Legislative influence on performance management

Legislative Influences on Performance Management ReformAuthor(s): Carolyn Bourdeaux and Grace ChikotoSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2008), pp. 253-265Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25145600 .

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Carolyn Bourdeaux

Grace Chi koto

Georgia State University

Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform

The management literature argues that legislative

involvement is important to the implementation of

performance management reform, but it does not specify

how legislatures should be engaged or how different

legislative organizational arrangements affect reform. This article blends theories of management and legislative

professionalism to better understand the influence of leg islatures on the implementation of management reform.

Drawing on data from several surveys, it examines the

influence of legislative organization on the managerial

use of performance measures. The findings suggest that

citizen legislatures

are associated with better administra

tive practices than professional legislatures and that the

quality of legislative involvement may be more important than its

quantity.

Democratic governing institutions attempt to

achieve multiple and often competing objec

tives, including representation, responsive

ness, leadership, constraint of

power, preservation of rights, and

general freedom, as well as the

efficient and effective provision of public services.1 A dilemma in the design of democratic institu

tions is that the institutional

arrangements that emphasize one

set of objectives may undermine

others. For public administrators,

a key tension is that administra

tive organizations are expected

to achieve efficiency and economy, which may directly conflict with the

"legislative" values of representativeness, openness,

and responsiveness (Rosenbloom 2000, 140). Al

though this tension is, in part, inextricably associated

with democratic governance, one hope of institutional

scholarship is that through the exploration of alterna

tive institutional arrangements, one can identify

new

ways to balance these competing objectives (Weaver

and Rockman 1993).

This article examines the tension between legislative bodies and administrative agencies in the implementa

tion of management reform. Specifically, we examine

whether different state legislative institutional arrange

ments affect the agency-level implementation of perfor

mance-based management reform. State legislatures in

the United States are predominantly bicameral2 and

subject to the separation of powers; yet within this

overarching constitutional framework, these legislative

bodies vary substantially in their structure and capacity.

Among other differences, state legislatures vary in size,

staff support, professionalism of the legislators, term

limits, and levels of authority relative to the executive.

Some of these variations affect policy making (Rosenthal 1998, 2004) and budget processes (Abney and Lauth

1987, 1998; Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003) and likely influence legislative interactions with administrative

agencies in performance management reform as well.

This article first examines the tension between legisla tive decision making and control and administrative

A dilemma in the design of democratic institutions is that

the institutional arrangements that emphasize one set of

objectives may undermine

others.

efficacy and then considers how

differences in legislative organiza

tion and capacity influence these

conflicts. Then, using several data

sets, it tests the influences of

legislatures on the implementa

tion of performance manage ment in state

agencies.

Legislative oversight of reform

emerges as a critical variable

influencing effective agency

implementation; yet professional legislators, with

broad authority and capacity, have a significant and

negative effect on implementation, with the inverse

implication that citizen legislators have a

significant

positive effect.

Legislative Organization and Capacity and

Performance Management Reform In keeping with Hatry (1999), in this analysis, perfor

mance management is defined as a reform that focuses

on the use of performance measures in policy making,

management, and budget decisions, as well as a philo

sophical shift to focus on results rather than inputs or

Perspectives on Performance

Management

Carolyn Bourdeaux is an assistant

professor in the Andrew Young School of

Policy Studies at Georgia State University. Her research focuses on the implications of

legislative integration of performance information into budget processes. Previous

publications include a review of efforts to

implement performance-based manage ment at the local level in Public Administra

tion Review and an evaluation of the use of

alternative dispute resolution at the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency in

Negotiation Journal.

E-mail: [email protected]

Grace Chikoto is a research associate

working on her doctoral degree in the

Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at

Georgia State University. Her research

interests include program evaluation and

performance management. E-mail: [email protected]

Legislative Influences on Performance Management Reform 253



processes. This analysis focuses primarily on U.S. state

legislatures but also draws on federal-level experiences

with the Government Performance and Results Act. The

U.S. Congress is larger and more

professionalized than

most state legislatures; however, it is organizationally

similar to state legislatures and has been used in other

studies of state legislatures

as a comparable institution

(see, e.g., King 2000; Mooney 1994; Squire 1993).3

A number of important works in public administra

tion acknowledge the democratic importance of legis

latures and the allegiance that administrators owe to

legislative bodies (Burke 1986; Lowi 1969; Piotrowski

and Rosenbloom 2002; Rohr 1986; Rosenbloom

2000), but the theoretical and empirical literature

exploring state and federal legislative influences on

administrative efficiency generally describes a negative effect.4 Administrative efficiency requires clear policy

direction and some level of administrative discretion

to apply

resources toward their most productive ends

(Ingraham 1995; Wilson 1989). Legislative bodies are

designed to act as a restraint on executive power, to

represent a broad cross-section of the population

(Rohr 1986), and to act as advocates for their con

stituents (Rosenthal 2004). However, the same legisla

tive features that support these activities are also

associated with unclear and conflicting policy objec tives, micromanagement of administrative activities

(Ingraham 1995; Moe 1989, 1997; Wilson 1989), a

tendency to advance parochial

concerns over ones that

are good for the polity

at large, and a reactive, short

term policy perspective (Joyce 2005).

The institutional conflict over administrative effi

ciency is a recurring theme in public administration,

and the tension between legislatures and administra

tive agencies has colored administrative reforms

throughout the 20th century

(Rosenbloom 2000). Fragmenta

tion of decision making and

competing political priorities have been implicated

as a prob

lem for performance-based

management reforms, as have

legislative capacity and legislature

failure to use the information

generated from the reform.

Fragmentation and

Micromanagement At the state and federal levels in

the United States, the executive

and legislative branches, as well as administrative

agencies, compete for control over policy making and

implementation (Rourke 1993; Sundquist 1992). Furthermore, with the exception of Nebraska, state

and federal legislatures are bicameral and large in size

(with 60-424 members) and may divide control over

a policy

area among multiple committees in each

chamber (Radin 2000; Rosenthal 1998, 133-37). The

complexity of this process often leads to competing or

vague policy directives (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Rosenbloom 2000; Weaver and Rockman

1993). Alternatively, when there is disagreement be

tween the legislative and executive branch or adminis

trative agencies, the legislature may attempt to control

administrative activities by issuing minutely detailed instructions or

by refusing to remove

legal impedi ments (Sundquist 1992).

Performance management reforms require agencies to

identify clear mission-oriented policy objectives (CBO 1993; Joyce 1999, 2005; Radin 2000), a process that

is made difficult by political conflict. For instance, in

2003, $91 billion in federal spending for 30 programs was allocated without authorizing language because of

internal congressional disagreements or

congressional executive conflict over reauthorization (Joyce 2003,

27). Even if Congress identifies program objectives, these may compete with other legislative priorities.

Piotrowski and Rosenbloom (2002) express concern

that performance management reforms have under

mined important non-mission-oriented legislative

values, such as transparency. Along the same lines,

agency or executive identification of objectives may

conflict with legislative intent. Radin (2005), in testi

mony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, points out

that the Office of Management and Budget's efforts to

set performance

measures for Community Develop ment Block Grant funds undermine the ability of

local governments to use the money in an flexible

manner, a legislated purpose of the program.

Similar conflicts occur when the policy recommenda

tions that emerge from performance reviews conflict

with political pressure to protect key constituencies.

Fragmentation of decision

making and competing political

priorities have been implicated as a problem for performance based management reforms, as

have legislative capacity and

legislature failure to use the

information generated from the

reform.

Kettl (1995, 20) observes that, at

the national level, performance

reform led to suggested budget cuts in areas such as the Veterans

Health Administration, but

legislative leaders rejected the

recommendations in order to

avoid any appearance of under

mining veterans programs.

Roberts (1997) describes union

resistance and subsequent con

gressional resistance to

proposed

reorganizations in air traffic

control administration and in the

Patent and Trademark Office.

Observing state legislatures, Barrett and Greene

(2005) note that in some states, performance audits

have been scaled back because legislators do not want

to see results for a favored program. The Congressio

nal Budget Office (1993) report on performance

management reforms concludes that state govern

ments seem to be struggling to with implementation

254 Public Administration Review March | April 2008



because of the diffusion of authority that is inherent

in their institutional structures. Although

some of

these studies are from the early days of reform, it is

unlikely that the pressures that they observe have

changed.

Institutional variations and implications. In sum,

fragmentation and micromanagement are associated

with complex political preferences that are expressed

through complex institutional structures with many

"points of access" through which stakeholders can

influence policy and implementation. In part, frag

mentation and micromanagement are related to het

erogeneity in the political environment and, in part,

to constitutional features of American government,

such as the separation of powers, that are not ame

nable to change. However, at the state level, there are

a few variations in structure that may increase or

decrease fragmentation in legislative decision making,

as well as in interbranch negotiations. First, legislative

bodies may be fragmented by their size and possibly

by the number of committees with purview over a

single policy area. With the intent of strengthening

the authority and capacity of legislatures to make

decisions effectively, some states have reduced mem

bership in their legislatures or streamlined their com

mittee structures (Rosenthal 1998, 50-51, 134-36). Second, state

legislatures vary in their power relative

to the governor. Greater executive authority may make

the implementation of performance management

reform easier?agencies understand which cues to

follow, and legislators have less authority or

capacity to intervene or

micromanage. Obviously, this type of

shift may have democratic costs, and some empirical

evidence suggests that gubernatorial power may not

necessarily come at the expense of legislative power.

Dilger, Krause, and Moffett (1995) observe that states

with higher levels of institutional legislative power seem to have stronger and more effective governors.

Also, some evidence suggests that legislatures with

more responsibility for budgets (typically reflecting shared budgetary authority with the governor) may

manage the public purse more responsibly and may be

more interested in agency efficiency. In a 1994 survey

of budget officers, Abney and Lauth (1998) found that only 30 percent of respondents who ranked gu

bernatorial power as high also said that legislators

were as concerned about efficiency as the governor,

whereas 52 percent of respondents who ranked legisla tive power as

high made the same characterization.

Thus, higher levels of legislative authority relative to

the governor may lead to fragmentation and micro

management, but they may also lead to more respon

sible legislative decision making.

Propensity and Capacity to Use Performance Information

Legislators also face constraints imposed by the nature

of their elected office. Electoral cycles tend to focus

elected officials on short-term time horizons because

votes cannot be "capitalized" or spent on any election

other than the next one (Downs 1957). Voters or key interest groups may reward legislators for attention to

local or "parochial"

concerns over ones that affect the

polity at large (Rosenthal 2004). In addition, legisla tors are bounded by the time and resources that they

have to absorb policy issues. The length of legislative session, term limits, and amount of pay may encour

age or

discourage legislators from spending more time

on policy and political activities, while the number of

staff and possibly technological resources may affect a

legislator's ability to make informed policy decisions.

Finally, large legislative bodies not only increase the

number of viewpoints brought to bear on decision

making but also drive up the costs of decision making.

Because of electoral constraints, as well as constraints

on their time and capacity to assimilate information

and make decisions, legislative bodies tend to make most decisions "incrementally"

or at the margins

(Wildavsky 1988), and a variety of administrative

reforms intended to improve the level of information

brought to bear on

governmental decision making

have failed to alter this pattern (e.g., Lauth 1978;

Mosher 1969; Schick 1973; Wildavsky 1969).

Scholars have observed these same phenomena in

performance management reforms. At the national

level, Joyce (2003, 2005) and Radin (2000) note that

Congress seems to operate with a short-term time

horizon, and despite the availability of performance

information, Congress still tends to rely

on anecdotal

information, makes parochial choices, and often only

considers changes at the margin. Furthermore, con

gressional oversight focuses on high-profile, politically sensitive issues rather than systematically focusing

on

performance information. State information is less

detailed, but surveys suggest that state legislative bodies

also lag in the use of performance information (Melkers

and Willoughby 2001, 2004; Moynihan 2002).

Institutional variations and implications. Improv

ing legislative professionalism has been a long

standing recommendation for improving legislative

capacity for good policy making. The dimensions of

professionalism encompass both the legislators and

their staff resources. The effects of the former dimen

sion are more highly contested than the latter. Profes

sional legislators are

higher paid and work full-time.

The rationale behind the move to create more profes

sional legislators was that full-time, well-paid legisla

tors would both attract more qualified candidates and

would allow legislators more time to learn policies and

carefully assess their effects (Rosenthal 1998). Similar

arguments have been made against term limits

(Greenblatt 2005, 2006). These kinds of arguments suggest that professional legislators should have more

time and capacity to use

performance information

effectively.




However, research on term limits and professional

legislators seems to indicate the opposite. Rosenthal

(1998) argues that legislators who see politics as their

profession are ambitious for higher office and depen

dent for their livelihood on their current office. As a

result, they are anxious about risking defeat, less con

cerned about the state as a whole, and more eager to

curry favor with their district and key interest groups.

They may also have too much time on their hands and

thus be more likely

to "meddle" in administrative

activities. Some empirical evidence supports these

ideas, finding associations between higher legislative salaries and increased spending

on developmental

(interpreted as "pork barrel") spending rather than

redistributive policies (Barrilleaux and Berkman

2003). A study of term limits found that they lead

legislators to be less interested in pork barrel projects and more apt to make decisions based on "conscience"

and statewide needs (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998). Other research has shown higher levels of citizen

distrust of professional legislatures (Squire 1993).

Finally, Grizzle and Pettijohn (2002) suggest that term

limits might bring in legislators who are more likely to

need performance measures to

guide their activities or

who might have a higher propensity to use new types

of information such as performance information in

the first place.

In contrast, there does not appear to be the same level

of debate over staff professionalism. Rosenthal (1998) notes that increasing legislative staff capacity

was at

the top of legislative reformers' lists in the 1970s. Their reasoning

was that more and higher-paid staff

would give legislative bodies more capacity

to analyze

and oversee policy. Staff capacity to

analyze and pres

ent performance information generated by agencies is

also potentially critical to the effective use of perfor mance information in budgeting (Grizzle and

Pettijohn 2002).

Legislative Oversight The difficulties associated with engaging legislative bodies in performance reforms have led some scholars

to encourage administrative

agencies to

adopt reforms inter

nally without waiting for elected

officials (Joyce 2003; Swiss

2005). Most scholars would

likely agree that legislative en

gagement would be desirable?if

nothing else from a democratic

perspective; however, legislative

engagement is not generally

perceived as critical to

imple

mentation. Yet both Rosenthal

(2000) and Rosenbloom (2004) point out the impor tance of legislative bodies in their role of providing

oversight of executive activities. Although oversight is

typically conceptualized as

"checking the authority of

the executive," oversight can also serve an

important

administrative purpose as well. Without legislative

oversight (or oversight from legislatively governed organizations such as an

inspector general's office or a

legislative auditor), there might not be any serious

mechanism for ensuring administrative agency ac

countability. Criticizing an administrative agency is

often associated with criticizing the governor's stew

ardship, which suggests that the executive office may

not be as forthcoming about agency performance

problems as an external auditor.

While a legislature that is politically aligned with the

executive officeholder may choose to defend executive

interests or may want to defend a particular program

from oversight, institutionally, one would expect the

legislature to be less likely to be co-opted because it is

separated from regular management processes. Cer

tainly, Virginia's success in

developing serious admin

istrative accountability has been attributed, in part, to

its legislatively governed Joint Legislative Audit and

Review Commission (GPP 2005). In keeping with the

idea of external accountability, Grizzle and Pettijohn

(2002) call for an external nonpartisan agency to

provide oversight of performance reform. However,

unless they are affiliated with a branch of government, such entities may struggle

to find a political "constitu

ency" interested in their survival. In Florida, the gov

ernor attempted

to eliminate and then cut funding for

Florida's Office of Program Policy Analysis and Govern

mental Accountability, requiring the legislature to

intervene in support of the organization (Barrett and

Greene 2005).

Methodology

Methods and Data

Research and theory on

legislative bodies suggests that

legislative organization, authority, professionalism,

and capacity for oversight may affect state imple

mentation of a performance management reform,

although whether these variables will have a positive

or negative effect is not

always clear. This research uses

The difficulties associated with

engaging legislative bodies in

performance reforms have led

some scholars to encourage administrative agencies to adopt

the reform internally without

waiting for elected officials.

multiple regression analysis to

assess these relationships.

The analysis draws on surveys

that Melkers and Willoughby

developed and administered for

the Governmental Accounting

Standards Board in 2000. Spe

cifically, they sent surveys to 434

agency staff and program direc

tors in 50 states and received

152 complete responses (a re

sponse rate of 35 percent) from 48 states. The surveys

asked agency staff to assess the level of implementa

tion and use of performance information in general

management decision making and in very specific




practices, such as the use of performance measures in

making determinations about funding and their use

in the reduction of duplicative services. Obviously,

some cautions apply in the use of such self-assessment

data. For instance, respondents may not be fully

aware of levels of implementation; they may be bi

ased in favor of their particular program, or they may

feel pressure to answer positively. However, the data

for the survey was collected confidentially. The survey

was sent to agency leadership, who should have more

than a speculative knowledge about agency imple

mentation, and there is no initial reason to believe

that the respondents would dissimulate in reporting

use of performance measures for specific practices in

implementation. Although objective data from an

external evaluator would be desirable, this survey

data is currently one of the best available assessments

of state-level performance management

implementation.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables are two indices created from

questions in the Melkers and Willoughby survey. The

first index is the mean response of seven questions

on

the effectiveness of performance measures in improv

ing specific management practices, ranging from

raising agency awareness about performance to very

concrete practices such as

changing agency strategies

and eliminating programs (see table 1). The variables

are measured on a Likert scale, with 1 being "not

effective" and 4 being "highly effective." Not surpris

ingly, respondents tended to be more positive about

performance measures raising

awareness about perfor mance than about their use in actually changing pro

grams.5 The variables have an alpha

score of 0.91,

which indicates a high level of internal consistency in

the responses.

The second measure captures the extent of effective

management practices using performance informa

tion. For these questions, respondents were asked to

assess the number of programs in their agency using

performance measures for management purposes

(table 1). The categories used for this variable were not

initially equivalent. Specifically, the second category,

"a few programs," is not comparable

to the other

categories, "less than 50 percent," "greater than 50

percent," or "no agencies."

To develop comparable

categories, "a few programs" was

grouped with "less

than 50 percent." Thus, the analysis assumes that re

spondents interpreted "a few" as "less than 50 percent,"

and further, that the categories are

equivalent otherwise.

Table 1 Dependent Variables

Index Measure of Effectiveness of Performance Management in Improving Management (Effectiveness of Use)

In your opinion, how effective has the

development and use of performance Descriptive

measure been in agencies in your Not Somewhat Very Statistics for

state regarding. . . Effective Effective Effective Effective Mean Index

Improving effectiveness of 8 68 52 17 2.36 Alpha = 0.91

agency programs?

Reducing duplicative services? 34 71 31 6 1.92 Average = 2.49

Reducing/eliminating ineffective 36 70 30 6 1.90 Std = 0.63

services/programs?

Changing strategies to achieve 6 62 60 16 2.41 Min =1.00

desired results?

Improving programs/service quality? 6 76 45 17 2.32 Max = 4.00

Increasing awareness of and focus 2 52 59 32 2.63 N =135

on results?

Increasing awareness of factors 7 51 61 25 2.53

that affect performance results?

Index Measure of Extent of Effective Use of Performance Management in Management (Extent of Effective Use)

Based on what you have observed, please "A Few

place a check to indicate the extent to Select

which output or outcome performance Programs" measures are actively used by agencies and "Less Greater Descriptive

in your state for the following types of No Than 50% Than 50% All Statistics

activities or decisions... Programs of Programs" of Programs Programs Mean for Index

Establishing or changing policies 6 66 48 19 2.58 Alpha = 0.84

Program planning, annual business 6 58 55 26 2.70 Average = 2.63

planning, or oversight activities, Std = 0.66

including programmatic changes Assessment of program results 5 55 47 37 2.81 Min = 1.00

Managing operations (e.g., managing 14 68 42 12 2.38 Max = 4.00

services or contractors) or daily N = 129

decisions (e.g., scheduling activities)




Though the second model might be considered the more

stringent test because it attempts to capture

both the breadth and depth of the use of performance measures, there are variations in

wording across the

two sets of questions that suggest caution in this sort

of interpretation. For instance, the second set of ques

tions asked about whether "output or outcome" mea

sures were used (see table 1). The inclusion of "output" measures

might indicate to the respondents a weaker

form of performance measurement. Thus, the differ

ences in the models are suggestive, but the main pur

pose of using the models is to see whether the

independent variables have consistent effects across

different metrics of performance use in management.

Independent Variables

Fragmentation. The principal independent vari

ables assess legislative organization and capacity,

including internal fragmentation, institutional

gubernatorial power relative to the legislature, and

external fragmentation in preferences that might

create conflict within the government. To assess frag

mentation internal to the legislature, two measures are

used. The first is the total number of legislators (CSG 2000, 72), with the expectation that the larger the

number of people involved in decision making, the more

complex the process. The second measure is a

dummy variable capturing whether different parties

control the House and Senate (CSG 2000, 70), and

again the expectation from the literature is that split

control will lead to more fragmentation in decision

making and thus be negatively associated with admin

istrative outcomes.

To assess equality of power between the legislative and

executive branches, we used Beyle's index of institu

tional gubernatorial power for the year 2000. This

index measures the governor's control over the budget, veto powers, appointment powers, and tenure, as well

as the extent to which the governor's political party

controls the legislature (Beyle 2003). Higher values

indicate more gubernatorial authority

or power. Con

trol over the budget, veto

authority, and party control

in the legislature are direct measures of gubernatorial

authority relative to the legislature. The literature

anticipates that gubernatorial power will be positively

associated with implementation. Finally, an index of

heterogeneity is used based on the criteria and meth

odology described by Koetzle (1998). This measure

captures the extent to which the population is hetero

geneous across the dimensions of race, rural or urban

residence, education, and homeownership. A high

number indicates a greater degree of heterogeneity

(Koetzle 1998), and the expectation is that heteroge

neity leads to fragmentation and thus difficultly in

implementation. Descriptive statistics for these

variables are reported in table 2.

Propensity and capacity to use

performance

information. A series of measures of legislative and

staff professionalism assess the effects of professional

ism on implementation of performance reform. As

noted earlier, legislator professionalism is associated

with being full-time with long-term tenure. To exam

ine whether the legislators were highly professional ized, we use a measure for number of days in session

following a methodology described in King (2000),6 as well as a

dummy variable for states that had term

limits in place as of 1997 (Rosenthal 1998, 75).

Characteristics of professional staff support include

the number of staff per legislator and resources ex

pended on staff support. King (2000) observes that

these measures are highly correlated. A staff index was

created from a 2003 National Conference of State

Legislators survey of total staff available to the legisla ture during session and dividing this number by the

total number of legislators. Staff per legislator was

then divided by the total estimated number of staff for

the U.S. Congress in 2003. A legislative expenditures

index was created following a

methodology described

in King (2000), which also uses the U.S. Congress as

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics

Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N

Effective use of performance management 2.49 0.63 1 4 135

Extent of effective use 2.63 0.66 1 4 129

Number of legislators 143.05 52.99 49 424 152

Gubernatorial power 3.47 0.40 2.7 4.2 152

Split of legislative control 0.18 0.39 0 1 152

Population heterogeneity index 0.34 0.04 0.25 0.44 152

Days in session 90.98 56.62 33.6 363 152

Term limits 0.43 0.50 0 1 152

Staff index 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.78 152

Legislative oversight 0.34 0.48 0 1 152

Executive oversight 0.39 0.49 0 1 152

Legislative bill 0.49 0.50 0 1 152

Pm basics 2.13 0.47 1 3 143

Citizen ideology 35.09 26.24 0 90.5 152

Government ideology 41.87 14.29 15.22 77.26 152

Expenditures per capita 2.96 1.15 1.90 10.95 152

Ln state population 15.08 1.08 13.11 17.34 152

South_031_046_0_1_^52




a base. The two variables were then combined to

create a staff support index.7

Legislative oversight. To measure legislative

oversight, we use a variable in the Melkers and

Willoughby survey. Respondents were asked to iden

tify who they believed verified performance measures

"for accuracy, reliability, relevance and validity."

Respondents had options in the executive branch, the

legislative branch, state auditor, and various forms of

external oversight and could mark responses for all

that applied. If the respondents identified legislative branch oversight either through the budget office or a

legislative auditor, this variable was coded as a 1;

otherwise, it was 0. The responses to this question

varied within states, which suggests that this variable

may capture a perceived level of involvement and

oversight rather than a formally defined oversight

capacity. In general, however, this legislative oversight

variable was more consistent in states in which there is

a known high level of legislative engagement in per formance management, such as Texas, Louisiana, and

Florida.

Control Variables

Executive oversight. Traditionally, public adminis

tration has been concerned with executive authority over management processes in

order to improve administration

(e.g., Brownlow 1949). To cap

ture executive engagement in the

performance management re

form, we constructed an index

similar to the legislative oversight

index (i.e., a binary variable

capturing whether the respon

dents believed that executive staff

verified performance measures).

Effort to

implement reform. In 2000, some states

had only begun to

implement the reform, while oth

ers were using it quite broadly. To control for this level

of effort, we created two variables to assess effort to

implement. Because this analysis focuses on legislative

influences, the first variable captures whether the

legislature had enacted a law to implement the reform

(as opposed to the reform being implemented through an administrative action or executive order). Accord

ing to a report by Melkers and Willoughby, as of

2000, 22 states had legislation that required perfor mance measurement. In general,

most states followed

a model resembling the federal Government Perfor

mance and Results Act, so the type of reform was

similar; however, there were variations in the stage and

level of implementation (Melkers and Willoughby 2004, 14). To control for agencies that were in early

stages of implementation, had not implemented the

reform, or had abandoned the reform, we used an

index averaging the responses from two questions

from the survey that asked the respondent to evaluate

whether there were problems collecting performance

information and whether there were problems

main

taining performance information.8 Because these

questions are framed as

"problems in implementa

tion," there is likely to be a

negative relationship with

the dependent variables.

Other variables of interest. Citizen and elected

official ideology is measured using an index developed

by Berry et al. (1998). The index captures the strength of liberal ideology (as measured by the Americans for

Democratic Action and American Civil Liberties

Union) in the population and elected official ideology. A positive relationship would suggest the positive

influence of a liberal ideology on the dependent vari

able. Size of state and state expenditure

measures are

added, including the natural logarithm of the state

population and expenditures per capita. Also, a

dummy variable for "South" is added as control

variable.

Results and Analysis The results shown in table 3 for both of the dependent variables suggest a consistent if unexpected story. Note

that for each of the dependent variables, a "reduced

form" model is presented that drops two of the non

Traditionally, public administration has been

concerned with executive

authority over management

processes in order to

improve administration.

significant independent variables:

number of legislators and citizen

ideology. There is multicollinear

ity between the independent and

control variables, and dropping these two variables clarifies the

effects of several key dependent variables without substantially

reducing the overall power of the

model.

Fragmentation and Gubernatorial Power

The literature anticipated that fragmentation should

have a negative effect on administrative implementa

tion of a performance management reform, but here

the effect is mixed depending on the dimension of

fragmentation. In both models, gubernatorial power is

significant. This finding is in keeping with a long tradition in

public administration of emphasizing executive leadership and the idea that having clear

direction from the executive branch makes adminis

tration easier. The positive effect of executive oversight in the first model also supports the importance of

executive engagement in the reform.

Unexpectedly, the two other measures of fragmenta

tion, the measure of split party control in the legisla ture and heterogeneity

in the environment, have a

positive rather than negative effect on agency respon

dents' assessment of effective use of performance measures in management. Heterogeneity also has a

positive effect on the second dependent variable,




Table 3 Regression Results

_(1)_ _(2)_ Effective Use of Effective Use of Extent of Extent of

Performance Management Performance Management Effective Use Effective Use

Number of legislators 0.002 -0.001

(1.12) (1.21) Gubernatorial power 0.533 0.420 0.334 0.375

(3.72)*** (2.43)** (1.98)** (2.54)**

Split legislative control 0.478 0.455 0.185 0.193

(3.88)*** (3.65)*** (1.27) (1.32)

Population heterogeneity index 5.546 5.206 3.063 4.177

(3.38)*** (2.86)*** (1.31) (2.15)**

Days in session -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002

(1.40) (1.58)t (2.17)** (1.92)* Term limits 0.597 0.537 0.135 0.240

(4.08)*** (3.63)*** (0.83) (1.62)t Staff index -0.232 -0.429 -0.126 -0.177

(0.32) (0.64) (0.17) (0.25) Legislative oversight 0.168 0.202 0.305 0.289

(1.57)t (1.77)* (2.70)*** (2.67)*** Executive oversight 0.290 0.317 0.049 0.030

(2.66)*** (2.99)*** (0.45) (0.28)

Legislative bill 0.124 0.044 0.072 0.067 (1.03) (0.34) (0.54) (0.54)

Performance management basics -0.401 -0.387 -0.489 -0.481

(3.47)*** (3.35)*** (4.34)*** (4.20)*** Citizen ideology -0.005 -0.005

(1.14) (1.12) Government ideology 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.006

(1.42) (1.12) (2.92)*** (2.96)***

Expenditures per capita 0.108 0.101 0.022 0.040

(2.30)** (2.04)** (0.41) (0.74) LN state population 0.091 0.117 0.221 0.186

(0.78) (1.08) (1.73)* (1.52)t South -0.339 -0.302 -0.403 -0.368

(1.90)* (1.75)* (2.01)** (1.90)* Constant -2.635 -2.350 -1.702 -2.176

(1.37) (1.08) (0.81) (1.06) Observations 130 130 124 124

R2 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.40 Robust t statistics in parentheses

tSignificant at 15%; *

significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

extent of effective implementation. At a minimum, we

can conclude that there is no evidence to support the

proposition that heterogeneity in the population

at

large or

split legislative control has a negative effect on

administrative implementation of a reform.

Why the effect should actually be positive may require further investigation. The positive effect of split

con

trol of the legislature may capture the rise of Republi can control in state legislatures. In 2000, Republican and Democratic shares of seats in state

legislatures

overall were almost exactly evenly divided. The last

time there had been such parity in control was 1948

(NCSL 2005). In Georgia, we have observed that a

long period of single-party dominance created stasis?

embedded interests resisted change to programs and

management practices, efficiency or effectiveness

notwithstanding. Recently, with more political volatil

ity, longtime staff and elected officials have left, and

there has been more opportunity

to make changes in

management that were politically impossible previ

ously. There is also more need to make changes that

increase information about agency operations because

so much institutional memory has been lost. Along

the same lines, heterogeneity or

split control may

require agencies to exert more effort in explaining

or

justifying their programs and policies.

An alternative proposition is that heterogeneity and

split control may make it harder for legislatures to

govern and thus allow agencies more freedom to man

age as needed. More detailed assessments of the inter

actions between legislatures, the executive, and

administrators in different institutional contexts are

needed to assess these effects.

Legislative Professionalism

The proposition that legislative professionalism might

improve administrative implementation of a reform

also does not fare well. Term limits are strongly signifi

cant in the first model and just under significance at .10 in the reduced form of the second model. The

effect of term limits is large in the first model. A shift

from a non-term-limited to term-limited legislature

increases the respondent s assessment of implementa

tion by 0.60, or 20 percent (0.6 + 3). Similarly, the




days in session measure is just under significance at

. 10 in the reduced form of the first model and is

significant at .05 in the second model. Here, the effect

is small. For every 100 additional days in session, a

respondent's assessment of extent of effective use of

performance (model 2) decreases by 3 percent (0.1 -s- 3). The staff index appears to have no effect, and the

sign is consistently negative. At a minimum, we can

assert that there is no evidence that that legislative

professionalism, either for staff or legislators, has a

positive effect on implementation. These findings

are

actually in keeping with recent research on

profession

alism and term limits described in the literature

review.

Again, a

question for future research is better under

standing why professionalism might be having such a

negative effect on administration. Rosenthal (1998) contends that citizen legislators prioritize better, have

less inclination to micromanage, and take a less paro

chial, statewide view on policy. However, another

possibility is that citizen legislatures do not have the

capacity to ensure that agencies incorporate demo

cratic values such as responsiveness and transparency

into their decision making, and thus agencies do not

experience any conflict in the pursuit of mission

oriented objectives and the implementation of a per

formance management reform.

Legislative Oversight In contrast to

legislative professionalism, legislative

oversight has a positive impact

on agency level assess

ment of implementation and use of the reform. In

fact, it is also one of the few institutional variables

that is consistently significant in models testing the

use of performance measures in

budgeting processes as

well (reported in another paper, Bourdeaux 2006). This indicator is positive and significant at .01 in the

second model, is just under significance in the first

model, and is significant at .10 in the reduced form of

the second model. In the second model, if the respon

dent perceives legislative oversight, then his or her

assessment of the extent of effective use of perfor mance measures increases by 0.2, or 6.7 percent

(0.2 + 3). The question reflects agency identification

of active legislative staff engagement in verifying

performance measures, in effect an external oversight role that Grizzle and Pettijohn (2002) suggest might be important (although they propose a politically neutral entity).

How does a positive view of legislative oversight

square with the negative association with legislative

professionalism? In a more detailed examination of

states, one can see that legislative oversight does not

necessarily equate with legislative professionalism, either in terms of staff or

legislators. The National

Conference of State Legislatures uses a

typology of

professionalism that includes number of staff, legisla

tor time conducting legislative activities, and legisla tive salaries.9 The respondents in Melkers and

Willoughby's survey identified a strong legislative role

in seven states: New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas,

Louisiana, Florida, New Mexico and South Caro

lina.10 Of these, only Florida is identified as having a

highly professional legislature, although Texas does

have significant staff support (12 staff per legislator

during session). All of the states except for New

Hampshire and South Dakota are known for having a

strong legislature?in particular, these legislatures

share authority for developing the budget with the

governor (CSG 2000). Three of the states, New

Mexico, Louisiana, and South Carolina, have "moder

ate" levels of professionalism in the rankings, which

includes around 3.1 staff per legislator and legislators that spend 70 percent of their time or less on the

job and receive an average salary of $35,326. New

Hampshire and South Dakota have "low" levels of

legislative professionalism.

The intriguing finding here is that legislative engage ment in overseeing performance measures, presum

ably through their staff, leads to better agency level use of performance

measures in making management

decisions. However, high levels of responsibility are not

necessarily paired with high levels of staff or legislative

professionalism, which indicates that quality of staff

and legislator engagement rather than quantity might

be important.

The package of legislative features that is associated

with administrative efficacy in implementing the

performance management reform may be moderate or

even low levels of legislative professionalism combined

with significant engagement in oversight. This sort of

legislative model is evident in states such as Virginia,

which has consistently received high rankings from

the Government Performance Project for good admin

istrative practices and has high levels of legislative oversight (GPP 2005) but has only a moderately

professional legislature.

Conclusion At the most

general level, this analysis suggests that

legislative bodies have an important influence on the

implementation of an administrative management

reform. The results also support a distinct set of hy

potheses about legislative and administrative interac

tions. As described earlier, there is a growing

stream of

research indicating that term limits and citizen legisla

tures (or perhaps moderately professional legislatures) foster a

particular legislative outlook that is less fo

cused on micromanagement,

more apt to prioritize,

and less likely to be parochial in focus than profes sional legislatures. These qualities

are similar to those

required for administrative efficacy in a performance

management reform, and this research supports the

further conclusion that there may be a connection




between less professional legislatures, term limits, and

more positive administrative outcomes. Less devel

oped in the literature is the issue of legislative over

sight and the closely related concept of legislative

responsibility. This analysis shows that legislative

responsibility is not the same as legislative profession

alism and, furthermore, that engagement in oversight

of performance measures (a dimension of responsibil

ity) is a robust and positive influence over administra

tive outcomes. More intensive qualitative examinations

of entities such as Joint Legislative Audit and Review

Commission in Virginia or Office of Program Policy

Analysis and Governmental Accountability in Florida

and of legislatively driven budget processes such as

those in Texas or New Mexico might help build a better

understanding of the administrative response to legisla

tive oversight

as well as how to craft a constructive

legislative role in performance management reform.

Also interesting are the findings about heterogeneity and fragmentation, classic culprits

in analyses of dem

ocratic institution-administrative conflict. These

variables have a positive rather than negative effect.

Ideally, this would indicate that a healthy debate

between political parties has a positive effect on ad

ministration. A more cynical interpretation is that this

keeps elected officials occupied and gives administra tors the policy space to manage. Again, further analy

sis is warranted. These findings do not purport to be

the final word on these issues, but they do suggest some directions for future research as well as some

serious considerations for those who want to imple

ment reform at the state level.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Greg Lewis for his

careful review of this manuscript, as well as the anony

mous reviewers for their comments. The authors would

also like to thank Julia Melkers and Katherine

Willoughby for the use of the data set that they collected on behalf of the Government Accounting Standards

Board.

Notes 1. This list is a compendium of issues described by Dahl

(1998), Rosenbloom (2000), and Kaufhian (1969).

2. The only exception is Nebraska, which has a

unicameral legislature.

3. Local governments in the United States, although

interesting in their own right, tend to be institu

tionally different?typically much smaller, uni

cameral institutions, with significant variations in

the level of separation of executive and legislative

authorities. As a result, their experiences may be

difficult to translate to the state and federal levels

and vice versa (CBO 1993; Joyce 1999).

4. Trie term "efficiency" is used instead of "effective

ness," in keeping with Ingraham (1995), who

associates efficiency with the rational and cost

effective organization and allocation of resources,

whereas effectiveness encompasses the manage

ment of the institutional conflicts that create

multiple and competing objectives.

5. More detailed analyses of these questions can be

found in Melkers and Willoughby (2001, 2004)

and Willoughby and Melkers (2001).

6. Following King's methodology, the "days in session

index" was created by taking the total days in

session, including special sessions, for the legisla

ture during the 1998-99 biennium and dividing

by 2. Legislative days are counted as seven-fifths of

a calendar day. The data for the states is from the

Book of the States (2000-01) (CSG 2000), and the

data for the U.S. Congress is from the Resume of

Congressional Activity (U.S. Senate 2000). Alterna

tives tested included session indices for 2002-03,

which had the same effect, and controls for a

biannual budget cycle, which did not increase the

strength of the model but did introduce multicol

linearity, making the session index fall just below

significance at 10 percent in some models.

7. The staff support index used staff data from 2003,

as the National Conference of State Legislatures

only reports data for 1996 and 2003 (NCSL

2003). Staff for Congress was taken from Con

gressional Quarterly (2000). The expenditures

index was created using a method described by

King (2000), which is as follows: The expendi

tures index takes legislative expenditures (U.S.

Census Bureau 2004) divided by total number of

legislators less legislative compensation, which is

then divided by average expenditures per member

of the U.S. Congress, less average congressional

compensation (Congressional Quarterly 2000).

Total compensation per legislator was calculated

by taking salary information which was added to

per diem information multiplied times annual

days in session (CSG 2000, 83). Both the staff

support index and the expenditures index are

divided by the U.S. congressional numbers in

order to create comparable percentages that can

be combined into an index. The Cronbach's alpha

for the combined index was 0.881, reflecting the

high level of intercorrelation between staff and

expenditure indices.

8. This variable, PM Basics, is coded 3 for "signifi

cant problem" and 1 for "no problem," so one

would predict a negative association with the

dependent variables measuring effective manage

rial use of performance measures. Responses to

the two questions had an alpha score of 0.85,

indicating a high level of internal consistency.

Although this variable may raise concerns about

placing the dependent variable on both sides of

the equation, removing it did not substantially

change the results, except in one case. Testing

the first dependent variable, this PM Basics

measure slightly strengthened the significance and




magnitude of effect of the independent variables.

In the second model, it had the same effect,

except that gubernatorial power measure became

statistically significant.

9. The National Conference of State Legislatures

defines a high level of professionalism as spending

80 percent of the time on the job for legislators,

earning $68,599 in salary, and having 8.9 staff

per legislator. A moderate level of professionalism

occurs when legislators spend 70 percent of their

time on the job, receive an average of $35,326 in

compensation, and have 3.1 staff. A low level of

professionalism occurs when legislators spend

54 percent of their time on the job, receive an

average of $15,984 in compensation, and have

1.2 staff (NCSL 2005).

10. A strong legislative role is indicated when more

than half the agency respondents for a state

identified some form of active legislative oversight

in their survey response.

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