Case studies on conflict and cooperation in local water governance Report No. 11 The case of the Kumalesha Borehole Namwala, Zambia Mikkel Funder, Carol Emma Mweemba

2010

Mikkel Funder Senior Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark Carol Emma Mweemba Research Associate, Integrated Water Resources Management Center, University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia

List of all Case Study Reports -in the Competing for Water Programme Tiraque, Bolivia Report No. 1: The case of the Tiraque highland irrigation conflict Report No. 2: The case of the Koari channel Douentza District, Mali Report No. 3: The case of Lake Agofou Report No. 4: The case of the Yaïre floodplain Report No. 5: The case of the Hombori water supply projects Condega District, Nicaragua Report No. 6: The case of “Las Brumas” community Report No. 7: The case of “San Isidro” community Report No. 8: The case of “Los Claveles” community Con Cuong District, Vietnam Report No. 9: The case of the Tong Chai lead mine Report No. 10: The case of the Yen Khe piped water system Namwala District, Zambia Report No. 11: The case of the Kumalesha Borehole Report No. 12: The case of the Mbeza irrigation scheme Report No. 13: The case of the Iliza Borehole For other publications and journal articles, see www.diis.dk/water

Table of contents 1. Introduction............................................................................................................ 5 2. Methodology........................................................................................................... 5

2.1 Definitions......................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Case selection and supporting data ................................................................. 6 2.3 Studying local water governance ..................................................................... 7

3. Context ................................................................................................................... 7 4. Narrative description of the case ........................................................................... 9 5. Roles of selected actors.........................................................................................14

5.1 Key actors and interests ..................................................................................14 5.2 Mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion ..........................................................14 5.3 Role of women and the poorest .......................................................................15

6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................18 References .................................................................................................................19 Annex 1: Overall Timeline........................................................................................21 Annex 2: Overall Actor Matrix ................................................................................22 Annex 3: Expanded Timeline for the poor and women...........................................24 Annex 4: Expanded matrix for the poor and women ..............................................26

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1. Introduction This paper describes a case of local water conflict and cooperation in Namwala District in Zambia and is one of several similar papers developed within the Competing for Water research programme. The papers were initially prepared as part of the internal documentation for the research programme, but have been made publically available on the internet as illustrated examples of local water cooperation and conflict. The paper is focussed on an empirical description of the roles of different actors within the case. For more in-depth analysis reference is made to the various papers and articles prepared (or in preparation) by partners in the Competing for Water research programme. 2. Methodology The case discussed in this paper was selected for in-depth study from an inventory of local water conflict and cooperation conducted in five rural districts in Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua, Vietnam and Zambia under the three-year Competing for Water research programme. The inventory included detailed information on water competition situations and associated events (Ravnborg et al, 2008; Mweemba et al, 2010). 2.1 Definitions Competition for water is a social situation in which two or more parties have competing interests in the same water resource. Competition for water takes place within particular competitive situations, which are understood here as social situations where two or more parties have competing interests in the same water resource. The actual social process of competition takes place through specific conflictive or cooperative events. A conflict or cooperation event is an action (or set of actions) that seek to secure a party’s water access by either challenging the access of other parties, or by collaborating with other parties to secure shared water access. Finally, water conflict and cooperation take place within a particular national and local context, including the physical and hydrological regime, the socio-economic, cultural and political setting etc. The nested relationship between context, situation and event is illustrated in the figure below. For a more detailed description of these definitions see Ravnborg et al (2008).

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The nested relationship between context, water situation and water event 2.2 Case selection and supporting data In the Zambian inventory a total of 58 situations encompassing 183 conflictive and cooperative events were identified for Namwala District (see Mweemba et al, 2010). The case examined here constitutes one of these situations, selected for in-depth study together with two other cases described in separate papers. Selection of cases was based on the criterion that they provided a particularly rich insight into the issues we wished to explore, i.e. that they were of a certain duration and that they allowed us to explore the actions of the poorest in some detail (for a discussion of such rich or ‘dense’ cases, see Flyvbjerg, 2006). The case studies were supported by baseline information on livelihoods, water access and water ownership provided by a separate questionnaire survey of 200 households in the area. The survey allowed for stratification of results, using a well-being index developed as part of the programme (see Ravnborg et al, 1999 for the methodology applied). Additional supporting information came from the inventory and other information gathered during the fieldwork carried out under the research programme.

Situation B Event C1

Event C2

Event C3

Etc…

Situation C

Event

Event

Event

Etc…

Event D1

Etc…

Event A1

Event

Event

Event

Etc…

Situation E Context

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2.3 Studying local water governance Like all social situations, water competition is not static but evolves over short or long periods of time. This implies a perspective that recognizes water competition as a dynamic social process in which conflictive and cooperative events take place in succession of each other, or simultaneously (Zeitoun & Mirumachi 2008, Ravnborg et al 2008). The development of each case was therefore traced over time, charting the actions and interactions of the various actors involved. This was done using stratified semi-structured interviewing and techniques such as timelines to aid memory. The actions traced included physical actions, speech-actions as well as “non-actions” (e.g. deliberate withdrawal as an act in itself), with due regard to agency that might divert from the narratives imposed by other actors (or ourselves) on the conflict and cooperation events. In order to explore the role of users who are known to be frequently marginalized in water access, the case studies also examined the role of the poorest and women. Attention was paid to the particular risk of missing out on the “invisible” actions and non-actions of these actors, and interviews were thus kept relatively open and free of the particular timelines established by the researchers or other actors. A balanced approach was sought which on the one hand departed from notions of the poor as passive victims, while on the other hand recognizing the structural limitations they face (de Haahn & Zoomers 2005; Franks & Cleaver 2007, Nygren 2009). In order to structure the analysis, information obtained from the interviews was subsequently condensed and sorted into matrices. This included:

(i) Overall timeline matrices on the major events of the situations studied; (ii) Overall actor matrices providing details on the major actors and their

interests, actions and assets in the situations studied; (iii) Expanded timelines charting the actions of the poorest and women

specifically; and (iv) Specific actor matrices for the poorest households and women specifically,

charting their particular actions, assets, outcomes etc. Some of the resulting matrices have been annexed. 3. Context The case discussed in this document takes place in Southern Province of Zambia, in Muchila Chiefdom in Namwala District. The district covers an estimated total area of about 10,000 square kilometres, of which about a quarter is covered by the plains of the Kafue River that marks the northern border of the district. Namwala is among the poorest districts in Zambia, and although infrastructure in the area is now gradually developing, many parts of the district remain relatively remote with high poverty rates.

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Muchila Chiefdom covers the Southwestern part of Namwala district, and has historically been the most sparsely populated part of the district. The area suffers from a particularly poor infrastructure and has to some extent been marginalized in the economic development of the district. Its relatively low population numbers and lack of water and other resources has meant that neither the local Chief nor Local Government representatives (Councillors) have had much clout in district politics. Traditionally the population here has consisted of Ila pastoralists, who like other Ila communities in the district migrate their cattle to the Kafue Flats during the dry season. However, the area also has a substantial and increasing population of Tonga crop farmers, who cultivate maize, cotton and vegetables as cash crops for sale locally or to markets in neighboring districts. Indeed, the availability of vacant land and alledgedly better soils and rainfall has set off a substantial in-migration of Tonga farmers, who move to Muchila from other Districts where rainfall has declined markedly in recent years (especially Monze and Choma). This pattern is ongoing and evolving, with the children of immigrants moving further West into the chiefdom and beyond. These developments mean that Muchila has a greater emphasis on crop production than the other Chiefdoms of Namwala, where cattle dominates heavily. The in-migration is condoned by the Chief of the area, for whom it serves as a boost to the number of subjects under his authority, and a means of claiming additional territory. That said, wealthy Ila pastoralists (including the Chief himself) continue to have a highly influential role in Muchila politics, and cattle remains a high priority and/or ambition for many households. Muchila has very few natural streams (virtually none in the dry season), and only a small number of the so-called dambos (small shallow wetland areas) that are otherwise an important water source in rural Zambia. Water infrastructure in the area is sparse and does not match that of other Chiefdoms in the district. Traditionally, shallow wells were used (eg dug near dambos), later on supplemented by deeper “protected” wells and in recent decades by boreholes. The latter are however quite scarce – the Chiefdom currently has only seven publically accessible boreholes. Of these, five are currently broken down. Apart from this, some wealthy households own wells, or in a few cases even a borehole (eg the Chief and the Councillor have their own boreholes). A Danida-funded water supply programme plans to refurbish the existing boreholes and provide new boreholes on a demand-driven basis, with some 18 boreholes currently planned. Productive water uses in Muchila center on livestock and subsistence- and cash crops. The latter includes actual fields of maize, as well as cotton and other cash crops, and so-called “gardens” of vegetables which provide important sources of nutrition and cash incomes for women. Livestock is watered from dambos but increasingly also boreholes during the rainy season. During the dry season, the bulk of cattle is migrated to the Kafue Flats, but some cattle is retained in Muchila for use in ploughing, pulling oxcarts or “ox-sledges” and for milk. While fields are purely rainfed, vegetable gardens are maintained during the dry season through daily watering (by hand) from wells and boreholes. Domestic water is drawn from either shallow wells, “protected” wells or boreholes.

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Historically, ground water access in the area has been considered a basic right for all – meaning that in principle noone could be denied their basic access right to a natural source of water. Dambos were and are therefore free to use for all, although some forms of ad hoc regulation clearly takes place: For instance, informants mentioned how improper use of dambos and shallow wells (eg dirtying water unduly) would be immediately commented on by other users. The basic right to access water is also evident in the principle that even privately owned wells should be made accessible to other households in times of drought or other acute need. This latter water sharing principle, which has also been documented elsewhere in Southern Africa, is still maintained as a principle in some communities. While there have historically been no dedicated explicit organization or jurisdiction around water access, conflicts and grievances would normally be taken to the Headman or (once established during the colonial era) eventually the Chief. The notion of a basic water access right for all does however need to be qualified as follows: Firstly, the point that “some people are more equal are others” seems to apply to the everyday water access in both historical and current terms. For instance, informants mentioned how an unspoken rule existed and continue to exist that cattle should have priority over domestic uses at dambos, meaning eg that women should wait till cattle watering was done. Secondly, the notion of sharing water from private wells has recently been partially compromised by a tendency to demand payment for use of private boreholes in Muchila. Lastly, the development of borehole committees and associated regulations for use of boreholes has introduced a new paradigm of water governance and regulation which explicitly or implicitly requires certain assets and resources that some households may not have (see below). The in-migration and resulting growth in water user numbers has increased the pressure on local water points in Muchila. This has led some wells to dry up either permanently or during certain times of day, when users then have to wait for water to re-emerge in the wells. Boreholes are furthermore subject to extensive continuous use, leading to increased wear and tear and contributing to breakdowns. Increasing water demands from some existing households in the area have contributed further to this situation – including a growing tendency to use boreholes for watering cattle, and a scaling-up of water use for vegetable gardens by some households. The multiple uses and increased pressure on the limited water resources has led to increasing tension over siting of and access to boreholes. Muchila is not alone in this experience, which is echoed in a number of locations across the District where boreholes have been developed. However, the situation in Muchila is perhaps particularly severe as a result of the especially poor water infrastructure of this area. 4. Narrative description of the case Where to put a borehole? In the late 1990s and early 2000s, seven boreholes were established in Muchila with funding from various sources including the District administration, the Social Investment Funds and a Christian NGO. This included the Kumalesha borehole, which would serve 5 subvillages in the area.

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Prior to drilling the borehole, a community meeting was called by the responsible District officer in order to discuss the location of the borehole. At this meeting arguments broke out between members of the different village subsections over the siting of the borehole, claiming that their section was the most needy, practical and/or hydrologically sensible location for the borehole. This disagreement was not solved at the meeting, and during the coming weeks Headmen and wealthy cattle owners sought to influence the matter by individually looking up authorities to argue their case on behalf of their subsections of the community. This included district agricultural and health officers and the Chief. When drillers came to conduct a technical survey of possible sites, these were informally approached by some of the proponents and led by hand to particular sites and recommended to survey these. In order to avoid the matter becoming overly politicized, the responsible district officer called in a staff member from the local clinic who was regarded as neutral and could act as mediator. He led a community meeting at which he proposed that the borehole was located centrally in the village near the road. Although disagreement was expressed by some participants at the meeting, a number of community members (including wealthy cattle owners living near the borehole) argued that this location was indeed the most neutral. The participating Headmen eventually expressed their consent, and because of their authority as heads of the village subsections, this was considered an agreement made. Getting organized Shortly afterwards construction of the borehole began, and a Borehole Committee was established at the suggestion of the involved district officer. The task of the committee was to be responsible for borehole governance and management, including maintenance. The committee included 12 members, representing the different subvillages according to number of households. Members were elected at a public meeting, with a resulting gender ratio of 4 women and 8 men. The committee was dominated by wealthy cattle owners who lived in the original central area of the community, close to the road etc – ie exactly where the borehole had been located. For instance, the chairman and vice-chairman were brothers and wealthy cattle farmers with compounds near the borehole. They were elected directly by the participating community members, but while households from all subvillages took part in the voting, there was a higher turnout from those living near the borehole (who had not heard, lived more scattered, had further to go). The committee set about establishing rules for use and maintenance of the borehole. This included a payment scheme whereby users would contribute an annual “affiliation fee” of ZK 15.000, to be collected annually. Households not paying the affiliation fee would not be allowed access. An exemption was made from households known to be “vulnerable”, who instead of cash money would contribute through eg labour (cleaning around the borehole)1. Additional fees for repairs and spares were to be collected on an

1 No hard data or measure was used to define “Vulnerable” households – this would be based on the fee collector’s judgment and knowledge of community members, or arguments made by the Household in question as to why they should be exempted. In most cases it was interpreted as women-headed households with no cattle (a traditional measure of poverty in the area), or households who had in other ways been hit by deaths or disasters with catastrophic effects for

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ad hoc basis as needs arose, with fees divided equally among all affiliated households. Rules for borehole maintenance were also developed (mainly on cleanliness), with associated fines if these were broken. Livestock vs gardens and domestic use In the first dry season after construction of the borehole, a conflict gradually developed between men who came to water cattle, and women collecting water for domestic purposes and gardening. The former group felt that cattle had primacy of access to the borehole: For them, cattle constituted the central “bank” for their households and provided crucial draught power. It was furthermore seen as a key element in defining the household’s ethnicity as Ila and/or it’s social status as having done well (or at least reasonably well) for itself. As such cattle formed the center of the household’s long-term survival and prosperity in both economic and cultural terms. In practice, men and their sons would take groups of non-migrated cattle to the borehole, sometimes taking several hours at the time, and often followed immediately by the next household’s cattle. In so doing, women would be asked to wait or go elsewhere. For the women, this meant they were restrained in accessing an important water point that did not dry out as many wells did. In order to obtain water for drinking and other domestic uses, they would therefore have to wait extensive periods of time (sometimes a full day), or spend valuable time going elsewhere. Moreover, they would in some cases be unable to water their gardens for several days with potentially disastrous results for the crops. This in turn restrained the women’s ability to provide the important supplementary diet drawn from the gardens (and for which they are considered responsible by their husbands). They also felt it limited their opportunity for earning cash-incomes from small-scale vegetable sales, an otherwise important source of income over which they had control within the household. Women from the middle and wealthy strata typically came from cattle-owning households themselves, and some even “owned” a small number of their household’s cattle, as part of the social security system for women in case of the husband’s death or divorce. The poorest households in the area typically did not own cattle, although some were involved in the cattle-economy in the role as “stewards” of cattle for wealthier households. The issue for the women was therefore not to actually stop cattle’s access to the borehole, but rather to ensure equal access to water for cattle, gardening and domestic uses. Defining new rules In order to achieve more equal access between the different uses, the women spoke to their husbands, while some also engaged in open arguments at the borehole, claiming their turn and arguing that everyone in the community had a right to access the borehole. These measures had no effect, however, and following discussions between women at the borehole, a group of better-off women made a formal complaint to the borehole committee. They did so by looking up the female members of the committee, who brought up the issue during a committee meeting. the household in question. In other words, the emphasis was on poverty caused by factors beyond individual control (as opposed to eg laziness, which was typically frowned upon).

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On this basis, the borehole committee called a general community assembly, and upon the suggestion of the women proposed that a timetable was developed for the different uses of water from the borehole. Such a timetable had been dictated by the Chief and taken into use at an adjoining borehole following a similar conflict. The timetable stipulated that the borehole was reserved for collection of water for domestic use and gardening from early morning to 11 am, for cattle from 11am to 2pm, and for gardening and domestic use again from 2pm and the rest of the day, while the intervening hours were allocated to watering for cattle. Specific rules regarding how the cattle and gardens should be watered (in basins or a trough away from the borehole) were also developed to expedite the process. At the same time, a rotational system is developed between those women who have gardens close to the borehole, to avoid excessive individual use or potential conflicts. Most women in the village were satisfied with this solution and several said so at the meeting. No vote was held over the new rules, since the borehole committee was considered the decision-making body regarding the borehole. No sanctions were stipulated for breaking the rules. Violation and response In the months immediately following the establishment of the new rules, they were well honored by both sides. However, after a while some men with cattle began violating the rules and turning up at any given time, claiming immediate access for their cattle. They found it impractical to reserve watering of the cattle for a particular time period, and claimed that the agreed rules had only been a guideline. The increasing influx of new settlers to the area (all of which required water for domestic uses and gardens, and some brought cattle) issues developed to a point were access to the borehole became unreliable for the women. When individual women talked informally to the women members of the borehole committee they were advised that the male members considered the matter of little importance. In response, a group of women instead sought out the Councilor and the Chairman of the Area Development Committee. The borehole committee was not officially under the authority of any of these, but they nevertheless constituted important, high-profile authorities. Both were furthermore wary of the situation at a neighboring borehole: This had been “captured” by the Chief as a means of accumulating personal user fees, while at the same time demonstrating the Chief’s role as water-provider to the area – a role also claimed by the Local Government structure of which the Councilor and ADC chairman formed part. Against this background of institutional competition over the roles of development benefactors within water provision and beyond, the Councilor and ADC Chairman called a general community meeting to discuss the borehole situation. At the meeting they proposed that the borehole committee had been sitting for a sufficient length of time and that it was now time to replace it with a new cast of committee members. They further pointed to maintenance problems of the borehole. The existing committee accepted this, and at the time of writing a date had been set for election of a new committee [we should find out the constitution and whether new rules have been developed, if we can].

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Actions of the poorest Most of the poorest users of the borehole were women seeking water for domestic uses and gardens, with a few also acting as custodians of wealthier household’s cattle. As mentioned above, the borehole was eventually sited in the centre of the community in an area where several of the more wealthy households were located. In extension of this, the borehole committee came to be dominated by these same wealthy households. During interviews, the poorest households were fully conscious of this situation, and from the outset some households from the poorest group chose not to engage with the borehole at all, or only to a limited extent. They preferred instead to seek water in covered wells that were either communally accessible or privately owned (but with free access for the needy) – or alternatively in shallow-wells near dambos. Although these water points sometimes meant longer walking distances and poorer water quality, they felt it provided greater freedom of access, and allowed more individual decision-making and flexibility on their part. The borehole, by contrast, required interactions with a dominating elite and the prospect of unequal access (based on experience), as well as time-consuming meetings, risks of fines, affiliation fees/manual labour etc. Other households in the poorest group did choose to use the borehole more regularly, because it did not dry up during the dry season like many wells, and/or because the alternatives were judged to be too far away. However, they expressed the same sentiments that the borehole was dominated by wealthy cattle owners and that their own influence was inevitably very limited. Although they did usually participate in general meetings to discuss the borehole, they did not always have time or were not aware of the meeting. They did not volunteer for committee membership, refrained from taking the lead in collective activities and rarely made their own explicit opinions heard at meetings. During interviews they expressed that they did not feel qualified for doing so, and/or that it would be a waste of time anyway since noone would listen. Instead of engaging directly and visibly, some of the poorest households chose instead to influence matters through discrete private lobbying with community members of higher status that they considered “safe” – ie people they knew or felt were on their side. During the struggle of the siting of the borehole, some poor households thus individually talked to the headmen from their own village subsection about the importance of ensuring a favorable location. Likewise during the conflict between livestock and gardening/domestic water use, women from the poorest households talked to other women at the borehole and urged them to complain to the borehole committee. Other households from the poorest group responded to these conflicts by simply detaching themselves from the borehole seeking alternative water points temporarily or permanently. It furthermore became clear during interviews it that a partial exclusion of the poor was taking place within the allocated rules of drawing water for gardening: Because they lived close to the well, some wealthy households were able to locate their gardens on land close to the borehole, providing them with a direct advantage in terms of easy and regular access to water. The poorest households who lived further away from the borehole did not have this advantage of proximity. This was further aggravated by the special rotational rules that had been established for those gardens closest to the well.

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Although apparently intended to avoid excessive individual use, the system did not include gardens further away from the borehole. These factors together meant that the poorest households would usually find the wealthier women in the process of watering their gardens when they arrived at the borehole, and would have to wait their turn for a long time, or seek other water points. The wealthy households did not explicitly deny other households access to water, and no explicit conflict took place. Nor were any collective actions carried out by the poorest. Instead, the poorest again resorted to individual strategies, seeking the advise of eg the school secretary (to no avail as the wealthy households were not actually breaking the rules), and/or seeking other source with freer access to water.

5. Roles of selected actors 5.1 Key actors and interests The water users in this case consist of men from better-off cattle-owning households, opposed to women from all three strata who seek water for domestic uses and gardening. In other words, the conflict is partly between different uses of water within households (eg cattle vs gardening in better-off households). Because these different uses are associated with men and women respectively in cultural and practical terms, the conflict and cooperation is partly a gender issue. At a deeper level, however, the case also shows different interests between different wealth groups. The fact that the borehole is dominated by wealthy cattle-owning households makes the exclusion of alternative uses particularly problematic for the poorest households – especially for those poor households who are not caretakers of other people’s cattle (typically poor women-headed households). This is also evident from the “hidden” marginalization of the poorest women from water for gardening by the more wealthy women. Finally, the case also illustrates how the local politics of water development can bring local political actors onto the scene. In Muchila, “water is dynamite” as one of the respondents put it. The ongoing influx of people from other areas means that the pressure on water is increasing in an area that already suffers from very limited natural water access and a particularly poorly developed water infrastructure. Development of water infrastructure is therefore very high on the local political agenda. For the Councilors, ADC chairman and the involved Headmen and Chief, being able to set down one’s authority in such cases is important. This is partly because of the importance to establish oneself as a “water authority” and player in the specific water game - but also as a means of gaining support and status as a “water developer” and thereby more generally a “developer” and patron of the area. 5.2 Mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion

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This case deals with the small-scale, everyday processes of inclusion and exclusion in water access. It shows, firstly how one particular use of water comes to dominate – namely water for cattle. This is possible partly because (i) the borehole becomes dominated by wealthy cattle-owning households almost from the outset, through their physical proximity to the borehole and through their domination of the borehole committee, and partly (ii) the traditional priority and status given to cattle in the economic and socio-cultural customs of the area, which in turn is tied closely to (iii) the custom for male domination in public decision-making fora and (in principle) in determining overall household priorities in economic terms. It is on this basis that the men are able to require women to go elsewhere or wait in the everyday interactions at the borehole, and to later on override the schedule for water use. Secondly, the case shows how a particular exclusion of the poorest women/households takes place around the borehole. This takes different forms: (a) Some poor households withdraw from use of the borehole at the very beginning and on their own account, feeling they will loose out anyway and preferring instead to make their own individual decisions; (b) other poor households are marginalized in the process of conflict and cooperation, as they have no de facto influence on decisions made, and/or prefer to withdraw in the everyday interactions around the borehole The mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in this case thus take place against a background of classic structural inequality, determined through assets such as wealth, gender, social status and land ownership (near the borehole). These assets are partly drawn on and referred to by their proponents – the better-off men – but they are also to some extent reproduced by the poorest themselves: Much of their agency in the case is based on perceptions by the poorest that they are already the weaker part, and that it is not worth their effort to engage directly and explicitly in the borehole committee and in the cooperation and conflict surrounding it. Likewise, they tend to take the view that “such things are not for us” and that eg “we do not have the knowledge to join a borehole committee”. In this way, the structural inequalities that already exist become reproduced into the conflict and cooperation process. Importantly however, this does not mean that all of the excluded actors acted in this way, or that those who did simply gave up, as discussed in the following. 5.3 Role of women and the poorest It is important to note here how the women as a group do in fact try to bypass the Gender inequalities in the cooperation and conflict process. The case shows how some of the women do argue their case against the men in the everyday interactions around the borehole, and how they take up the issue with the women members of the borehole committee. These actions are met with some success as they lead to the decision to employ a time-table for different water uses. When the men then begin to override these rules, the women are again successful in bringing local politicians into the matter, and to have the existing committee dismantled – quite a feat in itself (although the final outcome remains to be seen). This suggests that the process of inclusion and exclusion in the case should not be seen to deterministically, and that instead there is a flux in which actors are always at different degrees of exclusion/inclusion.

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The fact that the women are able to do this seems to rest on several issues: (i) the women who make the case include women from wealthy and influential households, who have a certain status and social connections in the village; (ii) the women are able to refer to the existence of a timetable scheme already in use at the Chief’s borehole (thereby “borrowing” some of his authority, although he does not appear to have been directly involved); (iii) the women are furthermore able to refer to the basic principle that the borehole was intended for everyone in the community (thereby invoking the customary notion that water is for everyone); and finally (iv) the women are able to benefit from the interests of the Councilor and ADC chairman within the wider local politics of water development. Turning to the poorest women and households, it seems clear that these also try various “work-arounds” to overcome the structural inequalities in the process. One of these are the efforts to influence the conflict and cooperation process through “safe” (trusted/well known) third parties. This includes a school secretary, a local Headman or the better-off women mentioned above. When asked why they did this, respondents said they did not feel anyone would listen to them if they spoke up individually (because they were poor and/or didn’t understand the situation), and also because it would not give them any trouble, ie there would be no risks involved of people seeking revenge on them etc. A second way in which the poorest responded to the inclusion and exclusion is by full or partial withdrawal from the borehole, both in terms of use and in terms of its governance. As described above this took place either from the very outset or in the course of the cooperation and conflict process. It is debatable whether this withdrawal can be seen as a kind of “foot-dragging” in order to counter or subvert the process of exclusion. Rather it seems here to be a case of strategic risk-minimization by the poorest households: Reliable and unhindered access to water points was a key priority for all water users in Muchila. Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that water access has to be from the same water point all the time (although it is preferred). The most important thing for households is that they are able to make their dispositions and rely on them – ie that they can decide to allocate a certain amount of time and expense to collect water and then be sure that this is in fact achieved (ie that the water point has water, and that there are no unforeseen hassles, problems, expenses, time-losses etc). For the poorest in particular, this ability to make independent decisions with predictable outcomes seemed far more important than other water access issues (eg water quality), as they have particularly limited resources for household reproduction. At the same time, their low-status position means that they consider it imperative to avoid engaging explicitly in conflicts on their own account. From such a perspective, the poorest households preferred seeking other water access points, even if it involved longer (but predictable) time and even if the water was of lower quality.

Implications for water access of the poor and women From an overall perspective, the actual establishment of the Muchila borehole can be seen as the development of a new access point to a highly valuable resource in the area (ground water). However it is through the everyday processes of both cooperation and

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conflict that the conditions and degree of access for the different parties have been fleshed out in practice. This has happened partly through the reproduction of existing inequalities and power structures, and partly through the attempts that women and the poorest households have made to influence and/or escape these same inequalities. In this process the better-off group of women appear to have had some degree of success in fighting off the attempts to entirely marginalize non-cattle water users from the borehole. For instance, the development of a simple time table for water use can be seen as an important step. Not only does it in fact for a while provide the women with improved access to the borehole, but more symbolically it also signifies a break with the basic notion that cattle have priority at all time. In other words, it suggests a (modest) shift from a situation where the rules that regulate access are present but “unwritten” (cattle have priority over other uses, men have priority over women etc) to a situation where access is based on common and equal access regulated according to jointly agreed rules2. This of course does not mean that all is well with the Muchila boreholes. Firstly, the new rules are soon overruled in the everyday interactions by men and women at the borehole, suggesting that rather more is needed than a timetable to overcome historical patterns of domination. Reliable access of the women is therefore again compromised, and at the time of writing it was unclear to what extent the otherwise impressive efforts to elect a new committee would in fact lead to a better situation. Secondly, the development of rules of access (including “new rules” as opposed to customary ones) can also contribute to the exclusion of the poor. One example of this is the way in which the rules of rotation between the garden owners with land closest to the borehole suddenly come to exclude/inhibit access of the poorest. For the poorest, overall access to water is therefore only marginally improved by the conflicts and cooperation surrounding the borehole. Although they do benefit to some extent from the development of a timetable, the benefits are limited by the fact that the borehole is generally dominated by the more wealthy households/women in the area. The poorest do not therefore have the secure and reliable access to the borehole that is so important to them. Instead they resort to their existing strategy of seeking water in areas with greater reliability. They are thereby forced to continue going longer distances, and do not get the benefits from better quality water. This in turn means they are unable to allocate time (of parents and/or children) and water to tend and develop their gardens and other income generating activities. Finally, the strategy of the poorest (to shift between different alternative water points that are low-risk and do not provide “trouble”) rests to some extent on the customary principle that noone in need can be denied access to water. Hence several of our informants from the poorest group described how they would use even private wells dug by neighbours, relatives or simply other community members who would grant them access on no conditions. By contrast, the borehole shows a situation where specific demands are placed on users, including user fees, rules of use and maintenance and the 2 The fact that the women also seek and gain the support of the Councillor and the ADR chairman (whose positions represent “development” and “rational planning”) is perhaps no coincidence either, although it would be problematic to create an artificial distinction between these actors and eg the Chief/Headman structure as modernity vs tradition – as we have seen in one of our other cases!

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complexities of organization and domination discussed above. Similar features are required with other developing “community boreholes” in the area, and interestingly also with private boreholes: As opposed to private wells, free access to these does not appear to be granted, and although other community members are sometimes allowed access to private boreholes, they must pay for all kinds of use. This may suggest a possible shift with the introduction of boreholes, whereby the substantial required investments (and hard to get spares) mean that customary principles of free water access are gradually changed to a more exclusive “user pays” principle – well in line with the theory of “hydraulic property rights”. 6. Conclusion This case shows how conflict and cooperation events can flow in extension of each other, and also illustrates the point that cooperation can lead to exclusion, as pointed out earlier by eg the Nicaraguan team. This is particularly true of the poorest whose are to a large extent excluded from secure and reliable access to the borehole. However at the same time the case also gives examples of how the opposite can be true, ie that conflict can lead to greater inclusion: For instance, had the better-off women not challenged the claims of the men that cattle should have priority, it is unlikely that the time-schedule and associated rules has been developed, which at least for a while led to greater inclusion in accessing the borehole. In extension of this, the case suggests that rules and institutions in water governance can be developed not only from cooperation, but also from conflict – as suggested again by the timetable and by the eventual ousting of the original borehole committee. The women and poorest are therefore not passive bystanders in water conflict and cooperation, but act out their own well-considered strategies, working through third parties. For the poorest, these may even consist of a complete or partial “de-linking” from use of the water point in question in favour of other water access points that provide a more predictable and less involved water access situation.

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References Chabwela, H., Haller, T., (2008). Governance issues, potentials and failures of participative collective action in the Kafue Flats, Zambia. In: 12th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Commons, Cheltenham, England. Chabwela, H.N.W., Mumba, W., (1998). Integrating water conservation and population strategies on the Kafue Flats. In: de Sherbinin, A., Dompka, V. (Eds.), Water and population dynamics. American Association for the Advancement of Science Washington, DC. Chileshe, P., Trottier, J., Wilson, L., (2005). Translation of water rights and Water Management in Zambia. International workshop on African Water Laws: Plural Legislative Frameworks for Rural Water Management in Africa. Johannesburg, South Africa. Flyvbjerg, B. (2006) Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry Vol. 12 No. 2 219-245 Franks, T.; Cleaver, F. (2007) “Water Governance and Poverty: A Framework for Analysis” Progress in Development Studies, vol. 7 no. 4, 291-306 Funder, M.; Mweemba, C.; Nyambe, I.; van Koppen, B.; Ravnborg, H.M. (2010) Understanding Local Water Conflict and Cooperation: The Case of Namwala District, Zambia. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 35 pp 758-764 de Haan, Zoomers, A. (2005) Exploring the Frontier of Livelihoods Research. Development and Change Vol 36 No. 1: 27–47 T. Haller (2007): “The Contested Floodplain: Institutional Change of Common Pool Resource Management and Conflicts among the Ila, Tonga and Batwa: Kafue Flats, Zambia” Unpubl. Post Doc Thesis, Dept. of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich Mweemba, C.; Nyambe, I., Funder, M.; van Koppen, B. (2010) Conflict and cooperation in local water governance: Inventory of local water-related events in Namwala District, Zambia. DIIS Working Paper 2010:15, Copenhagen Nyambe, I., Feilberg, M., (2008). Zambia: National Water Resources Report for World Water Development Report 3. Ministry of Energy and Water Development, Lusaka. Nygren, A. (2009) Life here is just scraping by: livelihood strategies and social networks among peasant households in Honduras , Jounral of Peasant Studies, 36, 4, pp 827 - 854 Ravnborg, H. M., Escolan, R. M., Guerrero, M. P., Mendez, M. A., Mendoza, F., de Paez, E. M., & Motta, F. (1999). Developing regional poverty profiles based on local

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perceptions. CIAT publication no. 291. Cali: Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical Ravnborg, H. M., Funder, M., Bustamante, R.; Cissé, A., Cold-Ravnkilde, S.M.; Cossio, V.; Djiré, M. ; Gómez,L.I.; Koch, J.; Le, P.; Maseka, C.; Mweemba, C.; Nyambe, I. ; Paz, T.; Rivas, R.; Sjørslev, J., Skielboe, T.; van Koppen, B., Yen, N.T.B. (2008) Understanding conflict and cooperation in local water governance. Paper presented at the 13th IWRA World Water Conference, 1-4 September, Montpellier Schelle, P., Pittock, J., (2006). Restoring the Kafue Flats: A Partnership Approach to Environmental Flows in Zambia. WWF, Godalming, UK Zeitoun, M., Mirumachi, N., (2008). Transboundary Water Interaction I: Reconsidering Conflict and Cooperation. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.

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Annex 1: Overall Timeline Explanatory note: Numbers beneath years show event intensity. The intensity is scored according to a scale used for all events in the study, where -7 is most conflictive and +7 is most cooperative. For details, see Ravnborg et al (2008).

2003-2004

-1

2003-2004

-1

2004 +3

2004 +6

2004-2005

-2 Event 1 During meetings to establish a new borehole, arguments break out between different subsections of the community over the siting of the borehole

Event 2 Leading community members try to influence the drillers, the district staff and the Chief to site the boreholes in their subsection of the community

Event 3 A staff member from the local clinic is called in to act as neutral mediator, and an agreement is reached that the borehole should be sited centrally in the community

Event 4 A borehole committee is established with elected members. Rules are made for payment schemes and maintenance.

Event 5 Repeated arguments take place between men with cattle and women with gardens over access to the borehole

2005-2006

-3

2006 +6

2006-2009

-2

2008

-3

2009 +4

Event 6 Women complain several times to Borehole committee about their difficulties in accessing the borehole

Event 7 The committee calls a general assembly and a time schedule is agreed upon for different water uses, as well as particular rules for watering cattle and gardens

Event 8 Men with cattle begin again to violate the time schedule for water access and continue to restrict women’s access to water for gardening

Event 9 Women complain to Councilor and ADC chairman over continued violation of their access to the borehole

Event 10 Councilor and ADC chairman call a general meeting. The borehole committee agree to step down and it is agreed to elect a new committee endorsed by the councilor/ ADC chairman

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Annex 2: Overall Actor Matrix OVERALL ACTOR MATRIX FOR SITUATION: Muchila boreholes Situation No: 5087

Men from cattle owning households Women seeking water for gardens and domestic uses

Councilor and ADC chairman

1. What do the actors want to use the water for?

For non-migrated cattle, espec. during dry season For vegetable gardens (consumption and cash-income) and drinking, washing, cooking

“Community development”, political leverage

2. What are the immediate aims of the actor in terms of water access?

Un-restrained, time-saving, secure access to boreholes

Un-restrained, time-saving, secure access to boreholes (or other water sources)

- Benefit politically from providing water to community

3. How do the actors justify their claims in the events?

- Cattle is central to the community economy -Cattle owners were the original inhabitants here

- Water is for everybody/the whole community - Water is an open resource and all must have equal access - Domestic water uses and gardening sustain the basic survival of families

- Water is for everybody/the whole community - Water is key to development and therefore Local Gvt authorities have a key role to play

4. What are the main actions of the actors to achieve their aim in the events?

- Direct and outspoken engagement in planning meetings - Volunteer for borehole committee - Seek to influence and “hijack” borehole drillers - Agree to rules for sharing access but disregard or tweak them in daily practice

Better-off women: - Complain to Chief - Complain to Councilor/ADR chairman - Take part in planning meetings - Claim plots near well to ease direct access - Agree to rules for sharing access but tweak them in daily practice Poorest women: - Seek alternative sources of influence and access (see below)

- Openly question legitimacy and efficiency of borehole committee - Indirectly question legitimacy of Chiefs rule over “his” borehole - Call for constitution of new borehole committee with broader representation - Engage actively in district planning of new boreholes in the area

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5. In what forums do their actions take place?

- Formal meetings on borehole construction and management - Informal liaison with other like-minded in community - Everyday borehole use practices

- Direct organized complaints to authorities - Formal community meetings on borehole management - Informal person-to-person complaints - Everyday borehole use practices

- Formal meetings on borehole construction and management - Informal person to person contacts

6. What third parties do they try to involve, and how?

- Headmen - Borehole drillers

- Chief - Headmen - Councillor/ADR chairman - School secretary

- District authorities

7. What main assets have they used in the events?

- Social status of cattle owners - Male “authority” (as per custom) - Membership of committees etc

- Family relations (to Chief) - Other personal relations to other influential community members

- Recognized authority as “developers” - Social status - Access and connections to District administration etc

8. What have they gained in terms of water access from the events?

- Relatively secure access to the two boreholes for cattle during dry season - De facto priority over access for other uses

- Improved access to water for some women (better-off), but still vulnerable and unreliable

- Enhanced status as “water providers” for the community

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Annex 3: Expanded Timeline for the poor and women

Time and intensity

2003-2004

-1

2003-2004

-1

2004 +3

2004 +6

2004 onwards

2004-2005

-2 Event description Event 1

During meetings to establish a new borehole, arguments break out between different subsections of the community over the siting of the borehole

Event 2 Leading community members try to influence the drillers, the district staff and the Chief to site the boreholes in their subsection of the community

Event 3 A staff member from the local clinic is called in to act as neutral mediator, and an agreement is reached that the borehole should be sited centrally in the community

Event 4 A borehole committee is established with elected members. Rules are made for payment schemes and maintenance.

Event 5 Repeated arguments take place between men with cattle and women with gardens over access to the borehole

Actions specific to the poorest

Join meetings but rarely speak out. “Noone will listen to us anyway”.

Some lobby for a favorable borehole siting on a person-to-person basis with prominent individuals they know/are close to

- Joined meeting but none spoke out - Poor hh not satisfied with borehole siting. -Feel it will favour certain better-off households who live near the selected site - But choose not to complain as it will give trouble and “lead to nothing”

- None volunteered to join (too time consuming /don’t feel qualified, “not for us”) - Some voted but don’t feel well represented by the outcome - Comes to meetings if committee calls general assembly through headman

- Some poor refrain from using the borehole from the outset. Instead use alternative sources (espec. wells) - Even if they have to walk further and quality is poorer. -This gives less “trouble”, less cash cost and they can make their own decisions

- Especially critical for poorest users as they have no cattle - do not engage in direct confrontations/ arguments - some seek alternative water points - some wait (eg all day)

Actions specific to women

- Join meetings if not too busy with work - Some better-off women (wealthy or middle) speak out , claiming that their respective area needs the borehole most

During subvillage meetings, better-off women impress on Headman to ensure good borehole siting

- Joined meeting if not too busy with work - Some better-off women complain over siting at meeting but are overruled

- Some better-off women join (4 of 12 members are women). - Women who vote tend to vote for women - But poorest women don’t feel well represented

- Better-off women engage in arguments by the borehole - Better-off women complain to husbands but they prioritize cattle - Poorer women complain to husbands but with no result

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Time and intensity

2005-2006

-3

2006 +6

2006 onwards

2006-2009

-2

2008

-3

2009 +4

Event description Event 6 Women complain several times to Borehole committee about their difficulties in accessing the borehole

Event 7 The committee calls a general assembly and a time schedule is agreed upon for different water uses, as well as particular rules for watering cattle and gardens

Event 8 Men with cattle begin again to violate the time schedule for water access and continue to restrict women’s access to water for gardening

Event 9 Women complain to Councilor and ADC chairman over continued violation of their access to the borehole

Event 10 Councilor and ADC chairman call a general meeting. The borehole committee agree to step down and it is agreed to elect a new committee endorsed by the councilor/ ADC chairman

Actions specific to the poorest

- Poor women discuss w. other women at borehole - But do not take active part in complaint themselves

- Participate in meeting (including some who use alternative sources) - Satisfied with proposed schedule

- Some feel that women from wealthy hhs monopolize water for gardening, so can’t access for drinking or gardens - Do not respond collectively as it “won’t help” - individual informal complaints to trusted individuals (eg school secretary, clinic staff) - But with no results - Use alternative sources instead

- do not engage in direct confrontations - seek alternative water points (some even move gardens) - some wait (eg all day)

- do not take active part in complaint, or in organizing it

- take part in the meeting - do not believe it will change much

Actions specific to women

- Better-off women make the formal complaints

- Participate in meeting - Satisfied with proposed schedule

- Issue not addressed by non-poor women (incl. in borehole committee)

- some better off women complain individually to women on borehole committee - but no result

- better-off women make the collective complaint

- take part in the meeting - better-off argue for better representation of women in committee

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Annex 4: Expanded matrix for the poor and women

Main issue

Poor

Women

1. What do they want to use

the water for in this situation?

- Domestic uses - Vegetable production for subsistence and sales (“gardens”) - A few hhs also dependent on looking after and borrowing cattle from well-off families, so feel there should also be water for cattle

While men tend to prioritize cattle, women in hhs with cattle also find them important as it is part of their livelihood strategy and some women also own cattle as their social security. As the poor do not generally have cattle, the interests of men and women within the poor hhs are generally similar in relation to the boreholes

2. Do they have access to the water that the situation is about?

-For domestic use most poor have at least occasional access but it is irregular and therefore insecure due to more well-off hhs dominating access to the borehole. Often they have to use other sources of water which are further off and less clean and dry up during dry season -For gardens some have partial access and some are excluded from access due to more well-off hhs monopolizing the water for cattle or their own gardens

- Men and cattle generally dominate access to the boreholes - But there is also exclusion among women as more well-off women monopolize access to water for gardens

3. What are the immediate aims of the actor in terms of water access?

- To ensure secure and regular access to domestic water and thereby maintain a secure and healthy domestic water supply, and spend less time getting water - To improve subsistence and cash incomes by getting water for gardens

4. How do they relate to the situation we have recorded?

In terms of cooperation the poor take part in meetings etc. However in terms of conflict they undertake mostly individual actions on their own account, often outside the recorded events.

Women are active in the recorded and unrecorded events. They explain they have to be active as they are responsible for securing domestic water and gardens.

5. What are their specific actions within the recorded Events?

- Join community borehole planning meetings - Join regular community borehole meetings

- Join community borehole planning meetings - Join regular community borehole meetings - Complain to chief over cattle domination at boreholes

6. What are their specific actions in relation to the Situation but “outside”

- Complain/lobby individually to (i) their own headman, (ii) school secretary over (a)cattle owners breaking rules, (b) hhs monopolizing water for gardening, (c) wealthy hhs marginalizing those who are poor

- Complain individually to individual women representatives in borehole committee

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our recorded Events)? - Seek alternative sources of water in response to marginalization and/or to avoid “trouble” and allow individual decisions

7. What role do they play in their actions within the Situation?

- In organized collective events the poor are participants, not leaders. This seems to be a conscious strategy – minimizing risks in collective events/settings. - The poor however also act individually “outside” our events and here they show much initiative and taking responsibility for their own fate

- Better-off women take the initiative of complaining in relation to the Chiefs borehole - At community borehole meetings they are however less active, and tend to let the men speak

8. How do the actors justify their claims in the event?

Water belongs to the whole community Water as a basic right Inequality in water access is unfair

Women provide the basic means for families to live

9. In what forums do their actions take place?

Formal forums (community meetings), but especially privately Formal and informal forums, and privately

10. What third parties do they try to involve?

Personal contacts to known and “safe” prominent community members – ie village headman, school secretary, health officer, concellor (through village headman)

Chief, village headman, school secretary

11. What assets have they used

- Time - Knowledge of alternative water points - Payments for borehole repairs (some, not all) - Individual connections to resource persons

- As for poorest, and: - Family status (women in Chiefs family complain to Chief - Gender (complaining directly to women in borehole committee – not men)

12. Have they lacked key assets needed in the situation and with what effect?

- Influence afforded through family status and/or cattle ownership - Proximity to boreholes (which are sited near powerful families) - Technologies: Sleighs and oxcarts for hauling greater quantities of water per turn, and over longer distances and can be done by boys)

13. What are the main outcomes of the Situation so far for their water access?

- Improved in that additional water access points have appeared, however the poorest have only restricted access from these and have in some cases been marginalized almost entirely

- Improved access to domestic water and for cattle and especially gardens for the more well-off women, but not for the poorest - Still tendency for cattle to dominate and restrict access to domestic water and gardening

17. How has the Situation so far affected their wider livelihoods?

- The restricted access/marginalization of the poor means that water reliability, water quality and incomes (gardening) are lower for poorest, and time needed to collect water (in other places) is higher

- Improved water quality and gardening incomes for better-off women, but not for poorest