Maintaining Authoritarianism in Syria and Egypt

Craig Browne 1

To what extent do authoritarian regimes rely on coercion to survive? Discuss with reference to

two or more cases from the Middle East.

The uprisings throughout the Middle East in 2011 were momentous events partly because they

rocked autocratic regimes that had been dominant for decades. That said, the contrasting

outcomes in Egypt and Syria would suggest that the respective regimes differed in their methods

of survival and to a certain extent that is correct. However, this paper will analyze coercion,

patrimonialism, co-option and corporatism, and rents and international support as they were key

factors that enabled the Egyptian and Syrian regimes to remain in power for such a long period

of time. These factors have been selected because similar criteria have been used effectively in

the past in order to analyze authoritarianism in the Middle East, notably by Eva Bellin in her

article on the robustness of authoritarianism in Comparative Politics.1

While coercion was the most fundamental factor in sustaining authoritarianism in Egypt and

Syria, this paper cites numerous scholarly sources on Egypt, Syria, and authoritarianism in

general, in proving that it was not the only factor. Thus, Hannah Arendt’s statement on power

and violence, if one broadens violence alone to include coercion more generally, aligns with the

conclusion of this paper: ‘Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the

other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in

1 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective”

in Comparative Politics 36, 2 (2004): 144.

Craig Browne 2

power’s disappearance.’2 This conclusion has been realized to different extents in Egypt and

Syria and it supports the analysis that several factors are necessary in sustaining a regime.

While extremely difficult to define due to the differing nature of authoritarianism from country

to country, Linz’s general definition is an extremely useful base to work from. He posits that

limited pluralism, distinct mentalities in lieu of an ideology, limited political mobilization, and a

leader or small group exercising power within formally ill-defined but predictable limits combine

to define authoritarianism in its various guises around the world.3 This definition can easily be

applied to the contrasting regimes in Egypt and Syria while it also clarifies the basic nature of

these regimes.

This paper will begin by defining coercion and analyzing its mechanisms and usage throughout

recent decades in Egypt and Syria. The importance of patrimonialism will then be discussed

before co-option and corporatism are looked at, as there is much overlap between the strategies.

Finally, the ways in which Egypt and Syria have utilized rents and international support, in the

form of the USA for Egypt and the USSR for Syria, and the key role they have played in

sustaining authoritarianism in the region will be detailed. With each factor, the specific examples

of Egypt and Syria will be looked at.

2 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: Penguin, 1970), 56.

3Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 159.

Craig Browne 3

Coercion

Byman and Waxman have defined coercion as ‘the use of threatened force, and at times the

limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than

it otherwise would.’4 Applying this definition, it is clear that the regimes in Egypt and Syria have

relied upon coercion to varying degrees and at different times.

The coercive apparatus in Syria is notoriously ubiquitous, to the extent that it is a part of people’s

everyday lives.5 It has played an important role in the country, particularly since the coup in

1970 led by then Minister of Defense Hafiz al-Asad. Due to the ethnically fractured nature of

Syrian society and the volatile political factions of the time, it was important for al-Asad to

build-up a strong coercive apparatus in order to strengthen his position and maintain stability.6

Over time this apparatus was built up to include numerous, overlapping security services that

keep each other in check.7 State-security under al-Asad proved to be so pervasive over the

decades, that any opposition was extremely constrained and underdeveloped meaning

mobilizations were infrequent and readily suppressed.8 The most serious threat to the regime

came during a Muslim Brothers-led uprising in the city of Hama in February 1982. In this

4 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of

Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 30.

5 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 148.

6 Joshua Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,

2012), 63.

7 The apparatus included security services from groups as wide-ranging as the Ba’th party and the Air Force.

8 Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory” in

Comparative Politics 36, 2 (2004): 135.

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instance, ‘the iron-fist methods [al-Asad] put into practice probably saved the regime’9 as

thousands of militants and civilians were killed. Indeed, political Islam would prove to be the

regime’s strongest and most durable opposition.10

The similar omnipresence of the Egyptian security services can be seen by the fact that there

were over 1.5 million Egyptians employed by them shortly before the revolution in 2011.11

As in

Syria, coercion had been a backbone of the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak regimes in Egypt. After

signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and after much criticism of his domestic policies,

President Sadat arrested around 1500 intellectuals, religious, and political individuals in

September 1981.12

This display of coercion would directly lead to his assassination a month later

and showed the dangers on relying on coercion alone. Signs of strong opposition would still be

met with coercion under President Mubarak, as the arrest of 2000 Muslim Brotherhood members

and supporters on the eve of the 1987 parliamentary elections attests to.13

The aforementioned examples of coercion in Egypt and Syria show that coercion is a pillar of

strength for these authoritarian regimes, particularly when the survival of the regime is

9 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B.Tauris, 1988), 327.

10 Raymond Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba’thist Syria: Army, Party and Peasant

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 276.

11 Stacher, Autocrats, 7.

12 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,

2004), 144.

13 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 152.

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threatened. While this makes coercion an extremely important asset of the regimes, it cannot be

successful unless it is tied to other stabilizing factors such as patrimonialism.

Patrimonialism

Volker Perthes has rightly pointed out that religious denomination was never a criterion for

membership in Hafiz al-Asad’s regime elite, loyalty to the president was.14

While Alawites

would have a comparative advantage over others, owing to their shared sect with the president,

patrimonialism was the most important trait. Therefore, Bellin is not entirely accurate when she

writes that ‘ethnic ties are used to guarantee loyalty’15

as the relationships can be more nuanced.

The patrimonialist system, defined by Clapham as being held together by an oath of loyalty,16

was not always quite as strong as it was once al-Asad had consolidated his authority.

Immediately after his successful coup, al-Asad had to ensure that the political center was

inclusive due to Syria’s history of elite conflict.17

He enhanced his legitimacy by

institutionalizing a parliament and a constitution while the personalistic way in which al-Asad

strengthened the regime’s social and economic networks made elites more dependent upon

him.18

Even when the president’s own brother moved to take over the reins of power in 1984 al-

Asad was able to keep his position thanks to the loyalty of the coercive apparatus and the

14

Perthes, Asad, 182.

15 Bellin, “Robustness of Authoritarianism,” 149.

16 Christopher S. Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison,WI: University of Wisconisn Press, 1985),

47.


18 Perthes, Asad, 133.

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patrimonialism within it. Throughout Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency he was able introduce reform

measures selectively, by avoiding being tied to IMF or World Bank loans, and so patrimonialist

bases in the bureaucracy and public sector were extended thus improving the regime’s chances of

survival.19

Similarly, patrimonialism has been key in Egypt ever since President Nasser dismissed hundreds

of judges who refused to join his party, the Arab Socialist Union.20

This set a precedent of

dependency derived from the president’s power to appoint and dismiss whomever he wished.21

President Sadat continued this patrimonialist system, taming the military elite by linking tenure

in office to unconditional support of Sadat’s policies.22

Sadat’s Corrective Movement, whereby

he removed pro-Nasser elements from the elite, is a clear example of establishing

patrimonialism.23

The simple fact that all of the political elite owed their positions to the

president during President Mubarak’s reign emphasizes the importance of patrimonialism;

figures who gained too much popularity and power would simply be moved on to a position

holding less domestic power, as happened in the case of former Foreign Minister Amr Mousa

who was dispatched to the Arab League.

19

Perthes, Asad, 251.

20 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 168.

21 Ibid., 168.


23 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,

2007), 90.

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The strength of centralization and patrimonialism is likely to be stronger in Egypt than in Syria

owing to the homogeneous nature of Egyptian society however, patrimonialism played an

important role in both countries though arguably, co-option and corporatism have proved far

more important in Syria.

Co-option and Corporatism

There are numerous ways in which an authoritarian regime co-opts individuals and groups into

either providing support for the leadership or acquiescing to the power of the elites. As a result of

being co-opted by the regime, Syrian citizens would increase their social status, protection, and

benefits.24

The Ba’th party was used as the main component of the regime’s corporatist system as

it served as a vehicle for socialization and mobilization in the form of semi-mandatory

participation.25

In a different manner of corporatism, civil society institutions, such as the

Writers’ Union and the Women’s Union, were transformed into quasi-corporatist organizations

as they were penetrated by the regime.26

The regime of President Mubarak in Egypt showed many signs co-opting and corporatism. The

National Democratic Party was used to co-opt outside groups into the political system27

as can be

24

Stacher, Autocrats, 40.

25 Steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1999), 208.



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seen in the case of Ahmad ‘Ezz, a former steel magnate who had thrived thanks to the economic

policies of the regime, when he became a parliamentarian and saw the merging of his business

empire and the interests of the party.28

While there have been other ways in which the regime co-

opted individuals, the Mubarak regime was notable for its use of elections to allocate power to

allies and supporters, manipulating the legitimacy afforded by elections.29

Co-option and corporatism have benefitted people at both ends of the bargain in Egypt and Syria;

people have accommodated themselves with the regime in order to secure acceptable medical

care or full access to rations30

whilst the regimes have utilized this dependency upon them to

strengthen their position.

Rents and International Support

The final key factors in maintaining the survival of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes have been

the use of rents and international support. Rents come in the form of the export of minerals and

natural resources, location rents from transportation routes, grants and military aid, loans for

development purposes, and remittances.31

The funds gained from each of these rents have been

28

Ibid., 6.

29 Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 117.


31 Thomas Richter, “The Political Economy of Regime Maintenance in Egypt: Linking External Resources and

Domestic Legitimation,” in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 181.

Craig Browne 9

vital factors in the survival of the regimes in Egypt and Syrian whilst international support, in its

various guises, has had the same effect.

Rents in the form of remittances from the Gulf during the oil boom of the 1970s, and grants from

Gulf nations in support of Syria’s 1973 war effort proved to be extremely important but equally

important has been support from the USSR, and to a lesser extent Russia, as it has, since the mid-

1970s, seen Syria as the champion of ‘anti-imperialist unity’ in the region.32

On top of that, the

proximity of South Western Russia to the Middle East has led to a Russian desire to have a stable

and safe frontier in order to minimize threats from the area.33

This support has been clear ever

since the signing of the first Soviet-Syrian arms deal in the autumn of 1955, at a time of great

instability in Syria, after which more than £100 million of arms were received by the Syrians.34

This support took a more direct form in the 1973 October war when air defense units under

exclusive Soviet operation were deployed near Latakia and Damascus.35

These rents and Soviet

support enabled the Syrian regime to strengthen its grip on the population by buying

acquiescence from citizens in the form of subsidies, and by maintaining and funding a strong

coercive apparatus.

32

Efraim Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970 (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 325.

33 Efraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: the Asad Years (London: Routledge, 1988), 1.

34 Ibid., 3.

35 Ibid., 13.

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If Syria has been reliant on Soviet/Russian support over the years, the relationship between

Egypt and the USA has been even clearer. As Brownlee notes, the United States has bolstered

Egyptian regimes through: Defense, because US support tends to check the aggression of

neighbours; coup-proofing, as $1.3 billion of military aid each year satisfies the armed forces and

the coercive apparatus in general; and macroeconomic stability, whereby USAID has funded

infrastructure projects and food subsidies.36

On top of this, Egypt has received substantial

funding through its control of the Suez canal and so all of the aforementioned rents have

combined to enable successive Egyptian regimes to co-opt and coerce at will, so long as peace

with Israel is maintained.

The sheer amount of money and support received by the Egyptian and Syrian regimes, even as

oil-poor countries, has contributed to their longevity. The extent and intent is clear as 15% of

Egypt’s budget was spent on indirect subsidies in 2005.37

Authoritarian regimes can thus be

sustained by rents and foreign support even while they suffer from domestic economic woes, as

Syria experienced during the 1980s.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that while coercion has been one of the most important factors in ensuring

the survival of the regimes in Egypt and Syria, it is certainly not the only reason. Patrimonialism,

36

Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US-Egyptian Alliance (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11.

37 Richter, “Regime Maintenance,” 187.

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co-option and corporatism, rents, and international backing have all combined with coercion to

sustain formidable authoritarian regimes, though none of these features would ensure the

survival of an authoritarian regime in Egypt or Syria on their own. In spite of these shared pillars

of strength, the regimes in each country differ in terms of ethnic homogeneity, degrees of

centralization, and reliance on the coercive apparatuses. These differences are illustrative of the

various forms of authoritarianism around the world however, wherever there is a durable

authoritarian regime, there will also be a reliable coercive apparatus.

Craig Browne 12

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Maintaining Authoritarianism in Syria and Egypt

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