CREATING ENEMIES

STABILIZATION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

of

American Military University

by

David A. Mattingly

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

June 2014

American Military University

Charles Town, WV

ii

The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display

these contents for educational purposes.

The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States

copyright law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author’s creation or in the

public domain.

© Copyright 2014 by David A. Mattingly

iii

DEDICATION

The last American, Specialist Zack Zornes (4,474 killed in action during

Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn) died on November 14, 2011, killed by a

roadside bomb. In the name of freedom, to protect the United States, and to bring

freedom to a repressed nation the U.S. offered its most valuable treasure, its men and

women. In addition to those that lost their lives, thousands returned home with lifetime

physical and mental injuries, to Captain KJ who took his life after returning from Iraq and

his family. Moreover, the families; mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters whose lives

have been altered by the Iraq War to these I dedicate this paper in the hopes that in the

future before the nation goes to war policymakers will ask the right questions and analyst

and planners will explain the issues in the context to make a decision.

Additionally, I dedicate this paper to an unnamed Iraqi special forces lieutenant

colonel detained by American forces for literature found in his taxi. When he was asked

what he would do if he was released, he said my friend is now leading an Iraqi Army

unit, I want to join the Army and fight for my country. This occurred in 2005,

approximately two years after the invasion.

Lastly to the nation that gave me the opportunity to wear the nation’s cloth for

thirty-two years, my shipmates, and my family, especially my daughter Kelsey that put

up with deployments and assignments that took me away so many times as she grew up.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to acknowledge the many that have been a part of my career, that taught

me what it was to be an analyst and more important how to think. My editor added the

extra set of eyes, found all the extra commas and made great suggestions to the paper.

The last few weeks Iraq has been racked with violence many with origins in the

issues that this paper discusses. Iraq absorbed a great part of my life from 2001 to 2011.

During my research, I relied on sources available in the public forum and to the best of

my ability; I did not rely on my knowledge or memory of events that occurred during the

period with the exception of the incident described in the above dedication.

.

v

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Creating Enemies

Stabilization Operations in Iraq

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

of

American Military University

by

David A. Mattingly

American Military University, June 2014

Charles Town, WV

Professor Ronald S. Mangum

The Bush administration planned the invasion of Iraq to be a quick “in and out”

operation without dedicating a large force for the invasion and the aftermath. The

“honeymoon period” immediately after the invasion closed and the insurgency movement

emerged and grew when the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the army and

banned the Ba’ath Party and most of its members from participating in the new

government. The results of the orders created an insurgency war that the U.S. and

Coalition forces had not planned to fight. The war created numerous domestic and

foreign insurgency groups and militias as well as a largely under-governed area in

vi

Western Iraq on the Syrian border. The Syrian Civil War drew a number of groups into

the country to fight along the pro-Shi`a and pro-Sunni factions. The insurgency war born

in the aftermath of the invasion has created regional instability and conflict. The war has

also crippled the U.S. in reacting to other global conflicts at a time when Russia is

increasing its involvement in world affairs.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS .......................................................................................... v

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES.................................................................................... i

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................. 11

METHODOLOGY and RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................... 21

FINDINGS and ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 27

THE ADMINISTRATION ........................................................................................... 28

WAR PLANNING ........................................................................................................ 36

PHASE IV ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................................................ 41

INTELLIGENCE .......................................................................................................... 44

PHASE IV PLANNING................................................................................................ 47

OFFICE OF HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE (OHRA)

....................................................................................................................................... 49

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) .................................................. 51

THE ORDERS .............................................................................................................. 57

viii

THE MISSING VOICE ................................................................................................ 61

DE-BA’ATHIFICATION ............................................................................................. 62

THE INSURGENCY .................................................................................................... 67

ARAB REVOLUTION ................................................................................................. 70

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 74

FIGURES and TABLES ..................................................................................................... 1

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 1

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Table 1 Summary of Explanatory Perspectives on the Iraq Invasion ................................. 1

Table 2 Ba`ath Party Membership Levels .......................................................................... 2

Table 3 Security Indicators in Iraq April – October 2003 .................................................. 3

INTRODUCTION

“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first

being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he

intended to conduct it.” 1

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

If you are going to put people’s lives at risk you better have a darn good reason,

you better know what that reason is, know why you are doing it….”2

Secretary of Defense Donald F. Rumsfeld

President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq will arguably be the

watershed mark defining his administration and its response to the attacks on the U.S. by

al-Qaida on September 11, 2001. This paper will not debate the reasons for going to war

or whether it was a just war beyond stating the Bush administration vacillated as the

operation unfolded from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), countering the next attack

on the U.S. by reducing the terrorist threat, and finally to spread democracy in the Middle

East.34

Its failure to establish a concrete goal contributed to the failures in 2003.

This paper focuses on the decisions made by the Bush administration’s principal

decision makers—President Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State

Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor

Condoleezza Rice—which led to Coalition Provisional Authority Orders Number 1

(Disbanding the Ba’ath Party) and 2 (Dis-establishing the Iraq Army and Security

Forces). 5 This paper argues that the resulting orders were principal factors in the

emergence of the Sunni insurgency; created an environment of sectarian violence—

2

Sunni, Shi’i, and Kurd fighting—hampered the formation of a new government that

delayed Iraqi sovereignty, cost thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, and ultimately

established the conditions for other Arab revolutions to launch.

“We will demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the United States

wants to liberate Iraq, not to occupy Iraq or control Iraqis or their economic

resources.”6 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman

The decision to invade Iraq in the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11was seen

through often-distorted lenses; Americans first had the images of the attacks on 9/11, then

the administration created Iraq as the enemy with an impending threat just over the

horizon. Additionally, they remembered the quick and largely “casualty free” Operation

Desert Storm in 1991 and the successful small-scale invasion of Afghanistan that toppled

the Taliban.

Secretary Rumsfeld and the policymakers in the Department of Defense saw

Saddam’s regime as a threat based on the regime’s alleged links to terrorism and

possession of WMD, as a test bed for bringing democracy to the Middle East, and lastly

as a laboratory to further test the transformed military—one that had performed well in

Afghanistan. Secretary Powell supported the war; however, the majority in the

Department of State saw Iraq as a threat that could be contained with smart power using

diplomacy and the international community. Figure 1, Summary of Explanatory

Perspectives on the Iraq Invasion.

Exiled Iraqis saw an opportunity to return to their homeland, presented a best-case

scenario of Iraqis welcoming the Coalition, and lobbied for a position of power in the

3

new Iraq.7 However, to Arabs it was an American attempt to insert themselves into

Middle East affairs and to support Israel. Arabs would quickly see the Americans as

occupiers.

Most European allies that supported the war in 1991 saw the invasion as a “war of

choice” and a misadventure of the U.S. into the Middle East. Only the United Kingdom

would provide troops for the invasion with other countries joining later to become the

“coalition of the willing.” Critics of Rumsfeld labeled him as the “non-diplomat” after

several press statements that appeared to insult the nation’s oldest allies referring to them

as “old Europe”—later clarified by the Pentagon though Rumsfeld did not apologize for

the statement.8 Many European allies, including France that had voiced pre-invasion

opposition, who considered working in the reconstruction of Iraq, opted out after the

summer of 2003. The short-term window for the Coalition closed as security decreased

in Baghdad; the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy (August 7, 2003), a truck bomb

destroyed the United Nation headquarters in the Canal Hotel killing the lead diplomat

Sergio Vieira de Mello (August 20, 2003), and the assassination of Shite leader Ayatollah

Mohammad Baqir al- Hakim (August 29, 2003).9 10

11

Press reports quoted former U.S.

Deputy Secretary of State James Rubin, stating that the terrorism in “Iraq had changed,

pointing to more attacks against civilian targets and fewer large scale attacks against

American soldiers.”12

See Table 3 for statistical assessment of Iraq security June to

October 2003.

4

Many Bush administration policy-makers assumed office supporting Iraqi regime

change but it was not a top priority during the 2000 campaign. Moreover, Bush came to

office believing, “American leadership, and especially its use of force,[be] restricted to

defending narrow and traditional vital interests….”13

The 9/11 attacks on the United

States afforded the U.S. the opportunity to carry out what many of the policymakers saw

as the failure of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the policies of former President

William J. Clinton’s administration.1415

Many of them believed Operation Desert Storm

should have removed Saddam or at least the U.S. should have supported the later Shi`a

and Kurd uprisings. They saw the Clinton administration’s use of bomber and cruise

missile attacks on Baghdad (Operation Desert Fox) as ineffective and its failure to

support Iraqi exiles after signing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 as a demonstration of its

lack of commitment to solving the “Saddam problem.” They believed the Bush

administration should avoid Clinton era “nation building operations”, Bosnia, Kosovo,

and Somalia, that they considered a quagmire and waste of resources to be avoided.

Lastly they had little if any experience or academic study of the Middle East—its culture,

history, or human geography—if they had understood the Middle East, applied critical

thinking, and risk probability the decision making process would have likely been

different.

The foreign policy focus of Bush’s administration changed after the attacks of

September 11 and Jonathan Renshon used operational coding to divide Bush’s foreign

policy into four temporal periods: pre-presidential, pre-9/11, post-9/11, and end-of-term

5

presidency beliefs.1617

The attacks on 9/11 acted, as the traumatic catalyst that behavioral

theorists argue is needed for a dramatic change in a person’s beliefs and raised the

perceived threat of Saddam Hussein to the United States. Working from this “increased”

threat the administration’s national security policymakers moved the focus towards

regime change in Iraq as a means to prevent the “next attack.”18

General George Patton was quoted in an interview with Feith, “I would rather

have a good plan today than a perfect plan two weeks from now…”19

If there was an

impeding threat the quote could be considered correct, however the Bush administration

created the threat in the minds of America after 9/11. Haass quoted President John

Quincy Adams when he advised that the country “does not go abroad in search of

monsters to destroy…” the administration created Saddam as that monster.20

U.S. Army historians offer that Operation Iraqi Freedom planning began on

March 1, 1991—the day after the end of Operation Desert Storm.21

However, historical

events in the Middle East dating back to the Ottoman Empire, the landing of British

troops at Fao (Faw), and the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 in which the United

Kingdom and France created Iraq and other Arab states affected the later U.S. occupation

of Iraq.*

* Translation of geographic names has changed over time and is dependent on whether it

was originally an English or French translation. Geographic names mentioned in this

paper will be the name as shown in a quoted text and with the current common name in

parentheses if different i.e. Fao is now Faw.

6

The British mandate attempted to create a government and the issues surrounding

the British colonial experience re-emerged as the Coalition attempted to create a new

Iraq.22

Additionally, the role of “occupier” in Arab culture has historical connotations of

“humiliation and oppression” (often associated with the creation of Israel) rather than the

idea of freedom and liberty usually associated with the western idea of “liberator” and

this image remained in the Iraqi conscious that would result in the failure of the Coalition

to “win the peace.”23

24

25

Patrick Lang, a former senior defense intelligence officer,

argues Americans in general have a difficult time accepting that other people are different

from Americans and “we tend to attribute to them motives that we’re comfortable with,

that we think where society and human nature ought to be at the time.”26

A priority for

the Bush administration was to ensure that the elements of the Saddam regime

responsible for persecuting the Iraqi population did not reemerge after the invasion or

that the country did not fall into chaos described as—“Saddamism without Saddam.27

Many of the administration policymakers believed this meant changing the foundation of

Iraq society and that democracy was a universal ideal that would naturally emerge with

the fall of Saddam.28

The administration under estimated what would occur after the

invasion in addition to the time and resources which the U.S. would need to commit to

achieve a “new Iraq.”

There is a common idea that the Bush administration did not plan for Phase IV

operations (operations when no fully, legitimate civil governing authority is present.29

)

This paper argues that a number of agencies conducted planning. However, it was shaded

7

in the definition of planning by the various agencies of the government; from general

policy planning of the State Department to the very detailed Time Phased Force

Deployment Data (TPFDD) the Defense Department uses to move a soldiers and

materials into an area of operation.30

From 9/11 through 2002, as the plan for invading

Iraq was refined and troops moved into place in the Middle East, the attention given to

fighting the war was not afforded to Phase IV operations. Haass advised Powell in a

memo in September 2002 of the lessons from past reconstruction and how they could

occur in Iraq. He stressed “…we must prevent a security vacuum after Saddam’s

ouster…” and continued to state “long term success hinges on the establishment of

effective and legitimate governance…”31

The administration; State, Defense, National Security Council and ultimately the

President’s, lack of attention to Phase IV was evidenced in National Security Presidential

Directive (NSPD) 24 being issued on January 20, 2003, only a few weeks before the

commencement of combat operations, giving the Department of Defense primary control

over Phase IV operations.32

Although post-conflict operations were in the past the

purview of the Department of State, Secretary Powell did not argue for control and

allowed Defense to take control. Dobbins states, “Powell and Armitage believed Defense

had the money and resources to devote to the postwar mission and therefore was entitled

to run them.”33

Haass argues that the White House via the National Security Council

should direct stability and reconstruction operations because of their multi-agency

nature.34

Moreover, NSPD 24 directed ten agencies to provide experts to OHRA at a

8

seniority level adequate to represent their agencies but failed to provide clear lines of

command or provide for inter-agency coordination needed in developing a whole-of-

government approach required to focus the capabilities of the government departments,

international and non-government organizations.35

36

The appointment of Bremer as both

the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority CPA as well as presidential

envoy, compounded the problem; it gave him direct access to the president while

nominally reporting to the Secretary of Defense.

Army historians describe the period from May to August 2003 as the window of

opportunity to create a new Iraq.

“Right after we got into Baghdad, there was a huge window of opportunity that if

we had this well-defined plan and we were ready to come in with all these

resources, we could have really grabbed a hold of the city and really started

pushing things forward.” 37

Colonel David Perkins

During this period, the insurgency was at its infancy, although looting contributed to the

general failure of law and order that planners failed to anticipate and several commanders

as well as newly arrived CPA administrator and Presidential Envoy L. Paul Bremer III

later considered as contributing to the failure of Phase IV operations.3839

At this time,

negotiations were underway to bring the international community into the process, the

U.S. military was planning to go home, and General Tommy Franks was planning his

retirement.40

Soon after arriving in May 2003, Bremer issued two orders, which created a pool

of 400,000 idle men—trained and armed—alienated against the occupation to fuel the

9

emerging insurgency. Retired Army Lt General Jay Garner, the outgoing director of

OHRA, referred to the two orders plus the U.N. declaration establishing the U.S. and

U.K. as the occupation authority for Iraq as the “three tragic decisions.”41

The two orders enacted with little debate within the administration or between the

military and civilian decision makers changed the pre-invasion assumptions that affected

the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Phase IV, Stability and Reconstruction

Operations after the cessation of major combat. Richard Haass, director of policy

planning for the Department of State argued the discussion of whether the decisions

originated in Washington or Baghdad is “illuminating” on the administration.42

War planners used the administration assumptions. First, Coalition Forces would

evaluate the Ba’ath Party members based on their past and remove only the top tier; those

with “blood on their hands.”43

Second, it assumed the Iraq Police and Army would

remain intact and be a resource to maintain law and order in addition to performing other

reconstruction duties.

This paper argues that not only did these decisions increase the insurgency threat

that successfully countered the Coalition until the “Surge” in 2006 but also supported the

emerging violent groups which spread through the region especially to Syria. The Iraqi

insurgency used Syria as a safe haven for Ba’athist Former Regime leaders fearing

prosecution in Iraq—including Saddam’s family that had the ways and means to support

the insurgency. Furthermore, it would create an under-governed area between Iraq and

Syria, which allowed for the free flow of insurgents and weapons into Iraq. When civil

10

war broke out in Syria after Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to other Arab North African

nations, it led to a resurgence of violence in Iraq.4445

There are critics of the Iraq War that argue planning would not have eliminated

the problems faced after the invasion; “endemic violence, a shattered state, a

nonfunctioning economy and a decimated society faced by the Coalition after the

invasion.46

Andrew Rathmell argued that Iraq was not a good prospect for “building a

peaceful, democratic, or free-market nation” in the Middle East.47

However, it is

arguable that had the U.S. (war planning was for the most part a U.S. activity without

Coalition input) made decisions based on the long term security of Iraq and the region,

Phase IV, regional security, and current global security could have been different.48

The quick turn over of the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance,

to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) added to the “fog” hanging over the

operation. Rebuilding the state, economy and society could not occur until basic security

could reasonably be expected on the streets of Baghdad and without building the state,

economy and society the Coalition could not prevent Iraq from becoming a failed state—

a state which would be the base for future violence in the region. Middle East expert Ken

Pollack argued, “Security is the most important prerequisite for the reconstruction of Iraq.

Although there is no guarantee that reconstruction will succeed with adequate security, it

is guaranteed to fail without it.”49

The war in Iraq lasted longer than was envisioned by the Bush administration and

was acceptable to Americans in 2003 as shown in public polls and the eventual

11

redeployment of U.S. forces in 2011. Some critics of the employment of U.S. military

forces argue Americans have become casualty averse from the experiences in Somalia

and Lebanon, moreover Thomas Barnett argues Americans accept the cost of war “if the

goals are well defined and the cost seems worth the potential gain.”50

However, the Iraq

War negatively colored the U.S. in the eyes of Arabs and its European allies but more

importantly, it cast a pall of distrust of the government by American voters.

Additionally, it has restricted the options available to President Barack Obama in Syria

and will continue to restrict the options available to the president in future conflicts.51

52

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a plethora of literature written on the subject of the Operation Iraqi

Freedom and specifically Phase IV, stability, security, and reconstruction operations.

Although there is a large amount of primary source literature available, there is not a

single document that shows the discussion and decision process which dramatically

shifted the administration’s policies regarding disbanding the Iraqi Ba’ath Party and the

retention of the Iraq Security Forces. It leaves participants to tell their version of history,

often shaded by their association with the major principals— President George W. Bush,

Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld—and lastly Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, administrator of

the Coalition Provisional Authority. Many historians interpreted the lack of a letter or

memorandum from the president as the president’s lack of “hands on” leadership during

12

this portion of the operation and open to finger pointing by those in the Defense and State

Department camps.

The government released primary source documents from both President Clinton

and Bush’s administrations and other officials, including former Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld, released documents as part of their official papers or books on the

period.

Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor wrote a very well researched and

detailed book Cobra II: The inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Both

have reported extensively on military subjects and had access to many of senior leaders

during the invasion as well as the Soldiers on the ground in Iraq. The authors uniquely

were able to write their book from the “ground up” including detailed tactical maneuvers

while also discussing the invasion and occupation as well as from the highest levels of

the Bush Administration.53

Gordon was an embedded reporter with the staff of Lt.

General David D. McKiernan, commander Combined Forces Land Component

Command (CFLCC) as the war planning began through its execution and the resulting

occupation. Gordon and Trainor used primary documents from both the Coalition and

Iraqi government, including captured documents released by CFLCC and Joint Forces

Command to recreate Iraqi command and control and its reaction to Coalition ground

movement. They argued that Saddam did not believe Coalition Forces would capture

Baghdad and he failed to plan for the U.S. occupation and opined that Saddam’s war

planning for an occupation failed as badly the U.S.54

13

Like many critics of the occupation, Gordon and Trainor established that the first

three phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom were successful in toppling the regime and

capturing Baghdad but Phase IV failed, living up to the phrase “Winning the War but

Losing the Peace.” Additionally, a one-hour Council of Foreign Relations interview The

Inside Story of the War in Iraq with the authors was compliments their books and

provides additional information55

.

Gordon and Trainor authored a follow-on book Endgame: The Inside Story of the

Struggle for Iraq from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. The book compliments their

first book providing additional information on the occupation and carrying the operation

to its end and the redeployment of all U.S. forces. They argue the decision by General

Tommy Franks, U.S. Central Command Commander, to retire from the Army weeks after

the start of combat operations affected the Phase IV operations citing General Richard

Meyers’, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opinion that Franks had “taken off his

pack” after the invasion and Franks stating the occupation was “three-star work”.56

The American military chronicled its operations throughout history and OIF was

documented in a series of books; On Point I (pre-invasion to May 2003) and On Point II

(May 2003 to January 2005) cover the period addressed in this paper. On Point II steps

back to include information from the previous period that was not available at the first

book’s time of publishing that provides a better perspective of Secretary Rumsfeld’s

inflexibility in altering the operation plan as the war progressed. Lt. General William

Wallace, V Corps commander, was reported in the New York Times saying “The enemy

14

we’re fighting is different from the one we war gamed against”.57

This added to the

turmoil in the early days of transition to Phase IV, the replacement of OHRA, and the

arrival of the CPA.

As the Iraq war progressed and policymakers left the Bush Administration, many

wrote books that included personal vignettes about decisions made leading to the

invasion and Phase IV operations. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith

in his book War and Decision defended the decision-making of his office supporting

Secretary Rumsfeld and blamed the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency

for the errors and misjudgments.58

Feith argues the two mistakes made in executing OIF were, “maintaining the

occupation for over a year” and secondly, failing to “organize an adequate security

force”.59

He attempts to place blame on General Meyers and General John Abizaid,

deputy and later commander of CENTCOM, in addition to Secretary Rumsfeld, for the

small number of troops, however for the troops to be effective during the window of

opportunity they needed to be on the ground in Iraq.

Richard Haass compares the two wars; Operation Desert Storm (George H.W.

Bush) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (George W. Bush) in his book War of Necessity War

of Choice where he challenges the threat created in 2003. He argues the second Bush

administration operated under the guise of having won the election by a landslide and that

“power was to be used… and successful presidents generate power by using it.”60

15

“The standards for wars of choice must be high if the human, military, and

economic costs are to be justified. There are unlimited opportunities to use

military power—but limited ability to do so.... Even a great power needs to

husband its resources. American democracy is ill-suited to an imperial foreign

policy where wars are undertaken for some 'larger good' but where the immediate

costs appear greater than any benefit. Wars of choice are thus largely to be

avoided—if only to make sure there will be adequate will and ability to pursue

wars of necessity when they materialize."61

He uses his experience in both Bush administrations, the White House, State

Department, and National Security Council, to examine the relationship of the principals

in each agency. He argued the uniformed military often sided to a more moderate

position than the civilian leaders based on the fact they would be the ones on the

battlefield. This carried over to Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage. Both were

combat veterans compared to Rumsfeld and others in the Defense Department that lacked

combat experience.62

His final analysis is that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a war that

was preventable but counsel arguing against the war was “rebuffed.”63

There is a large amount of pre-war literature arguing for restraint and questioning

the apparent decision to go to war. In The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading

Iraq Ken Pollack, a recognized Middle East expert and former National Security Council

and CIA analyst, in 2002 warned the impact of decisions made regarding Iraq will have

“enormous repercussions.” 64

Throughout his book, he brings to point many of the ideas

of pre-war planning which in hindsight appear to be errors, such as limiting the invasion

force rather than utilizing the Powell Doctrine of an overwhelming force.65

16

A number of “think tanks” produced pre-war studies including the Center for

Strategic and International Studies’ Anthony Cordesman who has written extensively on

Iraq including the pre-invasion Planning for a Self-Inflicted Wound: U.S. Policy to

Reshape a Post-Sadam Iraq where he argues that planners must admit to a “level of

ignorance and uncertainty.”66

The Atlantic Council teamed with American University

and released Winning the Peace: Managing a Successful Transition in Iraq which argued

that a clear vision of the future of Iraq was critical not only for the U.S. but also for the

Iraq people.67

Although the Bush administration had not publically made the decision to go to

war, it was an assumption globally accepted. Ivan Eland of the CATO Institute argued

against the war and pointed out the risk of it destabilizing other governments in the

region in his article Top 10 Reasons Not to “Do” Iraq and an essay by Daniel Byman,

“Iraq after Saddam” in the Washington Quarterly pointed out the removal of Saddam

would not solve many of Iraq’s problems 68

69

Presidential administrations face an array of problems and chose to react to or not

react based on the “personality” of the administration. Many critics of the administration

argue President Bush entered office without any notable foreign policy experience and

depended on Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell and National

Security Advisor Rice.70

Fred Kaplan argued Rumsfeld was the epicenter of Iraq War

decision-making within the Bush administration.71

Bush saw the National Security team

as strong leaders that would complement each other; however, Bradley Graham’s book

17

By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld

revealed the strong personalities antagonized rather than complemented the team.72

Dr. Ali A. Allawi, who served in a number of positions in the CPA, Iraq

Governing Council and later in the new Iraq, government wrote Occupation of Iraq:

Winning the War, Losing the Peace which provides an Arab and Iraqi view of invasion

and the aftermath. Allawi argued the testimony given by Under Secretary of State Marc

Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith on February 11, 2003

demonstrated the disconnect between the two departments in planning Phase IV

Operations.73

As a participant, he provides a unique look into the attempts made early in

the occupation to establish a government starting with the Nasiriya Conference on April

15, 2003 to establish the Interim Iraqi Authority and following with a conference held in

Baghdad prior to the arrival of Bremer. The Baghdad Conference, overseen by Garner,

voted to form a post-war Transitional Government—the conference believed a

government rather than an administration would lead more quickly to sovereignty.74

Allawi argued the arrival of Ambassador Bremer reversed the work of Garner and

OHRA in creating an interim Iraq government. At Bremer’s first meeting with the Iraqi

leadership council known as the G-7, he established his position as the ultimate power in

Iraq. Until sovereignty was transferred in June 2004, the Iraqi leaders and the new

governing council would be subordinate to CPA75

Allawi argued “Iraq became a victim

of chaotic scramble to impose conflicting agendas on the government of the country,

18

ranging from the neo-conservative warriors on one hand, to the hard headed ‘realist’ of

the national security state on the other”.76

The order to disband the Iraq Army had immediate impact on security in Iraq and

this paper argues that it affected regional and global security. The order banning the

Ba’ath Party has continued to affect the political arena in Iraq through the process of de-

Ba’athification instituted by the CPA and later became Iraqi law administered by the

Higher National Office for De-Ba’athification (HNDB). The Center for Transnational

Justice studied de-Ba’athification and produced two reports, Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New

“Accountability and Justice” Law in 2008 and later A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-

Ba’athification in Iraq in 2013, and argued the process was a “deeply flawed process”

which has contributed to the current internal instability. The idea of de-Ba’athification

had historical roots in post-World War II de-Nazification of Germany and the Bush

administration considered two approaches: limited dismissal of senior party members

(Department of State and CIA) and secondly a broader dismissal of the civil service and

military (Vice President Cheney and Department of Defense).77

78

79

See Figure 2, Ba`ath

Party Membership Levels, which explains the levels of membership.

The authors contend that the CPA lost control of the process to the Iraqi

Governing Council and Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi, the first commissioner,

transformed the process into a Shi`a dominated political strong arm used as late as the

2010 national elections to decertify Sunni candidates and came to be known as “de-

Sunnificiation.”8081

The authors describe the commission as being “widely criticized as

19

secretive, all-powerful, and manipulative” and to demonstrate the long term effect of the

process in the 2010 national election, the government tried to decertify 511 candidates—

including sitting members of the Council of Representatives and 15 parties—based on

past ties to the Ba’ath Party.82

83

Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki (formerly deputy chairman of the commission

under Chalabi) has kept the Ba’ath Party alive by using the Justice and Accountability

Commission to prosecute and disqualify Sunni politicians. After the redeployment of

U.S. forces in 2011, Prime Minister Maliki removed Ahmed Chalabi as chairman and

ordered the arrest of a large number of “Ba’athists” including Vice President Tariq al-

Hashimi. 8485

Andrew Terrill in Lessons of the Iraq De-Ba’athification Program for Iraq’s

Future and the Arab Revolutions argued this has “serious consequences for Iraq’s ability

to build a unified and successful state”.86

De-Ba’athification he argues was not one

decision but a number of decisions made by the CPA and the new Iraqi government that

has alienated the Sunni people in Iraq and surrounding countries.87

He also argues that

Arabs in Arab Spring see de-Ba’athification as a worst-case scenario of what can happen

when a long-standing dictator falls.88

The Bush administration failed to see the linkages that would play out by

invading Iraq especially with its closest neighbor Syria. The war plans failed to include

forces to secure borders with Syria and Iran resulting in the free flow of weapons and

fighters to support both the Sunni and Shi`a factions. Many of the same authors that

20

wrote on pre-war Iraq also contributed to literature on Syria and especially President

Barack Obama’s options in the region. Daniel Byman and others argue, “To protect U.S.

interests, the régime of Bashar al-Asad cannot triumph. But a failed Syria…would be

just as bad.”89

The rhetoric sounds familiar to pre-invasion literature but the authors

argue it has greater international implications because of the international implications

and the Russian and Iranian support of the al-Asad regime.90

21

METHODOLOGY and RESEARCH DESIGN

The Bush administration experienced the most traumatizing event that affected

U.S. national security since the attack on Pearl Harbor. The decisions made after the 9/11

attacks were intended to “prevent the next attack”. However, the decisions; first to

invade Iraq and then CPA Orders No. 1 and 2, fueled the insurgency and created an

under-governed area used by the insurgents, as a safe-haven, and for traversing weapons

and fighters, continue to affect security in Syria and Iraq.91

To examine the administration’s decision-making process through the political

psychology process, the researcher can study a leader’s “operational code” (subset of an

individual’s beliefs) as well as their personal characteristics to explain their decision

making process and as an indicator of why and how a leader responds to an event and

then reacts. 9293

Political psychologists explain behavior by the “factors internal to the

decision makers, and that consequently these personality variables represent links”

between the leaders and their behavior.94

Margaret Herman, an early researcher in this

area developed six characteristics in political leaders: “nationalism, the need for power,

the belief in one's ability to exercise control over events, the need for affiliation,

cognitive complexity, and suspiciousness” are linked to form two basic orientations to

foreign policy (the "independent" and “the "participative”). Using content studies of

speeches and interviews, a researcher can assess “aggressive or conciliatory” behavior.95

Karen Rasler, William Thompson and Kathleen Chester in their research depart

from Hermann’s original research to argue that rather than using a random period of time

22

such as a decade, the research is temporally based on a specific period which can be

decided by a major events—the attacks on 9/11.96

Renshon goes further and breaks

Bush’s campaign period and eight years in office into four distinct periods where his

operational code changed.97

The trauma of 9/11 is the catalyst that affected Bush’s operational code and

beliefs. Bush’s beliefs are considered as stable or unchangeable are represented by his

deep religious faith and self-confidence compared to those that may change due to an

event or are situation based. Beliefs are the filters, which an individual uses to sort

information. After 9/11, the shift of situational beliefs makes it is easier to understand

how Bush accepted the assumptions made by his administration.

The administration can be broken politically into three groups; the realist, the

nationalist, and the neoconservatives.98

By understanding these three groups and their

placement within the administration and inter-play, one can begin to understand how the

president was influenced by Cheney and Rumsfeld as “nationalist” fueled Wolfowitz and

Feith as neoconservative and their propensity to create a new world with the U.S. as the

leader. Lastly, the pragmatic realist, Powell and Armitage recognized some of the faults

in planning but did not yield the power to counter-act the need for retribution after 9/11.

The paper cites literature from multiple sources to compare assumptions made

prior to the invasion by the planners in the Department of State, Department of Defense

and academia that were the basis for administration decisions especially Phase IV

operations and specifically the orders to remove the Ba`ath Party and the order to disband

23

the Iraqi armed forces. The paper questions whether these assumptions and the resulting

decisions were valid based on reporting and literature post invasion.

In foreign policy decisions, there is a natural rivalry between realism and idealism

especially within the democratic traditions of the United States. The researcher will

evaluate the Bush administration policymakers and their decisions based on this structure

using historical data to characterize their careers and events that may have affected how

they approached the Iraqi threat and invasion planning. I will delineate whether the

idealism or the realism of the Cold War and Post-Cold War era affected the policies that

continue to affect regional and global authority.

The leadership style of the Bush administration’s decision-making, groupthink,

and idealism versus realism are elements that affected the decision making process and

how decisions were made leading to CPA Orders No. 1 and 2. Margaret Hermann and

Thomas Preston created a list of six personal characteristics that relate to foreign policy

decision-making. I will apply these to President Bush and the principals within his

administration to identify their effect.

The paper uses news media reporting and assessments made by researchers that

will show the ongoing revolution in Syria is linked to Iraq and the Iraqi insurgency and

militias.

The research uses the observations based on the available literature to logically

prove or disprove the thesis that CPA Orders No.1 and 2 have directly influenced

regional and global security.

24

Social science often lacks empirical scientific evidence that can be tested and

relied on as in the “hard” sciences. In researching historical or political events, the

researcher often finds the events colored in the prejudices, biases, and political objectives

of a particular person or group. Going to war in Iraq was emotionally charged due to the

effect on the American psyche after the attacks on 9/11and the desire for retribution. The

American people were convinced by the administration that an attack by Saddam was

imminent and after the failure to locate Saddam’s WMD a level of distrust in the

administration began to evolve. Americans felt a level of betrayal after information

presented as “irrefutable proof” but was false.

The methodology used in this research is to logically examine literature written

prior to the Iraq invasion, reporting from Baghdad during the invasion, the immediate

period after the invasion commonly known as Phase IV, literature written as the new

nation of Iraq emerged, and literature surrounding the violent insurgency in Syria. The

purpose of this portion of the research is to examine the decisions made by the

administration of President George W. Bush that resulted in Ambassador Bremer issuing

Coalition Provisional Authority Orders No. 1 and 2 and the orders influence on the Iraq

insurgency.

The paper cites a number of publicly available sources including government

archives including official libraries and online archives, publicly available primary

documents available in private libraries of Rumsfeld, Bremer, and Feith. The press

documented the war and video interviews made during the various phases will provide

25

expanded information in the “question and answer” format. Though the start of the war

is over 10 years past, it continues to be a subject of academic study and the researcher

will include relevant events conducted by think tanks relating to the papers subject. An

interesting note: Cheney has retained his official papers and provided them to the

National Archives or the Bush Presidential Library.99

The events surrounding the Iraq War are easily divided between the actors in the

realpolitik camp and those that fall into the camp of nationalism and an “artificial” world

of the neoconservative. Each piece of literature is testable on its content to categorize it

as supporting, against, or neutral towards the two approaches. The challenge is in

separating fact from opinion and therefore multiple sources were used of the same event

to confirm the factual basis. Post invasion reporting appears to support or oppose the

operation based on the above cleavage.

Many of the critics of this period found fault with the intelligence analysis of pre-

invasion Iraq primarily in the “thinking” process—deductive, inductive and

adductive. This led to many of the assumptions being made that did not take into account

the function of time and space—making assumptions based on places (post WWII

Germany) or time (Iraq and the Middle East circa Operation Desert Storm). The paper

highlights where accepted intelligence tradecraft or critical thinking could have exposed

assumptions and judgments that affected the decision to enact CPA Orders No. 1 and 2.

26

Because decision-making is central to this research, the researcher used political

profiling literature and political psychology to identify faults in the “war cabinet’s”

organization and process which influenced the decisions.

Using available literature, the paper establishes that the government failed to fully

use an interagency—whole-of-government— approach to adequately plan for Phase IV

and to determine whether the assumptions made by the policymakers and war planners

were valid based on best assessments by academia and the Intelligence Community prior

to the invasion and post invasion literature.

The paper uses literature and news reporting to establish that the Iraq insurgency

created an under-governed area on the border of Iraq and Syria. Historically the difficult

desert terrain of porous borders and ratlines was allowed to be a permissive area, was so

during the invasion and went on to become a base of operation for the Iraqi and later

Syria insurgencies. The literature was studied to develop the hypothesis that the Iraq

insurgency is linked to the Syrian Civil War and that the back and forth movement of

insurgents has spilled over into a regional conflict affecting global security.

Using this methodology, the researcher tests whether current and historical

literature supports the hypothesis that CPA Orders 1 and 2 created more enemies for the

U.S., went on to contribute to the Syrian Civil War, and affected global security. The

hypothesis will support that decisions made must consider second and third tier affects

which can have long-term consequences.

27

FINDINGS and ANALYSIS

Iraq became a subject of major importance to the average Americans in1991 as

Coalition bombs and missiles fell on Baghdad and then remained a prickling problem that

ebbed and flowed as a matter of national importance until the attacks on 9/11.100

The

invasion of Iraq shifted historic U.S. policy from one of defense and containment to one

of “preventive wars and unilateralism.” The Bush administration created a black and

white schema of good versus evil and “for us or against us” mentality.101

Elizabeth

Saunders in her study Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions

argued, the greatest factor in deciding to intervene “is the perception of a threat to

national security….”102

The Bush administration started from the decision to invade and

worked backwards to create the justification for military action which affected what and

how information was presented to the American people. Dr. Haass, who served in both

Bush White Houses, argued Saddam did not present an imminent threat to national

interest and the administration created the threat to support its decision for regime change

in Iraq.

Dr. Allawi, who would become a central figure in the new government, argued

Iraq is not a nation tied to historical “dynasties or monarchies” or a common shared

history. 103

Iraq’s borders are not geographically defined but were created by the

European powers that incorporated three distinct ethnic and religious groups that centered

on the cities of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul.104

Allawi argued Iraq has the “geographic

misfortune of lying across the fault lines of civilization and empires…”105

Robert Kaplan

28

argued that Iraq supported the “realist” idea that “geography, history, and culture” are

limiters on what is accomplishable in a particular place and time.106

With a few exceptions, the majority of the Bush administration policymakers,

military leaders, and planners failed to understand the intricacies of Iraqi tribal, clan, and

family relationships that transcended the European created borders. The static picture of

Iraq included the strong military, political system, and industry and did not take into

account the 1991 defeat, the effect of U.N. sanctions, and ethnic unrest of the 1990s. It

also failed to understand that Saddam Hussein, the military, and the Ba’ath Party—the

basis for a “centralized state” which maintained the status quo of a broken society—when

removed would result in the collapse of the society and create a vacuum that the

Coalition would need to fill.107

THE ADMINISTRATION

George W. Bush did not run for the presidency on a platform of regime change in

Iraq and initially focused on Russia and other areas, however faced with the traumatic

aftermath of the attacks on 9/11, his administration quickly placed Iraq and Saddam

Hussein on the action list for protecting the United States from future attacks.108

109

The

One Percent Doctrine was accredited to Cheney “…if there was a one percent chance of a

threat, we must act as if it was a certainty.”110111

The spread of democracy is historically central to U.S. foreign policy based on the

idea that democracies cooperate resulting in a more stable world. The administration’s

National Security Strategy, published after the attacks, marked a change in U.S. strategy

29

to “preemption and unilateralism.”112

President Bush’s post-9/11 policy centered on the

“direct application of U.S. military and political power to promote democracy in strategic

areas” and moving towards “regime change” in Iraq fit into his strategy.113

The Bush cabinet was not selected or organized as a “war cabinet”; the three

primary foreign policy makers, Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin

Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor

Condoleezza Rice brought divergent experiences, views, and “sizable egos” to the

administration. Bush stated “I view the four as being able to complement one another”

however after 9/11 and especially as eyes turned towards Iraq the friction between

Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell emerged which spilled over to their departments.114

James Dobbins of the RAND Corporation points out there were many clashes in the

cabinet, which Bush allowed to a limit, where his style was characterized by “themes

rather than details.”115

Studies of the administration divide the war cabinet it into three

groups; “assertive nationalist”—Cheney and Rumsfeld, “neoconservatives”—Wolfowitz,

Bolton, Perle and Feith, and “pragmatic internationalist”—Powell and Armitage, each

with distinctive views of the threats facing the U.S. and different thoughts on the ways

and means of ensuring national security and preventing the next attack.116

Director of

Central Intelligence George Tenet, a carryover from the Clinton administration, would

find himself brought into the “war cabinet” as intelligence came to play a major role in

the war on terrorism.

30

As vice president, Cheney played a greater role in foreign policy than any of his

predecessors and came to the position with a broad career from working in the White

House, Congress, the Pentagon and in private business.117

As Secretary of Defense at the

end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 said, “If you’re going to go in and try to topple

Saddam Hussein, you have to go to Baghdad. Once you’ve got Baghdad, it is not clear

what you do with it.”118

Haass argued in an interview that Cheney was the “odd man

out” while serving as Secretary of Defense and did not challenge the more centrist views

of the first Bush administration (Bush, Brent Scowcroft, and James Baker).119

His ties to

Rumsfeld began in the White House where Cheney replaced Rumsfeld as President

Gerald Ford’s chief of staff and Wolfowitz served as undersecretary of defense under

Cheney.120

President Bush’s style of leadership and decision-making was “empower and

trust” which granted Cheney a large role in the area of national security.121

James Fallon,

who consolidated a number of articles into his book Blind into Baghdad, stated that

during the multiple interviews done for the book he never heard anyone say, “We took

this step because the president indicated…The president really wanted. Instead I heard

Rumsfeld wanted, Powell thought, the vice president pushed, Bremer asked…”122

The position of the National Security Advisor has evolved with each

administration and Rice consciously decided to organize the National Security Council to

facilitate rather than create policy. She developed a close relationship with the president

as his campaign foreign policy advisor and as leader of the group of advisors known as

the Vulcans.123

Bush appointed her to act in his absence as the chair of the war cabinet

31

instead of the vice president or one of the secretaries—this is in contrast to Cheney’s

chaining of regular NSC meetings in the absence of Bush.124

Many critics have argued the U.S. national security system (National Security Act

of 1947) conceived in the days after World War II and in response to the Soviet threat is

not organized to fight a non-nation state enemy including the insurgency threat in Iraq.125

126 A study conducted by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute found

the “performance of the national security apparatus is inconsistent” and further argues

“…the U.S. government can under some circumstances, generate relatively efficient and

effective policy actions, the infrequent achievement of such outcomes points to

underlying flaws in the national security policy development and implementation

process.”127

In a study to compare the differences in State or Defense led stabilization

operations, the author cites a study that found creating a lead agency “usually means in

practice a sole agency approach” since a lead agency cannot exercise authority over

another independent agency.128

129

Moreover, the Army War College found usually an

agency takes the lead based on the perceived importance for the agency or of a major

agency official.130

Hooker, in his analysis of CENTCOM planning, points out the

inability of the combatant commander to exercise control over the various agencies

involved in Phase IV operations, calling it “one of the most frustrating areas of military

planning.”131

32

Rumsfeld moved from government service to private business but remained

available to serve as an advisor on Defense boards during his tenure on the Commission

to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. He began to distrust the CIA,

citing their estimates of the Soviet missile threat as soft and unrealistic. After 9/11, he

emerged as the de facto leader of the Cabinet as military retribution became the primary

cause for the administration.

Paul Wolfowitz, considered to have been the intellectual of the “neocons” that

made up the Vulcans during the campaign, became Rumsfeld’s deputy in the Pentagon.

Wolfowitz brought Iraq to the table at the first meeting of the war cabinet at Camp David

on September 15, 2001 where he assessed that Saddam was tied to the 9/11 attack and

afterwards the president directed the Department of Defense to begin Iraq war planning

on September 17.132

Robert Kagan, a conservative writer stated, “Paul may have brought

it up but Bush from the beginning was thinking about Iraq.”133

134

Colin Powell was not a participant in the neoconservative cabal and brought to the

administration the respect he attained as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during

the 1991 war and as National Security Advisor. Initially considered the top cabinet

member, Rumsfeld overshadowed him after 9/11 when the focus turned to defending the

country from a future attack and retaliating against al-Qaida. Haass, who served under

Powell, argues that Rumsfeld and Cheney did not accept Powell as an insider because he

was too “popular, too moderate, and too independent.”135

Powell acted as a pragmatist

and argued for a diplomatic solution but Rumsfeld bureaucratically overpowered him and

33

when it came to Phase IV operations, Powell acquiesced and did not argue for the

traditional role for the State Department in post-conflict operations.

The role of deputies is an important aspect of the war cabinet; Richard Armitage

(State), Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith (Defense), Steven Hadley (National Security

Council), and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby (Office of the Vice President) were central to

many of the decisions in planning and executing Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Iraq had been a subject of interest of many of the war cabinet dating from their

service in President George H. W. Bush’s administration and Operation Desert Storm in

1991and continuing while out of government during President William Clinton’s

administration. Most notably was a 1998 letter from the Project for a New American

Century written to President Clinton that stated the containment policy was not working

and urged him to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Armitage

and others in the administration signed the letter.136

137

From their positions in academia,

think tanks and private business they published op-ed pieces and articles citing the lack of

action by the Clinton administration, supporting Israel, and calling for a harder stance

against Saddam Hussein.

Former defense intelligence officer W. Patrick Lang uses the euphemism,

“Drinking the Kool Aid” to describe a point where “…a person has given up personal

integrity and succumbed to the prevailing groupthink…” which he argues is indicative of

Post-9/11 policymaking where a small group attempted to create a “correct view of the

world…” whilst “…excluding all that disagree.”138

The close ties of the members of the

34

war cabinet created an aura of “groupthink” however Bush said, “There is going to be

disagreement, I hope there will be disagreement, because I know the disagreement will be

based upon solid thought. And what you need to know is that if there is disagreement, I’ll

be prepared to make … the decision necessary for the good of the country.”139

Dina

Badie, argued groupthink affected the decision to go to war and created Saddam as a

“existential threat” from his position previously as just a “troubling dictator”.140

Feith

states, that if a person approached Rumsfeld saying “…let us tell you what postwar Iraq

is going to look like, and here is what we need plans for. If you tried that you would get

thrown out of Rumsfeld’s office so fast…you wouldn’t get your second sentence out.”141

Groupthink is traceable to many areas of the administration and was prevalent in

the civilian sector of the Pentagon starting with Rumsfeld’s transformation of the military

where he saw the uniformed hierarchy as a block to modernization and sidelined officers

that did not agree with his ideas. David Unger argues in The Emergency State: America's

Pursuit of Absolute Security at All Costs, stating, “Rumsfeld prior to 9/11 spent his time

downgrading the status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and “increasing his authority in the

chain of command.” It is important to note Powell’s service as an Army general officer

and as chairman of the Joint Chiefs (1989-1993) and the Powell Doctrine (based on clear

national interest, military goals, exit strategies, and overwhelming force) which was

successful in Operation Desert Storm added to the rivalry between the two secretaries.142

The friction between Rumsfeld and the military was most evident in the decision

by Rumsfeld on the number of troops needed for the invasion. The Senate Armed

35

Services Committee questioned General Eric Shinseki, Army chief of staff, for his

opinion of the invasion force; he expressed his opinion that was quite different from the

intended plan, which a number of retired generals with experience in stabilization

operations supported.143

Wolfowitz testified a few days later to justify the difference

saying the Army chief’s estimate was “way off”. This episode colored the remainder of

Shinseki’s career. It is arguable Franks folded under the power of groupthink, accepted

the challenges made to the original war plan and developed a war plan that did reach the

object of toppling the regime but fell short in creating a stable secure environment for a

new Iraq. Critics argued the plan met its goal; however, what was its goal? Moreover,

Badie argued that Powell fell under “anticipatory compliance” by allowing groupthink of

“retribution” to become the major plank in American foreign policy without substantive

debate within the administration.144

Groupthink affected the intelligence analysis prior to the invasion. George Tenet

admitted he did not present the worst-case scenarios of a CIA product known as the

“Perfect Storm” which carried a warning of what might go wrong.145

Defense and

military intelligence officers whose assessment of the Iraqi threat did not match

Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz or Feith’s found themselves transferred or otherwise sidelined.

The two organizations, OHRA and the CPA, suffered from the need to fill seats

without consideration to qualification. Moreover, the Offices of the Vice President and

Secretary of Defense controlled some of the appointments in an attempt to freeze out

State Department personnel. There is also evidence that appointments were made using

36

an “old boy” network; for example, in the appointment of Michael Mobbs, a partner in

Feith’s law firm without experience in the Middle East, who was given responsibility for

leading the OHRA political group which had been promised to a former ambassador with

extensive experience in Iraq and the Middle East.146

WAR PLANNING

“Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass

destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to

terrorist allies…If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we have waited too

long…We are in a conflict between good and evil….”147

President George W. Bush, West Point 2002

War planning doctrine divides a military operation into four phases, the first three

focuses on preparing and fighting the war and the final phase. Phase IV, being the

stability and reconstruction operations after the cessation of major combat. Lt. Colonel

Crane of the U.S. Army War College argued that wars are won in Phase IV, which was

historically planned while Phase III—combat operations—were ongoing.148

However, he

argued that modern war fighting theory of “schemes of maneuver designed to speedily

defeat adversaries” requires planning to be done concurrently and goes on to argue “such

an approach [to planning] is no longer wise or feasible.”149

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Phase III was a quick run towards and the capture of Baghdad and therefore CENTCOM

should have completed Phase IV planning prior to commencement of combat operations.

Thomas Barnett, a former Pentagon strategist and professor of strategy, suggests

that defense strategists attempt to go directly to the commencement of war, he argues by

37

doing so the Pentagon “short-changes the military role in crisis management... and short-

circuits planning of what comes after the war…”150

War planning is a multi-phased process of first general policy direction from the

White House and Pentagon to mold the plan into the overall National Strategic Security

policy for the United States. Secondly, the regional combatant command, in the case of

Iraq, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) produces the detailed operation plan for

approval by the Secretary of Defense and the President. The U.S. maintains contingency

war plans for many areas of the world and CENTCOM maintained OPLAN 1003-98 for

Iraq—built as a defense plan in the event Iraq invaded Kuwait.151

The plan developed

under CENTCOM commander Marine General Anthony Zinni and at the time Army

Central Command commander General Tommy Franks called for nearly 500,000 troops,

and associated logistics that Rumsfeld considered too large and too slow.152

Upon entering office, Bush wanted to transform the U.S. military and Rumsfeld

assumed office with plans to transform the military into a “leaner more lethal force.” One

target area for revision was the planning process for combatant command’s operation

plans. The plans were normally reviewed and updated every two years however; the

process was placed on hold while Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) finalized the new

process.153

Rumsfeld CENTCOM OPLAN 1003-98 represented the military that

Rumsfeld wanted to change and in his opinion, the plan was “the product of old

thinking”.154

38

Policymakers assessed the Saddam military as vulnerable to the overwhelming

technology of the U.S. military. Greg Hooker, a senior analyst at CENTCOM, argues

this resulted in the policymakers’ view a small force would defeat the Iraq Army and

meet the administrations objectives.155

He argues further that Pentagon policymakers

inserted their assumptions and “exerted downward pressure” on CENTCOM planners.

Rumsfeld met with Franks at CENTCOM Headquarters at MacDill Air Force

Base in November 2001. Notes from the meeting show many of the assumptions in the

mind of Rumsfeld from how to start the war; “…Saddam “moves against minorities

(Kurds), discovery of a 9/11 connection to Saddam, and dispute over WMD inspections.”

How to fight the war; “surprise and speed” and what to do afterwards; “provisional

government” and lastly “have ideas in advance who would rule afterwards.”156

Hooker

points out the normal two-year refreshing cycle for operational plans starts with the

command requesting a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) from the CIA and National

Intelligence Council that would establish the strategic environment; an NIE was

eventually produced at the urging of Congress.157

Rumsfeld’s direction was to prepare a

number of options for the president and not simply a “do nothing or massively invade”

Iraq. Rumsfeld wanted to consider looking at Iraq through “slices”—“goals, targets, or

pressure points.”158159160

He continued to influence the war planning by challenging

troop movements and directly placing himself in the planning process. Throughout the

process, Rumsfeld applied his assumptions, micro-managed, and applied his bureaucratic

39

supremacy to force the military into accepting a plan that would later affect the long-term

security of Iraq and the region.

The Departments of Defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS J-5

Planning, CENTCOM and CFLC) and State were responsible for the majority of

planning for Operational Iraqi Freedom while the Office of the Vice President was also

involved. The same offices were also working the ongoing war in Afghanistan; this was

especially pronounced in CENTCOM where the Iraq team worked in temporary trailers

in a fenced off area of the command parking lot while the Afghanistan team filled the

Joint Operation Center and other offices in the main headquarters building.161

The

success of Afghanistan operations by Special Operation Forces (SOF) increased

Rumsfeld’s push to use a smaller force in the Iraq plans and create a new plan, not simply

revise OPLAN 1003-98—the new plan to be known as OPLAN 1003V. 162

163

After an attack on Baghdad during the Clinton administration (1998 - Operation

Desert Fox), then commander of CENTCOM General Zinni began to wonder about the

outcome if Saddam’s government fell either internally or by an attack by the U.S. He

assembled a group representing government agencies, academia, and think tanks to study

and develop a plan for post-Saddam Iraq. The group and CENTCOM war-gamed and

tested both “worst case” and “most likely” scenarios; the effort produced OPLAN

“Operation Desert Crossing”.164

The after action report supported immediate planning

for a U.S. response in anticipation that Saddam’s regime would fall, and incorporated

OPLAN 1003-98. Many of the issues discussed in the war game after action report

40

would re-surface in 2003 however, when Zinni later discussed Operation Desert Crossing

with the CENTCOM staff; they replied, “What’s that, never heard of it.”165

The planning

recommended fell within the scope ordered by Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive

56 (PDD56), “Managing Complex Contingency Operations”, which was never fully

implemented and which Bush canceled and ordered National Security Presidential

Directive (NSPD) 1 that organized the NSC and turned the process of military-political

plans to the regional National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees.166

167

Dobbins argue the lessons learned in the Clinton administration (Somalia, Haiti, and

Balkans) were lost when PDD56 was cancelled.168

The reorganization did not create the

planning needed to ensure the success of Phase IV operation.169

Historical biases by the administration leaned toward a quick victory in defeating

Iraq and establishing a new government. The administration failed to understand that

conjunctive events of the operation require “a previous event must be successful for the

next stage to begin.”170

Army Major Blair S. Williams writing on military planning

breaks Operation Iraqi Freedom into “six conjunctive phases; removal of Saddam’s

regime, eliminating Iraq’s WMD program, capturing, killing, or removing terrorist from

Iraq, ending UN sanctions and delivering humanitarian supplies to the people, securing

the oil fields, and creating an atmosphere for the Iraqis to establish a representative

government.”171

A U.S. Institute for Peace special report prior to the invasion argued whether the

invasion would be a just war. Ethically, for a nation to go to war it must have an

41

expectation of victory and that the end will justify the cost.172

Williams argues

policymakers often look at the events independently however, if policymakers and

planners gave each of the above events a probability of 75 percent chance of success, the

conjunctive model would show the overall chance of the operation at approximately 18

percent.*173

*(.75*.75*.75*.75*.75*.75*=0.1779, 17.79 percent).

PHASE IV ASSUMPTIONS

“Everything we do is to be focused on the destruction of the Iraq Army.

Everything, anything that does not point us in that objective needs to be

eliminated.” 174

1st Marine Division Commanding General’s Guidance

Strategic planning has become more complicated as non-state groups and leaders

emerge and do not act in logical Western political thought. The military follows a

precise regimen of steps to produce a plan or operation that will produce an expected

result. One method is Assumption Base Planning; based on developing assumptions of

uncertainties that may affect the plan’s outcome or looking at “which assumptions may

become vulnerable and how.”175

It is important to define the terms, “An assumption is an

assertion about some characteristic of the future that underlies the current operations or

plans…An assumption is important if its negation would lead to significant changes in

those operation or plans.” An assertion can be based on scientific or empirical

evidence—a judgment or facts—whilst others are open to interpretation.176

The planning

42

function failed to determine the vulnerabilities and effect on the outcome of Operation

Iraqi Freedom by accepting the administrations assumptions as “judgments”.

Tom Ricks in his book Fiasco on the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom

states, “When assumptions are wrong, everything built upon them is undermined” this

describes Phase IV operations.177

Rumsfeld was known for challenging assumptions

made by others in what he called a “poverty of expectations” where a large amount of

effort is placed on some dangers while ignoring others.”178

Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and

Feith saw Iraq with very selective vision, made assumptions, and ultimately formed

unchangeable opinions and Graham suggests they had developed “selective listening.”179

Feith argued that planning is to “anticipate problems and devise ways to avoid or

manage them” however, in the climate created by Rumsfeld, rather than studying and

mitigating the problems the administration dismissed problems that countered the

accepted assumptions. Rumsfeld made lists of potential problems however, the planners

worked from a list of critical assumptions that appeared to be codified and

unchallengeable. Bremer faulted the assumptions arguing that they made the CPA’s

actions more difficult and Iraq society was a more dysfunctional society than originally

projected.180

The administration’s plan was to paint the anticipated invasion of Iraq in the

colors of liberation rather than the label of occupation. Assumption by the Pentagon and

imposed on military planners at CENTCOM and the Coalition Forces Land Command

(CFLC) planners in Kuwait included:

43

1. The “leaner” military would successfully invade and stabilize the country

with less than half the troops provided in previous plans—OPLAN 1003-

98

2. The U.S. military would quickly turn the government over to Iraqis and

leave only a small force estimated to be approximately 35,000 troops.

3. The Iraq ministries would be intact and continue to manage the

government.

4. Iraq infrastructure was in good shape

5. The Iraq Police would maintain law and order and Iraq army would be

available to support reconstruction operations.

6. The U.S. military did not anticipate any sectarian violence.

7. Only the top tier Ba’ath Party members would be excluded from the New

Iraq government.181

Credible intelligence, history nor experience figured into the administration’s

assumptions and they contradicted the history of the British experience in Iraq, the

planning done under Zinni at CENTCOM—Operation Desert Crossing 1998, the

Department of State “Future of Iraq Project” and numerous think tank studies done for

the government or as academic studies. Anthony Cordesman of the CSIS argued instead

the assumptions were based on exaggerations by Iraqi exiles and exile groups who

largely had not been in Iraq for years if not decades. Cordesman also states:

“Many, if not most, of the factors that led to these failures were, however, brought

to the attention of the president, National Security Council, State Department,

Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community in the summer and fall of

2002.”182

Rumsfeld in October 2002 wrote a memorandum “Iraq: An Illustrative List of

Potential Problems to be Considered and Addressed” or commonly known as the “Parade

of Horribles” listed 29 potential issues and included:

1. “…U.S. could fail to manage post-Saddam successfully.

44

2. …the effort could take 8 to 10 years.

3. …recruiting and financing for terrorist networks could take a dramatic

upward turn

4. Iraq could experience ethnic strife

5. …the U.S. will learn…a number of “unknown unknowns.”183

From Rumsfeld’s note in November 2001 and the above list of potential

problems, it is evident that he was thinking of post-Saddam Iraq and Feith cites that he

“urged that we plan early for Iraq’s reconstruction.”184

However planning for these

issues did not make it past this memo as Rumsfeld focused late 2002 and early 2003 on

the actual invasion.

INTELLIGENCE

Rumsfeld had served in numerous roles in government, assumed office with

preconceived ideas of the Intelligence Community and held a common belief with

Cheney, Wolfowitz and Feith that the CIA did not see the threats to the U.S. and “what

he was getting from the CIA was out of date and wasn’t any good.”185

Additionally, he

controlled much of the Intelligence Community but shared authority with the Director of

Central Intelligence and later the Director of National Intelligence.

The Intelligence Community after 9/11was the focus of a number of

investigations to explain the failure to assess the attacks and would continue to be in the

spotlight as it attempted to provide intelligence to two simultaneous campaigns.

Collecting human intelligence (HUMINT) inside Iraq was difficult due to the extreme

security of the Saddam regime and the closed nature of the Iraq society.186

Additionally

the U.S. had not maintained a diplomatic presence in Baghdad since 1990. The agencies

45

relied on second source reporting— which often proved to be fabricated—or erroneous,

information from exiles and the exile groups that provided information to support their

agenda but did not represent what was happening in Iraq. Sir Richard Dearlove, director

of British MI-6, felt “the crowd around the vice president was playing fast and loose with

the intelligence” and Director of Central Intelligence argues, “Policymakers have a right

to their own opinion, but not their own facts.”187

Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith characterize the failure of Phase IV on poor

intelligence provided by the CIA and the Intelligence Community of what to expect

during Phase IV or for the administration to plan for the “unknowns”. However, there

have been declassified reports released that indicate the Intelligence Community did

address many of the issues of Iraq society and the government that caused problems

during Phase IV but failed in others especially regarding WMD and the military. The

CIA disseminated a report in March 2003 that assessed Iraqis may be less cooperative,

are distrustful of the exile groups, and Sunnis have the most to lose and would most

likely consider the U.S. as the enemy.188

The same report failed to assess that the Iraq

Army would remain intact and the Iraq officers would try to claim a role in the new

government and participate in the reconstruction. This contradicted the 1991 experience

where Iraqi soldiers surrendered individually but not as a unit.189

Rumsfeld’s answer to the “poor” performance of the Intelligence Community was

to create his own analytical unit, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the

Office of Special Plans or commonly called “Iraq intelligence cell” within Feith’s

46

office.190191

Congressional investigations show that the unit acted outside its role as a

policy office and often cherry picked non-validated information and included misleading

information as alternative analysis in what appeared to be “coordinated and finished”

intelligence. Feith’s office provided reports and briefings outside of Intelligence

Community channels to several policymakers including Cheney. The Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence reported the findings of the Department of Defense Inspector

General report which concluded that though not “illegal or unauthorized, the actions

were…inappropriate given that the products did not show the variance with the consensus

of the Intelligence Community and were in some cases shown as intelligence

products.”192

Senator Carl Levin stated after the hearings that Cheney often “did not present the

assessment of the Intelligence Community but relied on information from Feith’s office”.

Levin stated Feith’s office added or subtracted slides from briefings depending on the

audience; a presentation to the CIA and the White House had three slides removed at CIA

Headquarters in Langley.193194195

The information is not the primacy of the Intelligence Community; beyond the

official assessments, information was available on the Arab and Iraq cultures which if

applied would have presented a better picture of the post-invasion Iraq. Youssef H.

Aboul-Enein wrote in Iraq in Turmoil “Intelligence without the context of cultural and

historical is of limited value. Cultural and historical understanding is essential to

defining the nature of the conflict…”196

47

PHASE IV PLANNING

The CENTCOM planning staff was responsible for the majority of the Iraq

planning, however it focused on the combat phases due to Rumsfeld’s expectation of a

quick campaign with U.S. forces commitment of only a few months and Frank’s opinion

that that Phase IV was not his [CENTCOM] responsibility.197

“You pay attention to the

day after and I’ll pay attention of the day of” was the message Franks sent to Rumsfeld’s

staff and the Joint Chiefs. 198

The JCS created Joint Task Force 4 in December 2002

commanded by Brigadier General Steve Hawkins as the lead-planning agency for Phase

IV but failed to define the command reporting relationship between the new command

and CENTCOM. By April 2003 the command was disbanded and Army historians

wrote, “…it completed some initial planning tasks before the war, its work did not

influence CFLCC planning.…”199

However, Feith states Franks received orders to plan

for the “transition of operations from decisive combat through the post hostilities

restoration of Iraq” in December 2002.200

The forward combat staff deployed to Qatar to

exercise its new deployable headquarters during Operation Internal Look (November and

December 2002), it is most likely that Phase IV planning was not on the front burner of

the staff.

Colonel Kevin Benson of McKiernan’s CFLCC staff (CFLCC deployed to

Kuwait was also participating in Operation Internal Look) was responsible for the

majority of Phase IV planning and said, “We were extraordinarily focused on phase

3…There should have been more than just one Army colonel, me, worrying about the

48

details of phase four (sic)”. Units moving toward Baghdad received Benson’s plan in

April 2003 well into Phase III.201

Serious planning for Phase IV began with the creation of the Office of

Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (OHRA) and the appointment of retired

Army Lt. General Jay Garner as its director in January 2003. Rumsfeld intended the

appointment of Garner to be for a short period where humanitarian assistance would be

the primary mission and later he would be replaced by the appointment of a “former

governor or ambassador” who would lead the rebuilding of Iraq.202

His arrival on the job

was strewn with roadblocks placed in his way by Cheney, Rumsfeld, Franks and others in

the Pentagon.

Upon arrival in Washington, Garner attempted to integrate the studies and plans

produced by the various committees within State, NSC and the Pentagon that he

described as being “pretty good.” However, he based his outlook on the above

assumptions and the humanitarian relief project he headed in Northern Iraq after

Operation Desert Storm where food and shelter was the primary concern and not in

reconstituting a national government. Allawi, described the planning effort as:

“Half-hearted and unreal attempt to tackle the issues that would confront the

overseers of a country with a devastated economy and a dictatorial political

culture. Most of the groups dealt with issues on which the participants had not up

to date information, or immediate experience.” 203

In one of the myriad of studies after the invasion, Stephen Benedict Dyson argued

in his article “What Really Happened in Planning for Postwar Iraq?” described the

fundamental basis of the plans was the extent of U.S. control; should it be limited or

49

extensive, short term or long term, exercised in collaboration with Iraqis, with the

international community or neither?” 204

Benson recounted his tenure as the CFLCC planner arguing the “political object is

the real motive for war…and [will] determine the amount of effort needed to attain the

objective.” He identified two key points:

“(1) Before taking the decision to use force we have to advance the discussion of

military requirements AND policy guidance so all parties understand what we are

doing, and (2) we military professionals must ALWAYS bear in mind that

political and policy conditions are going to change in the duration of a

campaign.”205

OFFICE OF HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

(OHRA)

President Bush issued NSPD 24 in January 2003, formally gave responsibility for

Phase IV operations to the Department of Defense and created the Office of

Humanitarian Operations (OHRA). Rumsfeld argued in 2002 for controlling the

operation, that having the military and civilian operations in the Defense would ensure

unity of command and he could control the operation, ensuring the military could be

quickly redeployed after the new government was established. 206207

The Council on Foreign Relations and The Baker Institute for Public Policy at

Rice University jointly produced an independent study Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-

Conflict Policy in Iraq before the invasion that discussed the idea of a “Coordinator for

Iraq”. The study stated, “The coordinator should have full White House backing, a

deputy to run the public diplomacy campaign, and should have responsibility for a post-

conflict Iraq task force that draws it membership from the interagency process.”208

50

To head up the operation, the administration appointed Garner, who had led

Operation Provide Comfort and humanitarian operations in Kurdistan after Operation

Desert Storm, in January to plan and recruit personnel to staff the operation. In a few

weeks he would have a staff of over 100 people but Cheney or Rumsfeld denied the

appointment of a number of State Department officers for ideological reasons including

Thomas Warrick who headed up the State Department’s “Future of Iraq Project” and

Meghan O’Sullivan (she would later serve in Baghdad with the CPA). OHRA would

have an influx of young appointees eager to go to the war but without the experience of

the senior specialist.209

210

211

212

As OHRA organized, it suffered from “who does what”;

Garner filled positions only to find Rumsfeld’s office had promised the positions to

another person and others frustrated with the organization quit before deploying to

Iraq.213

Britain provided Major General Tim Cross, who was experienced in humanitarian

missions in the Balkans, as deputy to Garner and a small team of civil servants.214

The most notable planning function was a “rock drill” conducted at the National

Defense University at Fort McNair in February 2003 where Garner said, “we don’t have

any resources to do this and we’ve got a plan, the plan’s going to cost three billion

dollars—we have thirty-seven thousand.”215

At the time of the drill, Garner did not have

access to OPLAN 1003V or the timetable for the invasion. The rock drill identified

issues including the failure to staff the ministerial teams and postwar security however, it

did not act to correct deficiencies or correct any mistakes.216

Garner and the OHRA staff

51

left the U.S. with the broad mandate first to provide humanitarian assistance and secondly

to facilitate reconstruction operations however, arriving into the theater it found its

portfolio had expanded to that of the civil government of Iraq.

In mid-March OHRA arrived in Kuwait, however the CFLCC headquarters at

Camp Doha did not allow the OHRA staff to locate at the camp. Their time in Kuwait

would be spend at a Kuwait City hotel inconvenient for meetings with the military and

without communications or computer support until moving forward to Baghdad on April

21. The OHRA plan for Iraq, which carried the caveat “Initial Working Draft”, was

described as more of an outline than a plan and called for OHRA to be out of Iraq by

August 2003.217

After arriving in Baghdad, Rumsfeld notified Garner on April 24 that

Bush planned to appoint Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III as the administrator of the

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and he would be the U.S. authority in Iraq.

Bremer arrived on May 12 and Garner would leave Iraq on June 1.218

Rumsfeld had

failed to alert Garner of the policy shift made by Bush and Bremer over lunch; changing

the role of the U.S. by extending the Coalition’s presence and extending the period for

forming a new government.219

Before Bremer’s arrival Garner spoke to a group of Iraqi

leaders at the Baghdad Convention Center, an Iraqi asked who was in charge of [Iraqi]

politics and Garner responded, “You’re in charge.”220

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA)

“Therefore, I am creating the Coalition Provisional Authority to exercise powers

of government temporarily, and as necessary, especially to provide security, to

52

allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and to eliminate weapons of mass

destruction.”221

General Tommy Franks, Freedom Message to the Iraq People April 16, 2003.

On Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad, he negated the work done by Garner and

Alamay Khalilzad with the Iraqi leaders.222

Some critics describe the tenure of the CPA

as a lost year, it would be during this period that the U.S. policy shifted and the

insurgency, by August 2003, was moving towards a full guerilla operation and instigating

ethnic fighting teetering on civil war.223

Multiple reports indicate that the policy of the

U.S. to act as an occupier and to extend the military role in Iraq changed over a White

House lunch between Bush and Bremer without any further discussion among the

principles.224

Bremer argued that there should be only one presidential envoy in Iraq, to

reduce confusion and create “unity of command.”225

The original plan was to appoint

Alamay Khalilzad, who had been working with the exile groups, as presidential envoy to

establish the government. During the lunch, Bremer convinced Bush to cancel

Khalilzad’s position. Bremer would be the only presidential envoy with supreme

authority in Iraq in addition to his title as administrator of the CPA; Bush announced the

change after the lunch at a NSC meeting without consultation with the war cabinet and

caught Powell and Rice by complete surprise.226

“I was neither Rumsfeld’s man nor

Powell’s man I was the President’s man,”227

There was confusion at the top level of the

administration, when Rice asked Rumsfeld to pass policy information to Bremer the

Secretary of Defense replied “he could not since Bremer worked for the White House.”228

53

The administration’s original plan was to quickly appoint a new government, the

Iraq Interim Authority (IIA), and Feith states Bremer was briefed on April 28 about the

Baghdad conference as well as the administration’s plan to remove only the top 1 percent

of the Ba’ath Party leadership, and understood the President had approved the IIA

plan.229

Before leaving for Baghdad, Bremer and Feith discussed CPA Orders No. 1 & 2

and it was decided Bremer would issue the orders after he arrived in Baghdad as a way of

establishing” his authority. In a memo, Bremer wrote his arrival should, “be marked, by

clear, public, and decisive steps to reassure Iraqis…”230

Though it appears the orders

were discussed within the administration, JCS Chairman General Richard Meyer and

General Peter Pace, deputy chairman and Steve Hadley at NSC stated they were not

consulted.231

232

Regardless of the U.S. rhetoric of avoiding the role of occupier, it was the de facto

occupation force under international law. The United States and United Kingdom in

early May notified the U.N. Security Council of the creation of the CPA and later the

Security Council issued U.N.S.C. Resolution granting occupation status to the Coalition

legitimizing Franks earlier proclamation.

“The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, acting under

existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition

Forces, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority [...] to exercise powers

of government temporarily and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to

allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass

destruction.” United Nations Security Council May 8 2003233

Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the

United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

54

Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the

specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international

law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the

Authority”)… United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 May 22, 2003.234

With the above two documents the U.S. became the de jure occupying authority

of Iraq. Bremer announced his authority in CPA Regulation No. 1 that read much like the

British proclamation in 1917 which granted the commanding general of British Forces

Iraq “absolute and supreme control” Bremer became the latest “dictator” of Iraq. 235236

Moreover, regardless of the rhetoric of the administration of democracy and liberation it

would be “the occupation authority” in the eyes of the Iraqis and the world.

Bremer saw the challenges as, “first, to provide security for the Iraqi people;

secondly, to set Iraq on the path to a more open, humane and democratic society; and

thirdly to reform Iraq’s closed and moribund economy.”237

Bremer was concerned with

the effect of the Coalition drawdown and asked Bush to reconsider it since the anticipated

influx of foreign troops had not occurred.238

239

He would argue later that the failure to

secure the Iraq population “seriously complicated the CPA’s efforts in the political and

economic area.”240

241

The Atlantic Council study quoted an Iraqi general that had

defected to the West “…given Iraq’s 40-year history of repression, it is highly likely that

blood will fill the streets.”242

The error by the policymakers to realize the security

problem was evident in pressure placed on CFLCC’s planners’ plans to redeploy and

orders for the 3rd

Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to redeploy in

addition to canceling orders for the 1st Calvary Division.

243 244

55

Some military officers saw the utility of using soft power in dealing with Iraqis.

Lt Colonel B. M. Iverson, advisor to Lt General Sanchez said, “We wounded their Arab

pride and their tribal pride” whilst another officer said “If I were treated like this I would

be a terrorist.”245

Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History, discussed his book at

a seminar “The End of History? 25 Years Later” where he argued the application of

Plato’s Tripartite Theory of the Soul’s principle of spirit as the struggle for a society’s

dignity and recognition; Bremer and the CPA orders failed to account for the dignity of

Iraqis especially those that served in the Saddam government and the Sunni sect in

general.246

After fighting the Coalition, the Iraq Army did not remain in their garrison or

surrender en masse as the CIA suggested it simply went home. Likewise, few Iraq Police

remained on duty and CFLCC’s OPLAN did not address using the Coalition troops to

maintain civil law and order.247

As the violence and insurgency increased, an Anbar

province leader of the Awakening said former regime officers left the country fearing that

“terrorist” [in the case of Sunnis they would be killed by Shi`a militias] would kill them

and cited a number of military and civilian leaders that were killed.248

Additionally, as security declined the military could not provide the security

escorts and the CPA workers were restricted to the safe area of the “Green Zone” or

“International Zone” unable to meet with their Iraqi counterparts or non-government

agencies.249

250

251

It was about to get worse!

56

About that time, Bremer arrived in Baghdad; military commanders acting without

Phase IV orders created local police forces and established local and neighborhood

governing councils.252253

McKiernan and his staff met with Faris Naima, a former

military officer and diplomat that had left the regime, who presented a plan to

reconstitute the Iraq Army to help the police in curbing the looting and civil disorder. 254

Additionally, General John Abizaid, deputy CENTCOM commander in May met with

some Iraqi generals to discuss the future of restoring the army and Army Colonel Paul

Hughes, detailed to OHRA for military issues was working with Iraqi officers to

reconstitute the army and had gathered 100,000 names. Hughes felt “discredited when

the officers came to meet him after the order was announced and argued that dismissing

the army removed the last symbol of sovereignty and it was now gone.255

However, the

orders codified and made the demobilization “official and permanent.”256

What now can be seen as the major shift in U.S. policy and Garner’s statement before

the Iraqi leaders that they were in charge, Bremer met with the leaders and changed the

game plan telling them a new Iraqi government would have to wait. Secondly, within a

few days he imposed two orders that would have a devastating effect on security.

On arriving in Baghdad, Bremer discussed the orders with Garner; however, he

would not accept Garner’s argument to reconsider the orders. He did not discuss the

orders with McKiernan or Sanchez, who was assuming command of the ground forces as

commander Task Force 7, CIA station chief, or any other advisors in Iraq and McKiernan

denied seeing the plan.257

The failure to coordinate the orders established a state of

57

distrust between the CPA and the military that continued throughout Bremer’s tenure in

Iraq.258

The combination of Bremer’s personality and that of others in the administration,

i.e., Rumsfeld, alienated many organizations in the international community best suited to

assist Iraq in establishing a transitional government. Only organizations that were willing

to “play” by Bremer’s rules and sanctioned by the CPA were allowed to work in Iraq

leaving others with more experience to watch while Bremer and the CPA attempted to

solve a situation where they did not have the knowledge or experience to be successful.

THE ORDERS

“With these two decisions the United States has committed irreversible

damage.”259

Charles Duelfer, U.S. Iraq Survey Group

The first order issued on May 16, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1—

De-Ba’ath of Iraq Society recognized that the Iraq people suffered under the Ba’ath Party

and it was threat to the Iraq and Coalition Forces.

1) “.…The Coalition Provisional Authority disestablished the Ba`ath Party of Iraq.

This order implements the declaration by eliminating the party’s structures and

removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi

society. By this means, the Coalition Provisional Authority will ensure that

representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Ba`athist elements

returning to power ant that those in positions of authority in the future are

acceptable to the people of Iraq.

2) Full members of the Ba`ath Party holding the ranks of ‘Udw Qutriyya (Regional

Command Member), ‘Udw Far’ (Branch Member). ‘Udw Shu’bah (Section

Member), and ‘Udw Firqah (Group Member) (together, “Senior Party Members”)

are hereby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in

the public sector.” 260

58

The second order issued a week later on May 23, Coalition Provisional Authority Order

Number 2—Dissolution of Entities, dissolved the army and the security services.

1) “Any military or other rank, title, or status granted to a former employee or

functionary of a Dissolved Entity by the former Regime is hereby cancelled.

2) All conscripts are released from their service obligations. Conscriptions is

suspended indefinitely, subject to decisions by future Iraq governments

concerning whether a free Iraq should have conscription.”

3) Any person employed by a Dissolved Entity in any form or capacity, is dismissed

effective as of April 16, 2003. Any person employed by a Dissolved Entity, in any

from or capacity.”261

Bremer and many in the administration argued the orders were moot points since the

army and the civil government had “self-demobilized” and simply walked away from

their jobs.262

263

Bremer believed recalling the predominately Sunni army would stir the

ethnic issue in creating the new government.264

Prior to the invasion the assumption was

made that the army (less senior officers with ties to the regime) would be available for

reconstruction operations and Garner intended to reform the army and place it under

civilian control but it was dependent on whether the army stayed intact. Feith briefed the

NSC on Garner’s plan, which advised it would be dangerous “to immediately demobilize

250,000 to 300,000 personnel…” Feith presented Bush with the pros and cons of

retaining or dismissing the army that Feith saw as a “close call” however, Rumsfeld

decided to accept Garner’s plan and according to Feith, no one at the NSC meeting spoke

against it.265

266

Bremer countered the above chronology, stating that the two plans; recall the army or

build a new army of vetted veterans of the Saddam army and new recruits, was briefed on

a video-teleconference on April 17 (prior to his appointment).

59

Abizaid, at the time deputy commander to Franks, favored option two and Walter

Slocombe, appointed as the CPA military advisor but still in Washington, briefed

Wolfowitz and other Pentagon policymakers and it was decided it would be a

“impractical and political mistake” and in a single blow “against “Saddamism” the

Ba’athist would be removed from government.267

268

Additionally, Powell and Rice were

caught off guard; Powell called from an overseas conference and was told by Rice “I was

surprised too, but it’s a decision that has been made and the president is standing behind

Jerry’s [Bremer] decision.” 269

Former CENTCOM commanders Zinni and Hoar called

the move a “blunder” while Slocombe differed saying “he wasn’t sure they were aware of

the facts in May (2003).”270

The original CPA staff had two advisors for Iraq’s security; former NYPD

commissioner Bernie Kerik was to advise the Iraqi Police whilst Slocombe would be

responsible for the military and intelligence services. Bremer combined the positions and

Slocombe concentrated first to establish the military. Slocombe, a tax attorney with

experience in the Department of Defense, did not have any experience in creating a

police force or an army and no experience in the Middle East.271

The original CPA plan

was to create the new army over a two-year period but cut the time to one year by

reducing training and increasing recruiting.272

To fill seats the administration often appointed young and eager “fresh from school”

individuals that lacked “on the ground experience” and would fail in dealing with Iraqi

leaders where maturity and age is part of assuming a leadership position. A CIA officer

60

returning from Iraq told Tenet, “…That place is being run like a graduate school seminar,

none of them speak Arabic, almost nobody has ever been to an Arab country…”273

Another handicap to the organizations was the quick turn over of personnel, some worked

for as short as three months before returning to the states.

The use of military reservist also sometimes placed square pegs in round holes

though there were occasions that a reservist’s civilian and military careers were synched

but not at the exact same level. For example, the Baghdad stock market was created by

an Army specialist that worked as a stockbroker for American Express even though a

request had gone to Treasury to supply an expert in the area or draw from the New York

Stock Exchange. Eventually a recent graduate that had worked as a real estate consultant

arrived, painfully without a finance background274

The two orders, which the administration enacted with the idea of removing the

oppression of the Saddam regime, actually decreased security and created 400,000

unemployed Iraqis (when multiplied by the average family size the decision affected

approximately 1.6 million people) with the weapons, training, money, and skills to

oppose the Coalition.275

Barnett argues the increase of unemployed young men is a

prime indicator of violence; they join insurgency groups or gangs until jobs become

available. 276

Many Middle East observers considered the army to be the foundation of

Iraq society and the most capable organization to maintain security and ensure the ethnic

and tribal entities did not turn to violence. Bremer, however argued that there had to be a

“complete reform and de-politicization” of the army to ensure it was not seen as an

61

extension of the Saddam regime. By dismissing the army and party, the CPA created a

vacuum that the Coalition military had not intended to fill.277

The initial plan was to

review the records and only remove those individuals with “blood on their hands” while

in reality many had not participated in the Party or Army’s oppression. Many of these

400,000 were the technocrats and professionals needed to run the government and teach

in the universities and schools.278

“Still, a better-prepared and resourced program for disarmament, demobilization

and reintegration would almost certainly have both attenuated the reaction to the

army’s ‘disbandment’ and made reconstitution of a new force somewhat

easier.”279

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III 2008

The Iraqis reacted to the decisions with demonstrations in Baghdad and Mosul. 280

THE MISSING VOICE

The Bush administration, prior to the invasion, repeatedly stated it was not for the

U.S. to create a new government and a quick transition to Iraqi sovereignty. The voice

heard was that of Chalabi and the exile leaders and not the Iraqis that suffered under

Saddam’s regime. An article in Human Rights Quarterly argues, “The CPA made no

significant effort to consult Iraqis about the transitional justice processes that were

intended to help…..”281

Many critics of the CPA argue that Bremer and his staff were

insulated from reality, it offices located in the “Green Zone” were walled off and entry

controlled at three points and as violence increased few staff members ever ventured to

the outer provinces.282

Additionally, after the CPA abolished the Ministry of

62

Information, Baghdad fell into a communication “black hole” where rumor became fact

and the work of the CPA appeared to be blanketed in secrecy. The local governing

councils appointed by the CPA lacked the legitimacy of having been elected by the

people or selected by tribal elders or other Iraqi leaders.283

Regardless of the rhetoric of liberation and bringing democracy to Iraq many of

the individuals arrived with an air of superiority over the Iraqis. Larry Di Rita, Defense

spokesman, arrived in Kuwait and was briefed by a USAID official who discussed the

need to show positive “benefits” to the Iraqis Di Rita reportedly slammed his fist to the

table exclaiming, “we don’t owe the Iraqi people anything!”284

The U.S. created the Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) made

up of 150-exiled Iraqi to act as advisors to the Pentagon and as a “link to Iraq society.” 285

Isam al-Khafaji, a member of the IRDC and a participant in the Department of States

Future of Iraq project described the CPA Order No. 2 as a “big crime.” 286

Neither the

Pentagon policymakers nor the CPA consulted the IRDC until after the officers started

protesting in Mosul. An Iraqi stated, “The less you knew about Iraq the more influence

one had [with the Bremer and the CPA].287

DE-BA’ATHIFICATION

“A rationally ordered system of officials [the bureaucracy] continues to function

smoothly after the enemy has occupied the area; he merely needs to change the

top officials. This body of officials continues to operate because it is to the vital

interest of everyone concerned, including above all the enemy”288

Max Weber

63

De-Ba’athification had historical precedence from de-Nazification of post-World

War II Germany and the Truth and Reconciliation process in South Africa after the fall of

apartheid. The principle for the removal of the Ba’ath Party from Iraq society was the

total defeat and the eventual capture of Saddam Hussein.289

It is arguable the delay in

capturing Saddam and other key members of the party led Iraqis persecuted by the former

regime to believe the party could be revived which fueled Shi`a extremist groups (Sadr

and Mahdi Army), deterred Iraqis from assisting the Coalition, and former regime

members time to organize against the Coalition.

The International Council for Transitional Justice which has monitored the

process and its effect on Iraqi politics and society breaks de-Ba’athification into three

phases; 2002-2005 - the planning and initial implementation period, 2005-2008 - new

Iraq government and constitution, and lastly 2008-2012 - the establishment of the

Supreme National Commission of Accountability and Justice (also referred to as the

Justice and Accountability Commission).290

Because of the repressive nature of the Ba’ath Party among the majority of the

Iraq population some planners assessed de-Ba’athification would be easy except for the

top tier that would view it as a loss of power and would fight the Coalition. A pre-

invasion assessment compared Iraq to being a concentration camp awaiting liberation and

the party as an extension of the secret police in controlling society.291

Days before the

invasion, Frank Miller of the NSC Executive Steering Group briefed Bush and others that

there were an estimated 1.5 million party members but only 25,000 would be affected by

64

the de-Ba’athification order; only the most senior members would be prohibited which

was 1% of the Iraqis working for the government or serving in the military.292

Though predominately Sunni, there were Shi’i and Kurd members of the Ba’ath

Party moreover the predominately Shi’a government did not apply de-Ba’athification

equally. Shi’a were sidelined throughout Iraq’s history, by occupiers and eventually the

minority Sunni because of their religious beliefs as well ties to Shi’a in Iran.293

Different

from the Kurds, the other minority, the Shi`a objective was to govern Iraq whilst the

Kurds argued they should be a separate nation.294

The Coalition faced several risks in de-Ba’athification;, it needed to avoid

implementing decisions that would fuel the appearance of an “occupation”, war crimes

trials that could divide Iraq society, and removing party members needed to maintain the

government, commerce, and manufacturing.

All planning for post Saddam Iraq included the premise that the Ba’ath Party

could never be a part of the new Iraq.295

However, the degree to which de-

Ba’athification took place, the procedure for implementing the program and the lack of a

program for reconciliation turned what “had to be done” into a political weapon that Shi’i

politicians used by prevent Sunni politicians from participating in the government as well

as soldiers from serving in the military. Most importantly, it has continued to influence

the political stage in Iraq as de-Ba’athification was used to disbar politicians and parties

from participating in the political process. Iraqi Ambassador to the U.S., speaking at the

65

Center for Strategic and International Studies, said only 15 candidates were barred from

2014 parliamentary elections compared to approximately 500 in the 2010 Elections.296

International estimates based on the Higher National de-Ba’athification

Commission (replaced by the AJC in 2008) indicate there were approximately 400,000

full members (150,000 civil servants and 250,000 military and Ministry of Defense).297

Bremer however removed nearly 100,000 civil servants, teachers, technocrats needed to

manage the government, education, and business. It also purged member of the military

that were also members of the Ba’ath Party.298

The early days of de-Ba’athification

relied on accusations often without evidence that made the process appear to be arbitrary

and prejudicial towards the Sunnis. The membership lists and records were lost during

the looting of the ministries in the early days of the invasion or destroyed in the bombing

of the party offices. The Coalition discovered the military membership list in June

2004.299

The international community characterized the original plan as a failure like the

other aspects of Phase IV. The de-Ba’athification at the time of the invasion was to

remove the top tier of the party leadership while reviewing the records of others to

determine if they “had blood on their hands”. Ahmad Chalabi, head of the INC, and the

exile community drove the establishment of de-Ba’athification and the Iraqi Governing

Council appointed him as the first director in July 2003. As director, he expanded to ban

lower ranking members and “gave the commission enormous new, undefined powers to

66

influence political participation, civil service recruitment, social status, and the economic

welfare…”300

Later the U.S. Institute of Peace Iraq Study Group judged de-Ba’athification as an

error by the CPA recommending, “Political reconciliation requires the reintegration of

Ba’athist and Arab nationalist into national life with the leading figures of Saddam

Hussein’s regime excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified

Iraqi professionals—Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Ba’athist, Kurd or Turkmen or

Christian or Arab—into the government301

.” Sanchez noted “The whole de-

Ba’athification order became a complete catastrophic failure” and another critic argued,

“de-Ba’athification probably did more to disrupt efforts to get the country running

smoothly than anything al-Qaida could have done.” 302

303

May 2003 was critical to standing up local governments and commanders

unanimously complained de-Ba`athification was affecting Civil Affairs units’ ability to

create neighborhood and local councils. The CIA station chief advised Bremer that CPA

Order No. 1 would “[drive] 30,000 to 50,000 Ba’athist underground. And in six months

you’ll really regret this.”304

Feith defended the process claiming it affected only 2

percent of the party members and placed the blame on Iraqis acting outside CPA Order

No. 1; however, it closed the government, educational, and commercial elements of

society.305

The de-Ba’athification was limited after sovereignty transferred in June 2004 to

the interim government of Dr. Allawi, who was a former Ba’athist and secular Shi’a but

67

increased after the election of a new government in the January 2005 elections. 306

The

process would continue to evolve as Iraq moved forward, most notably the parliament’s

enactment of the “Law of the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and

Justice” in January 2008 that preserved the system and extended its reach into other areas

including the judiciary.307

Additionally it prohibited all former Ba’athist from serving in

the Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs.

THE INSURGENCY

“The years after our war of independence involved a good deal of chaos and

confusion. There were uprisings…with mobs attacking courthouses and

government buildings. …There was looting and crime and a lack of an organized

police force. There were supporters of the former regime whose fate had to be

determined… And, unlike the people of Iraq, we did not face the added challenge

of recovering from the trauma of decades of brutal rule by a dictator like Saddam

Hussein. The point is this: It is now just seven weeks since Iraq's liberation -- and

the challenges are there. As Thomas Jefferson put it, "we are not to expect to be

translated from despotism to liberty in a featherbed." It took time and patience,

but eventually our Founders got it right -- and we hope so will the people of Iraq,

over time.” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, May 27, 2003.308

“We are a tribal people, and in our tradition, we know revenge. If someone gets

killed from your family, you have to kill the killer, or at least a relative of his.

When the Iraqi army was dissolved, they left a lot of armaments, including

armored personnel carriers, heavy machine guns, and a lot ordnance. Most of us

were in the army, so using weapons was something we could do with ease. So

these people whose youth was killed by the Americans, they formed a cell, and

they started looking for revenge.”

Thamer Ibrahim Tahir al-Assafi, Council of Muslim Scholars in Ramadi309

Maj. General Buford Blout commander of the 3rd

Infantry Division stated “There

was a time when the insurgency could have been headed off or greatly reduced and

68

contained…For a time we were perceived as and acted as liberators but as more combat

troops came there was a shift to an occupation or fortress mentality.”310

There was

warning from the intelligence community, foreign leaders, academia, and think tanks that

indicated the need to maintain the Iraq Army less leaders with direct connection to the

regime of Saddam Hussein. Cordesman of the CSIS warned, “It was clear what might

happen in a highly militarized society once the regime fell…The U.S. largely ignored

these indicators.”311

One had only to refer to the British experience after the fall of the

Ottoman Empire to foresee the problems with occupying Iraq. The British arrived in Iraq

and in retribution for the killing of a British officer executed 11 insurgents, and targeted

for killing Sheik Badr al-Rumaydah—in doing so they “alienated a major political

group… the ex-Turkish officials and officers.”312

In 2003, Bremer with CPA Order No.

1 alienated the Ba’ath Party members and with Order No. 2 alienated the major organized

group…the military.

After the announcement, former soldiers protested in Baghdad and Mosul, during

which 16 U.S. military were killed and Petraeus told CPA defense ministry advisor

Walter Slocombe that the decision had put U.S. soldiers at risk. Without a job, armed

and without supervision, the soldiers were prime recruits for the militias or insurgency

including al-Qaida affiliates.313

Rumsfeld attempted to label the insurgency as a small

remnant of the regime “dead-enders” and nothing of great concern but Abizaid on July

16, at his first press conference in his new role as Frank’s replacement, told the press the

U.S forces were now facing a classical guerilla-type campaign.314

Major General Ray

69

Odinero, who later commanded U.S. forces in Iraq, at the time said. “Decisions were

taken out of our hands we lost the window of opportunity when it would have done the

most good.”315

The violence in Iraq was not limited to the Sunni insurgency attacks on

the Coalition but also Shi`a militia attacks on the Coalition and sectarian attacks between

elements of the two groups.

The shortage of Coalition troops began to affect security at the same time the

looting began to shift to insurgency attacks. Brigadier General Spider Marks,

McKiernan’s intelligence officer said, “We needed more troops to act on the intelligence

generated. They took advantage of our limited numbers” 316

The Iraq Army was predominately Sunni and the two orders affected the Sunni

community more than the Shi’i. Colonel Derek Harvey, CTF-7 Intelligence officer who

presented “A “Red Team” Perspective on the Insurgency in Iraq” listed the

misconceptions of the insurgency where he dispelled many of administrations talking

points. Harvey, argued, “Sunni Arabs—for the most part the old oligarchy, the old

leadership, the clerics, tribal leaders, and others—are focused on regaining their power,

influence, and authority in whatever form that is relevant for different groups that are

there.” 317

He used military significant activity (SIGACTS) reports to argue statistically

against the common ideas and stated CPA Orders No. 1 and 2 created a sense of

“marginalization and fear of the future”.318

The former regime members were typically members of the Ba’ath Party however, the

insurgency was not a fight for Ba’athist ideology but a fight for return to power often

70

referring to their effort as al-Awda the “Party of Return” and Harvey presented the nature

of insurgency:

Sunni-Arab insurgency driven by former regime members

o Residual Ba’ath/FRE/Old Oligarchy networks

o Smaller number of Iraqi and foreign Islamic extremist

o A multi-group insurgency with no clear dominant player

o Personal relationships based on professional, tribal, family, religious, or

criminal ties are the glue

o Networks overlap and cross ideological lines

o Not a popular or nationwide insurgency…but there is support in some

sectors of the Sunni Arab community

Long term threat is form resilient former Ba’ath/FRE/Old Oligarchy networks319

Petraeus faulted the failure of de-Ba’athification was in not having a

reconciliation process for reintegration of party members back into society.320

The years

of violence and the under-governed area became the incubator for the Arab movements

that emerged in 2012 with the Arab Spring, first in Northern Africa and followed in

Syria.

ARAB REVOLUTION

"Americans planted a tree in Iraq. They watered that tree, pruned it, and cared

for it. Ask your American friends why they're leaving now before the tree bears

fruit."321

President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

The Atlantic Council judged prior to the invasion, “In terms of regional security,

the United States is the only country that has the influence with many of the key players,

including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to forge the needed consensus among Iraq’s

71

neighbors on a stable future for the region.322

There appears to be little discussion during

the decision and planning phases within the Bush administration about the effects of an

invasion of other countries in the region, especially Iran. The discussion centered more

on Saddam’s support for terrorist in other areas like Lebanon rather than what blowback

might occur after the invasion especially in regards to Iran where there was more solid

evidence of the nuclear weapons program.

In the years after the invasion, the U.S. suffered domestically from the impact of

protracted combat and internationally for its hubris in going to war. Al-Qaida likewise

suffered militarily and politically in Iraq.323

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim of the Harvard Kennedy

School argues the Syrian Civil War allowed al-Qaida to recover but has seen a power

struggle between al Qaida factions; Al Nusrah Front and the newly merged Al-Qaida in

Iraq and the Levant.324

In 2011, the U.S. had little ability to influence or otherwise

control the Arab movements when Arab Spring erupted.

“…al-Qaeda has recovered from its losses in the period up to 2010 and has

managed to emerge as a dominant force and ideology across the Islamic world,

taking advantage of political upheaval and Western failures. However, while al-

Qaeda, in its most recent manifestation in Iraq and Syria, appears to be alive and

well…”325

Syria supported the U.S. in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm but saw itself as the

next target for U.S. regime change and allowed the Iraqi insurgency to use its territory.326

The cradle of the insurgency, the Iraq and Syria border, described, as “a quagmire of

sectarian violence,” has become an area supporting fighting between the government

72

forces of countries, tribal militias and insurgency groups like al-Qaida of Iraq and the

Levant.327

.

Although the Arab Spring erupted in Arab North Africa in 2012, Henri Barkley

argued Syria would contribute to regional instability through spillage to Lebanon, Jordan,

Turkey and Israel and with it the fate of the Middle East as well as the fate of Iraq. He

further argued the Syrian Civil War’s impact on the success of the Iraqi government to be

most harmful.328

In a January 2014 opinion article in Aljazeera America, the author questions whether the

state of Syria existed or replaced by the Emirate of Iraq and Sham. The argument the

author makes is the borders between Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon do not exist and the

governments are “disappearing as coherent states.”329

330

The civil war in Syria and the resulting chaos in the region is a second tier effect

of the U.S. and British invasion of Iraq, the second tier of the war in Syria is the power

struggle of the multiple groups that have emerged. Most simply, the struggle centers on

the Shi’i and Sunni sects of Islam, Iran as the supporter of the Shi’i and Saudi Arabia

supporting the Sunni. Russia as an ally of Syria and the U.S. relationship with Israel

makes this a truly international conundrum. The power struggle and the tangent struggles

outside the region have demonstrated the global nature of war and the limits of unilateral

action; even by what was then the only super power. The struggle has been eclipsed by

the east-west struggle with Russia as an ally of Syria and Israel as the barrier of the war

73

moving south of Lebanon, and the U.S. reacting with words but with little hard or soft

power to exert bringing peace to the region.

74

CONCLUSION

“It never had to be this bad. The reconstruction of Iraq was never going to be

quick or easy but it was not doomed to failure….Its disastrous course to date has

been almost entirely the result of a sequence of foolish and unnecessary mistakes

on the part of the United States.”331

Ken Pollack 2006

Lt. General HR McMaster, who served in Iraq in a number of positions and is

considered one of the Army’s “warrior-thinkers”, wrote that to ensure the U.S. doesn’t

fall victim of what went wrong in Iraq he listed three “age old truths:

“War is political…and should never be thought of autonomous, but always as an

instrument of policy.” Secondly, “War is human... a poor understanding of the

recent histories of the…Iraqi peoples undermined efforts to consolidate early

battlefield gains into lasting security.” Lastly, “War is uncertain, precisely

because it is political and human. The dominant assumption…was that

information would be the key to victory…American forces must cope with the

political and human dynamics of war in complex, uncertain environments. Wars

like those in…Iraq cannot be waged remotely.”332

The Bush administration created the “perfect storm” for creating enemies while

attempting to decrease the threat and prevent the next attack after the attacks of 9/11 and

the resulting invasion of Iraq. The decisions to invade Iraq and the decision to enact

Coalition Provisional Authority Orders No. 1 and 2 were grave miscalculations by the

Bush administration based on the failure to use critical thinking and risk management in

assessing the threat and making key judgments for planning Operation Iraqi Freedom and

most notably Phase IV operations. The resulting effects on Iraq’s internal security and

the security of U.S. and Coalition forces and the chaos that created the under-governed

area between Iraq and Syria has served as the incubator for violent extremism, which

would morph into the Syrian Civil War and a blowback of violence in Iraq. Francis

75

Fukuyama opined in 2006 as the third anniversary approached that Iraq had replaced

Afghanistan as the terrorist “magnet, training ground, and an operational base for jihadist

terrorists.333

There is overwhelming evidence that the administration planned to invade Iraq

based on emotions from the 9/11attacks and not on an assessed and validated threat to

national security. The administration presented “a war of choice” to the American people

and the world as a “war of necessity” requiring immediate action. The approval ratings

of Bush jumped dramatically 30 to 40 percent after the attack; the traumatized American

people accepted the threat as presented by the administration.334

The eighteen months between 9/11 and the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom

(March 19, 2003) gave the administration time to plan and deploy for the operation,

gather international support, and analyze the threat. However, President Bush made the

decision in mid-summer 2002 without a thorough, deliberate discussion or analysis of the

threat, including the second and third tier effects, moved the country towards war.

The administration attempted to use the cloak of secrecy to hide the decision to go

to war and many in the administration argued they maintained planning at a low level so

as to keep the intention to invade secret until immediately before the operation even

though around the world it appeared war was looming. Cheney stated, “A lot of what

needs to be done here will have to be done quietly without any discussion…”335

The

basic principle of a democracy is the truthfulness and transparency of the government, a

failure in Operation Iraq Freedom.

76

The ideal of neo-conservatism that “American power can be used for moral

purposes” failed to create a new Iraq due to its proponent’s failure to examine global

realpolitik and society and culture of Iraq and the Arab Middle East.336

Feith and

Rumsfeld continue to fault the intelligence provided by the CIA and the Intelligence

Community for failing to provide intelligence that, would have provided a better base to

plan Phase IV operations. Moreover, the administration had nearly certain information

that Hurricane Katrina was going to hit New Orleans but failed execute. Having

intelligence would not have guaranteed success.

The military functions by plan, even though Clausewitz said, “no war plan

outlasts the first encounter with the enemy” and for that reason a plan must be based on

valid assumptions and include various contingencies—best case as well as worst-case

scenarios.337

However, Rumsfeld wanted Franks to develop more than a single go or no

go plan, in the end the military wrote one plan although the military adapted after the

beginning of the operation, the civilian administration’s policymakers failed to adapt

during the Phase IV operations as the violent insurgency increased.

The civilian military relationship appeared to be broken during the planning and

execution of the invasion. The role of the military in the planning process and senior

military officers carrying out their orders even when they personally questioned them

emerged after a number of general officers retired and the military appeared to be in a

quagmire fighting the insurgency. Lt. General Gregory Newbold, former JCS director of

operations described a list of mistakes as “McNamara-like micromanagement” and said:

77

“I was a witness and therefore a party to the actions that led us to the invasion of

Iraq—an unnecessary war…I have resisted speaking out in public. I’ve been silent

long enough. I am driven to action now by the mistakes and misjudgments of the

White House and the Pentagon, and by my many painful visits to our military

hospitals…a leader’s responsibility is to give voice to those who can’t—or

don’t—have the opportunity to speak.”338

Several others called for Rumsfeld’s resignation including Wolfowitz’s former military

assistant Major General John Batiste who commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq.

Major General John Riggs said, “…they [civilian leaders] only need the military advice

when it satisfies their agenda.”339

340

The National Security Council, CIA and Department of Defense had to look at all

threats after the attack to ensure national security. Bush declared war on an idea or

methodology and not on a nation without a clear idea of what victory would look like and

“dead or alive” became an accepted outcome. From the list of nations named as the “axis

of evil”, the administration pushed Iraq ahead of other countries that were further along

as a nuclear threat. It was a simple jump for world opinion to see it as a war on Islam.

Bush departed from what had become an unstated policy of multilateralism by

invading Iraq without international support and failed to build a broad based coalition,

including regional representation. Bush moved the U.S. from a policy built on defending

against a threat to preemptive war when he declared that Saddam had 48 hours to leave

Iraq or “it would result in military conflict at a time of our choosing.”341

Haass lists three

variants of war; preemptive-to prevent an imminent attack or “national survival”,

78

preventative—to contain a growing threat but attack is not imminent, and lastly a war of

discretion or “choice.” It is clear that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a war of choice.

The administration of President Bush failed by acting unilaterally against a

perceived threat, which was contained prior to 9/11, but morphed into a threat worth

investing and risking U.S. resources and its position as the global leader was built in the

months after 9/11. It went to war without understanding how unilaterally invading an

Arab country would damage U.S. ability to act in the region whilst increasing Iran’s

ability in Iraq and in the region. Wolfowitz describe Iraq as the “super-bowl” for

terrorism arguing the longer the war is fought the reason to go to war-9/11—fades from

memory.342

The administration created a war but was not prepared to fight the war it

created.

The president allowed the heuristic pre-conceived political notions of some to

override what should have been a deliberate risk assessment to determine the seriousness

of the threat as well as the risk and cost of acting. The emotions of 9/11 and the new

policy of preventive war moved the nation on the course towards war with Iraq. The

planning done prior to the invasion relied on invalid assumptions created by how some

decision makers wished the situation to be rather than how it was in reality. The

administration dismissed the plethora of studies by government agencies and independent

groups that identified the problems that the military and civilian reconstruction efforts

would encounter in 2003.

79

After a review of literature examining the planning process it is accepted that

statements made saying Bush failed to plan for Phase IV are false however, the planning

done did not face the same scrutiny as the combat phases and lacked the details normally

considered in a military operation plan. The combatant commander, Franks, and the

lower headquarters had not synchronized the small amount of planning done after NPSD

24 was issued and the designation of Defense as the lead agency. Phase IV would

commence with the leaders having little guidance and units operating on the initiative of

the commander.

The administration’s decision-making process, the failure to ask the right

questions, acceptance of assumptions, and total failure to consider the second tier effects

and created the early chaos in Iraq. The third tier effects of each decision made resulted

in additional damage to an already broken society that would continue through the U.S.

occupation and have continuing affects after the U.S. left the country. Bush has been

characterized as the independent “cowboy “where he “relies on gut instinct to size people

up and to make snap decisions.”343

Since its establishment after WWII, the U.S. national security apparatus has

adapted to the personalities of the principals, is typically reactive and failed to consider

realpolitik in the regions. The U.S. Army study pointed out that the U.S. took five-years

after 9/11 to develop a public development strategy. Reorganization done by a number of

different administrations has been inconsistent in improving the probability of success.344

80

The studies of the political psychology of the Bush administration illustrate the

trauma that moved the country after 9/11 and how it influenced the president’s decision-

making process and the changes in his fundamental beliefs. Dobbins compared Bush to

his father, George H.W. Bush, as being more outgoing and charismatic but lacked the

bureaucratic, legislative, and foreign policy experience of this father.345

After 9/11,

President Bush established a policy of retribution and accepted the failed assessments and

war planning without asking the critical question “what happens tomorrow?” If that

question were asked and answered, the heuristic opinions forced to be evaluated, regional

and global security could be much different.

The military performed well in the opening phases of the war but stumbled when

faced with the insurgency, and Rumsfeld defended the Army saying, “You go to war with

the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later

time.”346

The U.S. in retrospect had all the time to plan, organize, and equip the Army to

fit the mission. However, it applied a “rush” scenario to the process and went to war with

an Army not ready to deal with the issues that would arise during Phase IV or to confront

insurgency groups rather than nation-states. It quickly defeated Saddam’s regular army

but was not trained or equipped to combat the insurgency, which emerged after the CPA

orders. Writing about the Army’s new field manual, FM3-07, Lt. Colonels William

Caldwell IV and Steven M. Leonard argue in Iraq;

“In the wake of shock and awe, we faced disenfranchised populations neither

shocked by our victory nor awed by our presence. We failed them in many ways,

and much of our focus remained on applying the lethal and destructive aspects of

81

our military might rather than the nonlethal, constructive capabilities so vital to

success in operations conducted among the people.”347

Rumsfeld’s plan to transform the military while conducting three military

operations (Afghanistan, Iraq, and the remainder of the world) was an unneeded

distraction for the Department of Defense. Rumsfeld’s contempt for the military,

especially the Army, and his manner in dealing with the military resulted in the military

having to accept his assumptions or risk their careers. As an example, when the Chief of

Staff of the Army, General Shinseki retired Rumsfeld reached to the retired ranks and

appointed General Peter J. Schoomaker as his replacement.348

Arguably, the decision that had the greatest effect on the operation’s planning was

the reliance on the exile groups for current information on Iraq. The ability of Chalabi

and to a lesser extent others in the exile groups which had a vested interest in the future

of Iraq created an illusion in which they could emerge as leaders.349

They worked to cut

out a role in the new government, often at the cost of their opposition—creating a Shi’a

mirror image in Saddam. Accepting the heuristic reports, the administration accepted the

assumptions without using critical thinking or risk assessment before committing the

nation to a perceived threat. Secondly, many of the exile leaders had lived in the west for

decades and had no first had information on Iraq. The Iraqis that stayed behind

considered most of the exiles as “carpet baggers” and they did not have legitimacy in

Iraq. Feith argued that many later emerged in the Iraqi government but it can be

82

countered they did so through the advantages they held as exiles; money, foreign

connections, and support of the U.S.

OHRA was set up for failure; its creation at the last minute prevented Garner from

participating in the planning process and forced him to rely on what others had created.

Garner’s perceived mission for OHRA was to provide food, shelter, and medical care to

refugees (similar to his role in Operation Provide Comfort in 1991) and not in

establishing a new government.

The chaos of the invasion, followed by the errors in planning and staffing Phase

IV were compounded with the change from Garner and OHRA to Bremer and the CPA

The change in policy and strategy made during Bremer’s lunch with Bush compounded

the personnel change.

Bremer and his staff’s arrival and immediately issuing CPA Orders No. 1 and 2

without a force to fill the vacuum of the military and the government resulted in the

window of international cooperation closing. Bremer ‘s plan for the sovereignty “would

take time”, however the establishment of a new government floundered and finally was

rushed into existence when the Coalition was faced with increasing violence from the

Sunni insurgency as well as the Shi’i extremist led by Muqtada al-Sadr.350

351

The staffing of the CPA followed the model of OHRA, relying on short-term

deployment of personnel from various agencies and the appointment of inexperienced

individuals to both junior and senior positions. Many decisions of the CPA were based on

83

the lack of understanding of the Iraqi culture and society. The stripping of the military

and civilian leaders of their position created an immediate enemy.

Larry Diamond wrote that after Bremer left Iraq and sovereignty was in the hands

of Iraq that “the Iraq of today falls far short of what the Bush administration promised.

Because of a long chain of U.S. miscalculations, the Coalition occupation has left Iraq in

far worse shape than it need have and has diminished the long-term prospects of

democracy.”352

Whilst his assessment was correct, it lacked the additional impact on the

region caused by the occupation, the sectarian violence after the U.S. withdrawal and the

overall impact that emerged as the Arab Spring movement and 2011 Syrian Civil War.

Moreover, the Syrian Civil War has resulted in the resurgence of the East-West Conflict

between the U.S. and Russia. The proximity of Syria to the already existing Israeli and

Palestinian conflict and Lebanon create a region of violence that draws a new cleavage

creating a new “Cold War” in the region.

The lack of security in Western Iraq and Syria has resulted in an “under-

governed” area where weapons and fighters easily cross the porous borders resulting in

greater violence on both sides of the borders and creating the new “supposed state”.

The al-Qaida linked organization ISIs or AQI emerged, renaming itself as AQ of Iraq and

the Levant (AQIL), fighting both Syrian and Iraqi governments and giving credence to al-

Qaida even though after the killing of Usama bin-Laden the current administration

claimed al-Qaida was “on the ropes”.

84

The failure to have a realistic postwar strategy in Iraq left the military with too-

few personnel, under-resourced civilian agencies, and limited police training

capacity, which contributed to the chaos of the country. Such poor, splintered

U.S. government planning is putting the United States at risk in multiple

ways…The most tragic costs of flawed policy planning and implementations are

unnecessary military and civilian casualties.”353

The long-term effect of the Iraq war has instilled a level of distrust in the

government of the United States both by its citizens and by the international community.

Additionally it has hamstrung the President of the United States in his dealings with

current crises in the Middle East as well as elsewhere in the world. Moreover, it has

made the U.S. appear impotent when the president draws a “red line” but does not have

the political capital or resources to enforce his declaration.354

“…Clear thinking about war costs nothing. What we can afford least is to define

the problem of future war as we would like it to be, and by doing so introduce

into our defense vulnerabilities based on self-delusion.” 355

Lt. General HR McMaster

FIGURES and TABLES Table 1 Summary of Explanatory Perspectives on the Iraq Invasion

Theory Focus

Realism Unipolarity, maintain hegemony and avoid post-9/11 decline by

demonstrating U.S. willingness to use force

Avoid nuclear proliferation, eliminate Iraqi WMD threat against

the

U.S. and its allies

Gain regional military bases, pressure Syria and Iran, assist Israel

Secure U.S. oil supplies, reduce energy vulnerabilities

U.N. inspections are unreliable, sanctions policy causes

resentment

Liberalism Democracies’ fear that dictatorships will attack them first

Security derives from spreading democracy and human rights

Elite Interests War for partisan political gain: Divert public from failure to

prevent

9/11 or capture al-Qaeda leaders, and from past ties to Saddam

Hussein

Vested interests (e.g. energy corporations), war profiteering

Interests of the defense bureaucracy and intelligence agencies

Ideological

Influences Neoconservative belief in efficacy of unilateral force

Orientalist beliefs about Middle Eastern peoples, and evangelical

Christian beliefs concerning Israel

Vengeful U.S. nationalism after 9/11

Personality and

Social psychology Bush’s need to surpass father, family vendetta against Saddam

Hussein

Attractions of applying the “Munich analogy” to Iraq

Cognitive inability to adapt to a non-state adversary and reflexive

resort

to Cold war strategies and weaponry, ignorance of the Middle East

Societal need for enemies Source: Daniel Lieberfeld, “Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War,” International Journal of

Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2005,

2

Table 2 Ba`ath Party Membership Levels

Level in Party

Hierarchy

Rank-English Title Rank-Arabic Title

Highest –Symbolic National Command

Member

Adw qiyada

qawmiyya

Highest Level of

Iraqi leadership

(Region referred to

Iraq and Nation to

Arab world

Regional Command

Member

Adw qiyada

qutriyya

Offices could be

geographical or

professional. This

level was omitted

from CPA orders.

Office Member Adw maktab

Branch Member Adw fara`

Section Member Adw shu`ba

Group Member Adw firqa

Actual Membership

Commenced

Active Member Adw `ail

Trainee Member Adw mutadarib

Candidate Murashah lil

adwiyya

Advanced Partisan Nasir mutaqadam

Partisan Nasir

Lowest level of

association

Supporter Muwayyid

Note 1. Blue shade levels banned by CPA order

Tan Shade banned by CPA but allowed to return to government in 2008

Accountability and Justice Law. However, they continued to be banned if they

served in highest civil service positions or in selected ministries including the

Supreme Judicial Council. The new law also banned all members of the Ba’athist

security and intelligence service regardless of party rank.

Note 2. There is not a credible list of membership numbers for each category.

Source: International Center for Transitional Justice, Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New

“Accountability and Justice” Law, January 22, 2008.

3

Table 3 Security Indicators in Iraq April – October 2003

Category

/Month

April June August October

Top Ba’athist at

Large1

40 23 16 15

US Forces2 150,000* 150,000 139,000 131,000

Coalition

Forces1

23,000* 21,000 22,000 23,000

Daily attacks

on U.S. Forces1

5-10 6 15 30

Available Iraq

Security

Forces1

0 25,000 48,000 85,500**

U.S. Killed in

Action1

22 29 36 43

Annualized

Murder Rate in

Baghdad per

100,0001

100 135 185 140

1 National Interest

2 Brookings Institute

* U.S. and Coalition Forces May 2003

**The number of Iraq Security Force (ISF) is of questionable accuracy as a statement of

Iraq security. Qasem Daoud, former minister of state for national security stated the

focus in 2003 on the ISF was on quantity and not quality.356

The number trained and

equipped in February 2005 varied from 40,000 quoted by JCS Chairman Gen Myers to

4,000 to 18,000 quoted by Senator Biden. The Brookings Institute warned that ISF

figures were provided by the government of Iraq and possibly included units controlled

by sectarian interests.357

Sources:

John O’Sullivan Ed. The National Interest, “Scoring the Iraq Aftermath,” Winter

2003/04

Michael O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index, November 30, 2012.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aarts, Paul. “Iraq Is Not a Lost Battle. Middle East, Interview with Isam Al-Khafaji.”

quoted in “Iraq Under Construction,” Middle East Research MER 228 (Fall

2003). http://www.merip.org/mer/mer228/iraq-not-lost-battle Middle East

Research and Information Project MER 228 (accessed April 11, 2014).

Al-Khoei, Hayder ,“Syria: The View from Iraq.” in “Syria: Views from the Region.”

special issue, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014 (June 14, 2013).

http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_syria_the_view_from_iraq136 (accessed

May 11, 2014)

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham.” Middle East

Forum (December 11, 2013). http://www.meforum.org/3697/islamic-state-iraq-al-

sham. (accessed May 1, 2014).

Al-Wardi, ʻAli, and Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Iraq in Turmoil: Historical Perspectives of

Dr. Ali Al-Wardi, from the Ottoman Empire to King Feisal. Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 2012.

Allawi, Ali A. “The Iraq Crisis and the Future Middle East Order,” Ali A. Allawi (blog),

2009. http://www.aliallawi.com/art_iraqCrisis.php (accessed May 7, 2014).

Allawi, Ali A. The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace. New Haven,

CN: Yale University Press, 2007.

http://www.myilibrary.com?id=173511&ref=toc.. (accessed April 18, 2014).

Ajami, Fouad. The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq.

New York: Free Press, 2006.

Badie, Dina. “Groupthink: Iraq and the War on Terror,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6

(2010): 277-96.

http://www.politics.ubc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/poli_sci/Faculty/price/Iraq_War

_Groupthink.pdf. (accessed April 1, 2014).

Baker, James A. III, and Lee Hamilton. The Iraq Study Group Report. Washington, DC:

U.S. Institute for Peace, 2006.

http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html

(accessed May 19, 2014).

2

Ballard, John R. From Storm to Freedom: America's Long War with Iraq. Annapolis,

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010.

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=n

labk&an=526783 (accessed May 20, 2014).

Barkey, Henri J. “Spinoff: The Syrian Crisis and the Future of Iraq.” The American

Interest (December 26, 2012) http://www.the-american-

interest.com/articles/2012/12/26/spinoff-the-syrian-crisis-and-the-future-of-

iraq/ (accessed June 7, 2014).

Barnett, Thomas P M. The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First

Century. Berkley trade pbk. ed. New York: Berkley Books, 2005.

Batchelor, John. “Do Syria and Iraq Still Exist?” Al Jazeera America. January 24, 2014.

http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/1/emirate-iraq-syriasovereignty.html.

(accessed May 4, 2014).

Bensahel, Nora et al. After Saddam Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq. Santa

Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 2008.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG642.html (accessed March 9, 2014).

Benson, Kevin. “Of Note: A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003,” Parameters

43, no. 4 (Winter 2013-2014): 119-23.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/issues/Winter_201

3/12_Benson.pdf (accessed May 16, 2014).

Boot, Max. War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to

Today. New York: Gotham Books, 2006.

Bozo, Frédéric. “France, the U.S. and the 2002-2003 Iraqi Crisis.” Lecture, Wilson

Center, Washington, DC, March 28, 2014. Podcast available at

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/history-the-iraqi-crisis

Bremer, L. Paul III, and Malcolm McConnell. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a

Future of Hope. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

Bremer, L. Paul III, “What We Got Right in Iraq,” Washington Post. May 13, 2007.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/05/11/AR20070511

02054.html (accessed May 1, 2014).

3

Bremer, L. Paul III and James Dobbins, David Gompert, “Early Days in Iraq: Decisions

of the CPA,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, no. 4. (September 8,

2008): 21-56 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802328925 (accessed March 8,

2014).

Brown, L. Carl, “The Dream Place of the Empire is a “Noble Failure””. Foreign Affairs

85, no. 5, (September-October 2006). Review of The Foreigners Gift by Fouad

Ajami http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032077 (accessed April 2, 2014).

Burke, John P. Becoming President: The Bush Transition, 2000-2003. Boulder, Colo.:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

Bush, George W, “Bush: 'Leave Iraq within 48 hours'”. CNN. March 17, 2003.

transcript of Bush speech to the nation.

http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/.

Original Video is available at http://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/Photos-

and-Videos/Video-Clips/Video-Clips.aspx

Byman, Daniel, “Iraq after Saddam.” The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 4 (August 2001):

151-62. http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/dlb32/publication-32007.pdf.

(accessed March 9, 2014).

Byman, Daniel, and et al. “Symposium: Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on 'Terror'.”

Middle East Policy 7, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 1-24.

http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&

AN=16296783&site=ehost-live (accessed June 7, 2014).

Byman Daniel et al, Saving Syria: Assessing Options for Regime Change. Middle East

Memo 21 (March 2012)

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/15%20syria%20s

aban/0 315_syria_saban.pdf (accessed April 14, 2014).

Caldwell, William B. IV, and Steven M. Leonard, “Field Manual 3-07 Stability

Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change,” Military Review (July-August 2008).

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20

080831_art005.pdf (accessed May 24, 2014).

Caldwell, Dan. Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2011.

4

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone. New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.

Coalition Provisional Authority. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1

De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society. Regulation. Coalition Provisional Authority

Baghdad, Iraq, May 16, 2003. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-

iraq/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.p

df (accessed March 10, 2014)

Coalition Provisional Authority. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1 Coalition

Provisional Authority. Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq, May 16,

2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-

Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf (accessed March 10, 2014).

Coalition Provisional Authority. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2 Dissolution of

Entities. Coalition Provisional Authority. Baghdad, Iraq May 23, 2002.

http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_

Entities with_Annex_A.pdf (accessed March 10, 2014).

Collins, Joseph J., “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath.”

Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Papers 5 (April 2008).

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-

1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=55662. (accessed May 14, 2014).

Cordesman, Anthony H. Planning for a Self-Inflicted Wound: US Policy to Reshape a

Post-Saddam Iraq. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International

Studies. Rev 3, December 31, 2002.

https://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/iraq_wound.pdf (accessed March 30, 2014).

Cordesman, Anthony. American Strategic and Tactical Failures in Iraq: An Update.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006.

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060808_iraqfailures.pdf (accessed March 19,

2014).

Crane, Conrad C, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won.” Military

Review (May-June 2005): 27,

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_

2008CRII0831_art006.pdf (accessed April 10, 2014).

Dewar, James A. et al. Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain

Times. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993.

5

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR114.pdf

(accessed May 27, 2014).

Djerejian, Edward P. and Frank G. Wisner. Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict

Policy in Iraq. Report of an Independent Working Group. Cosponsored by the

Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public

Policy of Rice University. 2003, http://bakerinstitute.org/files/2685/

(accessed March 8, 2014)

Dobbins, James. After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush. Santa

Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2008.

http://images.contentreserve.com/imagetype-100/1736-1/{e981bbe9-b711-42b7-

ab1f-519d3897ce91}img100.jpg (accessed June 7, 2014). .

Dobbins, James. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Rand

Corporation Monograph Series. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.,

2009. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg847cc (accessed May 20, 2014).

Dyson, Stephen Benedict, “What Really Happened in Planning for Postwar Iraq?”

Political Science Quarterly 128, no. 3. 2013. www.psqonline.org (accessed

March 30, 2014)

Eland, Ivan, “Top 10 Reasons Not to “Do” Iraq”. CATO Institute. August 19, 2002.

http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/top-10-reasons-not-do-iraq

(accessed April 4, 2014).

Eisenstaedt, Michael and Eric Mathewson ed. “U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq, Lessons

from the British Experience,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

(April 2003). http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-

policy- in-post-saddam-iraq-lessons-from-the-british-experience (accessed March

18, 2014).

Faily, Lukman. “Iraq's Parliamentary Elections: A Conversation with Ambassador Faily.

interviewed by Dr. Jon B. Alterman.” Center for Strategic and International

Studies. April 23, 2014. https://csis.org/event/iraqs-parliamentary-elections-

conversation-he-ambassador-faily (accessed April 23, 2014).

Fallon, James M. Blind into Baghdad: America's War in Iraq. New York: Vintage

Books, 2006

6

Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on

Terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, 2008.

Filkins, Dexter and Richard A. Opel Jr., “After The War: Truck Bombing; Huge Suicide

Blast Demolishes U.N. Headquarters In Baghdad; Top Aid Officials Among 17

Dead,” New York Times. August 20, 2003.

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/20/world/after-war-truck-bombing-huge-

suicide-blast-demolishes-un-headquarters-baghdad.html (accessed April 26,

2014).

Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East. New

York: Vintage Books, 2007.

Flavin, William, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success.”

Parameters (Autumn 2003).

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/03autumn/flavin.

pdf (accessed March 13, 2014).

Fontenot, Gregory, E J. Degen, and David Tohn. On Point: The United States Army in

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Official U.S. Government ed. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.:

Combat Studies Institute Press. 2004.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/OnPointI.pdf (accessed

April 2, 2014) This is commonly referred to as On Point I in literature written

later in the war to differentiate it from later editions.)

Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History? Twenty-Five Years Later.” Lecture, CATO

Institute, Washington, DC, June 6, 2014. http://www.cato.org/events/francis-

fukuyamas-end-history-25-years-later Podcast available (accessed June 7, 2014).

Gaines, Brian J, “Where’s the Rally? Approval and Trust of the President, Cabinet, and

Government Since 9/11,” PS Online. American Political Science Association.

September 2002. https://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/Where'stheRally-

Gaines.pdf (accessed April 20, 2014).

Gardner, Lloyd C. The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the

1970s to the Present. New York, NY: New Press, 2008.

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion

and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006.

7

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. The Endgame: The Inside Story of the

Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. Vintage books ed.

New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 2013

Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard Trainor. The Inside Story of the War in Iraq. Council of

Foreign Relations. interviewed by John McWethy ABC News May 2, 2006.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPULUbO1W8w (accessed April 22, 2014).

Graham, Bradley. By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of

Donald Rumsfeld. New York: Public Affairs, 2009.

Groen, Michael S. With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No

Worse Enemy. Quantico, VA: History Division Marine Corps University, 2006.

http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/With%20the%201st%20Marine%2

0Division%20in%20Iraq,%202003%20%20PCN%2010600000000_1.pdf (accessed

May 2, 2014).

Grossman, Marc. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Post-

Saddam Iraq, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. February

11, 2003.). http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/17616.htm (accessed March 18,

2014).

Harvey, Dereck. “A ‘Red Team’ Perspective on the Insurgency in Iraq. Army at War

Change in the Midst of Conflict.” Lecture, The Proceedings of the Combat

Studies Institute. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Combat

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College., Fort

Leavenworth, KS, August 2-4, 2005.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AnArmyAtWar_ChangeI

nTheMidstOfConflict.pdf (accessed May 2, 2014).

Haass, Richard. War of Necessity: War of Choice. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.

Haass, Richard. “Why Did We Go to Iraq?” Lecture, Zocalo Public Square.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo4M5B0XxV4 (accessed May 17, 2014).

Haass, Richard. “Big Think Interview with Richard Haass.” Big Think April 23, 2012.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DEeqwrUQtwY (accessed May 17, 2014).

Hermann, Margaret G., “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal

Characteristics of Political Leaders,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1

8

(March 1980): 7-46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600126. (accessed April 1,

2014).

Hendrickson, David C. and Robert W. Tucker. Revisions in Need of Revising: What

Went Wrong in the Iraq War. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, 2005.

http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/63144346.html. (accessed April 29,

2014).

Hicks, Kathleen H. et al. The State of U.S. Power: Perceptions Across the Globe.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategy and International Security,

http://csis.org/publication/state-us-power-perceptions-across-globe. (accessed

April 8, 2014).

Hinnebusch, Raymond, “The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences.”

Perceptions (Spring 2007). http://sam.gov.tr/wp-

content/uploads/2012/01/Raymond-Hinnebusch.pdf (accessed March 18, 2014)

Hooker, Gregory. Military Research Papers. Vol. 4, Shaping the Plan for Operation

Iraqi Freedom: the Role of Military Intelligence Assessments. Washington, DC:

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/shaping-the-plan-for-

operation-iraqi-freedom-the-role-of-military-intelligence (accessed May 30,

2014).

Holmes, Terrence M., “Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz’s On War,” The Journal of

Strategic Studies 30, no. 1: 129

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/TMHolmes.pdf (accessed May 3, 2014)

Hoffman, Bruce. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: Rand

Corp. 2004.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP1

27.pdf (accessed March 24, 2014).

“Iraqi Parliament Passes the Accountability and Justice Law” Institute for the Study of

War. January 14, 2008

http://www.understandingwar.org/publications/commentaries/iraqi-parliament-

passes-accountability-and-justice-law (accessed May 4, 2014)

Isikoff, Michael, and David Corn. Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the

Selling of the Iraq War. New York: Crown Publishers, 2006.

9

Jervis, Robert, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly 118, no.

3 (Fall 2003): 365-88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30035780 (accessed May 24,

2014).

Kaplan, Fred M. Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American

Power. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.

Keeter, Scott, “Trends in Public Opinion about the War in Iraq, 2003-2007,” Pew

Research. March 15, 2007. http://www.pewresearch.org/2007/03/15/trends-in-

public-opinion-about-the-war-in-iraq-20032007/ (accessed April 4, 2014).

Lang, W. Partick “Drinking the Kool Aid.” Middle East Policy 11, no. 2 (Summer 2004):

39-60.

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/military/docview/203711704/fullte

xtPDF/C2F97A8A98974FBDPQ/1?accountid=8289 (accessed June 2, 2014).

Leffler, Melvyn P., "9/11 in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (September 2011): 33-

44. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost

(accessed May 16, 2014).

Levin, Carl. Senate Intelligence Committee Report, Congressional Record: July 8, 2004

(Senate) S7811-S7819.

https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/levin070804.html (accessed May 2,

2014).

Locher, James R. III, and et al. Project on National Security Reform: Turning Ideas into

Action. Arlington, VA: September

2009. http://www.policyscience.net/pnsr2010.pdf (accessed May 24, 2014).

Loose Ends: Iraq's Security Forces between U.S. Drawdown and Withdrawal. Brussels,

BE: International Crisis Group, 2010.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Ir

aq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/99%20Loose%20Ends%20-

%20Iraqs%20Security%20Forces%20between%20US%20Drawdown%20and%2

0Withdrawal.ashx (accessed June 9, 2014)

Mansoor, Peter R. Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq. The Yale

Library of Military History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

10

Mausner, Adam et al, The Outcome of Invasion: U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition

in Iraq, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March

2012. http://csis.org/files/publication/120308_Combined_Iraq_Chapter.pdf

(accessed March 23, 2014).

Mockaitis, Thomas R. Avoid the Slippery Slope: Conducting Effective Interventions.

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. 2013.

Montgomery, Gary W., and Timothy S. McWilliams, eds. Al-Anbar Awakening Volume

Ii Iraqi Perspectives: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009.

Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2009.

http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolII[1].pdf

(accessed May 10, 2014).

Monten, Jonathan, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and

Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy.” International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring

2005): 112-56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137499. (accessed April 22, 2004).

Murphy, Richard W. and C. Richard Nelson. Winning the Peace: Managing a Successful

Transition in Iraq. The Atlantic Council and American University. January 2003.

http://www1.american.edu/cgp/pdf/iraqreport.pdf (accessed March 6, 2014)

O’Hanlon, Michael, “Iraq without a Plan Next Time Listen to the Generals”, Policy

Review 128. (December 1, 2004) http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-

review/article/7655 (accessed April 23, 2014).

O'Hanlon, Michael, and Ian Livingston. Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of

Reconstruction in Post-Saddam Iraq. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute,

2011.

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/centers/saban/iraq%20index/index20111130.p

df (accessed June 9, 2014).

O'Sullivan, John ed. “Scoring the Iraq Aftermath.” The National Interest no. 74 (Winter

2003/04): 31-36.http://nationalinterest.org/article/scoring-the-iraq-aftermath-

1132 (accessed June 6, 2014).

Nurnberg, Erica and Lauren Ackerman. “Interview with Douglas Feith,” November 19,

2010. Pitt Political Review 3, Spring 2011. GSPIA Ed. Pitt Political Review 3,

Spring 2011. GSPIA Ed. (accessed April 30, 2014)

http://www.gspia.pitt.edu/Portals/0/PageFlip/Pitt_Political_Review/2011/files/ppr

_flipbook.pdf#page=76

11

Packer, George. The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Straus and

Giroux, 2005.

Pincus, Walter, “Before War, CIA Warned of Negative Outcomes,”. Washington Post.

June 3, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060200905.html (accessed March 25,

2014).

Pfiffner, James P. “President George W. Bush and His War Cabinet”. Presentation at The

Presidency, Congress, and the War on Terrorism Conference. University of

Florida. February 7, 2003.

http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Pfiffner.PDF

(accessed March 17, 2014).

Pfiffner, James P., “US Blunders in Iraq: De-Ba`athification and Disbanding the Army,”

Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 1, 76–85, February 2010.

r.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Articles/CPA%20Orders,%20Iraq%20PDF.pdf

Pollack, Kenneth M. The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq. New York:

Random House, 2002.

Pollack, Kenneth M., “The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq: A Retrospective

Analysis of the Reconstruction,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10,

no. 4 (December 2006): 1-20.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2006/12/iraq- pollack (accessed

May 26, 2014).

Pollack, Kenneth M. A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq.

Washington, DC: Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings

Institution, 2006.

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=n

labk&an=167341 (accessed May 17, 2014).

Porch, Douglas. Strategic Insight: Germany, Japan and the "De-Ba`athification" of Iraq.

Center for Contemporary Conflict, National Security Affairs Department, Naval

Postgraduate School. March 7, 2003.

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD

A485192). (accessed April 30, 2014).

12

Rasler, Karen A., William R. Thompson, and Kathleen M. Chester, “Foreign Policy

Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note On Reliability

Problems,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (March 1980): 47-66.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600127. (accessed May 10, 2014).

Rathmell, Andrew, “Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We

Learn?” International Affairs Royal Institute of International Affairs 81, no. 5

(October 2005): 1013-38. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569073. (accessed May 16,

2014).

Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin

Books, 2007.

Renshon, Jonathan, “Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of

George W. Bush,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 6 (December 2008).

http://www.jstor.org/stable/27638642 (accessed April 22, 2014)

Robinson, Lee, “Generals, Ambassadors, and Post-War Policymaking.” The Current 13,

no. 1 (Fall 2009): 2.

http://blogs.cornell.edu/policyreview/files/2011/06/TheCurrentv13n1fall2009.p

df (accessed May 24, 2014).

Rotmann, Phillip, David Tohn, and Jaron Wharton. Learning under Fire: The US

Military, Dissent and Organizational Learning Post-9/11. Cambridge, MA:

Belfer Center, JFK School of Government, May 2009.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/0904.Learning%20Under%20Fire%20dis

cussion%20paper.pdf (accessed June 9, 2014).

Rumsfeld, Donald F. “Talking Points November 27, 2001.” Talking Points, Meeting

between Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld and CENTCOM Gen Tommy Franks, MacDill

AFB, Tampa, FL, November 27, 2001

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/doc08.pdf. (accessed

March 13, 2014).

Rumsfeld, Donald F. “Iraq and Illustrative List of Potential Problems to be Considered

and Addressed.” Office of the Secretary of Defense. October 15, 2002. Rumsfeld

Library

http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/310/Re%20Parade%20of%20Horribles%20

10-15-2002.pdf (accessed March 13, 2014).

13

Rumsfeld, Donald “Inside the Pentagon.” (video). 2002. National Geographic Film,

Available thru Netflix (accessed April 14, 2014).

Rumsfeld, Donald F. “Secretary Rumsfeld Town Hall Meeting in Kuwait.” Department

of Defense News Transcript. December 8, 2004.

http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1980 (accessed

March 20, 2014).

Saunders, Elizabeth N. Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions.

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011.

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=n

labk&an=673745 (accessed May 20, 2014).

Shoamanesh, Sam Sasan. A New Security Order for the Middle East. Center for Strategic

Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey. Winter 2013.

http://sam.gov.tr/a-new-security-order-for-the-middle-east/ (accessed May 3,

2014)

Sissons, Miranda and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi. A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-

Ba’athification in Iraq. New York: International Center for Transnational Justice.

March 2013 http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-

2013-ENG.pdf (accessed April 5, 2014).

Sissons, Miranda and Alexander Mayer Rieckh. Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New

“Accountability and Justice” Law. New York: International Center for

Transnational Justice. January 22, 2008

https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Iraq-Accountability-Briefing-2008-

English.pdf (accessed May 3, 2014).

Smock, David. “Would an Invasion of Iraq Be a Just War?” U.S. Institute for Peace

Special Report 98 (January 2003) http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr98.pdf

(accessed May 24, 2014).

Smyth, Phillip, “From Karbala to Sayyida: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’i Militias,” CTC

Sentinel. U.S.M.A. West Point NY August 27, 2013.

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/august-2013 (accessed March 28, 2014).

Strother, Roger. “Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game.” George Washington University,

The National Security Achieve. November 4, 2006.

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/(accessed March13,

2014).

14

Stansfield, Gareth “The Transition to Democracy in Iraq”, in Alex Danchev and

J.M. Macmillan (Eds.), The Iraq War and Democratic Politics, Routledge, 2005,

London and New York.

http://people.exeter.ac.uk/grvstans/Webpage/The%20Iraq%20War.pdf . (accessed

March 24, 2014).

Stover, Eric, Hanny Megally, and Hania Mufti, “Bremer's 'Gordian Knot': Transnational

Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq,” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3

(August 2005): 830-1146.

http://media.proquest.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/media/pq/classic/doc/884432571/f

mt/pi/rep/NONE?hl=&cit%3Aauth=Stover%2C+Eric%3BMegally%2C+Hanny%

3BMufti%2C+Hania&cit%3Atitle=Bremer%27s+%22Gordian+Knot%22%3A+T

ransitional+Justice+and+the+US+Occupation+of+Iraq&ci(accessed May 26,

2014).

Sunstein, Cass R. Worst-Case Scenarios. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

2009.

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=n

labk& an=282565 (accessed May 24, 2014).

Tenet, George and Bill Harlow. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the C.I.A. New

York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007.

“Tim Cross: UK's Logistics Expert in Iraq,” BBC, April 14, 2003.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2948015.stm (accessed May 2, 2014).

Terrill, W. Andres. Lessons of the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Program for Iraq’s Future

and the Arab Revolutions. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic

Studies Institute.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1106

(March 14, 2014)

Unger, David C. The Emergency State: America's Pursuit of Absolute Security at All

Costs. New York: Penguin Press, 2012.

Victor, Phillip J, “Al-Qaeda Disavows Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” Al Jazzeera.

http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/3/al-qaeda-breaks-

tieswithislamicstateofiraqandthelevant.htmlAmerica (accessed April 2, 2014).

15

Weitz, Richard. Case Studies Working Group Report, Volume II. Carlisle, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012.

Wilcke, Christoph, “Castles Built in Sand: U.S. Government Exit Strategies in Iraq,

Middle East Research Project, MER 232 (Summer 2004)

http://www.merip.org/mer/mer232/castles-built-sand-us-governance-exit-

strategies-iraq (accessed March 12, 2014).

Williams, Blair S., “Heuristic Biases in Military Decision Making,” Military Review

(September-October 2010): 40-52.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_

20101031_art008.pdf (accessed May 24, 2014).

U.N. Security Council, May 8, 2003, 1.”Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent

Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and

the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of

the Security Council”. (S/2003/538). Official Record. New York, 2003.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Iraq%20S2003538.pdf, (accessed March 19, 2014)

U.N. Security Council. “Resolution 1483 (2003) adopted by the Security Council 4761st

meeting, on 22 May 2003”. (S/RES/1483 (2003)).

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairaq/unsc1483.pdf (accessed March 19,

2014)

U.S. Central Command. Desert Crossing (U) After Action Report. June 28-30, 1999.

AAR for Seminar held at U.S. Central Command, McDill AFB, FL.

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/Desert%20Crossing%20

After% 20Action%20Report_1999-06-28.pdf (accessed March 20, 2014).

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Near Eastern and

South Asian Analysis. Iraq Consequences of a Rapid Coalition Victory.

Intelligence Report. Washington, DC, 2003

http://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/pdf/2008-015-doc1.pdf (accessed

March 11, 2014).

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Intelligence

Community’s Prewar Assessment on Iraq together with Additional Views. 108th

Cong., 2d sess., 204. S. Rep. 108-301.

http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf (accessed March 29, 2014)

16

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Select Committee on Intelligence. Intelligence

Activities relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation

Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy. 110th Cong., 2d sess., 2008. S. Rep. 110.

http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/080605/phase2b.pdf (accessed March 20,

2014)

U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. DoD Briefing on Policy

and Intelligence Matters June 4, 2003. Prepared by Douglas J. Feith, William

Luti. Press Briefing. Washington, DC, 2003

http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2724 (accessed

April 30, 2014).

U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Department of Defense

News Briefing. September 17, 2003. Prepared by Walter Slocombe and Lawrence

DiRita. News Briefing. Washington, DC, 2003.

http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3164 (accessed

May 6, 2014)

U. S. Department of Defense, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction

Operations. February 2010

http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929220550/http://www.wartimec

ontracting.gov/docs/SIGIR_ApplyingHardLessons.pdf (Accessed March 31,

2014).

U. S. Department of Defense Biography, Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff.

August 1, 2003

http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=91(accessed May

6, 2014).

U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0.

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed April 30, 2014).

U.S. Department of State. The Future of Iraq Project Defense Policy and Institutions

Working Group. May 24, 2004.

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20Defense%20Po

licy%2 0and%20Institutions.pdf (accessed March 20, 2014).

17

U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to

the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. Report. Washington,

DC, 2010.

http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001084705/http://www.sigir.mil/

applyinghardlessons/index.html (accessed May 1, 2014).

“US National Security Decision-Making.” Strategic Comments 8, no. 7 (October 22,

2007) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788020872 (accessed May 17, 2014).

Wright, Donald P. and Timothy R. Reese. The United States Army in Operation Iraqi

Freedom, May 2003-January 2005: On Point II. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat

Studies Institute Press, 2008.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/OnPointII.pdf (accessed

April 2, 2014)

Zakheim, Dov S. “Confessions of a Vulcan.” Foreign Policy. (May 13, 2011).

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/13/confessions_of_a_vulcan

(Accessed March 31, 2014)

2

1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. The Clausewitz Homepage

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Cquotations.htm (accessed April 5, 2014). Writers and speakers often

use this quote when discussing military planning, operations. Secretary of Defense Carl Weinberger used it

in discussing The Weinberger Doctrine of 1984. 2 Donald F. Rumsfeld quoted in “Inside the Pentagon.” (video), 2002, National Geographic Film,

Available thru Netflix. Inside the Pentagon. Interview filmed after 9/11 and prior to the invasion of Iraq. 3 Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the

Iraq War (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006), 191. 4 Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (Fall

2003): 365-88, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30035780. (accessed May 24, 2014). 5 James P Pfiffner, President George W. Bush and His War Cabinet. Prepared for presentation at

the conference on “The Presidency, Congress, and the War on Terrorism.” University of Florida (February

7, 2003). http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/17616.htm, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the-

future-of-iraq (accessed March 22, 2014)

6 Marc Grossman, “Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee” (February 11, 2003).

http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/17616.htm, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the-future-of-iraq

(accessed March 22, 2014) 7 Raymond Hinnebusch. The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences. Perceptions

(Spring 2007):18. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Raymond-Hinnebusch.pdf (accessed

March 23, 2014) 8 Graham, By His Own Rules, 366. Reportedly he was meant to use the term ‘old NATO’ to

differentiate between ‘new NATO’, the former Warsaw Pact nations that were joining the Coalition. 9 Dexter Filkins and Richard A. Opel Jr. After The War: Truck Bombing; Huge Suicide Blast

Demolishes U.N. Headquarters In Baghdad; Top Aid Officials Among 17 Dead. New York Times. August

20, 2003 http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/20/world/after-war-truck-bombing-huge-suicide-blast-

demolishes-un-headquarters-baghdad.html (accessed March 23, 2014). 10

Frédéric Bozo, “France, the U.S. and the 2002-2003 Iraqi Crisis” (lecture, Wilson Center,

Washington, DC, March 28, 2014). http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/history-the-iraqi-crisis Event at

Wilson Center, Bozo argued that a window closed in July for France to participate in the reconstruction. He

faulted U.S. attitude especially of the DoD and Sec. Rumsfeld toward the Europe that did not participate in

the invasion which created ill-will between the U.S. and Europe. 11

Joseph J. Collins, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath”, Institute for

National Strategic Studies Occasional Papers 5 (April 2008): 23, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-

Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=55662.

(accessed May 14, 2014). 12

CNN, “Truck Bomb Kills U.N. Envoy to Iraq,” CNN.com/World, August 20, 2003, (accessed

May 14, 2014) http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/19/sprj.irq.main/ (accessed March 24, 2014). 13

Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine 365-88 14

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD Briefing on Policy and

Intelligence Matters June 4, 2003, prepared by Douglas J. Feith, William Luti, Press Briefing (Washington,

DC, 2003) .http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2003/intell-030604-dod01.htm (accessed

April 26, 2014). 15

Dan Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and

Iraq (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 95.

3

16

Melvyn P. Leffler, "9/11 in Retrospect." Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (September 2011): 33-44.

International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed May 16, 2014). 17

Jonathan Renshon, “Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George

W. Bush,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 6 (December 2008): 821. 18

Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions, Cornell

Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011),

215, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&an=673745 (a

ccessed May 20, 2014). 19

Erica Nurnberg and Lauren Ackerman. “Interview with Douglas Feith November 19, 2010”, Pitt

Political Review 3, (Spring 2011) GSPIA Ed. 76 www.ppj.gspia.pitt.edu (accessed April 23, 2014) 20

Richard Haass. War of Necessity: War of Choice. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. 278. 21

Gregory Fontenot, E J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation

Iraqi Freedom, official U.S. Government ed. (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press:

(2004), xxii. 22

Andrew Rathmell, “Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq,” 1018 23

Michael Eisenstaedt and Eric Mathewson ed. “U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq, Lessons from

the British Experience”. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (April 2003): 3-4.

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-policy-in-post-saddam-iraq-lessons-from-the-

british-experience (accessed March 24, 2014). 24

‘Al Al-Ward and Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, Iraq in Turmoil: Historical Perspectives of Dr. Ali

Al-Wardi, from the Ottoman Empire to King Feisal (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 4. 25

James Dobbins, Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Rand

Corporation Monograph Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2009),

xiv, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg847cc (accessed May 20, 2014). 26

Daniel Byman et al, “Symposium: Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on 'Terror',” Middle East Policy 7, no.

1 (Spring 2005): 1-24,

http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=16296783&site=ehos

t-live (accessed June 7, 2014). 27

Andres Terrill W. Lessons of the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Program for Iraq’s Future and the

Arab Revolutions. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. Terrill attributes this

term to Douglas Feith. 28

Renshon, “Stability and Change in Belief Systems,” 145 29

U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington,

DC: Department of Defense, (2011), III-43. 30

Rathmell, “Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq,” 1013-38. 31

Haass, War of Necessity: War of Choice, 279-293. Memo to Powell included in appendix of

book. 32

Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom,

May 2003-January 2005: On Point Ii (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 89. 32

Nora Bensahel et al. After Saddam: Prewar Planning And The Occupation Of Iraq (Santa

Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2008),70. 33

James Dobbins, After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush (Santa Monica,

CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2008), 107, http://images.contentreserve.com/imagetype-

100/1736-1/{e981bbe9-b711-42b7-ab1f-519d3897ce91}img100.jpg (accessed June 7, 2014). 34

Haass Interview (Big Think). 35

Collins, “Choosing War,” 13. 36

Dobbins, After the War, 112.

4

37

Wright and Reese, On Point II, 89. 38

Nora Bensahel et al. After Saddam: Prewar Planning And The Occupation Of Iraq (Santa

Monica, Ca: Rand Arroyo Center, 2008), 118

Http://Catalog.Hathitrust.Org/Api/Volumes/Oclc/232002125.Html (accessed March 9, 2014). 39

John R. Ballard, From Storm to Freedom: America's Long War with Iraq (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 2010), 150. 40

George Packer, The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,

2005, 147 41

Collins, “Choosing War,” 19. 42

Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of

Donald Rumsfeld. New York: Public Affairs, (2009): 261. 43

Packer, The Assassins' Gate, 129. 44

Phillip Smyth, From Karbala to Sayyida: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi`a Militias, CTC Sentinel,

(August 27, 2013) https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/from-karbala-to-sayyida-zaynab-iraqi-fighters-in-syrias-

shia-militias (accessed March 12, 2014). 45

Byran Price, “Syria: A Wicked Problem for All”, CTC Sentinel. U.S.M.A. West Point NY

August 27, 2013. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/syria-a-wicked-problem-for-all (accessed March 12,

2014). 46

David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong

in the Iraq War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 3.

http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/63144346.html. (accessed April 29, 2014) 47

Rathmell, “Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction In Iraq,” 1018 48

David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went

Wrong in the Iraq War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 4,

http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/63144346.html (accessed April 29, 2014). 49

Kenneth M. Pollack, A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq (Washington, DC:

Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2006),

140, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&an=167341 (a

ccessed May 17, 2014). 50

Thomas P M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century,

berkley trade pbk. ed. (New York: Berkley Books, 2005), 204 originally printed in Wall Street Journal.

“Support Our Troops” by Paul Wolfowitz, September 2, 2003.

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB106247190441278700 51

Daniel Bynan, et al “Saving Syria: Options for Regime Change.” Middle East Memo. Brookings

Saban Center. (March 2012): 4.

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/15%20syria%20saban/0315_syria_saban.p

df (accessed March 26, 2014). 52

Collins, “Choosing War,” 1. 53

Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and

Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books, (2006): xxxiii. 54

Gordon and Trainor, “Cobra II,” 138-139. 55

Michael R Gordon and Bernard Trainor interviewed by John McWethy The Inside Story of the

War in Iraq. Council on Foreign Relations. ABC News May 2, 2006.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPULUbO1W8w (accessed April 4, 2014). 56

Michael R Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for

Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. Vintage books ed. New York: Vintage Books, A Division of

Random House, Inc., (2013): 12.

5

57

Wright and Reese, On Point II, 15 58

Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism.

New York, NY: Harper, 2008.506, 515 59

Feith, War and Decision, 515-516. 60

Haass, War of Necessity: War of Choice, 168. 61

Haass, War of Necessity: War of Choice, 278 62

Haass, War of Necessity: War of Choice, 183-185. Rumsfeld was the only senior policymaker

in DoD with military experience, he served on active duty as an aviator and flight instructor during

peacetime (1954-57) and continued to serve as a reserve officer retiring at the rank of Captain (O-6). 63

Richard Haass, “Why Did We Go to Iraq?” Zocalo Public Square,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo4M5B0XxV4 (accessed May 17, 2014). 64

Pollack, A Switch in Time 65

Pollack Kenneth M. The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq. New York: Random

House, 2002. 342. 66

Anthony H. Cordesman, Planning for a Self-Inflicted Wound: US Policy to Reshape a Post-

Saddam Iraq. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Rev 3, December 31, 2002,

2. https://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/iraq_wound.pdf (accessed March 30, 2014). 67

Richard W Murphy and Richard C. Nelson. Winning the Peace: Managing a Successful

Transition in Iraq. The Atlantic Council and American University. January 2003.

http://www1.american.edu/cgp/pdf/iraqreport.pdf (accessed March 25, 2014). 68

Ivan Eland, “Top 10 Reasons Not to “Do” Iraq”. CATO Institute. August 19, 2002

http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/top-10-reasons-not-do-iraq (accessed April 4, 2014). 69

Daniel Byman, “Iraq After Saddam,” The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 4 (August 2001): 152-

53, http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/dlb32/publication-32007.pdf. (accessed March 9, 2014). 70

Haass, War of Necessity: War of Choice, 170. 71

Fred M Kaplan, Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power.

Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.118 72

Graham, “By His Own Rules,” 204. 73

Ali A Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CN:

Yale University Press, 2007), 96, accessed April 18, 2014,

http://www.myilibrary.com?id=173511&ref=toc.. 74

Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Allawi 2007 101 75

Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Allawi 2007 32 76

Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Allawi 2007 111 77

Miranda Sissons and Alexander Mayer Rieckh. Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New “Accountability and

Justice” Law. New York: International Center for Transnational Justice. January 22, 2008, 5

https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Iraq-Accountability-Briefing-2008-English.pdf (accessed May

3, 2014). 78

Miranda Sissons and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi. A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Ba’athification in

Iraq. New York: International Center for Transnational Justice, (March 2013).

http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-ENG.pdf (accessed May, 3

2014). 79

L. Paul Bremer III, “What We Got Right in Iraq,” Washington Post, May 13, 2007,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/11/AR2007051102054.html. (accessed

May 1, 2014). 80

Sissons and Al-Saiedi, A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Ba’athification in Iraq, 17.

6

81

Lee Robinson, “Generals, Ambassadors, and Post-War Policymaking.” The Current 13, no. 1

(Fall 2009): 10. http://blogs.cornell.edu/policyreview/files/2011/06/TheCurrentv13n1fall2009.pdf

(accessed May 24, 2014). 82

Sissons and Rieckh, Briefing Paper, 5. 83

Sissons and Al-Saiedi, A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Ba’athification in Iraq, 20. 84

Sissons and Al-Saiedi, A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Ba’athification in Iraq, 20. 85

Adam Mausner et al. The Outcome of Invasion: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq.

Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2012, 5

http://csis.org/files/publication/120308_Combined_Iraq_Chapter.pdf (accessed April 20, 2014). 86

Terrill, Lessons of the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Program for Iraq’s Future and the Arab

Revolutions. xi. 87

Terrill, Lessons of the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Program for Iraq’s Future and the Arab

Revolutions, 57. 88

Terrill, Lessons of the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Program for Iraq’s Future and the Arab

Revolutions, 61. 89

Byman, “Iraq After Saddam,” 1. 90

Byman, “Iraq After Saddam,” 4. 91

Collins, “Choosing War,” 1. 92

Renshon, “Stability and Change in Belief Systems,” 820. 93

Margaret G. Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics

of Political Leaders,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (March 1980): 7-46,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600126. (accessed April 1, 2014). 94

Karen A. Rasler, William R. Thompson, and Kathleen M.Chester, “Foreign Policy Makers,

Personality Attributes, and Interviews: A Note on Reliability Problems”, International Studies

Quarterly 24, no. 1 (March 1980): 47 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600127 (accessed May 10, 2014). 95

Rasler, Thompson, and Chester, “Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and

Interviews,” 48. 96

Rasler, Thompson, and Chester, “Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and

Interviews,” 54. 97

Renshon, “Stability and Change in Belief Systems,” 820-49. 98

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, 96. 99

Christopher Lee, “Cheney Is Told to Keep Official Records,” Washington Post, September 21,

2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/20/AR2008092001627.html

(accessed May 16, 2014). 100

Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts

and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House, 2012), 19. 101

Raymond Hinnebusch, “The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences,”

Perceptions. Spring 2007, 18 http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Raymond-Hinnebusch.pdf

(accessed March 18, 2014). 102

Saunders, Leaders at War, 5. 103

Allawi, Ali A. The Iraq Crisis and the Future Middle East Order. November 4, 2009.

http://www.aliallawi.com/art_iraqCrisis.php 104

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, 53-54. 105

Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace. New Haven, CN:

Yale University Press, 2007, 11 http://www.myilibrary.com?id=173511&ref=toc.. (accessed April 18,

2014). 106

Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, 23.

7

107

Allawi, “The Iraq Crisis and the Future Middle East Order.” 108

Leffler, “9/11 in Retrospect” 109

Dobbins, After the War, 86. 110

Ron Suskind, “The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since

9/11,” abstract, Capitol Reader Political Book Summaries (September 2006): 3,

http://www.tburg.k12.ny.us/hsking/Apgov/The%20One%20Percent%20Doctrin.pdf (accessed May 2,

2014). 111

Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009),

1, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&an=282565

(accessed May 24, 2014). 112

Leffler, “9/11 in Retrospect.” 113

Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy

Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 112-56,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137499. (accessed April 22, 2004). 114

Graham, By His Own Rules, 204. 115

Dobbins, After the War, 86. 116

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, 195. 117

US National Security Decision-Making.” Strategic Comments 8, no. 7 (October 22, 2007)

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788020872 (accessed May 17, 2014). 118

Lloyd C. Gardner, The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the

1970s to the Present (New York, NY: New Press, 2008), 121-122. 119

Richard Haass, “Big Think Interview with Richard Haass” (April 23, 2012), Big Think,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DEeqwrUQtwY (accessed May 17, 2014). 120

John P Burke. Becoming President: The Bush Transition, 2000-2003. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne

Rienner Publishers, 2004: 39. 121

Burke, Becoming President, 96, 122

James M. Fallows, Blind Into Baghdad: America's War in Iraq (New York: Vintage Books,

2006), 96. 123

Burke, Becoming President, 55, 93-95. 124

Dobbins, After the War, 86 125

Barnett The Pentagon’s New Map 236 126

James R. Locher III, et al, Project on National Security Reform: Turning Ideas into

Action (Arlington, VA: Project on National Security September 2009),

II, http://www.policyscience.net/pnsr2010.pdf (accessed May 24, 2014). 127

Richard Weitz, Case Studies Working Group Report, Volume II (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 913. 128

Lee Robinson, “Generals, Ambassadors, and Post-War Policymaking,” The Current 13, no. 1

(Fall 2009): 2 http://blogs.cornell.edu/policyreview/files/2011/06/TheCurrentv13n1fall2009.pdf (accessed

May 24, 2014). 129

James R. Locher III, et al, Project on National Security Reform: Forging a New

Shield (Arlington, VA: Project on National Security, 2008), 159-160

http://0183896.netsolhost.com/site/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/pnsr_forging_a_new_shield_report.pdf (ac

cessed May 24, 2014). 130

Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 942. 131

Gregory Hooker, Military Research Papers, vol. 4, Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi

Freedom: the Role of Military Intelligence Assessments (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near

East Policy, 2005), 35-36.

8

132

Dina Badie. “Groupthink: Iraq and the War On Terror”, Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (2010): 277

http://www.politics.ubc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/poli_sci/Faculty/price/Iraq_War_Groupthink.pdf.

(accessed May 11, 2014). 133

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 41. 134

W. Patrick Lang, “Drinking the Kool Aid,” Middle East Policy 11, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 39-

60,

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/military/docview/203711704/fulltextPDF/C2F97A8A98974

FBDPQ/1?accountid=8289 (accessed June 2, 2014). 135

Haass, War of Necessity: War of Choice, 185. 136

Graham, By His Own Rules, 184-185. 137

Isikoff and Corn, Hubris, 77-78. 138

Lang, “Drinking the Kool Aid,” 39-60. 139

“U.S. National Security Decision-Making,” Strategic Comments 8, no. 7 (October 22, 2007): 1,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788020872 (accessed May 17, 2014). 140

Badie, “Groupthink” 278 141

Dobbins, After the War, 111. 142

David C. Unger, The Emergency State: America's Pursuit of Absolute Security at All

Costs (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 256. 143

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, 117. 144

Badie, “Groupthink,” 285 145

Walter Pincus, “Before War, C.I.A. Warned of Negative Outcomes”. Washington Post. June 3,

2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060200905.html

(accessed April 5, 2014). 146

George Tenet and Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York:

HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 423. 147

Bush quoted in Pfiffner 2003. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Administration

of George W. Bush, 2002,“Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point,

New York” (June 1, 2002), pp. 944-948 148

Conrad C. Crane “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won”, Military Review (May-

June 2005): 27,

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art006.pd

f. (accessed April 10, 2014 149

Crane, “Phase IV Operations,” 27. 150

Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map, 116. 151

Hooker, Military Research Papers, 4. 152

Gordon and Trainor Cobra II, 31. 153

Hooker, Military Research Papers, 4 154

Gordon and Trainor Cobra II, 4. 155

Hooker, Military Research Papers, xi 156

Donald F. Rumsfeld, “Talking Points November 27, 2001” (talking points meeting between

Sec of Defense Rumsfeld and Gen Tommy Franks, MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL, November 27,

2001), http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/doc08.pdf. (accessed March 132014). 157

Hooker, Military Research Papers, 7 According to Hooker the NIE was written in

approximately one month and delivered to CENTCOM in September 2002—5 months before the

commencement of the invasion and planning was completed. 158

Bensahel, “After Saddam,” 6. 159

Feith, War and Decision, 219.

9

160

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 25. 161

Hooker, Military Research Papers, 17 162

Graham, By His Own Rules, 328. 163

Bensahel, “After Saddam,” 7. 164

Roger Strother, “Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game,” George Washington University The

National Security Archive, November 4, 2006 http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/

(accessed March13, 2014). 165

Strother, “Post-Saddam Iraq.” 166

U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the

Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. SIGIR, 2010) 5

http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001084705/http://www.sigir.mil/applyinghardlessons/inde

x.html (accessed May 1, 2014). 167

Packer, “The Assassins’ Gate,” 110. 168

Dobbins, After the War, 88. 169

William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success”, Parameters

(Autumn 2003): 103. Clinton PPD 56 is available at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.html Bush

NSPD 1 is available at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/03autumn/flavin.pdf. (accessed March 13,

2014) 170

Blair S. Williams, “Heuristic Biases in Military Decision Making,” Military Review

(September-October 2010): 40-52,

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20101031_art008.pdf

(accessed May 24, 2014). 171

Williams, “Heuristic Biases in Military Decision Making,” 40-52 172

David Smock, “Would an Invasion of Iraq Be a Just War?” U.S. Institute for Peace Special

Report 98 (January 2003): 1, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr98.pdf (accessed May 24, 2014). 173

Williams, “Heuristic Biases in Military Decision Making,” 40-52. 174

Michael S. Groen. With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse

Enemy (Quantico, VA: History Division Marine Corps University, 2006), 10,

http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/With%20the%201st%20Marine%20Division%20in%20Ira

q,%202003%20%20PCN%2010600000000_1.pdf (accessed May 2, 2014). 175

James A. Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain

Times (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993), xi.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR114.pdf (accessed May 27,

2014). 176

Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning, 5. 177

Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin

Books, 2007.111. 178

Graham, By His Own Rules, 350. 179

Graham, By His Own Rules, 350-51 180

Bremer, “Early Days in Iraq,” 22. 181

Graham, By His Own Rules, 349 182

Anthony Cordesman, American Strategic and Tactical Failures’in Iraq: An Update

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 8,

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060808_iraqfailures.pdf (accessed March 19, 2014).

10

183

Donald F. Rumsfeld, “Iraq and Illustrative List of Potential Problems to be Considered and

Addressed,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 15, 2002. Rumsfeld Library.

http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/310/Re%20Parade%20of%20Horribles%2010-15-2002.pdf 184

Feith, War and Decision, 221. 185

Isikoff and Corn, Hubris,107. 186

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict,132. 187

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, 147. 188

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Officer of Near Eastern and

South Asian Analysis, Iraq Consequences of a Rapid Coalition Victory., Intelligence Report (Washington,

DC, 2003), 1-2 http://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/pdf/2008-015-doc1.pdf (accessed March 23,

2014). 189

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 120. 190

Isikoff and Corn, Hubris,101. 191

Kaplan, Daydream Believers, 103. 192

Senate Committee on Select Committee on Intelligence, “Intelligence Activities relating to Iraq

Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,” 110th Cong., 2d sess., 2008, S. Rep. 110, 1

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB456/docs/specialPlans_48.pdf (accessed March 28,

2014). 193

Carl Levin, Senate Intelligence Committee Report. Congressional Record Senate. July 8, 2004.

S7811-S7819. https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/levin070804.html 194

Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 348. 195

Senate Committee on Select Committee on Intelligence, “US. Intelligence Community’s

Prewar Assessment on Iraq together with Additional Views,” 108th Cong., 2d sess., 204, S. Rep. 108-301,

361. http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf (accessed March 28, 2014). 196

Al-Ward and Aboul-Enein, Iraq in Turmoil, 1. 197

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 159. 198

Graham, By His Own Rules, 348. 199

Wright and Reese, On Point II,70. 200

Feith, War and Decision,361. 201

Graham, By His Own Rules, 349. 202

Gordon and Trainor, End Game, 12. 203

Dyson, Stephen Benedict. What Really Happened in Planning for Postwar Iraq? Political

Science Quarterly 128, no. 3. 2013 459 www.psqonline.org. (accessed March 28, 2014). 204

Dyson, “What Really Happened in Planning for Postwar Iraq?” 460-61 205

Kevin Benson, “Of Note: A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003,” Parameters 43,

no. 4 (Winter 2013-2014): 119-23,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/issues/Winter_2013/12_Benson.pdf

(accessed May 16, 2014). 206

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 120. Packer states the directive was drafted by Feith’s office

without consultation with the Department of State. 207

Graham, By His Own Rules, 377. 208

Edward P Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner. Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict

Policy in Iraq. Report of an Independent Working Group Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign

Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University. 2003

http://large.stanford.edu/publications/power/references/baker/docs/GuidingPrinciples_USPostConflictPolic

y_Iraq.pdf (accessed March 14, 2014).

11

209

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 124-25. 210

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 182. 211

Bremer, “Early Days in Iraq” 54. 212

Feith, War and Decision, 387. 213

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 123. 214

“Tim Cross: UK's Logistics Expert in Iraq,” BBC, April 14, 2003

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2948015.stm (accessed May 2, 2014). 215

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate 123. 216

Bensahel, “After Saddam,” xxii. 217

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 133. 218

Bensahel, After Saddam, xxii-xxiii. 219

Feith, War and Decision, 442. 220

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 144. 221

Wright and Reese, On Point II, 140. 222

Feith, War and Decision, 444. 223

John R. Ballard, From Storm to Freedom: 145-161,

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&an=526783 (access

ed May 20, 2014). 224

Bremer and McConnell. My Year in Iraq, 11 225

Gordon & Trainor, Endgame, 13 226

James P Pfiffner, “US Blunders in Iraq: De-Ba`athification and Disbanding the Army”,

Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 1, 76–85, February 2010.

r.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Articles/CPA%20Orders,%20Iraq%20PDF.pdf (accessed April 10, 2014). 227

Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 13. 228

Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, 261. 229

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 546. 230

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 546. 231

Kaplan, Daydream Believers, 152. 232

Bensahel “After Sadam” xxiii. 233

U.N. Security Council, May 8, 2003, Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent

Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of

America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538). Official

Record. New York, 2003. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Iraq%20S2003538.pdf, (accessed March 19, 2014). 234

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) adopted by the Security Council 4761st meeting,

on May 22, 2003 (S/RES/1483 (2003) http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairaq/unsc1483.pdf

(accessed March 19, 2014). 235

Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1, Coalition Provisional Authority,

Baghdad, Iraq. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-

iraq/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf (accessed March 19,

2014). 236

Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East (New York:

Vintage Books, 2007), 140-141. 237

L. Paul Bremer III, James Dobbins, and David Gompert. “Early Days in Iraq:

Decisions of the CPA.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50,

No. 4 21-56. September 08, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802328925 accessed (March 8,

2014).

12

238

Gordon & Trainor, Cobra II, 561. 239

L. Paul Bremer III and Malcolm McConnell. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future

of Hope. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006 12, 19. 240

Bremer, Dobbins and Gompert, “Early Days in Iraq,” 22. 241

Bremer, Dobbins and Gompert. “Early Days in Iraq,” 22-23. 242

Murphy & Nelson, Winning the Peace, 5. 243

Wright and Reese, On Point II, 27. 244

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 142. 245

Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to

Today (New York: Gotham Books, 2006), 407. 246

Francis Fukuyama et al, “The End of History? Twenty-Five Years Later” (lecture, CATO

Institute, Washington, DC, June 6, 2014), http://www.cato.org/events/francis-fukuyamas-end-history-25-

years-later (accessed June 7, 2014). A quick explanation of can be found at Plato “A New Theory of the

Human Soul” http://tab.faculty.asu.edu/chapter53.html 247

Bensahel, “After Saddam,” xxvi. 248

Gary W Montgomery, and Timothy S. McWIlliams, eds., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II Iraqi

Perspectives: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps

University, 2009) 53 http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Al-

AnbarAwakeningVolII[1].pdf (accessed May 10, 2014). 249

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 143-184. 250

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II 562. 251

Peter R Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq. The Yale Library

of Military History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 200827 252

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 147. 253

Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 386. 254

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 551-52. 255

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 194-95. 256

Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, 27-29. 257

Bensahel, “After Saddam,” xxii. 258

Robinson “Generals, Ambassadors and Post-war Policymaking,” 6. 259

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, 181. 260

Wright and Reese, On Point II ,593-594. 261

Wright and Reese, On Point II, 595-597. 262

Feith, War and Decision, 431-432. 263

Bremer, Dobbins & Gompert. “Early Days in Iraq,” 23. 264

Robinson, “Generals, Ambassadors and Post-war Policymaking,” 8. 265

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 185. 266

Feith, War and Decision, 367. 267

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 553. 268

Bremer, Dobbins and Gompert, “Early Days in Iraq,” 24. 269

Gordon and Trainor, End Game, 15. 270

Slocombe and DiRita, DoD News Brief. 271

Slocombe, Walter, Biography. Caplin & Drysdale Attorneys.

http://www.capdale.com/wslocombe 272

Slocombe, Walter and Lawrence Di Rita. Department of Defense News Briefing. September

17, 2003. 273

Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 423.

13

274

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone (New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 94-98. 275

Paul Aarts, “Iraq Is Not a Lost Battle. Middle East, Interview with Isam Al-Khafaji”, in “Iraq

Under Construction,” Middle East Research MER 228 (Fall 2003): 1

http://www.merip.org/mer/mer228/iraq-not-lost-battle Middle East Research and Information Project MER

228 (accessed April 11, 2014). 276

Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, 291. 277

Gareth Stansfield, “The Transition to Democracy in Iraq”, in Alex Danchev and

J.M. Macmillan (Eds.), The Iraq War and Democratic Politics, Routledge, 2005, London

and New York 141. http://people.exeter.ac.uk/grvstans/Webpage/The%20Iraq%20War.pdf (accessed

March 24, 2014). 278

Stansfield, The Transition to Democracy in Iraq, 151. 279

Bremer, Dobbins, and Gompert. “Early Days in Iraq,” 21-56. 280

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 556. 281

Eric Stover, Hanny Megally, and Hania Mufti, “Bremer's 'Gordian Knot': Transnational Justice

and the US Occupation of Iraq,” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (August 2005): 835,

http://media.proquest.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/media/pq/classic/doc/884432571/fmt/pi/rep/NONE?hl=&cit

%3Aauth=Stover%2C+Eric%3BMegally%2C+Hanny%3BMufti%2C+Hania&cit%3Atitle=Bremer%27s+

%22Gordian+Knot%22%3A+Transitional+Justice+and+the+US+Occupation+of+Iraq&ci (accessed May

26, 2014).. 282

Stover, Bremer’s Gordian Knot, 835. 283

Wilcke, “Castles Built in Sand,” 2. 284

Packer, The Assassins’ Gate 133. 285

Bensahel, “After Saddam,” 118. 286

Aarts “Iraq Is Not a Lost Battle.” 287

Packer, “The Assassins’ Gate,” 198. 288

What Really Happened in Planning for Postwar Iraq?, ‘Bureaucracy’ in H.H. Gerth and C.

Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press 1946) p.229.

Quoted in Pffiffner 79 289

Porch, Douglas. Strategic Insight: Germany, Japan and the "De-Ba`athification" of Iraq. Center

for Contemporary Conflict, National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School. March 7,

2003. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA485192 (accessed

April 30, 2014). 290

Sisson and Al-Saiedi A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Ba’athification in Iraq 9 291

Porch, Strategic Insight: Germany, Japan and the "De-Baathification" of Iraq. 292

Bensahel, “After Saddam,” 36. 293

Stansfield, The Transition to Democracy in Iraq, 143. 294

Stansfield, The Transition to Democracy in Iraq, 144. 295

Djerejian and Wisner, Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq, 6. 296

Lukman, Faily, “Iraq's Parliamentary Elections: A Conversation with Ambassador Faily.

Interviewed by Dr. Jon B. Alterman,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 23, 2014.

https://csis.org/event/iraqs-parliamentary-elections-conversation-he-ambassador-faily. 297

Sisson & Al-Saiedi, A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Ba’athification in Iraq, 6. 298

Stansfield, The Transition to Democracy in Iraq 150-151. 299

Sisson & Al-Saiedi, A Bitter Legacy, 6. 300

Sisson & Al-Saiedi, A Bitter Legacy, 12.

14

301

James A. Baker III and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: U.S.

Institute for Peace, 2006), 45

http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html (accessed May 19, 2014). 302

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, 179. 303

Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle New York: Harper 2008 184. 304

Pfiffner, “US Blunders in Iraq,” 79. 305

Nurnberg and Ackerman “Interview with Douglas Feith,” 87. 306

Sisson and Al-Saiedi A Bitter Legacy, 13-45. 307

Sissons and Rieckh, Briefing Paper, 2. 308

Donald F. Rumsfeld, “Core Principles for a Free Iraq.” Wall Street Journal. May 27, 2003

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB105399179076190200 (accessed March 27, 2013) 309

. Montgomery, and McWIlliams, Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II, 33. 310

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 568. 311

Fallon, Blind in Baghdad, 103. 312

Fisk, The Great War for Civilisation, 145. 313

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 556. 314

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 561. 315

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 564. 316

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 566. 317

Dereck Harvey, “A ‘Red Team’ Perspective on the Insurgency in Iraq. Army at War Change in

the Midst of Conflict” (lecture, The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute. U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command and Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College., Fort

Leavenworth, KS, August 2-4, 2005), 193

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AnArmyAtWar_ChangeI

nTheMidstOfConflict.pdf (accessed May 2, 2014). 318

Harvey “A ‘Red Team’ Perspective on the Insurgency in Iraq.” 196 319

Harvey “A ‘Red Team’ Perspective on the Insurgency in Iraq.” 200 320

Pamela Hess, “Analysis: Petraeus Lists Mistakes in Iraq,” UPI, January 25,

2007, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2007/01/25/Analysis-Petraeus-lists-mistakes-

in-Iraq/UPI-40031169739655/ (accessed May 19, 2014). 321

Mausner, The Outcome of Invasion, 2.. 322

Murphy and Nelson. Winning the Peace ix 323

U.S. Department of the Army, Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, The Resurgence

of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq, by Azeem Ibrahim, Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Government Printing Office,

2014), v. 324

Ibid, 1. 325

Ibid, 3. 326

Hayder Al-Khoei,. “Syria: The View from Iraq”, in “Syria: Views from the Region,” special

issue, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014 (June 14, 2013): 1, accessed May 11, 2014,

http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_syria_the_view_from_iraq136. 327

Ibrahim, The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq 5 328

Henri J. Barkey, “Spinoff: The Syrian Crisis and the Future of Iraq,” The American

Interest (December 26, 2012): 1, http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2012/12/26/spinoff-the-

syrian-crisis-and-the-future-of-iraq/ (accessed June 7, 2014). 329

John Batchelor, “Do Syria and Iraq Still Exist?” Al Jazeera America, January 24, 2014

http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/1/emirate-iraq-syriasovereignty.html. (accessed May 4, 2014).

15

330

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham”, Middle East Forum

(December 11, 2013): 1 http://www.meforum.org/3697/islamic-state-iraq-al-sham.. accessed May 1, 2014 331

Kenneth Pollack, “The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq: A Retrospective Analysis of the

Reconstruction,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 4 (December 2006): 1-

20, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2006/12/iraq-pollack (accessed May 26, 2014). 332

HR McMaster, “The Pipe Dream of Easy War,” New York Times, July 20, 2013, under

“Opinion,”http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-

war.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed May 20, 2014). 333

Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” New York Times, February 19,

2006,http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/neo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed June 9,

2014). 334

Brian J Gaines, Where’s the Rally? Approval and Trust of the President, Cabinet, and

Government Since 9/11, PS Online September 2002. https://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/Where'stheRally-

Gaines.pdf (accessed April 14, 2014). 335

Suskind, “The One Percent Doctrine” (Summary), 4. 336

Fukuyama, “After Neo-conservatism.” 337

Terrence M. Holmes, “Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz’s On War,” The Journal of

Strategic Studies 30, no. 1 129. http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/TMHolmes.pdf (accessed May 3,

2014). 338

Phillip Rotmann, David Tohn, and Jaron Wharton, Learning under Fire: The Us Military,

Dissent and Organizational Learning Post-9/11(Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, JFK School of

Government, May 2009), 12,

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/0904.Learning%20Under%20Fire%20discussion%20paper.pdf (ac

cessed June 9, 2014). 339

Rotmann, Learning under Fire, 13. 340

Graham, By His Own Rules, 600. 341

George W Bush, Bush: 'Leave Iraq within 48 hours'. CNN. March 17, 2003.

http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/ video available at

http://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/Photos-and-Videos/Video-Clips/Video-Clips.aspx 342

Barnett The Pentagon’s New Map 291 343

Suskind, “The One Percent Doctrine” (Summary), 6. 344

Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 915-916. 345

Dobbins, After the War, 86. 346

Donald F. Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Town Hall Meeting in Kuwait. Department of

Defense News Transcript. December 8, 2004.

http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1980 (accessed May 10, 2014). 347

William B. Caldwell IV and Steven M. Leonard, “Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations:

Upshifiting the Engine of Change,” Military Review (July-August 2008): 8,

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20080831_art005.pdf

(accessed May 24, 2014). 348

Department of Defense Biography, Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff.

http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=91 (accessed April 28, 2014). 349

Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict ,146. 350

Gordon and Trainor, End Game,15. 351

Bremer and McConnell. My Year in Iraq, 378-398.

16

352

Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq: Blundering in Baghdad,” Foreign Affairs

(September / October 2004): 34-56, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60095/larry-

diamond/what-went-wrong-in-iraq (accessed April 10, 2014). 353

Weitz, Project on National Security Reform, 919,929. 354

Kathleen H. Hicks, et al. “The State of U.S. Power: Perceptions across the Globe, April 8,

2014. http://csis.org/publication/state-us-power-perceptions-across-globe 355

McMaster, “The Pipe Dream of Easy War” 356

Loose Ends: Iraq's Security Forces between U.S. Drawdown and Withdrawal (Brussels, BE:

International Crisis Group, 2010), 5.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon

/Iraq/99%20Loose%20Ends%20-

%20Iraqs%20Security%20Forces%20between%20US%20Drawdown%20and%20Withdrawal.ashx

(accessed June 9, 2014). 357

Michael O'Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of

Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2011),

11,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/centers/saban/iraq%20index/index20120131 (accessed June 9,

2014).