“Nationalism and Conflict Resolution: The Roman Catholic Church and the Disintegration of Iraq and Syria.” Korean Political Science Review, (Vol. 48, No. 3, 2014), pp. 111-32.

Nationalism and Conflict Resolution: The Roman Catholic Churchand

The Disintegration of Iraq and Syria

Benedict E. DeDominicis, The Catholic University of Korea

Abstract: Humanitarian military intervention should follow theprecepts of just war doctrine. Developing this doctrine in a moreeffective political strategic direction requires aconceptualization of national self-determination as a humanright. A foreign policy is more ethically significant to theextent that it more effectively predicts the consequences of thepolicy. A just war approach to humanitarian military interventionrequires strategically effective action by the internationalcommunity. It should resolve the nationalist conflicts thatproduce human rights atrocities. National communities that seethemselves as having both the right and the capability to achievesovereign nation statehood will more likely view the politicalstatus quo as oppressive. External intervention is likely toaffect their relative power capability self-perception, makingnationalist striving for independence more probable. It was oneof the consequences of Western intervention in Yugoslavia. Italso has been a consequence of US military intervention in Iraq.The ongoing civil war in Iraq together with the subsequent ArabSpring weakening of the Syrian regime has caused the Iraqi civilwar to expand into Syria. International humanitarian interventionshould follow the lead of regional actors in supporting thereconfiguration of the post-colonial states in the Levant andMesopotamia.

Keywords (English): Iraq, Just War Theory, Nationalism, RomanCatholic Church, Syria Keywords (Korean): 이이이, 이이이이 이이이, 이이이(Politics), 이이이이이, 이이이

Introduction

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This study outlines the potential for the Roman CatholicChurch to play a more effective strategic political role in theinternational community’s response to Middle East communalviolence. The Catholic Church was not a pivotal lobby groupregarding the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 following theSeptember 11, 2001 attacks on the US. The US justified theinvasion as an act of preemptive self-defense against thedeployment of new Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that werefound not to exist (BBC 2004). Global opposition by establishmentreligious communities condemning preparations to invade Iraqobviously failed to prevent the US from leading the 2003 invasion(Pew Research 2003, “NCC Delegation to Paris Surprises Many withOpposition to War” 2003). Yet, transnational religious actorssignificantly support or challenge the international orderthrough their international soft power appeal, especially in areligious country such as the US (Haynes 2009, 46-48, 50-51). Thesubsequent Iraqi disintegration with the strengthening ofpolitical Islamic militancy has motivated leading US politicalfigures to deny that they supported the 2003 invasion (“JohnKerry Has No Shame, Claims He Opposed the Iraq War” 2013). Othershave felt the imperative to defend their 2003 support for theinvasion while denying that the current Iraqi civil war wastriggered by the 2003 invasion (“Tony Blair: Iraq violence aresult of inaction over Syria” 2014, “Iraq, Syria and the MiddleEast – An essay by Tony Blair” 2014). These public statements ofconcern indicate the existence of an international politicalpotential for intervention albeit at a low-cost (for the US)level, e.g. drone air strikes. If national military interventionoccurs, then the intervener(s) will likely include the definitionof the intervention as serving humanitarian aims to stop genocidein order to justify it (Hyde-Price 2009, 35-36).

The study presumes that the Catholic Church has thepolitical potential to function as a norm entrepreneur to promoteself-determination as a human right. Thereby it may contribute tothe global normative strategic goal of alleviating the politicalconditions that contribute to the commission of systematichumanitarian crimes. These crimes include apartheid and genocide.The potential political efficacy of the Roman Catholic Churchapplies insofar as it may contribute to a norm cascade. Its focus

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would be to support UN institutional partnership oversight of thecomplicated political reconstitution the Levant and Mesopotamia(e.g. Cox 2010, 95). It would not remove from power the currentShiite-led governments in Damascus or Baghdad, thus lessening thecurrent resistance in Moscow and Beijing. The latter two view UNSecurity Council implementation of the UN “Responsibility toProtect” (R2P) in Libya as having been a cover for NATO “regimechange” (Dietrich 2013, 345-48). It would include a new, SunniArab confederal entity straddling current borders with apolitical center in Riyadh (Fisk 2014). This norm cascade shouldaim to strengthen the already existent, post Cold War legalprecedent. It holds that moderating inter-communal conflict mayrequire international recognition of internal borders as new,internationally recognized state borders (Cassese 2005 83-84).

These internal borders may have been originally drawn byother sovereign state actors, e.g. the postwar Communistauthorities of socialist Yugoslavia. Until the end of the ColdWar the international legal community recognized existing stateborders as inviolable under the doctrine, uti possidetis juris, i.e.“you will have sovereignty over those territories you possess asof law” (Ibid.). With the secessions from Yugoslavia in the early1990s, European legal opinion shifted to acknowledge thatexisting provincial borders may be recognized as new, sovereignstate borders (Ibid). These secessions occurred amidst greatviolent conflict. In coalition with other groups and actors, theRoman Catholic Church may work to further strengthen this legalprecedent. It may thereby work to shape international militaryintervention in the escalating Middle East conflict so that itserves the objective of conflict resolution rather thanintensification.

As a case study, this study focuses on the Catholic Churchwith the aim to contribute to the discourse regarding theinternational community’s response to the current Middle Eastturmoil. The linkage between the Syrian civil war and the ongoingIraqi fighting portends regional political destabilization andescalating, potentially genocidal, communal conflict. It focuseson the role of the US as a target of Catholic Church lobbyingsince the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq in response to theSeptember 11, 2001 attacks on the US. It critiques the Roman

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Catholic Church’s potential role as an international human rightspressure group for “strategic peacebuilding” after intervention,i.e. jus post bellum (Philpott 2008, 13). The study first presentsthe theoretical framework for the analysis. It develops theCatholic doctrine of just war through elaboration of a theory ofhuman rights that builds on a theoretical conceptualization ofnationalism. Nationalism is a group identity-based value drivingcollective perception and behavior into recognizable patterns(Cottam and Cottam 2001).

Examples of multinational states experiencing violentdisintegration among competing national groups includeYugoslavia, Iraq and Syria. International community interventionto redraw state boundaries in the Middle East is necessary toreduce the mass violence. It is also necessary for creating theconditions for the existence of democratic political regimes. Atleast some of the permanent members of the UN Security Counciland their allies must play a critical role because of their powercapabilities, a necessity in implementing agreements. To preventthis external intervention from repeating the imperialarbitrariness that created the current conditions for violence,regional international actors should publicly take the lead.Candidates for regional leadership at an international conferenceon a Middle East “grand bargain” include the Organization of theIslamic Conference with its strong Saudi presence (Kodmani 2011,234-36, 240-42). The panoply of non-governmental, internationalhuman rights organizations should ideally occupy the lobbyingrole of generating inexorable public opinion pressure. Thispressure on state governments intervening political, economicallyand militarily should be to implement human rights precepts.These precepts should include self-determination for aspiringnational groups. The Roman Catholic Church as a religiousinternational organization with over one billion nominal membershas the potential to be such an international human rights lobby.Its focus would be on pressuring Western governments to act inaccordance on behalf of self-determination for all ethno-sectarian national groups in the Levant and Mesopotamia.

Perspectives on Military Intervention

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Hoffmann infers that according to the liberal philosopherJohn Stuart Mill, international intervention on behalf of self-determination in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor was permissible.However, intervention in Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda to overthrowdespotic regimes was not (2001, 274). Others argue that Walzerhas a more refined conception of the legitimacy of collectiveforeign intervention. Moszkowicz views Walzer’s justification ofthe legitimacy of humanitarian intervention as evident inresponse to grave and systematic violation of individual, humanrights (2007). These violations may be a consequence ofnationalist, intra-state warfare. The systematic, gross violationof individual human rights is the justification for intervention.According to this argument, national self-determination andsecession for a national minority is justifiable. The necessaryconditions are to create a political environment that ends thesystematic abuses and is more protective of individual humanrights (Moszkowicz 2007, 284, 288-92, 296).

Current international practice shows that the right ofnational self-determination gains support when the suppression ofnational self-determination generates a humanitarian catastrophe.The humanitarian crisis per se does not cause the intervention.Rather, the crisis, including mass refugee flows, threatensregional political destabilization impinging on Great Powerinterests. Examples include East Timor and Kosovo in that in bothcases, the political clamor for international intervention arosein response to the atrocities and humanitarian calamities. Theintervention was not due to the lack of national self-determination per se (Hoffmann 2001, 275). In East Timor, thefocus was on Indonesian military and paramilitary atrocities inreaction to a UN-sponsored referendum on independenceoverwhelmingly in favor of independence. The focus was not onIndonesia’s non-compliance with the results of the referendum(Hoffmann 2001, 274-75). In 1991, the UN Security Council neverpromised the Kurds and Shiites of Iraq national self-determination. The UN Security Council rather called on Saddam’spredominantly Sunni Arab regime to stop atrocities against them(Hoffmann 2001, 275).

The principle of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) withininternational community became high profile in international

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discourse following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Report of theInternational Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, vii-viii,5). It attempts to conceptualize normative justifications forinternational intervention in the sovereign affairs of statesregarding systematic human rights violations. Theorists haveappropriated just war theory for a historical philosophicalcontext within which to place R2P. Just war in the form ofmilitary intervention must not only end the human rights abuses,but it must also rebuild the political order to prevent them fromrecurring (Massingham 2009, 804-07).

Just War Theory and Humanitarian Military Intervention

Catholic “just war” theory is the most coherent body ofthought on the ethical treatment of the use of state force ininternational relations. According to writers such as PatriciaMcNeal, early Christian pacifism ended in the fourth centuryduring the reign of the Roman emperor Constantine. Augustinesubsequently adapted the secular just war criteria toChristianity and laid the basis for all modern Christian thoughton war. Thomas Aquinas expounded the just-war doctrine, whichsubsequent thinkers refined. It sets forth the principles bothfor going to war, jus ad bellum, and for waging it, jus in bello. Thecore elements are the following:

A competent authority must declare war. A just cause must exist for engaging in war. The evil results of war must be less than the likely

beneficial results of a war, i.e. the so-called principle ofproportionality.

The waging of war must be a last resort, i.e. after theprotagonists have exhausted all peaceful means.

The waging of war must occur with the right intention, i.e.a prerequisite for the waging of war is that its purpose isto achieve a just end (McNeal 1996, 33-34).

The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia was one of the firstextended crises leading to the use of deadly force by theinternational community in the new post Cold War internationalorder. At its end, a determination that the Kosovo interventionwas a just war could only occur after the fact when Russia failed

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to intervene to block NATO. The classical international legalprinciple of effectiveness holds that legal claims, such as anintervention being just, are in force only with the effectiveapplication of power to actualize them (Cassese 2005, 12). Thusaccording to the international legal principle of effectiveness,NATO demonstrated that the intervention was in fact a just waraccording to the above criteria. In this sense, proving it was ajust war means creating political facts during the interventionthat make it appear just in this anarchic, self-help,decentralized international system. If Russian militaryintervention had led to a violent escalation between the US andRussia, then one would probably not argue that the interventionwas just (Knowlton 1999, Fitchett a1999). News reportsimmediately following Operation Allied Force in Kosovo note thatNATO and Russian forces could readily have come into directmilitary confrontation. British General Sir Michael Jacksonrefused NATO commander US General Wesley Clark’s order tointercept militarily a Russian force moving into Prishtinaairport from Bosnia. He retorted, “'No, I'm not going to do that.It's not worth starting World War III" (Fitchett b1999).Statecraft is critical, then, in making an intervention just orunjust; it includes a prediction and strategic influence oftrends. It means shaping perceptions of capabilities andintentions, individually and collectively. The NATO interventionand the Russian response changed the situational dynamics topermit the UN to intervene. Nationalists striving for nationalself-determination regardless of whether of the Croat, Kosovar orKurdish varieties, however, are willing to pay these high costsalbeit at risk of escalation.

Intervening in a multinational state such as Yugoslavia orIraq or Syria may be politically more precarious for the regionaland international system. In sum, state leaders have to helpcreate these appropriate international political contextualcircumstances through hard and soft power-based politicalstrategy.

Others argue that just war theory developed in relation toopponents who do not follow the rules of war between “civilizednations.” These actors are those who do not abide by the war-fighting rules that the great powers of the time establish

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(Stimpson 2007). Referencing the relativism inherent in theprinciples of the doctrine, “competent authorities” are the greatpowers themselves in the anarchic, self-help internationalsystem. They focus on dealing with these enemies of theestablished international order in which US influence is todaypredominant. These advocates have argued for jettisoning “justwar” theory (Stimpson). The debate centered on the question ofwhether or not a Catholic can in good conscience participate inwar on the side of the US-led coalition in Iraq. It was part ofthe US-declared, controversial “war on terror” since the 11September 2001 attacks. Other labels that G.W. BushAdministration figures had used to describe the enemy include“radical Islamic terrorism” or even more colorfully, “Islamo-fascism” (Adams, C., Alden E. 2005). It is a conceptualization ofthe current conflict between the US and its allies, on the onehand, and a social movement in the Muslim world, on the other. Itconforms with the immediate post Cold War prediction of a “clashof civilizations” (Huntington 1993, Anderson, Roy R., Seibert,Robert F., Wagner, Jon G. 2012, 377-78).

Humanitarian Intervention and the Clash of Civilizations

The theoretical conceptualization of nationalism that thisstudy employs is in Martha L. and Richard W. Cottam (2001). Inparticular their focus is on the extent of “identity communitycomplementarity” overlap between territorial, religious, ethnicand racial community self-identification. It would manifestitself in identifiable patterns of collective political behavior(Cottam and Cottam 2001, 45-47). How to define a civilization isan intriguing question from the perspective of conflictresolution. Arguably it, like ethnicity and race, is ultimatelysubjectively defined. The boundaries between the civilizationalin and out-group are dynamically evolving social constructions.They exist, if at all, as the politically prevailing self-identification among the members of the in-group community asdisplayed in political interaction with out-group communities.The extent to which a consensus exists both among the elite andthe public on where to locate these boundaries would be oneindicator of the intensity of the in-group self-identification.

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One typical assumption appears to be that a civilization issignificantly, perhaps largely, defined as the community ofinheritors of a religious tradition. This tradition is understoodas inherited from the pre-modern era during which it provided thepredominant political symbolic legitimation symbol set forimperial rule and expansion. Dourley provides an application ofCarl Jung’s work on the “participation mystique” and “representationscollectives” to analyze relationships of the three national groupsin Bosnia (1998). The potential intensity of religiouscivilizational identity is evident in the cases of individualsparticipating in genocidal inter-communal ethno-sectarianviolence.

The symbolic role of the Catholic Church has a substantialpotential to affect the usefulness of political identity symbolmanipulation. It may strengthen or undermine political claims ofa clash of civilizations. Pre-modern political leaders were thenand may be romantically stereotyped today as defenders of anidealized traditional identity community if not as “defenders ofthe faith.” The Vatican futilely insisted that the draft EuropeanUnion constitution include a reference to Europe being theinheritor of Judeo-Christian values. It illustrated thecontinuing political symbolic significance of civilizationalstereotypes of self and other. “The pope was particularly upsetthat the new European Constitution signed in late 2004 made nomention of Christianity's cultural, historical and spiritualrole” (“Pope John Paul II: Obituary”).

Prevailing national political identity values in Europe andthe Americas appear to focus primarily on existing ethnic andterritorially-defined communities, respectively. Still, inEurope, religious-community components of identity are important,particularly in regional contexts such as Northern Ireland andthe Balkans. Religious political militancy occurs within existingpolitical contexts characterized by varying degrees of politicalpolarization (Selim 2009, 59). Cottam and Cottam note thatprimary intensity self-identifiers with a religious communityconflate this identity allegiance with other, overlappingnational identity components. These delimiters include ethnic,racial and territorial identifications. Consequent implicationsfor perceived political obligations among national governments in

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relation to contemporary conflicts will follow. For example, pan-Islamist self-identifiers in Iran will tend to view the Iraniangovernment’s obligations towards the Palestinians with primaryintensity. Their foreign policy preferences will be differentfrom their fellow citizens who share primary intensity Iranianself-identification. Yet, the latter do not share a primaryintensity attachment with this pan-Islamic community of religiousbelievers. The latter will be less willing to devote and riskIranian national resources to supporting the Palestinian cause.The former, in turn, will be prone to view the latter as traitorsand infidels (2001, 54).

In the United States, the contemporary conservativeChristian political movement is particularly strong amongProtestants (“The Tea Party and Religion” 2011). The election ofJohn F. Kennedy as President in 1960 appeared to indicate thesuccessful integration of minority Roman Catholics into the UScore political culture. Yet, the reinvigoration of sectarianpolitical self-identification and its influence in the statepolicy making process is evident in the US and elsewhere. Therise of the “religious right” simultaneously with thedisintegration of the Cold War and the rise of political Islam inthe latter third of the twentieth century are indicative of it.The Roman Catholic Church’s potential for contributing toconflict resolution in this post Cold War context of risingsectarian nationalism may be significant. It stems partly fromits avowedly transnational institutional role. It has anadministrative hierarchy and a high-profile leader with formallegal sovereign recognition. The Roman Catholic Church’spotential for contribution to conflict management focuses on theGreat Powers. Their propensity for intervention and the featuresof their intervention in local, nationalist conflicts areessential components for conflict resolution.

The Roman Catholic Church as an advocacy organization aimsto persuade governments and their publics to support what itclaims are universal human rights. However, it also emphasizesadvocacy for the protection of the rights of the world’s CatholicChristian population. As such, the concern exists that it mayfind itself in a political dilemma in which it risks appearing tofavor the human rights of one major sect of the world’s

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population over another. The result may well be the exacerbationand intensification of nationalist conflicts. Also, allowingitself to become part of the legitimation mechanism forparticularistic national policies is a danger. The United StatesConference of Bishops itself recognized that humanitarianintervention is “a cloak for great power dominance, as itsometimes has been in the past” (Powers). A Vatican focus is uponprotection of Christian minorities amidst the violence in theMiddle East (Glatz 2004, “Pope Francis says he won't rest whileChristians are persecuted in the Middle East” 2013). The claim ofprotecting minorities should be a particular concern of ChristianNGOs in that state governments may cloak in it their pursuit ofparticular foreign policy aims (e.g. “Bush's shifting rationalefor Iraq war” 2006). The Pope’s symbolic role as a representativeof the Judeo-Christian West gained global prominence in 2006under Pope Benedict XVI. The hostile response in the Muslim worldto his quotation of anti-Islamic comments of a late medievalByzantine emperor illustrated the sensitivity of his position(Fisher 2006).

The Catholic Church as an NGO is of course very large andvery diverse in terms of the viewpoints that large groups ofmembers hold on any particular global policy issue. Thesedisputes included the meaning of human rights and violentconflict and how to address them in the case of the Iraq War(Plumley 2006). Consequently, from the perspective of a member,as well as of an observer, the public position of the Pope onglobal policy issues is convenient. It permits an identifiable“Catholic Church” position, albeit unofficially, to exist. TheUnited States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) representsas the name indicates just what it is. It is the position of theUS Catholic Church hierarchy on issues that it collectively feelsnecessary to express an opinion. One might well expect that mostCatholic Americans do not even know that the USCCB exists. Thepontiff displays a higher public profile in terms of politicalinfluence capability over the Catholic citizenry in the US.

Conflicts between the USCCB and the Pope are not withoutprecedent although they are not direct. Towards the end of theCold War, the USCCB briefly did acquire a high public profileamong the American intelligentsia. In 1983, it condemned Mutual

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Assured Destruction (MAD) in nuclear war fighting strategy asimmoral (USCCB 1983). Polish bishop Karol Józef Wojtyła hademerged as a strongly anti-Communist figure with his election asPope John Paul II in 1978. John Paul II came from a background inwhich Poland’s Roman Catholic Church was a symbol of nationalresistance to the Moscow-installed Communist client regime inPoland. He cooperated with the US Reagan Administration,including funneling support to the Solidarity independent tradeunion movement in Poland (Bernstein 1992). This policy choicearguably indicated that he was closer in his worldview to the onethat prevailed in the Reagan administration than the one thatprevailed at this time in the USCCB. The analyst may infer thatthe USCCB did not perceive the USSR as an adversary of suchmonolithic aggressive intensity to the degree that prevailedwithin the Reagan administration (Cottam 1977, 313-33). Factionswithin the core constituency support for the Reaganadministration saw the USSR as an intense threat requiringassurance of nuclear annihilation to necessitate its cooperation.This MAD would be the foundation that would be logicallynecessary to motivate Moscow as an “evil empire” to coexist andcooperate with the West (Reagan 1983). If a split did existbetween the USCCB and the Vatican, the differences in policypositions on this major Cold War conflict defining theinternational political system were not direct. John Paul IInever publicly contradicted the 1983 statement of the USCCB. TheUSCCB did of course cite John Paul II’s condemnation of war asevil, although it did recognize the right of use of force inself-defense.

Both John Paul II and the USCCB were explicit in theirrejection of a pacifist position, coming to view use of force aspart of “humanitarian intervention” as justifiable. John Paul IIalso later accepted the necessity of use of force in the Balkansand in Afghanistan (Plumley 2006, 3).

Humanitarian Intervention and Human Rights Diplomacy

Shannon notes that the pervasive foreign policy pursuit ofparticularistic nationalistic objectives weakens the influence ofinternational norms of non-intervention. Yet this intervention

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must be justified in terms of prevailing international norms ofappropriate behavior (2000, 296-97). A conflict potentialinherently exists in a powerful nation state such as the US usingits power leverage to promote what its government may claim arehuman rights (Herrmann, R., Keller, J. 2004, 574-76). Cottam andCottam note that this pitfall is greater in their pursuit towardsanother nation state political community manifesting relativelyintense nationalistic value predispositions. The aim may be toreduce systematic state agent abuse of minority individuals andgroups on its territory. The appearance of an initiator state’sunilateral administration of pressure puts at risk the minoritygroup within the target state on behalf of whom the initiatorstate is generating the pressure. The minority group risksappearing among the nationalistic majority group of the targetstate as an agent of the initiator state. Political entrepreneursmay exploit national symbols in response to this dispute.Consequent additional suspicion within both the target governmentand public perceptions towards the minority may emerge. Negativestereotyping against the minority as a policy consequence mayoccur as a result of the same policy that aims to protect thisminority (2001, 263-65).

The Roman Catholic Church’s highly developed, formal andinformal institutional roles would appear to be useful forsupporting a diverse, consistent human rights constituency. Itmay thereby support placing transparent transnational pressure onindividual state democratic legislative, executive and judicialprocesses. Democratic regimes demonstrate a variety of accesspoints for public opinion pressure through decentralization ofinstitutional communications between the public and thegovernment. EU liberal democratic integration may further developthese public opinion pressure access points upon nationalgovernments of developed European societies.

The second part of the strategic formula requires theconceptualization of national self-determination as a humanright. National self-determination for an aspiring nationalcommunity will not fade away by its own accord, as if it weremerely an ideological predisposition. A community thatcollectively views itself as having both the right and thecapability to win national self-determination despite the heavy

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price of struggle will pay this price. The struggle will beagainst the international regional political status quo. As thePalestinian Arab case illustrates, the potential for intra-community and regional conflict and violence will increase(Bornstein 2009). The violation of the human rights of theindividual will consequently be greater along with thepolarization and hatred that strengthens itself in a self-reinforcing cycle of violence. Local and regional actors may haverespective great power patrons that aid their respective localclients and thereby contribute to the conflict. Nationalism willtend to supersede other political motivations for communitypolicy behavior, overriding individual human rights protectionand making their violation more likely.

NGOs would need to advocate peace strategies in situationsin which the power centers of the international community reactto nationalist movements instrumentally. Great Power support oropposition to national self-determination movements emerges inregard to their perceived role in promoting their respectiveregional foreign policy aims. A human rights diplomacy under theleadership of an “ideal typical” transnational NGO, therefore,should include a focus on national self-determination. It wouldbe one component of the panoply of human rights that it advocatesconsistently and transparently in relation to all state actors.

The US Roman Catholic Church and the Iraq War

This framework permits evaluation of the peace activism ofthe Roman Catholic Church in relation to this Weberian ideal-typical model of a transnational, human rights NGO. To rephrase,the evaluation focuses on the strategy of seeking conflictresolution through promotion of human rights, including the humanright of national self-determination. The case study forexamination is the ongoing Iraqi civil war and the role of the USRoman Catholic Church in critiquing the activity of US-ledinternational coalition in it.

Firstly, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops did opposethe launch of the Iraq war in March 2003 (USCCB 2002). In 2001,it did support the US-led invasion of Afghanistan to defend theUS against terrorism while reiterating the need to address the

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sources of terrorism. The USCCB called for resolution of thePalestinian-Israeli conflict with the implementation of a two-state solution (2001). However, this statement also noted thatparticipation in the war by American armed forces personnel wasnot immoral (Levinas, 13, 22). Only one US Catholic Bishop,Bishop John Michael Botean of the Romanian Byzantine CatholicRite equated participation in the war as a mortal sin. On 7 March2003, only days before the start of the US invasion of Iraq,Bishop John Michael Botean stated,

[…] I, by the grace of God and the favor of theApostolic See Bishop of the Eparchy of St. George in Canton,[Ohio, USA (BD)] must declare to you, my people [the severalthousand Romanian Byzantine Catholics in North America(BD)], for the sake of your salvation as well as my own,that any direct participation and support of this waragainst the people of Iraq is objectively grave evil, amatter of mortal sin. Beyond a reasonable doubt this war ismorally incompatible with the Person and Way of JesusChrist. With moral certainty I say to you it does not meeteven the minimal standards of the Catholic just war theory.

Thus, any killing associated with it is unjustifiedand, in consequence, unequivocally murder. Directparticipation in this war is the moral equivalent of directparticipation in an abortion. For the Catholics of theEparchy of St. George, I hereby authoritatively state thatsuch direct participation is intrinsically and gravely eviland therefore absolutely forbidden (Botean 2003). […]

Bishop John Michael’s public position received voluminouscommentary on the Internet. Within the Catholic bloggercommunity, positive commentary came from peace activists who werecritical of the lukewarm opposition of the USCCB leading up towar (Waldrop 2006). One priest suggested that the USCCB’swillingness to adopt controversial policy positions suffered asevere blow as a consequence of the sex scandals rocking theChurch.1

1 Interview, Fr. Ken Miller, Pastor, St. Louis Church, Louisville, Ohio, USA. 04 December 2006.

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Bishop John Michael’s position was in stark contrast withthe position of the Archbishop Edwin F. O’Brien, the head of theU.S. Archdiocese for the Military Services. In a letter to hispriests on March 25, 2003, he wrote that members of the armedforces should carry out their duties “in good conscience.”O’Brien argued that they can “presume the integrity of theleaders who decided to go to war in Iraq.” O’Brien noted thatthe US Administration was not making all of its intelligenceinformation public (“Vatican: Both Sides to Blame for Failure toDisarm” 2003). In comparison, a representative of the CatholicWorker pacifist movement wrote subsequently,

Bishop Wenski's [Bishop Thomas Wenski, at the time chairmanof the United States Bishops' Committee on InternationalPolicy (BD)] statement says that the bishops warned of themoral problems of the Iraq war, but there is less here thanhis text suggests. Skipping over the fact that the bishopsendorsed the Afghan war as just, over the last five yearsthe bishops' statements regarding Iraq were weak, they werenot given with a united voice, there was no organizedcatechesis (or even disorganized catechesis, for thatmatter) and the conference and leadership's statements werealmost immediately contradicted and rendered meaningless bythe many bishops who supported the Republican and Democraticparties in the 2004 election. Some of these bishopsdepersonalized the victims of our war policy in order tojustify their support for a bi-partisan regime that hadwaged two unjust wars! The deaths of those innocent peopleweren't so bad, they said, because while deaths of unbornchildren are always morally wrong, deaths of innocent peoplein war aren't always morally wrong if it is a just war.Their implication was clear and often explicit - the Afghanand Iraq Wars are just wars! (Waldrop 2006).

Mr. Waldrop continued, noting that “Only one Bishop had thecourage to speak the full truth about the Iraqi War, and that wasthe Most Reverend John Michael Botean of the Rumanian Catholicdiocese of Canton, Ohio …” [sic] (2006).

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Subsequently, on 13 November 2006, the entire USCCB approvedby voice vote a four-page document. The USCCB Committee onInternational Policy in collaboration with the U.S. Archdiocesefor the Military Services and the USCCB Administrative Committeeprepared it for this meeting. It expressed support for the workof the Iraq Study Group in order to “help bring about the honestdialogue that our nation needs” (USCCB 2006, 2). Bishop Boteanearlier sent a letter to all bishops stating that the “mostpressing need” facing the conference was “to address publicly themoral issue of the war in Iraq” (O’Brien 2006). Robert Gates, USSecretary of Defense during 2006-11, replaced Donald Rumsfeld whohad overseen the US-led invasion of Iraq. A national USRepublican Party figure, Gates was a founding member of the IraqStudy Group. He remained US Secretary of Defense in theDemocratic Obama Administration that came into office in 2008 tosucceed the Republican G.W. Bush Administration. The Iraq StudyGroup produced the influential blueprint strategy for US militarydisengagement from Iraq. With the US force “surge” in 2007 andeventual withdrawal by December 2011 the USCCB has continued toissue statements on Iraq until September 2012. The most prominenttheme in these statements has been the protection of Iraq’sChristian minority (USCCB “Iraq”).

March 19, 2007 was the fourth anniversary of the start ofthe US-led invasion of Iraq. Bishop John Michael Botean led aspecial vespers mass for all of the victims of this war at St.George’s Church in Canton, Ohio, USA that this writer attended.The 50 attendees at the service included Johnnie A. Maier, Jr.,chairman of the local US Democratic Party organization for StarkCounty, Ohio. Mr. Maier noted that his background includesRomanian ancestry.2

In an interview, Bishop Botean portrayed just war theory asa result of the adaptation of Christian doctrine to stateinterest. In developing it as such it has resulted in derogationfrom the Christian principles of “loving one’s enemies.”3 Boteannoted that most references to just war theory forget to note thatAugustine also said while fighting one’s enemy one was to love2 Personal communication, 19 March 2007, reception immediately following the service.3 Bishop John Michael, personal interview, 01 April 2007.

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them. He stated that the Catholic Byzantine rite is notcompletely comfortable with Augustine’s thinking because of hisLatin background. Still, Catholic Byzantine rite thinkersacknowledge that Catholic social thinking is much more developedas Christian social thinking than in the Protestant or theOrthodox schools. Bishop Botean noted Rerum Novarum as an example(Pope Leo XIII, 1891). Bishop Botean asserted that the Pope todayis the de facto personal representation of Christianity to therest of the world. Pope Benedict’s symbolic act to pray at theBlue Mosque in Muslim fashion in the direction of Mecca duringhis late 2006 visit to Turkey was therefore especiallysignificant (“Turkey trip 'defines Benedict papacy'” 2006). Itcame not long after the widespread interpretation in the Islamicworld of his September 2006 speech to his alma mater atRegensburg as anti-Islamic (“Dry speech that snowballed aroundthe world” 2006). It was a symbolic effort at reconciliation(“Pope Benedict XVI tours Hagia Sophia, prays in Blue Mosque”2006).

As to the consequences of Bishop Botean’s pastoral letter,Botean said he sought out US Catholic military chaplain EdwinO’Brien to get his feedback regarding his letter. Botean notedthat O’Brien appreciated Botean approaching him because O’Brienhad gotten queries from US military chaplains regarding how torespond to Botean’s letter. Botean explained that he wasattempting to help out conscientious objectors regarding the war.O’Brien appreciated the explanation. Evidently, no one hadcontacted Bishop Botean directly regarding his letter at the timeof this interview.

Bishop Botean noted that the Catholic hierarchy does nothave a single position on anything. Cardinal Ratzinger’sopposition to the Iraq war heavily influenced John Paul II’sopposition to it.4 Disagreement within the church with the popeon non-doctrinal issues is typical. Bishop Botean insisted thatthe final arbiter on morality in foreign policy, particularlyregarding use of force, is not the state (Botean 2003). Boteandid nevertheless understand that the just war theory is thepredominant theoretical framework within the Church. In Botean’sview, even according to this framework, participation in this war4 Bishop John Michael, personal interview, 01 April 2007.

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was unethical. Botean recognized that his obligation was todefend conscientious objectors and his flock more broadly whoshare his view or who even doubt the morality of the Iraqinvasion. Consequently, public debate and persuasion was anobligation for him. Nor, of course, in this age of nationalism,should Catholic peace activists expect their positions to bepopular. Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker movement sufferedmajor losses in US public acceptability due to their rejection ofUS participation in World War II. They therefore supportedconscientious objectors (Egan 1996).

A challenge confronting the Catholic Church as a globalhuman rights NGO is that it is too large and too diverse in itsinterests. Indeed, public dissension by the Catholic hierarchyduring a time of war is a relatively new phenomenon. Among theAmerican mass public, the Catholic minority had been a group thatthe Protestant majority tended to view with political contemptand mistrust (Klejment, A., Roberts, N.L. 1996, 156). TheAmerican Catholic minority only by the end of the Second WorldWar had begun to enter the middle-class political mainstream(Klejment and Roberts 1996, 156). Until that time, Catholicclergy leadership willing to dissent from US foreign policy hadbeen miniscule. Regarding civic duties in times of war, virtuallythe sole position it espoused was, for example, the duty of theindividual Catholic to the nation. This duty took the form ofobedience to the will of the government to submit to the draft(Egan 1996, 124).

The roots of a more visible, higher Catholic clergyinvolvement in peace movements dissenting from prevailing USgovernment policy emerged during the Vietnam era. The Catholicclergy’s engagement on issues of international peace had acatalyst in the work of the Second Vatican Council, during 1962-65. On 11 April 1963, Pope John XXIII issued his Pacem in Terris(Peace on Earth) encyclical. Controversial components of theletter included a call for peaceful coexistence between thecapitalist and communist world, as well as providing an implicitsanction for civil disobedience (Egan 1996, 129). Eileen Egan isan American Catholic peace activist who co-founded theorganization, Pax. According to Egan, John XXIII reiterated in

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this encyclical the statement of “Pope Benedict XV, the PeacePope of the First World War,” that:

The Gospel has not one law of charity for individuals andanother for states and nations (Egan 1996, 127).

Later, Egan claims that Pope John XXIII “echoed” Pope BenedictXV. Pope John II asserted that “[t]he same moral law whichgoverns relations between individual human beings serves also toregulate the relations among political communities” (Egan 1996,129). Joseph Alois Ratzinger’s selection of the name “BenedictXVI” upon his election as Pope in 2005 noted his predecessor’speace diplomacy. Benedict XV’s avowedly neutral papacy after hiselection in September 1914 focused on failed attempts atpeacemaking that led many nationalists in the church to derideand revile him (Jaccarini 2008). Their charges included biasfavoring the enemy and undermining soldier morale, with majorpower national Catholic hierarchies vigorously supporting thenational war effort.

The American Catholic church hierarchy during the course ofthe postwar era evolved along with changes in the political viewsin the US regarding the Cold War. The predominant voice of theAmerican Catholic clergy was the Catholic Association forInternational Peace (CAIP). It of course used the just wartradition to justify in 1966 again its support for the Americancontainment strategy and specifically for the US reliance upon anuclear deterrent. Consequently, it became a primary focus formobilization and dissent within the Catholic peace activistmovement. One critic claimed that “[i]n our own time and in ourown country, we are not far from the contagion of nationalism, anunquestioned hyper-patriotism, an attempt to identify the causeof the State with the cause of Christ” (Scharper 1965, qtd. inEgan 1996, 155).

American clergy views regarding the Vietnam War evolved fromsupport to dissension. In 1967, for example, the American Jesuitpublication America strongly supported the war (Egan 1996, 155).The American Catholic bishops more broadly, however, did move tomake dissent against US foreign policy in effect the prevailingview among US clergy. It referenced the just war tradition. On

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November 19, 1971, the national conference of US bishops adopteda resolution. It declared that the US’ ongoing use of force inSoutheast Asia was causing more harm than any good that wouldconceivably emerge from it. Speedily ending the war therefore wasthe highest moral imperative (Egan 1996, 144). Later, in 1983,American Catholic bishops issued their rejection of MutualAssured Destruction, and skepticism regarding nuclear deterrencemore broadly. They did so at a time of a reinvigorated Cold War.

Today, militant Catholics who intensely self-identify withthe United States at a primary intensity level may also tend toself-identify with the Catholic Church. In this regard,nationalistic political communities such as the US are more proneto stereotyping than non-nation states (Cottam and Cottam 2001,18-19). They would likely view the US and the Catholic Church asdefinitive representations of Western civilization. William A.Donohue of the Catholic League is representative of such dual,primary-intensity self-identifier with the American nation andits American Catholic component community. Commenting on aTurkish film’s portrayal of American soldiers, Donohue stated,

In this country [US (BD)], we are civilized. We don'tappreciate it when somebody sticks it to you in the name offreedom of speech, sir. We condemn it. But over there, they

take the uncivilized approach. And then they wonder why somany people don't trust the Muslims when it comes to liberty,because they will abuse it. In this country, we prize freedomof religion. They abhor it (2006).

The membership of the Roman Catholic Church as a transnationalNGO is prone to be susceptible to these nationalisticstereotyping tendencies at the national level. The churchhierarchy is in a position to oppose them, if willing. Just wartheory, however, developed in a pre-nationalistic age, in whichnation states did not exist. Indeed, as noted above, a movereportedly exists within the Catholic Church to dispense withjust war theory. It aims to permit theological support for totalwar against enemies who seek revolutionary change of theinternational political status quo through terrorism (Stimpson2007).

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The paradox is that the Roman Catholic Church’s publicopinion influence potential derives partly from its omnipresentplace in national society. Yet, this widespread involvement alsoweakens its capacity to mobilize to create a common position. Thehierarchical nature of the church partly compensates for thisobstacle. In the view of the typical US citizen, for example, theposition of the Pope is the position of the Roman CatholicChurch.

Conclusion

The acceptance of national self-determination as a humanright for groups meeting the requirements for recognition as anaspiring nation would require a reconceptualization of humanrights. It needs to allow the structured disintegration of Iraqand Syria to be a just cause (Wright 2013). The US-led invasionof Iraq appears to have made this outcome more likely. From theperspective of Iraqi Kurds, for example, the beneficial resultsof the war outweighed the costs. These include the solidificationof American commitment to de facto Kurdish sovereignty overnorthern Iraq (Parsons 2007).

In the former Yugoslavia, the strategy of the US and therest of the international community was first to stabilize theregional situation (Cottam and Cottam 2001, 265). The US isapparently now following a similar strategy in Iraq and Syria.With the invasion and destruction of the Baathist regime in Iraqand the disintegration of the Syrian Baathist regime, the currentUS strategy appears to be relatively low cost for the US.National secession is not an option which government spokespeoplenote. However, former diplomats such as Peter Galbraith proposedthat the international community accept the formal partition ofIraq. Peter Galbraith had previously been the US ambassador tooverwhelmingly Roman Catholic Croatia during the end of theBosnian War (Galbraith 2007). The alternative is to accept theinevitability of the violent genocidal disintegration of Iraq andSyria with the consequent implications for the entire post WorldWar I order in the Middle East. Resistance to the inevitable,however, is likely to sharpen and intensify regional

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polarizations even further, magnifying the potential forgenocidal violence.

A hypothesis for further research would be that theVatican’s position on these issues can be important in affectingthe debate within the great powers. Pope Francis’ interest in thePalestinian-Israeli dispute is clear. He reiterated the Church’ssupport for a two-state solution during his pilgrimage to theHoly Land, meeting with the Orthodox Ecumenical PatriarchBartolomew I (i24News 2014). Immediately following it, he invitedIsraeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian AuthorityPresident Mahmoud Abbas to a “joint prayer meeting” in theVatican on June 8, 2014. He stated, “This will be a meeting for ajoint prayer, and not a mediation. There will be a rabbi, amullah and me” (ITAR-TASS 2014). Pope Francis’ statements comeless a month after the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, usedthe term “apartheid” to describe the likely outcome of a failureto reach a two-state agreement (Cohen, T.  Labott, E. 2014).Religious and academic groups are mobilizing in the US under theBoycott, Divest and Sanction movement to push Israel to implementa two-state agreement (“Israel Boycott Considered By USPresbyterians” 2014).

This debate should focus on how to respond to thenationalist forces motivating the Arab Spring and the subsequentevents. These events include the civil wars among thedisintegrating post-colonial states in North Africa, EasternMediterranean and Mesopotamia. The Roman Catholic Church is onlyone non-state transnational actor with a vested interest in theregion. Cooperation with other international actors that areauthoritative among the leaders of Muslim communities of theregion would be a prerequisite for a more effective globaldialogue. This dialogue should move towards structuring a newpolitical order in the Levant and Mesopotamia. Participants wouldinclude the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Muslimrelief organizations. A productive route may be to include anddevelop the current UN “cluster” network for coordinatinghumanitarian relief assistance to disaster areas, manmade,natural or both (Heath 2014, 242-46). The current structureemphasizes the UN appointing a UN agency to coordinate reliefefforts among the diverse intergovernmental organization, state

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and non-governmental organizations (Heath 2014, 249-51, 264-66).The nine million internally displaced persons and refugees mostlyin Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey from the Syrian conflictalone is now 40% of the Syrian population (Al-Jazeera 2014). Thescale of the disaster and its political consequences indicatethat nationalist conflict resolution strategies will beinseparable from humanitarian relief and reconstruction policies(Heath 2014, 270, 272-78). Relief provision may well requireoverriding Syrian government objections to relief agenciesaccessing rebel-held territory (Sengupta 2014). Current UNstructures provide an institutional framework for public opinionmobilization and lobbying by the Roman Catholic Church and otherglobal high-profile non-state actors. Muslim internationalorganizations and non-state actors must play their part. Yet oneof the critical functions of the Catholic Church would be tomobilize Western public opinion to pressure Western governments.The goals of this pressure would include reconstitution of stateactors of the Levant and Mesopotamia to increase the prospectsfor satisfying human needs. These needs include safety, security,dignity and development for all ethno-sectarian national groupsin the area, e.g. Jews, Maronites, Sunni Arabs (including thePalestinians), Shia Arabs and Kurds.

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