrueaccount.142

NeverthelessMacIntyre seesAristotleas implicitlyundertakinga tradition-

constitutedenquiry:torepeatacrucialmaximofMacIntyre,Aristotle’sphilosophy

140WJWR,ix.141AV,146.142AV,146.

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presupposes a sociology.Aphilosophical theoryof the virtues takes as its subject

matter a pre-philosophical theory ‘implicit in and presupposed by the best

contemporary practice of the virtues.’143A philosophical theory of human action

developsoutofobservationandreflectiononhumanactioninitssocialcontext.In

hiswork,Aristotledevelopsaphilosophicaltheoryofthevirtuesbyreflectingonthe

socialpracticesextantinHomericandclassicalGreece.ThosewhofollowAristotle

do the same, adding Aristotle to their historical series. Hence Aristotle’s

philosophical theory of the virtues, particularly in his most influential text, the

NicomacheanEthics, is important for any later thinkerwho attempts todevelop a

philosophical account of the best contemporary practice of the virtues. Although

Aristotledoesnotsay it,hisworkconstitutes thestartof theclassical traditionof

ethicalenquiry.144

Asatraditionallowsforcorrectionanddevelopment,MacIntyre’scastingof

AristotleaspartofatraditionallowedhimtocriticizeAristotleforhisweaknesses,

and develop the tradition, without repudiating Aristotelianism. MacIntyre’s own

viewsdevelop as a response to later criticismsof and commentaries onAristotle.

The positions of Aristotle himself are secondary to the views that MacIntyre

advances as a spokesman of the Aristotelian tradition. It is in these terms that

MacIntyrecallshisaccountneo-Aristotelian.145

The programme initiated byAfterVirtue turns back toAristotle to counter

the Enlightenment project’s rejection of teleology and reconstruct the concept of

143AV,148.144AV,147.145ECM,31.

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teleology. Yet in approaching Aristotle as part of a tradition, MacIntyre in After

Virtue first criticized Aristotle’s conceptualization of teleology, for Aristotle

explainedteleologyintermsofadiscreditedmetaphysicalbiology.

MacIntyremeantthatAristotle’sdevelopedaccountofteleologyreliesonhis

accountofnaturalsubstances.Naturalsubstanceshaveadeterminatefunction,end,

or telos, and why and how the activities of natural substances achieve that

determinatefunction,endortelos.Sincehumanbeingsarealsonaturalsubstances,

they are also subject to teleological explanations that show the telos of human

activity.Aristotlethinksthatnaturedeterminesthespecificgoodthathumanbeings

seek.TheergonargumentintheNicomacheanEthicstriestodeterminethespecific

goodthathumanbeingsseekintermsofthespecificergon(function)ofthehuman

being.Aristotleprovidesananswertotheergonofthehumanbeingintermsofthe

unique activity characteristic of the human being, stemming from a feature of

humannature,therationalpartofthesoul.146

Writing in After Virtue, MacIntyre was concerned that Aristotle’s ethics

presupposedthismetaphysicalbiology,andhedistancedhimselffromit.147Instead

he drew from a different side of Aristotle to reflect on the operations of human

activity. Aristotle thinks that the reflection on human actions provides a better

understandingofhumanactivity.Throughthatreflection,theagentunderstandsthe

demandsofhumanactivity,andgraspsitsgoalsorultimatetelos.Thefundamental

lesson that Aristotle provides is that the reflection on human activity reveals the

146SeeMacIntyre(1966),62-63;Lutz(2012),167.SeealsoEN1097b22–1098a20. 147SeeAV,xi;148.MacIntyredroppedAristotle’svocabularyofacharacteristicallyhumanself-activity(energeia)anditsstateofcompletion(entelecheia).Knight(2007),135-36.

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importance of teleology for practical reasoning. Human activity, as MacIntyre

appreciated fromMarx, isgoal-oriented—itmustbeunderstoodwithreference to

intentions,purposes,andreasonsforaction.148Aristotlegraspsthisimportantpoint

as well. In A Short History of Ethics, MacIntyre had written that Aristotle was

‘completelyright’inidentifyingthegoalortelosofhumanactionwiththegoodthat

the human agent pursues.149It is then possible to identify the good not from

metaphysics but through reflecting on the actions of human agents. The human

good, forAristotle, andMacIntyre, is ‘sociallydiscovered.’150Beingneithermoney,

nor honour, nor pleasure, the human good is eudaimonia.151 Eudaimonia has

variousdefinitions:itisthestateofbeingwellforman,thebestlifeforman,whatis

ultimately good for man or what provides human ‘flourishing.’152In After Virtue,

MacIntyre’s formulationof howAristotle introduces the virtues is as thequalities

which enable an agent to achieve the telos of eudaimonia, and the lack of which

frustratesthemovementtowardsthetelosofeudaimonia.153

Recalling the trenchant criticisms of instrumental reasoning in his earlier

work,MacIntyrespecifiesthekindsofmeansvirtuesaretotheendofeudaimonia.

To do so he drew on a distinction between two kind of means-end reasoning,

‘internal’ and ‘external’means to an end. It is a distinction not explicitlymade in

Aristotle, yet MacIntyre believes it was required to understand Aristotle’s

148AV,83.149MacIntyre(1966),58.150Lutz(2012),174.Seealso167-68;MacIntyre(1966),58-59.151MacIntyre(1966),81-82;AV,160.152MacIntyre(1966),59-62;AV,148.‘Flourishing’isatermusedinAnscombe(1958),andregularlyinlaterworksofMacIntyre:e.g.DRA;ECM,24-31.153AV,148.

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intention.154‘External’means-endreasoningidentifiestrulyinstrumentalreasoning,

wheretheendischaracterizedindependently,orexternally,ofthemeansthatcan

be used to achieve it. When Aristotle speaks about virtue as the means to

eudaimonia, he intends to say that virtue is ‘internal’ means-end reasoning. So

necessaryarethevirtuesto livingthegoodlife, thattheendofeudaimoniacannot

becharacterizedwithoutmakingreferencetothevirtues.Thevirtuesarequalities

whicharevaluedbothfortheirownsakeandforthesakeofeudaimonia.155Onthese

essentials,MacIntyre holds that Aristotle’s account of the goal-oriented character

forhumanaction,ultimatelywiththegoaloflivingthebestlife,wascorrect.

Aristotlewasalsocorrectintheessentialsofpracticalreasoning,the‘action

theory’ outlining the logical stages of human action. Aristotle, MacIntyre argued,

outlines the necessary conditions for intelligible human action, holding for any

human culture.156For Aristotle, practical reasoning has the following structure.157

First,therearethewantsandgoalsoftheagents.Withoutthiselement,therewould

benocontextforpracticalreasoning.Second,thereisthemajorpremise:‘doingor

seekingsuch-and-suchisthetypeofthingthatisgoodfororneededbyaso-and-so.’

Third,thereisaminorpremise,wheretheagentperceivesthatthisisaninstanceof

therequisitekind.Fourth,thereistheconclusion,aparticularkindofaction.

Considered in termsof the structure of practical reasoning, the virtues are

those qualities which enable the agent to grasp the major premise, and give the

154AV,148;184.155AV,148-49.MacIntyreisthinkingofEN1097b2-4.ThereissomedevelopmentandclarificationinMacIntyre’sunderstandingofthemeans-endrelationship.Knight(2007),134-38.156AV,161.157AV,161-62.

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agent the capacity to act upon it. The virtues involve training in habituation,

enabling the agent to becomebetter at practical reasoning.158The virtues express

trainingintheemotionsandpassions.Thepassionsaretrainedintoconformitywith

what theoretical reasoning identifies as the right goal or telos, andwhat practical

reasoning identifies as the right action to do in a particular time and place.

MacIntyre thereby contrasted neo-Humean or emotivist accounts of practical

reasoning to Aristotle’s. From an Aristotelian standpoint, reason cannot be the

servantofthepassionsbecausethepassionsmustbeeducatedinconformitywith

practicalreasoning.159

These three positions of Aristotle, the need for the ultimate telos of

eudaimonia, the role of the virtues in relation toeudaimonia, and the structureof

practical reasoning, form the core of MacIntyre’s reconstruction of Aristotelian

ethical theory.However, thisaccountofAristotelian theorymustbeplacedwithin

theAristoteliantraditionofpracticalreasoning,MacIntyre’srealreconstruction.Ina

tradition, these positions must be described in terms of their historical origins.

Moreover, if the tradition is toengagewithmodernaccountsandescape fromthe

charge that the preference forAristotle’s positions is also arbitrary, itmust show

where it is in need of refinement to demonstrate its superiority over alternative

positions. So it is necessary to contextualizeAristotle’s theories as an inheritance

fromHomeric and classical Greek societies, showingwhat Aristotle develops and

where in turn Aristotle needs to be developed. MacIntyre’s argument is that the

discussion of theHomeric inheritance produces two competing traditions. On the158AV,150.MacIntyredrawsfromEN1095b1-8.159AV,162.

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one hand, there are the sophists; and on the other, there are Socrates, Plato, and

Aristotle.160MacIntyre’sreadingofAristotle is thatAristotledevelopsandcorrects

themes incipient in thestrugglesSocratesandPlatohavewiththesophists.So for

thatreasonthereisatrajectoryfromtheHomericinheritance,throughthedebates

ofclassicalGreece,tothedevelopedpositionsofAristotle.161

Therearethree important inheritancesthatdevelopinMacIntyre’saccount

of the Aristotelian tradition. First, Aristotle inherits an idea fromHomeric, heroic

societiesthathumanexcellenceisadesirablegoalandanormativegoalforhuman

action. The goal is to lead the best life. Aristotle develops that into eudaimonia;

neverthelessAristotle initially leaves the contentofeudaimonia open.162This is in

parttobeexpected,becauseofthecharacterofdialectics.InAristotle’sphilosophy

(asopposedtoPlato’s),dialecticsmovestowardatelos,aimingtogiveanaccountof

thefirstprinciples(archai)ofthefieldbeingdiscussed,buttheconclusionisalways

inneedoffurtherelaborationordevelopment.163Itistobeexpected,therefore,that

thereisatleastinitiallyanopenaspecttoAristotle’saccountofthehumantelosof

eudaimonia.164

Aristotle’s second inheritance from heroic societies is to note that the

exerciseofthevirtuesinpursuitofeudaimoniatakesplaceinasocialcontext,notas

anindividualizedself,separatefromsociety.ModernslikeHobbes,Locke,Rousseau,

and Nietzsche tried to portray such an individualized, pre-social self—and in

160ForMacIntyre’saccountofhowthediscussionontheHomericinheritancedividedintothesetwotraditions,seeWJWR,30-46.161WJWR,88-100.162AV,148.163WJWR,90-93,100.164WJWR,118.

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Nietzsche’s case celebrated Homeric heroic life as the case par excellence of

individualized,self-assertion.Yettheyareallmistaken.165Instead,asLutzobserves,

MacIntyre’s interpretation of heroic societies finds that the persons who pursue

excellenceinthissocietylook‘morelikethenaturalcitizensofAristotle’sPolitics.’166

ForMacIntyre,thatparticularpassageinBookIofAristotle’sPolitics isonewhose

‘importance for the interpretationofeverything thatAristotlewroteabouthuman

lifecannotbeunderrated.’167Aristotlegraspsfromtheheroicsocietiesthatitisonly

possible to pursue eudaimonia by assuming one’s social role and acknowledging

thatoneisamemberofacommunitywithparticulartasksandpurposes.168Humans

cannotbeseparatedfromtheircommunity,whichforAristotleisthepolis,without

beingdeprivedofsomeoftheiressentialattributes.169

Aristotledevelopsthelinkbetweenthehumanagentandthecommunityto

two kinds of ‘evaluative practice.’170 First, the community must recognize the

qualities of character that help agents achieve their goals, encouraging the

developmentofthosequalitiesanddiscouragingqualitiesthatdonotfurtherthose

goals.Second,thecommunitymustdeterminewhatactionshelptheagentsachieve

thesegoals,whilecondemningactionsthathinderthesegoalsandhinderpursuitof

thecommongood.Thequalitiespertaintohowthecommunityinvolvesitselfinthe

developmentofvirtues,andtheactionspertain tohowthecommunitymakes just

laws to support the development of the virtues necessary to achieve the agent’s

165AV,126,129.166Lutz(2012),109.167WJWR,96-97.MacIntyrereferstoPolitics1252b28-1253a39.168SeeespeciallyAV,123.169WJWR,96.170AV,151.

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goals. Virtues and laws are interconnected.171 In connecting virtues and laws,

MacIntyretakespartofAristotle’stheoryofthevirtuestoinvolveobediencetothe

laws of the community that prescribes or prohibits certain types of action

absolutely, thekindsofactions thevirtuousmanwouldalwaysdoorrefrain from

doing.MacIntyrethereforeinterpretsAristotletobecommittedtomoralabsolutes.

‘Itis,’MacIntyrewrites,‘acrucialpartofAristotle’sviewthatcertaintypesofaction

are absolutely prohibited or enjoined irrespective of circumstances or

consequences’;althoughAristotleis‘sobriefastobecryptic’onthesubject.172

The third inheritance concerns the content of the virtues. The heroic

societiesemphasizedcompetitivevirtues,virtueslikesuccessandbravery.Aristotle

develops the tradition away from these competitive virtues and toward the

cooperative virtues of classical society, emphasizing virtues like justice and

temperance.173Theaccountofcooperativevirtuestranscendscommunitystandards

andargues theyarepartof anobjectiveorder that is the case, irrespectiveof the

vastswatheofdifferencesincommunitystandards.Inthephilosophicaldebatesof

the4thcenturyBC,thesophistsarguedthatthereisnoaccountofthevirtuesandthe

telosofhumanbeingsassuch,butonlyasit isunderstoodwithinaparticularcity.

By contrast, Aristotle holds that there is an account of the virtues and of telos

attributedtohumanbeingsassuch,makinganargument for theobjectivityof the

virtuesandthehumantelos.174Aristotleprovidesanexplanationforthehumantelos

171Lutz(2012),113.172AV,150;seealsoWJWR,113.173AV,133-34;Lutz(2012),109-10.InWJWR,MacIntyrespeaksofthegoodsofeffectivenessandthegoodsofexcellence.174AV,139;forMacIntyre’sfullaccountofthesophists(amongwhichheplacesThucydides),seeWJWR,46-68.

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intermsofhisaccountofhumannature.Moreover,Aristotle’saccountofobjectivity

alsoshowsthatheregardstheuniverseashierarchicallyordered,sothatthevirtues

andpracticalreasoning(aswellashumannature)canonlybefullyunderstoodwith

referencetotheirplaceinthecosmosawhole,withinwhichthelifeinthepolisfinds

itscompletion.175

Tosummarize, then,Aristotle initiatesa tradition that identifies thehuman

telos as eudaimonia and uses dialectics to discover the content of it; it aims to

discover anobjective telos attributed tohumansqua humans,whoare situated in

theirhierarchicallyorderedplace in the cosmos; and it seeks to identifywhat the

virtuousactionsandactionsthatareabsolutelyrequiredtorealizethebestlifefora

humanbeing,inlightofhisnaturalmembershipinthecommunityofthepolis.

Nevertheless,fromhisstandpoint,MacIntyreseesdifficultiesinthetradition

Aristotle initiates from heroic society. First concerns themeaning of eudaimonia.

AlthoughAristotledetermined thatmetaphysical contemplationof the impersonal

unchanging divine was the ultimate human telos and the essential content of

eudaimonia,thisanswerexposesaweaknessinAristotle’saccount.ForMacIntyrein

AfterVirtue,‘thereisacertaintensionbetweenAristotle’sviewofmanasessentially

political and his view of man as essentially metaphysical.’176MacIntyre does not

wish to adopt the metaphysical side. Second, Aristotle’s emphasis on the

community’s role in assisting with the pursuit of excellence raises a series of

problems. Aristotle’s lack of historical awareness leads him to an excessive

exultationoftheGreekpolisastheonlypossiblearenainwhichtopursuethegood175WJWR,101-2.176AV,158.

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life.Third,Aristotle’saccountofvirtueandviceprioritizesthelifeofthegentleman

and diminishes the artisan classes; MacIntyre holds that Aristotle unfairly

diminishes the virtues involved in manual skill and labour.177Fourth, Aristotle’s

proclivity for the Greek gentleman’s life leads him to the evidently mistaken

conclusion about human nature; non-Greeks and slaves cannot pursue the good

life.178Fifth,MacIntyrechargesAristotlewithseeingtoogreataharmonybetween

goods. Aristotle neglects to consider how agents experience the insoluble,

sometimestragic,moraldilemmas,theconflictsthatarisebetweengoods.Although

Aristotlethoughttragedyarosefromtheagent’scharacter flaws,agreattragedian

likeSophoclesgraspsthattragedyarisesfromveryfabricofhumanlife.179

Toresolvetheseproblems,theAristoteliantraditionmustconsiderhowthe

conceptionofthebestlifepersistswhentheinstitutionoftheGreekpolishaspassed

away.180Itmustprovide amorehistorical accountofhumannature thatdoesnot

fallpreytoAristotle’sahistoricalunderstandingofhumannature.181Itmustprovide

an account of virtue in which insoluble conflicts between goods do not solely

originate from character flaws of the agent. Finally, it must temper Aristotle’s

account of the virtues of the gentlemen with the historical awareness of other

accountsofthevirtues.Indeed,asthetraditionofvirtuesdevelopedinresponseto

very different historical subject matter, a variety of incompatible answers were

given both about the virtues and about the ultimate human telos. As MacIntyre

177AV,159;WJWR,104.178AV,157-58;WJWR,105;D’Andrea(2006),258-59.179AV,157-58,163.180AV,163.181AV,158-60.

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notes, ‘Aristotle and Nietzsche, Hume and the New Testament are names which

representpolaroppositionsonthesematters.’182InAfterVirtue,MacIntyreseeksto

overcomeAristotle’sweakhistoricalawareness,withoutrelyingonametaphysical

biologicalexplanationofteleology.

Historical awareness relates to an overall problem the third inheritance

exposes, the issue of objectivity. MacIntyre in After Virtue was well aware that

historical awareness exposes deep disagreement over what the telos of human

activityis.Aristotletriedtoestablishanobjectiveaccountofit,butonaccountofhis

discreditedmetaphysicalbiologyandhistoricalbiashisaccountwasinadequate.If

MacIntyre’sembraceofthetheoryofthevirtueswasnottofallintotheproblemof

arbitrarinessthatplaguesmodernethics,heneededtoovercomethisproblemwith

due attention to these different theories that establishes an objective account. To

attend to this overall problem,MacIntyre’s historical surveypresented an explicit

reflectiononvirtuousandvicioushumanaction,focusingespeciallyonthedifferent

ethicaltheoriesofHomer,Aristotle,andBenjaminFranklin.183Thepointwastofind

acoreaccountofhumanactivity,faithfultotheAristoteliantradition,whichdraws

fromthehistoricalrecordtoprovideaphilosophicallydefensible,objectiveaccount

ofhumantelos.

II.Practices,Virtues,andtheUnityofHumanLife

InAfterVirtue,MacIntyre’shistoricalaccountofthedifferenttheoriesofthe

virtuesbringhimtotheconclusionthatinallthehistoricalcases,virtuesnamethe

excellencesinpracticalreasoningthattheagentseeks.Inhisthree-folddefinitionof182AV,162.183AV,185.

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virtue,MacIntyreargues that thevirtuesenable theagent toachieveexcellence in

termsofpractices,theninthenarrativeorderofaunifiedhumanlife,theninterms

oftraditions.Thisprovidesthebasisforunderstandingwhathumanactivityisand

how it is directed toward a unified end or telos. Overall, MacIntyre’s account of

human activity reconstructs the functional, teleological conception of the human

agent denied by Enlightenment. MacIntyre’s concepts provide much material for

analyticalcommentary,butIfocusonhowMacIntyredevelopstheseconceptsfrom

AristotleandtheAristoteliantradition.

In the first place, the virtues are developed within a social sphere called

‘practices.’Definingapractice,MacIntyrewrites:

Bya‘practice’Iamgoingtomeananycoherentandcomplexformofsociallyestablishedcooperativehumanactivitythroughwhichgoodsinternaltothatformofactivityarerealizedinthecourseoftryingtoachievethosestandardsofexcellencewhichareappropriatetoandpartiallydefinitiveof,thatformofactivity,withtheresultthathumanpowerstoachieveexcellenceandhumanconceptionsoftheendsandgoodsinvolved,aresystematicallyextended.184

ForMacIntyre,activitiesliketic-tac-toeorthrowingafootballarenotpractices,but

technical skills: abilities and capacities that do not admit of further development.

Once one knows how to do it correctly, nothing further is required to their

performance. They serve the ends and goods of practices, and relate to practices

becauseeverypracticerequirestechnicalskills.185Bycontrast,thefollowingareall

practices:architecture, farming,painting,andmusic; themakingandsustainingof

184AV,187.185AV,193.

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families and political communities; games like chess and football; and theoretical

academicscienceslikephysicsandchemistry.186

MacIntyredevelopsthisaccountfromAristotleintwoways.First,MacIntyre

terms practices to be ‘socially established cooperative’ activities. Building on

Aristotle’s reflection that thepursuitofexcellence is takenup incommonandnot

alone,MacIntyremakespracticesthefunctionofsocialrelations,linkingonehuman

agent with other human agents.187He agrees with this aspect of the Aristotelian

tradition.Heendowsthepursuitofexcellencewithasocial locus thathe thinks is

faithfultoAristotle’sintentionifnothiscontent.188

Second,MacIntyre’sexamplesofpracticesshowthathealtersAristotle’sown

account of human activities. Aristotle distinguishes between poiēsis and praxis,

where the latter addresses human action undertaken for its own sake and the

formeraddressesaproductiveaction, thepurposefulactionofbringingsomething

intobeingdistinctfromtheproducer.YetMacIntyreusesbothactivitiesasexamples

of a practice; he classes the activities of politics and community life alongside

farming andpainting.189Moreover, by classifying theoretical sciences as practices,

heblursAristotle’sinsistentdistinctionbetweenpraxisandtheōria,wherethelatter

concerns the realm of what is contingent and could be other than it is, and the

former concerns the realmofwhat is eternal andunchanging. SettingMacIntyre’s

treatmentoftheōriaaside fornow,hisblurringofpoiēsisandpraxisdemonstrates

186AV,187-88.187Knight(2007),146.188MacIntyredownplaystheindividualizedcomponentsofAristotle’saccount.D’Andrea(2006),271.189ForadefenceofthecontinuityofMacIntyre’sinterpretationfromAristotle,seeKnight(2007),30-36,38.

281

his development of the Aristotelian tradition. MacIntyre argues that productive

crafts are valuable because they help human beings achieve excellence. The

‘craftpersonisperfectedthroughandinherorhisactivity’aswellasbecauseofthe

‘good product.’190He is then able to overcome Aristotle’s diminishment of the

productive arts associated with labour, although MacIntyre drops Aristotle’s

distinctionbetweenproductiveandunproductivepractices.191

Fromunderstandingpractices,MacIntyreargues, it ispossible to introduce

whatvirtueis.Anagententersintoapracticebecausethepracticeaddressesaneed

or desire that they have. It helps the agent achieve certain goods.192Applying the

distinctionbetweeninternalandexternalgoodsthatMacIntyrethinksisimplicitin

Aristotle,MacIntyre argues that practicespursue internal goods. In the context of

practices,internalgoodsarethosethatcanbeachievedonlybyparticipatinginthe

practice and learning to achieve those standards of excellence appropriate to the

practice.Successinthepracticeisonlypossiblebyhabituallycommittingoneselfto

gainingexcellenceinthepractice.InMacIntyre’sexample,theonlywaytobecome

skilled at chess is to play chess.193MacIntyre’s introductory definition of virtue is

thatwhichhelps someone succeed in thepractice: ‘a virtue is anacquiredhuman

quality’enablingustoachievegoodsinternaltothepractice.194

Practicescanalsobehelpfulforattaininggoodsexternaltothepractice.The

difference is that the pursuit of external goods does not require achieving those

190MacIntyre(1994c),284;Knight(2007),155-56.191Knight(2007),147.192Lutz(2012),157.193AV,188.194AV,191.

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standardsofexcellencewithinthepractice.TouseMacIntyre’sexample,supposea

parentencouragesachildbypromisingarewardofcandyforvictory.Candywould

beanexternalgood. If thechildplayschess towincandy, thechildcouldcheat to

winthatcandy,violatingthestandardofexcellencewithinthepracticeofchess.195

Alternatively,thechildcouldfindthatitiseasiertowincandybydoingsomething

else,likesellinglemonadeforcandy.

MacIntyre’sintroductorydefinitionofvirtuehelpsreinforcethatsuccessina

practice requires strong qualities of character. It is necessary to desire the good

internal to the practice for its own sake and not instrumentally, as a means to

achieve an external good. If the child reallywants to learn to play chesswell, he

recognizesthathelearnsmorefromlosingwellthanfromcheatingtowin.Hemust

learn the qualities that allow him to become strong enough to overcome the

temptationtocheat,soassistinghimtosetasidehisdesireforcandyashisprimary

motivationforplayingchess.196

Nevertheless, this definition of virtue only addresses the pursuit of

excellenceinternaltoapractice.AsinAristotle,virtueismadeameansinternalto

the end—but the end is the practice, not the good. A more complete (and more

Aristotelian) definitionmust address how the virtues relate to the pursuit of the

good across various practices.197Many of the virtues an agent cultivateswithin a

practicepresupposea largerunderstanding.MacIntyrethinksthis is thecasewith

justice, understood in Aristotle’s way as giving each person her due. One can

195AV,188.196Lutz(2012),157.197AV,201.

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understandwhatapersonisdueonlybybeingabletoorderandevaluatedifferent

practices in terms of her overarching good.198SoMacIntyre’s second definition of

virtuearguesthatthevirtues‘sustainusintherelevantkindofquestforthegood,’

enabling us to overcome ‘harms, dangers, temptations, and distractions’ and

furnishing us with ‘increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the

good.’199

This account provides a goal to the virtues that transcends particular

practices. In thismanner,MacIntyre addresses the issues of the conflict between

goods that he thought Aristotle had addressed inadequately.200Conflicts between

thegoodscanarisebecauseofthedifferingdemandsmadebetweenpractices.But

ordering and evaluating goods with respect to our personal goals can overcome

these conflicts. MacIntyre’s second definition allows agents to rank the goods

internaltodifferentpractices,bothforthemselvesandforothers,byanoverarching

telostranscendingpractices.

Moreover, the seconddefinition elaborates on a presupposition of the first

definition: that is an agentwho pursues these goals, with a continuous identity

through time and participation inmany different practices.201The agent can only

pursue these goals intelligibly by having an account of the unity of his life, or an

overallhumangood.Theagentactstoseekaunifiedlife,whichisagoodlife.How

198AV,202.SeeLutz(2012),158.199AV,219.200AV,201.201D’Andrea(2006),274.

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then to show that it is rationally justifiable to ‘conceive of each human life as a

unity,’toastospecifythegoodofeachlife?202

InAfterVirtue andhis followingworks,MacIntyre justifies theunityof life,

theoverallhumangood,intermsoftheintrinsicnarrativestructureofhumanlifeor

‘narrative concept of selfhood.’203MacIntyre thinks this account of narrative is

presupposedinAristotleandhispredecessors,butasitwastakenforgrantedthen

itwasnotmadeexplicit.SoMacIntyredevelopsit.204Inhisunderstanding,narrative

isinter-dependentwiththeconceptsofintelligibilityandaccountability—usingone

conceptpresupposestheother.205Theunityoftheindividuallifeofahumanbeingis

the‘unityofanarrativeembodiedinasinglelife’ofahumanbeing.206

Human actions are ‘enacted narratives.’207MacIntyre takes the first step of

Aristotle’s account of practical reasoning, the wants and goals of the agents that

provideacontext forpractical reasoning,andelaborates thesewantsandgoalsas

the storywe each tell about our own life.No action is possiblewithout implicitly

answering the question, ‘of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’208For

MacIntyre, it is only by reference to these previously existing narratives that the

action is intelligible.209By arguing that goals require narratives to be intelligible,

MacIntyre has taken teleology and given it a narrative meaning. To pose the202AV,203.203AV,217.204AV,203.205AV,218.206ForMacIntyre,personalidentityisunityofcharacter.Metaphysicalattemptstojustifypersonalidentitycannotsucceedindependentoftheinter-relatedconceptsofnarrative,intelligibility,andaccountability.AV,218;Lutz(2012),124;D’Andrea(2006),276.207AV,211.208AV,216.209AV,206.Atthisstageofhisargument,MacIntyretakesuptheinsightsofAnscombeandWittgensteinthatintentionalactionsarenotinteriormentaleventsbutmustbeunderstoodwithrespecttosocialpractices.SeePerreau-Saussine(2005),85-87.

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question‘Whatisgoodforme?’istoaskhowbesttoliveoutthenarrativeunityof

mylife.Thisismytelos.

How then to answer the question of what is good for man? MacIntyre

answers that the good is a unified life. The goal an agent is pursuing is to unify,

integrate,andharmonizetheirlife,describedasanarrative‘quest.’210Twofeatures

of this quest relate to MacIntyre’s conception of teleology. First, this quest is in

searchofthegood,theultimategoodbywhichweordertheothergoodsofourlives.

Second,thegoodcannotbeadequatelycharacterizedinadvanceofthepursuitofit.

It has to be discovered. This process of discovery is by no means smooth. As

MacIntyre’s second definition reminds us, harms, dangers, temptations, and

distractionshinder thepursuit of aunified life.These require thedevelopmentof

newqualitiesofcharacteroraneducationinthevirtues.ForMacIntyre,thepurpose

of an education in the virtues is both for acquiring greater self-knowledge, and

gainingagreaterunderstandingofthecharacterofthegoodthatissought.211

MacIntyre’sdefinitionof thecontentof thegoodor telos forman, thegood

lifethat is to filloutthecontentofeudaimonia,constitutesthequest forthegood:

‘thatthegoodlifeformanisthelifespentinseekingforthegoodlifeforman,and

thevirtuesnecessaryforseekingarethosewhichwillenableustounderstandwhat

moreandwhatelsethegoodlifeformanis.’212Farfromprovidingrobustcontentto

the telos of eudaimonia, this is, as MacIntyre says, very much a ‘provisional

210AV,219211AV,219.212AV,219.

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conclusion.’213Nevertheless,hehopesitachievestheobjectivitythateludesamore

specific account of the telos of eudaimonia, and is justifiable in a way that more

substantiveaccountsarenot.214

Suchisthecontextinwhichtheseconddefinitionofvirtueoperates.Yetitis

still incomplete. It considers narrative in terms of an individual, but it does not

considernarrativeintermsofitssocialsetting.Forifstoriesshapeourownlife,so

thatwealwaysactinmediares,inthemidstofpreviouslyexistingstories,thenwe

arealsoheirstothestoriesofothers.Frommembershipinafamily,city,tribe,and

nation, one inherits from the past a variety of expectations and obligations.

MacIntyre holds that the membership in these communities provides an agent’s

‘moralstartingpoint,’givinganagent’slifeitsownmoralparticularity.215Anagent

findshimselfpartofpaststories,partofahistory,whichprovidesthesettingforhis

actions.Inthissense,heispartofatraditionthattransmitspractices.216Tradition

thusprovidesthecriteriaforMacIntyre’sthirddefinitionofvirtue:

The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining thoserelationshipsnecessary if thevarietyofgoods internal topracticearetobeachieved andnot only in sustaining the formof an individual life inwhichthatindividualmayseekouthisorhergoodasthegoodofhisorherwholelife,butalsoinsustainingthosetraditionswhichprovidebothpracticesandindividualliveswiththeirnecessaryhistoricalcontext.217

213AV,219.214D’Andrea(2006),277.215AV,220.216Institutionsalsosustainpractices,andtherebyhavearoletoplayindevelopingtraditions.SeeD’Andrea(2006),277.Yetinstitutionsarenotthesameaspractices,whichcriticsofMacIntyre’sconceptionofapracticefailtoaddress.C.f.Miller(1994);MacIntyre(1994c),284-86.Successfulinstitutionsaresubordinatedtothegoodsinternaltopractices.Theroleofthevirtuesistofocusontheseinternalgoods,keepingtheinstitutionsfromcorruption.SeeAV,194;Knight(2011),25-26.217AV,223.

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MacIntyre’spurposehereisnottoreturntothenormsofthepast,butisinsteadto

reject liberal individualism. The second definition of virtue stops with the

individual. It does not consider the individual’s past. On thatmeasure, a wealthy

aristocratcouldhimselfembodyallthevirtueswithoutconsideringthatthefamily

fortunewasbuilt on injustice.218Tradition connects the individual topasthistory.

MacIntyre’sreflectiononAristotelianjustice,givingeachpersonherdue,expanded

thefirstdefinitionofvirtueintothesecondbynotinghowpracticesstandingalone

wereinsufficientforacknowledgingtheoverarchinggoodoftheperson.Inthesame

way,henotestheinsufficiencyoftheseconddefinitionbyobservinghowit leaves

noplacetoconsiderpastinjusticesthatthwarttheoverarchinggoodoftheperson.

So thethirddefinitionofvirtueconnects the individual to thepastandprovidesa

better,deepersenseofwhatjusticeis.219

AsMacIntyre’s claimwas to choose Aristotle as opposed to Nietzsche, the

culmination of modern liberal individualism, he must show how his account is

Aristotelian. In After Virtue he offers two ways it is not, and three ways it is.

MacIntyre’s account does not require allegiance to Aristotle’s explanation of

teleologybyreferencetometaphysicalbiology.Moreover,MacIntyreacknowledges

thatinsolublemoraldilemmasarepossible.Theycanarisebetweenthedemandsof

competing practices.220The ways it is Aristotelian are ‘at least’ three.221First, it

commits toa rangeofconcepts thatanAristotelianaccountofpractical reasoning

218Lutz(2012),124-25.219AV,126.Miller(1994)neglectstoconsiderhowallthreedefinitionsarerequiredtorealizethevirtueofjustice.SeeMacIntyre(1994c),284-86.220AV,196-97.221AV,197.

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requires,helpingprovidethecorrectphilosophicalpsychologyofhumanagencyto

replytothefailuresofliberalism.222Thisaccountintegratesmoralityintothewhole

rangeofhumanactionanddissolvestheseparationbetweendesireandmorality.223

MacIntyredevelopshisphilosophicalpsychologyinlaterworks,takingcaretoshow

howhisAristotelianismremainsdistinctfromNietzsche’saccount.224

ThesecondwayMacIntyre’saccountisAristotelianaddressesitsdifferences

fromutilitarianismorconsequentialism.InAfterVirtue,heelaboratesononemajor

difference, the account of pleasure and enjoyment. While utilitarianism treats

pleasureandenjoymentas theendofeveryactivity,Aristotle remindsus that the

pleasure and enjoyment differ from activity to activity. Some pleasures are

independentofallactivity,andareassociatedwithexternalgoods.Otherpleasures

are associated with particular activities, and are associated with internal goods.

Consequentialismhasnocapacity tomake thisdistinction.225Moreover,MacIntyre

defends moral absolutes while at the same time rejecting rule-based

consequentialism.Many neo-Aristotelians take the position that abandoning rule-

basedapproachestomoralitymeansabandoningmoralabsolutes.Yet indoingso,

they endorse a version of the consequentialism. For MacIntyre, like Elizabeth

Anscombebeforehim,therejectionofmoralabsolutesisacharacteristicofmodern

222AV,197.MacIntyrelistsseveral,althoughhislistiscertainlyincomplete:‘voluntariness,thedistinctionbetweentheintellectualvirtuesandthevirtuesofcharacter,therelationshipofbothtonaturalabilitiesandtothepassionsandstructureofpracticalreasoning.’223BecauseMacIntyreappearstodownplaytheroleofreasoninpracticalreasoning,Nussbaum(1999,169,196)classifiesMacIntyreasaneo-Humean.Thisisaseriouserror.MacIntyrecarefullydistinguisheshispositionfromHumeanandneo-Humeanaccountsofpracticalreasoning.Hume’smistakeisnottodistinguishbetweenpracticalreasoningoftheform‘Idesirex,’andpracticalreasoningoftheform,‘Idesirexbecausexisgoodtopursue.’MacIntyre(1982),295-305;AV,161;WJWR,298-99.224SeeECM,68,whereBernardWilliamsisthespokesmanofNietzsche.225AV,197-99.

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moral philosophy and politics. Consequentialism justifies Stalinism, for then the

endsofcommunismcanjustifythemeansofterroranddeceit.MacIntyrecounters

consequentialismandStalinismbyupholdinganAristotelianisminwhichthereare

moralabsolutes.226

The thirdwayMacIntyre’s account isAristotelian is that it linksevaluation

andexplanation.By identifyingcertainactionsasvirtuousorvicious,one isnever

onlyevaluating,butalsohelpingexplainwhythoseactionsratherthanotherswere

performed.Withoutreferencetothevirtues,anattemptedexplanationofhumanlife

willaccomplishvery little.227The linkbetweenevaluationandexplanation ismost

evident inMacIntyre’s reconstruction of the functional concept as emerging from

reflectiononapractice.Withinapractice likesailing, the functionalconcepthelps

establish the validity of reasoning from ‘he is a sea-captain,’ to ‘he ought to do

whateverasea-captainoughttodo.’228ItcounterstheHumeanclaimthatnovalid

argument can move from factual premise to evaluative conclusion. MacIntyre’s

account enables a descriptive account of the standards of excellence internal to a

practice,thereasoninginternaltoapractice,toevaluatebetweenrightandwrong

actions.229

Withhisthree-folddefinitionofvirtue,MacIntyreinAfterVirtue thoughthe

developedtheAristoteliantraditioninsuchawayastorehabilitatetheteleologythe

Enlightenment project rejected. Specifically, MacIntyre’s objective was to

226Anscombe(1981)66-71;Perreau-Saussine(2005),88.ForaMacIntyreandiscussionofhowconsequentialismincontemporaryvirtueethicsdepartsfromAnscombe’svirtueethics(1958),seeSanford(2015),69-80.227AV,199.228AV,56-58;Knight(2011),23.229Knight(2011),23.

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rehabilitate the idea that man is a functional concept.230He hoped to imitate

Aristotle’s ergon argument, although distancing himself from the metaphysical

biological substance of this argument.231Practice, the narrative order of a single

human life, and tradition, are MacIntyre’s tripartite substitution for the

metaphysicalbiologicalteleologyof‘man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos.’232

III.DeepeningAristotelianismthroughThomasAquinas

InresponsetosomecriticismsoftheaccountofvirtuesandpracticesinAfter

Virtue, MacIntyre developed his reconstruction of the Aristotelian tradition of

practical reasoning to be more Aristotelian. Although MacIntyre continued to

criticizeAristotleforhisinsufficientlyhistoricalconsciousnessandfordiminishing

the importanceofactivitiesrelated towork,MacIntyre’smost importantrevisions

showhowhedeepenshiscommitmenttotheAristoteliantradition.InthissectionI

shall treat two of MacIntyre’s revisions: adopting the unity of the virtues and

droppingtheconceptofinsolublemoraldilemmas,byformulatingmoralabsolutes

throughtheaccountofthenaturallawprovidedbyThomasAquinas.

ThenoveltyoftheargumentofAfterVirtueinfavourofAristotelianismwon

MacIntyrewidespreadacclaimandmanysupporters.NeverthelessAfterVirtuewas

neverintendedtobeasolitarymagnumopus,butthestartofaresearchprogramme

for the Aristotelian tradition: ‘a work still in progress’ with need for further

refinement in the face of criticism. 233 MacIntyre responded to his critics by

deepeninghiscommitmenttoAristotelianism.Yetsomecritics,initiallysympathetic

230AV,58-59.231Knight(2007),138.232Knight(2011),142.233AV,278.

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to the research programme of After Virtue, were scandalized that MacIntyre’s

deepeningAristotelianismledhimto identifyasaThomist.MarthaNussbaumand

Thomas Nagel, for example, sawMacIntyre’s self-identification as a Thomist as a

rupture with Aristotelianism. In their view, MacIntyre had turned an exciting

programme in ethics into an embrace of Christianity. Perhaps he had hidden this

commitmentallalong.234

This charge ignores how MacIntyre narrates his own movement from

Aristotelianism to Thomism, and fails to engage with where MacIntyre sees

continuity between Aristotelianism and Thomism. Rather than arguing that

MacIntyre’sChristianviewshadbeendrivinghisAristotelianphilosophy,orthathe

had abandoned his philosophical reasoning, it is better to argue that his

AristotelianismleadshimtorecognizephilosophicalproblemsthatThomismhelps

answer. Although his religious views find philosophical justification in Thomism,

theyareasecondaryissue.235

AsMacIntyrenarrates,hebecameaThomistpartlybecause:‘Aquinaswasin

somerespectsabetterAristotelianthanAristotle,thatnotonlywasheanexcellent

interpreterofAristotle’stexts,butthathehadbeenabletoextendanddeepenboth

Aristotle’smetaphysical and hismoral enquiries.’236Quite obviously Aristotle and

Aquinas have major differences. Aquinas is a theologian, and should not be

transformed into a philosopher doing theology. MacIntyre sees Aquinas as

integratingAristotleintotheunderstandingoftheBiblicalreligionprovidedbythe

234Nussbaum(1989)andNagel(1995),203-214.235C.f.Nagel(1995),209.236AV,x.

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tradition Saint Augustine initiates, not vice versa.237But the issue is whether an

initial philosophical conflict between each is reconcilable. Bymaking the issue of

reconcilability about Christianity, Nussbaum and Nagel obscure where MacIntyre

seespossiblereconciliationbetweenAquinasandAristotle—andwherehecomesto

realizeitisnotpossible.

MacIntyretookseriouslythequestionofwhethera ‘reconciliation’between

AquinasandAristotleispossible:itisa‘questionoftherelationshipofclaimsabout

the human virtues to claims about divine law and divine commandments.’238For

MacIntyre’sreconciliationofBiblicalreligionandAristotelianismtohold,MacIntyre

has to defend the Thomist thesis that ‘only a life constituted in key part by

obedience to law could be such as to exhibit fully those virtues without which

humanbeingscannotachievetheirtelos.’239Obediencetothelawmustfitwithinan

accountofthevirtuesandthehumantelos.

Before tackling thismore fundamental issue,MacIntyrerevisedone feature

ofAfterVirtue’sargument,hisrejectionofthescholasticconceptoftheunityofthe

virtues:thattohaveonevirtue,onemusthavethemall.240MacIntyre’streatmentof

this issue reveals how he recognizes philosophical problems that Thomism helps

answer.

In After Virtue, MacIntyre was wary of embracing the unity of the virtues

becausehethoughthewouldhavetotakeasubstantivestandonthecontentofthe

237WJWR,182.238AV,278.239AV,278.240E.g.EN1106b36-1107a2;STIa-IIaequ.65ar.1InsummarizingMacIntyre’smodifiedaccountoftheunityofvirtuesandtheexistenceofevilpractices,IamindebtedtoLutz(2012),160-66.

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virtuesandthenatureofhumanperfectibility.MacIntyreheldthatthecourageous

Nazisoldiershouldberegardedasvirtuous.241AsMacIntyrerealizedbythetimehe

published Whose Justice? Which Rationality? this account led him into serious

difficulties.242Theproblemwith rejecting theunityof thevirtues is that it is then

impossibletospecifyobjectivelywhatmakesanactvirtuous.Itturnedvirtueintoa

qualityoftemperament.243TojudgeNazi’sactionsasevilwouldrequireastandard

externaltohumanagency.Itwouldturntovoluntarismwherethestandardofgood

andevilissuppliedexternally,possiblythroughalawgiver.244

Bycontrast, forAristotle thevirtuesarenevermerequalitiesorhabits,but

habits that make the agent excellent.245As long as the Nazi soldier’s courageous

habitwasdirectedtowardanunjustobject,itcouldnotbedescribedasvirtuous.246

MacIntyrerecognizedthattherejectionoftheunityofthevirtuescompromisedhis

ability to describe a virtuous action in an objective way. So he agreed that to

establishanobjectiveaccountofthevirtuesdemandsdiscoveringtherequirements

241AV,179.MacIntyredebateswithPeterGeach(1977),150-70.GeachisdistinguishinghisownpositionontheunityofthevirtuefromAquinas.InGeach’sviewAquinasheldanall-or-nothinginterpretationoftheunityofthevirtues.YetGeach’spositionmaybeamisreadingofAquinas,seeLutz(2012),183.MacIntyreadmitshisviewontheunityofthevirtues‘wasdueinparttoamisreadingofAquinas,’buthedoesnotspecifytheoriginofhismisreading,WJWR,x.242WJWR,x.243SimilartoKant’saccountofcourage:seeLutz(2012),162.244Lutz(2012),164-65.ThesameissueappliestoMacIntyre’sallowanceinAVthattheremaybeevilpractices(AV,164).WhileKnightsuggeststhatMacIntyrenowholdsthatatraditionofenquiryenablesonetojudgebetweengoodandevilpracticesKnight(2011,23),itisbettertoarguethatMacIntyrechangeshismindnottoallowthematall(considerthelanguageofMacIntyre’sresponsetoFrazerandLacey(1994)inMacIntyre(1994c),289-90).Thisisbecauseitsuggeststhatthehumanpowerstoachieveexcellencecanbegainedinitiallythroughevilaction.Lutz(2012),164-65;EN1104b30-3.245SeeEN1106a15-24.246D’Andrea(2006),265-67.

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of excellence in human agency. The Aristotelian and Thomist path to do so is by

discoveringtheinterrelatednessofthequalitiesofexcellenthumanagents.247

CriticsofMacIntyre’sThomismcouldacceptthisrevisiontodrawawayfrom

voluntarismandanexternal lawgiverprovidingthestandardofgoodandevil.Yet

MacIntyre’sadoptionofThomistnaturallawseemedtoviolatethisverypurpose.248

AfterVirtuewassupposedtobeaffirmingamoralityofthevirtues,buthadinstead

apparently conceded authority to a morality of rules. MacIntyre reminded these

critics that theyweremakingamistake inseeingsuchastarkcontrastbetweena

morality of virtues and a morality of rules. MacIntyre had done no such thing.

InsteadhehadarguedthatanAristotelianmoralityofvirtuesrequiresamoralityof

laws,notablylawsgoverningmoralabsolutes.WhileAristotlewas‘sobriefastobe

cryptic’ on this subject, MacIntyre uses Aquinas to explain in greater detail the

connectionbetweenlawsandthevirtues.249

MacIntyre’s explanation extends through several works, but his basic

intention is to defend the precepts of the natural law that Thomas Aquinas

elaborates.Whatarethepreceptsofthenaturallaw?Theyareoneandthesamefor

everyone,theyareunchangingandunchangeable,theyareknowntobewhatthey

arebyall rationalhumanbeings, and theknowledgeof themcannotbeabolished

from the human heart.250AsMacIntyre already accepted that Aristotle argued for

247ForMacIntyre’smodifiedinterpretationofAristotle’sunityofthevirtues,seeWJWR,137;FortheconsequencesofthismodifiedinterpretationseeLutz(2004),98-104;Lutz(2012),163-64.248Nussbaum(1989)specificallyreferstothis.249WJWR,ix.250EP,65.

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moralabsolutes,hedoesnotthinkthatthisdefinitionofthepreceptsofthenatural

lawviolatesAristoteliantenets.

The Thomist and Aristotelian treatment of the natural law appear very

different.ForAristotlethelawisthatwhichappliestothecitizeninthebestpolis;

forAquinasthelawisthenatural law,thatwhichappliestoeveryhumanbeingin

thecivitasDei.However,MacIntyrefindsaspecificparallelbetweentherolenatural

lawplaysforAquinasandtherolepositivelawplaysforAristotle.Bothoutlinethe

presuppositionsofeffectivepracticalandtheoreticalreasoning.AsAquinaspresents

thelawfromthetheologicalperspectiveofobediencetoGod’slaw,MacIntyrefirst

reinterprets the precepts of the natural law in Aquinas as the presuppositions of

effectivepractical reasoning.Theyhelp initiate theeducation in thevirtues.251For

AristotleandAquinas,thelawgiverhelpsusidentifywhichactionsarejustpriorto

ouracquisitionofvirtue.Thelawalsohasafunctioninoureducationinthevirtues,

byanswering thequestion ‘whataction is itbad formetoperform?’252Toanswer

thisquestiondemandsrationalenquiryintowhataregoodandbadacts.MacIntyre

argues that the precepts of natural law provide the necessary preconditions for

rational enquiry.Theyadmitofnoexception,becauseanyexceptionwill threaten

thepossibilityof rational enquiry.Moreover, theymustbeuniversal, because any

humanbeing is potentially a partner in deliberation concernedwith goods.253For

MacIntyre, there are a variety of ways we can fail to exercise properly the self-

questioning that would enable us to resolve moral disagreements. Violating the

251WJWR,180.252WJWR,181.253EP,79.

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preceptsofthenaturallawisviolatingreason,inthesensethatit ishinderingour

capacity to pursue the truth about goods and the goods, in order that we might

achievethegoodsandthegood.254

To reconcile this account of the natural law to Aristotle requires showing

that Aquinas’s Biblical understanding does not claim that obedience to the law

whollyconstituteshumanlife.Aquinasmustclaimthat‘onlyalifeconstitutedinkey

part by obedience to law could be such as to exhibit fully those virtues without

whichhumanbeingscannotachievetheirtelos.’

In MacIntyre’s interpretation of Aquinas, obedience to the precepts of the

natural law extendsbeyond the act of obedience, simplydoingwhat theprecepts

enjoin and refraining from doingwhat they prohibit. AsMacIntyre describes, the

precepts of the natural law become operational at the point where we have

motivating reasons for performing actions contrary to the precepts. The precepts

thenprovideareasonthatoutweighsthemotivatingreasonsfordisobedience.The

reasonforobedienceisthattheypointustowardamoreperfectgoodthatwouldbe

thwarted by following through on the motivating reasons. Obedience, then, is

meaningfulbyreferencetothismoreperfectgood.Obediencetothelawisonlyone

characteristicofthegoodnessofactions.255

Furthermore, no law governs how to apply the natural law to individual

cases. Only a personwith the right virtues can apply the natural law correctly to

individual cases. Like Aristotle, Aquinas leaves the judgement concerning how to

apply the law to individual cases to the virtue of prudentia (phronēsis). For both254EP,81-82.255WJWR,194-95.

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AristotleandAquinas,phronēsis/prudentia is thereforearequirement forapplying

thenaturallawandtheothervirtues.256Obediencetothenaturallawisanecessary

requirementtoachieveone’stelos,buthardlysufficient.Withoutthevirtues,human

beings cannot achieve their telos. One needs the virtues. Reconciliation between

ThomismandAristotelianism isherepossible.MacIntyrehas successfullymet the

challengehegavehimself.

Of course, reconciliation at this level does not mean the abolition of the

differences between Aquinas and Aristotle. There is a major difference between

AquinasandAristotleinthecontentofthevirtuesandthehumantelos.ForAquinas,

Aristotle only has a partial understanding of what the human telos is, so his

understanding of the virtues is incomplete. On Aquinas’s view, we are naturally

inclinedtodisobeythenaturallaw.Wethereforerequiregracetoobeythelawand

initiatetheeducationinthevirtues.Graceprovidesnewvirtues,notablycharity,the

acquisitionofwhichisaprerequisiteforthenaturalAristotelianvirtuesbeingable

to achieve the genuine human telos. Thus Aristotle is brought into the Biblical

Augustinian framework.257Moreover, while Aquinas’s prudentia closely parallels

Aristotle’sphronēsis, Aquinasdeparts fromAristotle toplaceprudentiawithin the

BiblicalAugustinian framework.Prudentiaisexercised toward theultimateendof

humanbeings,yethumanactionsaremeanttoaccordwithGod’sprovidence.God

createsandordersparticulars;ifweactrightly,ouractionsreproducethisordering

andaretheninaccordwithGod’sprovidence.Forthatreason,Aquinas’sprudentia

alwayshasatheologicaldimension.SowhileMacIntyre’scriticswererighttopoint256WJWR,195-96.257WJWR,181-82.

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out the theological dimension of Thomism, dismissing it as ‘ideological’ fails to

engagewith the continuityMacIntyre sees between Aristotle and Aquinas on the

roleofthenaturallawandunalterablemoralabsolutes.258

Byaffirmingthepreceptsofthenatural lawasunalterablemoralabsolutes,

MacIntyrerecognizesthatitseemstocreateinsolublytragicmoraldilemmas,where

conflictinggoodsprovideonewithnowayofexitingthesituationwithoutviolating

onemoralabsolute.InAfterVirtue,oneofhiscriticismsofAristotlewasthathehad

ill-appreciated the tragic character of these situations. Later, however, he

acknowledges he made a mistake. Correcting this mistake from a Thomistic

standpoint,MacIntyrearguesthatinsolublemoraldilemmasonlyemergeasaresult

ofaprioractionthatviolatedapreceptofthenaturallaw.259

To deal with moral dilemmas, MacIntyre emphasizes against Williams,

Nussbaum, and others thatmoral dilemmas should not be treated as brute facts,

producinginescapabletragedy. Instead,moraldilemmasappear inescapablytragic

only through a certain theoretical account that makes certain conclusions about

their source and how resolvable they are.260MacIntyre’s theoretical account sees

moral dilemmas arising in a different way. Individuals arrive in moral dilemmas

becauseoftheirpracticalreasoning.261Theyfindthemselvesconfrontingasituation

wherenorightactionseemsavailable.Nevertheless,theyarestillseekingtopursue

the right action,which iswhy they cannot simply drop one horn of the dilemma.

Aquinas’s account of moral dilemmas is helpful because it shows how these

258WJWR,196-97.C.f.Nussbaum(1989).259EP,viii-ix.260EP,96;WJWR,186-187.261EP,93.

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situationsarise,butsuggeststheagentfollowtheirdesiretopursuetherightaction

byself-questioningtheirpracticalreasoningthathasbroughtthemtothispoint.The

problemliesinthereasoningthathasledonetoconcludesomethingaboutoneor

bothhornsof thedilemma. Insteadofassumingtheoreticallythatmoraldilemmas

are brute facts, Aquinas takes the theoretical stance that anyone can understand

that their reasoning is in error, and right reasoning can always rescue the agent

fromseemingmoraldilemmas.262

IV. Continuity and Rupture with Aristotelianism: MacIntyre’sMetaphysicalBiology

The most significant revision following After Virtue, however, is that

MacIntyrechangeshisstancetowardAristotle’s ‘discreditedmetaphysicalbiology.’

He now believes his account of the virtues requires both a metaphysics and a

biology—exactly as Aristotle thought. Yet his version is not Aristotelian in

substance.AlthoughhismetaphysicsmaintainscontinuitywithAristotle,thebiology

and the corresponding account of the virtues he develops do not. It is on these

issueswhereheadoptsThomistandun-Aristotelianpositions.

In After Virtue, MacIntyre’s argument made teleology intelligible by the

reflectiononsocialpracticesthataimatthegoodthehumanagentdesires,revealing

that the agent is aiming at an ultimate good. This could be accomplished while

discountingAristotle’sexplanationofteleologyinhisaccountofhumannature—his

metaphysical biology. Yet by making teleology ‘social’ rather than ‘metaphysical,’

MacIntyre opened himself to the criticism that he had not actually succeeded in

262EP,99-100;WJWR,187.

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providing an objective account of the virtues and teleology.263He was therefore

vulnerabletothechargethathisaccountofthevirtuesandteleologydidnotescape

relativism.The kind of relativism suggestedherewould be thatMacIntyre’s truth

claimsaboutvirtueandteleologyalwaysdependuponthelimitedviewoftheworld

theperspectiveofsocialculturesprovide,ratherthanaclaimthattranscendsthese

perspectives.264

In clarifying whether his account of teleology was ‘social’ rather than

‘metaphysical,’MacIntyrerealizedthathisaccountofsocialteleologypresupposeda

specificaccountofhumannature,aspecificmetaphysicalgrounding.Heneededto

acceptthathumanbeingshaveaparticularend(inwhichpractices,traditions,and

the narrative unity of human life function as they do) toward which they are

directedbyreasonoftheirspecifichumannature.265Althoughhehadtriedtoevade

Aristotle’s ergon argument, he had to face it directly. He could not explain the

humanultimategoodwithoutalsoexplainingthenatureofthehumanbeing.

AsMacIntyresuggestsinWhoseJustice?,thedangerwasthatintheabsence

of this kind of explanation, it was too easy to transform Aristotle into another

protagonistofmodernity.Recallthatmodernityrejectstheideaofanultimategood.

Thecontemporaryspokesmanformodernity,JohnRawls,goessofarastosaythat

theideaofsubordinatingallouraimstooneultimateend‘strikesusasirrational,or

morelikelyasmad.’266YetRawlscitesAristotlewithapproval;Rawlsassuresusthat

263Forasummaryofthesecriticisms,seeLutz(2004),115-19.264SeeLutz(2012),175-76.NotethatthechargeofrelativismappliedhereisdistinctfromthechargeofrelativismappliedtoMacIntyre’sclaimsabouttheprocessoftherationaljustificationofatradition.265AV,xi.266Rawls(1971),554.CitedinWJWR,165.

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he is not alien or mad. Nussbaum echoes Rawls by emphasizing that Aristotle

recognizes thevarietyandheterogeneityofgoods, incontrast toThomasAquinas.

MacIntyre’s reply is that Aristotle and Aquinas both recognize the variety and

heterogeneity of goods, understanding them as goods insofar as they are

constituents of ‘the kind of life directed to the good and the best.’267Rawls and

NussbaumcandiscountAristotle’sultimategoodandtransformhimintoafamiliar,

sane,modernbecausetheysetasideAristotle’sPoliticsandthemoremetaphysical

aspects ofAristotle’s account of humannature as determined toward a particular

telos. Aristotle understands the ultimate good through how the good life is

constitutedinthepolis,andhowthispoliticallifefindsitscompletionwithreference

toitsplaceintheteleologicalorderofthecosmos.268

To establish the impossibility of aligning MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelianism

with the modernist appropriation of Aristotelian views practiced by Rawls and

Nussbaum, MacIntyre clarifies the place of metaphysical explanation in the

Aristoteliantradition.He finds inAquinas themostcogentaccountof theultimate

human good presupposing an account of human nature.269Interpreting Aristotle,

Aquinas argues that the essence of goodness consists in what is desirable.270

Goodnessiswhatalldesire,andalldesiretheirownperfection.Perfectionrelatesto

a being’s actuality or its existence. Aquinas then argues that being is prior to

goodness: for something to be good and desirable, it must be actual—it must

267WJWR,165.MacIntyrereferstoNussbaum(1978),(1986).268WJWR,165-66;EP,4-5.269‘Ihad,withoutrealizingit,presupposedthetruthofsomethingveryclosetotheaccountoftheconceptofthegoodthatAquinasgivesinquestion5inthefirstpartoftheSummaTheologiae.’AV,xi.270InSTIaqu.5ar.1.AquinascitesAristotledirectlytoestablishthisargument:‘HencethePhilosophersays(Ethic.i):“Goodnessiswhatalldesire."’

302

exist.271As being precedes the good, the understanding of the goodmust also be

informedbyanunderstandingofourbeing,orthekindofnaturalsubstancethatwe

are. It is because Aristotle takes this argument to be correct that he explains

teleologyintermsofthespecificitiesofthehumannature.Hethengivesanaccount

of the specific human telos and the specific kind of flourishing that realizes this

telos.272MacIntyreexplicitlyadopts thesamestructure,evenwith its cosmological

implications.

Inordertoprovideharmonyandorderforthevarietyandheterogeneityof

goods, addressing the ultimate good, Aristotle formulates a conception of the

unifyingpurposeofallaction,whichMacIntyredefends.Thisconceptionservesas

thefirstprinciple(archē)ofpracticalreasoning.Thearchēisafixedandunalterable

end, providing a permanent, universal standard for evaluating action.273It is this

metaphysical feature that supplies stability ofmeaning and thereby objectivity.274

Thearchē isfirstinthesensethatit istheprinciple,theend,uponwhichallother

acts of practical reasoning are based. Deliberation about acts is about ordering

means to achieve a predetermined end.Only insofar aswe have anarchē canwe

thenembarkondeliberation.275Thearchēofpracticalreasoningisanaction-guiding

principle,connectingtothetelosofaction.AsAristotlesays, ‘Deductivearguments

concerningwhatistobedonehaveanarchē.Sincesuchandsuchisthetelosandthe

271InSTIaqu.5ar.2,AquinascitesAristotledirectlytoestablishthisargument:‘ItissaidbyAristotle(DeCausis)that"thefirstofcreatedthingsisbeing."’ 272Knight(2007),195.273TP,146.274TP,152.275WJWR,132-33.

303

best...’276Thearchēistheprincipleinaccordwithwhichthehumanagentdevelops

otheraction-guidingprinciplesthatenabletheagenttorecognizewhenhisdesires

arepointinghim inadirectionaway fromtheultimategood, thewrongdirection,

and correct them to the right direction.277There are two aspects to the archēof

practical reasoning, which MacIntyre describes in the following way. ‘We reason

theoreticallytoandaboutthatultimateendwhichisthearchēofpracticalenquiry

and reasoning, but from thatarchē it is by practical reasoning thatwe are led to

particular conclusions about how to act.’278So while the archē is discovered by

theory,aproperunderstandingofthearchēcannotsetasidethecharacterizationof

practicalreasoninginitsowntermsthatusesthearchē.

MacIntyre’s contention is that while the ultimate human good is

metaphysical,theconceptionoftheultimatehumangoodmustbeunderstoodfirst

bytheplaceithasinpracticalreasoning.Onemustnottosetasidethereflectionon

practical reasoning and social context to find a satisfactory metaphysical

explanation derived from theoretical reasoning. Philosophical theory must not

dictate what practical reasoning is from a standpoint external to practical

reasoning. 279 MacIntyre situates himself against two camps. Renaissance

Aristotelians assume one can beginwith a theory of the ultimate good and then,

secondarily, find an application for the theory of the ultimate good in practice.280

Theyfailfortworeasons.First,theoreticalargumentsabouttheultimategoodnever

276ENVI1144a32-35;MacIntyrecitesthisinTP,146.277D’Andrea(2006),311;ECM,55.278WJWR,193.MacIntyredrawsfromAquinas,CommentaryontheEthicsVI,lect.2.279ECM,53.280EP,7-18,36.E.g.FrancescoPiccolomini,LeonardoBruni,andJohnCase.

304

succeedinformingthegoodcharacterthatisarequirementofsuccessfulpractical

reasoning.281Second, as contemporary Aristotelians correctly note in criticizing

‘Grand End’ views of practical reasoning, one does not first need theoretical

knowledge of the ultimate good to act correctly. It is mistaken to think that an

agent’s choice shows the virtue of prudence only if it realizes the agent’s grand

picture, ‘a true and acceptable account of the good.’ 282 Yet the camp of

contemporary Aristoteliansmistakenly argue that a genuine Aristotelian position

takes the theoretical conception of the ultimate good as irrelevant to agent’s

practicalreasoning.

Bycontrast,MacIntyrearguesthatturningtoatheoreticalconceptionofthe

ultimategoodhelpsjustifythechoiceshumanagentsmake:

Sincewhatdiscriminatesonekindof character fromanother is howgoodsare rank ordered by the agent, and since each rank ordering of goodsembodiessomeconceptionofwhatthegoodlifeforhumanbeingsis,wewillbe unable to justify our choices until and unless we can justify someconceptionofthehumangood.283

MacIntyrestressesthepracticalrelevancetotheagentofatheoreticallygrounded

conception of the human good, which is grounded in metaphysics.284MacIntyre’s

statement of the place of archē in theoretical reasoning is important here, as it

remindsusthatitisnotan‘epistemological’firstprinciple,asCartesianphilosophy

adopts and Aristotelian philosophy must reject. In MacIntyre’s telling, Aristotle

developsaconceptionofdialecticalenquirythataimstogiveanaccountofthefirst

281EP,21.282Broadie(1991),198.CitedinEP,22.MacIntyrecharacterizesBroadieasa‘contemporaryAristotelian.’ShearguesMacIntyresubscribestothe‘GrandEnd’view.283EP,36.284EP,26.

305

principles (archai) of the field being discussed. But acquiring knowledge of first

principles is a process. They are not knowable at the outset of the enquiry.285

Moreover, the conclusion one makes is always in need of further elaboration or

development.286

In the course of an agent’s practical reasoning, seeking an answer to the

questionofwhatsortofhumanbeingheshouldbecome,theagentdiscoverswhat

thegoodisandbeginstothinktheoretically,tophilosophize,aboutthegood.Itdoes

notmeananagentmust firstbea theoristorphilosophertoactprudently. In this

respectthecontemporaryAristoteliancritiqueofthe‘GrandEnd’positioniscorrect.

Instead it is to say that good rational agents seeking to justify their choicesbegin

theoreticalenquiry,andbecomemoralphilosophers.287

So what then is the archē, the ultimate good of practical reasoning, that

theoretical enquiry discovers?MacIntyre’s holds off from providing a substantive

account.TheviewthatheascribestoAristotleemphasizesthedialecticalcharacter

of this discovery. His Aristotelian tradition provides an ‘outline sketch’ of

eudaimonia.288ButitsetsasideAristotle’ssubstantiveanswerofcontemplationasa

caseofphilosophicaltheorizingfailingtocharacterizethelifeofpracticeinitsown

terms.WhatMacIntyrepreferstodoislistsomecharacteristicsoftheultimategood.

Itsachievementinvolvesahighdegreeofself-knowledge.Itisanendthatcompletes

andperfectsthelifeoftheagentwhoachievesit.Whenothergoodsaregiventheir

dueplaceinthelifeoftheagent,thentheagentisdirectedtowardtheachievement

285TP,146-50.286SeeTP,149.287EP,35.288EP,35.

306

ofhisultimategood,andviceversa.289Thiskindofdescriptionreinforcesfeaturesof

theultimategoodalreadyknown.Anadditionalstep,onetakenbyThomasAquinas,

istoapproachthequestionnegativelyanddeterminewhattheultimategoodcannot

be.290Thisrulesoutalifecompletelydirectedtoacquisitionorpossessionofmoney,

politicalhonours,reputation,power,health,pleasure,aswellasintellectual,moral,

aesthetic, and spiritual excellence.291 This kind of answer makes it clear that

MacIntyreisrecastingtheergonofthehumanbeingasoneofrationalenquiryinto

theultimategood.292

There is one way to describe the content of ultimate good positively. For

Aristotle, the content of the human good is determined in a particular way.

MacIntyre frequently emphasizes that Aristotle held that one cannot deliberate

aboutone’sowngoodwithoutdeliberatingaboutthegoodofone’scommunity,and

viceversa.293Theergonof thehumanbeingcannotbeactualizedwhenthehuman

being is detached from the context of the community, thepolis. In a likemanner,

MacIntyreholdsthattheergonofthehumanbeingissuchthatthehumanagentcan

onlydeliberateabouthisowngoodwhiledeliberatingaboutthegoodoftheagent’s

community, embodied in practices, relationships with others, and traditions. The

ergonofthehumanbeingcanonlybeactualizedincommon.294

289ECM,53.290ECM,53,229;MacIntyrereferstoSTIa-IIaequ.2-3;andqu.2ar.1-8.SeealsoD’Andrea(2006),277.291ECM,53,229.292SeeECM,86.293EP,35.Itis‘fromwithinandonlyfromwithinagivenpolis,’thatonecanaskwhatistheultimatehumangood.WJWR,133.294ECM,51-52;seealsoWJWR,133.

307

Inthelastanalysis,theAristoteliantraditioncannotbringforthaprotagonist

of modernity because the Aristotelian tradition characterizes the ergon of the

human being in terms anathema to modern liberal individualism. Again, the

fundamental opposition is between Aristotle and Nietzsche. In Ethics and the

Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre contrasts his neo-Aristotelianism with the

Nietzcheanconceptionoftheergonofhumanbeing.TheNietzscheanconceptionof

the ergon is that it is actualized when the human being excludes oneself from

practices, relationships, and tradition. From MacIntyre’s perspective, the

Nietzscheandeniesoneself ‘thepossibilityofunderstandingwhatit istobesucha

rationalagent.’295

To elaborate on the specific human nature that supports this common

deliberationaboutthegood,MacIntyreacknowledgesthattheaccountofthegoods

requires a biological explanation, which he develops in Dependent Rational

Animals.296The intention of Dependent Rational Animals is in a significant way

Aristotelian.MacIntyrehasfullydiscardedtheinitialconvictionofAfterVirtue:that

it was possible to reconstruct teleology without reference to the ‘metaphysical

biology’ that explains Aristotle’s teleology. Nevertheless MacIntyre acknowledges

that the biological explanation he offers inDependentRationalAnimals is ‘not an

especiallyAristotelianone.’297

InDependantRationalAnimals, MacIntyre builds a link between the social

practices human beings hold in commonwith intelligent non-human animals like

295ECM,58.296DRA,x.297AV,xi.

308

dolphinsandgorillas.Thesocialpracticesofeachinvolvethepursuitofrespective

goods—whatcontributestotheflourishingofamemberofthatspecies.MacIntyre

argues that intelligent non-human animals are, like human beings, capable of

practicalreasoning.Whetherwearespeakingofhumans,dolphins,orgorillas,when

wedescribethemactingtopursuetheirgoodsthemeaningof ‘goods’ is ‘precisely

the same.’ 298 MacIntyre believes that philosophers have overemphasized the

distinctions between human and non-human animals, obscuring resemblances.299

MacIntyre regards the focus on human animality—the emphasis of the features

humananimals sharewithnon-humananimals—asanAristotelian regard, for ‘no

philosopherhastakenhumananimalitymoreseriously.’300

To identify what is specifically human flourishing, MacIntyre follows

Aristotle in identifying human flourishing with a specifically human activity. As

opposed to dolphins, human beings need to understand themselves as practical

reasonersaboutgoods,andargueandlearnfromothersabouthumanflourishing.301

All this helps us judge truly for ourselveswhat is good.Human flourishing is not

possiblewithoutthisindependenceofjudgement.Unlikegorillasanddolphins,the

specificactivitythatmustberealizedforhumanflourishingisforthehumanbeing

to be an independent practical reasoner. Independence here signifies that we

humans, using language in different ways than animals, evaluate our own social

298DRA,61;64.299DRA,49-51.300DRA,5.301DRA,67-68.

309

practicesandthesocialpracticesofothers.Thisenablesustojudgeandactonour

own.302

Now,Aristotleheld that the criterionof self-sufficiency is a requirementof

the ultimate good. Aristotle argued that themegalopsychos (themagnanimous or

great-souledman)isaparagonofvirtuebecauseheisself-sufficient.Forexample,

the megalopsychos is ashamed to receive benefits because it is the mark of an

inferior to receive benefits. 303 By contrast, MacIntyre criticizes Aristotle’s

megalopsychosforindulgingintheillusionofself-sufficiency.Aristotlelosessightof

our animal dependency, and assumes that the human being does not require the

communalrelationshipsofothersinordertolivewell.Thisisamistakealsomade

by Nietzsche. 304 To establish a stronger difference between Nietzsche’s

individualism and neo-Aristotelianism requires dropping themegalopsychia from

the virtues. So MacIntyre turns ‘Aristotle against Aristotle’ with ‘the aid of

Aquinas.’305

While MacIntyre follows Aristotle in arguing that we need the virtues

because of the kind of biological being we are, he emphasizes different virtues,

arguingthatwearerationalanimalswhosevulnerability(susceptibilitytodisability

andaffliction)throughoutmostoflifemakesusmutuallydependentononeanother.

To become independent practical reasoners, we require the constant aid and

assistanceofotherindependentpracticalreasoners.306Thevirtuesthatenableusto

302DRA,71-77;Knight(2007),197-98.303DRA7,127;MacIntyrecitesEN1124b9-10.304DRA,162-65;Knight(2007),198-99.305DRA,8.306DRA,81-98;D’Andrea(2006),378.

310

become independent practical reasoners are the virtues that foster these

relationshipsofaidandassistance, thevirtuesof ‘acknowledgeddependency.’307A

keyvirtueofacknowledgeddependency iswhatMacIntyrecalls thevirtueof ‘just

generosity.’308To conceptualize the virtue of just generosity MacIntyre follows

Aquinas against Aristotle. MacIntyre replaces Aristotle’s flawed virtue of

megalopsychia with Aquinas’s virtue ofmisericordia (mercy or pity).Misericordia

calls us to meet the urgent needs of our fellow human beings, notably when

situations of vulnerability arise.309Only when we can depend on others can the

goods human beings seek to pursue in their social practices be realized. The

communal life that Aristotle argued belongs essentially to human beings can

therebyberealizedonlywhenthevirtueofmisericordia isconsideredthegreatest

ofvirtuesinrelatingtoourneighbour.310

MacIntyre’s argument in Dependent Rational Animals thus exposes two

pointsofrupturewithAristotle.First, itshowshowMacIntyredevelopsAristotle’s

ergon argument in a different way than Aristotle. MacIntyre believes Aquinas’s

accountofthevirtueiscorrectbecauseofthehumanbiologicalconditionofmutual

dependency.Thehumanergon isexplained in termsofmutualdependency,which

underwrite the conditions for human flourishing. Aristotle, for his part, stressed

self-sufficiencytoestablishhistheoryofthekeyvirtuesandtheultimategood.The

humanergonisexplainedbytheactivityofthehumanbeing,theself-sufficiencyof

the rational soul, which bears the least resemblance to animals. Self-sufficiency

307DRA,120.308DRA,121-23;foraconciseexplanationofthevirtueof‘justgenerosity’seeDunne(2013),65.309DRA,123-28;MacIntyreisinterpretingSTIIa-IIaequ.30ar.3,qu.31ar.3.310DRA,125;MacIntyrecitesSTIIa-IIaequ.30ar.4.

311

therebyunderwrites thecondition forhuman flourishing.Bycontrast,MacIntyre’s

explanation of the human ergon comes from human social practices that most

resembleanimals.311

A second rupture lies in the consequence of MacIntyre’s rejection of self-

sufficiency.ForAristotle,self-sufficiencyultimatelyjustifiesthebesthumanlife,the

contemplative life, because it is the life that is themost self-sufficient.MacIntyre

cannotacceptthatargument.312SoonepartofMacIntyre’sneo-Aristotelianismsets

asideAristotle’s answerof the contemplative life as thebest life, fornotproperly

characterizing the lifeofpractice in itsown terms.Yetanotherpart,developed in

DependentRationalAnimals,rejectsthesubstanceofAristotle’scontemplativelifeas

thebestlife.

ThesetworupturesemergebecauseofthedifferencesbetweenAquinasand

Aristotle.InopposingAquinas’smisericordiatoAristotle’smegalopsychia,MacIntyre

concedes that there is greater opposition between Aquinas and Aristotle than he

hadinitiallythought.313Tobevirtuous,Aquinaswishesnottoshareintheattitudes

of Aristotle’smegalopsychos.314Thus it is Aquinas, not Aristotle, who provides a

correcttheoryofthevirtues.Moreover,itisAquinas,notAristotle,whoprovidesan

accountofthebestlife.

V.ThomismandtheFinalEndofHumanLife

MacIntyrehadclaimedinAfterVirtuethathisaccountwasnotAristotelianin

twoways: itdoesnotrequireallegiance toAristotle’smetaphysicalbiology,and it

311Knight(2007),200.312Knight(2007),200.SeeEN1177a28-1177b1.313DRA,x-xi;AV,xi.314DRA,xi.

312

gives an account of moral dilemmas, that does not spring from a character flaw

alone. In his later revisions, hemade his accountAristotelian in both theseways.

Moreover,hesubscribedtotheunityofthevirtues.Healsosawsufficientcontinuity

betweenAristotleandAquinas toadoptAquinas’s formulationsof these issues, as

wellasadoptingAquinas’sviewsonthenaturallaw.

One might wonder why MacIntyre chose to identify himself as a Thomist

ratherthanasanAristotelianwhoagreedwithAquinas’selaborationsonAristotle’s

positions. The best answer is that on MacIntyre’s own account of philosophy,

philosophical positions are always embedded within traditions of enquiry and

cannotbe articulated intelligiblyoutsideof a traditionof enquiry.Aphilosophical

personistrainedintoatradition,butitmayneverhavebeenexplicitlyformulated

for them. For that reason, a philosophical person can experience ‘a shock of

recognition’whensheencountersa coherentpresentationof tradition: ‘this isnot

only, so such apersonmay say,what I now take tobe truebut in somemeasure

whatIhavealwaystakentobetrue.’315MacIntyre’sself-identificationasaThomist

is such an instance in the biography of a philosophical person. Upon studying

Aquinasmorecarefully,hisshockofrecognitionwasthatevenduringtheperiodof

his self-identificationwithAristotelianismhehad ‘in somemeasure’ always taken

theprominentphilosophicalpositionsofThomismtobetrue.

This also applies to MacIntyre’s Catholicism. He was received into the

Catholic Church in 1983, following the publication of After Virtue. MacIntyre had

turnedtoKarlBarthasacountertoliberaltheology’slackofrealfaith,butthrough

315WJWR,394.

313

Barth,MacIntyrehadlosthisownfaith.HelearnedfromBarthtoseparaterational

philosophical argument from theology, considering them as two wholly separate

spheres. MacIntyre then realized he could not rationally justify religious belief.

Later, MacIntyre learned why the separation Barth made was false. 316 Here

Aristotelianismplayedamajorrole. ‘Iwasonlyable torespond to the teachingof

the Church,’ said MacIntyre, ‘because I had already learned from Aristotelianism

boththenatureofthemistakesinvolvedinmyearlierrejectionofChristianity,and

how to understand aright the relation of philosophical argument to theological

inquiry.’317

MacIntyre’s interpretation of Aristotle acknowledged that according to

Aristotle,reasoncouldshowthatGodexistsandthatitispossibletogainknowledge

ofGodinsomesense.AccordingtoMacIntyre,Aristotle’sbesthumanlifetakesplace

‘in the overall life of the polis, which itself has to be understood, in this light, as

existing for the sake of that in human beingswhich links them to the divine. All

rationalpracticalactivityhasasitsultimatefinalcausethevision,sofarasitisopen

to human beings, ofwhat God sees.’318OnceMacIntyre granted that reason could

gainknowledgeofGodinsomesense,therewasnolongerthecompleteseparation

between philosophy and theology that Barth imagined. The pressing question is

what ‘insomesense’means. Inanswering thisquestion,MacIntyrewashelpedby

Thomas Aquinas and his doctrine of analogy.319MacIntyre holds that Thomism’s

specificallyreligiousconclusions—thatknowledgeofGodisinsomesensepossible

316MacIntyre(1994b),257.317MacIntyre(1994b),266.318WJWR,143.319Perreau-Saussine(2005),145-46.

314

and that he exists—have intrinsic philosophical merit consonant with

Aristotelianism. 320 Barth’s anxiety, that any theology too close to philosophy

succumbed to liberal theology and to liberalism, no longer troubled MacIntyre:

liberalism could be refuted on the secular philosophical grounds Aristotelianism

provided.321YettoadoptThomistelaborationsofAristotelianismmeantMacIntyre

wasworkingfromwithintheThomisttraditionandhadrecognizeditsconclusions

tobecorrect.SoheidentifiedhimselfwithThomism.

There is then an additional step to take. Once the identification with this

traditionbecomespartofthelifeofthephilosophicalperson,rationalityrequiresof

suchapersonthat:

he or she confirm or disconfirm over time this initial view of his or herrelationshiptothisparticulartraditionofenquirybyengaging, towhateverdegree is appropriate, both in the ongoing argumentswithin that traditionandinargumentativedebatesandconflictsofthattraditionofenquirywithoneormoreofitsrivals.322

OnceMacIntyrehasidentifiedasaThomist,hemustdebatefromthatperspective.

SoheengagesinongoingargumentswithinThomism,aswellaselaboratingdebates

withtraditionsofenquirythatconflictwithThomism.

Intheprocessofdoingso,hemakesthefollowingdiscovery.Hehadinitially

identifiedastrongcontinuitybetweenAristotleandAquinas.Heregardshisviews

about the relationshipbetween theologyandphilosophyaspartof the continuity.

Nevertheless,hediscoveredthathecouldnotpassoverthepointsofdiscontinuity

320SeealsoD’Andrea(2006),389-93.321‘Myphilosophy…issecularinitscontentasanyother.’MacIntyre(1994b),266.SeealsoMacIntyre’saccountoftheself-understandingofearly20thcenturyThomists,ECM,106.322WJWR,394.

315

andrupturebetweenAristotleandAquinasonthecontentofthevirtuesandofthe

bestlife.CompletereconciliationbetweenthetwoeludesMacIntyre.

What then isMacIntyre’saccountof thebest life, and inwhatwaydoeshe

regard it as Aristotelian? To answer the question of the best life, he recasts

Aristotle’s life of theoretical contemplation into an account of the practice of

theoretical enquiry provided by Thomism. As a Thomist, he does not regard his

account as identical to Aristotle. As outlined above, themost significant ruptures

betweenAristotle andMacIntyre’sThomismarise inMacIntyre’s rejectionof self-

sufficiency in life as illusory, entailing a rejection of megalopsychia as well as

Aristotle’scontemplativelifeasthebestlife.Therewasasignofthislatterrupture

inAfterVirtue.MacIntyredescribedtheoreticalactivityasapractice.Aristotlenever

did this, and was insistent on distinguishing between praxis and theōria: praxis

concernstherealmofwhatiscontingentandcouldbeotherthanit is,andtheōria

concernstherealmofwhatiseternalandunchanging.

FollowingAfterVirtue,MacIntyrediddevelophisAristotelianismtoconfirm,

thatphilosophicalenquirymustbetheoretical inAristotle’ssense: itmustaddress

therealmofwhatiseternalandunchanging.Afterall,MacIntyreacknowledgesthat

hecannotjustifyhisaccountofteleologywithoutametaphysicalexplanationtaking

theformofadefenceoffirstprinciples.‘Archē/principiumandtelos/finis,soitmust

seem, stand or fall together.’ 323 As described above, the archē is decisively

metaphysical. It is a fixed and unalterable end, providing a permanent, universal

standardforevaluatingaction.MacIntyreholdsthatthisun-modernconclusionisa

323TP,146.

316

reasonable conclusion to make. The distinctiveness of Aristotelianism in both

theoretical explanation and practical rationality is its first principle of the

reasonableness of a ‘final good’ or ‘final end,’ to introduce MacIntyre’s Thomist

vocabularyforthe‘ultimategood.’324

ForMacIntyre’sactivityoftheoreticalenquirytobea‘practice’inhisuseof

the term, one must be able to identify a telos or distinctive good internal to the

activity of enquiry. 325 Although neither Aristotle nor Aquinas systematically

discussesthepracticalactivityofenquiry,MacIntyrearguesthatAristotlesupplies

thistelosinPosteriorAnalytics.Thistextprovidestheaccountofaperfectedscience,

aperfectedtypeofunderstandingortheoreticalenquiry.326PosteriorAnalyticshelps

clarifythat‘achievedunderstandingisthetheoreticalgoalofthepracticalactivityof

enquiry.’ 327 Aristotle’s account, filled out by Aquinas and other Aristotelian

interpreters,arguesthatunderstandingisonlyachievedonceonegraspsthearchai.

Consequently,theoreticalenquiryhasasitsteloswhatiseternalandunchanging.328

Moreover, enquiry aims at completion or finality. At least theoretically, there is a

finalterminusforenquiry.MacIntyrefindsthisconclusionparticularlyimportantin

defendinghismetaphysicalrealism,because itallowsusto justifywhyanotionof

truthinvolvesanabsolutestandpoint.329‘AbouttruthitselfAristotlesaidverylittle,’

writesMacIntyre,sohelookstoAquinasfora‘moreextendedaccount.’330

324Knight(2007),165.325TP,156.326TP,155.327TP,156.328TP,156-57.329TP,208;157-58.330TP,159.

317

Describing the practice of philosophical or theoretical enquiry within the

Thomist tradition,MacIntyre supplies four characteristics. First, allmen desire to

knowandunderstand,sophilosophypursuesquestionsposedbyhumanbeingsin

general.331Professional philosophers elaborate questions about the universe and

theendsoflifethatarefirstexploredby‘plainpersons,’ordinarypeopleuntrained

as philosophers. 332 Second, philosophy as practice has and develops its own

standards of excellence, including a semi-technical vocabulary, and its own

specializations.333Good philosophical practice preserves as the central topics for

developingitsstandardofexcellenceorinternalgoods‘thenatureoftruth,ofgood,

of rational justification, and ofmeaning.’334Moreover, good philosophical practice

developsitsownstandardsofexcellencewithoutlosingsightofthequestionsabout

theuniverseandtheendsoflifefirstexploredbyplainpersons.335Third,philosophy

providesasystem:itprovidesacomprehensivevisionofthegood,theendsoflife,

and the order of things.336Good philosophical practice contributes to previously

existingconversationsaboutthissystem,acknowledgingtherolefutureparticipants

have to make further contributions.337Fourth, philosophy can learn from God’s

revelation.Thisrelationshipisacomplexone,buttherearetwoconceptionsofthis

relationship towhichMacIntyredoesnotsubscribe.Revelation isnotsupposedto

putadecisiveendtotherationalenquiriesofphilosophy,showingphilosophytobe

331TP,180.332TP,187.Foranaccountof‘plainpersons,’seeMacIntyre(1992).MacIntyreintendsthetermtobefairlyuniversal,but‘plainpersons’mightbefarlesscommonthanhethinks.Beiner(2014),183-88.333TP,180.334TP,131.335TP,130.336TP,181.337TP,130-31.

318

redundant and unnecessary before the claims of revelation. Nor is philosophy

limitedasaprologuetorevelation,afterwhichitmustbesilent.Instead,revelation

ennoblesphilosophy: itprovidesnewresourcesandteachesphilosophicalenquiry

where it can best pursue further questions. A holy life does not stop being a

philosophicallife.338

While the furtherdetailsof thisaccountarebeyond thepresentstudy, it is

importanttonotetwoAristotelianfeatures.Carryingonfromhischaracterizationof

Aristotle’sdialecticsasaprovisionalkindofenquiry,MacIntyre’sThomistaccount

emphasizesthatprogressinenquiryisalwaysopentofuturecontributions,making

progressinphilosophyprovisional.Aristotle’sdialecticsisinsearchofarchaiasits

telos.339Toreachthetelosoftruthisalong,challenging,andsometimesfrustrating

process, and conclusions admit of further possible revision. Yet MacIntyre

emphasizes the provisional character of enquiry more than Aristotle or Aquinas

everexplicitlydid; thoughhe thinksAquinas’s conclusionsweremoreprovisional

than Aristotle’s, making his emphasis more Thomist than Aristotelian. 340

MacIntyre’s reflections on the provisional character of knowledge take full form

throughhisconceptofatraditionofenquiry,whichcompeteswithrivaltraditions

inordertoprovidethemostrationallyjustifiableaccountofreality.

Second,theNicomacheanEthicsandPoliticsprovidethecontextwithinwhich

theoretical enquiry takes place. 341 While MacIntyre rejects Aristotle’s

characterizationofself-sufficiencyasillusory,inturning‘AristotleagainstAristotle’

338TP,182;213-14.339TP,162.340TP,163,166-67.341TP,164.

319

he can concentrate on the insights of the context that Aristotle provides for

theoretical enquiry. Aristotle ostensibly presents two conflicting accounts of the

best life; one, a solitary theoretical activity contemplating the eternal and

unchanging; and two, the life of moral and political virtue realized in common.

Aristotle appears to make the life of moral and political virtue inferior. 342

MacIntyre’s interpretation is that both lives need to be combined.WhileAristotle

seesthemoralandpoliticallifeassubordinatetothelifeofcontemplativeenquiry,

thelatterisimpossiblewithouttheformer.Thetwomodesoflifemustbecombined

in thepolis, and thepolisexists ‘for the sake of that in humanbeingswhich links

themto thedivine.All rationalpracticalactivityhasas itsultimate finalcause the

vision,sofarasitisopentohumanbeings,ofwhatGodsees.’343

MacIntyre therefore argues that philosophical enquiry in the Aristotelian

tradition is an inherently social activity. ‘In importantmatterswedeliberatewith

others,’ wrote Aristotle, ‘not relying on ourselves for certitude’.344Aristotle’s and

Aquinas’s remarks, writes MacIntyre, ‘could have been made just as aptly about

theoreticalasaboutpractical thinking.’345Solitarydeliberationfails.Weneedfrom

others the virtues of objectivity—a shared commitment to pursue truth. 346

Moreover, the life of theoretical enquiry requires certain virtues, bothmoral and

intellectual.347These virtues are at play in fostering the characteristics of good

philosophicalpractice.MacIntyrealsoconnectsthecontextofphilosophicalpractice

342WJWR,142.MacIntyrecitesEN1177a12-1178b32.343WJWR,143.344EP,73.MacIntyrecitesEN1112b10–11.345EP,73.346EP,74.347TP,164.

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totryingtoseetheworldfromtheabsolutestandpoint,subspecieaeternitatis—as

earlier noted, a tenet of metaphysical realism. MacIntyre’s conception of

philosophical practice so that it is friendly to the insights of revelation can be

regarded as an extension of this aspect of the Aristotelian context. MacIntyre’s

accountofphilosophicalactivityemphasizesthefeaturesofmoralandpoliticallife,

thestudyofwhat isgoodandtheendsof life,alongsidethecosmologicalorderof

things.

ThiscontextalsoclarifieshowMacIntyretreatsthequestionofthebestlife,

the one that best realizes the final end or ultimate good of the human being. As

noted above, MacIntyre’s hesitancy to provide a concrete answer to what the

ultimategoodmeansheapproachesitbyrulingoutwhatitisnotandwhatkindof

lifeitdoesnotinvolve.Heemphasizestheenquiryratherthanaparticularanswer.

For MacIntyre, the ergon of the human being is one of rational enquiry into the

ultimategood.MacIntyre’saccountofphilosophicalpracticeisnotofanactivityof

rational enquiry reserved to a privileged professional set. Instead, plain persons

first pose philosophical questions. Self-questioning is a general human activity.

Second,MacIntyreholdsthattheergonofthehumanbeingissuchthatthehuman

agentcanonlydeliberateabouthisowngoodwhiledeliberatingaboutthegoodof

the agent’s community, embodied in practices, relationships with others, and

traditions.Theergonofthehumanbeingcanonlybeactualizedincommon;while

Aristotlesaiditmustbeactualizedinthepolis,MacIntyre’sThomismsubstitutesfor

thepolisthefamilyandpoliticalcommunity.348

348TP,194.

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Nevertheless, these are descriptions ofwhatwould be required to live the

best life.Theydonot explainwhat thebest lifewouldbe,beyond that it requires

seekingwhat is thebest life.MacIntyre’s rejectionof self-sufficiencyasan illusion

depriveshimoftheAristoteliancriterionforexplainingwhatthebestlifewouldbe.

Heisleftwithnospecificexplanationofthecontentofthebestlife.

ThisisMacIntyre’sintention.349MacIntyreavoidsatheoreticalexplanationof

thebestlifeandthefinalendthatcharacterizesitfortheaforementionedreason:he

doesnotwanttocommittoatheoreticalexplanationofthelifeofpracticethatfails

tocharacterize the lifeofpractice in itsownterms.Additionally,MacIntyre thinks

his reticence to give a comprehensive account of the final end is faithful to the

nature of theoretical enquiry. The provisional character of theoretical enquiry

meansthatwecannotexpectadefinitiveanswertotheultimateendofhumanlife.

HereMacIntyreshowshowheprefersAquinastoAristotle.WhileAristotlethought

he could definitively conclude that the final end is theoretical contemplation,

Aquinasdefers the final end toanotherworldly future. ForMacIntyre, thismeans

that the answers reason provides are tentative.350The application of MacIntyre’s

Thomism preserves the provisional character of theoretical enquiry. Yet it

acknowledgesthattheologycouldprovidemoredefinitiveanswers,whichcouldin

turn inspire new philosophical enquiry. Nevertheless in his major writings

MacIntyre remains neutral with regard to theological commitments, not arguing

349C.f.Beiner(2014),170.350WJWR,193;Knight(2007),196.

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from these commitments. He thereby invites his readers to debate him on

philosophical,ratherthantheologicalgrounds.351

There is, however, an additional purpose in MacIntyre’s reticence. It

indicatesthathesupportstheThomisticaccountofthefinalend.Heisnotrejecting

self-sufficiency as a characteristic of themost perfect good.He is instead arguing

that self-sufficiency is not found where Aristotle thought it was found, in great-

souledor contemplative activity lived in thispresent, finite life.Aristotle failed to

recognizethattheseactivitiesrequirethevirtuesofacknowledgeddependencyfor

their realization. For a Thomist, Aristotle did not grasp the final end correctly;

consequently, his account of practical reasoning is not merely incomplete, but

radically defective.352MacIntyre acquiesces to the Thomist critique of Aristotle in

two ways: he suggests theoretical enquiry reveals that no good discovered in

present,finitehumanlifecanbesatisfyingforhumannature,andheimpliesthatas

self-sufficiency is not found in any present human life. Self-sufficiency, and the

perfect good satisfying human nature, is found only outside and beyond this

present,finitelife.353Aquinasusesthisargumenttoexplainwhythefinalendofthe

beatific vision is suggested by human nature, and is therefore a reasonable

conclusiontoconsider.MacIntyre followsthisapproach inEthicsintheConflictsof

Modernity. By frequently stressing the incomplete character of the final end

discernedthroughpracticalreasoninginthispresentlife,MacIntyreaskshisreader

to consider what a complete or perfected life would look like. His intellectual

351D’Andrea(2006),392.352WJWR,193.353TRV137-38;WJWR,192.MacIntyrereferstoSTIa-IIaequ.5ar.4.

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practice is not that of a Thomist theologian, however. He concludes Ethics in the

Conflicts ofModernity by raising the question ofwhat a perfected lifewould look

like;yethehaltshisenquiryatthepointwhereitwouldaddressnaturaltheology.354

VI.RevolutionaryAristotelianism

MacIntyre’stheoreticalargument,developedthroughouthiswork,isthatthe

AristoteliantraditionelaboratedbyAquinasprovidesthebestresponsetomodern

liberal individualism.MacIntyre’sclarificationsandelaborationsof this theoretical

argumentconstitutethemajorityofhisacademicwork,butitisimperativenottolet

thisquantitydistortthepurposeofhisproject.Torepeatagainhiscrucialmaxim,a

philosophypresupposesa sociology.A corollaryof this claim is thatphilosophical

theoryisembodiedwithinsocialpractices.MacIntyre’soppositiontomodernliberal

individualismisnotonlyatheoreticalconflict,asthetheoreticalmistakesofmodern

liberal individualism are embodied in the dominant institutions of social life.

Providing a better theory tomodern liberal individualism is an important part of

challengingit,butitisultimatelyinsufficientforcorrectingliberalindividualism.It

mustbechallengedinsociallife,intheinstitutionsthatembodyit.355

Modernliberalindividualismisembodiedintheinstitutionsofthestate,the

market, and ‘Morality.’356These three institutions are linked. Although the state

claims to be political, to realize the common good, it represents institutionalized

interests. The state is united in an indissoluble partnership with the market. Its

Weberianbureaucratsshareaneedwithprivatecorporationsforcapitalformation,

354SeeECM,315.355MacIntyre(1994a),228-29;Knight(2007),174.356ECM,166.

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economic growth, and a trained yet disposable labour forcewhosemembers ‘are

also compliant consumers and law abiding citizens.’357‘Morality’ helps to shield

theseinstitutionsfromrationalcriticism.

For MacIntyre, no political tradition offers a practical alternative to the

institutionsofmodernliberalindividualism.Marxismandallpoliticaltraditionsare

exhausted.358ThisistrueoftheAristoteliantraditionaswell.Aristotle’scontextfor

humanlife,includingphilosophicalenquiry,culminatesinthepolisastheidealform

ofpoliticalcommunity.ButrecoveringthepolisisnotanoptionforMacIntyre.The

historical and social circumstances that led to its emergence in ancientGreeceno

longer exist. There is nopractically applicable path to reviving it.Moreover, even

nostalgia for the polis would bemisplaced. The polis is forMacIntyre a seriously

deficient political form in terms of justice.359After all, it excluded slaves, women,

artisans,andnon-Greeksfromparticipationinit.

SomeofMacIntyre’smoresubtlecriticshavearguedthathedoesnottakeup

the themecentral toAristotle’sPolitics: thequestionof thebestregime.Aristotle’s

analysis of thepolis points to different political regimes,ways of governance into

whichthecitycanbearranged.Thisraisesthequestionofwhichregimeisbestfor

realizing human perfection. Aristotle thusmakes the question of the best regime

central to thePolitics.360MacIntyredoesbriefly consider thebest regime, thebest

kind ofpolis, yet does not see it as a live political option for Aristotelianism. The

357EP,211;Knight(2007),170.358AV,262.359PaceNussbaum(1989):MacIntyrelongs‘nostalgicallyforaunanimitythathumanlifehasneverreallyhad.’SeeLutz(2012),179-80;D’Andrea(2006),421-26.360Perreau-Saussine(2005),54,128;Manent(2005),2-3,5-6.

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restructuringof thebestkindofpolis to remedy its injustices, thepolis that could

admitslaves,women,artisans,andnon-Greeks,andallowthemtoparticipatefully

in the life of the polis, would be inconceivable to Aristotle.361Moreover, itmakes

Aristotle’spolisincoherent,sincehesimultaneouslydescribesahumanergon,while

excludingthevastmajorityofhumansfromrealizingit.362

Ifallpolitical traditionsareexhausted, includingAristotle’sregime, there is

nopracticalpoliticalalternativetotheliberalregimeatpresent.Itisheretostayfor

theforeseeablefuture.363MacIntyreacceptsthis.364ByimmigratingintotheUnited

States in 1969, he acquiesces to the rule of liberalism exemplified by the United

States. In his life, liberalism’s ‘political solution’ becomes the default solution.365

Attemptstooverthrowliberalismendin‘terrorismorquasiterrorism.’366Stalinism

andotherextremistideologiesareruledout;heiswillingtotolerateallianceswith

liberal states to defeat these ideologies.367The reason, therefore, that MacIntyre

drops Aristotle’s question of the best regime is because the practical answer at

presentisliberalism.368

However,MacIntyre’sAristotleremainsradicallypolitical.Hisreconstruction

ofthepoliticsoftheAristoteliantraditionfocusesnotonthetheoryofpoliticsorthe

361WJWR,105.362ECM,86.363AV,255.364AsPerreau-Saussinehasargued.HedeploysaMacIntyreanaccountofphilosophicalbiography,wheredetailsofbiographicallifeplayaroleinunderstandingthenarrativeofthephilosopher’slife.SeeTP,132.ForMacIntyre’sownself-understandingofwhathehadlearnedfromlivingintheUnitedStates,seeMacIntyre(1994b),266.365AV,255;Perreau-Saussine(2005),53.366MacIntyre(1994b),265.367MacIntyre(1997),252.368Inthissense,Perreau-SaussineiscorrecttosaythatMacIntyre‘radicallydepoliticizes’Aristotle:MacIntyreanalysesmanandtherequirementsofmorallife,astheyarerealizedinsocialpractices,stoppingthereandnotrelatingthesetothebestregime.Perreau-Saussine(2005),54.

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best regime but on the basic level of practice.369For MacIntyre, to resist the

institutions of the liberalism requires eventually building up new, alternative

institutions. The source of institutions lies in practices. So rather than speculate

about the institutions required in the best regime, MacIntyre sees the more

fundamental issue in specifying what kinds of political practices need to be

encouraged. His goal is not to reform and replace the dominant order of liberal

individualism.Rather,hehopestosubvertitbyfosteringthekindsofpracticesthat

enabletherightkindofcharacterformation,habituationinthevirtues,whichwould

permithumanagentstoworktogethertoachievethegood.370

MacIntyre argues for three different forms of resistance to the liberal

institutionalorder.First,hearguesforpassiveresistance,refusingtoparticipatein

the activities of the liberal state since it always results in ‘collaboration.’371For

example, MacIntyre argues that one should not vote.372He urges adopting the

strategyofwithdrawalandresistancepursuedbyStBenedict,meaningcommunal

retreat from participation in liberal institutions. 373 In later works, MacIntyre

elaborated on two additional forms of resistance informed by the politics of the

Aristotelian tradition. These are pursuing common projects that conflict with the

managerialinstitutionsofthestate,andactiveresistancethatweakensthepowerof

unjustinstitutions.374

369Knight(2011),34.370MacIntyre(2011a),12-13;Knight(2011),30,32-34.371MacIntyre(1994b),265.372Knight(2007),179-80.373AV,263;seexviforMacIntyre’slaterclarification.374ForfurtherelaborationseeKnight(2007),179-89.

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Theefforttoachievethegoodtogetherisanessentialfeatureofthepolitics

intheAristoteliantradition.ForAristotle,theactivityofthepolispresupposesthat

there is an ultimate good for the human being. It aims to discover it.375In the

absenceofthepolis,agenuinelyAristotelianpoliticalpracticemustbeorderedfor

thesakeof theultimategood.376Moreover,anessential step inunderstanding the

goodisthatthegoodquaindividualisonlyachievedbydirectingoneselftocommon

goods. The pursuit of the ultimate good requires addressing and ranking these

commongoodsaswell.377ForMacIntyre’sAristotelianism,participationinpoliticsis

reasoningtogetherabouttheultimategood.378

Thegood life is inan importantwayalsothe lifeofpoliticalaction;politics

cannotbeanoptionalactivityfortheagentinformedbytheAristoteliantradition.379

Politics in the Aristotelian tradition does not demarcate between morality and

politics. Inmodernity,when institutionshostile toAristotelian traditiondominate,

thevirtuesplayanimportantroleinachievingthecommongoodindefianceofthe

institutional obstructions of liberal individualism.380Moreover, for Aristotelianism

the virtue of justice cannot come intobeing in the soulwithoutmaking efforts to

realize justice in actual social contexts.381In that way, active resistance to liberal

individualismthatweakensunjustinstitutionsispartoflivingagoodlife.382

375WJWR,134.376Knight(2007),178.377ECM,175.378Knight(2007),179.379ECM,182.380ECM,178,82.381WJWR,89-97;D’Andrea(2006),301.382Knight(2007),186.

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MacIntyreneedstoshowthathisaccountofAristotelianpoliticsandmorals

has contemporary relevance. He must specify ‘what kind of practice it is within

whichinhisparticulartimeandplacetheformofanAristotelianmoralandpolitical

life can be realized.’ 383 He therefore draws attention to three important

characteristicsofthemodeofsocialandpoliticalpracticethatAristotle’stheoryof

politicspresupposed.

First, the practice of Aristotelian community must be informed by shared

deliberation. It must be a type of practice in which there is sufficient agreement

about goods and how to order them, to provide shared standards for rational

deliberation on both moral and political questions.384MacIntyre’s account of the

role of natural law here comes into force, as he argues that such rational

deliberationisonlypossiblewhenthereissharedrecognitionoftheauthorityofthe

preceptsofthenaturallaw.385

Second,theactivitiesofthesecommunitiespresupposesharedstandardsof

rational justification independent of the de facto interests and preferences of

members.Thesestandardshelpdefinethecommongood.Nootherpre-rationalor

non-rational bond, whether ethnic, religious, or cultural, can substitute for these

standards. 386 An Aristotelian political community is a community of rational

enquiry, not just a community linked through pre-rational bonds.387Tomeet this

standardofrationalenquiryisexacting.AlthoughMacIntyreisfrequentlyclassified

383EP,18;5-6,38-39;ECM,176.384EP,39.385ECM,178;DRA,111.386EP,39;ECM,177.387MacIntyre(1997),241.

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as a communitarian, this is incorrect for one overriding reason. He never praises

communities as such. Instead he argues that the best human life is embodied in

communitiesdirectedtowardthecommongood.MacIntyreisunflinchinglycritical

toward communities that fail to realize the common good—as communities often

do.388The precepts of the natural law provide this exacting standard for radical

social critique, for they are such that ‘any’ violation constitutes a threat to justice

andthecommongood.389

Third, the practice of an Aristotelian community must be small and local.

Widely shared participation in deliberation, if it is to lead to effective decision-

makingthatrealizesthecommongood,requiresacommunitysmallenoughforits

members to hold each other to account. To succeed in this end again requires

justice: the community must avoid conflicts of interest that arise from too great

inequalities.390These kinds of communities, argues MacIntyre, are incompatible

withthenation-stateandthemarket,andmustremainsmalltoprotectthemselves

from theirdestructive incursions.391Thesekindsof communities are foundwithin

the households, fishing crews, farming cooperatives, schools, clinics,

neighbourhoods, and small towns.392SinceAfterVirtue,MacIntyrehasargued that

the pursuit of these common projects is one of the most important forms of

resistancetoliberalindividualism.Pursuingtheseprojectsisthemodernequivalent

offoundingapolis.393MacIntyre’sfocusonthesekindsofcommunitiesleadstothe

388MacIntyre(1997),243-46;AV,xiv-xv;Perreau-Saussine(2005),44-46.389EP,48.TheemphasisisMacIntyre’s.SeealsoMacIntyre(1997),247;ECM,89.390EP,39;MacIntyre(1997),250;MacIntyre(2011a),13.391MacIntyre(1997),248.392ECM,110.393AV,151.

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charge that he preaches romantic localism, but this charge misunderstands his

intention.394Thebasisfortheseformsofcommunitiesisnotintheirparticularplace

or locality, but in their exemplification of certain practices. MacIntyre praises

particular communities because they do what theory cannot: they succeed in

defending rational enquiry, fostering the virtues of human agents, and caring for

common goods against institutional corruption and managerial manipulation.395

These communities succeed in caring for the common good, so unlike the liberal

state, they succeed in justifying the exercise of political authority over their

members.396

Nevertheless thesuccessesof theseprojectsare fragile.MacIntyre isunder

no illusions that the refusal to collaborate with the institutions of liberal

individualism, active resistance to liberal individualism, and pursuing common

projects informed by the Aristotelian tradition will achieve victory over the

institutionsofliberalism.ThebarbariansalludedtoattheendofAfterVirtueareset

toruleforalongtime.397Thepresentmoment,then,ismarkedbyalong,drawn-out,

twilight struggle between two rival philosophies of practical reasoning. It is a

struggle that fractures the thinkingof rational agents, andnoone can escape this

394SeeD’Andrea(2006),421-26.395MacIntyre(2011a),14-16;Knight(2011),32.396Murphy(2003),152-53,160-61.397AV,263.MacIntyre’sreflectionsontheinstitutionoftheuniversityexemplifyhispessimism.AlthoughMacIntyredefendstheThomistpracticeoftheoreticalenquiry,hearguesthatevenattheimpressivemomentofitsfoundation,whenitwasimmediatelyrelevanttophilosophersandplainpersons,theThomistpracticedidnotsucceedinsecuringinstitutionalsupport,duetovoluntarism’sdoubtsaboutaunifiedsubjectoftheoreticalenquiry(TRV,158-61;ECM,93;MacIntyre(2009),97-98,101-2;D’Andrea(2006),363-64).Asthemodernuniversityhasinstitutionalizedthedisagreementsthatcharacterizeliberalsociety,reformforthesakeoftheThomistpracticeoftheoreticalenquiryisperhapsimpossible.MacIntyre(2009),173-80;ECM,177.

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conditionentirely.398The criticalpoliticaldifference is that liberalismcontrols the

institutions, and the Aristotelian tradition does not. The critical theoretical

difference is that the Aristotelian tradition aims at discovering the final end for

humanbeings.Liberalismdoesnot.399

Conclusion

TowardtheendofEthicsintheConflictsofModernity,MacIntyrecrystallizes

his neo-Aristotelian philosophy of practical reasoning into four integrated

conclusions:

Agentsdowellonlyifandwhentheyacttosatisfyonlythosedesireswhoseobjectstheyhavegoodreasontodesire,thatonlyagentswhoaresoundandeffectivepracticalreasonerssoact,thatsuchagentsmustbedisposedtoactasthevirtuesrequire,andthatsuchagentswillbedirectedintheiractionstowardtheachievementoftheirfinalend.400

Each of these four conclusions generates their particular philosophical

controversies. Yet for MacIntyre, they stand and fall together with the last

conclusion,whichbrazenlychallengesmodernliberalindividualism:thatagentsdo

wellonly if andwhen theydirected theiractions toward theachievementof their

final end. SinceAfterVirtue, MacIntyre’s philosophical preoccupation has been to

givethebestaccountanddefenceoftheconceptoffinalend,ultimategood,ortelos,

andtheroleitplaysinhumanagency.

In After Virtue, MacIntyre began the reconstruction of the Aristotelian

traditionofenquiryonthevirtuesandtheultimatehumangood.Heconstructeda

neo-Aristotelian account of teleology that in large part agreed with the specific

398ECM,167.399ECM,182-83;Knight(2007),188.400ECM,243.

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positionsofAristotle,butalsorejectedseveralprominentpositionsAristotle took.

InAfterVirtue,hedevelopeda sociallydiscoveredaccountof teleology,where the

human ergon is understood without reference to the metaphysical biology with

which Aristotle justified his account of the human ergon. Despite Aristotle’s

metaphysical biology,MacIntyre alsodiscovered inAristotle a social investigation

intohumanagencythatdemonstratedthathumanagencyisgoal-oriented.Human

actionisdirectedtowardanultimategoalortelos,humanflourishingoreudaimonia,

and the virtues are the qualities enabling an agent to achieve the telos of

eudaimonia.Theexerciseofthevirtuestoachieveeudaimoniatakesplaceinasocial

context. Human agents help each other cultivate the virtues, and the laws of the

community, including moral absolutes, help one in cultivating the virtues and

avoidingvice.

In MacIntyre’s reconstruction, the virtues are defined in three ways. The

virtuesenable theagent toachieveexcellence in termsofpractices,byaiming for

the goods internal to practices. The virtues sustain the unity of an agent’s life in

which the agent seeks out the good of his whole life. The virtues sustain the

traditions, which provide the social, historical, and narrative context to practices

and the lives of individual agents. MacIntyre’s three-fold definition shows that

humanaction issocialandgoal-oriented,challenging theprominentphilosophyof

modern liberal individualism. His account distinguishes itself from liberal

individualism, because it upholds the importance of social context. In linking the

virtuestotraditions,histheorylinksthepresentlifeofasingleindividualintotheir

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whole inherited past. His account distinguishes itself from modernity, and the

Enlightenmentproject,byadheringtotheethicalframeworkitrejected:

1. Aconceptionof‘untutoredhumannature.’2. Thepreceptsofrationalethics.3. A conception of the human good as that of ‘human-nature-as-it-

could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos.’

InAfterVirtue,MacIntyredevotedhimself toanAristotelianreconstructionof (3),

though he additionally argued that laws and moral absolutes, exceptionless

precepts,playarolein(2).Neverthelesshisreconstructionwasinseveralwaysun-

Aristotelian: it didnot relyuponAristotle’smetaphysical biology, it discarded the

unityofthevirtues,anditacknowledgedinsolublytragicmoraldilemmas.

Following After Virtue, MacIntyre became more Aristotelian by reading

ThomasAquinas,tojustifyhimselfvis-à-vismodernity.Headoptedtheunityofthe

virtues.Hearticulated(2)andthemoralabsoluteshepreviouslyacceptedthrough

the precepts of the natural law, regarding insolubly tragicmoral dilemmas as the

product of flawed practical reasoning. MacIntyre also found Thomism helpful to

meetthedemandsof(1).Heacceptedthatthepractices,individualnarratives,and

traditionsofhumanagentsaimingat(3)havethespecificendtheydoforreasonof

theirspecifichumannature.Anaccountofthehumangoodpresupposesanaccount

of human being, as Aquinas recognized. MacIntyre gave an account of how

metaphysical firstprinciplesrelatedtopracticalreasoning. Inthesedevelopments,

hewasexploringthecontinuitybetweenAristotleandAquinas.Thisaccounthelped

himdistinguishhisneo-AristotelianismfrommodernistappropriationsofAristotle

practicedbyRawlsandNussbaum.

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Furthermore,MacIntyre realized that (1) requirednot only ametaphysical

grounding, but a biological grounding as well—as Aristotle recognized. Yet

MacIntyre departed from Aristotle to provide a more Thomist account. While

humanbeingsneed tobe independentpractical reasoners inorder to flourish,we

arebiologicallydependentonotherhumanbeingstofulfilthisneed.Consequently,

thevirtuesofacknowledgeddependenceareanimportantpartofrealizinghuman

flourishing. Aquinas grasped dependency in his discussion of the virtue of

misericordia. Aristotle did not, instead praising self-sufficiency in the virtue of

megalopsychia.MacIntyre’srupturewithAristotelianismrests intheconsequences

ofcriticismofself-sufficiencyasillusory.NotAristotlebutAquinasprovidesabetter

account of the content of the virtues. Moreover, MacIntyre rejects Aristotle’s

argument that the contemplative life is the best life, the one that most realizes

humanflourishing,becauseitisthemostself-sufficient.

Whatthen, forMacIntyre, isthebest lifethatrealizeshumanflourishing?It

wouldbethelifelivedinaccordancewiththefinalhumanend.YetitisAquinas,not

Aristotle, who provides the better account. Aristotle ostensibly presents two

conflicting accounts of the best life, the moral and political life and the

contemplativelife.AlthoughAristotleseemstosettleonthecontemplativelifebeing

thebestlife,healsosuggeststhatoneneedsthemoralandpoliticallifetorealizethe

contemplativelife.

Toclarifythisproblem,MacIntyreconcentratesonthehumanergon,which

wouldhelparticulatetheultimatehumantelosorfinalendandanswerthequestion

ofwhatlifebestrealizeshumanflourishing.Heconsidersthehumanergonasoneof

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rational enquiry into the final end, which can only be actualized in common. He

firmly places rational theoretical enquiry within a social and political context.

Politics and philosophy are intertwined and inseparable. His account of the

Aristotelianpolitical community isas the locationwhere rationalenquiry into the

finalendtakesplace.

MacIntyreregardsboththeoryandpracticeasconstitutiveofthebestlife.He

arguesthat theoreticalenquiry intotheultimategoodor finalend isan important

part of practical reasoning. The goal of theory is both to order theoretical beliefs

rationally, and to orient the practices that presuppose these beliefs rationally.

Conversely, practice that instils the virtues in the human agent strengthens

theoretical enquiry. One learnswhat justice is in part by being just and pursuing

justice.Political lifehelpsthehumanagentbetterunderstandwhatthevirtuesare

andhisfinalend.Boththeoryandpracticeworktogethertoprovideanaccountof

the final human end. While the final end is discovered by theory, a proper

understanding of the final end cannot set aside the characterization of practical

reasoninginitsowntermsthatusesthefinalend.

For MacIntyre, political life matures into philosophical life, which in turn

directs political life. In the course of an agent’s practical reasoning, seeking an

answer to their final end, and beginning to rank and order the goods, the agent

beginstodiscoverwhatthegoodis;tothinktheoretically,tophilosophize,aboutthe

good.Onedoesnotneedtobeaprofessionalphilosophertodothis.Everyhuman

beingbecomesaphilosopherthroughthecourseofgoodpracticalreasoning.

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MacIntyre describes the best life as the philosophical quest for

understanding the final end, worked out in a political context. He provides some

characteristics of the final end. Its achievement involves a high degree of self-

knowledge. It is an end that completes and perfects the life of the agent who

achievesit.Whenothergoodsaregiventheirdueplaceinthelifeoftheagent,then

theagentisdirectedtowardtheachievementofhisultimategood,andviceversa.

In thequest forunderstanding the final end, the agent rulesout a lifedirected to

acquisition or possession of money, political honours, reputation, power, health,

pleasure,aswellasintellectual,moral,aesthetic,andspiritualexcellence—although

each of these have their place. Nevertheless MacIntyre the Thomist gives no

definitiveanswertothefinalend.Thefinalendisnotdiscoveredinthispresentlife.

WhileAristotlethoughthecouldreachthetheoreticalconclusionthatthefinalend

is in theoretical contemplation, Aquinas argues all accounts of the final end are

imperfect. MacIntyre exposes the limits of philosophy: definitive theoretical

conclusions explaining the final end fail, and distort the proper theoretical

understandingofthelifeofpractice.

MacIntyre’s theoretical study of practice tries to avoid both a flight into

theoretical abstraction and a fall into anti-theoretical particularism. MacIntyre’s

philosophicalbiographies frequently identifyphilosopherswhoareguiltyof these

errors. For example, Georg Lukács is guilty of theoretical abstraction and Franz

Rosensweig isguiltyofanti-theoreticalparticularism.401EvenAristotle takes flight

into theoretical abstraction by considering the final end to be theoretical

401TP,133-39.

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contemplation.Bycontrast,MacIntyre’sneo-Aristotelianismstrivestorespectboth

the universal and the particular. ‘Neither in life nor in enquiry,’ he writes, ‘is it

possible to encounter the concrete and particular except as instances of the

universalandgeneral.AsweshouldhavelearntfromAristotle,every“this”thatwe

encounterisa“this-such.”’402

The necessary link between the two means that MacIntyre’s last bow in

Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity goes to narratives. He has argued that we

understandourselvesasrationalagents inaquesttounderstandourfinalend.To

dosorequiresgraspingtheunityofour life throughtheunityofanarrative.Both

thecourseandtheoutcomeofpracticalreasoningareunderstoodbybeingableto

provide a narrative of our own life. Yet we also need instruction through the

narrativesofotherrationalagents.Why?

For MacIntyre, our theoretical reasoning is not fully developed. The

theoretical generalizations about practical reasoning are only understood

adequatelythroughattentiontoparticularcasesofpracticalreasoners,understood

through narratives. Once we understand the particular cases, we can apply the

theoretical generalizations, but not before. Narratives teach us how to apply the

theoreticalgeneralizationstoparticularcases.403Moreover,ourpracticalreasoning

isnotyetfullydeveloped.Sothestudyofparticularagentsexhibitstherelevanceof

theoreticalgeneralizationstoagentsengagedinpracticalreasoning.Narrativesare

onlyunderstoodifwehavetherighttheoreticalgeneralizations.404

402TP,139.403ECM,311.404ECM,311.

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For MacIntyre, we require narrative biographies of rational agents and

politicalcommunities.Hisbiographiesareintendedtoteachustheimportancethat

the narratives of other rational agents have for understanding practical

reasoning.405Moreover, we must never forget that practical reasoning includes

politics. We need ‘to examine instructive examples of the politics of local

community…soastolearnwhatmakessuchpoliticseffectiveandineffective.’406His

examplesattempttoshowwhyeffectivepoliticsrequirethevirtues,andtherefore

the conception of practical reasoning offered by the Aristotelian tradition.407The

pointofMacIntyre’sphilosophyisforustolearnthatthisistrueabouttheworld,so

thatwecanthenchangeit.

405ECM,244.406MacIntyre(1997),252407ECM,176-83,esp.180,181;MacIntyre(2011a),17-19.

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Conclusion:PostmodernAristotelianism

What,then,tomakeofthesethreereinterpretationsofAristotle,which

considerthebestlifethehumanbeingcanlive?1AllthreefaceaNietzschean

temptation,contendingthatinmodernity,thetraditionalresourcesforanswering

thatquestionareinastateofexhaustion.Allthreeagree,withNietzsche,that

modernityhasexhausteditself,placingtheminanunprecedented,‘postmodern’

situation.Allthreefindevidenceforthisdiagnosisinphilosophy,politics,andhow

modernphilosophyrelatestopolitics.Theystresspoliticalirresponsibilityinthe

presentthatimpelsthemtoturntothepast.ButunlikeNietzsche,andunlikemany

oftheircontemporaries,theymaintainthatfromtheirstudyofthepast,arecovery

ofthequestionofthebestlifeispossible.ForthatrecoverytheyturntoAristotle.

Thisraisesanotherseriesofquestions.ForArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyre,

thequestionsofwhattocritiqueinmodernity,what‘recovery’ofpolitical

philosophyfrompre-modernityispossibleinpostmodernity,andwhatistobe

recoveredfrompre-modernityareallinterrelated.Theyformpartoftheir

investigationintothequestionofthebestlife.Thesecondfeaturetonote,then,is

thatthestudyofthepoliticalphilosophyofArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyremust

addressthesequestionstogether.Totakeoneofthesequestionsawaymakestheir

politicalphilosophyappeartruncatedorarbitrary.Myapproachhasbeentoshow

1C.f.Zuckert(1996),254.

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thatlinkingthesequestionsthroughaparticularthinkerthattheyalladdresshelps

gainabetterunderstandingoftheirpoliticalphilosophy.Prioritizingthequestions

ofwhytheyturntoAristotle,howtheyreadAristotle,andwhattheyfindinAristotle

revealshowtheytreatthequestionofthegood,thebestlife,andthustheirpolitical

philosophy.Thethirdfeaturetonote,then,isthatitenrichesthestudyofArendt,

Strauss,andMacIntyretointerprettheminlightofhowtheytreataparticular

‘exemplar’fromthecanonofpoliticalphilosophy.

Initially,Isubmittedthattonavigatethedividesofcontemporarypolitical

philosophybeyondanincommensuratepluralism,itwouldbevaluableto

reconsiderthesedividesbyprovidinganaccountofhowthinkerstreat‘exemplars’

inthetraditionofpoliticalphilosophy.Toconclude,Idescribesomeofthemain

featuresor‘conditions’ofAristotelianpoliticalphilosophythatemergefromhow

Arendt,Strauss,andMacIntyreinterpretAristotle.WhatisAristotelianpolitical

philosophy?

TherearetwoboundariestothisquestionasIpursueithere.Althoughwhat

Ioutlinecouldprovidepointsofcontrastbetweensomeofthemainfeaturesof

Aristotelianpoliticalphilosophyandtheapproachesincontemporarypolitical

philosophy,Idonotprovidethesecontrastshere.Second,Iignorethedistinctions

andinterpretivedisputeswithinAristotelianism.Nevertheless,Ioutlinetheterrain

ofAristotelianismthatunitesArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyreintheirreflectionson

theendsoflife.Moreover,Iprobethemonhowcomfortablytheyinhabitthis

terrain.2

2MyapproachissimilartoSanford(2015),150.

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1. Aristotelianpoliticalphilosophyseeksananswertothequestionofthegoodlifeforthehumanbeing.WhileAristotlecanbegintheNichomacheanEthicsbyobservingthatpeople

have‘noblydeclaredthatthegoodisthatatwhichallthingsaim,’3Arendt,Strauss,

andMacIntyrediagnoseamodernitythatisuncomfortable,ifnotdownrighthostile

tothis‘noble’declaration.Allidentifyacomplacentrelativismthatneutersthe

vitalityofthequestionofthegood,effectivelydenyingthatitcanbeansweredand

thereforedenyingthatitshouldbeaskedasaquestion.4Thosewhoflatter

themselvesthattheyremainneutralbetweenthe‘goods’peddledinpoliticallife

inevitablyprivilegecertainconceptsofthegood.5Theforgettingofthequestionof

thegoodraisesthespectreofpoliticalirresponsibility.AsStraussargues,ifthe

rationalevaluationofthegoodisimpossible,onedefinesthegoodbywhatis

historicallycontingent.Itisthereforeimpossibletoevaluatebetweengoodandbad

politicalregimes.Inthelastanalysis,deferringtohistoryprivilegestyranny.Arendt

isnotfarfromStrauss.Thosewhotrytodefinethegoodbyhistoryendup

subordinatingthegoodtohistorical‘processes.’Totalitarianmovementsclaimtheir

authoritythroughtheirpurportedknowledgeofthesehistoricalprocesses.

WhileArendtandStrausslinkrelativismandpoliticalirresponsibility

throughhistoricism,MacIntyrelinksthemwithemotivism.Thisdescribesthe

modernsocialcultureandtheuseofstatementsaboutthegood;arbitraryattitudes

replacejudgementsaboutwhatthegoodis.Modern‘Morality,’asMacIntyrerefers

toit,iswheredisagreementsaboutthegoodareclashesofthewill.For‘Morality,’

3EN1094a2.4C.fBeiner(2014),xix.5C.f.Beiner(2014),xix.

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thereisnojustificationtochoosethegoodoftheliberaldemocratoverthegoodof

theStalinist.Sobothcampstrytomanipulateotherstoservetheirinterests,

deepeningproblemsofpoliticalirresponsibility.AsAlexanderSolzhenitsyn

understood,liberaldemocratsandStalinistsarebothcohabitantsofmodernity.6

TheseproblemsimpelArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyretoseekananswerto

thequestionofwhatthegoodlifeforthehumanbeingis.Whatthen,isthegood?

Againstrelativismandhistoricism,allagreethatthegoodisknowable,butalldeny

thatitisself-evidentorexpressedasasingleprinciple.Understandingthegoodis

itselfaproblem:becauseofitscomplexity,thequestionraisesfourlevelsof

consideration.7

Asthegood,8itimpliesacosmos,inwhichthehumanbeinghasitsplace;as

thehumangood9,itfocusesonwhatisgoodspecificallyforhumanbeings;asthe

practicalgood,10itaddressesthesphereofaction;asthegood‘beingsought,’11it

relatesthequestionofthegoodtotheactivityofseeking,suggestingthatthegoodis

alwaysaquestionforthehumanbeing.Ifthegoodistheobjectofstudy,theobject

tobeexplained,thenthestudyofthegoodlinksevaluationwithexplanation.Onthis

pointArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyreallagree.Theyallagree,moreover,thaton

accountofthecomplexityofthegood,neitherexplanationnorevaluationcanyield

lawsorrulesthataretrueforalltimeorthatbindallrationalbeings.12

6AV,35.7Salkever(1990),151.IdrawthesefourlevelsfromBurger(2008),14.8EN1094a22.9EN1091b7.10EN1095a16-17.11EN1097a15.12Salkever(1990),151.

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ThisexpressesthecoreofAristotelianpoliticalphilosophy.MacIntyre,

Strauss,andArendtdonotlosesightofthiscore,andtheydonotlosesightofthese

fourlevelsofconsiderationofthegood.InthesubsequentconditionsofAristotelian

politicalphilosophy,theirtreatmentofthesefourlevelsofconsiderationwillremain

atheme.

Thisfirstconditionisthecore,butitdoesnotaddressthemannerof

treatmentofthequestionofwhatisgood.13Considerthefollowingmannerof

treatment;itanswersthequestionofwhatisgoodbyanauthoritythatrevealswhat

isgoodtohumanbeings.‘Hehastoldyou,Omortal,whatisgood;andwhatdoesthe

Lordrequireofyoubuttodojustice,andtolovekindness,andtowalkhumblywith

yourGod?’(Micah6:8).14Thesecondconditionhelpsdistinguishbetweenthis

manneroftreatmentofthequestionofthegood,whichreliesontheauthorityof

revelation,andthemanneroftreatmentpursuedthroughAristotelianpolitical

philosophy.

2. Aristotelianpoliticalphilosophypresupposesnoauthoritativeanswerastowhatisgoodisreadilyavailable.Onemustseekananswertowhatisgoodwithoutrelyingonanauthority.Arendt,Strauss,andMacIntyreallgrapplewiththeissueofhowauthority

canrelatetothequestionofwhatisgood.ForHannahArendt,modernityis

characterizedbytheexhaustionofprevailingauthoritativestandards.Nietzsche’s

phrase,‘GodisDead,’indicatesthedepthandextentofthecollapse.Awhole

tradition,professingauthorityinreligion,metaphysicalphilosophy,andpolitical

thought,isnolongereffectivelybelievedin.Themovementofmodernityhas13SeeKerber(2016)forthiscritiqueofBeiner(2014).14ThesubsequentconditionisindebtedtoBartlettandCollins(2011),237-38.

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exhaustedthemeaningfulnessoftheseauthorities.Thestormsoftotalitarianism

havesuccessfullyburiedthetraditionsothatitisimpossibletorecoverit

completely.Withoutmeaningfuldirectionforlife,themodernhumanbeingis

exposed,asifinadesert.ForArendt,thisexposurecannotbeescapedoravoided,

butmustbefaceddowndirectly.Thinkinginthemodernworldis‘thinkingwithout

abanister,’becausetherearenostandardslefttorelyupon.15YetwhileArendt

thinksacompleterecoveryoftraditionalauthoritiesisimpossible,aretrievalof

theirfragmentsispossible.Thesefragments,includingthewritingsofAristotle,help

onetospurthinking,survivethesandstorms,anddiscovertheoasesofmeaning

thatpersistinthedesert.16

LeoStraussalsoholdsthatmodernityischaracterizedbyastateof

exhaustionintheprevailingauthorities.ButwhileArendtseestheexhausted

traditionalauthoritiesasextendingbacktoPlato,Strausspinpointstheexhausted

authoritytotheEnlightenmentproject’sefforttosolvethetheologico-political

problem,thetensionbetweenphilosophicreasonandrevealedreligion,onceand

forall.TheobjectiveoftheEnlightenmentrationalism,touseNietzsche’slanguage,

wastokillGod.AlthoughtheEnlightenmentrationalismaimedtoexposereligious

revelation’sclaimtoauthorityasarbitrary,itcouldnotdosowithoutmakingits

ownarbitraryclaimtoauthorityoverreligiousrevelation.TheEnlightenmentthus

sufferedfromalackofprobity.Thisemboldenedreligiousauthoritytoresistthe

Enlightenment.TheEnlightenment,awareofitsowninconsistencyandunableto

proclaimdefinitivelythat‘Godisdead,’couldnotjustifyitsownclaimtoauthority15HA,336.16PP,201-204.

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andenteredintocrisis.Asmodernsgiveuptryingtojustifywhichoneistrue,

unjustifiedclaimstoauthoritythenaboundinmodernity;thetendencyistodifferto

history.Whatisneededisaformofrationalismcapableofquestioningthese

authorities.Thatformexistsinclassicalrationalism.WhileArendtseesonlya

retrievaloffragmentspossibleinlightofmodernconditions,Strausscontendsthata

returntoclassicalrationalismispossible.Strauss’sreturntoAristotleisnotinorder

tomakehimanauthority,butbecauseheprovidesanexampleofrationalismdone

well,someonewhothinksintheabsenceofapredeterminedauthority.Aristotle

becomespartofStrauss’sefforttojustifyrationallywhichaccountofthegoodis

correct.

LikeLeoStrauss,AlasdairMacIntyrealsoidentifiesthesourceforthelossof

rationalauthorityinthefailureoftheEnlightenmentproject.Straussaddressesthe

Enlightenment’sambitiontooverthrowreligiousauthority;similarly,MacIntyre

addressestheEnlightenment’sambitiontofreehumanagentsfromthetraditional

sourcesofauthorityfoundintheirchurchesandcommunities.TheEnlightenment

aspiredtoprovideanewauthorityforhumanpracticalreasoning,basedonthe

powerofeachindividual’shumanreasontoidentifyself-evidentpreceptsof

morality.YetMacIntyrearguesthattheEnlightenmentprojecttojustifymorality

hadtofail:itdroppedtheconceptofteleology,whichhadprovidedthenecessary

socialandnaturalcontexttomakemoralityintelligible.Inmodernsociety,the

preceptsofmoralityare‘taboos,’negativeorpositivecommandsthataretakenas

authoritativebyhumanagents,withoutthehumanagentsunderstandingwhythey

shouldbeauthoritative.Whenthetaboosarechallenged,theyaredropped.

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Nietzsche’schallengestothesetaboosareenoughtomakemodernsocietyonein

whichnoauthoritativejustificationformoralityispossible.

Torecovertherationaljustificationofthegood,MacIntyreinitiatesthe

researchprogrammeofAfterVirtue.HeseekstoreconstructtheAristotelian

conceptionofpracticalreasoning,updatingittorespondtocontemporary

philosophicalproblems,anddemonstratethesuperiorityofthisreconstructionover

alternatives.MacIntyre’sreconstructionjustifiesteleology,providingthe

authoritativejustificationformoralitythattheEnlightenmentfailedtoprovide.Yet

MacIntyre’sdevelopmentoftheAristotelianconceptiontakeshimtoThomism,

exposinghimtothechargethattheresearchprogrammeofAfterVirtue

presupposedreligiousauthorityallalong.Isthistrue?

UnlikeArendt,whothinksthatreligiousauthoritynolongerholdsweightin

modernity,andStrauss,whodescribestherelationshipbetweenphilosophyand

religiousauthorityasaperennialconflict,MacIntyrethinksreligiousauthoritycan

enrichphilosophicalenquiry,andphilosophicalenquirycanhelpbetterarticulate

religiousauthority.However,itisincorrecttocharacterizeMacIntyreasrelyingon

religiousauthority.MacIntyreholdsthatsecularphilosophy—thatis,philosophy

thatdoesnotpresupposeareligiousauthority—providesanoutlinesketchofwhat

thegoodis.Anadditionalfeatureofhisoutlinesketchistoshowthatthe

presuppositionsofrevealedreligionarephilosophicallycompatiblewith

Aristotelianism.MacIntyrecanthereforeshowonthegroundsofsecularphilosophy

thatitispossiblethatreligiousauthorityiscorrectaboutwhatthegoodis.For

MacIntyre,itisreasonabletoproceedfromsecularphilosophytonaturaltheology.

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Todenythatsecularphilosophyraisesquestionsofnaturaltheologywouldbea

failureofreason.OnthispointheandStrausswouldagree.Asphilosophersthey

bothhalttheirenquiryatthesamepoint,whereansweringthequestionofquidsit

deusintheaffirmativewouldprovideadditionalcharacteristicsastowhatthegood

isbeyondthoseconfirmedbysecularphilosophy.17

IfStraussraisesafundamentalconflictbetweenphilosophyandrevelation,it

isbecausehe,likeKarlBarth,seesphilosophyandrevelationasirreconcilable

authorities.18ThedifferenceisthatwhileBarthisolatesrevelationfromphilosophy

topreserverevelation,Straussisolatesphilosophyfromrevelationtopreserve

philosophy.MacIntyre’sresponsetoeachisthesame:heseesnostrictseparation

betweenphilosophyandrevelation,onthegroundsthattheauthorityofrevelation

requiresphilosophytomakesenseofwhoGodis.Thatanswermaynotsatisfy

Strauss,butitisadisputeinthephilosophyofreligion,andnotadisputebetween

theologiansthatpresupposesacertainauthority.MacIntyre’senquirymayarriveat

conclusionscompatiblewithreligiousauthority,buthisenquirypresupposesthat

noauthoritativeansweraboutwhatisgoodisreadilyavailable.

Sofar,thefirstandsecondconditionsthatIhaveoutlinedcouldverywellbe

calledconditionsofpoliticalphilosophy,notrestrictedtoAristotelianpolitical

philosophy.19ToidentifythenecessaryfeaturesofAristotelianpoliticalphilosophy,

itishelpfultoturntothefollowingtwoconditions,whichsetahighstandardfor

howAristotelianismunderstandsthegood:

17Cf.CM,240-41;ECM,314-15.18Batnitzky(2009),45.19N.B.Salkever(1990),151.

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3. Aristotelianpoliticalphilosophyfindsincoherentthedesignationofadistinctivesphereofhumanactiondefinableas‘themoral.’

4. Aristotelianpoliticalphilosophyisnon-consequentialist,intheAnscombeiansense.20Aristotelianpoliticalphilosophyconsidersthepracticalgood,soitaddresses

thewholerangeofhumanaction,or‘ethics.’Thisscopeallowsittobeconcerned

withthewholehumanwayoflife,andraisethequestionastowhatisthebestway

oflife.Asphereconcernedwhollywith‘themoral,’themeaningof‘ought’andits

cognates,whichwouldprovideareductionistseriesofrule-basedprinciples,does

notfeature.21MacIntyre,Arendt,andStraussallprovidecriticismsofattemptsto

understandhumanactionintermsofasphereof‘themoral.’

WhileneitherMacIntyrenorStraussrejectsoutrightaplaceforan‘ought’in

practicalreasoning,theybothholdthatitisonlyintelligibleinrelationtothewhole

humangood.MacIntyre’scontentionisthattheEnlightenmentprojecthadtofail

becauseittriedtoseparateconsiderationsofprecepts(the‘ought’)froma

functionalunderstandingofthehumanbeing.Thusitcollapsedintoincoherence.

MacIntyrereconstructsanethicalframeworkthatseespreceptsasonlyintelligible

byreferencetohowtheyrealizethehumangood,therebylinkingthe‘ought’toa

functionalunderstandingofthehumanbeing:‘human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-

realized-its-telos.’

Strauss,forhispart,sketchesasimilarchargeofincoherenceinhiscritique

ofmodernity’sfact-valuedistinction.Thedemarcationbetween‘is’and‘ought’turns

the‘ought’intoasubjective‘value,’invitingrelativism.Bycontrast,Strauss’sreturn

20IdrawthesetwopointsfromSanford(2015),153.21Sanford(2015),152.

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toclassicalpoliticalphilosophyisaturntothestudyofthehumanthingsasapartof

thestudyofnature,whichdiscoverswhatthehumangoodisbynature.AsAristotle

reveals,thenaturalhumangoodisfullydiscoveredinthecity,inpoliticallife,as

‘moralvirtue.’AnimportantaspectofAristotle’sdiscoveryofmoralvirtueisthat

‘theought,’simplecommandsorprecepts,areinsufficienttodescribeorrealizethe

humangood.‘Themoral’cannotbedemarcatedfromthewholehumanrangeof

humanaction.ForthatreasonStraussdoesnotgoinpursuitofadistinctlymoral

sphere,butturnshisattentiontohowthegoodisrealizedinpoliticallife.Fromthis

structureofpracticalreasoning,refusingtoseparate‘themoral’and‘thepolitical,’

MacIntyreandStraussseektodiscoverwhatisthehumangoodthatwould

characterizethebestwayoflife.

Arendtstressesdistinctspheresofhumanactivity.Yetneitherdoesshe

concedeadistinctsphereto‘themoral.’InsteadArendtarguescriticallythat‘the

moral’distortstheunderstandingofhumanaction,whichischaracteristically

politicalaction.Arendtpraisesthe‘good’ofpoliticalactionintermsofits

‘meaningfulness,’contrastingthatwithaspecifically‘moral’goodness.Arendt

associates‘moral’goodnesswiththecomingofChristianity,andseestheessential

featureof‘moral’goodnessasanonymity.But,Arendtargues,meaningfulhuman

actionisfoundintheopposite:inperformingone’sactionpublicallytodisclose

one’sindividualitybeforeothers.WhileArendtstopsshortofcallingtheChristian

useof‘themoral’incoherent,herchargeisthattheapplieduseof‘themoral’to‘the

political’leadstoincoherencies.Forexample,thesphereof‘themoral’focuseson

one’sinnerwillorintentioninordertoidentifywhetherone’sactionswere

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‘morally’goodorbad.Arendtarguesthisleadstoincoherentassessmentsofthe

enormityofthecrimescommittedbyparticipantsintotalitarianregimes,suchas

thoseofAdolfEichmann.Tothosewhoholdthatintentionmattersformorality,

Arendtasks:inlightoftheenormityofEichmann’scrimes,dospeculationsonthe

extentofhisanti-Semitismaddordetractfromhisguilt?Isitnothisdeedsthat

damnhim?Arendtseespartofherprojectassketchinganewunderstandingof

moralitythatstemsfromreflectingonthepracticalgood,thephenomenaofhuman

politicalaction,ratherthantryingtoapplyaso-calledsphereof‘themoral’tothe

political.Arendtdoesnotavoidthequestionofwhatmakesanactrightorwrong,

butinsteaddiscoversthecriterionofrightandwrongintheindividual’ssilent

dialoguewithhimself.22ForArendt,thesilentdialogueexposesthatmoralityisnot

experiencedas‘ought’or‘oughtnot,’butasa‘can’or‘cannot.’23

AsArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyreallcritiqueadistinctsphereof‘themoral’

concernedwiththemeaningof‘oughts’atplayinmodernity,itisunsurprisingthat

allthreefaceversionsofthechargeofamoralismorrelativism.Hencethefourth

conditionisimportantforspecifyingthecharacterofmorality,ofassessinggood

andbadactions,inaformofpoliticalphilosophythatrejectsthesphereof‘the

moral.’

MacIntyredrawsmuchinspirationforthecriticalargumentofAfterVirtue

fromElizabethAnscombe’scritiqueofmodernmoralphilosophy.Anscombeargues

thatmodernmoralphilosophyischaracterizedby‘consequentialism,’the

rationalizationofsettingasideprinciplesforthesakeofadesiredconsequence.22RJ,97-98.23RJ,78-79,109.

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Consequentialism,Anscombecharges,isunabletoprovideanintelligibleaccountof

moralabsolutes.Itcanprovidenoreasonwhythejudicialmurderoftheinnocents

shouldbeimpermissible.InAnscombe’sconstructiveargument,shearguesthat

Aristotelianismmustbenon-consequentialist,providinganaccountofmoral

absolutesthatcannotbesetasideforfearorhopeofconsequences.Thisiswhatit

meanstobenon-consequentialistintheAnscombeiansense.24

MacIntyreoffersthemostexplicitandunequivocaldefenceofmoral

absolutesinAristotelianism.Heupholdsanddefendsexceptionlessmoralabsolutes

asafeatureofAristotelianism.Theyarenecessaryfortrainingtheagenttolivewell

incommonwithothers,aswellastopursuerationalenquiryintothegood.

MacIntyrefindstheThomistformulationofthepreceptsofthenaturallawtobethe

cleareststatementoftheroletheseexceptionlessmoralabsolutesplayinpractical

reasoning.MacIntyreemphaticallycontrastshisunderstandingwiththeformsof

instrumentalreasoningthatheseesascharacteristicofmodernpoliticalsystems.

ArendtechoesMacIntyre’scritiqueofinstrumentalreasoning,andisdismayedby

itsprevalenceinmodernpoliticalsystems.Arendt’sproposalsforanew

understandingofmoralityclearlyevokeanuncompromisingstandardofjudgement.

Herstandardof‘responsibility’condemnsanyoccasionwhereanagentsetsaside

hisprinciplesforthesakeofadesiredconsequence.Considerthekindsofproblems

uponwhichconsequentialistmoralphilosophythrives.Inthe‘JimandtheIndians’

problem,themilitarycaptainpreparingtoexecutetwentyIndianspresentsthe

visitor,Jim,withthechoiceofeithershootingoneIndianhimselfandseeingthe

24Anscombe(1958),9-10,12,19.

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othernineteenbespared,ornotshootingoneIndianandseeingalltwentybe

executed.Consequentialistmoralityprovidesaclearanswer,butArendthasapithy

waytocutpastit:theonlywayforJimtoseetheconsequentialistcalculusisasa

temptation.25IfJimismorallyreliable,hewouldreply,‘Ican’tmurderinnocent

peoplejustasIcan’tsay,“twoandtwoequalfive.”’26Arendtacceptsexceptionless

moralabsolutes,andisanonconsequentialistintheAnscombeiansense.

Strauss’soppositiontorelativismmeanshemusthaveasuspicionof

consequentialism,becausesuggestionsthatprinciplescanbesetasidethreatens

relativism.Strauss’sdiscussionofnaturalrightevinceshisinterestinprovidinga

responsetothechallengeofrelativism.Strauss’sstandardfornaturalrightisnot

basedon‘rights’orrules,butonthebestregimeandhowitrealizesthecommon

good.Thebestregimeisthatwhichismostperfectlyjustandthusperfectlyrealizes

thecommongood.Itspositivelawswouldbeperfectlyjust.Bearingthebestregime

inmind,Straussholdsthatthevastmajorityofregimesneverachievethisperfect

compatibilitybetweenlawandnaturalright.

ForMacIntyre’sThomism,evenifhumanreasonfrequentlyerrs,human

reasoncangraspthenaturallawcorrectlyandthereforeidentifytheexceptionless

moralabsolutescorrectly.Straussdoesnotsharethisconfidenceinhumanreason.

HecriticizestheThomistconceptofnaturallawforpresuming,intheabsenceofthe

bestregime,thatalawcanbeoutlinedinsufficientadequacyanddetailtomeetall

25Williams(1978),98-99;RJ,18.C.f.Anscombe(1958),12:‘Byit[consequentialism],thekindofconsiderationwhichwouldformerlyhavebeenregardedasatemptation,thekindofconsiderationurgeduponmenbywivesandflatteringfriends,wasgivenastatusbymoralphilosophersintheirtheories.’26RJ,78.

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requisitecircumstances.Thisistopresumethekindofknowledgeonlyadivine

authoritywouldpossess.StraussthereforecriticizesThomismonthegroundsits

exceptionlessmoralabsolutesarenotreallyprovidedbyhumanreason,butby

Biblicalrevelation.Straussinsteadarguesthattheproperunderstandingofnatural

rightgrantsthatrulesformulatedinpositivelawsometimesadmitofexceptions.

Theseexceptionsarenecessarytopreservethecommongood,suchaswhenthe

veryexistenceofthepoliticalcommunityisthreatened.ForStrauss,thisisa

requirementofthecommongood,andthereforearequirementofjustice.Although

interpretingStraussasdenigratingmoralityisamistake,sincejusticeremainsthe

standard,Straussimpliesthattherearenoexceptionlessmoralabsolutes.

IfanAnscombeianweretochargeStrausswithconsequentialism,Strauss

couldreplythathespeaksaboutthekindsofexceptionsthatariseinlaw.For

example,nolawsonkillingcanpossiblyidentifyallthecircumstanceswherekilling

mightbejustified.Strauss’sreasoningisaboutidentifyingwhetherdoingacertain

actionincertaincircumstancesasanactofjusticeorinjustice.Heisnotdiscussing

whetherthereareexceptionstoactionsassociatedwithbadness,suchasadultery.27

Strauss’sprioritizationoflawandpoliticsmightsatisfyanAnscombeianinthese

discussions,butcontroversiesoverotherissues,suchastheuseofatomicweapons

inwar,willundoubtedlypersist.28Yetevennonconsequentialistsinthe

Anscombeiansensedebatebetweenthemselveswhetherformulationsofmoral

absolutesshouldbemorerigidorflexible.Strauss’semphasisonflexibilityneednot

27ItisthuscompatiblewiththekindofAristotelianreasoningoutlinedinAnscombe(1958),12.C.f.EN1107a9-21.28C.f.Anscombe(1958),9n.

354

makehimanexternalcontributortothisdebate.TheabidingissueisStrauss’s

critiquethatmanyoftheseformulationsowetheircontenttoBiblicalrevelation,but

eventhatcritiqueneednotplaceStrauss’scontributionsextraecclesia

Anscombeia.29Strauss’spositionsarethereforecompatiblewith

nonconsequentialismintheAnscombeiansense.

5. Aristotelianpoliticalphilosophyconsidershappinesstoinvolvetheactivityofvirtue.30AlasdairMacIntyre’sresolutiontotheweaknessofmodern‘Morality’isto

reconstructthetheoryofthevirtues.Yetunlikesomeproponentsof‘virtueethics,’

whopaylipservicetoAristotle’sinfluencebutdeveloptheirconceptsinmore

contemporaryways,MacIntyrediscoversamorerobustpositioninAristotle.31The

reconstructionofAristotle’stheoryofthevirtuesarguesthatvirtueisdefinedbyits

relationtohappiness.Happinessisthatwhichisconstitutedbyvirtuousactivity.But

theunderstandingofthevirtuesisepistemologicallypriortoanunderstandingof

happinessorhumanflourishing.ForMacIntyre,thehumangoodcannotbe

adequatelycharacterizedwithoutalreadyhavingmadereferencetothevirtues.32It

isforthisreasonthatMacIntyreseekstoreconstructanAristoteliantheoryofthe

virtuesthatwouldadequatelycharacterizethehumangoodandthereforehuman

flourishing.HeeventuallyfavoursaThomistaccount,becausehethinksaThomist

accountisbetteratcharacterizingtheconditionsofflourishing.33MacIntyreargues

29Astipulationofthe‘NewNaturalLaw’accountofmoralabsolutes,whichclaimsdescentfromAnscombe,isthattheymustnotbedependentonBiblicalrevelation.Grisez(1983),115;c.f.Finnis(2011),52.30Sanford(2015),157.31Sanford(2015),157.32AV,49;Sanford(2015),157-58.33C.f.Jaffa(1952),23-34,123-66.NoteAV,278.

355

forthevirtuesofacknowledgeddependency,whicharevirtuesthatfosterthe

relationshipsofaidandassistanceuponwhicheveryhumanbeingrelies.

MacIntyre’sconsideredviewisthathumanflourishingisconstitutedbythevirtues

ofacknowledgeddependency.

WhileArendtusestheterm‘virtue,’shedoesnotusetheterm‘happiness.’

Shepreferstousetheterm‘meaningfulness.’Neverthelesssheisthinkingofa

relationshipbetweenvirtuousactivityandmeaningfulnessanalogoustothe

relationshipbetweenvirtuousactivityandhappiness;forArendt,meaningfulnessis

constitutedbyvirtuousactivity.ArendtemphasisesvirtueinitsoriginalGreek

derivation,aretē,understoodasexcellence.Asvirtueisanexcellence,performedfor

itsownsake,Arendtusestheterm‘virtuosity’todrawattentiontothepublically

performativecharacterofvirtueimpliedinactivitieslikeflute-playinganddancing.

Asanactivityperformedinpublic,virtueenablesoneindividualtodistinguish

himselffromanother.Thisiswhatvirtueisfor.Realizingone’sindividuality

disclosesone’sactionasafreeaction,whichiswhatmakeslifemeaningfuland

connectstheperformanceofvirtuetofreedom.Arendt’sconsideredviewisthat

meaningfulnessisconstitutedbyfreedomasvirtuosity.YetArendtsuppressesa

descriptionofvirtueashexis,andsoomitstoconsiderhowvirtuerelatesto

particularpassions,emotions,ordesires.34Shepreferstoreflectcriticallyonhow

traditionalconceptionsofthewilllimitfreedom,andtherebyconstrainthespace

wherefreedomasvirtuosityappears.

34EN1104b5-8.

356

MacIntyrearguesagainstomissionsofArendt’skind.Theycontrastthewill

asthesourceofwhatisgoodandbadtonaturalhumandesiresorgoals.Although

Arendtpreferstheterm‘action’over‘will,’shestrugglestoformulateaneffective

criterionforjustifyingmoralityotherthanone’schoice.WhileArendtholdsto

unwaveringmoralstandards,MacIntyre’schargeisthatthevoluntarismbegunin

thelatemiddleagesandcarriedonuptoKant(whoisasourceofmuchinspiration

forArendt’suntraditionalunderstandingofaction)isphilosophicallyuntenable.

AlthoughArendttentativelyanswersthequestion‘whatkindofpersonshallI

become’byreferringtoadialogueinoneselfaimingatinternalharmony,MacIntyre

wouldholdthatonlyaphilosophicalpsychologyofhumanagency,unitingdesire

andaction,establishestowhatgoodtheinternalharmonymustbedirected.

ForMacIntyre,treatingvirtueashexisallowsonetobeginarealanswerto

‘whatkindofpersonshallIbecome?’Thatliesinaperson’seducation.Toacquire

thevirtuesrequiresbeingtrainedintherighthabits.Toeducateapersonwell,so

thattheyactfreelyasindependentpracticalreasoners,MacIntyreemphasizesthe

virtuesofacknowledgeddependency.ThisisnottosuggestthatArendtignoresthe

topicofeducation.Whilesheaimsatandcelebratesfreedominpolitics,sheinsists

thattreatingchildrenasfree,independent,orautonomousruinseducational

systems.35YetunlikeArendt,MacIntyreprovidesaphilosophicalexplanationasto

whyitisamistaketotreatchildrenasautonomous.Thisexplanationonlycomesby

referencetohumanbiologicalnatureasdependentrationalanimals.

35BPF,177-78.

357

WhileStraussapproachesvirtuefromtheperspectiveofpoliticalscience,he

alsorelatesvirtuetohexis.Thetaskofpoliticalscienceiseducation.Tothequestion

‘whatkindofpersonshallIbecome’theansweris:ajustandnobleperson.For

Strauss,politicalsciencecultivatesthepassionstowardthegood,encouragingthe

virtuesofself-masteryandmoderation.Onlyinthiswaycanthecitizenexercisethe

virtueofprudence.LikeMacIntyreandArendt,Straussaimsatpoliticalfreedom.If

Arendt’sfreedomisaboutdisplayingindividuality,andMacIntyre’sfreedom

addressesindependenceinpracticalreasoning,Strauss’sfreedomisaboutself-rule.

MacIntyrestressesthevirtuesofacknowledgeddependencythatarerequiredto

reachindependence.Pursuingadifferentcourse,StraussstressestheAristotelian

meaningofliberalityasself-mastery,whichallowstheliberalindividual—theone

whohasthevirtueofliberality—torulehimselfandnotberuledbyothersin

politicallife.MacIntyre’seducationisaneducationingenerosity,withtheThomist

senseofmisericordia;Strauss’seducationisaliberaleducation,withtheAristotelian

senseofliberality.36

WhileArendtdoesnottreatthetopicextensively,bothMacIntyreand

Straussemphasizetheimportanceoflawfortheeducationinthevirtues.Goodlaws

arenecessarytosupportthedevelopmentofthevirtues,byteachingwhichactions

helporhindertheachievementoftheindividualaswellasthecommongood.Laws

arethereforenecessaryfortheachievementofthecommongoodandthusfora

genuinepoliticalcommunity.Yetgoodlawscannotteachbyrationalpersuasion

alone.Straussholdsthatwhilereasonplaysaroleintrainingcitizensinthevirtues,

36Notethattheeducationisnotrestrictedtocivicrepublicanism;c.f.Salkever(1990),258.

358

therearethosewholackself-ruleandremainslavestotheirpassions.Straussthus

arguesthateffectivelawisonlypartiallybasedonreason.Aslawneedstodirect

thosewhoarenotgoingtobepersuadedbyreason,itisalsopartiallybasedon

poeticappealstothepassions,andpartiallybasedonforce.37

MacIntyre,forhispart,isattunetothefactthatpositivelawisonlypartially

basedonreason,butseesthisasaproblemtoovercome.Heoffersaradicalcritique

oflawsthatfailtoconformtotherationalstandardprovidedbynature.For

MacIntyre,theimperfectapplicationofthepreceptsofthenaturallawisalways

damagingtotheindividualandcommongood.Goodcommunitiesaimtoconform

theirpositivelawtothenaturallawasarequirementforrealizingtheindividual

andcommongood.Toaccomplishthisrequiresinturnsharedrationalor

philosophicalenquiryintothegood,apracticenotrestrictedtoprofessional

philosophersbutavailabletowhatMacIntyrecalls‘plainpersons.’Occasionally

communitiessucceedinrealizingtheindividualgoodandcommongood,butthatis

especiallyrareinmodernitywhereinnumerableobstaclesarethrownup.Farmore

oftenthepracticeofrationalenquiryshowsplaceswherethepreceptsofthenatural

lawarenotupheldandthuswherethecommongoodisdamaged.Theimperfection

ofthelawthwartshappiness,andexposestheneedfortheradicalcritiqueofthe

institutionsofmodernitybypoliticalphilosophers.Whenanimprudentenquirer

askedCharlesdeGaulleifhewashappy,deGaullereplied,‘Iamnotstupid.’38

MacIntyrecomesclosetosayingthatinthevastmajorityofmodernsocieties,

humanbeingsarehappyonlyiftheyarestupid.37Zuckert(1996),267-68.38ECM,202.

359

ForStrauss,positivelawhasaperenniallyimperfectcharacter.While

MacIntyrewantstodenythatmostsocietiesaregenuinepoliticalcommunities

becausetheyfailtoconformtothehighstandardofthenaturallaw,Straussinstead

arguesthatknowledgeofthewholeofnature,requiredtoformulatenaturallaws,is

notavailable.Intheabsenceofperfectknowledge,positivelawremainsimperfect.

Straussthentakesaseriesofadditionalsteps.Hedistinguishesbetweentwotypes

ofrecipientsofthelaws:thosewhoarepersuadedbyreason,andthosewhoarenot.

ForStrauss,thosewhoarepersuadedbyreasoncanbeoftwotypes:eitherthey

obeyonewhospeakswell,ortheyknowwhatvirtueisalready.Thosewhoknow

whatvirtueisalreadycanalsobeoftwotypes:eithertheyaresatisfiedwithwhat

virtueisandhavenoneedtoknowwhyitisvirtuous,ortheyarenotsatisfiedto

knowwhatvirtueis,andwillwanttoknowwhyitisvirtuous.39ForStrauss,itisthe

roleofthelegislatororpoliticalscientisttoformlawsthateducateallthesehuman

typesinthevirtuousactionsrequiredforachievementoftheindividualgoodand

commongood,inlightoftheperenniallyimperfectcharacterofpositivelaws.

Nevertheless,thosewhowanttoknowthe‘why’requirespecialattention,because

theirintellectualenergysurpassesalltheothergroups.Theachievementoftheir

individualgoodisthendistinguishedfromtheachievementofthecommongoodof

whichtherestarecapable.Theyalonecanrealizethehighestnaturalendofman,

theoreticalunderstandingorphilosophy.Theyaretheonlyoneswhocanbehappy

inthefullestsense.Strausscomesclosetosayingthatinexistingpolitical

communities,thestupidareactuallyunhappy.

39EN1095b3-13.

360

6. ForAristotelianpoliticalphilosophy,prudencedirectsthetrulyvirtuoustorightaction.40MacIntyreandStraussbothfindinAristotleanelaborationanddefenceof

thepositionthatanagentisonlydoingagoodactifhehasthevirtueofprudence.In

MacIntyre’stheoryofpracticalreasoning,whenanagenthasthevirtueofjustice,he

knowstheactionsthatcountasjust,andishabituallyinclinedtowardtheseactions.

Thejustagentdoesnothavetospeculatecontinuallyaboutwhatitistoactjustly,as

thatiscontainedwithinhishabitofjustice.Yetheneedstoknowhowtoactjustlyin

aparticularcircumstance.Itisbythevirtueofprudencethatanagentisguidedto

rightactioninaparticularcircumstance.41LikeMacIntyre,Straussholdsthat

prudenceisinseparablefromgoodorvirtuouscharacter.LikeMacIntyre,neither

art,norlaw,nornaturallaw,cansubstituteforprudence.Prudenceisrequiredto

completereasoningonhowtoactvirtuouslyinparticularcircumstances.Itis

prudencethatmakesonegenuinelyjust.42

Prudence,liketheothervirtues,needstobetaught.Aneducationin

prudenceisastudyofparticularity,theparticularcircumstancesinwhichthe

prudentpersonhasactedprudently.Toacquireprudence,anagentneedstostudy

theseexemplarycases.Inhislatestwork,MacIntyreprovidesnarrativebiographies

ofindividualagentswholeduntypicallivesandconfrontissuesnotfacedbymany.

MacIntyre’sprimaryobjectiveistoshowthatwerequireanarrativeunderstanding

ofotheragentstogrowinprudence.Heshowsthatintheirprudentactionsthey

pursueanultimategood;prudenceisexercisedwithaviewtotheultimatehuman

40Sanford(2015),161.41WJWR,196;Sanford(2015),162.42CM,25;WJWR,194-96.

361

good.Yetthisalsoshowsthatnofinitegoodservesastheultimatehumangood.For

MacIntyre,thisistrueofpoliticsaswell.Althoughwecanstudyexemplarycasesof

communitiesthatachievethecommongood,whicheducateprudenceinpolitical

actions,thesestudiesshowhowfrequentlyliberalinstitutionsthwartthecommon

good.Whileoneoptionwouldbetoadvocatefortheoverthrowofliberalism,

MacIntyreseesthatasaninvitationtoterrorismandrejectsit.Nopolitical

alternativeispossible,soMacIntyreacquiescestotheruleofliberalism.Hedoesnot

teachanalternativepoliticalscienceofthebestregime.Intheabsenceofthat

teaching,communitiesachievingthecommongoodarefatedforfragile,finite

accomplishments.MacIntyrethusexposesthelimitationsofethicsandpolitics:

practicalreasoninginethicsandpoliticsseekssomethingitcannotobtainfully

there.43

Straussalsoholdsthataneducationinprudencestudiesparticularity.He

linksprudencetothesearchforthehumangood,startinginpoliticallife.Strauss’s

examplesforaneducationinprudencehavethecharacterofaneducationin

politicalscience,studyingstatesmenlikeWinstonChurchill.Churchillvividly

displaysaparticularcaseofhumanexcellenceinthefaceoftyranny.Thatexcellence

involvesadefenceofliberalism.UnlikeMacIntyre,Straussseesmodernity’scrisis

notinliberalismitself,butintheabilitytoarticulateanddefendliberalism.Strauss

tacklespoliticalirresponsibilityandthethreatoftyrannybyprovidingadefenceof

thebestregime.InStrauss’saccountofpoliticalscience,thepracticallyrealizable

bestregimecorrespondstoliberaldemocracy.Aristotleteachesalessoninthe

43ECM,314-15;WJWR,196-97.

362

commongoodthatChurchillexemplifies.Nevertheless,Straussobservesthateven

thoseexemplarystudiesofstatesmendonotrealizethewholehumangood.

Churchill’scareerisalsomarkedbyagreatfailure.Althoughhesucceededagainst

Hitler,thissuccessinevitablyincreasedthethreatposedbyStalinandtheSoviet

Union.Churchillthereforeremindspoliticalscientistsoftheirlimitations.44

Whilepoliticalscienceappearstoaddressthewholehumangood,itcannot

realizethewholehumangoodbecausethereisnocompleteachievementofthe

humangoodinpoliticallife.Strauss’sexamplesofstatesmen,therefore,draw

attentiontohumanexcellenceinpoliticallife,butalsoexposethatthisexcellenceis

incomplete.Inpoliticallife,‘thereisnoadequatesolutiontotheproblemofvirtueor

happiness.’45Thecontrastisthenwiththelifethatwouldrealizethenaturalhuman

endandbeatrulyhappylife.Sincethestudyofprudence‘removesascreen’

separatingthesetwowaysoflife,thestudyofprudenceshowsthatthehumangood

isdividedbetweenthecityontheonehand,andtheindividualontheother.46Itisin

thissensethatpoliticalscienceisinstrumental,becauseiteventuallyshowsthatthe

facetofprudenceconcernedwithpoliticallifecannotbeanendinitself.Itmustbea

meanstowardamorecompletehumangoodrealizedinanotherwayoflife,pursued

byindividualswhotranscendthecitytodiscovertruehappiness.47Straussthus

arrivesataremarkablysimilarinsighttoMacIntyreonthelimitationsofethicsand

politics:inethicsandpolitics,prudenceseekssomethingitcannotobtainfullythere.

44CG.45OT,182.46CM,28.47CM,49.

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Startingfromdifferentconcerns,StraussandMacIntyreaddresstherole

playedbytheoreticalknowledgeindevelopingthevirtueofprudence.Strauss’s

concerniswithpositivistsandrelativists.Theywieldtheoreticalclaimsover

practicalreasoningtodiminishthedignityofpoliticsasanexpressionofthehuman

good,ordenythatthereisahumangoodaltogether.Torecoverthedignityof

politicsasanexpressionofthehumangood,Straussarguesthattheoretical

knowledgeisnotnecessaryfordevelopingthevirtueofprudence.Therequirement

isinsteadtohaveasufficientlevelofself-awarenesstorecognizewhatvirtueis.

Thereisnoneedtoknowthe‘why’inaddition.Practicalreasoningistherefore

separatedfromtheoreticalreasoning.Onlywhenthevirtuesarechallengedbyfalse

opinionsaboutwhatthegoodisandwhatthehumangoodisdoesonerequire

theoreticalknowledgeofnaturetocounterthesefalseopinions.

MacIntyre’sconcerniswithliberals.Theyattempttounderstandthe

practicalgoodwithoutreferencetothegoodorthehumangood,andsoengagein

practicalreasoningwithoutreferencetotheoreticalreasoning.MacIntyre’sliberals

concedethattherearehumangoods,buttheyhaltfurtherenquiryintotheultimate

humangood.MacIntyrethereforearguesthattoenactthevirtueofprudence

requiresarankorderingbetweenhumangoods.Thisrankorderingembodiesa

conceptionoftheultimatehumangood.Tojustifyone’schoicesthereforerequiresa

theoreticalunderstandingofthehumangoodandthegood;MacIntyredevelopsthe

researchprogrammeofAfterVirtuetoincludebothbiologyandmetaphysics.

MacIntyreandStraussagreethatavirtuousagentdoesnotstartfromtheoryand

applytheoreticalunderstandingtopractice,andthatitispossibleforagentstoact

364

prudentlywithoutrecoursetotheoreticalreasoning.Theyholdsimilarpositions

aboutprudenceandrightaction,andtheroleoftheoreticalreasoninginjustifying

reasonsforaction.

Theirdeepestdifferenceslieelsewhere.MacIntyreholdsthattheoretical

knowledgeiscontinuousfrompracticalreasoning.Fromtheircontinuity,MacIntyre

arguesthattheincompletegeneralizationsoftheoreticalknowledgeneedtobe

substantiatedbyinstancesofpractice,sothatwhiletheoryinformspractice,

practicealsoinformstheory.Straussrecoilsfromthisview.Heaimstoavoidthe

situationwherepoliticalidealsaretakenasessentiallytrue,asHeidegger

notoriouslydid.ForStrauss,thisistheproblemofradicalhistoricism.Onceone

beginstoaskthe‘why,’Straussmaintains,thepoliticalspherebeginstoshowits

imperfections,orevenmutilations.48Politicsdoesnotguidephilosophy.Theeffect

ofStrauss’sseparationistodemarcatethosewhopracticepoliticsfromthosewho

practicephilosophy.

Arendt,forherpart,hasnoextendedtreatmentofthebestregimeor

prudence.Arendtiscertainlynotblindtothequestionofthebestregime;she

favoursAmericanliberaldemocracy.Arendtvoluntarilychosetobecomeacitizenof

theUnitedStatesbecauseit‘wasindeedagovernmentoflawandnotofmen.’49But

herjustificationforchoosingthisconstitutionalregimeoverandabovetheregimes

ofEuropeannation-statesextendsbeyondAristotle.50Arendtdoesrefertothe

virtueofphronēsisasoneofthefundamentalabilitiesofmanasapoliticalbeingto

48NRH,151.49RJ,3-4.50E.g.ForadiscussionofArendt’sclassicalrepublicanism,seeBrunkhorst(1999),McCarthy(2012).Volk(2015)arguesArendtultimatelylookedtoWeber.

365

orienthimselfinthepublicrealm.Prudenceistheprincipalvirtueofthestatesman.

YetArendtdevelopsitundertheheadingof‘judgement,’whichtakeshertoward

Kant.51ThisprojectisincompleteinArendt’swritings,itisnotpossibletoexamine

whetherArendtseesprudenceasdirectingthetrulyvirtuoustorightaction.Yetitis

possibletoexaminewhatArendtconceivestobethestartingpointofjudgement,in

theactivityofthinking.AlthoughArendtcriticizesthetraditionofphilosophyforits

distortionofthepolitical,shedoesnotdispensewiththeactivityofthinking.

DrawingfromAristotleandtheGreeks,Arendtarticulatesauniqueinterpretationof

theoreticalactivity,atopicStraussandMacIntyrealsoaddress.

7. Aristotelianpoliticalphilosophyinsistsontheparamountimportanceoftheoreticalactivity.52Strauss,MacIntyre,andArendtalldistancethemselvesfromtraditional

interpretationsoftheōrētikosas‘contemplative.’Arendtisthemostcriticalofthe

traditionalinterpretation,forsheregardscontemplativeactivityastheintroduction

ofPlatonictwo-worldmetaphysicalfallacy,whereaworldofappearancesis

contrastedtotheworldofBeingor‘reality.’InthisPlatonicpicture,contemplation

isassociatedwithphilosophy.AsAristotleinheritsit,theobjectofcontemplationis

‘reality,’thearchaioreternalprinciples.Bycontrast,Arendtargues,theworldof

appearancesisassociatedwithaction,withthecontingentandchangingworldof

politics.ThePlatonicpicturerankscontemplationashigherthanaction,and

philosophy,understoodascontemplationofnon-humanaffairs,ashigherthan

politics,therealmofhumanaffairs.Thedignityofpoliticsistherebydiminished.

51BPF,218;Beiner(1983),12-19.52C.f.Sanford(2015),154.

366

Arendtholdsthatthemetaphysicaltraditionisexhausted.Itsquestionsno

longerneedtobeoutlinedandanswered.Themorepressingtaskistoovercome

thisexhaustedmetaphysicaltradition.TothatendArendtdevelopstheontological

thesisthatBeingandappearancecoincide.Thereisnotranscendentrealminwhich

philosophersthink,apartfromtherealmofappearances.Fromthatontological

thesis,Arendtreconsiderswhatitistothink.Arendt’spost-metaphysicalstance

leadshertodroptheobjectofthinkingasthecontemplationofarchai.Yetthisdoes

notleadhertoconcludethattheonlymeaningfulhumanwayofliferemainingis

politicalaction,tochangetheworldthroughaction.AlthoughArendtwishestoraise

thedignityofpoliticalaction,ArendtdoesnotwishtorepeattheerrorofMarx.For

Aristotlewasrightthattheactivityofthinkingisnotthesameasacting.

RetrievingtheactivityofthinkinginitspuritythroughAristotle’sinsight,

ArendtlookstoAristotle’sother‘fragments’.Sheopenstheactivityofthinkingtoall

humanbeings—notjustprofessionalphilosophers—andconfidentlycaststheobject

oftheactivityofthinkingastheworldofappearances,notanobjectbeyondthe

world.YetthinkingisforArendtatleastinonesensebeyondtheworld;itbeyond

theworldorrealmofpolitics.Thethinkerisaspectatorwhoobservesthe

participantsofpolitics,butdoesnotparticipateinit.Thespectatoristherefore

betterpositionedtounderstandpoliticsthantheparticipant.Arendtaimsto

overcomethehierarchyofcontemplationoverpolitics,yetparadoxicallyshe

retrievesaconceptionofthemeaningfulnessofpoliticsandaconceptionofthe

meaningfulnessofthinking.Arendtelevatesthedignityofpolitics,butbyconceiving

thethinkerasaspectator,shetakesadistancing,ironicattitudetowardpolitics.

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Thinkingistheactivityofparamountimportanceforthehumanwayoflife,asitis

theonlywaytounderstandBeing.‘Icanverywelllivewithoutdoinganything,’

Arendtdeclares,‘butIcannotlivewithouttryingatleasttounderstandwhatever

happens.’53

ForStrauss,itisthepoliticalwayoflifeinitselfthat,byitsimperfections,

impliesphilosophyisthehigherwayoflife.Politicsdoesnotfulfillthenatural

humanend,andsocannotprovidetruehappiness;yetthephilosophicwayoflife

can.Tothetraditionalinterpretationofphilosophyas‘contemplativeactivity,’

whichhasasitsobjectthearchai,Straussrealignsitsobjectivesbyanontological

thesis:the‘subjectivecertaintythatonedoesnotknow’thewhole‘coincideswith

objectivetruth’aboutthewhole.54Philosophyiszetetic.Itisnotaboutthe

possessionoftheknowledgeofthearchai,butthequestfortheknowledgeofthe

archai.Thisquestprovidesawarenessofthefundamentalquestionsaboutthe

wholethattraditionalmetaphysicsaddresses,aboutGod,man,theworld,andthe

natureofallthings.Tovindicatethesequestionsasthefundamentalquestions,

Straussupholdstheadditionalontologicalthesisofnoeticheterogeneity,thereby

defendingthebasisoftheSocraticandAristotelianunderstandingofnaturethat

treatsthegoodasdistinctfromtheotherpartsofnature.55Noeticheterogeneity

establishesthatthearchaiexist,includingthearchēofthegood,butnotwhatthey

are.

53HA,303.54OT,196.Straussexhibitsapost-Kantianthesis:he‘undertakesareturntoclassicalthoughtwithoutareturntometaphysicsasthetraditionconceivesit.’Velkley(2011),69;seealso54.55InthiswayStrauss‘seekstorecover“whatmetaphysicsintended.”’Velkley(2011),69.

368

MacIntyrealsorealignstheobjectoftraditionalmetaphysics.Heunderstands

philosophyasthequestfortheknowledgeofthearchai,primarilythequestforthe

archēofthehumangood.MacIntyre’sepistemologicalthesisisthatrationalityis

tradition-constituted,sothateveryunderstandingofthearchaiisprovisionaland

alwaysopentofurtherrevisionandjustification.Fromthatepistemological

standpoint,MacIntyredefendstheontologicalthesesthatthehumangoodisanend

towardwhichhumansaredirectedbecauseoftheirspecificnature,andthatitis

attainable.56MacIntyrethusinsistsontheparamountimportanceoftheoretical

enquiryintothehumangood.YetMacIntyrealsoholdstheadditionalthesisthatthe

humangoodisnotattainableinthislife.57Thereconciliationofthesethreetheses

liesinThomism.58

SowhileArendt’stheoreticalactivitycountersthebasiccosmological

assumptionsofthetraditionofmetaphysicalphilosophy,StraussandMacIntyre

considertheoreticalactivityasazeteticorprovisionalactivitythatraisesawareness

ofthequestionsthetraditionofmetaphysicalphilosophyposes.ForArendtthese

questionsaretentativelyposedanddefinitivelyrejected;forStrausstheyare

definitivelyposedratherthantentativelysolved;forMacIntyretheyaredefinitively

posedandtentativelysolved.Althoughtheytreattheseissuesindifferentways,

theirdeliberatedontologicalthesesshowthattheirtheoreticalactivityraisesthe

fundamentalquestionofmetaphysics:whatisbeing?59Theparamountimportance

56C.f.STIaqu.5ar.1;Ia-IIaequ.5ar.1.57C.f.STIa-IIaequ.5ar.3.58WJWR,192-93.59Metaphysics983a22.

369

theygivetotheoreticalactivitygivesAristotelianpoliticalphilosophyadecidedly

metaphysical,evensupernatural,outlook.60

WhileStrauss,Arendt,andMacIntyreallarguefortheparamountimportance

oftheoreticalactivity,theydonotlosesightofthefactthattheoreticalactivityisan

activity,awayoflifeaddressingthepracticalgood.61ForStrauss,theoreticalactivity

offersapracticalgooddistinctfromthatfoundinpoliticalactivity:thepreservation

oftheoreticalactivityinthefaceofthehostilepoliticalactors.Theoreticalactivity

cultivatesanironicorexotericrhetoric,dissimulatingthoseaspectsoftheoretical

activitythatothersfindthreatening.Itadditionallycultivatesanesotericrhetoric,

invitingthepoliticalactorsmostreceptivetotheoreticalactivitytoseekthegood.

Arendt’stheoreticalactivityisalsoironic,butofadifferentsort:itisinanexercise

indistancingoneselffrompracticalactivity.LikeStrauss,sheholdsthattheoretical

activityproposesapracticalgoodorwayoflifedistinctfromthatoriginally

retrievedorrecoveredinpoliticallife.

Perhapsrelatedtohissuspicionofirony,onlyMacIntyretriestoabolisha

distinctpracticalgoodfortheoreticalactivity.62ForMacIntyre,Aristotle’s

understandingofcontemplativeactivityisdeficientbecauseitpursuesanillusory

idealofself-sufficiency.Theoreticalactivityisapractice,pursuedincommonwith

otherhumanagents.Humanagentsundertakeaquestforthepracticalgood

becausetheydesiretolivewell.Attimesthisquestbecomestheoretical:thegood

beingsoughtisthehumangoodandthegood,withitsmetaphysicaland

60C.f.Sanford(2015),156.61C.f.Hadot(1995)129.62MacIntyre(2012).

370

supernaturalimplications.Yetthewayoflifethatseeksthegoodisalwaysina

political,practicalcontext.ForMacIntyre,onepursueswhatisgoodsothatonemay

actonit.HenceMacIntyrestressesthatitisthepracticalgoodbeing-soughtin

theoreticalandpracticalactivity.

WhatofthequestionofSimplicius?Whatplacedoesthephilosopherhavein

thecity?Astraightforward,‘Platonic’answeristhatitsufficesforthephilosopherto

rulethecity.Philosophyandpolitics,theoryandpractice,canbeunified.Nietzsche

agreedthatphilosophyhadtraditionallyaspiredtorulethecityinthisway,

legislatingitsownideaofthegoodforthewholecity.Inmodernity,the‘Platonic’

answerisfullyexposed;moreover,itsrationalfoundationsforprovidinganideaof

thegoodareexposedasexhausted.WhatisleftforNietzscheistohuntdownthe

originsofthe‘Platonic’answerinthehistoryofphilosophy.Thosewhojourney

fromNietzschedothesame.

Yetthe‘Platonic’answerstillpersistsinthepresent.Whenthisansweris

mixedwiththehistoricismthatNietzscheadvocated,itcombineswiththe‘Platonic’

answertoproduceanoxiousbrew.Nietzschewascontenttomakeominous

predictionsaboutthewarsofthefuture.ButforArendt,Strauss,andMacIntyre,

passingthroughthesewarsimpelsthemtoaskwhethertheprojecttounifytheory

andpracticethroughhavingthe‘right’arguments,whicheffectivelydeferstobeing

onthe‘right’sideofhistory,wasitselfgood.Thesignificanceoftheirjourneyfrom

Nietzscheisthatinrecoveringthequestionofthegood,believingthatrationalismis

notexhausted,andthatrationalismdoesnothavetobowtohistory,Arendt,Strauss,

andMacIntyrealldisagreewithandcounterthe‘Platonic’answer.Forthe

371

AristotelianpoliticalphilosophythattheirjourneyfromNietzschearrivesat,there

isnofinalitytotheproblemoftheoryandpractice.

MacIntyre’spoliticalphilosophyplacesthephilosopherinthecityinorderto

changethecity.Yetbecausethephilosopherdoesnotknowdefinitivelywhatthe

goodis,neithercanthecitizens.MacIntyredoesholdthatcitieswillcontinuetobe

imperfectuntilcitizensbecomephilosophersandphilosophersbecomecitizens,but

thatpresentsnoresolutiononitsown.Philosopher-citizenscandiscover

characteristicsofthegood,buttheycannotknowdefinitelywhatitis.Knowledgeof

thegood,includingthepracticalgood,ispossibleintheorybutisnotfullyachieved

inpractice.Hisphilosopher-citizensarepilgrimsforthepracticalgood,onquestto

discoverwhatthegoodis.

Forthesakeofthecitizen,Arendt’spoliticalphilosophyseemstobanishthe

philosopherfromthecity.Whilephilosophershithertodisparagedthepractical

goodofpoliticalactivityinlightofthegoodofcontemplativeactivity,thecitizen

shouldrealizethatthepracticalgoodinfactahumangoodworthyofaim.Yet

Arendtdevelopsthethinkerdistinctlyfromthecitizen,assomeoneawareofthe

limitationsofthepracticalgoodofthecitizenasahumangood.Sheimpliesthatthe

thinkerbettergraspsthehumangood.Arendtthenfostersatensionbetweenthe

thinkerandthecitizenoverthehumangood.Oftenthethinkerexposeshowcitizens

failtoachievethepracticalgood.Thethinkerlivesinthecity,butthethinker’sway

oflifemakesherastrangertoitscitizens.

Strauss’spoliticalphilosophyisdevelopedinresponsetothefearthat

philosophycanbebanishedfromthecity.Ifitisbanished,thenwhowillraisethe

372

questionofthegood?Yetthatquestionofthegoodcanonlybedisclosedbyfirst

examiningthepracticalandthehumangoodthatisdiscoveredinthecity.Topursue

thequestionofthegood,thephilosophermustthereforefinditsplaceinthecityand

studythecityas‘firstphilosophy.’Attimeshemayhavetodefendthecity.He

disguiseshimselfbeforethecity;attimeshemayhavetodefendhimselffromthe

city.Thephilosopherlivesinthecitybutnevercompletelyreconcileshimselftoit.

Heneverforgetsthathiswayoflifetranscendsthecity,inthegoodbeing-sought

thatisalwaysaquestionforthehumanbeing.

373

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