Muhammadiyah Scholars and Democratic Transition in Post-New Order Indonesia

KULTUR

Advisory BoardProf. Azyumardi Azra (State Islamic University,Jakarta), Prof. Komaruddin Hidayat (State IslamicUniversity, Jakarta), Prof. Karel Steenbrink (UtrechtUniversity, the Netherlands), Prof. M.C. Ricklefs(National University of Singapore, Singapore), Prof.Robert W. Hefner (Boston University, USA)

Editor-in-ChiefDr. Amelia Fauzia

Managing EditorProf. Dr. Sukron Kamil

EditorsIrfan Abubakar, M.A.Dr. Noorhaidi HasanDr. Suparto

Language EditorDavid Gordon Henton

SecretarySri Hidayati, M.Ed.

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K U LT U RThe Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures

Volume 5, Number 1, 2010ISSN 1411-6812

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FOREWORD

Unlike previous the last edition which took formalization of Islamicsharia as its principal topic, the main issues of this edition, Kultur

Volume 5 Number 1 2011, is democracy and civil society. Both of these fallnaturally within the context of Muslim cultures. In this context democracyand civil society remain as crucial issues, not only in scholarly discoursebut also in political practice. In academic discourse the relationship ofIslam and democracy is a matter of debate by experts. It is inherent in civilsociety as the living space of democracy. In looking at democracy the ex-perts are split three ways: those who see democracy as entirely consistentwith Islam, those who see it as consistent but with reservations, and thosewho see it as being in conflict. In political practice many Muslim countriesare still ruled by authoritarian leaders, although some are not.

This edition contains eight articles and three book reviews. The firstarticle is written by Azyumardi Azra. Its topic is “Islam, Civil Society, De-mocracy and Good Governance: A Glance at the Indonesian Experience”.Unlike intellectuals like Max Stackhouse who claim Islam as a religioustradition that is incompatible with democracy, Azra takes the opposite view.For him, consistent with Indonesian Islam’s primary character as tolerantand peaceful, democracy in Indonesia as the world’s largest Muslim nationis growing and developing. As a house for democracy civil society is alsodeveloping in Indonesia, and many Muslim leaders have emerged and grownin civil society organizations. However he goes on to propose that there isan imbalance between democratic practice in Indonesia and good gover-nance. As a result, corruption in Indonesia still flourishes and may threatenthe consolidation of democracy. Because Islamic community organizationsare one of the pillars of civil society, bodies like Muhammadiyah andNahdhatul Ulama (NU) are working with the NGO ‘Partnership’, making cor-

ruption their common enemy. And of course the State is doing the samething through the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), although re-cently this institution has been opposed by those supporting the statusquo.

The same issue is addressed by Kusmana in his article “Islam andDemocracy in Tasikmalaya: A contemporary discussion”. He discusses Is-lam, democracy and gender equity in one localized area, Tasikmalaya inWest Java. By interviewing leaders, in his article he breaks the Moslemleadership of Tasikmalaya into four camps, according to their response todemocracy and gender equity: the pro-democracy camp, represented by(among others) leaders of the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI); those whoaccept democracy, but use Islam as its barometer; those who believe thatdemocracy must first be made Islamic, and those who totally reject de-mocracy because they see Islam as already being perfect. He concludesthat in general, democracy as a concept and political practice is acceptedin Tasikmalaya’s Muslim circles. However, according to his research infor-mants, there are reservations concerning particular issues; adaptation andcontextualization are needed in questions concerning household manage-ment and raising children, which are the obligations of women. In particu-lar issues, democracy was criticized.

M. Hilaly Basya’s article then throws light on Muhammadiyah as oneof the strengths of Indonesian civil society and progressive Islam. His ar-ticle “Muhammadiyah Scholars and Democratic Transition in Post-NewOrder Indonesia: The Critical Response of Muhammadiyah Scholars to Radi-cal Islamist Movements”, specifically addresses their critical response toState/religion relations. He first discusses the refusal of Syafi’I Ma’arif, asMuhammadiyah’s leader in 2002, to bring back the Jakarta Charter (PiagamJakarta) which asserts the supremacy of sharia, and his rejection of shariabylaws which he saw as weakening national integration. Ma’arif’s viewsgained support from many progressive Muhhamadiyah leaders, both athigher and lower levels, however there were Salafists circles withinMuhammadiyah which rejected these views outright, for example AdianHusaini.

Still in relation to civil society, the next article concerns higher edu-cation, with a focus on the discussion in public university mosques. HilmanLatief takes up this theme in: “Youth, Mosques and Islamic Activism: Is-lamic Source Books in University-Based Halaqah”. Halaqah here signifiesmosque based communities of learning, particularly in campus mosques.In his article he finds that halaqah not only use the standard books such asBulu >gh al-Mara >m (a collection of hadiths by Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani), butalso books by Islamist ideologists like Sayyid Quthub and Islamist maga-zines exemplified by Sabili and Hidayatullah. He also notes that halaqahhave escaped the attention of mainstream, moderate Islamic preachings,such as those of NU and Muhammadiyah.

The two articles which follow differ from the first two which stress theinstitutional political autonomy of civil society, by emphasizing its eco-

nomic autonomy. These articles are Tuti Alawiyah’s “Dompet Dhuafa as aCivil Society Organization”, and Alfritri’s “Philanthropy and the IndonesiaCommunity in Seattle: The Cerdas Foundation Experience”. Tuti Alawiyahtakes Dompet Dhuafa as a philanthropic civil society organization. Philan-thropic organizations (LAZIS - Lembaga Amil Zakat, Infak, dan Sedekah)in Indonesia run economic empowerment, health, social welfare and edu-cation programs for disadvantaged individuals and families. This move-ment has turned individual recipients (mustah }iq) into zakat contributors(muzakki >). However Tuti is emphatic that firstly, as a power within civilsociety, Dompet Dhuafa should ideally develop its institution by focusingitself on empowerment at community level.

Similarly, Alfitri’s article spotlights the potential of the Cerdas Foun-dation in its role of building resilience and community development inIndonesia through its education and disaster relief aid. Among other ac-tivities, in 2008 this institution was able to collect USD12,021 and givescholarship assistance to 80 people, and to 107 people in 2009-2010. Themotto of this Seattle based foundation is “Education for a Brighter Future”.However until now this motto has not been fully realized, as the foundation’smanagers work on a part-time basis.

The final article dealing with the main theme of this edition is DenyHamdani’s “The Role of Celebrities in Promoting Muslim Attire”. Deni ar-gues that the political tensions between State and political Islam evolvingfrom the time of Reformation, which established a democratic political sys-tem and gave freedom of expression, led to the expression of Islam by aculture of Islamic dress. This is exemplified by the extent to which womenwear the jilbab (head covering). He suggests that the emergence of fashion-able, life style versions of the jilbab has occurred through the influence ofits commercialization by celebrity artists as models, although some of themwear it out of religious conviction. This everyday style of jilbab is differentfrom the jilbab of traditionally devout women, and even more so from thatof ideologically Islamic women.

The last article, by Suhaili Usman, departs from the main theme ofthis edition. It is entitled “Exhibiting Islam: A Study of the Singapore AsianCivilization Museum’s ‘West Asia/Islam’ Permanent Galleries”. It raisesquestions about Singapore’s Asian Civilization Museum’s arrangement andcategorization of works of Islamic art in its West Asia gallery, while theHindu and Buddhist civilizations are categorized in the museum’s South-east Asia gallery.

As already mentioned, this edition also contains three book reviews;Luthfi Assyaukanie’s book Islam & the Secular State in Indonesia is re-viewed by Suratno, Syafiq Hasyim’s Bebas dari Patriarkhisme Islam is re-viewed by Dick van der Meij, and Zaki Mubarok reviews Benih-benih IslamRadikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo, edited by Ridwan al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF.

For publication of this edition we are indebted to many people. I wouldlike to express my thanks to all those who contributed to its publication,

and offer my special thanks to Kultur’s editors and management, the StateIslamic University Syarif Hidayatulah Jakarta, and Dompet Dhuafa whichfunded the publication costs. More particularly my thanks go to DavidHenton, whose sincerity in working went beyond the bounds of his duty aslanguage editor.

Jakarta, June 2010

Sukron KamilManaging Editor

K U LT U RThe Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures

ISSN 1411-6812Kultur, Volume 5, Number 1, 2010

Table of Content

ArticlesIslam, Civil Society, Democracy and Good Governance: A Glance at theIndonesian Experience Azyumardi Azra _______ 1

Islam and Democracy in Tasikmalaya: A Contemporary DiscussionKusmana _______ 15

Muhammadiyah Scholars and Democratic Transition in Post-New OrderIndonesia: The Critical Response of Muhammadiyah Scholars to RadicalIslamist MovementsM. Hilaly Basya _______ 47

Youth, Mosques and Islamic Activism: Islamic Source Books in Univer-sity-based HalaqahHilman Latief _______ 63

Dompet Dhuafa as a Civil Society OrganizationTuti Alawiyah _______ 89

Philanthropy and the Indonesian Community in Seattle: The CerdasFoundation ExperienceAlfitri _______ 105

The Role of Celebrities in Promoting Muslim AttireDeny Hamdani _______ 121

Exhibiting Islam: A Study of the Singapore Asian Civilisation Museum’s“West Asia/Islam” Permanent GalleriesSuhaili Osman _______ 141

Book ReviewsLuthfi Assyaukanie, Islam & the Secular State in IndonesiaSuratno _______ 165

Syafiq Hasyim, Bebas dari Patriarkhisme IslamDick van der Meij _______ 170

Ridwan al-Makasary and Ahmad Gaus AF (eds.), Benih-benih IslamRadikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan SoloZaki Mubarak _______ 175

Islam, Civil Society, Democracy andGood Governance: A Glance at theIndonesian Experience Azyumardi Azra*

Abstract

Indonesia is not only the third largest democratic country, but is also the largestMuslim nation in the world. The transition to and consolidation of democracy inIndonesia over the last ten years has brought some hope and expectation for thefuture of the country. Despite the fact that geographically Indonesian Muslimslive in an area that is far away from Mecca and Medina where Islam was re-vealed, they are no less orthodox than Muslims elsewhere in terms of faith andpractice. Generally speaking, however, Indonesian Muslims are moderate andtolerant in their outlook and mind. The peaceful penetration and spread of Islamin the archipelago, as well as the social and cultural system of the Indonesianpeople contributed to the distinctive character of the Indonesian Muslim. Hence,the social, cultural, and political expression of Islam in Indonesia. No doubt, thepeaceful and tolerant character of Indonesian Islam has laid down the founda-tion for the burgeoning of democracy in the country. Moreover, Indonesian Is-lam is very rich.

Keywords

Islam, democratic consolidation, civil society, good governance, and corruption.

*Azyumardi Azra is Professor of history and Director of Graduate School, SyarifHidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia (January 2007-on).

Kultur, Volume 5, Number 1, 2010: 1 - 14

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Indonesian Islam is very rich, not only in terms of its cultural andsocial expression, but also in terms of institutions. Indonesian Islam

has two dominant mainstream wings, the Muhammadiyah (founded in1912), and NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, founded in 1926), and many other orga-nizations which since their inception have operated in what is often called‘cultural Islam’, as opposed to ‘political Islam’. They comprehensively rep-resent mainstream Islam in Indonesia. These organizations, together withmany other mainstream Muslim organizations throughout the country, ownthousands of educational institutions ranging from elementary madrasahand schools to pesantren and universities. In addition, they operate hospi-tals and clinics, orphanages, people’s credit banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat/BPR of Baitul Mal Wattamwil/BMT), cooperatives, NGOs, and much else.

Not the least important role of these mainstream Muslim organiza-tions is in civic life and civic culture. They are in fact religious-based civilsociety organizations. They fit perfectly with the definition of civil societyorganizations, in that they are independent of the state, self-regulating, andself-financing bodies that work as mediating and bridging forces betweenthe state on the one hand and society on the other. As civil society organi-zations, they work for the better ordering of society as a whole.

Politically speaking, despite the fact that almost 90 per cent ofcountry’s total population is Muslim, Indonesia is clearly not an Islamicstate, nor is Islam the official religion of the state. Rather, Indonesia is aPancasila (‘Five Pillars’) state. The very first pillar of Pancasila is the beliefin One Single God, which according to virtually all Muslim leaders is inconformity with the Islamic belief in tawh }i >d, the unity of God. That is alsotrue of the other four pillars of Pancasila, that is, humanity, the unity ofIndonesia, democracy, and social justice. Thus Indonesia is neither a theo-cratic nor a secular state.

That is why Pancasila, as plural Indonesia’s common platform, hasbeen accepted by the mainstream and moderate Muslim organizations notedabove since the early days of Indonesian independence, declared on 17August 1945. This is also one of the reasons why these Muslim organiza-tions do not support the appeals and efforts of certain Muslim fringe groupsfor the transformation of the Indonesian state into an Islamic state, nor dothey support the implementation of shari‘a (Islamic law) in the country.

There is no doubt that Muslims have played a great role in the evolu-tion of the Indonesian state, and in its sometimes difficult path to democ-racy. Since independence Indonesian people have accepted democracy,and one can observed various kinds of democracy implemented. Howeverwhat was first implemented was far from real democracy, but rather moreclosely resembled authoritarianism. When President Soekarno was in powerhe implemented what he called ‘Demokrasi Terpimpin’ (Guided Democracy),which was only a guise for his autocratic rule. And when General Soehartorose to power following the failed communist coup d’état in 1965, he imple-mented what he called ‘Demokrasi Pancasila’ (Pancasila Democracy), whichlikewise was no more than authoritarianism.

3Islam, Civil Society, Democracy, and Good Governance (Azyumardi Azra)

Islamic-based Civil SocietyA number of studies of civil society in Indonesia, such as those of

Hefner1 and Nakamura, Sharon Siddique and Bajunid2, have concluded thatMuslim or Islamic-based civil societies and their leaders have played amajor and crucial role not only in the better ordering of Indonesian Muslimsociety at large, but also in the initial development of democracy, and thisin turn led to the eventual fall of President Soeharto’s regime in May 1998.

Many leaders of Muslim or Islamic-based civil society organizations,the most prominent among them being Abdurrahman Wahid (popularlyknown as ‘Gus Dur’ and the then national leader of the Nahdlatul Ulama/NU), Mohammad Amien Rais (then the national chief leader ofMuhammadiyah), and Nurcholish Madjid (the former national leader of theAssociation of University Muslim Student Association/HMI), were the mostoutspoken critics of the Soeharto regime. They took a leading role in theincreased prominence of civil society’s appeal for democracy, as well as inopposing the authoritarianism Indonesia had experienced since PresidentSoeharto came to power in 1966.

Indonesian religious-based civil society has a long and rich history.As has been shown by many Indonesianists, the earliest form of nation-wide civil society groups in the country were Muslim social-religious orga-nizations such as Muhammadiyah (established in 1926), Nahdlatul Ulamaor NU (founded in 1912), and many other national and local organizations.The Muhammadiyah and NU were (and still are) the largest Muslim organi-zations in Indonesia, and now claim membership of some 35 and 40 millionrespectively. As mentioned before, they are voluntary, independent fromthe state, self-funded, self-sufficient and self-regulating. Since the colonialperiod these Islamic-based civil society organizations have been conduct-ing a variety of programs and activities, ranging from religious activities tosocial, cultural, educational, health, and economic ones.

The second kind of civil society organizations in Indonesia mostlyappeared during the economic modernization period of President Soeharto,from about the early 1970s to the second half of the 1990s. They are non-govermental organizations (NGOs), initially known in Indonesia as LembagaPengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat (LPSM, Community Self-DevelopmentGroups) but which in current usage are popularly known as LembagaSwadaya Masyarakat (LSM, or Social Empowerment Institutions). Most ofthese LSMs (NGOs) are non-religiously based, even though their activistsby and large are Muslims, However an increasing number of Islamic-basedNGOs have also made their appearance. These NGOs could be also regardedas advocacy organizations, working for the empowerment of society in suchfields as democracy, human rights, gender equity and environmental pres-ervation.

The third group of civil society organizations existing in Indonesiacomprises professional bodies, such as associations of teachers, medicaldoctors, journalists, or labor movements. Some of these many associa-


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tions are Islamic-based, like the All-Indonesian Association of Muslim In-tellectuals (ICMI, or Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia) and theUnited Muslim Labor Movement. Even though these associations have be-come increasingly vocal in furthering their own interests, they are rarelyinvolved in much wider social, political and cultural issues.

The first two groups of civil society organizations have been directlyor indirectly involved in many political, social, cultural and economic is-sues. This is the reason that during the last years of the Soeharto govern-ment, leaders of civil society organizations tended to be heavily politi-cized. Soon enough they themselves became politicians, following Presi-dent Soeharto’s fall from power in May 1998 after more than three decadesof authoritarian rule. The question was whether or not they would be ableto live up to the expectations of the public in general.

This can be clearly seen in the case of Abdurrahman Wahid, the na-tional chairperson of the NU, who founded the Nation Awakening Party(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/PKB), or Amien Rais, the national chief ofMuhammadiyah, who established the National Mandate Party (PartaiAmanat Nasional/PAN). In the period after Soeharto’s replacement, Presi-dent BJ Habibie, introduced liberalization of Indonesian politics and a multi-party political system. Later, following the first democratic general elec-tion of 1999, Rais was elected as the Speaker of Indonesian People Consul-tative Assembly (Majelis Permusyaratan Rakyat/MPR), and Wahid waselected President of the Republic of Indonesia.

However President Wahid, the former civil society leader, failed tomeet public expectations; he was impeached by the MPR in 2001 followinghis controversial policies and statements, his erratic attitude and his mis-management of the state. He was replaced by his vice-president, MegawatiSoekarnoputri, the national chairperson of the Indonesian DemocraticParty-Struggle (PDI-P) and one of the daughters of Soekarno, the first presi-dent of the Republic of Indonesia.

Despite Abdurrahman Wahid’s failure, many other civil society fig-ures and public intellectuals continued to be tempted by power politics.The most striking example is Nurcholish Madjid, one of Indonesia’s mostprominent independent public intellectuals of contemporary times, who inthe end could not resist political temptation. He made a bid for the presi-dency through the Golkar party convention in 2003, but soon withdrewfrom power politics after discovering the complexities of Golkar party poli-tics. Other public intellectuals such as Sjahrir and Ryaas Rasyid foundedtheir own parties, but they fared poorly in the 2004 general elections.

This tendency continued during the 2004 presidential elections. Anumber of civil society leaders such as Hasyim Muzadi, the national chair-man of the NU and Salahuddin Wahid, Vice Chief of the Indonesian HumanRight Commission, entered the political battle field. Muzadi becameMegawati Soekarnoputri’s vice-presidential candidate in her bid to win an-other term of office as president. Salahuddin Wahid, the younger brother ofAbdurrahman Wahid, was the vice-presidential candidate of the retired


general Wiranto. Their bids failed. The winners of the direct presidentialelections were Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Muhammad Jusuf Kalla. Inthe last presidential elections in 2009, however, no civil society leader wasinvolved as either presidential or vice-presidential candidate. I would ar-gue that this is a good sign for the healthier development of civil society.

This is because, as I have discussed elsewhere3, the involvement ofcivil society figures and public intellectuals in Indonesian power politicsduring the so-called ‘Reform Period’ (Masa Reformasi), has resulted notonly in their failure, but also in the unmaking of civil society in Indonesia ingeneral. The involvement and eventual failure of civil society leaders inIndonesian politics has led to a measure of frustration and disorientation incivil society organizations and groups. This is true not only in the case ofreligious-based civil society organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah,but also of advocacy NGOs, since many figures of the latter groups havealso been pulled into politics. The implications have been far-reaching. Atgrass-roots level members of NU and Muhammadiyah were involved inmass-brawls during the period of President Abdurrahman Wahid. WhenPresident Wahid was on the brink of impeachment, fanatical NU supportersaccused Muhammadiyah, to which the Speaker of the MPR belonged, oflaunching an anti-Wahid campaign.

The political situation became more stable after the last years of Presi-dent Megawati Soekarnoputri, and was even more conducive to democ-racy after the general elections of 2004. Since then, there have been prom-ising signs that civil society organizations and groups have been trying toreconsolidate themselves. After his failure in the 2004 presidential elec-tion, Hasyim Muzadi, the chief leader of NU, for instance, publicly prom-ised that he would never again be involved in power politics. At the sametime, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, the national chief of the Muhammadiyah re-mains adamant that his organization must hold fast to the idea of civil soci-ety; Muhammadiyah must continue to stand apart from practical, day-to-day and power politics.

With the continued stabilization of Indonesian politics under Presi-dent Yudhoyono, both the President and Indonesian society in generalhave placed a number of crucial items on the national agenda. Foremostamong these were the creation of good governance, the eradication of ram-pant corruption, the continued recovery of the Indonesian economy andthe improvement of law and order enforcement. There are high hopes thatalongside government efforts, civil society organizations and groups shouldplay a greater role in all of these urgent agenda.

Good Governance in IndonesiaSince the fall of President Soeharto in 1998 there have been increas-

ing demands from many sectors of Indonesian society for the creation ofgood governance. Civil society organizations have been also trying to playa greater role towards this end, by forming (for instance) a number of ‘watch-


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dog bodies’ to oversee the working of government institutions and otherpublic offices. A number of policies and programs have been implementedby the government, but one has to admit that little progress has been made.4

A number of inhibiting factors make the creation of good governance inIndonesia seem an impossible task.

Employing the Weberian framework, Indonesia could arguably beincluded in the category of soft states. In my opinion this has long been oneof the biggest hurdles to the creation of good governance in Indonesia.Among the important factors making Indonesia a ‘soft state’ are: first, theexistence of ‘patron-client’ relationships among state officials and manysegments of society, particularly the business sector. This kind of relation-ship gave rise to strong ‘patrimonialism’ at almost all levels of society, whichin turn manifested itself in the culture of ‘ABS’ (Asal Bapak/Ibu Senang, or‘yes men’). Second, unclear and inappropriate government and bureau-cratic practices which, for instance, make it seem that there are no clearboundaries between official matters and those which are personal in na-ture. Third, weakness in social and public ethics; and fourth, weakness inlaw enforcement compounded by the low credibility, accountability andmorale of law enforcement agencies.

Furthermore, despite Indonesia’s Partnership for Governance Reform,the concept and practice of good governance is poorly understood by stateofficials and society at large. This is not surprising. From the period ofPresident Soekarno’s Old Order and throughout Soeharto’s New Order re-gime, the dominance of the often arbitrary executive branch of govern-ment was unchallenged, at the expense of society in general. The executivebranch of the government was almost completely unaccountable. Thus whenideas of good governance gained momentum in post-Soeharto Indonesia,there was no fertile ground in which to plant them.

Government is of course only one of the actors in governance. Thereare many other actors outside of the executive branch of government, in-cluding the legislative and judicative branches which play an importantrole in the decision-making process. In an even wider sense, other ‘non-government actors’ with a role in decision-making or in influencing thedecision-making process, can be seen as ‘actors’ in governance; they are,for instance, civil society organizations and groups, NGOs, research insti-tutes, political parties, the military, religious leaders, and public intellec-tuals. But, above all, it is government especially that is central in the cre-ation of good governance.

The creation of ’good governance’ demands an accurate understand-ing of the very concept and practice of ’governance’. According to the con-cept of ’participatory governance’, ‘governance’ basically is good gover-nance and well ordered public life for the shared social betterment. There-fore, ‘good governance’ is an order that makes it possible for the public toshare a better life, and at the same time be free from disorder and imbal-ance. Good governance includes eight major characteristics; it is participa-tory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective


and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of law. With thesecharacteristics, good governance assures that corruption, for instance, isminimized.

There are many very complex constraints to the creation of goodgovernance; among these are first, a lack of understanding of the conceptand the necessity of good governance; second, a lack of trust and coopera-tion between government bodies and agencies on the one hand and civilsociety on the other; and third, an absence of precedence and experiencein Indonesia of the implementation and development of good governance.

Good governance in many ways is identical with governance that isfree from what is in Indonesia called KKN (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme, orcorruption, collusion, nepotism). Good, clean, healthy governance can becreated by reforming the bureaucracy and public service. The aim of thereforms is to create transparency in bureaucratic processes and the publicservice. To achieve this aim, it is necessary to improve the quality of hu-man resources in bureaucracy. Human resources development in bureau-cracy should be more professional, starting with the recruitment of em-ployees and continuing to their performance as public servants and theirjob promotion.

The reform of governance can also be called the ‘reinventing of gov-ernment’. Using Osborne & Gablaer’s5 framework, ‘reinventing government’is oriented to the creation of ten governance models. These are: 1. Catalystgovernment, which leads rather than dictates; 2. Society-owned govern-ment, which gives authority rather than being served; 3. Government withmission, which transforms the organization of bureaucracy from simply“works by regulations” to “works towards missions”; 4. Competitive gov-ernment, which emphasizes competitiveness in public service; 5. Result-oriented government, which has an orientation to results rather than sim-ply the presence of employees; 6. Society-oriented government, which aimsto fulfill the needs of society rather than those of bureaucracy; 7. Entrepre-neurship government, which produces revenues rather than simply spends;8. Anticipative government, which prevents rather than cures mistakesand failures; 9. Decentralized government; and 10. Market oriented gov-ernment, which encourages changes through the market and the public.

It is clear that the creation of good governance needs the participa-tion of civil society and the public as a whole. By the same token, rampantpower arrogance and KKN in Indonesia have also been caused by publicapathy. This originates from public’s lack of awareness of their rights asboth citizens and subjects of the public service of government bureaucracy.Either the public does not know how to file complaints, or it does not wantto be bothered by the complications resulting from complaints about badbureaucratic practices. Therefore dissemination of the ideas and practicesof good governance is absolutely necessary, concepts of what good gover-nance is all about, of the benefits that the public can derive from goodgovernance and, in reverse, of the public disadvantages or even losses re-sulting from bad governance.


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Corruption and PoliticsCorruption is undoubtedly one of the most acute problems Indonesia

faces today, and the biggest challenge to efforts to create good governance.Although efforts to combat corruption seem to have gained momentum inthe last several years, during the presidency of President Susilo BambangYudhoyono there is little evidence that this acute problem can soon besolved. Indonesia remains on the lowest rung of the ladder, among themost corrupt nations in the world. In fact recently there have been signsthat the powerful KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) is being crippledby its conflict with the Indonesian police and other government agencies,as discussed below.

These trends suggest that the battle against rampant corruption is farfrom easy. The difficulties are complex, as corruption seems to have be-come a ‘culture’ at every level of Indonesian society, growing ever stron-ger roots in public and societal lives. Serious and concerted efforts areneeded to reduce, if not completely eliminate corruption. This paper willtherefore suggest a number of steps that can be taken in to combat corrup-tion, and which should be instrumental in the creation of good governance.

Before going too far into discussion of ways to combat corruption, itis necessary to define what it is. In general, the term ‘corruption’ conven-tionally refers to any illicit and illegal activities for personal or collectivegain. More recent discussion uses various definitions of corruption, how-ever there is a general emphasis on corruption as the use and abuse ofpower or public position for individual and collective gain. Based on thisdefinition, Philip6 identifies three general definitions that are commonlyused in discussions on corruption.

First, corruption that is centered in public office (public office-cen-tered corruption), which is defined as the “acts and policies of particularpublic official that is not in accord with his/her official position in order toget personal gains, or gains for certain people who have close relationshipwith him/her such as family, relatives, and friends”. This definition, as onemight observe, includes corruption and nepotism, that is, establishing pa-tronage and awarding positions based on familial relationship (inscriptive)rather than on merit.

Second, the definition of corruption that centers on the effect of cor-ruption on public interest (public interest-centered). In this respect, cor-ruption can be said to have taken place when a power holder or publicofficial’s actions or policies are based on the will of other individuals whohave provided money or other kinds of material ‘rewards’. Thus corruptioncan be said to have taken place when a holder of public office favors certainpeople in return for material reward. Such a person has corrupted his/herofficial position and the public interests.

Third, there is a market-centered definition of corruption. This defi-nition uses various theories of social and public choice, as well as economicapproaches within a political analysis framework. The corruption is thusdefined as an ‘extra-legal’ institution, used by individuals or groups of people


to influence the policies and practices of bureaucracy. This definition ofcorruption suggests that individuals and groups involved in decision mak-ing are more prone to corruption than any other individuals or groups.

Still within this framework, corruption also means the abuse of powerby public servants, government or public officials in order to gain extraincome from public resources. Thus public position or office is used (orabused) as a business venture to be exploited for the maximum possiblegain.

Based on the three groups of definitions above, a number of academicforums and international organizations, including the ADB, World Bank andTransparency International, and also government officials have proposeda minimalist definition that would include almost all forms of corruption.This minimalist definition as formulated by Leiken7 states that “corruptionis the use and abuse of public power for personal material gains as well aspolitical benefits”.

Expanding on this minimalist definition, the World Bank gives a de-tailed elaboration of the corrupt abuse of public office: “Public office isabused for private gain when an official accepts solicits, or extorts a bribe.It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumventpublic policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Publicoffice can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs,through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversionof state revenues”.8

A similar minimalist definition is also put forward by Syed HusseinAlatas.9 In his opinion, “corruption is the abuse of trust in the interest ofprivate gain”. Based on this minimalist definition, Alatas proposestypologies of corruption. First, “transitive corruption”, that is corruptionin the form of some agreement between a donor and recipient for mutualgain; second, “extortive corruption”, that is corruption that involves ex-tortion to avoid possible legal consequences for those who are involvedand close to the actor of corruption; third, “inventive corruption”, that iscorruption that begins with promises as a kind of investment, in anticipa-tion of certain gains in the future; fourth, “nepotistic corruption”, that iscorruption that takes place because of favorable treatment in job promo-tion in public office and in projects for close relatives; fifth, “autogeniccorruption”, that is corruption that takes place when a public official gainscertain benefits for his/her knowledge as insider (insider information) ofpublic policies that he/she must otherwise keep secret; and sixth, “sup-portive corruption”, that is the protection or even support for certain actsof corruption that takes place within power struggle.

Thus starting with a minimalist definition, corruption can be dividedand subdivided into a number of typologies and categories. Furthermore,corruption can also be categorized by its location in either the public orprivate sector, or based on its isolative or systematic intensity, or catego-rized as national or local, personal or institutional, or traditional or mod-ern.


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All of these categories, typologies and the kinds of corruption lead toa better knowledge of corruption and its causes and consequences, but alsoto finding ways to solve it. They help to formulate strategies to combatcorruption, to develop political will against it, and to mobilize an anti-cor-ruption movement within the public arena.

Good Governance and the Anti-Corruption WarRecognizing the various categories, typologies and kinds of corrup-

tion in this context is necessary if corruption is to be eliminated. Briefly,the anti-corruption movement includes two stages. First, the stage of policyformulation to address the main root causes of corruption, and second, thestage of creating and enhancing political will which is critical to the imple-mentation of anti-corruption programs.

The two-stage process reflects the essential role of government andthe bureaucracy in the war against corruption as of the first steps towardsthe creation of a democratic, credible, and accountable government. There-fore the first crucial step in the eradication of corruption is to acceleratedemands and pressures for reform at the government level, then of thebusiness sector, and in lastly at the level of the public in general.

One of the most important determining factors in the success of theanti-corruption efforts is the political will of the highest leadership of thegovernment. After conducting extensive research into corruption, Mor-gan points out that one conclusion of the many studies of corruption is thata sincere commitment by high level leadership to counter-corruption ef-forts is a crucial component of successful campaigns”.10

Hence the failure of the anti-corruption programs in many countriesdoes not lie in incomplete or insufficient laws and regulations or lack ofanti-corruption bodies, but more often because of the absence or lack ofcommitment, seriousness, and sincerity on the part of the government high-est office holders. In most cases, they rarely talk about corruption eradica-tion.

When they do talk about corruption, governments often give thestrong impression that they do so only for political publicity, or for addi-tional legitimacy through the issue of corruption. In fact, there is a strongtendency among them to apply political cost-benefit analyses in decidingwhether or not to implement anti-corruption policies and programs. Itbecomes the task of anti-corruption agencies and the public in general tocontinually pressure them, in order to ensure that they have the politicalwill to adopt and enforce corruption eradication policies and programs.

Basically, there are three kinds of policies available to governmentpolicy makers in order to effectively minimize, if not wholly eradicate vari-ous kinds of corruption. First, reforming policies that in one way or an-other could be abused by corrupt public officials; second, reforming thesalary structure and other incentives of the bureaucracy and other publicinstitutions; third, reforming law enforcement agencies and expanding theircapacity to enforce law and order and, lastly, strengthening the rule of law.

1 1Islam, Civil Society, Democracy, and Good Governance (Azyumardi Azra)

There is little doubt that successful corruption eradication depends verymuch on the ability to simultaneously, comprehensively and consistentlycarry out these three reforms.

In the next stage, the three kinds of reform mentioned above can beintegrated with recommendations issued by World Bank11 on strategies tocomprehensively eradicate corruption. These strategies include three maincomponents. First, developing bureaucracy based on the rule of law withsalary structures that honor employees for their honesty. Recruitment andpromotion should be strictly on the basis of merit to prevent political in-terference. Financial controls and controllers should be empowered to pre-vent the arbitrary misuse of public funding. Second, preventing employeesfrom acting corruptly by limiting their authority in the formulation of poli-cies and the management of funding. Third, enhancing the accountabilityof government employees by strengthening monitoring; anti-corruptionagencies and public in general should also enhance their control and moni-toring.

The empowerment of control and monitoring functions of such insti-tutions also needs certain strategies so that the eradication of corruptioncan be conducted comprehensively. There are at least three strategies inthis respect: First, to strengthen official institutional control mechanismsin order to supervise and monitor employees, officials, and other holdersof public office; second, to increase public pressure for these institutions tofunction in a more effective way. This can be done through a free press,decentralization of administration, and greater transparency on the part ofgovernment in decision-making processes. Lastly, to educate the public toapply moral and political pressure for the eradication of corruption. Thepublic should also be educated in such concepts as ‘public office’, ‘publicservice’ and the social, economic, political and religious consequences ofcorruption for public life.

Concluding Remarks: Maintaining the MomentumIndonesia’s war against corruption eradication seemed to gain some

momentum under the President Yudhoyono’s administration. The latestdisclosure of major corruption involving the Bank Mandiri, the ElectoralCommission (KPU), a good number of provincial governors and head ofdistricts and members of local parliaments gives even stronger hope of theeradication of corruption in the country. Despite this, a lot remains to bedone in order to win the war against corruption and thus provide morefertile ground for the creation of good governance.

The KPK has identified some of the factors that make corruption ram-pant. The combination of a corruption prone system combined with publicoffice holders who lack integrity and inconsistent law enforcement haveexacerbated the problem. Not only that, law enforcement agencies andanti-corruption bodies responsible for investigating and bringing corrup-tion cases to court have not been supported by sufficient funding. There isalso strong evidence that the government is still lacking the political will to


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fight corruption. Worse still, there is also widespread public apathy to-wards corruption.

Efforts to combat corruption and create good governance at all levelsof society need to be scaled up and given increased momentum. Civil soci-ety organizations and groups in Indonesia, as suggested above, have beeninvolved in the war against corruption and creation of good governance.Since 2003 the two largest Muslim civil society organizations in the coun-try, NU and Muhammadiyah have worked jointly with Indonesia’s Part-nership for Governance Reform, in a program to combat corruption. Inmid 2005 Muhammadiyah chairperson, Ahmad Syafii Maarif and his NUcounterpart signed an agreement to work together to fight corruption tak-ing place inside and outside the two organizations.12

There was no resistance to the fight against corruption from withinthe two organizations. In contrast there is clearly a lot of strong support.But their joint efforts have yet to make any progress, and some of their ownmembers stand accused of involvement in corruption. Many leaders of NUand Muhammadiyah have admitted that the joint anti-graft movement re-mained ineffective, since no concrete follow up programs were designed.

On 7 July 2005 The Jakarta Post reported the remarks of PresidentYudhoyono at the opening ceremony of Muhammadiyah’s national con-gress. He said that this predominantly Muslim country should be very em-barrassed by the fact that it was still considered to be one of the most cor-rupt nations in the world. President Yudhoyono did not blame Islam forthe widespread corruption, but said that some Muslim individuals were toblame for failing to embrace the Islamic teachings that, among other things,prohibit Muslims from involvement in corruption.

Notes1 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia ,(Princeton: Princeton University PressHefner, 2000).2 Mitsuo Nakamura, Sharon Siddique & Omar Faruk Bajunid (eds.), Islam andCivil Society in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001).3 Azyumardi Azra, “Civil Society and Democratization in Indonesia: The Transi-tion under President Wahid and Beyond”, in David G. Schak & Wayne Hudson(eds.), Civil Society in Asia, (Aldershot, Eng: Ashgate, 2003); Azyumardi Azra,“Civil Society and Democratization in Indonesia”, in Towards Good Society: CivilSociety Actors, the State and the Business Class in Southeast Asia, (Berlin: HeinrichBoehll Foundation, 2004).4 M. C. Ricklefs, “Susilo’s War on Graft: Lots of Talk, Little Action”, Jakarta Post,17 May 2005; Jakarta Post, “Antigraft Campaign Sees Little Progress: ICW”,Jakarta Post, 30 May 2005.5 David Osborne & Ted Gablaer, Reinventing Government, (Addison-Wesley Publ.Co., 1992).6 Mark Philip, “Defining Political Corruption”, Political Studies, Vol 45, No. 3,

1 3Islam, Civil Society, Democracy, and Good Governance (Azyumardi Azra)

1 9 9 7 .7 Robert S. Leiken, “Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic”, Foreign Policy105, Winter, pp. 55-73.8 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank,(Washington DC, 1997).9 Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Consequences ,(Aldershot, Brookfield, Vt.: Avebury, 1990), pp. 3-4.10 Amanda L. Morgan, Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implica-tions: A Literature Review, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 1998), p. 6.11 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank,p. 105.12 The Jakarta Post, 7 July 2005.

BibliographyAlatas, Syed Hussein, 1990, Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Consequences,

Aldershot, Brookfield, Vt.: Avebury.Azra, Azyumardi, 2003, “Agama dan Pemberantasan Korupsi” [Religion and

the Elimination of Corruption], Kompas, 5 October 2003._______, 2003, Civil Society and Democratization in Indonesia: The Transi-

tion under President Wahid and Beyond’, in David G Schak & WayneHudson (eds), Civil Society in Asia, Aldershot, Eng: Ashgate.

_______, 2004, ‘Civil Society and Democratization in Indonesia’, in TowardsGood Society: Civil Society Actors, the State and the Business Class in South-east Asia, Berlin: Heinrich Boehll Foundation.

Elliot, Kimberley A, 1997, “Corruption as a Global Policy Problem: Overviewand Recommendations”, in Kimberley A. Elliot (ed.), Corruption and theGlobal Economy, Washington D.C: Institute for Global Economics.

Hefner, Robert W., 2000, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia,Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Heywood, Paul, 1997, “Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives”, Politi-cal Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, Special Issue.

Hidayat, Komaruddin & Ahmad Gaus AF (eds.), 2005, Islam, Negara & CivilSociety [Islam, State and Civil Society], Jakarta: Paramadina.

Jakarta Post, 2005, “Antigraft Campaign Sees Little Progress: ICW”, JakartaPost, 20 May.

Kaufmann, Daniel, 1997, ‘Perceptions about Corruption among Elites in Emerg-ing Economies’, World Bank.

Karni, Asrori, 1999, Civil Society and Ummah: Sintesa Diskursif Rumah Demokrasi[Civil Society and Muslim Society: Discursive Synthesis of DemocracyHouse], Jakarta: Logos.

Klitgaard, Robert, 1988, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley: University of Califor-nia Press.

Leiken, Robert S., 1996, “Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic”, Foreign


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Policy, 105, Winter.Morgan, Amanda L., 1998, Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Impli-

cations: A Literature Review, San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.Nakamura, Mitsuo, Sharon Siddique & Omar Faruk Bajunid (eds), 2001, Islam

and Civil Society in Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS.Nye, JS., 1989, “Political Corruption: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”, in Political Cor-

ruption: A Handbook, New Brunswick: Transaction.Philip, Mark, 1977, “Defining Political Corruption”, Political Studies, Vol 45, No.

3 .Ricklefs, MC, 2005, “Susilo’s War on Graft: Lots of Talk, Little Action”, Jakarta

Post, 17 May 2005.Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1978, Corruption: A Study of Political Economy, New

York: Academy Press.Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1996, “Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption”, View-

point, Note No. 75, World Bank.World Bank, 1997, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World

Bank, Washington DC.

Islam and Democracy in Tasikmalaya:A Contemporary Discussion

Kusmana*

Abstract

This article focuses on the discourse of Islam and democracy at Tasikmalaya 1 (inWest Java), within the broader context of the consolidation of relations betweencivil society and the state in the first decade of Indonesia’s Reformasi. In thisperiod freedoms of speech and gender equality have emerged into the spotlight ofnew democratic processes. Its findings are based on the author’s interviews witha range of Tasikmalaya intellectuals, conducted from August 2008 to April2009. The author proposes that democratization demands cultural change whichcannot occur overnight, and finds that this process is resisted by reactionaryhardliners who paradoxically take advantage of the new freedoms brought bydemocracy to oppose it. Contestation between agencies is therefore inevitable.The article examines these with particular reference to local perceptions of gen-der equality, as exemplified by concepts of kodrat perempuan or the innate na-ture of womanhood, and discusses them in relation to Islam, gender and democ-racy. Although feminists see kodrat perempuan as a construct designed to sup-port male hegemony by defining and restricting the socio-political role of women,this article argues that it is also used by forces supportive of women’s activism.

Keywords

Islam, democracy, Tasikmalaya, gender, kodrat perempuan, and camp.

* Kusmana is a lecturer of Faculty of Theology and Philosophy, UIN SyarifHidayatullah Jakarta and a PhD student at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, theNetherlands.


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Islam and Democracy

Azyumardi and Hudson found that scholars such as Max Weber2, KarlWiifogel3, Samuel Huntington4 and Bernard Lewis5 saw Islamic soci-

eties as being critical of modernity and democracy, due to their inequali-ties and discriminative nature either towards other religious followers orbased on gender.6 For example, Lewis agreed with Huntington’s view of theIslam’s incompatability with democracy, due to the absence of free elec-tions in many Muslim societies. He further asserted democracy as “... apolity where the government can be changed by elections as opposed toone where elections are changed by the government.”7 Furthermore, PaulMarshall’s anthology8 documented the appalling influence of the emergenceof extreme Shari’a law on human rights, in particular on women and rightsof religious freedom in Muslim countries.

However, this contention has been refuted by many other scholars,among them Hefner9, Bowen10, Robinson11, Muzani12 and van Doorn-Harder13,and in Azra and Wayne’s anthology14. Azra and Hudson, for example, pro-posed the importance of democracy as the operative concept of today’smodern nations. However, they also noted that its application should takeinto consideration new contexts and necessary pre-conditions in order fordemocracy and human rights to operate in the new context. In addition,quoting Stout15, they also suggested that the best way Western countriescan encourage democracy is by exemplifying its best practice to other coun-tries.

Azra and Hudson maintained that Indonesian Islam is compatiblewith modernity, as it contains a number of values and institutions thatpromote democracy and human rights. Only an insignificant number ofgroups and institutions oppose it. They explained:

Indonesian Islam is essentially a tolerant, moderate and ‘middle way’(ummat wasat) Islam, and differs significantly from the Islam foundin the Middle East. In Indonesia, Islam spread peacefully, and informs which took account of diverse ethnic, cultural and social reali-ties of the region. Further, the vast majority of Indonesian Muslimsbelong to moderate mainstream organizations such as the NahdatulUlama, Muhammadiyah and many other regional organizationsthroughout the country which support modernity and democracy,and oppose the establishment of an Islamic state.All these moderate and mainstream organizations are basically civilsociety organizations, and they play a crucial role in the develop-ment and enhancement of democracy. These organizations are alsovery active in the dissemination of ideas of democracy, human rights,justice and gender equality that are crucial for a modern society. Itis true that there are small and fringe groups of radical Muslimswhich have captured a lot of media attention, such as the IslamicDefense Front (FPI), the Jihad Troops (Laskar Jihad), the Council ofJihad Fighters (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia), and the Party of Lib-eration (Hizb al-Tahrir), but these groups, which are mainly led bynon-native Muslims, have limited influenced in Indonesia as awhole.16

1 7Islam and Democracy in Tasikmalaya (Kusmana)

Muslim intellectuals interviewed in Tasikmalaya generally measuredthe relations between Islam and democracy from religious perspectives.Most of them confirmed Azra and Hudson’s affirmation of the compatibilityof Islam with modernity. Only a few saw things otherwise, and their orien-tation towards the existing system was one of non-violence. They accepteddemocracy, and put it and Islam in a mutual sharing relation, however theystill considered the concept of democracy with a keen suspicion.

Generally, Muslim intellectuals in Tasikmalaya considered that inpublic life Muslim women have the same rights, opportunities and accessas men do. In this instance Islam and democracy are congruent. In terms ofIslam, they cited human striving and piety towards God as the fundamentalmeasurement of their status17 as suggested by Dudung A. Kasah, a formerhead of MUI Tasikmalaya Kota (City).18 However these same people saw thefunctions and tasks of private or public life differently. Some, like a head ofMiftah al-Huda Pesantren, Tasikmalaya Kabupaten (Regency), related rightsto obligations, saying that rights and obligations should be fairly appor-tioned.19 They rationalized, for example, the natural attribution of leader-ship to the husband, who has obligations as the breadwinner and responsi-bility for nurturing the family. In this ‘job description’ they saw naturaljustice. Some religious leaders, educators in pesantren (Islamic boardingschools), activists and civil servants held this view, such as Miftah Fauzi, alocal preacher known as one of Ajengan Bendo group20 and Lia Srimulayni,a local activist.21

Other people embraced a more flexible view, seeing the relative rolesand responsibilities of men and women as dependent on the situation. Rais-ing a family, for example, is not a simple matter, and requires complexinterdependencies. These people considered the assumed leadership of thehusband only as a formality of the state administration. Women are notdenied the opportunity to represent their families when the need arises.Thus when a husband is sick, or when a woman is considered more capableof handling something than her husband, she is entitled to represent thefamily. They grounded their argument in the fact that males are not in-nately superior to females, and vice versa. Among the female intellectualswho used this reasoning are Djudju Djubaedah, a madrasa teacher22, LiaSrimulyani23 and Moneng Masithoh, a lecturer of Siliwangi University.24

Some others criticize democracy because it is not Islamic. Their num-ber is limited in Tasikmalaya. They are largely confined to, for example,members of the Ihya al-Sunnah pesantren which adopts the Salafi politicalideology, or to Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia/LDII (the IndonesianIslamic Institution of Dakwah),25 or to Hizbut Tahrir/HT (Party of Libera-tion).26 Salafi political ideology rejects the existing political system, al-though its followers concede that it is better than having no system andliving in a power vacuum. Although historically Salafi in Indonesia cannotbe separated from its formative period, it has little connection with DewanDakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII - Indonesian Council for Islamic preach-ing),27 Jamaah Islamiyah (JI - Community of Islam)28 or Majlis Mujahidin


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Indonesia (MMI - the Council of Jihad Fighters).29 Politically, some mem-bers have dreamed of establishing an Islamic state,30 but the majority didnot share that dream. With other current Muslim figures and organizationsthey supported the idea of incorporating Shari‘a into local governmentregulations, however mainstream Salafi itself makes no efforts to formallyencourage proposals for perda syari’ah, (religious provincial regulations)or imposing Shari‘a through local government regulations.

The Perspective which Accepts DemocracyPeople of this perspective believed that Islam and democracy meet

universal values of justice, transparency, consultation, dialogue and ac-countability. Within these values, democracy in Indonesia is contextualizedand integrated with the existing indigenous values but with the tendencynot to place democracy over cultural and religious understandings. Theystrongly criticized parochial understandings of Islam and cultural prac-tices which are unsupportive of democracy. At the same time, some ofthem believed in Islam’s potential to bring about democracy. This perspec-tive includes religious scholars, activists, politicians, state officials andeducators interviewed. They can be categorized into three camps, those ofpro-democracy, sharing and Islamizing.

The Pro-democracy CampThe pro-democracy camp sees democracy and human rights as being

in accord with Islam. It attributes binding values, rights and obligations toevery member of society, and its operations are open and non-discrimina-tory. Contemporary Indonesia is essentially on this democratic Islamictrack. These three systems – Islam, human rights and democracy – areleading the recovery of the country after the fall of the New Order regime,as the State and civil society exercise more democratic interaction andcommunication.31

Among the religious and community intellectuals interviewed, 32

Dudung A. Kasah, former head of MUI Tasikmalaya City, considered thatdemocracy is consistent with Islam, as both maintain a fair balance be-tween rights and obligation. He said that democracy is rah }ma li al-‘a >lami >n(a blessing for all universe), in the same way that Islam is blessing for all theuniverse. He related Islam with democracy by reference to Al-Hujura >t 49:13, in which the Qurán does not differentiate man from women. What makespeople different is their taqwa (piety) and deeds. He explained:

... In my view, democracy is not contradictory to Islam. Democracymeans that rights and obligations to manage the world are collec-tive rights. And they have regulations. The regulations are the prod-ucts where nobody’s rights are violated, giving advantages to someand disadvantages to others. I understood it there and indeed this isa theological democracy and its source is faith, the Q. 49: 13, ...Lita‘a >rafu > (to know one another), but the verse continues, ... fa innaakramakum ‘inda Alla >hi Atqa >kum... (...Verily the most honoured of


in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you ...) andI understood the Lita‘a >rafu > as mu‘a >shara bi al-ma‘ru >f (good interac-tion) between man and woman. Both man and woman have thesame rights and obligations. ....33

However, for him this meeting of Islam and democracy is notunproblematic, as they have different starting points: democracy and hu-man rights derive from human authority, whereas Islam is given by God. Atempirical level, he argued that the practice of democracy leaves as yetunsolved practical problems. Representative democracy validates every-body equally, regardless of their capacity, whereas in spite of its non-dis-criminatory values Islam also acknowledges that authority makes peopledifferent from one another. Democratic elections have resulted in manyunqualified people being elected to parliament. As a result it is not surpris-ing if some members treat their status as a job rather than a representativefunction. The difficulties faced by political parties include balancing thepragmatics of financial needs, ideology, interests and electability. In short,this respondent considered that it is not only the perception of kodratperempuan which restricts women’s civic engagement, but also other ob-jective difficulties. He believed improving women’s capabilities and capaci-ties will certainly improve their social activity participation.34

My field observations showed that the country is still facing very fun-damental problems of health, education and poverty. These problems areexacerbated by the complex and interrelated factors of corruption, paro-chial understandings of religion, and inaccurate translation of cultural val-ues into a modern context. At Tasikmalaya, contestation between religionand the practice of democracy takes place at the level of these fundamentalweaknesses.

Acep Zam Zam Nur, a local literary thinker, said that religion is beingused for political purposes, either for gaining support in the election pro-cess or running for government position. He is critical of both societies andstate officials who play the game. For example, he criticized the perfor-mance of young religious leaders, known as kyai or ajengan35 bendo36 whopreach the teachings of Islam and at the same time actively support theexisting government. He saw their support of the government as a trap,because it restricts their ability to criticize government weaknesses, cor-ruption and poor public service. Religious figures, according to him, are farbetter to provide a role model for maintaining high values, because in-volvement in practical matters will only lead to compromise and dilemma.He is also critical of state servants or members of parliament who do vio-lence to women, such as to those who practice polygamy.

The way he criticized them is by irony, through the medium of ban-ners in public places showing the contradiction between ideal claims andreal practice. For example, one banner read, “Dengan visi relijius/Islami,kita masyarakatkan poligami,” (With religious/Islamic vision, let’s makepolygamy the social norm). Another example was “Selamat padaKabupaten Tasikmalaya yang telah meraih urutan ke 17 MTQ SeJawa


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Barat,” (Congratulation to Tasikmalaya Regency which won 17 th place inthe West Java Quranic Reciting Competition). He further explained:

Installing banners in public places is intriguing, opening public dis-cussion and I explained this point in every interview. Implementingpolygamy was the only practical result of the efforts some peoplemade to formulate Islamic law in local regulations. The issue of localformalization of Shari»a in Tasikmalaya attracted the attention inthe 1999 elections, however in the 2004 General Election it washardly heard. Initially the isuue was very provocative, some saidthat a thief should publicly have his hand cut off in the town’s publicsquare (alun-alun). With the course of time this hardline voice lostmost of its strength.37

This mocks the failure of the government’s attempt to portray theregency as a kota santri (city of religious students)38 and a district withreligious vision.39

Another group comprises the politicians and staff of the local elec-toral commission (KPU), and ten of these were interviewed.40 Most of themmay be included in the broad pro-democracy camp. Local KPU staff andthose affiliated with open parties such as Golkar, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa(PKB - the National Awakening Party), Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB -the Concern for the Nation Functional Party) and Partai Amanat Bangsa(PAN - National Mandate Party) are also included to this camp. AdeMustikawati, a former head of Margaluyu village, Manonjaya, from1988to2007, considered the function of the democratic system should be tofocus solely on development, as occurred during the New Order era. Shepointed to the stability and affordable prices of staple foods during the NewOrder period as achievements worthy to be continued in the Reformasiera. This is why, in the Reformasi era, she is affiliated not with Golkar, butwith the PKPB. She was assigned as head of PKPB for Tasikmalaya Regencyfor the period 2007-2009. In her view:

...many people did not see the corrupt practices of Soeharto and hiscolleagues, but they appreciated the stability and affordable pricesof the New Order era. Their thinking was unsiphisticated. After thedecline of the New Order, prices continously increased .... Whoeverthe president might be, for the politicians of PKPB, they still look toSuharto’s positive policies....41

Cholish Muchlis, head of Tasikmalaya’s Komisi Pemilihan UmumDaerah (KPUD - Regional Electoral Commission) and Jejen Jaenuddin, headof D Commission of Tasikmalaya City’s DPRD42, admitted that the problemof democracy in Indonesia is the recent incomplete fulfillment of demo-cratic requirements. Muchlish referred to the weak roles of local NGOs (NonGovernment Organizations) as a case in point. Local NGOs are not yet play-ing their ideal role as agents of civil society. Many of their members use theNGO only to fill their basic economic needs.43 Muchlis explained:

In Tasikmalaya’s context, NGOs have not played their ideal roles


virtuously. What we found (at the KPUD), in their encounters withpolitics these NGOs were being coopted by political, economic, andproject-vested interests. In short, there are many NGOs, but oncemore they do not yet play their ideal role....44

This pessimistic perception of the role of NGOs in rural areas is under-standable, to the extent that the NGOs and local governments do not havestrong relationships. Neither party, and particularly the state, is at all com-fortable with the sort of decisive criticism that the central government isaccustomed to receiving. In addition, district level NGOs seldom receiveforeign funding. This most often goes to the NGOs at the national level, or atmost at provincial level. During the fieldwork I found that some NGOs atnational and provincial level collaborate with NGOs at local level such asLKaHAM with LKiS (Lingkar Kajian Islam/Circle for Islamic Studies),Yogyakarta45, or established a branch at a district such as Puan Amala HayatiJakarta which established a branch at Cipasung Tasikmalaya Kabupaten.46

Dadan Badran was trained in the State Islamic Institution inYogyakarta, and was also active in the Circle for Religious and Human RightsStudies (LKaHAM - Lingkar Kajian Agama dan HAM). Unlike Muchlis, whowas critical of the local practice of democracy, Badran did notproblematicize Islam and democracy. In his leadership in the KPUD ofKabupaten Tasikmalaya (1999-2004), he often used religious principleslike musha >wara (dialogue) to solve political conflict. The term is well knownamong Tasikmalaya religious societies and familiar to many local ulama47

and government and religious teachers at Islamic education institutionssuch as pesantren. It was generally found helpful when he applied this prin-ciple to resolving local political tensions.48

Thirteen local government staff members were interviewed49, rang-ing from village and sub-district heads, municipal and religious depart-ment staff to police officials. As state civil servants, they all accepted thecurrent democracy as the operative state political system, and they usedthe system in their daily work as government employees. However, fromtheir own Islamic perspective they perceived it slightly differently. Forexample, Ade, head of Cipakat Village, Singaparna, was suspicious of thepolitics of human rights, which originated from the Western tradition. Heidentified the philosophical stance behind these concepts as freedom andindividualism, which are viewed differently in Indonesia generally, and byIslam in particular. Ade’s attitude was a little different to the rest of thestate employees interviewed.50 This may be traced to the surroundings ofhis village, which is surrounded by Islamic educational institutions, bothpesantrens and madrasahs.51 The village is very proud that in 1994 theXXIX National Congress of NU was held in its area.52

Asep Rili Fatah, head of Rajapolah Ward (Kecamatan), stressed theimportance of the context where Sundanese and Islamic values intermix.In the melting pot of Islam and Sundanese culture, values such as modera-tion, careful consideration, team work and harmony may be used effec-


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tively to contextualize similar democratic values.53 Enting, head of the Of-fice for Libraries and Archives, explained this further by referring to theimportance of Majlis Taklim54 in promoting supportive values for democ-racy. She observed that Majlis Taklim have been used for a long time asplaces to study religious and other matters, where members could sharetheir experiences and work together for their community.55 N. Aah, a statereligious counseling worker, often used majlis taklim as a place to dissemi-nate gender and democratic values through religious language. She sug-gested that if the state worked together with civil society through majlistakim, democracy would grow more strongly. This is because she believedthat civil society in Tasikmalaya has the potential to be a critical partner forthe state.56 Doorn-Harder finds that many Muslim intellectuals used majlistaklim as a medium to spread social awareness of, for example, gendersensitivity.57

Another category of respondents comprised educators, and fourteenteachers and lecturers were interviewed.58 Most of them supported theimplementation of democracy in Indonesia. They integrated democracyand gender into their education development and daily life as educators.However their implementation of modern values was mediated by con-sciousness of their own religious and cultural values. This presented prob-lems for Noneng Siti Masitoh, a lecturer at Siliwangi University. She foundthat democratic values are not yet reflected in the processes and outputs ofeducation. Attempts to use the logic of modernity to transform local cul-tural and religious and particularly ethical values were not always success-ful. She observed that criticism in education was not encouraged, particu-larly in pesantren and community education such as at majlis taklim. Shereferred to “being afraid and shamed to ask” as an indicator of the weakcriticical tradition among students and members of majlis taklim.59 AsepTamam, a lecturer at IAIC (Institute Agama Islam Cipasung/Institute forIslamic Ctudies, Cipasung) and STAI Tasikmalaya (Sekolah Tinggi AgamaIslam/College forIslamic Studies) explained that Muslim students gener-ally do not have a strong tradition of criticism. He believed a critical tradi-tion in the learning process is fundamental to the role of students as agentsof social change.60

Djudju Djubaedah, a teacher at the Madrasah Aliyah and a womanactivist, considered that democracy is important in modern life, and thereis no reason why Indonesia should not learn and implement it. Learning isuniversal. The West had learned from Muslims in the past, and it is perfectlyacceptable for Muslims to learn from the West now. The Prophet himselfsuggested that every Muslim should seek knowledge, even from as far awayas China. However she identified as a problem the implementation of thesedemocratic values without having fulfilled democracy’s pre-conditions. Shewas deeply concerned with the fact that modernization in Indonesia, in thiscase in Tasikmalaya, is not accompanied by strategies designed to reduceits negative impacts. She specifically worried about the attitude of manypeople, particularly those in politics and government, who calculate ev-


erything by money. She called it UUD61, standing for ujung-ujungnya duit(money oriented). In her view this situation can be ameliorated by improv-ing the educational sector, by fieldwork, and by open dialogue addressingIslam, local culture and Western values. If people’s minds were opened tothese concepts, she believed that the implementation of democracy (in-cluding gender equity) would meet the needs and expectations of thepeople.62

Eka Yuniarti, who teaches for Muhammadiyah and the al-FurqanPesantren, proposed that the dialogue between Islam and democracy shouldtake place in a realistic way, allowing room for a give and take process. Shewould like to rationalize existing Islamic teachings, using a measured andrealistic approach to doing things. With this stand she was sometimes criti-cal of Muslim practices, and at other times sensitive to Western ones. Forexample, she criticized Muslim politicians who care only for themselves,and do not give their serious and creative attention to the expectations ofthe people. At the same time, she criticized feminist interpretations of theimportant role of a mother in the house and in child rearing. For her, equityand equality do not mean avoiding household responsibilities and childcare activities, but a rational sharing of these between husband and wife.63

Finally, she strssed that “we have to support figures who are capable ofimplementing democracy honestly.”64

Twelve activists were interviewed.65 They all accepted democracyand used it to encourage change within the existing political system. AtangSetiawan, coordinator of LKaHAM in Tasikmalaya, identified the democra-tization process in Tasikmalaya as growing, and believed it needs to beimproved.66 However this situation did not stop Iwa Lasmini from activelyfighting at the implementation level for policy change. She headed the MerakCommunity Learning Centre (PKBM - Pusat Kegiatan Belajar Masyarakat)at Rajapolah. She was also active in the political process as the secretary ofthe Indonesian Women’s Political Caucus (KPPI -Kaukus Perempuan PolitikIndonesia), and secretary of PKPB in Tasikmalaya. She was concerned withthe development of the democratic process in the country.67 Another re-spondent, Jamal (a student) was active in an NGO and is currently coordi-nator of KMRT (Koalisi Mahasiswa Rakyat Tasikmalaya, or Student Coali-tion for the People of Tasikmalaya). He used the concepts of accountabilityand transparency in criticizing Government policies and practices.68

The last group in the pro-democracy camp comprises national Mus-lim intellectuals, and nine of these were interviewed during the field work.69

Most of them have an NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) background and there wasonly one from Muhamadiyah, one from the Islamic Unity organizationsPersis (Persatuan Islam), and one who was concerned with Sundanese heri-tage. Badriyah Fayumi, a former member of DPR from the PKB faction,explained three factors that mark the good relations between Islam anddemocracy in Indonesia: a non-discriminatory constitution, the history ofpluralistic Islam in the country, and the open structure of the Indonesiannation state. In contrast, she also identified three factors which hinder re-


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lations between the state and Islam in relation to gender politics: the NewOrder’s single interpretation of UUD, the Constitutional Court (MK -Mahkamah Konstitus) whose decisions tend not to support affirmative ac-tion policy, and religious fundamentalism.70 The problem is that some In-donesian Muslims express their fundamentalism locally, creating tensionbetween Muslims themselves. There are tensions within Muslim society,and within each Muslim mass organization there are pro and contra wingsresponding differently to contemporary issues, for example global injus-tice. To some extent this religious fundamentalism becomes a barrier tothe compatibility of Islam and democracy in the country, but as explainedby Azyumardi and Wayne Hudson (above), this is not strongly significant.

Elis Suryani illustrated Islam/state relations by stressing the moder-ate attitude of the local Sundanese culture. The majority of Sundanese peopleare Muslim, and they equate their culture and their religion in the expres-sion urang Sunda mah Muslim - Sundanese are Muslim.71 Suryani explainedthe moderate attitude of the Sundanese towards the intersection of state,religion and culture. She contended that Sundanese people follow the middleroad in accepting modernity or democracy. The way they accept it, in heropinion, will be determined very much on the basis of culture and the Is-lamic religion.72 In the case of Sundanese woman, she explained that:

... actually, if Sundanese women were given the opportunity, theywould be able to do (what men do). However they are still regulatedby all things that include religious and cultural values, they stillfind difficulties doing this (not ready yet). .... (women) have dyna-mism within constraints, within norms...... Sundanese people, menand women, take the middle way (sineger tengah). It means that awoman is encouraged not to be at the forefront, and at the same timenot at the rear, but should properly reside in the middle position....if a woman reaches high achievement, she is expected to hold norms:religious norms and Sundanise tradition....73

Evi Sofia, head of Nasyi’ah, the women’s wing of Muhammadiyah, andImas Karyamah, head of the youth wing (Pemudi) of Persis, acknowledgedthat their perspective on the relation between Islam and democracy is in-fluenced by the fact that their organizations supported the New Order’swomen’s issues policies, for example state ibuism.74 However, Sofia arguedthat her attitude to this has evolved over time, and she is now more open togender issues.75 Slightly differently, Karyamah responded to gender issuesby rationalizing gender-based Islamic teachings.76

The Camp that Balances Islam and DemocracyThe second camp is similar to the first one, but maintains a balance

between implementing gender equity, democracy and human rights, andthe goodness of Islam. This stand is commonly held by many of the respon-dents. The modernist principle, al-muh }a >fad }a ‘ala al-qadi >m al-S }a >lih } wa al-akhdhu bi al-jadi >d al-as }lah } (maintaining the existing teachings which areright, and adopting best of the new ones) is usually used to relate Islam with


modernity. The base premise of this camp is compatibility between Islamand democracy, but with the inclination to make Islam the barometer ofdemocracy and not the other way around. When there are principles orpractices with no precedent in Islamic communities, such as freedom andequality, they were generally willing to adopt them from the democratictradition itself. In a Western context, these two values have beencontextualized into the practices and institutions of democracy. In Indo-nesia, including in Tasikmalaya, inter-personal relations and practices arestill paternalistic, creating differences between the people and the elite.Elite citizens have more decisive roles than ordinary citizens, who are some-times collectively characterized in Indonesia as the ‘floating masses’.77

Siddiq Amien, head of Persis Indonesia and Benda Pesantren,Tasikmalaya believed that democracy may be a pragmatic way of living ina modern state. Noting that the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, heexplained that Muslims themselves have the right to determine the affairsof the country. He himself was member of National Parliament from 1999to 2004, as part of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD - DewanPerwakilan Daerah) faction. He believed that this democratic system shouldstruggle to develop a State which maintains morality and integrity. Thesetwo values, according to him, could be provided by religion, in this caseIslam. He also gave credit to the importance of mass organizations as theagents of civil society. He illustrated this by attributing the failure of politi-cal Islam in Afghanistan to the absence of strong civil society within it. Healso believed that the existing pro and contra in political process and soci-etal life are actually positive, as reasoned debate makes all agents of de-mocracy more mature. He was aware of the importance of political partiesin the democratic system, and he himself was affiliated with the (Islamic)Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB - Partai Bulan Bintang). He criticized theliberal camp for leaning too far towards western ideas and subordinatingIslam. In gender issues, he suggested that a woman’s political engagementshould be within the boundaries of her kodrat.78 He illustrated this by say-ing:

Yes, actually, in democracy people can vote or not, it is not a reli-giously forbidden thing to do. With its positive and negative impact,I personally use it and I have experience of practicing it. I think thatthe legeslative body needs members with integrity. If many Mus-lims choose not to vote now, history will repeat itself and we returnto a complete absence of qualified members. In fact, implementationof the democratic system is entirelyvalid, because at the end themajority of voice is the determinant. That is what happened in WestJava, including Tasikmalaya... In Manokwari79 it was the Christianmajority voice that determined the aspirations of people. This is OK,as the same tendency occurs in Muslim cities… We need Muslimmass organizations. We can learn from the experience in Afghani-stan, where the Taliban occupied the region but they were not readyto formalize Shari‘a because they did not have mass organizationssupporting them.... I have seen that current Islam in Indonesia is


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tough, able to handle excessive pressures... it is now more maturebecause of this current development of culture... firm resistencemakes them more mature... With regards of pluralism, human rightsand gender, they has positive sides, but the Qur’an should be thebarometer and not the other way around. As I see it, in Islam there isalways a limitation and that for the purpose of protecting women....80

Another respondent was Asep Hidayat, head of Al-Furqan pesantrenand a member of Local Parliament of Tasikmalaya Regency as part of theProsperous Justice Party (PKS - Partai Keadilan Sejahtra) faction (2004-200). He held “public interest” or mas }a >lih } mursala as the basis of his in-volvement in politics. Democracy for him provides a measured and ac-countable way of how to do ma‘ru >f or khayr (good deeds) through thestruggle for policies that may improve the welfare, education and health ofsociety.81 Iip Syamsul Arief, the head of Muhammadiyah for Tasikmalaya,had similar opinions. He believed that the existing system is appropriatefor Indonesian citizens, including Muslims. He was also convinced that theexisting system will empower citizens, including women, but it necessi-tated natural process and a long period, at least another 20 years. By thattime, significant results and development will have been achieved; democ-racy will be much more mature. The capacity and skill of women will bemuch, much better and they will be ready to compete with their male col-leagues for status, role and career opportunity.82

Achef Mubarok, the present head of the Indonesian Council of Mus-lim Scholars (MUI - Majlis Ulama Indonesia) of Tasikmalaya Kota, arguedthat the existing political system provides ample opportunities to improvesociety, including Muslim societies in the country. Only through the exist-ing system are Muslims realistically able to improve their lives. He consid-ered the weakness of the country is education, in which general and reli-gious education are not yet integrated. Education development will pavethe way for economic, health and cultural development. He consideredthat these are the preconditions a democratic system needs to run prop-erly. In other words poverty, ignorance and sickness impede democracy.Both Islam and democracy are dedicated to eradicating these from soci-ety.83 Asep Abdullah, head of the Condong pesantren’s Parents’ Committeein Tasikmalaya, shared Mubarak’s view, and considered that Islam and de-mocracy come together in the reciprocity principle, man lam yarh }am lamyurh }am (people who do not care about others will not be cared about bythem).84

The politicians and local KPU staff members interviewed all supportedthe implementation of democracy from an Islamic perspective. ThreeTasikmalaya District Parliament (DPRD) members were interviewed; AniNuraini, Evi Elvinadianty and Ucu Dewi, from the political parties PAN,PPP, and PKS respectively. They believed that Islam could bring about theimplementation of democracy in Indonesia. Nuraini stressed the impor-tance of Islam as a measurement of the implementation of democracy 85,whereas Elvinadianty hoped that Islamic political parties would collabo-


rate strongly in attempting to meet public expectations.86 Dewi further-more underlined the role of a political party as a bridge between the expec-tations of the public and at the interests of the Government.87

Government officials interviewed all agreed with implementation ofdemocracy in the country, with one exception. Ade, head of Cipakat Vil-lage, illustrated the absence of Muslim aspirations to develop concepts ofhuman rights by referring to history. Politically he suspected ulterior mo-tives of revenge towards Muslims. With these two points he believed thatdemocracy that includes human rights and gender equality should becontextualized and measured against Islam. He explained that human rightsare universal, and so is Islam (rah }ma li al-‘a >lami >n – a blessing for all theworld). The universalism of human rights, according to him, should nottransgress Islamic universalism because the former functions only here inthe world, whereas Islam operates here and also the hereafter. Islam re-spects and requires the balance of rights and obligations, whereas Ade saw“Human Rights” more as rights without obligations. This is why HumanRights often fail to appreciate some of the wisdom of Islamic teachings, forexample in gender issues.88

Educators interviewed held similar views to the government officials.They were supporters of democracy. Salman al-Farisi, a young lecturer,believed that relations between the West and Muslims are marked by mu-tual suspicion, however both ideologies can agree on the importance ofprotecting and empowering women, because this is an enduring universalneed. Of the two perspectives, he prefered the Islamic model, as it has servedTasikmalaya well for over four centuries.89

None of the activists and national Muslim intellectuals who were in-terviewed form part of this camp, as for the large part they were uncommit-ted, undecided or had open attitudes towards the relations between Islamand democracy. In terms of gender, the proponents of this camp believedthat although a woman may work the same way as a man, the place and timeof the work may differ because of the woman’s kodrat. For example, awoman’s job should not interfere with her responsibilities of householdmanagement and child bearing, and she should not work at night. Blackburnfinds that under the New Order regime the state upheld an ideology of gen-der that is supported by culture and religion.90

Iip Syamsul Arif, head of Muhammadiyah for the Tasikmalaya dis-trict, for example, argued that in Muhammadiyah, men and women areequal. This is not only a matter of organizational policy, but can be seen inthe practice of men and women working hand in hand in public activities.The organization itself has a female wing, Aisyiah, in which young femalemembers can be active. However, he noted that women’s activism in publicaffairs may be restricted by their natural rights or kodrat, and explainedthat many women work together with male partners in areas such as educa-tion and health care activities. Arif believed that the political sphere is stilltoo large for women. His conviction may reflect commonly accepted val-ues which prefer women to tend to household matters and child bearing


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and rearing. He did not see this as a religious matter, but one of job alloca-tion and understanding the rights and obligations of husbands and wives.Mushâwara or dialogue for redistributing job descriptions may help tosolve the problem. So, both husband and wife can both have their owncareers, without being afraid of neglecting their obligations or other rights.91

The Islamizing Democracy CampThe last camp may be called ‘Islamist’ for their exclusive use of Islam

as their perspective. They accepted and implemented democracy, genderequity and human rights, but in ways according to their own understand-ing. They invoked the term ‘democracy’ only to support their own inter-ests. Some ulama may be classified in this camp, such as a group known asAjengan bendo,92 Ii Abdul Haq, a leading figure of MMI (Majlis MujahidinIndonesia – Indonesian Council of Holy Warriors) in West Java, and a pro-ponent of Toliban, (not to be confused with the Taliban).93 This camp be-lieved that Muslims should regulate their lives by Islam, the Qur’an and theSunna. They criticized Muslims who do otherwise. However they did not allsee involvement in politics the same way. Miftah Fauzi, a member of AjenganBendo and head of the pesantren Asaira Tajur, Tasikmalaya, criticized otherKyais who involve themselves in politics, saying that their ideal role is asguardians of morality. If they become involved in politics, they will find itdifficult to maintain high principles and values and maintain their authori-tative role in society, as they may become trapped by their political inter-ests. He also proposed the spirit of the Medina Charter as the authenticmodel of democracy, because this charter provides the first example ofIslamic public affairs with direct relevance to democracy and conceptssuch as social contract, mutual understanding, accountability, and honor-ing the rights and obligations of all parties.94 Mahfudz Shiddiq, anothermember of Ajengan Bendo and head of Pesantren Nurul Arief Salam inTasikmalaya, strongly believed that Muslims should implement Shari‘athrough the existing system. He and some other members of Ajengan Bendoparticipated in preparing draft regulations for local government relating toformalizing the principles of Shari‘a.95

Ii Abdul Haq was head of MMI in West Java from 2001 to2006, andsince 2006 has been head of MMI’s Consultative Council (Dewan Syura).He had a pragmatic perspective of the relations between Islam and democ-racy. He cited a principle of Islamic jurisprudence, ma > la > yudraku kulluh la >yutraku kulluh (things that are not entirely known need not be entirelyrejected). By this he means that just because the existing systems are notcompletely Islamic, we do not need to completely reject them. If we didthis we might find we had no system at all. He interpreted relations betweenIslam and democracy as evolving through systemic social change, basedon living as absolute Muslims. He explained that we have to let Islam comein to and guide us comprehensively, following the method of listening(sami‘na >) and then following (at }a‘na >). There are four steps to building inte-grated individuals and an ideal society: first, individual character building,


second, family character building, third, village building, and fourth, na-tion-state building. He quoted the Qur’an, al-Ru >m: 3096 and 3297 tostrengthen the importance of taking care of the family. The ProphetMuhammad’s life history, according to him, taught the importance of obe-dience and efficacy or social awareness. The power of obedience was verypowerful for the purposes of social consolidation and productivity. Theperiod of Mecca and Medina are the first example of how to build societyand a state based on these values. These four steps are not separated fromthe MMI’s three main methods of dakwah: first, a cultural approach intransforming society through Islamic values; second, using the method ofdakwah or preaching; third, using the method of jiha >d in its broader mean-ing of leaving no stone unturned to gain an objective. He considers that theadvocacy of Muslim figures in Tasikmalaya City and Regency for local gov-ernment regulations based on Islamic teaching (Perda Syari‘ah) is part ofthis jiha >d.98

Zenzen, head of Toliban movement, is disappointed with the religiousagents who work either in civil society or for the state. He is critical of thestate for its poor education, health care and poverty reduction services. Heis greatly concerned with the insensitivity and the immorality of peoplegenerally, and especially of state employees. He concluded that democ-racy contributes to this situation, as it concentrates only on power. Despitethis, he still acknowledged democracy because it provides leadership, andthis is better than a state with no leader. He acknowledged the view that inIndonesia Islam has been restricted to individual, personal matters. Thiscan be traced to the period of Dutch colonization, when Muslims were con-trolled and monitored. They were directed to refrain from social action andto confine their religion to matters of worship. This changed only when thesocial action aspects of Islam were influenced by Indonesian students whohad studied in the Middle East, however their impact was not significantthen because of strict control by the New Order, and the established way ofIslamic education which dealt mainly with individual and family matters.Excising Islam’s social elements paralyzed the Islamic public sphere. Forthese reasons Zenzen believed that we need to reconnect Islam’s social andreligious functions so that it can contribute to social development.99

Asep Akhmad Mausoel was a participant in the political process and amember of parliament for the United Development Party (PPP – PartaiPersatuan Pembangunan). Despite this, he criticed the concept of humanrights, as the concept entails Western and Jewish values and only eradi-cates rights. For him, talking about rights requires talking about obliga-tions at the same time. A considered comprehension of the balance of rightsand obligations will give a greater appreciation of the roles of men andwomen. Gender and human rights in Islam, according to him, are betterexplained by taking this stance, which includes that fact that women havekodrat, or God-given, intrinsically feminine natures. Their kodrat may af-fect their performance through such things as menstruation, pregnancyand breast feeding. To maintain fairness, these factors have consequences


3 0

which should be handled without discriminating against men.100

In relating Islam and modernity, Ismail, a religious teacher at HaurKuning pesantren, Salopa, preferred not to go beyond what is written in theQur’an and Sunna, and the writings of classical ulama. He measured realityby these normative precepts. Gender relations are operative within thesevalues, and women’s space, opportunities and social activities are deter-mined by their kodrat and by their capabilities and limitations.101

The Anti-democracy CampThe anti-democracy camp rejected the concept of democracy simply

because it is not Islamic. However, empirically the refutation is negotiated,and they considered the present situation as temporary. Their opinion onleadership is that although a system or a ruler may not be Islamic, they sawthis as better than society without a system or a ruler. They shared thisview with the Islamizing camp. The difference lies on this camp’s rejectionof the concept of democracy, whereas the other camp criticized it rigor-ously. Salafi organizations such as pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah of Tasikmalayaand Hijbu al-Tahrir are cases in point.

Islam, according to Abu Qotada Suherlan, head of Ihya al-Sunnapesantren in Tasikmalaya, is ka >mil (perfect) and mutakammil (causes per-fection). These two characteristics are supported by the ideal practices ofthe formative period of Salaf, the time of the Prophet Muhammad, theS {ah }a >ba (Companions of the Prophet), Ta >bi‘i >n (Followers) and the Ta >bi‘ al-ta >bi‘i >n (Followers of the Followers). This claim to Islam’s perfection is in-spired and confirmed by the Sunna of the Prophet. The camp believes thatthese periods and their heritage contain general teachings, values and ex-amples of models for all situations, and provide all that Muslim and humanbeings need to guide their lives, whenever and wherever. In other words,they provide for general as well as specific matters. The general matters orvalues are principles, the details of which may differ from time to time.However certain specific matters are unchanging, for example matters of‘iba >da (worship) such as S {ala >, or fasting during the month of Ramadhan arepermanently referent to the practice of the Prophet Muhammad and theverses of the Qur’an. With these considerations, the Ihya >’ al-Sunna (Reviv-ing the Tradition) Pesantren in Tasikmalaya has developed its own commu-nity where its members live by themselves, learn religious and generalknowledge, perform religious preaching (dakwah), run their own educa-tion program, and even do business and staff their own cooperatives.102

They have their own dress code, in order to protect them from wrongdoing. A male member wears a loose pair of trousers and a long gamis.103 Amale Salafi member usually dresses in white. The women wear clothingthat covers the whole body, with a burka or veil that covers all the headexcept the eyes. Even their feet are covered by socks. They usually weardark coloured clothes and veils, and black is their favorite color.

According to Suherlan, tarbiya or education may be defined notmerely as running a school, but also as character building with Salafi nu-


ances. It is the first priority of the movement and implemented by adoptingvarious formats. The Salafi seem open in this matter because they considerthis area as tajruba or an experiment which aims to find the best methodsan educator can adopt. In this they maintain their Salafi paradigm andperspective, into which they contextualize their tajruba so they can havethe best benefit from both traditions. The community uses standard schoolsubjects, materials and methods for teaching both religious and generalknowledge. They use the standard curriculum (Kurikulum Tingkat SatuanPendidikan/KTSP - Level of Education Curriculum Unit) which covers frompre-school to senior high school levels. Suherlan furthermore expectedthat sometime in the future, they will be able to offer higher education. Tosupport the effectiveness of management and teaching processes, they areequipped with computers. For religious matters, they use Islamic sourcesof the Tradition, the opinions and practices of the Companions, Tabi‘i >n, andTa >bi‘ al-Ta >bi‘i >n. Based on this they have developed a Salafi paradigm whichstresses the use of belief and work in implementing religious teachings. Aqlor ratio is better used under the guidance of naql or Divine guidance.104

Suherlan explained that Islam places women in an honored position,and Islam itself is the religion of moderation. In his words, Islam is in themiddle position, wast } bayna al-Yahu >d wa wast } bayna Nas }a >ra > (in themiddle position between Jews and Christianity). By this he meant Chris-tianity as a Western tradition that is seen to be too liberal, and the Jewishtradition as being too rigorous. He gave the example of the different way amenstruating woman is treated. He believed that Christianity has a looserattitude than the Jewish religion, but Islam stands in between, allowing ahusband to tease his wife when she has her period, with the only prohibi-tion being on sexual intercourse.

The honoured position accorded women and Islam’s moderation be-come perspectives to define a woman’s role, either in the private or publicsphere. For example, he considered that a non Salafi woman may havecareer in politics as long as she can maintain her honour and carefulness. ASalafi woman is not allowed a political career, on the grounds that the po-litical system adopted by the state is not Islamic. Furthermore he explainedthat the Salafi period provides practices for Muslims which honour women.The second fundamental position in the relations between man and womanis that they are based on difference and not sameness. Islam, according tohim, acknowledges the difference between women and men in terms ofkawniyya khalqiya (creation) and of Shari‘a. God created man and womanwith certain different physical differences. The difference implies that theyhave different functions, different inclinations and different natures. Fol-lowing from this explanation, Shari‘a is provided by God to match the dif-ferent nature of man and woman. So the differences recognized in Shari‘aare actually designed not to subordinate women, but to honour them. Thedifference is not only applied to women but also to men, for example, thereis no permission for a man to leave prayer. If we reject these two basicgendered natures, we are deemed to contradict the naql or divine norm


3 2

and ‘aql or rationality (of the Shari‘a). For example, saying that woman andman are the same contradicts common sense and religious teaching, asboth of these respect the natural gender differences or kodrat.105

The Salafi camp, in the opinion of Suherlan, has two criticisms of femi-nism. The first of these concerns the phenomena of immorality betweenmen and women, which diminishes the place of women. Secondly, it criti-cizes existing feminist studies for not taking into consideration that immo-rality degrades the status of women. With regard to the first point, he ex-plained that modernity raises gender issues and the like, and results inmoral decadence in many aspects of life. He had witnessed loose and per-missive relations between girls and boys, and men and women. He esti-mated that many of female junior and senior high school students have losttheir virginity. News reports also show that many of the personal secretar-ies of members of the parliament have been sexually abused, and this con-firms worries about immorality.106

The second point argues that gender studies give little considerationto these facts. Suherlan insisted these facts are extremely worthy of consid-eration in seeking a solution to the deteriorating status of women. A morecareful and comprehensive study is critically needed. On one hand heseemed to suggest the need for rationalization of the existing Islamic heri-tage, specifically the Salafi legacies, and on the other hand the need tofocus on programs to preserve women’s morality. He explained that he andhis colleagues run their own education program as an example of the ef-forts to maintain the honored place of women.107

Concluding RemarksHaving discussed Tasikmalaya Muslim intellectuals’ perception of the

relation of Islam with gender and democracy, the study confirms that In-donesian Muslims accept the use of democracy, with certain adaptationsand contextualization. All except one of the people interviewed showed astrong belief in democracy, but criticized the way it is practiced. The ex-ception was the respondent from the Salafi Pesantren, who denied democ-racy and proposed Islam instead. All others argued that the system hasprovided opportunity and access fairly and equally to women and men.When democracy is seen from Islamic perspectives, they evaluated it againsttheir understanding of Islam. Some of the pro-democracy camp accepted iton the grounds of the universality of Islamic and democratic values such asfreedom, accountability, equal rights and transparency. They were, how-ever, critical of its practice, citing the difficulty of finding qualified repre-sentatives who will guarantee fulfilment of the public’s expectations.

Two other pro-democracy groups, the sharing camp and the Islamiz-ing camp, take similar stands, except in the extent to which they are moti-vated to validate democracy using Islamic precepts. In gender issues, thesethree camps find no objection to women having social activities, civic en-gagement and political participation as long as kodrat is maintained, par-ticularly the kodrat of women. They generally perceive what is often pro-


posed as socially constructed difference to be divine construction, givenby God, and thus something that must be accepted. Few community mem-bers, young activists or national level Muslim intellectuals interviewedperceive gender as socially constructed. However all respondents - reli-gious scholars, community leader, educators, politicians, state civil ser-vants and national or provincially active Muslim intellectuals – firmly agreewith the need for women’s empowerment on objective grounds.

Interestingly, the study finds that although there is an anti-democ-racy camp which refuses democracy because it is not Islamic, their practi-cal stand is to accept the existing system, considering that it is better thanbeing void of any system or leader. In Tasikmalaya this camp is primarilyrepresented by the Salafi, whose main activities are concentrated in theirpesanntren, Ih }ya >’ al-Sunna (Reviving the Tradition). This camp and a smallnumber of the Islamizing camp criticize Western modernity as being a non-Muslim way. The Salafi consider the current situation as temporary, be-cause while they are living in this environment they are developing theirown way which will succeed in the fullness of time. However, the camp seesno objection to women engaging in social and political processes, as long asthe kodrat is upheld. Their exception to this principle is Salafi female mem-bers, as guarding their morality makes them feel more secure. The Salafialso agree with the initiative of formalizing Shari‘a in law or local govern-ment regulation, as proposed by the sharing and Islamizing camps, but donot participate in the struggle to have draft legislation ratified by the gov-ernment and the legislative body.

The pro-democracy followers contitute the majority in TasikmalayaKota and Kabupaten and they contextualize the democratition process inthe area, thus the religious institutions and local ethnic values embeddedin social practices will maintain their alignment with this process. Revivingreligious and local ethnic values which are compatible with democraticvalues will certainly contibute to a better democratic processes.

Local Muslim intellectuals’ perceptions of life in Tasikmalaya are con-sistent with my field observations. Muslim women in Tasikmalaya workhand in hand with their opposite gender partners in almost every field ofsocial activities. It seems generally that they have as wide a range of publicengagements as their male counterparts, as if there were no gender-basedconstraints. What differentiates them from men is the quantity and qualityof their role and performance. In terms of quantity, with the exception ofeducation and health, in almost every field of work and social arena thepercentage participation rate of men and women disproportionately favoursmen,. On the other hand, in terms of quality, economic factors and levels ofeducation are very important in providing access and opportunity of bothmen and women. Women who have a good education and financial supportare likely to have more opportunities and a greater potential role in soci-ety. The less education and financial support they receive from their familyor society, the fewer opportunities they are likely to have. This suggests acontradiction in the mixture of values embedded in society. The source of


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these values is often claimed to be a parochial understanding of Islam heldby some Muslims, and the normative hold of Sundanese ethics. However,this does not necessarily mean that Tasikmalaya Muslims can be describedas anti-modern and anti-democratic, as most of them agree with and sup-port that the modern, democratic practices of the State.

All this suggests strongly that Tasikmalaya can be seen as a living,working example of the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Theproblem confronting the democratization process in the country, includ-ing in Tasikmalaya, is that inadequate basic education, health and welfareservices, and corruption, injustice and discrimination work together tohinder the this process. In a global context, where countries such as thoseof the Middle East still critically question the compatibility of Islam anddemocracy, the example of Tasikmalaya shows that democratization canwork in Muslim societies. Those who doubt this would do well to noteTasikmalaya’s example, and open themselves to the possibilities inherentin the synergies of Islam and democracy.

Notes1 In this article I use “Tasikmalaya” generally to refer to both the city (kota) andthe District (kabupaten). When one or the other is required I specify it directly,for example Tasikmalaya Kota.2 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. of vol. 2, ch. 4 (1963); fromWirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Basic Concepts in Sociology, trans. by H.P. Secher(1962).3 Karl Wiifogel, Oriental Despotism: A comparative Study of Total Power, (NewHeaven etc.: Yale University Press, 1957).4 Samuel Huntington P, Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order,(London: The Free Press, 2002).5 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and the Middle EasternResponse, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).6 Azyumardi Azra and Wayne Hudson (eds.), Islam Beyond Conflict: IndonesianIslam and Western Political Theory, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), p. 1 .7 Bernard Lewis, “A Historical View”, in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Platter andDaniel Brumberg (eds.), Islam and Democracy in Middle East, (Baltimore andLondon: The Johns Hopkins university Press, 2003), p. 209.8 Paul Marshall (ed.), Radical Islam’s Rules: The Worldwide Spread of ExtremeShariá Law, (Lanhma: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing inc., 2005).9 Robert W. Hefner, Islam, State and Civil Society, (New York: SEAP Cornell Uni-versity, 1993); and Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization inIndonesia, (Princeton, NJ (etc.): Princeton University Press, 2000).10 John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia: An Antrophology of PublicReasoning, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).11 Kathryn Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, (London & NewYork: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2009).


12 Saeful Mujani, “Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Politi-cal Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, A. Dissertation, (Ohio: The OhioState University, 2003).13 Nelly van Doorn-Harder, Women Shaping Islam: Indonesian Women Readingthe Qur’an, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006).14 Azyumardi Azra and Wayne Hudson (eds.), Islam Beyond Conflict: IndonesianIslam and Western Political Theory.15 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, (Princenton: Princeton UniversityPress, 2004).16 Azyumardi Azra and Wayne Hudson (eds.), Islam Beyond Conflict: IndonesianIslam and Western Political Theory, p. 5.17 “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, andmade you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that yemay despise (each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allahis (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is wellacquainted (with all things).” (the Qur’an, Al-Huju >ra >t/49: 13).18 Interview with Dudung A. Kasah, 10 February 2009.19 Interview with Asep Mausoel, 14 October 2008.20 Interview with Miftah Fauzi, 11 February 2009.21 Interview with Lia Srimulayni, 24 November 2008.22 Interview with Djudju Djubaedah, 1 September 2008.23 Interview with Lia Srimulyani, 24 November 2008.24 Interview with Moneng Masithoh, 21 November 2008.25 LDII is actually not confronting the existing political system. It appeared asYayasan Karyawan Islam (YAKARI) established January 3, 1972 in Surabaya,and was changed into Lemkari in its Musyawarah Besar (Big Conference) in1981 and took its present name in 1990 for its similarity with the acronym ofLembaga Karate-Do Indonesia (Indonesian Institute for KarateDo), as suggestedby General Rudini, the Internal Affairs Minister at that time. (http://www.ldii.or.id/content/view/39/26/lang,id/August 19, 2009). However, the organiza-tion has been criticized for having associated with Islam Jamaáh or Darul Haditsestablished in 1952 by Nurhasan Ubaidillah Lubis. In the past, member of theorganization openly treated non members as unclean by such demeaning prac-tices as scrupulously cleaning places in their mosque where visitors had per-formed prayers. Some of their key concepts which implied exclusivity weremanqul (exclusive chain of authority of learning) whereby the members learnonly from internal authority, ima >ma/leadership and bay‘a/oath of loyalty, as-suming others as kafir, etc. However, they undertook an internal re-evaluationand are now developing a smoother approach to others. Politically, having beenaffiliated with Golkar in the past, in 2005 LDDI shifted its stance to a neutralposition. LDII also reaffirmed its neutral stance and open attitude to other othersin 2007 in response to MUI’s Fatwa No 3 2006 on religious life in Indonesia.Habib Setiawan, Robi Nurhadi and Muhammad Muchson Anasy, After New Para-digm: Catatan Para Ulama tentang LDII, (Pusat Studi Islam, Madinah Institute,2008).26 HTI is a branch of transnational HT. HT’s main goal is the re-establishment ofthe Islamic Caliphate. It operates in over 43 countries in the world. HTI is one of

http://www.ldii


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the largest members in the Muslim World. Sheikh Taqiuddin Nabhani, thefounder, proposed a universalist Islam as an answer to the problems of the Mus-lim World. In contrast to Western political concepts, he advocated a caliphateand single ummah instead. Many observers believe that this idea is “fundamen-tally at odds with the goals of the nation-state.” Mohamed Osman, MohamedNawab. “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Reviving the Khilafah in the Nusantara (MalayWorld)” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA 49th ANNUAL CON-VENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco 2008. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253842_index.html, August 19, 2009.27 DDII was established in 1967 by a number of Muslim leaders and initiated byMohammad Natsir, former head of Masyumi Party (Majelis Syura MusliminIndonesia) and Prime Minister Indonesia. Among other important figures arePrawoto Mangkusaswito, Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap (another former PrimeMinister), Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara (formerly proposed as President of In-donesia and Governor of BI), DR. Mohammad Rasjidi (First Ministry of ReligiousAffairs), Mr. Mohammad Roem (former Vice Prime Minister and Minister ofForeign affairs RI), KH. Hasan Basri (former head of MUI) , KH. Faqih Usman(former Minister of Religious affairs RI), K.H.M. Yunan Nasution, K.H.Taufiqurrahman, H.M.D.Dt. Palimo Kayo, Prof. Osman Raliby, DR. AnwarHarjono, K.H.M. Rusyad Nurdin, H.A. Malik Ahmad, etc.28 JI or Darul Hadits was established in 1952 by Nurhasan Ubaidillah Lubis andat the same time Pondok Pesantren Burengan Kediri was also founded. In 1963the head of Pesantren Burengan was handed down to Drs. Nurhasym and Lubiswas still active there. It is believed that since then a number of practices wereconsidered derailed from the mainstream of Islam. The state, through theMahkamah Agung/MA (Supreme Court), responded to this delicate issue andissued a decree to ban the organization, No. Kep-089/D.A/10/1971. HabibSetiawan, Robi Nurhadi and Muhammad Muchson Anasy, After New Paradigm,pp. 1-2.29 MMI was established in 2000 in Yogyakarta, recommended by its first con-gress which took place on August 5-7, 2000. MMI’s political stand is neutral. Itcriticizes the state for using democracy as political system. For them democracyis not Islamic, and instead it proposes the formalization of shari’a. MMI alsoconsiders democracy as a stumbling block, because the proponents of Shari’a arefar fewer than the proponents of democracy. Organizationally, MMI does notparticipate in political practices to maintain Muslim ummah solidarity. How-ever, the organization allows its individual members to participate in any politi-cal parties. http://majelismujahidin.wordpress.com/2008/01/31/profil-majelis-mujahidin/#more-4 August 20, 200930 Martin van Bruinessen, Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational Re-form and the Travails of Pluralism in Indonesia, nd, pp. 1-12.31 Susan Blackburn, Women and the State in Modern Indonesia, (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2004), pp. 227-228; Kathryn Robinson, Gender, Islamand Democracy in Indonesia, pp.1-9; etc.32 They are Ir. Asep zamzami Nur, Msc., KH. Asep Mubarok, KH. Ismail, KH. M.Zaenal Muttaqien Aziz known as ustadz Zenzen, KH. Asep Akhmad Mausoel,Asep Hidayat, S1., Iip Syamsul Arif, KH. Asep Abdullah, KH.Abu QatadahSuherlan, KH.Ii Abdul Haq, KH. Mahfud Shiddiq, KH. Dudung A. Kasih, KH.Miftah Fauzi and KH. Siddiq Amien. KH. is abbreviation of Kyai Haji. Kyai is an

www.allacademic.com/meta/p253842_index.html

http://majelismujahidin.wordpress.com/2008/01/31/profil-majelis


honorific for the person who is held to have deep knowledge and ceremonial skillsin Islam. A Muslim scholar usually gains the title from society. The title alsobelongs to traditional camp of Islam. Haji is a title for the person who has per-formed Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca. Ustads in Indonesian context is similar toKyai but it belongs usually to modernists, or to a person who teaches Islamicteachings.33 “.......Kalau agama dan demokrasi tidak bertentangan denga n Islam.Kemudian, demokrasi itu diartikan bahwa hak dan kewajiban mengelola duniaini adalah hak bersama, namun ada regulasinya, regulasi berupa produksehingga tidak ada satupun yang terampas haknya oleh orang lain, tidak adasatupun komunitas terampas hak-haknya oleh sebuah komunitas, sehinggatidak terjadi pergolakan hidup antara manusia di muka bumi ini yang manapergaulan ini adalah merugikan satu pihak, menguntungkan satu pihak lain.Jadi tidak ada pihak yang berpangku tangan mendapat beban tanggung jawabtapi mendapatkan yang banyak sampai-sampai hak orang lain terampas.Bapakmah memahami demokrasinya di sana dan memang itu demokrasitheologis dan itu sumbernya keyakinan, the Q. 49: 13, ....Lita‘a >rafu > tapi diakhirnya fa’inna akramakum ‘inda Alla >h Atqa >kum... (...Sesungguhnya yang pal-ing mulia di sisi Allah adalah yang paling taqwa diantara kalian....) danmemahami Lita‘a >rafu > as mu‘a >shara bi al-ma‘ru >f antara wanita dan laki-laki inipun sudah kelihatan bahwa laki-laki itu punya kesederajatan punya hak danpunya kewajiban yang sama ....”34 Interview with Dudung A. Kasah, 10 February 2009.35 Ajengan has a similar meaning to term kyai, i.e a religious scholar. Sundanesepeople usually call kyai “ajengan”.36 Bendo literally means hat, here refers to white hat covered with long veil, andthe person who wears it, dressed in a white skirt similar to the dress worn byPangerang Diponogoro.37 “Pemasangan spanduk itu memang memancing, itu menjadi perbincangan,menjadi terbuka dan dalam setiap wawancara saya jelaskan seperti itu. Jadibahwa hasil dari gembar-gembor keinginan pelaksanaan syaria ’t Islam ituhanya satu yang dilaksanakan, yaitu poligami. Isu ini menarik pada Pemilukemudian, tahun 1999, tapi di Pemilu 2004 tidak kedengaran lagi isupelaksanaan syari’at Islam di Tasikmalaya. Awalnya isu syari’at Islam itu kerassekali, sebagian bilang, kita harus ambil pencuri dan bawa ke alun-alun danpotong tangannya. Hal ini kemudian tidak kedengaran lagi”. Interv iew withAcep Zam Zam Nur, October 15, 200838 Amin Mudzakkir, “Mejadi Kota Santri : Wacana Islam dalam Ruang Urban diTasikmalaya”, Afkar, Edition 20, 2006, pp. 78-100.39 Interview with Acep Zam Zam Nur, 15 October 2008.40 They are Ade Mustikawti (head of PNBK for Tasikmalaya Regency and formerhead of Margaluyu Village, Manonjaya, Tasikmalaya regency), Evi Elvinadianty(member of DPRD/Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/The Regional People’sRepresentative Council of Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, PPP/Parati PersatuanPembangunan/United Development Party), Dede T. Widiarsih (head of LocalTransportation and member of DPRD Tasikmalaya Regency), Jejen (head of DCommission of DPRD Tasikmalaya City), Ucu Dewi Syarifah (member of DPRDTasikmalaya Regency of PKS), Ani Nuraini (member of the DPRD KotaTasikmalaya of PAN), Drs, Chalish Muchlis, M.Hum (head of KPU’s Kota


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Tasikmalaya, 2004-2008 and 2009-2014), Drs. Dadan Badran (head of KPUKabupaten Tasikmalaya 2004-2008), Deden (head of KPU KabupatenTasikmalaya, 2008- 2014), and Ani Heryani, M.Hum (head of Panwaslu/PanitiaPengawasan Pemilu/Committee of General Election, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya2004-2008 and lecturer at STISIP/Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik/College of Social and Political Sciences, Tasikmalaya).41 “... bagi masyarakat bawah yang dilihat adalah bukan korupnya Soeharto cs,tapi stabilitas dan harga-harga teh stabil. pemikiran-pemikiran sederhana ieujadi pertimbangan. Ayena wae setelahnya Orde Baru runtuh harga pada naek,miningkeneh pak Harto. .....Siapapun presidennya, kitu nya, dari PKPB, itumungkin akan melihat lagi kebijakan-kebijakan pak Harto ketika dia lagiberkuasa.” (Interview with Ade Mustikawati, 25 November 2008).42 Interview with Cholish Muchlis and Jejen Jaenuddin, 10 November 2008.43 Interview with Cholish Muchlis, 4 November 2008.44 Interview with Cholis Muchlish, 4 November 2008.45 Interview with Atang Setiawan, 16 October 2008.46 Interview with Enung Nursaidah, 6 November 2008.47 In Indonesia the term Ulama refers to a person who is expert in religious sci-ences and ceremonies, and is used here with this meaning.48 Interview with Dadan Badran, 21 October 2008.49 They were Ade (head of Cipakat Village, Cipasung, Singaparna), Agus Abdullah(staff of Religious Department, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya), Asep Riri Fatah (headof Rajapolah Ward), Roni Sahroni (head of social and political affairs, KabupatenTasikmalaya), Titin, Eka dan Siti Hamidah (staffs of local Police Department,Kota Tasikmalaya), Lilis Ellia DM (head of sub division of Administration andDocumentation of Law affairs, Kota Tasikmalaya), Endin (head of Division ofReligion and Society, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya), Hermansyah (Staff of Centrefor Statistic Office, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya), Hj. Reni (head of Division of SocialAffairs, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya), N. Aah (staff of KUA Cibeurem, KotaTasikmalaya), Tatang Suryana (head of Sub Division of Administration andDocumentation of Law Affairs, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya) and Yulia Perdanawati(Head of Division of Human Resource Affairs, Kota Tasikmalaya City).50 Interview with Ade, 14 October 2008.51 Madrasa is classical Islamic school similar to secular school in Indonesia withthe difference on the certain proportion of Islamic subjects of its curriculum. It is“an institution here lessons are imparted or in other words, a school.” See FarishA. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinesses (eds.), The Madrasa in Asia,Poltical Activism and Transnational Linkages, (Amsterdam: The ISIM Series andAmsterdam University Press, 2008), pp. 9-10.52 Iip D. Yahya, Ajengan Cipasung: Biografi KH. Moh. Ilyas Ruhiyat, (Yogyakarta:Pustaka Pesantren, 2006), pp. 169-70.53 Interview with Asep Rili Fatah, 8 November 2008.54 Majlis Taklim is the informal institution where Muslims usually from those ofolder generation study Islamic teaching and recite the Qur’an.55 Interview with Enting, 22 October 2008.56 Interview with N. Aah, 14 November 2008.


57 Nelly van Doorn-Harder, Women Shaping Islam.58 They are Djudju Djubaedah (teacher of Madrasah Aliyah Cipasung and Mus-lim female feminist), Heriyanto, (teacher of Madrasah Aliyah Muhammadiyahand KNPI/Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia [Youth Indonesian National Com-mittee] activist in Tasikmalaya), Eka Yuniarti (teacher of SMA Muhammadiyahand al-Furqan Pondok Pesantren, Singaparna), Etih (head of SDN [Sekolah DasarNegeri/State Primary School] 2 Cilolohan I), Asep Tamam (lecturer of IAIC [Insti-tute Agama Islam Cipasung/Cipasung Institute for Islamic Studies & STAIN[Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri/Islamic State college] Tasikmalya), AiRukhayah (teacher of SMPN [Sekolah Menengah Pertama Negeri/State JuniorHigh School] 13 Tasikmalaya), Erly Nurhidayati (teacher of SMK [SekolahMenengah Keguruan/Vocational senior High School] Muhammadiyah,Tasikmalaya), Ida (teacher and principle of State Madrasah Aliyah, Cipasung),Mela Rifatul (junior teacher at al-Furqan Pondok Pesantren, SingaparnaTasikmalaya), Noneng Masitoh (lecturer of Siliwangi University, Tasikmalaya),Salman al-Farisi (lecturer of STISIP and HMI [Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Islamic Student Union] activist), KH. Usep Hudaibi (head of Abdul Aziz Founda-tion, Singaparna), Nunung (teacher at Abdul Azizi Foundation, Singaparna)and Nia Rohayati (lecturer of Siliwangi University and STAIN Tasikmalaya).59 Interview with Noneng Siti Masitoh, 21 November 2008.60 Interview with Asep Tamam, 21 October and 5 November 2008.61 This is an ironical, veiled reference to UUD as the common acronym forIndonesia’s national constitution – Undang-undang Dasar 1945.62 Interview with Djudju Djubaedah, 1 September 2008.63 Interview with Eka Yuniarti, 19 November 2008.64 “kita berusaha mendukung mana kira-kira yang bisa melaksanakan demokrasiini dengan bersih.” Interview with Eka Yuniarti, 19 November 2008.65 They are Atang setiawan, SHI (Coordinator LkaHAM, Tasikmalaya), LiaSuryani, SH. (Activist and advocate in Kabupaten Tasikmalaya), EnungNursaidah, SP, MSc., (head of Puan Amala Hayati, Cipasung Singaparna), IwaLasmini (activist, candidate of DPRD of PKPB), Jamal (student activist, KMRT[Koalisi Mahasiswa dan Rakyat Tasikmalaya/ Tasikmalaya Coalition of Studentand People]), Maskur and Dede (head and secretary of Karang Taruna,Rajapolah), Mimin Mintarsih (cadre of Posyandu, Rajapolah), Yatimi Medinah(cadre of Posyandu, Kersamenak, Kawalu Kota Tasikmala), Yayah Sofiah (cadreof Posyandu Rajapolah), Yuli Yulianti (head of RT/RW 01/02), Dewi Hikmah(coordinator of PKK Kecamatan Mangkubumi) and Usep Abdul Aziz (young ac-tivist).66 Interview with Atang Setiawan, 16 October 2008.67 Interview with Iwa Lasmini, 13 November 2008.68 Interview with Jamal, 21 October 2008.69 They are KH. Hussein Muhammad (head of pesantren, gender specialist andmember of National Commission of Women’s rights), Elis Suryani (Sundaneseexpert and lecturer of Univeristy of Padjadjaran), Neng Dara Afiah (head ofSub-commission of education and research of Komnas Perempuan), AD.Kusumaningtyas, SAg., MHum. (member of Rahima, Jakarta), BadriyahFayumi, LC. (member of DPR RI of PKB, 2004- 2009), Maria Ulfa Ansor (head ofFatayat NU 2000-2009, member of DPR RI 2004 – 2009), Masruchah (Secre-


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tary General of Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia [Indonesia Women’s Coalition forJustice and Democracy]), Evi Sofia (head of Nasyiatul A’isyiah,Muhammadiyah) and Imas Karyamah (head of Pemudi Persis).70 Interview with Badriyah Fayumi, 21 January 2009.71 The expression that Sundanese are Muslim is to show that the majority of themconverted to Islam. It may certainly be traced back to the history of Islamizatinin the region. Islamization in West Java began in the 15th century in north partof the province, and is identified with the pesantren Quro, at Pura, Karawangestablished by Syaikh Hasanuddin. At that time Sundanese communities werenot colonized by any other colonies. Islamization was intensified in Tasikmalayain the period of Syekh Abdul Muhyi (1650-1730). It was believed that Muhyiunderstood the existing culture very well, and this is why that he had success-fully asked Sundanese people to convert to Islam. Iip D. Yahya, Ajengan Cipasung,pp. 7-14.72 Interview with Elis Suryani, 24 November 2008.73 “...saleresnamah upami leures-leures menurut kesempatan, saleresna tanpaitu oge tiasa, istriteh. Tapi, kumargi katalikung tea tah, ku sagala rupi, adatistiadat, nilai, nilai dari agama dan sebaginya, janten masih keneh … kitu (teusiap?)... (Perempuan mempunyai) dinamika dalam batas-batas tertetu, norma-norma tertentu… Orang Sunda, istri-pameget nyepeng prinsip sineger tengah.Ieu saleresnamah, payun teuing, entong, pengker teuing entong, tengah-tengah... Meskipun perempuan itu meraih prestasi setinggi apapun, wanitaSunda jadi apapun harus tetap memegang norma-norma: norma agama, normaadat istiadat Sunda...” Interview with Elis Suryani, 24 November 2008.74 Ibuism is the term used to describe an ideology of motherhood in Indonesianhistory. The New Order used the term and concept of ibu to formulate the role ofwoman in both private and public spheres. Robinson. 2009: pp. 68-88;Blackburns: pp. 138-66.75 Interview with Evi Sofia, 4 February 2009.76 Interview with Karyamah, 9 January 2009.77 Maswadi Rauf, “Prolog: Mengungkapkan Hubungan Budaya Politik Lokal danDemokrasi”, in R. Siti Zuhro et al, Demokrasi Lokal: Perubahan danKesinambungan Nilai-nilai Budaya Politik Lokal di Jawa Timur, Sumatera Barat,Sulawesi Selatan dan Bali, (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2009), p. xv-xvi.78 Interview with Siddiq Amien, 13 November 2008.79 In predominantly Christian Papua.80 ya, sebenernya dalam demokrasi orang mau memilih atau tidak, sebenernyasesuatu yang tidak di haramkan. Yang tidak boleh itu adalah menganjurkanorang lain untuk golput. Saya pribadi dengan segala positif negative dengansystem demokrasi di ukur dari system Islam masih banyak hal hal yang terkaitdengan pengalaman masa lalu, padahal DPR di isi oleh orang orang yang punyaintregritas tinggi. Saya pikir ini perlu diisi. Kalau sekarang banyak orang islamyang golput itu terulangi lagi... Wajar aja, karena kultur Jawa Barat,Tasikmalaya bagain dari jawa barat, sebenarnya sistem demokrasi sah-sah ajayang menentukan pada akhirnya kan.. (suara terbanyak)...Suara terbanyakseperti di daerah kemaren manokwari mayoristas Kristen. Kalau di lihat yawajar aja, sebab ketika kota kota muslim yang dominan ada keinginan jugamereka...


... Keberadaan organisasi islam itu tetep di perlukan. Melihat pengalaman diafganistan Taliban menguasi daerah mendaulah kekuasaan tapi di afganistantidak ada Ormas-ormas Islam, nah ketika di buat Syariah Islam itu merekabelum siap... Saya melihat sekarang ini di Indonesia Islam jadi tahan bantingmenerima takanan bertubi tubi... lebih dewasa itu karena hasil perkembangankultur ... Yah sebenernya kalau saya justru dengan adanya resisitensi yangkeras mendewasakan mereka... Sebernernya nilai positif itu ada, pasti ada gen-der equality itu untuk mengukur Qur’an, begini saja sekarang seperti ini sajabanyak ketentuan Islam diukur dengan HAM, pluralism, kalau kita kaummuslimin justru Qur’an jadi barometer... : kalau ana memahaminya tetep tidakdi bolehkan saya melihat ajaran Islam ada batasan, itu pada hakikatnyamelindungi kaum wanita itu ...”81 Interview with Asep Hidayat, 5 November 2008.82 Interview with Iip Syamsul Arief, 25 October 2008.83 Interview with Achef Mubarok, 12 October 2008.84 Interview with Asep Abdullah, 14 February 2009.85 Interview with Ani Nuraini, 11 December 2008.86 Interview with Evi Elvinadianty, 23 October 2008.87 Interview with Ucu Dewi, 23 October 2008.88 Interview with Ade, 14 October 2008.89 Interview with Salman al-Farisi, 8 November 2008.90 Susan Blackburn, Women and the State in Modern Indonesia, p. 11.91 Interview with Iip Syamsul Arif, 25 October 2008.92 Ajengan bendo is the name in Tasikmalaya to a group of religious figures, andis a reference to the way they dress. According to KH. Mahfud Siddiq, the groupconsists of nine members: he himself, KH. Didi, KH. Asep Akhmad Maosul Affandi,KH. Amang Baden, KH. Miftah Farid, KH. Abdul Jabbar, KH. Miftah Fauzi, KH.Achef Mubarok and KH. Unang Faruk. KH. Didi, a senior member, had passedaway. The group emerged not long after the 1996 demonstration, known asDesember Kelabu or Tasikmalaya Lautan Api (Gloomy December or the Burn-ing Sea of Tasikmalaya). They urge people to formalize shari’a and propose draftlocal regulations which are in accordance with religious precepts. They buildcollaboration with both the public and the state, including the police.93 Toliban is a local Islamic movement pioneered by KH. Zenzen, head of al-Irsyadiyah Pesantren, situated at Jalan Paseh Tasikmalaya City. The move-ment was born from the initiative of KH. Zenzen. It was named Toliban, accord-ing to Zenzen, because the movement aimed to increase religious relevance withsocial practices. It derives from the verb molaba ya mlubu mâliban, meaningseeking for or in searching of (knowledge), thus he named the movement lâliban.The name of the organization was written as Toliban to differentiate from Taliban,a radical movement headed by Usamah bin Laden.94 Interview with Miftah Fauzi, 11 February 2009.95 Interview with Mahfudz Shiddiq, 13 February 2009.96 “So set thy purpose (O Muhammad) for religion as a man by nature upright -the nature (framed) of Allah, in which He hath created man. There is no alter-ing (the laws of) Allah’s creation. That is the right religion, but most men know


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not –” (the Qur’a >n, al-Ru >m/30: 30)97 “Of those who split up their religion and became schismatics, each sect exult-ing in its tenets.” (The Qur’a >n, al-Ru >m/30: 32)98 Interview with Ii Abdul Haq, 16 February 2009.99 Interview with Zenzen, 12 February 2009.100 Interview with Asep Akhmad Mausoel, 14 October 2008.101 Interview with Ismail, 18 February 2009.102 Interview with Abu Qotada Suherlan, 17 February 2009.103 Gamis is a long dress like pajama with longer size.104 Interview with Suherlan, 17 February 2009.105 Interview with Suherlan, 17 February 2009.106 Interview with Suherlan, 17 February 2009.107 Interview with Suherlan, 17 February 2009.

BibliographyAzra, Azyumardi and Wayne Hudson (eds.), 2008, Islam Beyond Conflict: Indo-

nesian Islam and Western Political Theory, Burlington: Ashgate.Blackburn, Susan, “Gender Interests and Indonesian Democracy”, in David

Bourchier and John Legge (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia: 1950’s and1990’s.

_______, 2004, Women and the State in Modern Indonesia, Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press.

Bowen, John R., 1998, “Qur’a >n, Justice, Gender: Internal Debates in IndnesianIslamic Jurisprudence”, in History of Religions: an Intenational Journal forComparative Historical Studies. Islam and Law, Vol. 38. Number 1. Au-gust 1998, pp. 52-78.

_______, 2003, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia: An Antrophology of PublicReasoning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, M., 1987, “Ibuism and Priyayization: Path toPower?”, in E. Locher-Scholten and A. Niehoff (eds.), Indonesian Womenin Focus: Past and Present Notions?, Dordrecht-Hollad: Foris Publication,pp. 43-51.

Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning (FK3) Jakarta, 2005, Kembang Setaman Perkawinan:Analisis Kritis Kitab ‘Uqud al-Lujjayn, Jakarta: Kompas.

Horokoshi, Hiroko, 1976, English edition and 1987 Indonesian, Kyai danPerubahan Sosial, Jakarta: P3M.

Hefner, Robert W., 2000, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia,Princeton, NJ (etc.): Princeton University Press.

Huntington P, Samuel., 2002, Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of WorldOrder, London: The Free Press

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Interview with Lia Srimulayni, 24 November 2008Interview with Djudju Djubaedah, 1 September 2008Interview with Moneng Masithoh, 21 November 2008Interview with Acep Zam Zam Nur, 15 October 2008Interview with Cholish Muchlis, 4 November 2008Interview Jejen Jaenuddin, 10 November 2008Interview with Dadan Badran, 21 October 2008Interview with Ade, 14 October 2008Interview with Asep Rili Fatah, 8 November 2008Interview with Enting, 22 October 2008Interview with N. Aah, 14 November 2008Interview with Asep Tamam, 21 October and 5 November 2008Interview with Djudju Djubaedah, 1 September 2008Interview with Eka Yuniarti, 19 November 2008Interview with Atang Setiawan, 16 October 2008Interview with Iwa Lasmini, 13 November 2008Interview with Jamal, 21 October 2008Interview with Elis Suryani, 24 November 2008Interview with Evi Sofia, 4 February 2009Interview with Siddiq Amien, 13 November 2008Interview with Asep Hidayat, 5 November 2008Interview with Iip Syamsul Arief, 25 October 2008Interview with Achef Mubarok, 12 October 2008Interview with Ani Nuraini, 11 December 2008Interview with Evi Elvinadianty, 23 October 2008Interview with Ucu Dewi, 23 October 2008Interview with Salman al-Farisi, 8 November 2008Interview with Badriyah Fayumi, 21 January 2009Interview with Imas Karyamah, 9 January 2009Interview with Asep Abdullah, 14 February 2009Interview with Dudung A. Kasah, 10 February 2009 Interview with Miftah Fauzi, 11 February 2009Interview with Ii Abdul Haq, 16 February 2009Interview with Zenzen, 12 February 2009Interview with Ismail, 18 February 2009Interview with Abu Qotada Suherlan, 17 February 2009Jackson, Karl D., 1990, Kewibawaan Traditional, Islam, dan Pemberontakan:

Kasus Darul Islam Jawa Barat, Jakarta: Grafiti.Jakubowicz, K., 1994, “Civil Society, Independent Public Sphere and Informa-

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Contemporary Perspectives on the Changing World Order, Indiana: PurdueUniversity Press, pp. 78-102.

Kabupaten Tasikmalaya dalam Angka Tahun 2005, 2006 , Tasikmalaya: BPSTasikmalaya Kabupaten.

Kurniawan, Herry D., “KH. M. Zaenal Muttaqien Azis: Kiai Thaliban dariTasikmalaya”, in Media Islam Sabili: Meniti Jalan Menju Mardhotillah. No.07, Year XI October 23, 2003, pp. 42-4.

Lewis, Bernard, 2002, What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and the Middle East-ern Response, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_______, 2003, “A Historical view”, in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Platter andDaniel Brumberg (eds.), Islam and Democracy in Middle East, Baltimoreand London: The Johns Hopkins university Press, p. 209.

Mudzakkir, Amin, “Mejadi Kota Santri : Wacana Islam dalam Ruang Urban diTasikmalaya”, Afkar, Edition 20, 2006 , pp. 78-100.

Mohamed Osman, Mohamed Nawab, “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Reviving theKhilafah in the Nusantara (Malay World)”, Paper presented at the annualmeeting of the ISA’s 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLEDIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, 2008.

Paul Marshall (ed.), 2005, Radical Islam’s Rules: The Worldwide Spread of Ex-treme Shariá Law. Lanhma: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, inc.

Ma’lous, Louwis,1975, al-Munjid fi> al-Lugha wa al-A‘la >m. Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq.Mujani, Saeful, 2003, “Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim

Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, A Dissertation, Ohio:The Ohio State University.

Peletz, Michael G., 2007, Gender, Sexuality, and Body Politics in Modern Asia, AnnArbor: Association for Asian Studies.

_______, 2009, Gender Pluralism: Southeast Asia Since Early Modern Times,New York and London: Routledge.

Rauf, Maswadi, 2009, “Prolog: Mengungkapkan Hubungan Budaya Politik Lokaldan Demokrasi”, in R. Siti Zuhro et al, Demokrasi Lokal: Perubahan danKesinambungan Nilai-nilai Budaya Politik Lokal di Jawa Timur, SumateraBarat, Sulawesi Selatan dan Bali, Yogyakarta: Ombak.

Robinson, Kathryn, 2009, Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, London &New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

_______, 2002, Women in Indonesia : Gender Equity and Development. Indone-sia Assessment Series, Singapore: ISEAS Press (ed. with Sharon Bessell).

Stout, Jeffrey, 2004, Democracy and Tradition, Princenton: Princeton Univer-sity Press.

Sullivan, Norma, 1983, “Indonesian Women in Development: State Theory andUrban Kampung Practice”, in Lenore Manderson (ed.), Women’s Workand Women’s Roles: Economics and Everyday Life in Indonesia, Malaysiaand Singapore, Camberra: Development Studies Centre, Australian Na-tional University.

Suryakusuma, Julia, 1996, “The State and Sexuality in the New Order Indone-sia”, in Laurie J. Sears (ed.), Fantasizing the Feminine in Indonesia, Durhamand London: Duke University Press, pp. 92-119.


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Turam, Berna, 2007, Between Islam and State: the Politics of Engagement, Stam-ford, California: Stanford University Press.

Vreede de Stuers, Cora, 1960, The Indonesian Woman: Struggles and Achieve-ments, The Hague: Mouton.

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van Doorn-Harder, Nelly, 2007, “Reconsidering Authority: Indonesian FiqhText About Women”, in R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammac (eds.),Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions, pp. 27-43.

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http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253842_index.html, 19 August 2009.h t tp ://ma je l i smuja hid in .wor dpr ess .com/2008 /01/31/pr of i l -ma je l i s-

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Muhammadiyah Scholars andDemocratic Transition in Post-New OrderIndonesia: The Critical Response ofMuhammadiyah Scholars toRadical Islamist Movements

M. Hilaly Basya*

Abstract

Following the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in Indonesia, the nation isexperiencing a transition to democracy. This very democracy is, however, threat-ened by the rapid growth of Islamist movements which aspire to the implemen-tation of shari’a throughout Indonesia and the establishment of an Islamic State.In its most extreme form, the contest is between theocracy and democracy. Inthis contestation of ideologies the voice of Muhammadiyah, as one of the country’sleading mass religious organizations, carries considerable weight. This articlereviews and discusses the perceptions of a number of influential Muhammadiyahscholars. It finds that Muhammadiyah encompasses both progressive and con-servative wings, and that there is heated debate between them over issues ofreligion and state. This can be seen in their attitudes towards Salafism andsecularism, and is reflected by their two distinctly different approaches to tack-ling radical Islamic movements – the political approach and the cultural ap-proach. The heart of the debate lies in the ability and/or willingness of Muslimleaders generally and Muhammadiyah scholars in particular to contextualizethe values of Islam within modern social and political theories, and align themwith the growth and consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

Keywords

Radical Islam, Muhammadiyah, moderate progressive, democratic transition,youth movement

* M. Hilaly Basya is a lecturer at the Master Program of Islamic Studies, the Univer-sity of Muhammadiyah Jakarta


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Introduction

After the fall of the New Order (Orde Baru) Regime of Indonesia in themiddle of 1998, Islamic radicalism increased significantly. Several

Islamic groups representing radicalism emerged and proposed the formal-ization of Islamic law (shari’a). They have attempted to establish an Is-lamic state, and are intolerant of religious diversity.1 The rapid growth ofthese radical Islamic movements in Indonesia is a consequence of politicalturmoil during the period of transition to democracy.2 Experts such asLiddle and Sorensen state that euphoria and extremity tend to increase atsuch times.3 At these moments, various movements, either radical or mod-erate, have an opportunity and the right to express their ideas. In this way,Islamic radical groups have developed in Indonesia.

Some Muhammadiyah scholars have devoted great attention to thephenomenon of religious radicalism. They are committed to providing guid-ance during this transitional period and during the process of democratiza-tion. They have criticized radical Islam’s ideas, and conducted workshopsand conferences to strengthen the role of moderate Islamic groups in stem-ming the growth of radical Islamic movements. However, the ability ofMuhammadiyah scholars to fight radical Islam’s ideas has been called intoquestion, because Muhammadiyah is associated with puritan and salafimovements. According to Khaled Abou El Fadl, in his book entitled TheGreat Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, puritan theology is posi-tively correlated with radical Islam.4

The main focus of my article is to explore the extent to whichMuhammadiyah scholars have been able to counter radical Islamic move-ments in the period of democratic transition in Indonesia’s post-New Orderregime. I would especially like to elaborate on Muhammadiyah scholars’ideas regarding the formalization of shari’a and democracy, and investi-gate how these scholars negotiate Salafism with democracy.

The Position of Muhammadiyah Scholars on Amending theConstitution

Amendment of the Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945) was a crucialstep in the early period of the democratic transition. Demands to changearticle (pasal) 29 resulted in heated debate among Muslim groups. RadicalIslamic groups demanded that Islamist political parties such as PPP andPBB in the People’s Representative Assembly (MPR) call for the constitu-tion to include ‘the seven missing words’ (the obligation to carry out shari‘afor adherents of Islam).5

In 2000 FPI, KISDI, KAMMI, and HTI mobilized approximately fivethousand people to pressure the MPR. They called on the MPR to amendarticle 29 of UUD 1945. Warhito Adnan, a leader of the FPI, said that theJakarta Charter is a political right of Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, hestated that non-Muslims should not be worried, because it does not pre-vent non-Muslims from going about their religious worship. In his view, if

4 9Muhammadiyah Scholars and Democratic Transition (M. Hilaly Basya)

shari‘a is implemented, non-Muslims are still free to pray according totheir own religions.6

These organizations believed that implementing State shari‘a was thebest solution to the social, economic, and political crisis. Furthermore,they accused Muslim scholars who rejected amendment of article 29, suchas Syafii Maarif, Hasyim Muzadi, and Nurcholish Madjid, of betraying Mus-lim struggles.

Syafi’i Maarif, the then chairman of Muhammadiyah, stated publiclythat naming any particular religion in UUD 1945 would create disintegra-tion. Article 29 should be seen as the final decision regarding the relationsbetween the State and religions. Moreover, by not mandating the obliga-tion of Muslims to carry out shari‘a in UUD 1945, Muslims remain uncon-strained in practicing their religious doctrines. In addition, Maarif statedthat attempts to force Muslims to obey the teachings of Islam would fail. Itwould be better for Muslims to implement Islamic doctrines voluntarily.7

Maarif, together with Hasyim Muzadi and Nurcholish Madjid, rejectedthe idea of including the Jakarta Charter, and in particular ‘the seven words’,in UUD 1945.8 Maarif’s position concerning the amendment of article 29was answered variously by Muhammadiyah activists. Some were disap-pointed because, according to them, it is not proper for a Muslim leader toreject shari‘a. Ultimately Muhammadiyah adopted Maarif’s opinion, andformalized this in its letter No.10/EDR/1.0/1/2002, which was released asa statement on the issue of the amendment.

Amien Rais, the chairman of the MPR and former chairman ofMuhammadiyah, held similar views to Maarif. According to Arskal Salim,the Reformasi Fraction representing PAN offered to amend article 29. Thewording was to be that ‘every believer is obliged to carry out their respec-tive religious teachings’.9 Salim saw the Reformasi Fraction as having simi-lar aims to those Islamist political parties attempting to include the JakartaCharter in the constitution. Salim also said that on the one hand PAN wantedto accommodate their constituents, most of whom were members ofMuhammadiyah, while on the other hand, it believed that religion shouldnot be regulated by the State. As a result, PAN offered an alternative solu-tion which was to include ‘the seven words’ and leave the original text ofarticle 29 UUD 1945 untouched.10

According to Saiful Mujani, PAN’s position regarding amendment ofUUD 1945 is a progressive one, since PAN rejected the inclusion of the ‘theseven words’. Mujani believes that PAN is predominantly supported byMuhammadiyah. This shows a significant change in Muhammadiyah’s po-litical position.11 Haedar Nashir shares this view. He believes PAN’s posi-tion was a clear rejection of the proposal to include the Jakarta Charter inthe article 29 of UUD 1945.12

As chairman of PAN at that time, Amien Rais played a significant rolein stemming the demands of radical Islamic groups attempting to amendarticle 29 of UUD 1945. Furthermore, Rais argued that MPR’s intention notto amend article 29 was based on requests by Muhammadiyah, NU, and


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other leaders from various religions in Indonesia who insisted on keepingarticle 29 unchanged.13

Response to Perda Syari’ahFor some Muhammadiyah scholars such as Syafii Maarif, Haedar

Nashir, and Moeslim Abdurrahman, Islamic law (Perda Syari’ah)14 as prac-ticed in the province of Aceh and some other regions in Indonesia is disap-pointing. They have criticized the implementation of Perda Syari’ah fornot being compatible with democracy and Pancasila. Syafii Maarif assertedthat the Perda tend to weaken the foundation of national integrity. Further-more, he stated that all of the contents of the Perda can be established onbehalf Pancasila.15 What Maarif means is that it is better to fight for thevalues of shari‘a than shari‘a (Islamic law) itself. His statement is based onthe perception of the proponents of Perda Syari’ah that shari‘a is believedto be fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) produced by the medieval Ulama. Maarifsaid that this sort of shari‘a produced at specific times and places in thepast is not compatible with contemporary social and political conditions.16

Maarif is a well-known opponent of Perda Syari’ah. He has often statedthat the lifespan of Perda Syari’ah in Indonesia will be short, since it is anexternal part of Islamic teachings. Moreover, he has asked the governmentto review Perda Syari’ah as something which potentially disturbs the har-mony of plural society. As far as Maarif is concerned, certain points ofPerda Syari’ah have become troublesome to national integrity. He arguesthat many non-Muslims feel that Perda Syari’ah is making Indonesia sec-tarian.17

In addition, Maarif has stated that MMI, HTI, and FPI – all propo-nents of Perda Syari'ah – are organizations intent on establishing an Is-lamic State.18 Together with Abdurahman Wahid, a former President andchairman of PBNU, Maarif published a book entitled Ilusi Negara Islam:Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnational di Indonesia (The Illusion of theIslamic State: the Expansion of the Transnational Islamic Movement inIndonesia). This book criticizes those Islamic organizations attempting toestablish an Islamic State and eliminate plurality.19 In Maarif’s view, state-ments from these organizations that categorize Muslims and non-Muslimsrejecting Perda Syari'ah as kafir or zhalim, and fasik will disturb pluralism.Maarif believes such claims illustrate a rigid style of religiosity. He assertsthat they simply divide people into ‘white’ and ‘black’.20 In Maarif’s view,this threatens the future of democracy.21

Haedar Nashir has also criticized those organizations promotingshari’a to be Perda. Nashir uses the term Gerakan Islam Syariat (Shari‘aIslam Movement) to describe these organizations.22 According to Nashir,this Gerakan Islam Syariat tends to be intolerant to others. It interpretsIslamic teachings literally and rigidly. Hence its members often clash againstMuslims who have progressive interpretations on Islamic doctrines, par-ticularly regarding Islamic law.23 In Nashir’s view, when shari‘a is formal-ized as Perda, it reduces the substance of Islam.24


Furthermore, Nashir asserts that Abangan – the majority of Indone-sian Muslims – are more comfortable with secular law and that the imple-mentation of Perda Syari'ah simply forces them to be Islamic or religious.25

In addition, in his view Islamic teachings were never intended to forcepeople to be religious. The Prophet Muhammad performed Islam as rah }mali al-‘a >lami >n.26 Nashir expresses serious concerns about these Islam Syariatmovements in his doctoral research on this issue. His research recommendsthat Muhammadiyah and NU revitalize their strategy in order to counterthese radical Islam movements.

With regards to Perda Syari’ah, Din Syamsuddin has stated that shari’ais not equal to Islamic law. Shari’a is defined as the whole and principleaspects of Islamic teachings. Furthermore, Syamsuddin says that shari’aemphasizes akhlak (behaviour). In general he does not agree with Perdaregulating and controlling Muslims. Syamsuddin argues that Perda has re-duced Islamic teachings and it is better to emphasize and promote Islamicvalues.27

As rah }ma li al-‘a >lami >n, Islam should be performed in accordancewith social conditions. Moeslim Abdurrahman argued that Perda Syari'ahhas marginalized and victimized women, as most Perdas regulate women’sattitudes, performance, and behavior. Instead of empowering and helpingwomen, Perda oppresses them.28 Moreover, Abdurrahman has said thatthe Perda does not intend to target rich people. It has nothing to do withcorruption. All it does is make poor people the objects of law. Abdurrahmanconcludes that Perda Syari'ah discriminates against women, poor peopleand minorities.29

Another important point is highlighted by Syafiq Mughni, chairmanof Muhammadiyah in Surabaya. He says that the decision to wear the jilbab(veil) should be based on free will. Mughni’s position is a response to astatement issued by the Chief Police in Surabaya, stating that policewomenshould wear the jilbab.30 Nashir and Salim note that the Perda Syari'ahimplemented in the province of Aceh and other Indonesian districts forceMuslim women to wear the jilbab.31 Mughni’s commentary is a criticism ofPerda Syari'ah, and the enforced wearing of the jilbab in particular.

The Emergence of Moderate-Progressive InstitutionsThe rapid emergence of radical Islamic groups during the period of

democratic transition in Indonesia alerted Muhammadiyah to movementsthreatening democracy. Some Muhammadiyah scholars feared that theemerging radical Islamic intended to change the political system from de-mocracy to theocracy. Consequently, concerned Muhammadiyah schol-ars established institutions such as the Center for the Study of Religion andCivilization (PSAP), the Ma’arif Institute, the Muhammadiyah Young Intel-lectual Network (JIMM), the Center for Dialog and Cooperation among Civi-lizations (CDCC), the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP),and the Center for Moderate Muslim (CMM). Although each of them has adifferent emphasis, they all attempt to counter radical Islamic ideas and


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strengthen democracy.Muhammadiyah scholars such as Syafii Maarif, Din Syamsuddin, Amin

Abdullah, Sukidi Mulyadi, and Pramono Tantowi established the Center forthe Study of Religion and Civilization (Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradabanor PSAP). PSAP is concerned with the future of democracy. It attempts tocounter the influence of radical groups and disseminate a moderate Is-lamic view. This institution publishes the journal of Tanwir and variousbooks promoting Islamic values which support democracy. In addition,PSAP has conducted seminars and public discussions to raise awareness ofdemocracy.32 PSAP can be seen as the counter movement to Hizbut TahrirIndonesia (HTI), which criticizes democracy and calls for an Islamic ca-liphate.

Syafii Maarif, a former chairperson of Muhammadiyah, is seen as anicon of the progressive Muhammadiyah scholars’ movement, andMuhammadiyah scholars founded an institute named after him – the MaarifInstitute – in 2002. The main purpose of this organization is to strengthenthe moderate element of the Muhammadiyah movement.33 Like PSAP, theMaarif Institute publishes a journal and books and conducts workshopsand seminars. An interesting part of the organization’s program is the an-nual Maarif Award which is given to a person who is actively involved incommunity based social transformation. The criteria for this award includethe active promotion of tolerance, pluralism, democracy, peace, and hu-man rights at a local level. In 2007, the Maarif Institute gave the award toboth Arianto Sangaji, an activist who established peace initiatives in Poso,and Jacklevyn Frits Manuputy, a priest who pioneered cooperation be-tween religions in Ambon.34 As Syafii Maarif explains, this award aims torecognize figures or activists who support and strengthen democracy.35

Maarif said that religious radicalism is one of the surface phenomena of thecrisis faced by Indonesia.

A couple of months after its foundation, Maarif Institute activists suchas Moeslim Abdurrahman, the first executive director of the Maarif Insti-tute, and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, founded the Muhammadiyah Young Intel-lectuals Network (JIMM). This organization was created as an umbrellaorganization for the various young Muhammadiyah intellectual move-ments. Abdurrahman believes that there is huge potential for youngMuhammadiyah thinkers. Moreover, he believes that the presence of a plat-form supporting their intellectual development is one of the factors en-abling the emergence of young intellectual movements withinMuhammadiyah. JIMM was launched at a national workshop in 2003 at-tended by young Muhammadiyah activists and its founders. In addition,similar workshops were also conducted in Yogyakarta, Malang, Surabaya,and Solo.36

Soon after its launch, JIMM activists made a big impact on the massmedia with their articles in the column ‘Opinion’. JIMM saw religious radi-calism as consequence of neo-Liberalism, and they offered the concept ofdemocracy as a guarantee of economic justice. 37 Although this


organization’s emphasis differs from that of the PSAP and the Maarif Insti-tute, they too believe that religious radicalism should be reduced as it threat-ens the future of democracy.

Din Syamsuddin, a chairperson of Muhammadiyah, together withAbdul Mu’ti, a chairman of Pemuda Muhammadiyah, established the Cen-ter for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilizations (CDCC). The purposeof CDCC is to create mutual understanding among different religions, cul-tures, nations, and civilizations. Although it was founded later than thePSAP, the Maarif Institute and JIMM, CDCC has similar concerns.Syamsuddin believes that a lack of dialogue is the biggest causal factorbehind religious radicalism. He calls for dialogue among Western govern-ments and the Muslim world. Mutual understanding can be created if peoplecommunicate their beliefs, ideology, and culture.38

Another organization which should be explored here is the Interna-tional Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP). It was founded by Syafii Anwar,a former member of the Muhammadiyah board, after he finished his doc-toral degree in Australia. This organization attempts to create harmoniousrelationships among various cultures and religious groups. ICIP was es-tablished in Jakarta in July 2003. Its establishment involved intellectualsand specialists on Islam and pluralism from Indonesia, Malaysia,Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines. The main objective of ICIP is tobuild a network of progressive-moderate Muslim activists and intellectu-als, particularly in Southeast Asia.39 Religious intolerance during the post-New Order era in Indonesia was one of the reasons why Syafii Anwar foundedICIP.

Bombings carried out by radical Islamist activists in the early 2000sprompted responses from Indonesian Ulama, mainly from NU andMuhammadiyah. The Jakarta International Conference (JIC) was held in2003, with the aim of building a network among Ulama in Southeast Asia tostem the spread of radical Islamic ideas, and to promote moderate Islam.The conference participants agreed to create the Center for Moderate Mus-lims (CMM). This institution is organized and maintained by Muhammadiyahand NU leaders and activists, and also involves Muslim scholars from otherSoutheast Asian countries. It is led by Syafii Maarif, Tarmizi Taher, andHasyim Muzadi.40 CMM has links to Muhammadiyah’s and NU’s pesantrenand mosques. Since this non-governmental organization (NGO) was mainlycreated by Muhammadiyah and NU leaders, it facilitates cooperation be-tween these two Islamic organizations to achieve CMM’s mission.41

Salafism, Muhammadiyah Scholars, and SecularismThe role of Muhammadiyah scholars in countering radical Islam move-

ment is controversial. Many Muslim activists have questioned these schol-ars’ commitment to Islam, and particularly the commitment of Syafii Maarif.Husain Umar, a chairman of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), isdisappointed with Maarif’s often critical view of the proponents of shari’a.42

Criticism comes not only from outside Muhammadiyah, but also from in-


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side the organization. Adian Husaini, a board member of Muhammadiyahbetween 2005 and 2010, criticized Syafii Maarif’s opinion of shari’a. Hesaid that Maarif does not know about shari‘a, because he is a professor ofhistory. Furthermore, Muhammadiyah critics of Maarif see him as a secu-lar scholar who is intent on separating religion and the State.43

It is undeniable that all these Muhammadiyah scholars are the follow-ers of Salafism. This can be traced to their commitment to Muhammadiyah’smission. Din Syamsuddin states that from its foundation until the presentday, Muhammadiyah has been part of the Salafi movement. Syamsuddinrecognizes that the thoughts of Ibnu Taymiyyah, Muhammad bin AbdulWahhab, and Rasyid Rida significantly influence Muhammadiyah.44

For instance, Syafii Maarif had been a supporter of an Islamic State.He was influenced by Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Quthb’s view, but changedhis mind while studying for his doctoral degree at Chicago University. Hisencounter with Fazlurrahman’s thoughts made him aware that an IslamicState is not the goal of Islam. He argues that Islamic values such as justice,harmony, prosperity, education, and supremacy of law are the importantpoints that must be established by Muslims.45

It is worth noting that the early Salafism developed by MuhammadAbduh was progressive. Abduh used Salafism to support his ideas aboutreformation and modernization of the Muslim world. His modern thinkingaccommodated Western ideas and mixed them with Islamic teachings.46

His pupil, Ali Abdul Raziq, is even more liberal than Abduh. Raziq statesthat Islam never commands Muslims to establish an Islamic State. In Raziq’sview, a secular system separating religion and State is the best model todevelop.47 The views of Abduh and Raziq are that the Salafi movement hasthe potential to support a democratic and secular system. In general,Salafism has close relations with radical movements supporting the IslamicState and fighting against Western culture. Rashid Rida, another of Abduh’spupils, is one of the Salafi scholars fighting for an Islamic State (caliphate).Unlike his teacher, Rida has always distanced himself from Western thoughts,particularly in the latest period of his life.48 Even more critical of Westernideas than Rida is Hasan al-Bana, the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin. SayidQuthb, one of the most prominent figures of Ikhawanul Muslimin, also criti-cized Western culture. Quthb believes that the Western political and eco-nomic system is not proper for Muslims. He believes that an Islamic systemis the best model and should be implemented by Muslim rulers.49 TheWahhabi movement which emerged in the 18th century and was strength-ened at the beginning of the 20th century reinforces the harsh nature ofSalafism. Wahhabi followers have destroyed historic sites and Islamicgroups which they believe ‘pollute’ their idea of pure Islam. They are intol-erant of Sufism, philosophical Islamic theology and a rational interpreta-tion of Islam, all of which they condemn as heretical. Furthermore, theyattack and oppress others. Wahhabi followers believe that Islam should beunderstood literally from the Qur’an and the Sunna of the ProphetMuhammad.50


Muhammadiyah has experienced dynamic development. Variousforms of Salafism – puritan, moderate, and progressive-liberal – can befound in Muhammadiyah.51 Syafii Maarif, Moeslim Abdurrahman, AminAbdullah, Amien Rais, Din Syamsuddin, Syafii Anwar, and Haedar Nashirare categorized as progressive and moderate Muhammadiyah scholars. Toa certain extent, they are able to negotiate Salafism doctrines with secular-ism. Haedar Nashir states that Muhammadiyah is fundamentally reformistSalafi in nature, an important factor that allows it to accommodate a secu-lar system such as democracy and Pancasila.52 In line with Nashir, SaifulMujani found that Muhammadiyah positively correlates with democracy.He said that Muhammadiyah leaders have close connections with modernWestern social and political thought. This enables its leaders to accommo-date and promote a secular system to Muhammadiyah members.53 How-ever, Nashir and Mujani’s findings should be examined further, becausethere remain some Muhammadiyah scholars who promote the formaliza-tion of shari’a.

Muhammadiyah scholars who reject the amendment of article 29 UUD1945 and criticize Perda Syari'ah generally have a close connection to mod-ern thought. Most of them graduated from Western universities. For ex-ample, Syafii Maarif and Amien Rais are alumni of Chicago University,Moeslim Abdurrahman pursued his master’s and doctoral degree at theUniversity of Illinois, and Din Syamsuddin and Syafiq Mughni graduatedfrom the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). This is, of course,not the only factor which influences their stance. As Haedar Nashir notes,Muhammadiyah adheres to reformist Salafism, and differs from ideologicalSalafism which fights to establish an Islamic State and shari’a. In Nashir’sview, reformist Salafism tends to modernize and reform Islamic interpreta-tions in order to be compatible with modernity and social necessity.54

Syafii Maarif always interprets Islamic doctrines by emphasizing thepublic benefit. He is well known as a proponent of Pancasila and an oppo-nent of an Islamic State and Perda Syari'ah. He believes that Pancasila isthe most proper frame for relations between religions and the State. Thisdemonstrates that he has moved beyond literal interpretations of theQur’anic verses which require the State implementation of shari‘a. Maarifreinterprets such verses and contextualizes them based on the contempo-rary social-political environment.55

Like Maarif, Moeslim Abdurrahman highlights the need for socialhermeneutics and critical theories. He says that to understand the messageof a verse of the Qur’an, it is necessary to comprehend the social and politi-cal context of a society. He believes that the Qur’an underlines the impor-tance of helping oppressed people. Abdurrahman sees shari‘a not as aninstrument to support individual piousness, but as a message to establishjustice and human rights.56

Amin Abdullah also promotes hermeneutics as a way to understandQur’anic verses. When he was chairman of Majelis Tarjih, he published abook (together with other Muhammadiyah scholars such as Munir Mulkhan,


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Hamim Ilyas, and Syamsul Anwar) introducing the idea of progressive in-terpretation of the Qur’an in the context of relations between Muslims andnon-Muslims.57 The book caused a heated debate among Muhammadiyahleaders and members. In addition, Abdullah proposed that Baya >ni, Burha >ni,and ‘Irfa >ni should be adopted by Muhammadiyah as new ways of under-standing the Qur’an and producing fatwas.58 Of these methods, Burha >ni isthe one associated with hermeneutics.

While Amien Rais may be not as liberal as Maarif, Abdurrahman orAbdullah, he too emphasizes the need to consider the contemporary socialand political context when interpreting texts. Rais has shown himself to beconcerned with issues of democracy and neo-liberalism. For example, hereinterprets the meaning of tawh }i >d as the rejection of authoritarianism. Heoffered a new concept of tawh }i >d in order to fight against the Suharto regimein 1998.59

Observing these Muhammadiyah scholars, it seems that modernthought and methodology are the main factors influencing their progres-siveness. Not all reformist Salafi have such progressive ideas. Some schol-ars on the Muhammadiyah board, for example, support the amendment ofarticle 29 of UUD 1945 and the implementation of Perda Syari'ah, while ahandful of Muhammadiyah scholars have made their position and ideasclear in terms of supporting democracy and a secular system.

Concluding RemarksIt is apparent that Muhammadiyah is part of the Salafi movement. Din

Syamsuddin is quite clear that Ibnu Taymiyyah, Muhammad Abduh, RashidRida, and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab are Salafi figures who inspiredMuhammadiyah ideas and movements.60 In this regard, Haedar Nashir clas-sifies Muhammadiyah as reformist Salafism. Nashir states that reformistSalafism does not aim to establish an Islamic State and resist Western cul-ture. Moreover, Nashir explains that reformist Salafism attempts to mod-ernize Islamic doctrines in order to make them compatible with modernityand democracy.61 Nashir tries to differentiate between Muhammadiyah andradical Salafi movements such as FPI, MMI, and FKAWJ.

In my opinion, Nashir’s argumentation is weak. It appears to me thatvarious Salafist characteristics can be found in Muhammadiyah. Not onlyreformist, but also radical-Islamist Salafism, has grown withinMuhammadiyah. This can be observed from responses which are critical ofleading Muhammadiyah scholars who fight for pluralism and democracy.As Pradana Boy points out, there is heated debate between the progressiveand conservative wings of Muhammadiyah.62 It is possible to find someMuhammadiyah activists who are interested in radical Islamic movements,and some who are even actively involved with these radical organizations.

However, the role of those Muhammadiyah scholars who are fightingagainst radical Islamic movements is significant. These scholars are cat-egorized as the progressive wing of Muhammadiyah. Some of them play animportant role in the cultural dimension, while others are active in parlia-


ment. These scholars have two different approaches to tackling radical Is-lamic movements and achieving their goals – the political approach andthe cultural approach. They responded to and opposed amendment of ar-ticle 29 of UUD 1945 and the implementation of Perda Syari'ah. They con-vinced Indonesian Muslims not to support the application of State shari‘a.Shari‘a is defined by these scholars as path to reaching God. Moreover,they state that shari‘a has a broad scope related to divine teachings. Shari‘ais not defined merely as Islamic law, and they argue that views claimingshari‘a to be Islamic law has actually reduced shari‘a.

Their actions in countering radical Islamic ideas are based on theirvision of democracy. According to them, democracy requires the separa-tion of religion and the State. This does not mean that religions should bemarginalized or banned. The spirit and ethics of religions are taken as thesources and inspiration for the development of the State. Furthermore,they believe that democracy would guarantee all religious followers theright to freely practice their religion.

The responses of some Muhammadiyah scholars to the amendmentof article 29 UUD 1945 and Perda Syari'ah, indicate that in the context ofunderstanding shari’a, modern thought and methodology are the main fac-tors affecting their progressive thinking. Not all reformist Salafis developthe idea of democracy and secularism. Within Muhammadiyah itself, thereare several figures who oppose these progressive views. Mujani’s view thatthe close connection of many Muhammadiyah leaders with modern thoughtis the main factor in Muhammadiyah promoting democracy is not entirelycorrect. In my view, certain modern thoughts do influence Muhammadiyahscholars in understanding the proper relationship between religions andthe State, however, the way they interpret shari‘a is another importantfactor that is not mentioned by Mujani.

Besides mustering modern thoughts, these Muhammadiyah scholars– including Syafii Maarif, Din Syamsudin, Munir Mulkhan, Amien Rais,Moeslim Abdurrahman, Amin Abdullah, Syafiq Mugni, and Syafii Anwar –are also deeply in touch with Islamic doctrines. In addition, they placemore emphasis on Islamic values than Islamic symbols, and so they haveno problems in terms of contextualization. These Muhammadiyah scholarsreinterpret shari‘a through modern social and political theories. This is notthe case with the conservative wing of Muhammadiyah and radical-Islam-ist Salafi. They have been exposed to these modern theories as well, butthey criticize and reject them and they are unable to contextualize or par-ticipate in dialogue on Islam within modernity. Furthermore, they believethat the modern thought created by Western scholars will destroy the Mus-lim faith.

For these Muhammadiyah scholars, the growth of radical Islamicmovements in the democratic transition of post-New Order Indonesia hasbecome a threat to democratization. They see that the obvious task facedby Indonesian Muslims is to fight against the ideas of theocracy that threatenthe future of democracy in the country. Their critical response to the amend-


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ment of article 29 of UUD 1945 and Perda Syari'ah indicates their commit-ment to establishing democracy. Furthermore, the establishment of studycenters and NGOs, such as Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization(PSAP), the Maarif Institute, Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network(JIMM), Al-Maun Institute, International Center for Islam and Pluralism(ICIP), and the Center for Moderate Muslims (CMM) can be seen as thesescholars’ strategy for fighting against radical Islamic movements, and away of preventing other Muslims from sympathizing with radical Islam’sagenda.

Notes1 Jamhari, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo/RajawaliPers, 2004), p.2-8.2 Baladas Ghoshal, “Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto Indonesia”, in Journal Contemporary Southeast Asia, No. 23, 2004, p.506.3 William R. Liddle, “Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic PoliticalThought and Action in New Order Indonesia“, in Mark R Woodward (ed.), To-ward a New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesia Islamic Thought, (Ari-zona: Arizona State University, 1996), p. 323-356. Georg Sorensen, Democracyand Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, (Oxford:Westview Press, 1993).4 Khaled Abou el Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, (NewYork: Harper Sanfransisco, 2005) p.27-41.5 These seven words derived from the Jakarta Charter that was formulated byPPKI before Indonesian independence. Based on social and political considerationsthe charter was changed by the founding fathers of the 1945 constitution (UUD‘45). Plurality and proper relations between the State and religions resulted in itbeing replaced. This change caused controversy and polemical debate betweennationalists and Islamists, particularly during the Old Order regime (1945-1966) .6 “Ormas Islam Demo MPR”, Tempo Newspaper, 15 August 2000.7 “NU and Muhammadiyah Tegaskan Kembali Tidak Amandemen Pasal 29”,Tempo Newspaper, 7 August 2002, http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2002/08/078 “NU dan Muhammadiyah Tegaskan Kembali”.9 Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: Islamization of Law in Modern Indo-nesia, (University of Hawai Press, 2008), p. 99.10 Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State, p. 9911 Saiful Mujani, “Politik Tujuh Kata”, Tempo Newspaper, 31 July 2002.12 Haedar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indo-nesia, (Jakarta: PSAP Muhammadiyah, 2007).13 “Pasal 29 UUD 1945 Tidak akan Diubah” in http://www.gatra.com/2002-02-29/artikel.php.

http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/

http://www.gatra.com/2002-


14 Perda (Peraturan Daerah) Sharia is District Government Regulations relatedto Islamic law and religious behavior for Muslim communities.15 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Demi Keutuhan Bangsa”, Republika, 11 July 2006.16 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Demi Keutuhan Bangsa”.17 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Demi Keutuhan Bangsa”.18 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (interview) “Kalau Beragama Secara Hitam Putih,Mungkin Lebih Baik Menjadi Ateis”, http://www.voa-islam.com/news/features/2009/10/22/147919 Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan IslamTransnasional di Indonesia, (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009).20 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (interview) “Kalau Beragama Secara Hitam Putih”21 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (interview) “Kalau Beragama Secara Hitam Putih”22 Haedar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat, p. 426.23 Haedar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat, p. 426-429.24 Haedar Nashir (interview), “Gerakan Formalisasi Syariat tak Ada Matinya”,http://www.islamlib.com/id/page/.php?page=article&id=1281.25 Haedar Nashir (interview), “Gerakan Formalisasi Syariat tak Ada Matinya”.26 Haedar Nashir (interview), “Gerakan Formalisasi Syariat tak Ada Matinya”.27 Din Syamsuddin (Interview), “Dari Nekolim hingga Syariat Islam”, RakyatMerdeka, 17 December 2006, http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/edisicetak/?pilih=lihat&id=28654. An Interview with Din Syamsuddin, Leiden, 7 Novem-ber 2009.28 Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Korban Pertama dari Penerapan Syariat Islam adalahPerempuan”, http://www.Islamlib.com/id/article.29 Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Korban Pertama dari Penerapan Syariat Islam adalahPerempuan”.30 “Muhammadiyah Dukung Imbauan Polda Berjilbab”, http://www.surabaya.detik.com/read/2009/03/0431 Haedar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat; Arskal Salim, Challenging the SecularState.32 http://psap.or.id/component/content/article/34-psap/45-profile-psap.pdf33 http://maarifinstitute.org/content/view/79/79/lang,indonesian/34 http://maarifinstitute.org/downloads/tor_maarif_award_2008.pdf35 http://maarifinstitute.org/downloads/Mencari_Pemimpin_Lokal_Visioner.pdf36 “Kelahirannya tanpa Deklarasi”, Republika, 21 Nopember 2003, in PradanaBoy (ed.), Era Baru Gerakan Muhammadiyah, (Malang: UMM Press, 2008), p.207-209.37 Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Tiga Pilar JIMM”, Republika, 21 November 2003, inPradana Boy (ed.), Era Baru Gerakan Muhammadiyah, (Malang: UMM Press,2008), p. 195-199.38 An Interview with Din Syamsuddin, 7 November 2009.39 http://www.icipglobal.org.40 http://www.cmm.or.id.

http://www.voa-islam.com/news/features/

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41 http://www.cmm.or.id.42 Adian Husaini, “Ada Apa dengan Syafi’i Maarif” in http://www.swaramuslim.com/more.php?id=5243_0_1_644_M.43 Adian Husaini, “Ada Apa dengan Syafi’i Maarif”.44 Din Syamsuddin, “Pemikiran Islam Muhammadiyah dalam Pusaran Zaman”,in Syamsul Hidayat (ed.), Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadapLiberalisasi Islam, (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2005), p. viii-ix.45 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Titik-titik Kisar di Perjalananku: Otobiografi Ahmad SyafiiMaarif, (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2006).46 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1984), p. 116.47 Sami Zubaidi, Islam and Secularization, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005),p. 446-447. It is also available in http://www.brill.nl.48 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, p.231.49 Khaled Abou el-Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, (NewYork: Harper Sanfransisco, 2005).50 Khaled Abou el-Fadl, The Great Theft.51 Pradana Boy, In Defense of Pure Islam: the Conservative-Progressive Debatewithin Muhammadiyah, Unpublished Thesis, (Canbera: Australian National Uni-versity, 2007).52 Haedar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat, p. 476-477.53 Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat: Islam, Budaya Demokrasi, dan PartisipasiPolitik di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2007), p. 174.54 Haedar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat, p.476.55 Syafii Anwar, “Syafii Maarif, Bung Hatta, dan Deformalisasi Syariat”, inAbdul Rahim Ghazali, Muhammadiyah dan Politik Islam Inklusif: 70 Tahun AhmadSyafii Maarif, (Jakarta: Maarif Institute, 2005), p. 31-48.56 Moeslim Abdurrahman, Islam Sebagai Kritik Sosial, (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2003),p. 192-193.57 Syamsul Anwar, “Fatwa, Purification and Dynamization: A Study of Tarjih inMuhammadiyah“, in Journal of Islamic Law and Society, vol. 12, afl. 1, 2005, p.38-39.58 Pradana Boy, In Defense of Pure Islam: the Conservative-Progressive Debatewithin Muhammadiyah.59 Tamrin, Gagasan Demokrasi Amien Rais dalam Teori Politik Islam Indonesia,(Padang: Andalas University Press, 2006), p. 77-88.60 Din Syamsuddin, “Pemikiran Islam Muhammadiyah dalam Pusaran Zaman”,p. viii-ix.61 Haedar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat.62 Pradana Boy, In Defense of Pure Islam: the Conservative-Progressive Debatewithin Muhammadiyah, p. 100-111.

http://www.cmm.or.id.Kultur

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Politik di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, Jakarta: Gramedia._______, 2002, “Politik Tujuh Kata”, Tempo newspaper, 31 July.Nashir, Haedar, 2007, Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di

Indonesia, Jakarta: PSAP Muhammadiyah._______, (interview) “Gerakan Formalisasi Syariat tak ada Matinya”, http://

www.islamlib.com/id/page/.php?page=article&id=1281“NU dan Muhammadiyah Tegaskan Kembali Tidak Amandemen Pasal 29” in

Tempo newspaper, 7 August 2002, www.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2002/08/07.

“Ormas Islam Demo MPR”, Tempo newspaper, 15 August 2000.“Pasal 29 UUD 1945 Tidak akan Diubah”, http://www.gatra.com/2002-02-

29/artikel.php.Salim, Arskal, 2008, Challenging the Secular State: Islamization of Law in Modern

Indonesia, University of Hawai Press.Syamsuddin, Din, 2005, “Pemikiran Islam Muhammadiyah dalam Pusaran

Zaman”, in Syamsul Hidayat (ed.), Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Responsterhadap Liberalisasi Islam, Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press.

_______, (Interview), 2006, “Dari Nekolim hingga Syariat Islam”, RakyatMerdeka, 17 December, http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/edisicetak/?pilih=lihat&id=28654

Sorensen, Georg, 1993, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Pros-pects in a Changing World, Oxford: Westview Press.

Tamrin, 2006, Gagasan Demokrasi Amien Rais dalam Teori Politik Islam Indone-sia, Padang: Andalas University Press.

Wahid, Abdurrahman, (ed.), 2009, Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan IslamTransnasional di Indonesia, Jakarta: The Wahid Institute.

Zubaidi, Sami, 2005, Islam and Secularization, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.

http://www.voa-islam.com/news/features/2009/Kultur

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www.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2002/

http://www.gatra.com/2002-02-29/artikel.php

http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/edisicetak/

Youth, Mosques and IslamicActivism: Islamic Source Books inUniversity-based Halaqah1

Hilman Latief*

Abstract

This paper discusses the emergent religious enthusiasm among young Indone-sian Muslims, with special reference to the university-based halaqah activists inYogyakarta. Halaqah is a growing phenomenon of socio-religious expressionamongst university students. Within the Islamic movement, it has had a newand powerful influence on Indonesian Muslim youth cultures. It provides a sys-tem within which young Muslims seeking a new personal or collective socialidentity can cultivate their religious orientation and thirst for knowledge. Theregional spread of halaqah seems to correspond to the rapidly increasing numberof publishers producing the halaqah reference materials that the movementdesires, and making them readily available in the market. This paper aims toprovide a comprehensive account of the religious, political, and cultural orien-tations of halaqah members by examining the reading materials circulatingwithin halaqah. It argues that campus-based mosques are controlled by twokinds of halaqah, namely Salafi halaqah and Tarbiyah halaqah. The findings alsoshow that Indonesia’s two mainstream moderate-traditionalist and reformistIslamic movements, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, are less favoredby university-based halaqah activists. This is partly because, although boththese Indonesian mass organizations are faith-based civil society associations,they both overlook campus-based mosques in their main da‘wa agenda.

Keywords

Youth, halaqah, Tarbiyah, Islamic activism, and student organizations.

* Hilman Latief is a lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta andcurrently a PhD Candidate at Ultrecht University.


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Introduction

Increasing intellectual transformation in the Muslim world has accelerated the spread of social, religious and political ideologies. These

have impacted the dynamics of religious life in Muslim societies. Indone-sia, in particular, has witnessed such an intellectual transformation overrecent decades, as evidenced by the increasing production of Islamic lit-erature and the exchange of knowledge with Muslim groups around theglobe. This has been instrumental in reshaping Muslims’ religious and po-litical behavior, their reception of modernity and perceptions of the rela-tionships between religion and the State, their attitudes towards the publicsphere, and their imagination of the global Islamic community. Living onthe periphery of the Muslim World (however we define it), Indonesia Mus-lims frequently refer to the works of Islamic scholars in order to grasp andpractice authentic Islam. To a significant extent, fata >wa (religious and le-gal opinions) issued by Islamic scholars from the Middle East have beeninfluential in shaping the domestic religious and political attitudes of Indo-nesian Muslims.2

The influence of Islamic developments in the Middle East on Indone-sian Islam can also be seen in the emergence of the Islamic reformist move-ment in the early 20th century. The works by Abduh and renowned Islamicscholars, such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Rashid Rida, werecirculated among the advocates of Islamic modernism in Indonesia. Thereinclude Ahmad Dahlan who founded Muhammadiyah, and Shaikh AhmadShurkati who established Al-Irshad al-Islamiyyah in 1912 and 1914 respec-tively. The notion of Islamic revivalism arose in the same way. Followingthe Iranian Revolution at the end 1970s, the Islamic Brotherhood move-ment in Egypt, which had existed since the mid 1930s, began to gain groundamong Indonesian Muslims. This can be seen by the wide-spread circula-tion of literature written by leading Muslim thinkers and ideologists, in-cluding Ali Shari’ati, Murtada Mutahhari and Imam Khomeini from Iran,and the Egyptians Sayyid Qutub and Hassan al-Banna. Apart from this, theburgeoning puritan Islamic Salafism movement in Southeast Asia, stronglysupported by the Saudi government for the last four decades, has ideologi-cally and culturally challenged not only the growth of both the Iranian andEgyptian-based Islamic revolutionary movements, but also IndonesianMuslim groups. In a nutshell, this rapid intellectual transformation can beattributed to the emergence of Muslim societies in the public sphere, assignified by the availability of many easily accessible publications attract-ing readers from various segments of society, from well-trained Islamicscholars to politically–oriented Islamists.

For dedicated Muslims, questions of ‘authenticity’ increasingly be-came a key issue. Despite the fact that some Islamic groups have tried topreserve the purity of Islamic creeds by referring directly to the Qur’anand Sunna, others seem to take another - but not always opposite - way bystudying either medieval or modern treatises by Islamic scholars as a means

6 5Youth, Mosque and Islamic Activism (Hilman Latief)

of understanding the fundamental sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Sunna(prophetic tradition), and the practice of ‘true Islam’. For some, being agood Muslim is not simply a matter of translating Islamic doctrines intopractice, but also of appreciating the works of ulama who are held to havethe required skills and knowledge, and exceptional spiritual capacity ininterpreting the messages of Islam, analyzing scriptures, and “learning howto derive rules of behavior from them”.3 For others, having suitable Islamicsource books is not sufficient. Further effort is required to steer Islam backonto the right track and call Muslims to the right path. This requires devel-oping a ‘tranquil community of learning’ in which people can foster theirreligious identity, share their religious experience with fellow Muslims,and be guided by trustworthy Islamic creeds.

Youth, Halaqah and Campus-based MosquesSince the collapse of the New Order regime and the rise of Reformasi

Era more than a decade ago, Indonesia’s socio-political landscape has be-come increasingly democratic. In this environment Islamic activism hasentered a new phase, and found space to grow more rapidly than ever be-fore. This is in part attributable to the opening of a public sphere accessibleto Muslim groups, in which they can stand on the national stage and beactively involved in Indonesia’s social and political processes. Their publicappearances have taken the form of activities ranging from conducting re-ligious gatherings and charity-based social activities, to establishing soli-darity groups and political parties. The post-New Order process of democ-ratization has also reshaped relationships between the State and Islam.This is again indicated by the pervasive public appearance of Islamist asso-ciations which had to conceal themselves from public view in the past, dueto New Order’s military-based repressive policy toward Islamists. In therapidly changing socio-political atmosphere of the era of political transi-tion in Indonesia, mosques retained and even expanded their functions.Apart from being places of worship, they became ideal venues for mobiliz-ing resources, exchanging information and transferring knowledge amongMuslim communities. This particularly applies to the campus-basedmosques existing in higher education institutions since the 1970s, whichrepresent a religious symbol guiding university students to nurture theirreligious knowledge, spirituality and political interests.

After Indonesia achieved independence in 1945, the number of highereducation institutions increased dramatically. The few higher educationinstitutions that existed before Independence included Institut TeknologiBandung (ITB) and Universitas Indonesia (UI), originating from DutchTechnische Hoogeschool and Recht Hoogeschool respectively, and Uni-versitas Islam Indonesia (UII), established on 8 July 1945, just 40 daysbefore the declaration of Indonesia’s Independence. UII was founded byMuslim political leaders who included Moh. Natsir, Prof. KHA. Muzakkir,Moh. Roem, and KH. Wachid Hasyim. Indonesia then began witnessing a


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proliferation of higher education institutions, sponsored either by the State,privately, or by religiously-inspired and secular-based associations. To-day there are over a thousand higher education institutions operatingthroughout Indonesia. State-sponsored universities are mainly non-reli-giously affiliated, with the exception of those universities under supervi-sion of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. However, since the 1980s, theestablishment of mosques in non-religiously affiliated state universities(Universitas Negeri) has become prevalent. The primary objective of es-tablishing mosques at State-sponsored universities is to fulfill Muslims’ re-ligious and social needs, and is a consequence of the increasingly closerrelation between Islam and the State. Government efforts to sponsor theestablishment of mosques within State-sponsored universities continuetoday. Muslim students, administrative staff and lecturers no longer haveto leave the campus to attend Friday prayers or to perform their own dailyprayers.

In tandem with this development, Muslim communities have found anew environment in which to intensify their religious, social and politicalactivities through campus-based mosques. As an ‘open area’, campus–basedmosques have increasingly become contested venues, where groups ofuniversity students of different religious, social and political stands com-pete for control. This in turn and unavoidably leads to rivalry betweenthem. Campus-based mosques also function as centers of intellectual, so-cial, political and even economic transformation among Muslim universitystudents. It is very common for students to hold discussions or meetingsand make preparations for mass-demonstrations at mosques. Likewise,mosques have often been the starting points of demonstrations and protestmarches by Islamist associations to voice their concerns and to protestagainst events detrimental to Muslims, such as the war between Palestin-ians and Israelis. In sum, activities within mosques - to borrow Wictorowicz’sexpression - can provide “opportunities for organizing contention”.4

Halaqah is a popular generic term used to signify religious activitiesorganized by Muslim student groups, regardless of their religious orienta-tion, who use mosques or mushalla (a place of worship smaller than mosque)as their center of activities. Halaqah may be translated as ‘circle of knowl-edge’ or ‘community of learning’. It has been claimed that the widespreadhalaqah system in Indonesia is in part a result of (and influenced by) theMuslim Brotherhood (Ikhwa >n al-Muslimi >n), an Islamic political movementfounded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. In recent times, the halaqahsystem is closely associated with and has been popularized by the Tarbiyyahmovement, whose activities have much to do with the use of mosques asvenues for ‘reIslamization’. Moreover, halaqah signifies three aspects ofthe learning process: 1) ta‘ri >f, meaning preamble, (re)introducing Muslims,especially potential Muslim activists, to Islam; 2) takwi >n implying the pro-cess of creating and strengthening personal and communal Islamic identi-ties within the group; and 3) tanfi >z } signifying efforts to put Islamic doc-trines (Shari‘a) into action. The current widespread involvement of uni-


versity students in campus-based mosques, notably students of ‘secular’education institutions, is apparent in numerous big cities, and providesmounting evidence for a new religious enthusiasm among Muslim youth.At the same time this has provided an environment for New Religious Move-ments (NRMs) to develop.

Observers such as Noorhaidi Hassan5, Yon Mahmudi6, ElizabethCollins7, Robert Hefner8 and Richard Kraince9 have all proposed that stu-dent movements represented by Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations(Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/LDK) have been deeply involved with socialand political activism for the last two decades. This activism has been trans-formed from a purely student movement, becoming a “collective client” ofIslamic political parties.10 In order to discern the process of intellectualtransformation and the dynamics of Islamic activism among universitystudents active in campus preaching organizations or halaqah groups, thisarticle examines the types of Islamic source books being utilized in halaqah.It analyzes the way in which halaqah activists seek reading materials whichenhance their religious understanding, develop their narrative of the idealIslamic community (umma), and publicly broadcast their rhetoric of thefuture of Islam in the modern nation-state.

It is worth emphasizing that campus-based mosques provide a bridgebetween universities as modern academic institutions, and pesantren, or‘traditional’ educational institutions. Many Islamic teachers (usta >dh) frompesantren regularly give sermons and lectures on Islam at campus-basedmosques. It is safe to say that campus-based mosques resemble pesantren,in that both provide opportunities for students to intensify their studies ofIslam. Moreover, without diminishing the dominant role of Islamic teach-ers (usta >dh) in nurturing students’ spiritual and intellectual needs throughcourses of study in halaqah and providing reading materials, students alsoexercise their personal preferences by reading various Islamic readingmaterials available in the market. The nature of the reading material se-lected by halaqah activists to enrich the students’ knowledge of Islam maybe influential in making them more critical, moderate, or conservative intheir religious views and in expressing their personal or collective atti-tudes.11 What a sort of Islamic textual references (classical, modern, andcontemporary) do halaqah activists commonly use? What kinds of Islamicscholars (ulama, including native and foreign preachers and writers) areattractive to halaqah activists, and why? This article will conclude with adiscussion of the socio-religious or political affinities between student move-ments inside campuses, and other socio-political groups outside universi-ties.

This piece is based on my research in Yogyakarta. Yogyakarta is widelyrecognized as a multicultural city in which various ethnic groups and reli-gious organizations exist with few locally imposed government constraints.For the past three decades various Islamic groups, including the conserva-tive Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) andSalafi pesantren, have experienced rapid growth, to the extent that they


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have emerged as influential religious streams in both urban and rural ar-eas. Yogyakarta can also be labeled a ‘student city’ (kota pelajar) becauseits State, private, secular and religious universities number more than onehundred. Interestingly, given this diversity, acts of violence involving Is-lamic groups rarely if ever occur in Yogyakarta, unlike Jakarta or Surakarta.

The source materials used by halaqah activists or the Tarbiyah move-ment were collected during my fieldwork and observations at five campus-based mosques in Yogyakarta, from August-November 2007. These were:the Gadjah Mada University (UGM) campus mosque, the Mujahidin mosqueat Yogyakarta State University (UNY), the al-Itqan mosque atMuhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY), the Ulil Albab mosqueat Indonesia Islamic University (UII), and the Al-Jami’ah mosque at theState Islamic University of Yogyakarta (UIN). I attended sermons and reli-gious gatherings at campus-based mosques, and interviewed halaqah ac-tivists, student leaders and chairs of the mosque committees (takmirmasjid). My research assistants were halaqah activists who helped me todistribute and collect questionnaires during the course of pengajian (ser-mons) at halaqah. The questionnaires were distributed randomly to 20students in each halaqah. Thus one hundred halaqah activists from fiveuniversities, ranging in age from 18 to 23, gave their personal opinions byfilling in questionnaires about the reading materials suitable for their per-sonal and collective religious preferences.

Two kinds of halaqah will be discussed. The first is the ‘community oflearning’ type, organized by mosque committees or student organizationsthat are officially recognized and partly funded by universities (organisasiintra-kampus). Not all students attending halaqah organized by LDK (cam-pus preaching organizations) at a campus-based mosque come from that oran affiliated university. For example, regular religious gatherings conductedon the UGM campus can be attended by students from other universitiessuch as UNY, UMY, UII or UIN. It seems that LDK activists have estab-lished networks among themselves. This can be seen by their regular na-tional meeting, attended by LDK activists from all parts of Indonesia. LDKactivities have even attempted to standardize da‘wa mechanisms, and haveproduced practical guidance for managing campus preaching organiza-tions.12 In organizing halaqah, LDK activists usually invite off-campus Is-lamic teachers, notable from pesantren. Other Islamic teachers invited havevarious Islamic studies educational backgrounds, but most were trained inMiddle Eastern universities such as Darul ‘Ulum of Madina, or Azhar Uni-versity of Cairo.

The second type of halaqah conducts da‘wa activities using the formof ‘usrah’, or the ‘membership’ of a ‘family’ system. Using a patron-clientinteraction model, there is a closer bond between teachers (murabbi >) andstudents (mutarabbi >). They know each other personally, and through thisrelationship the Islamic teachers are able to intensify their supervision ofthe students. Each usrah may consist of five to ten students, led by murabbi >.These usrah have multiple functions, such as to solidify commitment of


group members; to mobilize solidarity, to disseminate information, tostrengthen collective norms, to internalize codes of conduct and valuesand to provide a forum for sharing experiences among members.13 By ap-plying the principles of shura and collective action (‘amal jama >‘i) and byavoiding individualistic attitudes (infira >diya), what may be called ‘recipro-cal relations’ develop between murabbi > and mutarabbi >.14 Usrah also uses a“peer tutoring system”, by which senior or junior students assist sopho-more or freshmen students to learn Islam.15 The teaching-learning processwithin usrah is conducted in a very intimate but relaxed atmosphere, andthus the process of transfer of knowledge and values can be achieved in amore effective way. This is in contrast to the practices of a large halaqah,which is often characterized by very formal lectures from Islamic teachers.

On Being a New Santri: Bringing Islamic Revivalism toCampus

The rise of neo-Islamic revivalism or Muslim student movements inIndonesia is certainly not a subject in its infancy. It has been much ob-served by scholars. However how the ideology of Islamic revivalism haspenetrated the ‘academic domain’ of university-based communities, andwhy it has had such a great impact on Muslim youth activism in contempo-rary Indonesia, are questions still in search of answers. Why now, but notbefore? One should not disregard the fact that campus-based da‘wa havetaken place since the 1970s. A number of Islamic student organizations,including halaqah and the Tarbiyah movements, played a pivotal role inthe process of campus Islamization, and in the transmission of Islamic re-vivalism into the cultural and political realms of youth. For example, therise of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), a leading Islamic party, cannotbe detached from the “campus Islam” conducted mainly at campus-basedmosques.16 According Martin van Bruinessen, cultural and ideological para-digm shifts have occurred among halaqah activists. He suggests that, “lib-eral Islam was the dominant trend among committed Muslims in the stu-dent movement throughout the 1970s, but in the 1980s more radical trendsappeared”.17 This can also be seen after the Reformasi era, when campus-based mosques were very much characterized by two contrasting studentgroups: the ‘apolitical’ purist Salafi group and the politically-orientedTarbiyah movement.

As noted above, the Islamic teachers who regularly give sermons athalaqah often come from pesantren. A pesantren is “an institution offeringan intense form of Islamic education, and is the most important type ofschool in training young Muslims in Islamic sciences”. 18 To borrowFederspiel’s expression, learning at a pesantren can be regarded as entail-ing “a master-disciple relationship, frequently with pedigrees traced to theprophet himself”.19 In Yogyakarta, a number of pesantrens have becomemagnets for students, and some university students prefer staying at thesepesantren rather than renting conventional dormitories. However living


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and learning about Islam in a pesantren is not an option for the majority ofstudents, as the available space is limited. As an alternative to pesantrenlearning, many students learn about Islam through the halaqah activitiesoffered at campus-based mosques and supported by Islamic teachers frompesantrens. The ideology of each pesantren clearly influences the nature ofthe Islamic source books its campus halaqah students are expected to readand absorb. Ideologically speaking, some pesantrens in Yogyakarta haveaffiliations with either traditionalist or modernist Muslim organizations,while others are affiliated with Salafi groups. When considering the trans-formation of religio-political ideologies at campus-based mosques, the roleof Islamic teachers from pesantren and the source-books they use cannotbe disregarded.

Moreover, university-based halaqah activism cannot be simplifiedinto a single pattern of Islamic activism, as it is not socio-religiously orideologically univocal but depends on the interest of the jama’ah. For thatreason, campus-based dakwa may adjust teaching materials to suit the wide-ranging socio-spiritual needs of its participants. Students participating inthe halaqah come from various educational backgrounds and major in dif-ferent subjects. This means that the effort to be “a pious student” or newsantri while studying at a tertiary institution can no longer be exclusivelyassociated with graduates from Islamic High Schools ( ‘Aliyah), but alsowith students from ‘secular’ High Schools (SMA) and Vocational Schools(SMK). Among the hundred student respondents, about 44 per cent weremajoring in Natural Sciences, 32 per cent were studying Social Sciences,and the remaining 24 per cent were undertaking Religious Studies. Thelength of participation in halaqah differs from student to student.

Chart 1a: Period of Students’ Involvement with Halaqah

Interestingly, nearly half of students (43 per cent) were members ofmore than one halaqah, either inside or outside their own campus. Thissuggests that many students have strong motivation for studying Islam.They may visit two or three different mosques or halaqah every week or


month to listen to religious sermons, and strengthen friendship and net-works with other halaqah activists.

Chart 1b: Students Participating in More than One Halaqah

The “campus Islam” movement, as Bruinessen has suggested, is asymptom of “cultural conflicts”, reflecting competition between supreme,noble Islamic values and the “free-values of secularism”.20 Therefore, theterm “ghazwu al-fikr” (intellectual wars) is often heard.21 These are muchconcerned with such issues as moral degradation, permissive sexual be-havior, the negative impact of modernity, pornography, and hedonismamong youth. There is some truth in Ira M. Lapidus’ statement that “Is-lamic revival movements may be understood as a reaction against moder-nity, but more profoundly they are also an expression of modernity”.22

Chart 2: Location of Students’ Halaqah

Islamic gatherings at campus-based mosques initially aimed to pro-vide a forum within which students could learn general Islamic doctrinesand traditions, including Quranic exegesis (tafsi >r), prophetic tradition(h }adi >th), Islamic legal thought (fiqh), Islamic ethics (akhla >q), the historyof prophethood (si >ra nabawiyya) and Islamic preaching (da‘wa). Speak-


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ing of the function of mosques for university students during the New OrderEra, Fahri Hamzah, the first president of KAMMI, a campus-mosque spon-sored student association, said:

Mosque was the safest venue to discuss Islamic subjects with fewerportions of local political issues. This is simply because discussinglocal political issues openly was unsafe at that juncture. Therefore,student movement initiated campus-Islam preferred discussing in-ternational politics (Bosnia, Palestine, etc.) to exploring openly localpolitics…23

The teaching materials offered at halaqah resemble those providedat pesantren in general. In recent times, both Salafi and Tarbiyah spon-sored halaqah, for example, have offered broad-spectrum Islamic sub-jects. Despite promoting ‘purification’ of Islamic belief and Islam ka >ffa (per-fect Islam), halaqah sponsored by LDK have attempted “not to reproducethe traditionalist-modernist dichotomy” in Islamic expression in Indone-sia.24 In studying Islamic jurisprudence, general fiqh books are selected sothat students can become acquainted with various Islamic schools of thought(madha >hib al-Isla >m). Nevertheless, they also campaign for the implemen-tation of Islam kaffah (complete Islam), consistent with their endeavors topromote an Islamic State system in Indonesia. By contrast, Salafi halaqahat campus-based mosque remain apolitical in character, to the extent thattheir overriding concern is the purity of Islam.

Islamic Sources-Books: A View From WithinA number of works by prominent ulama are used in Salafi and Tarbiyah

sponsored halaqah. The books frequently utilized by halaqah representthe three streams of Islam: 1) Salafi-puritan literature; 2) general Islamicliterature and 3) ideological politically-oriented literature. I will begin myexamination by giving a brief assessment to the types of books written byforeign scholars, mainly from Middle Eastern countries.

Table 1: List of Books Employed in the Halaqah

No Title Author Subject

1 Kita>b al-Tawh}i >d Shaykh Muh}ammad ibn‘Abd al-Wahha>b (d. 1206)

Islamic theologyKita>b ‘Aqi >da Isla>miyya Imam Ibn Taymiyya (d.

1328)

2 Kita>b Fiqh al-Sunna

Bida>ya al-Mujtahid

Sayyid Sa>biq (d. 2000)

Ibn Rushd (d. 1198)Comparative fiqh


Table 1 shows the various Arabic books utilized in halaqah. Theirrange covers theology (‘aqi >da), comparative Islamic legal thought (fiqh),collections of h }adi >th (prophetic narrations), and quranic exegesis (tafsi >r).Islamic teachers in halaqah do not use these sources simultaneously. In-stead, they are examined separately during the course of weekly gather-ings. For example, in the first two weeks the group might study h }adi >th andtafsi >r, while in the third week the topic might relate to practical Islam andjurisprudence (fiqh). It should be noted that almost all these major Islamictextual sources used in halaqah were written by prominent purist ‘ulamasuch as Syaikh (Sheik) Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Taimiyya.There was no significant difference between the literature on fiqh used inSalafi halaqah, Tarbiyah halaqah, and even in traditional and modernpesantren.

1. Salafi-purificationist LiteratureWorks by the prominent Islamic theologians Syaikh Muhammad b.

‘Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Taimiyya were among those frequently used by thehalaqah observed. ‘Abdul Wahhab’s Kita >b al-Tawhi >d and Ibn Taimiyya’s‘Aqi >da Isla >miyya25 promote Islamic puritanism. Their theological frame-work has far-reaching implications for some Muslims’ inflexible attitudestowards eradicating heresies and accretions within Muslim communities.Both of these Islamic scholars are polemical in nature, combating religiousbeliefs considered as deviant, and eradicating religious practices consid-ered to violate the purity of Islam.26

2. Common-Islamic LiteratureUnlike the characteristically puritan-inclined theological thinking

developed within halaqah, the legal thoughts offered to participants repre-sent the diversity of Muslim expression through a wide-ranging examina-tion of fiqh books or h }adi >th collections. Sayyid Sabiq’s Fiqh al-Sunna, forexample, claims not to give preferential treatment to any of the fourmadhhab scrutinized, despite the fact he wrote it at the request of his teacher,Hassan al-Banna, the political ideologist of Ikhwan al-Muslimin. Ibn Rushd,in his Bida >ya al-Mujtahid wa Niha >ya al-Muqtas }id, examines issues con-cerning Islamic law and jurisprudence (masa >il al-ah }ka >m or masa >il min al-

3 Kita>b Arba‘i >n al-Nawa >wi >

Za >d al-Ma‘a >d fî Hua >Khair al-‘Iba >d

Kita>b Bulu>gh al-Mara >mmin Adilla al-Ahka>m

Ima>m al-Nawa>wi> (d. 1277)

Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya(d. 1349)

Ibn H{ajar al-Asqalani (d.1448)

Collections of hadith(Thematic issues)

4 Tafsi >r Ibn Kathi >r

Mukhtas }ar Tafsi >r IbnKathi>r

Ibn Kathi>r Quranic exegesis


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fiqh Isla >miyya) by presenting a wide diversity of scholarly opinions onparticular legal issues in Islam. Thus these two books allow readers to com-pare the different legal opinions voiced by Islamic scholars. Furthermore,the works of Ibn Kathir, such as the Mukhtas }ar Tafsi >r Ibn Kathi >r and Tafsi >ral-Qur’a >n al-Kari >m, are instrumental in the study of Quranic exegesis byhalaqah activists. These two works provide straightforward explanationsof the meaning of Quranic text that students and teachers can easily under-stand. Similarly, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani’s Bulu >gh al-Mara >m min Adilla al-Ahka >m, Imam an-Nawawi’s al-Arba‘i >n Al-Nawa >wi > and Bukha >ri>’s S {ah {i >h } al-Bukha >ri >, and Ibn al-Qayyim’s Za >d al-Ma’a >d present general issues that themajority of Sunni Muslims may welcome, and classify hadith thematically.However, it is worth emphasizing that although the second group of bookscannot be exclusively ideologically associated with Salafi groups, radicalIslamic movements or Islamic political parties, the characteristics of theIslamic teachers who give lectures at halaqah are instrumental in deter-mining what sort of religious framework students should follow. The topicschosen by Islamic teachers within Salafi halaqah are mainly “private is-sues,” dealing primarily with ‘aqi >da (theology), fiqh (law) and akhla >q (eth-ics), and have little relevance to with actual public issues.

3. Politically-oriented literatureAlmost all books on Islamic theology, jurisprudence and hadith col-

lections mentioned above were selected by halaqah coordinators or Is-lamic teachers (ustadh) who organize halaqah activities. Some other bookswritten by both classical and contemporary ulama, politicians, and ideolo-gist have caught students’ attention, and been made part of their privatecollections or references. The widespread distribution of Islamic books(translated into Indonesian) provides students with easy access to a vari-ety of works by prominent Muslim scholars, political activists, and revolu-tionary ideologists. Students involved in halaqah were asked the names ofscholars who have influenced their religious and political views. Interest-ingly, the foreign authors most frequently mentioned were Yusuf al-Qardawi,Imam Hassan al-Banna, Shaikh ibn Baz, Shaikh al-Uthaimin, Sayyid Qutb,Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jauziyya, Ibn Taimiyya, Aidh al-Qarni, and Fati Yakkan.If we look closer these authors, it appears that most of students prefer toread modern Muslim scholars of the 20th and 21st centuries. The two ex-ceptions to this are ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who livedin the 14th century. The works listed above were originally written in Ara-bic, but have recently been translated into Bahasa Indonesia.

Yusuf al-Qardawi is a prolific Islamic scholar whose works have beentranslated into many languages. He is regarded as a moderate Muslim thinkerwho tries to bridge Islamic tradition and the increasingly globalized world.His works discuss the Qur’an, tradition (Sunna), fiqh, and other contempo-rary issues. His most popular works are Fata >wa Mu‘a >s }ira and Kita >b al-Zaka >. He is one of the most respected scholars, and his works are verypopular with halaqah activists. Above all, more students favor Qardawi’s


works than those of political ideologues such as al-Banna or Sayyid Qutb,who are ranked in the second and third position respectively.

The characteristics of works written by al-Qardawi and al-Banna andSayyid Qardawi are quite different. While al-Qardawi’s works cover wide-ranging issues, from theology and fiqh to Islamic ethics, and present rigor-ous erudition on major contemporary issues in the Muslim world, al-Banna’s writings are mainly characterized by heroic narratives, providingthe readers with notions of the Islamic movement (h }araka isla >miyya). As afounder of Ikhwan al-Muslimin in Egypt, al-Banna has “planted intellectualseeds of a socio-religious and mass-oriented movement that has played asignificant role in the politics and society of the Arab Middle East and NorthAfrica”.27 The power of his thought has also shaped the growing spirit ofIslamization among Muslims, including within the tarbiyya movement.28

His Mudha >kara >t al-Da‘wa wa al-Da >‘iya, Da‘watuna and Majmu >’a >t al-Rasa >lal-Ima >m al-Shahi >d H {asan al-Banna are well-liked works that nearly allstudents of harakah, tarbiyya and halaqah activists talk about. Likewise,Sayyid Qutb, another prominent Ikhwan al-Muslimin figure, has also in-spired Tarbiyah activists, especially in conceiving the role of Islam in themodern nation-state. According to Ibrahim Abu Rabi’, Qutb “does not di-vorce social conditions from political theory and practice”29. Fi > Z {ila >l al-Qur’a >n and al-‘Ada >la al-Ijtima >‘iyya fi > al-Isla >m are among his popular trea-tises in Indonesia. Qutb and Yusuf al-Qardhawi, according to one Islamicbook publisher, are among his bestselling authors. Another name oftenmentioned by students is Fathi Yakkan, the prominent Islamic scholar,cleric and political activist who pioneered the Islamic movement in the1950s in Lebanon while he was the General Secretary of the Lebanese Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya.

It is widely-acknowledged that Salafi pesantren, representing the pu-rification movement, have become determinant factors in the dissemina-tion of Salafi ideology. This is also supported by large number of ‘Salafibooks’ produced by Islamic publishers in Indonesia. Although studentsdid not specify the precise Salafi sources that have impressed them, theyoften mention the names of Islamic scholars such as Shaikh b. Baz and SyaikhUthaimin, whose religious views cannot be separated from such scholars asQayyim al-Jauziyya and Ibn Taimiyya. The proliferation of Indonesiantranslations of their works coincides with the massive publication of Is-lamic books. According to IKAPI (Association of Indonesian Publishers),the number of Islamic publishers has increased rapidly, and now comprises35 to 40 per cent of all publishing companies in this country. As the world’slargest Muslim country, Indonesia has increasingly become a giant marketfor Islamic books. According to a 2003 survey in ten major cities, about71.7 per cent of Muslim respondents acknowledged that they read Islamicbook during Ramadhan month. A number of publishers of general text-books or popular books have even begun to establish special divisions forIslamic books.


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Local Islamic ScholarsDespite showing their admiration for Islamic scholars from the Middle

East, halaqah activists also give attention to local ‘ulama or Muslim leaderswhose personalities are considered as inspiring. This means that they readnot only books written by the foreign scholars listed above, but also bylocal writers. It seems that the role of the media is essential to the increasedadmiration of students for Indonesian Islamic scholars. Popular figuresmentioned by students, ranging from Muslim intellectuals and academia topreachers and popular writers, are mainly those who frequently appear onNational Television.30

Table 2: List of Local Muslim Authors/ Ulama Favored byHalaqah Activists (ranked)

First of all, Abdullah Gymnastiar or Aa Gym is very popular amonghalaqah activists. Aa Gym is a key figure of the Pesantren of Daarut Tauhidin Bandung. His teachings and speeches are favored not only by variousMuslim groups, but also by non-Muslims, as he is able to promote religiousnotions of peace, brotherhood, social unity, and individual integrity in anenthusiastic and popular way.31 He prefers discussing the general principlesof the morality (akhla >q) in society, rather than elaborating on the rigiddifferences in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Books about Aa Gym were alsoamong bestsellers. Another figure is Yusuf Mansur whose popularity andprominence are approaching Aa Gym’s. Mansur’s preaching on radio andtelevision, together with his publications concerning poverty, charity, gen-erosity, and social welfare, have made him the second most respected

No Name Profession/Background Subject/Expertise

1 Abdullah Gymnastiar Cleric, Entrepreneur ,trainer Manajemen Qalbu,

2 M. Anis Matta Politician, writer,activist

Youth movement Islamicpolitics, Motivation.

3 M. Yusuf Mansur Cleric, Entrepreneur Charity

4 Abu Bakar Baashir Cleric Jihad, Islam Sharia, andpolitics

5 Quraish Shihab Academic, Intellectual Qur’an & tafsir

6 Ari Ginanjar Professional, trainer ESQ

7 Habiburrahman El-Sirazy Writer Islamic Stories (Novel)


preacher by halaqah activists. Mansur is the President of the WisatahatiCorporation, a spirituality-based cooperation which focuses on businessconsulting, entrepreneurship, printing, financial healing, achievementmotivation and spiritual training. Next to him is another well-known pro-fessional entrepreneur, Ari Ginanjar Agustian, who invented “Emotionaland Spiritual Quotient” (ESQ) or “the ESQ Way 165”, a spirituality-basedhuman resources training program. His ESQ Training programs haveachieved extraordinary prominence, and have been attended by thousandsof middle class participants, including government officials, businessmen,top company leaders, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, academicians and stu-dents.

Students displayed mixed and unpredictable responses to mention ofMuhammad Annis Mata, a politician and the General Secretary of Prosper-ous Justice Party (PKS). Born in Makassar and a graduate of the PesantrenDarul Arqam Muhammadiyah Gombara Makassar, Anis Matta earned hisbachelor degree from LIPIA-Jakarta, a Saudi-sponsored Arabic and IslamicStudies academy. Apart from his involvement in an Islamic political party,Anis Mata has recently published books on Islamic Da‘wa, youth, and Is-lamic movements.32 Students were more favourable towards Abu BakarBaasyir, the Muslim cleric who was accused of involvement in terror activ-ism and of being the leader of Jamaah Islamiyah, an association the USAbelieves is linked with al-Qaida. Despite his rare publications, Abu BakarBaasyir Baashir was well-liked by halaqah activists. His statements andspeeches about the implementation of Islamic Shari’a and jihad seized theattention of young Muslim activists. He has often been invited to give ser-mons on occasions such as Tabligh Akbar, mass religious gatherings thatcan be attended by thousands of people. Baashir has often criticized thenation-state system in Indonesia. He promotes its replacement by an Is-lamic system of governance, together with the implementation of Syariahand Islam Kaffah, yet he has never clearly formulated the sort of Islamicsystem he wants to be implemented in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Baashir’sefforts are admired by his halaqah activist followers and sympathizers.33

The only moderate Muslim academic to obtain first-rate appreciation fromthe halaqah activist respondents was Quraish Shihab, a professor of QuranicStudies and Exegesis (Tafsi >r) at Islamic State University Syarif Hidayatullah,Jakarta. Holding a Doctoral Degree from the Azhar University, of Cairo,Shihab has published a number of respected works on Qur’anic Studies andTafsi >r. His best-selling Membumikan al-Quran and voluminous Tafsir al-Misbah have been republished several times. Shihab also often appears onTV, guiding discussions on Islamic issues.

The people not mentioned by halaqah activists and students are per-haps as significant as those discussed above. Remarkably, few students ad-mired the so-called modernist or neo-modernist figures such as M.Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Some other names popularamong activists in the 1990s, such as M. Amien Rais, Sahal Mahfudz, AliYafi, Jalaluddin Rahmat, Johan Effendi, Kuntowijoyo, and A. Mukti Ali,


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were overlooked by halaqah activists. Again, if we compare the listed Is-lamic scholars favored by halaqah students after Reformasi with those inthe 1980s and 1990s, we find significant differences in the characteristic ofthose figures. For example, prominent Muslim thinkers such as Ali Shari’ati,Imam Khomeini, Ziyauddin Sardar, and Murtada Mutahhari were formerlyhighly favored by university student Muslim activists. 34 However thehalaqah activists’ answers obtained by this research show that revolution-ary thinkers such as Shari’ati and the Muslim scholars listed above, includ-ing Abu al-A’la al-Maududi, are ‘forgotten’. By contrast, such political ideo-logues as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb remain in the minds of halaqahactivists.

Islamic MagazinesIn addition to admiring Muslim academics, writers, preachers, train-

ers, and politicians, and as well as reading books on Islam to satisfy theirintellectual and spiritual needs, young halaqah activists also read varioustypes of Islamic magazines. The recent proliferation of Islamic magazinesconfirms the increasingly visible strength of the Islamic movement amongyouth. Islamic magazines, like other popular magazines, provide updatedinformation and cover wide-ranging issues concerning Islam and Muslimcommunities. However the mainstream and long-established Islamic orga-nizations such as the Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persatuan Islamand al-Irshad al-Islamiyyah seem not to be taking advantage of this oppor-tunity, and their publications appear to lack appeal for Muslim youth. Thelist of the favored Islamic magazines below reveals that Islamic magazinespublished by mainstream Islamic associations have declined and are nolonger favored, at least by halaqah activists.

Table 3: List of Magazines Favored by Halaqah Activists

Magazines Main Content Main Readers Style

As-SunnahAsyari’ahRisalah

Messages of scriptures,Islamic tradition, fiqh,hadith, tafsîr.

Adult Formal

SabiliHidayatullah

Muslim-world, society,Islamophobia,Christianization,contemporary politicalIslam, Islamic tradition,morality, Christianization,anti-liberalism & politicalissues

Adults &teenagersstudent

activists, andclerics

Semi-formal

AnnidaMutiara AmalyHidayahElfataTarbawi

Short religious stories andteenagers social issues,Islamic tradition, morality,Islamic movements,spiritual messages

Adult andteenagers Popular


Halaqah activists are quite familiar with three streams of Islamicmagazines. The first type of magazine, issued by Salafi-oriented publishers,deals heavily with the notion of “authentic” Islam. These magazines coverissues such as Islamic propagation and criticism of fellow Muslims they seeas deviant. They make simplistic value-statements, and their clear-cut,black-and-white judgments reflect a strictly textual approach to Islam.Examples of these magazines are Asyari’ah, As-Sunnah and Risalah, whichrepresent Salafi ideological streams.

The second type is concerned with contemporary social and politicalissues. These periodicals often criticize religious movements other thanIslam, trying to protect Islam and Muslims from offensive penetration byother ‘ideologies’ such as secularism and liberalism. Christianization, inparticular, is one of their main issues. Such magazines as Sabili andHidayatullah adopt a critical and provocative tone, and epitomize theseideologically-driven Islamic magazines.

The last type comprises popular Islamic magazines, presenting thefriendly face of Islam to Muslim youth and giving a warm impression. Theyoffer a broader dimension of Islam, motivating the younger generation tobe more active, creative, and engaged. They are characterized by a colorfulpresentation, cheerful journalism, inspiring Islamic short-stories and fash-ionable issues. This type of periodical includes Annida, Elfata, Tarbawi,Mutiara Amaly and Hidayah.

Social and Political AffiliationsThe mosque is the heart of Muslim civilization. Since the era of the

Prophet Muhammad, mosques have remained essential for Muslim com-munities. The slogan “back to the mosque” has been promoted by Muslimactivists since the 1970s. Campus-based mosques, where many halaqahhave operated for the past three decades, are often arenas of contestationof competing ideologies and interests among students. In Indonesia’s cur-rent socio-political setting, students are not immune to political infiltra-tion from outside the campus. This is reflected by the configuration of so-cial and political affiliations of university-based halaqah activists with off-campus associations or political parties. Some activists confirmed theirattachment to socio-religious organizations or political parties. About 55per cent of respondent halaqah activists said that their halaqah are insti-tutionally independent and free from infiltration by political parties, while24 per cent of students acknowledged the political interests of their halaqah.


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Chart 3: Social and Political Affiliation

Rather than attempting to detail the type of political parties thathalaqah activists or students may affiliate with, this article will highlightwhy students are less interested in joining or affiliating with mainstreamIslamic organizations. Although 55 per cent of students affirmed that theyare politically autonomous now, the question of their likely future social orpolitical affiliation remains. Will they become advocates of moderate, lib-eral, or radical Islam?

Observers regard Indonesian Islam as being moderate, and Islamicorganizations such as Muhammadiyyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are amongthe major pillars of civil society in Indonesia, yet, neither has significantinfluence on halaqah activists. Muhammadiyah’s purification agenda, andits solid achievements in establishing social institutions like schools, or-phanages, clinics and hospitals throughout Indonesia, seem not to be de-terminant factors attracting halaqah activists as members. Similarly, thesuccess of Nahdlatul Ulama in preserving traditional Islam and its study ofboth classical and contemporary Islamic works, again, cannot attracthalaqah activists’ attention. The surprising conclusion seems to be thatMuhammadiyah and Nahdlatul ‘Ulama have not taken any decisive actionto include campus-based mosques within their da‘wa agenda. Consequently,rather than joining the mainstream moderate organizations ofMuhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama, the two largest Islamic organizationsin Indonesia, about 20 per cent of respondent halaqah activists have es-tablished close bonds with other movements, such as Salafism, Tarbiyah,or Islamic political parties, notably PKS. Some students also confirmedthat outside campus they are active in mosque youth activist groups (remajamasjid) or as teachers at Islamic Kindergarten.


Chart 4: Organizational Affiliation

Intellectual exercises, liberal Islamic discourse, and progressive for-mulations of Islam are too complex for the halaqah activists, and have nosignificant impact on their religious enthusiasm. In order to enrich theirreligious knowledge, students prefer studying Islamic books that, accord-ing to their understanding, will develop their commitment (ghi >ra) to Is-lam. This coincides with the fact that modernist, neo-modernist, and tradi-tionalist Islamic organizations have increasingly been bureaucratized. Inturn, halaqah activists have increased their efforts to find alternative waysto study Islam and to articulate their religious expression. However, asalready noted, about 55 per cent of students confirmed that they are notaffiliated with - and their halaqah are free from penetration of - politicalparties.

Some questions remain for further research: what will be the contri-bution of halaqah activists to the Islamization process in Indonesia for theyears to come? Despite sharing some similarities, there are differences be-tween Salafi halaqah and Tarbiyah movement, especially in their politicalinterests. To what extent will competition between the two kinds of halaqahhappen, and to what extent can collaboration between the two can be es-tablished?

Concluding RemarksThe increasing pace of Islamization and the changing political envi-

ronment of Indonesia over the past thirty-years have been instrumental inestablishing mosques at both religious and secular higher education insti-tutions, and in spreading a ‘community of learning’. It is evident thatmosques and musholla operating at both religious and secular higher edu-cation institutions to some extent resemble informal ‘Islamic educationinstitutions’ where students can intensify their studies of both classical andmodern Islamic literature. Nevertheless, at the time of this research thetypes of Islamic literature being studied at halaqah varied in nature, but


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generally ranged from theology and Islamic jurisprudence to Islamic eth-ics. The findings also reveal that unlike Tarbiyah halaqah, Salafi halaqahhave rarely dealt with contemporary issues such as political Islam, Islamand modernity, and Islam and the State. Inspired by political ideologistssuch as Qutb and al-Banna, Tarbiyah halaqah are more familiar with politi-cal Islam. Their activism is no longer restricted to the campus milieu, andthey have established networks with other groups outside campus, rangingfrom political parties to solidarity groups.

For Muslim youth, studentship can be a time when they search for a‘role model’ from whom they can learn about Islam for intellectual andpractical purposes. The Muslim figures mentioned by students clearly showthat they admire popular preachers, especially those appearing on nationaltelevision and in the mass media, rather than Indonesian writers or aca-demics. At the same time, a number of foreign Islamic scholars, writers,and political ideologists from Middle Eastern countries influence the reli-gious and political orientations of youth, particularly halaqah activists. Itis also arguable that the dynamics of Islamic activism among students whoare involved in Islamic students associations have been paralleled by theefforts of Salafi groups and the Tarbiyah movement, and also by Islamicpublishers who make Islamic literature accessible to a wider public, in-cluding halaqah activists.

At times, in tandem with their deep studies of Islam, many halaqahactivists have intensified their participation in ‘campus politics’, capturingStudent Representative Councils (Senat Mahasiswa) at many State and Is-lamic universities. In this they compete with other Muslim students whosenarratives hold “a pluralist nationalist and social-democratic persuasion”35,such as HMI (Muslim Students Association), PMII (Indonesian Islamic Stu-dent Movement) and IMM (Muhammadiyah Students Association). Salafigroups, on the other hand, remain in their conservative position, keepingtheir religious activities far from ‘politics’ inside and outside campus.

Although formal Islamic education institutions have witnessed changeand modernization, it seems to me that unless there is a paradigm shiftamong the Islamic teachers (ustadh) who are so instrumental in shapingIslamic materials used in halaqah, in the coming years the ‘curriculum’ ofSalafi halaqah and Tarbiyah will not radically change.

Notes1 This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the International Confer-ence on Muslim Youth as Agents of Change, sponsored by Training Indonesia’sYoung Leaders-Leiden in cooperation with the Ministry of Religious Affairs andthe Islamic University of Malang (UNISMA), in Batu-Malang, 26-29 November,2007. I would like to thank conference participants for their invaluable com-ments.2 M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa,


(Honolulu: University of Hawa’i and Allen & UnwinHooker, 2003), pp. 63-66;Noorhaidi Hassan, “Between Transnational Interest and Domestic Politics: Un-derstanding Middle Eastern Fatwa Jihad in the Moluccas”, Islamic Law andSociety 12/1, 2005, pp. 73-92.3 Howard M. Federspiel, Popular Indonesian Literature of the Qur’an, (CornellUniversity Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1994), p. 40.4 Quintan Wictorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Theory Movement Ap-proach, (Bloomington: Indiana University PressWictorowicz’s, 2004), p. 1.5 Noorhaidi Hassan, “Islamist Party, Electoral Politics, and Dakwa Mobilizationamong Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia”, Working Paper184, (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2009).6 Yon Machmudi, “Islamising Indonesia: the Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and theProsperous Justice Party (PKS)”, a Ph.D Thesis submitted to the Australian Na-tional University, Canberra, 2006.7 Elizabeth Collins, “Islam is the Solution: Dakwah and Democracy in Indone-sia”, Unpublished paper, Ohio University, Athens, 2004.8 Robert W Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, (NewJersey: Princeton, 2000).9 Richard Kraince, “The Role of Islamic Student Groups in the Reformasi Struggle:KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia)”, Studia Islamika 7, 2000,pp. 3-50.10 Aay Muhammad Furqan, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis PolitikKaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004); Ali SaidDamanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah diIndonesia, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); Ahwan Fanani, “Akar dan PemikiranGerakan Revivalis Islam Indonesia: Studi terhadap Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”,in Komaruddin Amin et al (eds.), Quo Vadis Islamic Studies in Indonesia, (Jakarta& Makassar: Direktorat Pendidikan Tinggi Islam, Departemen Agama RI & Pro-gram Pascasarjana UIN Alauddin Makasar, 2006); Haedar Nasir, Gerakan Is-lam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Pusat StudiAgama dan Peradaban, 2007); Jamhari & Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikaldi Indonesia, (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004).11 To borrow George Kelly and Sebastian Huber’s “personal construct theory,”religious identity, including that of Muslim youth, is “a personal construct sys-tem” and “defined by the way the individual construes or understands his/herpersonal world”, Sebastian Murken & Sussan Namini, “Choosing Religion as anAspect of Religious Identity Formation in Modern Societies”, in Alef TheriaWashim et al (eds.), Religious Harmony: Problems, Practice and Education ,(Jakarta & Yogyakarta: Aosis Publisher, 2005), p. 275.12 See Tim Penyusun SPMN FSLDK Nasional (UI & ITB), Risalah Manajemen DakwahKampus: Panduan Praktis Pengelolaan Dakwah Kampus (Standarisasi PelatihanManajemen Nasional), (Jakarta: Studi Pustaka, 2004).13 Mahfuzd Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktivis DakwahKampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis NasionalMultidimensi, (Solo: Intermedia, 2003), pp. 78-79.14 M. Imadadun Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS: Dari Masjid Kampus ke GedungParlemen, (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2008), p. 271.


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15 Yudi Latif, Intelegensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Intelegensia Muslim Indo-nesia Abad ke-20, (Bandung: Mizan, 2005), p. 535.16 Yon Machmudi, “Islamising Indonesia: the Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and theProsperous Justice Party (PKS)”, pp. 61-67; Noorhaidi Hassan, “Islamist Party,Electoral Politics, and Dakwa Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous JusticeParty (PKS) in Indonesia”.17 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post SoehartoIndonesia”, Southeast Asia Research, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2002.18 Howard M. Federspiel, Popular Indonesian Literature of the Qur’an, p. 40; seealso Karel A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalamKurun Modern, (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan PeneranganEkonomi dan Sosial, 1986); Martin van Bruinessen, “Gerakan Sempalan diKalangan Umat Islam Indonesia: Latar Belakang Sosial-Budaya” (SectarianMovements in Indonesian Islam: Social and Cultural Background), Ulumul Qur’anvol. III (1), 1992; Martin van Bruinessen, “Pesantren and Kitab Kuning: Conti-nuity and Change in a Tradition of Religious Learning”, in Wolfgang Marschall(ed.), Texts from the Islands: Oral and written traditions of Indonesia and the Malayworld, (Berne: The University of Berne Institute of Ethnology, 1994).19 Howard M. Federspiel, Popular Indonesian Literature of the Qur’an, p. 4020 Martin van Bruinessen, “Gerakan Sempalan di Kalangan Umat Islam Indone-sia: Latar Belakang Sosial-Budaya”, Ulumul Qur’an, Vol. III, No. 1, 1992, pp. 16-2 7 .21 Mahfuzd Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktivis DakwahKampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis NasionalMultidimensi, p. 87.22 Ira M. Lapidus, “Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Move-ments and the Historical Paradigms”, Journal of the Economic and Social Historyof the Orient, Vol. 40, No. 4, 1997, p. 444.23 Fahri Hamzah in Mahfuzd Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: KiprahPolitik Aktivis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di TengahGelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi, p. 12.24 Abdul Karim Soroush, The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam: Negotiat-ing Ideology and Religious Inquiry, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2006), p. 35.25 Nadia Abu Zahra, The Pure and the Powerful: Studies in Contemporary Mus-lim Society, (Ithaca, 2000).26 The concept of ‘heresiography’ in Islamic tradition began as soon as the fall ofthe “Guided Caliphs”and developed rapidly, as reflected by muchheresiographical literature, after Imam al-Ash’arî wrote his magnum opus con-cerning Sunnism theological concept, Abdurrahman Badawy, Madha >hib al-Isla >miyyî >n, (Da >r al-‘Ilmi Li al-Malayi >n, 1997).27 Ibrahim M Abu Rabi’, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the ModernArab World, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 64.28 Haedar Nasir, Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indone-sia; Yudi Latif, Intelegensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Intelegensia MuslimIndonesia Abad ke-20.29 Ibrahim M Abu Rabi’, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the ModernArab World, p. 115.


30 Other Indonesian Muslims favored by halaqah activists are HAMKA, AbdullahSahal, Fauzil Adhim, Nurcholish Madjid, Salim Badri, Hidayat Nur Wahid,Yazid Jawwas, and Cahyadi Takariyawan.31 Aa Gym was invited to give a speech in a Christian Church by the Christiancommunity in Ambon to deliver his messages on peace, solidarity, and unity.32 Anis M Matta, Model Manusia Muslim Abad XXI: Pesona Manusia PengembanMisi Peradaban Islam, (Bandung: Progressio, 2007)33 Irfan Suharyadi Awwas, Risalah Kongres Majelis Mujahidin I dan PenegakkanSyari’ah Islam,(Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001); Sabili, No. 6, VIII, 6 Septem-ber 2000.34 Von der Mehden, Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East ,(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993); A. Rahmad Zainuddin and M.Hamdan Basyar, Syi’ah dan Politik di Indonesia, (Bandung: Puslitbang Politikdan Kewilayahan, LIPI dengan Penerbit Mizan, 2000); Yudi Latif, IntelegensiaMuslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Intelegensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20.35 Robert W. Hefner, Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education inSoutheast Asia, (Honolulu: The University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), p. 75.

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Dompet Dhuafa as a Civil SocietyOrganizationTuti Alawiyah*

Abstract

This paper attempts to understand Dompet Dhuafa (DD), an Islamic philan-thropic organization, as a civil society organization. There are three differentconcepts of civil society: as associational life, as the public sphere, and as a searchfor a good society. The paper highlights the way that DD has fulfilled its role as acivil society organization by creating educational, social, health and economicprograms to help needy individuals and families. DD’s empowerment programsplace emphasis on economic empowerment more at individual than commu-nity levels. While empowering individuals is reasonable, since a communitycomposed of individuals and families, it is also crucial to put emphasis on com-munity levels to contribute to civil society.

Keywords

Dompet Dhuafa, Civil Society, Associational Life, Public Sphere, Civility andCommunity Development

* Tuti Alawiyah is a Ph.D Candidate from University of Texas at Austin, Texas.


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Introduction

The purpose of this article is to understand Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (DD) as a civil society organization. Dompet Dhuafa Foundation

is an Islamic charitable non-profit organization founded in 1993. It is regis-tered as a foundation by the Indonesia’s Social Department, and is alsoregulated under Zakat Law No. 38/1999 as an Amil Zakat Organization atnational level1. DD stands out among Indonesia’s many civil society organi-zations by the fact that it operates solely with local financial resources, anddoes not depend on international funding2. DD is a leading civil societyorganization that implements both direct and indirect services and pro-grams, from providing immediate help for the poor, scholarships for stu-dents, and helping the sick to economic empowerment and communitydevelopment3. Three conceptualizations of civil society will be used in or-der to understand DD as a civil society organization; civil society as asso-ciational life, as the public sphere, and as the search for civility, or a goodsociety.

Civil society in its definition as associational life consists of diverseorganizations and associations in a community, ranging from educational,social, health, art and cultural organizations to humanitarian and chari-table organizations, those promoting women’s rights and environmentalmovements. These organizations serve as structures that mediate the in-teractions of citizens, the state and market institutions4. Using the associa-tional life perspective, civil society has attracted tremendous attentionfrom scholars in fields such as politics, economics, and social studies5. Asecond concept of civil society is as a public sphere. This concept has beenused in many developing and formerly communist countries to refer to theavailability of a sphere that enables citizens to talk, discuss, and debate acommon good as well as to counterbalance hegemonic and repressivestates6. The third concept of civil society is the search for a good society. Itis a normative perspective that refers to the social norms and values thatguide communities to achieve a good and just society7. These three con-cepts of civil society will be used to analyze Dompet Dhuafa’s vision, mis-sion, and programs, and thus provide a better understanding of DompetDhuafa as a civil society organization.

This paper will start by highlighting the three conceptions of civilsociety. The next section will describe Dompet Dhuafa’s programs and itscontribution to civil society. The last section will critically discuss the roleof DD as a civil society organization.

Civil Society as Associational Life, Public Sphere andCivility

American people are founders and joiners of civic associations8. Thiswas first noted by Alexis de Tocqueville, the French aristocrat, historianand political thinker, as early as the 1830s.9 The ubiquity of associationsand organizations which provide both services and advocacy programs

9 1Dompet Dhuafa as a Civil Society Organization (Tuti Alawiyah)

has been understood as associational life. The strong associational life inthe United States has been seen as part of the exceptionalism of that coun-try10. Following de Tocqueville’s assertion of the importance of associa-tional life in the United States, scholars have studied civil society as asso-ciations and nonprofit organizations11. For example, scholars from the Foun-dation Center have studied the economic role played by civil society or thenonprofit sector in the United States12. Robert Putnam, a political scientistfrom Harvard University, is the pioneer in pushing the current understand-ing of associational life as a source of social capital and as the most impor-tant element of a society that is civil13.

Associational LifeThe first concept of civil society is associational or organizational life.

What constitutes associational life and why is this concept important whenwe discuss civil society? These questions will guide us to considering asso-ciational life as a mediating structure between citizens, government andthe market. Associational life can take various forms, such as professional,modern non-profit organizations (e.g. Dompet Dhuafa), old, traditional or-ganizations (e.g. Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah), and community-based organizations such as neighborhood associations14. Even though theseorganizations have different categorizations, they can be united under oneumbrella, civil society organizations. Scholars have identified several char-acteristics that should be found in these civil society organizations. Theyshould have some sort of legal framework that legalizes their existence.They should be a private or institutionally separate from government, butthis does not mean that they cannot get government support. They shouldbe a self-governing organizations, controlling their own activities. Theyshould be non-profit distributing, prohibited from distributing any profitto the owners or directors. And the last characteristic requires some sort ofvoluntary activities involving voluntary participation from members ofthe community15. For the sake of clarity and to avoid confusion, this paperwill use civil society organization (CSO) and nonprofit organization (NPO)interchangeably since the two share similar characteristics as forms of as-sociational life. Civil society organizations have been classified into 12 clas-sifications based on the types of services that they provide, such as educa-tion and research, cultures and recreation and health and social services aswell as philanthropy and charitable organizations16. Using this classifica-tion, Dompet Dhuafa can be classified as one of Indonesia’s civil societyorganizations.

There are two functions of civil society organizations; in the indi-vidual and societal context, or at the micro and macro levels. At individuallevels, CSOs have been seen as a source of social capital or civic virtues.Associations teach individual members of organizations norms and valuessuch as trust, reciprocity, and solidarity as well as tolerance and equality17.Robert Putnam’s study of democratic governance in Northern and South-


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ern Italian regions showed the importance of these values and norms orsocial capital at individual and community levels in creating a better com-munity18. Putman has defined social capital as “features of social life – net-works, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together moreeffectively to pursue shared objectives” 19. At the macro levels, organiza-tions have external effects as “interest representation” and “interest inte-gration” to pursue a better, just and democratic society20. Several of theways to achieve the external effects of organizations are through collabo-ration with other different organizations, cultivation of advocacy, andthrough social change programs. The existence of Zakat, Wakaf (religiousphilanthropy), and family laws in Indonesia are examples of the externaleffects of Islamic civil society organizations as “interest representation” atthe macro levels.

Public SphereThe second concept of civil society is the public sphere. The idea of

the public sphere has been popular among social activists as a counterbal-ance to hegemonic states such as in the East European countries, and inother authoritarian countries such as Indonesia in President Suharto’s eraand the Philippines under President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The public sphereis an important addition to the concept of associational life, since civil soci-ety associations cannot make broad social changes without a sphere inwhich to discuss and debate common interests.

While understanding the public sphere as a counterbalance to theState is important, this section will specifically highlight the roles of thepublic sphere as a space in which the public interest can be cultivated, andwhich makes it possible for CSOs to flourish. First, the public sphere inrelation to cultivating the public interest emphasizes the crucial roles ofthe various spaces in which people can create dialogue. These are criticalto the health of democracy. If only particular groups such as (for example)the rich were heard, it would violate the public interest that should em-brace all elements of society21. Thus, the public sphere provides an arenawhere different groups of people from different backgrounds - such as dif-ferent ethnicity, social class, and religion - come together to create publicopinion and discuss the public good. The current debates on syari’ah,Ahmadiyah, pornography, and the role of philanthropic institutions in In-donesia, for example, provide good examples of how groups from differentbackgrounds can discuss public issues and pursue common interests. Is-sues that affect all elements of society need to be discussed in a way thatembraces all strata of society.

Second, the public sphere also provides a space which allows civilsociety organizations and political participation to flourish22. Without thispublic sphere, CSOs would have to be very careful in the way they commenton current policies and the way the government runs the country. CSOs inthe Suharto era, for example, found very limited space for being different


from the government. Most of the time, they had to follow governmentdirections, which prohibited such things as addressing religious, race andethnicity issues. At that time, there were many restrictions regarding howto talk, what could be discussed, and who could criticize23. Therefore, CSOscan function well when the public sphere is available and accessible. Publicdebate of civil rights, environmental issues and women’s rights in the UnitedStates (and other countries) exemplifies how CSOs can develop when thepublic sphere is sufficiently open.

A Search for CivilityThe third concept of civil society is the search for a good society, or

civility. In addition to the definition of civil society as associational life andthe public sphere, scholars have also defined civil society from a norma-tive perspective as norms and values that constitute a good society. Inother words, civil society seeks to become a good society24.

The concept of civil society as the search for a good society has be-come the motivational force behind global movements across societiesfrom the political left to the right, from East and West, to cultivate a societythat is civil. As Edwards has noted, a search for an Islamic civil society inMuslim societies, a search for a civil society in communist countries, acollective action to protect human rights, a feminist movement, and anenvironmental movement are all examples of global movements guided bythe idea of civil society as a search for a good society25.

Even though scholars have not come to agreement on what consti-tutes a good society, they have associated a good society with a notion ofcivility26. According to Edward Shils, one of the thinkers of the civility con-cept, civility as the virtue of civil society can be understood as a consider-ation of others as equal fellow citizens, as the readiness to moderate par-ticular interests, and as a concern for the well-being of the whole society.Consideration of others as equal fellow citizens requires consciousness “thattakes into account the reality of other consciousness operating in a sharedworld”27. The treatment of others equally would also require tolerance ofother differences in order for them to be able to moderate particularitiesand to give precedence to the larger public interest. In addition, an attach-ment to the society as a whole reduces the rigidity of attachment to par-ticular interests, whether based on religious, ethnic, political, or social classinterests, so these individuals would be able to mediate conflicts and pri-oritize the common good28.

In the Indonesian context, a society that is civil is referred to as amadani society, with roots in the Prophet Muhammad’s tradition. In Is-lamic terms, a search for a good society can also take such forms as theconcept of balda t }ayyiba wa rabb ghafu >r, or a good society that is blessedby God and negara yang adil dan makmur, or a just and prosperous soci-ety. It is apparent that Islamic CSOs such as Muhammadiyah and DompetDhuafa strive to create such society as their ideal goal. Other CSOs also


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make efforts to search for a good society that promotes citizen equality andtolerance, as well as the enhancement of minority and women’s rights29.

From the above description of the three concepts of civil society, itcan be inferred that while the associational life concept refers to civil soci-ety organizations that serve as the infrastructure of a civil society, and apublic sphere provides a space for discussions and dialogues to cultivate apublic good, the civility concept refers to values such as civic virtues, equal-ity, trust, solidarity and tolerance that guide individuals, organizations,and societies in cultivating the common good.

The next section will specifically focus on Dompet Dhuafa Foundation(DD) as one example of a civil society organization in Indonesia, and howDD cultivates programs that help individuals gain access to social welfare(education, social, health and economic programs).

Dompet Dhuafa: Vision, Mission, and ProgramsThis section highlights Dompet Dhuafa’s vision, mission and programs

since its inception in 1993. It will not describe every previous DD program,but highlight several of those that are relevant to the discussion of DD andcivil society in this paper.

DD has rapidly grown, especially since the economic crisis in 1998, asa highly effective non-profit charitable organization for collecting Mus-lims’ donations such as zakat, infak, sedekah (ZIS) and wakaf 30. DD hasutilized these donations to support programs from helping needy families,students, and patients, to providing economic and social empowermentfor low-income families31. Muslims’ contribution to philanthropic organi-zations is not a new phenomenon. Muslims in Indonesia have contributedmoney and other goods to similar causes such as mosques, Islamic board-ing schools or pesantrens, and other Islamic foundations. A study con-ducted by the Centre for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) UINJakarta found that in 2004, 94 per cent of Muslim households (around 33million in 2004) gave to mosques and other Islamic causes and to needyindividuals in their communities, while only 4 per cent (around 2 millionhouseholds) gave to philanthropic bodies like Badan Amil Zakat Infak andSedekah (BAZIS) and Lembaga Amil Zakat Infak and Sedekah (LAZIS)32. Thesmall number of households that have contributed to new charitable non-profit organizations such as Dompet Dhuafa is understandable, since theseIslamic charitable organizations (BAZIS and LAZIS) are new organizationscompared to mosques and other long established Islamic causes. In addi-tion, these new organizations mostly target middle-class, urban communi-ties, and these do not form a majority group in Indonesia33.

The vision of DD as a leading charitable organization is to enhanceself-supporting society by utilizing local resources. DD’s vision and mis-sion include empowerment programs at the micro and macro levels. AmongDD’s mission are to be a driving force behind social and economic empow-erment in society and to develop networks among empowerment organiza-tions founded by DD or jejaring DD34. So far, DD has fulfilled its mission to


empower disadvantaged people at the micro levels by helping these indi-viduals through direct services, education, health care, social and eco-nomic programs. DD helps marginalized people to improve their humancapital by providing several education programs such as scholarships andteacher empowerment. It believes education can give people access andopportunities to pursue better lives by expanding their knowledge, skillsand creativity. DD is also committed to educating young generationsthrough creating an exemplary school for bright students from low-incomefamilies, without charge, through the formation of Lembaga PengembanganInsani (LPI- DD)35.

DD has also worked to aid needy individuals to access health care byproviding health care services such as Klinik Gratis (free clinics) andLembaga Kesehatan Cuma-Cuma (LKC - a free hospital). In economic andsocial programs, DD has provided financial capital by lending poor peoplemoney to create a small business. At the same time, DD has also facilitatedsocial programs through group empowerment in communities to improveindividual skills and capacity to run a business, connect with others, totrust, and to help others. Until 2010, DD had implemented economic andcommunity empowerment programs in 90 villages and kelurahan in 28districts or cities across the country.

At the macro levels, DD has collaborated with several other nonprofitorganizations as well as with corporations to enhance the well-being ofcommunities. DD, for example, with other organizations such Forum Zakat(FOZ) has advocated zakat and wakaf legislation. DD has also built partner-ships with several corporations such as Bank Danamon Syariah, GarudaFoodand PT Pupuk Kaltim, Bontang to implement community empowermentprograms for farmers, breeders, and women’s groups36.

In addition to the success of DD’s programs in enhancing the well-being of individuals and communities, at the mezzo levels, DD has met theirgoals to found several organizations under DD supervision (or JejaringDD). The establishment of this jejaring is to broaden DD’s agenda and pro-grams and to increase DD’s ability to reach out to various segments of poorcommunities. Jejaring DD that work to help needy families and to improvethe well-being of individuals and communities include Kampoeng Ternak,Masyarakat Mandiri, and Lembaga Pelayan Masyarakat (LPI-DD) andLembaga Pengembangan Insani (LPI-DD).

Dompet Dhuafa and its Contribution to Civil SocietyFrom the above explanation, it is clear that DD can be categorized as

a civil society organization, as DD has characteristics of a nonprofit organi-zation (it has legal framework, it is private or separate from government,self-governing, non-profit distributing, and involving some voluntary par-ticipation). Using the 12 classifications created by Salamon and Anheier, itis also obvious that DD falls under this CSO classification as a philanthropicorganization.

From this description of Dompet Dhuafa’s vision, mission, and pro-


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grams, it is apparent that DD has fulfilled its role as a CSO, especially as anIslamic philanthropic organization that collects Muslim donations and as asocial service provider. DD’s programs are in line with its vision and mis-sion to help individuals, families, and communities to achieve better liveswith their own resources. In Islamic term, this means to move these indi-viduals from the mustah }ik category to the muzakki category by providingeducational, social, health, and economic programs.

However, as we can see in DD’s empowerment programs, the empha-sis is more on empowerment at individual rather than community levels.While empowering individuals is reasonable since a community composedof individuals and families, it is also crucial to put emphasis on communitylevels to create changes in a larger societal context that eventually couldcontribute to civil society. The analysis will focus on several ways that hasbeen done and could be done more by DD to cultivate a society that is civil.

DD could be improved in terms of community development programsthrough building social capital, improving collaboration with other non-profit organizations and various elements of a society, developing organi-zational capacity outside jejaring DD, and supporting social change throughadvocacy and the cultivation of the public sphere.

First, the development of social capital. In general, DD’s programshave been focusing on economic empowerment, for instance by facilitatingsmall business and establishing co-operatives (koperasi) among low-in-come mothers, breeders, fishers and farmers. While it is undeniable thateconomic progress is one of the measures of individual well-being, it is notthe only measure. Investing in social capital development could be moresustainable than merely investing in economic programs. The success ofDD’s economic programs at individual levels still needs to be further inves-tigated, since only a few studies have been done. A study conducted byFuaida, for example, reported that only 22 of the 282 mitra (client-part-ners) who joined DD’s economic programs in 2004 have succeed in movingfrom the mustah }ik category in four villages37. Fuaida also found that familyfinancial management played an important role in the success stories ofthese 22 individuals. The result highlights the arduous process required tobuild economic progress at individual and household levels.

Economic empowerment programs such as micro credit that havebeen developed by DD have taught individual members not only skills tooperate business, but also skills to build social capital such as trust andnetworking among its members. This program has utilized group empow-erment to enhance individuals’ social capital through regular contacts withother members, routine meetings, and through the development of mutualtrust and cooperation.38. While social capital formation is evident in a mi-cro credit program such as the one that DD has developed, its primaryintent is not to build social capital. As previously noted, economic progressis not the only measure of individual and community well-being, and theeconomic progress of DD mitra needs further examination. DD could use-fully search for alternative empowerment programs, not merely based on


economic development, but also based on ways that could improve localsocial resources and local capacity. One example is by giving emphasis tobuilding social capital at community level, and building collaboration withother nonprofit organizations.

As an illustration, we can learn how to develop social capital from thewell-known rotating credit association (or arisan) that exist in a commu-nity39. The arisan activity requires members to have trust in other mem-bers, so when someone gets the money in the first round, people will trustthis person to continue to pay until all other members get their turn. It is anunwritten rule that everybody has to be trustworthy, a norm that shouldbe obeyed by all members. Arisan also require other dimension of socialcapital, reciprocity and solidarity that guide members to join the groupwith the expectation that they can help each other by forming the arisangroups. The relationship with other members of the community createsnetworks that guide the selection of arisan members. Therefore, while trustis important in arisan activity, networks are also important for selectingmembers.

We can learn from arisan activity that local resources can be tappedby individuals to eliminate life’s hurdles. While arisan is only one form ofactivity that encourages social capital formation in the first place, otheractivities in organizations and communities can be directed to the forma-tion of social capital as well. Several studies have found that membership,volunteering and engagement in civic and social activities can become asource of social capital formation40.

Second, it is necessary for DD to build partnerships with other non-profit organizations, and with all elements of a society that existed beforeDD was founded. Community development based on local resources andlocal capacity requires the involvement of various elements of society,such as neighborhood associations, local religious and social organizations,and local governments on the one hand, and the involvement of individu-als or citizens on the other hand41. This effort can be seen through the imple-mentation of DD’s vision to depend on “our own resources” in building agood community. However, several of DD’s programs may not reflect thisnotion of empowering local resources and capacities. In education pro-grams, for example, instead of empowering established schools in a com-munity such as pesantren or other private nonprofit schools to educateyoung bright students, DD created its own exemplary school. In a healthcareprogram, instead of using local hospitals or clinics to help decrease theburden of the patients, DD founded its own new hospital, LKC. Very carefulconsideration may have been given to the decision not use such estab-lished institutions, due (for example) to their poor systems or weak man-agement. However, if the goal is to improve local capacity and to use localresources, creating its own hospital or school consumes a lot of energy andresources, and might not be the answer.

In addition, DD provides a crucial service in providing direct social,educational and health services to needy individuals and families. How-


9 8

ever unless the recipients’ circumstances can be changed, the provision ofdirect aid by DD or other CSOs will be a never ending program. It would bebetter if DD’s resources could be directed not only to social service deliv-ery programs, but also to supporting social reforms. Even though DD hasits own hospital, for example, in the long term and in a larger social con-text, this may not the best answer to reducing problems such as infant andmother mortality at regional or national levels. DD’s single hospital alonehas a limited capacity to serve patients. Therefore building a free hospitalmay help to decrease the burden on some needy patients, there must stillremain many people who need health care. However by collaboration withother nonprofit organizations and communities, DD could help needypeople in more strategic ways, for example, by encouraging the govern-ment to initiate a universal health care system, so that health care can beaccessed by all individuals regardless of their social and economic status.

Third, while DD has formed network affiliations with several organiza-tions (jejaring DD) such as Masyarakat Mandiri and Kampoeng Ternak, it isnecessary for DD to help improve organizational development outside DD’snetworks. Even though such affiliated CSOs do deliver services, they arenot seen as having an important role compared to government agencies,and may not have built partnership with relevant agencies. The nature ofmany CSOs is different from that of DD, which uses skilled professional staffrather than enthusiastic volunteers, and modern management techniquesrather than traditional organizational practices. With all its experience andexpertise, DD could consider helping to develop the organizational andmanagerial capacities of other CSOs to improve their programs and perfor-mance42.

Fourth, DD could invest in macro levels by supporting social changethrough advocacy programs and the cultivation of a public sphere. DD wouldhave better leverage if it could build better strategies for helping needypeople. This might take the form of encouraging the government to initiatepolicies that benefit the poor, such as a universal health care system. DDcould also contribute to the development of civil society by encouraginggreater participation and utilization of the public sphere, for example bycreating discussion forums, seminars, workshops, media campaigns, andbooks, magazine or journal publications. These various methods could bedirected to discussing and debating the best ways to solve social problemssuch as child labor, disability protection, domestic violence, aging, infantand mother mortality rates, HIV-Aids transmission rates, domestic labor,and human trafficking. Through these diverse programs, Dompet Dhuafacould contribute to a society that is civil by investing in social, educa-tional, health, and economic development.

ConclusionDompet Dhuafa, an Islamic philanthropic organization and social ser-

vice provider, has fulfilled its role as a civil society organization. DD hasdeveloped several programs to enhance the well-being of individuals, fami-


lies and communities through educational, social, health and economicprograms. DD’s empowerment programs have emphasized economic em-powerment at individual level. Empowering individuals and families is ofcourse an integral part of empowering communities. However, it is alsocrucial to put emphasis on community levels to create larger changes in asociety and to contribute to civil society.

Several recommendations that could be considered by DD includesocial capital development, collaboration with other nonprofit organiza-tions and various elements of a society, improvement of organizationalcapacity outside jejaring-DD, and support for social change through advo-cacy and the cultivation of the public sphere. Through social, educational,and economic programs both at the individual and community levels, it ishoped that DD can contribute more to the creation of a society that is civil.The description and analysis of DD in this paper may help readers and prac-titioners to understand the roles played by DD as a civil society organiza-tion in Indonesia.

Notes1 http://www.dompetdhuafa.or.id2 According to a study conducted by The Synergos Institute, among the 25 civilsociety resource organizations studied, DD is the only organization that has nearly100 per cent local funding while other non-governmental organizations mostlydepend on international aid agencies. (The Synergos Institute. 2002. Nationaldirectory of civil society resource organizations, Indonesia. Series on FoundationBuilding in Southeast Asia. The Synergos Institute, New York. http://www.synergos.org/knowledge/02/indonesiacsrodirectory.pdf. accessed in Au-gust 5, 2010, p. 13. A study conducted by Helmanita, reported that if in its firstyear DD had collected zakat less than 100 million Rupiah, ten years later (in2004), DD had been able to collect more than 20 million Rupiah (K. Helmanita,“Managing Islamic Philanthropy with Modern Management: The Experience ofDompet Dhuafa”, in C. S. Bamualim et al, Islamic Philanthropy & Social Develop-ment in Contemporary Indonesia, (Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion andCulture, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and the FordFoundation, Jakarta), pp. 99.3 K. Helmanita, “Managing Islamic Philanthropy with Modern Management:The Experience of Dompet Dhuafa”, in C. S. Bamualim et al, Islamic Philan-thropy & Social Development in Contemporary Indonesia, (Jakarta: Center for theStudy of Religion and Culture, State Islamic University Syarif HidayatullahJakarta and the Ford Foundation Jakarta), p. 105-108. See also S. Abbas,“Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Miskin melalui Investasi Sosial: ExperimentasiLembaga Pengelola Zakat”, in A. Subhan & Y. Kilun, Islam yang Berpihak:Filantropi Islam dan Kesejahteraan Sosial, (Jakarta: Cooperation between DakwahPress, CIDA, IISEP, and PIC, 2007), p. 16-21.4 M. Edwards, Civil Society, (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004). See also Peter L.Berger and J. Neuhaus, “To Empower People”, in V. A. Hodgkinson & M. W.Foley (eds.), The Civil Society Reader, (Hanover, NH: Tufts Published by Univer-

http://www.dompetdhuafa.or.id

www.synergos.org/knowledge/02/indonesiacsrodirectory.pdf


100

sity Press of New England, 2003), p. 214.5 P. Dekker, “Civicness: From Civil Society to Civic Services?”, Voluntas: Interna-tional Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 20 (3), 2009, p. 226.6 J. Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, (Stanford, California: StanfordUniversity Press, 1998), p. 6; See also M. Edwards, Civil Society, p. 6.7 M. Edwards, Civil Society, p. 38; See also E. Shils, The Virtue of Civil Society, thisis the text of a Government and Opposition lecture delivered at the AthenaeumClub on 22 January 1991, pp. 11-12.8 H. K. Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy, (London:Routledge, 2005), p. 26.9 Alexis de Tocqueville (1835), in Alexis de Tocqueville and Bruce Frohnen (ed.),Democracy in America, (Washington DC: Regnery, 2002), p. 472.10 H. K. Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations, p. 23.11 M. Edwards, Civil Society, pp. 10-13.12 H. K. Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations, pp. 68-72.13 R. D. Putnam, “Tuning in, Tuning out: The Strange Disappearance of SocialCapital in America”, PS: Political Science and Politics 28 (4), 1995, p. 665.14 The three categorizations of nonprofit organizations can be found in the UnitedStates as in Smith & Lipsky’s nonprofit organization’s categorization. See S. R.Smith & M. Lipsky, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting,(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 37-40.15 Salamon & Anheier, “The International Classification of Nonprofit Organiza-tions: ICNPO-Revision 1”, Working Papers of the John Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project, No. 19, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Institute for PolicyStudies, 1996), pp. 2-3.16 L. M. Solomon Salamon & H. K. Anheier, “The International Classification ofNonprofit Organizations: ICNPO-Revision 1”, Working Papers of the John HopkinsComparative Nonprofit Sector Project, no. 19, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins In-stitute for Policy Studies, 1996), p. 7.17 R. D. Putnam, “Turning in, Turning Out”, p. 665; See also R. D. Putnam, R.Leonardi, & R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy,(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 167-171.18 R. D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, & R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, p. 176.19 R. D. Putnam, “Turning in, Turning Out”, p. 664.20 R. D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, & R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, p. 90.21 M. Edwards, Civil Society, p. 55.22 M. Edwards, Civil Society, p. 61.23 It is well-known that many civil society organizations challenged thegovernment’s agenda and policies during Suharto era See for example, M. Sirry,“The Public Expression of Traditional Islam: the Pesantren and Civil Society inPost-Suharto Indonesia”, The Muslim World 100, 2010, p. 67. Sirry highlightsthe efforts made by Pesantrens and Nahdhatul Ulama leaders and activists tochallenge Suharto’s regime as well as to promote minority rights.24 M. Edwards, Civil Society, p. 3925 M. Edwards, Civil Society, p. 39; See also J. Keane, Civil Society: Old Images,

101Dompet Dhuafa as a Civil Society Organization (Tuti Alawiyah)

New Visions, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 23-31.26 M. Edwards, Civil Society, p. 39; See also E. Shils, The Virtue of Civil Society, Thisis the text of a Government and Opposition lecture delivered at the AthenaeumClub on 22 January 1991, p. 3.27 B. R. Barber, “Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age”, in V.A. Hodgkinson & M. W. Foley (ed.), The Civil Society Reader, (Hanover, NH: TuftsPublished by University Press of New England, 2003), p. 243.28 E. Shils, The Virtue of Civil Society, pp. 11-13.29 M. Sirry, “The Public Expression of Traditional Islam: the Pesantren and CivilSociety in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, The Muslim World 100, p. 72.30 K. Helmanita, “Managing Islamic Philanthropy with Modern Management”,p. 99.31 K. Helmanita, “Managing Islamic Philanthropy with Modern Management”,pp. 105-108.32 I. Abubakar & C. S. Bamualim, Filantropi Islam & Keadilan Sosial: Studi TentangPotensi, Tradisi, dan Pemanfaatan filantropi Islam di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Centerfor the Study of Religion and Culture, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2006).33 K. Helmanita, “Managing Islamic Philanthropy with Modern Management”,p. 9534 Organizations under Jejaring DD includes Kampoeng Ternak, MasyarakatMandiri, and Lembaga Pelayan Masyarakat (LPM-DD) and LembagaPengembangan Insani (LPI-DD). See http://www.dompetdhuafa.or.id.35 See http://www.lpi-dd.net/index.php36 See http://www.masyarakatmandiri. org37 L. D. Fuaida, “Manajemen Keuangan Keluarga Miskin: Kasus MasyarakatMandiri, Dompet Dhuafa Republika”, in A. Subhan & Y. Kilun, Islam yangBerpihak: Filantropi Islam dan Kesejahteraan Sosial, (Jakarta: Cooperation be-tween Dakwah Press, CIDA, IISEP, and PIC, 2007), p. 59.38 Sirajuddin Abbas, for example, analyzed that economic empowerment doneby DD is part of social investation on the form of social capital through indi-vidual and group empowerment. See S. Abbas, “Pemberdayaan MasyarakatMiskin melalui Investasi Sosial”, p. 7.39 This type of social capital activity, arisan, has been cited elsewhere whenpeople refer to a form of social capital. See for example, R. D. Putnam, R. Leonardi,& R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, p. 168-169.40 See for example, R. D. Putnam, “Turning in, Turning Out”, p. 665; See also P.Dekker, “Civicness: From Civil Society to Civic Services?”, p. 228.41 For further discussion, see for example, M. Edwards, Civil Society, p. 48; Seealso M. Walzer, “A Better Vision: The Idea of Civil Society”, in V. A. Hodgkinson& M. W. Foley (eds.), The Civil Society Reader, (Hanover, NH: Tufts Published byUniversity Press of New England, 2003), pp. 317-319.42 Wahyu Susilo, for example, stated that government has not recognized therole of civil society organizations in achieving Millenieum Development Goals(MDGs) to alleviate poverty and tackle social problems such as the high levels ofinfant and mother’s mortality rate and HIV-Aids transmission rate. (W. Susilo,“Wajah Muram MDGs di Indonesia”, Kompas, Wednesday, 4 August 2010). As a


http://www.lpi-dd.net/index.php

http://www.masyarakatmandiri


102

comparison, in the United States, civil society organizations have been recog-nized as government’s partners to deliver social service. It can be seen, for ex-ample, that the revenue of nonprofit sector is a combination of fees and charges(54 per cent), government funding (36 per cent) and private giving (10 percent) (H. K. Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations, p. 72).

BibliographyAbbas, S., 2007, “Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Miskin melalui Investasi Sosial:

Experimentasi Lembaga Pengelola Zakat”, in A. Subhan & Y. Kilun, Is-lam yang Berpihak: Filantropi Islam dan Kesejahteraan Sosial, Jakarta:Cooperation between Dakwah Press, CIDA, IISEP, and PIC, pp. 3-24.

Abubakar, I. & C. S. Bamualim, 2006, Filantropi Islam & Keadilan Sosial: Studitentang Potensi, Tradisi, dan Pemanfaatan Filantropi Islam di Indonesia,Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, UIN SyarifHidayatullah.

Anheier, H. K., 2005, Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy, Lon-don: Routledge.

Barber, B. R., 2003, “Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age”,in V. A. Hodgkinson & M. W. Foley (eds.), The Civil Society Reader, Hanover,NH: Tufts Published by University Press of New England, pp. 234-254.

Berger, P. L. & J. Neuhaus, 2003, “To Empower People”, in V. A. Hodgkinson &M. W. Foley (eds.), The Civil Society Reader, Hanover, NH: Tufts Publishedby University Press of New England, pp. 213-233.

Dekker, P., 2009, “Civicness: From Civil Society to Civic Services?”, Voluntas:International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 20 (3), pp.220-238.

Edwards, M., 2004, Civil Society, Malden, MA: Polity Press.Fuaida, L. D., 2007, “Manajemen Keuangan Keluarga Miskin: Kasus Masyarakat

Mandiri, Dompet Dhuafa Republika”, in A. Subhan & Y. Kilun, Islamyang Berpihak: Filantropi Islam dan Kesejahteraan Sosial, Jakarta: Coop-eration between Dakwah Press, CIDA, IISEP, and PIC, pp. 55-74.

Helmanita, K., 2006, “Managing Islamic Philanthropy with Modern Manage-ment: The Experience of Dompet Dhuafa”, in C. S. Bamualim et al (eds.),Islamic Philanthropy & Social Development in Contemporary Indonesia ,Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, State Islamic Uni-versity Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and the Ford Foundation, pp. 85-1 1 8 .

http://www.dompetdhuafa.or.idhttp://www.lpi-dd.net/index.phphttp://www.masyarakatmandiri.orgKeane, J., 1998, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, Stanford, California:

Stanford University Press.Putnam, R. D., 1995, Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social

capital in America. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28 (4), 664-683.


http://www.lpi-dd.net/index.php

http://www.masyarakatmandiri.org

103Dompet Dhuafa as a Civil Society Organization (Tuti Alawiyah)

Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R., 1993, Making Democracy Work: CivicTraditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Salamon, L. M. & H. K. Anheier, 1996, “The International Classification of Non-profit Organizations: ICNPO-Revision 1, 1996”, Working Papers of the JohnHopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, No. 19, Baltimore: The JohnHopkins Institute for Policy Studies, 1996.

Shils, E., 1991, The Virtue of Civil Society, This is the text of a Government andOpposition lecture delivered at the Athenaeum Club on 22 January 1991.

Sirry, M., 2010, “The Public Expression of Traditional Islam: the Pesantren andCivil Society in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, The Muslim World 100, pp. 60-7 7 .

Smith, S. R., & M. Lipsky, 1993, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Ageof Contracting, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Susilo, W, 2010, “Wajah Muram MDGs di Indonesia”, Kompas, Wednesday, 4August.

The Synergos Institute, 2002, “National Directory of Civil Society ResourceOrganizations, Indonesia, Series on Foundation Building in Southeast Asia,The Synergos Institute, New York, http://www.synergos.org/knowledge/02/indonesiacsrodirectory.pdf. Accessed in 5 August 2010.

Walzer, M., 2003, “A Better Vision: The Idea of Civil Society”, In V. A. Hodgkinson,& M. W. Foley (eds.), The Civil Society Reader, Hanover, NH: Tufts Pub-lished by University Press of New England, pp. 306-321.

http://www.synergos.org/knowledge/

Philanthropy and the IndonesianCommunity in Seattle: The CerdasFoundation ExperienceAlfitri*

Abstract

As the number of Indonesians migrating to foreign countries grows, so do theremittances they send back to Indonesia. The amounts are significant. The WorldBank’s Migration and Remittance Factbook noted that in 2008 Indonesia rankedthirteenth in world’s top remittance-receiving countries. In 2006 Indonesia re-ceived inward remittance flows of 5.722 million US dollars, or 1.6 per cent of thenation’s GDP. However, few studies have been conducted of the Indonesiandiaspora’s philanthropic organization. This article will examine the experienceof the Cerdas Foundation in managing Indonesian philanthropy in Seattle, inthe United States of America. In accomplishing its mission statements, the CerdasFoundation faces obstacles and challenges generated by the problems of distancefrom Indonesia, inadequate organizational structure, and an “open ideology”.Despite this, the Cerdas Foundation arguably has the potential to contributesustainably to Indonesia’s social and economic development through its educa-tion and disaster relief programs, if it can transform itself from a gathering ofnostalgic Indonesians in Seattle to a functional corporation. This is possible, thearticle argues, if the Cerdas Foundation adopts a more hierarchical organiza-tional structure and balances its stance of philanthropic amateurism.

Keywords

Philanthropy, Indonesian community, Seattle, Cerdas Foundation, fundrising.

* Alfitri is a lecturer at the Faculty of Shariah, Samarinda State Institute for IslamicStudies (STAIN Samarinda); Graduate student of University of Washington Schoolof Law, Seattle.


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Introduction

T his article examines the obstacles and challenges faced by theChildren’s Education Relief and Development Assistance foundation

(Cerdas) of Seattle. Cerdas was established in 2001 by Indonesians living inSeattle, with the mission of helping underprivileged children in Indonesiato continue their education, and providing disaster relief in Indonesia. As a501(c)(3) charitable organization1 (the status was acquired on January 10,2009), Cerdas is run solely by volunteers. Its sole purpose is to generatefunds in Seattle for beneficiaries living in Indonesia. This type of philan-thropy is commonly known as “diaspora philanthropy”.

Diaspora communities have become significant players in the eco-nomic development of their home countries, given increasing rates of mi-gration and the money migrants are able to send home. According to theWorld Bank, economic remittances received by home countries from itscitizens living overseas now surpass the official development assistance ofinternational donors.2 However, there is a concern among researchers aboutthe extent to which the remittances of diaspora communities really reachthe poorest of the poor, since people living in poverty at home do not havelinks to diaspora communities. Researchers are concerned that remittancesare usually intended for immediate family members, who often utilize themfor family maintenance, housing improvements and conspicuous consump-tion.3 The potential of remittances to improve the quality of life and eco-nomic development in the country of origins is greater than this. Manyresearchers have addressed the importance of diaspora organizations inchanneling these remittances for broader philanthropic purposes in thecountry of origin.

For this to happen, diaspora organizations need to function efficiently.They must be well managed, otherwise they will suffer from various formsof voluntary failure such as philanthropic insufficiency when they havelimited scale and resources, philanthropic paternalism when a wealthymember or a strong senior figure controls the community priorities, orphilanthropic amateurism.4 According to some studies, the volunteer-based, unsophisticated nature of diaspora organizations means that theyrely on strongly personalized networks, and this often contributes to theirfailures to achieve optimal results.5

As a volunteer-base diaspora organization, how can Cerdas Founda-tion secure itself against these voluntary failures and keep contributing toeconomic and social development in Indonesia, especially through its schol-arships and disaster relief programs? To examine this question, this articlewill first explain the background of Cerdas Foundation’s formation. Next,its mission statement and structure will be discussed in order to under-stand the obstacles and challenges faced by the organization in achievingits goals. This part will consider strategic management assessments of howthe organization deals with these obstacles and challenges.

Research for this paper used interview, observation and documenta-

107Philanthropy and the Indonesian Community in Seattle (Alfitri)

tion methods to collect data about Cerdas Foundation. Interviews and ob-servations were conducted during Cerdas’s monthly meetings and the elec-tion of the Cerdas Board of Directors, facilitated as required by e-mail cor-respondence. Documentation mainly utilized Cerdas’s Bylaws, Article ofIncorporation (as amended), Profile, and online information from the Cerdaswebsite and blog. As a courtesy to Cerdas, individual officers, membersand volunteers who provided information in interviews are not identifiedin the footnotes.

Indonesians in Seattle and the Establishment of CERDASFoundation

Much research has been done about the generosity of diaspora com-munities in giving back to their countries of origin, either in financial terms(material remittances) or through knowledge transfer and volunteerism(social remittance). This occurs because individuals living outside of theircountries of origin often maintain strong familial, cultural, economic andpolitical ties to their homelands, giving rise to transnational citizens andvillages.6 The ties become stronger when natural disasters or severe pov-erty at home triggers a sense of humanity and nationalism. To deal withsuch situations, instrumental diaspora philanthropy needs to be carefullymanaged; otherwise it simply becomes a temporary relief measure ratherthan making a significant contribution to social and economic wellbeing inthe home communities and countries. Or, even worse, the funds will bemisapplied and no public good will result.

Cognizant of the impact of poverty on equal access to education inIndonesia, in 2001 the members of the Indonesian Muslim congregation inSeattle started a school funding program to address the critical issue ofeconomically disadvantaged students in Indonesia who drop out of school.The program initially had the modest goal of helping two students in Subang(West Java, Indonesia) to for pay their elementary school tuition and sup-plies. The number of beneficiaries subsequently grew significantly, until itexceeded the ability of this small émigré group to manage them either ad-ministratively or financially. The sustainability of the school funding pro-gram faced a serious challenge.

In 2006, the program initiators responded to this challenge by form-ing the Cerdas Foundation, and opening its membership to the wider Indo-nesian community in Seattle. Indonesians living in Seattle in fact comefrom diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. They have come to Seattlefor different reasons: to work for companies such as Boeing and Microsoft;to study at universities or community colleges; or to become US citizen.Romanticizing the ancestral homeland and issues of return are usually re-garded as the defining features of a diaspora.7 In the case of the CerdasFoundation, this romanticism is combined with the alarming rate of earlyschool leavers among Indonesian children, as well as the socio-economicproblems generated by natural disasters in Indonesia. These prompt mem-


108

bers of Seattle’s Indonesian community to identify with the plight of theancestral homeland, even though they are living in another country. Byforming the Cerdas Foundation formation, they hoped that members of thenext generation of Indonesians in Seattle would continue to be concernedwith Indonesia’s socio-economic situation, even though they might neverreturn to the ancestral homeland.

By opening up the organization membership, Cerdas Foundation nowhas increased volunteer support, and it is able to work not only on issues ofequal access to education, but also on appeals for disaster relief. Neverthe-less, Cerdas needs to manage this resource strategically so that its missioncan be accomplished. Funds raised from its two major annual events havein fact decreased over the last two years, while the number of school fund-ing program beneficiaries has expanded. In 2008, for example, Cerdas wasraised USD 10,357.00 from gifts, grants and contribution from a fundraisingdinner, and USD 1,664.50 from cultural gatherings. In 2009, however, theseamounts decreased to USD 7,037.00 and USD 917.25.8 On the other hand,the number of scholarship recipients soared from 44 children in academicyear 2007-2008, 80 in 2008-2009, to 107 in 2009-2010. It is estimatedthat approximately USD 21,000 (IDR 188 million) is needed to supportthese 107 students per year.9

With the acquisition of a corporation certificate as a non-profit orga-nization (NPO) in 2007 and tax exempt status in 2009, Cerdas is requiredto become more accountable, by (for example) filing an annual report withWashington State and publicly disclosing aid disbursed to Indonesia. Thisbrings new challenges to the organization, as its administrative responsi-bilities have become greater while the organizational structure arguablyremains modest and more unstructured than hierarchical in meeting thedemands of its missions and objectives.

CERDAS Mission and Structure: The Need to Revisit?In the nonprofit world, mission statements play an important role

because they determine the boundary functions of an organization so thatit can focus on achieving its goals and move forward amidst the competi-tion. Well defined mission statements can also motivate the nonprofit orga-nization staff and donors because they carry the ideology of organization.Last but not least, mission statements help nonprofit organization in theprocess of evaluating its performance.10 Is the Cerdas Foundation missionstatement able to play these roles?

Cerdas Foundation is an Indonesian community-empowered organi-zation in Seattle, driven by a vision of a world where all children have equalaccess to education, regardless of their ethnic, religious, social or economicbackgrounds. Its motto is “Education for a Brighter Future”, which accordsto the selection of organization name “Cerdas”. The word “Cerdas” is anIndonesian word meaning “intelligent” or “bright”, and is used to describea sharp mind.11 Through this vision, the organization reflects the inspira-


tion behind its establishment of helping the bright young minds of poorchildren who represent hopes for a better tomorrow, both for their familiesand for their country, Indonesia.

The Foundation’s mission statement gives its goals as:a. To provide financial aid for learning and education to underprivileged

children and to provide relief assistance for any emergency disaster inIndonesia;

b. To support social development projects in Indonesia;c . To foster and promote international friendship, understanding and col-

laboration between people of the United States and Indonesia;d. To promote Indonesian culture, tradition and heritage in the United

States;12

Does this mission statement accurately reflect Cerdas’s vision, or doesit go further? It talks not only about educational aid (its vision), but alsoabout providing disaster relief, social development projects, friendship andcultural exchange. According to Oster, a broad mission statement can beuseful. It can open new opportunities for nonprofit organizations, espe-cially those whose major resource is fundraising. This is because a moregeneral mission statement enables the organizations to target a wider rangeof donors.13

Cerdas Foundation’s experience seems to be consistent with Oster’sargument. Through its two major fundraising programs, an annualfundraiser dinner and various cultural gatherings, Cerdas can raise fundsnot only from Indonesians in Seattle, but also from fellow Americans andothers who are interested in knowing this country.14 This is because bothprograms exhibit Indonesian culture through performance arts (dancesand folklore) and Indonesian cuisine to a broad audience. Funds raisedsupport the school funding program. These programs neatly combineCerdas’s first goal of educational support with its third and fourth goals offostering international friendship and Indonesian culture. 15 However itssecond goal of supporting social development in Indonesia is more prob-lematic. It is so broad that it may distract the Foundation from its primaryfocus of “education for a brighter future”, particularly given its modest andrelatively unstructured management hierarchy.

The Foundation’s organization structure consists of board of threedirectors and a range of officers: a president, two vice presidents, a secre-tary, two treasurers, a program coordinator, two public relations officersand various volunteers, all of whom are members of the Cerdas Founda-tion. Anyone can become a member as long as they maintain their interestin accomplishing the organization mission, and are approved by the board.16

These conditions are not intended to limit Cerdas Foundation member-ship, but to validate voting rights and rights to nominate candidates and tobe elected to office. In fact, there is no rigorous membership approval pro-cedure, because Cerdas aims to be a vehicle for collective action by Indo-nesians in Seattle, and by non-Indonesians who are interested in Indonesiaand want to contribute their perspectives, skills and resources for its bet-


110

terment.Initially this structure seemed to serve the organization’s mission,

however when its officials assumed their positions they realized that theylacked job descriptions, and that they needed staff to help officers whowere overwhelmed by administrative tasks, such as program coordinationand public relations.

One problem is that all the Foundation’s officers are not in full timeemployment (see Table 1, below)

Table 1: CERDAS Foundation Officers 2007 - 2009

Names withheldfor privacy

reasons

Position Employed by

1. President Health Research Assoc. Inc

2. Vice President Boeing

3. Vice President Boeing

4. Secretary Graduate Student

5. Treasurer Microsoft

6. Treasurer Day Care Center

7. Public Relation OSSI

8. Public Relation Day Care Center

This problem is solved by the officers through a monthly meetingwhere each person comes with ideas about what the president, vice presi-dents, secretary, treasurers, program coordinators and public relationsshould do beyond their responsibilities as outlined in the bylaws. How-ever, this is not documented yet. To deal with the lack of volunteer staff,the directors and other officers back up each other’s tasks, and also involvethemselves directly in organizing fundraising programs, often coordinatedby the public relations officer.

This kind of familial relationship and less hierarchical organizationhas helped Cerdas Foundation to operate, even though it is run by volun-teer officers. Technically, the bylaws grant the officers reimbursement forexpenditures incurred on behalf of the corporation.17 In many cases theydo not ask for reimbursement for such expenses as the transportation, com-munication and catering needed to prepare and carry out programs or themonthly meeting, because they consider this a donation to the foundation.

From a strategic management perspective, however, there is con-cern about the organization’s sustainability if it continues to rely on these


loose management practices. This is particularly so given the overwhelm-ing administrative and implementation duties of the directors and officers,while they hold firmly to their philanthropic amateurism stance. 18 Beloware some obstacles and challenges faced by Cerdas in accomplishing itsmission statements and objectives.

Challenges: From the Familial to the Hierarchical

1. Problems of Distance in Administering Programs in IndonesiaThere are two education programs, the Children’s Education Scholar-

ship Program and the Generic Education Assistance Program. This latterprogram includes procurement of items to support school programs, schoolrecovery following natural disaster, or aid for community learning pro-grams. The Program Coordinator in the organization structure has specifi-cally responsibility for Cerdas education programs. This officer is assistedby the Cerdas scholarship committee, comprising board members and of-ficers who assess scholarship proposals and determine recipients.19 Cerdashas not embarked on Generic Education Assistance program yet, becausethe scholarship program is deemed to have more immediate urgency. Atthe same time, Cerdas is still trying to find an efficient method to executethe scholarship program.

One of the problems is the selection of reliable program coordinatorsin Indonesia, and how to control their work. Program coordinators, eitherindividual or NPO, are volunteers who manage the funds and become theliaison between CERDAS Foundation and the children receiving the fund-ing. Each coordinator take cares of from five to fifteen children receivingthe scholarships. The coordinators are selected either because they pro-posed themselves to Cerdas, or were recommended by Cerdas members.

A student nominated for a scholarship must be from a needy family,and be at risk of dropping out of school if not assisted The nominationprocess is initiated by the coordinators, who submit a proposal comprisinga statement form, information about the prospective awardee, and an imple-mentation and evaluation form. All form templates are provided by Cerdasand proposals may be sent by mail, facsimile, or e-mail. All proposals areevaluated by the Cerdas scholarship committee. Grant renewal is possiblebased on the students’ performance at school and their family situation.For this purpose, the coordinator must periodically submit an implemen-tation and evaluation form.20

Some program coordinators in Indonesia have not realized the im-portance of reporting their activities each semester to Cerdas, and thatCerdas needs these to comply with disclosure requirements in Seattle. Thisis a major problem, because accountability is essential to philanthropy.Without it, donors can lose their confidence in the organization.21 Mean-while, the Program Coordinator in Seattle relies on online communication,phone calls and site visits to coordinate and control the scholarship pro-


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gram. Site visits may not be scheduled, but made opportunistically when aprogram coordinator or a member of Cerdas is going to Indonesia at theirown expense for vacation, business or for family reasons. This well-mean-ing but haphazard system does not allow maximal coordination or control,particularly considering the geographic spread of the scholarship program.There are 107 scholarship recipients in all, of whom 55 are at elementaryschools, 20 at junior high schools and 54 at senior high schools. Geographi-cally, there are 52 students from West Java (Bekasi, Bandung, Cianjur andCimahi), 25 from Central Java (Purwokerto, Bantul and Yogyakarta), 26from East Java (Surabaya, Madiun and Madura), and four from Bali.22

There is a plan to establish a Cerdas Foundation chapter in Indonesia,but the organization has difficulties with the Indonesia legal system’s un-certain incorporating process for a foreign foundations. The law allows forcollaboration between foreign foundations and domestic foundations basedon a memorandum of understanding, but says nothing about incorporatinga chapter of a foreign foundation.23 To deal with the problem of distance,therefore, Cerdas must collaborate with not-for-profit organizations in In-donesia, and each collaboration must be based on a formal MoU ratherthan an informal, oral agreement with an individual. This is required toensure effective coordination and control in channeling the scholarshipfunds and disaster relief programs. By signing an MoU, Cerdas can be morecertain of receiving timely, standard reports, as this requirement would bewritten into to contract.

The effectiveness of collaboration can be seen in channeling the di-saster relief program for the victims of 30 September 2009 earthquake inWest Sumatra. Collaborating with PKPU, donations from Cerdas Founda-tion provided 200 cartons of bottled water, 150 cartons of instant noodles,and 5,000 packs of biscuits, for the immediate needs. With its experiencein humanitarian services in disaster area, PKPU also used the donations forconstructing a temporary school for SDN 13 Batang Tapakis, Pariaman,providing 1000 packages of school supplies, and building 343 temporaryhouses in the West Sumatra earthquake area. A trauma healing programwas conducted in ten temporary schools, intended to help school childrendeal with the experience of psychological trauma caused by the disaster.24

2. Focusing on Fundraising with no Fundraiser ManagerThere is no fundraiser manager in the organization structure. The

major fundraising programs are a dinner and cultural gatherings. Since2009 the Indonesian Kid’s Festival has been added to the fundraising pro-gram. Public relations responsibility is usually assigned to the programcoordinator. This person must therefore juggle two chores, namely seekingsponsors for the fundraisers and donors for Cerdas. This is because part ofthe task of public relations is to link Cerdas with potential business sectordonors.

The importance of having a fundraiser manager in an era where non-profit organizations compete for the funds cannot be overemphasized.


Fundraising is instrumental for nonprofit organizations in order to assuretheir future and their planned good works. Moreover, the success offundraising marks the extent to which a nonprofit organization’s purpose isaffirmed by society, since a donors’ decision to support any particular chari-table organization is determined, inter alia, by a conviction that the orga-nization is accountable and able to effectively provide services to the tar-get community. In strategic management, this perspective is called philan-thropic fundraising. It denotes “the philosophy and practices that fostervoluntary giving to achieve public good.25 Assigning an officer to lead thefundraising programs is deemed to be part of philanthropic fundraising,because it shows that a nonprofit organization has moved to the highestfundraising development stages, the integrative stage.26

Cerdas Foundation therefore needs to adjust its organizational struc-ture by adding a new position and clearly defining the job descriptions of itsDirectors and Officers. Cerdas needs to consider the effectiveness of havingtwo vice presidents, treasurers and public relations officers. Instead, it hasto create a fundraiser manager responsible for managing the major annualfundraising program and working to maintain a good relationship with spon-sors.

3. Relying on Volunteers without Volunteer ManagementSince its inception, Cerdas Foundation has emphasized the integral

role of volunteer in accomplishing its mission statements. The need forvolunteers, unfortunately, has not been anticipated by a method to recruitand retain them. Recruitment is through indirect messages like “we needyour support …”, in every Cerdas news update, on the website, by word ofmouth and by Cerdas members inviting the help of their fellow Indone-sians. However there is no specific position or officer assigned to managingvolunteers. Meanwhile, volunteers are very much needed for day to dayadministration, such as proofreading articles/news updates for the Cerdaswebsite; for fundraising programs; and for handling paperwork in educa-tion programs.

Creating a volunteer service position is essential to Cerdas’s struc-ture in order to recruit, manage and retain volunteers. In addition to aword-of-mouth invitations, recruitment can be done by means of morepopular and accessible social networks, for example by creating a Facebookpage. This is much more accessible to more people than a website newsupdate or mailing list; only those who visit the website or are on e-mail listwill receive information. A dedicated volunteer service would also collectdocuments on volunteer participation, and prepare planning for optimalvolunteer utilization.

4. Challenge of Sustainable Resources and Consistency with OpenIdeology

In its search for sustainable education program resources, CerdasFoundation has collaborated with religion based Indonesian groups includ-


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ing church congregations and Islamic discussion groups (pengajian), byproviding Cerdas donation boxes and flyers during their activities. There isan opportunity for Cerdas to get more sustainable funds from Islamic zakatal-mal charitable donations. However, Cerdas cannot accept such specifi-cally targeted religious donations as zakat al-mal because this would con-flict with its vision as an open organization without any specific ethnic orreligious affiliation, so that children can have equal access to scholarshipprogram regardless their ethnic, religious, social or economic backgrounds.While the students helped by Cerdas include both Muslims and non-Mus-lims, some Cerdas Foundation members believe that only Muslims can ben-efit from zakat al-mal.27

Cerdas deserves credit for being consistent in its open ideology, eventhough this denies it access to the sustainable resource of zakat al-malfunds. Suppose, for example, that a hundred people paid their zakat al-malon savings through Cerdas Foundation, based on a minimum asset of 3ounces of gold valued at approximately USD 3,455.28 The 2.5% zakat al-mal of 2.5 per cent of savings received by Cerdas Foundation would amountto approximately USD 8,700.00 annually (almost eighty million Rupiahsat the exchange rate of Rp. 9,000.00) The amount of zakat paid is thereforequite significant. Given the low organizational autonomy when receivingzakat al-mal funds exclusively for the benefit of Muslims, Cerdas founda-tion cannot accept these funds. This, to some extent, contradicts Pratt’sargument about the high reliability of individual contributions for highlyorganizational autonomy so far as the exclusive proposition of zakat al-mal beneficiaries is concerned.29

Given this, Cerdas foundation needs to continue and expand its searchfor partners and donors, and it needs to be creative and innovative. It hasdone this with one of the biggest department store chains in the UnitedStates, Macy’s. Through its Shop for a Cause program, Macy’s has partneredwith non-profit organizations nationwide to raise more than $28 millionfor their ongoing charitable efforts. Cerdas has been given the opportunityto participate in this. The program gives Macy’s patrons the opportunity tohelp Cerdas Foundation by purchasing a $5 Shopping Pass for exclusivesavings and special offers in every Macy’s store. As a participating charity,Cerdas keeps 100% of the proceeds from the sale of each pass.30

ConclusionIn managing Indonesian diaspora philanthropy in Seattle, Cerdas

Foundation has been able to survive its early failures thanks to the capac-ity, sophistication and efforts of its active members, officers, volunteersand board members in developing the organization.31 They continuouslydiscuss what makes a good organization, and apply their ideas to the run-ning of the organization. They are also able multi-task to cope with otherfellow officers’ performance constraints and the lack of volunteers for day-to-day administration needs. This is presumably because they bring the


experience of their professional working experience to Cerdas Foundation.However, Cerdas Foundation can no longer rely on a strongly familial,loosely hierarchical organization structure if they want to grow to the nextorganization phase of mission accomplishment or strategic alliance, be-cause this requires good governance.

There is an excellent proposal from the incumbent President of CerdasFoundation to improve officers’ performance by requiring candidates tobe interviewed by the President and the Board, and to sign a performancecontract prior to assuming the position. Cerdas anticipates that this morehierarchical organization proposal may increase the management perfor-mance, which is challenged by a shortage of day-to-day volunteer staff. Inaddition to the proposal, Cerdas Foundation may need to balance its phil-anthropic amateurism stance with part time paid staff, especially if thePresident’s proposal fails to attract fully committed and dedicated officersto the organization.

Notes1 Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code of 1986 which functions as domestic statu-tory tax law of the United States, a 501(c)(3) organization is referred to as acharitable organization. Any contribution made to organizations under this cat-egory is deductible by the donor for income tax purposes. This status presum-ably enables these organizations to more easily attract funds than other not-for-profit organizations which do not have this status. Corporations and any com-munity chest, fund, or foundation can apply for acquiring this tax-exempt orga-nizations as long as they are organized and operated exclusively for:“…religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-tional purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competi-tion (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilitiesor equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part ofthe net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder orindividual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propa-ganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwiseprovided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaignon behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”See US Code Title 26 § 501(c)(3), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode26/usc_sec_26_00000501——000-html. 29 October 2009.2 Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, “Diaspora Philanthropy in an At-Risk Society: TheCase of Coptic Orphans in Egypt“, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 200837, p. 411.3 For example research conducted by Massey et al (1999), Nyberg-Sorensen,Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen (2002); Özden and Schiff (2005) as quoted byJennifer M. Brinkerhoff, “Diaspora Philanthropy in an At-Risk Society, pp. 411-4 1 4 .4 Salamon (1987) as quoted by Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, “Diaspora Philanthropy

http://www.law.cornell.edu/


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in an At-Risk Society, p. 415.5 For example Dade (2006); Portes, Escobar and Radford (2005) as quoted byJennifer M. Brinkerhoff, “Diaspora Philanthropy in an At-Risk Society, p. 415.6 See Peggy Levit, The Transnational Villagers, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer-sity of California Press, 2001), pp. 11-15. See also Paula Doherty Johnson,Diaspora Philanthropy: Influences, Initiatives, and Issues, research funded byThe Philanthropic Initiative Inc. and The Global Equity Initiative, HarvardUniversity (May 2007), p. 3, available at http://www.tpi.org/downloads/pdfs/Diaspora_Philanthropy_Final.pdf. October 29, 2010.7 See Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, (London: University Col-lege London, 1997), pp. 184-185.8 See Cerdas Foundation 2009 and 2008 Cash Flow Summary, available athttp://www.cerdasfoundation.org/docs/public/reports/2009CashFlowSummary.pdf., 26 July 2010.9 Cerdas Foundation Organization Profile, p. 5.10 Sharon M. Oster, Strategic Management for Nonprofit Organizations: Theory andCases, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 22-23.11 Cerdas Foundation Organization Profile; see also “About Cerdas”, available athttp://www.cerdasfoundation.org. 29 October 2009.12 Cerdas Foundation Article of Incorporation and Amendment, Article IV(1)(A)(B)(C)(D).13 Sharon M. Oster, Strategic Management for Nonprofit Organizations, p. 27.14 In every cultural and fundraising events organized by Cerdas, non-Indonesianpatrons or attendees always join the events. They might be those who studyIndonesia or happened to visit Indonesia and love its cultures. Documentationabout the events can be seen at http://cerdasfoundation.net/blog.15 Except for the disaster relief program which has its own specific appeal whenthe circumstances arise.16 Cerdas Foundation Bylaws, Article 2 (2.2) of Qualification for Membership.17 Cerdas Foundation Bylaws, Article (4)(10).18 For example: coming late to monthly meetings or missing them; delayingcompleting the tasks or not carrying them out. This does not necessarily meanthat they are not committed to the organization. Instead, they may have otherconcurrent commitments with their full time jobs or families.19 See “Cerdas Foundation Program”, http://cerdasfoundation.net/blog/?p=11,29 October 2009.20 See “Cerdas Foundation Program”, http://cerdasfoundation.net/blog/?p=11,29 October 2009.21 Based on interviews with Cerdas officers and board, they often receive e-mailmessage from donors questioning whether the funds raised will channeled toIndonesia.22 Cerdas Foundation Organization Profile.23 See Law No. 16/2001 of Foundation, article 69(1)(2); and PP No. 63/2008 ofthe Implementation of Foundation Law, article 62(2)(3)(4).24 “Sumatra Earthquake Report 2009”, available at http://cerdasfoundation.

http://www.tpi.org/downloads/pdfs/

http://www.cerdasfoundation.org/docs/public/reports/2009CashFlow

http://www.cerdasfoundation.org

http://cerdasfoundation.net/blog

http://cerdasfoundation.net/blog/



net/docs/public/reports/PKPU_Report_Original_Version_2009.pdf, 14 Decem-ber 2009.25 See for Robert E. Fogal, “Designing and Managing the Fundraising Program”,in Robert D. Herman and Associates, The Jossey-Bass Handbook of NonprofitLeadership and Management, (San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005), 2nd edition,pp. 419-420.26 The integrative stage characterizes the organization as strategist which growspartnerships and builds as well as maintaining philanthropic relationships inorder to assure organizational growth. See Robert E. Fogal, “Designing and Man-aging the Fundraising Program”, pp. 420-421.27 The exclusive proposition of zakat al-mal beneficiaries has been challenged bye.g. Al-Khayyat, a leading Jordan Islamic scholar, who argues that the phraseal-fuqara’ means “all the (category of the) poor” in Arabic; therefore, the benefi-ciaries must include the non-Muslim poor. This view has been practiced by Is-lamic Relief, a major British Muslim relief agency, which extends zakat al-malfunds to non-Muslims in Africa. See Jonathan Benthall, “Financial Worship:The Quranic Injunction to Almsgiving” Journal of the Royal AnthropologicalInstitute (N.S) 5 (1999): 31.28 This amount is valid as of November 23, 2009 based on Mercy-USA for Aid andDevelopment, “Zakat ul Mal Calculation Form”, available at http://www.mercyusa.org/ZabihaUSemail.cfm, 29 July 2010.29 See Jon Pratt, “Analyzing the Dynamics of Fundings: Reliability and Au-tonomy”, The Nonprofit Quarterly, Summer 2004, pp. 9-10.30 See “Shop for a Cause”, available at http://cerdasfoundation.net/blog/?p=91.31 This confirms Moya study in 2005 about surviving from voluntary failureswith increasing sophistication and capacity within the diaspora organizationsector; see Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, “Diaspora Philanthropy in an At-Risk Soci-ety”, pp. 415-416.32 Cerdas Foundation 2009 and 2008 Cash Flow Summary, available at http://www.cerdasfoundation.org/docs/public/reports/2009CashFlow Summary. pdf.,26 July 2010.

BibliographyAbout Cerdas, accessed at http://www.cerdasfoundation.org/. 29 October 2009.Cerdas Foundation Program, accessed at http://cerdasfoundation.net/blog/?p=11,

29 October 2009.Shop for a Cause, accessed at http://cerdasfoundation.net/blog/?p=91.Sumatra Earthquake Report 2009, accessed at http://cerdasfoundation.net/docs/

public/reports/PKPU_Report_Original_Version_2009.pdf, 14 December2009.

Benthall, Jonathan, 1999, “Financial Worship: The Quranic Injunction toAlmsgiving”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S) 5.

Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., 2008, “Diaspora Philanthropy in an At-Risk Society:The Case of Coptic Orphans in Egypt”, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quar-

http://cerdasfoundation.117


www.cerdasfoundation.org/docs/public/reports/2009CashFlow

http://www.cerdasfoundation.org/



http://cerdasfoundation.net/docs/


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terly 37, p. 411.Cerdas Foundation 2009 and 2008 Cash Flow Summary, accessed at http://

www.cerdasfoundat ion.or g/docs/publ ic/r ep orts/2009Ca sh FlowSummary.pdf>. 26 July 2010.

Cerdas Foundation Article of Incorporation and Amendment.Cerdas Foundation Bylaws.Cerdas Foundation Organization Profile.Cohen, Robin, 1997, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, London: University Col-

lege London.Fogal, Robert E., 2005, “Designing and Managing the Fundraising Program” in

Robert D. Herman and Associates, The Jossey-Bass Handbook of NonprofitLeadership and Management, 2nd edition, San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass.

Johnson, Paula Doherty, 2007, Diaspora Philanthropy: Influences, Initiatives,and Issues, research funded by The Philanthropic Initiative Inc. and TheGlobal Equity Initiative, Harvard University, May, p. 3, accessed at http://www.tpi.org/downloads/pdfs/Diaspora_Philanthropy_Final.pdf, 29October 2010.

Law No. 16/2001 of Foundation.Levit, Peggy, 2001, The Transnational Villagers, Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni-

versity of California Press.Mercy-USA for Aid and Development, Zakat ul Mal Calculation Form, accessed at

http://www.mercyusa.org/ZabihaUSemail.cfm, 29 July 2010.Oster, Sharon M., 1995, Strategic Management for Nonprofit Organizations: Theory

and Cases, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Pratt, Jon, 2004, “Analyzing the Dynamics of Fundings: Reliability and Au-

tonomy”, The Nonprofit Quarterly (Summer), pp. 9-10.US Code Title 26 §501(c)(3), accessede at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/

uscode26/usc_sec_26_00000501——000-.html, 29 October 2009.

Appendix 1

Income Breakdown Up to 2009

http://www.cerdasfoundation.org/docs/public/reports/2009CashFlow

www.tpi.org/downloads/pdfs/Diaspora_Philanthropy_Final.pdf

http://www.mercyusa.org/ZabihaUSemail.cfm

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode26/usc_sec_26_00000501


Expenses, Gifts and Grants Breakdown Up to 2009

The Role of Celebrities in PromotingMuslim AttireDeny Hamdani*

Abstract

Veiling has traditionally been more about displaying religious observance thana woman’s beauty. In recent years the practice of veiling among IndonesianMuslim women has become much more prevalent, influenced by consumerism,the example set by celebrities, and the power of the mass media. A new andmulti-dimensional nexus seems to have emerged which conflates fashion withreligiosity, traditional practice with popular culture, market forces with per-sonal transformation, and celebrity role-models with spirituality. The transac-tional processes occurring between product, brand identification, celebrity pro-moters and consumers are complex. This paper examines these interwoven di-mensions by exploring the role of celebrities in promoting Muslim attire. It findsthat the concept of beauty among veiled women defies established concepts ofbeauty in the secular world, and that while the emerging industry of creativeMuslim clothing offers economic gains to garment producers, the use of celebri-ties to promote their garments in not commercially unproblematic. AlthoughIndonesia’s contemporary cultural transformation is subject to the forces of themarket economy, it is also mediated by an evolving paradigm of celebrity, fash-ion and Islamic faith. Exploring the experience of Muslim celebrities in theirefforts to introduce Islamic fashion is to enter a new understanding of the devel-opment of Islam in Indonesia.

Keywords

veiling, religiosity, celebrities, fashion, capitalist force, consumer, marketeconomy, Indonesian Islam.

* Deny Hamdani is a lecturer at the State Islamic University (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah)Jakarta and Researcher at the Social-Economic Research Institute (SERI).


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Introduction

S ince religious interpreters’ ideas about covering the male body arenot as intense as shrouding female body, in religious and social com-

munities the practice of veiling has become an important part of the dis-course of femininity, morality, modesty, piety and identity. In the folk tra-dition of Indonesian Muslims, veiling was an exclusive practice amongsantri (pious) women to distinguish them from abangan (nominal) Mus-lims. The practice of wearing a kerudung (loose headscarf) and mudawarah(tight veil) in denominational schools was a common feature of religious-based society. Although it is different from the cultural practice of the Arabworld, normative and ideal values have been embedded in the traditionalveiling worn by Muslim women. The practice of Muslim dress, according toWhalley, is “a spiritual test, an overcoming of amoral influences, a battlewith desires, a submission to the greater mission of Islam”1.

While such practices and values prevail in a limited part of society,female modesty and standards of morality have been manifested in a diver-sity of ways in the Indonesian archipelago. Van Dijk2 reported that women,on many occasions, were bare-headed. In the third Sarikat Islam (SI) Con-gress at the end of 1918, he noted three young ladies who had chosen towear modern European dress which identified them as ‘free women’, andalso observed women teachers who choose Western dress and not a cheapJavanese kain (skirt of printed cloth). In Yogyakarta, the use of head shawlin 1930s was opposed by a schoolgirl of seventeen who objected to thepractice of wearing the veil to safeguard feminine virtue, reasoning thatJava is not Arabia, and following Islam does not necessarily mean comply-ing with Arab rules. When Indonesian people started to learn modern ideas,most women of the Javanese bureaucratic and religious elites did not wearhead shawls. This included wives and daughters of high ranking Javaneseadministrators like bupati (regent), and also many practicing Muslims. VanDijk also found an interesting description of a wedding ceremony where K.H. Hasan Basri sat as the groom wearing national dress, while the bridewore a kain and kebaya (Javanese close-fitting blouse), traditional dress.3

This historical background shows that veiling has prevailed in a verylimited circle within the social structure of Indonesian society. The reli-gious exhortations from Muslim bodies, for example Nahdhatul Ulama andMuhammadiyah circles – the two biggest religious organizations – hardlyaddress the significance of veiling; it was the dakwah (Islamic promulga-tion) movement of Islamist activists in urban and secular universities’mosques that intensified and inserted the agenda of veiling as a crucialissue. In other parts of the Muslim world, a worldwide Islamist movementalso encouraged Muslim women to take up the veil through religious ser-mons and fatwa (religious edict).4 The movement vigorously promotedveiling as central to the revival of Muslim identity and the construction ofan Islamic moral and social order.5 As the accepted Islamists’ outfit, manyMuslim women wear what people know as the jilbab, a long loose robe withlong, wide sleeves, and the khima >r, a headdress covering all the hair to

123The Role of Celebrities in Promoting Muslim Attire (Deny Hamdani)

below the neck at the back and passing below the chin in front, leaving theentire face exposed.6

However, this veiling movement was still exclusive, and tended todevelop in narrow communities. The scope of this movement still centeredon mosque networks, secular schools and universities and a few religiousgatherings (pengajian). The practice of this kind of veiling seems to be ideo-logical, and did not represent a clothing style for many women. Subse-quently, however, veiling practices developed to become a commodity forconsumption. The wearing of a headscarf has been pervasive among vari-ous classes of Indonesian Muslims. Many abangan Muslims left their oldappearance and adopted the new one by taking up the veil. Moreover, middle-class celebrities have participated in commercial efforts to campaign forthe wearing of Muslim attire. This new trend raises questions about veilingand more broadly, about the relationship between the routine consump-tion of Muslim attire and celebrities. Although veiling has historically beenpracticed and campaigned for by various pious Muslim elements, why didit only receive a strong positive response from the Muslim public after thecapitalist market system penetrated consumption culture and harnessedthe potential of celebrities in promoting the consumption of Muslim prod-ucts?

I argue that exploring the experience of Muslim celebrities in theirefforts to introduce Islamic fashion is to enter a new understanding of thedevelopment of Indonesian Islam, in the light of daily consumption of youngMuslim women over their need for credible and attractive models or idols.Revealing the meaning transfer from celebrities to the product crystallizesa series of issues concerning the powerful role of veiled celebrities, thecomplexity of attribution of Muslim attire and the importance of role mod-els to young women. In this paper, my argument is that consumers and thepopular culture of veiling show how Islamic actors are adapting and trans-forming the capitalist market at the same time as they promote a contradic-tory mix of different message in which Islam presents as a supporting force.By using McCracken’s model, this paper attempts to capture the nexus ofmeaning transfer from celebrity to products in relation to the role of celeb-rities in campaigning Muslim attire.

Based on the literatures, media reports and secondary materials, thecurrent pervasive practice of Islamic veiling differs from the formerly ex-clusive practice of Muslim dress among santri Muslims and Islamism activ-ists. This change took place after celebrities, through advertising and me-dia coverage, started taking part in the capitalist industry of Muslim fash-ion. I argue that the new appearance of Muslim women, within a new casualand relaxed life style paradigm challenges the old practices and values ofreligious and communal identity. This paper examines how capitalism worksto reproduce the cultural items of a certain social class by empoweringIslamic figures to transfer their meaning to products, in the receptive so-cial and political constellation of contemporary Indonesia.


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The Appearance of Celebrity in MediaEarly appearance of celebrities wearing Islamic clothing in public

spheres occurred in the 1990s during the Festival of Istiqlal (FI - an Islamiccultural festival), and since then the ruling regime has accommodated Mus-lim aspiration concerning the wearing of headscarves in the public domain.The media reported that some celebrities took part in the Islamic fashionshow which was part of the FI program, including some models and ac-tresses, among others are Ida Royani, Ida Leman and Nani Wijaya, and thatit had the backing of a prominent designer, Anne Rufaedah.7 As by defini-tion, celebrities are people who are ‘known for being well-known’8 whosepopularity transformed the public image of headscarves as the unfashion-able attire of a certain social class of Muslim, turning them into a fashionstatement. The appearance of celebrities promoting busana muslim (Is-lamic attire) at the FI, according to Rufaedah, was significant in fosteringthe adoption of this new fashion by Indonesian Muslims. She argued thatthe popularity of Islamic attire became increasingly intense after the festi-val, such that almost half of all clothings offered for sale in popular urbanmarkets like Tanah Abang (Central Jakarta) was busana muslim.9

McCracken has defined celebrity as ‘‘any individual who enjoys pub-lic recognition and who uses this recognition on behalf of a consumer goodby appearing with it in an advertisement’’.10 Studies of the role of celebrityin influencing public attitudes through consumer behavior have been con-ducted by several scholars.11 One of the potent roles of celebrities is to offera range of personality and lifestyle meanings that other agents cannot pro-vide.12 In explaining his theory of social influence, Kelman 13 argued thatcelebrities influence individuals, positing that identification occurs whenindividuals conform to the attitude or behavior advocated by another per-son (celebrity) after these individuals acquire gratification from the personthat they admire. Such an attitude is formed when individuals emulate thebehavior of celebrities only because they wish to be like them. Their needfor self esteem motivates them to act in a way that establishes and enhancestheir ideal self. Thus consumers conform to the attitudes and behaviorsendorsed by the celebrities who they perceive to possess the qualities theywant to achieve their ideal image.

While McCracken’s theory of the celebrity endorser conceptualizedfrom celebrity to product and from product to consumer, the process ofmeaning transfer in the promotion of Islamic headscarves is relatively morecomplex. Apart from selling a product, the appearance of veiled celebritiesboth as advertisement endorser and by their personal coverage in the me-dia has a ‘side effect’ on audiences, raising questions about the comfort andattractiveness of their lifestyle as unveiled women. The new life stylebrought by celebrities not only becomes a meaningful reference for women,but also gives them more confidence to wear headscarves, especially amongyoung women who believe that role models are very important in theirsearch of identity. In this token, Yue and Cheung14 found that young people


can have both idols and models. Idealism, romanticism, and absolutismseem more important in idol selection, whereas realism, rationalism, andrelativism coincide with model selection. But in selecting their idols andmodels, young Muslim women may refer to veiled celebrities based onintertwined aspects which combine idealism-realism, romanticism-ratio-nalism and absolutism-relativism.

Inneke Koesherawati as celebrity endorser in a shampoo product

The changing appearance of Inneke Koesherawati15, for example, froma ‘you-can-see’ style to the fashionable-shrouded attire has drawn publicattention to the new role model of veiled celebrity. Although her trackrecord shows that she was not a religious person, her subsequent self-trans-formation provided a great inspiration for young women. Her new appear-ance with the ‘jilbab gaul’ (fashionable veil) has made her an icon as a beau-tiful woman who has elected to cover her body and hair for the sake ofreligious prescription. Unlike previous celebrities who experienced declin-ing popularity after taking the veil, Inneke’s decision to wear the headscarfhas boosted her career in the entertainment world. Her opportunities totake part in religious-based programs on TV, radio or in the print media areincreasing with the growing numbers of Muslim consumers in many marketsectors. When a survey conducted by a shampoo company found thatInneke, wearing a head scarf, was the favorite celebrity, the company usedher as a model for this product.16 She then appeared on TV and printedmedia marketing for the shampoo with her hair covered by a veil. Seem-ingly the company anticipated that by capitalizing on Inneke’s new reputa-tion, people’s admiration for her would influence the selling of product.

Celebrities are often regarded as ‘the epitome of the inauthenticity orconstructedness of mass-mediated popular culture’.17 Their common mo-tive tends to be driven by the market economy rather than the personal


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ambition and their own ideal norms, although once they enjoy the eco-nomic advantages and comforts of celebrity, sustaining it may become theirpersonal dedication. The initial trigger of Ratih Sanggarwati to take up theveil, by her own admission, was an unusual offer from a cosmetic companywith an Islamic label, Az-Zahra. This company offered her a position as amodel for their product, subject to certain conditions. She had to wear theveil in their advertisements, and wear Muslim dress during the time shewas bound by the contract. As a top model in 1980s, Ratih usually mod-elled secular fashions at both national and international levels. Howevershe accepted the offer, despite having no experience with the practice ofheadscarf. When a journalist asked her: “When will you take up the veil?”,Ratih looked at the contract, which stated that she agreed to cover herbody from the first day of publicity for the advertisement. She then askedher client (the Az-Zahra representative): “When will the advertisement bepublished?” The representative replied, “It will be published in the nexttwo months”. Ratih immediately said, “I will take up the veil in the next twomonths, as stated in the contract.”18

Maudi Kusnaedi in the cover of Paras, a Muslim Women magazine

Media also selects unveiled celebrities as market drivers, becausetheir appearance can make money and they can help media entrepreneursto attract new audiences.19 Paras magazine, which targets Muslim middleclass readers, once published Luna Maya20 and Maudy Kusnaedi21 on itscover, although they were not veiled celebrities. Since then this magazinehas promoted Islamic clothing, and the women pictured on its pages andon its cover always wear headscarves. The editor argues that the idea to put


Luna Maya and Maudi Kusnaedi in the cover was related to a marketingstrategy to attract readers, while at the same time claiming that the maga-zine is implementing dakwah (calling for religious virtues) by introducingheadscarves to the unveiled celebrity. Using celebrities with Islamic cloth-ing as the cover picture can significantly increase sales, although the costof a celebrity is much higher than that of a non-celebrity model, the editoradmitted. Accordingly, this magazine keeps finding new celebrities to dem-onstrate newly designed Muslim fashion, as a way of persuading new read-ers to buy the magazine.

Celebrities performing both on stage and screen own their meanings,and through the intensity of media exposure can deliver them more power-fully.22 Even with her hair covered, Ratih Sanggarwati can demonstrate ‘el-egance’ much more vividly than other elegant models. It is no wonder thatshe was asked to model Islamic labelled cosmetics and Muslim fashions,and appear on the cover of Islamic media after she took up the veil. As wellas this she is often invited by event-organizers to share her knowledge andskill on fashionable ways to don headscarves. She evokes the meanings ofher persona with greater vividness and clarity. Ratih’s book, ‘KerudungCantik’ (beautiful headscarf)23, discussing special techniques for lookingattractive by wearing a headscarf, while still complying fully with the con-ditions of syariah, is a best seller and has been reprinted many times. Herreputation as the winner of a Jakarta beauty contest (None Jakarta/MissJakarta) and photography competition has enabled her to deliver meaningin a more powerful way, especially to young women. Her public recogni-tion as a top model in 1980s gave her a very strong stage presence. Herexample attracts many people, because she enacts and radiates her eleganceby performing on stage, screen and other media. The powerful meaningRatih possesses is built on her appeal, beauty and personality as a formerhigh class model. When she brings these meanings to an advertisement, themeanings she conveys actually derive from another meaning transfer pro-cess. Her career as a model is declining, however her unique qualities meanthat she still appears frequently in public, albeit attracting different mar-kets and in different arenas. After resigning from her old profession, shestill takes part in religious and art events such as religious preaching, po-etry readings and as a costume advisor.

Another important aspect of celebrities relates to their appearance inthe media and the messages they send to audiences. While their appear-ance strengthens their public recognition, their communication with audi-ences sends celebrity-conveyed meanings which are implicit in construct-ing a satisfying self-concept.24 For example, the media prominently reportedawards granted to veiled celebrities for their achievements in the enter-tainment world. Neno Warisman, a former actress and singer, received anaward sponsored by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI: Majelis UlamaIndonesia) for being the best presenter on Indonesian television. She sub-sequently became the presenter on the program Renungan Ramadhan(‘Ramadhan’s Contemplation) for a private TV station.25 Neno’s public rec-


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ognition was further enhanced in 2006 when she received the Insan Peduli(Humanitarian) Award from the Ministry of National Education. This wasgranted in recognition of her concern for childhood development issues.26

Ratih Sanggarwati’s book on the various techniques of wearing headscarves

Similarly, Inneke Koesherawati also received a Best Presenter Awardfrom the MUI for her performance on TV.27 In acknowledging the award,Inneke commented to media that it was proof that wearing headscarf is nota problem in pursuing her career, although some people previously doubtedthis. Inneke said: “Do not hesitate to wear the veil!”.28 Because it was con-veyed by Inneke, her message that “We have to improve the negative im-age of Islam (by wearing) appropriate clothing”29 undoubtedly conveyedpowerful meanings to the audience, certainly as powerful as the mediamessages of other celebrities. In a similar tone, Astri Ivo, a former moviestar, tries to fill the self-concept of Muslim woman by correlating the con-cepts of physical beauty and Muslim attire. She invites Muslim women towear the headscarf, while ensuring them to be still attractive.30

Attribution of Islamic Headscarves to CelebritiesWhen a celebrity appeared in an advertisement, there should be clear

identification of the product with the endorser and transfer the meaning toit.31 In promoting Islamic clothing, Al-Fath – a producer of Muslim fashion,hired Ratih Sanggarwati to identify the product with the image of high classtaste as attached to Ratih.32 Consumers who use the product certainly asso-ciate it with the beauty and high class image of Ratih Sanggarwati. The sameexpectation came from the Muslim fashion producer Shafira, when hiringBerliana Febrianti to model Islamic clothing.33 This prominent producer of


Muslim fashion not only hired Berliana, but also used Inneke Koesherawatiand Marissa Haque for brand personification. This competitive situationled another producer of Islamic clothing, Rabbani, to involve celebrities tomarket its products. Based on her consistency in wearing and promotingIslamic clothing on many occasions, the producer chose Astri Ivo as amodel for their product. The identification of products with a celebrityendorser has seemingly become a common marketing preference of pro-ducers, who rely on the package of meanings that celebrity endorsementbrings to their products.

Unlike McCracken’s model that focused on meaning delivery fromcelebrities to advertized products, the media appearance of veiled celebri-ties appears to be more complex. The meaning transfer of celebrity to prod-uct does not always advantage the advertisers, as Muslim clothing industryentrepreneurs in shopping centres or traditional markets often replicatethe fashion style, and thus compete with the advertiser for sales. In otherwords, the unregulated property rights of Islamic clothing design meanthat the product is more closely associated with the individual celebritythan with the trademark of the original producer of the clothing. In thisrespect, the meaning transfer occurs in reverse. It is not delivered by thecelebrity to the product, but the “product” refers to the celebrity. Althoughthis could be categorized as violation of property rights, the trend to unli-censed copying in the Muslim fashion market is relatively common, andhas never been regarded as a serious issue by designers and celebrity en-dorsers. When Inneke’s style of headscarf was found in Tanah Abang mar-ket, for example, the celebrity did not take it as serious matter. She evensaid that if her style has benefited others, it is not a problem for her.

From time to time, there have been various styles of Muslim fashionassociated with celebrities. As soon as Ratih Sanggarwati appeared in me-dia with her distinctive style of clothing, it immediately inspired the sale of‘kerudung à la Ratih Sang’. Muslim consumers attribute a new and uniqueveiling style, which combines the Javanese kebaya and the Malay bajupanjang (long blouse), to Ratih Sanggarwati’s influence. Another popularstyle is associated with Inneke Koesherawati, usually known as ‘kerudungInneke’. Unlike the classical style of headscarf which covers the chest, thiskind of headscarf is worn by winding it to the neck. Although Inneke wasnot the pioneer wearer of this style, her way of veiling is known as ‘kerudunggaul’ (fashionable headscarf). One of the early generations of headscarfstyles was worn by Neno Warisman. It comprises of two layers of clothwhich are installed like a wave on the head. Unlike the veiling stylescommodified by other celebrities, Neno’s style of headscarf became popu-lar without any advertisement or marketing strategy. Consumers only learnit from Neno’s media appearances, or by attending a workshop on the tech-niques of wearing a headscarf à la Neno.


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Neno Warisman’s style of headscarf on the stage reading a poem

Given those various alternatives of Muslim dress, consumers no longerhave difficulty in finding choices that suit their taste. These popularheadscarves do not have strong connection with ideological spirit and mili-tant movement as practiced by Islamism activists in 1980s. They are notan outward expression of traditional elements of a religious group whichstereotypically concerned with fashionable appearance. This is a demon-stration of the changing culture of veiling practices among Muslim womenresulting from the involvement of capitalist forces in fostering consumerculture. It is also supported by the growing trend of the de-ideologizationof veiling by exchanging the concept of jilbab with that of kerudung. Al-though both head covers are similar, the former has been adopted by peopleas more ideological than the latter. Ratih Sanggarwati is one of celebritieswho prefers changing the concept of jilbab to kerudung in veiling nomen-clature. When she published her book about various techniques on wearingheadscarves, she decided to use the word ‘kerudung’ rather than jilbab.34

She admitted that her use of the word kerudung is for the sake of marketingstrategy. “It’s not good for commercial purposes if I use the word jilbab”,she argued. 35

Dissociation of current Muslim dress with ideological elements is oneproof of transformation of Indonesian culture. Celebrities have played asignificant role in boosting popular forms of Indonesian Islam, and havenegotiated between two spheres of religious identity: between ‘theoretical’and ‘popular’, ‘official’ and ‘folk’ Islam. The result is that Islam has devel-oped specific local features across large historically and culturally-shapedregions of the Muslim world. Instead of relating to the traditional veil wornby Arabs at the original centre of Islam, Indonesian Muslims, living in a


peripheral region produce new and creative styles of veiling which main-tain a distance from Arab practice. “There are many types of headscarf inIndonesia, but they’re not like Arabian clothes. We’re creating our ownIndonesian Muslim style”, says the owner of a modern Muslim clothingboutique.36 Compared to past decades of Muslim experience in contempo-rary Indonesia, this changing of outward appearance is the new develop-ment of Muslim practices at the regional level. The emergence of regionalforms of Islam, as identified by Gradeva and Ivanova37 has been character-ized by incorporating large-scale adaptations of local cultural and religioususage.

While economic factors have become an inherent motive for veiledcelebrities, their participation has been an important part of campaigningfor Muslim attire. In relation to Bourdieu’s concept, celebrities play signifi-cant roles as ‘agents of consecration’ in the field of restricted production tofoster producers of a ‘determinate type of cultural goods’ and consumerscapable of consuming them.38 This consecration of celebrities can datedfrom their early efforts to introduce Muslim dress to consumers, until thecurrent pervasive practice of Muslim attire right across society. At the endof 1970s, Ida Royani, decided to “jump” to the world of fashion design andbecome an entrepreneur of Muslim clothing after becoming tired of thesinging and acting profession. In order to enter her new world, she took acourse at the London Academy of Modelling, and designed various items ofIslamic clothing, particularly for the upper social classes. Her devotion tothis was rewarded with the Rochelier Designers Award 1998, and the TenBest Dressed Women award in Singapore.39 Although Islamic clothing waspreviously seen as unfashionable and low class, she is one person who hasendeavoured to introduce fashionable Muslim clothing both in her bou-tique and high class outlets. With other members of the Association of In-donesian Designers and Fashion Entrepreneurs (APPMI, Asosiasi PerancangPengusaha Mode Indonesia), she regularly participates in Muslim fashionshows.40

Ratih Sanggarwati, a top model in 1980s, is another agent of conse-cration among celebrities. While Ida started her dedication through fash-ion design, Ratih initiated her devotion in promoting Muslim fashion bybeing a celebrity endorser in Muslim daily media. After resigning from thecatwalk she dedicated her life to popularizing shrouded Muslim attire bymany ways. For example, she often visits religious gatherings (pengajian)in mosques and teaches people on how to wear headscarves in a better way.As part of her concern with promoting Muslim attire, she established andmanages a training centre for young women, the ‘Lembaga Pendidikan RatihSang’ (LPRS), where they learn to display a good personality while demon-strating Muslim fashion. She also initiated a contest for female Muslim models(Pemilihan Top Model Muslimah) in which young women from Indonesia’smajor cities have participated since 2004. In her autobiography she ex-presses her devotion to promoting Islamic attire as self-transformation -‘From Catwalk to the Stage of the Religious Call’ (Dari Catwalk ke Panggung


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Syiar). She declares that “the modeling world is really my destiny, man-dated to me by Allah SWT. Now I take God’s way by promoting Islamicattire. I feel that my experience of involvement in the modeling world willbe a sufficient investment for me to call for virtues”.41

Although celebrities are socially and physically distant from averageconsumers42, their appearance and personal experience, which is frequentlycovered by media, makes them appear close to consumers and worthy ofbeing a personal reference for them. The religious awareness that they claimas “hidayah” (God’s guidance) is their turning point from a secular life to a‘religious’ one. Their changed appearance with a headscarf is a “conver-sion” representing a new ‘historical consciousness’, ‘self-transformation’and a vision of society that distance itself from the past.43 The dramaticchange in Ratih’s attitude to her religion is a good example for the public ofhow a glamorous and hedonist top model converted to be a “pious Muslim”and became a heroic campaigner for religious identity. The drama of Ratih’sand Inneke’s experiences shows a self-transformation from seductive andimmoral practices in her movies, to becoming a “respectable woman” whohas eagerly taken a religious path. These stories certainly inspire youngwomen to associate the practice of veiling with self-transformation, as asignifier of religious awareness.

Consuming Beauty with VeilingIn his study of celebrity endorsers, McCracken44 conceptualized how

the process of celebrity endorsement helps consumers take meanings froma product and incorporate them into their lives. As McCracken argued, themeanings of the object do not spontaneously leave that object and enterthe consumer’s concept of self and world. There is no automatic transfer ofmeaning, nor any automatic transformation of the self.45 Some productsadvertized by veiled celebrities are not only self referential, but also refer-ential of the celebrities themselves and their style.

Transformation of the self possibly occurs when ‘people admire, emu-late, and become infatuated with their favorite celebrities’.46 Among youngwomen, favorite celebrities play an important role in influencing their self-transformation and worldview. Evidence of how a young woman can trans-form herself to be her favorite celebrity may be found in Andina Agustina(b. 1986). As a beauty contest participant in 2004, she appeared in anunusual outfit known as busana Muslim (Muslim attire) that covered andwrapped her body, limbs and head, while other participants revealed theshape of their bodies. The competition was organized by a secular cosmeticcompany, PT. Mustika Ratu. The beautiful young shrouded girl not onlybecame a finalist, but also won a prize in the category of ‘Favourite Prin-cess’. Her victory was broadcasted on TV and published in the print media.“I am proud that I can win while wearing the jilbab (headscarf). I want toshow the world that wearing the jilbab is not an obstacle to achieving suc-cess and participating in all kinds of social life,” she remarked.47 Besidesexpressing her pride in her own public achievement, Andina also paid hom-


age to her idol, a popular veiled actress. According to Andina, one of herreasons for taking up the veil was her admiration for Inneke Koesherawati.

Andina’s admiration was of Inneke, certainly not to the product ad-vertized by the beautiful celebrity, however her physical attractivenessbecame a crucial factor of self-transformation. Kahle and Hommer48 identi-fied that most studies have shown physical attractiveness as a source whichfacilitates attitude change.49 However, the physical attractiveness of a veiledcelebrity is different from the image of beauty constructed by a ‘secularconcept’. The physical attractiveness here tends to be associated with theelegance of veiled popular women in demonstrating Muslim attire. Althoughthe changing veiling practices of young women cannot always be attrib-uted to the physical attractiveness of celebrities, this has been an impor-tant aspect of the growing new appearance among Muslim women. Andinaacknowledged that her appearance was influenced by Inneke’s appeal aftergaining a reputation as veiled woman, and this trend shows how individualsacquire gratification from celebrities they admire, and emulate their be-havior because they wish to be like them.50

Since beauty is an attribute and objective that all women necessarilywant to manifest, the discourse of physical beauty for veiled women hasseemingly experienced a shifting paradigm. After they change their ap-pearance by adopting Muslim attire, the role of celebrities in constructingbeauty for Muslim women is intensified through heavy media coverage.This can be seen in comments concerning veiling and beauty in the epi-logue of a book.51 “Subh }a >nalla >h” (glorious is God)… by wearing the kerudung(veil), I do not feel uncomfortable, complicated or old-fashion as I oncethought,… I feel that I am a real Muslim now. And who said that womenwearing an Islamic headscarf cannot look beautiful? It’s not true at all!”(Mediana Hutomo, sinetron artist). “Alhamdulillah, I feel safe, comfort-able, at peace and happy after wearing a headscarf. If many women whodon the headscarf look more beautiful, I am sure that it actually comesfrom the outpouring happiness and tranquility of their souls” (Dewi Hughes,a presenter who took up a headscarf and recently decided not to do soanymore). “As looking beautiful is the nature of women, wearing a headscarfdoes not reduce the level of female beauty. Because beauty has nothing todo with revealing our bodies for the sake of vogue”(Inneke Koesherawati,actress and presenter).

Unlike the practice of veiling among previous generations, which owedlittle to trying to make Muslim dress beautiful, this current veiling pro-motes the concept of beauty as an integral concept with veiling. Contraryto the concept that ‘hair is powerfully symbolic of the self52, covering thehair and body is another version of female beauty that promoted by manypracticing Muslims. People in workplaces, campuses, schools, religiousgatherings (pengajian) and even in social network communities commonlyexpress their compliments to veiled women, such as: “You are so beautifulwith the headscarf !” or “You look more gorgeous!” or “I’ve never seen youas beautiful as you are now!”. These compliments become motivating words


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for the wearers of headscarves and people supportive of newcomers to ofMuslim clothing. Although this kind of beauty is rather elusive, the con-cealment of body and hair has challenged the established concept of beauty.A defender of veiling argues that the beauty of concealment lies in the elimi-nation of the physical values in order to revive the values of the real self ofa woman in the mind of the society of man and woman.53

When people assume that veiling and beauty can be combined, it cre-ates a promising commodity for capitalist consumer culture. The vast rangeof Islamic clothing which is currently produced, marketed and sold pointsto the significance of appearance and beauty for Muslim women. Images ofspiritual achievement and a respectable impression, which are also associ-ated with materialism and leisure, emphasize the importance of appear-ance and look. Within consumer culture, advertisements and popular Mus-lim media provide a proliferation of stylized images of outward appear-ance. This current Muslim fashion is designed to celebrate the freedom towear a colorful and attractive outfit in order to beautify women on manyoccasions, but it is promoted with religious messages by the endorsers ofcapitalist market system. To a larger context, this is about a popular cul-ture whose raw materials are the products of commercial activity, prac-tices of mass-produced culture, and what the society makes out of theseproducts and practices.54

ConclusionThe transformation of Indonesian Muslim society is not only notice-

able in religious or political life but also in everyday consumption. Thedeclining political tension between state and Islamic forces at the end ofNew Order regime paved the way of a growing consumer culture under theauspice of consecration agents to share economic and social advantages.While veiling was a religious and political issue during the marginalizationof Muslim politics, the development of Muslim attire progressed aftermiddle-class celebrities took part in promoting more attractive ways ofwearing headscarves. Although their role is intertwined with their eco-nomic interest, the attractive aspect of celebrities offers a range of person-alities and lifestyles that models or other agents cannot provide.

Instead of attributing the product of Muslim attire to celebrity andthen to the producer or its trademark55, the meaning transfer of celebrityendorser in promoting Islamic attire has experienced a blurred associa-tion. The Muslim clothing products that are advertized by veiled celebri-ties do not only refer to the marketing agents, but also inherently attach tothe celebrities beyond the control of their producers. As a result, the asso-ciation of various products with the name of certain celebrities has emergedin shopping centres and trading centres without any affiliation with theoriginal producers. Wearers of Muslim attire can easily find many kinds ofheadscarves in the styles of Inneke Koesherawati, Ratih Sanggarwati, NenoWarisman, Astri Ivo and many other celebrities in diverse versions.


Since popular culture is formed by a contradictory mix of differentcultural forces, commercialized culture for consumption has been rede-fined, reshaped, and redirected to be a new cultural product which dis-tances itself from the past. The current practice of veiling among youngwomen is certainly different from ideological veiling among Islamist activ-ists and from the traditional head shawl worn by santri women, and this isdue to the more casual and relaxed values which are were not available toprevious generations. At the same time, the concept of beauty among veiledwomen defies the established concepts of beauty in the secular world. None-theless, the emerging industry of creative Muslim clothing has not onlyoffered economic advantages for the endorsers, but also challenged thesovereignty of Muslim consumers to determine the direction of culturaltransformation without reference to the market economy. Thus, the direc-tion of a new cultural entity is being influenced by clothing producers’ andcelebrities’ respective roles in creating a supply and demand balance thatis still being continuously negotiated in changing daily life.

Notes1 Whalley cited in A. Feillard, “The Veil and Polygamy: Current Debates onWomen and Islam in Indonesia, Moussons, vol. 99, 1999, p. 12.2 K. Van Dijk, “Sarong, Jubbahs and Trousers: Appearance as a Means ofDistinctionand Discrimination”, in H.S. Nordholt (ed.), Outward Appearances:Dressing state and Society in Indonesia, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), pp. 65-73.3 K. Van Dijk, “Sarong, Jubbahs and Trousers: Appearance as a Means ofDistinctionand Discrimination”, pp. 65-73.4 E. A. Daomato, “Seclusion”, in J.L. Esposito, (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia ofthe Modern Islamic World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 19.5 V. M. Moghadam, “Rhetorics and Rights of Identity in Islamist Movements”,Journal of World History, vol. 4, 1993, p. 240.6 F. El-Guindi, Veil: Modesty, privacy and resistance, (Oxford, UK: New York,Berg, 1999), pp. 474-475.7 Gatra, February 4, 1995.8 D. J. Boorstin, The Image, (New York: Atheneum, 1961), p. 57.9 Kompas, 1 December, 2002.10 G. McCracken, “Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of theEndorsement Process”, The Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 16, 1989, p. 310.11 For example; B. D. Till and T. A. Shimp, “Endorsers in Advertising: The Case ofNegative Celebrity Information”, Journal of Advertising 27, 1998, pp. 67–82; C.Tripp, T. D. Jensen, and L. Carlson, “The Effects of Multiple Product Endorse-ment on Consumers’ Attitudes and Intentions”, Journal of Consumer Research20, 1994, pp. 535–547.12 G. McCracken, “Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of theEndorsement Process”, p. 315.


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13 H. Kelman, “Process of Opinion Change”, Public opinion quarterly 25 (Winter),1961, p. 57.14 X. D. Yue and C. K. Cheung, “Selection of Favorite Idols and Models AmongChinese Young People: A Comparative Study in Hong Kong and Nanjing”, Inter-national Journal of Behavioral Development 24, p. 91.15 The female celebrity who used to be known as a hot-movie actress has dramati-cally changed her appearance in 1990s. She acted in various hot-movies such asDiskotik DJ (DJ Discotheque, 1990), Gadis Metropolis (Metropolitan Girl, 1991),Gairah yang nakal (Seductive Desire, 1993), Ranjang Ternoda (Dirty Bed,1994), Asmara di Sirkuit Sentul (Love in ‘Sentul’ Circuit, 1994).16 This survey was conducted by Unilever in 2004. This multinational companyis one of the leading companies in the manufacture and marketing of food, home,and personal-care products, with some 400 brands.17 Franklin cited in G. Turner, Understanding Celebrity, (London: Sage Publica-tion, 2004), p. 4.18 Hamdani, The Quest for Indonesian Islam: Contestation and Consensus Con-cerning Veiling, Dissertation at the Australian National University, Canberra,2007, p. 98; See also Ratih Sang, Kerudungmu Tak Sekedar Cantik: Dari Catwalkke Panggung Syiar, (Jakarta: Hikmah, 2006), p. 58.19 G. Turner, Understanding Celebrity, p. 34.20 Luna Maya is a young-beautiful celebrity who has been popular with hervarious professions as actress, singer, fashion and commercial model.21 Maudy Kusnaedi is a beautiful actress, model and presenter. After she won aJakarta beauty contest, Abang None Contest 1993, she has acted in variousmovie and sinetron (electronic cinema).22 G. McCracken, “Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of theEndorsement Process”, p. 315.23 Ratih Sang, Kerudung Cantik, (Jakarta: Hikmah, 2004).24 G. McCracken, “Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of theEndorsement Process”, p. 317.25 Suara Merdeka, 21 December 2005.26 See Hamdani, The Quest for Indonesian Islam: Contestation and ConsensusConcerning Veiling, p. 97.27 Gatra, 14 January 2002.28 Gatra, 14 January 2002.29 Suara Merdeka, 7 November 2003.30 Suara Karya, 8 October 2005.31 G. McCracken, “Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of theEndorsement Process”, p. 316.32 Suara Merdeka, 7 November 2003.33 Serambi Indonesia, 11 April 2006.34 Ratih Sang, Kerudung Cantik.35 Interview with Ratih in Jakarta, 21 September 2004.36 The Jakarta Post, 19 March 2007.


37 R. Gradeva, and S. Ivanova, “Researching the Past and Present of MuslimCulture in Bulgaria: The ‘Popular’ and ‘High’ Layers”, Islam and Christian–Mus-lim Relations, vol. 12, No. 3, 2001, p. 239.38 P. Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, editedby R. Johnson, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 121.39 Suara Karya, 12 October 2005.40 http://www.batavia.co.id, 11 July 2010.41 Ratih Sang, Kerudungmu Tak Sekedar Cantik: Dari Catwalk ke Panggung Syiar,p. 35.42 A. Cocanougher, and Bruce, “Socially Distant Reference Groups and ConsumerAspirations”, Journal of Marketing Research 8, 1971, p. 379.43 S. Brenner, “Reconstructing Self and Society: Javanese Muslim Women andthe Veil”, American Ethnologist, vol. 23, 1996, p. 673.44 G. McCracken, “Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of theEndorsement Process”.45 G. McCracken, “Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of theEndorsement Process”, p. 317.46 McCutcheon et. al., Conceptualization and Measurement of Celebrity Wor-ship”, British Journal of Psychology 93, 2002.47 Republika, 10 August 200448 Kahle and Hommer, “Physical Attractiveness of the Celebrity Endorser: ASocial Adaptation Perspective”, The Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 11, No.4, 1985.49 Baker and Gilbert, “The Impact of Physically Attractive Models on Advertis-ing Evaluations”, Journal of Marketing Research, 14 November 1977; Caballeroand Price, “Selected Eeffect of Salesperson Sex and Attractiveness in Direct MailAdvertisements, Journal of Marketing 48,January 1984; S. Chaiken, “Commu-nicator Physical Attractiveness and Persuasion”, Journal of Personality and So-cial Psychology 37, August 1979; Horai et. al., “The Effect of Expertise and PhysicalAttractiveness upon Opinion Agreement and Liking”, Sociometry 37, December1974; Joseph, “Credibility of Physically Attractive Communication: A Review”,Journal of Advertising 11 (3), 1982; Kulka and Kessler, “Is Justice Really Blind?The Influence of Litigant Physical Attractiveness in Juridicial Judgements”,Journal of applied of social psychology 8, October 1978; Mills and Aronso, “Opin-ion Change as a Function of the Communicator’s Physical Attractiveness andDesire to Influence”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1, February1965; Mills and Harvey, Opinion Change as a Function of When Informationabout the Communicator is Received and Whether He is Attractive or Expert”,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21 , January 1972; Petty andCaciappo, “Effect of Issue Involvement on Attitudes in an Advertising Context”,in Proceedings of the Division 23 Programs, Gerald G. Gorn and Marvin EGoldberg(eds.), (Montreal, Quebec, Canada: American psychological Association, 1980).50 H. Kelman, “Process of Opinion Change”, p. 57.51 Ratih Sang, Kerudung Cantik, p. 84.52 A. Synnott, “Shame and Glory: A Sociology of Hair Author”, The British Journalof Sociology, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1987, p. 404.

http://www.batavia.co.id


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Exhibiting Islam: A Study ofthe Singapore Asian CivilizationMuseum’s “West Asia/Islam”Permanent GalleriesSuhaili Osman*

Abstract

Objects in museums cannot speak for themselves but are things outside of theiroriginal contexts. Curators usually determine the meanings of these preservedobjects as they are re-organized as exhibits in relation to some present objective.Museums are thus never neutral spaces that simply display historical artefactsand narrate past reality. Indeed, museums assert their influence on how visitorsview the past through the themes that organize their collections. Museum col-lections and educational programmes can also be tools to legitimize present po-litical authority. With respect to Islam, it is imperative that we scrutinize anddebate representations of the religion in museums because museums have theability to shape how visitors imagine ‘Islam’ and mediate responses to competingnotions of Islamic culture, religion and values. In the case of Singapore, the“West Asia/ Islam” galleries of the Asian Civilizations’ Museum (ACM) are notonly a means of educating visitors about Islam, it is also, along with the rest ofthe ACM’s galleries, an extension of nation-building and national identity cre-ation. However, a number of curatorial strategies used in the galleries haveresulted in some tensions between the social message and ideas that the ACMwants to communicate and visitors’ expectations and ‘memories’ of Islam andIslamic culture.

Keywords

Exhibition, Asian civilization, museum, Singapore, Islamic art narrative

* Suhaili Osman is MA candidates from Department of History, National Universityof Singapore.


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Introduction: Museums and Nation-building Programmesin Southeast Asia

The political histories of many Southeast Asian countries are repletewith events and government campaigns that have strived to create a

sense of unified national identity amongst such diverse ethnic populations.The success of these respective state-initiated campaigns has been mixed.As these countries become more stable and affluent nation-states in thelate twentieth century, a number of them such as Singapore, Malaysia, andIndonesia have been able to turn their attention towards a development ofthe cultural aspects of citizenship. In this regard, a considerable amount ofmoney and resources have been spent to develop grand concert halls, pub-lic libraries and art galleries that impart various forms of cultural capital tothose who patronize them. At the same time, ‘national’ (usually a historicalnarrative of the nation’s genesis) and ethnographic museums inherited fromerstwhile colonial rulers are revamped to serve nation-building purposes.These cultural institutions are made easily accessible to the general publicand serve as overt marks of educated, intellectually-liberal and civilizednation-states.1

Several studies have been done in examining how museums, as re-positories of history and memory, as well as educational institutions, havecontributed to the shaping of the national citizenry.2 National governmentsof the majority of Southeast Asian countries are aware that their countryusually consists of multiethnic and multicultural populations which expecttheir cultural identities to be reflected in the national polity. Hence, gov-ernments must find the right balance between acknowledging the uniquecultural identity of each ethnic group while striving to create a unified na-tional one in its social policies. Further, governments have to figure outthis balance in the dominant face of representations provided by moreestablished Western/ Western-styled museums where the exhibition of non-Western cultures and religions tend to get exoticized as ‘others’ throughthe objectification of their cultural and religious practices by displayingtheir material culture.3

Museums are never neutral spaces that simply display historicalartefacts and narrate objective facts. The objects in museums cannot speakfor themselves but are things displayed on pedestals and in glass casesremoved from their original contexts. Their meanings are then (re)inscribedand (re)contextualized by the curator in relation to the present.4 In effect,museums assert their influence on how its visitors view the past throughthe themes they use to organize their collections.5 Various national muse-ums and heritage sites in Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Brunei reflecttheir long histories of resplendent kingdoms and rich material culture notsimply in honour of preserving objects of antiquity but also to legitimizepresent political authority. National museums which chronicle conditionsunder colonial rule and subsequent struggles towards modern nationhoodconstantly reinforce a narrative of loyalty towards the country via the con-certed display of artefacts from the given historical period. In the case of

143Exhibiting Islam (Suhaili Osman)

Singapore, of which the Asian Civilizations Museum (ACM) “West Asia/Islam” gallery is the focus of this paper, the development of the heritageand museum sectors at their very inception was conceptualized as sup-porting the nation-building programme to create a strong national identityfor a young nation-state with a relatively short national history6.

It is important to study the subjects that are displayed in museums.The representations of ‘religion’ in museums have to be subject to scrutinyand debate by local and international communities as museums are publicsites for exposition and have the authority (if not always the resources) toinfluence their visitors’ perceptions of the subjects on display. Throughtheir collections, display methods and even the buildings themselves, mu-seums have the ability to mediate many of society’s basic values and un-derstandings of the world around them, including how they respond tocompeting notions of Islamic culture, religion and values. Far from beingpolitically-neutral spaces of learning where patrons ‘draw their own con-clusions’ after viewing the numerous artefacts on display, museums aresocial-cultural-educational institutions that influence their patrons andsocialize them into behaving and responding to the exhibitions in mannersdeemed desirable by the (usually hidden) curatorial team.

At the same time, museums are themselves shaped by governmentpolicy and more often than not, must adhere to and disseminate the valuesthat have been deemed important to society and foreign visitors as well.Even private funding does not necessarily come without any strings at-tached. Borrowing artefacts from privately-owned collections and nationalinstitutions affects how curatorial teams organize the material in a mean-ingful way to create a coherent narrative for its intended audience. Myexamination of the ACM’s “West Asia/Islam” galleries argues that artefactsassociated with Islam and Islamic history have been organized in such away that it tends to represent Islam as a monolithic religion and a civiliza-tion which appears relatively unchanged over time. In addition, the his-torical socio-geographical entity of Dar-al Islam7 has also re-designated bythe ACM more loosely as “West Asia” rather than on its own territorial andjuridical terms to better serve Singapore’s nation-building programme.

For the purposes of this paper, I will examine the architectural andcuratorial strategies that the ACM in Singapore has deployed to portray itsinterpretation of Islam, both as a ‘living’ religion8 and as an important iden-tity marker for its significant Malay minority population. I will argue thatthe approach that the ACM has chosen was shaped by not only the philoso-phies and artistic vision of its respective curatorial teams but has also beenvery much influenced by the national political agenda of the People’s Ac-tion Party (PAP). Both domestic and foreign policy considerations of theSingapore government have found their way into the direction of the heri-tage and cultural preservation policies and have resulted in museums andheritage sites becoming an extension of nation-building and national iden-tity creation. These concerns have directly affected the shaping of themuseum’s “West Asia/Islam” gallery. Similar to other Southeast Asian gov-


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ernments managing the role that religion plays in respective public spaces,the PAP strives to define the role of Islam in its modern, ethnically andreligiously plural state while maintaining a secular and nationalist publicspace. I argue that the “West Asia/Islam” galleries in the ACM have beenappropriated by the state’s nation-building programme to narrate a storyof the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural ancestral roots of current-daySingaporeans rather than a straightforward ethnographic treatment of thematerial culture produced in an Islamic tradition. This is not to say thatone approach is preferred over the other. Inevitably however, themuseological result is that the “Islam” that is portrayed and displayed inthe ACM is less concerned about Islam in general than it is about SingaporeanMuslims.

An important corollary is that museums in particular, as repositoriesof history and memory, have tended to place a higher value on artefactsfrom what is considered ‘Islamic heartlands’ – areas of the Arabian Penin-sula which were more familiar to Occidental experience and memory - overits Southeast Asian peripheries. This preference has resulted in exhibitionson Islamic art or civilization that tend to treat the impact that Islam hashad on the material culture of Southeast Asian peoples as marginal and “athin and easily flaking glaze” – a mere gloss over earlier Hindu-Buddhisttraditions.9 I will show that ACM’s treatment of Islam is very much shapedby the artefacts that are available to them and that the lack of indigenousIslamic material culture has led to a narrative organized more heavily aroundartefacts from loans by Middle Eastern, Gulf and Turkish museums as wellas on supplementary audio-visual media. Moreover, despite its theme ofIslam as “a living religion”, the ACM neither challenges orthodox narra-tives of Islamic practices, nor does it question the dominance of Arab-Persian and Turkish Islamic material culture over other indigenous Islamicones. This may result in an exhibition that distances Southeast Asian Mus-lims because they do not find resonance with the “Islamic” material culturebeing displayed. Alternatively, the wonder of the fine objects from the his-torical regions of succeeding Islamic civilizations might even change theway local Muslims view its own cultural production so that it might moreclosely align itself to seemingly more orthodox Islamic traditions. 10

To its credit, the ACM does make a genuine attempt to show visitorshow the basic tenets of the Islamic religion are practized by its adherentsaround the world. Nonetheless, because of the state nation-buildingprogramme that aims to unify the disparate origins of its multiethnic popu-lation, the curatorial approach undertaken by the ACM highlights thatSoutheast Asia, and Singapore in particular, lies at the crossroads of majorcivilizational forces of Hinduism, Taoism, Buddhism, Jainism and Islam.The sleight-of-hand here is that the ACM has conflated the Oxus-to-NileRiver geographical origins of Islam with one religion out of the many whichhave emerged from Asia. Whether done consciously or otherwise, such ageographical reorientation of Islam serves to more firmly situate Islam’sorigins and Arab Muslims in the past and Singaporean Muslims in the present


by incorporating the Arabian Peninsula and the histories of Dar-al Islaminto a ‘larger’ pre-existing history of West Asia.

Islam and ‘Islamic’ Material Culture and ArtIn a museum, displayed objects far removed from their original con-

texts are used to represent Islam as both a ‘living’ religion and historicalphenomenon. Such a setting necessitates a discussion on what is meant by‘Islamic material culture’ and ‘Islamic art’ as well as the extent that heritageinstitutions can comfortably use objects made by Muslims or which areculturally or aesthetically informed by Islam as a metonymy for Islam orany given Islamic civilization.

The two terms ‘Islamic civilization’ and ‘Islamic art’ are themselvesproblematic. This is because, whether or not one realizes it, Western-cen-tric conceptualizations of ‘civilization’ and ‘art’ are applied to the historicaldevelopment of Islam as a world event as well as to describe bodies ofmaterial culture that were produced and consumed by communities whichprofessed to organize their cultural frameworks around Islam as a religiousand political system. Examining Islam as a ‘civilization’ raises several im-portant methodological concerns. For instance, Chakrabarty argues thatsocial science terms and frameworks such as “socialism”, “democracy”,“class” and even “religion” which have been used to examine non-Westernsocieties are not neutral ontological categories but are shaped by occur-rences in European history and were society-specific in its analysis. 11 Inthis light, a term like “civilization” is itself a Western-centric construct thatemerged in the nineteenth century from the analyses of classical Europe.More significantly, in the name of the universal social sciences, these cat-egories of rationality and scientific study of both history and society, con-tinue to be propagated by institutions such as universities, public librariesand museums– institutions that are very much based on Western philo-sophical traditions. Chakrabarty argues that these traditional social sci-ence categories might even be inadequate frameworks to study non-West-ern societies.12

Given that Islam was conceptualized as a religion with principles, laws,symbols and rituals which were particular to the experiences of the ProphetMuhammad and the Quraish and Medinaen societies of Saudi Arabia in 7th

Century C. E., it raises questions of how one could ‘properly’ study thedevelopment of a religious community which was not organized along more-familiar Western sociological norms and political frameworks. For instance,while a political schism exists between adherents of Shi’ite Islam and themajority Sunni Muslims13, Islam did not experience the doctrinal schismthat Christendom went through during the Protestant Reformation of 1516-1564 which questioned the practices and ecclesiastical hegemony of theCatholic Church in the experience of Christianity as well as the fundamentalrelationship between man and the experience of Christ. Despite the ongo-ing differences between Shi’ite and Sunni traditions over the primacy of theProphet’s bloodline in establishing the leadership of the world Muslim com-


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munity, both orthodoxies are in agreement over the Qur’an as the para-mount ‘word of God’ and the importance of the collected ‘sayings’ of ProphetMuhammad’s, the hadith, as a means of interpreting the metaphorical andtheological density of the Holy Book. Moreover, the experience of ruleunder respective Islamic dynasties in the lands of Muslim conquest up tothe 16th century was quite different than those under Spanish and Portu-guese Catholic rule. In Ummayad Andalusia and Ottoman Constantinoplefor instance, instead of forced conversions under European-Catholic rule,Jews and Christians were allowed to continue practising their faith asdhimmis under a benevolent Muslim despot to whom they paid feudal taxesto.

Beyond events and debates that occurred within the sphere of theearly Islamic communities itself, neither internal political upheavals onthe Arabian Peninsula nor the period of European colonial rule led to theremoval of autocratic monarchical rule. Furthermore, despite the wide-ranging effects of the French Revolution on the political restructuring ofEurope which also effectively resulted in a philosophical commitment tothe necessity of a separation between church and state, Islam was not rel-egated to the sphere of the ‘private’. The ‘individual’ experience of the faith,while philosophically and doctrinally explained as a ‘submission’ to Allah,was never meant to dominate the experience of Islam as ‘a community ofthe faithful’ – the spiritual umma who is able read and recite the Quran inone common language, observe the obligations of fasting and charity asexampled by the daily practices of Prophet Muhammad and ultimately, acommunity of believers who all face the same direction of the Kaa’bah inMecca as they offer their prayers in a unified set of ritual poses and recita-tions.

Hence, a discussion of what constitutes an ‘Islamic civilization’ wouldhave to examine the development of Islam’s history and that of its diversecommunities of the faithful on its own terms. A study of the history, poli-tics, experience and practice of Islam by Muslims should not, for the sakeof convenience of understanding by non-Muslims, uncritically employ cat-egories such as ‘civilization’ as a universal socio-scientific category. Such asociological framework might unwittingly subject Islam, as both a histori-cal and sociological phenomenon, to an embedded narrative of ‘moder-nity’ which the chronology of European history adheres to. In this sense,the traditional theoretical framework of ‘civilization’ conflates time andspace in searching for a coherence of causes and effects and which inevita-bly includes providing evidence of the various ‘civilising’ achievements ofthat community. Similarly, one would be tempted to view the material cul-ture produced by the various Islamic dynasties as a ‘development’ of anartistic ‘tradition’ that had Islamic themes as its organising compass.

I am not suggesting that one has to do away with all conventionalsociological frameworks of studying Islam as a civilization despite theirinadequacies because as Chakrabarty argues, they have become“indispensible” to the study of societies14. Rather, I am saying that one


should remember to examine Islamic societies from the perspective of theirown historians. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 A. D.) coined the term ‘umran’ inhis book Al-Muqaddima li al-Kita >b al-‘Ibar in the fourteenth century todescribe what we conventionally call ‘civilization’.15 He detailed out in his‘ilm al-umran (study of civilization) that a “civilized society” possessed anumber of characteristics: “it has a Higher form of Religion, a well-orga-nized State, a system of law, City-life, a developed system of writing (Script),and distinctive forms of art and architecture”. 16 While Ibn Khaldun’sconceptualization bears some similarities with later modern European so-ciology, what is more significant is that we have to frame Ibn Khaldun’swritings against his medieval environment when Islam had established alevel of maturity as a religion on the Arabian Peninsula and Mamluk Egypt,and the Turks had already established an Islamic empire that reached thesouthern ends of the Mediterranean and had captured Constantinople in1453.17

Among the Muslim scholars of the twentieth century, ShaykhMuhammad ‘Abduh expressed his view on civilizations in the Tafsi >r of al-Qur’a >n that all civilizations (mada >niyya) were established on the founda-tion of religion.18 Following Ibn Khaldun’s criteria, ‘Abduh argued that de-spite the “undeveloped, paganistic Faiths” which the Greeks, the Chaldeans,and the ancient Egyptian observed, these ancient umran based their civili-zations on religious foundations.19 Yet another Muslim scholar, MuhammadAsad asserts that Islamic civilization is an “ideological civilization” whichhas the Qur’an as its source as well as its “only justification”.20 He arguesthat “Islamic civilization was essentially intellectual in its motive power: itgrew out of the broad, circumscribed code of individual and socialbehaviour, called the Shari’ah”21 and that it had “nothing to do with theconcepts of race or nation, and so lacks the cement of racial consciousnesswhich was the cardinal factor in all other civilizations”.22 Hence, the con-cept of a global umma or community of believers which is supposed totranscend racial and cultural boundaries is an important perception of howMuslims all over the world are connected to one another and which manyMuslims hold on to. These various factors to delineate what Muslims think-ers considered were fundamental criteria in establishing a civilization wouldalso inform an assessment of the traditions associated with Islamic aesthet-ics, especially if one presupposes that the ideology of the Qur’an permeatedthrough Arabic script and into the rest of the material culture of the myriadsocieties under erstwhile Islamic empires.

The need for precise terminology and standards with which to exam-ine Islam is demonstrated with great earnest in Hodgson’s voluminous writ-ings to provide a rigorous theoretical and technical framework in which toexamine and understand Islam as a religion that has spread across the worldfrom its Arabian origins.23 Islam as a religion is very much associated withArab culture, especially from a Western perspective when nineteenth cen-tury Western scholarship was obsessed with its concern over “Mediterra-nean (and hence largely Arab) Islamdom, as nearest to Europe and most


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involved in its history”. Hodgson is aware that there is an incommensura-bility of meanings that emerges if scholars identify “Islamic culture” as a“culture appearing in the Arabic language” because it results in the treat-ment of all pre-Islamic Arabian elements (i.e. those found on the ArabianPeninsula) as “native to Islamic culture...while Syriac, Persian or Greekcultural elements as foreign imports into Muslim Arab life”.24 He arguesthat the terms “Islam” and “Islamic” have been used “too casually” in mod-ern scholarship for what we may call “religion and for the overall societyand culture associated historically with the religion” as the “society andculture called ‘Islamic’ in the second sense are not necessarily ‘Islamic’ inthe first”. Hence Hodgson warns against using the terms interchangeably torefer to its various social institutions as a means to connect disparate prac-tices specific to a particular time and space in the experience of Islam. Eventhough one could speak of “Islamic literature, of “Islamic art”, of “Islamicphilosophy”, even of “Islamic despotism”, he maintains that one would bespeaking less and less of something that expresses Islam “as a faith”.25

Hodgson argues further that this need for distinction is urgent because onehas to take into account the cultural variations of the lands that have beeninfluenced by Islam.

Hodgson’s exhortations that the geography and ethnography of Is-lam have to be transparent when one examines Islam as a faith is importantin understanding how a tradition of ‘Islamic aesthetics’ could have beeninvented and how historians and those concerned with ‘art’ ethnographi-cally can begin to distinguish between elements of faith and those that havebeen mediated by culture, though it would be an understandably complexenterprize to undertake. In navigating this complication, Hodgson seessome merit in Bernard Lewis’ suggestion that the adjective “Islamic” beused in the “cultural sense” and the adjective “Muslim” in the “religioussense”. Nonetheless, as he did not feel that the usage would be maintained,he offers instead new terms to describe Islam as a historical and sociologi-cal phenomenon. “Islamdom”, for instance, would denote not just an areaof Islamic rule per se but also a “complex of social relations” (Hodgson’semphases) and is a better term than “Muslim lands” as “Islamdom” wouldbe “clearly collective” and “immediately intelligible by analogy to“Christendom”. Moreover, as Hodgson sees culture as a kind of ‘spin-off’which moves further and further away from religion proper, he proposesthe term “Islamicate” to refer to the cultural traditions of successive Is-lamic dynasties - a culture that has “centred around a lettered tradition”.26

With such terminology in place, “Islamicate cultural traditions” (and not“Islamic culture” per se) is more accurately historicized and does not getobfuscated by debates over the proper terms in use the anthropology ofIslam. Hence, Hodgson has pointed out that the study of Islam as a “civili-zation” is not only complicated by the conflation of religion with history,but has to also take into account the different experiences of culturally-diverse Muslims as they melded their religious identity with pre-existingcultural systems of their own national or cultural communities.


The issue then is how does one make sense of ‘art’ in Islamic cultureand how far can the term “Islamic art” be expanded to include all the mate-rial culture produced by different Muslim communities across time andspace. The problem is compounded because “Islamic art” as a collectiveterm referring to some forms of Islamic material culture was coined innineteenth century Europe. Such a tendency to view Islamic material cul-ture indiscriminately as Islamic art again raises the underlying suspicionthat there might be a universalising aesthetic informed by Western tradi-tions that not only elevates an object from mere functionality to that whichgives pleasure in its viewing, but which might also assume a developmentallinearity in the chronology of Islamic art. In that regard, Oleg Grabar ac-knowledges in his book The Formation of Islamic Art, that “early Islamicart” raises a number of “abstract questions about the nature of artistic cre-ativity and aesthetic sensibility which transcend the exact time and placeof its growth”.27 Perhaps more radically than Hodgson, Grabar argues that“Islamic” does not refer to the art of a particular religion because “a vastproportion of the monuments have little if anything to do with the faith ofIslam”. He notes the “very uncertainty and incompleteness” of Islamic artbecause they do not always fit neatly in conventional aesthetic categoriesthat are understood by Western traditions.

While he agrees to some degree with George Marcais’ claims that therewas a certain “personality of Islamic art” which differentiated them frommasterpieces of other artistic traditions “almost automatically”28, Grabarargues that even if “(Islamic art) exists at all”, the “most important point isthat ‘Islamic’ in the expression ‘Islamic art’ is not comparable to ‘Christian’or ‘Buddhist in ‘Christian art’ or ‘Buddhist art’”. Rather, he asserts that theterm “Islamic” would be more comparable to those like “Gothic” or “Ba-roque” and would suggest a “more or less successful cultural moment in along history of native traditions”. “Islamic” in this usage would be “like aspecial overlay” and which acted like “a deforming or refracting prism whichtransformed, at times temporarily and imperfectly, at other times perma-nently, some local energies or traditions”.29 Hence, the distinction betweenwhat constitutes Muslim themes in an artistic production and the contin-ued production of pre-Islamic material culture during an Islamic period ofrule is more complex than what is usually displayed in the Islamic art andmaterial collections of various museums.

Grabar also takes on the issue of the span of Islamic art, specificallythe start and end periods of the perceived tradition. Given that one canonly seriously begin talking about Islamic art and material culture after theProphet Muhammad established the first Muslim community in Madina inA. D. 622, the “absolute time”30 to mark the beginning seems obvious. How-ever, Grabar argues that this post quem date is “not a very meaningful onefor the arts”. Instead, a more appropriate absolute date would be that of theconquest of a given region by Islam which in turn would result in “in acuriously curved date which would begin in 634 when the first Syrian vil-lages were taken over by Muslim Arabs and would end in the early six-


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teenth century when the Mughal emperors consolidated into one entity themany sultanates of India.”31

The most surprising aspect of Grabar’s periodization after he has gonethrough the trouble of differentiating the historical and spatial context tostudy Islamic art is the boundary that he draws that excludes a discussionof the material culture that is produced by Muslim Southeast Asia. Evenwhen he entertains the possibility of extending the timeline of Islamic artinto the nineteenth century, it is only with reference to when certain partsof Africa became Muslim.32 The chronology of the “development” of Is-lamic art that begins during the age of the Caliphate on the Arabian Penin-sula (c. 632 A.D.) as the “early Islamic period”, and spans North Africa,Central Asia, Spain and usually ends in Mughal India in the “late Islamicperiod” has become the accepted convention in periodising Islamic art andmaterial in museums that are interested in the subject.33 Such a ‘genealogy’of Islamic art has resulted in not only a conflation of geographical distanceand the compressing of time in favour of a narrative of a certain continuityof Islamic ‘traditions’, but it has also historically left out the period of artand material culture production in Southeast Asian communities whichhave been influenced by Islam as a faith when Islam arrived in the Indone-sian Archipelago with the Muslim merchants and traders from India andYemen from as early as around the eleventh century.34

Given this tendency to exclude or marginalize the material culture ofMuslim Southeast Asia in museum exhibitions of Islamic art, I argue thatIslamic art and material culture has been ‘consumed’ or appropriated bythe ACM to not only represent Islam as a ‘civilization’ but also to expandthe traditional geographic boundaries of the Dar-el Islam by positioningSoutheast Asia as part of this enlarged “Islamdom” using the evidence ofthe region’s rich material culture that pertain to indigenous practices ofIslam. Especially if one was to take most basic common factor that couldexpress some idea of this uncertain and incomplete collective tradition ofIslamic art: “Verily, Allah is beautiful and He likes beauty’,35 it is even morecurious as to why the art and material cultures of Southeast Asia on whichIslam would also have acted as “a special overlay” would be left at themargins of the artistic expression of Islamic civilization.

Hence, I argue that the ACM has conflated the chronology and geo-graphical differences of Islamic art and material culture to better displayits exhibits in a narrative that emphasizes the quotidian practices of Mus-lims with comments on some contributions of Islamic civilization, specifi-cally in the area of astronomy and anatomical sciences, to the rest of theworld. This is done in the hopes of fostering greater understanding of Islamamongst non-Muslim visitors. When all the other galleries are consideredas a whole, the larger aim of the ACM’s collection is to cultivate culturalsensitivity and religious tolerance amongst its multicultural andmultireligious citizens.


The Establishment, Vision and Mission of the Asian Civiliza-tions Museum (ACM)

The ACM was conceived by the government of Singapore in 1991 whenthen Minister for Information and the Arts, Brigadier-General George Yeo,announced the devolution of the National Museum into three separate en-tities: the Singapore Historical Museum (SHM), the ACM and the SingaporeArts Museum (SAM).36 The ACM was initially meant to be a Southeast AsiaMuseum but Yeo believed that Singapore’s ancestral roots extended be-yond the immediate geography of Southeast Asia and hence, the focus ofthe museum should expand to include Asia.37

The management of the ACM came under the umbrella of the NationalHeritage Board (NHB), a statutory board under the then Ministry for Infor-mation, Technology and the Arts (MITA), so one can easily argue that themuseum and heritage sectors were part of a larger government apparatusof socialization. In the 1990s, the government allocated some 300 milliondollars in total to the three museums, an amount unimaginable a decadebefore.38 It even increased the funding of the museums during times ofeconomic downturn,39 demonstrating the importance of the museums tothe Singapore government’s nation-building programme.

The building which houses the ACM has its own history. Originallysmaller than it is today, it was designed by colonial engineer J F A McNair inthe mid 1860s and used as colonial government offices, including the officeof the Colonial secretary as well as the Legislative Chamber. It was renamedthe Empress Place Building at the turn of the 20 th century in honour ofQueen Victoria. The building’s architecture is a typical example of the neo-Palladian style with the rusticated treatment of its ground floor facade andthe stately Doric columns40. Narrative boards detailing the history and res-toration and renovation works of the building are located on the groundfloor of the museum next to the main staircase. That a colonial buildinghouses the material culture of Singapore’s multi-ethnic ‘Asian’ ancestralroots reflects the comfortable relationship Singapore has with its colonialpast relative to more problematic ones experienced in the rest of the re-gion. It also underscores the state’s national myth that the British colonialexperience was beneficial to Singapore’s development and stands as a cul-tural symbol to Singapore’s transformation from an Asian regional tradingport to a modern and Western-styled metropolis in Southeast Asia.

The ACM’s mission is “To explore and present the cultures and civili-zations of Asia, so as to promote awareness and appreciation of the ances-tral cultures of Singaporeans and their links to Southeast Asia and theworld”. Its vision is to be the “The Best Museum in Asia – Inspiring theDiscovery of Selves and Others”.41 Hence the four main galleries of the ACMwhich categorizes Asia into the four civilizations of “China”42, “West Asia/Islam”, “South Asia” and “Southeast Asia”43 are targeted at both local andinternational audiences.


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The “West Asia/Islam” Galleries in ACM (Galleries 5 and5a)

The “West Asia/Islam” galleries were built from scratch in 1993 withextensive loans from the collections of museums from Iran and Turkey,and to a smaller degree, Malaysia and Indonesia. Partly due to the smallnumber of artefacts at its disposal, the ACM chose to focus on Islamic his-tory and culture rather than attempt a more inclusive presentation.44 Mysurveys of the “West Asia/Islam” galleries45 revealed that rather than con-centrating attention on the aesthetic qualities or skilled craftsmanship ofthe artefact per se, its curator favoured a specific narration in the presenta-tion of the artefacts in its collection. Organising the theme of the West Asia/Islam galleries around Islam as “A Way of Life”46, the fundamental tenets ofIslam that Muslims practice, “The Five Pillars of Islam”47 are stressed re-peatedly throughout the gallery leaflet and on a huge text panel.

The strains of Quranic verses recited in prayer by an invisible ima >mcan be heard the moment one enters the “West Asia/Islam” gallery. Thecollection of “Islamic” artefacts are grouped according to themes that re-flect either an Islamic philosophy, such as “Religious Knowledge” and “TheQuest for Knowledge” or practices of the Muslim faithful such as “Life, Fes-tivals and Rites”. Each section is accompanied by an explanatory introduc-tory text panel that places the artefacts in the context of how several im-portant tenets of Islam are practized so that the visitor might visualize howthe artefacts are used in the quotidian life of Muslims from all over theworld. The pre-eminence of the Quran in the Islamic faith is reflected to ahigh degree in the gallery by apportioning a significant amount of space tothe display of several varieties of Qurans from different countries and timeperiods as well as the various styles of Arabic script. This section is pre-ceded by an explanatory narrative board that describes the collection oftexts as ‘Qur’an: The Divine Revelations’.

The artefacts on display are predominantly that of Arab, Persian (earlyIslamic period), Turkish Ottoman and Mughal Indian origins. The numberof artefacts from regions where there is historical presence of Islamic dy-nasties and communities like China and Southeast Asia are much smaller incomparison, most likely due to lesser museum cooperation in these areas.Nonetheless, the selection of artefacts is predominantly of precious andhighly crafted specimens. The selection of ‘high culture’ artefacts demon-strates that the curator of the gallery had chosen to use examples of Islamicart to represent what can be considered aspects of Islamic civilizationthrough history. However, the effect of the curatorial strategy in the ‘WestAsia/Islam’ galleries is that the differences in artistic treatment of objectsfrom the different periods of Islamic art have been subsumed under a nar-rative of their respective functionality. It has been argued that by exhibit-ing the Qur’ans out of their original contexts inclines visitors to focus onthe aesthetics of the objects and judge them according to their own con-temporary standards instead.48 However, I argue that displayed togetheras a “Collection of Qur’ans”, “a Collection of Qur’an stands (rehal)”, “a col-


lection of h }ajj items” and so on within the same display case, these artefactsfrom different times and places are homogenized when, despite their mate-rial provenance, the visitor’s attention is drawn to their similarities in func-tion rather than their decorative embellishments because of the over-ridinginfluence of the accompanying theme. Arguably, these artefacts even losesome degree of historicity as their particularities, whether unwittingly orotherwise, are downplayed in favour of the continuity of a religious or cul-tural function.

In addition, while Arabic calligraphy is given prominence in the WestAsia/Islam galleries (Gallery 5) and beautifully executed calligraphic artfrom the different ages and places are displayed to advantage, there is littleinformation in the accompanying text panels of how Arabic calligraphy asan urban art49 emerged as part of the development of what can be consid-ered an Islamic civilization as “the most original art of Islam.”50 To make upfor the lack of displayed information on Islamic calligraphy in the gallery,the museum produced a “Quick Guides” informational booklet on Islamiccalligraphy in 2008. It provides an introduction to Arabic script, examplesof different forms of Arabic script as well as the historical importance ofcalligraphers in the Islamic world.

Rather than focussing on the artistic differences between the artefactswhich provide a localized context of how Islam had cast its “special over-lay” over pre-existing material culture of different regions of Islamdom,the text panels and electronic ‘virtual guides’ that accompany the displaysin the West Asia/Islam galleries reinforce how the five basic tenets of Islamas well as prayer rituals unite Muslims worldwide with a collective con-sciousness of belonging to the same community. This technique not onlyallows for the recontextualization of the artefacts in their natural environ-ment, but it also serves to connect Singapore Muslims to a larger groupbeyond Singapore because they share religious (if not cultural) affinitieswith other Muslims across the span of history and geography. In this re-gard, it reinforces the national narrative of Singapore being at the cross-roads and even “melting pot” of major cultural influences.

The last installation that a visitor sees before leaving the first WestAsia/Islamic gallery (Gallery 5 on the second floor) is a recreation of theprayer hall of a mosque oriented facing the direction of Makkah, completewith a mihra >b (qibla marker) where a Qur’an stands at its centre and amimba >r where the Friday prayer sermon is delivered from. A booklet thatdescribes the interior of a mosque, architectural features of mosques ofvarious regions and descriptions of some famous mosques is also situatedon a stand at the front of the recreated prayer hall. This in–situ approach toinstallation51 is one that “expands the ethnographic object” by broadeningits boundaries to include more of its original context, albeit with a highdegree of the theatrical involved. However, while the architectural beautyof mosques are celebrated by the projection of changing images of themihra >bs of famous mosques around the world, this staged environmentproduces a hyper-real effect that tends to highlight differences from a


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visitor’s expectations52.Such a response in turn emphasizes the ‘otherness’ of the Muslim reli-

gious context from their own cultural experiences. Without appropriatesupplementary information or an informed docent, a non-Muslim visitorwould also be likely to come to the conclusion that all Muslims performtheir prayers in the mosque and that the Qur’an is designated a place ofimportance at the front of the congregation in a similar way that a Biblemay have during Holy Communion in a Catholic Church or the centrality ofa church in the communal worship of Jesus Christ. However, this would nothave been an accurate comparison since in practice, Muslim prayers canbe performed wherever he can find a clean space and face the direction ofthe Kaa’bah. A physical text of the Qur’an is not used as the recitation ofselected verses is done from memory. Also, women are generally not ex-pected to perform prayers at the mosque due to the latter being considereda public sphere that is male-dominated. When women are present in amosque, they perform their prayers in a separate area from the men andare usually hidden from view. Thus, while a non-Muslim visitor might notrealize the inaccuracy of the installation and leave the museum thinking hehad gained some insights into Islamic practices, a Muslim (or more in-formed) visitor would notice that the installation was a kind of ‘curatorialshorthand’ to describe an important Muslim experience because it was notaligned to his or her memories of the place or practice. From an artisticpoint of view, a certain kind of stereotype of Islamic architecture is propa-gated which focuses on mihra >bs and domes rather than pointing out thelarger literature of Islamic architecture or those more commonly foundacross the indigenous landscape.

Problems with ‘Memories’ of IslamThere are some problems that need to be addressed in terms of how

an understanding of Islam in terms of a civilization as well as a ‘memory’ ofMuslim believers, locally in Singapore as well as internationally. MonaOzouf’s discussion of the intimate relationship between time and space whichraises obstacles in the re-enactment of the festivals of the French Revolu-tion would be helpful in analysing how different profiles of museum visitorsmight react to the ACM’s exhibition on Islam.53 For instance, if the objectson display are meant to authentically represent Islam and the life-worlds ofMuslims, then these artefacts must have some resonance in the collectivememories of each Muslim regardless of his own cultural and national histo-ries. The problem occurs when visitors who view these artefacts are notable to identify with them and cannot reconcile their experience of Islamand its culture with the visual and written narratives that are presented tothem in these museums.

This problem can be both spatial and temporal. For instance, a WestEuropean visitor, regardless of his religious orientation, might find somepersonal resonance in his appraisal of artefacts from the period of almost


five hundred years of Muslim rule in Spain and Portugal because of hiscultural proximity to Spain and Portugal. However, an Indonesian-Javanesevisitor might find it more difficult to identify with the material culture ofIslamic Spain, despite these artefacts’ articulation of an Islamic philoso-phy, because he has no living memory of Muslim Andalusia. Still with Ozouf’sspatial schema in mind, three possible consequences of that cognitive mis-match could arise. Firstly, a false sense of unity is created amongst Muslimvisitors across different cultures as they ‘force’ their minds to assimilatethe presented heritage into their identity as Muslims. Secondly, Islamicartefacts that do not fit into the memories of the Muslim visitor become‘exotic’ and remain at a cultural distance from him or her. The third in-stance, in the case of the ACM, would be that indigenous Southeast Asianexpressions of Islamic art and material culture are considered less authen-tically “Islamic” just because they do not number as many or are not dis-played as prominently as those from the Arab-Persian regions.

Furthermore the ACM has also had to reconcile the representation ofIslam as a civilization that produced great works of art and made significantcontributions to early scientific knowledge with more recent popular memo-ries of prolonged warfare, and acts of terror and violence of Islam in theinternational media. The attempt to address the violent memories associ-ated with Islam especially with regard to warfare, leads to the downplayingof arms and armoury artefacts and using additional narratives which focuson Islam as a ‘religion of peace’. Artefacts such as swords, daggers, bodyarmour and war banners and other paraphernalia would have their mate-rial provenance displayed but rarely the historical context in which theywere used. Instead, it is the decorations embellished on the weapon that isbrought to the fore or its talismanic properties.54 In this instance, thereseems to be a tension between exhibiting such artefacts along the conven-tional framework of what constitutes a religion (or even civilization) andavoiding the evocation of memories of violence that accompany suchartefacts pertaining to warfare.

Technology and NarrativePerhaps, the most interesting aspect of the West Asia/ Islam gallery is

not any specific artefact in its collection. Rather, it is the electronic ‘virtualguides’ – actors filmed on a touch-screen machine which serve as exten-sions of the artefacts and installations on display.55 In this regard, the ACMcan be considered a “new” museum – one that goes beyond the conserva-tion of objects to also continuously reinterpret them (through the effectiveuse of different forms of media)56.

One of these virtual guides is an actor of Malay origin who appears ona screen close to selected exhibits. He is depicted as an ‘insider’ to Islam ashe professes to be practicing tenets of Islam. The Singapore connection toIslam is made by the “Singaporean” guide who refers to “West Asia” as “thelands where my forefathers came from”. On the one hand, the presence of


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this additional narrator to the objects on display further contextualizes thedisplay of Islam and provides additional information for the exhibits. Thisis useful and even necessary as the objects cannot speak for themselves. Onthe other hand, the remark about West Asia as the guide’s ancestral home-land problematicizes the Southeast Asian origins of Singapore Malays if thevirtual Malay looks beyond the region to West Asia as a historical and spiri-tual homeland. This seemingly contradictory statement creates a kind oftension that may intrude upon a visitor’s individual experience of the ex-hibits. In this case there could be a miscommunication of the (nation-build-ing) message that the collection is supposed to convey to the visitor.

These virtual guides are also imperative in communicating an impor-tant social policy of the Singapore state – that of promoting religious har-mony. Another virtual guide, a woman by the name of “Zuraidah” is lo-cated in Gallery 5a on the third floor. When a visitor touches the screen,“Zuraidah” whose features appear a blend of Arab-Malay ancestry, comesalive and introduces herself by stating her profession (a lawyer) and ex-plaining her religious philosophy. By touching the screen on a selection oftopics, “Zuraidah” will explain to a visitor the reasons behind several Is-lamic practices with regard to marriage (polygamy), sexuality and dietaryrequirements. Under the topic “What’s your pet peeve?”, she remarks thatshe gets annoyed when Muslims and non-Muslims erroneously interpretjiha >d as “holy war” when it “actually means ‘struggle’, against both externalinjustice and within oneself”. She also explains the meaning of h }ala >l (whatis permissible) and haram (forbidden). Clearly, “Zuraidah’s” role is tocounter presumably common ‘misconceptions’ on topics that have con-temporary resonance such as jiha >d, polygamy and the perceived inequal-ity of women in Islam.

It is significant that there is a question “Are you a feminist?” directedat “Zuraidah”. She responds that she is a feminist if one takes into accountthat she admires the work of Muslim women such as Leila Ahmad, FatimaMernissi, Amina Wadud as well as noted Islamic modernist Fazlur RahmanMalik, Islamic intellectuals that provide alternative interpretations on therole of women in Islam and Quranic exegesis. “Zuraidah” continues by stat-ing her belief that since the Quran is true for all times and places, there is aneed to constantly study the Quran and interpret Scripture and the Prophet’sh }adi >th with relevance to contemporary times and societies. What can beargued here is that “Zuraidah” is an idealized portrayal of the modernSingaporean-Muslim – well-educated, articulate, observing Muslim tenetsbut also progressive-minded – such that she identifies herself as a citizen ofa modern and multicultural society.

In this instance, the need to educate museum visitors takes prece-dence over the exhibition of the collection itself. Just as the weaponry andwar banners’ inherent bellicosity is downplayed in favour of their talis-manic qualities, these electronic virtual guides emphasize how Islam shouldbe understood on its own terms, and especially as “a religion of peace”. Thepresence of these interactive audio-visual media consoles that visitors can


“engage” to give additional information or narratives to the artefacts ondisplay underscores the Singapore government’s aim of promoting reli-gious tolerance through education even while it creates a public space forthe articulation of a racial group’s cultural identity.57 Further, one cannotdiscount the suggestion that these virtual guides subtly communicate as-pects of the ideal “Singaporean-Muslim” by situating themselves firmly inpresent-day Singapore and distancing themselves from historically ‘lessprogressive’ Islamic practices. Hence, with respect to the curatorial strat-egies in its West Asia/Islamic galleries58, the ACM not only aims to inspirethe “Discovery of Selves and Others” as its vision proclaims, it also attemptsto influence what visitors discover and learn about Islam and Muslims.

ConclusionUltimately, the question of ‘who’ is included in conventional Islamic

civilization tradition is also laid bare by the curatorial strategies that theACM employs in their interpretation of Islam as a historical phenomenonand an actively practised faith. For instance, that the ACM repositionedIslam as a ‘West Asian’ religion is not an overstatement as the artefactspertaining to Islam are exhibited in a separate gallery from the main gal-lery on Southeast Asia. The distinction of Islam from other religions thathave influenced Southeast Asian societies both politically and culturally ispeculiar given that artefacts that are associated with Hindu-Buddhist tradi-tions are displayed under the category of “The Hindu-Buddhist Civiliza-tions of Southeast Asia” within the “Southeast Asia” gallery. Further, if oneunderstands the origins of Islam and Christianity as situated within thesame geographic area, it is significant that Islam alone is exhibited while‘Christian artefacts’ are conspicuously absent because Christianity doesnot fit neatly into the memories of what constitutes ‘Asian’ culture and doesnot immediately serve the People’s Action Party (PAP) government’s na-tion-building programme of creating “a strong national identity which isbased on Asian cultural values”.

The ACM’s exhibition of its Islamic collection as the “West Asia/Is-lam” galleries recalls Marshall Sahlins’ argument that not only do culturalstructures import historical significance to an event, culture and culturalcontexts themselves are created by the actions of the individuals within asociety, these cultural schemes (meanings) get transformed and hence “re-valued” with each subsequent action or even in its own reproduction.59

Thus, Islam is important enough to be treated as a separate gallery be-cause, firstly, Singapore is situated in a region of huge Muslim populationsand the significant Malay-Muslim minority in Singapore can still trace theirethnic lineages to pre-colonial (and sometimes more ancient) Malay statesand the Indonesian archipelago. Secondly, because of the Singaporegovernment’s championing of ‘multiracialism’, it could be argued that Is-lam would be best understood by its non-Muslim citizens if it was displayedinstitutionally as “a way of life” as it would simultaneously facilitate reli-


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gious tolerance amongst Singaporeans and help explain, for instance, theco-existence of separate matrimonial and estate laws for Singaporean-Mus-lims alongside civil ones.

In conclusion, one must be reminded that ACM’s “West Asia/ Islam”collection is small compared to other Islamic art and material culture col-lections that can be found in similar museums in Indonesia, Malaysia andBrunei. Hence, if assessed in isolation from the rest of the galleries, the“West Asia/ Islam” galleries would be wanting in some aspects. Despite thegalleries’ theme of Islam as “a way of life”, the narrative tends towardsessentialising Islam as a series of religious obligations rather than the indi-vidual Muslim or even Singaporean Muslims’ experience of the world-faith.Further, the narrative ‘fixes’ the contributions made by Islamic thinkersand artists firmly in the past of Islam’s ‘golden age’ with little mention ofhow Islamic intellectuals are still contributing to contemporary globalknowledge production. In that regard, the exoticness and “other-ness” ofIslam is highlighted to non-Muslim visitors rather than the commonalitiesit shares with other faith systems.60 At the same time, not all Muslim visi-tors might identify with the narrative that is presented to them as they viewthe exhibits in the West Asia/Islamic galleries and a distance remains be-tween the message that the museum wants to communicate and the pre-existing memories of Muslim visitors.

Nonetheless, the ACM has made a genuine attempt to use its collec-tion as a means of educating the general public about Islam. The generallyfavourable reviews that museum visitors give the ACM demonstrate howimportant museums are in knowledge production and how the appropriatecuratorial approach and visitor engagement can contribute a more accu-rate and favourable representation of Islam61. Finally, if one bears in mindthe determined efforts of the Singapore’s long-serving national governmentto foster a common national identity and national loyalty amongst its eth-nically and culturally disparate citizenry, the verdict would be more posi-tive. The various curatorial strategies employed, including the interactivemedia displays and public outreach events62, have made optimum use ofthe limited selection of artefacts at its disposal by infusing each displaywith a purposeful narrative that supports the museum’s educating missionas well as the state’s larger nation-building efforts.

Notes1 See Flora E.S. Kaplan (ed.), Museums and the Making of “Ourselves”: The Role ofObjects in National Identity, (London and New York: Leicester University Press,New York: Distributed in the U.S. and Canada by St. Martin’s Press, 1994). Thata good number of ‘national’ museums in Southeast Asia were established byBritish, French and Dutch colonialists who directly governed these areas fromthe mid-eighteenth century up till the end of World War II is of significance. Theprogenitors of today’s national museums had their beginnings as ethnographic


inventories that housed all the natural oddities of the local flora and fauna aswell as the cultural curiosities of the indigenous peoples they ruled. With inde-pendence, Southeast Asian countries which inherited these collections respec-tively embarked on applying various methods to use these collections to create(and display) their desired national histories and also in support of various na-tion-building programmes.2 See Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and Education: Purpose, Pedagogy, Per-formance, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Flora E.S. Kaplan (ed.),Museums and the Making of “Ourselves”: The Role of Objects in National Identity;and Peter Vergo, The New Museology, (London: Reaktion Books, 1989).3 Susan Vogel, “Always True to the Object, in Our Fashion”, in Ivan Karp andSteven D. Lavine (eds.), Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of MuseumDisplay, (USA: Smithsonian Institute, 1991), pp.191-203.4 Susan Vogel, “Always True to the Object, in Our Fashion”, pp.191-1965 Stephen Bann, The Inventions of History: Essays on the Representation of thePast, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 34.6 Speech delivered by Brigadier-General George Yeo, http://www.a2o.com.sg/a2o/public/search/index.html, 31 January 19927 While ‘Da >r al-Isla >m’ is used conventionally to refer to those lands which werehistorically under Muslim rule and would be loosely analogous to meaning as‘Christendom’, Marshall Hodgson argues in Ventures in Islam (1961) that strictlyspeaking, ‘Da >r al-Isla >m’ is essentially a juridical and territorial term.8 “Islam is a way of life” in West Asia/Islam Gallery leaflet, Asian CivilizationsMuseum, Singapore. Visit date: 30 March 2009.9 J.C van Leur as quoted in William R. Roff, Studies on Islam and Society inSoutheast Asia, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009), p. 3.10 Stephen Greenblatt, “Resonance and Wonder”, in Ivan Karp and Steven D.Lavine (eds.), Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display,(USA: Smithsonian Institute, 1991), pp. 42-55.11 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe - Postcolonial Thought and His-torical Difference, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 29-42.12 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe - Postcolonial Thought and Histori-cal Difference, p. 88.13 The schism originated from a disagreement over whether the mantle of theCaliphate should be inherited by the relatives of the Prophet or chosen on a basisof merit once the last of Prophet Muhammad’s closest companions died.14 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe - Postcolonial Thought and Histori-cal Difference, p. 6.15 M. A. J. Beg, Two Lectures on Islamic Civilisation, (Kuala Lumpur: Universityof Malaysia Press, 1982), p. 13.16 M. A. J. Beg, Two Lectures on Islamic Civilisation, p. 14.17 C. E. Bosworth, “The Historical Background of Islamic Civilisation”, in R. M.Savoury (ed.), Introduction to Islamic Civilisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1976), pp. 15-16 and pp. 24-25.18 M. A. J. Beg, Two Lectures on Islamic Civilisation, pp. 17-18.19 M. A. J. Beg, Two Lectures on Islamic Civilisation, pp. 17-18.

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20 M. A. J. Beg, Two Lectures on Islamic Civilisation, pp. 17-18.21 M. A. J. Beg, Two Lectures on Islamic Civilisation, pp. 17-18.22 M. A. J. Beg, Two Lectures on Islamic Civilisation, pp. 17-18.23 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a WorldCivilisation, Volume 1: The Classical Age of Islam, (Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 1974). Hodgson wrote 3 volumes of the Venture of Islam thoughhe passed away suddenly in 1968 in the midst of writing the third manuscript.24 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, pp. 40-41.25 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, p.57.26 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, p.58.27 Oleg Grabar, The Formation of Islamic Art, (New Haven and London: YaleUniversity Press, 1973), p. xv.28 Oleg Grabar, The Formation of Islamic Art, p.129 Oleg Grabar, The Formation of Islamic Art, p. 230 Oleg Grabar, The Formation of Islamic Art, p. 6. In considering artistic andcultural change, Grabar argues that we have to take into account what heterms “absolute” and “relative” time. “Absolute time” consists in those centu-ries, decades, or even years after which Islamic art was possible and probablyexisted and which could generally be defined with some degree of precisionthrough historical events or through particularly important monuments. Onthe other hand, “relative time” is defined by a moment when a culture as awhole has accepted and is transformed by changes which in themselves mightbe dated precisely. In that conceptualization of time, Grabar argues that a Chris-tian art may have been possible and even existed as early as 2nd Century A. D.but it would have been set against an artistic “landscape” of Imperial Rome.31 Oleg Grabar, The Formation of Islamic Art, p.732 Oleg Grabar, The Formation of Islamic Art, p. 833 The museum catalogues of the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1971(The Islamic World) and the British Museum in 1991 (Islamic Art) both respec-tively end the discussion of Islamic art with Mughal India in reference to theirIslamic art collections.34 G. W. J. Drewes, “New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia”, (The Hague:Koninglijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde, 1968), as printed inReadings of Islam in Southeast Asia, Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and YasminHussain (eds.), (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 7-9.35 M. A. J. Beg, Wisdom of Islamic Civilisation, (Kuala Lumpur: University ofMalaya Press, 1980), p.48. The statement is from a hadith of the ProphetMuhammad which has presumably informed a sense of Muslim aesthetics.36 Speech delivered by BG George Yeo, http://www.a2o.com.sg/a2o/public/search/index.html, 31 January 199237 Oral Interview, Dr. James Khoo, former Chairman of ACM 1994-2003, 25January 2007 as cited in Yoong Gee Kee Jackie, “Exhibiting History: A study ofthe Asian Civilisation Museum of Singapore”, Unpublished Academic Exercisesubmitted to the Department of History, National University of Singapore, 2000,p. 6.38 Kwa Chong Guan, “Transformation of the National Museum”, Unpublished

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Essay, 2007 as cited in Yoong Gee Kee Jackie, “Exhibiting History”, p. 6.39 The Business Times (B.T.), 27 July 1999.40 Purchased visitor brochure “ACM Highlights Map-Guide: Where Asian Cul-tures Com Alive!”, 7 July 2010.41 ACM website, http://www.acm.org.sg/home/home.asp, 21 April 2009.42 It is significant that ‘China’ as a category of exhibition was preferred over ‘EastAsia’ which would have included some engagement with Japanese and Koreanmaterial culture which carries a number of distinctions from Chinese tradi-tions. It demonstrates how tightly focused the narrative of the ACM’s collectionis on communicating ideas on the ancestral roots of the three major ethnic groupsin Singapore, i.e. Chinese, Malay and Indian.43 Personal communication with Kwa Chong Guan, Director Old History Centreand the Old National Museum 1985-1994, 6 April 2009. Prof Kwa explainedthat the reason was because the galleries had each been organized around thetheme of the major religions that had their roots in that particular region ofAsia. Hence, the ‘China’ gallery was focused on displaying artefacts that wouldnarrate the Taoist-Buddhist belief system, ‘South Asia’ would center around thehistories and life practices of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, the self-ex-planatory ‘West Asia/ Islam gallery objectified Islam as an all-encompassingreligion while ‘Southeast Asia’ would be the region where all these great reli-gions and cultures met in a “melting pot” of material cultures to represent South-east Asia as situated at “the crossroads of world trade for thousands of years”(ACM Southeast Asia Gallery visitor brochure).44 Iola lenzi, Musuems of Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2004), ascited in Yoong Jee Kee Jackie, “Exhibiting History”.45 I first surveyed the ACM on 30 March 2009 and participated in a docent-guided museum tour later on 7 July 2010. In the West Asia/ Islam galleries, theguided tour highlighted exhibits which represented the birth of Islam (territo-rial map and timeline of the birth and spread of Islam), the Quran as God’sdivine Revelation (early Islamic period Quranic script on parchment), the obli-gation of the hajj (section of the Kaa’bah kiswah) and the centrality of dailyprayers (recreated interior of a mosque prayer hall).46 The West Asia/Islam Gallery, Asian Civilisations Museum, Singapore. Visitdate: 30 March 2009.47 The five fundamental obligations that a Muslim is expected to observe are thedeclaration of the Syahadah of the monistic nature of Allah, the daily prayersthat are performed five times a day, fasting and the paying of the zakat (tithe) inthe month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Makkah if one has the means to doso.48 Jan Naderveen Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Multiculture: Pants for an Octo-pus, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007), p. 164.49 M. A. J. Beg, Wisdom of Islamic Civilisation, p.42.50 M. A. J. Beg, Wisdom of Islamic Civilisation, p. 40.51 Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Objects of Ethnicity”, in Ivan Karp and StevenD. Lavine, Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display, (USA:Smithsonian Institute, 1991), p. 389.52 Jan Naderveen Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Multiculture: Pants for an Octo-

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pus, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007), p. 132-153.53 Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution, (Cambridge, Massachusetts,London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 9.54 The narrative panel that accompany two glass cases displaying an embel-lished sword and dagger, a war banner and assorted charms, amulets and talis-manic paraphernalia, is entitled “Invocations to God” and asserts that “Talis-manic objects in the Islamic world reflect a Muslim’s trust in God”.55 These standing electronic consoles featuring ethnically identifiable actors arealso found throughout the other galleries in ACM and they serve a similar func-tion of proving additional information or a ‘backstory’ to a specific collection ofartefacts.56 C. Price as quoted in Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and Education, p. 1.57 The four administrative categories of ‘race’ in Singapore are ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’,‘Indian’ and ‘Others’. There is also a tendency to conflate ethnicity with religionin the creation of cultural identity in Singapore which would explain the use ofvisibly ‘Malay’ actors as electronic guides in the West Asia/Islam galleries.58 The mission to educate visitors even after they have left the museum can beseen with the sale of “Quick Guides” informational booklets on the four maingalleries of the ACM. These can be purchased at the ticketing counter either atthe start or end of one’s visit. The West Asia/Islam gallery “Quick Guide” focuseson Islamic calligraphy, an important aspect of Islamic art and material culture.59 Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,1985).60 See Ivan Karp, “Other Cultures in Museum Perspective”, in Karp Lavine, Ex-hibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display, pp. 375-376, for adiscussion on exoticizing strategies vis-à-vis assimilating strategies that muse-ums employ to curate their collections.61 See Fayeq S. Oweis, “Islamic art as an Educational Tool about the Teaching ofIslam”, in Art Education, vol. 55, One World (March 2002), pp. 18-24.62 The ACM and other museums overseen by the National Heritage Board regu-larly stage nation-wide public events, competitions and travelling exhibitionsto encourage visitors to its various museums as well as to educate tourists andSingaporeans alike about Singapore’s political and social histories. An upcomingevent is the Singapore HeritageFest 2010 which will run from 11-22 August2010. The theme of the event is “What Brings Us Together? Celebrating andShowcasing our Multi-Cultural Heritage”. Mentioned in its promotional bro-chure is a series of ‘festivals’ in both the city and suburbia centres (“heartlands”)of the island, student competitions and “adventure trails” to historic ethnicenclaves.

BibliographyAsian Civilisations Museum, Empress Place, Singapore. Visit date: 30 March

2009Asian Civilisations Museum website, http://www.acm.org.sg/home/home.asp,

21 April 2009.


Bann, Stephen, 1990, The Inventions of History: Essays on the Representation ofthe Past, New York: St Martin’s Press.

Beg, M. A. J., 1982, Two Lectures on Islamic Civilisation, University of MalaysiaPress: Kuala Lumpur.

Beg, M. A. J., 1980, Wisdom of Islamic Civilisation, University of Malaya Press:Kuala Lumpur, 1980, p. 48. The statement is from a h}adi >th of the ProphetMuhammad which has presumably informed a sense of Muslim aesthet-ics.

Drewes, G. W. J., 1968, “New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia”(Koninglijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde: The Hague), asprinted in Readings of Islam in Southeast Asia, Ahmad Ibrahim, SharonSiddique and Yasmin Hussain (eds.), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies:Singapore, pp. 7-9.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 2000, Provincializing Europe - Postcolonial Thought andHistorical Difference, Princeton University Press: New Jersey.

Fayeq S. Oweis, 2002, “Islamic Art as an Educational Tool about the Teaching ofIslam”, in Art Education, vol. 55, One World, March, pp. 18-24.

Grabar, Oleg, 1973, The Formation of Islamic Art, Yale University Press: NewHaven and London.

Guided ACM tour with volunteer docent, Ms Wai Ling Yeoh. Visit date: 7 July20 10

Hooper-Greenhill, Eilean, 2007, Museums and Education: purpose, pedagogy,performance, Routledge: London and New York.

Hooper-Greenhill, Eilean (ed.), 1995, Museum, Media, Message, Routledge: Lon-don and New York.

_______, 1992, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge, Routledge: Londonand New York.

Informal Oral Interview with Kwa Chong Guan, Director, Old History Centreand the Old National Museum 1985-1994, 6 April 2009.

Kaplan, Flora E.S. (ed.), 1994, Museums and the Making of “Ourselves”: The Roleof Objects in National Identity, London and New York: Leicester UniversityPress; New York: Distributed in the U.S. and Canada by St. Martin’s Press.

Karp, Ivan and Steven D. Lavine, (eds.), 1991, Exhibiting Cultures: The Poeticsand Politics of Museum Display, Smithsonian Institute: USA.

Kwok, Kenson, The Asian Civilisations Museum A-Z Guide of its Collections, TheAsian Civilisations Museum: Singapore.

Ozouf, Mona, 1988, Festivals and the French Revolution, Harvard UniversityPress: Cambridge, Massachusetts, London.

Pieterse, Jan Naderveen, 2007, Ethnicities and Global Multiculture: Pants for anOctopus, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Sahlins, Marshall, 1985, Islands of History, The University of Chicago Press:Chicago.

Savoury, R. M. (ed.), 1976, Introduction to Islamic Civilisation, Cambridge Uni-versity Press: Cambridge.

Speech delivered by Brigadier-General George Yeo, http://www.a2o.com.sg/a2o/public/search/index.html, 31 January 1992

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The Business Times (B.T.), 27 July 1999.The Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia, 2002, The Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia,

Volume 1, Malaysia.Vergo, Peter, 1989, The New Museology, London: Reaktion Books.Yoong Gee Kee Jackie, 2000, “Exhibiting History: A study of the Asian

Civilisations Museum of Singapore”, Unpublished Academic Exercise sub-mitted to the Department of History, National University of Singapore.

http://www.a2o.com.sg/a2o/public/search/index.html

Book Reviews

Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam & the Secular Statein Indonesia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2009, 262pages.

John Hughes (2009) once argues that democracy cannot work in aMuslim country like Afghanistan because of the dictatorial grip of the war-lords. Likewise, it does not work in Iraq because the country is in chaos. InEgypt, or Saudi Arabia, or the rest of the Arab world, democracy also can-not work because of autocratic rulers and Muslim extremists. But in Indo-nesia as a predominantly and even the largest Muslim country in the world,Hughes says, “we can see there are examples of burgeoning democracy”.Simply, for him, it is because Indonesia is known for its rather mellow pur-suit of Islam, in contrast to the fervor found in many Arab countries. How-ever, it should be added to Hughes’ argument that democracy can alsowork because of the strong commitment to democracy and it has long his-tory in Indonesia. The agreement by founding fathers to choose Pancasilaas the state basis and the rejection of Islamic state in the early period ofindependence is crucial for the development of democracy. From the his-torical and contemporary development of politics in Indonesia; we alsosee that several political changes regarding Islam and democracy in whichMuslim intellectuals play important roles in term of their discourses andactivisms.

Assyaukanie’s work traces the political change regarding Islam anddemocracy in Indonesia over the past 60 years, 1945-2005. The work

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claims that there are three main Muslim models of polity implemented inthe country which is historically different from the Middle Eastern Islamiccountries. These three models that are imagined and endorsed by the threedifferent generations of Indonesian Muslim include the Islamic DemocraticState (IDS); the Religious Democratic State (RDS), and the Liberal Demo-cratic State (LDS).

The first model is IDS which dominated Islamic political discourseduring the first two decades of Indonesian independence (1945-1965).Assyaukanie finds that the term was introduced by M. Natsir (1908-1993)who wrote the following phrase “the state based on Islam is not a theoc-racy. It is a democratic state. Neither is it secular state. It is an IslamicDemocratic State”. However, Natsir considered a democratic state was es-sentially good, but it was not good enough compared to Islamic politicalsystem which encompassed all aspects of Muslim life. Therefore, Natsircarefully accepted democracy. The real exponents of IDS were those whoaffiliated to Islamic parties, mostly Masyumi. It was not surprising then ifIDS was theoretically formulated by its leaders, such as M Natsir (1908-1993), Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1911-1983), Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-1989), M Roem (1908-1983), Abu Hanifah (1906-1981), Hamka (1908-1981)and M Rasjidi (1915-2001). The economic basic of IDS model is the guidedeconomy, the third way that can span the two extremes; capitalism thatprovides economic freedom to every individual and socialism that allowsthe state authority to regulate. It is not merely a combination of capitalistand socialist system because the IDS exponents formulated this kind ofeconomic principle on the basis of Islamic sources. SjafruddinPrawiranegara, for instance, argued that the welfare state did not belongsolely to capitalism or socialism, since the Qur’an clearly encourages Mus-lim to establish a just and good society.

The limit of IDS model, for Assyaukanie, arose when dealing with cer-tain religious-political issues such as the right of minorities, freedom ofreligion, freedom of thought. Since the exponents of IDS were able to coop-erate with various elements of the nation, the problem is related to whatAssyaukanie describes as the limit of Islamic democracy, mainly aboutattitude and understanding of the classical Islamic texts. The life of IDSmodel strongly depended on Masyumi. Consequently when the party wasdisbanded in 1960, the popularity of IDS also began to fade out. During thefirst half of 1960s, the proponents of Masyumi were unable to make muchprogress, since most of them were sentenced to jail by Soekarno on thecharge of against the ruling regime. Nevertheless, as a political idea, IDSwas not really dead and its exponents continued to campaign for the IDSpersistence.

The second model, RDS, appeared and played important roles duringSoeharto era (1966-1998). Assyaukanie explains that RDS is the responseto the religious-political attitudes of the IDS exponents. It is basically builton the foundation that Indonesia is a pluralistic country. Any understand-ing on the religious-political issues, therefore, must be developed on this

167Book Reviews (Suratno, Dick van der Meij, and Zaki Mubarak)

basis. The exponents of RDS were mostly new Muslim generations that cameon to the political stage during the early 1970s and who were ready to workwith Soeharto, either as his allies in the cabinet such as M Sjafaat Mintaredja(b. 1921) and A Mukti Ali (1923-2004) or as the political opposition in theparliament such as Djarnawi Hadikusumo (d. 1993) and Lukman Harun(1934-1999). RDS was also favored by Muhammadiyah and NU leaders suchas Amien Rais (b.1944), Kuntowijoyo (1943-2005) and Dawam Rahardjo(b.1942) from Muhammadiyah and Achmad Siddiq (1926-1991), SahalMahfudz (b.1937) and Ali Yafie (b.1928) from NU. Add some arguments asto why this model was much favored by the two groups of intellectuals whoopposed and supported the regime.

The foundation of RDS is two: the acceptance of Pancasila as the statebasis and the rejection of secularism. It argues that all of principles inPancasila are compatible with Islam. Unlike their elders, the exponents ofRDS accepted Pancasila as the final state philosophical basis. Besides, theexponents of RDS rejected secularism on the basis that Islam does not ac-knowledge the separation between religious and worldly domains. Theyalso rejected the idea of Islamic state as a consequence of acceptingPancasila as the only basis. To ensure themselves that the state would notbecome a secular state, they supported every policy and bill that aims atendorsing the public role of religion. On economy, Assyaukanie says thatthe exponents of RDS supported what so called Pancasila Economy althoughin fact they did not like to use the term that was already widely recognized.The term was introduced by Emil Salim in his article in Kompas (1966) andin Prisma (1979). However, it was not much known until Mubyarto a Pro-fessor of economics from UGM reintroduced it in 1981. He explained (yearof reference) that it was an economic system based on the fifth principle ofPancasila on social justice and Section 33 articles 1, 2 and 3 of UUD 1945 oneconomic democracy.

Despite being a sophisticated theory, Assyaukanie highlights that RDSfaces difficulties when it is put into practice. On the one hand they did fullyagree and were ready to go hand in hand with other religious groups. But onthe other hand they tended to consider that the adoption of certain reli-gious values by the state does not need the consensus of other religiousgroups such as the legislation of Marriage Law in 1974 and of ReligiousJudicature in 1989. The main problem with RDS model, for Assyaukanie,was about how to define the role of religion in the state and how far such arole could be accommodated by the state. In fact, this polemic often madethe situation worse. It was against all the disparities that the third model,LDS, came into existence.

Muslim discourse on LDS has been growing since the downfall ofSoehato in 1998. Certainly, it did not emerge suddenly after 1998. It hasstarted since the time of independence, but as far as Musims are concerned,it began in the early 1970s when the Islamic reform movement appearedand dramatically changed Muslim political discourse in the country.Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) and Djohan Effendi (b.1939) for instance

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are among such reformists who constantly promote the spirit of Islamicliberalism and highly support the idea of LDS. During 1980s AbdurrahmanWahid (1940-2009) also became prominent figure on the discourse. Be-sides, the role of IAINs (State Institute for Islamic Studies) and their fig-ures, such as Mukti Ali, Harun Nasution, Azyumardi Azra, KomaruddinHidayat from IAIN Jakarta, and Amin Abdullah and Masdar Mas’udi, fromIAIN Yogyakarta are instrumental. The emergence of young liberal Mus-lim NGOs such as JIL in Jakarta, LKiS in Yogyakarta, and Resist in Malangalso support the development of LDS.

The foundation of LDS is mainly constructed on the separation be-tween religion and the state, or simply a sort of secularization. It is perhapsnot an appropriate term to use. Indeed, secularization has become themajor question for many Muslims, first as to whether it has any relevancefor the context of Indonesian Islam and second whether it is possible forIslam in general to be secularized. The exponents of LDS have their ownanswer. Madjid, for instance, generally distinguishes between seculariza-tion and secularism, arguing that secularization is every form of liberatingdevelopment and secularism is a new closed world view which functionsvery much like a new religion. Madjid’s view of secularization must be so-ciologically understood. He held the view that Indonesian Muslims havedistorted understanding of the hierarchy of values since they no longerdistinguish between transcendental and temporal values, between ukhrawi(non-worldly affairs) and dunyawi (worldly affairs). This confusion madeMuslim unable to respond to the development of contemporary thoughts.The role of secularization is thus to distinguish such two different things.From this sociological analysis, Madjid elevated it into a political contextand came to a conclusion, which later became his famous slogan: IslamYes, Islamic Party No.

Because of the conviction that separation of religion and the state ispossible in Islam, according to Assyaukanie, that is why the exponents ofLDS believe that the state that is ruled free of religious interference is betterthan that which adopt religious interference. Criticisms by the exponentsof LDS of the state-religion relationship are addressed to two targets. Firstis to the state that still maintains Soeharto’s model of polity. Second is toMuslims who are obsessed with “conquering” the state by whatever meansso they can impose their religious agenda. Major issues often discussed bythe exponents of LDS mostly related to the issue of the officialization ofreligion, the criticism of the shariah and religious bills and the likes. Oneconomy, the exponents of LDS believe that Islam does not deal with eco-nomic in details. As with politics, Islam only provides general guidelines,often in the form of moral values to Muslim economic activities. Madjid(year of reference), for instance, argues that as long as certain economicsystem creates healthy activities and promotes prosperity to all people, itcan be considered Islamic.

Finally, Assyaukanie’s work attempts to analyze the continuity anddiscontinuity of the three models based on the current development of


Islamic political thought. The work claims that Post-Soeharto era has beenpartly colored by the emergence of Islamic radical groups. But, it is notsignificantly due to ideological thinking but rather to the weakness of thegovernment and the complex political situation of transitional state. Is-lamic parties such as PBB, PKS etc whose ideas can be categorized as theincarnation of IDS are also becoming more pragmatic. Their result of lastelections and the poor support from major Islamic groups have forcedthem to rethink their strategy and political standpoint. If such parties canbe considered as the successor of IDS, it is unlikely that the polity modelhas any future in the country. Pragmatism is also seen in RDS, which is nowset in different situation. In the past, the dominance of RDS was highlysupported by the Soeharto regime. Presently, it is challenged by two polesof Islamic political discourse; radical and liberal Islam groups. The posi-tion taken by the proponents is the middle path. In practice, this position isrepresented by PAN, whose leaders are mainly the proponents of RDS.Meanwhile, the third model, LDS, has developed quite significantly due tothe rise of young liberal Muslim figures and groups over the last two de-cades. Having a better religious education and chance to access modernideas, they have confidently developed religious political discourses. Iftheir seniors were discussing major issues such as state ideology and mod-ernization, they are generally more concerned with practical discourse ofLDS; not only that of the separation between religion and state, but also ofhuman right, freedom of thought, gender equity, religious pluralism etc.

Assyaukanie’s work is excellent in explaining the development of Is-lam and democracy in Indonesia. The work also successfully proves thatMuslim intellectuals in Indonesia have been influential actors who havecontributed to political changes in term of their discourses and activisms.However, some notes should be addressed. First is about western. It can beclearly seen not only from the conclusion that LDS is seemingly a morepromising than two previous models, but also because Asyyaukanie him-self in the beginning of his work declares that the history of modern Islamicreformism is a series of Muslim responses to the ideas and notions comingfrom the West. The existence of LDS, therefore, is likely an effort of Muslimintellectuals to interpret Western ideas. Second is the ignorance of the riseof political Islam. Previously restrained under Soeharto regime, politicalIslam now features a bit prominently in the Indonesian polity. Its rise re-flects both domestic and political forces let loose after Soeharto, and alsothe world-wide Islamic revival. The phenomenon of PKS, a quite new Is-lamic party that has significant support from educated and young people,is an example. Apart from maneuvers of its leaders to make the party moremoderate, people still consider it as an Islamist party and will enforce Is-lamic agenda if they become a ruling party in the future. Besides, it is truethat several Islamic and Muslim parties currently tend to be more prag-matic due to the failure of winning the last election. However, at the sametime, secular parties such as PDIP, Golkar and Demokrat are trying to showthat they are “Islamic” (by establishing its Islamic wings and recruiting

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Islamist figures to join them) in order to attract Muslim voters. In somecases, even secular parties do not seriously hamper the demand of Islamistagenda such as the case of RUU Pornography. A-half-hearted pragmatismfrom Islamic and Muslim parties as well as Islamism from secular partiesshould be seriously seen as a threat to the future of LDS.

Despite the above notes, Assyaukanie’s work is a systematic and com-prehensive attempt to map the political discourses of Indonesian Muslimsover the past 60 years, 1945-2005. The author describes the complex fac-tors and actors influencing the political change during this period. Thismakes this work very valuable and becomes a-must-read book for thosewho are interested in the development of Islam and democracy in Indone-sia.

(Suratno, a lecturer at Paramadina University in Jakarta andcurrently a PhD student at Goethe-University Frankfurt, Germany)

Syafiq Hasyim, Bebas dari PatriarkhismeIslam, Depok: KataKita, 2010, 442 pages.

Nowadays we should be happy that finally men have also entered thediscussion on women’s issues, gender, and the role of women in Islam. Thistrend has been especially visible during the last decade and Syafiq Hasyimis one of the men actively engaged in trying to understand issues pertainingto women in Islam, the history of these issues and the ways to understandand ultimately to solve them. He has been a prolific writer on the issue videhis Menakar Harga Perempuan (Measuring the Value of Women), pub-lished by Mizan, Bandung 1999, Hal-Hal yang Tak Terpikirkan tentangIsu-isu Keperempuanan dalam Islam (Unthought of matters pertaining toWomen’s issues in Islam) which was also published by Mizan in 2001. Apartfrom that, he has also written various articles and has been the editor ofvarious compilations of articles on the subject. He hails from NU circles, isalso Leiden-trained, and is well versed in the traditional and modern litera-


ture on the issue.The book under discussion looks at the ways Islam may be liberated

from patriarchism. Syafiq is outspoken. He makes a clear distinction be-tween Islam and its primary sources the Qur’an and Sunnah, and manmadeinterpretations of these sources such as tafsir, ijtihad, and fiqh, which arethus not core elements of Islam and therefore prone to mistakes, differ-ences, and uncertainty. He therefore considers the role of the traditionalmen of knowledge (ulama) as fallible because they are prone to culturalrather than theological influences. Because many people have access to theworks of the ulama but not to the Qur’an and Hadith because of languageproblems, the influence of the ulama is enormous and this is for a large partresponsible for misunderstandings in Islam as to women’s roles and posi-tion and the attitude men should adopt towards them. This distinction isvery important because it opens the way for novel interpretations, which,in Syafiq’s view are desperately needed. Syafiq’s overall conclusion is simpleand definite: Patriarchism is not part of Islam and should be erased from it.

There are in Syafiq’s mind three reasons for the present situation re-garding women in Islam. On the one hand, the sources of Islam are ap-proached too dogmatically rather than critically or intellectually; secondly,the role of the ulama and thirdly, the sources are taken too literally and notcontextually. In other words, Syafiq is convinced that Islam and present-day situations have to be considered together, and that Islam’s validity inthe contemporary world should be enhanced by interpreting Islamicsources in the light of present-day notions and cultural expressions. Forme, this book tries to do just that. It is of great importance because it is abook written for Muslims by a Muslim and concerns an important part ofthe Muslim reality in its relation to the modern world. It is written by aninsider for insiders and not by an outsider who, no matter what, does nothave the finely tuned understandings and approaches an insider may have.The clarity of his distinction between Muslims and Islam is fresh and usefulto a modern exposition of the ins and outs of the matter at hand. Especiallyhis understanding that it is impossible for humans to know Islam and thatthe only thing we may try to fathom is our understanding of what Islam is(p. 27) is especially useful in the search for solutions to the issues. Thelogical outcome of this line of reasoning is that we need not only to reinter-pret the original sources of Islam – Qur’an and Sunnah – but also the entirescholarly tradition surrounding it (p. 28 note 1). His observation that theQur’an contains verses on the equality of women – when concerning gen-eral issues such as religious duties and humanity – and those that emanateideas of inequality when it talks about specific issues is also useful. It leadSyafiq to ponder about a reading of the Qur’an with the idea of generalitiesand specificities is mind, which may lead to new and probably more work-able understandings in our present era.

The last decades have witnessed a plethora of books and articles, schol-arly and in the media on women and gender issues. Syafiq is of the opinionthat one of the main problems is that men are usually not involved in gen-

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der studies and gender solutions, either because they don’t want to or be-cause women don’t accept them. In his eyes this is a serious flaw as men areresponsible themselves for their attitude and their behavior against women,and for that reason alone should be included in the discussion and in thesearch for ways of solving problems. Luckily, there is a trend in this direc-tion and various young ulama such as KH. Muhyiddin Abdusshomad, KH.Hussein Muhammad and KH. Masdar F. Mas’udi (and Syafiq himself) areactively involved in ways to discuss and solve issues.

The role of international media should not be underestimated, letalone forgotten, and because of many international seminars and othervenues, thoughts and notions spread around the world more rapidly thanever before. This is a good thing and needed to liberate the issue from na-tional confinements, but carries the risk that issues on a high theoreticallevel interfere with practical solutions on the floor. Sometimes this is evi-dent in the present book, as the discussion on the semantics of gender,feminism, women’s issues and such attest. The book yoyos between thepractical and the theoretical levels, which is sometimes a pity. In Indone-sia it is also hard to engage in dialogues on these theoretical issues for thesimple reason that a library has been written about them and taking part inthis totality is hard, especially since in Indonesia modern books on thesematters are very hard to get.

So what are the issues? Women have had a hard time in the Islamicworld ever since Islam was first revealed in Arabia in the seventh century.Originating in a society with a long and persistent patriarchic culture, it isnot surprising that women were seen as second rate citizens and as objectsof men’s desire, rather than as subjects who decide on their own fate. It issafe to say that over time, traditional ulama have not missed any opportu-nity to minimalize women’s roles in what they consider Islam. Syafiq men-tions a catalogue of instances where the secondary role of women becomescrystal clear. They are discriminated against and exploited and there is alot of violence against women out there under a veneer of Islamic piety. Inshort, women are (apparently) not as human as men. They are only half ofthat. They don’t have the same inheritance rights, have to marry throughthe use of a wali whereas they themselves cannot act as one. Their testi-mony is only half of that of a man; two women have to testify against that ofone man. When a boy is born, two goats are slaughtered, when a girl is born,one is enough. They may not act as leaders, have to wear a jilbab and otherbody-hiding garb, they are impure during menstruation, may not act asimam for a full Muslim audience, are the victim of polygamy, and have toendure their husbands in whatever he wants, thinks, and does. If this wouldnot be enough, the matter is even more exacerbated by the fact that therole men force upon them is religiously justified, and that many womenhave little to no opportunity or even the knowledge to dispute the discus-sions and decision-making processes that surround their role in which theyare not involved and the outcome of which they have to suffer. What I don’tunderstand is that if women are seen to add to man’s perfection (p. 50), how


can it be that the agent who provides this additional perfection can be con-sidered so negatively that it ends in abuse and discrimination. What does itmean to perfect man? I would rather think that if men need perfection, theyare imperfect, not the agents (women) that perfect them. The fact that Is-lam acknowledges the differences between men and women does in Syafiq’seyes not mean that one is better than the other. In his view, Allah pays noattention to this difference, as for him only someone’s taqwa (religiousdevotion) counts.

Syafiq is adamant in his statements that Islam is a religion for every-body, that Islam values the life of every adherent and that Islam is notagainst women. It is sometimes for me surprising to see that more than halfof all Muslims are women and this fact alone must mean that Islam is notagainst them; why would women want to believe in a religion that is againstthem? As in many instances of unequal relations, it would be wrong toassume that only men are responsible for the continuation of the statusquo. Women also do that, even if it is against their own interests. Theythemselves are also largely responsible for the fact that their role is limitedto sumur, kasur, and dapur (well, bed and kitchen) (p. 15).

It is a pity that Syafiq has not gone sufficiently deeply into the basicissue as to why male Muslims are so fond of downplaying the roles of theirsisters, daughters, spouses and other female family members. Also the rea-sons why so many Muslims are concerned with other people’s business isleft in the open. It is also a pity that the role of sex and paternity in this issuehas not been delved into much deeper to provide insight into the root causesof the problems. In my view, the reasons may be quite simple. Apparentlymany Muslim males (and not only they) are so obsessed with power, sex,and the paternity of their offspring that this alone would explain many ofthe issues Syafiq mentions, and would also explain why no ulama has ap-parently the audacity to simply issue a fatwa against violence and discrimi-nation against women. Apparently, there is a real divide between the worldsof Muslim men and Muslim women so that this – in my eyes quite simplesolution – is unthinkable. Rather than liberating Islam from patriarchism,Islam might want to be liberated from excessive notions of paternity. Theexcessive fear males seem to have of the female body (female sex drive issaid to be nine times higher than that of a man) and of the imagined possi-bilities of women to engage in sex always and everywhere – which is appar-ently so much dreaded by Muslim men – virtually amounts to an obsessionwhich may be more reflective of their ideas and desires than those of theirfemale co-believers.

The book contains a lot. It also addresses issues like homosexuality(which I find odd because by definition, homosexuals have little interest inwomen, or in patriarchy for that matter), and this piece is rather weak andmight have been left out (pp. 241-243). The fact that there should be areason that someone becomes gay is peculiar because there is apparentlyno need for a reason to become heterosexual. Apparently, it is hard toaccept that many things are nature given and that no reason might exist.

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The idea that homosexuality might be genetic (p. 241) was once expertlyrefuted by an American female researcher who dryly stated that if thatwould be the case it would have died out long ago. Only half a page has beendevoted to lesbianism, which is in this book unacceptably short and con-tains only the shallowest of remarks. In this case, Syafiq is in danger ofrevealing precisely the line of reasoning he tries to combat in other issues.Women are different from men, but that too is a God given fact and it ispointless to discuss this or to find reasons for the existence of these differ-ences. The HIV/Aids discussion is too short and too general (pp. 247-249).Syafiq rightfully says that people would not contract Aids through sex ifpeople remained faithful to their spouses but fails to see that this makesAids also an important ethical issue and therefore alone should have gener-ated a longer and more in-depth discussion. His statement on pp. 264-266that in Indonesia, scholars and religious activists have paid little seriousattention to HIV/Aids because it is a medical issue also sounds rather pe-culiar to me.

There are some things I miss in the book. I miss, for instance, a moredetailed exposition of the ideas living among Muhammadiyah and NahdlatulUlama circles, or in other Muslim circles in Indonesia. A more detailedinsight into this may reveal more of the immediate experiences womenhave than the lengthy expositions of a more general nature found in thebook. The fact that a very demeaning feature like kawin sirri (unregistredmarriage) does not feature in the book at all is also odd, as it puts women inan extremely disadvantageous position. The fact that many people defendthe idea of polygamy as a means to circumvent infidelity is also not ad-dressed, as it may simply be construed as legalized infidelity. That manyinvalid ways of reasoning are used to defend the issue is not surprising inview of its delicate nature, and thus the two pages devoted to polygamy(pp. 236-238) are clearly insufficient. The impact of the Shariat bylaws inmany regions in Indonesia is also not addressed sufficiently. We all remem-ber the shocking news from Tangerang where women were picked up fromthe streets after dark, accused of prostitution and put in jail while they werecompletely innocent, and the aftermath these issues had for these womenonce they had returned home. These down to earth issues might have beengiven some more attention.

For me one thing is clear though. This is by far the most comprehen-sive and important book on gender and women’s issues to have appeared inIndonesia for decades. The book is wonderfully clear and well written, al-though some final editing might have been desirable to eliminate manyannoying spelling mistakes which especially pop up in foreign names andexpressions, but are also evident in Indonesian. One thing that makes thebook rather distant to non-experts may be that many Arabic quotes fromthe Quran and Hadith have not been translated, like various other quotesfrom modern sources. This makes me wonder who the intended audiencefor the book is.

It is hoped that Syafiq will continue to write these kinds of works and


that, rather than writing a book of a general nature as the one at hand, hewill address many of the issues he dealt with in much more detail so that wemay learn much more of how the issue of patriarchy, gender, gender rela-tions and their roles in Islamic thinking may be revealed.

(Dick van der Meij, an advisor at the Center for the Study ofReligion and Culture, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, Indonesia)

Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: StudiKasus Jakarta dan Solo, (The Seeds ofRadical Islam in Mosques: A Case Study ofJakarta and Solo), Ridwan al-Makasary andAhmad Gaus AF (ed.), Jakarta: Center forthe Study of Religion and Culture UIN SyarifHidayatullah Jakarta, 2010, 358 pages.

The growth and spread of radical currents in Indonesian Islam afterthe collapse of the New Order brought implications which have stigmatizedIndonesia’s Muslim community, widely known as moderate and tolerant.Not only that, but religious radicalism, often accompanied by acts of ter-rorism, has also implicated mosques as centres of concern. There are manysuspicions that mosques have been exploited by terrorists to implant radi-cal religious ideologies. As was widely reported, Dani Dwi Permana, the J WMarriot hotel suicide bomber in 2008, was recruited and indoctrinatedwith radical Islamic ideas using the activities of the Parung Mosque YouthGroup. Not only the government feels uncomfortable about this; mass Is-lamic organizations are also worried. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) andMuhammadiyah tightened control over the mosques they manage in re-sponse to sustained infiltration by various groups intent on implanting theideologies of radicalism through mosques.

Similar threats have also occurred in other Muslim countries, for ex-ample in Pakistan. Terrorists took over the workings of the government’sRed Mosque (Lal Masjid) as a base for the radical Islamic movement. Thesame has occurred in madrasahs (Islamic schools), which have been usedby the Taliban to recruit and brainwash young people and turn them into

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suicide bombers. It is little wonder that the image of mosques is worsening.In fact, as Makdisi (2005) has noted, in the first centuries of Islam’s

growth mosques clearly appeared as the mainstays of human civilization.At a time when Europe was still deep in the dark ages, the mosques of theMuslim world had already become springs of knowledge as places of educa-tion in the humanities and religion. With the continuing decline of the Is-lamic world, the role of mosques as centres of civilization began to weaken.This phenomenon is pictured by the majority of mosques in Indonesia, andcan be seen in the growing vulnerability of mosques to the spread of radicalreligious ideas and ideologies offering hatred and violence.

This book publishes the results of two separate pieces of serious re-search into the relationships between mosques in DKI Jakarta and Solo andthe seedbeds of radical Islamic ideas. The first research program, “Map-ping the Ideology of Mosques in Jakarta” was carried out from the end of2008 until the end of 2009, followed by the research into the Solo mosqueswhich started in September 2009 and ran until December of that year. Thebook of 358 pages is divided into five chapters.

The first chapter explains that the research into mosques in Jakartaand Solo used two different research methods. In Jakarta the research useda quantitative approach to survey 250 mosques, while the Solo researchused a qualitative approach for ten mosques. These ten mosques were:Kotabarat Mosque managed by Muhammadiyah; al-Islam MangkunegaranMosque; the NU affiliated al-Firdaus Mosque in Gendingan; al-MaghfirohMosque; the campus mosque of the Sebelas Maret University; the al-HikmahJoyodiningratan Complex mosque, Agung Mosque Solo; the mosque of theJamsaren Pesantren; the Grand Mosque (Masjid Besar) at Laweyan, and al-Muttaqin Mosque at Kartopuran (p. 7). The objective of the research in thetwo cities was to uncpver the religious perceptions, teaching activities andideological orientations of the mosque managers in relation to the systemof government, formalizing sharia law, jihad, gender equality and plural-ism. The Jakarta research was designed as a preliminary to the subsequentresearch carried out in Solo, although the methodologies used were not thesame.

The second chapter contains a lengthy explanation of the conceptualbasis of Islamism, mosques and radical Islamic movements in Indonesia.Since the events of September 11 2001 a number terms have emerged forIslamic groups which forefront violence: Fundamentalist Islam, RadicalIslam, Political Islam, Militant Islam, and more recently, Islamism. Theresearch elected to use this last term, Islamism. The reason for this is thatIslamism has a wide coverage, encompassing different Islamic groups whowork actively through three different avenues: firstly the political avenue,as reflected by Islamic political parties like the Prosperous Justice Party(PKS – Partai Keadilan Sejahtera); secondly through preaching and spread-ing the faith (dakwah), of which the salafist group led by Ja’far Umar Thalibwas one of the prominent groups at the beginning of the Reformasi period;and thirdly the jihadist faction, which is heavily influenced by the thinking


and radical ideas of Sayyid Quthb (pp. 12-18). In a global context al-Qaedaand Jamaah Islamiah (JI) are included in this category. In Indonesia thisthird Islamist stream includes (among others) Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia(HTI), Majelis Mujaihidin Indonesia (MMI), Laskar Jihad, Front PembelaIslam (FPI), Jamaah Islamiah (JI), as well as various terrorist networks.

To determine the position taken by mosques in relation to the seedsof radicalism, this research used five core criteria for its in-depth inter-views: establishing an Islamic caliphate and Islamic State (DaulahIslamiyyah) versus a democratic system; imposing sharia law as opposedto a constitutional and democratic legal system; jihad as war (qital); femaleequality in public life, and pluralism in religious life (p. 23).

Chapters three and four briefly describe the Jakarta and Solo surveyresearch findings. The CSRC research team made an interesting observa-tion about the political-religious attitude of mosque managers in Jakarta.Although the majority of managers take a moderate view, the threat ofinfiltration by radical ideologies is clearly visible. This can be seen in therespondents’ significant support for the formation of an Islamic State (21%)and Islamic caliphate (32%) (p. 91). An anti gender-equality attitude is alsodominant, and can be seen in their rejection of the right of a woman tobecome President (56%). The same can be seen in the non-pluralist reli-gious views of the mosque managers. As many as 85% of them did not agreethat a non-Muslim had the right to become President, although at the levelof more general political rights the majority of respondents (87%) agreedthat non-Muslims had rights of citizenship. More alarming was the consid-erable support for State formalization of sharia law, for example by govern-ment regulation of dress codes (60%), in issues of worship (41%), and in theobligation for Muslims to press for implementation of the Jakarta Charter(45%). Implementing this defunct charter would legally require Muslims tofollow sharia law.

From the picture painted above in can be concluded that althoughmoderatism remains the mainstream for mosque managers in Jakarta, thisis overshadowed by the spectre of radicalism, opposition to gender equal-ity and intolerance. Only the test of time will show whether the stream ofmoderatism can continue to survive, immune to infiltration by radical re-ligious precepts.

The results of the research into mosques in Solo presented in the fol-lowing chapter five are extremely challenging. In the setting of its socialand political history, Solo’s people are well known for having ‘short fuses’,and this is marked by the high level of social strife found in Solo. In manyrespects the characteristics of the Solo mosques are closely connected withthose who control them. These “controllers”, the mosque managers, safe-guard their existence by tight control over the various activities and reli-gious material taught in the mosques they manage. Ultimately and to alarge part their Islamic ideologies closely follow the ideologies of thosewith influence over them. This can be seen, for example, at the Maghfirohmosque, where the mosque manager is affiliated with Hidayatullah and the

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al Islam Gumuk Mangkubumen mosque, which are both dominated by theSolo Islamic Youth Front (FPIS). These two groups are believed to repre-sent the hard-line wing of Islam, and loudly echo its rejection of democ-racy, gender equality and pluralism. The support of mosque managers foran Islamic caliphate, formalization of sharia law and the perception of jihada war (qita >l), is clearly apparent.

Influences countering this are seen in the political-religious ideolo-gies of managers of mosques affiliated with moderate Islamic mass organi-zations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. In Muhammadiyah’sKotabarat mosque, for example, the mosque managers are adamant that itis not possible for an Islamic caliphate to be instituted in the context of theIndonesia’s current concepts of state and nationhood (p. 111). The sameapplies to sharia law and support for its formalization, where the most im-portant issue for mosque managers is developing a substantive Islam whichmanifests itself in the consciousness of its followers, without any need forState involvement. Generally speaking, the stakeholders (mosque manag-ers, preachers and mosque congregations) in Muhammadiyah’s mosquesaccept concepts of pluralism and gender equality well, although the viewsof a minority of mosque managers are somewhat different. In the al-Firdausmosque, affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, statements disagreeing with insti-tuting an Islamic caliphate, formalizing sharia law and terrorism in the nameof jihad demonstrated the moderate attitudes and thinking of this mosque’sstakeholders. It would not be wrong to see the Muhammadiyah affiliatedKotabarat mosque and the NU affiliated al Firdaus mosque as being at theforefront of moderate Islam (p. 101, p. 127). The problem is that the mosquemanagers’ loose supervision of activities in their mosques makes them vul-nerable to infiltration by radical groups. At the very least this can be seenin various actions by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, which consistently attemptsto use the Muhammadiyah Kotabarat mosque as a base camp for its activi-ties.

In general, although other mosques such as the Agung Mosque (MasjidAgung) Surakata, the al-Hikmah Kratonan mosque and the Jamsaren mosqueare relatively open and do not exercise tight control over the content ofsermons and addresses, nevertheless they stand as being moderate. Condi-tions are quite different at the Nurul Huda mosque on the campus of theSolo’s Sebelas Maret University (UNS), which is vulnerable to penetrationby Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and also the salafist movement (pp. 267 – 271).The views of its stakeholders are fragmented, with the majority holding toreligiously moderate ideologies but with a small number of quietly activemilitants who still echo a radical Islamic agenda. At Solo’s Laweyan Mosquethere is a hotly contested discourse between moderates and hard liners.Initially, in the early 1980s, every Sunday morning this mosque gave spaceto Islamic radical leaders like (the late) Abdullah Sungkar and Abu BakarBaasyir to fill their study groups (p. 169). When Sungkar and Baasyir fled toMalaysia in the mid 1980s, the radical stream at the Laweyan mosque slowlybegan to weaken. Despite this, radical ideas left residual traces, as can be


seen by the presence of some mosque managers who agree with the con-cept of the Islamic caliphate (p. 170).

From CSRC’s research we can see the complexity of the position occu-pied by mosques in the revolving currents of the radical Islam movement,which has been steadily growing since Indonesia’s democratic reform. Themoderation of the managers of Jakarta’s mosques is continually hauntedby the co-existence of radical ideologies. In Solo there is ongoing and closelyfought contestation between moderatism and radicalism. The majority ofmosques still hold firmly to their moderatism, while some other mosqueshave fallen headlong into the pit of radicalism and exclusivism. Thus apartfrom making a major contribution to the study of mosque relations andreligious opinion, this research also sends an important message to thegovernment and the Muslim elite to make deep inroads into protectingplaces of worship from infiltration by extremist groups.

( Zaki Mubarak, Lecturer in Political Science, Faculty of Social andPolitical Sciences, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta)

Muhammadiyah Scholars and Democratic Transition in Post-New Order Indonesia

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