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Transcript of MIAMI UNIVERSITY - OhioLINK ETD
MIAMI UNIVERSITY The Graduate School
Certificate for Approving the Dissertation
We hereby approve the Dissertation
of
Jonathan Tyler Baker
Candidate for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
_____________________________________
Dr. Kate Rousmaniere, Director
_____________________________________
Dr. Kathleen Knight-Abowitz, Reader
_____________________________________
Dr. Joel Malin, Reader
_____________________________________
Dr. Michael Todd Edwards, Graduate School Representative
ABSTRACT
IN A STATE OF ACCESS: OHIO PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION, 1945-1990
by
Jonathan T. Baker
In a State of Access is a historical study about the way public higher education in Ohio became
both generally accessible to nearly every citizen while also offering elite undergraduate and
graduate programs. This project grapples with the question of how national, state and regional
factors — from the mid-1940s through the end of the 20th century — influenced the way Ohio’s
leaders viewed the purpose of public higher education and influenced whether Ohio’s leaders
chose to focus on making public higher education more selective or accessible. State leaders
initially balked at the idea of funding public higher education. When they did decide to make the
investment, ideological battles, economic stagnation and the state’s budget deficit continually
influenced how state leaders viewed the purpose of public higher education. As a result, state
leaders never succeeded in building a system of public higher education that reflected a clearly
defined, well-organized purpose. This dissertation is the first full-length study about
contemporary public higher education in Ohio and one of the few case studies of any state’s
system of higher education. As the public and politicians at the state and national level pay more
attention to the accessibility of higher education, and the role of a college degree in a globalized,
service economy, a case study of Ohio helps us to better understand why public higher education
is still struggling with problems over access.
IN A STATE OF ACCESS: OHIO HIGHER EDUCATION, 1945-1990
A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of
Miami University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Educational Leadership
by
Jonathan T. Baker
The Graduate School
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio
2020
Dissertation Director: Kate Rousmaniere
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments v
Chapter One: Introduction — The Purpose(s) of Higher Education 1
Chapter Two: Being a Historian of Higher Education — Historiography and Literature
Review 11
Chapter Three: Panic Pause and Purpose in Ohio Higher Education 31
Chapter Four: A Policy of Accessibility 62
Chapter Five: Toward the Year 2000 82
Chapter Six: Where Do We Go from Here? 93
Epilogue 103
Bibliography 108
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It all began the summer after fifth grade. The same summer Ken Griffey Jr. hit his 500th home
run: 2004. I was eleven and going to college. Sort of. I asked my parents to sign me up for a
program called “Kids in College,” or something to that effect. Elementary and Middle School-
age students picked a subject and took three hours of class a day for a week at Miami
University’s Middletown campus. Naturally, I picked a course on meteorology. Don’t ask me
why, I just loved weather despite being deathly afraid of thunderstorms. Every day my
grandfather would take me to-and-from Miami-Middletown, and I marveled at how he didn’t
need directions to the campus despite us living thirty minutes away. So, being a curious,
question-asking eleven-year-old, I asked him how he knew about the campus (my grandfather
didn’t go to college). He told me the campus is located on land that used to be a community park
for families who were employed at AK Steel — the place my grandfather worked for thirty
years. Even then I thought something didn’t sound right. Why did AK Steel, one of the largest
employers in the county, give up land used for their employees’ enjoyment, so Miami could
build a college? I’d been to plenty of parks and they were, at least to young Tyler, way more fun
than a college classroom. I filed that interaction away and spent the rest of the week with my
head turned towards the clouds — literally.
By the time I graduated high school and had taken, but barely passed a calculus class, my
dream of studying meteorology had been replaced by a love of history, particularly studying the
biography of powerful people. My high school United States’ history teacher, an Army veteran-
turned-academic, Mark Pierett, taught me how to love the subject. He helped me see how
powerful people, especially in the twentieth century, made consequential decisions that shaped
millions of lives. That was cool and all, but what really stuck with me was how these folks got
into such a powerful position. Sure, they came from rich families (both Roosevelts, Bush 41 &
43), had some good luck (Wilson), and sometimes oozed charisma (Kennedy), but I noticed
something else: they had similar higher education backgrounds at institutions known universally
by their first name, like Harvard, Yale and Princeton. I began to wonder how a college degree
from one place meant less than a degree from another institution. Wasn’t going to college
vi
enough? I quickly learned that where somebody goes to college is perhaps more important than
simply going to college.
I started scrutinizing where I was going to apply for undergraduate studies. The Ohio
State University was the state’s crown jewel. Except I couldn’t stand the idea of going there.
My economics teacher and de facto life coach at the time, Ben Peterson, told me The Ohio State
is an exceptional school, but most of their rankings came from graduate, not undergraduate
education. I would probably get lost in the shuffle. If you know me, I’m not exactly the type of
person who enjoys getting lost in the shuffle. He said I should look at liberal arts colleges;
they’re small, offer a rigorous academic program, and give students more time with faculty. So,
I looked into liberal arts colleges.
When I enrolled at Transylvania University in 2011 I felt like I had found my dream
school. After a rough first semester, I met Dr. Ken Slepyan, a History professor who taught a
survey on Western Civilization. I was hooked. He became my advisor, and soon enough, I
began asking him questions about his academic background. He told me he went to the
University of Michigan, a state-assisted public institution, for his Ph.D. I’d never really thought
about why the University of Michigan had such an outstanding reputation when other state-
assisted public institutions like Eastern Michigan University or Wayne State University were
considered good schools, but not held in the same high regard as their neighbor in Ann Arbor.
I shelved the thought and headed off to a graduate program in History at the University of
Kentucky.
While at Kentucky, I realized I could study the history of American higher education,
which made me quite happy. I combined what I had learned about twentieth-century United
States’ leaders, my experience at Miami’s branch campus, and the fact that I attended a liberal
arts college — the endangered species of American higher education — and wrote a Master’s
thesis on the way students slowly moved towards public institutions and away from the liberal
arts college using Transylvania as a case study. I earned my Bachelors with an emphasis in
World History, but that didn’t matter much: I couldn’t shake this desire to understand why
American higher education kept changing and how the system took on a multi-purpose identity.
I spent most days during my time at the University of Kentucky finding ways to talk with my
advisor, Dr. Melanie Beals Goan, about my research and listening to Dr. John Thelin complicate
vii
what I thought I knew. They both deserve more thanks than I can express for dealing with my
desire to be ever-present in their company.
I arrived at Miami University in 2017 to study for a Ph.D. in Educational Leadership. I
was attracted to the program for a lot of reasons, but I’ll talk about the two that are most
important. First, I wanted to be closer to my family. My grandfather’s health was failing and I
hadn’t made the time (and in many ways still haven’t) to be close with my parents. The man
who drove me to Miami-Middletown (among a thousand other places) passed away in 2018. His
story of creating a middle-class family from wages as an industrial laborer, combined with my
grandma operating a successful business, my uncle Todd earning a four-year degree through
part-time study, and my mom not having the opportunity of pursuing a college degree all
influenced me to better understand how economic changes and access to higher education have
significant effects on the lives of every American, especially those living in the shadow of
deindustrialization. They’ve pushed me to do great things and refused to accept anything less
than what they believed I am capable of achieving. I wouldn’t be submitting a dissertation if it
weren’t for them.
Second, I wanted to work with Dr. Kate Rousmaniere. There are few occasions in life
when you truly feel like you got more luck than you deserved. I could be home and work with a
renowned historian of American education. I’d never stopped thinking about that week at
Miami-Middletown in 2004 and why the school was so different from The Ohio State or
Transylvania. Dr. Kate pushed me to think about the purpose of higher education, how its
changed over time, who/what was responsible for the change, and how I could study Ohio’s
system of public higher education to find an answer to questions I’d thought about for years.
She’s a rock star, a friend, and an excellent advisor.
Sometimes I read acknowledgements and think folks mention mentors and colleagues out
of obligation since they list names at a rapid-fire pace. Now here I am wanting to thank
everybody who has helped me along the way and I see how limited of a space I, and other
authors, have. From Transylvania, Dr. Gregg Bocketti and Melissa McEuen sharpened my
writing and analytical skills. Dr. Bocketti would look at an argument I made in a paper and often
say, “Why should we care?” Because of him, I understand why a historical argument needs to
have significance. As for Dr. McEuen, she forced me to think about my positionality and the
responsibility of being a historian. After I submitted a final paper for a course called "Women in
viii
American Life & Thought," I told her I felt like I couldn’t write about women because I am a
man. She went silent and I could see the disappointment in her expression. Looking back on
that moment, I’m pretty ashamed, yet extraordinarily thankful she called me out on my
ignorance. I am a man, but that has nothing to do with my job as a historian, which is, in part, to
uncover voices silenced by marginalization and oppression.
During my time at Miami University, I’ve had the pleasure of working with bright,
talented, caring, extraordinary professors and colleagues who changed my life. Dr. Tom Poetter
modeled the way character and integrity are integral to successful teaching and scholarship. I
also need to thank Dr. Brittany Arsonson, Dr. Joel Malin, Dr. Kathleen Knight-Abowitz and Dr.
Elisa Abes for treating me like a colleague. All of you are truly outstanding.
Hannah Stohry did not let an occasion go by where she could challenge me to think
harder about issues of race, place and epistemological difference. Ashley Cartell Johnson, Don
Murray, Gul Rind, Cindy Sanders, Jason Harnish, Prince Johnson and Kristan Barczak have
treated me with outstanding kindness. I love a good conversation about nothing and they always
generously gave their time to shoot the breeze despite all of us having work to do. I also need to
express my gratefulness to Virginia Phelps, Cindy Ulreich, Kathy Rosenberger and Kari Arnett.
I'm inept at finding/doing things around the office, yet they always had the patience to deal with
me. It is hard to accept that I won’t be in direct proximity to everyone mentioned here as I finish
my Ph.D. and end my formal education journey. But I know everything they’ve given me is a
foundation for a fruitful, exciting future.
1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE(S) OF OHIO PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
Ohioans will notice two distinct characteristics about their state’s system of public higher
education: it’s both highly selective and extremely accessible. On the surface, these two qualities
don’t mean much. Most of the United States’ public colleges and universities are no more than a
century old. An even larger number lack any sort of academically prestigious reputation. As a
result, the bulk of American institutions of higher education offer something close to unlimited
access. David Labaree described the historical development of American higher education as the
development of a three-pronged criterion that colleges and universities have to meet in order to
be considered ‘elite’ or ‘prestigious’ that includes a university’s age, competitive undergraduate
and graduate admission, and a strong enough academic program to reap the rewards of research
funding on a consistent basis.1
By these categories, most public colleges and universities in the United States aren’t
considered elite, prestigious or competitive. As of 2020, a large proportion of higher education
institutions are open to all enrollment/universal access, also known as non-selective institutions.
According to the National Association for College Admission Counseling, “most colleges admit
most applicants, and the rarified world of Ivy League admissions is almost completely irrelevant
to what goes on in most of higher education.”2 Nonetheless, some public institutions remain
highly competitive. In the case of Ohio, a student can gain general admission to a public college
or university, but not every college or university. Because even though access is a defining
1 David Labaree, A Perfect Mess: The Unlikely Ascendancy of American Higher Education
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), 9.
2 Scott Jaschik, “More Applications, Plenty of Spaces,” Inside Higher Ed, September 8, 2016
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/09/08/nacac-survey-shows-most-colleges-admit-
most-applicants.
2
characteristic of most public universities, Ohio’s system of public higher education is organized
to offer both access and prestige. In fact, few Ohio institutions can offer both competitive,
academic excellence and universal access. Although, upon closer examination, this statement is
more complicated. For example, Miami University, Oxford is often regarded as one of the most
competitive, selective public universities in Ohio with an admission rate of 65%. Fifteen miles
down the road, Miami University’s two-year branch campus in Hamilton has an acceptance rate
of 100%.3
Miami University is not unique in this attribute. In fact, all of Ohio’s public four-year
institutions operate branch campuses. And as the number of branch campuses has grown
alongside the number of two-year community colleges, Ohio’s public four-year institutions also
added nearly 200 graduate degree programs — a process that has rarely slowed since it began in
the late-1960s. In other words, Ohio higher education is continuing to uphold Labaree’s criterion
for prestige while simultaneously building a pedigree for universal access. How did this unique
situation come about? While some historians have studied why and how some public
universities made it to the pinnacle of American academic excellence, there is no historical
explanation for why and how some state systems of public higher education came to be both elite
and accessible. Historians of American higher education have yet to study how, or why, some
individual public institutions or entire state systems of higher education created a balance
between universal access and academic excellence.
There is no better time for historians to begin this work. Going to college is more of an
American expectation at the present moment than it has been at any other point in the nation’s
3 Initially referred to as ‘satellite’ campuses, regional branch campuses are categorized as two-
year institutions financially and organizationally connected to a four-year public institution.
These campuses offer students a choice of two-year terminal degree programs or a low-cost
option to complete coursework towards a four-year degree that will be completed at the four-year
institution. Regional branch campuses are known for their near universal access, low-cost tuition
and lack of residential facilities. For more information, see:
https://www.ohiohighered.org/campuses.
3
history.4 This is especially true for the American working class.5 Until the mid-1970s, industrial
manufacturing jobs could be obtained without a college degree. By the 1980s, service sector and
technological jobs began to require higher education.6 America’s youth and those who wish to
be re-skilled for a new job need higher education for employment.7 Indeed, there is a need for
accessible higher education.
The need for accessible higher education is particularly acute in the Midwest, due to the
region’s economic characteristic commonly referred to as the ‘Rust Belt.’ The collapse of
industrial manufacturing in the Midwestern United States that began in the 1970s and
accompanying national transition towards a service sector economy left states like Ohio in a
4 Mark A. Hecker, “The Importance of a College Education,” chicagotribune.com. Chicago
Tribune, December 12, 2018. https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/opinion/ct-
ptb-heckler-guest-column-st-0912-story.html ; “Going to University Is More Important Than
Ever for Young People.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, February 3, 2018.
https://www.economist.com/international/2018/02/03/going-to-university-is-more-important-
than-ever-for-young-people. ; David Leonhardt, “Is College Worth It? Clearly, New Data Say,”
The New York Times, August 28, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/upshot/is-college-
worth-it-clearly-new-data-say.html?module=inline ; Natalie Proulx, “Should Everyone Go to
College?” The New York Times, January 16, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/learning/should-everyone-go-to-college.html.
5 Don Lee, “Is College Still Worth It? Pew Research Says Yes,” Los Angeles Times, February 11,
2014. https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-earnings-college-premium-0140211-
story.html; Elisa Stephens, “A College Degree Is More Important Than Ever, So Long as It Is the
Right Degree,” HuffPost, May 25, 2011, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-college-degree-is-
more_b_619592; Jaques Steinberg, “Plan B: Skip College,” The New York Times, May 15,
2010.
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/weekinreview/16steinberg.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=
FC6786CE5C9B9B048EDBB997D83B5F92&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL.
6 Martin Neil Baily and Barry P. Bosworth, “US Manufacturing: Understanding Its Past and Its
Potential Future,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, no. 1 (2014): 3–26; Justin R. Pierce and
Peter K. Schott, “The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment,” American
Economic Review 106, no. 7 (2016): 1632-62.
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20131578; Roberto A. Ferdman, “The Decline
of the Small American Family Farm in One Chart,” The Washington Post September 16, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/16/the-decline-of-the-small-american-
family-farm-in-one-chart/?noredirect=on.
7 Anthony P. Carnevale, Nicole Smith, & Jeff Strohl, Recovery: Job Growth and Education
Requirements Through 2020 (Washington: Georgetown Public Policy Institute: Center on
Education and the Workforce, 2014), 22.
4
precarious position.8 The state’s once thriving industrial sector has declined by nearly 40% since
the mid-1970s and, in 2019, the most abundant employers are located in sectors like health,
hospitality and customer service that require a higher education degree.9 Because of the need for
a more educated workforce, the number of public colleges and universities has increased
substantially since the mid-1970s while overall enrollments — despite moments of decline —
have steadily grown, too. Ohio — and the Midwest as a whole — lags behind other regions,
such as the South and West, in the number of jobs in developing industries, population growth,
per capita income, and number of residents with a four-year college degree.10
Compared to states in the Southern and Western United States, and other Midwestern
states like Michigan, Ohio was relatively late in developing a system of accessible, two-year
public colleges across the state. Until the mid-1960s, Ohio policymakers did not have a deep
commitment to public higher education. Ohio’s liberal arts colleges and state-flagship
university, founded in the 19th century, earned a national reputation for academic excellence long
before the first two-year public university campuses opened in the late-1960s and early-1970s.
But compared to other Midwestern states, Ohio was slow in developing other public, accessible
higher education institutions, such as two-year colleges.11 In a State of Access is about how Ohio
8 Paul D. Staudohar and Holly E. Brown, eds., Deindustrialization and Plant Closure
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987); Ruth Milkman, Farewell to the Factory: Auto
Workers in the Late Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997);
Jefferson Cowie, Joseph Heathcott, and Barry Bluestone, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings
of Deindustrialization, (Ithica, NY: Ilr Press, 2003); Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The
Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling
of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
9G Scott Thomas, "Ohio Lost 346K Manufacturing Jobs in a Decade," Dayton Business Journal,
May 26, 2011, http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/news/2011/05/26/ohio-lost-345600-
manufacturing-jobs.html; National Association of Manufacturers, US Manufacturing Statistics -
Manufacturing & Trade Data By State
(Ohio), http://www.nam.org/~/media/9FB12626D4F64F9586A971C573E8AEE9.ashx
10 Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, “Demographic Trends in the 20th Century,” U.S. Census
Bureau, 2002: https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf ; Benjamin Austin, Edward
Glaeser, and Lawrence Summers, Jobs for the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st Century
America (Washington D.C., Brookings Research Institute, 2018), 151-255.
11 For example, Michigan had twenty-five two-year institutions in operation before Ohio opened
a branch campus or community college. A quick glance at the list of Michigan’s colleges and
universities shows that more than 80 percent of its two-year institutions opened before 1966 —
the year Ohio’s oldest regional two-year institution, Miami University’s Middletown campus,
5
higher education became, on one hand, so selective and elite, while, at the same time, accessible
to nearly every citizen, and how ideological battles, economic stagnation and the state’s inability
to fund higher education ultimately shaped that process from the mid-1940s through the end of
the 20th century.
I contend that statewide governing bodies in higher education, namely, the Board of
Regents, originally — and strategically — organized Ohio public higher education on a socio-
economically stratified model, which prioritized elite graduate programs that would bring the
state much needed capital investment while simultaneously funding two-year institutions as an
avenue for workers to gain new skills in an evolving Ohio economy and ensure all Ohioans could
gain entry into higher education — regardless of the institution’s quality — if they wished. The
Board of Regents was established by the Ohio General Assembly in 1963 to be the planning and
coordinating agency for the State’s system of higher education. Its role, according to the
Regents’ mission statement, “is to help develop state policies to meet the needs of Ohioans for
postsecondary education by effectively utilizing the resources available in public and private
institutions.”12 The Regents consists of nine members appointed by the Governor and two ex-
officio members, all of whom must serve a nine-year term. The Board of Regent’s strategy was
complicated and contradictory because of the way it emphasized both elitism and access;
vocational skills and professional knowledge; associates degrees and the Ph.D. The Board of
Regents also didn’t anticipate the effects of deindustrialization and a budget deficit that impacted
the state for nearly two decades.
Due to the Board of Regent’s bifurcated approach to higher education, their plan to
educate a new professional workforce, develop elite research programs, and also attract new
industries to Ohio, ultimately failed. Where the Board of Regents’ plan did succeed, however, is
in the area of accessibility: over 100 two-year institutions have opened since the publication of
the Ohio Higher Education Master Plan in 1966. Nonetheless, the question remains whether the
Board of Regents ultimately failed in their goal of creating a system that was both accessible for
opened and 50 percent of their two-year institutions were founded before nearly every one of
Ohio’s community or technical colleges.
12 Ohio Board of Regents, “Chancellor’s Report, July 1, 1973 — June 30, 1979,” Southwest
Ohio Regional Depository, 1979, 2.
6
those who wanted to attend college and focused on the academic rigor of graduate-level research
that could lead to economic development in the state.
Much of contemporary political debate about higher education is about cost and
accessibility. This study explores the historical context of that debate.13 Because higher
education is a state responsibility, a study on the development of Ohio’s contemporary system of
higher education can offer a significant contribution to our historical understanding of the role of
state government in defining higher education’s purpose. There are currently very few in-depth
studies on state systems of higher education. A dissertation provides the space to conduct a
manageable study of a single state, and it is my hope that future historians will engage in more
single-state studies or conduct a comparative study.
Ohio is an excellent state to study in an exploration of the history of accessibility to
higher education in the 20th century. The state is currently the seventh most populated in the
Union and ranked in the top five until 1970.14 Ohio has long boasted a reputation as one of the
nation’s largest industrial manufacturers.15 Moreover, Ohio often played a crucial role as a
bellwether state during Presidential elections and has a rich political tradition in both the
Republican and Democratic Party.16 Ohio is known for the presence of labor unions as well as
farmers while gaining national attention for the decay of cities like Cleveland and the plight of
13 Matthew Yglesias, “Democrats' Ongoing Argument About Free College, Explained,” Vox,
June 24, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/6/24/18677785/democrats-free-college-sanders-
warren-biden; Anya Kamenetz, “Presidential Contenders Make Higher Education Costs A Hot
Button Issue,” NPR, June 26, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/06/26/736138081/democratic-
presidential-contenders-make-higher-education-costs-a-hot-button-issu; Zack Friedman,
“Student Loan Debt Statistics In 2019: A $1.5 Trillion Crisis,” Forbes, February 25, 2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/02/25/student-loan-debt-statistics-
2019/#4f6de995133f.
14 Erik Ostermeier, “Ohio's Population Rank Over the Last 100 Years,” Smart Politics, February
1, 2016, https://editions.lib.umn.edu/smartpolitics/2011/01/14/ohios-population-rank-over-the/
15 Kevin F. Kern and Gregory S. Wilson, Ohio: A History of the Buckeye State (West Sussex:
Wiley, 2014), 390.
16 Mark Heyne, “The Critical Importance Of Ohio In Presidential Elections Now And Through
History,” WVXU: Cincinnati Public Radio, September 19, 2016,
https://www.wvxu.org/post/critical-importance-ohio-presidential-elections-now-and-through-
history#stream/0; Howard Wilkinson, “Ohio, When It Comes to Choosing Presidents, You're It.
No Doubt About It,” WVXU: Cincinnati Public Radio, June 14, 2015,
https://www.wvxu.org/post/ohio-when-it-comes-choosing-presidents-youre-it-no-doubt-about-
it#stream/0.
7
rural areas like Athens County in the state’s Appalachian annex.17 As the national economy
moved towards sectors like health care and technology in the early-1980s, Ohio fell behind, and
the economic crisis created by the collapse of manufacturing made Ohioans participants in both
the Reagan Revolution and election of Donald J. Trump in 2016.18
Unlike other nations, the United States does not have a national system of higher
education, which means that each state controls their public colleges and universities.19 Most
states have yet to conduct a historical study of their colleges and universities; there is no research
on how Ohio higher education became, on one hand, so expensive while, at the same time,
accessible to nearly every citizen. And since political leaders and the public are becoming more
interested in state spending for services like higher education, historians should help build a
collective understanding about the way states have gone about funding higher education and how
today’s policymakers can learn from the past as they consider new directions in state-assisted
higher education. This dissertation grapples with the question of how Ohio legislators and other
policymakers designed the state’s higher education system to be both selective and accessible,
and how those contradictory initiatives shaped, or were influenced by, the state’s economy.
Ohio’s legislators were deeply guided by either their political ideology or affiliation to the state’s
industrial manufactures — both of which changed considerably over time. The Board of
Regents was focused more on using state-assisted higher education as a catalyst for economic
transformation, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, as a gateway for socio-economic improvement.
17 Michael Shields, “Manufacturing a High-Wage Ohio,” The Century Foundation, March 12,
2018, https://tcf.org/content/report/manufacturing-high-wage-ohio/?session=1.
18Stephen T. Pfeiffer, Hostile Takeover: The New Right Insurgent Movement, Ronald Reagan,
and the Republican Party, 1977-1984, Unpublished Dissertation, Ohio University, 2012;
Rich Exner, “Trump Had at Least 70 Percent of the Vote in 30 Ohio Counties; 6 Takeaways
From Ohio's 2016 Presidential Vote,” cleveland.com, November 9, 2016,
https://www.cleveland.com/election-results/2016/11/trump_had_at_least_70_percent.html; Dan
Horn and Jeremy Fugleberg, “How Donald Trump Won Ohio.” Cincinnati.com, November 11,
2016, https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2016/11/09/how-trump-won-
ohio/93560164/.
19The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education,
Purposes, Policies, Performance: Higher Education and the Fulfillment of a State’s Public
Agenda, 2003. http://www.highereducation.org/reports/aiheps/aiheps.shtml.
8
Other questions guiding this study include: To what extent did policymakers in Ohio
decide between offering universal access and creating competitive universities, or did it decide to
pursue both options? To what extent did economic factors play a role in what type of colleges
and universities Ohio policy makers decided to support? Were Ohio state decisions regarding
higher education based on political ideology or other forms of politically-influenced policy
decisions? What most influenced state leaders in their decisions regarding higher education?
Did state leaders’ thinking about higher education change over time? To what extent did the
process of deindustrialization in the 1970s? play a role in the way policymakers viewed higher
education? Compared to other states, did Ohio get a late start in the development of a two-year
public college system? Why did state policymakers want a system of two-year colleges? Did
their decisions influence the contemporary economic status of Ohio? Did Ohio fail to produce a
system of public higher education that benefited the state economy?
This dissertation brings together historical literature on the recent history of American
higher education, political and economic histories of Ohio, a variety of contemporary studies
from sociologists and economists, and primary sources from Ohio’s General Assembly, Board of
Regents and state leaders who had a role in the development of contemporary public higher
education. In the last two decades, the history of American higher education has received
attention from more than historians. In particular, sociologists have studied issues of class, race,
equal opportunity and hegemony within the context of American higher education in an attempt
to better understand how systemic disadvantage is historically rooted in the walls of colleges and
universities. While race and racism in higher education are of longstanding interest to historians
of higher education, sociologists have begun to look at socio-economic status and the resulting
economic stratification created by the American higher education hierarchy that spans from
community colleges at the bottom to elite, top-tier private institutions at the apex.20 The work of
20 Listed here is a snapshot of the sociological research that intersects socio-economic status and
American higher education: Randall Collins, The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of
Education and Stratification (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019); Amy E. Stitch &
Carrie Freie (eds.), The Working Classes and Higher Education: Inequality of Access,
Opportunity and Outcome (New York: Routledge University Press, 2017); William G. Bowen,
Matthew M. Chingos and Michael S. McPhearson, Crossing the Finish Line: Completing
College at America’s Public Universities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Tressie
McMillan Cottom, Lower Ed: The Troubling Rise of For-Profit Colleges in the New Economy
(New York: The New Press, 2017); Steven Brint and Jerome Karabel, The Diverted Dream:
9
these scholars is fundamental to understanding how socio-economic status became such a
polarizing issue in higher education and how that hierarchy was created. Many of the scholars
looking at socio-economic inequality in higher education analyze the motives of state and
national policy makers vis-à-vis the construction of contemporary systems of higher education.
Despite the pioneering work of sociologists and educational historians, several gaps still
remain in the historiographic canon of American higher education as it relates to socio-economic
stratification, economic hierarchies, and the way some state systems of public higher education
have focused on both prestige and accessibility. In a State of Access hopes to full these gaps by
providing a multi-decade study of how Ohio’s legislators and policymakers articulated a vision
for what they saw as the purpose of a state-assisted, public system of higher education. This
project does not offer wholesale acceptance, or rejection, of how these powerful constituencies
decided to purpose Ohio public education. Rather, this project critically engages with the
decades-long decision-making process, analyzes the successes and shortcomings of state leaders,
and provides a base for developing future studies on state systems of higher education.
This project includes a literature review and three research-based chapters. The literature
review, in chapter two, highlights how In a State of Access relates to, or is influenced by,
previous studies. Each subsequent chapter moves chronologically from the end of World War II
to the early-1990s. Chapter Three argues that state policymakers and legislators initially delayed
investing in public higher education during World War II before eventually taking investment in
higher education seriously beginning in the 1960s, which began an ongoing battle about the
purpose of public higher education. Chapter four examines how Ohio leaders responded to the
state’s worst financial crisis in the 1970s, how the economic recession forced legislators and
policymakers to acknowledge the plight of Black Ohioans, and the way public higher education
was still far from being accessible for the state’s most disadvantaged populations. The fifth
chapter argues that the economic recession and the national crisis around K-12 schooling in the
mid-to-late 198-s directed state spending towards public education, which caused Ohio’s leaders
to find ways to fund public higher education that didn’t take more money away from the state
budget. In a State of Access concludes, in chapter six, with a section regarding the present
condition of Ohio public higher education, who the system serves, what the system’s purpose
Community Colleges and the Promise of Educational Opportunity in America, 1900-1985 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
10
seems to be, if the state can take further action to address the cost of higher education and
possibilities for future research on state-systems of public higher education
11
CHAPTER TWO
BEING A HISTORIAN OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
As of 2020, there are entire sections of university libraries dedicated to the historical study of
American higher education and scores of academic journals publishing articles from the history
of student affairs to the development of university curricula. In the last three decades scholars
have slowly turned their attention to the development of, and consequences associated with, the
public, state-funded two- and four-year institution. Historians who chose to focus on this
particular area of American higher education have considered how variables like socio-economic
status and government policy created, or at the very least maintained, an economic and academic
hierarchy within America’s system of higher learning. Scholars and historians have spent less
time examining the history of public systems of higher education and related topics, such as, the
purpose policymakers had in forging systems of public higher education in the years following
World War II, how policymakers balanced the need of access with the desire to build elite
graduate programs, what influence their decisions had on intuitions like the economy, and what
contemporary policymakers can learn from previous attempts to make American higher
education more accessible.
Before moving on, the terms ‘access’ and ‘accessible’ should be defined. For the
purposes of this study, both terms are rooted in their financial-economic meaning and do not
consider physical accessibility or academic success. Access to higher education equates to an
individual’s financial ability to afford the cost of attending an institution that provides post-high
school learning. Access also refers to the cost of tuition at two-year and four-year public
colleges and universities. An institution of higher learning should be considered accessible if the
cost of attendance does not prevent, or financially hinder, a person’s ability to attend and
complete a degree program. Moreover, access, at least in the context of Ohio and the scope of
this dissertation, includes geographical accessibility, or the ability to commute to a campus.
12
These terms are more subjective than definitive, but they’re meant to provide clarification and
context for the reader throughout the document.
This chapter highlights the historical methodology used to reach the conclusions found in
this dissertation. Historians are often reluctant to show readers the process they used to analyze
documents and create their arguments. There is a benefit to doing work that helps both the
historian reflect upon their research process and convey those findings in a way that’s inviting to
all readers. This chapter also introduces the recent work of historians and economists who have
studied the way consumerism, citizenship, and socio-economic status have come together in the
last century to produce economic citizenship — a term and framework that is vital to
understanding how access to higher education has become so important.
The final section will detail the historiography of American higher education since the
1950s while noting how the studies of American colleges and universities closely follows the
growth and development of higher learning as a whole while mirroring changes in America’s
social, cultural, economic and political landscape. This section will also show how historians
have yet to study the economic consequences associated with delayed state investment in public
higher education. At the end of this chapter, several points should be clear: that there are distinct
economic and political variables inseparable to the study of Ohio public higher education that
have implications for higher education in 2020 and this dissertation’s significance is rooted in the
need for historians to look at the past for possible solutions to contemporary problems in public
higher education.
Positionality and the Historian
There is no perfect way to study the history of American higher education, but there are new
ways that we have yet to explore. Historians are unique in that they’re embedded in their
particular cultural context, but make a career out of studying the past. Like an invisible pair of
glasses, their worldview and analytical abilities are shaped by micro-forces, such as, life
experiences, positionality, education, socio-economic status, and geographic location. At the
same time, macro-forces like a national political climate, popular culture, global conflict and
health of an economy find ways to influence our thinking. Historians perhaps produce their best
work when they understand how their identity influences their scholarship and, in turn, their
13
scholarship reflects the historical present. What makes historiography so valuable is the way
historians regularly reimagine methodological approaches to a topic.
Historians are continually asking themselves the question of significance. Why does my
work matter? What does it add that hasn’t already been said? Why would people care to read
yet another work on American higher education? Contemporary historians are apt to include
their own subjectivity in their analysis, noting that one’s identity can shape interpretation.
Howard Zinn made this point in his essay “Objections to Objectivity” in which he argues that,
“history could only be a way of understanding and helping to change what was wrong in the
world. That did not mean looking only for historical facts to reinforce the beliefs I already held.
It did not mean ignoring data that would change or complicate my understanding of society. It
meant asking questions that were important for social change, questions relating to equality,
liberty, peace, justice—but being open to whatever answers were suggested by looking at
history.”1 My identity shapes both my interest in this topic and my interpretation of the sources.
I am a white, Protestant male from a baby-blue-collar family. My father is a crane-service
technician, my grandfather worked at AK Steel for thirty years, and his father retired from
Champion Paper Mill. Accounting for inflation, chances are I’ll never earn more a year than my
grandfather — despite the fact that I’ll have a Ph.D. and he performed shiftwork in steel roll
bearing shop without a college degree.
Equally relevant in my interpretation is that the American economy is substantially
different from that of my father, his father, and his father. That history of economics is a
significant source of and influence on my interpretation as I explored the initial question of why
good-paying, industrial jobs have retracted from Southwest Ohio over the last fifty years. This
dissertation is thus rooted in my own experience of being raised in a working-class Ohio family
riddled with anxiety about a changing economic landscape. Also influential is that as I write this
dissertation, I have observed how national politics have exploited middle-America’s economic
hopelessness and fearful desperation for political gain.
I believe that higher education played a role in nearly every act of Ohio’s economic
decline since World War II, including the rusting of the industrial belt in ways that are far more
significant than historians, economists and journalists have initially thought. Both my personal
1 Howard Zinn, “Objections to Objectivity” in Failure to Quit: Reflections of an Optimistic
Historian (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1993), 30.
14
experience and my scholarly research has brought me to this interpretation. I believe this
changing access to higher education fundamentally transformed the socio-economic fabric of the
state of Ohio. I believe that because of that history, socio-economic status continues to play an
outsized role in an individual’s ability to attend the college of their choice.
Historical Methodology and Policy Analysis
The most influential school of historical thought to my analysis is what Kate Rousmaniere calls
neo-revisionist historians, or neo-revisionist interpretation. The original neo-revisionist
historians were largely influenced by theorists like Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci who
often questioned how power worked and what characterized the relationship between the
oppressed and the powerful. As a result, neo-revisionist historians argued educational systems
were constructed on a dialectic of constraint and opportunity that often proved oppressive despite
the existence of avenues to socio-economic improvement. In other words, educational
institutions like higher education are systemically unequal because they are designed to favor
those with a higher socio-economic status and offer little reprieve for those from lower classes,
but the catch is that a college education is a near guaranteed way to improve one’s socio-
economic status.
Neo-revisionists are also noted for their desire to expose inequitable structures and
influence contemporary education reform initiatives. While historians agree on the importance
of constructing an accurate depiction of the past, they lose their harmony when it comes to the
question of significance. The extent to which historians use their research to influence
contemporary policy is both an ontological and methodological question. Some, like the
consensus historians, believed American education is a progressive march toward improvement,
focusing on equality and democracy.2 Since neo-revisionists believe American public schooling
has never upheld the promises of equality and democracy, their conclusions raise important
questions about the contemporary education landscape, such as, are we going to make the
necessary changes to make education more equitable? The purpose of this project, like the
purpose of any neo-revisionist history, is to make sense of the process that created Ohio’s
2 John Higham "Changing Paradigms: The Collapse of Consensus History," The Journal of
American History 76, no. 2 (1989): 460-66.
15
contemporary system of public higher education, what purpose, if any, influenced that system,
determine how that purpose changed over time, and suggest policy initiatives about the future of
Ohio’s public higher education.
Neo-revisionism is often influenced by Marxian economic thought, and there are
elements of Marxian theory that guided my analysis. One problem often overlooked by
historians of higher education is the definition of social class and how it lends understanding to
modern economic inequalities in institutions like colleges and universities. Class, whether it
refers to a group who share similar financial hardships, or to those who share a similar position
in an economic, social, or political structure, is an essential variable in understanding how
resources are distributed and who has access to those resources. What’s important to note is that
a person’s social class is just as powerful of an identity as their race, gender, age or sexual
preferences. The reason social class is being used as a theory of analysis in this project stems
largely from the fact that this study is dealing with an economic commodity — higher education
— and will be using Marx’s basic concept of class analysis.
Marx distinctly creates a class dichotomy between the working class and the master class
— those whose labor is exploited for little profit and those who own the means of production and
collect the profit, respectively.3 There is an inherent exploitative conflict between labor and
capital. The working class has to labor to create profit for the master class who then turns that
profit into capital for reinvestment. What’s happened over the last century, however, is the
development of the professional middle class — those who don’t own the means of production,
yet have the ability to barter for the price their labor receives, and distinctly don’t belong to the
working class. The basis of class differentiation between the working class and middle class is
the possession of skills or expertise. The more valuable a person’s skills, the less likely they are,
theoretically, to be victim or subject to an economically exploitative relationship. What’s most
interesting about a person’s skills is that they typically have to be learned. In the United States,
the way most Americans learn and perfect their skills are through the achievement of credentials
at an institution of higher education. Most people need the skills learned from a post-secondary
3 For more on Marx’s analysis of labor, class conflict and economic exploitation see David
Harvey, Marx, Capital, and the Madness of Economic Reason (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2019); Karl Marx, Das Kapital: A Critique of Political Economy (New York: Penguin
Press, 1993); John E. Roemer, Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic Theory (Oxford:
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
16
institution, which then becomes a commodity they can use to build wealth through gainful
employment.
Above all else, this dissertation is a history of how policy decisions influenced social
institutions like higher education and the way those decisions impacted the lives of those who
sought higher education for a number of different reasons. The study of policy history aspires to
offer nothing less than the history of particular social structures, or the sum of the social
relationships between society’s many different groups. Due to the influence of Marxist thought,
race, gender, sex, occupation and age have all been included in historical policy analysis.
Historicizing the way policy decisions influence social institutions and the people interacting
with those institutions is also included in historical sociology, a subset of history that relies on
the concept of social mobility and often goes in direct opposition with the existing power
dynamics in a social structure.4 Therefore, historians who study political structures focus on
society’s marginalized populations and require the use of unique historical methods to produce
the necessary research. I rely on the work on historical sociologists to make sense of the
consequences society has to face because of policy decisions.
Since this dissertation is framed to examine how policy decisions influence social
structures, I’ve opted to use policy analysis as my approach. A sizeable portion of the primary
sources used for this dissertation are state documents, reports, budgets, and memoranda. These
documents carry a special weight of significance because unlike personal correspondence,
diaries, or newspaper articles they were produced by a governing body and enacted on the
public. In policy analysis, legitimacy is given to policymakers because they are elected to
democratic institutions that create and implement laws. Political historians focus their attention
on the short and long term economic effects of legislative policies.5 One of the most
consequential developments in historical policy analysis is the emergence of new theories that
4 Charles Tilly, "The Old New Social History and the New Old Social History," Review 7 (1984):
363-406; James Henretta, "Social History as Lived and Written," American Historical Review 84
(1979): 1293-1323; Gertrude Himmelfarb, "Denigrating the Rule of Reason: The 'New History'
Goes Bottoms Up," Harper's Magazine (1984): 84-90; Peter N. Stearns, "Social History Present
and Future," Journal of Social History 37 no. 1, (2003: 9-19.
5 Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, eds., Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy
Coalition Approach (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); David Bryan Robertson, ed., Loss of
Confidence: Politics and Policy in the 1970s (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1998).
17
follow the theme of power relations — mostly between the state and citizens. One theory in
particular, elite theory, colored my analysis of Ohio’s system of public higher education.
Elite theory maintains that public policy is not determined by the demands and actions of
the electorate or the population-at-large, but is instead crafted by ruling elites who run
government in a way that benefits their economic and political interests.6 I argue that Ohio’s
leaders often acted in their best interest during the 1940s through the 1960s.
Economic Citizenship and Public Higher Education
Weaved throughout this dissertation is a narrative about access to public higher education in
Ohio. On the surface, gaining access to public higher education looks like a simple problem of
controlling the price of tuition and how close a person is to a campus, but the issue is much more
complex and ties directly into a subfield in economic history. It turns out the problem of access
to a public college or university also plays a role in an individual’s capacity to build economic
self-reliance and ability to participate in the economy. Having the opportunity to access higher
education became a key stepping stone for employment as the United States’ inched closer to the
21th century. That turned out to be particularly true in Ohio. By the 1980s, state leaders had
evidence that the income gap between those who have a post-secondary degree and those who
did not is larger than at any other point in Ohio’s history. Towards that end, Ohio’s leaders also
discovered a segment of the population was simply not participating in the economy and
attempted to use access to public higher education through state-supported initiatives as a way to
get people back into the workforce. Liz Cohen makes such an argument when she identifies the
term “economic citizenship” as a person’s ability to participate in the economy through
protections by federal or state law. Put in a different way, economic citizenship is a person’s
protected right to participate in economic institutions, like the labor force and economy. The
debate surrounding economic citizenship is about what responsibility the state has to ensure
every citizen is given the equal opportunity to participate in a nation’s economic structures, and
if such a responsibility exists, what are the necessary steps to provide that equal opportunity.
If there is one government-supported protection essential to an individual enjoying the
full right of their economic citizenship, it is the institution of education. By American state
6 Amitai Etzioni-Halévy, The Elite Connection: Problems and Potential in Western Democracy
(London: Polity Press, 1993).
18
law, every individual has the legal right to receive a free education from Kindergarten through
high school graduation. The argument of the state for providing such an education is that
education improves the nation’s economy.7
The rapid, unprecedented growth of spending, consumption, and disposable income that
accelerated in the period between the two World Wars and again immediately after World War II
ushered in a new idea of citizenship that included political as well as economic rights.8
Historical studies of economic citizenship illustrate how economics, politics, and culture were
interwoven in the nation’s history in this period. 9 Most historians agree that the birth and
maturation of consumer culture took place between 1950 and 1970 when citizens — fueled by
encouragement from the federal government — began to see the freedom of choice as an
economic activity that should be protected under the right of U.S. citizenship.10
Of particular interest in this period is the development of a modern form of class
identification. Prior to the 1930s, Americans did not place themselves within a stratified socio-
economic structure, due largely to the fact that America really only had two classes — rich and
poor .11 The rhetoric of the New Deal coupled with the growth of big business and liberal
economic policy furthered the Keynesian idea that spending created jobs and national economic
prosperity.12 The influence of Keynesian economic theory — and its emphasis on high wages,
full employment, and high production — created an economically-based socio-political
relationship that became a fabric of American culture. In other words, citizens needed to spend
to keep the economy going and state government had to invest in the economy to ensure
productivity during a downturn. Ohio’s leaders struggled to keep up with this concept. By mid-
7 Jan Eberly and Carmel Martin, The Economics of Higher Education (Washington D.C.: United
States Department of Treasury, 2012).
https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/20121212_Economics%20of%20Higher%20
Ed_vFINAL.pdf.
8 Liz Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America
(New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 9 Alice Kessler-Harris, “In Pursuit of Economic Citizenship,” Social Politics 10, no. 2 (2003):
158-174.
10 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987)
11 Herbert J. Gans, Middle American Individualism: Political Participation and Liberal
Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
12 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965).
19
century, Americans had developed a middle class which Burton Bledstein and Robert Johnston
describe as inclusive of economic benefits like “personal financial security, an opportunity to
accumulate assets, access to good schools and increasingly high levels of education, skilled work
in upwardly mobile careers, a safe environment in which to live and raise a family, health
insurance, material possessions to make life more convenient and comfortable, room for personal
adventure, self-expression, and a spiritual life.”13
As the middle-class developed in the mid-20th century, social commentators criticized
what they interpreted as the middle-class’ lack of community responsibility and civic duty. In
the 1950s, scholars argued that middle class Americans were narcissistic, individualistic and
anti-democratic. At the same time, business leaders applauded the middle class for making
better individualistic, consumerist decisions that would help the economy — something the
middle class hadn’t done since before the Great Depression.14 These attacks against the middle
class reveal an anxiety about the changing character of American citizenship after World War II.
The rise of individualism, consumerism, private gain, economic prosperity, and rational
selfishness were seen as being collectively devastating to American ideals of public good and
democratic pluralism. American citizens and government officials embraced the idea of middle
class prosperity.
Liz Cohen explains that the rise of middle class consumerism was interwoven with the
way in which economic citizenship transformed the United States’ definition of citizenship after
World War II because of the growing need to prove America’s economic and political
dominance over the Soviet Union. Cohen argues that the economic crisis of the Great
Depression and the employment shortage during World War II created the citizen consumer, but
the Cold War exacerbated the notion of economic citizenship through the rapid development of a
middle class with disposable income. As the Soviet Union became the singular threat to the
United States — as well as capitalism and democracy, according to the American government —
13 Burton J. Bledstein and Robert D. Johnston, eds., The Middling Sorts: Explorations in the
History of the American Middle Class (New York: Routledge, 2001), 2.
14 David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle
Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951). William H. Whyte, The Organization Man
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956); Christopher Lynch, The Culture of Narcissism:
American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979).
20
consumers began carrying an obligation to safeguard the economy. Cohen argues that citizen
consumers were encouraged by American businesses to see themselves as “responsible for
safeguarding the general good of the nation, in particular for prodding government to protect the
rights” of the individual citizen and their interaction with the marketplace.15 America, and Ohio
in particular, largely operated as a traditional agricultural economy until roughly 1920, spent less
than one decade experiencing rapid growth towards our contemporary market economy, then
dealt with nearly twenty years of government intervention, price regulation, and limited access to
consumer goods. After World War II, the federal government had the ability to protect against
inflation, the average American made a salary above the poverty line, and a ridiculously large
industrial and manufacturing sector upheld economic growth alongside a budding service and
knowledge industry.16 Until this point, Ohio seemed to be following the national trend of
economic prosperity.
The economic recovery after a decade and a half of depression and war depended on
Americans earning good-paying jobs and spending their disposable income to bolster the state
and national economy. Americans eventually made more money through a growing professional
and globalized economy, but some states like Ohio did not see the same gains in their economy,
which would eventually cause job loss and stagnant wages. Students around the nation entering
colleges and universities in the years following World War II were the catalyst for the wave of
change that swept through American definitions of citizenship, consumption and employment.
Prompted by a fundamental transformation of the United States economy, pre-professional
training and specialization molded public higher education into an incubator for job training,
research development and middle-class occupation.17 The states that didn’t invest in public
higher education had trouble keeping up with the economic transformation.
While students poured into college classrooms to receive an education suited to their
occupational aspiration, in the 1950s, the purpose of a college education in the United States had
a new requirement. The federal government and leading universities declared a need for students
to use their education to uphold the economy, be good citizens and produce knowledge to fight
15 Cohen, A Consumers Republic, 10.
16 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 148.
17 Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development
of Higher Education in America (New York: Norton Press, 1976).
21
the Cold War.18 Despite the fact that students had more control over their academic experience,
the purpose of American higher education was educating students with professional skills so they
can enter the workforce and be an economic citizen.
Most public colleges and universities in the United States reacted to the new purpose of
higher education by reforming to accommodate new subjects in the social sciences, humanities
and natural sciences through required general education courses. A number of these changes
stemmed directly from Harvard University’s 1945 report about the need for required general
education courses, the “Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society.”
The report’s author, Harvard’s President James Bryant Conant argued that required “general
education,” is an “education in a common heritage and toward a common citizenship” that
creates an “increased skill in analysis and expression, in the capacity to deal with general ideas
and to make and defend value-judgments.”19 As early as 1950, the distinction between public
and private, university and college, liberal arts and pre-professional training curriculums became
blurred as higher education came to adopt general education programs. According to one
researcher writing in the mid-1965, academic programs in American higher education in 1950s
started to encompass “the greatest possible variety of subject maters.”20 As a result, the newly
developed curriculum in American higher education was nearly universal and focused on helping
students understand and solve problems in the contemporary world that combined “vocational
preparation with the knowledge of social foundations from the vantage of point of multiple
perspectives.”21
Although higher education focused more on educating students with professional skills so
they could enter the workforce and be an economic citizen, outside factors limited the number of
18 Clark Kerr, The Great Transformation in Higher Education, 1960-1980 (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1991); Wayne J. Urban and Jennings L. Wagoner, American
Education: A History (New York: Routledge, 2009); Frederick Rudolph, The American College
and University: A History (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990); Clark Kerr, The Uses of
the University (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Derek Bok, Higher Education in
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).
19 James Bryant Conant, General Education in a Free Society (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1952), 47, 198.
20 Logan Wilson, Emerging Patterns in American Higher Education (Washington D.C.:
American Council on Education, 1965), 46. 21 Willis Rudy, The Evolving Liberal Arts Curriculum; A Historical Review of the Basic Themes
(New York: Institute of Higher Education,1960), 38.
22
students who could access a college or university. Historian Andrew Hurley argues that
Americans in the 1950s, spent money on things like higher education in order to identify with a
certain socio-economic class, but the number of Americans who could afford higher education
was quite small. In other words, Americans began spending money on higher education in the
1950s and 1960s because a college degree was a path to economic citizenship. The lack of
access to higher education for others led to poverty, mostly notable in housing differentials and
the type of type of job they could work.22
Improved housing and access to colleges worked as vehicles to integrate some white
working-class families into the growing middle class that came to define economic citizenship
— an idea Hurley believes is the true meaning of the “American Dream.” 23 But access to
consumer culture and the middle-class was denied to other populations, specifically African
Americans. The result of this economic and cultural change in the post-war era was that some
citizens were not being able to participate in the economy. Hurley argues that the economic
fragmentation and inequalities caused by unequal access of economic citizenship in the 1950s
was most noticeable in the decreasing access that the working poor had to housing and higher
education. Hurley argues that in the years after the second world war, Americans spent money
on things like higher education in order to identify with a certain socio-economic class. In other
words, Americans began spending money on higher education in the 1950s and 1960s because a
college degree was a path to the middle-class. While higher education offered access to the
middle class for some, the lack of access to higher education for others led to poverty, most
notable in housing differentials.24 Many colleges and universities still effectively discouraged
enrollment to Black students as late as the 1960s and plenty of employers were equally earnest in
their attempt to not hire Black workers. Ohio’s Black population experienced continued racial
inequality as state leaders largely ignored their well-being until the late-1970s.
22 Andrew Hurley, Diners, Bowling Alleys, and Trailer Parks: Chasing the American Dream in
the Postwar Consumer Culture (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 9.
23 Ibid., xv.
24 Ibid., 9.
23
A Historiography of American Higher Education
The history of American higher education tends to be written as individual institutional or
collective histories that emphasize Ivy League colleges and other elite institutions.25 These
institutional narratives rarely address larger economic, policy dimensions, or contemporary
public institutions not located on the East or West Coast.26 There are also only a few state-wide
studies of the development of higher education, but most are either half a century old,
commissioned by the state government, or focus on the state-supported institutions of
California.27 Nonetheless, several historians have made substantial strides in furthering our
understanding of the relationship between higher education and the state in the decades
following World War II and this work significantly framed my study of Ohio higher education
by providing clarified terms, debating the distinction between what makes an institution ‘public’
or ‘private,’ and arguing over how American higher education became a multipurpose institution
offering both democratic access and prestigious research in a number of fields.28
25 Laurence Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970); John R. Thelin, A History of American Higher Education (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011); Christopher J. Lucas, American Higher Education: A
History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Roger L. Geiger, The History of American
Higher Education: Learning and Culture from the Founding to World War II (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014).
26 That is not to say all institutional histories aren’t good. Some, like James Axtell’s The Making
of Princeton University: From Woodrow Wilson to the Present, do a fine job of dealing with the
complex nature of nationwide issues like anti-Semitism, statewide figures like future-President
of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, while focusing their studying within a bounded place
like Princeton University. 27 Saul Sack, History of Higher Education in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania
Historical and Museum Commission, 1963); James Albert Woodburn, Higher Education in
Indiana (Washington: G.P.O., 1891); George Gary Bush, History of Higher Education in
Massachusetts (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891); William S. Powell, Higher
Education in North Carolina (Raleigh: State Dept. of Archives and History, 1970); David
Gardner and Ann Lage. A Life in Higher Education: Fifteenth President of the University of
California, 1983-1992 (Berkeley, Calif: Regents of the University of California, 1997); Cristina
Gonzalez, Clark Kerr's University of California: Leadership, Diversity, and Planning in Higher
Education. 2017.
http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9781351528283; Maresi
Nerad, The Academic Kitchen: A Social History of Gender Stratification at the University of
California, Berkeley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999);
28 For those interested in reading more about the development of, and purpose for American
higher education, Bernard Bailyn’s Education in the Forming of American Society, Laurence
Veysey’s The Emergence of the American University, Lawrence A. Cremin’s American
24
Other historians’ contributions to various aspects of American higher education include
Roger Geiger’s continued work on the research university’s role in the development of the
modern American research university.29 Other historians have been critical of the research
university’s over-extension.30 Other historians have studied the relationship between public
policy and higher education, although more needs to be done to better understand the influence
of a state’s economic policy on the purpose of public higher education and the exact role of the
federal government in higher education finance. 31 Some contemporary studies in this topic can
contribute to the historical analysis.32 There is a long tradition of historians weaving the
narrative of higher education into the American political, economic and social history. In many
ways, higher education serves as a catalyst to study particular moments in United States’ history,
such as anti-intellectualism, McCarthyism, and Racial politics.33
Education: The National Experience, 1783-1876, Frederick Rupolph’s The American College
and University: A History, and John R. Thelin’s A History of American Higher Education are
excellent places to begin.
29 Roger Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of American Higher Education Research
Universities, 1900-1940 (New York: Routledge, 2017) and Research and Relevant Knowledge:
American Research Universities since World War II (New York: Routledge, 2017).
30 Michael J. Luger and Harvey Goldstein, Technology in the Garden: Research Parks and
Regional Economic Development (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).
31 Roger Williams, The Origins of Federal Support for Higher Education: George W. Atherton
and the Land-Grant College Movement (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press,
1991), Chester E. Finn Jr., Scholars, Dollars, and Bureaucrats (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institute, 1978), and Julie A. Rueben, The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual
Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996).
32 Ronald Ehrenberg, Tuition Rising: Why College Costs So Much (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2002) and Charles Clotfelter, Buying the Best: Cost Escalation in Elite Higher
Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016); Sara Goldrick-Rab, Paying the
Price: College Costs, Financial Aid, and the Betrayal of the American Dream (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2017), Elizabeth A. Armstrong and Laura T. Hamilton, Paying for
the Party: How College Maintains Inequality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015),
Christopher P. Loss, Between Citizens and the State: The Politics of American Higher Education
in the 20th Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014), and Barrett J. Taylor and
Brendan Cantwell’s Unequal Higher Education: Wealth, Status, and Student Opportunity (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2019). 33 Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1996);
Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986), Stefan M. Bradley, Upending the Ivory Tower: Civil Rights, Black
Power, and the League (New York: New York University Press, 2018), and Shelia M. Katz,
25
The history of access to higher education highlights an often piece of postwar higher
education: the community college and other two-year institutions. Philo Hutcheson, a historian
of community colleges, has argued that, “In general, historians of higher education have paid
little, if any, attention to the community college.”34 35 Yet community colleges and branch
campuses enrollments enroll more than 34 percent of all students and nearly 50 percent of all
first-year postsecondary students.36 More than 50 of all four-year degree holders who graduated
in the last ten years were once enrolled at a two-year college.37 In 1999, the National Center for
Education Statistics reported that four-year colleges enrolled roughly 6 million students, while
two-year campuses enrolled 5.3 million students.38 Two-year campuses have grown faster than
54-year institutions in the last 50 years. In 1965, only 26 percent of all college students attended
two-year campuses for a total of one million students; yet less than forty-years later, two-year
campuses witnessed a 413 percent increase in their enrollment and outpaced the enrollment at
four-year campuses by nearly 300 percent.39 Thus, as Hutcheson argues, community colleges
Reformed American Dreams: Welfare Mothers, Higher Education, and Activism Opportunity
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2019). 34 Philo A. Hutcheson, "Reconsidering the Community College," History of Education
Quarterly 39, no. 3 (1999): 307. Here is a list of the works referenced by Hutcheson: Robert T.
Pedersen, "Value Conflict on Community College Campus: An Examination of Its Historical
Origins," Managing Community and Junior Colleges: Perspectives for the Next Century, ed. by
Allan M. Hoffman and Daniel J. Julius (Washington, D.C.: College and University Personnel
Association, 1993), and Robert Pedersen, "The St. Louis Conference: The Junior College
Movement Reborn," Community College Journal 65, no. 5 (April-May 1995): 26-30; Steven G.
Katsinas, "George C. Wallace and the Founding of Alabama's Public Two- Year Colleges,"
Journal of Higher Education 65, no. 4 (July/August 1994): 447-472; and John H. Frye, The
Vision of the Public Junior College, 1900-1940: Professional Goals and Popular Aspirations
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992).
35 See J.M. Beach, Gateway to Opportunity? A History of the Community College in the United
States (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 2011) and Robert Patrick Pedersen, “The Origins and
Development of the Early Public Junior College: 1900-1940,” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University,
2000).
36 Community College Research Center, Teacher’s College “Community College Enrollment and
Completion,”, Columbia University, 2020. https://ccrc.tc.columbia.edu/Community-College-
FAQs.html.
37 National Student Clearinghouse Research Center, “Two-Year Contributions to Four-Year
Completions – 2017,”, March 29, 2017. https://nscresearchcenter.org/snapshotreport-
twoyearcontributionfouryearcompletions26/.
38 Henry T. Kasper, “The Changing Role of Community College,” Occupational Outlook
Quarterly 1, no. 18 (2002): 15.
39 Ibid., 17.
26
and other two-year institutions are equally crucial to the historical narrative of American higher
education as are 4-year colleges, particularly after World War II.
In the last two decades, however, community colleges and research universities have
received attention from more than historians. In particular, sociologists have used historical
methodology to study the issues of class, race, equal opportunity and hegemony within the
context of American higher education in an attempt to better understand how systemic
disadvantage is historically rooted in the walls of colleges and universities. Sociologists have
also turned their attention to socio-economic status, which is usually measured by determining
education, income, occupation, or a composite of these dimensions and indicates an individual’s
access to collectively desired resources, such as, educational opportunities, material goods,
income, careers, or income. Sociologists and historians have also studied the resulting economic
stratification created by the American higher education hierarchy that spans from community
colleges at the bottom to elite, top-tier private institutions at the apex.40 For example,
sociologists Amy Stitch and Carrie Freie use an historical approach to describe how the "college-
for-all" concept has grown more pervasive because systems of higher education have become
increasingly stratified by social class, which has inherently relegated working class students to
lower-tier public institutions.41
The work of historical sociologists is fundamental to understanding how socio-economic
status became a polarizing issue in higher education and how a class hierarchy was created
through that institution.42 Many of these scholars looking at socio-economic inequality in higher
education analyze the motives of state and national policy makers vis-à-vis the construction of
contemporary systems of higher education. For example, Joel and Eric Best’s 2014 study, The
Student Loan Mess: How Good Intentions Created a Trillion Dollar Problem, historically root
today’s student loan crisis in ill-guided government policies that allowed working-class students
41Amy E. Stitch & Carrie Freie (eds.), The Working Classes and Higher Education: Inequality of
Access, Opportunity and Outcome (New York: Routledge University Press, 2017).
42 Howard R. Bowen and Cameron Fincher, Investment in Learning: The Individual and Social
Value of American Higher Education (New York: Routledge Press, 2017); Century Foundation
Task Force on Preventing Community Colleges from Becoming Separate and Unequal, Bridging
the Higher Education Divide: Strengthening Community Colleges and Restoring the American
Dream: The Report of the Century Foundation Task Force on Preventing Community Colleges
from Becoming Separate and Unequal (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2013.
27
to take on crippling debt for the opportunity to attend colleges out of their price range, which
ultimately left millions of students in a worse financial position after college than before they
enrolled.43
Perhaps the most influential book to the framing of this dissertation is Steven Brint and
Jerome Karabel’s The Diverted Dream: Community Colleges and the Promise of Educational
Opportunity in America, 1900-1985. Brint and Karabel maintain that two-year institutions like
community college have failed to serve their purpose. Instead of being a powerful democratic
tool for those seeking to move beyond their class or marginalized status — namely women, the
working class and people of color — community college became an institution that largely
diverted people away from elite and four-year institutions. What’s more, the authors argue that
four-year institutions and powerful elites have used community colleges as a buffer that sorts
students into a vocational career path or diverts students away a bachelor’s degree.44 “Poised
between a burgeoning system of secondary education and a highly stratified structure of
economic opportunity,” write Brint and Karabel, community colleges were “located at the very
point where the aspirations generated by American democracy clashed head on with the realities
of its class structure.”45 Their argument is a necessary starting point for historians who want to
study what purposes state policymakers had in mind when they crafted two-year institutions.
Despite the pioneering work of sociologists and sociological historians like Brint and
Karabel, a gap still remains in the historiography of American higher education as it relates to
socio-economic stratification, policymaking vis-à-vis economic development, and higher
education’s dual focus on both prestige and accessibility. Scholars have yet to produce an
historical analysis of higher education at the state level. While some historians have studied why
and how some public universities made it to the pinnacle of American academic excellence,
there is no historical explanation for why and how some state systems of public higher education
came to be both elite and accessible. Historians of higher education have yet to study how, or
why, some individual public institutions or entire state systems of higher education balanced
universal access and academic excellence.
43 Joel Best and Eric Best, The Student Loan Mess: How Good Intentions Created a Trillion
Dollar Problem (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).
44 Steven Brint and Jerome Karabel, The Diverted Dream, 9.
45 Ibid.
28
According to John Thelin, an institution is considered ‘public’ if a college petitioned “a
state legislature for some funding,” which makes the answer seem rooted in financial
dependence.46 However, this is not always the case, especially if a state legislature grants a
college charter to a private party. America’s first colleges were considered ‘private’ because they
were charted by a private family, and, due to the 1819 case of Dartmouth College V. Woodward,
were protected by rule of law against state meddling despite a state legislature granting the
charter.47 In other words, a state may have chartered a college, but the college and those running
the institution become private entities free from any state interference — except in cases where
the college breaks a public statue, or law.48 And so, a ‘private’ institution is considered private
in so far as they don’t break laws, thus inviting state intervention. On the other hand, an
institution is considered ‘public’ if it is charted by the state, provided a portion of funding by the
state, and the state has a hand in the institution’s governance. The distinction is narrow yet
important.
Distinct to public universities is the state’s ability to influence various elements of that
institution’s size and purpose. Many historians of American higher education note that the
relationship between the government — both state and federal — and public universities
underwent a fundamental transformation after World War II that resulted in the contemporary
public research university.49 The relationship between government and public higher education
would have been difficult to achieve with private institutions due to the longstanding legal
precedent against state interference. Public universities, however, were perfectly situated to turn
state funding and research mandates into tangible benefits that would serve both the academics at
46 Thelin, A History of American Higher Education, 72.
47 "Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward," Oyez, Accessed November 11, 2019.
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/17us518.
48 Ibid; Thelin, A History of American Higher Education, 73. 49 For more on the development and growth of the public research university, see Roger L.
Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of the American Research Universities, 1900-1940
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant
Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993); Jonathan R. Cole, The Great American University: Its Rise to Prominence, Its
Indispensable National Role, Why It Must Be Protected (New York: Perseus, 2009); Hugh Davis
Graham and Nancy Diamond, The Rise of American Research Universities: Elites and
Challengers in the Postwar Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005): Bruce
Hevly and Peter Galison, ed., Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1992).
29
the institution and the goals of the state. Or, as one historian of American higher education
argues, state public universities provided a breeding ground for “a rich mix of intermediary
organizations, still anchored by state- and local-level government but joined by interest groups,
professional-voluntary association, and the private sector” for the federal government “to
regulate the economy, defend the homeland, and deliver goods and services to the American
people.”50
Some historians of American higher education argue that the fervor amongst higher
education leaders in the post-war era to achieve excellence in research and establish prestigious
graduate programs coincided with an effort to expand access to undergraduate education. The
decision to push public colleges and universities towards universal access was born more out of
necessity than a commitment to democracy in education. According to John Thelin, the
population of the eighteen-to twenty-two-year-old age cohort hit a historic high during the 1960s
and a considerable portion of this age group sought access to higher education, which left
institutions little choice other than to expand and accommodate.51 Roger Geiger built upon
Thelin’s conclusions by arguing that increased high school graduation rates, the economic need
for a more educated workforce, parents’ interest that their children have improved career
prospects and the growth of family incomes furthered the popular pressure for expanded higher
education enrollment in the years after the Second World War.52 David Labaree contends that
the increased demand for higher education in this period stemmed from a combination of
individuals desiring an enhanced social position and college being perceived as one of the only
ways to raise social status.53
Labaree also addresses the physical growth of public institutions in the decades following
World War II. Most state-funded public universities established branch campuses, and state
legislatures chartered two-year institutions that focused on lower-division baccalaureate courses,
technical education, or certification programs. Labaree is particularly interested in why two-year
public institutions were built in favor of expanding four-year publics institutions and how the
expansion hid inequality under the guise of democratic intentions. Rather than admitting
50 Christopher P. Loss, Between Citizens and the State, 2, 3.
51 Thelin, “A History of American Higher Education,” 300.
52 Roger L. Geiger, American Higher Education Since World War II: A History (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2019), 133. 53 David F. Labaree, A Perfect Mess. 95, 106.
30
students to established, reputable public and private institutions, Labree argues that “the higher
education system created a series of new lower-level institutions to make room for the influx,
leaving the college’s core middle-class constituency safely protected in institutions that, instead
of becoming more accessible in the face of greater demand, chose to become more exclusive.”54
In essence, Labaree argues that higher education expanded to provide greater access in a way
that furthered social and economic stratification. Any American could go to college — just not
necessarily the college they want to attend. This process of stratification through diversified
higher education options played out in Ohio in the decades after World War II.
54 Ibid., 106.
31
CHAPTER THREE
PANIC, PAUSE, AND PURPOSE IN OHIO HIGHER EDUCATION
Introduction
The state of Ohio’s contemporary system of public higher education is both unique and
emblematic. On the surface, it seems the recent history of Ohio public higher education is a
familiar story played out in other states. Like most states east of the Mississippi River, Ohio is
home to research universities that house dozens of graduate programs. Like most states in the
Midwest, Ohio benefited from the Morrill Land Grant Acts, which created colleges for the
benefit of agriculture and mechanical arts. And, like most states across the nation, Ohio’s baby
boom population came of age looking to enter higher education during the 1960s and early-
1970s.
What distinguishes Ohio’s system of public higher education is not what state leaders
initially accomplished but rather what they failed to do. The Regents had a plan that faced
numerous roadblocks in the late-1960s and early-1970s — caused, in large part, by Governor Jim
Rhodes’ ever-changing political ideology that derailed policy makers’ long-term goals for Ohio
public higher education. It took Ohio’s leaders more than twenty years, a critical period
spanning from 1943 to 1966, to organize and implement a state policy to invest in public higher
education. By 1966, a new governing body, the Board of Regents, became responsible for
development of Ohio higher education.
The Regents initially focused on creating a system that prioritized two competing, but
somewhat complimentary goals: open access at state-supported two-year branch campuses that
emphasized general education for underclassmen and the construction of research-based graduate
programs in science and technology at state-supported four-year institutions where focus would
be on upperclassmen education — a model they called the Master Plan for Ohio Higher
Education. New two-year campuses would give the state much needed space for the massive
wave of Baby Boomers looking to enter higher education while the graduate programs and
32
research facilities would provide an opportunity for economic development away from industrial
manufacturing.
The Regents’ plan seemed to be working quite well and enjoyed support from the
General Assembly and Governor Rhodes, who personally endorsed the Regent’s model for
public higher education. But then, in 1969, a mere three years into carrying out their Master
Plan, Governor Rhodes, who was elected in 1962 as a pro-New Deal, Eisenhower Republican,
began campaigning against the Regents’ Master Plan and turned Ohio’s campuses into his
political punching bag in attempt to win over the burgeoning “Law and Order” Republicans who
blamed the anti-Vietnam War, pro-speech, Civil Rights Movement protests of the late-1960s on
higher education. As a result, the push for graduate education and economic diversification
through research and development was replaced with Rhodes’ desire for a state investment in
two-year vocational training.
Behind the nearly thirty-year story of how Ohio’s leaders handled the development of
public higher education after World War II is an important narrative that explains the state’s
initial hesitancy about investing in public higher education and Rhodes’ eventual distaste for
graduate education: the deindustrialization of the American Midwest. There isn’t one singular
piece of evidence that connects the economic phenomena of deindustrialization to the decisions
Ohio policymakers made about public higher education, but there are enough clues to suggest
that a good number of state leaders knew Ohio’s economic dependence on industrial
manufacturing was not a healthy long-term plan for the state. As such, Ohio policymakers made
their decisions about public higher education because of, and, in some cases, in spite of, Ohio’s
identity as an industrial manufacturing state. A quick overview of the Midwest and Ohio in the
years immediately following World War II illustrates how the state’s economic identity
influenced the way Ohio policymakers viewed the purpose of public higher education and how,
as the economy changed over the next three decades, so too did their views.
This chapter seeks to accomplish three inter-related goals. First, it will establish the
economic and political conditions of Ohio in the immediate years preceding World War II and
explain how those conditions were related to the overall socio-economic culture of the Midwest
before, during and after World War II. Second, this chapter will examine how the economic
policies that benefited Ohio and the Midwest during World War II gave way to a new, post-War
economic order where the federal government prioritized research and development in aerospace
33
and technology through relationships with states and their systems of public higher education
that created new industries in the private sector. Once this new economic order became a reality,
Ohio’s leaders had little time to develop a plan that would earn the state a piece of the federal
government’s research funding.
Third, and most importantly, this chapter will argue that political ideology and economic
anxieties about industrial manufacturing gained an outsized influence in determining the purpose
of public higher education in the decades following World War II. High-ranking politicians,
especially Jim Rhodes, exploited those anxieties for political gain at the expense of reaching the
Regent’s goals for public higher education. Taken together, the story of Ohio public higher
education from the mid-1940s through the early 1970s is a gateway to understanding how three
significant events of the twentieth century — deindustrialization, the explosive growth of
American public higher education, and the rise of the New Right after the end of the New Deal
coalition — are all inter-related and vied to implement their vision, and purpose of, public higher
education.
Ohio and the Midwest: An Economic Overview, 1938-1943
The clearest picture of what happened to the strength of industrial manufacturing in the Midwest
involves the transformation of the American South as well as the economic development of the
American West, which was caused, in large part, by the federal government’s investment in both
regions during, and immediately after, World War II. President Franklin Roosevelt announced
in 1938 that the United States’ South was “the nation’s number one economic problem — the
nation’s problem, not merely the South’s.”1 At the time, the Midwest’s leading manufacturers,
industrialists and laborers could not have imagined that Roosevelt’s declaration would play an
outsized role in the Midwest’s eventual economic woes. Yet, the federal government’s New
Deal commitment to help the South would continue through the 1960s and beyond.2 The sudden
1 Bruce Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and
the Transformation of the South 1938–1980 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 12.
2 Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt, 90; Robert E. Gallman, "Commodity Output, 1839-
1899," in Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and
Wealth, no. 24 (Princeton, 1960), 2; Albert Fishlow, "Productivity and Technological Change in
the Railroad Sector, 1840-1910," in Output, Employment, and Productivity in the United States
After 1800, Studies in Income and Wealth, (New York, 1966), table 1, 585; Margaret Walsh, The
34
change in the South’s economy was so noticeable that, in 1956, the famed Southern writer
William Faulkner lamented, “Our economy is no longer agricultural, it is the Federal
Government.”3
But how did World War II federal spending help Midwestern states? For a brief period,
everything about the war was a boon to the Midwest’s economy, particularly in East North
Central Midwestern states like Ohio. One of the most effective ways to understand exactly what
World War II meant to Midwestern industrial manufacturing is to zero in on the economic
production of Ohio during the war. In 1941 the state’s main industries — agriculture and
manufacturing — went into hyper-production. Farm income increased by nearly 200 percent
while industry wages became the highest in the nation.4 Ohio’s industries employed 754,886
workers in 1941, but the increase in wages brought migrant workers from all over the Midwest
and South, raising the total number of workers to 1,268,685 by 1944. Most lucrative to Ohio’s
economy, however, were federal defense contracts. Ohio ranked fourth in the amount of money
received from federal government, with no less than $2 billion going to both Akron and Dayton
and a staggering $5 billion to Cleveland alone to aid the production of synthetic rubber and
airplanes to aid the war effort.5
During the race to create a synthetic rubber, the federal government introduced Ohio’s
leaders and citizens to a new model of economic development involving industry, corporations,
and the research university. Known as the Synthetic Rubber Program, the federal government
gathered military leaders, scientists, industrial managers, and government officials at the
University of Akron to develop a rubber that could keep the war effort moving since the
Japanese had systematically taken control of raw rubber production.6 At the time, state business
Manufacturing Frontier (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972); Daniel Nelson, Farm
and Factory: Workers in the Midwest, 1880-1990 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1995); Viken Tchakerian, "Productivity, Extent of Markets, and Manufacturing in the Late
Antebellum South and Midwest." The Journal of Economic History 54, no. 3 (1994): 497-525.
3 Bruce Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American culture, Society, and Politics
(Boston: Da Capo Press, 2002), 112.
4 Harry Schwartz, "Hired Farm Labor in World War II," Journal of Farm Economics 24, no. 4
(1942): 826-44.
5 Kevin F. Kern and Gregory S. Wilson, Ohio: A History of the Buckeye State, 390.
6 Peter J. T. Morris, The American Synthetic Rubber Research Program (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 46-62.
35
and government leaders didn’t know just how much the Synthetic Rubber Program
foreshadowed American postwar economic development.7
Resisting a New Direction: Ohio’s Debate Over a Postwar Economy, 1943-1957
John Bricker, Ohio’s Republican Governor from 1939 till 1945, looked forward to the day when
the state was free from the federal government’s bureaucratic oversight and state policymakers
were again in charge. “The individual citizen must again be conscious of his responsibility to his
government,” said Bricker, “and alert to the preservation of his rights as a citizen under it. This
cannot be done by taking government further away but by keeping it at home.” On another
occasion, Bricker told an audience that “The paternalism of the New Deal has weakened the old
homely virtues of initiative and self-reliance…We have been led to believe we can do very little
to help ourselves.”8 According to Bricker, any assistance from the federal government merely
meant less personal responsibility, and although Americans today perhaps don’t take as much
issue with the federal government funding university-based research for civil defense,
aeronautics and medicine, that was not always the case for Americans living in the 1930s and
1940s.
It’s easy to put the blame squarely on the shoulders of Ohio’s political leaders for not
wanting federal assistance. For one thing, few state legislators had reason to worry that the end
of postwar federal investment would hurt the state’s economy. In 1953 the nation’s average
income hovered near $1,800 while Ohio’s average income topped $2,000, which gave the state a
higher standard of living than some industrialized nations like Great Britain, Canada and
Sweden.9 Nearly all of the East North Central states shared Ohio’s good economic fortune
because of their industrial economies, high levels of employment, and early participation in the
nation’s space program.10 But what about the future? Such a question lingered in the mind of
not only state policymakers, but business leaders and citizens as well. If the end of war was
7 Vernon Herbert and Attilio Bisio, Synthetic Rubber: A Project That Had to Succeed (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), i-vii.
8 Richard O. Davies, Defender of the Old Guard: John Bricker and American Politics
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993), 51, 53.
9 See: Jon K. Lauck, Gleaves Whitney, Joseph Hogan, eds., Finding a New Midwestern History
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018).
10 Kern and Wilson, Ohio: A History of the Buckeye State, 399.
36
inevitable, so too was the end of heightened wartime production. Therefore, planning for the
transition to a peacetime economy was necessary to prevent the state’s economy falling into a
recession. Governor Bricker did not see a recession on the horizon, but still signed the bill to
create the Ohio Post-War Program Commission to study postwar economic options.11
Led by state policymakers, the Post-War Program Commission was instructed to
complete three vague tasks. First, the Commission needed to gather all available pertinent data
relative to “post-war problems which will confront the state and its inhabitants.”12 Second, the
Commission needed to determine “how, and to what extent, the state can help restore” returning
veterans into the economy.13 Finally, the Commission should “do such other things as may be
pertinent to the post-war effort of the state of Ohio.”14 The final report took nearly three years to
complete. The Post-War Commission’s report argued that the state should finance projects to
stop beach erosion, build public libraries, and erect dozens of new state parks.15 One of the
report’s findings eventually involved higher education and the Inter-University Council (IUC),
which was an organization of six public university presidents founded in to protect their interests
with the Ohio General Assembly, had sidestepped a national recommendation from the
American Council on Education to create a statewide system of two-year community colleges
because they believed two-year colleges were “dangerous to the future welfare of state-supported
institutions of higher learning.”16
Another of the report’s consequences was the creation of the ‘Science Committee,’ which
was an offshoot of a wartime committee, known as the Cyclotron Committee that was created to
do the same thing: study how the state could invest in new economic industries. In a 1944 report
to the 96th General Assembly, the Cyclotron Committee argued that the window for Ohio to
build a cyclotron facility, which uses machines to produced charged particles that can be used in
medical, industrial and nuclear research, to aid in the war effort had passed, but the state needed
to “take leadership in this type of post-war development” because cyclotron research could
11 Karl B. Pauly, Bricker of Ohio: The Man and His Record (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons,
1944), 91-96.
12 Michael Desmond, ed., Ohio Post-War Program Commission: Committee Organization
Preliminary Research (The F.J. Heer Co.: Columbus, OH, 1946), 2.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 29. 16 Ibid., 358.
37
produce products “that will form the basis for vast new industry, providing substantial
employment in the future.”17 The Science Committee reached the same conclusions in 1947.
They told the General Assembly that “research and creative ventures, which provide for the
development of our scientific, technical, and human resources, has received little financial
support from the State or municipalities,” and the state’s relatively little “stockpile of scientific
knowledge is not sufficient for our present and future purposes.”18 Moreover, the Science
Committee believed that the General Assembly should “invest funds in research and in the
application of new knowledge in the interest and general welfare of its citizens” because of their
“importance in the world of tomorrow to Ohio’s industries and Ohio’s seven million citizens.”19
The Science Committee’s recommendations were flatly ignored by the General Assembly and
the idea was shelved for more than ten years, a decision that went against national trends.
The Rise of the American and Ohio Higher Education, 1957-1962
Although it wasn’t entirely unexpected, the Cold War fundamentally adjusted the United States’
economic and political agenda for much of the three decades following World War II. And that
agenda had an outsized effect on the future of American public higher education. The desire for
scientific advancements in aerospace and other similar technological areas to compete against the
Soviet Union and contain the spread of Communism sent the federal government on spending
spree. In order to achieve dominance over the Soviet Union, the federal government fell back on
the successful wartime formula perfected during World War II: fostering a strong economic
connection between military contracts, job growth, research and development, and a highly-
skilled workforce. Wartime investment in new plants and additions to existing facilities were
concentrated in certain states, especially in the South. For example, almost two-thirds of the
total investment of $4.2 billion in structures and equipment was invested in just four states:
17 Ohio Looks Ahead: General Report of the Ohio Post-War Program Commission to the 96th
General Assembly and the Governor, 1943-1944, (Columbus: F.J. Heer Printing Company,
1945), 48.
18 Michael Desmond, ed., The Ohio Post-War Program Commission: Biennial Report to the
Governor and the 97th General Assembly (Columbus: The Ohio Post-War Program Commission,
1947), 99-100.
19 Ibid., 100.
38
Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, and Tennessee. Texas alone accounted for almost a third of the
region's total.20
The bulk of federal spending for research and development eventually went towards
development for military defense and the budding space program, which created a new, lucrative
market in post-war America: the aeronautics industry. Adjusting for inflation, total research and
development spending grew by 200 percent between 1955 and 1965. By 1960 some 70 percent
of the nation’s entire research effort now came from federal funding.21 Outlays for research had
grown from 5 percent to 15 percent of the federal budget and the bulk of funds went to research
facilities located on college campuses. In states such as California, approximately 50 percent of
the state’s economic growth from 1945 to 1960 was tied directly and indirectly to the defense
industry and federal outlays for research that simultaneously expanded — and brought national
acclaim to the state’s university system.22
Back in Ohio, state leaders watched as the rise in the South and West’s economic
prosperity nearly mirrored the Midwest’s slow economic dissent. In 1955, members of the state-
funded Industrial Development Committee (IDC) studied what the state could do to reinforce
their economy and prevent manufactures from leaving the state for the South. In the ten years
since World War II ended, manufactures had gradually left the state to open new plants in
Pennsylvania, California, and Georgia.23 Two economists from The Ohio State, Paul G. Craig
and James Yocum, were enlisted to help the Commerce Committee figure out the specific
20 Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, The Army and Industrial Manpower (Washington,
D.C.: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 101-104.
https://history.army.mil/html/books/001/1-8/CMH_Pub_1-8.pdf.
21 For more information on federal research funding and higher education see: Gary W. Matkin,
Technology Transfer and the University (New York: Macmillan, 1990); Roger Geiger, “The
Ambiguous Link: Private Industry and University Research,” In William E. Becker and Darrell
R. Lewis, eds., The Economics of Higher Education (Boston: Kluwer, 1992), 265-297;).
22 Roger Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge, 86-102.
23 For more information on the rise of the Sun Belt see: David L. Carlton, "The American South
and the U.S. Defense Economy: A Historical View," in Carlton and Peter A. Coclanis, The
South, the Nation, and the World: Perspectives on Southern Economic Development
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 151-62; James C. Cobb, The Selling of the
South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936-1990 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1993); Martin V. Melosi, "Dallas-Fort Worth: Marketing the Metroplex," in
Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, eds., Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World
War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 162-95; George Brown Tindall, The
Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967).
39
problems facing the state. Craig and Yocum concluded that Ohio’s economy was dominated by
— and therefore hinged on the success of — agriculture and industry. Roughly two-thirds of
Ohio’s annual GDP and workforce relied on the production of iron, steel, clay, glass, wheat,
corn, and automobiles, meaning that the state could be instantly plunged into a deep recession if
any combination of those industries took a cyclical downturn.24
Nearly a decade prior, state leaders had simply ignored similar conclusions reached by
the Science Committee, but by the mid-1950s, the need to build economic diversity in Ohio was
becoming too evident to ignore. Over the next seven years, the IDC studied what Ohio could do
to keep industries from leaving and attract new industries to the state. Their conclusions, which
reached Ohio’s General Assembly in 1962, showed a complete reversal on the state’s tradition of
eschewing the public financing in private industry. Initially, the IDC told legislators that
“public financing programs for private industry” was the only way to bolster manufacturing in
Ohio.25 Moreover, the IDC believed Ohio probably lost industries because the state refused to
sponsor development programs in public higher education that created a newly skilled workforce
and technological advances.26
In order to reach their conclusions, the IDC had surveyed numerous industry leaders in
the state about what steps policymakers should take to spur future economic growth. An
overwhelming majority recommended a pathway that Ohio’s leaders had long disregarded:
investment in public higher education.27 But the IDC’s report wasn’t the only indictment of
Ohio’s leaders. Within months of the IDC Report, the Department of Defense published the
Military Prime Contract Awards by State, 1950-1962. There, on the report’s thirteenth page,
was the final proof that Ohio’s legislators needed to understand how their lack of investment in
public higher education had legislative lasting consequences. Every year since 1950 Ohio had
lost a net percentage of military contracts, and by 1962, 54.6 percent of the state’s contracts with
24 Warren Van Tine, et al, In the Workers’ Interest: A History of the Ohio AFL-CIO, 1958-1998
(Columbus, OH: Center for Labor Research, 1998), 4-27.
25 “Industrial Development Committee Report on Plant Movement Out of Ohio during the Period
From 1955-1962," 12/10/62, p. 6, Collison Papers, box 3, folder, 3, Ohio Historic Archives
Library.
26 Ibid., 2.
27 Research Facilities Committee, Research Facilities in Ohio: A Report of the Research
Facilities Study Committee (Columbus, OH: Ohio Legislative Service Commission, 1963), 9.
40
the federal government had disappeared.28
Meeting minutes from May 11, 1962, when the General Assembly Legislative Service
Commission met with the Research Facilities Study Commission, reveal that some state leaders
recognized their mistake. First, some Assemblymen admitted “Ohio’s economy would now be
considerably stronger if a concerted research and development effort had been launched several
years ago.”29 Second, members of the Research Facilities Commission contended that “unless
the Ohio industrial, governmental, and educational community undertakes to participate far more
in this technological and economic revolution than has been the case thus far, the general
economy of this state will suffer some very real deterioration.”30 Third, both groups agreed that
Ohio’s limited research and development capacity and failure to attract federal contracts
stemmed from the state’s “astonishingly low” commitment to research universities.31 Fourth, the
General Assembly agreed that they must encourage and invest in the creation of private and
public research facilities, introduce competitive salary packages for researchers at public
universities, and create more graduate student programs to support the growth of graduate
student research.32
With their newfound goals in hand, Ohio’s General Assembly and Chamber of
Commerce spent the summer of 1962 canvasing the state to find members for the organization
that would lead the state’s charge to increase research and development capacities in higher
education. By the fall of 1962, The Ohio Research and Development Foundation (ORDF), a
state-supported advocacy group, was created. Taking their lead from the General Assembly’s
meeting with the Research Facilities Study Commission, the ORDF set about accomplishing
three primary goals. First, the group would evaluate the present status of Ohio’s research and
development capabilities, primarily in public universities. Second, the members would ascertain
how the federal government could use Ohio’s research and development facilities. Third, and
28 United States Department of Defense, “Military Prime Contract Awards by State, 1950-1962,”
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962).
29 Ohio General Assembly, Meeting Minutes, May 11, 1962, General Assembly/Legislative
Services Commission, "Minutes and Reports, 1947-1985," frame 113, Series 1609, Ohio Historic
Archives Library.
p.5
30 Ibid., 12.
31 Ibid., 25. 32 Ibid., 28.
41
most significant, ORDF would “create and foster plans to significantly improve the collaboration
between higher education and industry” to “increase the state’s research and development
capacities.”33 For the first time since World War II, public higher education had a purpose in
Ohio — research and collaboration with industry.
In order to ensure Ohio began moving forward on each initiative, ORDF needed the
General Assembly and Governor to support their mission and quickly approve funding. It
seemed obvious that ORDF’s plan had the support of the General Assembly. After all, both
chambers of the Assembly agreed to ORDF’s creation despite hesitation from fiscally
conservative Republicans who still cringed at any growth in the state’s power. But the
incumbent Democratic Governor, Michael DiSalle, who supported dramatic increases in state
expenditures to pay for the investment public higher education through hiking tax revenues on
cigarettes, alcohol and corporations had just been defeated by the relatively unknown and
unpolished Republican Mayor of Columbus, Jim Rhodes.
Jim Rhodes — an Interlude
When it comes to the history of Ohio’s system of public higher education, no other figure plays a
more vital and fascinating role than Jim Rhodes. A native of Indiana, Rhodes’ family moved to
Ohio after the death of his father when Rhodes was a young boy. Records indicate Rhodes’
father died during the influenza outbreak of 1918, but Rhodes, fearing the story of his father’s
death would make him look less masculine, instead told voters his father died in a tragic mining
accident in West Virginia — a mistruth that in part earned Rhodes the credentials he needed to
win over Ohio’s working-class voters.34 As Mayor of Columbus, Rhodes further cemented his
status as a friend-of-labor when he supported Democratic union members’ right to collectively
bargain after World War II. Whether or not he purposefully willed himself to become the state’s
33 “The Ohio Research and Development Foundation, Inc.: Its History and Objectives,” n.d., pp.
1-2, MSS 700, Ohio Research and Development Foundation Papers, box 1, folder 23, Ohio
Historic Archives Library.
34 “James Rhodes and the 1960s Origins of Contemporary Ohio,” in Van Tine, Warren and
Michael Pierce, eds., Builders of Ohio: A Biographical History (Columbus: The Ohio State
University Press, 2003).
42
working-class hero, or the mantel simply fell in his lap, Rhodes ran for Governor in 1962 as the
champion of the common man.35
What attracted working-class voters to Rhodes may have been his plain-spoken,
sweeping ideas about how to retain Ohio’s initial postwar economic success. Rather than
providing detailed explanations about how he would bring jobs back to the state, Rhodes simply
promised he would create jobs.36 Instead of coming up with original thoughts to show voters his
dedication to critical thinking, Rhodes co-opted ideas he thought would win the support of
voters. Of Rhodes’ lack of original thinking and ability to make his ideas seem original, one
historian writes:
“He [Rhodes] was not someone who reflected on problems, considered their nuances, and
sought to resolve their consistencies and contradictions into a new solution. He was instead
adept at scanning his environment, listening and looking for ideas to co-opt. His skill was then
in applying those ideas to a political situation and shepherding it through the process of making
public policy. To the convenience of Rhodes, the emerging idea of late 1962 was restructuring
Ohio’s economy by fostering technological research and development.”37
And that is the path Rhodes chose to follow, albeit late in his campaign. On October 2, 1962 —
just over a month before the election — Rhodes published his plan to bring jobs, research, and
technological development to Ohio. The Blueprint for Brainpower: A Program for Higher
Education in Ohio represented both Rhodes’ commitment to the working-class and the growing
belief held by most of the state’s leaders that Ohio needed to focus on developing the state’s
research capabilities through an invest in public higher education. But, instead of demanding an
increase in state-funded graduate student research, Rhodes believed that legislators should fully
reshape Ohio’s system of public higher education to provide more access to all students so the
percentage of possible future researchers could also increase. “We have only just crossed the
threshold of the golden age of science,” Rhodes commented in 1962, and “we need brainpower
to continue these magnificent advances.”38 Rhodes estimated that higher education enrollments
would climb from 140,000 to 210,000 full-time students by 1970 across all institutions — not
35 Tom Diemer, Lee Leonard, and Richard G. Zimmerman, James A. Rhodes: Ohio Colossus
(Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2014),78-94.
36 Ibid.
37 William Russell Coil, “New Deal Republican:” James A. Rhodes and the Transformation of
the Republican Party, 1933-1983,” PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2005, 258. 38 James A. Rhodes, “Blueprint for Brainpower,” State Library of Ohio Digital Collections,
1962. https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p267401ccp2/id/4510.
43
just public colleges and universities — and the General Assembly “must commence as soon as
possible a capital expansion program at state universities to prepare them for the tremendous
increase in number of students who will want to attend them,” wrote Rhodes.39 But that wasn’t
all.
Rhodes outlined five recommendations the state should follow to create a new higher
education program and these recommendations became an outline for the purpose of public
higher education un subsequent sections. The initial section of recommendations emphasized
increased state support. First, Rhodes believed public colleges and universities should receive
increased state funding as their enrollments grew. Second, to encourage more students to enroll,
especially students from working-class backgrounds, Rhodes suggested that legislators use more
of the state budget to subsidize the first two years of college courses for students to attend state
supported institutions — including the establishment of technical colleges, branch campuses and
community colleges.40 Pushing further, Rhodes believed that any municipality or county that
wanted a college should receive one with assistance from the state. Rhodes believed the General
Assembly should finally pass the stalled Senate Bill 519, which “provided for the creation of
branch campuses sponsored by either state supported or other universities in counties and
municipalities” to enable “young people to obtain two years of college credit toward a full
degree while avoiding board and room costs.”41
Perhaps Rhodes’ most important recommendation was his last. Ohio’s six public
institutions were officially guided by the loosely bound Inter-University Council (IUC), which
functioned as an organization of public university presidents to protect their interests with the
Ohio General Assembly.42 Although the IUC wielded an unusual amount of power and held
more autonomy than most higher education governing bodies in the nation, it was financially
strapped by the state’s longstanding blasé attitude towards education. Founded in 1939, the IUC
had failed in the first twenty years of its existence to get the state of Ohio to appropriate more
funds to public higher education. IUC member and former Miami University President John
39 James A. Rhodes, “Blueprint for Brainpower,” 1.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 3.
42 Michael A. Olivas, “State Law and Postsecondary Coordination: The Birth of the Ohio Board
of Regents,” The Review of Higher Education 7, no. 4 (1984): 357-395.
44
Millett remarked in 1953 that “Ohio as a state was simply not disposed to support its public
higher education in generous terms.”43
Rhodes believed the IUC should be brought under control of the state, and in return the
IUC would be given more authority, and money, to shape public higher education. Above all
else, Rhodes wanted a governing body that would develop a master plan for the expansion of
public higher education, identify areas for capital improvement, plan for the expansion of Ohio’s
public university system, and develop graduate programs to help diversify Ohio’s economy.
Rhodes was suggesting that Ohio’s system of public higher education should be governed by a
state-sponsored body like the university systems in states where higher education was a top
priority.
Rhodes went on to soundly defeat the Democratic incumbent DiSalle in November and
began work on turning the IUC into the Ohio Board of Regents. In less than sixteen months, the
General Assembly passed a resolution to create a $175 million bond issue that was approved by
Ohio voters and agreed to accept federal funds from the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963
that authorized “assistance to public and other nonprofit institutions of higher education in
financing the construction, rehabilitation, or improvement of needed academic and related
facilities in undergraduate and graduate institutions."44 With nearly $187 million now available
to invest in the state’s public universities, the General Assembly passed HB 214 creating the
Ohio Board of Regents as the state’s higher education planning and coordinating board, which
would be headed by Millett.45
Rhodes and the Regents: 1964-1968
A report from Science magazine in 1964 claimed “In higher education, Ohio is going through a
reappraisal and reorganization, and support is growing behind the doctrine that the economic
future can be brightened by freer use of public funds to educate scientists, engineers, and other
43 Michael A. Olivas, “State Law and Postsecondary Coordination,” 360.
44 United States Congress, "Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963", Public Law 88-204, 77
STAT 363, 1963, p. 1, accessed June 2018. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299886.
45 John D. Millet, Politics and Higher Education (University of Alabama Press, 1975).
45
professionals, to support research.”46 The same report, however, called out Ohio’s earlier
hesitation to invest in public higher education, “It can fairly be said that, compared to California,
Ohio and the other Midwestern states have been laggardly in organizing to provide the
coordinated system of low-cost, accessible, and diversified public higher education for which a
heavy demand has developed since World War II.”47
Armed with information and a now-supportive General Assembly, the Board of Regents
created a state master plan that detailed how legislators should expand public higher education
and what purpose the new system should serve. In June 1966, the Board of Regents published
The Master Plan for State Policy in Higher Education, a 125-page document that suggested that
public higher education should serve two purposes: geographic access to a college or university
so any student that wanted to attend could do so and investment in the development of elite
graduate programs that produced industry-leading research.
The Regents devised a three-tier priority system based on population, need and
demographics. Areas of the state with lower-incomes, a high percentage of industrial jobs, or
more than thirty miles away from higher education would receive a two-year community college,
branch campus, or vocational/technical institution. What made two-year institutions so
important? For the Regents, two-year institutions made all the difference. In 1966, provisions of
the Ohio law that created the Board of Regents — Revised Code 3333.04 — made it illegal for
any state assisted institutions to deny access to any student with a high school diploma. The
Regents believed the policy of open access — the same policy championed by Rhodes — should
be continued under their new system of public higher education, but with a catch. Instead of
funneling first-year students to public four-year colleges and universities, the Regents believed
lower-division students — those classified as “Freshman” or “Sophomore” — should take their
general education courses at a two-year institution and transfer to a public four-year institution
once they had enough credits to take a major.48 Towards that end, the Regents also specified that
all public four-year colleges and universities should focus their academic program on upper-
46 “Ohio: With New Board of Regents, Master Plan in Works, State Takes Plunge into State-
Wide Planning,” Science 145, no. 3629, 253.
47 “Ohio: With New Board of Regents, Master Plan in Works, State Takes Plunge into State-
Wide Planning,” 253.
48 Ohio Board of Regents, “State Master Plan for State Policy in Higher Education: 1966,”
Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 12.
46
division students — those classified as “Junior” or “Senior”— and graduate research.49 The
Regents stated that two-year institutions would “meet the growing enrollment demand in Ohio”
and “limit large enrollments on campuses,” which would help four-year campus facilities
concentrate “upon upper division, graduate, and graduate professional study.”50 Two-year
institutions, in other words, would be a perfect way to avoid overcrowding on four-year
campuses.
The Regents seemed to be well aware of the fact that most of the students attending two-
year campuses would be part-time students already employed and seeking credentials or an
associate’s degree instead of a four-year degree — a fact that carried numerous financial benefits
for the state. The Regents believed branch campuses would “provide opportunity for higher
education” for those persons who cannot be enrolled at a main campus “because of housing,
expense, or part-time employment.”51 The Regents also believed that one of the largest solicitors
of two-year colleges would be “professionally employed persons, especially in the public schools
and in business, who desire to improve their competency with additional higher education.”52
There was also a national development that made the construction of two-year campuses within a
state-assisted four-year institution a smart decision for Regents. The Higher Education Facilities
Act of 1963 provided, federal “assistance to public and other nonprofit institutions of higher
education in financing the construction, rehabilitation, or improvement of needed academic and
related facilities in undergraduate and graduate institutions."53 The federal government would
match funds put forward by a university that wanted to build or renovate their facilities, which
would naturally decrease the amount of funding the Regents had to commit to the construction of
a new branch campus and save more funding for research facilities — their top priority.
While two-year institutions met the criteria for providing access to public higher
education, the Regents also needed a plan to help ensure Ohio’s public universities became
academically elite. The Regents wanted to “upgrade and substantially increase Ohio’s
contributions to graduate education” while simultaneously expanding “state university activity in
research and increase the contributions of university research activities to Ohio’s businesses and
49 Ibid., 12, 13.
50 Ohio Board of Regents, “State Master Plan for State Policy in Higher Education: 1966,” 131. 51 Ibid., 131.
52 Ibid.
53 United States Congress, "Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,” 1.
47
industry.”54 The Regents’ desire to expand graduate programs was not misplaced. One national
outlet, writing about the development of a new public higher education in Ohio, remarked, “One
of the biggest problems facing the regents is to find ways and means to upgrade and expand
advanced education in the sciences, engineering, and medicine in the cause of economic
growth.”55
Rhodes played an influential role in the Regents’ decision. In a February 1966 meeting,
while the Regents were still constructing their initial Master Plan, Rhodes had a letter read aloud
to the Regents that explicitly stated they weren’t doing enough to address the problem of
graduate education. “In connection with the attention which the Board of Regents is giving to
the whole problem of university research and its relation to the technical development and
economic growth of business in Ohio,” writes Rhodes, “I believe it would be highly desirable to
broaden the scope of your concern to include the whole subject of graduate education, especially
at the doctoral level, and its relationship to technical development and economic growth.”56
Rhodes’ change of heart can be attributed to two things. First, his desire to have higher
education within thirty miles of every Ohioan included graduate education as well, not just two-
year campuses. Second, and more likely, Rhodes was also preparing to introduce a bill to the
General Assembly that would take six percent of general revenue taxes each year and put them
towards capital improvement projects. The more technical development and economic growth
Ohio experienced, the more revenue Rhodes would have to put towards capital improvement
projects.
The initial push for expanded graduate education proved to be quite successful. By 1967
the General Assembly had approved nineteen new Ph.D. programs across six public institutions
since 1963 including Linguistics and Nuclear Engineering at Ohio State, Chemistry at Akron,
and Physics and Solid-State Physics at Kent State.57 The Regents also used their allocation from
the General Assembly to approve a $1.4 million Biological Sciences Laboratory at Miami
54 Ohio Board of Regents, “New Responses to Vital Issues in Public Higher Education,” 1967,
Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 4.
55 “Ohio: With New Board of Regents, Master Plan in Works, State Takes Plunge into State-
Wide Planning,” Science 145, no. 3629, 254.
56 Ohio Board of Regents, Minutes of Meeting of February 18, 1966, Official Minutes of the
Board of Regents Volume 1, 1963-1966, Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 14.
57 Ibid., 14.
48
University and a $3.5 million engineering and science laboratory at Youngstown State.58 The
Regents also moved quickly to approve dozens of requests for law schools and Masters’
programs. In late 1964, the Regents approved both Akron and Kent State to grant Juris
Doctorates.59 Bowling Green State University was approved to grant an M.A. in Geography, an
M.S. General Experimental Psychology, Speech Pathology, and Physics while Ohio received
permission to grant Masters’ in Fine Arts, Music, Archeology, and Engineering.60
The Board of Regent’s plan was based on the argument that information and technology
developed at research facilities would be a lucrative means of making money from industries
hungry for the latest scientific developments, which would in-turn ignite even more economic
growth across the state and decrease Ohio’s outsized reliance on industrial manufacturing. The
only problem is that the Regents needed an initial investment of $420 million from the General
Assembly.61 Such an investment was problematic because the state of Ohio did not have an
income tax and Governor Rhodes was known for his refusal to even discuss imposing an income
tax. If any additional funding was needed for any long-lasting capital improvement project
around the state, Rhodes exclusively used state bond issues.62 And it seemed like additional
funding was desperately needed to both increase enrollment in the state’s geographically isolated
areas and in the newly minted graduate programs. But by 1968 Rhodes’ tone on the purpose of
public higher education had drastically departed from supporting graduate education to cursing
the Regents’ emphasis on expanding it.
58 Ohio Board of Regents, Minutes of Meeting of June 12, 1964, Official Minutes of the Board of
Regents Volume 1, 1963-1966, p. 2; Ohio Board of Regents, Minutes of Meeting of February 18,
1966, Official Minutes of the Board of Regents Volume 1, 1963-1966, Southwest Ohio Regional
Depository, 8.
59 Ohio Board of Regents, Minutes of Meeting of September 11, 1964, Official Minutes of the
Board of Regents Volume 1, 1963-1966, 3; Ohio Board of Regents, Minutes of Meeting of
October 9, 1964, Official Minutes of the Board of Regents Volume 1, 1963-1966, Southwest
Ohio Regional Depository, 1.
60 See: 1964, Official Minutes of the Board of Regents Volume 1, 1963-1966, 03/09/1965,
04/22/1965, 07/06/1965, 02/08/1966. 61 Ohio Board of Regents, “Capital Improvement Plan for State Assisted Institutions of Higher
Education, 1967-1973” (Columbus: Columbus Blank Book Company, 1967), Southwest Ohio
Regional Depository, 3.
62 Diemer, Leonard, and Zimmerman, James A. Rhodes: Ohio Colossus, 44.
49
Rhodes v. The Regents, 1968-1970
The Regent’s had proved reluctant to invest in, or expand, vocational/technical education
because they believed high schools could offer such training, and the state really didn’t have the
funding to build even more campuses. During the Regents’ second official meeting in 1963,
they discussed the topic of state-supported technical institutes. The meeting minutes reveal that
several key Regent members — including Ohio Director of Commerce, Warren H. Chase, who
served as the Regent’s Acting-Secretary — believed the Regents were only responsible for
cultivating community colleges, municipal universities and state university branch campuses
while “vocational training should be the responsibility of the high school.”63 It’s important to
note that vocational education was originally a designated responsibility of American high
schools, who had received federal funding since 1917 due to The Smith-Hughes National
Vocational Education Act. Moreover, the Smith-Hughes Act mandated that each state create a
board that specifically focused on vocational education. It wasn’t until 1963 that federal funding
significantly increased and state systems of higher education began offering vocational education
courses at two-year campuses. Even then, vocational education was still largely controlled by
Ohio’s Department of Education.
The Regents also made their lack of support for funding technical education known to
Rhodes. In a letter to Rhodes dated November 29th, 1963, the Regents did not mention technical
education as priority, but instead argued that Ohio had an immediate need to build campus
housing, science and research facilities, expansion of local higher education, and more students
in advanced degree programs.64 When the President of Cuyahoga Community College, Charles
E. Chapman, approached the Regents in December, 1963 for funding to start a technical
education on campus, the Regents tabled his request and told him to return the following month
so they could “study in greater detail, the advisability of adding technical programs.”65 At the
63 Official Minutes of the Board of Regents, Volume I: September 1963 to December 1966,
November 8th, 1963, 5.
64 Harold W. Oyster to James A. Rhodes, November 29th, 1963, Official Minutes of the Board of
Regents, Volume I: September 1963 to December 1966.
65 Official Minutes of the Board of Regents, Volume I: September 1963 to December 1966,
December 13th, 1963, 6.
50
following month’s meeting, President Chapman’s request was granted, but not before the
Regents approved a request from The Ohio State University to establish a doctorate degree in
optometry and a Ph.D. program in Slavic Languages.66
The Regents’ hesitation surrounding vocational/technical education soon became a
talking point for Rhodes, who, by 1968, believed public higher education should focus on
expanded access at the lower-level so students could get the necessary skills and training for
immediate employment while using research and development to assist industrial manufacturing.
The Regents were planning for the future of Ohio; Rhodes believed Ohio had no future if its
citizens couldn’t receive the education they needed for a good-paying job. On one occasion
Rhodes even remarked that public higher education had “bowed to the snobbery of the limited
group able to achieve in a few of the favored disciplines.”67 What makes this quote even more
stupendous is that it is not even close to the fever pitch of anger Rhodes reached on the subject.
To ensure Rhodes’ words aren’t minced, it seems appropriate to quote his grievances without
interruption:
“Recently, one of the major universities in Ohio “decreed,” as though from Caesar on
high, that all students entering the university would be required to wade through 2 years
of general studies before they could enter their college of specialty. This important
change, made under the guise of “academic excellence,” was not based on research, but
on the intellectual snobbery of the worst kind. This change was perpetuated by persons
who attempt to build their own professional standing on the shattered lives of students—
students who might have been successful if the educational program made any sense.
Instead of goal-centered education, which makes sense to students, they find they must
wade through 2 years of super high school academic theory before they can possibly
enter their professional area.
Universities contribute much in the area of research dealing with physical sciences,
engineering, and many of the social sciences, such as psychology; however, they seem to
be utterly blind to all research dealing with the educational process. This blindness
becomes oppression in term of controls on the high schools—controls requiring that
every student in the schools complete the “necessary” subjects to enter the “best
colleges.” This is true, in spite of the fact that massive research proves this requirement
to be false.”68
66 Official Minutes of the Board of Regents, Volume I: September 1963 to December 1966,
January 10th, 1964, 2,7. 67 James A. Rhodes, Alternative to a Decadent Society (New York: Howard W. Sams & Co,
1969), Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 5.
68 Ibid., 23-24.
51
Rhodes’ comments raise the question of whether or not his anger is misplaced. Was public
higher education becoming too elitist? The answer depended on who you asked. Until the early-
1970s, the Regents were represented by John D. Millett. Like Rhodes, Millett was born in
Indiana, but that is where their similarities end. After receiving his Ph.D. in Political Science
from Columbia University and spending one year as a postdoctoral fellow at the London School
of Economics, Millett served as a Colonel in the United States’ Army during World War II and
earned the Legion of Merit before joining the graduate faculty at Columbia — all before his 35th
birthday. After his tenure as President of Miami University (OH) (1953-1964), Millett spent
eight years as the Regents’ Chancellor where his thoughts on the purpose of public higher
education influenced much of the Regents’ planning.
According to Millett, public higher education should be viewed as a social institution that
balances the needs of the individual students and the reality of an ever-changing United States’
economy. In no uncertain terms Millett believed professional education was the key to national
social and economic success. In 1970, Millett wrote, “In social terms, the purpose of higher
education is to meet the demand for educated persons required for professional practice, and now
required also for the practice as professional associates.”69 Towards that end, Millett also made
clear that higher education is responsible for “providing educated talent to the American
economy” and contributing “an expanded knowledge to American society.”70 Millett’s words
carry a level of significance to an on-going debate about the purpose of public higher education
in the United States because they acknowledged the individual’s role in becoming educated and
contributing to the economy. “The case for higher education necessarily rests upon a different
kind of assumption,” writes Millett, “and that assumption is the contribution of educated talent to
the physical material, and other well-being of the American people” that assists “in the solution
of pressing social and governmental problems.”71
The Rhodes who, less than five years earlier, told the Regents, “to broaden the scope of
your concern to include the whole subject of graduate education,” now believed the purpose of
public higher education should be training young workers for vocational and technical
69 Ohio Board of Regents, “Planning, Programming & Budgeting for Ohio’s Public Institutions
of Higher Education” (Columbus: Columbus Blank Book Company: 1970), Southwest Ohio
Regional Depository, 10.
70 Ibid., 12.
71 Ibid., 12, 28.
52
occupations. In his opinion, vocational and technical training had failed to grow because of
“educational snobbery” that viewed both “as second class or poor education.”72 Rhodes went on
to claim that secondary and higher education has “been notoriously poor in providing guidance
for students related to occupations in which most of the American people are required to work as
adults.”73
What explains Rhodes’ change of heart about the purpose of public higher education?
One reason could be his reluctance to admit that Ohio had, due mostly to the loss of industrial
jobs, fallen into a deep fiscal bind during his time in office and he wanted to prove to his
working-class base that he was still on their side, which meant scaling back on spending not
directly related to job creation. Rhodes reorganized the system and governance of higher
education in the state while simultaneously using his political charm and connections to pass
state-wide bond issues that bankrolled the capital improvement of higher education. At the same
time, however, Rhodes’ reluctance to create a state income tax left any capital improvement
project at the mercy of bond issues, which had the possibility of leaving the state in crippling
debt if not handled carefully. And that’s basically what happened to the Board of Regents when
they proposed their $425 capital improvement plan in 1968. One of Rhodes’ top priorities going
into his re-election year of 1968 was the passing of a $759 million highway and general capital
improvements bond — a measure that would invariably provide work to numerous industrial and
blue-collar workers — that needed legislative approval to be on the ballot and voter confirmation
for the funds to become available.74 It was financially inconceivable the state could afford both
higher education and roads.
What little amount Ohio did collect in taxes from businesses and industry had steadily
declined throughout the 1960s along with a sizeable portion of jobs. One independent evaluation
from the United States’ Department of Housing and Urban Development found that between
1960 and 1970 Ohio’s economic production and job growth didn’t keep up with national
averages, particularly in the areas of industrial manufacturing and industrial services.75 For
72 Rhodes, Alternative to a Decadent Society, 48.
73 Rhodes, Alternative to a Decadent Society, 54.
74 Diemer, Leonard, and Zimmerman, James A. Rhodes: Ohio Colossus, 51. 75 Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission, “The Economy of the Miami Valley Region: A
Mid-Decade Assessment Using Shift-Share and Economic Base Analysis,” (Dayton, OH, 1977),
Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 4.
53
example, the region surrounding Ohio’s fifth largest county, Montgomery, and fourth-largest
metropolitan area, Dayton, lost over 10,000, or 7.9 percent, industrial manufacturing jobs
between 1960 and 1970 while losing another 10,000, or 21.5, non-electrical machine
manufacturing jobs and nearly 10 percent of all federally contracted jobs during the same time
period.76 If Rhodes was as attuned to the working-class as he claimed, it would be impossible
for him to not know what going on with the state’s economy.
Another significant contextual issue was the changing nature of the Republican Party’s
thinking about the purpose of higher education in the 1970s. Most Republicans, including
Rhodes, fell in line behind President Richard Nixon’s belief that higher education had slipped
into a malaise of irrelevant curriculums with too much emphasis on research, and the unequal,
ill-use of federal funds.77 One of Nixon’s most lofty goals was the creation of a career education
program in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that, according to his
Administration, “would authorize formula grants to be given to states to cover part of the cost of
beginning new programs of education in critical career skills in community colleges, technical
institutes, and other post-secondary institutions.”78
Thus, Rhodes’ thinking about higher education changed over the course of his
governorship (1962-71). In the early- to mid-1960s he was more in line with liberal Republicans
who favored maintaining certain New Deal-era programs and tentatively supporting some of
Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society agenda. By 1970, however, Rhodes’ rhetoric and actions
show a dramatic shift towards the politics of fear curated by President Nixon, California
Governor Ronald Reagan, and Alabama Governor George Wallace, who was known not only for
his blatant racism, but also his promise of "low-grade industrial development, low taxes, and
trade schools" to any person who wanted an education.79 These ‘Law-and-Order’ Republicans
are perhaps most infamous for using rising inflation, campus protests, rampant unemployment,
violence related the Civil Rights Movement, deindustrialization, urban decay, women’s
76 Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission, “The Economy of the Miami Valley Region,”
i-v, 4, 10.
77 Richard Nixon, "Richard Nixon's Plan for Higher Education » Richard Nixon Foundation,"
Richard Nixon Foundation, September 08, 2016, accessed June 2019.
https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2014/03/rns-plan-higher-education/.
78 Ibid.
79 Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism,
and the Transformation of American Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 103.
54
liberation, and the softening stance towards Communism as fodder for an assault against pro-
government, multi-cultural liberalism that was popularly associated with higher education — a
political position that rallied those Americans who felt the supposed radicalism of the 1960s had
negatively changed their country.80 According to these Republicans, college and university
campus were the places most responsible for fostering America’s growing sect of radical youth.81
Even though recent studies have shown that a significant number of colleges and universities
were politically inactive during the 1960s, several isolation incidents of campus protest quickly
stigmatized higher education for millions of Americans as colleges and universities went from
being seen as places of economic security to hotbeds of fear.82
The 1969-1970 academic year proved to be a turning point in the narrative of Ohio’s
public system of higher education due, in large part, to Rhodes’ changing political positions and
fateful decisions. In December 1969 Rhodes called out the National Guard in response to Black
student activists occupying the administration building at Akron University, but not before
calling their actions a “disgrace,” which earned him approval from some voters. One Ohioan
said that Rhodes had “restored [his] faith in law in order,” while another praised Rhodes for his
“consistent firmness and common sense in dealing with these university fiascos.”83
On Saturday, May 2nd, 1970, Rhodes agreed to send Companies A and C of the 1/145th
Infantry and Troop G of the 2/107th Armored Cavalry of Ohio’s National Guard to Kent, Ohio to
maintain order against what he saw as a growing, lawless mob. By Saturday evening, arsonists
had set the city’s Reserve Officers’ Training Corps building on fire before the Ohio National
Guard could arrive. According to Rhodes, who addressed the state shortly after the violence was
contained, the mob was “worse than the brown shirts and the communist element and also the
night riders and the vigilantes. They're the worst type of people that we harbor in America…I
80 For more information on the Republican Party’s push towards conservatism in the 1960s see:
James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford,
1996); Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s
(New York: Harper and Row, 1986); Jonathan Rieder, “The Rise of the ‘Silent Majority’,” in
Steven Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
81 Kenneth J. Heineman, Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities in
the Vietnam Era (New York: NYU Press, 1994), 235-240.
82 John R. Thelin, Going to College in Sixties (Williamsburg: William and Mary Press, 2018). 83 Mrs. Ed Hoban to JAR, 12/11/1969; Lonzo S. Green to JAR, 12/10/1969, MSS 353, James A.
Rhodes Papers, box 8, folder 6, Ohio Historical Society Archives.
55
think that we're up against the strongest, well-trained, militant, revolutionary group that has ever
assembled in America.”84 While the mob quieted down as the weekend came to an end, chaos
erupted on Monday, May 4th shortly after 12:00pm on the campus of Kent State University.
Fearing a loss of control, the National Guard fortified their position at the top of Blanket Hill —
a popular student gathering spot — and began thirteen seconds of shooting — firing sixty-one
shots — into the crowd. Four people were dead. Nine others were injured.
Rhodes’ actions and comments also showed he was officially done with supporting,
much less expanding, graduate degree programs in Ohio. Rhodes believed he had to literally
force technical education on campus administrators and threatened to use his control of the state
budget to ensure vocational education “over other degree programs, including any further
expansion of doctoral degree programs.”85 In less than ten years, from 1960 to 1970, Ohio’s
quest to renovate its system of public higher education had gone from a zealous, financially and
politically supported push to establish competitive graduate programs, research facilities, and
open access for those seeking a degree program to a hostile mission to develop vocational
education training over anything else.
Ohio in the Early-1970s: A Period of Transition
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when the United States’ economy began its transition
from industrial manufacturing to the service and knowledge industries, but most historians agree
the timeframe starts in the early-1970s as disinvestment and globalization took hold of the
nation’s economy. Recent work by economists, however, suggest the trend started in the late-
1950s when the Midwest’s industrialists had little incentive to innovate or diversify their
business model. In fact, between 1950 and 1970, the Midwest’s industrial belt market share of
national manufacturing fell from 55 percent to 45 percent and eventually fell 28 percent from its
original share by 1980.86 What Rhodes witnessed during the 1969 election was an industrial
84 William W. Scranton, et al., Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 253, 254.
85 Rhodes, Alternative to a Decadent Society, 28.
86 Simeon Alder, David Lagakos and Lee E. Ohanian, Competitive Pressure and the Decline of
the Rust Belt: A Macroeconomic Analysis, Working Paper 20538 (Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2014). https://www.nber.org/papers/w20538.
56
manufacturing economy that he believed simply needed better trained workers to attract more
employers to the state.
In the early-1970s, Ohio’s leading industries — steel, rubber, glass, automobiles and
appliances — began to experience plant closures and job losses due to relocation mostly within
the United States.87 As a result, the population of major cities that once housed manufacturing
jobs began to decline. In some cases, the population decline was staggering. For example,
between 1970 and 1980 the populations of Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Dayton and Youngstown
all decrease by an average of 15 percent while Cleveland lost nearly 25 percent of its
population.88 The residents of these cities felt the effects of deindustrialization before the rest of
the state, which created a deep divide among the state’s legislators about how to handle the
situation. According to historians Kevin Kern and Greg Wilson, most political leaders in Ohio
believed the economic issue to be a local matter and felt passing any legislation that forced
manufacturers to give more advanced notice before plant closings would only make the plants
close faster, deter new businesses from moving to the state, or infringe upon the right of
businesses to open and close as they wished.89 Ohio’s General Assembly usually had a fairly
conservative nature, but beginning in 1970 the body was composed of an unusually high number
of conservative Democrats and anti-Democrat Republicans that held fast to a pro-business, anti-
big government doctrine90
State leaders seemed to genuinely believe that recovery from the steady decrease in
Ohio’s manufacturing output was possible. In 1973, the Ohio Department of Economic and
Community Development released its annual Review and Outlook: United States and Ohio
Economy, which provided economic forecasts for the private sector and predicted areas of
possible economic growth. Upon the report’s release, state unemployment was the highest it had
been since the Great Depression, the economy had contracted in multiple years for the first time
87 Kern and Wilson, Ohio: A History of the Buckeye State, 459.
88 Ibid., 460.
89 Ibid., 462.
90 Hugh C. McDiarmid, “The Gilligan Interlude, 1971-1975,” in Alexander P. Lamis and Brian
Usher, eds., Ohio Politics (2nd edition), 114.
57
since World War II, more industrial plants had closed than opened, and inflation rates were still
growing.91
In 1971 Rhodes had reached a term limit and relinquished the Governorship to John
Gilligan, a World War II hero and moderate Democrat intent on instituting a state income tax.
Despite his insistence on an unpopular income tax law that would eventually get him ousted
from office after one term, Gilligan was perhaps the first governor to understand that industrial
manufacturing could not be Ohio’s economic lifeline. “Our well-developed industry base has
magnified economic upswings over the past several decades,” Gilligan reported in 1973, “But if
we are to translate the 1973 national economic upswing into tangible and lasting improvement
for every Ohio family, state government must take a strong leadership role to meet the challenge
of overcoming look overlooked problems in Ohio’s economy.”92
Ohio’s problems, according to Gilligan, stemmed from the state’s long-standing refusal
to diversify the economy, particularly in the area of scientific research and technological
development. Gilligan wanted “a public foundation to stimulate research and development
activities and growth of technology-intensive industry” and a “redirection of Ohio business
recruitment efforts toward the fast-growing services sector.”93 Gilligan told readers that in order
“to generate Ohio’s full potential for economic growth and development in 1973, we will
accelerate our “mind our business” approach at the state level,” which meant using the state’s
stock of “personnel, expertise and resources” to improve the economic climate to attract new
business that represent “80 percent of the state’s future economic growth.”94 In different words,
Gilligan was acutely aware of the fact that Ohio’s economy could not grow with diversification
and significant investment in research and development. In 1973, Gilligan organized the
Citizens Task Force on Higher Education and the appointed committee reported in 1974 that
Ohio was not positioned to succeed without sustained, purposeful public investment in higher
education. Ohio ranked 15th in the nation for per-capita-income, but also ranked 48th in per-
capita expenditure on higher education with the lowest overall enrollment of any state caused, in
91 John J. Gilligan, “Review and Outlook: United States and Ohio Economy,” Ohio Department
of Economic and Community Development (Columbus, OH:1973), Southwest Ohio Regional
Depository, i, iii.
92 John J. Gilligan, “Review and Outlook: United States and Ohio Economy,” i. 93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
58
large part, by high undergraduate tuition costs at state-flagship institutions caused by a severe
lack in state assistance.95
With all of this in mind, the Regents also believed public higher education, among other
things, had a tuition problem. According to the data published in their 1976 Master Plan, the
Regents reported that the average American college student in 1975 paid roughly 25 percent of
their tuition while students in Ohio were expected to pay 35 percent of their tuition due to a lack
of state support, which wasn’t helped by the fact Ohio had the fourth highest public tuition fees
in the nation.96 Moreover, the Regents found that Ohio’s reliance on durable goods
manufacturing and the strong presence of union jobs dissuaded a good number of its citizens
from attending college.97 The Regents also called out the General Assembly for dragging their
feet on opening two-year regional campuses and believed the process took so long that “for
many years this important option was not available to high school graduates.”98 Ohio’s leaders
had created an economy reliant on jobs that were slowly fading away and the remaining
workforce was both uneducated and unable to afford tuition for them or their children.
A closer look at enrollment numbers and the state population patterns from the time
period reveal that the Regents had a point. Despite the massive enrollment increases caused by
children of the Baby Boom enrolling in higher education, Ohio was still lagging behind other
states in terms of how much of the population was actually going to college. First, a low
percentage of college-aged (18-to-22-year-old) students were enrolled in Ohio’s public colleges
and universities. The overall Ohio high school graduating class of 1968 numbered roughly
150,000 and 45,000, or 30 percent, went on to higher education.99 Far fewer students earned
degree. In 1966, a study by the Ohio Department of Education found that, on average, fourteen
out of every one-hundred Ohio high school students completed a bachelor’s degree.100 When
95 Samuel G. Sava, et al., “Citizens Task Force on Higher Education State of Ohio Final Report
to the General Assembly and the Board of Regents,” Columbus: 1974, Southwest Ohio Regional
Depository, i-iv.
96 Ohio Board of Regents, “Higher Education in Ohio Master Plan: 1976,” Southwest Ohio
Regional Depository, 29.
97 Ibid., 27.
98 Ibid.
99 Rhodes, Alternative to a Decadent Society, 34.
100 Collins W. Burnett, “Studies Dealing with the Relationship Between a Prescribed Pattern of
High School Units for Entrance Requirements and Academic Success in College,” Enclosure
59
compared to the national average of twenty-six out of every one-hundred students completing a
bachelor’s degree, Ohio’s problem becomes even more pronounced.101 These figures are
significant because they represent the extent to which Ohio’s colleges and universities relied on a
small portion of graduating high school students to bolster enrollment. The spike in enrollment
caused by Baby Boomers was a financial boon for state-assisted institutions, but even with the
thousands of new students, Ohio still had fewer students going to college than states comparable
in population. Between 1945 and 1965 the state added four million new residents, which
certainly included a large number of college-aged students, or children who would eventually be
college-aged. Between 1965 and 1975, however, Ohio’s population only grew by 500,000 and
remained relatively unchanged for the next decade. It’s easy to see how a population growth of
four million people over twenty years is much more advantageous to college enrollment than a
growth of 500,000.
Ohio had the single largest enrollment increase, 8.4 percent, between 1966 and 1967 and
those 317,547 students represented 4.5 percent of the United States’ total enrollment in the fall of
1967, which hovered around 6.9 million.102 Ohio student enrollment in the fall of 1974 was
400,428 and represented 4.1 percent of the 9.7 million students attended college in the United
States.103 The change seems minimal, but when compared to national changes over the same
time frame, a troubling pattern emerges. National enrollment increased roughly 115 percent
from 1954 to 1964 and Ohio followed closely behind with an increase of 102 percent.104
Between 1964 and 1974, however, total enrollment in the United States increased by 82.5
percent — from 5,320,000 to 9,709,000 — while Ohio’s enrollment only increased by 61%.105
So why did Ohio’s enrollment plunge more quickly than the national average? Hidden beneath
the overall enrollment numbers is the fact that Ohio was falling behind the national average of
with September-October 1967 issue of Ohio Guidance News and Views, Ohio State Department
of Education, 78. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED129998/page/n5/mode/2up.
101 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1980.
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1975/compendia/hist_stats_colonial-1970.html.
102 Ohio Board of Regents, “Ohio Basic Data Series: Higher Education: 1975,” Southwest Ohio
Regional Depository, 11.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
60
students who attended two-year institutions due largely to high price of tuition and the state not
doing enough to financially support low-income students.
Conclusion
Despite multiple state-sponsored studies in the 1940s that showed that Ohio’s policymakers and
legislators needed to better financially support public higher education, the state waited nearly
twenty years, an entire generation, to take the first step. With the creation of the Board of
Regents in 1963, and the release of their first Master Plan in 1966, public higher education in
Ohio began to be characterized as having a dual-purpose: to offer geographic and financial
accessibility as well as elite graduate programs. This dual purpose represented ongoing battles
amongst Ohio policy makers about the purpose of public higher education. After the General
Assembly and Governor Jim Rhodes invested in building new, affordable, geographically
accessible campuses, the Regents began to emphasize the development of elite, research-based
graduate programs. Governor Rhodes himself went back and forth about whether or not the state
should put resources into graduate education, but ultimately, he decided that the effort would be
valuable for Ohio’s economic development. By the late 1960s, the higher education system of
Ohio had settled on two-year campuses for associate’s degrees or credits towards a bachelor’s
degree and four-year campuses for upper-division students (juniors and seniors) earning
bachelor’s degrees and research based graduate degrees.
By 1970, however, Rhodes’ beliefs about, and support of, public higher education
changed, as evidenced by his use of the National Guard to end student protests on multiple
campuses. Instead of following the dual-purpose of higher education that had been laid out in
the Regents’ Master Plan, Rhodes decided to advocate for more state support of vocational and
technical education — a move that jeopardized both the Regents’ plan and future state economic
support for higher education. At the same time, the number of students enrolled in Ohio’s
colleges and universities was below the national average despite the enrollment growths caused
by Baby Boomers entering higher education across the nation. Either Ohio’s public colleges and
universities weren’t offering the type of courses Ohioans wanted, or needed, for employment or
the Regents’ plan to make public higher education more affordable and accessible wasn’t
working. Ohio had overcome nearly two decades of delay to double the amount of state-assisted
61
colleges in eight years — from 1962 to 1970 — but something was still holding a number of
students back from enrolling.
62
CHAPTER FOUR
A POLICY OF ACCESSIBILITY
Introduction
Since 1966, when the Ohio Board of Regents — the governing body of Ohio higher education —
published their first Master Plan for Ohio Higher Education, political and economic factors
played an influential role in determining the purpose of the state’s system of public higher
education. For the first ten years after their establishment in 1963, the Regents worked to build a
system of public higher education that emphasized both academic excellence at the graduate
level and universal access for lower-division students. The clear priority for the Regents,
however, was the need to demonstrate that Ohio could compete at the highest academic levels
with other states in the areas of research and technological development in order to earn lucrative
government contracts that would, in theory, diversify Ohio’s economy and provide thousands of
jobs for all facets of a workforce.
But, in addition to the state’s Governor, Jim Rhodes, decreasing support in advanced
higher education, a significant string of economic setbacks in the late-1970s undercut the dual-
purpose of Ohio public higher education of elite graduate-level research programs and accessible
higher education programs for working Ohioans. These economic setbacks were accompanied
by an emerging service sector economy that brought jobs that required skills or credentials that
higher education could provide. Unless the state wanted increased numbers of unemployment,
higher education had to be both financially accessible and relevant to the needs of Ohio’s
workforce.
During the process of repurposing public higher education in the late-1960s, the Regents
discovered that Ohio’s public colleges and universities had historically, when compared to other
states in the Midwest, enrolled a significantly smaller percentage of the state’s population in
higher education, regardless of how many campuses opened across the state. Moreover, Ohio
had a smaller percentage of college-aged students enrolled at two- or four-year colleges than any
other state in the Midwest despite the influx of Baby Boomers driving up enrollment at four-year
63
public campuses. Even though Ohio had more students enrolling in higher education than ever
before, roughly 70 percent the state’s traditional college-aged population was forgoing college
all together. The Regents found that a significant portion of the traditional college-aged
population who forewent college were women who were either low-income, Black, divorced
single mothers, or, in some cases, all of the above.
Examining how the purpose of Ohio higher education changed, and who was affected by
the changes, in the late-1970s and early-1980s is important because the story illustrates how
politics, policy and the economy play an outsized role in what version of public higher education
a state’s residents receive. Moreover, the changing purpose of public higher education during
this period of Ohio’s history provides a powerful example of the way that centralized state
control over higher education is not always a guaranteed way to fix systemic socio-economic
problems. American higher education has, in some ways, represented a route towards economic
and social mobility, but those routes are only available if state policymakers stay committed to
providing access through long-term planning. In other words, a policy of accessibility needs to
be tailored to a wide variety of groups of people: what is accessible to one group may not be
accessible to another.
Even when enrollments were reaching all-time highs across Ohio and the nation, a
significant number of students still couldn’t access higher education due to financial restrictions.
From the mid-to-late 1970s through the early-1980s, the Regents turned their focus to increasing
the percentage of Ohio’s population enrolled in college. While such actions may seem counter-
intuitive to the belief that college and university enrollments were experiencing unprecedented
enrollments, the fact of the matter is that aside from increased enrollments at large, public four-
year schools and some of their two-year satellite campuses, the overall enrollment in Ohio’s
public colleges and universities was comparatively low. This chapter seeks to complicate what
historians of higher education believe about the enrollment spikes caused by the Baby Boom and
argue that, particularly in Ohio, many traditional college-aged students simply didn’t go to
college.
64
Ohio’s Labor Market and Higher Education in Context
Ohio’s economic situation in the late-1970s and early-1980s was noted by the sudden collapse of
heavy industry that financially jeopardized the entire state. Some segments of heavy industry,
such as paper production and automobile assembly, went through a decades-long process of
decline while other industries like steel and rubber nearly disappeared, literally, without warning.
For example, in September 1977 Youngstown Sheet and Tube fired over 4,000 workers as the
factory was abruptly shuttered.1 In Akron, Goodyear and Firestone ended nearly all of their tire
production by 1980 in order to move operation to new plants with a more skilled workforce.2
The United States lost roughly half of its share of world manufacturing between 1960 and 1980,
but some companies still chose to adopt new production strategies to compete against
international competition. Rather than staying in cities like Cincinnati, Cleveland, Toledo and
Youngstown, corporations simply built new factories in rural areas in and outside of the Midwest
where they could pay lower wages and escape union control.
Traditionally, laborers with a specialized education overwhelmingly flock to cities with
jobs that match their skill set. Even if a local city has a job that fits a laborer’s skills,
microeconomic theory dictates that “thick markets,” or those markets with an abundance of
available jobs that desire your skill set, provide more competitive pay, which causes a brain drain
from regions that don’t have thick markets. Furthermore, the companies that hire skilled laborers
need firms that provide intermediate outputs, or services like advertising, legal counsel or
engineering support larger firms can provide themselves. Put in a different way, cities with the
largest firms attract the most knowledgeable and skilled workers who then rely on smaller firms
who also attract the most knowledgeable and skilled workers — all of whom get paid the most
competitive salaries.3 Because industrial manufacturing moved out of Ohio, other inter-
connected businesses left the state too, or had to close their doors.
As for higher education, the Regents were worried that enrollment increases during the
mid-1970s, while significant, were still lagging behind other states. The Regents noted that the
number of Ohioans born between 1946 and 1961 created the largest demographic bulge that the
1 Kern & Wilson, Ohio: A History of the Buckeye State, 465.
2 Ibid., 464. 3 William Papier, “Employment Problems in Ohio,” Journal of the Ohio University College
Business Administration, vol. 1, (1979): 2-4.
65
state had ever experienced, but that number was misleading when it came to the low proportion
of students who would actually enroll in college — a fact that had been causing enrollment
instability across Ohio system of public higher education for over a decade. Although about
75% of all Ohio 18 year olds graduated from high school, and of those, about 60% attended
colleges, even recent increases due to the Baby Boom still meant that the enrollment of college
age students had been declining, which led the Regents to state that “the participation rate of the
so-called traditional college age group has been declining during the decade of the 1970s.”4
At the public institutions of higher education, there was some, but not significant
enrollment growth during the decade of the 1970s.5 Of the state’s five residential universities,
only Miami University and Bowling Green State University had a larger enrollment in the fall of
1977 than in 1971, and the Regents noted that, “while Central State had experienced a 28 percent
decline, Kent State had experienced an 11 percent decline, and Ohio University experienced a 32
percent decline.”6 Enrollments were so unstable at Ohio University that the gains of over 2,000
full-time students between 1974 and 1976 were wiped away by 1978, leaving the school with 64
fewer students than they had in 1971.7 As a result, Ohio University had seen a 32 percent drop
in the amount of money collected from student tuition.8 The only institutions actually gaining
students between 1971 and the fall of 1977 were two-year community colleges and technical
schools. According to the Regents, “Cuyahoga Community College was about 40 percent larger;
Lakeland 66 percent larger; and Sinclair was 162 percent larger.”9 Of the state’s 17 technical
colleges, each had more substantial enrollment increases. In fact, between 1971 and 1977, the
Agricultural Technical Institute of Ohio State had the largest enrollment increase of any state-
assisted institution in the state with over 900 students.10 Interestingly enough, the only numbers
to truly increase, or, at the very least, remain stable, were enrollments in graduate education, due
in large part to the state subsidies given to graduate programs and their students.
4 Ohio Board of Regents, “A Strategic Approach to the Maintenance of Institutional Financial
Stability and Flexibility in the Face of Enrollment Instability or Decline,” Southwest Ohio
Regional Depository, 1979, 3.
5 Ibid., 47.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 122.
9 Ibid., 48.
10 Ibid.
66
In response to declining undergraduate enrollments, the Regents sought a new plan that
included finding new students, expanding academic programs, and reducing qualitative standards
of admission. Most important to the Regents’ plan was “the expansion of part-time enrollment”
and “the expansion of continuing education as a public service,” which would help “reduce long-
term economic commitments and “seek alternative uses of capital plant.”11 Critical to the plan
was that the targeted new students would come from “the recruitment and enrollment of… high
school graduates who may not have considered college enrollment as an alternative to
employment, to employment training, to military service, or to unemployment.”12
If the Regents could get more students enrolled, then they believed Ohio’s economy
could get back on track. “The only hope for higher education affluence lies in economic
growth,” wrote the Regents, “and in a demonstration that economic growth has been influenced
or advanced by higher education.”13 Unless more students, those students who had largely
forgone college, were not enrolled and trained for employment, “Ohio will experience declining
per capita income, declining capital investment, declining population, declining governmental
revenues, and a declining quality of life.”14 The following sections examine how Ohio’s General
Assembly and Board of Regents worked together to identify what segments of the state’s
population were not attending an institution of higher education, what the government could do
to assist those potential students into higher education, and how public higher education was
designed to help bring Ohio’s economy out of recession through a newly educated, service-sector
oriented workforce. The General Assembly and Board of Regents initially focused on enrolling
low-income women who were often single mothers in technical education programs before
turning their attention to creating a statewide career education program that would, if successful,
re-skill millions of Ohio’s workers.
11 Ohio Board of Regents, “A Strategic Approach to the Maintenance of Institutional Financial
Stability and Flexibility in the Face of Enrollment Instability or Decline,” 145, 147.
12 Ibid., 152.
13 Ibid., 29.
14 Ibid., 45.
67
Who’s Missing?
The Regents comprehended how significant the development of new skills would be to Ohio’s
economy and labor force, but they still had to figure out what groups of both traditional and non-
traditional college-aged students were most likely to forgo college. As early as 1974, the
Regents knew that “Ohio dramatically falls below the national average of all states in the
percentage of population enrolled in post-secondary education” and, when compared to peer
states like Michigan, Pennsylvania and Illinois, Ohio’s post-secondary enrollment would need to
grow by 80,000 “to have a percentage rate equaled the national average.”15 By 1979, the
Regents believed people were not using local campuses to improve their “mid-career
occupational or professional skill” through continuing education programs, or simply never
going to college in the first place and were deemed as “missing students.”16 The Regents
discovered that the largest group of Ohioans not attending college were low-income women — a
group often considered the most economically disadvantaged in Ohio.
According to the Regents, the majority of the women not attending college students were
low-income African Americans. Of Ohio’s eighty-eight counties, the five counties with the
highest percentage of Black residents were the top five counties with the highest number of
people not enrolled in higher education. The Black population of Cuyahoga, Hamilton, Franklin,
Summit, Montgomery and Lucas Counties in the late-1970s through the 1980s accounted for
roughly 68 percent of Ohio’s overall Black population, and 28 percent of the “missing students”
not enrolled in higher education.17 To make matters even more troublesome, the major city in
each county had a higher Black population, a higher poverty rate, and a larger percentage of
people not in the workforce than those living in non-metropolitan, majority non-Hispanic white
areas of the state.18 Ohio had fallen behind in the percentage of people not enrolled in higher
education because of the absence of enrollment in highly concentrated areas of poor, Black
15 Ohio Board of Regents, “New Directions in Higher Education,” Southwest Ohio Regional
Depository, 1976, 1.
16 Ibid., 1.
17 Ohio Development Services Agency, Ohio African Americans, Columbus, OH: Ohio
Development Services Agency, 2019, accessed December 27, 2019.
https://development.ohio.gov/files/research/P7003.pdf.
18 Alan Mallach and Lavea Brachman, Ohio’s Cities at a Turning Point: Finding the Way
Forward, (Washington, D.C.: Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings Institute, 2010), 8, 9,
13, 15.
68
citizens. Much of the fault here lies in the Regent’s limited support of their own concept of
“accessibility.” Although since the first Master Plan for Higher Education in Ohio in 1966, the
Regents had made a commitment to access to higher education for those with limited economic
resources, it was not until the early-1980s that the Regents provided actual financial assistance to
those potential students. In other words, the Regents identified a social and emotional deficit of
African Americans as the cause for their low enrollment in higher education, and not their
limited financial resources and high tuition costs. In fact, finances were the main reason for
African American under-enrollment, and the financial barriers were, in part, created by higher
education institutions because of the state’s funding model: in 1979, the price of four-year higher
education across Ohio was almost $300 more than the national average.19 What’s more, the
average cost of tuition — without room and board — at the public four-year institutions serving
Cuyahoga, Franklin, Lucas, Montgomery Summit and Hamilton counties was roughly $1,000,
which was roughly 25 percent of local annual income.20 As a result, an overwhelming majority
of Black students living in these counties enrolled at two-year community colleges where the
cost of tuition averaged around $600.
The most under-represented sub-group in Ohio higher education was priced out of the
institutions that offered the most advanced degrees. The chances of low-income Black Ohioans
earning a four-year degree from a public college or university was the lowest of any
demographic group in the state. A report from 1983 reveals that a positive correlation existed
between an institution’s price — or its number of advanced degree programs — and the number
of Black students enrolled at that institution. For example, between 1979 and 1983, on average,
90% of all students attending branch campuses — a term the Regents used for two-year
campuses connected to residential, four-year institutions — technical colleges and four-year
institutions were white. These institutions also charged a higher tuition, or had more advanced
degree programs, than community colleges.21 Even though 10 percent of Ohio’s population was
19 Ohio Board of Regents, “Basic Data Series: 1987,” Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 41.
20 Ohio Board of Regents, “Basic Data Series: 1983,” Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 35,
36; National Longitudinal Surveys, Family Poverty Status and Family Poverty Level
Variables:1979-2018, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019,
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/other-documentation/codebook-
supplement/nlsy79-appendix-2-total-net-family-3.
21 Ohio Board of Regents, “Basic Data Series: 1983,” 62-68.
69
Black in 1983, they were woefully underrepresented at most public institutions. Black people
made up 6.8 percent of the students at four-year public institutions, 2.6% of the students at
branch campuses and 6.5 percent of the students at technical colleges.22 Black enrollment at
community colleges, however, was 14 percent.23 In fact, 70 percent of all Black college students
enrolled in Ohio’s community colleges went to one campus, Cuyahoga Community College,
which served the Cleveland metropolitan area.24 Black Ohioans were attending college, but the
overwhelming majority were enrolled in urban community colleges.
There are a number of reasons behind this phenomenon. First, there was a pervasive
sense of racism in Ohio, as in much of the nation, during the 1960s through the 1970s. In Ohio,
although a northern state, as historian Andrew Cayton has argued, “de facto segregation . . . .
flourished in everyday life.”25 Second, through the 1970s, Ohio’s white residents became
increasingly drawn to the Republican Party as Black voters shifted their allegiance to the
Democratic Party, which, except for the last four years of 1970s, would not hold a majority of
both houses in Ohio’s General Assembly for the rest of the century. As a result, political
representation for Ohio’s Black population was increasingly limited. Third, native white
Ohioans were largely segregated from Blacks throughout most of the twentieth century. State
policymakers did not strike down residential segregation until 1965, and by that point white Ohio
residents were leaving large cities for the suburbs as the Black population became heavily
concentrated in metropolitan areas — a separation that feasibly kept any struggles faced by
Black Ohioans hidden from the gaze of white policymakers and citizens.26 Such a level of
systemic neglect and segregation proved to be destructive to the livelihood of Black Ohioans and
created the economic consequences the Regents needed to address.
22 Ohio Board of Regents, “Basic Data Series: 1983,” 62-68.
23 Ibid.
24 Ohio Board of Regents, “Basic Data Series: 1987,” 64. 25 Andrew R.L. Cayton, Ohio: A History of a People (Columbus: The Ohio State University
Press, 2002), 342.
26 Patrick J. Leahy and Nancy Grant, “Racial Residential Segregation in Ohio’s Eight Largest
Cities: 1950-1980,” The Ohio Journal of Science 85, no. 1 (1985): 2-6.
https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/23045/V085N1_002.pdf;jsessionid=538693B8E3009E
644C525505762C1ABB?sequence=1; Adam A. Millsap, “How the Gem City Lost Its Luster and
How It Can Get It Back: A Case Study of Dayton, Ohio,” Mercatus Research, Mercatus Center
at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, 2017.
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/millsap-dayton-ohio-case-study-mr-mercatus-v3.pdf.
70
One of the biggest consequences of Ohio’s de facto segregation was the disproportionate
number of African Americans who were unemployed or out of the labor force entirely, when in
the 1970s, the state’s economy went into recession and opportunities for employment were
largely confined to the service sector. Cayton writes, “The fact that employers in service
industries put a greater emphasis on education and appearance than plant managers meant that
prejudice, conscious or unconscious, affected the hiring of Black men.”27 Black citizens’ lack of
political, economic and educational equality in the previous decades meant that a large portion of
Ohio’s Black population — both men and women — did not possess the same credentials as
whites when applying for service sector jobs. As a result, Black employment conditions did not
improve, generational wealth did not accumulate, and there was less possibility of paying for a
child’s college tuition.
Why did the Regents’ initial 1966 plan not do anything to help Ohio’s low-income Black
women? The Regents and state leaders had largely focused funding towards building two-year
campuses across the state to reach those most geographically isolated from higher education, an
effort that, although funded by bond issues, left the state with a large deficit. The campuses were
built, but state leaders, due to continuing budget constrictions, could not provide individual
financial assistance for students who may have been closer to a college but still couldn’t afford to
enroll. The state offered grants and other forms of scholarships, yet not on a scale that would
help every low-income student in part because the state had some of the highest tuition rates in
the nation. This absence was exacerbated when the manufacturing industry fell, thus limiting the
financial opportunities of the state’s poorest citizens.
The Regents’ initially relied on funding from the Higher Education Amendments of 1972
in the form of grants that would help low-income students with the cost of higher education —
but that source of federal funding disappeared in the early-1980s as Congress slowly phased out
need-based higher education grant and scholarship programs that had been around since the
early-1970s and replaced it with a student-loan system.28 Many students, including those from
low-income backgrounds, were left to the mercy of banks that demanded repayment of a loan
after completing college. In states where budgets were plush enough to provide student aid, the
27 Cayton, Ohio: A History of a People, 342.
28 Lawrence E. Gladieux, "The Issue of Equity in College Finance," Proceedings of the Academy
of Political Science 35, no. 2 (1983): 74.
71
effects of less federal funding were temporarily off-set, but financially-strapped states like Ohio
could offer no such help.
This change in need-based funding meant two things for Ohio’s most disadvantaged
populations. First, students from low-income backgrounds were less likely to attend four-year
colleges without taking on massive amounts of debt to do so — unless, of course, they received
an academic scholarship from the institution or need-based grants that covered a sizeable portion
of their tuition. Second, many non-traditional and low-income students were forced to attend the
lowest priced college while also working to cover living expenses since many, if not most, non-
four-year institutions did not provide residential facilities or work-study jobs that paid above the
poverty line.29 By the early-1980s, Ohio’s leaders had very little funding to provide potential
students with financial aid, a portion of the population without the skills needed for service
sector employment, and no financially feasible way to send students to college without causing
some form of financial hardship or unimaginable debt. These conditions were particularly
devastating to low income and African American Ohioans.
The Displaced Homemakers
A second group identified as being particularly under-enrolled in higher education in Ohio was
recently divorced women and single mothers, identified by one state program as “displaced
homemakers.” The Democratic Party controlled both houses of the Ohio General Assembly
from 1976 to 1980, and despite funding restrictions, the 112th General Assembly passed House
Bill 32 in 1978 to create the Displaced Homemakers program at all three Cuyahoga Community
College (CCC) campuses with roughly $200,000 in state assistance. House Bill 32 called for a
multipurpose service center that provided “health, education, training, job placement, and other
services for displaced homemakers,” an individual the General Assembly defined as thirty-five
years of age or older, has worked without pay because they stayed at home, not currently
employed, or would be likely to struggle finding a job, either deprived of the financial support
they once received from a dependent, or “has become ineligible for public assistance as the
29 Therese L. Baker and William Velez, “Access to and Opportunity in Postsecondary Education
in the United States: A Review,” Sociology of Education 69 (1996): 93.
72
parent of a needy child.”30 One qualified as a displaced homemaker only if they met all those
requirements, or at least one part of each requirement, and in effect the program was targeted for
low-income, unemployed, single mothers. Put differently, the “displaced homemakers” program
is an example of how state legislators in the 1970s began to see higher education’s link to the
new service economy by identifying higher education as a way to improve the economic
participation of a group of people — low-income women — who might well contribute to the
new service economy.
The 1978 Displaced Homemakers program was the state’s first step in addressing how
seriously the recent economic recession had affected low-income women in Ohio. In particular,
Black women have historically been the most marginalized group in the United States and
suffered a disproportionate amount of economic discrimination due to both sexism and racism in
and out of the workplace.31 The Ohio General Assembly acknowledged as much when they
concluded that “minority women are the lowest paid workers in the labor force.”32 Towards that
end, the number of Black and white low-income women had continued to increase since the
1950s. At the same time, divorce rates skyrocketed, which, when combined with inflation, the
loss of jobs that didn’t require higher education and no marketable skills, an overwhelming
percentage of women — almost 80 percent — were confined to employment in low-paying, low-
30 Ohio Board of Regents, “Displaced Homemakers: Evaluation Report on the Pilot Program at
Cuyahoga Community College,” Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 1980, 1. The term
“displaced homemakers” was not coined by the Ohio General Assembly. While no definitive
conclusions can be made about where the term originated, a case can be made that “displaced
homemakers” became popularized when Tish Sommers and Laurie Shields of the National
Organization for Women created a grassroots effort to encourage California lawmakers to create
a Displaced Homemakers program at state-funded colleges and universities and Yvonne Burke, a
member of the U.S. House of Representatives from California introduced a Displaced
Homemakers Bill in 1975. For more on the history of displaced homemakers, see: Barbara H.
Vinick & Ruth H. Jacobs, The Displaced Homemaker: A State-of-the-Art Review (Working paper
/ Wellesley College, Center for Research on Women, 1980).
31 For more information on the economic marginalization in the United States’ economy see:
Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from
Slavery to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 1985) and Deborah Gray White, “Making a
Way Out of No Way,” in Too Heavy a Load: Black Women in Defense of Themselves, 1894–
1994” (W.W. Norton & Company, 1999).
32 Ohio Board of Regents, “Displaced Homemakers: Evaluation Report on the Pilot Program at
Cuyahoga Community College,” 27.
73
status jobs in service industries, clerical fields, and retail sales where they made 60.2 percent of
what men earned.33 Women who worked these occupations lived without health insurance,
retirement plans and maternity leave despite the fact that nearly a fifth of all American women in
the 1970s were the breadwinner for their families.34 According to the Regents, Ohio had 190,000
“displaced homemakers.”35
Ohio’s leaders seemed to take all of this into account when they crafted the Displaced
Homemakers program. The General Assembly mandated that CCC would offer services like job
counseling, job training, assistance in job placement, health services, money management
programs, information on government assistance programs and personal counseling — all with
the intention of helping participants be job ready and, eventually, economically independent in
the new service economy.36 These offerings of the Displaced Homemakers program provided
radical new innovations to higher education which had traditionally focused largely on
academics. Within the program, students had affordable access to gynecological examinations,
appointments with state officials to discuss credit, legal aid, insurance, how to apply for financial
assistance and free counseling with a College psychologist.37 In order to begin the program,
participants were invited to a CCC campus, given a questionnaire to gauge their employment
needs, and provided with job counselling.38 Once students were placed in their program, they
began taking courses to fulfill a degree or certification program and, with the help of their
advisors, found employment.
Ohio’s 112th General Assembly argued that various factors, including access to higher
education, contributed to economic recovery and that state assistance was required in all
recovery efforts. Policymakers understood that central to any recovery effort was access to
higher education, especially for low-income women. No other institution under the control of
Ohio’s state government was in as many places, with the ability to provide as many services, as
the state’s network of colleges and universities. Before the late-1970s and early-1980s, Ohio’s
33 Ohio Board of Regents, “Displaced Homemakers,” 27. 34 Teresa Amott and Julie Matthaei, Race, Gender, and Work: A Multicultural Economic History
of Women in the U.S. (Boston: South End Press, 1996), 107. 35 Ohio Board of Regents, “Displaced Homemakers: Evaluation Report on the Pilot Program at
Cuyahoga Community College,” 27. 36 Ibid., 6-7, 8.
37 Ibid., 13-18.
38 Ibid., 12.
74
leaders used public higher education to focus on developing research to expand the state’s
economy to ward off economic recession and provide a way for people to receive an education,
if they wanted it, and if they could access it. In this earlier vision, public higher education in
Ohio was most valuable to the state because of what it could produce. However, by the late-
1970s, Ohio policy makers identified public higher education as most valuable to the state
because of how it could contribute to the state’s economic recovery.
Ohio’s General Assembly asked the Board of Regents to create a job training program for
low-income women that specifically focused on teaching the skills needed for service-sector
careers. More specifically, the General Assembly mandated that the “center’s program shall
include training for: employment counselors in social service agencies, home health technicians
with skills in nutrition, basic health care, and nursing for the disabled and elderly; health care
counselors for employment in hospital out-patient and community clinics, especially in the
counseling of middle-aged patients.”39 Most of the careers listed by the General Assembly were
commonly known as “pink collar” jobs, or jobs that were traditionally held by women in the
service economy.
Aside from what the Displaced Homemakers program would teach, the question of why
the General Assembly chose Cuyahoga Community College still deserves some clarification.
First, CCC was the largest community college in Ohio both in terms of enrollment and number
of campuses. In 1979, Cuyahoga County consisted of wealthy, mostly white suburbs, a densely
populated city where African Americans made up a majority of the residents, and working-class
neighborhoods throughout the western half of the county. CCC had a campus in each of these
areas. Second, Cleveland’s Metropolitan area was the largest in the state and had one of the
highest unemployment rates for women. In fact, Metropolitan Cleveland’s poverty rate in 1980
was nearly 34 percent and recent studies show that women accounted for half of that number,
meaning roughly 16 percent of the women in and around Cleveland were living under the
poverty line at a time when no more than 7 percent of women in the United States were living in
poverty.40
39 Ohio Board of Regents, “Displaced Homemakers: Evaluation Report on the Pilot Program at
Cuyahoga Community College,” 83.
40 Mark J. Salling, Cleveland Neighborhood Conditions and Trends, a report published by the
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, 2001, 22.
75
The Regents and General Assembly chose to pilot the Displaced Homemakers program at
Cuyahoga Community College because, according to the Regents, “of known needs for this kind
of program in the Cleveland area and because of the College’s on-going commitment to
programs for women.”41 Since the Displaced Homemakers Program was piloted in both urban
and suburban areas with a high proportion of unemployed women, particularly African American
women, the program effectively became a way to assist the entry of low-income women into
higher education and back into the workforce.
The program’s first year proved to be a success. According to data collected by the
Regents, more than half the Displaced Homemakers program graduates went on to find
employment.42 The Regents were pleased that “243 displaced homemakers…are now employed
have become contributing members of society…instead of needing public assistance for
themselves they are now, through their tax dollars, providing assistance for others.”43 One
women who graduated from the program said, “I thought I was past the age of studying. This
program gave me the courage to start forward with credits toward a degree in nursing.”44
There’s plenty to learn from the Displaced Homemakers program, especially when
studying the influence of state policy on public higher education. The Regents and General
Assembly were, for the most part, in sync with what they believed was best for the state’s
economic recovery and what role public higher education would play. In the 1940s and 1950s,
state leaders widely ignored the recommendation to expand public higher education for research
development. As public higher education became more centralized in the 1960s, the General
Assembly and Governors began to play outsized roles in their influence over policies that pulled
economic recovery, job training and Ohio’s public colleges and universities together.
The lesson here is simple but profoundly important to the success of centralized state
systems of public higher education: policymakers and the governing bodies of higher education
must be on the same page, have a functional relationship, be aware of their state’s economic
climate and consider ways public colleges and universities can both prevent economic stagnation
and respond accordingly to economic downturn. By the mid-1980s, most state systems of public
41 Ohio Board of Regents, “Displaced Homemakers: Evaluation Report on the Pilot Program at
Cuyahoga Community College,” 2.
42 Ibid., 54. 43 Ibid., 2.
44 Ibid., 61.
76
higher education were no longer loosely bound and autonomous. They were collectively
connected and seen as a viable public institution whose purpose, in part, was to provide for the
public good. What’s perhaps most tragic about this new arrangement is that it wasn’t destined to
last, regardless of how effective it could be.
A New Social Compact
Given the state’s high unemployment rate in the late-1970s, the Regents believed more could be
done to assist Ohioans. The original emphasis they placed on “missing students” slowly
expanded through the early-1980s to encompass a statewide program of career development,
skills training, and off-the-job continuing education that attempted to turn public higher
education into a for-profit public service. Aside from proving through the Displaced
Homemakers program that Ohioans would use public higher education for economic
improvement, a potential factor leading to the Regents and General Assembly’s decision to use
higher education as an avenue towards economic recovery was the changing public perception of
the value of college and university study. According to the Regents’ 1982 Master Plan, Ohioans
were coming around to the idea that there is a “high correlation between higher levels of
education and higher lifetime earnings,” that “college graduates generally suffer lower
unemployment during difficult economic times,” and that “a college degree is a valuable asset to
older persons reentering the job market and continuing education helps persons upgrade their
employment skills in a rapidly changing technological society.”45
By the early-1980s, the Regents’ case for adapting higher education for economic
development was gaining ground in the state. In 1982, of the 325,000 adults enrolled in both
non-credit and vocational education programs across the state, 10,400 were enrolled in one-year
certification programs — a significant increase since 1978.46 What’s more, roughly 300,000
people were in non-credit programs and of those 300,000, more than ten percent were taking
non-credit courses at a technical campus.47 These enrollment increases pointed to several key
developments, the most important being that Ohioans also saw the value of higher education for
45 Ohio Board of Regents, “Master Plan for Higher Education: Opportunity in a Time of Change:
1982,” Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 8.
46 Ohio Board of Regents, “Ohio Economic Outlook: 1982,” Southwest Ohio Regional
Depository, 10.
47 Ibid., 12.
77
economic improvement and recovery. The Regents reported that some companies were
sponsoring continuing education programs for their employees through higher education.
Nonetheless, some of Ohio’s largest companies were meeting their own training needs and didn’t
have a relationship with their local college or university.48 The case of company supported
education, which sidestepped formal higher education, was not unique to Ohio in this period. In
1982, at the national level, more than 72 percent of the students participating in postsecondary
education, or any type of education after receiving a high school diploma, were learning through
non-school organizations instead of colleges and universities. Private companies were spending
just as much on their own in-house training and instruction than colleges students were spending
on traditional higher education.49 Through the early 1980s, more employees across America
were being re-trained and skilled by their companies who spent just as much on continuing
education programs as traditional college students did on public higher education.
Yet Ohio remained behind the nation in this aspect of company training. The Regents
found that less than one percent of Ohio’s companies provided their employees with an in-house
training program, and, consequently, public colleges and universities were in a strong position to
develop programs for those in the labor force with limited access to development and training
opportunities.50 If the Regents could find a way to make a business-public higher education
partnership work, the payoff could be lucrative and help provide much needed funding to
institutions. But the Regents had to convince Ohio’s legislative leaders to fund such programs
through the state’s colleges and universities.
To convince policymakers of this option, in a 1982 proposal, the Regents’ played-up the
extent of Ohio’s economic downturn and public higher education’s potential ability to help the
economy recover. “It is our conviction,” writes the Regents, “that Ohio must organize for
unusual efforts throughout the balance of the century…Indeed, given the knowledge-based
character of the technological explosion in which we find ourselves, Ohio must likely organize
for concerted common efforts throughout the foreseeable future.”51 The Regents’ reported to
48 Ohio Board of Regents, “Ohio Economic Outlook: 1982,” 22.
49 Ohio Board of Regents, “Employer-Sponsored Instruction: Focus on Ohio Business and
Industry,” Ohio Southwest Regional Depository, 1982, 1.
50 Ibid., 37-38.
51 Ohio Board of Regents, “A Proposal to Establish the Ohio Business, Education and
Government Alliance,” Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 1982, 1.
78
state leaders that Ohio’s biggest cities were “severely declining,” the economy was “structurally
weak” due to over-reliance on heavy industry, and that “economic revitalization will depend
largely upon the further development of emerging technologies,” which could only happen
through policy-based action.52 Yet, if the General Assembly approved the Regents’ mandate for
a business, education and government alliance, then an appointed committee would do the leg
work of directing research on emerging technologies, work with businesses to train their
employees to create a more skilled labor force, and lead the way towards economic
revitalization.53
To convince public colleges and universities to fundamentally alter their programming,
the Regents relied primarily on guilt and the possibility of financial incentive. The Regents’
argued that public colleges and universities had not done enough to reach the general public and
believed that efforts from these institutions “should be dramatically expanded and intensified” in
order to reach “society at large” by “extending its instructional and research resources to
individuals and groups not normally viewed as within the academic community.”54 Towards that
end, the Regents asserted that the “fortunes of higher education in Ohio…are inextricably linked
to the fortunes of the state as a whole,” and “Ohio’s colleges and universities should therefore be
willing and determined to help the state meet its current challenges.”55 The Regents described
this step as a “renewed attention to services rendered to the larger society” that would require
public higher education institutions to “conduct a broad review of its own instructional, research,
and public service activities with a view to enhancing relationships with the developmental
interests of the state.”56 Such a goal, the Regents contended, could be achieved by colleges and
universities focusing on educating and serving local residents, government institutions and
businesses through a cooperative relationship.57
In making this recommendation, the Regents were following what it deemed to be a “new
social compact” in which the economic needs of the state and the strengths of higher education
52 Ibid., 3.
53 Ibid., 14-15. 54 Ohio Board of Regents, “Opportunity in a Time of Change,” Southwest Ohio Regional
Depository, 1984, 9.
55 Ibid., 10.
56 Ibid., 27.
57 Ibid., 15, 29.
79
intersected. Colleges and universities should partner with businesses, health care professions,
labor, government and industrial leaders to, according to the Regents, “promote advancement of
the quality of life in Ohio.”58 The plan called for faculty and administrators to make a front-end
investment on three tenants of higher education — instruction, research and public service — to
“expand the public’s appreciation of higher education,” which would result in Ohioans seeing
how much of a payoff higher education is and would then be eager to “fund college and
university service activities.”59 In this call for higher education’s contribution, the state admitted
that it did not have the funding to pilot “the new social compact” program across the state, but
that the notion of such a social contract was “not unlike the long-accepted concept of student and
state sharing the cost of instruction in which both benefit.”60
The regents’ proposal did offer a different kind of support for higher education in the
form of enrollment increases. State enrollments had declined since the mid-1970s and,
according to the Regents’ plan, colleges and universities could mitigate those losses, and be of
more public service, by reaching more non-traditional students through recruitment. This was
their theory, although in fact, non-traditional students were more likely to be employed, or have
an employment schedule that conflicted with course work. Such students were also more likely
to have families and were less incentivized to make the financial sacrifice of tuition.
Unfortunately, most colleges and universities never got the chance to take on the
Regent’s charge of developing and enrolling workers in off-the-job training programs. At the
same time that the Regents were lobbying the state for this funding, Jim Rhodes was locked in a
budget war with the divided General Assembly. While Democrats kept control of the lower-
chamber for the 1981-1982 session, Republicans won the Senate, which set-off an ideological
battle over state spending and tax increases. Rhodes had been re-elected twice on the promise of
“no new taxes” that favored well with the Senate and angered House Democrats who believed
that the state needed increased state spending but only with increased taxes.61 With the state in
such a deep recession, Rhodes had no choice but to increase taxes. A budget for 1982 finally
arrived the fall of 1981 —albeit after two interim budgets and four-months after the agreed-upon
58 Ohio Board of Regents, “Opportunity in a Time of Change,” 10.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. 61 Leonard, “Rhodes Second Eight Years, 1975-1983,” in Lamis and Usher, eds., Ohio Politics,
155.
80
deadline — that increased spending by 22 percent and increased the sales tax from 4 to 5.1
percent.62 Rhodes reluctantly signed the budget in late-1981, but threatened spending cuts of
nearly 30 percent if the General Assembly didn’t provide a 1983 budget with less spending and
more agreeable tax increases.63 In late-1982, Rhodes got what he wanted. The 1983 budget cut
state spending by more than ten percent with four percent cuts to education.64 The Regents’
legislative proposal for a social contract between business and higher education over job training
never made it past the House floor.
Conclusion: Toward a Working Ohio
In the 1960s, the Regents and General Assembly wondered why enrollment at Ohio’s state-
assisted colleges and universities had not increased like they were with the Baby Boom
generation in other states. By the 1970s, both groups faced a more challenging problem of an
economic recession and increasing financial limitations facing potential college students. How
the Regents and General Assembly imagined the use of Ohio’s public colleges and universities
during the ten years between 1976 and 1983 discloses several realities about contemporary
higher education that policymakers should take to heart. Above all else, public higher education
is co-dependent on the economic and political health of a state. Policymakers can decide to cut
funding to higher education in order to save money, but the ensuing tuition hikes will not only
create a financial burden for the most economically vulnerable populations, it will deny
thousands in the labor force the ability to grow their skills and engage in career mobility. And if
policymakers decide to provide more funding to higher education for the sake of economic
improvement, the investment must be long-term and far-reaching. But more investment in
higher education also needs to be tied back to the investors — the students who attend public
colleges and universities.
Public higher education is also the place where most of the state’s interests converge.
Low-income students need access to public colleges and universities for employment-based
training, lower-middle-class students need higher education for career mobility, and the state
needs both of these groups to be financially self-sufficient to ensure economic stability while
62 Leonard, “Rhodes Second Eight Years, 1975-1983,” 155.
63 Ibid., 157.
64 Ibid., 158.
81
universities need funding for research to create innovating technologies that, in time, can help
state economies, and its’ labor force, grow. Moreover, policymakers cannot use public higher
education as a political weapon. The economic consequences are too steep. State systems of
public higher education are both a curse and a blessing because they can be used by partisans to
make an expedient political point, or wielded to empower a state’s population in an efficient,
productive way.
Finally, every interest holder involved with public colleges and universities —
policymakers, faculty, students and companies — needs to understand that higher education does
not just have one purpose. The Ohio Board of Regents understood as much when they crafted a
state system that focused on both access and academic prestige. In 1975, Ohio’s system of
public higher education did not have all the elements necessary to be accessible to anyone who
wanted a post-secondary education. Multiple governing agencies attempted to correct this
problem by trying to expand the number of technical and vocational education centers, offering
state-supported programs to reach low-income populations, re-thinking how faculty could teach
students who already had full-time employment, and conceptualizing a business-higher
education relationship that focused exclusively on statewide economic development. The
problem is that each of these attempts were viewed by some to be inherently political or were
suggested during the state’s worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. None of the
attempts to repurpose Ohio higher education would fundamentally alter the character of the
system — they merely represented a belief that Ohio higher education could do so much more.
82
CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000
Selective Investment
The rest of the 1980s proved to be just as challenging for Ohio higher education as the first half
of the decade. By 1984 unemployment had reached a recessionary peak of 12.5 percent, state
per capita income fell from 15th in the nation to 25th, and the state had one of the lowest
population growth rates in the country.1 As a result of the state’s 1982 budget deficit, the Board
of Regents, along with the newly elected Governor, Richard Celeste, and the General Assembly,
agreed that the state should incentivize individual higher education institutions to either create
new research programs or to excel in undergraduate education, a strategy they called ‘selective
investment.’2 This chapter examines how the Regents still had a role in governing the state’s
colleges and universities, and argues that the 1980s ushered in a new era where institutions were
given more autonomy and responsibility to find their own sources of funding. The state could no
longer be the main financial supporter of higher education. It was up to the individual
institutions to find the means to pay the bulk of their bills.
Despite significant financial limitations, the Regent’s proposal for ‘selective investment’
largely mirrored their longstanding belief that public higher education in Ohio should be both
accessible and academically prestigious. Public two-year and four-year institutions could earn
the Program Excellence Award, which provided a one-time enrichment grant of roughly
$136,000 to the college or university with the best undergraduate program.3 The criteria used to
select a winning institution, according to the Regents, was that their undergraduate program
provided an education that “facilitates personal intellectual development, preparation to gain
employment and mature in a career, the ability to achieve economic and social mobility, and a
1 Ohio Board of Regents, “Towards the Year 2000: Higher Education in Transition: Volume 1,”
Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 1988, 21.
2 Ibid., 20.
3 Ibid.
83
commitment to community service.”4 By including two-year public institutions, the Regents
reaffirmed that students could receive a quality education somewhere other than a public four-
year college or university. The Regents’ also hoped that their strategy would encourage public
two-year institutions to improve their education programs by prioritizing academic planning and
focusing on an institutional mission.5 Two-year institutions could also receive funding by
focusing on excellence in classroom instruction, which would qualify them for a funds to build
instructional centers for the professional development of new faculty, and create job training
programs with local high schools that encouraged students to pursue a college degree.6
The main emphasis of the ‘selective investment’ program, however, was to encourage
public four-year institutions to build a more prestigious academic reputation. The Regents thus
maintained their historic interest in making public higher education in Ohio more elite in terms
of research and development in order to attract distinguished faculty and contracts from budding
industries and the federal government. This priority is reflected in the amount of research
funding earmarked by Regents during the mid-to-late-1980s. From 1984 to 1989, the state
earmarked nearly $64 million dollars for public higher education to “increase research activity
by supporting projects with a very high probability for attracting additional funds from business,
industry, and the federal government,” and to bring to four-year institutions “Ohio’s strongest
academic departments outstanding faculty members who have achieved national and
international prominence for their teaching, scholarship, and research.”7 In comparison, the state
only allocated $17 million for programs that specifically applied to two-year institutions despite
the fact nearly as many students enrolled at two-year colleges and universities as four-year
institutions.
The emphasis on increased prestige corresponded with an increased level of institutional
autonomy, and some campus leaders were pleased to know that they could promote innovation at
their institution, be financially rewarded for doing a good job, and not have to deal with state
regulation. E. Fred Carlisle, the Provost at Miami University, said as much in a speech given to
the University of Wisconsin System Conference on Assessment in 1988:
4 Ohio Board of Regents, “Towards the Year 2000: Higher Education in Transition: Volume 1,”
22.
5 Ibid., 19.
6 Ibid., 21. 7 Ibid., 21.
84
“Selective Excellence is nicely balanced between statewide challenge and
institutional definition of strength and priority. It balances, as well, state-wide
requirements for demonstration with internal choices of specific means. It
provided resources directly to academic programs. It spends money, in other
words, to challenge and reward, not to establish elaborate statewide regulatory
systems for assessing higher education. It focuses attention on achievement and
improvement… Above all, it protects the integrity of the campus.”8
The decision to give individual institutions more autonomy represents yet another example of
Ohio’s leaders sidestepping a national trend in American higher education. Historians of
American higher education generally agree that the federal government played an outsized role
in financially stabilizing colleges and universities in the two decades after World War II.9 By the
mid-1970s, state governments also took on more financial responsibility for the public colleges
and universities in their state. Since state governments do not share the same level of wealth as
the federal government, and some states produce far less wealth than others, a new era of
financial inequality began in American higher education. Most states could not provide a
consistent stream of financial assistance to public institutions, which resulted in higher tuition
costs for students and the growth of a fundraising bureaucracy at nearly every college and
university. Ohio, however, never shouldered the financial burden of funding its public
institutions, in part because it could not afford to.
The Regents’ decision to reward individual institutions for technological innovation and
other forms of academic research can be viewed as an attempt to build wealth through
performance funding, a process which “connects state appropriations directly to a college s
performance on outcomes such as student retention [and] graduation.”10 The primary issue with
performance funding is the stress it places on institutions that simply don’t have the financial,
material or intellectual resources to compete with larger, better funded schools.11 In a statewide
8 Ohio Board of Regents, “Towards the Year 2000: Higher Education in Transition: Volume 1,”
20.
9 Christopher P. Loss, Between Citizens and the State, 219-220.
10 Kevin J. Dougherty, Sosanya M. Jones, Hana Lahr, Rebecca S. Natow, Lara Pheatt, and
Vikash Reddy, "Performance Funding for Higher Education: Forms, Origins, Impacts, and
Futures," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 655, (2014): 163-
84.
11 Kevin J. Dougherty, Sosanya M. Jones, Hana Lahr, Rebecca S. Natow, Lara Pheatt, and
Vikash Reddy, Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of Performance Funding in Community
Colleges in Three States (New York, NY: Community College Research Center, Teachers
85
system, performance funding rewards those institutions that had a head start from decades of
accumulating wealth and academic reputation. Some American colleges and universities became
more financially self-sufficient in the 1980s and 19990s due to their contributions to research
development and the financial rewards they received in return. David Labaree described the
recent history of American higher education as the development of a three-pronged criterion that
colleges and universities have to meet in order to be considered ‘elite’ or ‘prestigious’ that
includes a university’s age, competitive undergraduate and graduate admission, and a strong
enough academic program to reap the rewards of research funding on a consistent basis.12
By these categories, most public colleges and universities in the United States aren’t
considered elite, prestigious or competitive. Nonetheless, some public institutions remain highly
competitive. In the 1980s, the Regents recognized as much and seemed to place their focus and
funding support on the institutions most likely to gain the most prestige, lure the most interest
from companies, and make enough money to reinvest in Ohio’s economy. The selective
investment and performance funding initiatives of the 1980s marked the start of a trend that
would make Ohio higher education more inequitable and solidify the boundaries between
institutions that provide access and those that carry academic prestige — for better or worse.
Toward the Year 2000
In a 1988 report, the Regents argued that selective investment was the model for higher
education’s future. The Regents identified “a transition for higher education,” in which
“economic resurgence and sustained competitiveness are dependent on the focused strengths of
higher education research, teaching, and service.” 13 Under selective investment, Ohio higher
education would “develop new knowledge; transfer that knowledge to new products and
services; [and] prepare individuals for a lifetime of learning and adapting to career changes.”14
Moreover, the days of students “preparing for careers that would provide entry-level job
College, Columbia University, 2014).
https://ccrc.tc.columbia.edu/media/k2/attachments/obstacles-to-performance-funding-
implementation.pdf.
12 David Labaree, A Perfect Mess, 9.
13 Ohio Board of Regents, “Towards the Year 2000: Higher Education in Transition: Volume II,”
Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 1988, 6.
14 Ibid.
86
opportunities” were fading as higher education came to be has perceived “as the foundation on
which to build the research, innovation, technology transfer, and entrepreneurship needed to
revitalize the state’s economy.”15 Public higher education in Ohio would not stop assisting those
who wanted skilled credentials for employment; but public higher education would also focus
more on making Ohio’s economy more competitive.
The Regents had a good reason for their proposed new direction for public higher
education. The Great Lakes region of the Midwest no longer had a competitive advantage in
manufacturing and, according to the Regents, the growing service industry in Ohio mostly
brought low-to-mid-wage jobs in areas like hospitality, health services and business services.16
An analysis of Ohio’s top employers from 1990 to 2010 shows that the state’s two largest
employers during that period were the Cleveland Clinic and Wal-Mart while three of the top four
employers were in the health services industry. Even if more students received a two-year
degree, the choice they had for employment was limited. The Regents were falling back on their
original plan of attracting new industries to the state through public higher education’s advanced
research productivity, which would create a wider variation of jobs that would require more post-
secondary education. This approach was nothing short of a gamble. But what choice did the
Regents have? Ohio’s standard of living could not grow on Wal-Mart wages.
In addition, colleges and universities in other states were using their research capabilities
to earn contracts with knowledge-based industries and the United States’ military that were
critical to the development and expansion of new economic sectors — a fact that the Regents
used to build their argument for Ohio to refocus higher education.17 In the Great Lakes region of
the Midwest, states were taking a similar route through spending on industrial research, and Ohio
had not kept up with that pattern. By 1985, Ohio’s level of spending on industrial research had
dropped 0.2 percent while the national spending average grew 68 percent, Illinois’ by 36 percent,
and 31 percent in Michigan.18 If Ohio could increase the level of investment in applied industrial
research, the Regents believed that the development of new technologies, processes and products
15 Ibid., 6, 7. 16 Ibid., 14.
17 Ibid., 15.
18 Ohio Board of Regents, “Towards the Year 2000: Higher Education in Transition: Volume II,”
15.
87
would “have a significant impact on the inter-connections of economic growth, human resource
development, and the quality of life.”19
It’s difficult to pinpoint exactly how Ohio needed to invest in applied industrial research
because the term covers dozens of industries and occupations. The Regents’ seemed equally
unsure. They suggested that Ohio’s colleges and universities should make investments in
“growth industries,” which included “information and communication, new materials,
biotechnologies, health and medical technologies, and factory and office automation.”20 To be
more specific, the Regents suggested that public higher education do everything it could to train
workers, produce research and build relationships with firms in areas like computer information
processing, synthetic construction materials, plant and animal genetic engineering, agricultural
food production, industrial chemicals, neurochemistry and immunology, programmable robotics,
integrated systems of inventory control, and integrated systems development.21 The only theme
holding all of these various industries together is the fact Ohio had fallen behind in each of them.
There’s no indication that the Regents expected one industry to thrive over the other, but rather
that they merely wanted an industry to thrive.
One of the biggest hurdles in attempting economic transformation through the
development of new industries is the logistical challenge of re-educating the labor force and
building new programs at both the undergraduate and graduate level. In a way, this was the
never-ending problem for Ohio in the last-half of the twentieth century: policymakers engaged in
a reactionary restructuring of public higher education and job training because of the
continuously changing economy. The late-1980s were no different. The Regents argued that
“Ohio’s people are woefully underprepared for the economic changes” because the state “ranked
last among the Great Lakes states in production of scientists and engineers,” and “a significant
number of youth and adults, particularly those with long-term unemployment are functionally
illiterate.”22 Certainly the state had invested in vocational and educational education programs.
But, according to the Regents, “leading U.S. industries, many of which are Ohio’s growth
industries, have upgraded their educational requirements considerably” and the state education
19 Ibid., 18.
20 Ibid., 20.
21 Ibid., 21-22. 22 Ohio Board of Regents, “Towards the Year 2000: Higher Education in Transition: Volume II,”
26.
88
system had not kept up in preparation for that type of work.23 Without a new direction in public
higher education, the Regents believed that Ohio’s workers would suffer job loss, perform
unskilled, low-wage labor, or be a lifelong displaced worker.24
The Regents’ belief in public higher education’s role — or in some cases, necessity —
for gainful employment predicted a contemporary dilemma in the American economy. In the
early-1980s, with the loss of industrial jobs and good pay, millions of Americans were left with
little options for high-wage employment without a college credential that correlated with the
skills needed for a particular job. That is not to say that every American needed post-secondary
education, but the type of post-secondary education each person needed varied case-by-case.
There are plenty of unskilled careers that provide a good income. However, the number of jobs a
person qualifies for is directly connected to their skill level. And a large number of industries
require skills for their employees that are hard to learn outside of higher education — especially
if employers require an employee’s skills to be validated by certification. The Regents noticed
this trend beginning in the late-1980s, and today economists and scholars predict that 64 percent
of all jobs in the United States will require some form of higher education or post-secondary
certification.25
In their 1988 report, the Regents’ claimed they had a plan to address these concerns that
included four goals: affordability, accessibility, better teaching at the undergraduate level, and
more emphasis in graduate education — all in an effort to make colleges and universities more
responsible and autonomous, which meant making institutions less reliant on the state for
funding. First, higher education needed to be more affordable. The Regents’ acknowledged that
the cost of attending a public college or university was impossible for a large segment of Ohio’s
population. In order to reduce the share of costs put on students, the Regents planned to petition
the state for more student financial aid programs. Second, the academic rigor of traditional
higher education — taking courses towards a terminal degree — seemed to be too much for a lot
of students coming from schools that did not have college preparation curriculum, or those
23 Ibid., 27.
24 Ibid.
25 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rates and Earnings by Educational
Attainment, 2016 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office).
https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/data-on-display/education-matters.htm.
89
students who just wanted training for a specific job. The Regents wanted public college and
university leaders “to work in concert with local school superintendents to strengthen curricula
and teaching in the areas of mathematics, science, and writing.”26 There were also plans to open
local collaborative laboratories where leaders from every level of education would gather
together, create a plan of action for college preparation, and hopefully increase the rate of
acceptance and retention in higher education.27
A third goal articulated by the Regents to be achieved by the year 2000 was a broad and
vague vision of leadership. By “leadership,” the Regents meant that colleges and universities
needed to identify, enhance, and mobilize the state’s economic and intellectual strength to
promote change.28 This unspecific and unwieldy initiative included changing the “state’s
expectations for its higher education system” to provide “adequate instructional quality and
accessibility.”29 The Regents wanted public higher education to “shape the society’s agenda for
change,” to discover “the harmonies that exist between higher education’s strengths and the
needs of society,” and to raise the “spirit of excellence to a higher level of consciousness rather
than managing closely the negative realities of decline, complexity, and ambiguity.”30
The Regents’ blueprint for achieving their identified new goals were just as vague as the
goals themselves. When discussing how to improve undergraduate education, the Regents said
that the “key to the continued improvement in the quality of undergraduate education will be the
identification and dissemination of information about program characteristics which contribute
significantly to its quality.”31 The Board of Regents also perceived significant opportunities for
academic and scholarly excellence in new graduate programs through collaborative
arrangements, especially at the doctoral level.32 The Regents never actually address how
colleges and universities should go about achieving specific goals, nor do they provide further
specifics about what terms such as “collaborative arrangements” or “program characteristics”
26 Ohio Board of Regents, “Towards the Year 2000: Higher Education in Transition: Volume
III,” Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 1988, 28.
27 Ibid., 28.
28 Ibid., 9.
29 Ibid., 8.
30 Ibid., 9.
31 Ibid., 14.
32 Ohio Board of Regents, “Towards the Year 2000: Higher Education in Transition: Volume
III,” 19.
90
mean. Regardless of how much autonomy the Regents wanted to give individual institutions to
plan their own future, the lack of a details about how to move forward only places more of a
burden on colleges and universities, and provides state policymakers with little incentive to move
forward.
The Regents had authorized institutions to be responsible enough to produce new
research and development without more oversight. Undergraduate enrollments had recovered
from recession-era lows. The percentage of the population either taking courses at a post-
secondary institution or had a post-secondary degree had increased by two percent since 1975.33
The economy seemed to be recovering. The issue of cost was still a problem for Ohioans
seeking to attend public higher education, but federal financial aid programs had provided
enough assistance to not significantly harm enrollments.
Conclusion: K-12’s K.O. of Higher Education
If there was a perceived crisis in education in the 1980s and 1990s, it was in elementary and
secondary education, not higher education. In 1983 the Reagan Administration released one of
the most damning reports on American K-12 education ever produced, A Nation at Risk, and by
the 1990s Ohio Republicans were making the report’s recommendations state policy. The
report’s authors declared "The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded
by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a nation and as a people," and that
national curriculums needed to be more rigorous, teachers should be better trained, and schools
would be better off if they were held to higher standards.34 Through the rest of the 1980s and
into the 1990s, state governments shifted their focus to increase per-pupil expenditures and set
education standards that included statewide assessments.35 Ohio was no different. According to
Kevin F. Kern and Gregory S. Wilson, elementary and secondary education reform became a
critical issue for Ohio Republicans in the 1990s because they believed public schools were
33 Ohio Board of Regents, “Ohio Public Higher Education Basic Data Series: 1993 Edition,”
Southwest Ohio Regional Depository, 11. 34 The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for
Educational Reform, April 1983. https://www.edreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/A_Nation_At_Risk_1983.pdf.
35 Jeffrey R. Henig, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Education Press, 2013), 107-120.
91
failing students.36 This emphasis intensified with the 1990 election of Republican Governor
George V. Voinovich, a fiscal conservative who believed more money should be spent on K-12
education, that K-12 curriculum should be more challenging and that “education results” should
“be demanded, measured, and rewarded.”37 Moreover, Voinovich vowed to increase state
spending on K-12 education by 5 percent and increase spending every fiscal year to increase the
state’s per pupil expenditure.38
Concerns about the quality and purpose of public higher education in Ohio didn’t
disappear, however. Instead, the purpose of higher education was once again molded to fit
another political vision. Voinovich, like nearly all of his predecessors, believed that public
higher education should balance quality and affordability, be open to all Ohioans, and upgrade its
research mission.39 To create more access to higher education, Voinovich sought and received
legislative limits on tuition increases and also put state funding towards need-based and merit-
based scholarships.40 These changes didn’t mean that public colleges and universities were
receiving more funding. In fact, college and university budgets were cut, primarily at the
graduate level, in order for the state to limit tuition hikes and offer more financial aid to students.
Voinovich’s advisors, as well as the Board of Regents, suggested that the state should
review doctoral programs and faculty workloads to identify and stop wasteful spending, and the
task should be completed by the colleges and universities and then reported back to the Regents.
During his 1994 State of the State Address, Voinovich celebrated what he viewed as the
approach’s early success stating:
“My hat is off to Ohio’s colleges and universities, which have accepted the
challenge to cut costs and refocus their missions as laid out in the Board of
Regents’ Securing the Future report and recommendations from their individual
Operations Improvement Task Forces. Already, new efficiency measures are
saving millions of dollars on campuses across the state—duplicate courses and
subject majors are being consolidated or cut altogether—and, thanks to your
efforts, undergraduate faculty members are spending more time where our
students need them most—in the classroom.”
36 Kern & Wilson, Ohio: A History of the Buckeye State, 477.
37 Florence Clark Riffe, Words & Deeds: The Achievements of Governor George V. Voinovich
(Athens: Ohio University Special Publications, 1999), 87.
38 Ibid., 87, 88.
39 Ibid., 117.
40 Ibid., 118.
92
It seems odd that the Regents would support Voinovich’s call for spending cuts on campuses and
his de-emphasis on graduate education after years of asking state leaders for the complete
opposite, but the reality is that the Regents didn’t have much of a choice in the matter and access
to undergraduate education had already suffered years of neglect from state leaders. If it took a
crisis in public elementary and secondary education to make state leaders care about access to
public higher education, then the Regents would do what they could to make the situation work
to their benefit. It’s also important to remember that the Regents were established to act in an
advisory role to the Governor on matters relating to higher education. They can make
suggestions, but they do not have legislative authority. The Regents also have a responsibility to
carry out tasks given to them by the Governor.
Voinovich believed that the cost of tuition at Ohio’s public colleges and universities was
the primary issue at hand. If the state’s new emphasis on improving K-12 education worked,
then more students would have the ability to access higher education. But this could only
happen if the cost of getting a post-secondary education at a public institution was manageable.
Colleges and universities would then make up the loss of tuition dollars by enrolling more
students, since a larger portion of Ohio’s under-eighteen population would be academically
prepared for higher education. In other words, Ohio’s public colleges and universities would
increase revenue by cutting the cost of tuition.
93
CHAPTER SIX
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
In less than thirty years Ohio built a centralized system of public higher education that included
an unprecedented number of enrollees across twelve state colleges and universities, two medical
colleges, eight community colleges, seventeen technical institutions and twenty-three branch
campuses.
Governor Rhodes’ ideological transformation led him to reject the traditional elitism of
higher education and be more supportive of two-year vocational and technological training.
Although, Rhodes’ views were influenced by national changes in the Republican Party and
caused him to clash with the Regents, other state leaders failed to realize that the state could not
afford to maintain financial support of its twenty-three public institutions and their students due
to a declining tax base, diminished revenue from enrollments, and a stagnating economy. As a
result, most public four-year institutions increased tuition, which pushed more students — at
least those who could afford it — to enroll at two-year community colleges and branch
campuses. During that time Ohio also experienced a disproportionate amount of out-migration,
lost more than half of its jobs in manufacturing, a decline in personal income, and an economic
recession that nearly bankrupted the state.
Ohio’s leaders responded to the late-1970s/early-1980s recession by emphasizing that
access and job training should be the purpose of public higher education. The recession and
repurposing of public higher education also forced state leaders to confront the plight of Black
Ohioans, and the way that public higher education was still far from being accessible for the
state’s most disadvantaged populations. State leaders had hoped that public higher education
could retrain the workforce for an emerging service sector, but that task was nearly impossible
because of the “missing students” who had fell into a cycle of unemployment due to racism,
economic downturn and deindustrialization. The effort to link public higher education with the
new workforce ultimately failed in the 1980s because of changing political leadership and
economic values in the state. Just when it seemed that state leaders could adapt higher education
94
to address economic and demographic changes, ideological changes in the General Assembly
and a new round of budget deficits prevented any further action.
By the late-1980s, Ohio’s leaders changed their plan for public higher education to one of
“selective investment” which proposed that colleges and universities would receive extra funding
from the state if they achieved a goal that the Regents’ created. Funding for higher education
now had to be earned through schools competing with one another to see who would receive the
extra money. Simultaneously, the national crisis around K-12 education diverted state spending
away from public higher education because Republican leaders like Governor Voinovich
believed that increased attention on public education would prepare more students for college,
which could increase enrollments and provide a new source of funding for public higher
education. Policymakers opted to provide what remaining funding they had to institutions that
excelled in areas like research and undergraduate education. All state leaders proved, however,
was that public higher education could not achieve a purpose without consistent financial support
from the state.
The problems facing Ohio’s public higher education in the post-war era center on the
failure of political leaders to address economic challenges in the state. Immediately after World
War II, Ohio’s leaders waited too long to invest in public higher education because they thought
that inviting new industries to the state would cannibalize business profits in manufacturing,
despite the growing emphasis on aerospace and technological development. Then state leaders
argued for advanced research and industry-based training in higher education, an effort which
largely failed because Ohio did not have a tradition of investing in higher education or the
bureaucratic ability to manage a centralized system of public higher education. That same
tradition of not supporting public higher education was also shared by the general public through
the late-1960s and mid-1970s. A segment of Ohio’s population found higher education to be
elitist and a source of the state’s on-going problems, and ultimately, Governor Rhodes adopted
this suspicion of advanced higher education. Meanwhile, the General Assembly was
ideologically divided when bi-partisan action might have helped revive a recessive economy. By
the 1980s and 1990s, national trends to support K-12 education led to continued reversals in
public higher education support.
Although these storylines tell us how one decision led to another, they don’t explain why
Ohio’s leaders and population acted like they did towards public higher education. Behind
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nearly every decision regarding Ohio’s economy, and what purpose public higher education
should serve, was a regional, or, in some cases, national problem that influenced policymaking.
The decisions made by Ohio’s leaders in this study were invariably swayed by factors beyond
the state’s borders. Ohio’s World War II-era policymakers did not invest in public higher
education because the federal government already had substantial manufacturing-based contracts
in Ohio and Ohio leaders did not see a pressing need for research in new industries. Most of
Ohio’s population had plenty of good paying jobs in heavy industry and manufacturing, there
were no signs of economic stagnation on the horizon, and transitioning the state’s economy away
from manufacturing would have been economically impractical. “Silicon Valley” and the “Sun
Belt” were not yet a threat.
As the state’s economy changed in the 1960s and 70s, the Board of Regents were not able
to recreate and regenerate higher education for the new economy. State initiatives were
financially limited by the state’s lack of a personal income tax to financially assist the most
disadvantaged students. Initially, the cost of tuition was relatively affordable and, combined
with aid from the federal government, low-income students had ways of affording higher
education. But national political and social movements changed the nature of support of higher
education. Ohio’s population, like the rest of the nation, was divided over the highly-publicized
Free Speech and Anti-War Movements on some college campuses. Depending on how they
interpreted the events, Ohioans perhaps thought college and university campuses were either
responsible for radicalizing students into draft-dodging protest or institutions that attracted draft-
dodging radicals. Jim Rhodes made his interpretation known when he dispatched the Ohio
National Guard to Kent State in 1970 and four students were senselessly murdered. Political and
economic transformations brought on by the ‘Silent Majority,’ the ‘culture wars,’
deindustrialization, the Reagan Revolution and ‘Supply-Side’ economics influenced
policymakers across the United States during the 1970s and 1980s — including those in the Ohio
General Assembly. By that time, however, the time to invest in public higher education had
already passed.
Analyzing how state institutions are disproportionately influenced by national and
regional events is important because it helps us understand more about how much political and
economic autonomy a state really has. Ohio’s leaders before the mid-1960s often made
decisions about the state’s economy before looking at national or regional economic forecasts.
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What they didn’t realize is that the growth of the industrial Sun Belt, tech-based Silicon Valley,
and global markets would have negative effects on Ohio’s economic fortunes. The United
States’ economy is an inter-connected web of local, state and regional markets that rely on each
other for sustained prosperity. Moreover, the national economy is in a continuous state of
evolution and no industry is safe from becoming irrelevant. Ohio’s manufacturers were a part of
the United States’ manufacturing industry, and once manufacturing began crumbing nationally, it
was only a matter of time before Ohioans were effected.
Another reason to analyze how state institutions are disproportionately influenced by
national and regional events is to see how, or if, public higher education actually influences
economic prosperity. After all, regardless of whether state leaders want public higher education
to be accessible or elite, the intended outcome of each purpose is fairly similar — economic self-
sufficiency — and this outcome is beneficial to the state because of increased economic
prosperity. An individual can get a college education because public higher education is
accessible. From that education, the individual gets a good paying job and, hopefully, achieves
economic self-sufficiency. If a state purposes public higher education for research and elite
academic achievement, the goal, at least in the case of Ohio, is also economic prosperity.
Developments in the state’s research capabilities lure new industries to the state, then those
industries provide good paying jobs, and an individual achieves economic self-sufficiency. In
both cases the state wins. It has a reliable tax base, less unemployment, a higher GDP and a
higher per-capita income. That, at least to this author, seems like economic prosperity.
In contemporary America, public colleges and universities have become their own
industry by providing knowledge and research to companies, the federal government and health
care providers — a development that piloted numerous instances of economic transformation
over the last sixty years. Public colleges and universities also credential a significant portion of
the American workforce. A dominant theme in the recent past of Ohio public higher education is
that the system’s purpose was ever-changing despite the Regents’ attempt to uphold a consistent
Master Plan.
Overall, one of the biggest takeaways of this dissertation is that Ohio’s public colleges
and universities were not able to keep up with the pace of change in American higher education.
The United States does not have a national university, nor is there one governing body
completely in charge of policymaking for every college and university. American higher
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education is mostly a term used to describe a loose collection of roughly 4,000 institutions that
are free to govern themselves. While federal policies and oversight do exist, and every state has
similar higher education laws and policies, the bulk of an institution’s success stems from the
strength of their endowment, prestige of its’ faculty research and the visionary leadership of its’
administrators. Ohio simply did not keep up with changes sweeping across the landscape of
American higher education and the state’s economy.
The other factor that accounts for Ohio public higher education’s changing purpose is
directly tied to the political nature of democratic governance. Elected political leaders are our
policymakers. They view the world through an ideological lens or political party platform that,
for the most part, offers particular solutions to economic, social and cultural problems.1 But
political ideology changes over time: Republicans and Democrats of fifty years ago are not
likely to see the world exactly the same as the Republicans and Democrats of 2020.2 Even the
meaning of Conservatism changed dramatically over the course of the twentieth century.3 As
legislative agendas and priorities changed as Republicans and Democrats competed over the
General Assembly and Governor’s Residence, long-term legislative victories and consistent
policy implementation over higher education was undercut.
An unintended consequence of not adhering to a long-term policy on public higher
education was the state’s unorganized two-year college system. Access to public higher
education, as defined by the Regents in 1966, was influenced by geographic distance and cost
and the Regents addressed this need by setting a goal of opening a campus within driving
distance of every Ohioan. By 1993, Ohio had thirty-eight state supported colleges and
universities scattered across the state, which is quite remarkable when one considers that the
state only had nine state-supported institutions in 1963.4 Nonetheless, state leaders failed to
1 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Transformation in American
Politics: Implications for Federalism (Washington, D.C.: United States Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, 1986), 81-91.
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1450/.
2 See, for example, John H. Aldrich, Why Parties: The Origins and Transformation of Political
Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995); and Stephen E. Frantzich, Political
Parties in the Technological Age (New York: Longman Press, 1989.
3 Kim Phillips-Fein, "Conservatism: A State of the Field," The Journal of American History 98,
no. 3 (2011): 732-740.
4 Ohio Board of Regents, “Ohio Public Higher Education Basic Data Series: 1993,” Southwest
Ohio Regional Depository, 1.
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control the price of tuition, and the differences in price created a hierarchy in status and the level
of support for different types of institutions. Consider being a resident of Defiance County,
located in Northwest Ohio, and wanting to attend a four-year institution as a commuter. There
are no state-supported institutions in the county. In fact, there are no state-supported institutions
in the four counties bordering Defiance County. The closest state supported institution,
Northwest Technical College, is two counties away. The nearest four-year state-supported
institution, Bowling Green State University, is forty-five miles away. Defiance County was not
an outlier. Other counties, including Logan, Coshocton, Noble, and Mercer, had residents who
were at least forty miles away from the closest four-year state-supported institution.
What’s most frustrating about Ohio’s new arrangement is that state leaders should have
never let higher education get into such a position. Granted, the state was in an economic crisis
for nearly a decade, yet that doesn’t excuse the legacy of partisan politics in both the Governor’s
Office and General Assembly that ultimately kicked the problem down the road. Even the
Regents called out the state for a lack of care when, in their 1992 report on the future of higher
education in Ohio, wrote that Ohio “has been losing economic ground for a generation, in part
because of the low priority the state and many of its people have given education.”5 By 1990
state policymakers had to do something so more people would have access to, and eventually
attend, public higher education because nearly twenty-percent of Ohioans didn’t have an
education beyond a high school diploma, the state had one of the largest income gaps in the
nation between those who had a four-year degree and those who did not, the state’s average
income was one of the lowest, tuition at all institutions of higher education were nearly fifty
percent higher than the national average, and Ohio companies were unable to compete in the new
global marketplace because they lacked the necessary skilled workforce.6 These numbers
shouldn’t be surprising, though. If the recent history of Ohio higher education tells us anything,
it’s that the state didn’t end up this way overnight, but it leaves those who read the story
wondering, “Did anything really change?”
Ohio public higher education still remained dual-purposed throughout the 1990s and into
the new century, but the cost-controlling measures of the Voinovich Administration could not
5 The Ohio Board of Regents, “Securing the Future of Higher Education in Ohio,” Southwest
Ohio Regional Depository, 1992, 1.
6 The Ohio Board of Regents, “Securing the Future of Higher Education in Ohio,” 1-4.
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keep up with the rapidly inflating price of tuition at public institutions. Even with tuition caps
set by the Governor, institutions found other ways to cover the funding gap left by the state’s
budget cuts to higher education. The state would not allocate more money to higher education
and the quest to repair public education only gained popularity as the year 2000 approached.
What this brief, yet significant, saga in the story of Ohio public higher education
illustrates is that no purpose or goal for public higher education, regardless of how noble, can be
achieved without funding. Individual institutions have little incentive to guide their college or
university towards a goal that will cost them a considerable amount of money, even if they will
be financially rewarded by the state, because the risk is just too high. All it takes is one year of
not meeting projected enrollments and an institution becomes financially at risk. Making an
investment in a future program or goal is untenable when annual budgets can be thrown into
chaos so quickly. Tuition is one of the surest ways for colleges and universities to keep a steady
stream of revenue when the state fails to provide assistance. Perhaps that’s where Ohio, and
many other states, have failed the most.
By the 1990s, the Regents recognized that although the state reached its goal of placing a
campus within commuting distance of every Ohioan, it did not remain consistent about what type
of campuses it opened.7 Some counties had a technical college, some had a state community
college, others had a regional campus, a handful had four-year state-supported institutions, and a
select few had one of each. “This kaleidoscope of campuses is confusing to the public,” wrote
the Regents in its 1988 report, “It also has meant until now that the range of services open to a
given community depends upon the particular type of campus that had been placed there a
generation ago.”8 In 1988, the state operated twenty-four two-year branch campuses — as many
as the total number of community and technical colleges combined.9 Tuition at branch
campuses, however, was nearly $1,000 more than community or technical colleges. The Regents
also proposed in 1988 that the state abolish the branch campus system and create one coherent
community college network that would be supported by local property tax and include all the
programs from branch campuses and technical and community colleges.10
7 Ohio Board of Regents, “Securing the Future of Higher Education in Ohio,” 19.
8 Ibid., 19.
9 Ohio Board of Regents, “Ohio Public Higher Education Basic Data Series: 1993,” 2.
10 Ohio Board of Regents, “Securing the Future of Higher Education in Ohio,” 20.
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A similar, albeit unique, fate also befell the Regents’ goal to make Ohio public higher
education competitive in technological research and development for the sake of landing
government contracts. Between the 1960s and 1990s, state leaders did make lasting, influential
changes in the areas of graduate research by authorizing dozens of new Ph.D. and Masters-level
programs at nearly every state-supported four-year institution between 1963 and 1993. As of
2020, the Ohio State University is a nationally recognized institution for its research and study in
fifteen academic disciplines.11 Today, Ohio’s graduate level programs and medical networks
produce valuable knowledge and significant contribute to the local and state economies.
With all of this in mind, does Ohio public higher education have a clear path forward?
Possible answers to this question should be the basis of future work for researchers and
policymakers. First, there has to be a higher level of coordination between the state and leaders
in higher education if Ohioans ever want to fully address the issue of access. Branch campuses,
community colleges, technical colleges and four-year state-assisted colleges and universities
must find a way to streamline the transfer process. Accomplishing this task will require the
Regents to develop guidelines about curriculum standards that all institutions of higher education
follow to determine how courses taken on one campus can easily count towards a program at
another campus. Students should not have to retake courses when they transfer. Forcing them to
do so is not only costing students more money, but it significantly decreases their chances of
graduating on time, or at all.12
Second, the cost of politicizing the topic of funding higher education is causing an
unnecessary financial burden for the American middle- and working-classes and we need to find
new areas of public funding for colleges and universities. Individual states should carry the
responsibility of organizing and develop funding for state-assisted institutions, as well as utilize
11 The Ohio State University, “15 Ohio State graduate programs ranked in top 10 by U.S. News
& World Report,” accessed January 10, 2019. https://news.osu.edu/15-ohio-state-graduate-
programs-ranked-in-top-10-by-us-news--world-report/. 12 Jon Marcus, “Federal study finds nearly 40 percent of transfer students got no credit, The
Hechinger Report, August 20, 2014, accessed January 21, 2019.
https://hechingerreport.org/federal-study-finds-nearly-40-percent-transfer-students-got-credit/ ;
https://nscresearchcenter.org/signaturereport11/; Sean Anthony Simmone, Transferability of
Postsecondary Credit Following Transfer or Coenrollment: Statistical Analysis Report,
Washington D.C.: United States Department of Education: National Center for Education
Statistics, August 2014, accessed January 5th, 2019. https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014163.pdf.
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local property taxes, increase income taxes, or make it easier for Ohioans to open and maintain a
529 college-savings plan. The long term economic benefits of educating more Ohioans far
outweighs the cost of managing the price of tuition. Moreover, it is foolish to think anyone, or
the economy, is being served by tens of thousands of Ohioans walking around with crippling
student loan debt. Political leaders should not threaten to cut state-funding for higher education,
nor should they suggest everyone gets free college. There is a middle ground approach and Ohio
is the perfect state to test possible solutions.
Finally, we need more research on community colleges and other two-year institutions,
including how they benefit lower-income and middle-class students and what we can do to
organize them into a single system. Ohio’s present number of two-year institutions far out-
number state-assisted four-year colleges and universities. On a national level, roughly half of all
students attend a two-year campus.13 Yet students at two-year institutions are rarely included in
the surveys of higher education, nor have historians done a good enough job documenting their
experiences — something this study also fails to address. One possible reason behind the lack of
attention given to student experiences at two-year campuses is a lack of primary sources. For
example, while researching Ohio’s community colleges and branch campuses, it became clear to
this author that a good number of institutions did not have student newspapers, yearbooks, or
other student-produced documents. Towards that end, if students did document their experience
at two-year campuses, they did so through private correspondence, such as, diaries, journals,
letters, or conversations — at least that’s what this author found when discussing the topic with
students who attended two-year campuses in the 1980s. Historians of higher education as well as
colleges and universities across the nation need to dedicate more time and resources to
preserving the history of what it was like to attend a two-year institution. The task will not be
easy, but the first generation of two-year college students — those who attended branch
13 Arthur Cohen and Carrie B. Kisker, The Shaping of American Higher Education: Emergence
and Growth of the Contemporary System (2nd ed.) (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2009), 435-
457; Clifford Adelman, Moving into Town — And Moving On: The Community college in Lives
of Traditional-Age Students, Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of Education: Office of
Vocational and Adult Education, Feburary 2005, accessed June 2018, xiii.
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/research/pubs/comcollege/movingintotown.pdf.
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campuses, state-assisted community colleges, and vocational or technical programs when they
first opened in the late-1960s — only have so many more years to share their memories.
Although there is more work to be done, Ohio’s network of state-assisted colleges and
universities have come a long way since the end of World War II. Even though most state-
assisted four-year institutions in Ohio still have a modicum of coordination with one another, the
same is not true for the state’s two-year institutions. Currently, Ohio has a state-level higher
education coordinating board that loosely coordinates locally governed community colleges, but
does not have an independent state-level board for community colleges. Scholars should look
into the benefits of having a state board that is responsible for regulating community colleges —
as found in states like Florida and Pennsylvania — or an independent state board whose sole job
is to coordinate community colleges, which is the case in Kentucky. From there, a new board
could find a new way to fund, consolidate and support all two-year institutions.
These institutions provide valuable services to Ohioans and represent the resiliency of a
state whose fortunes during that time period were less than favorable. While it seems unlikely a
state leader or policymaker will ever flip through the pages of this project, perhaps one might. If
so, my hope is that they understand the need for higher education to be anchored in a purposeful,
clear vision. That higher education does not have one purpose, or two, or even three. The
purpose of a higher education is the purpose given to it by an individual. We’ll never be able to
give everyone exactly what they want out of a college or university experience, but we have a
duty to ensure every person gets an opportunity to achieve what they need at a price they can
afford.
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EPILOGUE
I finished the first draft of my dissertation right as the coronavirus pandemic swept across the
United States. By the time I defend this dissertation to my committee on the last Monday of
May, 2020, Mike DeWine, the Republican Governor of Ohio, announced he would cut public
higher education funding by $110 million over two months.14 Another Republican Governor,
Mike Parsons of Missouri, slashed funding to public higher education by 10 percent.15 Even
individual public institutions, such as Pennsylvania State University, Western Michigan
University, Idaho State University and the University of Arizona, were forced to make budget
cuts in the face of an impending economic recession.16 What’s most fascinating about the
coronavirus-related woes facing American public higher education is that the news wasn’t all
that surprising.
In fact, the news is a nothing more than a continuation of a decades-long trend.
According to the Center on Budgeting and Policy Priorities, state funding for higher education
was $9 billion less in 2017 than it was in 2008.17 During those nine years, eighteen states cut
per-student spending by at least 20 percent.18 Commenting on the way states have few
reservations about taking money away from public colleges and universities, Annette Flores, the
director for postsecondary education at the Center for American Progress, said, “Funding to
public colleges is seen as a little bit more discretionary because institutions have options to fill
budget holes. They could hold back on spending on construction projects, on hiring, they can
14 Paul Fain, “Ohio to Cut Public College Funding by $110 Million Over 2 Months,” Inside
Higher Ed, May 6, 2020. https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/05/06/ohio-cut-
public-college-funding-110-million-over-2-months
15 Madison Czopek, “Compromise Eliminates State Higher Ed Cuts, Restores UM Project - with
a Catch,” Columbia Missourian, May 7, 2020.
https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/covid19/compromise-eliminates-state-higher-ed-
cuts-restores-um-project-with-a-catch/article_d0e21ad4-90bd-11ea-ace1-d32019fe2f56.html
16 Eastern Michigan University, “Other Universities - Budget Cut Announcements,”
https://www.emich.edu/budget-impact/other-universities-budget-cut-announcements/index.php
17Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman, and Kathleen Masterson, A Lost Decade in Higher
Education Funding: State Cuts Have Driven Up Tuition and Reduced Quality, Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities (Washington, D.C., 2017), 4-7.
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2017_higher_ed_8-22-17_final.pdf, 3.
18 Ibid.
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raise tuition, and so that's one of the reasons why I think higher education in particular is
vulnerable.”19
Flores’ analysis of why lawmakers are more discretionary about cutting spending on
public higher education harkens back to one of the main points brought up in this dissertation:
wrangling and maintaining a steady stream of funding from states for the support of their public
colleges and universities is, at best, like finding the pot of gold at the end of a rainbow. For
nearly six decades, the leaders of Ohio higher education fought to get policymakers to fund
higher education. Despite several key victories, the promise of continual, sustained funding
never materialized. Why the budgets of Ohio’s colleges and universities were consistently
slashed, jeopardized or made into a competition for the most funding is a question that can —
and should — still be asked.
The answer to that question, at least to me, is two-fold, and deals squarely with the way
higher education became a political issue and how that directly corresponded with the purpose
higher education serves in a state. As I hope you learned from the case study of Ohio’s system
of public higher education, money was often withheld from public colleges and universities
because the General Assembly or the Governor frowned upon the purpose that the Board of
Regents believed higher education should serve. If higher education became too focused on
educating students at the graduate level, a wave of concern grew about access for students who
wanted vocational or occupational training. If college campuses became too politically dissident,
some politicians would turn that activism against left-leaning students and the liberal culture
from which their views were born. If money became too tight during an economic recession,
higher education often helplessly watched as their budgets shrank.
After decades of being held financially hostage by the state, Ohio’s public colleges and
universities — along with public higher education in nearly every other state — turned to other,
private sources of funding, the sources Flores alluded to in her commentary. Miami University,
where I studied for my Ph.D., is a public university, but a commonly told joke is that the
institution, if it solely relied on funding from the state, would only be able to operate for about
19 Hugh T. Ferguson, “Cuts Expected for State Higher Education Funding in the Wake of
COVID-19,” NASFAA, April 8, 2020. https://www.nasfaa.org/news-
item/21469/Cuts_Expected_for_State_Higher_Education_Funding_in_the_Wake_of_COVID-19
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five hours each week. Do I think the joke is factually correct? Probably not. But the spirit of
the joke — that a state-supported institution of higher education receives a bafflingly small
amount of funding from the state — is quite serious. What we have to recognize is that in the
history of contemporary public higher education (1950s through the present) the question of how
schools will pay their bills has been one of the most pressing issues facing higher education
leaders. We also have to see that the recent history of American higher education is complex and
our vision for the future of America’s colleges and universities must be informed by
understanding those complexities and learning from them. As the old saying goes, if you don’t
know the past you are condemned to repeat it.
My point here is that higher education — particularly at the state level —has a short
memory and our knowledge of that past leaves much to be desired. The pace of physical and
curricular change on campuses across the United States makes it hard for typical Americans to
see that the present financial crisis facing higher education is nothing new. We’ve been here
before; we’ve witnessed budget cuts many, many times. Perhaps that’s why the news of another
budget cut is more of an expectation than a surprise. As state funding decreased, reliance on —
and the price of — tuition increased, the need for private donors to support the school
skyrocketed, and a public institution became uniquely reliant on private funding. That’s why
Governor DeWine’s decision to cut funding to public higher education is just another step in a
long journey of making higher education more inequitable, privately financed and inaccessible to
working-class and lower-middle class Americans.
If we are ever going to stop the madness of letting a public institution like higher
education turn into a private industry, we have to start by addressing what the purpose of higher
education is. I briefly mentioned in the last chapter that the purpose of higher education should
be determined by the student; individuals should be able to attend the college or university that
best fits their vision of an education and have the ability — financial and geographical — to
attend that institution. If an eighteen-year-old wants to receive a liberal arts education, and they
believe the purpose of higher education is to teach them how to analyze problems from the
standpoint of multiple disciplines, then they, as a citizen and consumer, have the right to attend a
school that offers them that opportunity. If a middle-aged barber wishes to change careers and
believes the purpose of higher education is to teach students skills that credential them for a job
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in the service sector, then they, as a citizen and consumer, have the right to attend a school that
offers them that opportunity.
The problem is that the more public higher education has to rely on private means to
survive, the less ability individuals have to afford the college or university of their choice. I am
not suggesting that we offer free tuition to anyone who attends college. What I am suggesting,
however, is that public higher education once again becomes affordable. If the purpose of higher
education is determined by each individual, then institutions of higher education should do
everything they can to focus on affordability as their purpose. Of course, public colleges and
universities can’t do that without state support. As it currently stands, students receive the most
funding to attend higher education from federal grants or student loans. I see nothing wrong
with that. If we left the burden of financially supporting students from low-income families to
the states, we’d have an inconsistent, unequal system of financial aid. That is why state funding
should be primarily focused on the overhead expenses of colleges and universities. The more
individual institutions receive in state funding, the less they have to charge students in tuition,
the less they have to rely on private sources of financing. For its part, the federal government
should allocate funding to individual students in attempt to lessen the financial burden of
attending college. The current system of providing grants and unsubsidized loans is helpful, but
I refuse to believe more can’t be done to ensure students aren’t crippled by debt, or are without
the money they need to attend the college or university that best serves their academic and
economic goals.
Addressing this problem now is important because we’ve seen, especially in the case of
Ohio public higher education, that actions taken in the distant past have contemporary
consequences. Consider where Ohio’s public colleges and universities would be if the state’s
leaders invested in higher education in the 1940s, or even the 1950s. Think about how many
more students may have enrolled in higher education if the state decided to fund a system of
community colleges accessible to every person in each of the state’s eighty-eight counties.
Instead, in the 1960s, Ohio’s Board of Regents, business leaders and policymakers saw the
economic benefit of higher education in scientific research and technological development.
That same thinking still dictates a lot of thinking about the purpose of higher education,
or using higher education as a way to bolster economic development and grow the labor force. I
firmly believe higher education can and should still be a catalyst for economic development and
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gainful employment. What I find most troublesome, though, is the amount of debt students have
to accept in order to attend higher education. How does $75,000 in student loan debt help
national economic development or individuals reach a state of economic independence? We,
citizens who have a say in how our public institutions are run, need to act now to prevent the
actions of today to have lasting consequences that go into the next half-century.
Higher education is a public good — the education we receive benefits the overall health
of our people, our economy, our system of self-government and our ability to effectively
communicate. Allowing that good to slip out of our hands and become even more reliant on
private funding is a mistake we don’t have to make. I encourage you to think critically about
where American public higher education is headed. If this dissertation leaves you with anything,
I hope it is this: don’t assume higher education will change for the better if we just give it a little
time. Ohio has had roughly seventy years to fund higher education and as of a week ago, the
present looks no different than the past.
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