Interest group influence on public opinion: A survey experiment on the Transatlantic Trade and...

Interest group influence on public opinion:A survey experiment on the Transatlantic Trade and

Investment Partnership

Andreas DurUniversity of Salzburg

[email protected]

Version: April 25, 2015(Work in progress)

Abstract

Much evidence suggests that interest groups not only respond to but also try toshape public opinion. So far, however, we know little about the effectiveness ofthese attempts. I present an argument that suggests that contrary to party cues,interest group cues matter little for individual attitudes. By contrast, the framesconveyed by interest groups have the potential to shape public opinion. Thiseffect is moderated by frame strength, people’s prior information about a policy,the strength of general attitudes relevant to a topic and personality traits. I testthese expectations relying on a survey experiment on the proposed TransatlanticTrade and Investment Partnership. The resulting evidence strongly supportsthe presence of framing effects. Moreover, these effects are largely moderated asexpected. By contrast, interest group cues turn out to have no effect on individualattitudes. These findings have important implications for the normative evaluationof elite influence on public opinion.

Keywords: public opinion, interest groups, framing, cues, survey experiment,Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Introduction

Much evidence suggests that interest groups not only respond to but also try to sway

public opinion.1 As early as 1951, Truman (1951: 213) concluded that interest groups

engage in “more or less continuing efforts to guide and control” public attitudes. He

even postulated that “almost invariably one of the first results of the formal organization

of an interest group is its embarking upon a program of propaganda, though rarely

so labelled, designed to affect opinions concerning the interests and claims of the new

group.” Nearly half a century later, Kollman (1998) found that for 56 per cent of interest

groups, “the public” was the primary target of their campaigns. Weiler et al. (2014)

report that citizens are an important or very important addressee for about a quarter

of German and Swiss interest groups; and the media for about half of them. Finally,

99 percent of 258 interest groups that Dur and Mateo (2015) interviewed indicated

that they at least sometimes distribute press releases, whereas 87 percent organize info

events, both tactics largely aimed at swaying public opinion. Some of these activities

may be aimed at shaping public opinion in the long-term, but many also have more

short-term objectives. This evidence begs two questions: First, do these activities by

interest groups actually change individual attitudes with respect to specific policies?

Second, if yes, how does this effect come about?

My argument is that interest groups can indeed affect public opinion on some issues;

but that this effect is conditional on a variety of factors. Concretely, I expect that

interest groups have an impact on public opinion mainly via the frames they convey,

whereas interest group cues should matter little. Interest group frames, moreover, should

have most impact if they contain concrete information; for people with relatively little

information about a policy; for people with weak general attitudes on a topic that is

1I gratefully acknowledge comments from participants at the 2015 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshopsand funding from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), project number I 576-G16.

2

broadly relevant to the issue at stake; and for people with specific personality traits. I

test these expectations using original data from a survey experiment on the Transatlantic

Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) fielded online to 6,826 respondents in France,

Germany and the United Kingdom in February and March 2015. As expected, I find no

evidence of an effect of interest group cues, but strong and conditional effects of frames.

In making this argument and testing it, this paper makes a key contribution to

a literature that argues that interest group activities matter for public attitudes (e.g.

Schattschneider 1960; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Berry 1999; Weakliem 2003; Kriesi et

al. 2007; Dur 2008; Grossmann 2012: 125; Waterhouse 2013; Tresch and Fischer 2014).

Goldstein (1999: 4, emphasis added), for example, argues that outside tactics allow

interest groups to show to incumbents “the electoral consequences of their actions and

provide information to constituents that may reframe an issue and possibly change

mass opinion.” Similarly, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 23, emphasis added) sustain that

NGOs’ “credibility still depends in part on their ability to mobilize their own members

and affect public opinion via the media.” Berry (1999: 3) argues that in the United

States (US) citizen groups are successful in influencing public policy because they can

affect election outcomes (via their influence on voters). Waterhouse (2013: 12) stresses

business’ ability to sway “the general public’s attitudes toward business, regulation,

labor, and taxation.” Interest groups’ ability to shape public opinion also plays a key

role in some formal models of interest group influence (Lohmann 1993; Yu 2005).

Studies that directly and systematically assess the effect of interest group campaigns

on public opinion, however, are rare. The few studies that speak to this question fall into

two groups. On the one hand, a few studies found no or even a negative effect of interest

groups’ attempts at shaping public opinion. In an early publication, Page et al. (1987)

concluded that interest groups’ attempts at influencing public opinion via the media are

likely to have the opposite effect. That is, if interest groups push in one direction, public

3

opinion more often than not moves in the other. The authors of that study, however,

stress that “public” interest groups may have a positive impact, whereas interest groups

representing narrow interests may have a negative impact (Page et al. 1987: 37). A

study of five ballot initiatives in California confirmed this finding by showing that voters

who knew the position of industry, but otherwise had little information about the details

of the initiatives, were much more likely to vote contrary to the industry’s position

(Lupia 1994). In a study of referendums in the American states, Gerber (1999) showed

that business expenditures had little impact on referendum outcomes. She concluded

that “if voters do not like what initiative proponents are selling, not even vast amounts

of campaign spending can get them to vote for a new policy” (Gerber 1999: 6). A few

case studies also found little impact on public opinion of specific campaigns (West el al.

1996; Andsager 2000). For the case of a late-term abortion debate in the US, Andsager

(2000) concluded that the most visible tactics by pro-life groups even led to negative

reactions by the public.

On the other hand, some studies conclude that interest groups are successful in

shaping public opinion in line with their preferences. Half a century ago a considerable

literature claimed that business can shape public opinion (Mills 1956; Lindblom 1977).

More recently, Smith (2000) found that business, working through think tanks, can

affect public attitudes on whether government should be strong or weak. The results

of a study of trade preferences by Fordham and Kleinberg (2012: 321) suggest that

“organized groups such as trade unions provide a large share of the facts and opinions

from which people distill their views on trade, foreigners, or the national interest.” A few

case studies of specific interest group campaigns also offer evidence of interest groups’

ability to push public opinion in the desired direction (or to increase the public salience

of specific issues) (e.g. Burstein 1985; McKnight and Hobbs 2013; Dur and Mateo 2014).

4

For several reasons, improving our understanding of how and when interest groups

can affect public opinion is timely. First, the question how interest groups (as one

type of elite actors) can shape – or manipulate – public opinion is a key concern for

democratic theory. Following Dahl (1971: 1), “A key characteristic of democracy is

the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of the people.” But

how easily can these “preferences of the people” be manipulated? Second, the topic has

become particularly relevant with the rise of social media and the digital revolution that

offer interest groups new tools to shape and mobilize public opinion. Third, much recent

research has studied the factors that explain variation in the choice of lobbying strategy

(e.g. Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005; Kriesi et al. 2007; Dur and Mateo 2013). A better

understanding of the conditions under which outside lobbying is effective in swaying

public opinion is crucial to further advance this literature. Fourth, several recent studies

analyse how public opinion matters for interest groups’ chances to influence public policy

(e.g. Burstein 2013). To the extent that interest groups manage to shape public opinion,

the question whether public opinion or interest groups matter more for public policies

needs to be re-considered. Finally, research on the determinants of public opinion has

made much progress over the last few years, but (while recognizing that an effect of

interest groups is plausible) has failed systematically to bring interest groups into the

picture.

Interest group influence on public opinion

An interest group that strongly favours a specific policy, but is unable to convince

decision-makers of the policy’s merits (e.g. Greenpeace trying to stop the negotiations

for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP) may decide to engage

in outside lobbying to mobilize and shape public opinion. It can do so by using both

5

new and traditional media, sending leaflets to households and holding a rally. On TTIP,

for example, Greenpeace has used campaign posters, launched a campaign website,

organized an online petition etc. Does this effort actually change public opinion, in the

sense of making people more or less supportive of the policy? If so, when can such an

outside lobbying effort have these effects and why?

The starting point for my response to these questions is the assumption that political

elites can indeed shape individual attitudes. This assumption is based on much research

on public opinion (Zaller 1992; Chong and Druckman 2011). This literature suggests

that the effect of political elites on public opinion may occur via two “mechanisms”,

namely via cues and issue frames. A cue is a piece of information that people use to

infer other information that they do not possess (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). As most

individuals are “awash in ignorance” of politics (Kinder 1998: 784; see also Zaller 1992),

they need cues to take decisions – the cue then is an information shortcut to avoid

investing time in learning about an issue. Cues can also work by activating certain

emotions. For example, people that identify with a specific political party may react

to a partisan endorsement of a specific policy without rationally updating their beliefs.

If people use cues in such a manner, they follow political elites “rather blindly” (Lenz

2012: 3).

Issue frames (also called emphasis frames) stress a specific interpretation of an event.

For example, a smoking ban can be framed as a public health issue or as government

interference with personal lifestyles. The impact of frames can best be understood when

conceiving of attitudes as the sum of a set of beliefs or evaluations and weights for

each belief (Nelson and Oxley 1999). The emphasis put on specific issue frames may

change the relative weights of the evaluations, by making one or several evaluations

more accessible and applicable to an issue. The result is a change in overall attitude. A

framing effect hence implies that “a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant

6

considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing

their opinions” (Druckman and Nelson 2003: 730).

Research on the impact of political parties on public opinion debates the relative

importance of party cues and frames in shaping individual attitudes (Cohen 2003;

Bullock 2011; Brader et al. 2013; Druckman et al. 2013; Leeper and Slothuus 2014).

Whereas some studies emphasize the role of party cues (Cohen 2003), others put more

emphasis on the effect of issue frames (Bullock 2011). To resolve this controversy, some

authors try to uncover the factors that make either frames or cues more important.

Slothuus and De Vreese (2010), for example, suggest that more politically aware people

react more strongly to party cues relative to issue frames than less politically aware

people. For people willing to invest effort in forming their attitudes, by contrast, cues

should matter less than other information they possess or receive (Leeper and Slothuus

2014). Strong party polarization on an issue also increases the relative importance of

party cues (Druckman et al. 2013).

Potentially, it could be expected that interest groups affect citizens’ attitudes both

via cues and issue frames. From the information that Greenpeace opposes a policy,

individuals may infer that this policy is likely to harm the environment, as they know

that Greenpeace is an environmental NGO. They then use lobbying by Greenpeace

as a source cue. Interest group cues may also tell citizens who the likely winners and

losers of a policy are, which in turn may allow them to adopt a position on that policy.

Outside lobbying by business interests in support of a policy, for example, may suggest

to individuals that business interests will be the main beneficiaries of that policy. The

lobbying then may be counter-productive with respect to individuals that identify with

non-business interests. More generally, in line with Page et al. (1987), it could be

expected that individuals react negatively to the cue sent by the lobbying efforts of

narrow interests and positively to the cue sent by the lobbying efforts of broad interests.

7

Nevertheless, my expectation is for interest group cues to have little impact on

individual attitudes. Whereas many people identify with specific political parties, there

is little indication that they also identify with specific interest groups or sets of interest

groups. In the absence of identification with a specific interest group, people are less

likely to be driven to see the world through a specific “group lens” (as compared to

seeing the world through a partisan lens). Interest groups as source cues then can only

affect attitudes as information shortcuts. But the amount of information transmitted

by interest groups as source cues is likely to be limited on most issues. The reason for

this is that interest groups have less of a reputation than political parties. Only people

with much information about a policy hence can make sense of an interest group cue;

and these people do not need to use the cue as an information shortcut, as they already

know what the issue is about. The first hypothesis that I propose thus is:

Hypothesis 1: Interest group cues do not have an impact on individual attitudes.

By contrast, the issue frames transported by interest groups are likely to have

an impact on individual attitudes. This should be the case even for frames that are

vague and hence transport little information. Much research, however, shows that

“frame strength” matters for the effect of frames on individual attitudes (Chaiken and

Maheswaran 1994; Druckman et al. 2013). In line with this literature, I expect frames

that transmit concrete information (“strong frames”) to matter more than vague frames

(“weak frames”). Nevertheless, even vague frames are likely to be more informative to

people than interest group cues. I thus hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2a: The frames interest groups convey to the public matter for individual

attitudes.

Hypothesis 2b: Strong frames have a greater effect on individual attitudes than weak

ones.

8

Whether or not people react to the frames transmitted by interest groups should

depend on the amount of information that they already possess about a policy. This

is so because any information contained in a frame most likely is already part of the

attitude of people that are highly knowledgeable of an issue. The frame then neither

changes the set of evaluations nor the respective weights underlying an attitude. By

contrast, people with little information about a policy may use information contained

in a frame to adjust their attitudes. This is most likely for frames that contain concrete

information. The hypothesis that I derive from this reasoning is:

Hypothesis 3: The less information an individual has about a policy, the greater the

effect of the (strong) frames conveyed by interest groups.

The effect of interest group frames should also be conditioned by how strongly

people hold attitudes on a broader topic relevant to the evaluation of a specific issue.

Individuals that hold strong attitudes with respect to a policy area will use this attitude

rather than any new information that they receive via a frame to decide on their attitude

with respect to a specific policy. For example, an individual may have strong views

on the desirability of environmental protection, which predispose her to take a specific

stance on the desirability of a concrete policy reducing CO2 emissions from cars, even if

she knows little about the latter. I thus expect individuals that hold a strong attitude

towards a specific policy to be less open to the information contained in the frames

conveyed by interest groups. My expectation hence is for the effect of frames to be

moderated by the strength of the attitudes held by individuals:

Hypothesis 4: The more strongly people hold a general attitude that is relevant for the

evaluation of a specific policy, the smaller the effect of the frames conveyed by interest

groups.

9

Finally, I also expect the size of the framing effect to depend on individuals’ personal-

ity traits. Personality traits “refer to basic dispositions that predispose one to consistent

patterns of thought, feeling, and action” (Caprara and Vecchione 2013: 27). Much of

the recent political psychology literature distinguishes the “Big Five” personality traits

(McCrae and Costa 2008): agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism,

and openness to experience. Extant research shows that these personality traits matter

for political attitudes and political behaviour (e.g. Bakker et al. 2014). I focus on two of

these traits, which seem particularly relevant for the impact of the frames conveyed by

interest groups on public opinion. On the one hand, people scoring high on extraversion

may generally be inclined to take a more favourable attitude on an issue than people

scoring low on extraversion. New information that they receive via a frame should

dampen this effect. They should thus react less to a positive frame; and more to a

negative frame than less extraverted people. On the other hand, I expect citizens that

score highly on openness to experience (that is, people who are curious) to be more

likely to respond to new information coming from an interest group campaign. The

following two hypotheses capture this reasoning:

Hypothesis 5a: People scoring high on extraversion react more strongly to a nega-

tive frame and less strongly to a positive frame conveyed by interest groups than less

extraverted people.

Hypothesis 5b: People scoring high on openness to experience react more strongly to

the frames conveyed by interest groups.

Methodology

Several methodological problems make testing these hypotheses challenging. First, it

is difficult to separate the influence of interest groups from the many other factors

10

that influence attitudes. Ascertaining the effect of interest groups requires showing

the counter-factual proposition that individual attitudes would have been different in

the absence of interest group activity. Second, few polls ask the public about specific

policies, and the few that do so, tend to focus on high-profile policies. We hence largely

lack observational data on how public opinion changes on specific issues that may be the

target of an interest group campaign. Third, interest groups likely anticipate on which

issues they can influence public opinion. If we see campaigns on issues where an effect

is most likely, we may overestimate the effect of interest groups. Fourth, campaigns by

interest groups taking opposite stances may neutralize each other, meaning that we may

observe no effect at all or underestimate any effect. Finally, whether or not a person

pays attention to an interest group message is not a random variable; the individuals

who pay attention are probably generally more politically aware (and have stronger

attitudes) than the individuals who do not pay attention.

To overcome these problems, I rely on an experiment embedded in a public opinion

survey. Experiments embedded in public opinion surveys have become an important tool

for the social sciences (see Mutz 2011), but they have not yet been used to investigate

the impact of interest groups on public opinion. In survey experiments, one or several

elements of the questionnaire used are systematically varied across respondents (e.g.

some respondents are told that an interest group supports a policy, whereas others

do not get that information, before a question on whether the respondents approve or

disapprove of the policy), with random assignment of respondents into treatment and

control groups. Variation between treatment and control groups, and across different

treatment groups, can be attributed to variation in the treatment that respondents

received. While clearly survey experiments are no panacea to all research design problems

(Gaines et al. 2007; Mutz 2011), they offer a unique opportunity to tackle some of the

problems hampering observational research on the impact of interest groups on public

11

opinion. Survey experiments combine the advantages of the traditional experimental

set-up (internally valid causal inference because of random assignment) with the added

strengths that participants can be representative for a given population and that sample

sizes tend to be large. Although a survey experiment only captures a short-term effect,

even such a short-term effect makes it plausible that repeated exposure in the real world

may create longer-lasting effects.

The specific approach that I use to test my hypotheses is a survey experiment in

which I vary interest group cues and frames across treatment groups. Concretely, the

experiment has thirteen groups (see the annex for the wording of the experiment). The

topic that I chose is the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

between the European Union (EU) and the United States. Selecting this topic allowed

me to carry out my experiment in several countries (for the country selection, see

below), as it is one that respondents across many countries can relate to. Moreover,

I intentionally picked a real-world example, as only for a real-world example there is

exogenous variation in the amount of information that people possess. I need such

variation to test Hypothesis 3. A real-world example also increases the external validity

of the experiment. At the same time, TTIP is a hard case for the first hypothesis: trade

negotiations are complex, making it more likely that people rely on cues than on policy

information in deciding on their attitudes.

Respondents in the control group were simply asked about their attitude towards this

trade agreement, on a seven-point scale from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support”.

Across the twelve treatment groups, I varied both the cue (no cue when respondents are

just told about supporters or opponents, and cues when either “business associations”

or specific interest groups are mentioned) and the frame (a weak and a strong frame for

both the pro and the con side of the debate). The exact cues vary by country: in each

country, I used the names of a peak national business association (e.g. the Confederation

12

of British Industry for the United Kingdom) and of two NGOs, Friends of the Earth

(FoE, in Germany BUND) and Greenpeace. I used well-known groups to maximize the

chances of seeing a cueing effect, which would disconfirm Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the

choice of both business groups and citizen groups allows to see whether they differ in

terms of their cueing effect.

The weak frames were formulated to be as generic as possible (e.g. the agreement

will benefit the economy), whereas the strong frames contain precise information (e.g. it

will lead to the creation of 150,000 new jobs). For the strong con frame, I used the topic

of investor protection, as this is key in the arguments by the agreements’ opponents.2

The difference in public opinion between the scenario with a weak (strong) frame with

interest group cue and a weak (strong) frame without interest group cue captures the

cueing effect. The difference in public opinion between the scenario with (without)

interest group cue and a weak frame and the scenario with (without) interest group cue

and a strong frame captures the framing effect.

The survey was fielded by the polling company YouGov to its online panels in France,

Germany and the United Kingdom between 18 February and 6 March 2015. These

online panels are actively recruited by YouGov and allow for the creation of samples

that are representative for the voting populations of these countries.3 A key advantage

of online surveys relying on large panels such as those maintained by YouGov is that

they are cost-efficient. Moreover, the problem of selection bias is comparable for phone

surveys that struggle with low response rates and surveys based on Internet panels

(Rivers 2006). This is particularly so because respondents to the YouGov survey did not

self-select into the survey after having seen the topic of the survey; they were invited to

2An analysis of more than 300,000 tweets via Twitter shows that “ISDS”, the acronym for investor-state dispute settlement, is the fourth most frequent substantive term used (after TTIP, trade andCETA) (unpublished data). There are also a few country-specific debates about TTIP, such as theeffect of this potential agreement on health services in the United Kingdom, but they would not haveworked well in the other countries.

3Only respondents eligible to vote in the respective country were allowed to participate.

13

participate in a survey and could only see the topic of the survey after they had agreed

to respond.

For each country, the survey has between 2,160 and 2,388 valid responses, for a total

N of 6,826 (see Table A-1 in the Appendix).4 Of them, 753 are in the control group,

3,226 got a frame that supports TTIP, and 3,128 got a frame that opposes TTIP. 2,242

respondents received a business cue and 2,241 respondents received a citizen group cue.

Quotas ensure the representativeness of the samples for the voting populations of the

three countries with respect to gender, age and region.

A manipulation check shows that the treatment worked as expected. After the

experiment, I asked respondents to evaluate the positions of a series of actors on TTIP.

Those that received the treatment with the named peak business association were

considerably more likely to indicate that this organization strongly supports TTIP (45

percent in treatment group 4 and 42 percent in treatment group 7, as compared to 31

percent in the control group).5 Equally, those reading the treatments containing Friends

of the Earth and Greenpeace were more likely to respond that these organizations

strongly oppose TTIP (32 percent and 40 percent in treatment groups 9 and 12, as

compared to 21 percent in the control group for Friends of the Earth; and 33 and 47

percent in treatment groups 10 and 13, as compared to 23 percent in the control group

for Greenpeace).

Having data from three different countries is a major asset of this paper, as it makes

sure that the results are not driven by the idiosyncrasies of a specific country. I opted for

4Before arriving at this number of valid responses, I dropped 315 respondents who spent less thanfour minutes on filling in the questionnaire. The median duration across all respondents was 9.9 minutes.Respondents who invested less than four minutes most likely could not read all the questions anddefinitely did not optimize responses. In fact, their answers to a set of knowledge questions, where theyfared much worse than the other respondents, suggests that their response behaviour was arbitrary.Male and female respondents are equally likely to be “speeders”; but most of the speeders fall into the25-44 year age group.

52-sample tests for equality of proportions show that these and the following differences betweenproportions are statistically significant at p < 0.01.

14

these three countries because they differ in the system of interest representation, with

France resembling the statist model, Germany the neocorporatist model, and the United

Kingdom the pluralist model, but are similar with respect to many other variables

(geographic location, size, level of economic development and democracy etc.). For the

specific survey experiment with respect to TTIP, this case selection is also interesting

because the populations of the three countries show some ex-ante differences in their

attitudes towards that agreement (European Commission 2014). Germans are after

Austrians the most sceptical about this agreement, with a slight majority opposing a

trade and investment agreement between the EU and the US (39 to 41 percent). The

French have a slightly more positive view of such an agreement (50 to 32 percent), and

the British are among the most supportive in the EU (65 to 19 percent). This may

reflect differences in general attitudes towards trade across the three countries. At the

same time, the three countries differ in the strength of an interest group campaign

against TTIP. This campaign was particularly strong in Germany, possibly explaining

part of the opposition to TTIP in that country.

The experiment was preceded by a question asking respondents about how well

informed they feel about the proposed trade agreement (with four response categories,

from “not well informed at all” to “very well informed”). This question allows me to

measure the predictor mentioned in Hypothesis 3, namely previous level of information

about a policy (Information). Figure 1 shows that only a small minority sees itself

as very well informed. At the same time, it reveals major differences in how much

people perceive to know about TTIP across the three countries. Germans perceive

themselves to be considerably better informed about this proposed trade agreement

than British and French citizens. Given the strong interest group campaign about TTIP

in Germany, this finding is not surprising. It suggests that the effect of the experimental

treatment should be weakest in Germany, because there the information contained in

15

Figure 1: Information about TTIP

All UKGerFra All UKGerFra All UKGerFra All UKGerFra0

20

40

not w

ell in

form

ed a

t all

not v

ery w

ell in

form

ed

fairly

well

infor

med

very

well

infor

med

Per

cent

age

the treatment should already form part of the attitudes of many people. Information

is positively correlated with respondents’ interest in politics and news consumption,

but these correlations are relatively weak. Even regular consumers of news do not feel

well informed at all about TTIP, despite considerable media attention to the issue at

least in Germany. The self-perception of information still seems to be a good measure

of actual information, as the respondents that saw themselves very well informed did

much better in the knowledge questions included as manipulation checks (considering

just those respondents in the control group, to avoid this check being influenced by the

experiment). Those indicating that they are not well informed at all about TTIP were

also much more likely to choose the ”do not know” response when asked about their

approval of TTIP.6

The questionnaire also contained a question (prior to the experiment) that asked

respondents to indicated the extent to which they agree with two opposite statements

6Again only for the control group: 49 percent of those that indicated that are not well informed atall about TTIP then picked the do not know response, compared to 14 percent for all others.

16

for a series of topics. The opposite statements relevant for this context are: “I am fully

in favour of restrictions on international trade” and “I am fully opposed to restrictions

on international trade”. Respondents could indicate the extent to which they agree

with these opposing statements on a scale from 0 (fully in favour of restrictions on

international trade) to 10 (fully opposed to restrictions on international trade). I created

two dichotomous variables from this item: Free trader is coded 1 if a person indicated 9

or 10 on the scale, and 0 otherwise, and Protectionist is coded 1 if a person indicated 0

or 1 on the scale, and 0 otherwise. Taking such extreme positions is an indication of

a strongly held attitude, which allows me to test Hypothesis 4. Of all respondents, 9

percent score 1 on Free trader and 8 percent score 1 on Protectionist. As can be expected,

in the control group these variables are correlated with the dependent variable: 26

percent of the respondents that are free traders strongly approve of TTIP, as compared

to 5 percent for those that are coded 0 on Free trader. The percentage of protectionists

that strongly disapprove of TTIP is even 57 percent as compared to 16 percent of those

that are coded 0 on Protectionist.

Finally, the survey also contained a 10-item Big 5 inventory (Rammstedt and John

2007), which I can use to test Hypotheses 5a and 5b. For each item, respondents

could indicate their agreement on a scale from 0 to 10. The measures that I use are

simple additive indexes of the two items that speak to extraversion (Extraversion) and

openness (Openness), respectively. Both variables thus range from 0 to 20. Extraversion

is normally distributed, but Openness is skewed to the right. Table 1 contains summary

statistics for the various variables.

17

Table 1: Summary statistics

N Mean St. Dev. Min Median MaxTTIP approval 4,903 3.63 1.90 1 4 7Information 6,826 0.93 0.81 0 1 3Free trader 6,826 0.09 0.29 0 0 1Protectionist 6,826 0.08 0.27 0 0 1Extraversion 6,826 10.34 4.17 0 10 20Openness 6,826 12.43 4.01 0 12 20

Empirical analysis

I start the empirical analysis by presenting some descriptive evidence on the dependent

variable. Figure 2 shows the mean responses to the question about TTIP approval by

treatment group.7 As expected in Hypothesis 1, the cues do not matter at all. In fact,

the various treatment groups that received the same frame show very similar results.

This is independent of whether respondents received a business cue (possibly indicating

a narrow interest) or a citizen group cue (possibly indicating a public interest). In no

case is there a statistically significant difference between treatment groups that received

different cues but the same frame. The fact that I used high-profile groups – the most

prominent business associations and citizen groups in these countries – as cues makes

this finding particularly interesting.

The data also offer strong support for Hypothesis 2a: as clearly visible from Figure 2,

the frames used in introducing the question about TTIP matter for the responses. When

regressing TTIP approval on four dummy variables for each of the four frames (while

controlling for country), all four coefficients are statistically significant (see Table 2).8

Interestingly, the coefficient for the weak pro frame is negative, meaning that this frame

7To calculate these means, I assumed that the seven-point ordinal response scale is continuous, i.e.,that I am dealing with equal interval data.

8While I use linear regression in the models I report in the paper, all results are substantively thesame when relying on ordinal logistic regression.

18

Figure 2: Attitudes towards TTIP

●

● ●

●

●

●●

●

● ●

●● ●

3.0

3.5

4.0

Contro

l

Gener

ic pr

o, wea

k

Busine

ss p

ro, w

eak

Specif

ic pr

o, wea

k

Gener

ic pr

o, str

ong

Busine

ss p

ro, s

trong

Specif

ic pr

o, str

ong

Gener

ic co

ntra

, wea

k

FoE co

ntra

, wea

k

Green

peac

e co

ntra

, wea

k

Gener

ic co

ntra

, stro

ng

FoE co

ntra

, stro

ng

Green

peac

e co

ntra

, stro

ng

Mea

n T

TIP

app

rova

l

Note: the whiskers show the 90% confidence intervals.

lowered approval of TTIP compared to the control group. This may be so because either

“benefitting the economy” is interpreted as benefitting only a few (e.g. capital owners)

or benefits to the economy are associated with harm for the environment, consumers

etc. The substantive effect is considerable especially for the strong con frame: the linear

prediction for the control group is 3.86 on the scale from 1 to 7; for the strong con frame,

this value is 2.83. The difference between these two values amounts to 17 percent of

the full scale. The respective value for the strong pro frame is 4.06. This is a modest

increase relative to the control group, but a considerable difference to the strong con

frame. The distance between the two strong frames amounts to 21 percent of the full

scale.

The basic pattern discerned in Figure 2 is stable across all three countries. Never-

theless, the strength of the framing effects varies by country, with the strongest effect in

the United Kingdom. In that country, the means vary between 2.29 (strong con frame)

and 4.45 (strong pro frame), with this difference accounting for 36 percent of the scale

19

Table 2: The effect of the frames

Variable Coefficient Prediction Variable Coefficient Prediction(Std. error) (Conf. interval) (Std. error) (Conf. interval)

Weak pro -0.23** 3.63 Weak con -0.31*** 3.55(0.09) [3.51, 3.74] (0.10) [3.43, 3.66]

Strong pro 0.20 4.06 Strong con -1.03*** 2.83(0.09) [3.95, 4.17] (0.10) [2.71, 2.94]

Note: N=4,903; adjusted R2=0.05. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Country dummies were also included in the model,but the coefficients are omitted here for space reasons.

ranging from 1 to 7. The effect is weakest in Germany, where citizens – according to

their self-perception – are best informed about TTIP. This offers some initial support

for Hypothesis 3.

The data also support Hypothesis 2b. The strong frames have a greater impact on

attitudes than the weak frames. With respect to the pro frames, the predicted mean

value for the group that received the strong pro frame is 0.43 higher than the predicted

mean value for the group that received the weak pro frame (7 percent of the scale).

With respect to the con frames, the difference is even 0.72 (12 percent of the scale).

In Hypothesis 3, I suggested that the frames conveyed by interest groups matter

most for people with little information about a policy. To test this argument, I ran a

linear regression model with TTIP approval as dependent variable and interaction terms

between Information and dummy variables for the various frames as predictors, with the

control group as base category (and country fixed effects as controls). The results largely

support the hypothesis (see Table 3). The two coefficients for the interaction terms with

the strong frames are statistically significant.9 Figure 3 shows that the strong con and

strong pro frames have opposite effects. The strong pro frame produced greater support

for TTIP among respondents with little information about TTIP. The strong con frame

had a major negative effect on respondents’ attitudes towards TTIP, with this negative

9This result is robust to treating Information as a categorical variable.

20

effect only disappearing for respondents that consider themselves very well informed

about TTIP. This is very much in line with the causal reasoning underlying Hypothesis

3. That the weak frames, which transmit less information than the strong frame, do not

have the same effect also makes sense within this argument.

Table 3: Interaction information times frame

Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient(Std. error) (Std. error)

Information* 0.12 Information* 0.14Frame pro weak (0.12) Frame con weak (0.12)

Information* -0.25** Information* 0.62***Frame pro strong (0.12) Frame con strong (0.12)

Note: N= 4,903; adjusted R2=0.07. *p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The constituent terms of the interaction termsand country dummies were also included in the model, but the coefficients are not shown here.

Figure 3: Illustrating the interaction effect – information times frame

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Strong pro frame

Control

3.5

4.0

4.5

0 1 2 3Information

TT

IP a

ppro

val

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Strong con frame

Control

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

0 1 2 3Information

TT

IP a

ppro

val


In Hypothesis 4 I argued that the framing effect is moderated by attitude strength. I

test this argument by regressing TTIP approval on four interaction effects, two for Free

trader times the pro frames (weak and strong) and two for Protectionist times the con

21

frames (weak and strong). The results offer some support for my expectation (see Table

4). Two of the coefficients for the interaction terms are statistically significant, with the

other two pointing in the right direction but not reaching statistical significance. Figure

4 shows the effects of these interaction terms graphically. As expected, respondents

that already hold strong free trade views are not influenced by the weak pro frame they

received (left pane of Figure 4). By contrast, respondents not committed to a specific

trade policy choice are moved towards a more negative position towards TTIP by the

weak pro frame. The effect is even stronger for respondents that received the strong

con frame (right pane of Figure 4). Whereas those committed to a protectionist trade

policy did not become more sceptical of TTIP as a result of the strong con frame, the

effect for those not committed to a specific trade policy orientation is very large.

Table 4: Interaction attitude strength times frame


Free trader* 0.59*** Protectionist* 0.25Frame pro weak (0.21) Frame con weak (0.23)

Free trader* 0.24 Protectionist* 0.61***Frame pro strong (0.21) Frame con strong (0.21)


Finally, I test Hypotheses 5a and 5b, following the same approach as for Hypotheses

3 and 4, but interacting the frames with Extraversion and Openness, respectively. The

results for Extraversion are largely supportive of Hypothesis 5a (see Table 5). Three of

the coefficients for the interaction terms are at least weakly statistically significant, and

also the fourth coefficient points in the same direction. Figure 5 shows the effects for the

interaction terms with the two strong frames graphically. Whereas Extraversion has a

strong effect on TTIP approval in the control group, with less extraverted persons being

considerably less supportive of this proposed agreement than more extraverted persons,

22

Figure 4: Illustrating the interaction effect – attitude times frame

●

●

●

●

Free trader

Weak attitude

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

Control Weak pro

TT

IP a

ppro

val

●

●

●

●

Protectionist

Weak attitude

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Control Strong con

TT

IP a

ppro

val


once respondents get a frame, this effect disappears. New information contained in the

frames thus reduces the effect of this personality trait on TTIP approval. When running

the model with Openness instead of Extraversion, however, none of the coefficients for

the interaction terms is statistically significant (results not shown).

Table 5: Interaction extraversion times frame


Extraversion* -0.03 Extraversion* -0.05*Frame pro weak (0.02) Frame con weak (0.02)

Extraversion* -0.04* Extraversion* -0.05**Frame pro strong (0.02) Frame con strong (0.02)


23

Figure 5: Illustrating the interaction effect – extraversion times frame

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Strong pro frame

Control

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

0 5 10 15 20Extraversion

TT

IP a

ppro

val

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Strong con frame

Control

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

0 5 10 15 20Extraversion

TT

IP a

ppro

val


Conclusion

Do interest groups matter for public opinion? Based on the argument and empirical

evidence presented here, a positive response to this question has high plausibility. This

finding offers support to the strand of literature that concludes that interest groups

are successful in shaping public opinion in line with their preferences. This effect,

however, takes place via (strong) frames, whereas interest group cues do not matter.

That not even the high-profile groups used as cues in the survey experiment mattered

for individual attitudes is a particularly stark finding. The relationship between interest

groups and public opinion thus is different from the relationship between political parties

and public opinion.

The effect of the frames conveyed by interest groups is moderated by a series of

variables. Strong frames that transport more information have a greater impact than

weak frames. The effect of frames with concrete information, moreover, is stronger for

respondents with little information about a policy than those with much information.

24

Prior attitudes relevant to the specific policy also matter for the impact of frames.

People that hold strong attitudes on a relevant broader topic react less to frames than

other people. Finally, frames reduce the impact of extraversion on attitudes.

These findings have important normative implications. Two opposing views exist

with respect to the normative evaluation of elite influence on public opinion. On the one

hand, some authors warn of the perils of elite influence on public opinion (Kuklinski and

Hurley 1994; Le Cheminant and Parrish 2011). If the masses are susceptible to strategic

communication by elites (such as interest groups), lies, manipulation and misinformation

may mislead the public. As a result, the public’s interests may be obscured (Lukes

1974). Moreover, if competing elites manage to influence public opinion, the latter

may become instable, not allowing for any coherent policy to emerge. On the other

hand, public opinion responding to new frames and new information may be good news,

because “citizens whose attitudes are held so rigidly that they seek only to reinforce their

existing views” are unlikely to be a good basis for democracy (Chong and Druckman

2012: 319). Citizens that fail to change their position, for example because they exhibit

a partisan resistance to new information, avoid uncomfortable truths, or are dogmatic,

closed-minded or politically intolerant, may create more problems for democracy than

citizens that change their opinions in response to elite communication. Elite influence

on public opinion then may equate “mutual education” (Mansbridge 2003) rather than

manipulation.

Both sides to this debate make valid points and it seems entirely plausible that

interest group influence on public opinion can result in both “enlightenment” (that is,

a better understanding) and “deception” (a wrong understanding) (for these terms,

see Lupia and McCubbins 1998: 8). On balance, the findings presented in this study

support an optimistic reading. Public opinion strongly responds to the frames conveyed

by interest groups rather than interest group cues. This means that people evaluate

25

the contents of messages, rather than just relying on cues as information shortcuts.

Moreover, this effect is driven by respondents with little information about a policy, and

thus the individuals most in need of information to make up their minds. If people have

other ways of forming an attitude on a new issue – for example attitudes on related

issues – then they make use of that opportunity. Clearly, then, people try to make

informed decisions and do not blindly follow political elites. Public opinion thus reacts

to interest groups’ outside lobbying largely in line with how normative political theory

states it should. The relevant questions for a normative evaluation of interest group

influence on public opinion then are which interest groups manage to have their voices

heard and how sincere the information is that interest groups convey to the public.

Bibliography

Andsager, Julie L. 2000. How Interest Groups Attempt to Shape Public Opinion withCompeting News Frames. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 77(3):577–92.

Bakker, Bert N., David Nicolas Hopmann, and Mikael Persson. 2014. “PersonalityTraits and Party Identification over Time.” European Journal of Political Research.

Berry, Jeffrey. 1999. The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups.Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

Beyers, Jan. 2004. Voice and Access: Political Practices of European Interest Associa-tions. European Union Politics 5(2): 211–40.

Binderkrantz, Anne. 2005. Interest Group Strategies: Navigating Between PrivilegedAccess and Strategies of Pressure. Political Studies 53(4): 694–715.

Bullock, John G. 2011. “Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate.”American Political Science Review 105(3): 496–515.

Brader, Ted, Joshua A. Tucker, and Dominik Duell. 2013. “Which Parties CanLead Opinion? Experimental Evidence on Partisan Cue Taking in MultipartyDemocracies.” Comparative Political Studies 46(11): 1485–1517.

Burstein, Paul. 1985. Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Em-ployment Opportunity in the United States Since the New Deal. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press.

Burstein, Paul. 2013. American Public Opinion, Advocacy, and Policy in Congress:What the Public Wants and What It Gets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

26

Caprara, Gian Vittorio, and Michele Vecchione. 2013. “Personality Approaches toPolitical Behavior.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. LeonieHuddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. New York: Oxford University Press,23–58.

Chaiken, Shelly. 1980. Heuristic versus Systematic Information Processing and the Useof Source versus Message Cues in Persuasion. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology 39(5): 752–66.

Chaiken, Shelly, and Durairaj Maheswaran. 1994. “Heuristic Processing Can BiasSystematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and TaskImportance on Attitude Judgment.” Journal of personality and social psychology66(3): 460.

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2011. “Public-Elite Interactions: Puzzles inSearch of Researchers.” In The Oxford handbook of American public opinion and themedia, eds. Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R Jacobs. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 170–88.

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2012. “Dynamics in Mass CommunicationEffects Research.” In The SAGE Handbook of Political Communication, eds. HolliA. Semetko and Margaret Scammell. London: SAGE, 307–23.

Cohen, Geoffrey L. 2003. “Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influenceon Political Beliefs.” Journal of personality and social psychology 85(5): 808.

Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press.

Druckman, James N., and Kjersten R. Nelson. 2003. Framing and Deliberation: HowCitizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence. American Journal of Political Science47(4): 729–45.

Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. 2013. How Elite PartisanPolarization Affects Public Opinion Formation. American Political Science Review107(01): 57–79.

Dur, Andreas. 2008. Interest Groups in the European Union: How Powerful Are They?West European Politics 31(6): 1212–30.

Dur, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. 2013. Gaining Access or Going Public? InterestGroup Strategies in Five European Countries. European Journal of Political Research52(5): 660–86.

Dur, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. 2014. Public Opinion and Interest Group Influence:How Citizen Groups Derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 21(8): 1199-1217.

Dur, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. 2015. Insiders versus Outsiders: Interest GroupPolitics in Multilevel Europe. Unpublished manuscript.

Eagly, Alice H., and Shelly Chaiken. 1993. The Psychology of Attitudes. Orlando:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College.

European Commission. 2014. Public Opinion in the European Union, StandardEurobarometer 82. Brussels: Eurobarometer.

27

Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2012. How Can Economic InterestsInfluence Support for Free Trade? International Organization 66(2): 311–28.

Gaines, Brian J., James H. Kuklinski, and Paul J. Quirk. 2007. The Logic of the SurveyExperiment Reexamined. Political Analysis 15(1): 1–20.

Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1999. The Populist Paradox. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.

Goldstein, Kenneth M. 1999. Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grossmann, Matt. 2012. The Not-So-Special Interests. Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: AdvocacyNetworks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kinder, Donald R. 1998. Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics. In The handbookof social psychology, eds. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey.New York: McGraw-Hill, 778–867.

Kollman, Ken. 1998. Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Anke Tresch, and Margit Jochum. 2007. Going Public in theEuropean Union. Comparative Political Studies 40(1): 48–73.

Kuklinski, James H., and Norman L. Hurley. 1994. On Hearing and InterpretingPolitical Messages: A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking. The Journal ofPolitics 56(03): 729–51.

Le Cheminant, Wayne, and John M. Parrish, eds. 2011. Manipulating Democracy:Democratic Theory, Political Psychology, and Mass Media. New York: Routledge.

Leeper, Thomas J., and Rune Slothuus. 2014. “Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning,and Public Opinion Formation.” Political Psychology 35: 129–56.

Lenz, Gabriel S. 2012. Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policiesand Performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-EconomicSystems. New York: Basic Books.

Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative PoliticalAction. American Political Science Review 87(2): 319–33.

Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan.Lupia, Arthur. 1994. Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior

in California Insurance Reform Elections. American Political Science Review 88(01):63–76.

Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. Rethinking Representation. American Political Science Review97(4): 515–28.

McCrae, Robert R., and Paul T. Costa. 2008. “Empirical and Theoretical Status of theFive-Factor Model of Personality Traits.” In Sage handbook of personality theoryand assessment, London: SAGE, 273–94.

28

McKnight, David, and Mitchell Hobbs. 2013. Public Contest through the Popular Media:The Mining Industry’s Advertising War against the Australian Labor Government.Australian Journal of Political Science 48(3): 307–19.

Mills, Charles W. 1956. Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.Mutz, Diana C. 2011. Population-Based Survey Experiments. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.Nelson, Thomas E., and Zoe M. Oxley. 1999. Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance

and Opinion. The Journal of Politics 61(4): 1040–67.Page, Benjamin I., Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn R. Dempsey. 1987. What Moves

Public Opinion? American Political Science Review 81(1): 23–43.Rammstedt, Beatrice, and Oliver P. John. 2007. “Measuring Personality in One Minute

or Less: A 10-Item Short Version of the Big Five Inventory in English and German.”Journal of Research in Personality 41(1): 203–12.

Rivers, Douglas. 2006. Sample Matching: Representative Sampling from Internet Panels.YouGovPolimetrix White Paper.

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semisovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart, andWinston.

Slothuus, Rune, and Claes H. De Vreese. 2010. “Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning,and Issue Framing Effects.” Journal of Politics 72(3): 630–45.

Smith, Mark A. 2000. American Business and Political Power: Political Opinion,Elections and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tresch, Anke, and Manuel Fischer. 2014. In Search of Political Influence: OutsideLobbying Behaviour and Media Coverage of Social Movements, Interest Groups andPolitical Parties in Six Western European Countries. International Political ScienceReview.

Truman, David. (1951) The Governmental Process: Political Interests and PublicOpinion. New York: Knopf.

Waterhouse, Benjamin C. 2013. Lobbying America: The Politics of Business from Nixonto NAFTA. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Weakliem, D. 2003. Public Opinion Research and Political Sociology. Research inPolitical Sociology: Political Sociology for the Twenty-First Century 12 : 49–80.

Weiler, Florian, Matthias Brandli, Ottfried Jarren, and Patrick Donges. 2014. Determi-nants of inside and Outside Lobbying Strategies among Swiss and German InterestGroups. Unpublished paper.

West, Darrell M., Diane Heith, and Chris Goodwin. 1996. Harry and Louise Go toWashington: Political Advertising and Health Care Reform. Journal of HealthPolitics, Policy and Law 21(1): 35–68.

Yu, Zhihao. 2005. Environmental Protection. The Review of Economic Studies 72(1):269–86.

Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.

29

Appendix

Wording of the survey experiment

GROUP 1 – control group: How do you view this planned trade agreement?

GROUP 2 – no cue, weak pro frame: Supporters argue that this planned tradeagreement will benefit the British economy. How do you view this agreement?

GROUP 3 – generic business cue, weak pro frame: Business associations arguethat this planned trade agreement will benefit the British economy. How do you viewthis agreement?

GROUP 4 – specific business cue, weak pro frame: The employers’ associa-tion Confederation of British Industry [France: Mouvement des entreprises de France(Medef); Germany: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie] argues that this plannedtrade agreement will benefit the British economy. How do you view this agreement?

GROUP 5 – no cue, strong pro frame: Supporters argue that 150,000 new jobswould be created in Great Britain as a result of this planned trade agreement. How doyou view this agreement?

GROUP 6 – generic business cue, strong pro frame: Business associationsargue that 150,000 new jobs would be created in Great Britain as a result of this plannedtrade agreement. How do you view this agreement?

GROUP 7 – specific business cue, strong pro frame: The employers’ associ-ation Confederation of British Industry [France: Mouvement des entreprises de France(Medef); Germany: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie] argues that 150,000 newjobs would be created in Great Britain as a result of this planned trade agreement. Howdo you view this agreement?

GROUP 8 – no cue, weak con frame: Opponents complain about the negoti-ations for this planned trade agreement taking place behind closed doors. How do youview this agreement?

GROUP 9 – Friends of the Earth cue, weak con frame: The environmen-tal organization Friends of the Earth [Germany: Bund fur Umwelt und NaturschutzDeutschland (BUND)] complains about the negotiations for this planned trade agreementtaking place behind closed doors. How do you view this agreement?

GROUP 10 – Greenpeace cue, weak con frame: The environmental organi-

30

zation Greenpeace complains about the negotiations for this planned trade agreementtaking place behind closed doors. How do you view this agreement?

GROUP 11 – no cue, strong con frame: Opponents warn that this plannedtrade agreement would allow foreign companies to sue Great Britain in private tribunalsfor billions in compensation. How do you view this agreement?

GROUP 12 – Friends of the Earth cue, strong con frame: The environmen-tal organization Friends of the Earth [Germany: Bund fur Umwelt und NaturschutzDeutschland (BUND)] warns that this planned trade agreement would allow foreigncompanies to sue Great Britain in private tribunals for billions in compensation. Howdo you view this agreement?

GROUP 13 – Greenpeace cue, strong con frame: The environmental organiza-tion Greenpeace warns that this planned trade agreement would allow foreign companiesto sue Great Britain in private tribunals for billions in compensation. How do you viewthis agreement?

Number of valid responses by treatment and country

Table A-1: Number of valid responses by treatment and country

Groups France Germany United TotalKingdom

Control 272 238 243 753Generic pro, weak 138 116 162 416Business pro, weak 167 183 173 523Specific pro, weak 236 163 246 645Generic pro, strong 202 142 187 531Business pro, strong 165 165 167 497Specific pro, strong 143 169 178 490Generic contra, weak 148 115 156 419FoE contra, weak 157 187 169 513Greenpeace contra, weak 197 187 160 544Generic contra, strong 168 140 118 426FoE contra, strong 198 175 160 533Greenpeace contra, strong 197 180 159 536Total 2,388 2,160 2,278 6,826

31

Interest group influence on public opinion: A survey experiment on the Transatlantic Trade and...

Documents

Transcript of Interest group influence on public opinion: A survey experiment on the Transatlantic Trade and...