Evolution of Market Based Electricity Trading in India

PROJECT

Submitted by

RONY JOHNSON Enrolment No: 060410058

to

Indira Gandhi National Open University in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award

of

Master of Business Administration (Finance)

2011

Evolution of Market Based Electricity Trading in India

PROJECT

Submitted by

RONY JOHNSON Enrolment No: 060410058

to

Indira Gandhi National Open University in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award

of

Master of Business Administration (Finance)

2011

Proforma for Approval of Project

Proposal

Evolution of Market Based Electricity

Trading in India

SYNOPSIS

a) Rationale for the study

Electricity has become an important ingredient in human life; it is essential for

modern living and business. Demand for electricity is now growing globally at a

rate higher than that of economic growth and, in many countries, at almost 1.5

to 2 times that of demand for primary energy sources. Historically the

electricity supply industry worldwide has resisted rapid change. This is mainly

because of the inertia of its large size and investments, and being monopolistic

in most cases. Most electricity utilities continued to be monopolies with, in

most cases, government ownership and control.

From the late 1980s and 1990s onwards tremendous developments in the

management, ownership, and control of the electricity industry began to take

place throughout the world, including India. These changes were prompted by

the influence of market economies, and its emphasis on competition, which

led to restructuring and deregulation, liberalisation, private sector investment

and ownership as well as electricity trade. These developments were made

possible by the recent spectacular technological advancement in information

technology and communications.

These advancements make it possible to sell electricity in an hourly basis in a

day ahead market, known as power exchanges, which functions similar to an

online share trading market. This study aims to understand all this

developments from a novice point of view.

b) Objectives of the study

The objectives of this study is to under stand

1. The essential aspects of electricity industry and how it is different from

other commodity based industries.

2. How the electricity industry evolved over the years from a vertically

integrated monopoly to a competitive market based industry in modern

world and how electricity trading system works.

3. History and growth of electricity sector in India.

4. Development of power exchanges in India for market based hourly

trading of electricity and its performance analysis.

c) Research Methodology

The methodology adopted is to collect information by literature survey and

also by discussions with experts in National Thermal power Corporation Ltd

(NTPC Ltd), the largest power utility in India and its electricity trading wing,

NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam limited (NVVN Ltd). The data for power exchange

performance analysis will be collected from Central Electricity Regulatory

Commission (CERC).

d) The expected contribution from the study

This study is expected to give necessary background on essential aspects of

electricity industry and its evolution from a vertical integrated monopoly to a

competitive market based industry. The development of Indian electricity

industry over the years will be discussed, also the rise of power markets in

India. Performance analysis of the operating power exchanges is also intended.

In short this study will give necessary background for power professionals to

function effectively in the rapidly rising power trading markets and power

utility firms.

e) Limitations, if any, and the direction of future research

Due to space restriction and to limit the topic to a novice point of view an

elementary discussion of power exchange only is intended here. This study can

be extended to future topics like risk management and congestion

management in power markets, comparative study of power exchanges etc.

CERTIFICATE OF ORGINALITY

This is to certify that the project titled “Evolution of

Market Based Electricity Trading in India“ is an original work of

the Student and is being submitted in partial fulfilment for the award

of the Master’s Degree in Business Administration of Indira Gandhi

National Open University. This report has not been submitted earlier

either to this University or to any other University/Institution for the

fulfilment of a course of study.

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR SIGNATURE OF STUDENT

Place: Place:

Date: Date:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I express my profound sense of gratitude to Mr S. Balasubramanya,

Deputy General Manager, Operation Department, National Thermal

Power Corporation Ltd for his guidance and constant encouragement

throughout the progress of this work.

I express sincere thanks to my organisation “National Thermal Power

Corporation Ltd” for providing, conducive atmosphere and facilities

to complete the project. Also I thank all the people at IGNOU

Trivandrum centre and New Delhi for the assistance provided.

Finally, I express my sincere thanks to my mother and friends for

their liberal help and encouragement.

Contents

PROFORMA FOR APPROVAL OF PROJECT PROPOSAL

SYNOPSIS

CERTIFICATE OF ORGINALITY

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY ......................................................................................... 1 1.2 CASE FOR COMPETITION ........................................................................................... 3

THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF ELECTRICITY .......................................................... 6

2.1 ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY FUNCTIONS .................................................................... 6 2.2 TRADITIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE INDUSTRY .......................................... 13 2.3 WHY COMPETITION? ................................................................................................. 15 2.4 KEY FACTORS SPECIFIC TO THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY .................................... 17

REFORMING THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY ............................................................ 22

3.1 CANDIDATES FOR COMPETITION .......................................................................... 22 3.2 FOUR MODELS FOR INDUSTRY STRUCTURE ...................................................... 24 3.3 TRADING STRUCTURES IN EXCHANGE – BASED ELECTRICITY SPOT

MARKETS ........................................................................................................................... 37

ELECTRICITY TRADING - INDIAN SCENARIO ......................................................... 44

4.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE INDIAN ELECTRICITY SECTOR ............................ 44 4.2 POWER EXCHANGE IMPLEMENTATION IN INDIA.............................................. 55 4.3 ANALYSIS OF POWER EXCHANGES PERFORMANCE ........................................ 63 4.4 FUTURE OF POWER EXCHANGES IN INDIA .......................................................... 67

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 69

FUTURE SCOPE OF WORK .............................................................................................. 71

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 72

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................. 73

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Introduction

1.1 THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY

Electric systems around the world are physically and operationally very similar.

The physical functions of the industry are generation (production), system

operations, transmission, and distribution. The merchant functions are whole

selling and retailing. Transmission and distribution are transport functions—

the transmission wires are networked and serve large areas; the distribution

wires are local. The typical organization of the industry prior to deregulation

was vertically integrated companies, incorporating all these functions.

These companies built their own generating plants and coordinated the

planning of generation with the planning of transmission. In real time their

system operators coordinated the generating plants, telling them when to run

and when to back off so as not to overload the transmission network. The

customers received a bill that had all these functions “bundled” into a single

tariff—the vertically integrated company was the retailer as well as the

producer. The vertically integrated companies had monopolies in their own

areas, and because of this, prices were regulated—in the India mostly by

regulators at the state level and central level. The integrated companies built

to serve their own customers, and had to build enough to serve them all, at all

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times. In India this integrated companies are represented by the state

electricity boards (SEBs).

Competition in the electric industry generally means competition only in the

production (generation) of electricity and in the commercial functions of whole

selling and retailing. These are the functions that would be deregulated—their

prices would be set in competitive markets and not by regulators. The

transportation functions (transmission and distribution) cannot be

competitive—they are natural monopolies. It doesn’t make economic (or

environmental or aesthetic) sense to build multiple sets of competing

transmission systems; everyone has to use the same wires. They have to serve

everyone, and they have to be regulated. System operations also have to be a

monopoly, since the system operator has to control all the plants in a control

area, or the system will not function. The worry is that in restructuring, the

competitive parts need to be separated from the regulated parts, and the

coordination that was working well in the integrated companies under

regulation may be lost. Institutions have to be designed to replace the previous

internal coordination without losing its important efficiencies. This has been

done successfully in parts of world, but it is still the major challenge.

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1.2 CASE FOR COMPETITION

The major theme of this project is simple: The need of introducing competition

into the production markets, because this is where most of the long-term

benefits of restructuring will accrue. Competition in the retail markets will not

produce low prices if the production markets are not competitive. It was in the

production end that the problems of the old system were mainly observed—a

highly politicized process of investment, inefficiencies in choice of technology,

construction, and maintenance, and difficulties in regulation and pricing, that

led to a desire to reorganize the industry. Since these are the places that

competition can help, introducing competition in production makes sense.

In general, a monopoly held in check by regulation is considered a poor

substitute for a competitive market and is only to be adopted where, for

reasons of natural monopoly or some overriding public interest, competition is

not feasible or performs poorly without government controls. We now know

from experience elsewhere and in parts of the world and India by electricity

trading market, that competition in electricity production is feasible. We know

that many of the reasons the industry was organized as regulated monopolies

for so long no longer apply. So competition is the standard to beat.

Competition is what benefits consumers. And in the final analysis, benefiting

consumers should be what public policy is all about.

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Consumers want, and should expect to have:

Low prices (although they know they have to pay enough to keep

suppliers in business);

Reliable service;

Fairly predictable bills; and

The opportunity to benefit from value-added services that may come

available.

However, there are certain technical details that have to be attended to for

competition to be able to produce these results. There are cogent reasons why

electricity was a monopoly for so long—electricity is indeed different from

other commodities. It cannot be stored; it is transported at the speed of light,

following laws of physics unique to this commodity, over a fragile and

interactive transmission network. The instant you flip the switch, something

happens at a generating plant somewhere, and the electricity gets to you in a

millisecond. The network requires the constant vigilant control of a system

operator; the penalty for inattention is to black out the whole area.

But the technical complexity exists everywhere there is electricity. We also

know that restructuring this industry is harder than most people think. Airline,

banking, and telecommunications industries have been made competitive,

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with considerable success. They were a piece of cake in comparison to

electricity. One thing has been made clear from experience both at home and

abroad: You cannot simply cease to regulate the industry and walk away from

it expecting a competitive market to rush in and work its magic. The

introduction of competition poses some really difficult problems, and rational

solutions depend upon understanding these complexities and designing ways

to account for them. The institutional changes must, in the end, permit

competitive markets in electricity to meet the ordinary requirements of

commerce. Many buyers and many sellers must be able to access each other

easily; they must be able to make contracts in advance and at spot prices; and

they must be able to transport the electricity with a high degree of certainty as

to the price and availability of the transmission network.

Efficiency is the goal; competition is the means; open access, restructuring, and

deregulation are terms sometimes used to describe the reforms, but they are

the tools to achieve it.

In India the competition in electricity is introduced recently by means of short

term trading of electricity in bilateral transactions and collective transactions

as in power exchanges. Already two exchanges are functioning namely Indian

Electricity Exchange (IEX) and Power Exchange (PXIL).

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The Essential Features of Electricity

2.1 ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY FUNCTIONS

How does the electricity industry function in simple terms? There are the

traditional physical functions: generation (production), transmission, system

operations, distribution (Figure 1); and there are merchant functions such as

retailing to final customers and wholesale power procurement.

Figure-1 Physical functions of electricity

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Traditionally the entire industry has had its prices set for it by government’s or

by independent regulators appointed by the government. In the worldwide

move to competition, some of these functions are being deregulated, but

others will continue to have prices set by regulators or governments.

Generation (Production)

Generation (production) accounts for about 35 per cent to 50 per cent of the

final cost of delivered electricity. The production of electricity has been

described as the opposite of the oil industry. Whereas the oil industry uses

crude oil to produce multiple products such as gasoline, heating oil, and

kerosene, the electric industry takes in multiple fuels and turns them all into

exactly the same product. It is totally standardized—it has to be or electric

appliances would not run properly.

Electricity is produced commercially in thousands of generating plants all over

the world. Wires turning in a magnetic field produce the electricity. The wire is

turned by a motive force acting against a fan or turbine. The motive force is

generally steam, but it can also be falling water, turning windmills, tidal

energy, or in some cases by direct combustion of a fuel, as in a jet engine. The

motive force of the vast majority of the commercial plants is steam, which in

turn is produced by a variety of fuels. Coal is the major fuel, but there are also

substantial amounts of oil, natural gas, and uranium (nuclear power). Virtually

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all plants use only one fuel, but anyone company may use a variety of fuels in

different plants.

The various fuels have different prices, which affect the cost of a plant’s

output. The efficiency of plants also varies, but they all have their place in

production. The plants that burn fuel less efficiently cost less to build and are

used only occasionally for “peaking” purposes, while the efficient ones are

used full-time as base load units. Before the late 1980s, efficiency typically

varied from about 18 per cent to 36 per cent, and there were economies of

scale—the bigger plants were more efficient. Because of the scale factors,

plants got larger and larger; they took years to plan and build.

Transmission

Transmission accounts for about 5 per cent to 15 per cent of the final cost of

electricity. Electricity is transported over a network of copper or aluminium

wires called the transmission system, on poles or towers, or sometimes

underground or underwater; and the electricity is delivered to local

distribution systems, and thence to customers. This is not a switched network

like railroad or telephone networks—the electricity flows freely on an

alternating current (AC) network according to laws of physics known as

Kirchhoff’s’ laws. The transmission system is quite fragile—if it overloads it

becomes unstable and can cause widespread blackouts. Flows have to be

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managed on a continuous, real-time basis—no traffic jams any busy signals.

For this reason, which we examine in more detail a little later, the transmission

system requires the constant attention of a system operator to integrate the

operation of the generating plants with the transmission system on a second

by second basis.

System Operations

System operations is the function that coordinates the generating plants with

the load (the sum of all customers’ instantaneous usage) to maintain a stable

transmission system. The instant the electricity is produced, it leaves the

generating plant, travels at the speed of light (about 186,000 miles per

second), and is consumed within a millisecond. The moment a customer

throws a switch, something happens in a generating plant somewhere. Since

customers do not have to call up and ask for power, and their usage is not

controlled, it is the generating plants that have to be controlled to meet the

load at all times. This is the job of the system operator and his staff, which is

peculiar to electricity, and a major focus of this book. They sit in a control

room, following the changes in load and ordering plants to start and stop

generating—dispatching the system in real time. They also schedule the plants

in advance—how far in advance depend on how long it takes the slow plants to

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start up. Hydro plants need only minutes. In contrast, a nuclear plant needs a

day or more.

These days most control rooms are heavily computerized, but it was not

always so, and even today there is a lot of judgment involved. Especially when

the job had (or in some cases still has) to be done with slide rules, diagrams,

and intuition, the best engineers were assigned to this function, since it is so

critical. The system operator’s job includes holding plants in reserve, ready to

run, and calling for special outputs known as ancillary services. The system

operator has the extremely complex task of managing the system in real time

and ensuring that no transmission lines get overloaded. Each line has a

maximum it can safely take. When it has reached this maximum, it is

considered congested. Beyond that, it is considered overloaded and a threat to

system stability. The operator plans in advance to avoid overloads. In real time

he instructs (dispatches) plants in order to manage congestion. The system

operator also has to coordinate with the system operators of neighbouring

systems.

Distribution

The distribution function accounts for about 30 per cent to 50 per cent of the

final cost of electricity. Its basic job is “the wires business”—transporting

electricity from the transmission system to customers. But distribution is not

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really a single function, because it is the local end of the business, and is

usually associated with the customer service operation, with metering and

billing and retail sales. Transmission and distribution together are the transport

system (they both have wires and poles, and are fully connected with each

other) but we generally think of them separately, and they are always

organized separately. Transmission works with generation (through the system

operator); distribution works with the customer. As far as the transport

element of distribution, transmission is like major highways while distribution

is like local roads. Transmission operates at higher voltages than distribution

(which means packing power in tighter); transmission is networked, and the

flows can reverse, whereas distribution is usually radial and the flows are one-

way (to the customer).

By the time electricity reaches the distribution wires it is too late to control the

generating plants. The electricity simply flows over the wires to the customers.

No one “takes delivery”, except the final customer—electricity just flows, and

meters record how much has flowed. The distribution people do not receive,

store, and send it out—they just read the meters and send the bills. The big

physical task of the distribution function is to keep the local wires in good

shape, replacing poles and wires after storms or, if they are underground,

protecting them from salt on the streets, and adding new ones as the

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population moves or as the load grows. The wires heat up as the load rises,

and this can cause overloads and local blackouts if the installation is not large

enough for the load. The vast majority of all consumer outages are local, and

caused by storms, malfunctions, or overloads on the distribution system.

Retailing

Generation, system operations, transmission, and distribution are physical

functions. Retailing and whole selling are merchant functions. Retailing is sales

to final consumers and involves a series of commercial functions—procuring,

pricing, and selling electricity, and also metering its use, billing for it, and

collecting payment. In the typical organization of the industry up to the 1990s,

no one even thought of retailing as a separate function. It was always part of

the distribution function.

Wholesale Power Procurement

Wholesale power procurement is only a separable function where someone in

the company makes decisions about which producer to buy from. In

companies that produce all their own power, there is no wholesale power

procurement. But as trading increases, wholesale procurement becomes a

bigger function.

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2.2 TRADITIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE INDUSTRY

For 100 years after electricity was commercialized in 1878, a single company in

each area typically produced, transported, and retailed the product and

operated the system. This vertical integration of functions was always the

typical organization of the industry throughout the world. The vertical

integration was almost always accompanied by a legal monopoly within a

service area—only one company could provide electricity to customers in that

area.

This was in effect vertical integration by contract, variation, but not an

exception, to the rule of vertical integration. The actual mechanism of

establishing the monopoly is generally to limit customers’ choice of supplier by

legislation rather than by prohibiting independent generators, although in

some cases both are in place. It may seem to come to the same thing, but in

most places self-generation is permitted, for a person’s or a factory’s own use.

(The precise mechanism of regulation also makes a technical difference to the

process of deregulation: Legislation is generally required to free up the

customers to choose suppliers; sometimes legislation may also be required to

permit new independent generators to sell.)

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Reasons for Vertical Integration and Monopoly

No one ever thought it could be done any other way, but in retrospect, the

reasons for vertical integration and the monopoly were due to transactions

costs as well as to the characteristics that made some functions natural

monopolies.

The elements relevant to the 100-year history of the industry as a monopoly

were these:

1. The natural monopoly aspects of distribution—only one set of wires would

run along a street, a public right of way. This was both for reasons of space and

visual appearance, and also because there are serious economies of scale in

distribution, which makes competing distribution functions uneconomic.

2. The natural monopoly aspects of transmission, not only its scale economies

and site requirements but also its network characteristics. Only one set of

transmission wires could economically serve any area.

But these two things alone would have led to monopolies only on the wires

businesses; they did not demand vertical integration. The main reasons for

vertical integration were:

3. The technical challenges of coordinating the generation with the

transmission demanded such complex integration of generation and

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transmission (via the system operator) that it was considered impossible to

separate them. The transactions costs were too high. The managers of the

generating plants had to obey the system operator, and the best way to do

that at the time was to have them in the same company. So, if only a single

transmission entity could serve a particular distribution system, then the

system operator and the generating plants had to come along with it.

4. The long-term planning of transmission and generation also benefitted from

the vertical integration of generation with transmission.

5. Finally the economies of scale in generation, during the period when bigger

and bigger plants produced lower and lower prices, added to the conventional

wisdom that generation also was a natural monopoly.

2.3 WHY COMPETITION?

What are the benefits of competition? The major difference between

regulation and competition has to do with who takes responsibility for various

risks. The placement of the risks is what provides the incentive to improve.

The main relevant risks are:

1. Market demand and prices;

2. Technological change rendering plants economically obsolete, or at least

uncompetitive;

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3. Management decisions about maintenance, manning, and investment;

4. Credit risk.

Under regulation, the customers take most of the risks, and also take most of

the rewards, with the regulators doing their best to oversee the big

expenditure decisions, sometimes penalising companies after the event for

bad management decisions. Under regulation, if new technology is invented,

the customers continue to pay (more) for the old technology, whereas under

competition the old-technology producers find their assets are worth less.

Under regulation, if demand turns out to be less than anticipated, prices have

to rise to cover the cost of excess capacity, whereas under competition, excess

capacity causes prices to fall.

Under competition, these risks are initially with the owners of the plants—they

will pay for mistakes or profit from good decisions and management. Under

competition, the generators also take the risk of changes in technology, so

they have strong incentives to choose the best technology and not get side

tracked into costly mistakes. They also take the risk of changes in market

demand and prices, so they need to be flexible in their building plants, and

watch the market constantly. They need to adjust their maintenance schedules

to get plants back on line when prices are high (which is just when they are

needed). The profit incentive works everywhere else to make producers

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sharpen their pencils, and it has had this effect elsewhere in the world when

competition has been instituted in electricity.

2.4 KEY FACTORS SPECIFIC TO THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY

There are key technical factors specific to the industry that may not be obvious

to the lay reader. They dictate the complexities of the short-term trading

arrangements.

Four Technical Truths

Truth 1: Electricity cannot be stored. Or rather, it cannot be economically

stored. Battery technology has not advanced to the point where electricity can

be bought in periods of low demand and stored at home for periods of high

demand. All electricity has to be generated when it is needed. The implication

of this is that when demand varies over the course of a day, production has to

vary at exactly the same time. Some people hear the word pool in connection

with electricity and think of it as a big lake where electricity is stored—but

nothing could be further from the truth. In addition, demand (usage) is highly

variable over the day and the year. Use is low at night, and rises in the

morning, usually reaching a peak in the afternoon, especially on hot days when

air conditioning is in full use. In hot areas, summer is the peak season. As in

other industries with peak demands and no storage (airlines, vacations, hotels)

the wholesale price of electricity varies tremendously with the demand/supply

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balance. Wholesale hourly electric prices in competitive markets commonly

vary by about 2:1 over the course of a day in the off-season and by as much as

10:1 between the peak in the high season and the overall low (with some

spikes above this as well).

Truth 2: Electricity takes the path of least resistance (literally—that is where

the expression comes from). Resistance is a technical word in electricity, which

means roughly what it sounds like—low resistance means it is easy to pass,

and high resistance means it is difficult. A big thick transmission line is an easy

path with low resistance and electricity will flow there rather than over a

skinny line elsewhere in the network. It is virtually impossible to command

electricity to take a particular path—it flows where it will over the network,

according to the laws of physics. One implication of this is that there is no such

thing as a defined path for delivery: Final customers simply get whatever

electricity happens to be flowing by them at the time. The secret of dispatch is

to arrange the inflow of generation and the configuration of the network so

that electricity “chooses” to flow to the customers who want it. Another

implication is that the addition of a new line to a network may radically change

flows elsewhere, and can actually destroy useful capacity on a network.

Truth 3: The transmission of power over the network is subject to a complex

series of physical interactions, so that what happens on one part of the system

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affects conditions on the network many miles away—in some cases many

hundreds of miles away. Many things can potentially destabilize the network,

including changes in customers’ use, reactions from certain electrical

equipment, and sudden loss of output at a generating plant. And a single plant

can produce multidimensional outputs (such as fast response and products

called reactive power, and other ancillary services that are essential to electric

system operations),but often one output is an alternative to another. As a

consequence, those responsible for trading arrangements have to be

concerned with pricing these various outputs so that the system operator gets

what he needs when he needs it.

Truth 4: Electricity travels at the speed of light. Each second, output has to be

precisely matched to use. If it is not, the frequency falls, clocks go slower, more

sophisticated appliances can fail, and if the situation is serious enough, so

many loads fail that it can set off a chain of events leading to a blackout. It is

critical that the system not become unstable in this way, so the system

operator has to be able to call on some generators to raise or lower output to

meet load changes within seconds. Further, transmission lines cannot be

allowed to overload, and plans have to be made in advance to prevent them

from doing so. The implication is that it requires advance planning and split-

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second control by the system operator to coordinate everything. The system

operator turns out to be the major player

Implications for System Control

Electricity really is different from other commodities in its need for short-term

coordination. (Short-term coordination here means day-ahead, on the-day,

and real-time coordination.) The system operator has to be able to control the

plants. The nearest analogy is the air traffic controller. His job certainly has

lives at stake rather than just risking a blackout of the whole area, but the air

traffic controller can tell planes to circle for an hour, whereas the system

operator has to respond in seconds to get plants to change their output if an

overload threatens.

In the first 100+ years of electric industry history, these factors dictated that

system operations were always integrated with generation—the system

operator’s relation to generation was that of command and control. For a long

time it was believed that it was an inevitable technological truth that system

operations could not be unbundled from generation. But the real difficulty was

designing new institutions—trading arrangements—that replicated the results

of command and control when the system operator is separated from the folks

running the generating plants. Without this competition is not possible.

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However, this has been done in every place that has introduced competition in

generation.

The series of special factors just laid out is unique to electricity; they are the

reason, and the only reason, that wholesale market institutions (trading

arrangements) have to be “designed” in electricity—to enable short-term

coordination of generating plants with transmission. Delivery has to be

coordinated by the system operator—there is no other way to do it. And this

involves unique arrangements that are found in no other industry. Electricity

has special attributes that require certain market design decisions be made

centrally and in turn requires the design of fair and incentive-compatible

wholesale trading arrangements.

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Reforming the Electricity Industry

We first see which functions can be competitive and which have to remain

(regulated) monopolies. Then we describe four models showing in broad terms

the structural options for introducing competition into the electric industry.

These models are defined in terms of the degree of monopoly retained in the

sector. But the models imply different requirements for restructuring the

industry—breaking up existing companies and developing new coordinating

institutions to replace the internal coordination that formerly existed. They

also imply different roles for regulators.

3.1 CANDIDATES FOR COMPETITION

The generation function is the major candidate for being made competitive.

The old arguments from economies of scale no longer hold; and the problems

of coordination of generation and transmission have been eased but not

entirely solved by the advent of high-speed computers. However, it is the

design of trading arrangements that have actually worked in practice to

replace internal coordination, which has made generating competition

possible.

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The retail function can be competitive as far as procuring, pricing, and selling

electricity.

The system operations function cannot be competitive—one system operator

is required per system.

The transmission network is a natural monopoly, although there are a few

cases, mainly of isolated lines (peripheral to the network), where an investor

might make a transmission investment and charge for it. This is not really

competition in transmission but rather competition to build additions to the

transmission network.

The distribution wires function is still considered to be a natural monopoly

everywhere, insofar as competing for the same territory.

These last three functions (system operations, transmission, and distribution)

remain monopolies because no one could economically provide competing

service. But all competitors require access to them—they are “essential

facilities”—and without non-discriminatory access for generators to reach their

customers, there will be no competition. Therefore, as monopolies they will

remain regulated under any of the four models we introduce; and as essential

facilities there will have to be ways of assuring open and non-discriminatory

access to them in the competitive models.

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The general problems are:

To eliminate as far as possible any conflict of interest between the

competitive entities (generators and retailers) and the providers of the

essential facilities (transmission, system operations, and distribution).

This includes eliminating opportunities to discriminate, as well as cross

subsidies between regulated and unregulated activities.

To ensure coordination between competitive entities and essential

facilities—coordination that was previously provided by the integrated

company—is replaced by new institutions, and new agreements and

rules.

To ensure that the market prices that replace regulated prices are set in

a market that is truly competitive. This is the critical issue that ought to

be central to policy.

3.2 FOUR MODELS FOR INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

We consider four models, differentiated by how much monopoly is retained.

All of the models assume continued monopoly over transmission, distribution

wires, and system operations. The defining question is: If there are to be

competitive generators, whom can they sell to? Or alternatively, who are the

buyers—who has the choice of supplier? The four models provide

progressively more choice, and progressively reduce the scope of monopoly.

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These models are all in operation somewhere in the world; they each have

their merits and difficulties.

Model 1: Vertically Integrated Monopoly

Figure-2, Model 1 - Monopoly.

Model 1 is a vertically integrated monopoly of the kind we have just described.

There are no competitive generators because no one is permitted to buy from

them. All functions in the industry are bundled together, and regulated (see

Figure 2). This model served the industry well for 100 years, and is still the

model in existence in most places. In this section, we will give more attention

to the alternative models.

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Model 2: Single Buyer

Figure-3, Model 2 - Single Buyer.

In a single-buyer model, only the existing integrated monopoly in any area is

permitted to buy from the competing generators (see Figure 3). This model is

being followed in many countries, in Asia particularly, as a first step to

liberalization and as a way of attracting much needed investment by private

capital. The defining feature is that independent generators may only sell to

the existing utilities, which still have a complete monopoly over all final

customers. The prices at which the IPPs sell to the utilities are regulated, but

not at their own cost of service—generally some form of auction is held to

determine the lowest cost offering, and the utility signs long-term life-of-plant

contracts with the IPPs when the regulator has approved the process of the

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auction and the results. These contract prices are then passed on to the final

customers as part of the bundled tariffs. (This, or sometimes Model 1, is the

current model in places that have not moved to competition.)

The single-buyer model is a limited form of competition. A market structure

based on long-term contracts, like the IPP markets under regulation, transfers

market risk, technology risk, and most of the credit risk back to customers

because the IPP contracts shelter the IPPs from market prices and improved

technologies, and the utilities are generally good credit risks. This is the

attraction for the Asian countries, because they are perceived as fairly risky

anyway—the long-term contract takes away some of the risk of investing in

these countries. The competition in the single-buyer model is only competition

to build plants and operate them.

The single-buyer model requires long-term (life-of-plant) contracts because

there are not enough buyers for full competition. Without a contract, a would-

be generator is reluctant to sink large amounts of capital in a plant if he runs

the risk of being beaten back to his running costs in price negotiations with the

single buyer after the plant is completed. Sellers need either many potential

buyers or life-of-plant contracts. The IPP contracts are almost invariably two-

part contracts that pay a fixed annual fee to cover the IPP’s fixed costs, and

amounts designed to cover the variable costs for each unit of power

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generated. The design issue is where the profits are earned: How to get the

plants to run at all if they have been paid their profits up front in the fixed

charges; or, if the profits are paid in the variable payments, how to get the

plants to stop running when they are not needed. The solution is usually to pay

the profits in the fixed charge and to have penalties for failing to run a

minimum number of hours.

Model 3: Wholesale Competition

Figure-4, Model 3 - Wholesale Competition.

Model 3 as we define it here has a fully competitive generating sector. There is

no cost-of-service regulated generation. Distribution companies (now called

Discoms) and large customers are the purchasers, but Model 3 still gives the

Discoms a monopoly over all the smaller final customers. (By contrast, Model

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4, which we discuss later, permits all customers, large or small, a choice of

supplier.) Model 3 is a serious option. It has competition in production, which

is where most of the benefits are, it has many buyers to pull through the

benefits of lower prices, and it avoids the costs and problems of providing

retail access for all the small customers.

Here is the form of Model 3 that would be recommending if a country is

working from a clean slate:

1. All generation is deregulated and sells into a competitive wholesale market.

2. Discoms and large customers purchase competitively in the wholesale

market.

3. Retailers, aggregators, brokers, and marketeers are permitted.

4. No default option for the large customers other than the spot market price.

5. Discoms provide for the small customers by making contracts with

generators or aggregators.

Model 3 is designed to produce the competitive wholesale markets that are

supposed to bring the benefits of competition. It requires features like—short-

term trading arrangements and a long-term business model for transmission,

many buyers and sellers, supply and demand responsiveness. It is a major step.

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It is only simple in that it does not require the whole new consumer-oriented

billing, settlement, and information infrastructure needed for retail access in

Model 4.

Why the Large Customers? The large customers are included as purchasers,

but not the small customers. Markets need many buyers as well as many

sellers—too few buyers lead back to Model 2, the single buyer, where sellers

require long-term contracts to persuade them to enter. An alternative version

of Model 3 might allow only the Discoms to purchase.

Perhaps under Model 3, the Discom could own its own generation, and sell to

the small customers at regulated prices, based on the cost of service of its own

generators. The regulated prices would simply act as if they were a contract

between the generator and the Discom—a regulated transfer price. This may

be the way to navigate a transition but it will not work in the long haul. This

would be a two-market system—a regulated market for small customers and a

competitive market for large customers. It only takes a thought experiment to

see that this is not a viable solution. While initially the prices can be set at the

old regulated rates, what happens as time goes on? Which assets enter the

rate base of the regulated part, and which sell their output at competitive

prices? How are the regulated prices set? Can the regulated assets be disposed

of? Can the Discom build new plants? No one will be satisfied with the result,

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unless by absolute chance the regulated prices were exactly the same as the

market prices. If they are not, the big customers will lobby for re-regulation, or

the small customers will seek deregulation. Then next year the positions will be

reversed. It is far preferable to buy out of the old regime and start anew. Even

the small customers should be paying market prices, and they will if the

Discom in Model 3 buys in the competitive market.

There can be transition mechanisms, generally called vesting contracts, set at

the old prices, which stabilize prices for the first few years while the

production markets settle down. Actually, this is what most countries have

done. When the plants are divested or deregulated, they go to the competitive

market with a suite of contracts to sell to the Discoms. This sets the

generators’ revenues and the customers’ prices and gradually phases in the

market prices. After the transition, the generating plants live or die by their

performance in the competitive markets. Even in the transition, while the

vesting contracts are in place, the generating companies are not regulated—

they choose whether to open and close plants, they are penalized at market

prices by having to purchase in the spot markets to meet their contracts if their

plants did not work; they gain additional profits from increasing efficiency.

They are subject to all the pressures of competition except that of having to

make contracts in the real markets, which they do after the vesting contracts

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run out. But the vesting contracts are artificial—they are not determined by

market prices as the result of arm’s-length transactions—they are a holding

action.

Model 4: Retail Competition

Figure-5, Model 4 - Retail Competition.

Model 4 (Figure 5) permits all customers to choose their suppliers, so a

competing generator can sell to anyone, although small customers usually buy

through aggregators or retailers. Model 4 is known in the United States as

“retail access” or “customer choice.” It is the model now in place, or being put

in place, in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Norway,

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Sweden, Spain, Alberta, and many states of the United States. Retail access

pulls through the benefits of a competitive wholesale market by allowing many

competing retailers (and not just the Discoms) to pressure generators into

better prices, and to offer deeper and more liquid markets for financing new

plants.

Model 4 requires the new wholesale trading arrangements, and competitive

wholesale markets, as did Model 3. The main additional requirements in Model

4 are the settlement process, meter reading, and billing, which are greatly

expanded from Model 3, and the education of millions of customers. They are

real, and argue for gradual implementation of Model 4. Gradual

implementation also leaves time for the new institutions on the wholesale

markets to be fine-tuned.

Model 4 works best where regulators trust the competitive markets to produce

the best deal for the customers, and do not waste time trying to retain old-

style regulatory protections. However, this presumes that the wholesale

markets are in fact competitive and working to keep costs and prices down.

Model 4 suffers from the instinctive desire of regulators to continue to protect

small customers, by regulating prices, which leads back to some of the Model 3

problems. If the wholesale markets in Model 3 are working well, competition

should be controlling prices, and regulators should be reassured.

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The advantage of Model 4 is that it gives all customers choice, which they have

in the rest of the economy; they seem to want it, and when they have it, they

seem to like it. For example, in the United Kingdom, which phased in retail

access in three tranches, in 1990, 1994, and 1999, while requiring the Discom

to provide regulated default service, quite a large proportion of customers do

choose, and the number grows as time goes on. The United Kingdom made no

special incentives in the early years for switching, and (correctly) did not

consider customer switching a goal of reform.

The big drawback of Model 4 is the cost of the settlement system for all the

small consumers, and the need to get the consumers educated. Just how big

the incremental investment has to be may depend on how much of it can be

consolidated with the software needed for the new metering and billing

arrangements for Model 3. The education of the customers is a difficult task

and can lead to much confusion.

In addition, it can be argued that the costs of retail competition are wasted on

small customers. Large customers have purchasing managers, who spend full

time on buying supplies, but small customers do not have the time or energy

to do this, and if middlemen or retailers do it for them it pushes up the cost.

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Which Model?

To summarize the models:

1. Model 1—Monopoly—was the standard for 100 years, the model

everyone is familiar with.

2. Model 2—Single buyer—allows independent generators to sell to a

single (utility) buyer in each area on long-term life-of-plant contracts.

3. Model 3—Whole sale competition—makes the Discoms and the large

industrial customers the buyers from competitive generators.

4. Model 4—Retail competition—gives choice of supplier to all customers.

The choice of model is up to the policy makers, but in deciding they need to

understand the implications for structural change, the need for new

institutions, and the complications, given the existing arrangements, of getting

from here to there. The different models need different amounts of structural

change and rearrangement of functions in the industry, new institutions

especially for wholesale markets, and new roles for regulation (Figure 5).

Figure-5, Changes needed for wholesale and retail competition.

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If the goal is competition in production, most of this can be achieved through

Model 3, wholesale competition. Model 3 requires most of the structural and

institutional changes at the wholesale level needed for Model 4, if it is to be

real competition, and not just letting in a few competitors on the edges while

retaining 90 percent of the system in the hands of the incumbents. Model 3

requires changes in the structure of the industry, in trading arrangements, and

also in metering at the customer level, so that customers can be responsive to

price.

The problems of Model 3 are problems of boundaries and contracting. The

problems of Model 4 are the transaction costs of having so many customers

participating in a huge new settlement system, and understanding what is

going on; and if default service is required, it does not avoid the Model 3

problems.

Full retail competition is a logical end point to these reforms, because Model 4

avoids the potential conflicts and inefficiencies of Model 3. It gets the

regulators out of the competitive market. The pressures for increased

efficiency come directly from the customers, not from regulated Discoms. Also,

many customers, particularly the larger and medium-size ones, seem to want

choice and there is no particular reason, other than cost, for them not to have

it. General recommendation is to go to Model 3 and then proceed step by step

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with liberalization of the retail markets, gradually reducing the size of the

customers who are offered choice, with the aim of eventually offering choice

to everyone, and getting the Discom out of the business of selling electricity.

3.3 TRADING STRUCTURES IN EXCHANGE – BASED ELECTRICITY SPOT MARKETS

As we have seen earlier the market trading of the electricity is the crucial part

in building competition. This section provides a synopsis of the prevailing

trading structures (mechanisms and traded products) that are currently in

place, or under development, at the major exchange-based European

electricity spot markets (i.e. APX – The Netherlands, APX UK / UKPX – United

Kingdom, Borzen – Slovenia, EEX – Germany, EXAA – Austria, GME – Italy, Nord

Pool – Scandinavia, OMEL – Spain, and Powernext – France ).

Markets

On a liberalised electricity market, the participants can act on a variety of

markets. Traditionally they can trade electricity bilaterally on the over-the-

counter (OTC) market, where the bulk of transactions is still being settled. As

an alternative in some countries organised markets, i.e. exchanges, have been

established. Electricity exchanges usually provide at least a day-ahead market,

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where electricity is traded a day in advance, and an operating schedule

developed by the system operator. Because of the unavoidable demand-supply

discrepancies between the settling of contracts on the day-ahead market and

actual physical delivery the day after, exchanges sometimes offer an intra-day

market, also referred to as hour-ahead or adjustment market. This market

closes a few hours before the actual physical delivery of the electricity

contracted for. Additionally, in order to balance power generation to load at

any time during real-time operations, system operators use a balancing or real-

time market, where participants can submit bids that specify the prices they

require (offer) to increase (decrease) their generation, or decrease (increase)

their consumption, for a specific volume immediately. Additional balancing

services (also referred to as ancillary services) needed to support a reliable

delivery of electric energy (e.g. load following capability, congestion

management, transmission losses, reactive power support, among others) are

sometimes also traded on an exchange-based market.

Trading System

Power exchanges normally provide bidding-based trading in contracts for

power delivery during a particular hour of the next day (except in England &

Wales, where half-hour contracts are traded). The usual trading system is a

daily double-side auction for every hour to match transactions at a single price

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and a fixed point in time. Again the UK market is an exception in this respect

since trading only takes the form of continuous trading.

In either form participants, by submitting bids, determine how much they are

prepared to sell or buy at what prices. Sometimes the possible price values are

bounded by a top limit (e.g. EEX in hourly auctions, Powernext). Another

special feature to be aware of are limits to price volatility in order to achieve

price continuity (e.g. EEX in continuous trading, Borzen). If the potential

execution price lies outside these limits, participants are allowed to change

their bids in an extended call phase of an auction, or an auction is initiated in

continuous trading to get a new reference price.

Usually the participants can add to their bids several execution conditions and

they can offer or ask the same quantity of power for a period of consecutive

hours called block bids.

Auction trading

Figure 6 depicts the basic structure of an auction. All the submitted bids are

collected in a sealed order book, i.e. the participants know only their own bids

and cannot see the others. The bids are changeable until the closure of the call

phase. For price determination in an auction all the bids collected up to the

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predetermined closure of the call phase are sorted according to the price and

aggregated to get a market demand and supply curve for every hour.

Figure-6, Basic structure of an auction.

The simple bid matching ignores any execution conditions or grid capacity

constraints and results in an initial market clearing price (or auction price) for

every hour and trade volumes for every bid (see Figure 7). The market clearing

price is the price level at the intersection of the aggregated demand and supply

curves and maximises the trade volume. If no linear interpolation is used to

derive the curves, additional pricing rules are applied in case of multiple price

levels at the intersection of the two curves. Non-existence of an intersection

may trigger a second round of submitting bids. Alternatively, the last

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calculated market clearing price of the product in question – referred to as the

reference price – may be used.

There may be a surplus at the market clearing price resulting of the simple bid

matching (e.g. there is a demand surplus in Figure 7). In this case the volumes

of bids with the market clearing price as limit are proportionally curtailed, or

the algorithm selects the bids according to the time of order book entering

(first come, first serve).

Figure-7, Simple bid matching.

The initial solution has then to be checked against all the conditions added to

the bid. For a block bid, an average of the market clearing prices for the hours

included in the bid is calculated. This price has to be equal or better than the

price limit stated by the participant to satisfy the bid (minimum income (sales)

or maximum payment (purchases) condition).

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If not all conditions are satisfied the price solution is not valid. In this case one

of the unfulfilled bids is eliminated and the price calculation is run again. This

checking process is iterated until all the remaining bids can be fulfilled.

The trade volumes of the matched bids have also to be checked against the

transmission grid capacities. If there are transmission constraints, the

schedules have to be balanced either by only adjusting the trade volumes (e.g.

OMEL), by adjusting the trade volumes and re-running the iterative bid

matching (e.g. APX), or by splitting the market in several areas (e.g. EXAA,

GME, EEX, and Nord Pool). This takes place either before (e.g. APX) or after the

optimisation (e.g. OMEL) process and results in a technically viable solution.

Continuous trading

Some exchanges provide an alternative trading form to the auction system

called continuous trading. This form is used either to only trade block contracts

(e.g. Borzen, EEX) or both individual hours or block contracts (e.g. UKPX, APX

UK).

Continuous trading differs from auctions in the following ways. First,

participants have access to the order book. Second, each incoming bid is

immediately checked and matched if possible according to price/time priority.

Finally, the contract price is not the same for all transactions, as it is

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determined according to only the concerned bids (pay-your-bid pricing at e.g.

APX, UKPX, APX UK) or the order book at the time of the bid matching (e.g.

Borzen, EEX). At some exchanges (e.g. Borzen, EEX) continuous trading is

preceded by an opening auction and followed by a closing auction. Both

auctions are similar to the auction described before.

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Electricity Trading - Indian Scenario

In this section we will start with the historical evolution of Indian electricity

sector and segregate the various stages into the models we discussed in earlier

section. Then we will move to the electricity market and discuss about the

evolution of power exchange and trading of electricity in India.

4.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE INDIAN ELECTRICITY SECTOR

Indian electricity market can be described to be in transitional phase from a

monopoly to a competitive one.

Introduction

The power sector has registered significant progress since the process of

planned development of the economy began in 1950. Hydro power and coal

based thermal power have been the main sources of generating electricity.

Nuclear power development is at slower pace, which was introduced, in late

sixties. The concept of operating power systems on a regional basis crossing

the political boundaries of states was introduced in the early sixties. In spite of

the overall development that has taken place, the power supply industry has

been under constant pressure to bridge the gap between supply and demand.

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Growth of Indian power sector

Power development is the key to the economic development. The power

sector has been receiving adequate priority ever since the process of planned

development began in 1950. The Power Sector has been getting 18-20% of the

total Public Sector outlay in initial plan periods. Remarkable growth and

progress have led to extensive use of electricity in all the sectors of economy in

the successive five years plans. Over the years (since 1950) the installed

capacity of Power Plants (Utilities) has increased to 89090 MW (31.3.98) from

meagre 1713 MW in 1950, registering a 52 fold increase in 48 years. Similarly,

the electricity generation increased from about 5.1 billion units to 420 Billion

units – 82 fold increases. About 85% of the villages have been electrified

except far-flung areas in North Eastern states, where it is difficult to extend the

grid supply.

Emergence of regional power systems

In order to optimally utilise the dispersed sources for power generation it was

decided right at the beginning of the 1960’s that the country would be divided

into 5 regions and the planning process would aim at achieving regional self-

sufficiency. The planning was so far based on a Region as a unit for planning

and accordingly the power systems have been developed and operated on

regional basis. Today, strong integrated grids exist in all the five regions of the

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country and the energy resources developed are widely utilised within the

regional grids. The northern four regional grids were interconnected later. Now

there are two grids in the country i.e., North-East-West-North East (NEW) Grid

and the South Grid. The two grids are interconnected asynchronously through

HVDC links and operate at different frequencies, rated frequency being 50 Hz

for both the systems.

Structuring the historical growth of Indian power supply industry into

various models

We can structure the historical growth of Indian electricity sector into four

models described in previous section namely

1. Model 1-Vertical integrated Monopoly-was the standard for 100 years,

the model everyone is familiar with.

2. Model 2—Single Buyer—allows independent generators to sell to a

single (utility) buyer in each area on long-term life-of-plant contracts.

3. Model 3—Whole sale Competition—makes the Discoms and the large

industrial customers the buyers from competitive generators.

4. Model 4—Retail Competition—gives choice of supplier to all customers

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Model 1-Vertical integrated Monopoly (Formation of State Electricity Boards,

SEBs)

In December 1950 about 63% of the installed capacity in the Utilities was in the

private sector and about 37% was in the public sector. The Industrial Policy

Resolution of 1956 envisaged the generation, transmission and distribution of

power almost exclusively in the public sector. As a result of this Resolution and

facilitated by the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the electricity industry

developed rapidly in the State Sector.

In the Constitution of India "Electricity" is a subject that falls within the

concurrent jurisdiction of the Centre and the States. The Electricity (Supply)

Act, 1948, provides an elaborate institutional frame work and financing norms

of the performance of the electricity industry in the country. The Act envisaged

creation of State Electricity Boards (SEBs) for planning and implementing the

power development programmes in their respective States. The Act also

provided for creation of central generation companies for setting up and

operating generating facilities in the Central Sector. The Central Electricity

Authority constituted under the Act is responsible for power planning at the

national level. In addition the Electricity (Supply) Act also allowed from the

beginning the private licensees to distribute and/or generate electricity in the

specified areas designated by the concerned State Government/SEB.

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During the post-independence period, the various States played a predominant

role in the power development. Most of the States have established State

Electricity Boards. In some of these States separate corporations have also

been established to install and operate generation facilities. In the rest of the

smaller States and UTs the power systems are managed and operated by the

respective electricity departments. In a few States private licensees are also

operating in certain urban areas.

Model 2—Single Buyer

(Formation of Central Public Sector Power Generators and entrance of

privately owned Independent Power Producers, IPP’s)

From, the Fifth Plan onwards i.e. 1974-79, the Government of India got itself

involved in a big way in the generation and bulk transmission of power to

supplement the efforts at the State level and took upon itself the responsibility

of setting up large power projects to develop the coal and hydroelectric

resources in the country as a supplementary effort in meeting the country’s

power requirements. The National thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and

National Hydro-electric Power Corporation (NHPC) were set up for these

purposes in 1975. North-Eastern Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO) was set

up in 1976 to implement the regional power projects in the North-East.

Subsequently two more power generation corporations were set up in 1988

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viz. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (THDC) and Nathpa Jhakri Power

Corporation (NJPC). To construct, operate and maintain the inter-State and

interregional transmission systems the National Power Transmission

Corporation (NPTC) was set up in 1989. The corporation was renamed as

POWER GRID in 1992.

The policy of liberalisation the Government of India announced in 1991 and

consequent amendments in Electricity (Supply) Act have opened new vistas to

involve private efforts and investments in electricity industry. Considerable

emphasis has been placed on attracting private investment and the major

policy changes have been announced by the Government in this regard which

are enumerated below:

The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 was amended in 1991 to provide for creation

of private generating companies for setting up power generating facilities and

selling the power in bulk to the grid or other persons.

Financial Environment for private sector units modified to allow liberal capital

structuring and an attractive return on investment. Up to hundred percent

(100%) foreign equity participation can be permitted for projects set up by

foreign private investors in the Indian Electricity Sector.

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Administrative & Legal environment modified to simplify the procedures for

clearances of the projects.

In 1995, the policy for Mega power projects of capacity 1000 MW or more and

supplying power to more than one state introduced. The Mega projects to be

set up in the regions having coal and hydel potential or in the coastal regions

based on imported fuel. The Mega policy has since been refined and Power

Trading Corporation (PTC) incorporated recently to promote and monitor the

Mega Power Projects. PTC would purchase power from the Mega Private

Projects and sell it to the identified SEBs.

Model 3—Wholesale Competition (current state of Indian power sector)

GOI has promulgated Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998 for setting

up of Independent Regulatory bodies both at the Central level and at the State

level viz. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) at the Central

and the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERCs) at the State levels. The

main function of the CERC are to regulate the tariff of generating companies

owned or controlled by the Central Government, to regulate the tariff of

generating companies, other than those owned or controlled by the Central

Government, if such generating companies enter into or otherwise have a

composite scheme for generation and sale of electricity in more than one State

to regulate the inter-state transmission of energy including tariff of the

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transmission utilities, to regulate inter-state bulk sale of power and to aid &

advise the Central Government in formulation of tariff policy. The CERC has

been constituted on 24.7.1998.

The main functions of the SERC would be to determine the tariff for electricity

wholesale bulk, grid or retail, to determine the tariff payable for use by the

transmission facilities to regulate power purchase and procurement process of

transmission utilities and distribution utilities, to promote competition,

efficiency and economy in the activities of the electricity industries etc.

Subsequently, as and when each State Government notifies, other regulatory

functions would also be assigned to SERCs.

Power sector across the world is undergoing a lot of restructuring; India is no

exception to this. The whole of the power industry in India is undergoing a

state of flux. The need for restructuring the power sector was felt due to the

scarcity of financial resources available with Central and State Governments,

and necessity of improving the technical and commercial efficiency. In some

States of India there are multiple private utilities, which are technically and

financially in a position to enter the phase of a competitive electricity market.

Hence, in 1998 the Regulatory Commissions were formed under the Electricity

Regulatory Commissions Act 1998 (Central Law) to promote competition,

efficiency and economy in the activities of the electricity industry. Central

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Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) has a key role in rationalizing tariff of

generating companies owned or controlled by the Central Government.

Ministry of Power has undertaken Accelerated Power Development and

Reform Programme (APDRP) from the year 2000-01 with the twin objectives of

financial turn-around in the performance of the power sector especially in

electric distribution and improvement in quality of supply.

The Electricity Bill 2003, approved in Indian Parliament in May 2003, aims to

enhance the scope of power sector reforms. This act consolidates all the

existing laws and introduces provisions with respect to new developments in

the sector. It focuses on creating competition, protecting consumer interests,

rationalizing tariff, etc. All the necessary powers including issue of licenses are

given to the regulators which are made independent entities from the

government. Electricity Act 2003 has come into force from June 2003. As the

act allows third party sales, it introduces the concept of trading bulk electricity.

The act also provides open access to transmission as well as distribution of

electricity.

The responsibility for the development of the Electricity Market in the country

has been entrusted to the Appropriate Commission as per the Section 66 of

the Electricity Act 2003 (EA 2003). Section 5.7 of the National Electricity Policy

(NEP) provides for promoting competition in the Electricity Sector with the

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objective of benefiting the end consumer. The Central Electricity Regulatory

Commission (CERC) is responsible for ensuring the development of the

Electricity Market at the inter-state level. The Indian Electricity Grid Code

(IEGC) was introduced in Feb 2000 with subsequent revision in April 2006 and

the settlement system (Availability Based Tariff or ABT) was introduced in

2002-2003. The ABT mechanism provided the framework for scheduling and

handling of imbalances. These two building blocks together provided the basic

rules for system operation and the commercial settlement. Thus, out of the

four essential pillars of electricity market design, i.e., Scheduling and Despatch,

mechanism for handling imbalances, Congestion management and ancillary

Services, two were in place before the introduction of Open Access.

Open Access in inter-state transmission was introduced in May 2004 and this

has been successfully implemented. This facilitated the development of the

bilateral market in the country and the results are very encouraging. Open

Access regulations provided for electronic bidding for reservation of corridor in

case of congestion.

In July 2006, CERC took a giant leap forward in developing the electricity

market in the country and floated a discussion paper on “Developing a

Common Platform for Electricity Trading”. Comments were invited and all the

stakeholders were involved in the discussion process, finalization of the

54 | P a g e

framework and rules. CERC issued the Guidelines for Establishment of Power

Exchange in February 2007 and in principle approval was granted to the first

Power Exchange in August 2007.

The Open Access in Inter State Transmission Regulations 2004 provided only

for the Bilateral Transactions and the transactions discovered through

anonymous bidding on a Power Exchange were not envisaged. The system of

application of transmission charges was in Rs/MW/Day. A single regional

postage stamp was applied in case of intra-regional transactions for

transmission charges and losses. For inter-regional transactions, pan caking

occurred. These methodologies for transmission charges & losses were not

conducive to the operation of a common platform for electricity trading i.e.,

Power Exchange operation. Changing the existing Regulations and framework

overnight would have had widespread implications. Implementation of the

proposed Power Exchange (PX) had to be done seamlessly in the existing

scenario. All these factors needed careful consideration and were crucial to the

success of the electricity market as a whole.

The Regulations for Open Access in Inter-State Transmission were revised by

CERC to include Collective Transactions Discovered on a Power Exchange, and

the new Regulations became effective 1st April 2008. The Regulator has

adopted the approach of light handed regulation while providing an enabling

55 | P a g e

framework for the development of Power Exchange. The objective was to

provide operational freedom to the Power Exchange within a given framework

and Regulation would be minimal and restricted to requirements essential for

preventing derailment of the process. Private entrepreneurship was allowed to

play its role so as to facilitate provision of value added and quality service to

the customers. The CERC Guidelines for Setting up of Power Exchange,

however, clearly provided for a de-mutualised form of Power Exchange

implementation where ownership, management and participants were clearly

demarcated.

4.2 POWER EXCHANGE IMPLEMENTATION IN INDIA

Salient Features:

The salient features of the Power Exchange implementation in India are:

a) Voluntary participation

b) Day ahead

c) Energy only

d) Physical delivery only

e) Double sided bidding

f) Hourly bids

g) Uniform pricing

h) Multiple Exchanges envisaged

i) Congestion Management by Power Exchange using Market Splitting

56 | P a g e

Timeline and Available Margins for Collective Transactions vis-à-vis

Bilateral Transactions:

The Open Access Regulations provide for a variety of products in the bilateral

transactions category which have a pre-defined time line. These are advance,

first-come-first-serve, day-ahead and contingency. Collective transactions

discovered on a Power Exchange through anonymous bids on a neutral

platform result in a transparent price discovery and present a balanced

portfolio to the system operator. These transactions are processed before the

processing of day-ahead and contingency category bilateral transactions. The

total available margins for short term open access are assessed by the RLDCs in

advance through simulation studies and made available transparently to the

stakeholders through their respective websites. The balance margin after

permitting advance and first-come-first serve bilateral transactions is the

margin available for scheduling of collective transactions. The day ahead and

contingency transactions are processed after the collective transactions have

been scheduled, using the balance available margins, if any.

Functional Power Exchanges:

Indian Energy Exchange (IEX), the country’s first Power Exchange, made an

application for grant of permission to setup a Power Exchange in March 2007

and an in-principle approval was accorded by the CERC on 31st August2007.

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India Energy Exchange (IEX), the country's first power trading platform, was

launched in November 2007 by MCX, with PTC, Tata Power, Infrastructure

Development Finance Company, Reliance Energy, Rural Electrification Corp,

Adani Enterprises and Lanco Infratech as promoters. IEX commenced

operations from the 27th June 2008 after the Rules and Bye Laws were

approved by CERC and permission was granted to commence operations.

The second Power Exchange, Power Exchange of India (PXIL), was granted in-

principle approval on 27th May 2008. PXIL went through a process of

Regulatory approval similar to that of its predecessor and it commenced

operations on 22nd October 2008.PXIL is promoted by the National Stock

Exchange of India Limited (NSE), and the National Commodity & Derivatives

Exchange Limited (NCDEX). The other stakeholders are Power Finance

Corporation Limited, Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited, West Bengal State

Electricity Distribution Company Limited, Madhya Pradesh Power Trading

Company Limited, JSW Energy limited, GMR Energy Limited and Tata Power

Trading Company Limited

Power regulator Central Electricity Regulatory Commission has given its nod to

state-run NTPC, NHPC, PFC, and Tata Consultancy Services for setting up a

power exchange. It is a joint venture company of NTPC, NHPC, PFC and TCS and

58 | P a g e

has been granted in-principle approval to set up and operate a National Power

Exchange (NPEX).NPEX is expected to be operation in the first quarter of 2011.

Competition amongst Exchanges:

The Regulators have provided for multiple Power Exchanges to exist

simultaneously in one physical market. Light handed regulation has been

adopted and the Power Exchange(s) have been given full functional autonomy.

This allows for competition amongst the existing Power Exchanges and an

automatic system of checks and balances. The market participants stand to

benefit from the Process of Exchanges vying with each other for providing

superior quality of service. Moreover, the charges collected by the Power

Exchanges for the services rendered are automatically regulated by the market

forces.

Definition of bid areas in the Indian market

Due to high growth rate of the Indian power sector, high uncertainty, haulage

of power over long distances, it is practically very difficult to identify areas

where congestion may occur. To start with each region was divided into two

bid areas. Ideally, each State may be defined as a Bid Area. Some of the large

States like UP and Maharashtra may have to be sub-divided into 2-3 sub-bid

areas. Other criterion for creating/restructuring the bid areas may be based on

the past experience of grid operation, pattern of drawls, seasonal variation and

59 | P a g e

degree of participation of the State and intra-State utilities in the short term

open access market. The Power Exchanges have also been advised of this

possibility and the need for reconfiguration of bid-areas, if need arises.

Figure-8 below shows the list of ten bid areas presently being used.

Figure-8 Bid Areas

Information Exchange between LDC and Power Exchange(s):

The exchange of information is fully automated between NLDC and Power

Exchanges, NLDC and the Regional Load Despatch Centres (RLDCs). The bidding

window for submission of the bids in the Power Exchange(s) is from 1000Hrs to

1200Hrs. Information is exchanged between NLDC, Power Exchange(s) and the

RLDCs as per a protocol defined in the Procedure for Scheduling of Collective

60 | P a g e

Transactions. A provisional solution is given by the Power Exchanges to the

NLDC at 1300Hrs for checking for congestion if any. In case of congestion,

NLDC advises the Power Exchanges about the limits of scheduling. The Power

Exchange(s) submit the Application for Scheduling of Collective Transactions by

1500Hrs and the approval for scheduling is communicated by NLDC by

1730Hrs.

Market Clearing Price (MCP) and Market Clearing Volume (MCV)

Prices are governed by the principle of Demand Vs Supply at exchange

platform. MCP Is the price of hourly electricity contracts established on IEX

arrived at after considering all valid purchase and sale bids on unconstrained

transmission network.

•All Purchase & Sale bids are aggregated to trace a demand supply curve.

•The bids and offer portfolio shall be assumed to be a sloping curve. All

purchase bids can have only non-increasing quantity for every increase in bid

price & every sale bid will have only non-decreasing quantity for every increase

in bid price

•An example for calculation of Market Clearing Price (MCP) & Market Clearing

Volume (MCV) is given below.

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Figure-9 Calculation of Market Clearing Price & Market Clearing Volume

Looking at figure-9 above,

(a) Demand curve is drawn by plotting the sum of purchase (buying) data

(volume) against price. This curve has a slope downwards.

(b) Supply curve is drawn by plotting the sum of sale data (Volume) against

price. This curve has a slope upwards.

(c) These two curves intersect at a point. This is the point of equilibrium. At this

point price for both buying and selling is same.

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d) If a perpendicular is drawn from point of equilibrium to price axis i.e. Y axis it

will meet at a point on Y axis. Price representing this point is market clearing

price (MCP)

(e) If a perpendicular is drawn from point of equilibrium to volume axis i.e. X

axis it will meet at a point on X axis. Volume up to this point represents Market

clearing volume.

Mathematically it can be proved that the area under supply curve up to point

of equilibrium taking X axis as base is equal to the area under demand curve

from point of equilibrium to the high point of the curve taking the MCP line

which is parallel to X axis, as base.

(f) All sale bids having price less than or equal to MCP value and all purchase

bids having more than or equal to MCP value will be cleared for trade.

Groups of Buyers and Sellers:

Some of the regional entities participating in trading through the Power

Exchange(s) are (region wise):

a) North: Rajasthan, Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, HP

b) West: Maharashtra, MP, Jindal Power, Gujarat, Goa, Chattisgarh

c) South: AP, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu

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d) East: Orissa, West Bengal

e) North-East: Tripura, Mizoram, Assam

The first private sector generator to trade through Power Exchange is M/s

Jindal Power in the Western Region. Since commencement of the operations,

captive generation from the industry has also been able to trade through the

Power Exchange.

4.3 ANALYSIS OF POWER EXCHANGES PERFORMANCE

In this section we will analyse the data of electricity traded in two power

exchanges IEX and PXIL for various parameters like

1. Volume of the electricity traded

2. Price of the electricity traded

3. Price Volatility

The data for this analysis was taken from CERC website, which is also given in

appendix.

Volume of Electricity Traded:

The figure-10 shows the growth of power trading by two exchanges, IEX and

PXIL in 2009 and 2010. As evident from figure-8 the maximum power traded

per day in IEX and PXIL for year 2009 was 27.09 MU and 8.2 MU respectively.

While in year 2010 it was 59.97 MU and 14.79 MU respectively. The total

cumulative power traded in IEX and PXIL for year 2009 was 5077.59 MU and

64 | P a g e

716.347 MU respectively. While in 2010 it was 10120.47 MU and 1433.45 MU

respectively.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Vo

lum

e tr

aded

in M

U

Days

Power Exchange Electricity Traded Volume in MU

IEX 2009

PXIL 2009

IEX 2010

PXIL 2010

Figure-10 Growth of Electricity Trading

This shows that the trading volume is doubling each year in both exchanges i.e.

a growth rate of 100%. IEX handles a major share of 87% of the total electricity

traded in exchanges for the year 2009 and 2010.

Prices discovered in the Power Exchange(s):

It is observed that the quantum of buy bids is much more than the quantum of

sell bids reflecting clearly the shortage scenario prevailing most of the time.

The bids placed in the Power Exchange(s) are reflective of the UI Price

65 | P a g e

anticipated for the next day. Thus the power exchanges are acting efficiently as

an electricity market price discovery mechanism. Physically, there are two grids

in the country i.e., North-East-West-North East (NEW) Grid and the South Grid.

The two grids are interconnected asynchronously through HVDC links and

operate at different frequencies, rated frequency being 50 Hz for both the

systems. The two grids thus signify two electricity markets having different real

time (UI) prices. There exists a possibility of arbitrage between these two

markets.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Pri

ce in

Rs/

kWh

Days

Power Exchange Weighted Electricity Price in Rs/kWh

IEX 2009

PXIL 2009

IEX 2010

PXIL 2010

Figure-11 Price of Electricity Traded

As shown in figure-11 the price of electricity traded in both exchanges shows a

strong correlation. Indeed the correlation coefficient of prices between two

66 | P a g e

exchanges IEX and PXIL for year 2009 and 2010 were 0.932 and 0.95

respectively.

In 2009 the weighted average price of electricity traded in IEX and PX were

5.96 Rs/kWh and 6.04 Rs/kWh respectively. The same for the year 2010 were

3.71 Rs/kWh and 3.84 Rs/kWh respectively. Thus the competition is building

up and the prices showed a positive reduction from year 2009 to 2010.

Price Volatility in Power Exchanges:

Price Volatility is calculated as below

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Volatility in the Price of electricity transacted through IEX has been computed

using daily data for the entire year and it was 18%. While Volatility in the Price

of electricity transacted through PXI was 16%.

4.4 FUTURE OF POWER EXCHANGES IN INDIA

Indian Power Sector entered the Electricity Market Regime on 27th June, 2008

when IEX went into commercial operation. PXI joined the Pan-India Power

Exchange league launching its commercial operation in October, 2008. By 2010

both the Power Exchanges together traded more than 11500 MU netting a

trading revenue over Rs.4370 crores during the short period of their operation

proving the sceptic wrong that power trading is not possible in a power deficit

country like India and proving Shri Amartya Sen right who has forcefully argued

that “Market Mania involves as under-examined faith in the efficiency and

other virtues of the market, regardless of the context.”

Both the Power Exchanges IEX and PXI have switched over to Term-Ahead

Market (TAM) from 15th September 2009 as per CERC order dated. 31.08.2009

launching the Term-Ahead Contracts which includes Intra-day Contracts, Day-

ahead Contingency Contracts, Daily Contracts and Weekly Contracts trading up

to one month in advance which has further deepened the electricity market in

future trading mode discovering thereby the week/month ahead price of the

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power for Evening Peak hours, Off-Peak hours and Round The Clock (RTC)

basis.

Thus it is evident that the power exchange trading of electricity is in up foot.

Newer types of products like futures and options will get introduced in near

future. Also innovative products like “Renewable Energy Certificate” (REC)

mechanism are on anvil. Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) is aimed at

evolving a mechanism to designate “Green Power” as a tradable commodity

and promote Inter-State sales of Renewable Energy. Also Bureau of energy

efficiency (BEE) is proposing introduction of Energy Saving Certificates (ESCs)

which can be traded in power exchanges.

In newly added generating stations in India it is proposed that 15% of the

installed capacity will be traded in power exchanges. Number of merchant

plants are coming up that does not have a long term power purchase

agreement, but trades entire installed capacity in power exchanges.

In short the Model-3 of Wholesale Competition is getting established in India.

Migration to the Model-4 of retail competition in India market may take time,

as the distribution sector strengthening and consumer education is lacking in

Indian electricity sector.

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Conclusion

This study explored in detail the essential aspects of electricity industry and

how electricity is different from other commodities. The evolution of electricity

industry from a vertically integrated monopoly to a competitive market based

industry was explained along with the existing trading mechanism in European

markets. The evolution of Indian electricity in line with the global trends was

discussed. The emergence of market based trading of electricity and

establishment of power exchanges, where electricity is traded in a day ahead

market much like in a stock exchange were explained.

The insight from this study is that the trading of electricity is on rise in India.

The analysis of power exchange performance shows that the volume of

electricity traded in doubling every year. Prices of electricity show a reduction

over the years. It is expected that soon market based mechanism will handle at

least 10% of the consumption of the country. As the markets mature we can

expect the electricity traders to bring more innovative products and execute

structured deals for the power sector participants. Similarly power exchanges

would create their place by providing low transaction cost standardised

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contracts and helping in electronic price dissemination. It can be expected that

liquidity will improve in day ahead and short term markets. New markets like

ancillary and capacity markets will also be developed. Eventually the whole

sale electricity market may mature with economic development of India to

retail electricity market, where individual customer can choose their electricity

supplier.

To sum up, there is a bright future for trading in the power sector of the

country in coming years when sufficient capacity addition along with

commensurate evacuation facilities will be in place.

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Future Scope of Work

Following are some future areas identified for the extension of this work,

1) Comparative study of other well developed international power markets

like UK, Nordic, PJM, California etc. with Indian market.

2) Performance comparison of two operating power exchanges in India -

IEX and PXIL.

3) Financial attractiveness of various financial products offered in the

power exchange like renewable energy certificates, energy saving

certificates, futures, options etc...

4) Topics of risk management and congestion management in power

exchanges can be further analysed.

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References

1. Electricity markets : investment, performance and analysis, Murray,

Barrie, John Wiley & Sons Ltd,1998

2. Market operations in electric power systems, Mohammad

Shahidehpour, John Wiley & Sons Ltd,2002

3. Electricity cost modelling calculations / Monica Greer, Elsevier Inc., 2011

4. Electricity Market Reform in Norway, Eivind Magnus and Atle Midttun,

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD, 2000

5. Making Competition Work in electricity, Sally Hunt, John Wiley & Sons

Ltd,2000

6. Economic evaluation of projects in electric supply industry, Hisham

Khatib, The Institution of engineering and technology, London, UK, 2008

7. Central Electricity Regulatory Authority web site, www.cercind.gov.in

8. Power Exchange India Limited (PXIL) web site, www.powerexindia.com

9. INDIAN ENERGY EXCHANGE (IEX) website, www.iexindia.com

10. Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India

website. www.cea.nic.in

11. Southern region load despatch centre, SRLDC website, www.srldc.org

73 | P a g e

Appendix

IEX and PXIL data for the 2009

2009

Day VOLUME in MU PRICE in Rs/kWh

IEX PX Power Exchange (IEX) Power Exchange (PXIL)

Min Max Weighted Min Max Weighted

1 10.1 1.8 1.65 8.05 7.01 3.75 7.97 7.32

2 14.37 1.84 4 8.1 7.29 0 7.97 7.11

3 9.41 2.31 4 8 6.6 0 8.05 7.49

4 6.46 1.5 3 7 5.76 4 7 7

5 10.81 1.68 3.4 7.9 6.95 4 7.9 7.9

6 10.13 1.16 3.3 7.4 6.67 4 7.5 7.5

7 10.95 1.16 3.5 7.5 7.05 4 7.5 7.5

8 11.65 0 3.25 7.95 6.88

9 12.82 1.47 3.5 8 7.27 0 7.5 7.43

10 11.72 0.55 3.5 8.05 7.35 0 8.25 7.71

11 7.8 3.5 7 6.49

12 5.79 3.5 8 7.07

13 10.07 1.3 2.5 8.05 6.95 4.5 7.93 7.83

14 5.89 3.05 2.29 7.5 5.96 4.5 6.4 6.39

15 8.6 0.43 2.8 6 5.66 0 6 6

16 8.21 1.62 2.04 5.5 5.22 2.45 6 5.98

17 5.95 0.12 1.75 5 4.76 2.45 4.05 3.92

18 5.29 2.01 5 4.48

19 10.31 3 6 5.25

20 11.52 3 6 5.53

21 9.84 1.2 3 5.5 5.11 4.5 6 6

22 9.43 3 7 5.35

23 11.5 0.5 3 7 5.79 4.5 6.13 6.03

24 13.44 0.81 1.6 7.1 5.73 2.99 6.05 6.01

25 9.58 0.05 1.9 6 5.02 2.49 6 2.49

26 4.48 1.65 5.5 4.36

27 9.24 1.28 1.65 8.05 6.16 0 6.1 5.97

28 10.09 1.65 7 5.7

29 9.58 1.65 7 6.2

30 8.32 0.72 2.98 6.5 6 3 6.7 4.78

31 8.37 0.18 1.75 7 5.91 5 7.15 6.39

32 9.03 0.35 1.75 7 5.6 4.5 6.1 6.1

33 7.7 1.1 3 8.05 5.84 4.5 7 6.34

34 5.81 1.1 1.6 8.05 6.28 4.5 7 6.45

35 6.86 1.4 1.6 7.1 6.28 4.5 7.03 6.49

36 8.51 1.95 1.6 7 6.03 4.5 6.53 6.53

37 5.44 2.08 1.6 8.05 6.66 4.5 6.7 6.62

38 7.14 2.17 1.6 7.5 6.45 4.5 7 6.81

39 8.37 2.06 2.5 7.4 6.38 4.5 7 6.86

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40 6.64 0.64 1.6 8.05 6.93 4.5 7.4 7.27

41 6.15 0.72 3 8.05 6.75 4.5 7.95 7.44

42 6.71 1.23 2.5 7.99 6.51 4.8 7.99 7.88

43 6.31 1.87 1.6 8.1 6.65 4.8 7.51 7.45

44 8.38 1.96 3.3 8.5 6.77 4.8 7.5 7.34

45 8.59 1.81 2 8.1 7.16 0 8 7.48

46 10.44 1.3 1.6 7.5 6.46 4.8 7 6.98

47 6.73 0.6 3.5 8.75 6.8 5 8.1 7.51

48 7.66 1.13 3.5 8.7 6.91 5 8.1 7.79

49 4.88 1.4 2.5 8.75 7.26 5 8.3 7.82

50 4.8 1.43 3 8.55 7.18 5 8.55 8.34

51 4.24 0.29 1.6 8.4 7.16 5 8.4 8.1

52 2.47 1.5 1.6 8.05 6.92 5 8.05 7.84

53 4.69 0.46 2 6.99 6.36 5 6.99 6.83

54 5.25 0.96 3.5 7.75 6.82 5 7.7 7.4

55 8.34 1.56 4.5 8.75 7.4 5 7.69 7.06

56 5.55 0.87 4 9.25 8.12 5 8.45 7.26

57 5.87 0.85 4 9.75 8.96 3.5 9.1 8.64

58 3.71 1.7 4.1 10 9.44 3.5 9.75 9.21

59 4.52 2.3 7.5 10 9.33 6 10 8.98

60 5.74 7.07 7.5 10 9.28 6.5 9 8.39

61 4.92 2 7.5 10.2 9.38 0 10 9.43

62 12.81 3.4 6.5 10.6 9.32 7.5 10.2 9.21

63 10.95 1.64 6.5 11 9.58 7.6 10.6 9.84

64 9.34 0.98 7.83 11.5 10 7.7 11 9.54

65 8.54 0.48 8.2 12.05 11.08 8.08 11.75 8.82

66 14.94 0.45 10.12 12.1 11.24 8.25 12.05 9.55

67 14.09 1.2 11.26 12 11.88 10.1 12 11.27

68 11.14 1.73 11.26 13.1 12.08 11.31 12.05 11.9

69 14.94 1.73 12 13 12.8 11.28 13.1 11.96

70 9.74 6.49 12 8.79

71 14.97 3.08 5 12.5 10.29 9.5 11.05 10.55

72 15.83 1.7 5 13 9.72 9.5 12.5 11.91

73 15.23 0.47 4.98 13 9.22 6 13 8.31

74 14.5 2.5 4.5 10.79 7.91 0 10.83 7.77

75 15.02 1.89 4.42 12.5 8.3 0 10.79 7.58

76 12.63 1.23 4.42 12.5 7.35 0 10.79 7.53

77 13.29 0.99 4.4 10.79 6.94 4.42 10.79 7.13

78 14.15 1.96 4.4 10.4 6.9 0 10.79 6.39

79 13.66 2.13 5 10.35 7.27 0 10.39 6.61

80 14.81 2.14 5.65 11.25 7.85 0 10.39 7.14

81 7.25 0.55 1.5 6.4 5.73 5.65 10.75 6.77

82 8.21 0.65 0.6 8.05 6.94 5 10 7.95

83 11 2.3 3.4 8.5 6.52 4.99 8 7.58

84 10.53 2.26 3.44 8 6.39 4.99 8.05 7.53

85 9.05 2.57 1.46 8.6 6.47 3.7 8 7.39

86 7.08 0.65 1.5 7 4.95 4.99 7.95 7.12

87 14.14 3 8.1 6.15

88 15.42 0.4 2.5 6.15 4.93 0 7.6 7

89 12.82 0.78 2.83 8 5.61 4.99 7.1 6.86

90 20.45 2.54 3 9.6 6.73 4.39 8.1 6.95

91 16.61 0.26 3 10.1 6.65 0 9.59 7.93

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92 19.08 0.6 2.98 10.2 7.29 4.99 10 7.1

93 21.24 1.27 3 10.25 7.47 4.99 9.59 8.19

94 17.57 1.45 3.8 10.25 8.75 0 10 8.94

95 11.32 0.6 9.5 11 10.53 0 10.25 7.82

96 12 7 13 11.35

97 17.91 1.06 10.19 12.5 11.77 10.19 12.01 11.09

98 15.45 0.61 8 12.8 11.68 0 12.1 11.12

99 19.07 2.08 7 12.85 11.42 9 12.8 11.9

100 18.3 3.22 6 9.28 8.03 9 12.8 12.05

101 19.73 1.91 5.5 11.5 9.14 7.94 11.8 9.89

102 17.25 2.08 3.88 9.27 6.65 7.69 9.75 9.37

103 13.69 1.7 4.32 11.77 8.98 0 9.75 9.35

104 12.05 0.67 4.88 12.6 10.27 0 9.75 8.88

105 7.61 0.18 8 13 11.49 4.38 12.09 7.5

106 9.91 1.28 6.99 13.6 11.75 6.75 12.45 11.17

107 6.68 0.71 4.8 13.6 10.85 6.75 12.3 10.45

108 5.09 0.32 6.99 13.6 11.57 0 11.62 8.43

109 8.76 1.12 8 14 11.69 0 12 9.93

110 10.26 0.7 7.1 14 10.48 7.1 12.7 10.64

111 9.47 0.7 7.08 14.5 11.21 0 12.25 9.75

112 7.96 3.35 6 13 8.95 7.05 13.5 10.38

113 7.51 1.8 5.99 14.5 10.8 6.29 13.14 9.4

114 6.88 0.95 8 14.5 12.42 8 14.5 10.84

115 7.32 0.5 10.5 14.5 13.2 10.5 14.5 12.34

116 7.39 5.8 14.5 11.03

117 8.9 0.25 10.25 14.9 13.36 0 13.5 11.7

118 10.29 10.5 14.9 13.5

119 15.04 10.5 14.5 13.25

120 16.37 10.3 14.9 13.4

121 10.36 2.53 8 15 10.63 9.3 13.9 12.48

122 13.13 1.9 7 14.5 10.29 7.99 14.49 11.31

123 14.53 0.6 5.25 14 8.81 6.49 11.99 9.76

124 14.31 0.33 5.6 14 10.4 7.6 12.85 7.6

125 14.09 1.85 5 14.6 10.62 6.45 14.25 10.25

126 13.08 2 14.5 8.94

127 17.21 0.7 4 14.5 8.52 4.78 11 7.58

128 15.12 0.45 4.8 14.75 9.22 0 9 7.75

129 16.09 0.35 4.49 10.3 6.93 4.74 12.5 7.98

130 10.52 0.41 4.64 7.98 5.72 4.7 10 7.77

131 15.62 0.55 4.5 11 7.74 5 9.5 7.93

132 13.79 0.65 4.4 11 8.07 5 9.5 8

133 14.14 0.8 3.7 9 6.41 5 9.5 7.53

134 11.7 1.95 3.7 9 6.28 3.7 8.25 7.69

135 10.24 1.43 4.4 8 6.32 3.7 8 7.42

136 9.33 3.9 12.6 7

137 7.92 0.2 3.6 5.6 4.34 3.7 7.5 4.13

138 8.99 0.55 4.8 8 6.27 3.7 7.74 7.19

139 9.93 0.45 4 7.5 5.53 3.7 7.62 7.18

140 10.94 0.55 3.6 7.7 5.31 3.7 7.62 6.58

141 6.67 3 7 5.02

142 8.7 3 6 4.68

143 4.84 3 4.9 3.91

76 | P a g e

144 6.9 2.2 3.9 3.04

145 5.97 2.5 4.9 3.46

146 2.17 1.65 3 2.35

147 5.92 1.65 3.7 2.98

148 11.98 2.5 6 4.22

149 9.05 2.5 7 5.57

150 8.61 2.5 6.75 5.22

151 2.06 1.57 1.9 2.49 2.1 3 5.9 4.9

152 2.92 0.36 3.49 1.71

153 6.8 0.13 2.1 1.45

154 4.57 0.98 2.9 2.02

155 7.36 0.35 0.71 2.9 2.07 2.2 6.75 2.5

156 9.55 2 5 3.19

157 11.44 1.98 5 3.65

158 12.75 0.35 1.7 4.15 2.67 3.5 4.72 4.39

159 15.04 0.15 1.21 5 3.63 2.5 4.72 4.72

160 16.89 0 0.7 4.15 2.95

161 18.83 0.5 2.05 5.2 3.83 2.9 5.3 4.86

162 18.34 0.61 3.3 6.5 4.96 2.9 5.5 5.09

163 14.72 0.99 3 7.5 5.84 2.9 6.5 5.85

164 14.74 1.92 2.25 8 5.98 2.5 8 7.4

165 17.8 1.57 2.9 8 5.06 2.2 8 6.4

166 16.17 1.39 4.3 8.5 6.35 2.4 7.92 7.14

167 17.89 1.74 2.4 7.75 5.92 4.7 7.93 6.92

168 13.31 0.75 6.3 4.19

169 18.73 1.01 2.4 8 5.91 2.4 6.95 6.65

170 13.93 1.51 5.6 9.35 7.45 2 8.25 7.23

171 17.11 2.63 7 10 8.87 7.68 9.31 8.58

172 22.09 3.16 9 10.2 9.72 7.68 9.39 8.97

173 19.69 1.91 10.2 11.1 10.71 7.81 9.9 9.21

174 20.04 0.88 9 11.5 11.09 9.8 11.5 10.62

175 17.74 3.21 9.5 12 11.3 9.52 10.88 10.75

176 20.33 4.43 9 12.75 11.85 9.55 11.77 11.12

177 23.5 5.68 8.75 13.5 12.23 10.5 12.35 11.63

178 26.44 5.55 8.5 13.5 11.75 9.85 12.22 11.66

179 19.46 4.64 4.5 13.5 8.48 9.14 12.37 11.39

180 21.57 3.97 3.76 13.5 9.89 6.9 11.45 10.02

181 19.01 2.58 4 13.65 9.41 5.85 10.75 9.12

182 16.76 2.33 0.23 8 6.65 5.8 8 7.4

183 24.35 1.26 1 6 4.39 5.9 6 5.97

184 25.47 1.47 1.5 7 4.66 2 5 4.65

185 13.14 0.68 3 6.5 5.5 2.9 5.05 4.52

186 10.71 0.16 1.25 5.5 4.01 2.9 5.5 4.18

187 13.8 0.19 4 7 6.53 3.3 7.2 5.25

188 12.89 0.45 5.4 7 6.55 4.8 8 5.79

189 14.98 2.2 5.5 8.5 7.27 4.95 7.41 6.87

190 15.31 2.78 5.5 8.5 7.44 5.5 7.68 7.14

191 11.71 2.23 5.5 9 7.31 3.4 8 7.25

192 10.54 2.86 2.98 7.5 5.79 2.4 7.4 6.69

193 4.62 0.71 2.89 3.5 3.4 1.9 4.32 3.83

194 11.39 2.09 3.5 5 4.43 1.8 5 4.67

195 13.26 2.52 2.89 5 4.44 3 5 4.7

77 | P a g e

196 14.07 3.04 2.05 4.5 3.9 2.35 4.5 4.07

197 11.48 1.78 2.4 4.5 3.55 1.77 4.62 4.08

198 13.24 2.48 3 4.5 3.93 2.14 4.5 4.04

199 11.16 2.08 3 4.5 4.06 2.14 4.5 3.73

200 9.84 1.78 1 3.75 3.17 1.93 4.13 3.4

201 13.65 2.09 3.01 4.51 4.11 2.69 5.27 3.85

202 13.37 2.67 3.5 5.25 4.85 3 4.55 3.97

203 12.62 3.43 4.01 6.2 5.33 3 5.5 4.97

204 17.87 2.67 3.4 6.5 5.52 3 7.38 5.03

205 17.65 3.53 3 6.5 4.38 3 7.38 5.03

206 14.66 2.2 3 5 3.74 1.49 5.05 4.15

207 8.67 0.66 0.78 3.5 2.81 0.78 4 3.24

208 15.52 2.63 2.75 4.1 3.67 2.25 5.64 4.16

209 14.34 2.44 1.75 4.1 3.26 1.75 5.27 4.02

210 11.27 1.17 1.5 4.1 3.25 2.54 5.1 3.34

211 18.0327 1.677 2.49 4.1 3.47 2.25 4.22 3.65

212 17.75 2.81 2.75 4.5 3.56 2.24 4.1 3.68

213 12.47 3.44 3 5.02 3.82 1.75 4.25 3.75

214 9.42 2.65 3.87 5 4.66 2.94 5 3.79

215 16 3.93 5 6.11 5.69 3 6.11 4.81

216 15.56 4.92 5.7 7 6.29 3 7.1 5.4

217 15.58 4.06 5 7.1 6.19 3.5 6.85 5.55

218 23.53 5.32 4.6 7.81 6.67 3.25 7.81 5.63

219 19.38 2.55 4.16 8 6.53 3.55 8.56 5.41

220 17.48 3.78 4.25 9 7.48 2.49 6.25 5.01

221 15.57 2.14 6.5 9.5 8.66 3.34 8.41 5.63

222 13.25 1.63 8.55 12.5 11.04 4.75 10.13 9.37

223 15.86 1.87 11.5 13.5 12.76 4.51 13.05 8.24

224 13.65 2.1 13.5 15 14.41 4.46 14.63 11.02

225 18.44 2.07 7.14 17 14.05 6 15 9.79

226 17.56 1.73 5.1 15 8.55 6.28 8.5 7.69

227 13.65 1.87 3 16 5.32 4.37 6.72 5.27

228 12.83 2.26 1.5 5 3.68 3.75 6.3 4.34

229 10.96 1.78 2.75 4.5 3.71 3.5 4 3.62

230 11.16 0.74 2.75 5.5 3.78 1.46 7.47 5.66

231 11.62 0.64 3 7.5 4.36 1.46 6.78 4.24

232 9.36 0.24 4.16 9.53 5.79 4.42 8.71 5.52

233 12.29 2.02 4.61 11 6.97 4.5 8.67 6.54

234 13.68 1.43 5.22 12.5 7.29 5.57 12.1 7.96

235 14.66 1.51 5 12.5 7.54 5.11 12.5 7.39

236 13 1.91 6 14 9.09 5.54 12.05 7.76

237 12.96 1.42 3 14.5 9.17 4.96 12.25 7.67

238 11.03 2.18 5.5 15 9.6 5.25 12.25 8.67

239 12.21 1.73 4.5 15.5 9.17 3.5 13 7.39

240 11.63 2.52 3 12 6.58 3 10.75 7.15

241 12.22 1.75 3 10.5 5.48 3.5 8.93 6.46

242 10.54 1.32 2.44 6 3.69 2.45 8.42 5.29

243 7.93 0.53 0.8 5.5 2.48 1.39 3.5 3.01

244 15.82 3.1 2 4.5 3.5 2.5 4.87 3.57

245 13.84 2.6 2.89 6 3.98 2.55 5.5 3.92

246 19.04 2.45 2.5 4.5 3.42 3 5 4.13

247 18.46 3.39 2.5 4.5 3.39 3 5.5 4.36

78 | P a g e

248 16.08 3.14 1.5 4.5 2.77 2.44 4.5 4.21

249 12.8 1.24 0.66 3.49 2.29 1.09 4.5 3.16

250 12.85 1 1.5 3.6 2.28 2.3 3.6 3.1

251 15.37 1.68 1.5 3.6 2.57 1.25 3.57 2.8

252 14.32 1.73 1.75 3.6 2.67 1.18 4 2.96

253 13.91 2.12 2 3.49 2.73 1.49 3.6 3.12

254 13.89 2.88 2 3.5 2.6 1.62 3.45 2.76

255 20.4 1.39 1 4.5 2.38 1.49 4.35 2.91

256 16.89 1.68 1 2.49 1.63 1.49 3.5 2.31

257 18.85 2.3 1.5 4 2.36 2 4 2.59

258 19.19 2.19 2 5 2.79 1.37 5 2.81

259 13.97 1.8 2.5 5.25 3.26 1.62 4.6 2.96

260 18.67 1.39 2.5 5.75 3.49 2.75 4.97 3.22

261 22.28 0.99 3 6 3.64 2.8 4.97 3.75

262 20.76 1.55 2 6 3.62 2.99 5.12 3.79

263 16.18 1.5 2.6 6 3.75 1.99 5.75 3.79

264 12.86 1.06 2.7 6.25 4.59 3 5.32 3.77

265 10.73 0.3 3.5 7 5.46 3.5 5.25 3.82

266 13.4 0.23 5 7.8 6.67 4.25 7.5 5.22

267 14.01 1.01 4.5 8 6.73 5 7.75 7.6

268 13.41 1.09 2.6 8 7 5.3 8 6.86

269 13.76 2.52 3.59 8 7.26 3 8 7.23

270 13.95 2.59 3.5 8 6.46 3.24 8 7.49

271 14.39 2.26 3.59 8 6.1 3 8 6.7

272 15.6 1.44 5.2 8 7.07 4 8 7.54

273 16.8 2.15 4 8 7.12 4.75 8 7.53

274 21.17 2.34 4 8 7.1 4.74 8 6.12

275 24.91 4.97 8 8 8 6 8 7.58

276 21.24 5.25 8 8 8 6 8 7.83

277 25.66 5.98 6 8 7.87 4 8 7.76

278 17.55 2.58 3.75 8 6.58 3 8 7.83

279 8.16 0.4 2 4.6 2.59 3 6 4.87

280 10.42 0.49 1.75 4 2.33 2.99 5.49 4.25

281 12.31 0.9 1.75 4 2.63 2.99 4 3.16

282 11.59 1.07 2 3 2.69 1.8 3.5 2.5

283 15.78 1.52 2.35 3.5 3.04 1.8 4 3.01

284 13.14 0.21 2.6 3 2.88 3.3 4.5 4.1

285 13.26 0.52 3 5 3.36 3 5 3.86

286 14.71 1.14 3.1 5 4.41 3.3 5 4.3

287 20.66 2.4 3.15 5 4.33 2.5 4 3.89

288 20.43 3.86 3.99 6.5 5.18 5 6.5 5.82

289 18.41 4.81 3.3 8 5.72 4.25 6.87 5.47

290 12.26 3.52 2.6 3 2.78 3 4.5 3.95

291 10.85 0.3 1.77 2.5 2.31 1.99 1.99 1.99

292 13.44 4.25 1.8 2.9 2.34 3 3.65 3.33

293 15.52 3.82 2.7 4 3.45 2.5 4.7 3.42

294 20.84 4.34 2.7 4.5 3.52 3 4.9 3.9

295 23.61 5.48 2.7 4.75 3.69 3 4.65 3.83

296 15.07 4.08 3 5 4.05 3.15 4.75 4.18

297 20.17 5.23 3.75 5.5 4.62 4.1 5 4.54

298 19.87 6.08 4 5.5 4.65 4 5 4.49

299 20.35 7.54 4.2 5.8 5 4.2 5.2 4.63

79 | P a g e

300 19.75 4.32 4.6 6.5 5.34 4.3 6 5.1

301 18.92 4.81 4.9 6.5 5.61 4.75 6.7 5.6

302 18.72 3.67 4.95 7.25 5.98 5.2 6.9 5.76

303 17.83 2.82 4.85 8 5.65 5 6.5 5.78

304 19.43 4.32 4.75 6.7 5.47 4.5 6.5 5.61

305 20.1 1.34 2.91 5 4.15 3.9 6.5 4.69

306 17.9 4.65 2 5 4.3 4 5.25 4.44

307 21.71 4.78 2.63 6.29 4.43 4 5.1 4.78

308 23.71 7.19 2.6 6.11 4.46 4 5.5 4.78

309 22.09 6.16 2.6 5 4.25 2.99 5.5 4.55

310 21.56 5.71 2.6 5 4.28 4 4.99 4.5

311 19.9 2.52 2.6 5 4.11 1.5 6 4.93

312 19.22 2.53 2.6 5 3.57 1.5 5.1 4.23

313 24.87 2.34 2.5 5 4 2.49 4.5 3.82

314 22.05 4.26 2.6 5 3.36 2.5 4.75 3.89

315 21.25 3.27 2.2 5 3.58 2.48 4.15 3.51

316 16.67 2.69 1.65 4.1 3.01 2.5 4.1 3.39

317 18.62 2.95 1.61 4.45 3.23 2.5 4.1 3.18

318 19.14 1.95 2.25 4.2 3.48 2 4.1 3.05

319 17.26 0.75 2 3.25 2.55 2 4.1 3.83

320 21.5 2.02 2 3.5 2.68 1.95 4.1 3.01

321 22.26 2.38 2 3.75 2.84 2.1 3.5 2.92

322 23.22 4.84 2 4 2.82 2.39 4.1 3.27

323 21.7 4.55 2 3.85 2.65 2.49 3.75 2.82

324 21.82 4.24 1.8 3.75 2.58 1.94 3.75 2.74

325 20.05 4.95 1.77 3.75 2.6 2 3.75 2.83

326 20.51 2.56 1.6 4 2.25 1.76 3.4 2.43

327 22.87 5.28 1.56 3.3 2.13 2.07 3.28 2.49

328 19.95 3.18 1.5 2.5 2.02 1.59 3 2.31

329 21.95 3.84 1.48 3 2.22 1.48 3 2.11

330 23.23 7.02 1.47 4 2.46 1.95 3.5 2.57

331 24.15 8.2 1.47 4.2 2.81 2.4 4 3.28

332 25.06 3.76 1.48 4.1 2.78 1.44 4 2.77

333 21.77 5.22 1.4 3.5 2.36 1.46 3 2.33

334 22.35 5.24 1.4 4.1 2.73 1.46 3.85 2.57

335 16.44 6.79 1.3 4 2.86 1.65 4 2.76

336 25.13 5.79 1.29 4.5 3.01 1.5 4 2.73

337 23.68 5.82 1.4 4 2.79 1.22 4 2.65

338 27.09 5.59 1.4 4.25 2.96 1.4 4.5 2.91

339 21.75 5.23 1.31 5 3.1 1.48 4.5 2.84

340 19.02 2.83 1.09 4 2.64 1.65 4.5 2.68

341 22.86 3.71 1.09 4.5 2.97 1.25 4.5 2.74

342 23.02 3.47 0.99 4.2 2.81 1.24 4.5 2.68

343 23.74 3.63 0.95 4.5 3.01 1.22 4.5 2.9

344 21.78 3.8 0.99 5 3.72 1.1 4.5 3.26

345 21.45 3.2 0.6 5 3.78 1.65 4.2 3.93

346 17.4 5.16 0.99 5 3.89 1.8 4.6 3.86

347 20.16 3.83 0.99 5 3.65 1.12 5 2.86

348 15.47 2.54 0.6 5.05 3.89 1.4 5 3.05

349 16.12 4.31 0.63 5.25 3.74 1.8 5 3.65

350 16.92 2.58 0.81 5.7 3.93 1.8 3.75 3.45

351 12.72 2.42 0.57 5.7 3.79 1.79 3.6 3.31

80 | P a g e

352 13.29 2.17 0.82 5.7 3.51 1.25 5.47 3.77

353 13.87 1.5 0.58 5.6 3.45 1.7 5.6 3.54

354 14.51 0.43 0.97 5.4 2.95 1.6 3.5 2.78

355 14.01 0.63 0.58 5.2 3.37 1.8 3.5 2.97

356 13.32 2.55 0.75 4.8 3.24 1.49 3.7 3.36

357 13.92 1.38 0.58 4.8 3.19 1.48 3.5 2.94

358 13.25 1.47 0.58 5 3.08 1.98 5.2 3.19

359 12.8 1.67 0.57 4.8 2.9 1.47 5.2 3.39

360 13.77 1.77 0.57 5 3.01 0.6 5.2 3.17

361 12.35 1.03 0.57 5 2.66 0.6 5.1 2.98

362 13.85 0.97 0.57 5 3.04 1.15 5 3.08

363 16.48 3.58 0.99 5 3.24 1.2 5 3.05

364 16.15 3.97 0.6 4.8 3.02 1.15 4.8 3

365 15.64 4.35 1 4.7 3.12 1.15 4.7 2.96

Sum 5077.593 716.347

Max 27.09 8.2 13.5 17 14.41 11.31 15 12.48

Min 2.06 0 0.13 2.1 1.45 0 1.99 1.99

Ave 13.91121 2.16419 3.517589 7.62463 5.958055 3.566231 7.304164 6.037112

Correlation Coefficient between IEX and PX Volume

0.591844

Correlation Coefficient between IEX and PX Price 0.932011

81 | P a g e

IEX and PXIL data for the 2010

2010

Day VOLUME in MU PRICE in Rs/kWh

IEX PX Power Exchange (IEX) Power Exchange (PXIL)

Min Max Weighted Min Max Weighted

1 21.59 5.16 0.5 3.1 2.07 1.15 4.25 2.72

2 26.74 4.86 1.12 3.2 2.4 1.12 4.25 2.98

3 14.94 2.85 0.5 3.25 2.28 1.12 4.1 2.77

4 16.98 2.79 0.1 3.35 2.39 1.11 3.15 2.73

5 20.28 3.28 1 3.6 2.41 0.95 3.3 2.73

6 22.45 5.08 1.25 4.5 3 1.2 4 2.87

7 20.19 4.58 1.65 5 3.45 1.5 4.5 3.16

8 21.63 3.54 2 5 3.77 2 5 3.21

9 23.17 3.52 2 6 3.88 2.1 6 3.45

10 25.85 4.18 2 5.8 3.53 1.5 6.1 3.52

11 26.24 4.77 2 6.11 3.98 2 6.1 3.7

12 27.78 5.27 1.99 6.11 3.95 2.4 6.8 3.8

13 27.76 7.01 1.99 6.2 4.06 1.99 5 3.72

14 28.19 6.76 1.33 5.5 3.66 1.99 6 3.55

15 20.84 2.45 1.02 6.75 3.9 1.25 6.75 3.37

16 22.02 3.16 0.35 4.05 2.86 1 4 2.78

17 16.06 0.78 1.1 4.05 2.63 1.9 4 3.13

18 24.32 6.87 1.07 5 3.42 1.75 5 3.08

19 24.18 6.59 0.95 5.3 3.58 1.2 5.3 3.1

20 21.87 5.89 0.91 5.5 3.81 1.15 5.5 3.46

21 25.11 4.72 1.1 5.5 3.84 0.75 5.3 3.55

22 23.91 5.22 1.5 5.5 3.78 1.59 5.55 3.54

23 20.33 4.18 1.4 6.11 3.87 1.4 5.6 3.2

24 15.09 2.12 1.5 5.5 3.64 2 3.49 2.85

25 23.47 4.93 1.5 6.11 4.09 1.75 6.5 3.47

26 27.86 4.13 1.4 4 3.23 1.7 7 3.09

27 23.92 3.43 1.5 5.75 3.78 1.5 5.65 3.77

28 27.65 3.43 1.5 5.75 3.77 1.85 6 3.73

29 29.05 3.3 1.6 6 3.68 2 5.7 3.87

30 27.81 5.21 1.7 6.11 3.72 1.7 6.6 3.9

31 26.14 2.61 1.8 4.4 3.3 2 4.5 3.31

32 18.29 2.01 1.13 5.75 3.68 1.25 5.75 3.62

33 21.23 3.77 1.5 5.55 3.28 1.7 5.55 3.38

34 19.6 2.23 1.5 4.62 3.27 1.75 5 3.29

35 18.09 2.96 1.55 5 3.48 1.6 4.75 3.26

36 21.75 3 1.5 4.75 3.47 1.49 4.75 3.48

37 20.98 3.32 1.7 4.9 3.42 1 4.9 3.62

38 21.27 2.41 1.63 4.9 3.07 1.7 4.9 3.2

39 24.57 3.32 1.7 4.9 3.31 1.9 4.9 3.09

40 21.7 3.23 1.7 5.15 3.55 1.7 4.9 3.37

41 15 2.69 0.92 4.99 3.04 1.7 5 3.28

42 25.38 4.23 1.2 4.95 2.91 1.1 4.5 3.18

43 26.79 4.87 1.4 4 2.75 1.5 4.5 2.92

44 26.56 6.65 1.49 3.7 2.59 1.5 5 2.87

45 19.13 4.3 1.4 3 2.19 1.4 3.15 2.62

82 | P a g e

46 25.09 4.49 1.45 3.5 2.59 1.45 4.5 2.99

47 19.79 4.32 1.45 4 2.73 1.4 3.99 2.9

48 22.73 6.25 1.6 4 2.77 2 4.6 3.15

49 25.03 5.59 1.6 3.99 2.88 1.6 5 3.12

50 18.69 4.29 1.8 4.25 3.08 0.5 5 2.77

51 31.43 5.4 2.05 4 3.25 2.2 4.5 3.58

52 28.74 4.89 2 3.5 2.92 2 5 2.65

53 26.66 6.31 2.5 4 3.22 2.05 5.5 3.3

54 28.3 5.65 2.5 4.5 3.44 2.5 6 4.02

55 21.37 3.64 2.49 5 3.51 2.5 6.5 4.25

56 27.9 3.51 2.7 5.6 3.77 2.2 6.7 4.49

57 29.76 1.83 2.7 5.09 3.86 2 7 3.1

58 28.28 3.05 3.02 5.25 4.09 0 7 4.19

59 22.36 2.27 2.24 5.25 3.75 2.4 7 3.88

60 10.42 0.79 2.4 5.25 3.4 0 7 6.47

61 13.3 1.16 2 6.9 4.39 0 7 6.55

62 13.62 0.48 3 6 4.17 0.4 7 6.71

63 16.4 1.11 2.5 6 4.24 2 7 4.95

64 13.58 0.84 3.7 6 5.15 2.5 7.1 4.39

65 14.73 1.66 4.5 6.5 5.45 1 7.12 4.07

66 16.6 2.48 3.4 6 5.04 3 7.12 4.36

67 14.33 1.2 4.5 7 5.64 3 7.12 6.03

68 16.34 2.11 4.15 7 5.82 2.5 7.12 5.8

69 14.98 2.52 4.15 7 6.01 2.5 7 5.85

70 16.12 1.67 4.5 7 6.19 2.5 7.12 5.36

71 15.9 2.17 4.5 7 6.29 2.5 7.12 5.54

72 16.78 1.69 3.5 6.1 4.94 2.5 7.12 5.25

73 22.5 2.6 3.07 6 4.83 2.5 7.03 5.34

74 19.32 2.52 3.7 7 5.53 3.15 7.1 6.07

75 17.59 0.81 3.9 7 5.78 2.5 7.3 6.14

76 14.9 1.66 4.21 7.01 6.15 3.7 7.33 6.19

77 12.34 1.71 5.1 7.25 6.54 3.7 7 6.91

78 12.58 1.6 5.5 7.6 6.79 4.9 7.25 6.72

79 11.53 1 6.54 9 7.93 2.5 7.65 7.23

80 21.57 1.33 5 7.5 6.28 2.5 8 7.21

81 22.74 2.8 5 7.6 6.74 2.5 8 7.44

82 20.72 3.26 4.19 8 6.77 5.01 7.9 7.26

83 23.32 2.97 3.24 8.1 6.54 5 7.9 7.19

84 23.24 3.08 4.5 8.01 6.89 4 8 7.27

85 24.69 3.42 4.5 8.01 6.73 5 8 7.41

86 25.38 4.53 4.49 8.19 6.6 4.4 8.22 7.33

87 24.22 3.84 3.33 7.5 5.08 3.5 8 7.09

88 27.67 4.15 4.2 8.1 6.16 3.65 8 7.28

89 23.73 4.78 3 8 5.09 3.5 8 7.27

90 21.98 3.04 2.7 5.74 4.13 3 7.9 5.55

91 17.79 3.53 1.99 5.5 3.71 2.5 7.2 3.84

92 19.56 3.33 2.19 6 3.78 2.5 4.49 3.59

93 22.27 3.65 2.6 6.5 4.25 2.5 6.3 4.06

94 20.28 3.32 3.7 6.5 4.71 2.55 7.5 4.31

95 19.63 2 4.8 7.35 5.66 2.72 7.25 6.52

96 19.2 1.9 4.49 8.5 5.73 2.5 7.6 6.6

97 17.35 2.36 5 8.6 6.11 4.15 8.6 6.69

83 | P a g e

98 17.8 2.55 5 8.9 6.34 4.5 8.5 6.49

99 14.96 1.32 6.25 9 7.1 5.1 8.8 6.36

100 12.4 1.31 7.2 10 7.83 6.75 9.25 7.46

101 15.8 0.73 7.5 9.5 7.82 7 9.5 7.59

102 16.47 2.05 7.4 10 8.06 7.45 9.75 7.65

103 17.07 2.37 7 10.5 8.37 7.5 10 7.86

104 17.78 2.26 7.5 10 8.6 7.49 10.3 7.82

105 13.79 2.11 7.75 11 8.73 7.75 10 8

106 17.06 2.19 7.95 12 9.15 8 10 8.92

107 13.47 1.09 8 12.15 9.49 8 12 9.42

108 13.69 1.04 8 12.15 8.55 3.7 12 9.66

109 14.34 1.63 8 13 10.19 8 10 8.83

110 17.95 1.64 8 13.21 10.31 8 12.5 9.28

111 22.36 3.74 7.9 13.5 10.25 7.9 10 8.82

112 23.66 4.76 6.7 12 9.04 7.9 12 9.13

113 21.32 4.32 5.5 12 8.85 6 11.5 8.61

114 21.64 3.31 6 12.2 8.85 5 12.5 8.4

115 16.56 3.26 1 8 6.64 6.7 11.5 8.2

116 21.77 4.22 6.5 13.2 9.29 6.8 11.5 7.91

117 24.11 3.22 6.8 12 8.72 7.35 11.75 8.14

118 26.23 4.35 6.46 13.5 8.91 7.35 11.3 8.23

119 22.36 3.09 6.8 13.9 9.23 7.35 11.75 8.51

120 24.87 4.13 6.8 12 9.07 7.35 10.4 8.64

121 15.46 3.62 7.5 10.5 8.39 7 9.5 7.74

122 12.49 2.13 5 8 6.7 4.75 8 6.51

123 21.87 3.63 4.81 12.5 8.5 4 12 8.27

124 16.38 1.95 4.38 8.8 5.99 4 8.5 7.3

125 11.95 0.8 2.5 5.15 4.23 3.9 5 4.29

126 12.81 1.02 2 3.15 2.82 2.5 2.9 2.69

127 18.84 2.81 2.5 3.6 2.99 2.5 3.15 2.86

128 17.38 2.48 2.83 4 3.36 2.5 3.5 3.04

129 21.71 3.06 2.5 4 2.9 2.4 3.75 2.85

130 15.11 2.59 2.92 9.1 4.53 3.75 5 4.17

131 15.48 1.48 2.87 8.7 5 4 5.5 4.71

132 18.35 3.61 2.95 9.6 5.17 2.7 5.75 4.77

133 12.63 2.97 4 10 5.99 2.7 6 5.14

134 16.78 3.49 2.99 8 5.58 3.5 6.5 5.26

135 17.09 3.79 3 7 5.54 3.6 7 5.29

136 23.62 4.2 3 6.24 4.86 2.9 6 4.09

137 18.05 3.19 3 7 5.43 3.5 6 4.74

138 15.43 1.99 3.37 6.9 5.63 3.49 7.3 5.71

139 16.88 1.83 4 7.49 6.02 3.99 7 5.69

140 22.55 2.44 4.6 8 6.28 4 7.1 5.37

141 27.3 3.77 4 7 5.23 4 5.5 5.02

142 29.33 4.22 3.5 6 4.42 3.5 5.15 4.52

143 29.99 3.86 2.7 5 3.59 2.7 4.3 3.5

144 31.07 2.89 2.7 5 3.8 2.49 4.9 3.75

145 26.8 2.72 2.5 5 3.79 2.99 3.99 3.47

146 22.36 0.72 2 4.01 2.96 2.49 3.25 2.91

147 19.84 2.12 2.4 3.72 2.74 2.5 2.9 2.62

148 15.24 1.27 2 3.5 2.54 2.29 2.9 2.74

149 15.8 1.38 1.45 2.9 2.17 2.25 2.94 2.74

84 | P a g e

150 15.22 1.1 1.71 2.9 2.21 1.97 2.35 2.11

151 18.07 1.44 2 3.64 2.61 2.15 3 2.84

152 29.44 1.38 2.1 4 2.84 2.5 4 3.04

153 27 3.22 2.5 4 3.29 2.5 4 3.13

154 31.73 8.29 3 4.6 3.93 2.5 4 3.52

155 31.1 7.07 3.5 4.75 4.23 3 4.7 4.09

156 31.33 6.1 3.5 5 4.38 3.5 4.75 4.42

157 38.74 8.95 2.99 5.25 4.39 2.99 5 4.67

158 26.64 7.74 2.99 4.9 3.94 2.99 4.75 4.18

159 23.39 5.5 2.25 3.5 2.84 2.5 3 2.83

160 24.47 7.64 2.1 3.1 2.61 2.09 3 2.84

161 23.73 3.68 2.19 3.5 2.78 2.09 2.9 2.68

162 22.15 3.19 2.28 3.75 3.06 2.5 3.5 3.03

163 18.44 1.79 2.09 4.14 3.25 2.09 4.5 3.73

164 21.03 3.05 1.99 4 2.97 1.99 4 2.97

165 17.05 1.43 3 4.75 3.8 2.25 4.5 3.8

166 23.28 2.89 3.49 5.2 4.09 2.95 5.2 3.87

167 28.24 4.65 2.8 5 3.62 3 4.65 3.64

168 29.4 6.1 2.4 4.64 3.25 2.8 4.7 3.56

169 27.46 4.6 2.5 5 3.15 1.89 3.75 2.89

170 33.32 6.55 2.9 4.5 3.68 1.89 3.85 3.01

171 29.62 7.56 1.89 4 3.37 2.15 5 3.08

172 28.36 6.39 3.3 4.53 4.04 2.15 5 3.4

173 24.49 6.1 3.51 5 4.17 3 4.75 3.62

174 21.27 4.78 2.75 4.55 4.04 2.75 5 3.85

175 22.26 5.02 2 5 3.84 2.7 4.55 3.71

176 17.84 3.04 1.89 4.55 3.44 1.89 4.55 3.56

177 15.46 2.56 1.89 4.19 2.74 1.89 2.9 2.64

178 17.47 2.23 2 3.59 2.65 1.88 3.1 2.63

179 22.52 3.97 1.88 5 2.76 2.25 5 2.91

180 18.67 4.39 2.1 5 2.96 2.1 4.75 2.87

181 22.49 2.4 1.9 5 2.98 1.89 4.75 3.02

182 24.79 4.32 2.25 4.5 3.21 2 4.75 3.1

183 25.01 3.92 2.99 5 3.52 2.75 5.5 3.47

184 29.37 4.37 2.9 5.3 3.74 3 6 3.95

185 35.83 6.88 2.61 4.5 3.34 2.5 4.49 3.4

186 27.26 5.7 2.25 3.8 2.94 2.5 3 2.77

187 24.23 4.65 2 3.3 2.64 2.5 2.9 2.68

188 23.83 3.96 2 3.1 2.48 2.3 2.9 2.63

189 31.9 4.78 2 3.35 2.72 1.9 3 2.64

190 36.9 8.04 2.16 4 2.9 2.5 3.5 2.95

191 41.89 10.8 2.5 4.1 3.26 2.75 3.75 3.04

192 45.16 9.16 2.5 4.25 3.21 2.75 4 3.06

193 35.78 4.69 2.75 4.4 3.46 2.75 3.5 3

194 35.62 6.88 2.8 4.75 3.43 2.8 3.75 3.09

195 30.86 11.97 2.25 4.51 3.04 2.5 4 3.11

196 28.75 5.53 2.75 5 3.41 2.75 5 3.49

197 31.25 6.53 2.75 5.1 3.5 2.75 5.6 3.53

198 29.67 5.82 3 5.25 3.82 2.6 5.25 3.85

199 27.81 5.17 2.8 5.1 4.01 2.4 6 3.84

200 18.32 2.52 4 6 4.36 3 5.75 4.08

201 19.25 0.81 3.6 7.1 4.54 3.5 6.6 4.05

85 | P a g e

202 21.32 1.01 3 5.75 3.93 2.99 7 4.75

203 21.75 1.15 3 5.8 3.96 3.25 6.25 4.08

204 27.47 1.42 2.9 5 3.66 2.9 5 3.69

205 26.76 5.15 2.75 5 3.5 2.9 4.99 3.55

206 28.22 1.77 2.55 5 3.21 2.55 4.3 3.31

207 34.05 6.88 2.7 5 3.4 2.2 3.9 2.99

208 30.23 7.53 2.34 4.25 3.13 2.45 4.5 3.23

209 25.24 5.38 2.35 4.3 3.01 2.2 4.25 3.07

210 23.14 3.14 2.1 4.5 2.96 2.05 4.25 3.16

211 26.92 4.3 2.5 5.1 3.23 2.3 4.75 3.12

212 19.48 0.97 3 5.56 3.91 4 5.51 4.14

213 26.95 1.68 2 5 2.98 2.5 5.01 3.45

214 39.57 6.53 2.18 4.99 2.97 2.25 4.75 3.11

215 41.1 6.66 2.25 4.9 3.11 2.25 4.75 3.04

216 32.19 6.77 2.01 4.5 2.83 2.2 5 3.03

217 31.57 4.72 2 3.5 2.58 2 3.5 2.62

218 35.41 5.56 2 4 2.82 2 3.99 2.67

219 36.87 5.79 2.25 4.15 2.93 2 4.15 2.76

220 37.82 7.23 2.1 4.25 2.77 2 4.15 2.58

221 37.47 5.41 2.65 4.5 3.35 2.15 4.5 3.13

222 32.51 7.83 2.75 5 3.48 2 4.55 3

223 28.71 8.91 3.5 6.01 4.1 2.7 5.5 3.53

224 31.86 5.38 3.9 6.3 4.4 3.74 6.31 4.24

225 36.45 7.32 3.9 6.81 4.55 3.95 6.4 4.59

226 33.66 7.43 3.81 7.01 4.58 3.9 7.1 4.64

227 32.17 6.74 3.12 6.9 3.95 3 5.75 3.82

228 46.86 10.08 3.9 7.15 4.62 3.1 6 4.03

229 47.58 12.16 3.65 6.75 4.47 3.7 6.5 4.23

230 48.43 12.96 3.2 6.5 4.28 3.5 6.5 4.37

231 46.3 9.67 2.86 6.51 3.87 2.99 6.3 4

232 46.01 14.79 2.48 6.66 3.72 2.6 6.3 3.87

233 54.16 11.34 2.3 6.6 3.52 2.4 6 3.67

234 47.6 6.51 2.15 6 3.14 2.2 5.9 3.47

235 37.74 5.81 2 6.1 3.17 2.2 5.5 3.46

236 50.55 10.01 2 6 3.04 2.1 5.9 3.33

237 39.54 6.33 1.9 6 2.94 2 5.5 2.95

238 32.49 5.06 1.79 4.96 2.74 1.9 4.5 2.64

239 34.03 4.4 1.8 5 2.8 2 4.5 2.84

240 34.06 5.34 1.68 5.15 2.78 1.95 4.5 2.6

241 30.29 2.34 1.8 4.5 2.61 1.75 4.5 3.32

242 34.29 3.03 2 5 2.77 2 5 3.04

243 37.05 5.66 1.87 5.25 2.83 1.9 5.15 3.14

244 30.57 2.72 1.7 5.5 2.71 2 4.9 3.07

245 30.88 3.23 1.66 5.5 2.64 2 5.25 3.32

246 37.28 5.67 1.7 5.5 2.62 2 5.25 2.93

247 29.47 3.21 1.5 5.1 2.43 2 5.5 3.16

248 25.08 1.75 1.44 4 2.13 2 4.25 3.15

249 28.83 3.53 1.5 3.85 2.19 2 3.85 2.57

250 31.29 2.36 1.99 4 2.41 1.97 4 2.78

251 30.31 2.92 2 4 2.49 1.97 4 2.72

252 33.59 3.06 1.89 4.1 2.44 2 4.1 2.61

253 33.71 2.57 1.67 4.5 2.42 1.96 4 2.79

86 | P a g e

254 29.04 2.42 1 4 2.03 1.97 4.5 2.91

255 29.16 2.43 1 3.5 1.6 1.99 3.5 2.64

256 40.04 4.85 0.9 4.5 1.79 1.9 3.5 2.38

257 29.61 1.59 0.9 5.51 1.93 1.5 5.51 2.72

258 26.23 1.43 1 4.5 1.74 1.25 4 2.53

259 26.5 1.38 0.9 4.75 1.63 1.4 4.5 2.8

260 27.51 1.65 0.8 5.5 1.74 1 4.5 2.56

261 26.67 2.2 0.9 4.51 1.61 0.95 4.5 2.55

262 25.43 0.73 0.5 3.75 1.38 1.3 2.5 2.37

263 29.62 1.61 1.25 4.6 2.21 0.9 4.5 2.7

264 41.79 2.65 1.99 4.8 2.45 1.25 4.75 2.62

265 52.06 7.17 2 5 2.67 2 4.9 2.5

266 57.31 7.21 1.9 5.1 2.72 1.9 5.05 2.62

267 59.97 9.27 1.8 5.5 2.85 2 5.25 2.77

268 59.02 10.52 1.99 5.65 2.96 1.85 5.4 2.93

269 46.5 7.95 1.8 5.1 2.6 1.85 5.5 2.75

270 53.85 10.27 1.97 5.75 3.07 1.8 5.5 2.74

271 56.52 4.65 1.98 5.8 3.27 1.7 5.75 3.25

272 51.58 4.05 2.3 6.25 3.45 1.82 6 3.45

273 48.41 2.82 2.25 6.75 3.47 2 6.71 3.57

274 51.19 9.64 2.5 7 3.86 2 6.75 3.46

275 50.38 9.42 1.98 6 2.82 2.5 8.01 3.66

276 41.37 5.02 2 4.4 2.68 1.5 7 3.12

277 46.28 9.91 1.98 7.25 3.34 2 6.8 3.23

278 45.38 6.36 1.9 5 3.07 2.1 4.2 3.12

279 40.63 4.06 1.99 4.4 2.89 1.9 4.25 3.18

280 28.09 3.1 1.9 4 2.59 1.9 5.71 2.96

281 36.24 2.25 1.99 4.05 2.72 1.89 5.51 3.16

282 35.22 2.85 1.97 4.3 2.77 1.9 4.3 3.06

283 27.41 2.15 1.8 4 2.46 1.8 4.19 2.88

284 32.38 2.85 1.8 4.5 2.62 1.9 4.25 2.8

285 31.12 3.49 1.94 4.65 2.83 1.9 4.25 2.78

286 41.73 2.46 2.5 4.75 2.98 2 5.71 3.04

287 43.77 3.3 2.3 4.9 3.05 2.25 5 3.13

288 43.52 3.42 2.75 4.7 3.14 2.25 5 3.17

289 39.43 4.19 2.5 3.81 2.72 2.4 4.2 2.77

290 20.09 1.52 1.96 3.12 2.29 2 4.25 2.59

291 29.06 2.43 1.85 3.9 2.41 2 4.4 2.94

292 32.15 2.52 1.99 4 2.61 2 5.51 2.85

293 33.52 1.89 2 3.51 2.62 2 4.75 2.68

294 35.9 3.58 2.5 4.75 3.09 2 4.8 2.43

295 36.29 3.32 2.2 5 3.34 2 5 2.63

296 32.86 3.08 2 3.85 2.86 2 6.01 2.75

297 28.41 1.71 1.9 3 2.18 1.9 5.71 2.24

298 36.13 4.67 1.9 3.25 2.25 1.95 5.15 2.65

299 29.09 1.97 1.81 3 2.09 1.8 6.21 3.11

300 27.1 2.66 1.94 3.6 2.4 1.8 7.51 2.53

301 29.12 2.15 1.8 3.3 2.21 1.8 8.01 2.45

302 27.25 2.3 1.85 3 2.24 1.8 8.01 2.39

303 28.4 1.83 1.75 2.23 1.89 1.75 8.35 2.59

304 29.96 2.23 1.7 2.3 1.82 1.78 8.35 2.52

305 34.62 2.73 1.7 3.51 2.13 1.75 6.5 2.56

87 | P a g e

306 28.26 1.86 1.64 2.7 2.01 1.7 6.51 2.32

307 27.44 1.78 1.6 2.5 1.9 1.7 6.51 2.59

308 27.87 2.21 1.6 3.5 2.26 1.6 6.01 2.22

309 23.29 2.4 1.5 3.5 2.11 1.2 6.01 2.19

310 13.89 0.98 1 2.5 1.54 1.58 6.5 1.74

311 18.89 0.36 1.5 1.6 1.52 1 5.01 1.87

312 27.3 0.73 1.6 3.61 2.19 1 6.5 1.17

313 24.8 1.24 1.5 3 2.02 1.5 2.5 1.67

314 26.04 0.93 1.5 3.5 2.15 1.5 4.01 2

315 24.13 1.3 1.5 2.5 1.96 1.5 4.01 2.26

316 24.59 1.1 1.8 2.7 2.21 1.49 2.75 2.25

317 23.47 0.8 1.8 2.4 2.03 1.49 3 1.94

318 27.04 1.26 1.49 2.34 1.91 1.49 3.75 2

319 32.59 2.32 1.75 2.5 2.19 1.75 3.8 2.29

320 29.74 2.01 1.9 2.55 2.23 1.6 3.75 2.63

321 33.97 3.36 1.8 3 2.08 1.8 3.8 2.27

322 31.87 4.79 1.7 2.74 2.14 1.6 4.25 2.44

323 33.6 4.3 1.6 3 2.01 1.6 4.3 2.31

324 33.87 3.15 1.6 3 2.04 1.6 5 2.96

325 32 3.14 1.4 3.3 1.87 1.4 5 2.63

326 30.7 3.79 1.5 2.5 2.01 1.49 5.6 3.04

327 29.47 5.45 1.42 3 2.03 1.39 5.2 2.88

328 34.72 5.48 1.35 3 2.08 1.35 5 2.76

329 35.15 4.93 1.3 3 1.83 1.3 5 3.13

330 32.06 2.1 1.25 2.85 1.74 1.29 5 3.63

331 31.1 3.61 1.2 3.5 2.05 1.19 5 3.53

332 28.17 2.62 1.18 2.5 1.88 1.25 5 2.87

333 32.94 2.3 1.18 3.9 2.41 1.18 5 2.89

334 32.06 3.21 1.18 3.85 2.35 1.18 5 3

335 34.88 2.57 0.88 4 2.39 1.18 5.5 3.56

336 37.77 2.92 1 4.25 2.46 1.18 5.3 3.63

337 39.83 3.19 1 3.95 2.39 1 5.3 2.94

338 38.21 4.02 1 4 2.39 1 5.26 2.87

339 36.03 4.48 1.26 3.5 2.27 1 5.3 3.23

340 34.69 3.16 1.2 4 2.57 1 5.5 2.74

341 36.72 4.57 1 4.45 2.46 1 5.4 3.05

342 36.7 4.35 1 3.9 2.41 1 5.4 2.83

343 31.33 4 1 3.25 2.04 1 5.4 2.77

344 29.4 3.55 0.95 2.85 1.73 0.95 5.4 2.49

345 29.3 2.76 0.95 2.5 1.6 0.95 3.5 2.21

346 31.44 3.54 0.97 2.5 1.68 0.97 4.75 1.81

347 28.52 3.22 1.2 3.5 1.97 1.2 5 2.63

348 30.99 3.43 1.4 3.7 2.19 1.25 5.5 2.71

349 30.7 4.09 1.4 3.25 2.22 1.25 5.4 2.75

350 32.27 4.51 1.3 3.4 2.29 1.35 5.4 2.97

351 35.13 5.37 1.3 3.51 2.44 1.3 5.4 2.67

352 37 4.24 1.25 3.31 2.33 1.6 5.4 3.18

353 40.13 3.5 1.2 3.25 2.41 1.2 5.2 2.76

354 43.17 4 1.1 3.81 2.67 1.1 5 3.09

355 39.15 4.81 1.1 4 2.7 1.1 5 3.26

356 38.28 5.71 1.04 4 2.74 1.1 5.01 3.17

357 39.19 6.5 1.03 3.75 2.79 1.1 5 3.18

88 | P a g e

358 42.25 7.54 1.05 4 2.79 1.1 4.95 3.2

359 44.09 6.45 1.1 3.65 2.73 1.1 4.9 3.25

360 40.18 6.27 1.1 3.65 2.58 1.1 4 3.04

361 41.05 6.93 1.1 3.99 2.76 1.1 4.5 3.22

362 36.8 5.78 1.1 4 2.92 1.1 4.5 3.18

363 35.67 5.18 1.1 4.5 3.01 1.1 4.52 3.18

364 36.34 4.11 1.2 4.33 2.96 1.2 6.5 3.09

365 34.15 3.87 1 3.85 2.67 1.1 5.5 3

Sum 10120.47 1433.45

Max 59.97 14.79 8 13.9 10.31 8 12.5 9.66

Min 10.42 0.36 0.1 1.6 1.38 0 2.35 1.17

Ave 27.72732 3.92726 2.512767 5.334959 3.705068 2.428849 5.639041 3.84211

Correlation Coefficient between IEX and PX Volume

0.651278

Correlation Coefficient between IEX and PX Price 0.950068