PARTNERSHIP ACROSS THE SOCIALIST CAMP: ROMANIA, NORTH KOREA AND THE BEGINNING OF THE NATIONAL WAY IN BUILDING SOCIALISM

"Sovieticii exercită presiuni asupra noastră

folosindu-se de dezbinarea ţării noastre. Suntem obişnuiţi cu

asemenea fapte. Ei însă nu pot ştirbi suveranitatea noastră. Nu

cedăm nimic din principiile noastre. Poporul nostru s-a deşteptat.

Ei exercită presiuni - poporul nostru duce o viaţă mai grea. Ce să

facem? Nu este nimic. Cerul nu va cădea şi nici pământul nu se

sparge. Apa continuă să curgă. România şi Coreea, cele două

popoare, vor exista în continuare. [...]" Kim Il Sung, 1978.12

The national way of both North Korea and Romania, affirmed during the mid-1950s, was

the most natural possibility at the hands of two leaderships who lacked any organic qualifications

for exerting authority over the political and social sphere of their respective societies. On the

Romanian side, the anxiety of an ideologically precarious Party apparatus1 over the tribulations

of the Soviet post-Stalinist repositioning2 and their fragile grip on the conscience of a nation over

which they had no other lever than that of brute repression, let no legitmatory alternative but the

appeal to the traditional elements of national political identity. The starting moment for this can

be found in the 1953 discussions in Moscow between the Soviet and the Romanian leadership.

Here, Gheorghiu-Dej and his team were brutally criticized for their unlettered policies by

Malenkov and for their lack of connection with the people by Molotov, whose words have made

a deep impact on the frailly positioned Dej.3 One month after the Romanian Secretary-General

received the words of the Soviet Foreign Minister that “if you will not connect with the people we

1 Mioara Anton, Ieşirea din cerc. Politica externă a regimului Gheorghiu-Dej, Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 24, 60.2 By not issuing norms of interpretation for the “Secret Report” of the XXth Congress, and by formally requiring radical political reform, the CPSU leadership invited the satellite Political Bureaus to exercise an initiative which was beyond their doctrinal capability, thus canalizing them towards the only available and tangible political substance, the national specific of each of the eastern European countries, compromising the ideological homogeneity of the Stalinist edifice. Dan Cătănuş, Tot mai departe de Moscova… Politica externă a României 1956-1965, Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucureşti, 2011, p.77-78 3 Ibidem, p.54-55

will not be able to help you”4, he admitted to the new Soviet ambassador in Bucharest, L.G.

Melnikov, to “have grown with one head” after the respective talks.5 On the North Korean side,

the Sixth Plenary Session of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee, in August 1953,

sees the decapitation of the Soviet and Yanan factions of Korean communists by Kim Il Sung

and his weak faction of Manchurian guerrilla combatants through the condemnation of the war-

time dispute between Ho Ka I and Pak Il U on the style of political work in the armed forces;6

the main target of the attack, Ho Ka I, the chief of the pro-Soviet group and the most powerful

organizer in the Party, the adept of an elitist approach towards the social composition of the

Party, commits suicide.7

The struggle for power that emerged in Moscow during the early post-Stalinist years

furthered the quest for autonomy and political self-determination on the both sides of the Soviet

empire, quest which was primarily a corollary in the process of political consolidation of Kim Il

Sung and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. But while the Korean consolidation was backed by Moscow

and Peking with an amount of material aid unprecedented in the “World Socialist System” – one

billion rubles and eight trillion yuans only in the fall of 1953 for the accomplishment of the three

year plan for post-war rehabilitation (1954-1957) and a total of three billion seven hundred and

thirty million rubles in grants for the entire period of the plan8 (of which Romania contributed

with 90.000.000 rubles)9, together with five million work-days contributed by the People’s

Liberation Army until 1958, the Romanian problems of growth and consolidation were treated

with far less understanding in the Kremlin. The two hundred million rubles aid offered in the

early 195410 was accompanied by a very acid criticism of the crippling mismanagement of the

state and economic affairs by the leadership in Bucharest. In January 1954, in Moscow, the

Romanian communists were confronted with words like this: “the serious shortcomings that take

place in the development of the national economy of Romania cannot be surpassed through the

4 Ibidem, p.565 Ibidem.6 Boo-Hak Koo, Political Economy of Self-Reliance. Juche and Economic Development In North Korea, 1961-1990, Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1992, p.727 Ibidem.8 Ibidem, p.70-719 Ibidem.10 Mioara Anton, op.cit., p.66

granting of credit, but through […] the implementation by the Romanian government of certain

measures that should lead to the radical enhancement of the management of the national

economy”. […] The grossly insufficient quality of ideological level of the Party influences

negatively on the accomplishment of certain economic, politic and organizational measures of

the Party and Government.11 The uncertainty of the position of the Romanian communists in

respect both to the aggressive requests for reform coming from Moscow and to the governed

Romanian society will transform in the following years in a decisive turn towards a self-

determined stance based on nationalism.

The years 1955 and 1956 have been decisive ones in the process of hammering a specific,

national way of building socialism in both Romania and North Korea. In the East Asian state,

against the tribulations of a beheaded Soviet faction and nurtured by the dawn of Soviet

reorientation towards mutual coexistence between the two antagonistic world camps,

reorientation which had no meaning to a regime born out of a combat frame vision of the world

politics, Kim Il Sung made his first Juche speech in December 1955 in which he emphasized

Korean nationalism for the first time by attacking the Soviet faction and asking the people to

exclude the Soviet influence from society and to promote good Korean examples instead of

copying Soviet ones.12 He called for an “independent, creative application of Marxism-Leninism

to the unique and specific conditions of Korea”13 and criticized his opponents as revisionists,

flunkeists and doctrinaires.14 In Romania, the year 1955 brought, on the basis of the Soviet-

Yugoslavian reconciliation, the display of the five points of peaceful coexistence (the joint

Soviet-Yugoslavian declaration of June 2nd, 1955) in Eastern Europe and the temptation of

assuming this new framework of international affairs as the basis for political independence in

relation with Moscow, in spite of precautions taken by the Soviet leadership by underlining that

the Declaration of June 2nd had no relevance for the intra-camp relations.15 In 1956, the 20th

Congress of CPSU officialised the new Soviet foreign policy doctrine which, in regard to

relations among people’s democracies, established that it was not compulsory anymore for every

11 Ibidem.12 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.3613 Ibidem, p.7414 Ibidem15 Mioara Anton, op.cit., p.73

socialist country to apply literally the Soviet model in economic construction. The stinted

amount of references towards inter-socialist relations indicated that Khrushchev’s interest in this

direction was limited only to specifications on economic collaboration.16 Despite this, at the

March 23rd-25th Plenary Session of the Romanian Workers’ Party, Gheorghiu-Dej affirmed that

the socialist construction “cannot be done on a unique pattern”.17 And, in the final declaration of

Tito’s Bucharest visit in June 1956, affirmed that “In different countries and in different

conditions also the methods of building socialism can be different, so there will not be

“tendencies of interference in the problem of establishing this forms and methods of socialist

construction.”18 Meanwhile, on the other side of the communist block, the destalinization

process brought new challenges for Kim Il Sung. The visit of Leonid Brezhnev, in April 1956, in

Pyongyang, leading a Soviet delegation to the 3rd Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea,

meant a severe shock for the Korean leader who was criticized for his Three Years Plan centered

on heavy industry at the cost of consumer goods industry, as well as for his unwillingness to

apply the principle of collective leadership.19 During the next months, the already stricken Yanan

and Soviet factions organized a coup d’état against Kim Il Sung when the later was out of the

country, in June and July 1956, on a Easter European tour with the purpose of gathering financial

and technical aid for the new Five Years Plan due to start in 1958.20 Returned home, Kim Il Sung

urgently convened the Central Committee and started the final purges of the two factions.

Although the Soviets and the Chinese compelled him to reinstate some of the purged

communists, at the 1957 Supreme People’s Assembly elections only 57 of the 572 deputies were

from the precedent legislature. The purge will be over with March 1958 Plenary, when Kim Il

Sung will victoriously reaffirm the Juche concept of national self-determination in ideology,

politics, economy and military affairs.21

The turbulent year 1956 marks also the first documented encounters between the

Romanian and Korean communist leaderships. On June the 13th, the Korean delegation headed

by Kim Il Sung arrived in Bucharest as part of the Eastern European tour mentioned above. The

16 Dan Cătănuş, op.cit., p.7017 Mioara Anton, op.cit., 7518 Ibidem, p.76-7719 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.7520 Ibidem.21 Ibidem, p.77

main theme of discussion being the request for aid made by Kim Il Sung for the post-war

reconstruction of Korea, Gheorghiu-Dej proposed also the creation of two basic instruments for

the regulation, management and development of the bilateral relations: an economic and

exchange agreement22 and an agreement for technical-scientifical cooperation, trying to move the

(Foto 1.Chivu Stoica, President of the Council of Ministers of Romanian People’s Republic receives Kim Il Sung, President of the

Administrative Council of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Bucharest, June 13th,1956. ANIC, f.C.C.al P.C.R., Albume

Dej, Vizite Externe)

focus of the discussions from one way economic aid to bilateral exchanges and cooperation.23 In

this sense a proposal for the delivery of Korean goods to Romania was made by the North

22 In October 1953, an Agreement for Economic and Technical Aid was signed between Romania and North Korea,which stipulated an irredeemable aid of 65 million rubles in products and technical aid. Before this, in 1951,approx. 4 million rubles worth of products had been delivered as aid, and in 1952, another 12 million rubles of merchandise had been offered. ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d. 51/1956, f.223 ”Gheorghiu-Dej: We can make exchanges, because you have wolfram, gold, zinc, [materials] that we need. […] We could give them textile installations. It is possible that we could contribute with a serious textile factory or

Koreans as early as March 1956: they were ready to offer rapid steel, talc and graphite as to

establish a barter trade of 25 million rubles.24 In the realm of cultural relations, the first

Agreement was signed in March 1956 in Pyongyang, Agreement which was preceded by a Plan

for Cultural Collaboration.25

The next two years saw the consolidation of both North Korean and Romanian

leaderships. As the March 1958 Plenary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of

Korea completed the final purge of the old Soviet and Chinese factions26, in June 1958 a

consolidated Gheorghiu-Dej finalized the purge of the last deviationist cell in the Party, the one

of the old members from the period of illegality. In the same year, again, both North Korea and

Romania experienced the retreat of the foreign troops stationed on their territory. The Chinese

volunteers and the last divisions of the Soviet Army stationed in Romania, left behind

consolidated Politburos capable of forwarding socialist construction with a degree of maturity

forged in the internal Party battles and camp tribulations of the 1950s. “The kids have grown and

are more and more difficult to control.” said Khrushchev referring to this period.27

When Kim Il Sung addressed the steel workers in Kangsong in 1957, during the Chollima

movement of mass mobilization for production and in the aftermath of the “August [1956]

incident”, by telling them that “our country has no one to count on other than you.”28, his mind

was set on following the path of self-reliance. One year later, in Bucharest, at the November

1958 Plenary Session, Gheorghiu-Dej bemoaned the lack of a Romanian strategic perspective for

the development of the national economy,29 and ordered the realization of a perspective plan for

the economic development of the next fifteen years,30 announcing the multilateral

industrialization of the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party (1960) aimed at

spinning mill. […] We can give you tractors, planters, ploughs. Think about what you can give us back, effectively to tell what you need and what you can give in exchange.” A.N.I.C., fond C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d.52/1962, f.624 ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d. 51/1956, f.4-525 Ibidem, p.13, 1626 “Our Party succeeded in eliminating the drawbacks of factionalism, which have existed throughout its history.",ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Cancelarie, d.50/1958, f.4 (Discussion between Kim Ben Dik, the North Korean ambassador in Bucharest and Gheorghiu-Dej, June 2nd, 1958) 27 Mioara Anton, op. cit., p. 11928 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.7529 Mioara Anton, op.cit., p.12030 Cezar Stanciu, Frăţia Socialistă. Politca RPR faţă de ţările lagărului socialist 1948-1964, ed. Cetatea de Scaun, Târgovişte, 2009, p.159

capacitating Romania as a sovereign actor on the world scene, following its own political and

economic interests. In the same year, at the May 1958 Workers’ Party of Korea Conference, it

was decided to “transform Korea, from a backward agrarian country, into a developed

agrarian-industrial state”31 opening the way for the launch of the ambitious First Seven Years

Plan in 1961, a cornerstone in the development and destiny of the North Korean state and

society.

Triggered by the ample propagandistic offensive initiated by the Soviets in January 1958

with the purpose of showing their propensity towards dialog and relaxation on the international

arena,32 the North Korean criticism of Soviet politics and their estrangement from the ways in

which the Soviet communists envisioned the inter-camp relations, manifested through the

accusations of revisionism launched at Josif Broz Tito but aimed at Khrushchev. When the North

Korean ambassador in Bucharest affirmed in his dialogue with the Romanian leader that “among

factionalists existed some that were under the influence of the contemporary revisionism,

especially of the Yugoslavian revisionism”33and when, in April 1959, Choe Yong Son, the

President of the DPRK’s Supreme People’s Assembly, then in Albania, indirectly criticized

Khrushchev by attacking “Tito’s” politics of peaceful coexistence34, the vociferous stance of the

North Koreans in respect to the revisionist attitude of the CPSU was an established reality.35 But

the real difficulties between the USSR and the DPRK started with the Sino-Indian frontier

dispute of 1959, when the Soviet leadership chose to adopt a neutral line. Kim Il Sung felt truly

endangered by this attitude. He feared that the USSR could take a similar position and leave the

DPRK without military assistance in the face of a US-armed and backed ROK.36 In opposition

31 ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Cancelarie, d.50/1958, f.332 Dan Cătănuş, op.cit., p.20033 ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Cancelarie, d.50/1958, f.534 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.9535 In the same time, the June 2nd, 1958 meeting between the Gheorghiu-Dej and the Korean ambassador is important also from the perspective of bilateral relations. Ambassador Kim Ben Dik, at the request of Kim Il Sung, enquires the Romanian Secretary-General about the “measures that the Romanian Worker’s Party and the Romanian Government intends to take about the contemporary revisionism” prospecting this way the political stance and inner party atmosphere in Bucharest. The answer of Gheorghiu-Dej contains multiple references, but finds itself on the same line of action with Kim Il Sung’s in what the treatment and elimination of dissidents is concerned. Both parties agree that the expulsion from the party ranks and the ostracism of the factionalist elements is a sine qua non weapon in the arsenal of the party. In essence, a salute is given from a victorious General Secretary to another in the wake of the final purges which consolidated and confirmed their positions.36 Young-Soo Kim, Toward the Opening of New Relations between Korea and East European Countries: the Soviet Union as a Key Actor, in “Korea and World Affairs”, 2/1977, p.183

with the revolutionary and military nature of the North Korean disaffection with the Soviet

Union, the Romanian alienation, the independent stance affirmed by Bucharest’s communists

was, in its essence, of an economic nature.37

The 1960s were crucial and complex years for both Romania and Socialist Korea. The

symmetries one can encounter in their political and economic evolutions are still substantial as

both countries were political actors searching for their own style of development and for the

consolidation of their own position in the global system of relations, interests and interactions.

During the first years of the new decade, the definitory reality which shaped the politics of the

communist states was the Sino-Soviet split. Born out of historic animosities and triggered by the

chaotic nature of destalinization, it generated different reactions in our subjects’ capitals. The

Romanian leadership manifested itself in two distinct phases.38 Between 1960 and 1962, during

the 3rd Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party of June 1960, the Moscow conference of

November-December 1960 and the 22nd Congress of the CPSU of October 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej

sided totally and radically with Moscow. Through this stance, he succeeded in building a

particular zone of autonomy for his stand-off with Moscow,39 for his search of an independent

course in politics and in the multilateral economic development announced at the 1960 Congress.

In the same period the North Korean position was built upon the principle of equidistance.

Beginning with the speech of Kim Il at the Moscow Conference on December 9th, 196040 and

continuing with Kim Il Sung’s final report at the 4th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on

September 18th, 196141, both the Chinese and the Soviets were appreciated and both the

“dogmatists” and “revisionists” have been criticized. In this spirit, in July 1961, at a distance of

only four days, North Korea signs Treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with

37 Adrian Cioroianu, Atuurile lui Gheorghiu-Dej, in “Dosarele Istoriei”, anul II, nr.3/1997, p.26, apud dr. Constantin Moraru, Politica externă a României 1958-1964, ed. Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2008, p.18938 Dr. Constantin Moraru, op.cit., p.9239 Mioara Anton, op.cit., p.16940 “We have to fight on two fronts, both against revisionism and dogmatism and sectarianism. […] The place of the Soviet Union and the CPSU in the socialist camp and in the international communist movement are firmly determined by the entire course of the historical development […] The Communist Party of China and the Chinesepeople offer a giant contribution to the cause of peace and socialism. Like the comrades of other brotherly parties, we firmly believe, on the basis of our own experience, that the CCP Is faithful to the revolution, is faithful to the proletarian internationalism.”, ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d. 79/1960, p.13-1541 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.99

both China and the Soviet Union.42

Romania’s attitude change in the Sino-Soviet split appeared clearly with the June 1962

Comecon Conference. Here, The Fundamental Principles of the international socialist division

of labor were adopted, paving the way for the creation of super-statal economic organisms and,

finally, for the attempts of economic integration conceived and aimed at by Khrushchev’s

administration. These factors together with the unpredictable situation created by the Soviets in

the Caribbean Sea convinced the development-seeking Romanian Workers’ Party that a clear

distancing from the tribulation of an anxious and troubled Soviet Union was imperative. In this

context, in October 25th, 1962, the Romanian government declared, together with the North

Korean government and with the governments of China, Poland and Mongolia that: “more than

ever before wisdom and responsibility are due in politics, and special care for maintaining and

consolidating peace and for eliminating the dangers that surround the world. The understanding

of this imperative is primordial for any statesman which is possessed by a spirit of responsibility

for his own people and for all the peoples.”43 If, until the summer of 1963, Romania kept a

neutral attitude, the violence of the dialogue between the Soviets and the Chinese made

Bucharest’s leadership to feel that a neuralgic point had been reached and that further

continuation of the intestine conflict in the socialist camp on this wavelength could affect the

fundamental equilibrium of the socialist system and Romania’s relations with other brotherly

countries.44 The years 1962 and 1963 were years of political reorientation for the North Koreans

too. After, starting with 1959, the USSR drastically reduced the deliveries of industrial

machinery to the DPRK45 while the planification of the First Seven Years Plan was based on the

Soviet and Chinese aid46 and after the abrupt halt of all Soviet military and economic assistance

in 1962 in response to the refuse of the North Korean part to adopt the coordinated

planification,47 the DPRK, being confronted with the increasing military and political

consolidation of the South Korean regime, the frightening spectrum of the undeclared war in

42 Ibidem43 Alexandu Oşca, Mircea Chiriţoiu, România- aliatul ignorat, in „Magazin Istoric”, 2/1995, p.36, apud dr. Constantin Moraru, op.cit., p.106-10744 dr. Constantin Moraru, op.cit., p.10845 Young-Soo Kim, op.cit., p.18346 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.12347 From 1 billion 800 million dollars in the 1950s, the foreign aid to North Korea fell to 424 million dollars in the 1960s, apud Ibidem, p.106-107

Vietnam and the Soviet refuse to supply the Korean People’s Army with modern anti-air

weaponry, saw itself with no other option than to close the ranks and follow its own goals of

self-sufficiency, reunification and political independence. In what North Korea’s relationship

with China was concerned, the Chinese were in no position to help militarily or economically;

“they didn’t perceived the importance of Kim Il Sung’s rupture with the Soviet Union. This way,

Kim Il Sung saw no advantage in entering the Chinese camp. […] He kept all his options.”48

Meanwhile, the North Korean economy went downwards and from 1963 and 1964 the majority

of statistic indicators were not published anymore.49 In this setting, an interesting document from

the Romanian Workers’ Party Central Committee archive speaks about the desperation with

which the Koreans were searching for support both morally and materially. In a report entitled:

“Some issues rose by the Workers’ Party of Korea activists arrived for vacation on June 20th

(Lim Te Cier, CC member, Chief of Finance and Planification Section of the Central Committee

[…] , An Sin Hak, alternate CC member, Chief of Central Committee’s Section for Light Industry

and Trade”50, the Korean visitors are presented as blatantly exacerbating the role of the

Romanian Worker’s Party in their pursuit for aid and alliance: “Comrade Gheorghiu is

evidenced as the greatest socialist leader and they try to oppose him to other leaders. […]

Permanently they try to separate the RWP politics from that of other European communist

countries. Our party’s policy of industrialization corresponds with their point of view and with

the policy of their party […] They affirmed that during the war, the ones that helped them the

most were the Chinese and the Romanians. Referring to Korea’s industrialization they’ve said

that when they wanted to build tractors, the Soviets told them that they don’t need tractors.

The Korean comrades insisted to receive documentation but the Soviets refused them. Then

they addressed our country and they received from us the documentations for the UTOS

tractor. From further discussion turned out that they want to officially ask for our new tractor

and for the tractors that work in the Danube Delta harvesting reed.”51 One year later, in 1964,

the tension between North Korea and the Soviet Union will reach climactic levels. When, on

March 12th and 13th, the Romanian Party delegation headed by prime-minister Ion Gheorghe

Maurer and composed from Emil Bodnăraş, Nicolae Ceauşescu and Chivu Stoica reached 48 Helen-Louise Hunter, North Korea and the Myth of Equidistance, in “Korea and World Affairs”, 2/1980, p.26949 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.11050 ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relaţii Externe, d.14/196351 Ibidem, p.2 (The production of Romanian tractors in the DPRK started in 1958. In 1959 It was planned to build 3500 tractors. ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, dl. 53/1958, f.23)

Pyongyang after visiting Peking with the goal of generating an armistice in the polemic battle

between the Soviets and Chinese, Kim Il Sung brought a rain of arguments to the detriment of

Soviet leadership: “The Soviet leadership wants to collaborate with the American imperialists

and addresses nice words to them, deluding themselves. […] The Soviet counselors, when they

were in our country, told us that we have to repeal the slogan in which we say that we have to

fight against the American imperialists. […] Likewise, the Soviet counselors told us that we do

not have to fire when American warplanes fly over our territory, urging us to pressure this

warplane into landing. We do not have forces which could pressure these planes to land and, at

the extent to which we can, we fire upon them and bring them down. […] The Soviet counselors

are not in our country anymore and we act as we think.”52 In the same time, about the possibility

of a temporary cessation of the public debate between China and the USSR, the Korean leader

pointed that “In my personal opinion this thing is greatly related to the attitude of the CC of the

CPSU. Why? Because the Soviet leadership was the first to start the public controversy. Then,

they asked the controversy stopped, but they were the ones to start it again. At comrade

Khrushchev is disparity between words and actions. […] If the Soviet leaders are honest, then

why don’t they want the consolidation of the People’s China? Polemics are polemics, but they

shouldn’t have pulled back the Soviet specialists so that China could not rebuild its economy.

[…]”53 and concluded: “In my personal opinion the Chinese comrades didn’t give you an

affirmative answer because […] sometimes comrade Khrushchev attacks by surprise. […] I think it is

good to wait for the talks because both parties want to meet. There is no other way.”54 Another subject

put forward by the Romanian delegation was the proposal laid down by Gheorghiu-Dej in 1962 and 1963, 55by which the Asian socialist countries should accede to membership in the COMECON with the

purpose of reducing the intensity of Soviet pressures towards integration and to constitute a counterweight

to the Soviet political hegemony in the respective international structure. But Kim Il Sung refused by

saying that “Now, when we reached this level we could enter, but when I see comrade Khrushchev’s

article about the unified plan, we reckoned that he wants to subjugate us and our power to move it

somewhere else, to enter in his hands. […] If it wasn’t for the Romanian comrades’ intervention and

the unified plan would have been realized, we would have become an economic zone. […] Our country

52 ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d.29/1964, p.146-14753 Ibidem, p.14554 Ibidem, p.15455 Cezar Stanciu, Războiul nervilor. Dispute Ceauşescu-Brejnev 1965-1971, ed. Cetatea de Scaun, Târgovişte, 2011, p.224

is still not unified and we have the duty to unify the country and that is why, first of all, for us, is

the construction of a self-sustaining national economy, an independent policy, active actions, as

to educate the people of Korea towards unification. We do not commit to you, but let us liquidate

this directive line of comrade Khrushchev and then we can enter COMECON.”56

Three months after the visit of the Romanian delegation , in the course of the Asian

Economic Conference organized in Pyongyang, attended by representatives from 28

governments and centered on issues as “neocolonialism and the Asian economy” or “self-

sufficient economy and the construction of an independent national economy” the apex of the

Soviet-Korean animosities is reached with the Soviet reaction towards the Conference stating

that ”the participants know nothing about economy” 57 and generating infuriated anti-Soviet

reactions in the North Korean press.

In Romania, the April 17th-22nd Enlarged Plenary, held one month after the Asian tour,

was generated by the Romanian leaderships’ belief that the chances for the public Sino-Soviet

confrontation to stop were scarce. Gheorghiu-Dej affirmed, on April 2nd, that “we did all that we

could” and proposed a public declaration about “our party’s position on the fundamental

problems of the communist and international workers’ movement from which should clearly

result that we do not enter the polemic neither with CPSU nor with CCP.”58 The plenary put into

debate a “Report regarding the discussions had by the RWP’s delegation with the leadership of

the CCP, the WPK and the CPSU in the problem of the unity of the workers’ movement and the

intercessions made by RWP leadership towards the termination of the public controversy.”59

The conclusive document of this Plenary Session, formulated in the “Declaration regarding the

RWP position in the problems of the communist and international workers’ movement”

represented the most important programmatic act through which the Romanian communist

leadership adhered to the national way of socialist construction, through which the Romanian

communists admitted publicly for the first time that the national interest was a priority,60 but, in

the same line with their North Korean friends they sustained that between the national interests

of a socialist country and the interests of world revolution there is no objective contradiction. 56 ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d.29/1964, p.15557 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.10558 Dan Cătănuş, op.cit., p.33259 Mioara Anton, op.cit., p.18460 Dan Cătănuş, op.cit., p.338

In Pyongyang, after two years of economic chaos following the cessation of Soviet aid,

and the consolidation in power of the military regime of general Park Chung He in South Korea

with American support, offered the North Korean government only one option: the militarization

of the North Korean economy and society and the attempt to unify the Korean peninsula by force

and subversion. At the fifth Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Committee of the WPK, in

December 1964, the decision to prioritize the consolidation of the military strength and

capabilities of the country was taken under Kim Il Sung’s thesis that: “the Party will put the

same accent on military preparedness as on economic development, even if the later will be

hampered.”61 Cadrification, modernization, arming the entire people and the transformation of

the country in an impregnable fortress, even if the economy was to suffer, were adopted as

guidelines of military policy under the Songun title, only four years ahead of the similar

Romanian version of national military doctrine being implemented.

In 1965, the deposing of Khrushchev opened a new chapter in the relations between

Romania and North Korea on one side and the USSR on the other. The visit of the Soviet prime-

minister Alexei Kosygin in Pyongyang, in February 1965 asking for DPRK’s cooperation in the

“united front” for the supporting of Vietnam, fructified Kim Il Sung’s strategy of forbidding the

consequences of bilateral differences with USSR from gaining a specific force, […] by

maintaining a public stance of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute.62 Kim Il Sung gained from

the inner dynamics of the Sino-Soviet split, by starting to receive modern Soviet military

hardware.63 Also, what Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej did in 1957 in respect to the renovation of the

Romanian diplomatic life, Kim Il Sung did in 1965 with his speech entitled “On tempering the

Party spirit of foreign trade workers and adhering to independence in foreign trade”, in which he

accepted for the first time that foreign trade plays a very important role in the acceleration of

socialist construction and in the development of friendly relations. In the same time, in July

1965, Leonid Brezhnev attends the 9th Congress of the, now renamed, Romanian Communist

Party, where he states that his dream is to remove “all that has gathered and overshadows the

relations between us”.64 In response, General Secretary Ceauşescu asked, among others, for the

restitution of Romania’s thesaurus given for storage in the First World War, the restitution of the 61 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.10862 Helen-Louise Hunter, op.cit., p.26963 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.11264 Mioara Anton, op.cit., p. 199

Communist Paty of Romania’s archive and modifications in the comand structure of Warsaw

Pact Organization. The creation of a Joint Governmental Commission is taken into

consideration.65

The begining of the Cultural Revolution in China and the opening of the chapter of

bilateral problems in the Soviet-Romanian relations marked the year 1966. The discussions held

by Brezhnev and Zhou Enlai with Ceauşescu in May 1966, in Bucharest on the nature of the

command organs of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and on other international issues, the

duplicitary attitude of Brezhnev, which after two months, affirmed at the July 1966 Bucharest

Conference that „what we agreed upon has no validity”66 in his efforts to transofrm the allied

military organs in super-statal organisms which could decide and determine the ways of military

construction of the European socialist countries, put the Soviet-Romanian relations into the

confrontational pattern that will characterize them until the end. In Korea, following the 1965

landmark speech of Kim Il Sung at the Indonesian Academy of Social Sciences, where he

reactivated and upgraded the Juche ideea pioneered in 1955, by saying that ”it means an

independent posture of abandonment of the dependence on others and of solving one’s own

problems on one’s own responsibility under all circumstances.”67, the start of the Cultural

Revolution with its ambition of „transforming Maoism in an ideology for the entire world”68 in

the words of Kim Il Sung, togheter with the Chinese teritorial pretentions affirmed in April

1966,69 tipped the balance of the North Korean preference towards the Soviet Union. In June

1966, a new Agreement of Technical-Economical Cooperation is signed between the DPRK and

the USSR for the 1967-1970 period.70 Also, in the same year, for the first time since its

foundation, the industral output of the DPRK fell by 3%.71 In Ocotber 1966, the Special

Conference of the WPK, took into account all this events, discussed the failure of the First

SevenYears Plan and emanated an official position of the DPRK on the Sino-Soviet Split.72 The

first signs of centralization can be observed: the Presidency of the Party is abolished and the

65 Ibidem., p.20066 ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d.156/1966, p.35 (Transcript of the unofficial talks between the North Korean delegation in Bucharest, December 12th-14th, 1966.)67 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.2468ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d.156/1966, p.869 Young-Soo Kim, op.cit., p.18470 Ibidem71 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.12072 Ibidem, p.112

Prezidium of the Political Committee is created. It can be said that the Special Conference of the

WPK was the equivalent of the April 1964 Plenary of the Romania Workers’ Party.

The symmetrical positions and interests of Romania and North Korea in the increasingly

complex international environment accentuated the necessity and will for mutual consultations

between the two leaderships. One of these mutual discussions which reflected the desire of

approach took place on June 2nd, 1966, when the Korean ambassador in a talk with Emil

Bodnăraş, the Romanian first-vice-premier, questioned about the Romanian Plenary Session of

late 1961, when “a series of comrades which made mistakes or supported factionalist elements

have been criticized.”; the Korean ambassador noticed that later this comrades have been

rehabilitated and asked how to interpret this reality: where the decision unjust or the comrades

liquidated their mistakes?73 Vice-premier Bodnăraş answered that both elements are true. This

could be connected with the decision of the October 1966 Special Conference of the WPK to

replace some of the party members which have been purged at the 4th Congress of the WPK, also

held in 1961.74 In the same audience the practice of inviting Asian socialist countries to attend as

observatory parties at the meetings and conferences of COMECON and Warsaw Treaty

Organization as to dilute the Soviet pressures, is reaffirmed. Emil Bodnăraş asks the Korean

ambassador to transmit the will of the Romanian leadership that Korean, Chinese and

Vietnamese delegations should attend the incoming Warsaw Pact Conference in Bucharest.75

In December 1966, Kim Il Sung, arriving from Moscow, makes a short unofficial visit in

Bucharest for consulting the Romanian leaders. The need for advice between the two parties is

reflected in the insistence with which the Romanians invited the Korean leader over the entire

course of 1966 and in the decision taken by Kim Il Sung to make an incognito Romanian visit

despite all political difficulties: “We discussed this problem in our Political Committee and we

used the Moscow visit to come to Romania.[…] We decided to come unofficially because I don’t

feel very well and, on the other side, I’ve been invited in other countries too. ”76 The most

important aspects of the visit reside in the fact that both Romanians and Koreans affirmed their

independent stance in political and military affairs and their decision of defending their counties’

73 ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d. 168/1966, p.2374 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.112.75 ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d. 168/1966, p.2176 ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d. 156/1968, p.4

sovereignty through military consolidation. Kim Il Sung’s assertion that “This Conference

(October 1966 Special Conference of the WPK) was in fact a measure of defense against foreign

influences”77, his rejection of the Chinese interferences in the realm of the doctrine of military

action (rejection of Lin Biao’s opinion that South Korea should be freed through guerrilla

struggle78 and rejection of the Chinese stance that economic development has no meaning while

capitalism is still in existence79) and his dissertation about the military position of the Workers’

Party: “After the Caribbean incident of 1962 we decided to go on these two lines: economic

development and strengthening the defensive capability. By this we don’t intend to build missiles,

atomic bombs, warplanes or other. […] we can build shelters which can resist atomic strikes; we

can build automatic, and generally, infantry weapons. So we took on this line to equip the army

and to increase its numbers. Also to arm the entire people. All these after Khrushchev cut our

military aid.”80, were met with approval by the Romanian General Secretary. While explaining

the context of the 1966 Bucharest WTO Conference and the maneuvers in which Brezhnev

engaged with the purpose of gaining a grasp on the military development of socialist countries,

Ceauşescu said that “[…] we asked them to take note of the fact that, starting with then, the

Romanian army will work as we specified, that the entire responsibility for the direction the

army remains with our Party and Government, without any interference from outside. They

asked us not to put this is in the Conference. We agreed and didn’t put it.”81 This December 1966

bilateral summit marks the beginning of the era of political bilateral cooperation and alliance

between Romania and North Korea. Two months after, in February 1967, when ambassador Kim

The Hi comes to his post in Bucharest he acknowledges Ceauşescu that: ”At my appointment as

ambassador in Romanian I received the task of developing even more the friendly relations that

exist between our countries. […] We consider that the relation between us can and have to be

more developed.”82

Even if the next few years, until December 1969, will be marked by tensions in the

Romanian-North Korean bilateral relations, tensions generated by the audacious foreign policy

77 Ibidem, p.978 Ibidem, p.1279 Ibidem, p.1080 Ibidem, p.1881 Ibidem, p.35-3682 ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d.7/1967, p.2, 7

movements of the Romanian leadership, the general atmosphere of cooperation between the two

countries will be maintained. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal

Republic of Germany, the increasing amount of trade with Japan and the unprecedented welcome

of Richard Nixon in Bucharest in August 1969, only three months after the shooting down of the

(February 1st, 1967. Ambassador Kim The He presents his credentials to Chivu Stoica, then President of the State Council of the

Socialist Republic of Romania. Fototeca online a comunismului românesc, 45/1967)

American EC-121 spy-plane over North Korea, as well as the Romanian reaction towards the

1968 events in Czechoslovakia, confused the North Koreans and determined them to show

reluctance towards Romania’s internal and foreign policy actions.83 In 1968, even the regular

acknowledgments of the Korean Foreign Ministry to the Romanian Foreign Ministry for the

international support showed by Romania were omitted.84 After a slight amelioration in the

83 AMAE, 220-911/1972 (Overviews of Romanian-Korean relations), p.284 Ibidem, p.3

beginning of 1969, when references on Romania’s friendship towards the DPRK and on the

status of bilateral relations were again made, at the September 1969 International Conference of

Journalists held in Pyongyang, the Korean organizers permitted the representative of the “Black

Panther” Organization to make biased references on the subject of Nixon’s Bucharest visit.85

These evolutions took place during a period in which the second Soviet-North-Korean

crisis appeared and developed. The slight improvement of economic conditions in 1967 and 1968

in North Korea and the increasingly friendly attitude of the USSR towards the United States

made Kim Il Sung to take the clause of privileged relations from the Soviets and to give it to the

Chinese. From now on, until the end of 1970s, the relationship with the USSR will continuously

degrade and the relationship with China will continuously improve; but, as it has already been

said, Kim Il Sung’s reorientation was simply a reaction to the inner dynamics of the Sino-Soviet

confrontation, a reaction kept from receiving its own backbone.

The 1968 visit of the Romanian Party delegation in Pyongyang, between January 31st and

February 3rd, brought some clarifications on the positions of both partners regarding various

international problems. The Vietnamese problem, the Middle Eastern problem, the

Nonproliferation Treaty, the European security problem, the position of the Romanian

Communist Party towards the strengthening of the unity of the world socialist system and the

principial position of the Romanian Communist Party regarding the convening of a world

conference of the communist and workers’ parties were all aspects that have been encompassed

in the discussion.86 If, in what the Vietnamese and the Middle Eastern problem were concerned,

the positions of the two parties differed – the Romanians argued that a peaceful solution for the

war in Vietnam is possible87 and that, in the Middle East, Israel is not the only one to blame88, in

regard to the opportunity of convening an world communist conference, the Romanian position

modified from its 1966 form and stood for the necessity of holding the conference irrespective of 85 Ibidem, p.4 (In his departure audience at Nicolae Ceauşescu, in October 1969, ambassador Kim The Hi answered the reproach made by the Romanian leader in connection with the refuse of the KWP to attend the 10th Congress of the RCP, by saying that ”the decision taken by the WPK was imposed by the hatred of the Korean people towards the American imperialism and towards its representative R. Nixon.” He continued “The special welcome accorded to R.Nixon in Romania coincided with the visit made in South Korea by W.Rogers with the purpose of instigating provocations against the DPRK.” He also reaffirmed the repeated appeals that the refuse to participate will not reflect on the future of bilateral relations. ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s. Relatii Externe, d.92/1969, p.6-7)86 ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s.Relatii Externe, d.20/1968 (Transcript of the talks.)87 Ibidem, p.588 Ibidem, p.6

who chooses to attend and who chooses not to attend.89 The Koreans affirmed that a conference

of communist movement is meaningless if it is not attended by all communist and workers’

parties and movements. Another important element discussed at this meeting was in connection

with the “Pueblo” case. Gheorghe Apostol, the chief of the Romanian delegation, informed Kim

Gioan Hop that, no more than a few days before, U Thant, Secretary-General of the UN,

transmitted to the Romanian permanent representative that, if he was to be asked to use his good

offices, he intended to name a special representative in the person of a Romanian diplomat which

could contact both parties for resolving the problem.90 Gheorghe Apostol continued by saying

that the Romanian Government informed the Secretary-General of the inopportune character of

such an act since “the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK declared as illegal the addressing of

this problem at the UN.”91

(December 23rd, 1969. Kang Iang Sap the new ambassador in Bucharest presents his credentials to Nicolae Ceauşescu, the

President of the State Council. Fototeca online a comunismului românesc, 183/1969)

89 Ibidem, p.1490 Ibidem, p.4391 Ibidem.

The year 1968 generated much disaffection in connection with the ways of the Brezhnev

administration both in Romania and the DPRK. The increasingly authoritarian methods through

which the USSR understood to impose its political line to other socialist countries, a political line

way too revisionist for the offensive and revolutionary ambitions of Pyongyang and way too

imperialist for the political ambitions of Bucharest, dislodged the two countries from the remains

of their brotherhood with the Soviet Union. In North Korea the second crisis in its relationship

with the USSR came with a heavy strike carried by Kim Il Sung against the military cadres who

held the forefront of the political scene in the country since 1962. Punished for the failure of the

campaign aimed at “liberating” the South by force and subversion, campaign started with the

rearmament of 1962, and for the enormous financial sacrifices made to accomplish this, at the

end of 1968, the military leadership is expelled from the Party.92 Among the accusations were

ones which remind of the depose of Marshal Zhukov in 1957: diminishing the role of the Party

organs in the armed forces, factionalism and a luxurious lifestyle.93 In this period, the new

generation of economic and technical cadres born after the Second World War reaches adulthood

with a political conscience of absolute loyalty to Kim Il Sung and the last traces of traditional

factionalist identities disappear from actuality.

On the realm of bilateral relations, the period of reticence closes with the December 24th

1969 message addressed to Nicolae Ceauşescu by Kim Il Sung in which the later affirmed the

wish to develop the relations between the two countries and proposed that problems appeared in

the previous period should be considered things of the past.94 This was the context in which the

important June 3rd-9th 1970 visit of the Romanian delegation on parliamentary and state line

headed by Emil Bodnăraş, vice-president of the State Council, was made. This visit set the cadre

and prepared the establishment of a multitude of bilateral instruments in various fields and

levels, instruments which have been the foundation for the complex and multilateral nature of

Romanian-North-Korean relationship during the 1970s and 1980s. Following it and resulting

from it, visits of the Romanian Defense Minister Ion Ioniţă, of the president of the Council for

State Security Ion Stănescu and of the first-secretary of the Romanian Communist Youth League

Ion Iliescu, set a new network of ties with the respective institutional counterparts from the

92 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.115.93 Ibidem.94 AMAE, 220-911/1972, p. 5

DPRK.95 From the economic perspective, at the proposal of Kim Il Sung, contacts between

economists from the two countries had been advocated with the purpose of creating a Joint

Commission of Economic and Technical-Scientifical Collaboration.96 During the talks, Kim Il

Sung also manifested the interest of the Korean part in collaborating and cooperating with

Romania on the production of certain elements of military equipment.97 This field of interest was

later deepened in a discussion between Emil Bodnăraş and Pak Sen Cer in Wonsan, on June 6th,

in which the Korean Foreign Minister mentioned that, with the Soviet refusal to provide spear

parts for MiG-15,-17 and -19 airplanes and the retreat of Hungary from a joint-venture on the

production of radars, the Korean side is interested in collaborating with Romania in the common

research and production of radiolocation devices, spare parts for MiGs, and machines and

weapons for mountain warfare.98 In the field of mountain warfare presents interest the proposal

put forward by Emil Bodnăraş to Kim Il Sung regarding the cooperation in the field of mountain

military formations.99

The discussions were also substantial from the political perspective. The new level of

Romanian-American relations opened with Nixon’s 1969 visit was exploited as a way of

transmitting signals from the North Korean leadership to the U.S. decision makers. Emil

Bodnăraş was asked explain to the Americans that „if they will not start a new war, a war will

not happen; that the termination of spying actvity and of provacations will terminate all

conflincts in this area.”100 In the same time, the Romanian vice-president was asked by the

Korean Foreign Minister if he knows or can predict the American plans towards Korea.

Bodnăraş replied that initialy, during the 1967 visit, Nixon disapproved of Johnson’s actions and

promised that, after he will be elected, he will solve the problems which provoke tensions in

95 Ibidem.96 “In what the future development of bilateral relation is concerned, comrade Kim Il Sung, expressed his full agreement with the proposals of the Romanian part regarding the intensification of exchanges in all fields: political, economic, technical-scientific and special. It was requested that comrade Ceauşescu be informed for agreeing on the initiation of contacts between the economists of the two countries with the purpose of […] creating a Joint Commission for Economic and Technical-Scientific Collaboration” . ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s.Relatii Externe, d.92/1970, p.497 Ibidem.98 Ibidem, p.55-56.99 “The old Romanian Army had a special formation for mountain warfare. Under the influence of the Soviet general conception, the Mountain Chasseurs units were disbanded. […] Eventually we reestablished the Mountain Chasseurs units without the approval of the Warsaw Pact. Here is a field in which we can make an exchange.”, Ibidem, p.16-17.100 Ibidem, p.5

Asia; but in his 1969 Romanian visit, when asked by Ceauşescu why did he abandoned his ideas,

he tried to offer some explanations involving the impossibility of acting against the will of the

ruling circles of the Pentagon.101 In the field of intra-camp relations, the discussion between the

Bodnăraş and Kim Il Sung reflected some changes in the position consecrated at the beginning of

the 1960s by Gheorghiu-Dej: “The practice has proved that relation can be developed even

though efforts are put towards integration. […] Today, we no longer ask you to enter

COMECON so that together to counter integration. Khrushchev told us: <I know why you want

China, Vietnam and Korean in the COMECON, to form a majority against me.> Currently other

interests are governing beside those of socialism, the interests of states. That is why, we, the

small countries have to rehabilitate the idea of principial collaboration. We do not search only

mutual material advantages from our collaboration, but also a mutual political advantage,

namely to demonstrate that the principles of independence, sovereignty and equality are not

outdated as comrade W.Ulbrich wanted to convince us.102

Following the important visit of June 1970, the bilateral relation between Romania and

the DPRK increased in complexity. Just one month after, the North Korean economic delegation

headed by Cion Ciun Thek, vice-premier, signed in Bucharest the convention for the

establishment of the inter-Governmental Consultative Commission on Economic and Technical-

Scientific Relations103. Among the members of this delegation were also military specialists

which came to discuss their specific problems.104

With North Korea’s political reorientation towards China started in April 1970 by the

visit of Zhou Enlai (his first foreign visit after the Cultural Revolution105), who came to

Pyongyang with extended offers of military aid for the first time in the history of Chinese-North-

Korean relations,106 and with the results of the September 1970 5th Congress of the WPK, which

officialised the generational shift in the Party by naming seventy young new specialist cadres in

a Central Committee extended from 85 to 117 seats,107 the new foreign policy doctrine of

101 Ibidem, p.57102 Ibidem, p.11-12103 AMAE, 220-911/1972, p. 5104 ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s.Relatii Externe, d.92/1970, p.55-56105 Helen-Louise Hunter, op.cit., p.272106 Ibidem.107 Boo-Hak Koo, op.cit., p.126

political and diplomatic offensive is inaugurated by the WPK on the ruins of the 1960s military-

subversive strategy. Announced and discussed during the 1970 Romanian-North-Korean talks,108

will make its presence felt with the July 1972 Joint Statement between the North and South.

The pivotal June 1971 Romanian-North-Korean summit opened a new chapter in the

history of bilateral relations. A final recognition of the importance which the Romanian

diplomatic connections worldwide have for the North Korean side is affirmed by Kim Il Sung,109

and new diplomatic instruments are signed110 which will assure the basis for a continuous

increase in economic exchanges. Only in 1971 the volume of commercial exchanges increased

with 45% over the 1970 indicator and the 1972 Trade Agreement states a new increase of 60%

compared with the year 1971.111

108 “Emil Bodnăraş: We consider necesary that the DPRK should be more present in the international public opinion […] politically as well as diplomatically. […] When in 1960-1961 we isolated ourselves we had much to lose. […] Now, the political front needs to be activated. Kim Il Sung: “Thank you. I appreciate that you are right and I assure you that we too are preoccupied with exiting the sphere in which we are now. We still need some support to enter some places which are less accessible: Western Europe and some international organizations.” ANIC, f. C.C. al P.C.R., s.Relatii Externe, d.92/1970, p.17109 “Kim Il Sung: You promote a policy of peaceful coexistence, of good relations with all countries, even with the developed capitalist ones and we consider this to be a good line. We perfectly understand you. […] The fact that you have wide connections worldwide is a good thing for us too; that is why we are not against your political line, which we deeply appreciate.” ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s.Relatii Externe, d.43-I/1971, p.58-59.110 Consular convention, Long-term Agreement for 1971-1975 period , Trade protocol for 1971, a Judicial Convention, AMAE, 220-911/1972, p. 5 and ANIC, f.C.C. al P.C.R., s.Relatii Externe, d.43-I/1971, p.176-184111 AMAE, 220-911/1972, p. 5, 9.