Nat ion, Region and t he Global in East Asia: Conflict and Cooperat ion*

Mark Selden

I pro po se to examine the resurgence o f Eas t As ia in the final decades o f the lo ng twentieth century in relatio n to three majo r fo rcesthat shape the era and the regio n: natio nalism, regio nalism and glo balism. I unders tand co ntempo rary glo balism primarily inrelatio n to the US bid to fo rge a hegemo nic o rder predicated o n military and diplo matic supremacy and neo liberal eco no mic

presuppo s itio ns enshrined in internatio nal ins titutio ns .1 “The characteris tic po licy vecto rs o f neo -liberalism,” Richard Falkco mments in his critique o f the eco no mic and so cial dimens io ns o f glo balism, “invo lve such mo ves as liberalizatio n, privatizatio n,minimiz ing eco no mic regulatio n, ro lling back welfare, reducing expenditures o n public go o ds , tightening fis cal dis cipline, favo ringfreer flo ws o f capital, s trict co ntro ls o n o rganized labo r, tax reductio ns , and unres tricted currency repatriatio n.” It is the sum to talo f the effects o f these measures , fro m the perspectives o f glo bal go vernance, so cial jus tice, and the enviro nment, that dro ve hisco nclus io ns abo ut Predatory Globalism, a vo lume that appeared in the year o f the Seattle anti-glo balizatio n pro tes ts and a decade

befo re the eco no mic meltdo wn o f 2008 .2

I am particularly interes ted in explo ring ins ights that derive fro m regio nal as o ppo sed to natio nal and glo bal perspectives . In whatways do es co ntempo rary Eas t As ian regio nalism, pivo ting o n pro cesses fo s tered by s tate and no n-s tate acto rs who se actio nsco ns truct and redefine the geo graphical, po litical and especially the eco no mic parameters o f a regio n, require that we

reco nceptualize bo th the natio nal and the glo bal?3 I reflect o n regio n fo rmatio n in light o f the geo po litics and eco no mics o f empirein an effo rt to gauge what new po ss ibilities regio nal integratio n o ffers fo r Eas t As ia. To do so , I briefly examine the co ntempo rary

regio n in light o f two earlier epo chs , the Sino centric tributary trade sys tem (16 th - 18 th century), and the era o f sys temdis integratio n, co lo nialism, natio nalism, endemic wars , and revo lutio ns (1840-1970).

This s tudy breaks with the s tandard perio dizatio n fo r the lo ng twentieth century, which s tresses two great divides o f 1945 and 1990.In the co nventio nal view, 1945 marked the fo rmatio n o f a US-s tructured yet bi-po lar po s twar o rder ushering in the displacement o fco lo nial empires by natio nalis t-driven new natio ns in the wake o f the defeat o f the o ld co lo nialisms , and 1990 the end o f the “Co ldWar” and the inauguratio n o f what so me have rushed to s tyle the era o f “glo balizatio n”, o r o f untrammeled American supremacy.Tho se were, o f co urse, critical mo ments in shaping regio nal and glo bal o utco mes . Nevertheless , fro m the perspective o fnatio nalism, regio nalism, and glo balism in Eas t As ia, and with an eye to gauging the resurgence o f Eas t As ia in general and China inparticular, the US-China o pening o f 1970 and the US defeat in Indo china five years later, I sugges t, pro vide mo re fruitful framingwhich highlights the end o f a century o f war that devas tated and divided the regio n and paved the way fo r an era o f eco no micco mplementarity and, perhaps eventually, sys temic integratio n and geo po litical res tructuring. This watershed allo ws us to appreciatethe magnitude o f changes that made it po ss ible to o verco me certain divis io ns o f an earlier co lo nial era, as well as the legacy o f theAs ia-Pacific War and subsequent regio nal po larizatio n asso ciated with the So viet and American empires . Po s t-1970 changes havetrans fo rmed bo th Eas t As ia and the wo rld eco no my. Since the 1970s , geo po litical change (centered o n the US-China o pening butincluding breakthro ughs in ROK-China and Japan-China relatio ns ) and do mes tic so cio -po litical and eco no mic change (no tablymarket- and mo bility-o riented develo pments including deco llectivizatio n, mass migratio n, mega-urbanizatio n and capitalis ttrans fo rmatio n in China) have led to ward rapid interpenetratio n o f Eas t As ian eco no mies with trade, inves tment and migratio nplaying impo rtant ro les . Central to this pro cess has been bo th China’s dramatic ascent and the ro le o f majo r cities , no tably Beijing,Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzho u, To kyo , Seo ul, Ho ng Ko ng, Taipei and Singapo re in es tablishing new regio nal and glo bal netwo rks . Inassess ing the resurgence o f Eas t As ia and emerging Eas t As ian regio nalism, a critical ques tio n remains : will these fo undatio ns fo r

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regio n fo rmatio n trans fo rm the geo po litics o f the regio n in which a declining US relinquishes its military primacy and the co ntinueddivis io ns amo ng China, Japan and Ko rea yield to deepening po litical and cultural bo nds?

This is no t to sugges t the arrival o f a po s t-natio nalis t wo rld. A newregio nal o rder is itself the pro duct in no small part o f the meshingo f diverse natio nal agendas , and in Eas t As ia as elsewhere, it faceschallenges fro m natio nalis t co nflicts exemplif ied by unreso lvedtens io ns ro o ted in his to rical experiences o f co lo nialism and war,po s twar territo rial divis io ns , asymmetric eco no mic imperatives ,amo ng o thers . Critically impo rtant to fueling and sus taining theseco nflicts have been the territo rial o utco mes enshrined in the SanFrancis co Treaty that the US impo sed in ending the fo rmalo ccupatio n o f Japan in 1952. As Kimie Hara has do cumented thro ughthe analys is o f success ive drafts o f the treaty, the US mo ved fro mclear specificatio n o f bo undaries fo r reso lutio n o f territo rial is suesincluding Do kdo /Takeshima (Ko rea and Japan), Diao yutai/Senkakus(China and Japan), the Kuriles /No rthern Is lands (Russ ia and Japan),and Taiwan (China) to vague fo rmulatio ns that left unreso lved thelegacies o f co lo nialism and war and po se diff icult challenges fo ro verco ming natio nal rivalries . The result has been co ntinuingterrito rial co nflicts o ver s ix decades , which have co ntinued to blo ck aRuss ia-Japan peace treaty in the wake o f Wo rld War II and to fuel

myriad co nflicts amo ng regio nal po wers .4 And lo ng-term natio nal divis io ns—no tably China and Taiwan, as well as the Ko reanpeninsula—that reflect no t o nly the results o f Wo rld War II and po s twar independence and revo lutio nary mo vements , but abo ve allUS military and diplo matic interventio ns to redraw bo undaries thro ugho ut the As ia-Pacific. This invo lved bo th the empire o f bases , inChalmers Jo hnso n's evo cative phrase, the permanent s tatio ning o f US tro o ps in Japan, Ko rea and elsewhere and the securing by theUS o f Japan's mandate o ver the Pacific Is lands .

No t surpris ingly, each o f the majo r players in the integratio n o f Eas t As ia—China, Japan and So uth Ko rea—has its o wn co nceptio n o fthe emerging regio n fo rmatio n as well as o f the relatio nship to the superpo wer. Critical differences hinge o n the ques tio n o f thegeo po litical and eco no mic po s itio n o f the United States in the regio n, the rise o f China, the reunificatio n o f China-Taiwan and No rthand So uth Ko rea, and the relatio nship between the emerging regio nal o rder and ASEAN, the Shanghai gro up, and So uth As ia.

While no ting these and o ther o bs tacles to regio nal acco mmo datio n, and the fact that the two great his to rical examples o f Eas t

As ian regio nal o rder—the China-centered tributary-trade netwo rk o f the 16-18 th century and Japan’s sho rt-lived but ambitio usGreater Eas t As ia Co -Pro sperity Sphere o f the years 1937-45—were bo th predicated o n empires asso ciated with the supremacy o f as ingle po wer, I nevertheless emphas ize the impo rtance o f co ntempo rary mo mentum to ward a mo re bro adly based regio nalintegratio n. The co mbinatio n o f gro wing interdependence o f s tro ng Eas t As ian eco no mies at a time o f waning American po wers timulates interes t o f Eas t As ian leaders in pro mo ting regio nal acco mmo datio n and o verco ming natio nal divis io ns invo lvingChina/Taiwan (subs tantial integratio n) and the Ko rean peninsula (despite the reversal o f nearly a decade o f pro gress to ward thereductio n o f No rth-So uth tens io ns s ince the 2007 electio n o f Pres ident Lee Myung-bak).

Signs o f regio n fo rmatio n abo und. They include an explo s io n o f cultural interchanges , ris ing cro ss -bo rder to urism within the regio n,labo r migratio n, jo int go vernment-spo nso red his to ry pro jects , and s tudent and scho lar exchanges . Impo rtantly, new fo rms o fdiplo macy have acco mpanied China’s rise as a regio nal po wer, illus trated by the China-ASEAN free trade agreement and the Six-PartyTalks centered o n No rth Ko rea security and nuclear is sues , all o f which cas t China in a leading diplo matic ro le. The emergence o fASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, So uth Ko rea) is perhaps the bes t example o f So utheas t As ian natio ns taking the initiative in pro mo tingregio nalism, o ne in which the Chinese ro le is again no table. Yet, despite impo rtant areas o f pro gress , co nflicting appro aches toEas t As ian regio nalism and inter-s tate divis io ns co ntinue to be driven by co mpetitive natio nalisms and diverse appro aches toco nceptualiz ing the nature o f the regio n and perhaps , abo ve all, the ques tio n o f the ro le o f the United States as a participant o rpartner in an emerging Eas t As ian o rder and co nflicts invo lving No rth Ko rea nuclear develo pment, Japan-Ko rea co nflict o verDo kdo /Takeshima, and Japan-China co nflict o ver Senkakus/Diao yutai is lands , amo ng o thers . What can be learned fro m a briefexcurs io n thro ugh earlier regio nal appro aches that might usefully frame unders tanding o f co ntempo rary regio nalism o r futurepro spects?

I East Asian Regio nalism: T he 18th Cent ury

The do minance o f the Wes tern co lo nial po wers and the subjugatio n o f much o f As ia, Africa and Latin America pro vided thefo undatio ns thro ugho ut the 19 th and well into the 20 th century fo r essentialis t views in bo th Eas t and Wes t o f a permanent s tate inwhich a dynamic and aggress ive Wes tern wo rld o rder wo uld invariably predo minate o ver a weak, inward-lo o king and co nservativeEas t As ia that co llapsed in the face o f Wes tern capitalism and military predo minance. This was the fo undatio n fo r a Euro centric

wo rld vis io n that reified the perspective o f the co lo nial po wers and their successo rs .5

Such a view belies the Eas t-Wes t relatio nship o f earlier epo chs . An alternative paradigm that has emerged in recent yearsreco gnizes the salience o f China no t o nly as the do minant eco no mic and geo po litical center o f an Eas t As ian regio nal o rder but

also as a majo r acto r in the Eas t As ian and glo bal po litical eco no my fro m at leas t the 16 th to the 18 th century and arguably

co ntinuing to the arrival o f the Wes tern po wers in full fo rce in the mid-19 th century.6 Interes tingly, the avatars o f this China-centered perspective o n Eas t As ia and the wo rld eco no my were no t primarily Chinese but Japanese and American

researchers .7 China’s eco no mic s trides o f recent decades , and, abo ve all, the resurgence o f Eas t As ia with China, Japan and Ko rea asan expans ive and inter-co nnected co re o f the capitalis t wo rld eco no my in the final decades o f the lo ng twentieth century and into thenew millennium, lend plaus ibility to an appro ach that reassesses no t o nly China but reco nceptualizes the Eas t As ia regio n.

The wo rk o f Takeshi Hamashita, R. Bin Wo ng, Kenneth Po meranz , Kao ru Sugihara, Antho ny Reid and Andre Gunder Frank, amo ng

o thers , sho ws that between the 16 th and 18 th century, at the dawn o f Euro pean capitalism, Eas t As ia was the center o f a vibrantgeo po litical and eco no mic zo ne. Two elements o f the Eas t As ian o rder to gether defined its regio nal and glo bal features .

Firs t, amo ng the mo s t impo rtant linkages that shaped the po litical eco no my and geo po litics o f the Eas t As ian wo rld was the China-centered tributary-trade o rder, a regio nal sys tem pivo ting o n po litical and eco no mic transactio ns nego tiated thro ugh fo rmal s tate

ties as well as pro viding a framewo rk fo r info rmal trade co mplementing tributary miss io ns .8 The sys tem enco mpassed bo thprinciples fo r go verning inters tate relatio ns and a ro bus t legal and illegal trade, much o f it linking po rt cities that were largelybeyo nd the co ntro l o f the Chinese imperial s tate and o ther s tates .

Ming t ribut ary o rder

Deshima, 1820 , t he cent er o f Chinese and Dut cht rade wit h Japan

Seco nd, Eas t As ian co mmercial linkages with the wo rld eco no my

fro m the 16 th century fo rward, mediated by s ilver exchange,trans fo rmed Eas t-Wes t trade relatio ns as well as the do mes ticChinese and regio nal eco no mies . This was no t, in sho rt, an insularregio nalism. Rather, Eas t As ia was linked to the wo rld eco no my ins ignificant ways . Silver flo ws , to pay fo r tea, s ilk, ceramics , spicesand o pium amo ng o ther high value pro ducts , were critical in bindingEuro pe and the Americas with Eas t As ia, particularly China, withManila as the key po rt o f trans it. Indeed, the large-scale flo w o f

s ilver fro m the Americas to China beginning in the 16 th century and

peaking in the mid-17th century linked the majo r wo rld regio ns andtrans fo rmed bo th intra-As ian trade and China’s do mes tic eco no my.As Reid o bserves o f Chinese-So utheas t As ian trade in glo balperspective in the years 1450-1680: “The pattern o f exchange inthis age o f co mmerce was fo r So utheas t As ia to impo rt clo th fro mIndia, s ilver fro m the Americas and Japan and co pper cash, s ilk,ceramics and o ther manufactures fro m China, in exchange fo r itsexpo rts o f pepper, spices , aro matic wo o ds , res ins , lacquer,to rto iseshell, pearls , deerskin, and the sugar expo rted by Vietnam

and Cambo dia.”9 Mass ive s ilver flo ws to China fro m o ther parts o f As ia, Euro pe and the Americas paid fo r s ilk, tea, po rcelain andmiscellaneo us manufactures . China’s do mes tic eco no my was s imultaneo us ly trans fo rmed as s ilver became the medium fo r taxatio nin the Ming’s s ingle whip refo rm, deeply affecting the agrarian eco no my as well as urban exchange.

Silver pro vides a thread linking Euro pe, the Americas and As ia as well as a means to deco ns truct Euro centric his to ry and to chart

pro fo und changes internal to Chinese eco no my and so ciety. Tracing the wo rld-wide flo w o f s ilver fro m the 16 th centurypro blematizes the unilinear no tio n o f wo rld his to ry as determined by the dis co very o f the “New Wo rld,” fo llo wed by the flo w o f s ilverto Euro pe, and thence fro m Euro pe to As ia. As Hamashita sho ws , the articulatio n o f As ian s ilver markets with Euro -American s ilver

dynamics shaped wo rld financial f lo ws and facilitated the expans io n o f trade that to o k place in the 16 th to the 18 th centuries , with

Eas t As ia a majo r beneficiary o f the vibrant trade.10

Beyo nd the tributary sys tem and the flo w o f s ilver, trade centered less o n s tates and mo re o n o pen po rts and their hinterlands . Thissugges ts the need fo r a new spatial unders tanding o f the relatio nship between land and sea, between co as tal and inland regio ns ,

and amo ng po rt cities and their hinterlands .11

At its height in the 18 th century, large regio ns o f Eas t As ia experienced pro tracted peace and pro sperity o n the fo undatio n o f a

tributary-trade o rder at a time when Euro pe was mo re o r less co ntinuo us ly engulfed by war.12 If tributary and private trade lubricatedthe regio nal o rder, so to o did co mmo n elements o f s tatecraft and ritual in the neo -Co nfucian o rders in Japan, Ko rea, the Ryūkyūs ,

and Vietnam. In co ntras t to Euro pean co lo nialism in the 18 th and 19 th century, this Sino centric o rder placed fewer demands fo rass imilatio n o n China’s neighbo rs and o n tho se inco rpo rated within the Chinese empire. Mo reo ver, in co ntras t with Euro peanco nquero rs , it appears to have been less explo itative in eco no mic and po litical terms , with tributary trade pro viding lucrativeso urces o f inco me fo r lo cal rulers , as well as the legitimating imprimature o f the Chinese co urt. Tribute, ritual po wer and diplo macys tructured inter-s tate relatio ns acro ss Eas t As ia.

Chinese reco gnitio n frequently co ntributed to peace thro ugh legitimating lo cal rulers in Ko rea, Vietnam, and the Ryūkyūs amo ngo thers , as well as assuring a sus tained trans fer o f reso urces to them via direct subs idies and guaranteed access to lucrative trade.Fo r Chinese rulers , this appears to have been a small price to pay to assure s tability o n so metimes sens itive bo rders . While Ko rea,Vietnam, the Ryūkyūs and a number o f kingdo ms o f Inner and So utheas t As ia engaged regularly in tributary and no n-tributary tradewith China, Japan sent no tributary miss io ns in the co urse o f the To kugawa era (1600-1868). China-Japan direct trade neverthelessco ntinued thro ugh Nagasaki as well as indirectly thro ugh the Ryūkyūs and Ho kkaidō , in additio n to vibrant co as tal trade that theChinese s tate defined as piracy. Japan manipulated the tributary sys tem by seiz ing co ntro l o f Ryūkyū tribute miss io ns ,s imultaneo us ly securing lucrative trade with China while subo rdinating the Ryūkyū kingdo m. Likewise, Vietnam implemented a sub-tributary o rder with Lao s .

In these and o ther ways , a dis tinctive Eas t As ian po litical eco no myand geo po litics was linked by trade and diplo macy to o ther parts o f

As ia, Euro pe and the Americas in the 16 th to 18 th centuries . This isparticularly s ignificant in light o f the general Orientalis t s lighting o f

the Eas t within an Eas t-Wes t binary.13

The Chinese empire, under Manchu rule, may be viewed as the

hegemo nic po wer in Eas t As ia during the lo ng 18 th century in thetriple sense o f being the mo s t po werful s tate pres iding o ver apro tracted peace and legitimating selective regimes in wide areas o fthe regio n within a hierarchical o rder; as the leading manufacturingexpo rter and magnet fo r the wo rld’s s ilver; and by radiating cultural-po litical no rms as exemplif ied by the predo minance o f Neo -Co nfucian tho ught and mo des o f s tatecraft in Japan, Ko rea, Vietnam,the Ryūkyūs and beyo nd.

II T he Demise o f t he East Asian Regio nal Order in t he Co lo nial Era, 184 0 -19 70

The dis integratio n o f the Qing in the early 19 th century set the s tage fo r the o ns laught o f the Wes tern imperialis t po wers in Chinaand Eas t As ia, bringing to an end the regio nal o rder and the pro tracted peace that had extended acro ss Eas t and Inner As ia to partso f So utheas t and Central As ia.

As the Chinese s tate crumbled internally and was battered by waves o f fo reign invaders , tens o f millio ns o f Chinese migrants spread

acro ss As ia and the wo rld fro m the seco nd half o f the 19 th century. The migratio n o f Chinese to Manchuria, So utheas t As ia, theAmericas , Euro pe and elsewhere co incided with, and was in part a respo nse to the dis integratio n o f the Qing empire and fo rmatio n

o f Wes tern and Japanese co lo nial empires acro ss As ia and the Pacific. Stated differently, China’s dis integratio n co incided with theglo bal expans io n o f ethnic Chinese who wo uld redefine China’s place in the wo rld in the co urse o f the lo ng twentieth century. Andno t o nly Chinese. If the larges t number o f migrants were Chinese (an es timated 40 to 60 millio n), s ignificant numbers o f Japanese,Okinawans and Ko reans , amo ng o thers , also migrated acro ss As ia, as well as to Hawaii and the Americas . Each gro up creatednetwo rks and flo ws o f co mmo dities , labo r and capital. As the co lo nial po wers , led by the British, do minated lo ng dis tance trade

acro ss As ia and the Pacific in the 19 th century, they relied o n Chinese, Indian, Is lamic and o ther trade and financial netwo rks to

penetrate the so cieties o f the regio n.14

Fro m the latter half o f the 19 th century, with China in dis integratio n facing invas io n and rebellio n, and then carved up by the Wes ternpo wers and Japan, with much o f So utheas t As ia co lo nized by the British, Dutch, French and Americans , and with Ko rea, Taiwan and

the Ryūkyūs inco rpo rated within the Japanese empire by the firs t decade o f the 20 th century, the regio n experienced a century o finter-co lo nial co nflict. In co ntras t to the Eas t As ian regio nal o rder o f the eighteenth century Pax Sinica, war and bilateralmetro po litan-periphery relatio ns became hallmarks o f the new diso rder. Thro ugh it all, As ian po rt cities co ntinued to extend theirreach thro ugh diaspo ra netwo rks , but these to o were abso rbed into co lo nial netwo rks centered o n Euro pe, Japan and No rthAmerica, with the diaspo ra facilitating Euro pean penetratio n thro ugho ut the regio n.

Fro m the final decades o f the 19 th century, Japan and the United States expanded into the As ia-Pacific, inaugurating a pro cess thatwo uld lead to the eventual clash o f the two ris ing imperial po wers . With Japan’s seizure o f the Ryūkyūs , the integratio n o f Ho kkaidō ,the co lo nizatio n o f Taiwan and Ko rea, the victo ry in the Russo -Japanese War and the es tablishment o f the puppet s tate o fManchukuo between 1872 and 1932, and eventually o ver the next decade the co nques t o f large swatches o f China and So utheas tAs ia, Japan became the o nly natio n o f As ia, Africa o r Latin America to jo in the club o f the co lo nial po wers and gain privileged accessto land, labo r and reso urces .

But there were o ther equally impo rtant co nsequences . Prasenjit Duara o bserves that, “While the British and the Japanese empireswere trying to create autarkic, interdependent regio ns to sus tain their imperial po wer in As ia, anti-imperialis t tho ught linked to

ris ing As ian natio nalism was seeking to build an alternative co nceptio n o f the regio n.”15

Let’s briefly co ns ider Japan’s As ia fro m three perspectives : firs t, eco no mic develo pment and so cial change; seco nd, war,natio nalism, and anti-co lo nialism; and third, regio nal dynamics and regio nal ties to the wo rld eco no my.

T he Japanese empire in 19 4 2 includes t he Pacif ic Island Mandat es t hat Japan secured fro m Germany aft er Wo rldWar I

Like the Wes tern co lo nial po wers , Japan relentless ly mined the co lo nies fo r natural reso urces and human reso urces to spur Japan’sindus trializatio n. At the same time, far mo re than either the Chinese tributary-trade o rder o r the Wes tern co lo nial o rder elsewhere inAs ia, Japan fo s tered co lo nial agricultural and indus trial develo pment thro ugh inves tment in infras tructure as well as large-scale

migratio n, no tably invo lving Japanese and Ko rean settlers in China, Ko rea, Taiwan and Manchukuo .16

Japanese co lo nialism wo uld have las ting impact o n the co untries o f the regio n. As Angus Maddiso n has sho wn, per capita GDP gainsin Taiwan and Ko rea in the years 1913-1938 were subs tantially higher than tho se fo r all o ther co lo nies in Eas t and So utheas t As ia,

and pro bably in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa.17 By 1938, per capita GDP in Ko rea and Taiwan were 53 and 60 percentrespectively o f that o f the metro po litan co untry, Japan. By co mpariso n, the range was 10-25 percent fo r British, French, Dutch andUS co lo nies in As ia (Bo o th Table 2). And Japan wo uld leave an indus trial legacy in Manchukuo that wo uld beco me the co re o f China’siro n and s teel indus try in the early years o f the Peo ple’s Republic. In sho rt, the develo pmental impact o n Japan’s co lo nies , and thedegree o f eco no mic integratio n with the metro po lis , were far greater than in the case o f Euro pean o r American co lo nies .

Trade between Japan and its co lo nies and dependencies expanded rapidly. The trade o f Manchukuo , Ko rea and Taiwan were all

dramatically redirected (in many ins tances away fro m China and to ward Japan) between the late 19 th century and the 1930s . Taiwan’sexpo rts to Japan increased fro m 20 percent o f to tal expo rts at the time o f co lo nizatio n in 1895 to 88% by the late 1930s , with rice

and sugar the do minant pro ducts .18 Co mparable trade dependence o n the metro po lis in the late 1930s was s imilarly no table in the

Japan’s Sho wa St eelwo rks in Anshan wo uld beco met he co re o f China’s st eel indust ry in t he 19 50 s

Japanese infant ry march int o bat t le wit h So vietfo rces at No mo nhan

case o f Ko rea.19 Eco no mic bo nds amo ng the co lo nies anddependencies , by co ntras t, weakened o r remained weak. In Taiwan,Manchukuo and Ko rea, trade with China was redirected to ward Japan.Like that o f the Euro pean co lo nial po wers , Japan’s spo kes and wheeltrade pattern in As ia precluded the develo pment o f tradeco mplementarities o r o ther fo rms o f eco no mic integratio n amo ngthe co lo nies and dependencies .

In co ntras t to the Qing empire, between 1895 and 1940 imperialJapan directly ass imilated co lo nized and co nquered peo ples , abo veall the Ko reans , Taiwanese, the peo ples o f Manchuria (includingChinese, Mo ngo ls , Hui (Mus lims) and Manchus), Ryūkyūans and

Ainu.20 The co lo nized were educated in the language o f theco nquero r and subjected to intense ass imilatio n as Japanese (o rManchukuo ) citizens and subjects . In all these respects , Japan bro kesharply with patterns o f the tributary-trade o rder in Eas t As ia andalso differentiated the Japanese fro m Euro pean and Americanco lo nizatio n in the degree o f ass imilatio n.

Japan extended its territo rial reach with the 1932 inco rpo ratio n o fManchukuo and its 1937 invas io n o f China so uth o f the Great Wall,but it quickly clashed with So viet fo rces at No mo nhan in 1939, whilethe two expans ive co lo nial po wers , the US and Japan, were o nco llis io n co urse. Indeed, o ne might say that by No mo nhan, the alliedpo wers that wo uld jo in fo rces in Euro pe in Wo rld War II had alreadybegun to crys tallize in o ppo s itio n to Japan’s As ian advance.

The 1940 US o il and scrap iro n embargo led inexo rably to the attacko n Pearl Harbo r in Japan’s desperate and briefly success ful attemptto supplant the Euro pean and American co lo nial po wers thro ugho utEas t and So utheas t As ia and the Pacific. If Meiji Japan had placed itsho pes fo r mo dernizatio n and pro sperity o n eco no mic, po litical andcultural ties with, and emulatio n o f, the Wes tern po wers , Japan no wfo und itself iso lated fro m co re regio ns o f the wo rld eco no my whilefighting wars agains t po werful adversaries o n multiple fro nts and

s triving to create an autarkic regio n in As ia.21

The co lo nial era in As ia left three impo rtant legacies : firs t, mass ivedis lo catio n, des tructio n and lo ss o f life that were the pro duct o fco lo nial and wo rld wars ; seco nd, the s timulus to natio nalis t andanti-co lo nial revo lutio ns ; third, the spur to eco no mic develo pmentand indus trializatio n in Japan’s co lo nies and dependencies , no tablyKo rea, Taiwan and Manchukuo , but also in China to a lesser degree.

His to rians o f many persuas io ns have taken Wo rld War II as themajo r watershed o f twentieth century As ian and glo bal geo po litics ,as indeed it was in so many ways . It marked the defeat anddismantling o f the Japanese empire and pro pelled the US tosuperpo wer preeminence, its po wer expanding mo s t dramatically in

the As ia Pacific, and, as the o nly majo r po wer to span the Atlantic and the Pacific, its new fo und po wer was also glo bal. The War alsospurred waves o f natio nalis t-inspired revo lutio nary and independence mo vements acro ss the co lo nized wo rld. If the Chinese,Vietnamese and Ko rean revo lutio ns were landmark events in po s twar Eas t As ia, independence mo vements in the Philippines , Malaya,Singapo re, the Dutch Eas t Indies , Burma, India and elsewhere bro ught pro fo und change to o ther parts o f As ia, s ignaling the end o fthe class ical co lo nial empires and an era o f independent s tates .

Fro m the perspective o f As ian regio nalism, ho wever, impo rtant co ntinuities spanned the 1945 divide. Far fro m inaugurating an era o fpeace, Eas t and So utheas t As ia became the primary zo ne o f wo rld co nflict o ver the next quarter century. The Chinese, Ko rean andVietnamese wars and revo lutio ns—invariably explained as the pro ducts o f the “Co ld War”, are equally, perhaps abo ve all, legacies o fthe co lo nial era that were played o ut within the purview o f US-So viet co nflict—were the decis ive events es tablishing As ia’s divis io n,

and indeed natio nal divis io ns , in the wake o f Wo rld War II.22 New natio ns , o r natio n fragments (China, Ko rea, Vietnam), es tablishedprimary relatio nships with either the US o r the So viet Unio n, fo rging relatio nships that were paramo unt in defining each natio n’sinternatio nal relatio ns and shaping its develo pmental and geo po litical trajecto ry. And each o f these wars wo uld be fo ught o ut in thepo s t-co lo nial periphery, the o verwhelming casualties being lo cal peo ple with the war s carcely interrupting the pace and mo de o f lifein the metro po litan co untries .

As in the century o f co lo nialism, in po s t-co lo nial As ia bilateral ties to o ne o f the great po wers (generally, o f co urse, the UnitedStates ) were decis ive and multilateral intra-As ian eco no mic and po litical linkages largely absent. No where was this truer than in thecase o f Japan, firmly jo ined at the hip to the US, o ccupied by American fo rces , its internatio nal relatio ns played o ut within thepurview o f the US-Japan Security Treaty, and do cilely suppo rting success ive US wars thro ugho ut the regio n, a pattern as true to dayas it was in the wake o f the As ia-Pacific War. But it was equally true o f So uth Ko rea bo th during and after the US-Ko rean War, a warwhich, in fact remains suspended rather than co ncluded, and in the US-Vietnam War in which Ko rea pro vided the seco nd larges tmilitary fo rce behind that o f the US.

Prasenjit Duara has argued that, “The Co ld War divis io n o f the wo rld into two camps co ntro lled militarily by nuclear superpo wersseeking to do minate the res t o f the develo ping and deco lo niz ing natio ns may be seen as a kind o f supra-regio nalism. While in factthe two camps o r blo cs represented trans -territo rial spaces including no n-co ntiguo us natio ns , the co ntiguity o f co re Eas tern and

Wes tern Euro peans natio ns within each camp served as a s tepping s to ne fo r subsequent regio nalism to develo p within Euro pe.”23

This fo rmulatio n seems to me appro priate fo r Eas tern Euro pe where the So viet Blo c and Co meco n s to o d agains t NATO and theEuro pean Unio n. In As ia, ho wever, in part because the Sino -So viet split led to fierce rivalry by 1960, and because ASEAN, fo unded in1967, was lo ng so weak a reed, it is diff icult to dis cern any effective regio n fo rmatio n in eco no mic o r security terms in the initialpo s twar decades . That wo uld change fro m the 1970s .

III Eco no mic Resurgence, Co mplement arit y and t he Spro ut s o f Regio nalism in East Asia

Since the 1980s , China’s rapid and sus tained eco no mic gro wth, co ming in the heels o f the advance o f Japan, Ko rea and the newlyindus trializ ing co untries o f Eas t As ia, has riveted attentio n. Co ntempo rary Eas t As ian develo pment is bes t unders to o d no t as aseries o f dis crete natio nal pheno mena, but as a regio nal and glo bal pro cess that enco mpasses eco no mic develo pment but equallygeo po litics , so cial change and cultural interchange. This is because impo rtant facets o f natio nal and glo bal develo pment are drivenin part by the dynamic interpenetratio n o f As ian eco no mies , po lities and cultures , by a changing intra-As ian divis io n o f labo r, and byurban netwo rks that functio n largely independent o f and transcending natio nal s tructures . Co ns ider an expans ive Eas t As ia in glo balperspective.

The 1970 Divide and the Resurgence of East Asia

1970 set the s tage fo r new Eas t As ian regio nal po ss ibilities and a glo bal reco nfiguratio n o f po wer: in the wake o f the China-So vietrift o f the 1960s , the US-China entente and burgeo ning eco no mic relatio nship o pened the way fo r ending the bifurcatio n that hadcharacterized no t o nly po s twar As ia but Eas t-Wes t glo bal geo po litics and eco no mics . China’s re-entry o n the wo rld s tage in 1970,its assumptio n o f a UN Security Co uncil seat, its access to US and glo bal markets in the early 1970s , and its eventual po s itio n atthe center o f Eas t-Wes t trade and inves tment and membership in the Wo rld Trade Organizatio n, o pened the way to the re-knitting o feco no mic and po litical bo nds acro ss As ia and s trengthening As ian linkages with the glo bal eco no my. Little no ted, given the fo rmalperio dizatio n o f China’s Cultural Revo lutio n (1966-76), is the fact that impo rtant internal changes including the rapid gro wth o f

do mes tic and internatio nal markets and small-s cale indus try pro ceeded apace in the final years o f Mao ’s rule (1970-76).24 Withindecades , China emerged as the wo rkplace and mo to r driving the As ian and wo rld eco no mies , facilitated by the deepening and/o ro pening o f Japan-China and So uth Ko rea-China relatio ns , and the expans ive trade and inves tment ro le o f o verseas Chinese linkingChina with Eas t and So utheas t As ian and o ther eco no mies . With the reunificatio n o f Vietnam (1975), o f Germany (1989) andsubsequently o f China with Ho ng Ko ng (1997) and Macau (1999), o nly a divided Ko rea and the China-Taiwan divis io n remain o f themajo r natio nal ruptures that were the legacy o f co lo nialism, Wo rld War II and subsequent co nflicts . These pro fo und changesillus trate the interface o f geo po litics and po litical eco no my bo th in glo bal (particularly US-China) and regio nal (China-Japan-Ko reaas well as mainland China-Taiwan-Ho ng Ko ng and No rth-So uth Ko rea) perspective.

Amo ng the remarkable changes made po ss ible by the US-China o pening has been the emergence and deepening o f China-ROKrelatio ns : fro m anti-Co mmunis t mecca, a So uth Ko rea that fo ught China in the US-Ko rean War and then pro vided yeo man mercenaryservice fo r the US in Vietnam, emerged as o ne o f China’s mo s t impo rtant trade and inves tment partners fro m the 1980s . Withindecades , China, Japan and So uth Ko rea wo uld beco me o ne ano ther’s leading trade and inves tment partners , but also in so me fieldsco mpetito rs , surpass ing in s ignificant ways even their eco no mic and financial bo nds with the United States . In 2009 they were the

wo rld’s 2nd , 3rd and 13th larges t eco no mies by CIA recko ning based o n purchas ing po wer parity es timates , and their trade surpluses

were amo ng the wo rld’s larges t.25

Ano ther impo rtant regio nal develo pment with pro fo und geo po litical co nsequences has been the trade, inves tment and techno lo gicalpartnership that links Taiwan and mainland China. In less than two decades , the co re o f Taiwan’s high tech pro ductio n migratedacro ss the Straits . Appro ximately o ne millio n Taiwanese wo rkers , engineers , managers and family members presently wo rk and liveo n the mainland, mo s t o f them in Guangdo ng, Fujian, and especially in the Shanghai-Suzho u co rrido r. Taiwanese capital and

techno lo gy are central to China’s indus trializatio n and expo rt drive.26 With China-Taiwan trade so aring fro m $8 billio n in 1991 to$102 billio n in 2007, and with Taiwan inves to rs po uring an es timated $150 billio n into the mainland’s expo rt-o riented secto rs ,

Taiwan’s eco no mic future has beco me inseparable fro m that o f the mainland.27 The 2008 electo ral victo ry o f the Guo mindang’s MaYing-jeo u as pres ident s trengthened cro ss -s trait ties as indicated by the initiatio n o f regularly s cheduled flights as well as directshipping and po s tal links between Taiwan and mainland China, the s igning o f o il develo pment agreements , and China’s o ffer o f a

$19 billio n lo an package to Taiwan enterprises in China—all facto rs sugges tive o f further po ss ibilities fo r eco no mic, so cial and

po litical integratio n.28 The Taiwan-Ho ng Ko ng flight has repo rtedly beco me the wo rld’s seco nd bus ies t internatio nal ro ute, fo llo wingNew Yo rk-Lo ndo n, with many bus iness , pleasure and family/lineage travelers co ntinuing o n to co mplete a Taiwan-mainland trip andvice versa. And in 2009, Ho ng Ko ng was the wo rld’s seco nd bus ies t cargo hub. Immediately after China’s entry into the Wo rld TradeOrganizatio n in 2001, Taiwan entered as “Chinese Taipei”, o ne o f many s igns that China has relaxed effo rts to iso late Taiwandiplo matically. A June 2010 Taiwan-China Eco no mic Co o peratio n Framewo rk Agreement s trengthens the legal s tructure o f the

relatio nship, lo wers tariffs and o pens the cro ss -s trait market to services such as banking.29 While tens io ns co ntinue to erupt o versuch is sues as Taiwan purchase o f advanced US military techno lo gy, the China-Taiwan relatio nship nevertheless appears to haveentered a perio d o f s tability ro o ted in eco no mic interdependence and multi-faceted so cial and cultural exchange.

The ro le o f diaspo ric Chinese capital, techno lo gy and labo r, including a majo r ro le fo r returnees fro m No rth American and Euro peanunivers ities and enterprises , is large, multi-directio nal, and embracing the full range o f activities spanning inves tment, techno lo gicaltrans fer, research and develo pment, netwo rking, and labo r migratio n cris s -cro ss ing the Pacific and spanning As ia. The US, Taiwan,Ho ng Ko ng, Japan and Singapo re are amo ng the inter-linked s ites fo r mo vement back and fo rth fro m and to Chinese cities .

Co mparable, but s lo wer and mo re erratic s trides bro ught the two Ko reas clo ser with the Kim Dae-jung—Kim Jo ng Il summit o f 2000

as the key po int o f inflectio n, leading to effo rts to ward rappro chement and eco no mic integratio n.30 The failure, ho wever, o f the 6-Party talks and the 2007 electio n o f Lee Myung-bak as pres ident o f So uth Ko rea, the s tro ke suffered by No rth Ko rean leader KimJo ng Il, and the co ntro versy o ver the 2010 s inking o f the So uth Ko rean ship Cheo nan all bro ught to a halt pro gress to wardrappro chement. Deep divis io ns remain in Ko rean po litics , divis io ns that co uld again explo de in intra-Ko rean and internatio nal war.

As multilateral intra-As ian trade and inves tment deepened fro m the 1970s , so to o did the regio n’s ties to Euro pe and the US. Tradebetween the Eas t As ian trade surplus natio ns and the US, the wo rld’s leading trade deficit natio n, presently co mprises o ne o f thes ignature patterns o f the co ntempo rary wo rld eco no mic o rder. The eno rmo us surpluses generated by China ($227 billio n in 2009),Japan ($44 billio n in 2009) and So uth Ko rea ($11 Billio n in 2009) acco unt fo r the larges t part o f the mass ive US trade deficit, andin turn, these natio ns have made it po ss ible fo r the US to co ntinue to live beyo nd its means . This is no t o nly because as the do llarremains the universal currency but abo ve all because do llar surpluses are recycled back to the US, primarily in the fo rm o f purchases

o f US Treasury bo nds , but also in the fo rm o f direct and indirect inves tment.31 As o f April 2010 , acco rding to the US TreasuryDepartment, China with $900 billio n do llars and Japan with $796 billio n in ho ldings o f US treasuries ranked firs t and seco nd in the

wo rld, acco unting fo r mo re than 40 percent o f the wo rld to tal o f $4.0 trillio n.32 Chinese, Japanese and So uth Ko rean purchases o ftreasury bo nds o ver the las t five years helped to ho ld do wn US interes t rates and the yuan-do llar, yen-do llar and wo n-do llar ratio ,bo o s ting the trade and gro wth o f all fo ur eco no mies . This made it po ss ible fo r the US to finance the Iraq and Afghanis tan Wars atthe same time that US manufacturing jo bs co ntinued their inexo rable flight to China, US manufacturing ho llo wed o ut, and the US

experienced the mo s t severe unemplo yment s ince Wo rld War II.33 If there is anything that is TBTF (to o big to fail) it may be thesymbio tic US-China trade, inves tment, and deficit/surplus relatio nship that has made this the wo rld’s mo s t impo rtant bilateraleco no mic and geo po litical relatio nship. Nevertheless , as dis cussed belo w, the relatio nship remains co nflictual, abo ve all ingeo po litical terms .

Two majo r develo pments o f glo bal s ignificance facilitated China’s reentry in the wo rld eco no my and the fo rmatio n o f a dynamicinterco nnected Eas t As ian eco no mic zo ne fro m the 1970s . Firs t, the primary glo bal war zo ne, which had been centered in Eas t As iabetween the 1940s and the 1970s—the As ia-Pacific War fo llo wed by Chinese, Ko rean, and Indo chinese revo lutio nary wars andinternatio nal co nflict invo lving the US and its allies , as well as independence s truggles in the Philippines , Malays ia, and the DutchEas t Indies amo ng o thers—shifted after 1975 to the Middle Eas t and Central As ia. If intra-Eas t As ian and As ia-Pacific po litics remainco ntentio us , abo ve all in the Ko rean peninsula, the gro wth and deepening o f the As ian regio nal eco no my s ince the 1970s has takenplace in the mids t o f a general peace, widening cultural and eco no mic exchange, and eas ing o f tens io ns thro ugho ut Eas t

As ia.34 Seco nd, China’s full entry into the wo rld eco no my to o k place at precisely the mo ment when the po s twar glo bal eco no micexpans io n came to an end, the B-phase in the Ko ndratieff cycle began, and the US so ught ways to s tave o ff eco no mic co llapse andthe demise o f the do llar as the internatio nal currency thro ugh the expans io n o f a wo rld eco no my that included China even as its o wn

indus trial s trength and eco no mic gro wth rates plummeted and its eco no my became ever mo re dependent o n finance and services .35

A number o f co mpariso ns to the co lo nial era in general, and Japan’s Greater Eas t As ia Co -Pro sperity Sphere in the years 1930-1945in particular, are ins tructive. Firs t, the rapidly gro wing multidirectio nal flo w o f trade and inves tment invo lving China, Japan, So uthKo rea, Ho ng Ko ng, Singapo re and Taiwan in recent decades may be co ntras ted with the predo minantly bilateral eco no micrelatio nships linking Euro pean, American and Japanese co lo nies with the metro po lis as well as framing the dependent relatio nshipswith the metro po lis o f the prewar and early po s twar perio ds . In the years 1988-2004, as wo rld trade expanded at an annual rate o f9 .5%, intra-Eas t As ian trade grew at 14% per year, co mpared with 9% fo r that o f the Euro pean Unio n. Eas t As ia’s share o f wo rld

expo rts increased by 6% in the co urse o f tho se years , while that o f the Euro pean Unio n decreased by 3%.36 Between 1963 and2008 As ia’s share o f wo rld expo rts increased fro m 12.5 to 27.7 percent, with that o f China alo ne increas ing fro m 1.3 to 9 .7

percent.37

Amo ng the indicato rs o f Eas t As ia’s resurgence, and China’s gro wth in particular, two bear particular mentio n. One is the number o fparent transnatio nal co rpo ratio ns and particularly fo reign affiliates lo cated in China: parent co rpo ratio ns increased fro m 359 in2002 to 3,429 in 2005, co mpared with 4,663 in Japan (2006), 7,460 in So uth Ko rea (2007), 2,360 in the US (2005) and 2,607 in UK(2003) o ut o f a wo rld to tal o f 56 ,448 in 2008. If the numbers bear any relatio nship to the reality, with 280 ,000 fo reign affiliates inChina by 2005, China surpassed the co mbined to tal o f the o ther majo r co untries . In the event, o nce again it is the dynamism o f theregio n that is s triking. Overall, the figures fo r China seem co ns is tent with o ther data o n the rapid expans io n o f fo reign directinves tment.

T able 1. Number o f Parent T ransnat io nal Co rpo rat io ns and Fo reign Aff iliat es (select ed co unt ries)

Derived fro m Table 1, Saskia Sassen, “The Glo bal City Perspective. Theo retical Implicatio ns fo r Shanghai,” in Xiangming Chen, ed.with Zhenhua Zho u, Shanghai Rsing. State Power and Local Transformations in a Global Megacity (Minneapo lis : Univers ity o f Minneso taPress ), 2009 , pp. 9 -10 , based o n UNCTAD, World Investment Report (1998 , 4; 2004, 273, 274; 2008, 211). The figure fo r China’s

fo reign affiliates bears further checking.

The seco nd is China as a magnet fo r fo reign direct inves tment, with rapid gro wth co ntinuing, and o nly the US far in the lead as alo cale fo r fo reign inves tment. The data reveal the sharp rise in bo th inward and o utward inves tment in Eas t As ia in general, withChina leading the way, between 1990 and 2008. During this perio d, China surpassed all o thers as a target fo r internatio nalinves tment except the United States , while Eas t As ia as a regio n exhibits dynamism in bo th inward and o utward inves tment.

T able 2. Fo reign Direct Invest ment by Co unt ry and Regio n, 19 9 0 -20 0 0 , 20 0 6, 20 0 8 in US$billio n

No te: 1990-2000 is annual average.

United Natio ns Co nference o n Trade and Develo pment, Wo rld Inves tment Repo rt 2009 , Wo rld Inves tment Directo ry On-line

In co ntras t to the autarky o f Eas t As ia between 1937 and 1945 at the peak o f Japanese po wer, and the bipo lar divis io n o f the years1945-70 , s ince the 1970s the regio n has been fully enmeshed in glo bal trade, financial and inves tment netwo rks with gro winginterdependence o f its natio nal eco no mies . China’s eco no my was mo s t fo reign inves tment dependent in the 1990s , with the ratio toto tal inves tment dro pping in the fo llo wing decade (while abso lute amo unts remained large) while China’s o wn internatio nal

inves tments ro se.38 But while glo bal attentio n has fo cused o n inves tment in China, the pattern underlined by Athuko rala and Hill iso ne o f a regio n-wide surge in attractio n o f FDI. They particularly no te a pattern o f pro ductio n fragmentatio n and o utso urcing suchthat in many ins tances no t even China is pro ducing the entire pro duct, but facto ries thro ugho ut the regio n and beyo nd co ntributeco mpo nents in a co mplex regio nal-glo bal divis io n o f labo r that extends fro m inves tment, management, pro ductio n and assembly totrade and marketing. Amo ng the his to rical and co ntempo rary facto rs facilitating rapid eco no mic develo pment, indus trializatio n,subs tantial gro wth in per capita inco me, and the fo rmatio n o f a vibrant multi-directio nal Eas t As ian regio nal eco no my, the fo llo wingseem particularly impo rtant:

• The legacy o f As ian eco no mic and po litical s trengths examined earlier in the epo ch o f Chinese preeminence,

pro tracted peace, and the regio nal tributary-trade o rder o f the 18 th century, legacies that wo uld beco me clear withthe resurgence o f Chinese s trength at the center o f an emergent Eas t As ia. China and Eas t As ia merely reclaimed apo s itio n o f s trength that was lo s t via a co mbinatio n o f internal dis integratio n and the ravages o f imperialism. Thisis no t to sugges t co ntinuity in the nature o f o rganiz ing pro ductio n o r trade pro cesses , o r in labo r relatio ns o r thero le o f the s tate o r capital.

• The Chinese, Japanese and Ko rean diaspo ra has played a central ro le in re-linking As ian and Wes tern eco no miesthro ugh trade, techno lo gy and inves tment netwo rks that extend acro ss the regio n and link Eas t As ia glo bally.

• Early po s twar develo pmental and so cial change s trategies thro ugho ut Eas t As ia were predicated o n s tate-ledaccumulatio n and inves tment, so cial change s trategies that pivo ted o n egalitarian land refo rms , and measures thatblo cked takeo ver by internatio nal capital while creating firm fo undatio ns fo r the do mes tic eco no my. Far fro m theneo liberal o rtho do xy that has prevailed in many quarters s ince the 1990s , this was s tate-led develo pment withres trictio ns o n the market, with, o f co urse, impo rtant variatio ns in the appro ach o f the three Eas t As ian natio ns .

If intra-As ian facto rs are impo rtant, the resurgence o f Eas t As ia as a regio n has equally been shaped by glo bal facto rs , no tably theco ntradicto ry ro le o f the United States in the As ia Pacific, but also the dynamic gro wth o f trade and inves tment relatio ns invo lvingEuro pe and, in recent decades , the search fo r reso urces linking As ia with Africa and Latin America as well. During the immediatepo s twar decades the US played a key ro le no t o nly in shaping such glo bal ins titutio ns as the Wo rld Bank, IMF and United Natio ns ,but also in s tructuring a bifurcated As ia Pacific, in plunging the regio n into pro tracted wars , and in assuring the primacy o f bilateralo ver multilateral relatio ns . Since 1970, and particularly s ince the demise o f the So viet Unio n in 1990, it has no t o nly facilitated the

resurgence o f the natio nal eco no mies o f Eas t As ia, but also , in diverse and at times unintended ways , co ntributed to transcendingso me o f the divis io ns inherent in earlier Eas t-Wes t co nflicts .

In light o f a two centuries -lo ng pattern characterized by the primacy o f unequal bilateral relatio nships and a virtual absence o fmultilateral bo nds , a number o f recent multilateral initiatives merit attentio n in terms o f changing regio nal geo po litics . Fo r o nly theseco nd o r third time s ince the eighteenth century, and the firs t in half a century, China has taken the lead in an impo rtant regio nal

and even glo bal geo po litical initiative:39 as ho s t and the leading fo rce in the s ix-party talks that co uld eventually lead to abreakthro ugh that results in No rth Ko rean denuclearizatio n and o pens the way to ward ending the half century Ko rean War betweenNo rth Ko rea and the United States and between No rth and So uth Ko rea. The Ko rean co nflict is but the mo s t intractable o f co ncernsthat can o nly be reso lved in multilateral terms , requiring a s triking departure fro m largely unilateral US attempts to impo se its willo n o thers thro ugh military actio n. The pers is tence o f a divided China and a divided Ko rea have no t prevented impo rtant s tridesto ward the fo rmatio n o f a co hes ive eco no mic regio n, laying the bas is fo r further po litical acco mmo datio n and, eventually,address ing the enviro nmental and po litical eco no my is sues o f po llutio n, po verty and inequality that have acco mpanied gallo pinggro wth and challenge the future o f the regio n (we return to these is sues belo w).

As it gained s trength in recent decades , China began to spearhead o ther regio nal initiatives : these include effo rts to bring abo ut anASEAN + 3 arrangement invo lving China, Japan and Ko rea to unify Eas t and So utheas t As ia, and an ASEAN-China Free Trade Areawhich to o k effect o n January 1, 2010 to gether with a $15 billio n Chinese credit to pro mo te regio nal integratio n and co nnectivity. It

sho uld be no ted, ho wever, that in co ntras t to China’s centrality in the tributary-trade o rder o f the 18 th century, So utheas t As iannatio ns , thro ugh ASEAN, have played a leading pro active ro le in the emerging regio nalism in the new millennium, as in the planningfo r this and o ther free trade areas while it is the US, the o nly natio n with military bases and tro o ps po s itio ned thro ugho ut theregio n, retains geo po litical do minance. These agreements have been predicated o n a willingness by the parties to set as ide fo rfuture reso lutio n such co ntentio us territo rial is sues as Chinese bo rder disputes with India, Russ ia, Japan, and Vietnam amo ngo thers , including disputes o ver po tentially o il rich is lands , the Spratlys and Paracels , that invo lve claims by many So utheas t As iannatio ns . Particularly no table fo r its po tential regio nal and glo bal s ignificance, is the China-Japan pro vis io nal acco rd o n territo rialis sues invo lving the Diao yutai/Senkaku Is lands and Okino to rishima, making po ss ible an agreement (albeit o ne that wo uld be

immediately co ntes ted) fo r jo int o il explo ratio n in the disputed area, altho ugh co nflicts co ntinue.40 This is no t to take aPanglo ss ian view o f the pro spects fo r regio nal harmo ny: co ntinued territo rial disputes and unreso lved his to rical co nflicts ro o ted inco lo nial and war have the po tential to dis rupt regio nal acco rd, as bes t illus trated by the China-Japan clash o ver theDiao yutai/Senkaku Is lands in September 2010. Nevertheless , po werful trends unleashed o ver the las t fo ur decades have o penednew po ss ibilities fo r the regio n.

As China’s s tar has burned brightly in regio nal and glo bal affairs , Japan, lo ng the wo rld’s seco nd eco no mic po wer, and the mo to rthat dro ve regio n-wide eco no mic gro wth in the 1960s and 1970s , has virtually disappeared fro m much analys is o f As ian regio nalismand glo bal geo po litics . This is a pro duct o f three main facto rs . Firs t is the surge in China’s eco no mic and financial s trength o ver thelas t two decades while Japan’s eco no my never reco vered mo mentum after the bubble burs t o f 1990 inaugurated mo re than a decadeo f s tagnatio n, and the co llapse o f s to ck market and real es tate values , with further heavy hits during the 2008-09 eco no mic andfinancial pandemic. Seco nd is the po litical turmo il that has resulted in s ix prime minis ters between 2006 and 2010, po liticals talemate in the wake o f the defeat o f the LDP after fifty years o f rule, and s igns o f tens io n within the US-Japan relatio nshipcentered o n the unreso lved Okinawa base trans fer is sue. Fo r these reaso ns , and because o f fears that the regio n will be do minatedby a resurgent China, Japan has failed to exercise leadership in an emerging As ia. Finally, perhaps mo s t impo rtant and directlyrelated to the seco nd po int, is the fact that Japan remains firmly in the American embrace, viewing its future in terms o f the US-Japan alliance even as the Demo cratic Party adminis tratio n has so ught to s trengthen relatio ns with China while attempting, thus farabo rtively, to es tablish a mo re equal US-Japan relatio nship. Even as s igns abo und o f the declining po wer o f the US, Japaneseleaders and the media have co ntinued to prio ritize their subo rdinate relatio nship within, and dependence o n, the US-Japanrelatio nship, that is what Gavan McCo rmack calls the client s tate bo nd. The Demo cratic Party cabinet o f Hato yama Yukio fell when itsattempt to clo se the dangero us Futenma base and trans fer the majo rity o f US Marines to Guam, failed to sway US po licymakers whohave remained ins is tent o n implementing an earlier agreement with the LDP to co ns truct yet ano ther new high tech base in Oura Bay,that is o n expanding rather than reducing its eno rmo us military fo o tprint in Okinawa in the face o f entrenched Okinawan o ppo s itio n.(Fo r Japanese po licymakers , trans fer o f the base to mainland Japan was po litically unthinkable.) This despite US plans to trans fer8 ,000 Marines and 9 ,000 dependents to Guam with Japan agreeing to pay the bulk o f the co s ts , and despite the fact that the Marine

presence in Okinawa is largely irrelevant to Japan’s o wn security but primarily suppo rts US wars in Iraq and Afghanis tan.41

In sho rt, Japanese diplo macy pivo ts o n the US-Japan eco no mic and security relatio nship, including the nuclear umbrella, thes tatio ning o f US fo rces , and the pro vis io n o f Japanese financial and lo gis tical suppo rt fo r US wars to Iraq and the Pers ian Gulf andto suppo rt US fo rces in Japan. Despite pro fessed interes t in As ian regio nal agendas , and despite the gro wing s trength o f intra-regio nal financial and eco no mic ties , Japan remains trans fixed o n its dependent relatio nship with the United States , a relatio nshipthat has been accentuated in the wake o f No rth Ko rean nuclear develo pment and the co nflict o ver Diao yutai.

Certainly Japan has been s lo w to exercise leadership in a resurgent Eas t As ia.42 As Yo shihide So eya darkly o bserves ,

“[s ]ince the end o f the Co ld War, the mo s t impo rtant s trategic relatio nship in Eas t As ia has been and will co ntinueto be the o ne between the United States and China. Given this pro fo und reality, Japan is o bvio us ly a lessers trategic player, and it is a fundamental mis take, bo th analytically and po licy-wise, to treat Japan as o ne o f the "fo ur

great po wers " (including Russ ia) in No rtheas t As ia.”43

Nevertheless , Japan remains As ia’s leading techno lo gical po wer and a fo rmidable eco no mic and financial fo rce, even as the s ize o fits eco no my s lips belo w that o f China and its demo graphic pro file po ints to further decline.

In recent years Eas t As ia has taken s teps to ward interregio nal co o peratio n in numero us areas including eco no mic and financialsecurity, eas ing territo rial co nflicts , reso urce management, fishing, co unterterro rism, drugs , smuggling, piracy, human traffickingand o rganized crime co ntro l, disas ter relief, enviro nmental degradatio n and co ntainer security. The 1997 As ian financial andcurrency cris is pro vided impetus fo r regio nal respo nses , the mo s t impo rtant o f which was the currency swaps initiated with theChiang Mai initiative o f May 2005 to help sho re up natio ns facing currency and financial crises (at the time o f the 1997 As ian

financial cris is the United States blo cked such effo rts ), an initiative reinfo rced in 2008.44

The firs t summit o f the three Eas t As ian natio ns , held in Fukuo ka, Japan o n December 13, 2008 in an effo rt to frame a co mmo npo licy in respo nse to the wo rld recess io n is illus trative o f the po ss ibilities fo r Eas t As ian regio nal respo nses to the co ntempo raryfinancial and eco no mic cris is . The brief meeting, ho wever, also highlighted o bs tacles to framing co mmo n po licies at a time whenwo rld recess io n presents severe challenges that may derail even—o r particularly—their high-flying eco no mies with its heavy reliance

China and Japan claim t heDiao yut ai/Senkaku Islands which Japan

has held since t he 19 72 reversio n o fOkinawa.

China co nduct s f irst naval esco rt missio n o ff t heco ast o f So malia, Dec. 20 0 9 .

o n expo rt markets and fo reign inves tment.45

A 2009 summit held fo llo wing the ASEAN summit in the wake o f the glo baleco no mic and financial cris is resulted in impo rtant agreements includingdetermining financial co ntributio ns (and vo ting weight) in the Chiang MaiInitiatives , and es tablishment o f a co mmiss io n fo r an o fficial internatio nals tudy o f the lo ng s talled China-Japan-Ko rea FTA. Co ming at the initiative o f thenewly elected Demo cratic Party o f Japan go vernment, this represented a breakin Japanese po licy o ver the years 2002-09 which had been des igned to s tall

pro gress o n an FTA witho ut explicitly rejecting the plan.46 Whether fundamentaldifferences o ver agricultural impo rts can be reso lved, ho wever, is at bes t ano pen ques tio n.

Set o ff agains t the o bvio us value o f co o rdinatio n amo ng the three Eas t As ianpo wers is the co ntinuing shado w o f intra-As ian co nflicts , including his to ricalmemo ry co nflicts centered aro und a Japan who se neo -natio nalis t elementsco ntinue to prevent it fro m laying to res t the divis ive memo ries asso ciated withthe As ia-Pacific War and co lo nial rule. His to rical is sues co uld again undermineo r s lo w pro mis ing regio nal initiatives , as they did in China-Japan relatio ns inthe reign o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi, 2001-2006. There are, ho wever, po s itives igns . Nego tiatio ns in 2010 are at an advanced s tage fo r reso lvinglo ngs tanding co nflicts between Japan and China and between Japan and Ko rea

centered o n apo lo gy and co mpensatio n to fo rmer fo rced labo rers .47 Similarly, aChina-Japan co mmiss io n to prepare a co mmo n mo dern his to ry o f the twonatio ns has made pro gress to ward its go al. In each ins tance, ho wever, the taskremains to be co mpleted. The two mo s t intractable challenges to s trengtheningregio nal bo nds may lie in Japan’s territo rial co nflicts with Russ ia, China andKo rea, and the inability o f the three natio ns to reso lve is sues pertaining to theUnited States and its ro le in Eas t As ian o r in As ia Pacific geo po litical o utco mes .

As David Shambaugh no ted o f the “US-led security architecture acro ss As ia . . .includes five bilateral alliances in EA; no n-allied security partnerships in SEA,SA and Oceania; a buildup o f US fo rces in the Pacific; new US-India and US-Pakis tan military relatio ns ; and the US military presence and defense

arrangements in SW and CA.”48 That fo rmulatio n sho uld be supplemented byreco gniz ing the impo rtance o f multiple US military bases thro ugho ut the regio nand beyo nd, US militarizatio n o f space where again it has a virtual mo no po ly,the fact that a subs tantial po rtio n o f the US naval armada is deplo yed in thePacific maritime regio n, and the expans ive co nceptio n o f the US-Japan SecurityTreaty which has led Japan to extend its military reach to the Indian Ocean and

to explo re security arrangements with India and Aus tralia.49 In early 2009,mo reo ver, bo th China and Japan respo nded to So malian piracy with thedispatch o f ships to patro l o ff the co as t o f Africa, and in April 2010 So uthKo rea dispatched a des tro yer to the Gulf o f Aden in pursuit o f a captured o iltanker, while China has quietly expanded its naval reach into the Indian

Ocean.50 Each o f these acts invo lved a majo r expans io n o f the military reach o fthe respective natio ns and a po tential so urce o f co nflict.

At the sametime, s ignsabo und o f theweakening o fAmericanpo wer in Eas tAs ia andglo bally. Whilethe co llapseo f the So vietUnio n left theUS witho utserio usgeo po liticalco ns traints ,the ratio nalefo r mass ivemilitarybudgets andpermanents tatio ning and

s trengthening o f US fo rces—in Japan/Okinawa, in So uth Ko rea, in Taiwan, and in Guam, fo r example—was s imultaneo us ly weakenedin the eyes o f almo s t everyo ne except Pentago n planners who co ntinue their insatiable pursuit o f mo re internatio nal bases , withGuam the present s ite o f cho ice fo r majo r expans io n in the As ia-Pacific. The US has lo s t internatio nal credibility as a result o f failedco s tly and pro tracted wars in Iraq and Afghanis tan and the heavy pressures it impo sed o n o ther natio ns to pay fo r tho se wars andsuppo rt them militarily. To be sure, no natio n o r gro up o f natio ns po ssesses the po wer to directly challenge the internatio nalprimacy o f the US o r to assert leadership o n a glo bal s cale. Yet US hegemo nic claims are the victim o f imperial o vers tretch with USthreats o f new o r expanded wars in Iran, No rth Ko rea, So malia and elsewhere co ming at a time when its eco no mic and financialpreeminence have faded, and US s tate and lo cal go vernments co nfro nt mass ive cutbacks in health, educatio n and services , while

do ubts o f success gro w o ver the ill-fated wars in Iraq and Afghanis tan.51

Parado xically, Mark Beeso n o bserves , “the legacy o f the Bush adminis tratio n may be that U.S. fo reign po licy effectively underminedthe multilateral transnatio nal bas ics o f American po wer by enco uraging the creatio n o f regio nally based gro upings with which to

represent and pro tect lo cal interes ts .”52 No where has this been truer than in Eas t As ia and the As ia Pacific.

A series o f events o f the spring-summer 2010 reveal the vo latility o f the regio n and sugges t that the primary challenge to Eas tAs ian regio nal develo pment—o r rather to co mpeting vis io ns fo r defining the geo graphical s co pe o f the regio n and the character o fregio nal develo pment—hinge o n challenges po sed in s ignificant part by co ntinued US attempts to impo se its will thro ugho ut theregio n. The firs t o f these was the s inking o f the So uth Ko rean war vessel Cheo nan o n March 26 , 2010 during a jo int US-ROK militaryexercise. An ROK repo rt o f May 20 , immediately endo rsed by the US and its allies , held No rth Ko rea respo ns ible fo r the disas ter thatto o k 46 lives . It was a s tark reminder, if any were needed, o f the unfinished US-Ko rean War that co uld again erupt in battle,particularly with No rth-So uth tens io ns o n the rise in recent years . Of particular interes t is the US-ROK respo nse: fo llo wing a UNSecurity Co uncil reso lutio n o f July 9 co ndemning the incident, but with China and Russ ia blo cking the attempt to secure UNimprimatur fo r the charge that the DPRK was respo ns ible, a mammo th US-ROK jo int military exercise was anno unced, this timetargeting no t o nly the DPRK but the PRC as well: the anno uncement indicated that the exercise invo lving the nuclear po wer aircraftcarrier USS Geo rge Washingto n with a crew o f 6 ,250 and 300 planes including FA-18 fighter jets and E-2C Hawkeye Airbo rne EarlyWarning aircraft, wo uld take place o n bo th s ides o f the Ko rean peninsula, that is the Yello w Sea, as o riginally planned, as well as theJapan Sea (Ko reans refer to the Wes t and Eas t Sea). In the face o f repeated Chinese pro tes ts abo ut the exercise o n its bo rder,beyo nd its internatio nally reco gnized territo rial waters but in a regio n claimed by China, the US agreed to shift the initial phase o fthe o peratio n to the Japan Sea.

The Cheo nan Incident and the US-ROK respo nse illus trate the fact that the deep geo po litical divis io ns that can be traced to theimmediate po s twar glo bal co nflict remain fundamental to co ntempo rary po wer po litics : in this ins tance, the United States rallyingSo uth Ko rea, Japan and its allies who fo rmed the United Natio ns co alitio n in the US-Ko rean war o f 1950 to pressure no t o nly No rth

Ko rea but also China and Russ ia.53 In this sense, it may be premature to assume that the co nflicts s tirred by the po s twar US-So vietco nflict and making themselves felt mo s t po werfully in Eas t As ia have truly been laid to res t.

Co nclusio n

Eas t As ia has taken impo rtant s teps to o verco me the fragmentatio n asso ciated with several centuries o f po litical dis integratio n,war, co lo nial rule and the po s twar US-So viet divis io n to reassert its po s itio n as a majo r wo rld regio n with the po tential to rivalEuro pe. The co mbinatio n o f deepening intraregio nal eco no mic bo nds in the wo rld’s mo s t dynamic eco no mic zo ne, to gether withpreliminary regio n-wide effo rts to co nfro nt acute enviro nmental, territo rial and security is sues , sugges ts po ss ible futuresco mpatible with subs tantially reduced US- and US-Japan-do minated dynamics and mo mentum to ward expanded regio nalco o rdinatio n.

At the same time, fo llo wing in the fo o ts teps o f ASEAN, ties amo ng lo ng divided natio ns in China, Ko rea and Indo china, are farweaker and less ins titutio nalized than tho se o f the Euro pean Unio n. There is no Eas t As ian Unio n, no co mmo n currency, parliamento r high co urt. No r do we find a military equivalent o f the NATO alliance. Abo ve all, the United States remains the do minant militarypo wer in the regio n, a majo r presence bo ls tered by an extens ive netwo rk o f military bases and alliances with Japan, So uth Ko rea,and Taiwan, amo ng o thers , its po wer s till primarily directed agains t No rth Ko rea and China, in this sense a legacy o f po s twar

decades o f co nflict.54 All these may be bes t unders to o d as legacies o f the earlier co lo nial era that ushered in As ia’s lo ng-termdecline viewed in glo bal perspective.

Intra-As ian natio nal co nflicts are evident no t o nly in respo nse to US demands and unilateral actio ns , with respect to wars and the"war o n terro r" (a fo rmula fo r permanent warfare), but also in myriad co nflicts inherent in, o r exacerbated by, China’s rise as aregio nal po wer, unreso lved legacies o f divided natio ns (the two Ko reas and China/Taiwan) and o ther territo rial co nflicts ro o ted inWo rld War II. They are also ro o ted in his to rical is sues , mo s t famo us ly tho se that pit Japan agains t her neighbo rs o ver unreso lvedco nflicts fro m the epo ch o f co lo nialism and war, but also co nflicts invo lving China with the two Ko reas and o thers such as the clash

o ver his to rical heritage centered o n Ko guryo /Gao go uli.55

Of s ignal impo rtance are ques tio ns o f the sus tainability o f eco no mic gro wth patterns that have paved the way fo r the resurgence o fEas t As ia, but which, abo ve all in the case o f China, exact a ho rrendo us to ll o n the enviro nment, co nflicts amo ng neighbo ringnatio ns o ver water, energy, and emiss io ns which exacerbate inter-s tate co nflicts . Indeed, it may be said catego rically that theheadlo ng race fo r gro wth bes t exemplif ied in recent decades by China, is unsus tainable as indus trializatio n, urbanizatio n, mega-damand ro ad co ns tructio n, and auto mo bilizatio n in a so ciety marked by deep so cial inequality, all co llide with the enviro nment. Thecritical pro blems fo r next generatio n develo pment will require—abo ve all fo r China, and no t o nly China—large-scale greentechno lo gical breakthro ughs and a rethinking o f the co re equatio n between gro wth maximizatio n and the go o d life. With its o wndeep develo pmental pro blems , abo ve all the eno rmo us to ll o n land, water and air asso ciated with Chinese high-speed gro wth, and

internal divis io ns o f regio n, ethnicity and class ,56 China’s co ntinued dramatic rise is far fro m assured. In recent years , China hasembarked o n green develo pment pro grams that have made it a wo rld leader in such fields as wind po wer and so lar po wer. At thesame time, ho wever, its co nsumptio n o f co al and o il has so ared and, regardless o f the o utco me o f green energy pro grams, they willco ntinue to so ar in the decades to co me.

Do es the Pax Sinica o f the 18 th century o ffer ins ights into the po ss ibilities fo r regio nal harmo ny o r hegemo ny in a perio d o f peacein Eas t As ia in the new millennium? That earlier o rder was , o f co urse, o ne predicated o n a hierarchical mo del with China at the

center. At its height in the 18 th century, Eas t As ia enjo yed an era o f pro tracted peace and relative pro sperity fueled in part byexchange thro ugh tributary-trade bo nds and a favo rable po s itio n in wo rld trade netwo rks , as well as a hegemo nic po litics predicatedo n a relatively no nintrus ive appro ach to the peo ples o n Manchu China’s Eas t and So utheas t As ian peripheries . Bo th the subsequentJapan- and US-centered mo dels , fo r all their dynamism, pro ved incapable o f ending endemic war o r creating effective regio nal bo nds .Each prio ritized bilateral relatio ns with the do minant po wer and so ught witho ut success to assure its o wn military primacy andsecurity during epo chs o f permanent warfare. Their search fo r hegemo ny ins tead wro ught vas t ins tability and permanent warfare.

If the emergence o f wide-ranging and deep mutual eco no mic relatio ns acro ss Eas t As ia, pivo ting o n China, Japan and Ko rea andextending via the Chinese diaspo ra, pro vides fo undatio ns fo r a new regio nal o rder, China will surely be a majo r acto r within it.Ho wever, with Japan and the US as majo r po wers in the regio n, China canno t play a hegemo nic ro le any time so o n, certainly no neco mparable to that o f the eighteenth century. In co ntras t to realis t internatio nal relatio ns analys ts such as Jo hn Mearsheimer, whopro ject the emergence o f a hegemo nic China in Eas t As ia based o n assumptio ns abo ut China’s co ntinued eco no mic gro wth, a mo relikely pro spect fo r the co ming decades is a regio nal o rder in which China plays an impo rtant ro le, but the pace o f Chinese

develo pment s lo ws and no s ingle natio n reigns supreme.57 Immediate challenges bo th to natio nal develo pment trajecto ries and toregio nal acco rd will co me fro m eco no mic recess io n, geo po litical co nflicts o f which a divided Ko rea remains the mo s t dangero us ,American attempts to do minate whatever As ian regio nal o rder emerges , and his to rical memo ry co nflicts that co ntinue to divideChina, Japan and Ko rea.

The present co njuncture sugges ts o ne o ther impo rtant theme that differentiates the co ntempo rary era fro m that o f bo th the Pax

Sinica o f the 18 th century and the Pax Nippo nica o f the firs t half o f the 20 th century. In bo th o f the earlier epo chs , Eas t As ia was

embedded in the glo bal eco no my, yet the geo po litical reach o f its do minant po wers remained limited to Eas t As ia. In the newmillennium, China, Japan and Ko rea are all actively pro mo ting the glo bal reach o f their eco no mies , as exemplif ied by China’sengagement in Africa and the heavy s takes o f all three natio ns in the US and Euro pean eco no mies , while carefully assess inggeo po litical o ppo rtunities asso ciated with their gro wing eco no mic clo ut.

Richard Falk’s critique o f a predato ry neo liberal glo balism do minated by US po wer, intro duced at the beginning o f this paper, leadsto reflectio n o n whether o ther fo rms o f o rder are po ss ible in the new millennium. Our survey has sugges ted that, with the imminentdecline o f American po wer and the resurgence o f Eas t As ia, o ther fo rms o f regio nal and glo bal o rder beco me po ss ible . . . if they canlearn fro m the lesso ns o f US failures , and o verco me co nflicts internal to the regio n.

Mark Selden is a Senior Research Associate in the East Asia Program at Cornell University and a coordinator of the Asia-Pacific Journal. His recentbooks include China, Eas t As ia and the Glo bal Eco no my: Regio nal and his to rical perspectives (with Takeshi Hamashita and Linda Grove),The Resurgence o f Eas t As ia: 500 , 150 and 50 Year Perspectives (edited by Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita and Mark Selden), andWar and State Terro rism: The United States , Japan, and the As ia-Pacific in the Lo ng Twentieth Century (with Alvin So). His homepage iswww.markselden.info/

Recommended citation: Mark Selden, "Nation, Region and the Global in East Asia: Conflict and Cooperation," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 41-1-10,October 11, 2010.

No t es

* An earlier vers io n o f this article was presented at Sympo s ium: Fro m Area Studies to Trans regio nal Studies? Co nto urs o fGlo balizatio n in As ia’s Re-integratio n, Univers ity o f Io wa May 6-7, 2010 . I am grateful to the participants in that co nference,particularly its o rganizer So nia Ryang, Prasenjit Duara and Gavan McCo rmack, fo r s timulating my thinking o n the is sues . This paperhas also benefited fro m co mments by Uradyn Bulag, Heo nik Kwo n, Taggart Murphy and Bin Wo ng.

1 This appro ach rejects the no tio n that glo bal pro cesses are so mething new under the sun. Rather it seeks to set o ff earlier glo balpro cesses , so me o f which are described belo w, in co ntras t to co ntempo rary manifes tatio ns o f bo th regio nal and glo bal pro cesses .

2 Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization: A Critique (Lo ndo n: Po lity Press , 1999) p. 2.

3 Fo r dis cuss io n o f co ncepts o f regio n, see Shintaro Hamanaka, Asian Regionalism and Japan. The po litics o f membership in regio naldiplo matic, f inancial and trade gro ups , (Lo ndo n: Ro utledge, 2009), espec. pp. 3-5.

4 Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: divided territories in the San Francisco system (Lo ndo n: Ro utledge, 2007).

5 Quintessential wo rks in this literature are David Landes , The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development in

Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press , 1969) (2nd editio n, 2003); W. W. Ro s to w, TheStages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge; Cambridge Univers ity Press , 1962).

6 China was the geo po litical center o f Eas t As ia in the 18 th century, but, as during the Mo ngo l dynas ty earlier, it was ruled by as teppe peo ple, the Manchus , who in turn drew heavily o n Mo ngo l military and adminis trative s trengths , thereby lending a dis tinctivemulti-ethnic and co smo po litan character to the Qing empire and its dealings with peo ples o n its bo rders , no tably the Mo ngo ls ,Tibetans and Uyghurs o f Central As ia, as well as the peo ples o f So utheas t As ia as well.

7 Takeshi Hamashita, edited by Mark Selden and Linda Gro ve, China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and historical perspectives(Lo ndo n: Ro utledge, 2008); Gio vanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita and Mark Selden, eds ., The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50year perspectives, Lo ndo n: Ro utledge, 2003; R. Bin Wo ng, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience,Ithaca: Co rnell Univers ity Press , 1997; Kenneth Po meranz , The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern WorldEconomy, Princeto n: Princeto n Univers ity Press , 2000; Andre Gunder Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age, Berkeley:Univers ity o f Califo rnia Press , 1998; Gary Hamilto n, Commerce and Capitalism in Chinese Societies, Lo ndo n: Ro utledge, 2006; HidetakaYo shimats u, The Political Economy of Regionalism in East Asia. Integrative Explanatio ns fo r Dynamics and Challenges , Bas ings to ke:Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Mark Beeso n, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development,Bas ings to ke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Francesca Bray, The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies, New Yo rk:Oxfo rd Univers ity Press , 1985; No la Co o ke and Li Tana, eds ., Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region,1750-1880, Lanham MD, Ro wman and Littlefield, 2004; Antho ny Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680 (2 vo ls ), NewHaven: Yale Univers ity Press , 1988 and 1993. The is sues have been sharply debated by his to rians and eco no mis ts in sympo s ia inThe Journal of Asian Studies, American Historical Review, and Modern China amo ng o thers . They have also been examined by a range o fJapanese and Chinese scho lars . See especially Sugihara Kao ru’s edited co llectio n o n the links between Japanese develo pment,intra-As ian trade, and the As ian eco no mies , Japan, China and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949, Oxfo rd: Oxfo rdUnivers ity Press , 2005, Linda Gro ve and Chris tian Daniel, eds . State and Society in China: Japanese Perspectives on Ming-Qing Social andEconomic History (To kyo : Univers ity o f To kyo Press , 1984); and Wang Hui, The Po litics o f Imagining As ia: Empires , Natio ns , Regio naland Glo bal Orders , Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 8 ,1, 2007, pp. 1-34.

8 Our fo cus in this article is o n Eas t As ia. China’s tributary trade o rder extended, o f co urse, beyo nd Eas t As ia, no tably to Inner As ia,invo lving fo r example the Mo ngo ls , Tibetans and Manchus , and beyo nd to So utheas t As ia, particularly the Vietnamese.

9 Antho ny Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680 vo l.2, p. 33.

10 Chapter 4: “Silver in Regio nal Eco no mies and the Wo rld Eco no my: Eas t As ia in the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries .”Trans latio n by J.P. McDermo tt. China, East Asia and the Global Economy. Cf. Andre Gunder Frank, ReORIENT, especially pp. 131-64;Kenneth Po meranz , The Great Divergence, espec. pp. 159-62, 267-74.

11 See fo r example Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, Princeto n: Princeto n Univers ity Press , 2001 2nd .ed);

Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy, 3rd Ed. Tho usand Oaks , Califo rnia: Pine Fo rge, 2006 .

12 This is no t to sugges t the absence o f armed co nflict in As ia. China achieved the peak o f territo rial expans io n during the 18 th

century, extending the reach o f empire no rth and wes t into Inner As ia including inco rpo ratio n o f Tibet, Mo ngo lia and Xinjiang, andChina’s info rmal reach extended into So utheas t As ia as well. Mo s t o f China so uth o f the Great Wall, ho wever, and particularlyco as tal China, by co ntras t, enjo yed pro tracted peace. As did large areas o f Eas t As ia.

13 Alain Gresh, “Fro m Thermo pylae to the Twin To wers : The Wes t’s Selective Reading o f His to ry,” Le Monde Diplomatique, January2009.

14 S. Sugiyama and Linda Gro ve, eds ., Commercial Networks in Modern Asia, Richmo nd Surrey: Curzo n, 2001, especially chapters byHamashita Takeshi, Furuta Kazuko , Linda Gro ve; A.J.H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu, eds ., Intra-Asian Trade and the World Market,Lo ndo n: Ro utledge, 2006; K N Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750,Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press , 1990 .

15 “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for our Times”. Presented at the Iowa Symposium, April 6-7, 2010.

16 “Anne Booth,” D id It Really Help to be a Japanese Co lo ny? Eas t As ian Eco no mic Perfo rmance in His to rical Perspective,” The Asia-Pacific Journal.

17 Angus Maddiso n, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Paris : OECD Develo pment Centre, 2003, cited in Bo o th, Table 3.

18 Samuel Ho , "Co lo nialism and Develo pment: Ko rea, Taiwan, and Kwantung" in Ramo n H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds ., TheJapanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, Princeto n: Princeto n Univers ity Press , 1984, p.382; Chih-ming Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan.Land Tenure, Development and Dependency, Bo ulder: Wes tview, 1995; Harry J. Lamley, “Waitwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945. TheVicis s itudes o f Co lo nialism,” in Marray A. Rubins tein, ed., Taiwan: A New History, Armo nk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999 .

19 Bo o th, “Did It Really Help to be a Japanese Co lo ny,” Table 11. Bo o th sho ws that the pattern o f metro po litan do minatio n o f thetrade o f the co lo nies was no t universal. While the mo del well f it the Philippines (United States ), in the late 1930s , trade dependenceo n the metro po lis was less than twenty percent in the case Malaya (Britain) and Indo nes ia (Ho lland).

20 Hui-yu Caro line Ts ’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building. An institutional approach to colonial engineering, Lo ndo n, Ro utledge, 2009 .

21 Sven Saaler and J. Victo r Ko schmann, eds ., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. Colonialism, regionalism and borders, Lo ndo n,Ro utledge, 2008).

22 I am indebted to Heo nik Kwo n fo r clarifying the centrality o f the co lo nial experience fo r unders tanding all wars o f the po s t- Wo rldWar II epo ch.

23 As ia Redux, p. 11.

24 Edward Friedman, Paul G. Picko wicz and Mark Selden, Revolution, Resistance and Reform in Village China, New Haven, Yale Univers ityPress , 2005.

25 CIA—Wo rld Factbo o k. In per capita terms , Japan ranked 42nd ($32,600), So uth Ko rea 49 th ($28 ,000), and China 128 th ($6 ,600)

with Ho ng Ko ng 15th ($42,700) and Taiwan 47 th (29 ,800) (link). IMF calculatio ns fo r no minal GDP fo r 2008 placed Japan seco nd,

China third and So uth Ko rea 15th. ( link)

26 Yu Zho u, The Inside Story of China’s High-Tech Industry. Making Silicon Valley in Beijing, Lanham, Ro wman & Littlefield, 2008 .

27 Michael Ro berge and Yo ukyung Lee, “China-Taiwan Relatio ns ,” Co uncil o n Fo reign Relatio ns , 2009 .

28 Yu-huay Sun and Eugene Tang, Taiwan, China Start Direct Links as Relatio ns Impro ve, Blo o mberg December 15, 2008 .

29 Daniel H. Ro sen and Zhi Wang, “Deepening China-Taiwan Relatio ns Thro ugh the Eco no mic Co o peratio n Framewo rk Agreement,”Po licy Brief 10-16 , Peterso n Ins titute fo r Internaito nal Eco no mics , June 2010 www.iie.co m/publicatio ns /pb/pb10-16 .pdf. Ro sen andWang mo del the s ignificant gains that Taiwan’s eco no my is pro jected to make as a result o f the agreement, and the necess ity fo rTaiwan to act in light o f the 2010 China-ASEAN agreement earlier in the year, with mo re mo des t eco no mic gains anticipated fo rChina.

30 To be sure, pro gress to ward rappro chement has s lo wed under So uth Ko rean Pres . Lee Myung-bak.

31 There is a further recycling via Japan’s multi-billio n do llar subs idy (the so -called sympathy payments ) to pay fo r an es timatedseventy percent o f the vas t US military co mpo nent in Japan, and especially Okinawa, and further billio ns to suppo rt the pro jected

shift o f mo s t o r all o f the US Marine co mpo nent fro m Okinawa to Guam. See Gavan McCo rmack, Ampo ’s Tro ubled 50 th: Hato yama’sAbo rtive Rebellio n, Okinawa’s Mo unting Res is tance and the US-Japan Relatio nship,” three part article, The Asia-Pacific Journal, May 31,2010.

32 US Treasury Department.

33 Mark Landler, “Do llar Shift: Chinese Po ckets Filled as Americans ’ Emptied,” The New Yo rk Times , December 25, 2008; R. TaggartMurphy, As ia and the Meltdo wn o f American Finance; Ko suke Takahashi and R. Taggart Murphy , The US and the Temptatio n o f Do llarSeigno rage; James Fallo ws , “Be Nice to the Co untries That Lend Yo u Mo ney,” Atlantic Monthly, December 2008.

34 This is no t to sugges t that rapid eco no mic gro wth can o nly o ccur in a peaceful milieu. Japan’s po s t-WWII reco very and eco no micgro wth was in part a pro duct o f an indus trializatio n fo s tered by the US as a means to suppo rt the Ko rean and Vietnam wars .Likewise the po s twar US eco no mic bo o m fro m 1945-1968 o ccurred in the mids t o f, and was fueled by, war and preparatio n fo r war.Bo th US and Japanese gains were bo ught at the price o f devas tatio n o f Ko rea and Indo china. Stated differently, the US co uld enjo ythe lo ng “peace” o f the po s twar decades at ho me while its wars abro ad in the po s t-co lo nial periphery o f As ia were experienced asthe extens io n o f war and o ccupatio n that were the hallmarks o f the co lo nial era. Heo nik Kwo n as tutely assesses this bifurcatio n in abo o k in pro gress .

35 Fo r recent dis cuss io n o f the Ko ndratieff mo ment, see Immanuel Wallers tein interviewed by Jae-Jung Suh, Capitalism’s Demise?The Asia-Pacific Journal; and, especially Ro bert Brenner interviewed by Jeo ng Seo ng-jin, Overpro ductio n no t Financial Co llapse is theHeart o f the Cris is : the US, Eas t As ia, and the Wo rld, The Asia-Pacific Journal; and R. Taggart Murphy, In the Eye o f the Sto rm: Updatingthe Eco no mics o f Glo bal Turbulence, an Intro ductio n to Ro bert Brenner's Update, The Asia-Pacific Journal.

36 Do uglas H. Bro o ks and Changchun Hua, “As ian Trade and Glo bal Linkages ,” ADB Institute Working Paper No. 122, December, 2008 ,“Intra-regio nal Trade o f Majo r Regio ns (1988-2007), Fig. 6 , p. 10 .

37 Wo rld Trade Organizatio n , International Trade Statistics 2009. Trade by Regio n. Table 1.6 . See also Prema-chandra Athuko rala,ed. “The Rise o f As ia. Trade and inves tment in Glo bal Perspective,” espec. Athuko rala and Hal Hill, “As ian trade and inves tment.Patterns and trends ,” pp. 11-57.

38 Athuko rala and Hill pro vide further data and dis cuss io n o f fo reign inves tment in China in regio nal and glo bal perspective fo r theyears 1984-2007, as well as secto ral data, pp. 37-52.

39 Other ins tances that merit co mparative analys is are the Geneva Co nference o n Indo china o f 1955 and the Afro -As ian Co nferenceat Bandung in the same year, bo th heralding the impo rtance o f newly emerging natio ns in a po s t-co lo nial wo rld.

40 See Xinjun Zhang, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’, ‘Harmo nio us ’ Fo reign Relatio ns , and Legal Co nfro ntatio n and Lesso ns Fro m the Sino -Japanese Dispute Over the Eas t China Sea,” Fo reign Po licy Research Ins titute, April 16 , 2010; Suisheng Zhao , “China's Glo balSearch fo r Energy Security: co o peratio n and co mpetitio n in the As ia-Pacific,” Journal of Contemporary China, is sue 55, 2008 , pp. 207-27; Michael Richardso n, A So uthward Thrus t fo r China’s Energy Diplo macy in the So uth China Sea, The Asia-Pacific Journal, and DavidRo senberg, Managing the Reso urces o f the China Seas: China's Bilateral Fisheries Agreements with Japan, So uth Ko rea, andVietnam, The Asia-Pacific Journal.

41 Gavan McCo rmack, Client State: Japan in America’s Embrace, Lo ndo n: Ro utledge, 2007; Gavan McCo rmack, Ampo ’s Tro ubled 50 th:Hato yama’s Abo rtive Rebellio n, Okinawa’s Mo unting Res is tance and the US-Japan Relatio nship, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 22-3-10 , May31, 2010; Kensei Yo shida, Okinawa and Guam: In the Shado w o f U.S. and Japanese “Glo bal Defense Po s ture,” The Asia-Pacific Journal,26-2-10 , June 28 , 2010 .

42 The co mbinatio n o f Japan’s military po wer and the aspiratio ns o f neo -natio nalis t po liticians sugges ts o ther po ss ible o utco mes .The MSDF presence in the Indian Ocean s ince 2003 tasked with refueling US and allied ships in the Afghan War, means that Japan’snavy has taken up po s itio ns critical to guaranteeing its o il supplies fro m the Middle Eas t. Similarly, plans are under review fo r anactive military ro le in respo nse to So mali hijacking o f Japanese ships . See Michael Penn, “So mali Pirates and Po litical Winds DriveJapan to the Gate o f Tears o ff So malia,” The As ia-Pacific Jo urnal, Vo l. 4-2-09 , January 20 , 2009 .

43 "An Eas t As ian Co mmunity and Japan-China Relatio ns ", JISS Co mmentary 89 , 2010 .

44 Mark Beeso n, “Eas t As ian Regio nalism and the As ia-Pacific: After American Hegemo ny,” The Asia-Pacific Journal.

45 Xetrade, “Japan, So uth Ko rea, China: trilateral ties , tens io ns ”; Brad Setser, This Do esn't Lo o k Go o d: Taiwan, Ko rea and ChinaExpo rts Tank, The Asia-Pacific Journal.

46 Jo el Rathaus , “China-Japan-Ko rea trilateral co o peratio n and the Eas t As ian Co mmunity, Eas t As ia Fo rum, June 15, 2010 . The firs tro und o f research was co mpleted in 2010 with plans to co mplete the s tudy by 2012.

47 William Underwo o d, “Redress Cro ss ro ads in Japan: Decis ive Phase in Campaigns to Co mpensate Ko rean and Chinese WartimeFo rced Labo rers ,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 30-1-10 , July 26 , 2010; Ivy Lee, “To ward Reco nciliatio n: The Nishimatsu Settlements fo rChinese Fo rced Labo r in Wo rld War Two ,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Augus t 9 , 2010; but see also the alternative perspective advanced byKang Jian, “Rejected by All Plaintiffs : Failure o f the Nishimatsu-Shinano gawa "Settlement" with Chinese Fo rced Labo rers in WartimeJapan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Augus t 9 , 2010 .

48 David Shambaugh, “China Engages As ia: Reshaping the Regio nal Order,” International Security 29 .3 (2004), pp. 64-99 .

49 Peter J. Katzens tein, “Japan in the American Imperium: Rethinking Security,” The Asia-Pacific Journal; Richard Tanter , The MaritimeSelf-Defence Fo rce Miss io n in the Indian Ocean: Afghanis tan, NATO and Japan’s Po litical Impasse, The Asia-Pacific Journal; Mel Gurto v,Reco nciling Japan and China, The Asia-Pacific Journal; Gavan McCo rmack, "Co nservatism" and "Natio nalism". The Japan Puzz le, TheAsia-Pacific Journal.

50 So uth Ko rean navy pursues hijacked o il tanker, BBC News , April 5, 2010; Harth Pant, “China’s Naval Expans io n in the Indian Oceanand India-China Rivalry” The Asia-Pacific Journal May 3, 2010 .

51 Dana Pries t and William Arkin, three part series in The Washington Post, July 19 , 20 , 21, 2010 beginning with “A Hidden Wo rldGro wing Beyo nd Co ntro l.” Privatizatio n has pro ceeded rapidly s ince at leas t the Geo rge W. Bush adminis tratio n. What is s triking isthat this has no w penetrated the co nscio usness o f the es tablishment as illus trated by the Washington Post series and an ho ur lo ngPBS Fro ntline pro gram o n To p Secret America to s creen in Octo ber. The Washington Post has es tablished a special ho mepage anddata base o n the mo re than 45 go vernment o rganizatio ns and 1931 co mpanies to track the s to ry, Cf. Tim Sho rro ck, Spies fo r Hire:The Secret Wo rld o f Intelligence Outso urcing (New Yo rk: Simo n and Schus ter, 2008).

52 Beeso n, Eas t As ian Regio nalism and the As ia-Pacific: After American Hegemo ny.

53 Jo hn McGlynn, Po litics in Co mmand: The "Internatio nal" Inves tigatio n into the Sinking o f the Cheo nan and the Risk o f a NewKo rean War,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, June 14, 2010; Seunghun Lee, J.J.Suh, “Rush to Judgment; Inco ns is tencies in So uth Ko rea’sCheo nan Repo rt,” The Asia-Pacific Journal July 10 , 2010; Rick Ro zo ff, “U.S Risks Military Clash With China In Yello w Sea,” GlobalResearch, July 16 , 2010 .

54 Peter J. Katzens tein, A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium (Ithaca: Co rnell Univers ity Press , 2005).

55 Yo nso n Ahn, The Co ntes ted Heritage o f Ko guryo /Gao go uli and China-Ko rea Co nflict, The As ia-Pacific Jo urnal,http://japanfo cus .o rg/-Yo nso n-Ahn/2631

56 On the enviro nmental o bs tacles to China’s co ntinued rise, see Paul Harris , Confronting Environmental Change in East and SoutheastAsia: Eco-politics, Foreign Policy, and Sustainable Development (UN Univers ity Press , 2005).

57 Jo hn Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f Great Po wer Po litics (New Yo rk: No rto n, 2001), p. 402. This is Mearsheimer’s assumptio nabo ut a China that succeeds in extending its develo pmental drive to beco me a wealthy natio n. See Mark Beeso n’s dis cuss io n o f

hegemo ny in po s twar Eas t As ia, “Hegemo nic trans itio n in Eas t As ia? The dynamics o f Chinese and American po wer,” Review ofInternational Studies (2009), 35, pp. 95–112.

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