Polishing the Jade: Xing (Human Nature) and Moral Cultivation in the Analects

This paper was published in JOSA, 44 (2012): 16–40. This is a preprint copy for the author’s private use.

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Polishing the Jade: xing (Human Nature) and

Moral Cultivation in the Analects∗

Shirley Chan Macquarie University

The absence in the Analects of explicit statements on and detailed discussions of the

nature of things including human nature (xing 性) is obvious enough that readers

would need no prompting by Zigong, one of Confucius’ disciples, to be made aware

of it, given that the word appears in the text only twice, one of these being Zigong’s

reminder that the Master’s view on xing cannot be heard.1 On the other hand, the

notion of xing attracted considerable attention in the Warring States period, as seen in

the extant works of Mencius and Xunzi, as well as in newly discovered texts. This

apparent gap in intellectual deliberations on xing could have been a gradual evolution;

its ideological trajectory could be traced to nascent concepts in the Analects.2 Starting

with the analogy in the Analects of unpolished jade, this paper shows that xing

contains both morally desirable and undesirable elements that need to undergo the

process of grinding and polishing in order to bring out their inherent beauty. Drawing

on the Confucian discourse, particularly in the contexts of self-cultivation, I will

retrace impressions of it in the Analects and unveil the sub-texts of Confucius’

conception of xing, arguing that native quality and cultural refinement are

complementary and that together they complete the moral transformation of human

development.

The Intellectual Landscape of xing

Written during the Spring and Autumn Period through the Warring States Period (ca

475–221 BCE), the Analects (Lunyu) is considered a record of the words and acts of

Confucius and his disciples, as well as the discussions they held. It is generally

∗ I would like to express my great gratitude to all those who have been involved in the process of

‘polishing and grinding’ this paper, although all flaws and imperfections remain mine. I thank Professors John Hanafin and Shun Kwong-loi for their feedback and comments when it was first presented at the 15th International Conference of Chinese Philosophy held in Wuhan University, China, in 2007. I also benefited from discussion and correspondence with Daniel Lee, Iain Clark and Marcus Chin. I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and Dr Sue Wiles for her professionalism throughout our correspondence.

1. D.C. Lau, Confucius—The Analects (Penguin, 1979), 41. In this paper I will use Lau’s translations of the Analects (with modifications where appropriate) unless otherwise stated.

2. Steven Van Zoeren, Poetry and Personality (Stanford University Press, 1991), 26.


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accepted that the book was not written by a single individual but was a collective

effort of generations of Confucian disciples. Nevertheless, the Analects as the

representative work of early Confucianism reflects its central ideas and concepts of

humanity, ritual practice and moral cultivation. My discussion about self-cultivation

and human nature in this paper will be based on the reading of the text as a whole, as

a compendium of knowledge created by a group of gatekeepers of these ideas. It is

recognised that the text, as it is received today, does not necessarily represent the

historical personage of Confucius; reference made in this paper to Confucius or

Confucian is no more than a conventional label for the stature of the ideological

Master whom the author(s) and editor(s) of the Analects understood or intended to

portray.3

As mentioned above, the character xing appears only twice in the Analects.

Apart from in Zigong’s words ‘The Master’s discourses about [man’s] nature, and the

way of Heaven, cannot be heard’ (fuzi zhi yan xing yu tiandao bukede er wen ye

父子之言性與天道不可得而聞也),4 its only other appearance is in Confucius’

comment that ‘[p]eople are close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of

practice’ (xing xiangjin, xi xiangyuan 性相近, 習相遠).5 The English interpretation

of the term xing is rather ambiguous. William G. Boltz, for example, has argued that

uses of the word xing in the Analects ‘are “non-philosophical,” i.e., they cannot be

shown unambiguously to carry the weight implied by the English translation “human

nature,” or they are perhaps anachronistic interpolations from a later time.’6 Leys, on

the other hand, argues that xing in Zigong’s remark should be understood as natura

rerum or the essence of reality, although most commentators interpret it as human

nature.7 However, this broader understanding of xing as a general term referring to the

nature of things does not exclude its meaning as [human] nature; xing, at least in the

context of the statement xing xiangjin, xi xiangyuan, may be appropriately taken to be

human nature. My current discussion will focus on xing as human nature.

3. It follows that expressions such as ‘Confucius said’ could be taken as ‘Confucian is quoted as having said’; authenticating the ascription of Confucius’ words or thoughts as they appear in the Analects is beyond the scope of this paper.

4. Analects, ‘Gongyechang’. 5. Lau, Analects, 17.1. 6. See William Boltz, ‘Logic, Language, and Grammar in Early China’, Journal of the American

Oriental Society 120, no. 2 (2000): 225 n 11. 7. Simon Leys, The Analects of Confucius (New York: Norton, 1997), 141–42.


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By xing xiangjin, xi xiangyuan, Confucius acknowledges that humans share a

similar nature, and points out that it is what humans learn and practise that makes

them different from each other; he acknowledges that social practice is the key factor

for shaping character. This terse statement does not provide a definition of what xing

actually is and as such would suggest that his conception is neither adequately nor

succinctly expressed, and that his conception of the goodness or badness of xing is

indeterminate.

In the intervening years between Confucius and Mencius there were scarcely

any received texts that could inform us of any significant intellectual development of

xing until the discovery of the hitherto un-transmitted text Nature Derives from ming

(Xing zi ming chu 《性自命出》; hereafter XZMC) in the Guodian bamboo

manuscripts.8 The text excavated in 1993 in what was the ancient state of Chu has

immensely enriched our understanding of the intellectual inquiry into the nature of

xing in pre-imperial times. This ancient manuscript of unknown authorship, datable to

the fourth century BCE, would probably have been written before the time of

Mencius. It examines the different concepts of xing, grounding its essence on

biological and natural tendencies with the functionality of an animate entity. The text

points to the relationship between xing, emotions (qing 情) and external things (wu

物). It provides an anatomy of xing, which is defined in terms of qi 氣, such as

feelings of happiness, anger, sadness and grief. The heart-mind (xin 心) that lays hold

of xing does not have a fixed intention but qi can be evoked and expressed outwardly

as qing when the xin is stimulated by external things. The author of XZMC believes

that xing begets qing, and that qing is the beginning of dao 道 which will end in

righteousness (yi 義). The inference of a kind of pilgrim’s journey starting with xing

and ending in yi through dao suggests a process of moral cultivation, which the sage,

having compiled, edited and refined the Odes, the Documents, the Rites and the

8. The Guodian bamboo manuscripts were unearthed in 1993 in a tomb from the historical state of

Chu in present-day Jingmen City, Hubei Province. Without identifying a definitive authorship, the cache was dated to the latter half of the Warring States Period (475–221 BCE). They consist of sixteen texts inscribed on approximately 800 bamboo slips. The slip texts were divided into three major categories: Daoist; Confucian and miscellaneous sayings that have not been ascribed to any of the traditional schools of thought. The manuscript texts have been transcribed into modern standard Chinese characters and were published with images of the slips under the editorship of Jingmenshi bowuguan as Chu Bamboo Slips from the Guodian Tomb (Guodian chumu zhujian) (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1998). All transcribed texts and strip reference numbers of the Guodian manuscripts cited in this paper are based on this 1998 publication.


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Music, teaches for the purpose of attaining propriety. It is observed that rituals, which

originate from the understanding of qing, can draw out the natural response or

tendency of people.9 The XZMC openly states that although man is endowed with

inborn nature (likes and dislikes, good and bad), this inborn nature cannot be manifest

without induction by the xin; it also states that xin needs to be, and can be, trained to

have a focused intention and commitment (zhi 志) through learning and practical

experience for the purpose of being morally principled.10 Without zhi, the xin is

simply moved by external stimuli, becoming activated by pleasure or the anticipation

of satisfaction (which probably can be morally positive or negative). It is through

repeated practice that it becomes part of xing, when the xin has reached a state in

which it will not be disturbed by distractions, but rather has developed a particular

emotional tendency that corresponds naturally with the subject’s action or movement.

In short, XZMC transcends the debate about human nature by elevating the discussion

to a higher plane of exploring the synergy of xing, qing, xin, moral cultivation and

ritual (li 禮).

Among the thinkers after Confucius’ time, Mencius believes that human nature

is predisposed to goodness, hence his conclusion that we are originally born good

with a natural tendency to become good, whereas badness is caused by external

influences. His all too frequently quoted case of our instinct to save a child from

falling into a well as evidence of the inborn good nature of human beings11 needs no

further elaboration. His understanding of xing is that it has the moral feelings of

commiseration (ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心), shame (xiuwu zhi xin 羞惡之心), reverence

(gongjing zhi xin 恭敬之心) and a sense of discerning right from wrong (shifei zhi

xin 是非之心).12

On the other hand, Gaozi debates with Mencius the essence of human nature,

arguing that xing is born without preordained character, like water which flows not

9. Munro has also argued that the association of mind (xin 心) with nature (xing 性) was already becoming apparent in the Warring States period. Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford University Press, 1969), 65, 82. Tan argues that emotions have an important place in Confucius’ ethics and that to have appropriate emotions is constitutive of the ethical life. See Sor-hoon Tan, ‘Imagining Confucius: Paradigmatic Characters and Virtue Ethics’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32, no. 3 (September 2005): 409–26.

10. XZMC, strips 1, 2. 11. Mengzi, ‘Gongsunchou 1’ <公孫丑上>.

12. Ibid.


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according to any predetermined direction but to the profile of its container or the

topography. Any goodness that may be derived from xing is a result of remodelling,

just as willow cups and bowls are created out of the willow tree by craftsmanship.13

In regard to xing as inborn characteristics, Xunzi’s view is not distinctly

different from that of Gaozi, who claims ‘[t]hat which is inborn is what is meant by

“nature”’ (sheng zhi wei xing ye 生之謂性也).14 But from this point their views

diverge as Xunzi collocates xing with egotistic desires inherent at birth which, if not

regulated, can lead to social conflict and disorder. In view of this, li 禮 was created by

the sage kings for regulating the desires of the people.15

Confucius’ gem-carving metaphor shares a close affinity with Gaozi’s simile of

making bowls out of willow, in that both are referring to a process akin to

craftsmanship. Along with his own interpretation of human xing, Mencius would

argue that Confucius’ process is to let the natural beauty (xing) of jade symbolise

moral excellence made manifest, whereas Gaozi sees the carved jade together with his

willow bowl as mutilating their original nature. Lastly, Xunzi considers li essential as

a tool with which to carve away the original badness of men.

The Unpolished Jade: Text and Sub-Text of xing in the Analects

As mentioned earlier, Confucius’ only definition of xing acknowledges that all human

beings are born with a similar nature and it is their habitual practice that sets them

apart. Ambiguous as it is, Confucius’s exposition as above is probably not to be

understood as a verdict on human nature.

In Confucius’ dialogue with Zigong human nature is metaphorically embedded

in the adage as a piece of jade or a gemstone which in its natural state comes with

potential goodness16 and imperfections. It needs to be cut, polished, carved and

13. Mengzi, ‘Gaozi 1’ <告子上>.

14. Ibid. 15. Xunzi 23.1a–b. 16. Also see Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, 80. I use the term ‘potential goodness’ here

to distinguish it from ‘original/natural goodness’ and to emphasise that it is the process of cultivation that awakens this innate potential moral awareness.


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ground (ruqie ruchuo, ruzhuo rumuo 如切如磋, 如琢如磨)17 so as to remove its

inherent blemishes and imperfections before its beauty and goodness can be revealed.

Yet the metaphor is presented so obliquely in the original text that the jade or

gemstone is not mentioned, and only with grammatical inflections does translation

turn the sub-text into plain text.18 Confucius does not hide his elation when he

considers himself to be a piece of beautiful jade (meiyu 美玉) on display to be

bought,19 by which he implies that he is lying in waiting to be appointed to office.

Confucius the consummate man of virtue (junji 君子) is not born a piece of beautiful

jade. When he reflects on his moral development he has this to say:

At fifteen I set my heart on learning; at thirty I took my stand; at forty I was never in two minds; at

fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at seventy I followed my

heart’s desire without overstepping the line.

(吾十有五而志于學，三十而立，四十而不惑，五十而知天命，六十而耳順，七十而從心所欲

，不踰矩)20

This passage implies that Confucius has undergone a process of learning or self-

cultivation with cause–effect characteristics in the different stages of his life to

become what he is. Central to the Confucian didactic is the concept of learning and

self-cultivation which is driven by Confucius’ thorough understanding of xing. The

Analects mentions more than once that the aim of Confucius’ teaching is to realise

moral excellence through cultural refinement (wen 文) and/or ritual practice (li 禮):

‘broaden [people] with culture and [restrain them] by means of the rites / ritual

practice’ (bo wo yi wen, yue wo yi li 博我以文,約我以禮)21—the antonyms bo 博 (to

broaden, enlarge) and yue 約 (to bring back to essentials, restrain) imply that there are

qualities in humans that need to be developed on the one hand, and qualities that need

to be regulated on the other. Moral cultivation does not mean rejecting human nature

17. Lau, Analects, 7. It is also noted that Confucius used utensils such as the gu 觚 (53) and hulian

瑚璉 (37) as metaphors for goodness of character. These may have been made of precious stones or wood and equally involved the process of carving and grinding.

18. I have borrowed the literary term ‘sub-text’ which can be defined as ‘what is not said or not done (and how it is not said or done), what may be implied, suggested or hinted . . .’ J.A. Cuddon, Dictionary of Literary Terms & Literary Theory (Penguin, 1998), 877.

19. Lau, Analects, 81. 20. Ibid., 11. 21. Ibid., 53, 79, 115.


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altogether; rather, it is about developing and refining what we were born with, having

the best balance of inborn nature and cultural refinement. Thus he explained:

When there is a preponderance of native substance over acquired refinement, the result will be

churlishness. When there is a preponderance of acquired refinement over native substance, the result

will be pedantry [of the scribe]. Only a well balanced admixture of the two will result in

gentlemanliness. (質勝文則野,文勝質則史。文質彬彬,然後君子)22

The key concepts here are zhi 質 and wen 文. Related to xing, zhi means native

substance or predisposed quality, denoting an original and inborn nature.23

Confucius’ definition of the cultivated junzi suggests that it is man’s inborn nature to

be in harmony with cultural patterns and refinement (wen); an ideal character is

achieved only when native attributes and acquired refinement are well balanced.

Zigong echoes Confucius in giving equal weight to zhi and wen:

Cultural pattern is just as important as inborn qualities; and inborn qualities no less important than

cultural accomplishment. Remove the hairs from the skin of a tiger or panther, and what is left looks

just like the hairless hide of a dog or sheep. (文猶質也,質猶文也.虎豹之鞹,猶犬羊之鞹)24

The fundamental understanding of wen in relation to zhi is well encapsulated in the

above analogy of the fur of animals. The statement asserts the correlation between

cultural refinement and innate quality. Development of human qualities, according to

the Confucians, is only complete through proper social and cultural practice bringing

out the features and patterns that define human society: wen, cultural patterns and

refinement like the animals’ hair, which is part of the defining and inherent

characteristics of the animals, is considered an indispensable and distinguishing

component of human features. Thus, while the analogy above makes no deliberate

effort to classify xing as human nature, it posits that zhi and wen are complementary

22. Analects 6.18. The word ye 野 in this passage means coarse, unrefined, rustic and also wild and

barbaric. Translation from Waley, modified: Arthur Waley, Lun yu = The Analects (Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 1998).

23. Zhi is defined as ‘form and body’ (質, 軀也《廣雅》<釋言>); ‘basic essence’ (質，猶本，又主也《廣雅》<釋詁三>). Similarly, zhi is used interchangeably with xing: 性，質也《廣雅》<釋詁三>.

24. Here I use Waley’s translation of Analects 12.8. Waley comments on this passage: ‘The man of good birth is potentially capable of “patterning his coat” with culture, and thus distinguishing himself from the common herd. But good birth alone, though essential as a basis for culture, is not enough to make a gentleman in the Confucian sense.’ Waley, Lun yu, 149 n 3.


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and, together, they define and complete what is appropriate in accordance with the

character of human beings.

I would now like to further my discussion of the Confucian discourse in the

Analects in the contexts of self-cultivation or acquisition of rituals (li), which are

implicitly pervaded by the notion of xing. In the Confucian context, the combination

of innate quality and acquisition and learning (xue 學) of li—cultural practice and

moral cultivation—signifies the interplay of inner being and outer world; they are

complementary components of the process working toward the development of

human beings. Inborn nature only partly explains how things come into being; the

predetermined characteristics or essential nature of human beings does not

automatically complete the process of development. The process of ‘being’ and

‘becoming’ is also the result of actual engagement and practice—acquiring and

attaining information and knowledge from the outside world. Rather than defining

human nature merely in terms of innate and fixed characteristics, Confucius

recognised that xing can only be properly understood as a combination of human

essence and socio-cultural mediation. My discussion of xing and moral cultivation

will evolve with this understanding.

Polishing the Jade: Moral Cultivation in the Analects

Within the context of self-cultivation human nature as the natural substance is

endowed with certain qualities in the form of emotions and feelings. To recap, in the

newly discovered Warring States bamboo text XZMC, qing is close in meaning to

emotions and feeling. The XZMC reminds us that as the xin (heart-mind) lays hold of

xing and is stimulated by external things (wu) then qi is drawn out and finds overt

expressions as qing. In a sense the XZMC concepts greatly supplement the brevity of

the thinking about xing in the received texts and aid us in unpacking such a notion in

the Analects.

While the word qing appears in the Analects twice,25 it is not used to denote

emotions or desires; yet the Analects is not devoid of human feelings and emotions.

Derived from human xing, qing certainly reflects the dimension of human nature and

should form the basis for cultivation. Interpreting qing in the context of the definition

25. Analects 13.4, 19.19.


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of xing that we have proposed, xing and qing are closely related on at least two levels.

If we take xing as referring to both inborn or predetermined nature and the tendencies

that designate the growth and life process of a thing, qing as part of human xing

denotes (1) the natural emotional features, including the essential emotional

repertoire, inborn emotional capacities and hardwired temperament and (2) the

developing emotional and psychological tendencies that are an expression of those

human needs, satisfactions, and desires that are a response to external stimuli in

particular circumstances. Depending on the context, this can be rendered as natural

emotional responsiveness, natural / genuine feelings, and even moral sensibility.26

Xing in terms of the qi of emotions is activated as a response to external stimuli,

resulting in qing. Feelings connect us with the value-charged presence of the external

environment. This implies that feelings or qing is a variable depending on the nature

of the external stimuli and on how the subject responds to external presentations.

Finally, qing constitutes xing when it becomes a habitual feeling or an emotional

tendency. The following discussion of qing in the Analects and thus its role in moral

cultivation will be built on this understanding.

In the Analects human emotions and mental states are closely related to how

humans perceive and respond to the world around them. Confucius is depicted in the

Analects as a person who openly expresses his emotions: he was so overjoyed that he

did not notice the taste of meat for three months after having listened to the music of

Shao;26 he ‘cried and wailed to himself without restraint when Yan Hui died’;27 he

did not hide his true feelings as he lamented his failed political endeavour.28 Many

words describing the repertoire of human emotions, feelings and mental attitudes

(desires, motives, emotions, feelings) can be found in the Analects: liking or fondness

(ai 愛); hatred, aversion (wu 惡); happiness (xi 喜); rage, anger (nu 怒); anger,

indignation (fen 忿); resentment (yuan 怨); joy, pleasure (le 樂); pleasure (yue 悅);

sorrow, sadness (ai 哀); shame (chi 恥); desire (yu 慾); fear (ju 懼); awe (wei 畏);

feelings of anger, hurt (yun 慍).

26. Analects 7.17. 27. Analects 11.9, 11.10. 28. Analects 9.5, 9.9.


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Emotions and feelings can be morally desirable or undesirable. Confucius

accepted the role of natural responses in moral life rather than marginalising them,

calling for cultivation of the morally desirable and control of the undesirable. He

points out that emotional responses to our moral development are crucial in

accomplishing the task of cultivation. Aiming to seek moral excellence, one should

have the desire and motivation to do so: wo yu ren si ren zhi yi 我慾仁斯仁至矣.29

Confucius’ idea of moral desire emphasises combining sensory emotions and the

commitment to moral principles, expressed, for example, in terms of ‘joy’ (yue 悅),

‘feeling at ease’ (an 安) or ‘taking pleasure in’ (yao 樂).

On the other hand, emotions can be self-serving, unstable and even destructive.

Confucius is warning that extreme feelings about another person can even blind our

judgment.30 Conversely, he praises Yan Hui for having never vented his anger upon

others.31 What Confucius is implying is that only a person of ren 仁 is capable of

liking or disliking other people without malice or bias;32 only a person with realised

ren is so capable of properly acquiring, controlling, directing and managing feelings

about others. Confucius makes it clear that without li, emotions and impulses could be

expressed in socially undesirable ways:

The Master said, ‘Unless a man has the spirit of the rites, in being respectful he will wear himself

out, in being careful he will become timid, in having courage he will become unruly, and in being

forthright he will become intolerant.’

(子曰：恭而無禮則勞,慎而無禮則葸,勇而無禮則亂,直而無禮則絞)33

Emotions that are inappropriate or in a state of imbalance can lure us into sensations

capable of gaining control of our positive energies and even becoming disruptive.

What begins as positive anticipation could end up as pain, owing to over-exuberance;

but a life ordered in harmony with li would realise the highest ideal.34 While it is

29. Analects 7.30. 30. Analects 12.10, 12.21. 31. Analects 6.3. 32. Analects 4.3, 6.3. 33. Analects 8.2. 34. Although ‘propriety’, ‘etiquette’ and the expression ‘good form’ embrace the meaning of li, li

also had a moral and religious significance immanent in all dimensions. Confucius condemns the non-rational impulses that would lead to disorder and confusion (luan 亂); the Master on a number of


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necessary to restrain improper emotions and feelings, it is equally essential to acquire

or develop proper attitudes and to cultivate proper mental states. Confucius explains

this clearly in his discussions of the relations between li and feelings of shame (chi

恥) and reverence (jing 敬). Feelings of shame and reverence are the two important

mental states valued by Confucius.35 Confucius places great importance on feelings of

shame because they orient men’s minds towards the realisation of ultimate moral

values. Unlike Mencius, who claims that the sense of shame and reverential attitudes

are predispositions of the xin that all humans possess, Confucius implicitly suggests

that feelings of shame and reverence are a combined result of a natural emotional

repertoire and acquiring the knowledge of moral principle, social norms and customs,

which in the Confucian context are all condensed into li.36 Humans may be born with

a core of emotions which may be predisposed to basic feeling such as shame, but

what we feel ashamed of is also acquired experience and varies with cultural practice

and customs. The essence of li lies in attuning our proper feelings and attitudes into

habits. The consequence of acquiring the knowledge of li, and thus feelings of shame,

is that people distance themselves from what is not appropriate, and thus morally

rectify themselves.37 Similarly, the feeling of ‘awe’ (wei 畏) begins with the

awareness of inadequacy and a perplexing sense of connection with the world. When

awe is directed at moral truth that is embodied in the mandate of Heaven, and the

paradigmatic characters and words of the sages,38 it has a powerful effect and will

inspire us in every aspect of our life to awaken and grow. Similarly, with a sense of

reverence we live life to the full by consistently doing our utmost.

Moral cultivation is a process of activating and refining inborn nature through

external influences of learning and cultural practice; whether a morally desirable

element is activated or not also depends on environmental factors: if the influences occasions criticised his disciples for taking action without careful planning. The learning of li is to ensure the proper mental state and the regulation of emotions and feelings. Analects 15.27, 17.23.

35. Chi 恥 and jing 敬 are also the two of the four sprouts of virtues presented by Mencius.

36. Analects 2.3. 37. Analects 2.3. For Confucius, the greatest difference in the functions of penal codes and the rules

of rituals/propriety (li) is that laws set standards for doing right, but there is nothing in them that makes people feel like following them. Rather they only make people avoid punishments (by not doing what would lead to being punished). Li, on the other hand, helps people cultivate proper mental attitudes—for example, the feelings of shame, that prompt them to behave well. Confucius took li seriously because it has a great impact on human feelings and mental states, which in turn affects people’s moral lives more profoundly than penal codes do.

38. Analects 16.8.


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are positive—for example, ritual and music—the result will be a harmonious unity of

nature and social practice. A careful reading of the Analects suggests an interplay of

humanity (ren 仁) and ritual practice / rules of propriety (li, variously translated as

etiquette, good form, rules of propriety).

For Confucius, feelings of community or social interest are an essential part of

human development.39 Confucius defines ren, which is generally agreed to be the

most important moral quality, as ‘loving your fellow men’ (仁者,爱人).40 This

‘love’—a kind of social feeling and social interest—constitutes an important element

of human essence. The orthographic construct of the graph 仁 connotes two humans,

thus suggestive of the close connection between high virtue and proper human

relations. Is social interest inborn? Confucius implicitly assumes that it begins to

develop as soon as a child is exposed to social connections. For Confucius,

community feelings start in the family—a child will have natural feelings toward his

parents and siblings. These feelings (viz., kinship love, respect and a sense of duty

towards the family that Confucius regards as the foundations of communal feelings

projecting onto the wider society of fellow humans) develop in the child presumably

in reciprocation for the love the child has experienced in the family.41 The sense of

connection, belonging and responsibility are expected to be nurtured by the

environment and through education and individual experience. Related to this is the

unique characteristic of li, which grows out of the sensual and emotional needs of

humans. Li is considered essential for achieving a true human harmony,42 as it not

only restrains the limitation and negative tendencies in human nature, it also activates

and makes manifest the goodness inherent in human xing.43 The features and

39. I borrow the term ‘feelings of community’ from Alfred Adler (1870–1937). The original German

term Gemeinschaftsgefühl has been translated as ‘social feeling, social interest, community feeling and social sense’. Henry Stein and Martha Edwards, Classical Adlerian Theory and Practice, http://go.ourworld.nu/hstein/theoprac.htm.

40. Analects 12.22. 41. Confucius confirmed this during his discussion with his disciple Zai Wo on the question of a

three-year mourning period. Confucius disagreed with Zai Wo when the latter suggested reducing the duration of mourning to one year, and said that it was natural to feel the need to mourn one’s parents for such a period of time in return for their love and care; he could only assume that in suggesting shortening the period of mourning Zai Wo had not enjoyed parental love. Analects 17.21.

42. For this purpose, one of Confucius’ disciples made it clear that the essence of the functioning of li is harmony. Analects 7.

43. Liji, ‘Liqi’: 禮，釋回，增美質。孔穎達疏：禮非惟去邪而已，人有類性也，禮又能益之也. Also see Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 5.


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capacities derived from human xing produce morally congenial sensual feelings and

spirit; they are morally congenial because they are spontaneous emotional tendencies

conducive to moral development, waiting to be evoked by external stimuli.

In the Confucian contexts, the acquisition of li is through music, poetry and

rules of propriety in general. These are the means to transform one’s body and soul,

resulting in proper and appropriate deportment. The educational value of the Book of

Music, the Odes and the Rites lies in their edifying power to instil moral-aesthetic

values in the xin:

The Master said, ‘It is by the Odes that the mind is aroused. It is by the Rules of Propriety that the

character is established. It is from Music that the finish is received.’44

The words ‘arouse’, ‘establish’ and ‘finish’ indicate that the whole process of

cultivation is to use the Odes, etc. as external factors to stimulate, inspire or otherwise

awaken the xin spiritually, emotionally and intellectually. Poetry is the articulation of

emotions and feelings. Confucius considers the Odes to be ‘expressive of enjoyment

without being excessive and expressive of sadness without being traumatic’ (le er bu

yin, ai er bu shang 樂而不淫, 哀而不傷).45 Similarly, music is created from the heart

and is moulded by emotions; good music is known for its power to endow the listener

with aesthetic and intellectual pleasure which comes as an irresistible inner urge.46 It

touches our emotions and even our very soul and leaves its imprint on us. Cultivation

of ritual propriety is embedded in the Confucian understanding of the natural human

response to music and therefore rituals in general. In the Analects, Confucius is

described as someone who loved music and singing.47 Furthermore, the profound

power of good music on the listener is not limited to the very moment of listening but

is enduring and can even overcome our basic desire for and pleasure from food.48 The

44. Analects 8.8. Translation from The Chinese Classics: Translated . . . by James Legge. Vol. 1. The

Life and Teachings of Confucius (London. Trübner, 1869).

45. Analects 3.20. While Lau has translated yin 淫 as ‘licentious’, I believe it should mean ‘overflowing’ or ‘excessiveness’. Accordingly, I have translated shang 傷 as ‘emotionally distressing’ or ‘traumatic’, which should convey the emphasis on emotional balance. It is noted that some critics regard Confucius’ comments here as referring to the music and not the poem.

46. It is assumed that any particular music has an inherent emotion—different music can arouse different types of feelings in listeners. Thus, Confucius was cautious in choosing the proper music for the purpose of cultivation. Analects 3.20, 15.11, 17.18.

47. Analects, ‘Shuer’. 48. Analects 7.14.


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purpose of music and ritual here is thus to extend or cultivate or, as suggested in the

XZMC, to awaken and to draw out (chu 出) people’s inborn moral sensibility. In this

sense, we may tend to accept that at least some part, if not all, of human nature has

morally desirable elements and potentialities and is deemed to be developed through

cultural practice.

Based on the discussion of the development of human xing—the

interrelatedness between inborn features and cultural practice and our natural

response to the world around us—we now can move to men as social beings. For

Confucius, an individual as a member of a community and a social being is defined

and conditioned by the rules of society and social relations (that is, the individual

belonging to a social structure, to a social order);49 the individual is bound to be

defined and conditioned by social status, social understanding and socio-cultural

practices, which thus become crucial in forming character. Confucius attaches

importance to the awareness of individuals of their position in society and of how to

fulfil their roles in accordance with li; a rigorous conformity to norms and social

conventions (li) defines each individual’s position and obligations (as a father, a son,

a ruler or a minister). Interactions between the self and others (culture and people,

past and present) influence, if not determine, who the self is.50 Confucius’ discussions

of human development are based on his recognition and understanding of humans as

social beings.

While admitting that people are teachable and that men have the potential to

become good, Confucius acknowledges that men have differing capabilities of

imposing moral codes on themselves.51 Only a small number of people are able to

understand fully the meaning and authentic value of the norms of ritual propriety, and

49. Confucius and his disciples realised their purpose through their mission of achieving political

reform in the hope of creating an ideal society. At a time of socio-political disorder, they did not escape from the world to become irresponsible hermits or political nihilists. Confucius and his followers considered it improper to flock with the birds and beasts, believing the simple rural life divorced from politics to be ignoble. If he were not to be an associate of his fellow persons, with whom, the Master asks himself, would he associate? Analects 18.6.

50. Analects 6.30. 51. He classified people into four hierarchical categories according to their moral competence by

nature, with those born with knowledge at the top. Next come those who attain knowledge through study. Next again come those who turn to study after having been vexed by difficulties. The common people, insofar as they make no effort to study even after having been vexed by difficulties, are the lowest. Analects 16.9. Confucius acknowledged that he was not born with knowledge but that, being fond of antiquity, he was quick in seeking it. Analects 7.20.


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only some persist in pursuing moral truth.52 For most individuals, behaviour and

mental states are responses to social conventions and education—men do have innate

tendencies, but these tendencies are adaptive to the time and environment in which

they evolve; it is unrealistic to expect all men would know the way towards an orderly

society; the common people (min 民) need moral guidance and they tend to follow the

good only if the environment—education, cultural influence and moral exemplars—is

conducive to it. What Confucius refers to as the ‘lower level of knowledge’ begins

with the perceptual process. Frequent discussions in the Analects of the

responsibilities of the ruler and the government assert that a social model and social

environment are essential for setting the standard and the government should raise the

good and place them over the rest.53 Not surprisingly, Confucius emphasises

repeatedly that the true elite class is in a position to be genuinely virtuous, and should

lead the masses to moral correction; he argues that if we really want to make people

take morality seriously, the government needs to ask how to establish the way in

which people can be guided and led, so that moral conduct may become the social

norm. To him, social disorder stems from the failure to perceive, understand and

follow what is appropriate; the government has to begin with giving priority to

rectifying minds and behaviour by placing things in the proper order and position so

that people can distinguish right from wrong and behave accordingly;54 true govern-

ment is about inspiring people by displaying what should be done and how to do it

with a deep sense of understanding and commitment.55

Self-cultivation, however, is a process that recognises the commitment of

individuals to the collective good. Being a component of the social structure, an

individual is expected to have the moral responsibility to manage the world and even

change it morally, for ‘it is man who enlarges the Way, not vice versa’56 when

Confucius asserts that it is the man who plays an active role in the decision-making

52. The Master points out that ‘the common people can be brought to follow the Way, but they

cannot be brought to understand it.’ Analects 8.9. 53. Analects 2.19, 2.20. 54. Analects 13.3. 55. Confucius defines government as being able to display the quality of filial piety and brotherly

dutifulness, which are the roots of humanity. Analects 2.21. 56. Analects 15.29.


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process, making moral judgments of right and wrong. The interplay of self-motivation

and external influence can be illustrated by the following dialogue:

Yan Yuan asked about ren. The Master said, ‘To return to the observance of the rites through

overcoming the self constitutes ren. If for a single day a man could return to the observance of the

rites through overcoming himself, then the whole Empire would return to the principle of

benevolence. However, does not the practice of benevolence depend on oneself alone, not on

others?’ (顔淵問仁.

子曰:‘克己復禮為仁.一日克己復禮,天下歸仁焉.為仁由己,而由人乎哉?’)57

This passage has three important implications. Firstly, restraining oneself (keji 克己) is

crucial for the attainment of ren (humanity). By keji, we assume that Confucius means

restraining improper desires, emotions and behaviour with conscious effort. Rational

regulation of reckless emotions and actions is the first step in the restoration of li.

This statement also indirectly addresses the state of human nature and the need for

self-transformation. When Confucius confirms that one should abide by li in order to

realise moral excellence (ren), he also asserts that humans are not born morally

competent and are in need of proper guidance. If this is correct, then it would be far

too simplistic to assume that Confucius believed in human nature being originally

good.58 Then, has Confucius suggested that humans are born with a bad nature, as

Xunzi would argue? Yan Hui’s conversation with Confucius sheds some light on this

issue. When Yan Hui asks how one is able to restrain oneself and restore the rites (keji

fuli 克己復禮), Confucius replies:

Do not look unless it is in accordance with the rules of propriety; do not listen unless it is in

accordance with the rules of propriety; do not speak unless it is in accordance with the rules of

propriety; do not move unless it is in accordance with the rules of propriety. (非禮勿視,

非禮勿聼,非禮勿言,非禮勿動)59

One possible reading of this in relation to human nature is that what we acquire in the

process of our encounter with the external environment (viz., through seeing, hearing

and finally practising) affects the shaping of our intrinsic quality. In this sense, it is

57. Analects 12.1. 58. Fingarette argues that a person is born as raw material and ‘must be elaborated by learning and

culture, shaped and controlled by li’. According to him, li has the ‘magical’ power that can help each person attain their true human form. Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 3, 21.

59. Analects 12.1.


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possible that by keji Confucius is referring to refraining from being influenced by and

thus practising what is not in accordance with li. This is consistent with the Confucian

view that it is through our habitual practice and all kinds of related conscious or

purposeful activities that we transform ourselves. Confucius notes that the acceptance

of moral codes is a conscious effort of not looking at and not listening to anything that

is not in accordance with li. He endorses the effect of selective perception: by looking

at and listening to what is in accordance with li, our eyes and ears will develop a

preemptive desire to avoid dwelling on the wrong things in the first place, and with

sufficient reinforcement, the end result will be that the individual will be inclined to

act only if it is in accordance with li. Confucius thus asserts that the advantage of

guiding the people by virtue and keeping them in line with li is that, besides having a

sense of shame, people will be able to reform themselves.60 It is through conscious

perceptions and repeated practice that what is appropriate becomes internalised as

motives and desires.

The second implication of the above discussion is that for Confucius the

functionality of li is that it is the social norm that defines every aspect of human

activity. Adhering to the social parameters of li is not only a means of pursuing

personal refinement and articulation, it is also a way to achieve social order, so that

‘all under heaven return to the principle of humanity’ (tian xia gui ren 天下歸仁).

The word gui 歸 (to return), in parallel with fu 復 (to restore) (as in ke ji fu li

克己復禮) suggests that both ren and li did exist and are interrelated: humans possess

the potential essence of humanity (ren)—a quality that, without the practice of li, will

be lost under the influence of the worldly environment; the cultural and social practice

of li makes manifest the principle of humanity.

The discussion so far suggests that the external environment and related

purposeful activities are the key factors shaping man’s moral character. However, in

the same passage, Confucius affirms that it is the individual (ji 己) who initiates the

motivation or desire to start the process of moral cultivation. In fact, as mentioned

earlier, how one feels about something and desires it sets in motion the original inner

60. This is in parallel with Kant’s ‘All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the

understanding, and ends with reason.’ Confucius in fact also said of himself ‘Use your ears widely and follow what is good in what you have heard. Use your eyes widely and retain what you have seen in mind.’ Analects 7.28, 2.18.


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driving force to attain it. Humans are capable of imposing moral codes, such as li, on

themselves through the acquisition of knowledge. This view is clearly epitomised in

the same passage where Confucius says ‘the practice of humanity depends on oneself

alone, and not on others,’ which leads us to the next concept, xin, and its role in moral

cultivation.

The Role of xin

Confucius makes it clear that self-cultivation is a never-ending and painstaking

process of ‘cutting, polishing and carving’. The individual has to devote himself to the

acquisition and internalisation of li, a process involving not only the systematic and

thorough study of a rich cultural practice, but also constant thinking and reflection,

and employing proper judgement in adapting to the changing social reality by which

he is surrounded. More importantly, he should adhere to moral principles in such a

way that nothing can diminish his resolve in pursuing them.

Extreme material and social adversity is one of the greatest trials confronting

the ethical practitioner. Regarding human desire, Confucius did not deny a natural

desire for good material conditions, and he said he himself was always prepared to

improve his material living conditions.61 Once he went so far as to admit that he

would be willing to work as a guard wielding a whip outside the marketplace if it

were possible for him to gain wealth by so doing.62 Here, one can argue that

Confucius did not take self-interest by itself as ‘bad’; it is, however, when wealth and

honour is in conflict with moral principle that the latter should become the priority.63

Mencius’ ‘fish and bear paw’ metaphor makes this explicit: he declares that he would

love to have both wealth and rightness but would give up wealth for rightness if he

had to make a choice.64 Here again, the concrete example is Yan Hui, the only

disciple who constantly received Confucius’ high praise. The images of Yan Hui

presented in the Analects are: adverse living conditions (food and abode);65 the

consistent practice of self-cultivation; an innate love of learning; and mental

61. Confucius stressed that poverty and low status are what men dislike, whereas wealth and high

status are what men desire. Analects 4.5. 62. Analects 7.12. 63. Analects 7.16. 64. Mengzi 11.10. Mencius compared life and righteousness to fish and bear paw. 65. Analects 6.11.


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tranquillity in the face of material hardship, without expectation of external success.

Persistence, firm practice, love of self-improvement and absence of preparation for

social and material achievements all constitute the consummate model of a great lover

of ethical truth. The key to moral quality becoming second nature is persistence (heng

恆), or having a fixed will. Confucius once commended Yan Hui for his firm devotion

to ren in poverty: ‘Hui could go three months without his xin deviating from ren,

whereas others could go not even one day.’66 This has usually been read as a

commendation of Yan Hui’s commitment and steadfastness in moral pursuance; the

passage is at the same time significant in confirming that the xin is the primary force

determining the direction and tenacity of moral practice, and in suggesting that even

the most morally adherent individual can be derailed by material hardship. Yan Hui

takes such delight in his pursuit of the Way of humanity that being a pauper cannot

perturb his will or cause his heart to deviate from the Way.67

The word xin appears in the Analects only six times but it is evident that

Confucius has been shaping the concept of xin as having a role in moral attainment.

When we desire both material good and moral principles, Confucius is making us

aware that volition should be set on pursuing the Way. This can be seen in such terms

as ‘applying one’s mind’ (yongxin 用心),68 ‘his heart did not deviate from ren for

three months’ (qi xin san yue bu wei ren 其心三月不違仁)69 and ‘following one’s

heart’s desire without overstepping the line’.70 By acquiring and practising what is in

accordance with moral principles, one is able to internalise moral quality and make it

second nature, thus reaching a stage of following one’s heart’s desire without

overstepping the line. Confucius uses the term ‘heart’s desire’ (心所欲) which can be

defined as the deepest moral, emotional and intuitive currents of one’s consciousness.

It is the link that connects body and mind to something greater. When one has reached

a stage at which moral sense has become second nature, one’s thoughts, desires and

actions will more than likely align with moral principles;71 while the word xin does

66. Analects 6.7. 67. Analects 6.11. 68. Analects 17.22. 69. Analects 6.11. 70. Analects 2.4. 71. Analects 2.4.


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not appear, the following excerpts suggest that mental power, such as desires and

volition, plays an active part in seeking moral truth. Confucius said:

(a) Is ren really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here.

(仁遠乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣)72

(b) At fifteen I set my heart on learning . . . (吾十有五而志于學)73

(c) The practice of ren depends on oneself alone, and not on others. (為仁由己，而由人乎哉?)74

(d) Is there anyone who has tried to practice ren for a single day? I have not come across such a man

whose strength proves insufficient for the task. (有能一日用其力於仁矣乎？我未見力不足者)75

The primary message here is that desire, will and volition is the starting point for the

process of self-cultivation—passages (a) and (b) indicates that the prerequisite for

pursuing the virtue of ren is to have such a ‘desire’ and ‘commitment’ and, to make

an effort as suggested by the word ‘try’ in passage (c). More importantly, this effort

derives from the individual (wo) rather than from purely external forces (d). This

means that Confucius regarded the individual as an active subject capable of reaching

a state of moral autonomy when pursuing moral excellence. The Master attached

importance to the individual as the essential agent ‘which does the thinking, the

knowing, the planning, the acting.’76 Confucius explicitly declares that one should set

one’s mind on the Way and take the realisation of ren as the ultimate goal.77 Such a

mindset depends entirely on oneself, and is quite independent of others. For

Confucius, it is the individual’s mental attitude rather than anything else that plays the

decisive role in imposing moral codes on oneself. Through habitual practice one’s xin

can be trained to satisfy one’s desires while acquiring knowledge.78 What your heart

desires (yu 欲) and what makes you happy (le 樂) is the most natural and the strongest

motivating force. The process of ‘learning and practice’ involves cultivation of the

xin, enabling the individual to have the joy and satisfaction of abiding by humanity

72. Analects 7.30. 73. Analects 2.4. 74. Analects 12.1. 75. Analects 4.6. 76. G.J. McCall and I.L. Simmons, Identities and Interactions (New York: Free Press, 1978), 53. 77. Analects 2.4, 4.9, 7.6, 8.7. Confucius further confirms that persistence and commitment are the

key to attaining ethical ideals: 苟志於仁矣, 無惡也.

78. Analects 1.1.


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and cultural practice, which even override our other desires. In the Analects, words

depicting such a motivating force or state of mind include ‘desire’ (yu 欲), ‘pleasure’

(yue 悅), ‘enjoyment’ (le 樂), ‘predilection’ (hao 好) and ‘ease’ (an 安). It has been

suggested that ‘feeling at ease on the dimension of moral emotion’ is the dominant

spirit of Confucius’ philosophy.79

By looking at the various contexts outlined above we may propose that xing is

what constitute the life and growth of a species, in terms of its natural course of

development as well as its inborn biological or genetically predisposed

distinctiveness. Human xing should refer to both inborn nature and the developing of

characteristic tendencies in response to the external world that contribute to the being

and becoming of life process of human beings;80 these could be the desires aroused

through the eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and body, as well as other human tendencies and

the potential and incipient ability to carry out social practices in response to cultural

mediation; this refers not only to our basic biological need for food but also to our

attitude towards and/or satisfaction from perception and experience of external

objects and cultural phenomena, including music and ritual practice.

The rich vocabularies of cultivation suggest xing is malleable and is defined as

how we relate and respond to the world around us; without a fixed intention and will

(zhi 志), the response of the xin depends on an individual’s anticipated desires and

satisfaction of them. To use the metaphor of unpolished jade, human xing needs to be

polished and ground: it needs to be nurtured and restrained through the process of

self-cultivation and the acquisition of and adherence to li.81 As humans, we have

various desires and needs, as biological beings and social beings; these desires and

needs can be morally desirable or undesirable. With its defined capabilities and will,

79. Liu called this an ‘emotional spirit’, for ‘[Confucius] takes some sensuous, easy, and pleasant

feelings as the intrinsic motivation and evaluating standard of human conduct.’ Qingping Liu, ‘On Confucius’ Principle of Consanguineous Affection: A Reading of the Dialogue about the Three-Year Mourning in the Lunyu’, Asian Philosophy 16, no. 3 (2006): 173–88.

80. It accounts for psychophysical characteristics in different stages of one’s life. Confucius pointed out that, accordingly, some of these need to be carefully guided. See Analects, ‘Jishi’.

81. This in fact is consistent with the view of human nature in the Guodian text XZMC, which states that some should be activated, nourished, and extended while others should be restrained and regulated, presenting a dimension of xing which suggests there are both good and bad elements for morality in human xin: Nature (xing) can be activated, received, restrained, polished and disciplined, evoked/manifested, nourished, or extended (凡性, 或動之, 或逆之,或節之, 或礪之, 或出之,

或養之, 或長之). Chu Bamboo Slips, 179.


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xing is best manifested when it is appropriately expressed together with cultural

refinement; it is by developing and adhering to the human Way that we develop as

complete beings, by fully maximising our ability and potentialities through unceasing

moral practice.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the notion of human nature—the closest translation of the

term xing 性—and self-cultivation in the Analects. Whilst the Analects as an earlier

text appears to have little to offer by way of detailed explication of xing, by casting

posterior but more implicitly expressed concepts of xing over the Analects an

embedded notion of xing pervading the Confucian discourse can be revealed.

The discourse in the Analects shows that human xing is a complex and dynamic

matrix: it is about predetermined features providing an essential base contributing to

the growth and development of things; it accounts for natural tendencies and abilities

in response to the surrounding world and the environment; it contains both potentially

morally desirable and undesirable elements; the manifestation of xing depends not

only on its inborn nature and features but also on external factors.

Rather than defining human nature merely in terms of innate, fixed

characteristics, the Analects suggests xing can only be properly understood as a

combination of human essence and socio-cultural mediation. Xing as human nature

sensu lato refers not just to an inborn or predetermined quality; it includes

psychophysically characteristic tendencies as a response to the outer world in the

course of development;82 when xing is expressed, a rich repertoire of feelings and

emotions is found in the vocabulary of the Analects. Realising that humans possess

the various needs and desires that might and might not be morally desirable,

Confucius urges us to take the human Way as our ultimate commitment. The Master

further asserts that humans have the capacity to learn and practise moral principles,

which requires self-motivation, commitment and dedication.

82. In this context Mencius asserted that a distinction can be made between the nature of humans and

the nature of animals, in particular with regard to the natural inclination and potential of human beings to be capable of moral practice. In his precept ‘there is little difference between man and animals’ (Mengzi 8.19), Mencius is asserting that humans should be differentiated from other animals by their natural tendency to acknowledge ethical obligations. Moreover, fulfilling these obligations means following heaven (tian). Also see Shun Kwong-loi, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford University Press, 1997), 210–26.


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With such an understanding of xing, self-cultivation is an unceasing process of

crafting and polishing to attain the proper manifestation of xing. To some extent

Confucius’ jade polishing metaphor and Gaozi’s simile of making bowls out of the

willow share similarities, in that both are referring to a process akin to craftsmanship.

Confucius considers ren and li essential and complementary components of a man’s

being and ‘becoming’ in the process of self-completion. Mencius along with his

understanding of human xing would insist that Confucius’ process is to allow the

inherent beauty of jade, symbolic of moral excellence, to become manifest; Xunzi

believes li to be a tool for carving away the original badness of human xing, and to

regulate human desires, for the good of the social order.

Polishing the Jade: Xing (Human Nature) and Moral Cultivation in the Analects

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