Leo Strauss and the Euthydemus

Leo Strauss and the EuthydemusAuthor(s): William H. F. AltmanSource: The Classical Journal, Vol. 102, No. 4 (Apr. - May, 2007), pp. 355-379Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and SouthStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30037930 .Accessed: 02/01/2011 16:01

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LEO STRAUSS AND THE EUTHYDEMUS

Abstract: On the basis of an "evolving argument in defense of eristics," Leo Strauss's Socrates in "On the Euthydemus" takes the brothers' eristic art seriously and seeks to become their student. Central to Strauss's argument is the premise, based on Socratic doubts as to whether virtue is teachable, that "wisdom in the proper sense" is impossible. An alternate interpretation of the Euthydemus suggests that Plato's Socrates is practicing the art of reproducing wisdom by teaching virtue to Ctesippus. The contrast between these interpretations distinguishes Strauss's intentions from Plato's.

I

f only as Americans, it is time for American Classicists to take another look at Leo Strauss. This is due not only to a growing awareness of Strauss's legacy-along with a flurry of apologetics'

intended to deflect criticism arising from that awareness-but also to the fact that no account of Strauss can avoid considering his relation- ship with Plato. The debate about Strauss between Miles Burnyeat and G.R.F. Ferrari revolved around Plato, and Classicists have generally been content to let the matter rest there.2 But thanks to the publication of the writings of the young Strauss,3 more data is now available for those who seek to learn (in Burnyeat's phrase) the Secret of the Sphinx; indeed it is the emergence of this material- along with the rise to political prominence of several Straussians- that explains the recent activity at the University of Chicago Press. The present article is written in a different spirit: it offers a detailed analysis of Strauss's 1970 article "On the Euthydemus" intended to illuminate some of Plato's secrets as well as those of Strauss.

Strauss is clear from the beginning about his motives for focus- ing on the Euthydemus: the dialogue sheds light on the Crito. Although originally published as a separate article, "On the Euthydemus" was reprinted in the posthumous Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (1983), and was placed, in accord with Strauss's wishes, after "On

Smith (2006); Pangle (2006); Zuckert (2006). Thanks to S. Douglas Olson, Tim Beck and two anonymous reviewers, this article is much better than it might have been. The weaknesses that remain are solely my responsibility.

Burnyeat (1985); Ferrari (1997). 3Strauss (1997a) and (2002), esp. 624-5.

THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL 102.4 (2007) 355-79

356 WILLIAM H.F. ALTMAN

Plato's Apology of Socrates and Crito."4 In his editorial Introduction, Thomas Pangle explains Strauss's intentions:

"In Strauss's view, a full appreciation of Crito's character, and therewith an accurate assessment of the teaching conveyed by the Crito, requires that one turn to the only other dialogue in which Crito is the interlocutor: the Euthy- demus." 5

In other words, to understand the Crito, we must understand "Crito ... the interlocutor," and to do that, we must understand the Euthy- demus. Strauss therefore begins his commentary on the Euthydemus with a comparison of the two dialogues6 and quickly brings to the reader's attention the manner in which the limitations of Crito as revealed in the Euthydemus may illuminate the central question of "an accurate assessment of the teaching conveyed by the Crito." This first limitation-others will come to light-concerns Crito's appreciation (or lack thereof) for Socratic irony.

Everyone will say, everyone has said that this is "that customary irony of Socrates." But Kriton, the direct addressee of Socrates' report about his conversation with Euthydemos, does not say this.7

Strauss continues:

"Was Kriton unaware of that irony? Was he impervious to it? Would thus the Euthydemus not reveal to us Kriton's most important limitation? Would it thus not throw light retroactively or in advance on the Crito?"

Although an extended discussion of the Crito is beyond the limits of this article, the keynote of Strauss's "accurate assessment of the teaching conveyed by the Crito" is that the Speech of the Laws delivered by Socrates is designed to persuade Crito but not Socrates himself." In addition to the limitations of Crito revealed in the Crito itself, Crito's lack of irony, revealed in the Euthydemus, helps us, Strauss believes, to understand why the Laws persuade Crito but not Socrates. All of Crito's limitations as described in "On the Euthy- demus" must be examined in this context: a limited Crito offers the means to limit the scope of a naive reading of the Crito. In addition to

4 If Strauss had written his projected article on the Gorgias, "On the Euthydemus" would have been the central chapter (of three) in Strauss (1983) about Plato. For the Gorgias, see Joseph Cropsey's Foreword (Strauss (1983) vii) with p. 17.

Strauss (1983) 16. 6 The opening sentence of Strauss (1983) 67 announces this theme: "From the Crito

we are led to the Euthydemus by the consideration that the Euthydemus contains the only other conversation between Socrates and Kriton."

Strauss (1983) 67. See Strauss (1983) 54-66: "The logos which convinces Socrates would not con-

vince Kriton and vice-versa" (p. 66).

LEO STRAUSS AND THE EUTHYDEMUS 357

lacking irony, Strauss's Crito is not philosophic,9 is primarily concerned with the well-being of his son,10 is not erotic,' and most important, declines to join Socrates in his decision to become a disciple of Euthydemus.12

Strauss's treatment of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus is as salient a feature of his commentary on the Euthydemus as his treatment of Crito, but in reverse: he emphasizes not the limitations of the sophists, but their considerable appeal. Strauss not only emphasizes that Socrates wants to become Euthydemus' disciple-and indeed exhorts Crito to become one as well-but suggests that Socrates really means to do so and is consequently hardly the enemy of the sophists he sometimes pretends to be.13 Pangle also hammers this point home in his Introduction and applies it specifically to the Euthydemus.14 Although Strauss records the traditional view that Euthydemus' art is "patently absurd and ridiculous,"'5 he indicates that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus need to be taken seriously if Plato's intentions are to be understood.

Consider the following paragraph, quoted sentence by sentence for exegetical purposes: "We might have expected that Socrates

Strauss (1983) 68: "Kriton's question "Who was..." reminds us of Socrates' "What is..." questions. Yet it is not philosophic but rather "anthropologic," i.e. belonging to the sphere of gossip, of ordinary curiosity."

Strauss (1983) 68: "We assume then that Kriton's initial question is inspired not by aimless curiosity but by paternal concern for Kritoboulos who gave him cause to worry. This assumption is borne out by the end of the dialogue." Cf. p. 82, pp. 87-8.

Strauss (1983) 71. For the importance of this limitation, see Strauss (1989) 167: "Spiritedness must be subservient to philosophy, whereas desire, eros, in its highest form is philosophy."

12 Strauss (1983) 86-7: "Kriton politely declines Socrates' suggestion [sc. that they become disciples of Euthydemus]: he belongs to those who would rather be refuted by Euthydemian speeches than refute other men with their help." This sentence suggests that Crito is to be regarded as what Strauss calls a "gentleman" as opposed to a "philosopher." See Strauss (1968) 9-25, esp. 13-14. For the pejorative connotations of "gentleman" in Strauss, see Burnyeat (1985) and Strauss (1997a) 570.

13 Strauss (1983) 88. 14 Strauss (1983) 16: "These reflections help explain why Socrates is, in the Euthy-

demus and in general, much more a defender of the sophists (even or especially the ones who are least "serious") than some might wish-while at the same time he attempts to admonish those same sophists, and suggest to them that they temper some of their imprudent zeal." Curiously, Strauss does not emphasize any attempt on Socrates' part to teach the sophists "political philosophy" in Strauss' sense (see Strauss (1983) 17-18, and in particular the texts cited there by Pangle). He does not comment, for example, on 304a7-b2.

Strauss (1983) 67: "The farcical character of the Euthydemus stands in a superficial contrast with the fact that Socrates praises therein the patently absurd and ridiculous "art" of Euthydemos, not only to Euthydemos' face, but in his absence when speaking to Kriton, as very great wisdom, he even expresses his desire to become a pupil of Euthydemos." The reason Strauss calls the contrast "superficial" is probably because he believes that the fact that Socrates praises Euthydemus "in his absence" indicates that that praise is not simply farcical.


would rebuke Dionysodorus for continuing with his boyish pranks,"16 remarks Strauss, after describing the argument advanced by the sophist that those who want to educate young Clinias wish to kill him (since by becoming wise he would unquestionably "cease to be the one he is now")." But Strauss emphasizes that this is not the case: "[Socrates] failed to do so." Moreover, this observation leads Strauss to make explicit the implicit claim of any commentary: that the com- mentator understands the text. Significantly, this is the only passage in "On the Euthydemus" in which he does so. "This fact is of considerable importance for the understanding of the dialogue as a whole." Strauss then suggests how Socrates' failure to rebuke Dionysodorus for lack of seriousness is an important clue to understanding the entire dialogue. "The speeches of the brothers are obviously ridiculous and yet Socrates says to Kriton that he contemplates becoming their pupil and he even tries to induce Kriton to join him." Strauss has already made this last point, and is thus emphasizing it: Socrates is narrating the conversation with the brothers to Crito only after the fact and therefore remains of the opinion that they should become the brothers' students, even after witnessing how "patently ridiculous" their art appears to be.18 While Socrates is unquestionably aware of this and says so, Strauss points out that he does so only at an early stage. "Of the first series of speeches Socrates said in so many words that he could not take them seriously." But this is not Socrates' last word on the subject: his last word is what he says to Crito at the beginning of the dialogue about becoming a disciple of the brothers. "His final judgment as stated to Kriton at the beginning of the dialogue makes sense only if at one point or another the conversation with the brothers had ceased to be playful and taken on a serious turn." Although Strauss never clearly states in the remain- der of his commentary when this occurs,19 he leaves no doubt that the matter is of vital importance: "We must watch to see how this change came about."

Just as Socrates and Clinias are hunting for the art that makes human beings wise, so Strauss leads his readers to hunt for the moment when the conversation with Dionysodorus and Euthydemus takes "a serious turn," leaving no doubt that "the understanding of

16 All quotations in this paragraph are from Strauss (1983) 78. 17 Strauss (1983) 77-8: "This is all Dionysodorus needed for his refutative speech:

desiring that Kleinias become wise means desiring that he cease to be the one he is now-that he cease to be-that he perish; fine friends and lovers you are!"

18 See n. 15, above. 19 In addition to the interpretations suggested below, see Strauss (1983) 83:

"Socrates raised no objections to this monstrous argument [sc. the proof that Socrates is omniscient] but he showed by deed that he had learned Euthydemos' art: he raised no objection because he had learned Euthydemos' art." Note that Strauss uses no quotation marks for "art" as he did earlier at p. 67.


the dialogue as a whole" depends on this. Although Strauss writes as if that moment were yet to come, he gives some indication that Socrates' failure to rebuke Dionysodorus is precisely that moment. In the only reference in "On the Euthydemus" to the Phaedo,20 Strauss begins the next paragraph with the seemingly incongruous question: "Did Socrates consider that philosophizing is learning to die?"21 The purpose of this question is to suggest that Dionysodorus's argument, that those who wish Clinias to be wise therefore wish to kill him, has a serious meaning, i.e. is echoed by something Socrates says in the Phaedo. This interpretation is confirmed by what Strauss says immediately afterward: "The obvious reason for his failure to rebuke Dionysodorus for his levity is that before he could say anything, Ktesippus vented his anger and indignation" by interrupting. By calling Ctesippus' intervention the obvious reason for Socrates' failure to rebuke Dionysodorus for levity, Strauss implies that there is a less obvious reason as well: that Socrates regards the argument as serious. On this reading, Strauss (playfully) warns us to be on the watch for a turning point immediately after the turning point itself has occurred.

But almost from the beginning of Strauss's commentary there are other indications that the apparently playful conversation with the brothers had "taken on a serious turn." A careful reading of "On the Euthydemus" indicates that Strauss concealed these indications in an even less obvious place than the one just described: in the open and repeatedly.22 Dionysodorus and Euthydemus claim to be able to "refute whatever is said, be it false or true and they can enable anyone within a short time to do the same."23 No sooner has Strauss restated their art this way than he advances for the first time an argument that becomes a veritable leitmotiv:24

This power is necessarily identical with virtue if virtue is wisdom and if wisdom in the proper sense-knowledge of the most important things-is

20 Phd. 64a4-6. 21 Strauss (1983) 78. 22 For careful reading as detective work, see "On a Forgotten Kind of Writing" in

Strauss (1959), esp. 231-2. "As Belaval notes, M. Kojhve, comparing my method to that of a detective, asserted that there is this difference: that my method cannot lead up to the confession of a criminal. My answer is twofold: I know of cases where the criminal confessed posthumously after having made sure that the detective would not con- demn him and I would be happy if there were suspicion of crime where up to now there has only been implicit faith in perfect innocence."

23 Strauss (1983) 70. The sentence begins: "What [the brothers] understand by virtue becomes clear from Socrates' report to Kriton about their newly acquired power...." This is the second time Strauss has described this power in similar words; cf. Strauss (1983) 68: "Above all, [the brothers] have made themselves masters in the battle of speeches simply: they can refute everything that is said at any time regardless of whether it is true or false."

24 Strauss (1983) 70. Notice that Strauss presents these statements as an argument; i.e. with clearly stated premises, conditionals and other logical connectives.


impossible. For in that case the highest superiority of a man to others in speeches is eristic superiority.

If (1) virtue is wisdom (and Socrates is known to have believed that virtue is knowledge),25 and (2) if real wisdom does not exist (a claim Socrates appears never to have made), then (3) the brothers' claim to teach virtue is identical with their eristic power to refute any statement, true or false, because the only mark of superiority by virtue of which one mind is superior to another (i.e. the only remaining virtue if there is no wisdom) is eristic power. This is the first of eight times that Strauss advances or alludes to this argument.

It is useful to recall at this point that the traditional view of the Euthydemus holds that Socrates is being ironic when he says that he intends to become the brothers' disciple, and indeed that the dialogue as a whole is Plato's attempt to distinguish Socratic dialectic from eristic.26 On this reading, eristic is an unworthy and immoral pursuit that, unlike the method of Socrates, actually corrupts the youth. Strauss must therefore defend his new interpretation against this tradition. Nor is it enough for him to simply deny that Socrates is being ironic about his determination to become a disciple of the brothers; he must also show why it is plausible that Socrates values eristic more highly than the modern scholarly tradition is willing to admit. In other words, Strauss must not only defend his revolu- tionary approach to the Euthydemus by offering a new interpretation of the dialogue, but he must also defend the proposition that eristic is worth taking as seriously as Strauss's Socrates is taking it.

At the outset, this defense takes the form of a conditional statement resting on two premises supported by an explanatory remark: eristic "is necessarily identical with virtue" (hereafter "the conclusion") if "virtue is wisdom" (hereafter "the first premise"), and "wisdom in the proper sense-knowledge of the most important things-is impossible" (hereafter "the second premise"), since "in that case the highest superiority of a man to others in speeches is eristic superiority" (hereafter "the explanatory remark"). In other words, if there is no wisdom "in the proper sense," there is no virtue (since by the first premise virtue is wisdom); should this be the case,

25 Consider from "The Problem of Socrates" Strauss (1989) 163: "Yet there is another root of virtue [as opposed to the utilitarian or social virtues Strauss has been discussing] and hence another kind of virtue: genuine virtue. The Socratic formula for genuine virtue is: virtue is knowledge. This is another manifest secret [cf. n. 107, below] of the Platonic as well as the Xenophontic Socrates. The formula means what it says. Virtue in the strict sense is nothing but knowledge or understanding, and vice in the strict sense is nothing but ignorance-knowledge or ignorance of the akra physeos, of the peaks of being." A more accurate (and revealing) gloss would have been "peaks of nature." See n. 77, below.

26 Guthrie (1975) 266-83.


eristic victory-as opposed to virtue or wisdom-will be the only intellectual criterion ("in speeches") of one man's superiority to another. As will become clear, this (1) opening statement of the argument is followed by (2) an examination of a dilemma that corroborates the second premise, (3) an interpretation of a statement by Dionysodorus that points to a second argument for the second premise, by assuming the truth of the conclusion as elucidated by the explanatory remark, and (4) the attribution to the brothers of both the second premise and the conclusion. (5) and (6) undermine the possibility that "wisdom in the proper sense" is the product of either dialectic or politics, and therefore further strengthen the second premise; (7) restates the entire argument in such a way as to suggest that it is endorsed by the brothers as well as Strauss; and finally follows (8), the attribution to Socrates of an assumption about the attempt mentioned in (5) and (6) that undermines the possibility that philosophy (along with dialectics and politics) involves "wisdom in the proper sense." Together, these statements constitute what I will call "the evolving argument (in defense of eristic)" or simply "the defense of eristics."27 Since all eight stages of this argument are stated hypothetically, they constitute a coherent argument that need never be treated (or defended) as such. With this schematic prelude in the reader's mind, let us return to the text.

The weakness of Strauss's argument is that it depends on the second premise, that "wisdom in the proper sense ... is impossible." But this weakness is addressed the second time Strauss presents the defense of eristics. The context is the first pair of trick arguments used by the brothers to refute the claim that either the wise or the unwise learn. After making the provocative point that each refutation looks like a Socratic elenchus,28 Strauss addresses the weakest point of his previous argument:

[If] the fallacy [sc. the equivocity of "unwise" which could mean either "stupid" or "ignorant"] is disregarded, the two refutations prove either that neither the wise nor the unwise learn, i.e. that learning is impossible, hence presumably that wisdom proper is impossible, and hence that the only wisdom possible is eristics; or they prove that both the wise and unwise

27 Strauss (1983) 69 first mentions "eristics": "Socrates replies [to Crito's objection that he is too old to learn this art] that the two brothers themselves were already of advanced years when they took up that wisdom which he desires and which he now calls eristics."

28 Strauss (1983) 73: "We on our part [i.e. Strauss himself, as opposed to the partisans of Socrates or the brothers] can hardly fail to notice that each of the two elenchoi looks like a Socratic elenchos." This observation suggests that Strauss, despite his apparent neutrality between "Socrates and the other friends of Kleinias" and "the brothers' pupils whom [Socrates] now calls their lovers" belongs to the latter camp.


learn, i.e. that wisdom is not only possible but even most easy to acquire: while being the best it is the cheapest, like water (304bl-4).29

Since even the defenders of "wisdom in the proper sense" would insist that it is by no means "most easy to acquire," the second horn of the dilemma may be discounted. This leaves only the strengthened version of the earlier defense of eristics: since learning is impossible, wisdom proper is impossible (since learning and wisdom are the same or similar). Although Strauss is left with proving that learning is impossible, he has given an indication of the direction in which he is moving: the teachability of virtue, famously doubted by Socrates,30 can be made into an argument that, since wisdom (part of virtue) cannot be taught, "wisdom proper" is impossible. This will leave eristics unchallenged as the wisdom (although admittedly not what Strauss calls "wisdom in the proper sense") by virtue of which one mind is superior to another. Before Strauss proceeds in this direction, he adds that not only can the two claims (that the wise and the unwise learn) both be refuted by the eristic art, but also that the alternative explanations of what follows from this (i.e. that wisdom is either impossible or trivially easy) contradict each other, offering further evidence of the claim Strauss wants to advance. "The contradiction between the two implicit results leads us to question whether wisdom is possible."31 By "wisdom," of course, Strauss means "wisdom in the proper sense." The more we question along with Strauss whether "wisdom proper" is possible, the stronger will be the explicit claim of Euthydemus that the brothers can teach virtue, the only meaningful virtue in a world where "knowledge of the most important things" is impossible. When Strauss adds: "The final result leads then beyond the brothers' wisdom,"32 he may be suggesting that his own refutation of wisdom in the proper sense-the ultimate proof of the power of the brothers' art-is only implicit in their art, but becomes explicit elsewhere, i.e. in "On the Euthydemus." Strauss thus takes the brothers more seriously perhaps than they take themselves; at the very least, he has devised an argument in defense of their eristic art that makes explicit what they left implicit.

The third time Strauss discusses the defense of eristics is in the context of defending Dionysodorus's claim that a demonstration of that art ipso facto provides the protreptic exhortation to virtue that Socrates demands of the brothers but they nowhere explicitly

29 Strauss (1983) 73. 30 viz. in the Meno generally and the Protagoras, esp. 361a5-c2. 31 Strauss (1983) 73. 32 Strauss (1983) 73.


produce, i.e. the claim "that eristics and protreptics are one and the same art."33

What [Dionysodorus] meant can be inferred from what he and his brother did: if virtue is above all superiority in speeches or the ability to refute every speech, the mere exhibition of this ability will urge on every ambitious youth toward virtue.3

Note that this abbreviated form of the argument simply assumes that wisdom proper does not exist and thus that eristics is virtue, i.e. that both the second premise and the conclusion as interpreted by the explanatory note are true. To that extent, the protreptic dialogue by Socrates that follows is unnecessary: the brothers have already provided a more effective version. But the inconclusive result of Socrates' dialogue with Clinias provides Strauss with an important part of his evolving argument in defense of eristics: it apparently confirms the well-known Socratic suspicion that virtue is not teachable. Having already made the connection between the impossibility of learning and the impossibility of wisdom proper, Strauss draws attention in the following sentences to the points he needs to emphasize:

Only one difficulty remained: they had not investigated whether wisdom is teachable, let alone reached agreement on this point. Speaking in a more lively manner than ever before, Kleinias proclaimed his opinion that wisdom is teachable. This pleased Socrates since it saved him a long inquiry on the subject; he did not say that he and Kleinias have reached agreement on it.35

This account emphasizes the dubiety of the claim that virtue is teachable, upon which the possibility of "wisdom in the proper sense" has been shown to depend.

It is in the fourth statement of his defense of eristics that Strauss integrates the questionable view that virtue is teachable into the argument. He begins by stating the argument, somewhat misleading- ly, as if it had been made by the brothers themselves. "The premise of the two brothers' speech was that wisdom proper is impossible and therefore that its place is properly taken by eristics."' At the very least, Strauss should have called this the "unstated" or "implicit" premise of their speech. He continues by discussing Socratic doubt and makes the connection between it and the defense of eristics explicit: "Socrates seemed to be uncertain whether wisdom is teachable; it is not clear whether that doubt affects the possibility of wisdom." This is a fair and balanced account: Strauss does not assert

33 Strauss (1983) 74. 34 Strauss (1983) 74. 35 Strauss (1983) 76. 36 Strauss (1983) 77.


that the one necessarily implies the other. "Yet the reasoning addressed to Kleinias seems to imply that in order to be wise one must know all the arts, and this does not seem to be possible for any one man; thus wisdom would be impossible." The reader has thus been given another reason to believe that the second premise-the weakest link in the argument in defense of eristics as a whole-is likely if not provably true.

With the significance of the impossibility of wisdom proper established from the beginning, Strauss has now given several reasons to believe that this crucial premise is true. The fifth and sixth statements assume the establishment of that argument and merely indicate other reasons to believe that Socrates is taking the brothers' (implicit) argument in defense of eristics seriously. Within the context of the second of Socrates' protreptic conversations with Clinias, Strauss claims that the arguments advanced there against either politics or dialectics being the art that produces wisdom "...cannot but redound to the benefit of eristics."3 He repeats this point, using nearly the same words, at the end of the section he curiously labels V.a rather than VI.38 The fact that Socrates attaches little hope to the possibility that dialectics is the missing art he seeks (Strauss calls this "the abstraction from dialectics") again "redounds in the circumstances of the dialogue to the benefit of eristics."39 This sixth time, Strauss adds the question: "But why is eristics to be benefited?"40 This proves an excellent question. Together, the fifth and sixth instances both emphasize that it is not only the brothers (and Strauss) who promote the goal of benefiting eristics: "...that defect [sc. of dialectics and politics] was due to the use of a criterion established by Socrates."4 This tends to support the view that the change in Socrates' attitude toward the brothers has, in any case, taken place by this point.

The reorientation of Socrates is also suggested the seventh time Strauss refers to the evolving argument. Euthydemus has just proved that Socrates not only knows everything already, but always will

37 Strauss (1983) 81-2. 38 This decision means that there are seven numbered parts to "On the Euthy-

demus" instead of eight. A key principle of Strauss' hermeneutics is the importance of the center; see Strauss (1983), esp. 109-10, 117. For example, the fourth section of "On the Euthydemus" includes the remark about "understanding the dialogue as a whole." In accord with this principle, one would expect this fourth incidence of the defense of eristics to be the crucial one, especially because the fifth and sixth instances are almost identical. This proves to be the case.

39 Strauss (1983) 83: "But then one must explain why Socrates abstracted from dialectics. Looking at the result of his action, one will be inclined to say that the abstraction from dialectics redounds in the circumstances of the dialogue to the benefit of eristics" (emphasis mine).

40 Strauss (1983) 83. Section V.a ends with these words. 41 Strauss (1983) 82. This is the last sentence in Section V.


know everything "...if this is Euthydemos' pleasure."42 Strauss comments: "This is perfectly reasonable given his premises: only what he says (or thinks) is or will be, but since genuine wisdom is not possible, its place is taken by eristics so that only what is upheld by the master of that art is or will be."43 This is a fascinating passage for many reasons, not least because of the equivocity of the word "his." Strauss suggests, of course, that he means Euthydemus. But the previous time he said something similar, he referred to both brothers: "The premise of the two brothers' speech was that wisdom proper is impossible."44 In addition to the shift from plural to singular, the earlier version alerts us to something more basic: the previous statement was misleading because Strauss failed to make it clear that the speech's premise was implicit and was stated only by Strauss himself. The next time, the word "premise" is retained but the word "speech" has dropped out. Without it, the word "premise" suggests an argument rather than a speech. Strauss suggests that if the premises are what he calls them, i.e. "his" (sc. Euthydemus'), the (evolving) argument is his as well. But this is not the case: Dionysodorus and Euthydemus never say anything more than that their art teaches virtue in the shortest possible time.45 Be that as it may, Strauss is able to show that Socrates has now reoriented himself in relation to the brothers precisely because he uses their own weapons against them;46 the next paragraph can therefore sensibly begin with what appears to be Socrates' opposition to the brothers ("Socrates next tried to entrap Euthydemos...").47 Hence the eighth and final allusion to that argument:

Socrates presupposes here that philosophy and the political art have different ends and hence are different arts; he tacitly repeats the radical distinction between dialectics and the kingly art. He asks that one not be angry with the detractors of philosophy; after all, they take hold of something reasonable:

42 Strauss (1983) 84. 43 Strauss (1983) 84. 44 Strauss (1983) 77. 45 Strauss (1983) 70. 46We are left with a reasonable doubt whether Strauss is now using those wea-

pons against us-as he could conceivably be telling us he is doing once we begin to wonder to whom the word "his" refers.

47 Strauss (1983) 84. The sentence continues: "...by asking him how he, Socrates, knows that the good men are unjust: if Euthydemos (we should remember the previous difficulty regarding justice) grants that Socrates knows it, he says something revolting; if he denies that Socrates knows it, he denies Socrates' omniscience which he had been at such great pains to establish." The "previous difficulty regarding justice" (what Strauss (1983) 76 calls Socrates' "abstraction from justice") will be discussed below. But if wisdom is impossible, the proposition that it is better for an unwise person to be unjust (which Socrates' "abstraction from justice" prevents him from saying according to Strauss) then Strauss is suggesting (in the parenthesis) a way to defend what he calls "something revolting."


they are aware of the radical difference between philosophy and politics. L Socrates has successfully vindicated Euthydemos and what he stands for.48

The fact that neither politics ("the kingly art") nor dialectics proved to be the elusive art of producing and using49 wisdom sought by Socrates and Clinias had already been taken by Strauss to "redound to the benefit of eristics." A change in vocabulary considerably increases the issue at stake: now neither politics nor philosophy can be this art. Moreover, the truth claims of either, as Strauss suggested in a similar situation elsewhere,50 are undermined by the "radical difference" (also called "the radical distinction") between the two. They cannot both be true, and the awareness of their radical incom- patibility can only have "successfully vindicated Euthydemos and what he stands for" if neither is. The art of eristics emerges as champion only if wisdom in the proper sense is impossible, i.e. if the deepest problems are insoluble because the competing solutions- whether political or philosophical-are antinomies. In "On the Euthydemus," the Socratic vindication of Euthydemus proves that if philosophy remains "the love of wisdom," it is no longer a love based on the longing for "wisdom in the proper sense," because this kind of wisdom is impossible. Only fools would search for something they know does not exist. An eristic art with no regard for anything but victory-and explicitly indifferent to what is true and what is not-is vindicated amid the collapse of both politics and philosophy, at least in the naive sense of those terms.

Important-and disturbing-though these conclusions are, it must be remembered that the Crito remains central to Strauss's "On the Euthydemus." In his analysis of Socrates' first protreptic dialogue with Clinias, Strauss draws the reader's attention to the first of three "abstractions" he will describe:51 what he calls the "abstraction from justice." Socrates is proving to Clinias that without wisdom, a number of previously agreed upon goods are actually bad for "a man

48 Strauss (1983) 87. 49 Strauss (1983) 81: "[Socrates and Clinias] agreed thereafter that they are in need

of a kind of knowledge in which both the making (production) of something and the knowledge of how to use that something coincide."

" Strauss (1983) 73: "The contradiction between the two implicit results leads us to question whether wisdom is possible." In this case, the contradiction between philosophy and politics would suggest that neither knows "the most important things."

These are, in addition to the "abstraction from justice" at Strauss (1983) 76, "the abstraction from the power of chance" (p. 81) and the fact that Socrates "abstracted from dialectics" (p. 83). This use of the word "abstraction" is important for understanding Strauss' reading of Plato. See for example Strauss (1989) 154-5: "Each dialogue treats its subject matter by means of a specific abstraction, and hence a specific distortion."


without intelligence" who possesses them.52 After demonstrating this in the easy cases, Socrates comes to three virtues other than wisdom: courage, moderation and justice.53 According to Strauss, Socrates gives Clinias no opportunity to draw the shocking conclusion that it would be better for an unwise man to be unjust.54 He then comments:

But this thought verges on the absurd. It is much better to say that justice seems to be the only good, the only virtue that is beneficent (on the whole) even if it is not guided by intelligence, perhaps because the laws which the just man obeys supply the lack of intelligence in the man himself.55

Although Strauss's footnote to this important passage deserves close attention in its own right, it is the mention of "laws" that establishes the crucial link to Crito. The next sentence, emphasized by the words that mark a digression,56 explain this link. "Accord- ingly Socrates' abstraction from justice here would be tantamount to an abstraction from law; he surely is silent about the laws in the Euthydemus as distinguished from the Crito."57 This passage thus sets

52 Strauss (1983) 74: "In this way it was established that first being rich, second being healthy, beautiful and the like, and finally noble birth, power and honor in one's city are good things."

53 Strauss (1983) 74: "[Socrates] asked [Clinias] whether moderation, justice and courage are good things or not, adding that their being good could be disputed." Clinias does not dispute their inclusion, but Strauss feels himself called upon to show the basis for such a dispute. "It could be disputed on the ground that the only good things are those mentioned earlier and that the virtues are not necessarily needed for obtaining them."

Strauss (1983) 76: "When Socrates asked next who would do less, a courageous and moderate man or a coward, and therewith which of the two is better off without intelligence, Kleinias replied 'the coward,' i.e. the coward without intelligence is better off than the courageous man without intelligence; Socrates gave Kleinias no opportunity to decide whether the unintelligent man is better off if he is moderate or if he is immoderate. He gave him even less opportunity to decide whether the unintelligent man is better off if he is just or if he is unjust; judging by the analogy of the other cases the answer would have to be that he is better off if he is unjust" (emphasis mine: how can there be less than none?); see also n. 47, above. As the italicized passage indicates, Strauss is on thin ice here. Since justice conventionally is "to do one's own job," 281c7- 8 probably refer to justice. Although Socrates says nothing that can be construed as referring to moderation, Plato does address any such deficiencies with 28161-2.

Strauss (1983) 76. "Be that [or "this"] as it may...." The words are used here for the second of

three times (Strauss (1983) 71, 76 and 80). The first will be discussed below. The third is particularly important because the sentence that precedes it reads as follows: "Strictly speaking they had not agreed on this [sc. "that one must philosophize"] since it followed from the premise, regarding which Socrates had suspended judgment, that wisdom is teachable" (Strauss (1983) 80, emphasis mine). On digressions, see Strauss (1958) 45: "In books like the Prince and the Discourses [i.e. exoteric books], the digressions contain discussions which would not be required to further the primary, explicit, ostensible or partial [i.e. the exoteric] intention but are required to further the full or true [i.e. secret and esoteric] intention."

17 Strauss (1983) 76.


up a conflict between the Crito and the Euthydemus-the dialogues Strauss linked in general terms from the outset-on the critical issue of the law."5 Strauss's teaching about the Euthydemus is clearly intended to undermine the naive reading of Crito in which the Laws persuade both Crito and Socrates. This is apparent in the sentence with which Strauss follows the eighth and final defense of eristics: "Socrates has successfully vindicated Euthydemos and what he stands for. Kriton neither denies nor admits this."59 The sub-philosophic Crito, concerned primarily with his sons, will be easy prey for the Laws and is persuaded by them in Crito. In the Euthydemus, Strauss suggests, we discover why. Crito cannot disprove or approve of Socrates' defense of Euthydemus' eristics, and this limitation is related to his inability, as a gentleman, to understand the nature of real virtue in a world where a shadow of justice is the only substitute for a wisdom that doesn't exist. In such a world, the man wise enough to know that true wisdom is impossible is, if we attend to the significance of Plato's "abstraction from justice," better off being unjust.

But the full extent of Strauss's intentions is clarified only in the final paragraph of "On the Euthydemus." Here his ongoing interpretive assault on the Speech of the Laws in the Crito is broadened to include those who made the Laws in the first place:

In the Euthydemus, Socrates takes the side of the two brothers against Ktesippos and Kriton. Socrates was not the mortal enemy of the sophists nor were the sophists the mortal enemies of Socrates. According to Socrates, the greatest enemy of philosophy, the greatest sophist, is the political multitude (Republic 492a5-e6), i.e. the enactor of the Athenian laws.60

It is not the Laws but the democracy responsible for them-indeed the multitude, the people-that is revealed as Strauss's principal target. Although the commentary has given reason to doubt that for Strauss "philosophy" means "the love of wisdom" in the proper sense, his animus toward not only the naive reading of the Crito but Athenian democracy is primordial: it is his last word. In this final paragraph, Strauss uses "philosophy" (i.e. the shadow version of philosophy that survives the "defect of dialectics" and the impossibility of "wisdom in the proper sense") to discredit democracy. Nor is Strauss being inconsistent by simultaneously defending eristics

The fact that the Euthydemus involves the abstraction from justice, and hence "an abstraction from law," probably means to Strauss that the Euthydemus negates what he regards as a superficial reading of the Crito.

59 Strauss (1983) 87. 60 Strauss (1983) 88. The linking of Crito and Ctesippus indicates that Strauss

regarded the latter as a sub-philosophic gentleman as well. See also Pangle at Strauss (1983) 16.


and attacking democracy. While the art of eristics defended in "On the Euthydemus" may not produce or even pursue wisdom, it does furnish the basis for the intellectual (if not the moral) superiority of one man to another. As such it is inimical both to democratic equality and to the unqualified obedience of men like Socrates (as distinguished from men like Crito and Ctesippus) to the Laws. In any case, a master of eristics may use the term "philosophy" for whatever purpose he sees fit. With this somber observation, I conclude my analysis of Strauss's interpretation of the Euthydemus.

The question that remains-a burning question, it appears to me-is whether it is only Strauss's Socrates or, as Strauss would presumably have us believe,61 Plato's Socrates as well who vindicates Euthydemus and that for which he stands. Less difficult is the question of whether we are dealing with Plato's Euthydemus; the evolving argument in defense of eristics is the creation of Strauss himself and not even of Strauss's Euthydemus, to say nothing of Plato's. But the question remains: is Strauss's Plato Plato? Although Plato's Euthydemus never formulates the defense of eristics as ably as Strauss does, the question remains whether anything in Plato refutes the argument. If not, then Plato is either irrelevant to a burning question arising from his own text or Strauss may be on to something about Plato's secret intentions.

Some weak points in Strauss's interpretation of the Euthydemus are visible in his treatment of Crito. Strauss dismisses Crito's interest in Euthydemus as merely anthropologic62 and fails to give due regard to Crito's interest in the philosophical issues involved.63

61 This may be naive on my part. Strauss (1958) is at pains to show that in the Discourses on Livy, a point is reached when Machiavelli is explicitly using Livy only to promote his own project. See in particular "Machiavelli's Intention: The Discourses," perhaps the most fascinating passage in Strauss' writings. Even if "the evolving argument in defense of eristics" is intentionally Strauss' creation alone, a commentary on Plato allows him to publish openly what others, even if they agreed with the argument, would prefer to keep secret. For another instance where Strauss may simply be presenting his own views under the guise of commentary, see Strauss (1947) 486, where a merely exoteric egalitarianism is attributed to Rousseau.

62 See n. 9, above. In fact, Crito raises a Ti tOTI type question the third time he speaks: Ka( TiT Ii oopq)a; (271cl). Strauss (1983) 68 cannot be unaware of this: "Kriton believes that they are sophists; he wishes to hear where they come from and what their wisdom is; he does not ask how much they charge" (emphasis mine). Indeed, this proves to be the crucial question.

Strauss (1983) 82 admits this: "Kriton's interest is not exhausted by his interest in Kleinias; he is also interested in the subject matter of the conversation; he is interested to know the sequel of Socrates' protreptic conversation and especially whether they found the art they were looking for." In fact, Crito seems more interested in this search than Strauss is, although that may simply prove that Crito is sub- philosophic in Strauss' new sense of "philosophy" and would therefore prefer to be refuted by Euthydemus than to refute others with his tricks (304c8-d2). By Plato's standard, Ctesippus surpasses Crito in this regard (see n. 97, below); hence Crito underestimates Ctesippus (see following note).


Strauss's interpretation of Crito's interruption-probably the most remarkable moment in the dialogue-is impossible to square with the text.64 Ironically, however, it is Strauss's claim that Crito is impervious to Socrates' irony that is most bizarre.65 According to the traditional reading of the Euthydemus, it is Strauss himself, by taking seriously Socrates' exaggerated praise for the ridiculous brothers, who lacks a sense of irony, while Crito correctly sees through Socrates' pose and dismisses the sophists as the lightweights they really are. Of course Strauss is tarred with the same brush he used on Crito only if his defense of eristics is his own rather than that of Plato's Socrates or Plato himself. It is therefore that defense which must be squared with the Platonic text.

The weakest point in the evolving argument is the premise that "wisdom in the proper sense" is impossible. Strauss's best argument is based on the well-documented Socratic doubt that virtue is teachable. Strauss himself suggests that if virtue-of which wisdom is a component if not the primary component-cannot be taught, it is impossible to achieve it. This ignores a crucial passage in the Euthy- demus itself (282c1-2): the Socratic alternative to virtue being t8aKTOV is not that it is impossible but that it arises 'rr Ta~rTOdpaTOu,66 perhaps

Strauss (1983) 82: "Kriton suddenly interrupts Socrates' narrative. The reason for this is not that he is greatly concerned about the desired science but that he is concerned about his sons; Socrates' glowing report about Kleinias has reminded him of his domestic difficulty." There is no evidence for this interpretation in the text; Strauss is compelled to read Crito's speech at 306d2 into this earlier passage. In fact, Crito interrupts because he cannot believe that Clinias could have spoken as power- fully as Socrates is reporting (290el-2). This is truly a wonderful moment: every reader of Plato has wanted to interrupt at one time or another, and Crito actually does so. The reaction of Socrates, who immediately opens the door to having been mistaken- it could have been Ctesippus (290e7) who spoke thus-proves that Crito was an astute listener. Crito thus accurately describes himself as

pthKoos at 304c6. Strauss (1983) 82

is also in error when he claims that Socrates "insists on not having given [the answers] himself": the only persons Socrates insists were not speaking are the brothers (291a2-3). Given that the wondrous replies were in response to Socratic-style questions and that the brothers did not give the answers, only Clinias and Ctesippus remain. When Socrates proposes the latter, Crito responds: "Not my idea of Ctesippus!" (Cooper (1997), Sprague's translation) or, more literally: "What sort of Ctesippus?" As I suggest below, we are in fact witnessing a new sort of Ctesippus: "one of the mightier ones" (291a4).

Admittedly the claim was in the form of a series of questions ("Was Kriton unaware of that irony?", etc.; see n. 9, above). But Strauss' command of English seems to wither when he admits: "[Crito] is then by no means incapable of becoming aware of Socrates' irony in any point" (Strauss (1983) 82; emphasis mine).

Clinias agrees with Socrates that a young man like himself should perform any honorable service for a lover who is able to make him wiser (282b2-6). Socrates responds: "But only if wisdom can be taught [MIaKT6V], Clinias, I said, and does not come to men of its own accord [Tlr6 TaOJTOpaTOU]" (Sprague's translation). Note that Socrates is here playing the go-between between Ctesippus and Clinias: if the former can make the latter wiser, the latter should gratify any honorable wish of the former.


through divine inspiration, at any rate through happy circumstance.67 Strauss's only other argument is that Socrates "...seems to imply that in order to be wise one must know all the arts, and this does not seem to be possible for any one man; thus wisdom would be impossible."6 As indicated by the pair of "seems," Strauss realizes that he is on weak ground here.69 Nevertheless, if Plato's only line of defense against the premise (i.e. that "wisdom in the proper sense" is impossible) is that he and his Socrates both believed in divine inspiration, Strauss may well be on the right track.

A more Platonic solution to the problem is suggested by one of Strauss's rare lapses70 and omissions. A particularly striking passage in the dialogue-the only example in the Euthydemus of a Platonic allegory-is completely ignored by Strauss. Strauss sets the stage for this omission by describing how the trap set by Socrates for Euthy- demus, previously mentioned in the context of the seventh instance of the defense of eristics, actually catches Dionysodorus.

Dionysodoros walked into the trap by preferring the alternative that is not shocking [sc. that Socrates nowhere learned that good men are unjust]; he was openly rebuked for this by his brother, so much so that he blushed. When Socrates asked Euthydemos whether his omniscient brother had not made a mistake, Dionysodoros quickly asked whether he, Dionysodoros, is Euthydemos' brother and thus forced [Socrates] to forego Euthydemos'

67 Strauss (1983) 77 gives only the slightest indication of acknowledging this text: "[Socrates'] doubt of the teachability of wisdom may be connected with what he intimated regarding the limited power of wisdom in regard to luck or chance; perhaps one must be particularly "wellborn" in order to learn wisdom." Strauss' use of "intimated" in connection with what he earlier called "the abstraction from chance" (see n. 51, above) arises from the forced readings dependent upon his (deliberate) failure to attend to the equivocity of aTruVXia (p. 75; see Gifford on 279d6). Wisdom "does not always guarantee good luck" (as Strauss puts it, in order to suggest the weakness of wisdom; p. 75). What Socrates means is that the wise will always--even in chance storms at sea-make "happy choices." To put it another way: for Socrates (and Plato), ErrTuXia is really aopia (as in the colloquial "I make my own luck"), whereas Strauss wishes to undermine the (unmade) claim that copia creates (external) ETrrvXia. Since it does not, coqpia does not exist.

68 Strauss (1983) 77. 69 It is not while addressing Clinias but the sophists (who know so many things;

271c6-72bl) that Socrates poses the problem "whether [Clinias] ought to acquire every sort of knowledge or whether there is one sort that he ought to get to be a happy man and a good one" (282e2-4; Sprague's translation).

The first time Strauss uses the words "be this/that as it may" (see n. 56, above) he offers an argument for which there is no textual evidence. See Strauss (1983) 71: "We assume that Socrates had heard of [the brothers'] new claims [sc. to have mastered the eristic art] during their present visit but in introducing the brothers to Kleinias deliberately refrained from mentioning their highest claim in order to hear that claim stated in public by the brothers themselves." In other words, Strauss creates an explanation for Socrates not revealing something of which there is no textual evidence that Socrates knew in the first place.


answer to his own question. The brothers finally forced him to admit that [Socrates] is fatherless. This gave Ktesippus an occasion to intervene.71

This summary omits the allegory found in the text between Dionyso- dorus's question about being Euthydemus' brother (297b2) and Socrates' admission (although it is considerably less than that) that Sophroniscus is not his father (298b2-3):

I am much more worthless than Heracles, who was unable to fight it out with both the Hydra, a kind of lady-sophist who was so clever that if anyone cut off one of her heads in argument, she put forth many more in its place, and with another sort of sophist, a crab arrived on shore from the sea- rather recently I think. And when Heracles was in distress because this crea- ture was chattering and biting on his left he called for his nephew lolaus to come help him, which Iolaus successfully did. But if my lolaus should come, he would do more harm than good [TrrXov av O6TEpOV TrroflOEIEV].72

This allegory of Socrates' battle with the brothers reveals that Dionysodorus is the crab and Euthydemus the Hydra: a seemingly unimportant detail (mentioned in the preliminary dialogue between Socrates and Crito) establishes that Dionysodorus was sitting on Socrates' left.73 In short, the correct interpretation of the allegory depends on what Strauss felicitously called "the abstraction from chance" in a Platonic dialogue.74 But the most important person in the allegory is Iolaus, the helper of Heracles-Socrates; although Gifford's view that this is a reference to Ctesippus has fallen out of favor, it has been revived by Chance and deserves to be recognized and preserved.75

71 Strauss (1983) 84-5. Notice that in this passage, Socrates defeats both Dionyso- dorus and Euthydemus. Compare Dionysodorus' blush to Strauss (1964) 74 and Strauss (1989) 153. In fact, Thrasymachus blushes for exactly the same reason, except that in Thrasymachus' case, the blush was deeper: Thrasymachus had been shamed by his enemy, not by his brother and ally.

72 297b10-d2 (Sprague's translation). I would translate TrNMov v 6&TEpOV T rol- oEIEV as "he would be more likely to do something else" [sc. than come to my aid effectively (iKavOCs)].

73 See Gifford (1905) on 297cl-dl generally and 297c6 in particular. 74 Strauss (1989) 151: "And secondly"-Strauss' first point is that "strictly speak-

ing" we do not see but merely hear the dialogues-"abstraction is made from chance. Everything happening in the work is meaningful and necessary." Strauss lays down this excellent hermeneutic principle, crucial for interpreting any great author (and therefore Plato in particular), in "The Problem of Socrates"; his own failure to consider so salient a feature as the allegory in the Euthydemus is not only a failure to apply his own principle but a most revealing clue as to the specific manner in which his interpretation is one-sided. For Strauss' first point about hearing the dialogues ("We do not, strictly speaking, see them"), compare O'Flaherty (1967) 183. There are many interesting parallels between Strauss and the enigmatic "Magus of the North." See Beiser (1987) Ch. 1, esp. 20, 25-6, and 31.

75 See Chance (1992) 157 n. 62.


The call to Iolaus indicates that it is not Clinias but Ctesippus whom Socrates is educating in the Euthydemus.76 Clinias is surely fair of face, but Ctesippus is noble and good in respect to his nature as a whole." Ctesippus is in love with Clinias, as Socrates, the expert in love-matters, is well aware.'" The way the sophists treat Clinias makes them Ctesippus' enemies. Inspired by his erotic desire to impress Clinias79 and instructed by Socrates about the tricks,80 rulesS and Achilles heel82 of the brothers' art, Ctesippus (as Iolaus) responds to Socrates' allegorical call83 for help and overcomes the sophists in three consecutive falls.84 He thereby wins not only the intellectual wrestling match, but the far more valuable meed of his beloved's admiration, as their triumphant laughter proves:

Ctesippus gave one of his tremendous laughs and said, Euthydemus, your brother has made the argument sit on both sides of the fence and it is ruined

76 Thus Pangle misses the point at Strauss (1983) 16. Strauss is well aware of this but is diverted from its significance by his pre-

occupation with Crito and the Crito. Strauss (1983) 70 n. 6 (cf. p. 162): "Socrates speaks of Ktesippos 'being beautiful and good in regard to his nature' (273a8). Kriton speaks of Kleinias being beautiful and good in regard to sight (271b4-5). Kriton never speaks of 'nature'." It is true that Crito underestimates Ctesippus (see n. 64, above), but so do Pangle (p. 16) and Strauss (p. 72). The principal difference between Hippocrates- whose corruption by the sophists Socrates fears (p. 72)-and Clinias is that the latter is being watched over and protected (cf. P1l. Prt. 313e2-14a3) by a philosophical-one is tempted to say "Platonic"--lover, while the former is not. For Ctesippus as educator, see P1l. Ly. 211c4-6.

See P1. Ly. 204b8-c2: "I may not be much good at anything else, but I have this god-given ability to tell pretty quickly when someone is in love, and who he's in love with" (Cooper (1997), Lombardo's translation). Ctesippus is given extensive instruc- tion

b7

Socrates in the Lysis on how a lover should behave toward his beloved. See 300c1: "I had the notion that Ctesippus was very much keyed up on

account of his favorite being there." (Sprague's translation). For example, Socrates explains the brothers' use of equivocity at 277e3-8a7.

Note that Socrates gives all the credit to Ctesippus himself at 300d7-9. Given his concealment of his own role in the victory, it is Socrates who is really the rogue.

Strauss (1983) 80: "Eristics, mental wrestling, is a game which as such is constituted by certain arbitrary but inviolable rules." At 300c6-7, Ctesippus uses those rules (discovered by Socrates at 295e4-6c7) to defeat the brothers. Strauss naturally offers no explanation in the course of his evolving defense of eristics for these "arbitrary but inviolable rules"; to do so would have blurred the difference between eristics and the Laws of Athens, i.e. between the Crito and the Euthydemus.

Socrates explains the brothers' slavish use of the law of non-contradiction at 293d4-8. Ctesippus eventually uses it against them in the two questions at 300c4-6.

83 Not only does Ctesippus come to Socrates' defense shortly after the allegory, but Ctesippus actually calls Socrates "Heracles" at 303a6. ponrOjocov at 303a5 also reminds the reader of the allegory (297c7-8).

84 The first is achieved by citing the mythological Geryon and Briareus (299c5-6), the second by exploiting the equivocity of iatrrcv in the case of the Scythians (299e3- 9) and the decisive third throw allows Ctesippus to allude to the famous eunuch with the bat (300d4, on which see Gifford). For the comparison with wrestling, see n. 81, above. For the significance of three falls, see 277d1-2.


and done for! Clinias was very pleased and laughed too, which made Ctesippus swell to ten times his normal size."85

The prodigious growth of Ctesippus in this passage also clears up the dialogue's most intriguing mystery: the careful reader is given reason to believe that while Crito was correct to doubt that Clinias had attained the level of education indicated by Socrates' report of his words (290e5-6), he was wrong to rule out that Ctesip- pus had done so. The juxtaposition of 291a3-7 with 300d6-7 reveals that it was this transformed and enlarged Ctesippus who demon- strated the high intelligence Crito correctly refuses to allow the boy but mistakenly attributes to Socrates. When Socrates suggests that it was Ctesippus (290e7-8), Crito responds: rroioS KT1r-OrrrroS; (291al). The answer to this incredulous question ("What Ctesippus are you talking about?") ends up being: the prodigious Ctesippus to whom Socrates has taught virtue.

The words with which Socrates concludes his allegorical call to Iolaus-Ctesippus: 6 8' 1bs '16XEC05 El dtXOo, TrXov &v O6dTEpOV TroIflEIEV

(297d1-2), are the interpretive crux of the dialogue. The meaning of these words has been missed both by those who reject and those who affirm the Ctesippus-Iolaus identity. It is revealing that both Chance and Jackson, who affirm the identity,86 view Ctesippus as having (dangerously) embraced the brothers' eristic outlook, while Sprague and Hawtrey, who reject the identity,88 see Ctesippus in a far more favorable light.89 Both schools of thought take Socrates' words too literally: if the reference is to Ctesippus, Ctesippus must be harmful, whereas if Ctesippus does well, these words must not be about him. The explanation for this interpretive parallel is that no one has grasped what Socrates-whose playfulness is prefigured when he calls himself a lesser man than Heracles (297cl)-means by the claim that his Iolaus would do more harm than good (297d1-2). Socrates here employs a pedagogical trick familiar to every com- petent teacher: he challenges his student to prove him wrong. It is therefore a challenge masquerading as a prediction that Socrates issues to Ctesippus for a purely pedagogical purpose.

On this reading, the education of Ctesippus can best be understood with reference to the three parts of the soul distinguished by Socrates in the Republic and the Phaedrus: the young man defeats the brothers because of a whole-souled determination to do so, i.e. a determination that calls into play all three parts of his soul. Socrates

85 300d3-7 (Sprague translation). Jackson (1990) 378-85; Chance (1992) 157. 87 Jackson (1990) 394; Chance (1992) 160-75, esp. 166. Sprague (1965) 47 n. 75; Hawtrey (1981) 159. 89 Sprague (1965) 12 n. 17; Hawtrey (1981) 13 n. 17.


prepares its rational part by anatomizing the tricks employed by the brothers; he takes advantage of Ctesippus' appetites-his erotic passion for Cleinias-by self-consciously staging a supercharged contest between rival lovers.90 But with his allegorical challenge to a potentially less than helpful Iolaus, Socrates also enlists the young man's thumos, awakening his sense of competitive zeal by making a predictive challenge, knowing that the young man's love of honor will compel him to refute Socrates by employing reason rather than force or passion to overthrow the brothers on his teacher's behalf. As Socrates will say in the Phaedo (89c11), it hardly matters-where teachers and students are concerned-who is Heracles and who Iolaus, both are heroes, and both win. In fact, it is always the teacher (Socrates) who wins when a student (Ctesippus) proves the teacher wrong by doing more good than harm.

In the light of Socrates' pedagogical purpose, Ctesippus' victory over the brothers becomes as delightfully uncomplicated as the laughter that crowns his triple victory.91 Sweet though this victory is to the lovers themselves, it is sweeter still to Socrates. The happy ending reveals that the art for which Socrates and Clinias have been searching, apparently in vain-the art of producing wisdom and using it rightly-is the unnamed pedagogical art of Plato's Socrates.92 Taking advantage of Ctesippus' natural gifts and erotic motives, Socrates has effectively challenged his student to excel himself, and, after teaching him how to defeat the sophists at their own game, to be a worthy preceptor and lover to the beautiful Clinias. Although this interpretation provides no doctrinaire answer to the question of whether virtue is teachable or a product of happy circumstance- there are elements of both in the story-Plato leaves no room to think that he regarded either wisdom in the proper sense or the transmission of virtue as impossible.93

By calling attention to the high stakes involved in this seemingly unsubstantial dialogue-and by suppressing discussion of the passage that unlocks its secrets-Strauss has, despite himself, helped us see Plato's intentions more clearly. He does this in a strictly

90 Jackson (1990) 382. 91' Chance (1992) 173 mistakenly calls the laughter "eerie." 92 292d1-6: "Then what knowledge does it convey? And what use are we to make

of it? It must not be the producer of any of those results which are neither good nor bad, but it must convey a knowledge that is none other than itself. Now shall we try to say what in the world it is, and what use we are to make of it? Is it agreeable to you if we say it is that by which we shall make others good?" (Sprague's translation). Notice that this speech is found in the direct dialogue between Socrates and Crito.

93 292d8-9: "Or shall we go on to say that they will make others good and that these others will do the same to still others?" (Sprague's translation). By passing his art to Ctesippus, Socrates also offers a "proleptic" solution (see Kahn (1996)) to the challenge posed for Socrates in the Clitophon, cited (in order to suggest that no such solution was forthcoming) at Strauss (1983) 83 n. 11.


negative sense, but he is directly responsible for teaching us why refuting the brothers is a serious matter with important political, moral and spiritual consequences. Although Plato's Ctesippus merely uses their own tricks against the sophists, Strauss proves that those sophists are dangerous enough that a virtuous person must learn their tricks if this is the only way to defeat them.94 Perhaps something similar is true about using Strauss's methods to interpret "On the Euthydemus"; Strauss himself, after all, noted that "in order to defeat an enemy you have to take a leaf from his book."95

Ctesippus' importance should therefore not be underestimated; he is not only the helpful Iolaus who comes to Socrates' aid, but also the paradigm of what Plato wishes the reader to become. Plato bestows the highest possible commendation on Ctesippus' commit- ment to philosophy by placing him in attendance at the death of Socrates when the dying master who lives forever defeats another pair: Cebes and Simmias.96 Strauss's failure to mention this final appear- ance of Ctesippus-indeed his more or less total "abstraction" from the Phaedo97--is another indication that he has been describing Strauss's Socrates but not Plato's. It should be added that if the Euthydemus imitates Socrates teaching virtue to Ctesippus, it is also a means by which Plato teaches the reader: every Platonist knows that Plato possessed the art of teaching virtue. In that sense, the triple victory in the Euthydemus is not merely (1) the three falls achieved by Ctesippus; the victory belongs to (2) Socrates and (3) Plato as well. But it is Strauss who proves that philosophy is more vulnerable to eristic than most Platonists had been inclined to believe and thus shows why those victories are important.

The riddle of Strauss's Socrates is solvable and has been described by others.98 Two additional observations are in order: the first is that, although Strauss rejects-correctly, in my judgment-the 19t century's obsession with Plato's development,99 he shows himself subject to the same obsession (and with less tangible evidence to support it) in his treatment of Socrates' development; hence the importance of the Aristophanic Socrates and the attribution of Strauss's

94 Weiss (2000). 95 "Why We Remain Jews," in Strauss (1997b) 316. The context is noteworthy. 96 Phd. 59b9. There is, moreover, no indication that Ctesippus weeps. 97 "From the Crito we are led to the Euthydemus by the consideration that the

Euthydemus contains the only other conversation between Socrates and Kriton..." (opening sentence of Strauss (1983); emphasis mine). Socrates directed his last words to Crito (see Phaedo) and one is inclined to believe that Crito understood them, irony and all. Note that Pangle slavishly follows his Master at Strauss (1983) 16, when he calls the Euthydemus "...the only other dialogue in which Crito is the interlocutor."

Lampert (1996); Zuckert (1996). Strauss (1989) 154: "The individual Platonic dialogue is not a chapter from the

Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences or from a system of philosophy, nor is it the product of an occasion or the relic of a stage in Plato's development."


own exotericism onto Socrates.100 The second observation is that as important as Aristophanes, Xenophon and Plato are to understanding Strauss's Socrates, Nietzsche's influence must be understood here as well.1'1 This influence is visible not only because Strauss followed Nietzsche in framing "the problem of Socrates," but because of Nietzsche's decisive and pervasive influence on Strauss's thought as a whole.102 The rigid exclusion of the divine; the Ideas and the conventional virtues; the fascination with the agon; the will to power; and the absolute gulf between the (ibermensch and the vulgar herd, all find echoes in Strauss's "On the Euthydemus." Moreover, our increasing knowledge of the early Strauss103 helps us understand why he was inclined to defend eristic antinomy104 and attack liberal democracy.10s

The last laugh-audible, perhaps, just beyond the dying echoes of the triumphant merriment of Ctesippus and Clinias-belongs to Plato. What better description could any Modern find of the Straussians than those occupying "the borderland between the philosophers and the politicians" who "regard themselves superior to either"?10' The antinomy between philosophy and politics revealed by Strauss in "On the Euthydemus," and the notion of a "philosophy" that survives the death of "wisdom in the proper sense," are

100 See Strauss (1989), as well as Pangle's abbreviated but accurate (and revealing) account of "The Socratic Turn" (Strauss (1983) 13-18). These are clearer accounts than Strauss (1964). See also Zuckert (1996) 132-64. 10' The opening of "The Problem of Socrates" suggests the question with which Timaeus begins: "One, two, three ... Where's number four, Timaeus?" (as translated in Cooper (1997) by Zehl). Strauss (1989) 103 writes: "Of the four chief sources on which we depend if we wish to understand the thought of Socrates, Aristophanes' Clouds is the first in time." Strauss never identifies the fourth (i.e. in addition to Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes). But he mentions Nietzsche (who included a section called "The Problem of Socrates" in Twilight of the Idols) in the second sentence and then mentions (and, more importantly, alludes to) him several times in the course of his "The Problem of Socrates." Other candidates for the honor are Alfarabi (p. 159); Johann Georg Hamann (pp. 125, 151; see n. 74, above); and finally, as the fourth on this esoteric list, Strauss himself. The view that Strauss intended Aristotle, conventionally used for that purpose by many, cannot be sustained; Strauss never cites the Stagirite about Socrates in "The Problem of Socrates."

102 Lampert (1996). 103 See the Editorial Introduction in Zank (2002); Sheppard (2006). 104 Altman (2007). 105See Sheppard (2006) Ch. 2. I address this question in a manuscript entitled Leo

Strauss and National Socialism, for which I am awaiting a publisher. Strauss (1983) 87: "Men of this kind belong according to Prodikos and

according to Socrates to the borderland between the philosophers and the politicians and regard themselves superior to either; in order to be recognized universally as such, they denigrate the philosophers: the greatest threat to their renown are the masters of Euthydemian speeches." Hence they must, suggests their Master, learn how to make such speeches.


Strauss's creations, not Plato's.107 Even in a comparatively minor dialogue like the Euthydemus, Plato has created not only a masterpiece but also the philosophical equivalent of a Rorschach inkblot: its secretive interpreter has revealed far more about himself than he has about the divine Plato.

WILLIAM H.F. ALTMAN Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

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Leo Strauss and the Euthydemus

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