Presented at the November 2008 NPSA (unrevised)

Reason and Morality: Strauss’ “The Law of Reason in the Kuzari”

In the preface to Persecution and the Art of Writing, Leo Strauss

tells us that the essays in the text were collected together

because they all are concerned with one issue: “the problem of

the relation between philosophy and politics.”1 In his

introduction to the book, we are told that the essays all fall

within the province of the “sociology of knowledge.” This

discipline is concerned with the impartial study of everything

that pretends to knowledge (i.e. opinion) as well as authentic

knowledge. Strauss also introduces a “sociology of philosophy,”

which addresses the pursuit of “genuine knowledge of the whole.”2

The fourth chapter of Persecution, “The Law of Reason in the

Kuzari,” is concerned with a specific province of the sociology of

philosophy. The explicit theme of the chapter is the “relation

of philosophy to social or political life” which is “adumbrated

1 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), preface.2 Ibid, p. 7. I take Strauss to be at least semi-serious in his ‘founding’ ofthe sociology of knowledge. He may be having a little fun at the expense of modern social science, but he is very concerned with demonstrating the superiority of his account on grounds such as “historical exactness.” See pp.27-29, 38, 142-144 for some relevant examples.

by the term ‘Natural Law.’”3 We come across the term natural law

as a necessary consequence of the investigation of the questions

“what is a philosopher” and “what is philosophy?” In Strauss’

account, the problem of the relation of philosophy to political

life which is outlined by the term natural law is “the most

serious implication” of the questions concerning the nature of

philosophy and the philosopher.4

It is important to note that Strauss assumes that while the

term “Natural Law” is “open to grave objections” it is

“indispensable.”5 It appears that one cannot articulate the

relation between philosophy and social/political life without

investigating the natural law. In this essay at least

historicism is apparently ignored. Those thinkers that did not

understand the relation of the philosopher to civic life in terms

of the natural law, thinkers such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and

Heidegger, are nowhere present.6 The conflict in this essay is 3 Ibid, 95.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Strauss did not ignore the problem of historicism in Persecution. Indeed, demonstrating that authors write between the lines or practice esotericism is in itself a refutation of historicism. See ch. 2, especially pp. 24, 27-32, and ch. 5, pp. 151, 155-162. See also ch. 2 of What Is Political Philosophy, “Political Philosophy and History.” Also, Strauss indicates in the preface that in the last three essays, including the piece on Halevi, he wished to

principally between two types, the philosopher and the theologian

or believer. They certainly differ in whether or not one should

accept divine revelation as authoritative, and they also disagree

to a lesser extent on the Law of Reason. But we shall see that

it is not so easy to distinguish between the philosopher and the

theologian as it would appear. Strauss’ essay on Halevi is

chiefly concerned with the education of the philosopher by what

appears to be a believer. The Straussian education here involves

replacing opinions about the relationship between philosophy and

civil life with knowledge as well as teaching the potential

philosopher a proper respect for the practical and theoretical

claims of morality.

Background Considerations

The education of the philosopher by the theologian or believer

and the difficulty of distinguishing truly between the

philosopher and the believer are more readily apparent if one

considers the critique of Socrates in the first two chapters of

view the problem of the relation between philosophy and politics as the medieval writers he is considering viewed the issue. This is related to the concern for historical exactness and a proper sociology of philosophy on Strauss’ part.

Persecution. Strauss, relying on Farabi, differentiates between

the way of Socrates and the way of Plato. The way of Socrates is

relentless investigation of justice and the virtues. Socrates

openly rejected conformity with the authoritative opinions of the

city. The way of Plato combines the way of Socrates with the

“way of Thrasymachus” and the “science and the art of Timaeus.”7

Plato brought together what one may call the Socratic method of

investigation with the rhetorical ability of Thrasymachus and the

metaphysical and religious doctrines of Timaeus. Plato appears

to be both philosopher and theologian.8

This Platonic “correction” allowed philosophy to become

acceptable in the city. The open non-conformity of Socrates is

replaced by the hidden non-conformity of Plato. Plato’s

rejection of the authoritative opinions of the regime is

concealed by rhetorical ability and a metaphysical/religious

doctrine that is not identical to traditional beliefs but is at

least politically acceptable. And the combination of a palatable

public teaching and the ability to convince through speech

7 Ibid, 16.8 Ibid, 18.

actually leads to the gradual modification of traditional beliefs

in favor of the philosophic doctrine.9 It is important to note

that the endeavor of Plato is presented by Strauss in the first

chapter of Persecution as conducted solely for the interest of

philosophers as a class, not for the good of the city. Civic

benefits from philosophic teaching are simply accidental in this

account. The only difference between philosophers “loyal” to the

regime or revelation and those who are disloyal is that the loyal

present an exoteric doctrine that appears to not harm the

received traditions or perhaps even defends them.10 The Platonic

correction of Socrates is chiefly important for philosophers

wishing to avoid the fate of Socrates in Strauss’ account in

chapter one of Persecution.

The account of Plato’s success above is shocking from the

perspective of the moral man or believer. Philosophy is not only

an inherently subversive activity, with the success of Plato it

becomes respectable. The philosopher is only really interested

in his investigations of justice and the virtues, he has no

9 Ibid, 16-17.10 Ibid, 17-18, 7-8, 10.

interest in the need to be or act justly and virtuously for the

sake of his political community or God.

But this is not Strauss’ final word on the subject. Plato’s

success poses a danger to philosophy too. The danger is that the

apparent harmony between philosophy and society will become the

reigning doctrine. The overt and hence dangerous non-conformity

of Socrates may be replaced by the safe but stultifying belief

that there is an essential harmony between philosophy and

opinion.11 This leads to the situation where, as Farabi put it,

philosophy is “blurred or destroyed.”12 Strauss argues that the

success of Platonism and the accompanying exotericism eventually

leads to the idea that there is no inherent gap between the

philosopher and the citizen. This line of thought, which is

supposed to have become prominent after the mid-seventeenth

century by Strauss, held that better popular education could

eliminate the difference between the philosophic few and the un-

philosophic citizenry or many. Strauss argued that these early

modern thinkers “believed that suppression of free inquiry, and

11 Ibid, 21.12 Ibid, 18. Farabi is speaking of the victory of monotheism and the assimilation of philosophy to theology.

of publication of the results of free inquiry, was accidental, an

outcome of the faulty construction of the body politic, and that

the kingdom of general darkness could be replaced by the republic

of universal light.”13

Earlier thinkers rejected this argument. They thought that

the gap between the philosophic few and the average citizen was

unbridgeable. Indeed, “They were convinced that philosophy as

such was suspect to, and hated by, the majority of men.”14 It is

this supposition which forms the ground of exotericism. “An

exoteric book contains then two teachings: a popular teaching of

an edifying character, which is in the foreground; and a

philosophic teaching concerning the most important subject, which

is indicated only between the lines.”15 Exoteric books are not

actually written for the many though. Such works do serve a

protective function, but this is a secondary consideration. They

are also not written for the “perfect philosopher.” The

essential function of these books is to catch the attention of

13 Ibid, 33.14 Ibid, 34.15 Ibid.

young likely philosophers.16 These “potential philosophers are to

be led step by step from the popular views which are

indispensable for all practical and political purposes to the

truth which is merely and purely theoretical. . . .”17 The

motive of the philosopher is love for the “puppies of his race,

by whom he wants to be loved in turn: all exoteric books are

‘written speeches caused by love.’”18

The argument has returned to the point made in the first

chapter about the philosopher’s apparent lack of concern for

those who are not at least potential philosophers. But Strauss

does not argue that education is simply about attracting the

notice of philosophic puppies. He says that education is “the

only answer to the always pressing question, to the political

question par excellence, of how to reconcile order which is not

oppression with freedom which is not license.”19 The point is

not simply to liberate the philosophers from the tyranny of

16 Strauss reverses the emphasis on protection and education from chapter 1 tochapter 2. In chapter 1 it seems that the self-preservation of the philosopher is the critical point. In chapter 2 the situation is reversed, and the education of the potential philosopher seems to be more important thanmere protection.17 Ibid, 36.18 Ibid.19 Ibid, 37.

public opinion. The freedom of the philosopher’s mind is of

chief importance for Strauss. But while Strauss does not want

oppression that denies the freedom of thought, he also does not

want license. The goal is to combine order and freedom.

This point is of critical importance in considering Strauss’

project in his chapter on Halevi. Strauss’ two goals in “The Law

of Reason in the Kuzari” are to replace opinion about the relation

between the philosopher and society with knowledge and to educate

the philosopher to understand and respect the claims of morality.

The philosopher (or potential philosopher) removes untrue

opinions without becoming a threat to his fellow citizens.

Indeed, the philosopher can become a benefactor to the polity

with this education.

The Literary Character of the Essay and Strauss’ Project

Persecution and the Art of Writing evinces a clear concern with

philosophic communication or “writing between the lines.”20 It

is here that Strauss presents his list of seven “rules” for

reading between the lines.21 These rules are to guide the

20 Ibid, 24.21 Ibid, 30.

careful “historian” or sociologist of philosophy in “the

tradition of historical exactness.”22 The book as a whole

devotes considerable space not only to the general consideration

of exoteric writing and the necessarily associated topic of

reading between the lines, but also to detailed considerations of

how Farabi, Maimonides, Halevi, and Spinoza wrote in this manner.

Strauss begins his discussion of Halevi by stating that “It is

not safe to discuss any topic of the Kuzari before one has

considered the literary character of the book.”23 The chapter has

fourteen pages and eleven paragraphs directly discussing the

question of how to read the Kuzari. The one section of comparable

length is only ten pages but contains thirteen paragraphs

(section IV, The Law of Reason as the Framework of Every Code).

The foregoing considerations do not prove that we should read

Strauss’ essay in the same manner in which he advises us we must

read authors like Halevi and Spinoza though. But two critical

points should persuade the careful reader of Strauss that we do

need to read him as he would have us read Farabi and Halevi. 22 Ibid, 29, cf. 98. The entirety of chapter 3, “The Literary Character of theGuide for the Perplexed, is devoted to the issue of how to understand literary character in general as well as Maimonides method in particular.23 Ibid, 98.

First, we are told that “As a rule, careful writers are careful

readers and vice versa. . . A man learns to write well by reading

well good books, by reading most carefully books which are most

carefully written.”24 It is hence possible to “acquire some

previous knowledge of an author’s habits of writing by studying

his habits of reading. The task is simplified if the author in

question explicitly discusses the right manner of reading books

in general. . . .”25 A little reflection makes it obvious that

these thoughts, written in the context of how to read Spinoza’s

Theological-Political Treatise, apply to Strauss’ own work too. He was a

careful reader of good books. He explicitly discusses how one

should read such books.26 Since Strauss’ work meets the criteria

he outlined for identifying those who read and write carefully,

it is proper that we should read him as he advises us to read

authors such as Halevi. Indeed, it is a matter of historical

exactness and would be a serious failing on the part of the

24 Ibid, 144.25 Ibid.26 This is after all if not the most important theme of Persecution at least a principal theme. See also “On a Forgotten Kind of Writing” in Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 221-232, and “Exoteric Teaching” in Leo Strauss, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 63-71.

sociologist of philosophy to not read Strauss as a careful (i.e.

exoteric/esoteric) writer.

There is a second consideration which is particular to the

Halevi essay. We may see it is as an application of the guidance

outlined above. Its importance is in the fact that it is to be

found directly in the chapter on the Kuzari. In a nutshell,

Strauss’ argument on how to read Halevi is transferable to the

careful reader of Strauss. This too is not simply an alternative

method of reading, but demanded by a careful examination of

Strauss’ scholarly commentary on Halevi. A thorough look at

Strauss’ construction of the essay reveals that he, like Halevi,

follows a Platonic method of presentation.

At first glance this assertion seems wildly improbable.

Strauss presents himself as merely a careful historian or

sociologist of philosophy, not as a philosophic writer.27 Halevi

is also not presented as a philosopher. He is described chiefly

by Strauss as an “atypical mutakallim,” a practitioner of the art

of kalam who is atypical insofar as he distrusts reason more than

27 Ibid, 94, 98.

the typical mutakallim.28 Halevi is also referred to a number of

times as a “poet” also.29 A poet and practitioner of kalam, i.e.

a defender of religion(s), seems to be very far from being a

philosopher. Strauss goes so far as to say that “the adversary

par excellence of Judaism from Halevi’s point of view is, not

Christianity and Islam, but philosophy.”30 Halevi is presented to

the reader as a defender of religion and morality whose main

opponent is philosophy.

This impression is strengthened when one considers what may be

termed Halevi’s personal experience of philosophy. Strauss

discusses the “well-known fact that Halevi, in spite of his

determined opposition to philosophy as such, underwent the

influence of philosophy to no inconsiderable degree.”31 Halevi is

alleged not merely to have dabbled in a superficial manner with

philosophic doctrine, but to have undergone a “conversion” to

philosophy. Strauss prefers to imagine that this conversion to

philosophy was of brief duration, for he believes that it would

have been a “spiritual hell” for Halevi. This brief experience 28 Ibid, 99-100.29 Ibid, 102, 104, 112.30 Ibid, 103.31 Ibid, 108.

of philosophy, besides supposedly being a spiritual hell for

Halevi, would have enabled him to see clearly the center of

philosophic teaching and be able to conduct a “serious, a radical

and relentless, discussion of that teaching.”32

In Strauss’ account, Halevi apparently went from pious belief

to the spiritual hell of a conversion to philosophy and then a

repentant return to orthodoxy. The brief spiritual agony of

Halevi, coupled with his understanding from the inside so to

speak of philosophy, gave him the motive and knowledge to

understand the grave danger that philosophy poses to religious

belief. This accounts for Halevi’s wariness in constructing his

arguments, lest his defense of the faith actually lead the reader

to philosophy rather than religion and morality. It is this

concern which led Halevi to avoid in his dramatic dialogue any

confrontation between the scholar defending religion and the

philosopher. He thought the danger of stating clearly the

philosophic doctrine in such an exchange would be

32 Ibid, 109, see also 139-141. One is driven to wonder how Strauss acquired the knowledge that Halevi’s experience of philosophy was a source of such great torment. It is also noteworthy that Strauss produces no evidence to substantiate the “well-known fact” of Halevi’s being influenced by philosophy in this way.

irresponsible.33 This is not Strauss’ final word on the subject

though.

There are a number of contradictions which should make the

reader consider how seriously Strauss takes the argument

described above. For one, Strauss says that “Halevi knew too

well that a genuine philosopher can never become a genuine

convert to Judaism or any other revealed religion.”34 But then

we must ask how Halevi could have converted from belief to

philosophy and then back to belief. It is perfectly plausible,

indeed it is a great danger according to Strauss, that the

intelligent believer exposed to philosophy will convert to

philosophy. The opposite phenomenon, the genuine philosopher

converting to authentic belief, simply does not occur if we take

Strauss at his word. This creates a serious difficulty, because

as we have seen, Halevi supposedly had a genuine conversion to

philosophy.

This is not the only problem of this sort. As we saw above,

Strauss was discussing Halevi’s position. But Halevi says very

33 Ibid, 109-112.34 Ibid, 104-105.

little in the Kuzari. The statements above that Strauss makes

about Halevi being an atypical mutakallim actually refer to

remarks by the scholar. This is not a mistake on Strauss’ part

either. He explicitly indicates that he was perfectly cognizant

of the distinction between Halevi and the scholar. Indeed, in

note 17, Strauss says “One cannot simply identify Halevi’s view

with the statements of his spokesman, the Jewish scholar. Halevi

intimates near the beginning. . . that not all arguments of the

scholar convinced him.”35

The Kuzari is essentially an “imititave” accout, a series of

conversations between a pagan king and a philosopher and then a

Christian, a Muslim, and a Jewish scholar. The reader must

translate the “relative” statements of the different characters

into “absolute” statements which express the view of the

author.36 After we think about the obvious fact that the Kuzari is

as Strauss says a “dramatic prose-work” where the author is

concealed by the characters and the conversational settings, it

is a short step to seeing that Halevi “platonized” concerning the

35 Ibid, 101.36 Ibid, 100-101.

form of his dialogue.37 Strauss overtly affirms this position

when discussing the point that there is no direct confrontation

in the text between intellectual equals (i.e. the scholar and the

philosopher). “In this most important respect the form of the

Kuzari agrees with that of the Platonic dialogues: all Platonic

dialogues consist of conversations between a superior man,

usually Socrates, and one or more inferior men.”38

The link to Plato should be understood in relation to the

comments on Plato in the introductory chapter of Persecution.

Plato was able to conceal the radical character of philosophy

through his exoteric writings. Strauss makes explicit references

to Plato in a number of places in this essay that are relevant to

Halevi as an exoteric writer. The description by Strauss of the

Kuzari as an “imitative” work is accompanied by a reference to the

Republic.39 Parallels are also noted to the Menexenus, the Second

37 Ibid, 98. See Leo Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil” in Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 175.38 Ibid, 104 and note 27. See also 110 and note 42.39 Ibid, 100 and note 16. The reference to the Republic is to 394b9-c3.

Letter, and the Apology of Socrates while discussing the literary

character of the Kuzari.40

It is clear that Strauss’ Halevi utilizes what may be termed

the Platonic method of writing. This makes it difficult to

determine what Halevi’s position is in relation to the statements

of the scholar. There is not a clear or unambiguous relation

between the “relative” statements made by the scholar and the

“absolute” views of the author. The links Strauss makes to Plato

are illuminating because they indicate that just as Plato

concealed his views, Halevi may very well have concealed his

views also. And we cannot ignore the fact that Strauss also may

be concealing his views!

The character of Strauss’ essay is the same as the Kuzari or a

Platonic dialogue in the decisive sense. The construction of

the essay is similar to a play within a play. Strauss is

describing a dramatic dialogue, the Kuzari, and he uses a sort of

dramatic dialogue to do so. The reader must be careful in

“translating” the relative statements that Strauss relates,

40 Ibid, 101 note 19, 103 note 24, 106 note 31, 105 note 29, and 107 note 33. There is one reference each to the Republic, Menexenus, and Second Letter and threeto the Apology in this section (The Literary Character of the Kuzari).

principally from the scholar and the philosopher, with the

absolute views of Strauss as author of the essay.41 Sometimes

Strauss is speaking openly. At other points he is relating the

views of the characters in the dialogue, particularly in the

second, third and fourth sections of the chapter. In these

sections the views of the scholar and the philosopher are

sometimes separated and at times conflated. The careful reader

must always be aware of the fact that Strauss has essentially

arranged the conflict between the philosopher and the scholar.

As noted above, the philosopher and the scholar do not confront

each other directly in the Kuzari. The King listens to the brief

argument of the philosopher, the philosopher departs, and after

his short remarks philosophy is then described by the scholar.

The conflict that Strauss seems to be describing he is in a way

actually constructing.42 The battle that Halevi apparently chose

41 In all fairness, Strauss is more present in his dramatic dialogue/essay than Plato or Halevi are in their works. See especially the introductory section on 95-98 and the last section on 135-141. But it is still no easy task to discern the relation between the remarks of Strauss and his account ofthe characters’ statements in the Kuzari.42 Ibid, 108 and note 36. If Halevi were a philosopher, the absent philosopher may have been a dramatic device to make the reader think constantly of what the philosopher might have said were he there. But Straussdiscounts Halevi being a philosopher, although not convincingly as I discuss above.

not to wage out of a sense of responsibility Strauss forces to

occur through a relentless examination of the different

conceptions of the philosopher and the theologian of the law of

reason.

The foregoing argument is meant to demonstrate that one cannot

assume that Halevi’s position is actually anti-philosophic. The

stated or overt position of Halevi, or more precisely his

“spokesman” the scholar, may not indicate the actual aim of

either the Kuzari or Strauss.43 Of course we may not assume that

Strauss’ intention is simply the same as Halevi’s either. Here

we will focus on discerning the view of Strauss as understood

through the dialogue he constructs between the view of the

philosophers and the theologians concerning the law of reason.

Opening Salvos: Philosophers vs. Theologians on the Natural Law

Strauss begins his description of the conflict between

philosophers and theologians before Halevi is even mentioned.

The reason for examining the arguments contained in the Kuzari at 43 The scholar is described as Halevi’s “spokesman” in notes 14 and 17 on pp. 100 and 101 respectively. But, as mentioned above, in the same note (17) where the scholar is described as a spokesman for Halevi, Strauss makes it clear that the scholar’s remarks may not be taken to simply equal the views ofthe author of the Kuzari.

all is that “An analysis of Halevi’s remarks on this subject may

contribute toward a better understanding of the philosophic

teaching concerning Natural Law and the Law of Reason.”44 As we

have already seen, the natural law is important as it is the term

which “adumbrates” the connection between the philosopher and

civic life.45 It is easy to lose sight of Strauss’ principal

concern in Persecution in general and the Halevi essay in

particular, which is the relation between philosophy and

politics. The discussion of the natural law and the Kuzari are

subordinated to this purpose. This relates to the dual intention

of Strauss in this chapter to replace opinions with genuine

knowledge concerning the relation between philosophy and

political life and teach the potential philosopher a proper

respect for morality. Strauss opens by highlighting the

difference between the philosophers and the theologians on the

issue of the natural law.

Strauss illustrates the gulf that separates the philosopher

and the theologian by arranging a dispute between two eminent

44 Ibid, 98.45 Ibid, 94. See page 1 and notes 1-3 of this essay also.

Christian Aristotelians, St. Thomas Aquinas and Marsilius of

Padua.46 These two thinkers are chosen due to the fact that

Aristotle was the philosophic authority in the Middle Ages.

Aristotle taught that there was such a thing as natural justice

(ius naturale). But he did not define the content of this term

precisely. While natural justice definitely exists, how does it

exist? Aristotle did not specify the way in which it exists.

Strauss argues that the “question can be reduced, to begin with,

to this more common form: is the ius naturale a dictate of right

reason, a set of essentially rational rules?”47

This question is a prime example of Strauss’ construction of a

dialogue. It is a rather arbitrary formulation. As we shall see

later, it is ultimately a formula that is questionable for both

the philosopher and the theologian. Strauss phrases the question

in the way he does because it allows him to begin by driving a

wedge between the philosopher and the believer. The particular

manner in which the question is raised allows Strauss to pit a

philosopher against an (apparent) theologian. In other words,

46 Ibid, 96.47 Ibid, 95.

Strauss chose the question in light of an answer he had already

determined was necessary to advance the course of his argument

and serve his purpose of educating potential philosophers. It is

interesting to note that a careful reading indicates that Strauss

is only interested in establishing an apparent conflict between

the philosopher and the theologian.

This strategy of forced conflict works because Marsilius and

Thomas Aquinas appear to disagree on the question that Strauss

utilizes. Marsilius adheres to what Strauss describes as the

“philosophic view” that one can only speak of the ius naturale

“metaphorically” as the iura naturalia. One may not speak of

natural justice as equivalent to the natural law according to

Marsilius because there are no natural moral rules. Ius naturale

refers instead to the moral conventions that are found by common

agreement in all nations. Since the ius naturale require human

institution, they cannot be properly speaking termed iura naturalia

or natural laws.48 Strauss argues that Thomas disagrees with

Marsilius and holds that natural justice is “a set of rational

48 Ibid, 96.

rules.”49 We will for the moment set aside the fact that the

citations used by Strauss to support his case do not indicate

that Thomas saw natural justice as a set of rational rules.50 It

was necessary for Strauss’ immediate purpose to set up an

opposition between Thomas as theologian and Marsilius as

philosopher.

The distinction between the theological and the philosophical

understanding is further reinforced when Strauss introduces the

Jewish Aristotelian Maimonides to attack the (alleged) Thomistic

position on the natural law. Strauss tells us that Maimonides

chose not to use the term “natural law.”51 In a repetition of

the procedure employed at the beginning of his discussion on

49 Ibid. 50 Strauss cites passages from Thomas’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics and Summa Theologiae. See note 3, p. 96. The passages from the Commentary on the Ethicsdemonstrate that Thomas held Aristotle to have taught that natural justice is “implanted” or “imprinted” in human reason. Thomas says nothing about “a set of rules.” See St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C.I. Litzinger (NotreDame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), 340, 528. Strauss also citesthe Summa Theologiae where Thomas famously described the natural law as the rational creature’s participation in the natural law. But again there is no idea of adherence to a set of rules. The basic Thomistic teaching on the natural law requires practical reason to reflect on the basic inclination to seek good and flee evil in particular situations. This is hardly a set of rational rules. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologca volume II, trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Allen, Texas: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, qu. 91, art. 2 and I-II, qu. 94, art. 2.51 Ibid. In note 5 on p. 97 Strauss says that Maimonides “may” have agreed with Marsilius and the Muslim Aristotelian Averroes in holding that natural justice may only be termed natural metaphorically.

natural law, Strauss decides to discuss the question Maimonides

addressed rather than simply describing his position. The great

Jewish Aristotelian “preferred to discuss the question in this

form: are there rational laws in contradistinction to the

revealed laws?”52 Maimonides agrees with the Christian

Aristotelian Marsilius once the question is put that way. He

denies that there is any such thing as “rational laws.” Those

who think that there are rational laws suffer from “the disease

of the mutakallimmun.” Instead of natural or rational laws,

there are generally or commonly accepted opinions.53 Strauss

argues that the view of Thomas, or at least his view of Thomas,

is “the theological view” or that of the kalam.54 Halevi is

brought onto the stage not because he disagrees or agrees with

either Strauss’ Thomas or Marsilius/Maimonides on whether or not

the natural law is a set of rules that exists independently of

human institution. Halevi is introduced because he alleges “that

the philosophers have set up rational nomoi.”55 52 Ibid, 97.53 Ibid. See Maimonides, Ethical Writings of Maimonides, trans. Raymond Weiss and Charles Butterworth (Dover: New York, 1975), 79-80, 156-158. The mutakallimunare the dialectical theologians who defend religion by argument. Cf. Ibid, 99. 54 Ibid, 97-98.55 Ibid, 98.

The ‘battle’ in the introduction of the essay between what

Strauss describes as the theological and the philosophic views is

meant simply to establish an apparent opposition between

philosophy and religious belief. It ends on an entirely

different note—an examination of the natural law based on the

argument of an atypical mutakallimun that the philosophers did

establish rational nomoi. This is strange because this was not

one of the questions posed in the arranged dispute between the

Aristotelian philosophers and the Aristotelian theologian.

Neither party asserted an opinion on whether or not the

philosophers “set up rational nomoi. . .” Halevi’s assertion

that the philosophers did establish rational laws is the basis

for Strauss arguing that an analysis of the Kuzari may help us

understand the philosophic teaching on the natural law.56 A

careful reading of the essay shows us that the apparent abyss

separating the philosophic and theological views of the natural

law is in some critical respects illusory.

The Philosopher’s Law of Reason and Way of Life

56 Ibid.

Strauss continues to emphasize further the difference between

the philosopher and theologian. In the first and second sections

of the essay, the distance between the two types takes on the

character of an abyss.57 The philosopher in particular is

depicted as hostile to both revelation and morality. The

theological position is to begin with passive. The disdain of the

philosopher for morality in particular is strongly emphasized by

Strauss at this stage of his argument. The philosopher’s

rejection of revelation remains throughout the entire chapter.

But the position of the philosopher concerning morality and the

practical need for revelation does change significantly during

the course of Strauss’ essay.

In the first section of the essay after the introduction,

during the discussion of the literary character of Halevi’s work,

Strauss develops a dialogical dispute between the philosopher and

the theologian that emphasizes the distinction between the ground

of their respective ways of life. The difference lies in the

attitude of the philosopher toward the possibility of revelation.

57 The sections in question are The Literary Character of the Kuzari (pp. 98-112) and The Philosopher and His Law of Reason (pp. 112-118).

Strauss makes a two stage argument elaborating the rationale of

the philosophic rejection of revelation.

First the philosopher is presented as simply ignorant of

divine revelation. After stating that an authentic philosopher

could never convert to a revealed religion, Strauss’ Halevi

maintains that the “philosopher is a man such as Socrates who

possesses ‘human wisdom’ and is invincibly ignorant of ‘divine

wisdom.’”58 The philosopher cannot accept revelation because he

is ignorant of the very premises or ground of any revelation.

Strauss says that “denial may be said to proceed from the fact

that he, being a philosopher, is untouched by, or has never

tasted, that ‘Divine thing’ or ‘Divine command’. . .which is

known from actual experience to the actual believer, the Jewish

scholar, and the potential believer, the king.”59 The example of

the Socratic response to the Delphic oracle is contrasted with

the response of the naturally pious king to the message of an

angel.60 The basic difference lies in Socrates’ questioning of

58 Ibid, 105.59 Ibid.60 It should be remembered that Socrates does not actually have a personal experience with the oracle. He did not seek confirmation from the oracle of his wisdom or way of life.

the wisdom of the oracle in contrast to the king’s obedience to

the angelic injunction. Socrates’ questioning led him to the

philosophic realization of his own ignorance and the need to seek

wisdom by continuing his investigations. The king also

questions, but his queries are confined to examining different

beliefs to see which is true and then accepting the catechesis

offered by the Jewish scholar. Strauss argues that Halevi’s

refusal to present a direct confrontation between the philosopher

and the Jewish scholar is evidence that the acceptance of

revelation requires experience “of at least a rudimentary

revelation of one kind or another.”61 The difference between the

two positions at this point is practical or based on experience.

Strauss continues his arranged disputation and revises his

argument. “This explanation, is however, not fully

satisfactory.”62 He is not satisfied with his previous remarks

because if true the philosopher would be inferior to the

intelligent believer. How can the philosopher admit he is simply

ignorant of divine things and not confess his inferiority to the

61 Ibid, 106.62 Ibid.

theologian? The theologian could know everything the philosopher

knows within the realm of nature and then the divine things of

which the philosopher knows nothing. This “defensive position”

would leave the philosopher in a situation “not merely

ambiguously worse, but infinitely worse than that of a blind man

as compared with that of a man who sees.”63 It turns out that

the philosopher is not content to occupy this merely defensive

position. Strauss indicates that Halevi was perfectly aware that

the philosophers “deny the very possibility of the specific

experiences of the latter (i.e. the believers), or more

precisely, the very possibility of Divine revelation in the

precise sense of the term.”64

The objection is no longer practical or based on differing

experiences. The philosopher is no longer passive or defensive.

Now the objection is theoretical and what may be termed

offensive. The philosopher is not simply ignorant of the “Divine

command” or experience of revelation. Instead he asserts that

any such experience is not possible. Strauss says that “denial

63 Ibid, 107.64 Ibid.

was presented by them (the philosophers) in the form of what

claimed to be a demonstrative refutation.”65 This means that

there is the possibility of a genuine dispute between the

philosopher and the believer. The initial argument offered by

Strauss and his Halevi would have meant that no such dialogue is

possible. If the philosopher was simply ignorant of divine

things, he could hardly challenge the believer. This is

important because the “disputation between believer and

philosopher is not only possible, but without any question the

most important fact of the whole past.”66 Strauss does not

explain the content of the refutation offered by the philosophers

here.67 He does mention that the “philosopher as such” is an

epicurean.68 Although the theoretical case against revelation is

mentioned, the emphasis is on the moral distinction between the

philosopher and the believer.

65 Ibid.66 Ibid. See also note 35.67 It is obviously noteworthy that Strauss alludes to the philosophic refutation that makes the dispute between philosopher and believer the most important fact of the whole past, but does not even hint at the content of thealleged refutation. 68 Ibid, note 34.

This is reminiscent of the description of Socrates or what may

be termed the “uncorrected” philosopher in the introductory

chapter to Persecution discussed above. Philosophy stripped of its

exoteric character is simply the investigation of justice and the

virtues, with no concern for the practice of the virtues. The

“loyal” philosopher exoterically defends religion and morality.

But the loyal philosopher is only exoterically separated from the

disloyal. The loyal and the disloyal philosophers, the Platonist

and the Epicurean, all have more in common in the decisive

respect than any philosopher and any group of non-philosophers.69

The theoretical life unites philosophers of both stripes and

separates them from believers or the merely moral. All religions

are dismissed as having no cognitive value whatsoever.70 Strauss

argues that the dispute between the theologian and the

philosopher is the most important fact of human history, but the

dispute in this essay between reason and revelation is fought out

at the level of action. It could be argued that there is a

theoretical component, but it is subordinated to practical

concerns.

69 Ibid, 8, 10.70 Ibid, 13.

Strauss amplifies this presentation of the philosopher’s

position as his argument progresses through the second section of

the Halevi chapter.71 Here Strauss has Halevi’s philosopher

present his views on the philosophic code(s). Neither Strauss

nor Halevi’s philosopher clarifies the content of the philosophic

refutation of the very premises of revelation. Strauss does

enlarge upon the argument that the philosophers of the different

schools or sects are all united insofar as they reject

revelation. The agnosticism of the philosophers regarding divine

things gives way to philosophers legislating complete codes in

opposition to divine revelation. This opposition does not

partake of the character of an explicit denial let alone

refutation. The philosophic rejection of revelation is presented

in this part of the essay as more of an implicit indifference

than an active or offensive critique. The philosopher’s law of

reason at this stage is presented as the law of reason viewed

from the perspective of the philosopher qua philosopher or the

philosopher as a member of the class of philosophers concerned

with the group interest of philosophers above all else.

71 The Philosopher and His Law of Reason, pp. 112-118.

Strauss begins his discussion of the philosophic understanding

of the law of reason by emphasizing the skeptical essence of

philosophy. He notes that the content of the philosopher’s

speech to the king indicates that the philosopher is “an adherent

of one particular philosophic sect among many, of one particular

brand of Aristotelianism.”72 But Strauss argues that examining

the “manner” of the philosopher’s speech enables us to “recognize

the philosopher in the Aristotelian. . . .”73 The “manner” of the

philosopher’s speech is, as opposed to the creeds of the

Christian, Muslim, and Jewish scholars who follow him, negative.

The philosopher’s way of speaking expresses denial, a “non est,”

or as Strauss says, “a reprobation of something.”74 The essence

of philosophy is skeptical denial of the received opinions or

investigation of the various “I believe” statements that

characterize public orthodoxy. There are many sects, and even

different varieties of one sect (i.e. Aristotelianism). The

doctrines of the sects overlay or conceal the questioning,

heterodox character of Socratic investigation.

72 Ibid, 112.73 Ibid.74 Ibid.

The philosopher does present a creed to the king though. The

essence of the philosophic creed is the denial of particular

providence. The God of Aristotle has no concern for or knowledge

of that which is changeable, such as human beings and their

affairs.75 No attempt is made to demonstrate the truth of the

philosopher’s assertion about the nature of God. The

philosopher’s creed has, as Strauss points out, the character of

an “assumption.”76 The assumption that the divine has no will,

knowledge of human affairs, or concern for human actions

underlies the philosopher’s preference for contemplation or

theory. The pious believer is concerned with pleasing God by

right actions according to Strauss’ Halevi. The philosopher

denies the importance of action. At most “goodness of character

and goodness of action is essentially not more than a means

toward, or a by-product of, the life of contemplation.”77

In Strauss’ account, the theological assumptions of the

philosophers are matched by an assumption on the part of the

pious. The believer assumes that actions which please God are

75 Ibid, 113.76 Ibid, 114.77 Ibid.

superior to contemplation. The basis of revelation is here

asserted to be the ungrounded premise that the practical life is

superior to the theoretical life. The believer needs revelation

only if actions are superior to contemplation.78 The dispute

between the philosopher and the believer does not involved

theory. The theologian and the philosopher simply proceed from

different assumptions. The philosophic preference for theory is

not based on theoretical insight or rational argument.

The philosopher does present a rational argument that follows

from his theological assumptions. Strauss says that the

“practical conclusion” of the theological premise of the

philosopher is religious indifference. The philosopher may

choose to adhere to any religious or political group, including

the one in which he is born. Or he may as well invent his own

religion for use by himself and/or his regime. But he could just

as rightly adopt the rational nomoi of the philosophers, the goal

78 Strauss does not elaborate on this argument. It seems that perhaps the believer requires revelation because the unassisted human reason cannot know which ceremonial and moral actions please God. With the “assumption” that actions are essential to please God, revelation becomes necessary. The philosopher’s assumption that there is a God but that there is no particular providence would lead to the conclusion that theory is most important simply because actions have nothing to (except perhaps as a means) to knowledge of God.

of which is purity of soul. It is obvious that “the philosopher

gives the king the conditional advice—conditional, that is, on

the king’s becoming a philosopher—to decide the religious

question on grounds of expediency alone. . . .”79 Strauss

believes that “This advice calls for some attention since it

contains what may be said to be the only authentic declaration,

occurring in the Kuzari, of the intentions of the

philosophers. . . .”80 This argument of the philosophers is

alleged to be the only genuine expression of the intentions of

the philosophers because it is not part of the philosopher’s

creed or doctrine, i.e. his Aristotelianism. It is instead a

statement of the philosopher in the Aristotelian. The

indifference on religious questions is also necessarily an

indifference to the question of the particular sect to which the

philosopher decides to adhere. Every philosopher must be a

Socrates as a philosopher. It is fundamentally a matter of

indifference whether the philosopher appears to be a Platonist or

an Epicurean.

79 Ibid.80 Ibid, 115.

Strauss radicalizes this position even further. “The

religious indifference of the philosopher knows no limits: he

does not oppose to the ‘errors’ of the positive religions the

religion of reason; he does not demand that a philosopher who as

such no longer believes in the religion of his fathers, should

reveal his indifference, preceding from unbelief. . . .”81 The

philosopher does not need to act “authentically,” he may

dissemble. He may even go so far as to comply in both word and

action with a particular religion even though he denies the

possibility of Divine revelation. He may even go so far as to

defend that faith with both arguments and the sword in an

“emergency.”82 This is perfectly logical when one considers the

relative unimportance of actions compared with the theoretical

life.

This argument does seem peculiar in light of the fact that the

rational nomoi of the philosophers are discussed as an option.

81 Ibid. Contrast this with the attitude of some Enlightenment authors, i.e. Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone or Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.82 Ibid. This does raise the important question of how one distinguishes the theologian from the philosopher. How can we know if the theologian is actually a pious believer as opposed to a philosopher making an exoteric defense of a religion chosen for the sake of expediency?

Why would a philosopher adhere to Judaism, Christianity, Islam,

or any other revealed religion or bother making up his own if

there is a set of rational laws already composed for

philosophers? The answer lies in the understanding of law on the

part of the philosopher. Law does not proceed from the will of

God as God has no will. Laws are simply devised by human beings.

The rational nomoi of the philosophers are rational, but not

obligatory. They do not come from God with the power and right

to guide us. If one considers the necessarily secondary question

of actions for the philosopher with the lack of an authoritative

lawgiver, it becomes evident that the rational laws of the

philosophers cannot be obligatory. The philosopher may adopt the

rational nomoi of the philosophers, but this decision can only be

grounded on what is most useful in the given circumstances.83

The rational nomoi of the philosophers do not have an

obligatory character or a fixed content. We can tell that they

do not resemble either one of the two types of natural/rational

law examined in the introduction to the essay. They cannot be

identified with the natural law “which binds every man and which

83 Ibid.

is the sum of dictates of right reason concerning objects of

action.”84 The rational laws of the philosophers do not bind and

hence are exchangeable with other religions and ways of life.

This is obviously incompatible with the natural law as formulated

above. The rational nomoi also cannot be equated with the

generally accepted moral opinions that all human societies have

in common. These opinions are the bare minimum standard

necessary for the perpetuation of any society. The rational laws

of the philosophers are a complete code, not a minimal

framework.85

While the rational nomoi or “religion of the philosophers” is

not obligatory, it is also not simply arbitrary.86 Since they

are rational, “they have been set up by the philosophers with a

view to the unchanging needs of man as man; they are codes fixing

the political or other conditions most favorable to the highest

perfection of man.”87 These codes may be political, and have an

explicit political theology, or they may be apolitical. The

84 Ibid. See also Ibid, 96. This is of course Strauss’ presentation of the Thomistic natural law doctrine in this essay.85 Ibid, 116. Here Strauss is recalling the doctrine of Marsilius of Padua and Maimonides. See also Ibid, 96-98.86 Ibid.87 Ibid.

philosopher may pursue the purity of his soul in or out of the

city. Strauss argues that it would be preferable for the

philosopher to pursue a solitary life seeking knowledge or to

live in the best political community, but this is a mere

preference.88 It follows that what religion the philosopher

follows is a matter of indifference. This indifference is

reinforced when the philosopher tells the king in his second

speech that the religion of the philosophers does not condone or

demand the killing of adherents of other religions simply because

of their religious adherence.89 The philosophers of Halevi’s day

did not object to the suppression of heterodox teachings or books

detrimental to the dominant faith.90 But the man-made religion

of the philosophers does not demand the right to kill others on

the basis of dissent from a philosophic code.

The Scholar’s Response and the Education of the Philosopher

The philosopher’s law of reason gives way to the response of

the scholar as arranged by Strauss. The dialogue in the essay so

far has emphasized the difference between the philosopher and the

88 Ibid, 117.89 Ibid.90 Ibid, 110.

theologian as well as the philosopher’s perspective on the law of

reason. The scholar’s response to the philosopher comes to the

fore as the dispute progresses. The scholar both disagrees and

agrees with the philosopher on the law of reason. The scholar’s

apparently contradictory arguments indicate what Strauss terms a

“grave question.”91 The apparently pious Jew cannot simply agree

or disagree with the law of reason. Agreement or disagreement

depends on the situation of belief and the precise definition of

the terms involved. The scholar can only attack the law of

reason as long as the king’s doubts remain intact. He may accept

and even praise the law of reason in a qualified manner once the

king’s doubts have been essentially overcome. “The scholar shows

. . . that only on the basis of faith can allowances be made for

reason, or that it is hazardous, if not futile, to make reason

the basis of faith.”92 The theologian may make rational

arguments as long as it is clear that reason is not the ground of

faith.93

91 Ibid, 118.92 Ibid, 119.93 The actual ground of faith is left at the “assumption” that actions pleasing to God are more important than knowledge of God. This assumption is intrinsically connected to an assumption or premise that particular providenceexists.

The scholar’s argument provides both a continuation of the

education of the philosopher on the meaning of the natural law as

well as a correction of the apparent disregard or contempt of the

philosopher for morality and religion. The seemingly

unbridgeable gap between the theologian and the philosopher is

perhaps not an abyss after all. The scholar in this chapter

turns the potential philosopher from the way of Socrates toward

the way of Plato.94 Socrates must dispute with St. Thomas. It

seems that Plato and St. Thomas may coexist peacefully.

The title of the third section of the essay provides a good

introduction to the scholar’s critique of the rational nomoi of

the philosophers. The section is entitled “The Law of Reason as

a Theological-Political Code.” The scholar and the philosopher

agree that the philosophers may present a complete theological-

political code.95 The scholar must of course reject this 94 The scholar, like the philosopher, does not elaborate on the grounds or premises of the dispute between philosophy and revelation. Perhaps Strauss avoided delving into the content of this dispute out of a sense of responsibility. Cf. Ibid, 111-112 on Halevi’s sense of responsibility.95 The philosopher may also simply choose to practice publicly a religion based on revelation or invent a religion that claims to be revealed. These alternatives, discussed above, are not discussed in the rest of Strauss’ essay. It is possible to discern the difference between the rational nomoi ofthe philosophers (i.e. Plato’s Laws) and a revealed religion. How is it possible to discern a difference between a religion invented by a philosopher from a revealed religion? A philosopher could of course invent a religion

approach. The basic reason is that the rational nomoi of the

philosophers is a man-made code.96 Hence its very existence

implies a rejection of the one true Divine code. The scholar

“attacks ‘the religion . . .to which speculation leads’ in the

name of the right kind of religion or law.”97 The scholar does

not differ with the theologian on what law ‘does.’ Law regulates

actions and beliefs. The nomoi or religion of the philosophers

is syllogistic and governmental. The philosophic religion is

syllogistic as it is based on “demonstrative, rhetorical, and

other syllogisms.”98 It is governmental as it aims to govern

either a political community or help reason to govern the

passions of an individual. The first fundamental problem which

comes to light has to do with its anarchic character: “the

philosophers do not agree as to a single action or a single

belief.”99 The root of this issue is that the religion of the

that appears to be revealed. And a philosopher could adhere to a genuinely revealed religion and even defend it in speech and deed without actually believing it. Based on these considerations we must wonder about the actual status of the scholar.96 Strauss points out that the religion of the philosophers is spoken of properly in both the singular and the plural. The reason for this is that there is a unified or singular intention of the philosophers but a multiplicity of exoteric sects. Cf. Ibid, 121.97 Ibid, 119.98 Ibid.99 Ibid.

philosophers is only partly demonstrative. Hence rational men

may disagree as to the content of the allegedly rational nomoi.

The rhetorical or non-demonstrative provisions of the philosophic

code are a matter of indifference. Hence every philosophic sect

may have its own code. Halevi’s scholar implies that they all

do.100

The scholar’s critique does not raise a problem of which the

philosopher has no knowledge. As we have seen, the philosopher

in the dialogue is quite open that the religion of the

philosophers is not obligatory. The scholar is merely drawing

out the implications of the philosopher’s statement that the

religion of the philosophers does not condone or demand the

killing of the members of other religions.101 The scholar shows

us the premise behind this conclusion. The premise is the partly

demonstrative and partly rhetorical character of the philosophic

religion. The semi-rhetorical, “dialectical or sophistical”

nature of the philosopher’s code logically precludes that code

from being obligatory and hence there can be no rational cause to

100 Ibid, 120.101 Ibid, 117.

persecute the members of other religions.102 The philosophic

religion has a demonstrative common core but many different

exoteric expressions. Strauss goes so far as to maintain that

“the admission of the possibility, and necessity, of an exoteric

teaching presupposes agreement concerning the most fundamental

point.103

The scholar also helpfully clarifies the meaning of ‘rational’

in the term rational nomoi. The code of the philosophers is not

simply or wholly reasonable. It is reasonable insofar as it is a

work of practical reason.104 Practical reason is the faculty that

brings “governments” as well as “governmental nomoi” into

existence.105 These laws, which promote the regimen solitarii of the

philosophers and/or the governance of a political community, and

perhaps also embody a “governmental religion” to aid obedience to

the political laws, are only rational insofar as they are useful

102 Ibid, 121. 103 Ibid. Again there is no discussion of the esoteric core of the philosophicreligion. The implication is that Socratic investigation is the common core or purpose.104 For the complex relationship between theoretical and practical reason and metaphysics or theology, see Ibid, 99-100, note 14. The question of divine justice is a matter of practical reason for Halevi and Maimonides according toStrauss. This understanding is apparently shared by the philosopher and the theologian.105 Ibid, 121.

to promoting contemplation or preserving the life of the

philosophers. They have the character of means, not ends. The

proper end of the best human being is the theoretical life or

Socratic investigation of justice and the virtues. The rational

nomoi of the philosophic code have the character of means to that

end. Practical reason is reasonable if it serves the end of the

theoretical life.106

Of course this argument takes us back to the conflict between

the philosopher and the theologian concerning the importance of

practice or morality versus theoretical reason. The religion of

the philosophers finds certain actions useful in given

circumstances, but action or morality is strictly subordinated to

theoretical reason. This position is of course seemingly

diametrically opposed to that of the theologian, who holds that

practice or morality is critical because it is not knowledge but

acting on the commands of God which is most important. Strauss

106 Ibid, 122. It seems that the way of Thrasymachus and the art of Timaeus that are the principal features of the Platonic correction of Socrates are works of practical reason. See also the reference to the Phaedo at Ibid, 123,note 77. It is important to note that the exoteric religion of practical reason can be a means of drawing potential philosophers to the life of skeptical investigation. Cf. Ibid, 15-18, 36-37. The exoteric teachings are not simply “window-dressing.”

reinforces this point by relating the scholar’s position on how

one should proceed in approaching God. The right approach is to

begin from Divine revelation. The wrong approach is to begin

with reason (“syllogism” and “thinking”).107 The premise of this

position is that it is absurd to follow man-made codes and the

way of Socratic investigation rather than acting on laws which

are revealed by God. The theologian issues what appears to be a

new facet to his argument though. In his repetition of the

critique of syllogistic religion, he ascribes its origin to

superstitious people and not philosophers.108

The preeminent example of the rational nomoi of the

philosophers is Plato’s Laws.109 The scholar does not maintain

that the Laws is a work of superstition. The example used by the

scholar of superstitious syllogistic religion is The Nabataean

Agriculture. The chief characteristic of the superstitious nomoi is

an emphasis on magic and ceremonial practices. The code of the

philosophers does not place much emphasis on magic or ceremony.

Strauss notes that the two types are similar or of the same genus

107 Ibid.108 Ibid.109 Ibid 123, 137.

as they are both the product of human reason. They are also

similar in the decisive respect for the scholar as they are both

man-made codes and hence in opposition to Divine revelation.110

There is one other respect in which the two species of the

genus “complete codes made by men that guide actions and beliefs”

may be similar. The apparently superstitious silliness of

magical practices, astrology, and the use of talismans may mask a

philosophic agenda. The superstitious syllogistic codes may not

be superstitious at all. Strauss continues with his example of

The Nabataean Agriculture: he states that it is possible the apparent

irrationality of the superstitious practices (i.e. idolatry and

witchcraft) in the text may really be a philosophic critique of

Divine revelation. An exoterically superstitious work may

present readers with “ridiculous nonsense in order to cast doubt

on the Biblical miracles. . .” and hence attack revelation

simply.111 Strauss reminds us that the overtly non-superstitious

Laws of Plato also presents a denial of Divine revelation.112 The

110 Ibid, 123-124.111 Ibid, 125.112 Ibid, 125, note 96. Strauss refers to “Plato’s discussion of the Divine origin of the laws of Minos and Lycurgus in the first book of the Laws” in note 96. The possible unity of purpose of The Nabataean Agriculture and Plato’s Laws on the philosophic denial of divine revelation is provocative but at best

genus of man-made codes composed of the two species philosophic

religion and superstitious nomoi are certainly united in that

they are both man-made, the products of human practical reason.

They may also be connected in making philosophic arguments

against Divine revelation. The decisive point for the theologian

is that the entire genus is a repudiation of Divine revelation.

The principal practical danger alluded to so far is that the man-

made codes lead to moral anarchy. The theoretical conflict has

to all intents and purposes been apparently concluded with the

discussion of the different assumption of the theologian and the

philosopher and the resulting consequences of emphasizing moral

action or theory respectively.

Strauss, after beginning to relate the scholar’s objections to

the rational nomoi of the philosophers as complete theological-

political codes, instead turned to an examination that focused on

how the scholar’s remarks “unpacked” the brief speeches of the

philosopher. So far the potential philosopher has learned the

initially unspoken conclusions of the philosopher’s premises.

a dialectical and not a demonstrative argument. One wonders if The Nabataean Agriculture isn’t related to works such as The Three Impostors or the later works ofReimarus and Voltaire.

The demonstration of the importance of morality for the

philosopher has begun with the point that the many codes of the

philosophers produce anarchy. This assertion has not yet been

developed.

What may be called the positive response of the scholar to the

philosopher’s law of reason is developed more fully in the fourth

section of the essay.113 The scholar elaborates an alternative

understanding to the complete man-made code(s) of the philosopher

and also clarifies the meaning of the relation between the law of

reason and the natural law. It is important to note that the

scholar’s position is not that of the kalam or the “theological

view” described in the introduction to the essay. The

theological view was said by Strauss to hold that the natural law

is a set of rational rules that embody the dictates of right

reason governing action. The philosophic view was said to reduce

natural justice to the common opinions or conventional rules that

prevail among all societies on moral matters.114

113 Ibid, 126-135. The section is titled The Law of Reason as the Framework ofEvery Code.114 Ibid, 95-98. See above 12-15.

It is already obvious that the initial discussion of the

distinction between the philosophers and the scholars has given

way to a new understanding of the law of reason on the part of

the philosophers. The philosophic argument as presented by

Strauss’ Halevi in the persons of the philosopher and the scholar

identifies the law of reason not with the conventional rules of

moral conduct, but as a complete man-made code that presents a

doctrine that provides for the governance of the political

community and/or the rule of the passions by reason. This

philosophic code may include a religious component to support the

political law.

The scholar has helped to develop the implications of the

philosopher’s brief speeches on the law of reason. The emphasis

turns now to the scholar’s alternative view of the natural law or

law of reason. The scholar’s argument is not the theological

view because in his hands the law of reason or natural law is not

simply a set of rational rules discernible by practical reason

that governs human action. The scholar instead presents the

natural law as the framework necessary to any human or divine

code of law.

The scholar first makes an “approving mention of the Law of

Reason” after the king has agreed with the fundamental argument

of the scholar and adopted Judaism.115 The approving mention of

the law of reason on the part of the theologian occurs not only

after the king has accepted Judaism but in the context of a

critique of the philosophic or anachoretic life. The king

thinks, on the basis of biblical texts, that the proper way to

approach God is through “humility, self-mortification and justice

as such, or. . .fearing God, in walking in His ways, in loving

Him and in serving Him with all one’s heart and all one’s soul,

in doing justly, in loving mercy and in walking humbly with

God.”116 The king’s position seems to make perfect sense. He is

citing the Bible and emphasizing pious actions. He has rejected

contemplation. He obviously wishes to please the God of Abraham

by right action rather than seeking the God of Aristotle through

contemplation. But the scholar objects strongly to the king’s

position. Why would the scholar or theologian who is seeking the

conversion of the king and defending morality offer a critique of

the king’s pious argument?

115 Ibid, 126.116 Ibid, 126-127.

Strauss holds that the theologian’s rejection of the king’s

understanding is in fact an attack on the eremitical or

anachoretic life of the philosopher, the regimen solitarii mentioned

earlier.117 And the scholar’s critique “is the central part of

the critique of philosophy; for it concerns, not this or that set

of dogmas or this or that philosophic sect, but the philosophic

life itself: the life of contemplation which is essentially

asocial and hence anachoretic.”118 There is no reason for the

theologian to devote time to attacking the doctrines of the

various philosophic religions. A disproof of Platonic doctrine

for instance would do nothing to disprove the way of life of

Socrates as the best way of life. The dogmas of the various

philosophic sects are meant to protect and promote the

philosophic way of life. Unless the critic of the way of

Socrates goes beyond the exoteric religions of the various

philosophic schools, he will not actually be able to offer a

critique of the philosophic life.

117 Ibid, 116.118 Ibid, 126.

The scholar’s striking response to the king is intended as a

rejection of the way of Socrates. The particular doctrine of

natural law advanced by the scholar furthers the critique of the

philosophic way of life. The law of reason as a complete

philosophic religious code(s) is replaced by the natural law as

the bare minimum moral requirements for any society. The

rational nomoi are “the sum of rules which describe the

indispensable minimum of morality required for the preservation

of any society.”119 These bare minimum rules are equated by the

scholar with the actions the king had mentioned (i.e. humility,

justice, self-mortification). The scholar compares their

necessity to “natural things” such as “food, drink, movement,

rest, sleep, and waking to the individual. . . .”120 The rational

nomoi are, according to the scholar, knowable apart from Divine

revelation in their substance, but not in their measure.121 This

indicates either a contradiction or at least a modification of

119 Ibid, 127.120 Ibid. These rules are not strictly natural, they seem to be quasi natural.The nomoi can only be analogously termed natural because they are nomoi and hence conventional. This admission links the scholar’s argument to Marsilius’philosophic view. Cf. Ibid, 96. It is difficult to distinguish the theologian and the philosopher.121 This is the Thomistic position also. Cf. Summa Theologica I-II, qu. 100, especially artricles 1 and 3 and note 50 above.

the original view ascribed to the theologians, where the natural

law is a set of rules knowable by right reason. The impression

left on the reader is that practical reason perceives a group of

clear, rational precepts. But if Divine revelation must specify

the “measure” of these rules, they are certainly not clear and

really not comprehensible simply to the practical reason. The

theological view seem to draw nearer to the philosophic view.

On the other hand, the scholar’s argument parallels that of the

kalam or theological perspective in several ways. First, the

scholar follows the kalam view by contrasting the rational laws

with the divine law.122 Second, Halevi includes duties to God in

the rational law. These views are not surprising for an

“atypical mutakallim.” But Strauss points out that these

arguments do in fact raise issues which are startling. First, it

seems odd for the pious to include “the most sublime religious

obligations” to God with the bare minimum requirement of morality

that all human societies, including gangs of robbers, must

include in their laws and that these minimal requirements are

performed almost as necessarily as natural activities such as

122 Cf. Ibid, 97-98.

eating and sleeping. Second, the scholar uses the terms

“rational nomoi” and “rational laws” interchangeably. This

implies that there is a close relationship between the scholar’s

view of the natural law as the necessary framework of any society

and the syllogistic religion/complete code of the philosophers.123

The scholar makes three statements on rational nomoi or

rational/governmental laws. These statements differ to the

extent that it is not clear whether or not religious duties are

part of the minimum moral requirements of the framework of any

society.124 Strauss, noting the “strange elusiveness” of the

scholar’s statements and the resulting difficulty of even

discussing the various alternative interpretations, reformulates

the questions.125 First, does religion belong to the minimum

requirements for the perpetuation of any society? Second, can

the natural laws be called rational?

123 Ibid, 128.124 Ibid, 128-129, see notes 109-110. It seems as if this is part of the education offered by Strauss’ Halevi. The apparently confused or confusing terminology and the different perspectives examined are elaborations of the problem. This is similar to Strauss’ argument about the nature of the eide inPlato. They are the permanent problems, and education consists of understanding the different aspects of the permanent problems. See Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 118-120.125 Ibid, 129.

Strauss twice mentions the “embarrassment” of the scholar

relating to the first question. The difficulty in which the

theologian finds himself on this issue is two-fold. On the one

hand, a pious man or at least a defender of piety does not want

to admit that religion is not essential to the preservation of

society. Strauss adds that it is also hard to dismiss the

necessity of religion for society if we put any trust in the

lessons of human history. On the other hand, an admission that

every society requires religion would dignify any religion, no

matter how degraded or barbaric. Certainly the band of robbers

does not adhere to the one true religion. Strauss says that from

the scholar’s “point of view, it is, I believe, impossible to

decide the question as to whether the denial, not accompanied by

the assertion of the existence of any other deity, of the

existence, say, of Moloch is better or worse than a living faith

in Moloch.”126 The scholar is seemingly caught between two

repulsive positions. Of course this is only a difficulty when

discussing the rational laws or the natural law, which we can

know with our unassisted human reason. The fact that this is a

126 Ibid, 130.

difficulty reminds us that it is dangerous for the believer to

employ reason in the defense of piety.127 The believer who simply

accepts his religion will have no difficulty on this question.

The revealed doctrine will point the way to approach the true

God. But when revelation is set aside and reason is employed

alone, this difficulty must be confronted. The potential

philosopher reading this essay sees that it is Strauss, and not

the scholar, who raises this difficulty.128 Strauss uses the

occasion of the scholar’s “embarrassment” to demonstrate the

limitations of reason.

The examination of the embarrassing position of the scholar

illuminates another aspect of the problem, it does not answer the

questions at hand. Strauss looks at what “governmental laws”

might mean to answer the questions whether the natural law

requires duties to God and whether the natural law is rational.

The obvious connection of the governmental laws with political

rule indicates that they might be “the indispensable moral

127 Ibid.128 This is the only occasion in the essay where Strauss employs the first person singular. Recall that he says “I believe.” Strauss “credo” in this essay points to both the problem of a natural law requirement for piety and also a reminder of the danger of employing reason to defend revelation. This is a defense of reason and revelation.

minimum of any government, or the evidently necessary and

sufficient, and the always identical, framework of both the many

man-made codes and the one Divine code.”129 Unfortunately, the

scholar’s statements on the governmental laws continue to be

strangely elusive. One cannot answer the vexing questions raised

by the scholar’s account through understanding governmental laws

because the governmental laws cannot ultimately be called

rational laws. The term “rational laws” linked to the natural

laws makes sense when contrasted with the divine law. The

rational/natural laws are those that can be known by the unaided

human reason and are the minimal framework necessary for the

perpetuation of any society. But this distinction does not work

when one considers the civil law. The civil laws of a society

may certainly be rational. Strauss points out that in one sense

they may be more rational, as the application of practical reason

to solve a particular problem in a particular place may be more

rational than a law valid in all circumstances. So the civil law

may very well be rational, but as they are particular to one

129 Ibid, 130-131. The reformulation by Strauss of the natural laws as a framework, always identical, of both man-made codes and the one Divine revelation is striking.

society, they are not universally valid and hence not part of the

natural law. The governmental laws are also only directed toward

bodily goods and not the higher considerations of human

perfection. Strauss doubts that one can call rational laws which

ignore human perfection.130

The rational laws do not or cannot be equivalent with

governmental laws. Once again a problem is elucidated but

without a solution. But the reader can make progress in

understanding the iura naturalia or natural laws. While the scholar

places the duty to train the soul by fasting and humility among

the governmental and rational nomoi at one point, he omits this

duty when discussing the Divine code. Strauss takes this to

indicate that the duty to train one’s soul by fasting and

humility is not part of the natural laws, which are identified

with the bare minimum requirements of the preservation of any

society.131 The provisions of the natural law may not simply be

deduced from the Divine code either, as the example just cited

130 Ibid, 133.131 Ibid, 131-132. Strauss points out that one cannot imagine a gang of robbers training their souls by means of fasting and humility to perpetuate the existence of the gang. The training of the soul by such means as fasting and humility is rational, but it is too “high” a consideration for the naturallaw.

may seem to indicate. Strauss points out that the Divine code

prohibits murder absolutely, this prohibition is not mentioned

when the scholar is discussing the governmental and rational

nomoi known independently of revelation. This is because a

society (i.e. a gang of robbers) does not need to refrain from

murder simply to preserve itself. It must only prohibit the

murder of other members of the society or gang. The governmental

laws of the Divine code command the honoring of father and

mother, the governmental laws known independently of revelation

enjoin the honoring of authorities such as teachers and other

intellectual superiors.132

Strauss makes comprehension of his argument more difficult by

using various terms to signify the same thing. The complicated

argument he makes that is related above may be simplified. “To

sum up: the iura naturalia are really not more than the

indispensable and unchangeable minimum of morality required for

the bare existence of any society.”133 The governmental laws and

rational laws may be equated with the natural law only when they

132 Ibid, 132.133 Ibid.

are known independently of revelation and are concerned with the

minimum moral requirements necessarily for the preservation of

the smallest or lowest community or gang of robbers.134

Once the focus is on the natural laws, the account becomes

clearer. The natural laws are equivalent to a “Binnenmoral,” an

insider-ethics or moral code for the members of a community.

This moral framework is not simply rational as it does not

provide for the perfection of man. The natural laws in the

philosophic view do not include any duties toward God.135 Strauss

points out here that of course the theologian cannot accept the

view that the natural laws do not require any duties to God. The

scholar can accept the natural laws as the framework of any

society, an unchangeable moral code known independently of

revelation. The theologian must add the requirement of what

Strauss terms “natural piety” as well.136 The scholar cannot

accept the view that religion is dispensable to the perpetuation

134 The content of the provisions of the natural law mentioned by Strauss is minimal. Murder of one’s fellow community members and lying or deceit are prohibited. The only positive injunction mentioned is the duty to honor authorities, the “fathers” in the broadest sense, i.e. teachers, advisers or intellectual superiors. Of course Strauss does not claim to present a comprehensive account.135 Ibid, 133-134.136 Ibid, 134.

of society because the natural laws can only provide the outline

and not the full “measure” or complete content of the iura

naturalia. Only divine revelation provides the measure or fills in

the outline provided by what the unassisted human reason can know

of the natural law. The natural law or unassisted human reason

sees that religion is necessary for society. Of course only

adherence to the one true revelation can guarantee that the

religious laws of a community are good.137 The philosophers do

not admit that the natural law requires religion. But perhaps

they are inconsistent on this point, as they have devised

religions to assist with inculcating obedience to the political

laws.138 Any governmental code which is good for the community

requires the natural law understood in the way of the scholar.139

This is a continuation of the scholar’s attack on the Law of

Reason of the philosophers. The scholar is not opposed to

reason. He is wary of its dangers for faith. The scholar cannot137 Ibid, 135.138 Ibid. This would appear to be a philosophic criticism of the philosophers on behalf of the philosophic view. The exemplars of the philosophic view in the introduction, Maimonides and Marsilius, both were “loyal” philosophers whodefended their respective religions.139 Ibid, cf. 133, note 124. This is a strange formulation. The natural laws are the beginning and it is the natural laws which are completed by Divine revelation. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II q. 104 art. 1 (referenced in note 124 by Strauss).

accept the Law of Reason of the philosophers, the complete man-

made codes made in opposition to the one true Divine code. He

can accept the legitimacy of rational laws insofar as they

coincide with the natural laws, which are “merely the framework

of any code, be it man-made or revealed. . . . ”140 It even seems

that the theological understanding may be more rational in

including the need for religion as part of the natural law or

minimum framework of society than the philosophic Law of Reason.

Strauss’ conclusion makes it clear that in a very real sense

the scholar’s theological presentation is more rational than that

of the philosophers. This is the emphasis of the last section of

Strauss’ dialogue.141 The problems and ambiguities of the

rational nomoi and the natural laws have been the dominant theme

of the education offered to the potential philosopher in this

140 Ibid, 135. This is an interesting way of describing the scholar’s position. It indicates the scholar is saying that the natural law is part of the necessary framework of Judaism. Of course the natural law is known independently of revelation although it requires Divine revelation for its completion. This appears to assimilate Thomism to Judaism on the subject of the relation between the natural law and the Divine law. The natural law in aheterodox community would be legitimate according to this formulation, even though the natural piety would be misguided by a false revelation.141 The last section is entitled The Law of Reason and the Natural Law. See Ibid, 135-141. Clear translations and instructive examples dominate this brief segment of the essay. The “strange elusiveness” of Strauss’ examinationof the different aspects of the law of reason gives way to an apparently clearconclusion.

chapter. At the very end, Strauss turns to clarifying the

ambiguous terminology and making clear the need for the

philosopher to respect the claims of morality.

This section begins with the final disposition of a murky

issue which has dogged the discussion to this point—the equivocal

use of the term “rational nomoi.” The scholar has used the term

in two senses. The first designated the complete man-made codes

condemned by the theologian due to their opposition to the one

Divine revelation. The second sense is “rules akin to the

‘rational laws,’ the ‘rational commandments’ in the sense of the

kalam, or for the framework of every code, of which he naturally

approves.”142 Strauss notes that it would have been easy for the

scholar to use two different terms. He does not believe that the

equivocal terminology of the scholar is due to sloppy or careless

thought. The unclear terminology forces the careful reader to

wonder if it is possible to reconcile the two meanings.143

142 Ibid, 135-136. 143 This is the reason for Strauss’ seemingly ambiguous and even tortuous discussion in the previous section of The Law of Reason as the Framework of Every Code.

The two meanings of the law of reason have been the principal

problems examined in Strauss’ dialogue. Now a tentative or

“hypothetical” solution is put forth.144 Strauss now will avoid

“rational nomoi” and instead use “Law of Reason” to describe the

complete man-made codes and “Natural Law” for the framework of

every code. We have already seen why the law of reason of the

philosophers is not equivalent to the natural law. The scholar

has extracted the “religiously neutral core of the Law of Reason”

from its “pagan periphery,” and he has “identified its core only

with the Natural Law.”145 The Law of Reason of the philosophers

is defined again as the rules of conduct necessary for a

potential philosopher to become capable of contemplation. This

framework is adaptable to different times and places. The

example par excellence of the Law of Reason is said by Strauss to be

Plato’s Laws. But he notes that the Law of Reason is not

“indissolubly” bound up with any form of society. The chief

focus of the Law of Reason is the set of rules that guide the

regimen solitarii of the philosopher. Strauss says these rules are

best exemplified by the duty to train one’s soul by fasting and

144 Ibid, 136.145 Ibid.

humility. These are the means to the aim of purity of soul and

assimilation to the God of Aristotle.146

The essentially eremitical or anachoretic character of the

regimen solitarii must also contain as a practical matter rules of

social conduct. The philosopher usually lives in society. He

even loves his pupils.147 This secondary aspect of the Law of

Reason of the philosophers, the rules of social conduct that

guide the essentially anachoretic philosopher, is identical with

what the scholar (and Strauss) term the Natural Law.148 The

scholar ignores the aim of the Law of Reason of the philosopher,

assimilation to the God of Aristotle. The scholar’s argument

takes what may be salvaged from the pagan Law of Reason and

applies it to a world of monotheistic believers.149

The scholar’s presentation of the natural law allows us to

comprehend the critical defect of the philosophic Law of Reason.

The precepts of the philosophic code are merely rules of

prudence. As noted above, the philosopher’s Law of Reason does

146 Ibid, 137-138, note 137, 131 note 115.147 Ibid, 138, 36.148 Ibid.149 Cf. “Maimonides’ Statement on Political Science” in Strauss, What is Political Philosophy, 155-169.

not have an obligatory character. The natural law, unless it is

completed and given the sanction of an omnipotent and omniscient

God, is not properly speaking a law. The guardian of the city or

the keeper of his brother do not and cannot see law in that way.

They must see the law as obligatory or absolutely binding. The

scholar agrees with the philosopher on the non-obligatory

character of the natural law. This is the reason for his

requirement of Divine revelation to complete the natural law and

Divine power to make it obligatory.150 Citizenship is only

possible on the basis of revealed law.

The scholar is able to see the defect of the philosophic code

because he has gone “so far with the philosophers. . . .”151

Reason does present a danger to belief, even when apparently in

the service of revelation. But it is through reason that the

theologian is able to make a critique of philosophy or at least

correct the Socratic excess of investigation that subverts the

basis of society. Strauss concludes that the true purpose of

Halevi was actually the defense of morality against philosophy

150 Cf. Ibid, 99-100, note 14.151 Ibid, 140.

understood as the way of Socrates. The irony is that the

apparent theologian is only able to uncover this defect through

the use of reason.

It is proper to say “apparent theologian” because it is

difficult to ascertain the difference between the theologian and

the philosopher who pursues not only the way of Socrates but has

understood the correction offered by Halevi. Halevi may be a

philosopher who has transferred the correction of Socrates by

Plato to the monotheistic world. We have seen that Strauss notes

Halevi’s philosophic methodology.152 We have also seen that

Strauss endorses the superior rationality of the scholar’s

position. Strauss does not endorse the theological position

simply. He does not set aside the importance of the regimen

solitarii. Instead he notes the inferiority of the way of Socrates

for civic life.

The potential philosopher has had a thorough exposure to the

relation between philosophy and social life through a

presentation of the problem of the law of reason. It is also

clear that the philosopher should treat revelation with respect 152 See above, page 6ff.

as the only sure ground of morality and hence civic decency. We

are left with the question of the theoretical conflict between

reason and revelation and the question of whether Halevi’s

critique of philosophy and defense of morality was ultimately

from the perspective of revelation or reason.