l t d nt t , L b r nd th PD: B r ndt th r t D b t

Steven Philip Kramer

SAIS Review, Volume 7, Number 2, Summer-Fall 1987, pp. 37-49 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University PressDOI: 10.1353/sais.1987.0007

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SOCIALIST IDENTITY, LABOUR.AND THE SPD: BACKGROUNDTO THE SECURITY DEBATE

Steven Philip Kramer

Neileil Kinnock's unilateralist approach to British security did not comeout of nowhere.1 Nor was the West German Social Democratic party's(SPD) August 1986 platform call for withdrawal of intermediate -rangenuclear forces (INF) from the Federal Republic unprecedented in thehistory of German or European socialism. What is significant is that majorsocialist parties of important West European allies have expressed seriousopposition to existing security arrangements. These parties have a signifi-cant chance of returning to power, if not in 1987, in the near future.

One way to understand the security debate in Labour and the SPDis to broaden the context of analysis. First, Labour and the SPD reflectthe widespread unhappiness of West European socialism with the stateof the Alliance. This unhappiness derives largely from socialism's inabilityto find solutions to the crisis of the welfare state. Second, the emergenceof a pacifist mood in socialism is not surprising because pacifism has beenone of the main currents in socialism's 150-year history. Third, thereare reasons specific to Labour and the SPD that explain why they havebeen particularly critical of security policy.

1 . Some of the ideas for this article were developed in a paper prepared for the U.S. Depart-ment of State in late 1985 on "European Socialist Parties and U.S. Interests: The German andBritish Cases." Ken Dillon, Bowman Miller, and E. Raymond Platig provided valuable sugges-tions. Some material in this article appeared in "Kinnock and the Peace Issue," The BaltimoreSun, 2 December 1986, 15A. I would like to thank Julie Reed of the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace for preparing the manuscript and my good friend and colleague Hugh DeSantis for his insightful critique.

Steven Philip Kramer, on leave from the University of New Mexico where he is associateprofessor of history, is director of the Carnegie Endowment's Face-to-Face program.He is the author of Socialism in Western Europe: The Experience of a Generation(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984). In June 1986 he was a candidate for theDemocratic nomination for Congress in the first district of New Mexico.

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38 SAIS REVIEW

A Socialist Identity Crisis

European socialism is undergoing an identity crisis, primarily dueto the impossibility of pursuing reformist and redistributive policies dur-ing an extended economic recession while lacking practical remedies forthe underlying causes of that recession. One consequence of the identitycrisis has been a tendency of some socialist parties to take positions onsecurity or foreign-policy issues that bring them into conflict with theUnited States.

The socialist movement has always been subject to an inherent ten-sion: how is it possible to work within the existing system and at the sametime represent an alternative vision of society? Before World War I re-volutionary and reformist currents coexisted uneasily within Europeansocialism. This tension continued even after the communist schism in1920. Only following World War II did European socialist parties un-equivocally acknowledge that social change should take place throughevolution and reform, not revolution. In some cases socialist parties wentfurther. The 1959 Bad Godesberg program of the SPD substituted thecreation and perfection of a mixed economy cum welfare state for theultimate goal of socialist transformation. It was an explicit renunciationof Marxism by a party that had once been the guardian of Marxist or-thodoxy. The Left stated its claim to power on the ground that it wasbetter qualified than the Right to run the new mixed economy. At thesame time, the Labour party rallied against an effort to remove ClauseFour (which advocated common ownership of the means of production)from the party program. This act of piety did not, however, change thefact that Clause Four had become a dead letter. Labour's real goal wasgreater social equality, not state control of the economy.

The "end of ideology" was predicated on the ahistorical notion thatpostwar prosperity would continue indefinitely and that wealth could bepainlessly redistributed, thereby resolving the social issue without massivestructural reforms. Capitalism was not inherently exploitative but couldbe reformed; social democracy would replace democratic socialism. Ac-ceptance of the mixed economy cum welfare state thus represented anill-founded act of faith that the mixed economy and welfare staterepresented an end to history; that the economic system would continueto deliver the goods, which could then be redistributed to promote"equality."

In the postwar period European socialist parties also made a decisivecommitment in foreign and defense policy. Despite a long tradition ofpacifism or antimilitarism and serious initial reluctance to accept thereality of a bipolar world, most socialist parties decided to support theAtlantic Alliance once the cold war began. Socialist hopes that wartime

SOCIALIST IDENTITY, LABOUR AND THE SPD 39

cooperation between the Western powers and the Soviet Union and theunity of the resistance within each country might survive the war weredashed when Eastern Europe was Stalinized and social democracy liq-uidated. The iron curtain and the fear of the Soviet Union reinforcedthe bitter historic rivalry with the communists that followed thecommunist-socialist split.

Thus, by the 1960s European socialism had formed a new identity.It stood for democratic evolution, the mixed economy, the welfare state,and NATO. But the decline of Marxism had unexpected consequences.Marxism combined a Utopian goal with a rationalistic if teleologicalanalysis of the historical process. The ideologies that partly supplanted itdid not effectively channel the Utopian impulse. As the events of May1968 demonstrated, socialist parties faced a younger generation in revoltagainst modern society. This radical Left was not Marxist; it showed lit-tle interest in the general problem of political economy. It shared theassumptions of the older generation that the "system worked" econom-ically; after all, it was the product of the "system." However, it was con-cerned about the impact of that system on the environment, that is, thecentralization of power and population in modern society. It was worriedabout the quality of life, participation, and sexual equality. It had theluxury of playing with ideas like "small is beautiful." Its greatest con-cerns were not socioeconomic at all but fear of nuclear conflict, thus ofthe superpowers, both of which were seen as equally inimical to worldpeace. It had a romantic identification with the Third World, especiallyin its revolutionary struggles against an ill-defined "imperialism." Theyounger generation of Socialists did not have any vivid experience withthe threat of communism or the Soviet Union. The great fear of the earlycold war had given way to détente with the Soviets in Europe by the 1960s.The America it knew was the America of the Vietnam War, the SantoDomingo intervention, and finally, the coup d'état against Allende in1973.

Absorption of some of these radical youth (in the late 1960s andearly 1970s and later in the wake of the INF debate) changed thecharacter of socialist parties. In some cases Socialists had to contend withnew parties to their left, such as the Greens. All this occurred when theindustrialized nations entered into an economic crisis anticipated byneither the older nor the younger generation. There seemed to be onlyone real economic doctrine around, that of neoconservative "free market"economics. Many socialist governments were forced to embark on austerityprograms, which inevitably irritated their working-class base and tradeunion allies.

For example, François Mitterrand was elected president of Francein 1981. For the first time in French history the Socialists obtained an

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absolute majority in the National Assembly. Yet, the approach of theparty turned out to be nothing more than massive nationalization,sometimes of dying firms (with the state buying 100 percent of the shares),accompanied by weak efforts to create employment and increase buyingpower. Soon the French, like so many of their fellow Socialists, were follow-ing "pragmatic" policies that differed little from those of the conservatives.That such policies would frustrate socialist militants is obvious. Whatdid it mean to be a Socialist when Socialists were forced to follow the sameeconomic policies as the Right? On what issues could socialist militantsfeel good about being Socialists?

The answer was foreign policy and security issues. Two issues becamethe particular focus of many socialist parties: Central America and Euro-pean security. Central America appealed to the younger generation ofideologically motivated Socialists while being of little appreciable strategicor military interest to Europe. Under the presidency of Willy Brandt,the Socialist International (SI) changed from a Eurocentric to an inter-national organization. It emphasized North-South issues and admittedmany Third World parties, especially those in Latin America. This newapproach was consonant with the heightened sensibility toward ThirdWorld problems on the part of the younger generation of Socialists, agroup which has preoccupied Brandt.

In the Third World, only Latin America had a fair number of partiesthat were similar in structure, membership, and ideology to Europeansocialism. There, linguistic and cultural ties with Europe were long-standing, especially with Iberia (which experienced its own transition todemocracy in the 1970s). Thus, Socialist International attention naturallyfocused on Latin America in the late 1970s, and additional LatinAmerican parties were admitted to the International.

The SPD and the wealthy Friedrich Ebert Foundation played a majorrole in the Si's Central American activities. The SPD was the most in-fluential party in the International. Because of its substantial budgetdevoted to Latin America and its decades of involvement, the EbertFoundation became a significant influence on the Latin American Leftas well. The Labour party played much less of a role but consistentlytook a left-wing position on Central America. For example, Neil Kinnockdeclared that the Central American problem was entirely a North-Southquestion.2

But the socialist quest for a third way between U.S. hegemony andcommunism proved unsuccessful. In 1981-82 there was great socialistenthusiasm for the Salvadoran guerrillas and the Sandinistas. However,by 1984 criticism of U.S. policy in El Salvador and solidarity with

2. In his preface to Stuart Holland and Donald Anderson, Kissinger's Kingdom: A CounterReport on Central America (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), i.

SOCIALIST IDENTITY, LABOUR AND THE SPD 41

Guillermo Ungo and the Fronte Democrático Revolucionario (FDR, theDemocratic Revolutionary Front) was replaced by de facto support forDuarte as the legitimate democratic force in El Salvador. Illusions aboutthe democratic vocation of the Sandinistas diminished in 1984 when ef-forts to create acceptable conditions for participation in the Nicaraguanelections by the opposition failed, undercutting the SI strategy of main-taining privileged contacts with the Sandinistas in order to influence them.Their influence turned out to be insufficient. In fact, this failure leftthem without a policy. The SI feared both a totalitarian Nicaragua tiedto the Soviet bloc and the possibility of U.S. intervention. It could nothonestly defend the policies of the Nicaraguan regime. On the other hand,it was unwilling to condemn it too harshly in public for fear of encouragingU.S. military action and alienating some of its own militants whose en-thusiasm for the Sandinista revolution remained undimmed. Rather thanaiding Socialists in search of an identity, the Central American issueproved divisive to the Socialist International.

If European Socialists became involved in Central America to fightthe good fight in a faraway place at small cost to themselves, concernwith European security derived from its centrality. Like many other Euro-peans, Socialists had an almost schizophrenic view on the subject: fearthat the United States would not defend them and fear that the UnitedStates would drag them nolens volens into a conflict not of their choos-ing. The first fear dominated the Carter era; the second, the Reagan.The Reagan presidency helped trigger a pacifist resurgence in somesocialist parties. There was a popular wave of opposition preceding thedeployment of INF. In August 1986 the SPD congress advocated removalof Pershing. 1 1 and cruise missiles. A few months later the Labour partyvoted opposition to the independent British nuclear deterrent and sta-tioning of nuclear weapons in Great Britain.

Socialism and Pacifism

Pacifism and antimilitarism have always been important parts ofthe socialist tradition, though not always dominant traits. Socialistsadopted the Enlightenment vision of man as rational, educable, and in-trinsically good. From this point of view tyranny and war were contraryto man's basic nature, aberrations that could be extirpated root andbranch. The creation of a just social system and the end of class oppres-sion would usher in a world of international harmony. In addition,Socialists saw the army as a means of maintaining the social order andnationalism as a desperate effort by the ruling classes to divert attentionfrom the social question. In Protestant countries, religious ideals oftenimbued socialism, contributing an evangelical pacifism. World War I

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undermined the view that progress would eliminate the vestiges of warand militarism. Most Socialists threw themselves into the fray on behalfof their respective nations, only later to have doubts. In the aftermathof the war came renewed insistence on peace, disarmament, and anti-militarism, almost as if to compensate for the "social patriotism" of August1914. As Albert Thibaudet said in 1932: "Today. . .socialism is the questfor peace. One is socialist to the extent that one places this problem beforeall others."3

Since World War I Socialists have tried to reconcile continued com-mitment to disarmament and peace with pragmatic realization of theneed to protect democracy against potential aggressors. Some Socialistswere ambivalent about how to respond to their bitter enemies Mussoliniand Hitler— sometimes almost paralyzed. Some French socialists preferreddefeatism to war and even collaborated with Vichy. The cold war andSoviet oppression in Eastern Europe drove most European Socialists tosupport the Atlantic Alliance. But still ambivalence existed. Détente pro-duced a revolution of rising expectations among Socialists, who enter-tained exaggerated notions about prospects for peace, or at least, forlimiting superpower conflict in Europe. At the same time, the VietnamWar diminished the United States' luster as spokesman for democracy.Thus, when détente began to crumble over Soviet actions in Afghanistanand Poland, many Europeans blamed the United States for reactingstrongly to Soviet actions.

The pacifist tradition customarily has been strong in the Labourparty and SPD, where it has been linked to Protestant thought as well.Although the Labour party supported British involvement in World WarI, a significant minority, including Ramsay MacDonald, was opposed.After the war Labour advocated disarmament. Despite the mountingfascist threat from 1931 to 1935, party leader George Lansbury, an elderlyChristian Socialist, remained faithful to an almost fully pacifist line. Evenafter Lansbury was deposed (largely through the efforts of trade unionleader Ernest Bevin), Labour hesitated to vote the defense budget.

After World War II the Labour party had mixed feelings aboutbecoming engaged in the cold war. To be sure, the immediate postwarLabour government led by Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin (1945-51)supported the same kind of East-West policies as the United States. Labourwas closer to U.S. views on decolonization than was the Conservative party.Moreover, it had less desire for the United Kingdom to behave like aworld power than did the Tories, who subsequently invaded Suez in 1956,creating the most serious postwar rift in Anglo-American relations. Therewas strong leftist opposition within the Labour party in the 1950s and

3. Albert Thibaudet, Les Idées politiques de la France (Paris: Stock, 1932), 203.

SOCIALIST IDENTITY, LABOUR AND THE SPD 43

early 1960s to the leadership's moderate policies, domestic as well asforeign. Aneurin Bevan was the leader of the Tribune group, whichthought the government's domestic policies were too timid and its foreignpolicy too complaisant toward the United States. On the critical issueof unilateral nuclear disarmament, however, Bevan made common causewith moderate party leader Hugh Gaitskell to the consternation ofBevanites like Michael Foot.

In 1960 the Scarborough congress of the Labour party narrowly ap-proved British renunciation of nuclear weapons. Gaitskell and theParliamentary party opposed the measure. This raised the question ofthe relative authority of the party congress and the parliamentary group,a question which reemerged in the 1970s. The next year Gaitskell wasable to obtain a reversal of that decision by the congress. Bevan diedin 1960, followed by Gaitskell only three years later. By 1964 HaroldWilson — who had favored a unilateral nuclear disarmament plank butchanged his position — seemed to have restored a more centrist consen-sus. The foreign policy of the Wilson government (1964-70) was closelyaligned with that of the United States, even over Vietnam. Indeed,Wilson's willingness to follow U.S. policy was partly responsible for therecrudescence of the Left, which felt betrayed.

Like Labour, the SPD has a long pacifist tradition. Before WorldWar I it refused to vote military credits. Carried away by nationalist feel-ing, it supported the government in August 1914; support for the wardisintegrated as time passed, however. After 1918 an SPD-dominatedgovernment signed the Versailles peace settlement and espoused pacifism.The Right, especially the Nazis, used this stance against the government.

SPD foreign policy in the immediate postwar period emphasized op-position to rearmament and advocacy of a neutral, reunified Germany.Party leader Kurt Schumacher, despite his intense anticommunism, re-fused to support the European Defense Community (EDC). Schumacher'sopposition came mostly from his insistence that Germany be treated asan equal; the rest of his party's opposition came from pacifism. Moreover,Schumacher feared that the EDC would prevent eventual Germanreunification, and he thought German unity was more important thanAtlantic solidarity. But this policy proved neither realistic nor elector-ally profitable at the time. Until recently the Schumacher era could easilybe characterized as a period of adjustment to the realities of the coldwar. Now, however, it is at least plausible to suggest that the period fromSchumacher's death to Helmut Schmidt's fall was an Atlanticistparenthesis in the history of the SPD.

In short, there is a long pacifist and antimilitarist tradition in Euro-pean socialism, especially in Britain and Germany, which has reemergedin the last decade. But this tradition has not reemerged uniformly

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over Western Europe. Conventional wisdom posits a significant gap be-tween "northern" and "southern" socialism, and conventional wisdomis fairly accurate in this instance. The French Socialist party, both ingovernment and in opposition, has adhered firmly to the French nationalconsensus in favor of an independent nuclear deterrent. The Italian andPortuguese socialist parties have generally supported U.S. positions onsecurity. Felipe Gonzales, whose Partido Socialista Obrero Español(Spanish Socialist Workers' party) opposed Spanish entry into NATOwhen in opposition, led voters to endorse membership in the AtlanticAlliance in a national referendum in 1986. On Central America, the Por-tuguese have been strongly anti-Sandinista, while the other parties havetended to look askance at both U.S. policy and Sandinista behavior.

The parties in the smaller NATO states of northern Europe havetended to be more critical of U.S. policy, although they have rarely beenin a position to affect policy decisively. In Belgium and the NetherlandsSocialists cannot obtain a parliamentary majority and have governed onlyin coalition. In recent years conservative coalitions or minority socialdemocratic governments have governed Denmark and Norway. Thesocialist parties in these countries are not in a position to alter significantlytheir own countries' policies, let alone NATO's. Thus, if EuropeanSocialists are to produce changes in European security policy, the primemovers of such change must be the Labour party or the SPD because theyare major parties in the two most important countries of the north.

Why Labour and the SPD Became Radical

There are several specific factors that explain the radicalization ofLabour and the SPD.

Electoral Defeat. Much of the Right's power within the SPD andLabour party derived from control of government. The Labour defeatin 1979 led to James Callaghan's retirement and the weakening of theRight. The same thing occurred in Germany when Helmut Schmidt wasforced out of office after the Free Democratic Party (FDP) switchedalliances in 1982. Long-standing internal leftist irritation with the Schmidtand Wilson-Callaghan leaderships boiled over after electoral defeat. Bythat time the Left had gained considerable power within the partyorganizations and pulled the party steadily leftward. Callaghan wasreplaced by Michael Foot, Schmidt by Hans-Jochen Vogel.

In the United Kingdom the Left, including such radical groups asthe Trotskyite Militant Tendency, became entrenched in the local partymachinery, while leftists gained control of many unions that supportedthe party. The Left was able to modify the rules governing leadershipselection to its own advantage and used "re-selection" of members of

SOCIALIST IDENTITY, LABOUR AND THE SPD 45Parliament as a means of intimidation. The new situation bewilderedthe party Right, which had been accustomed to being in power. In-tellectuals, teachers, and public workers, who support Labour in largenumbers, were to some extent radicalized by Thatcher's budget cutting.They responded favorably to trends toward equation of the superpowers,a sense of European helplessness, and a willingness to evade Europeandefense responsibilities.

Because trade unionists and right-wing socialist politicians concen-trated their efforts on domestic issues, the Left, especially the youngergeneration, was more successful in affecting foreign policy and security.Foreign and security policy became a safety valve for the Left, compen-sating for the lack of a socialist economic alternative.

Social Democrats and Greens. The election of Michael Foot as partyleader divided the moderate wing of Labour over tactics. One factiondecided to remain, while the Social Democratic faction decided to leave.The defection of the Social Democratic parliamentary leaders severelyweakened the power of the moderate wing within the Labour party. Thebalance of forces in Labour was skewed far to the Left. The SocialDemocrat- Liberal Alliance, however, failed to replace Labour as the prin-cipal party of opposition. Indeed, most of the members of Parliamentwho defected were defeated in the next election (a veritable charge ofthe Light Brigade). Generally, Labour voters and party militants remainedfaithful to the party. Social Democratic support, moreover, was notconcentrated in any given geographical region. The Alliance's popularvote of over 20 percent translated into very few seats. In West Germany, .the arrival of the Greens eroded the SPD's traditional appeal to youngfirst-time voters and encouraged the SPD to move to the Left to preemptthem. The tactical argument that it was necessary to move Left to con-tain the Greens was obviously consonant with the party Left's wish tomove in that direction anyway.

Ins and Outs Politics. Being in opposition, especially to govern-ments that the United States treats as privileged friends (such as thoseof Kohl and Thatcher), naturally leads to criticism of the United States.Harold Macmillan once said of Hugh Gaitskell:

The trouble about Mr. Gaitskell is that he is going through all the motions of beinga Government when he isn't a Government. It is bad enough having to behave likea Government when one is a Government. The whole point of being in opposition isthat one can have fun and. . .be colourful.4

The dynamics of a parliamentary system encourage parties to take radicalpositions in opposition and to become more "statesmanlike" when in

4. Philip Williams, Hugh Gaitskell (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979), 474.

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power. Being in opposition may make both Labour and the SPD seemmore radical than they really are; that is not to argue that what Labouror the SPD say in opposition may be safely disregarded as a clue to howthey would behave in government.

The National Question. Is it coincidental that the two socialdemocratic parties that most worry the United States are the British andGerman? Do these two national parties represent a trend in socialdemocracy, or rather does social democracy in these two countries reflecta national trend? British Labour has come to speak for a "Little England"policy that embodies the frustrations of a rapidly declining world powermuch of whose population tends to project the blame on outside forces.Many Labour voters have a xenophobic reaction to Europe and super-national ties in general, which they blame for a decline in standards ofliving. On the other hand, the SPD draws on large numbers of Germanswhose "pacifism" is tied to a nostalgia for a united Germany and whosepassion is to establish the closest possible ties with the East. Pan-Germannationalism expresses itself in pacifism and détente at any price, whereasWest German patriotism expresses itself in Atlanticism. In short, socialistparties in these two countries are reflecting national problems througha glass darkly. They are instruments for expressing such sentimentsbecause of a variety of historical reasons. Labour inherited the Liberals'commitments to pacifism and "Little England"; the SPD draws on its oldpacifist tradition, a tradition that under Kurt Schumacher was weddedto German nationalism. This resurgence of the national identity ques-tion may be harder to deal with than any radical mood in the socialistmovement.

A Return to Power?

The major obstacle to a return to power by Labour and the SPDis that the radicalization of both parties has not been accompanied bya radicalization of the electorate. Consequently, a return to power isunlikely unless either the parties moderate their positions or society movesto the Left. In the meantime, both parties face the same problem: howto placate leftist militants and voters while appealing to a centrist elec-torate without whose support they cannot win. Not only must they holdon to their militants and electoral clientele, but they must think in termsof possible coalition partners and the impact of small parties on theirchances to return to power.

The assumption here is that centrist voters will not elect Labour orthe SPD as long as they advocate radical security programs. It is, ofcourse, possible that the electorate might ignore party positions on defenseand vote for them for economic reasons. In that case the question is howthe public will react when it discovers that they really intend to destroy

SOCIALIST IDENTITY, LABOUR AND THE SPD 47

the status quo on European security (and how the right-wing membersof the parties will resist).

In Johannes Rau, the SPDs candidate for chancellor in the January1987 elections, the SPD found a politician who was not divisive, who camefrom the Right of the party, but who seemed willing to accept the Left'sideas on defense and security. But the party has not achieved unity andnew ideas since it fractured at the close of Schmidt's chancellorship in1979-82. It is not clear what Rau himself thinks about foreign policy andsecurity issues — although he seems inclined toward moderate views — orwhether he could have received party support for his own preferencesif elected. He was extremely careful to cite only SPD — rather than hisown — views on security and foreign policy. He knows the United Statesis displeased with the course and substance of SPD security thinking— itsnarrow, "Germany first" focus; the grasping at regional arms-controlquick fixes and the SPD-German Democratic Republic chemical-weapons-free zone notion; and the cleft between ritual affirmations ofAtlantic Alliance loyalty and the no-holds-barred SPD reexamination offundamental NATO and German defense premises. The security platformadopted in August 1 986 hardly reflects any newfound moderation by theSPD or the influence or Rau himself.

The virtual unanimity in the party's security platform in August 1986implied a tactical decision by the party Right not to contest the issueat that time. The decision probably was based on a variety of considera-tions: the desire to avoid internecine conflict before an election in whichthe party's candidate was a moderate; the hope that Rau as chancellorwould not act unilaterally to remove INF and could impose his positionon the party; the feeling that the real issue in the campaign would beeconomic; and, finally, recognition that the only way the SPD wouldreturn to government would be in the unlikely circumstance of a coali-tion. This coalition, possibly with the Christian Democrats and Chris-tian Socialists or the FDP, would require abandoning implementation ofmost of its radical ideas on defense. But the combination of a left-wingplatform and a right-wing candidate made it obvious that a consensuson security had not been restored in the SPD. This truce is unlikely tooutlive the electoral defeat, nor did it make for a striking campaign. Raucould hardly be a convincing spokesman for positions he presumably didnot share. In 1987, just as in 1982, interest in the party focused on whatwould happen the next time around, and the support of many partyleaders and militants for Rau was lukewarm. Brandt, in particular, usedhis position as party chairman to undercut Rau. The election of Vogelto replace Brandt does not represent a definitive policy choice.

Similarly, in Great Britain, the sectarian positions of the Labourparty under Michael Foot prevented it from taking advantage of discon-tent with the Thatcher government. Some "hard" left-wing factions

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preferred to control a Labour party out of power than compromise overideology. That is not the case with party leader Kinnock. He has madesome progress in dominating the hard Left and uniting the party behinda more domestic moderate policy line while vocally supporting a unilateristposition on elimination of nuclear weapons. Kinnock has wrested con-trol of the party apparatus from leftists as the collapse of the coal miners'strike discredited radical leaders Arthur Scargill and Tony Benn. He hasalso marked out a distance between the party and the unions. He hasbecome increasingly moderate on domestic issues and has skillfullydragged a good deal of the party along with him. At the 1986 party con-ference Kinnock won media acclaim for a masterful speech in which heattacked the ideological posturing of party leftists. It seems clear thatthe Right wing of Labour is pleased by Kinnock's domestic performanceand his willingness to take on the extreme Left over domestic issues toweaken its power within the party. The Right has been unable or un-willing to take him on concerning security issues.

In reality, since the social democratic schism, the party Right hasbeen weakened to the point of becoming a virtual hostage. Its membersof Parliament remain in Labour because they could not be reelected asAlliance candidates. Some remain out of traditional party loyalty, othershope that the storm will blow over, still others believe that Kinnock wouldfudge on security policy if elected or would be forced to participate ina coalition government that would temper Labour's positions. Most im-portant, many of them are more interested in domestic politics than inforeign policy. Domestic policy helps them reconcile themselves to Kin-nock's leadership, although Labour's position on security issues remainsfar to the Left. Kinnock, whose wife is a leading antinuclear campaigner,comes from the radical working-class socialism of South Wales and isthe chosen successor of Michael Foot. He called adamantly for the removalof British and U.S. nuclear weapons from Britain. The September 1986party congress strongly endorsed this position.5

Kinnock has taken his unilaterist position because he thinks it ismorally right, because he believes he can win the election with it, andbecause it is the position of the majority of his constituency in the Labourparty. He hopes to use his unilateralist position to force NATO to alterits policy of nuclear deterrence. The institutional memory of the LabourLeft makes it difficult for Kinnock to be elected on a unilateralist plat-form and then work his way back to the status quo. Just how far and

5. It is worth noting, albeit parenthetically, that the security issue is not divisive to Labouronly. The Alliance is split between the Liberals, who tend to oppose stationing of nuclear weapons,and the Social Democrats, who favor it. The compromise between these two positions seemedto be a "Eurodeterrent," an ingenious idea in theory but an unlikely one in practice. But theLiberal rank and file were not ready to grasp at this straw. On 26 January 1987 a new agreementwas reached between Social Democrats and Liberals on maintaining a minimum nuclear deter-rent until it could "be negotiated away, as part of a global arms negotiation process." TheWashington Post, 27 January 1987, A12.

SOCIALIST IDENTITY, LABOUR AND THE SPD 49

how fast he would go is the real question. Michael Foot's victory as partyleader was the first time that the Left had taken control of the party sinceWorld War II. The Left felt that the party apparatus, conservative tradeunion leaders, and parliamentary party had unfairly deprived them ofsuccess. Now, however, the Left has obtained control of those very in-struments of power. It is hard to imagine how Kinnock—even if he wantedto backtrack — could easily get the party to go along. The memory ofRamsay MacDonald's treason has been carefully cultivated in Labourannals. The fact that Kinnock has been flexible on other issues meansthat he cannot appear to cede an issue that he and his supporters havemade the cornerstone of Labour's program. Recent efforts to "clarify"Labour's position in view of U.S. -Soviet negotiations over INF and Kin-nock's trip to Washington in late March were desperate half measuresintended to reassure centrist voters. They are unlikely to succeed.

Dealing with Socialists

In the short term it is British and German voters, not U.S.policymakers, who will decide how far Labour and the SPD will threatenthe basic structure of NATO. But a few concluding observations for thelong term are in order. First, opposition to nuclear defense is fueled bya gestalt reaction of uneasiness to the United States and unhappiness withthe Reagan administration. The bottom line is the perception that beingdefended by the United States is more dangerous than not being defendedat all. A U.S. administration that seems more consistent and thoughtful,that consults more, and that does not indulge in adventurism andunilateralism may render European Socialists less prone to their own brandof adventurism and unilateralism. In that sense, timing may prove allimportant. If Kinnock comes to power and confronts the Reagan ad-ministration, the United States' worst fears may be borne out. If Labourwins in 1991 and faces a moderate or liberal Democratic administration,Labour itself may prove less doctrinaire and may be mollified by somepolicies already undertaken by the Americans.

Second, if the original argument is correct and radicalism in foreignand security policies are partly a result of failure to solve the economicand social problems of the 1980s, success or failure in doing so will bean important factor in determining the spirit of European socialism andthe tenor of relations with the United States. There is nothing ineluc-table about a split between European socialism and the United States.Wise statesmanship on the U.S. side and a sensitivity to socialist preoc-cupations can help preserve traditionally close relations. Ignorance andpetulance can undermine the common bond and common interests thathave tied the Atlantic Alliance together.