UNIVERSITATEA “BABEŞ-BOLYAI” CLUJ-NAPOCA

FACULTATEA DE STUDII EUROPENE

LUCRARE DE LICENŢĂ

Coordonator ştiinţific: Absolvent:

Conferențiar universitar doctor Liviu Țîrău Velenciuc Serghei

Anul 2014

UNIVERSITATEA BABEŞ-BOLYAI CLUJ-NAPOCA

FACULTATEA DE STUDII EUROPENE

Relații internaționale și studii europene linia Română

Geopolitics of Eastern Partnership

Coordonator ştiinţific: Absolvent:

Conferențiar universitar doctor Liviu Țîrău Velenciuc Serghei

Cluj-Napoca

Anul 2014

Declaraţie

Prin prezenta declar că Lucrarea de licenţă cu titlul “Geopolitics of Eastern Partnership”

este scrisă de mine şi nu a mai fost prezentată niciodată la o altă facultate sau instituţie de

învăţământ superior din ţară sau străinătate. De asemenea, declar că toate sursele utilizate,

inclusive cele de pe Internet, sunt indicate în lucrare, cu respectarea regulilor de evitare a

plagiatului:

toate fragmentele de text reproduse exact, chiar şi în traducere proprie din altă limbă,

sunt scrise între ghilimele şi deţin referinţa precisă a sursei;

- reformularea în cuvinte proprii a textelor scrise de către alţi autori deţine referinţa

precisă;

- rezumarea ideilor altor autori deţine referinţa precisă la textul original.

Cluj-Napoca, data

Absolvent Velenciuc Serghei

_________________________

(semnătura olograf)

For all my friends. You inspire, support, trust and believe in me. I will never forget you.

Maps and Tables

Table I.1 Perception of threat……………………………………………………...p.15

Table I.2 Behavior…………………………………………………………………p.15

Map 1.1 Geographic pivot of History …………………………………………….. p.22

Map 1.2 Spykman’s Rimland……………………………………………………….p.26

Map 1.3 Western Regional Security Complex ……………………………………..p.33

Map 1.4 Russian Security Complex of Former Soviet Union ……………………...p.34

Map 1.5 Russian Heartland Regional Security Complex……………………………p.35

Map 1.6 Eastern Partnership…………………………………………………………p.37

Table 2.1Perception of threat in Societal Sector……………………………………..p.49

Table 2.2 Behavior in Societal Sector ………………………………………………p.50

Table 2.3 Perception of threat in military sector ……………………………………p.57

Table 2.4 Behavior in military sector ……………………………………………….p.57

Table 2.5 Failed sate index of Armenia……………………………………………...p.59

Table 2.6 Failed states index of Azerbaijan………………………………………….p.61

Table 2.7. Failed States index of Georgia …………………………………………...p.63

Table 2.8 Failed states index of Belarus……………………………………………...p.64

Table 2.9 Failed States index of Moldova……………………………………………p.65

Table 2.10 Perception of threat in political sector …………………………………..p.69

Table 2.11 Behavior in political sector ………………………………………………p.69

Table 2.12 Perception of threat in economic sector …………………………………p.76

Table 2.13 Behavior in economic sector …………………………………………….p.76

Table 3.1 Perception of threat in EaP countries……………………………………..p.73

Map 3.2 Cultures of anarchy in Russian Security Complex of Former Soviet Union…p.76

Map 3.3 Cultures of anarchy in West+Eastern Partnership Regional Security Complex..p.80

Table 3.4 Degrees of internalization of cultures of anarchy ……………………………p.81

Table 3.5 Behavior of EaP countries…………………………………………………….p.82

Map 3.6 European Rimland and its orientations…………………………………………p.85

Abbreviations

CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization

EaP- Eastern Partnership

EIU- Economist Intelligence Unit

FSI- Failed States Index

FSU – Former Soviet Union

FSU RSC – Former Soviet Union Regional Security Complex

RSC- Regional Security Complex

West+EaP RSC- West+Eastern Partnership Regional Security Complex

Content

Introduction …………………………………………………………………… 9

1. Geopolitics and Regional Security Complexes ………………………………17

1.1 Heartland- Rimland theory of Geopolitics ………………………………..17

1.2 Heartland-Rimland theory and Regional Security Complexes theory ……26

2. Sector by sector analysis of the security of Eastern Partnership countries…….38

2.1 Societal sector………………………………………………………………38

2.1.1 Armenia …………………………………………………………………38

2.1.2 Azerbaijan ……………………………………………………………….40

2.1.3 Georgia…………………………………………………………………...42

2.1.4 Belarus……………………………………………………………………43

2.1.5 Moldova…………………………………………………………………..45

2.1.6 Ukraine ……………………………………………………………………47

2.2 Military sector ………………………………………………………………..50

2.2.1 Armenia .. …………………………………………………………………51

2.2.2 Azerbaijan ……………………………………………………………….52

2.2.3 Georgia…………………………………………………………………...52

2.2.4 Belarus……………………………………………………………………54

2.2.5 Moldova…………………………………………………………………..55

2.2.6 Ukraine ……………………………………………………………………56

2.3 Political sector ………………………………………………………………..57

2.3.1 Armenia .. …………………………………………………………………59

2.3.2 Azerbaijan ……………………………………………………………….61

2.3.3 Georgia…………………………………………………………………...62

2.3.4 Belarus……………………………………………………………………64

2.3.5 Moldova…………………………………………………………………..65

2.3.6 Ukraine ……………………………………………………………………67

2.4 Economic sector ………………………………………………………………..69

2.4.1 Armenia …………………………………………………………………70

2.4.2 Azerbaijan ……………………………………………………………….72

2.4.3 Georgia…………………………………………………………………...73

2.4.4 Belarus……………………………………………………………………73

2.4.5 Moldova…………………………………………………………………..74

2.4.6 Ukraine ……………………………………………………………………75

3. Analysis of European and Caucasus Rimland……………………………………77

3.1 Cultures of anarchy in international system ………………………………….77

3.2 Cultures of anarchy in EaP , orders and the structure of European and Caucasus

Rimland………………………………………………………………………………79

3.2.1 Cultures of anarchy of EaP countries………………………………………..81

3.2.1.1 Anarchy of Russian security complex of Former Soviet Union………..81

3.2.1.2 Cultures of Anarchy of West+EaP RSC ………………………………..85

3.2.2 Degrees of internalization of cultures of anarchy ………………………….89

3.2.1.1 Degrees of internalization of cultures of anarchy in Russian RSC FSU…90

3.2.1.2 Degrees of internalization of cultures of anarchy in Russian West+EaP RSC…91

3.2.3 Rimland’s dynamics……………………………………………………………….93

3.3 Geopolitical future of Europe……………………………………………………….96

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………98

Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………107

9

Introduction

The Eastern Europe and the Caucasus are one of the most interesting geopolitical

regions in the world. Historically, these regions were the subject of struggle and wars

between great powers and it is no surprise that, until the fall of the Soviet Union, all

states situated there had little or no experience as independent states. Today they are

independent, but they still have big territorial, economic and identity problems related to

their soviet or pre-soviet history. However, the Caucasus and the Eastern Europe are

important, because they are situated between two big geopolitical powers: the West and

Russia, and because these regions are gateways which link Europe and Middle East to

Eurasian Heartland.

All six former soviet states from the Caucasus and the Eastern Europe: Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, are more or less

important for EU, USA and Russia. For Russia, these states are important in order to

restore its imperial glory and legacy. As Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out: “Without

Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an Eurasian empire”.1 USA also has its interest here. To

explain US attitude towards Eastern Europe and Caucasus, I will quote Halford J.

Mackinder, whose famous dictum is still the basis for US foreign policy in Europe:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:

Who rules the World-Island commands the World2

Thus, Eastern Europe and Caucasus are important for USA in order to command Eurasia,

or prevent a power or a coalition of powers to achieve this goal. EU interest for Eastern

Europe and Caucasus could be explained using the quote of the President of European

Commission Romano Prodi: "sharing everything with the Union but institutions"3. That

does not clearly exclude the possibility for six former soviet states to become EU

members, but at the same time, it does not give any prospect for membership. After the

2007 EU enlargement and the refusal to accept Georgia and Ukraine in NATO, Sweden

and Poland had initiated the Eastern Partnership. It was a framework of cooperation which

promoted democracy, free trade, institutional reform, allowed a perspective to sign an

1 Z.Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books, 1997, p.46

2 H.J.Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, NDU Press Defense Classic Edition, 1996,p106.

3 Romano Prodi, A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability, Brussels, Sixth ECSA-World

Conference. Jean Monnet Project, 2002. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm

10

Association and Free Trade Agreement with EU, but never had offered prospects for EU

membership.

The Eastern Partnership failed to achieve its goal at Vilnius Summit in November 2013: to

sign an Association Agreement with Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia.

Armenia refused to negotiate it in September 2013 and decided to join Russian leaded

Custom Union. Ukraine refused to sign the agreement because of the unprecedented

Russian pressure both on political and economical level. Only Republic of Moldova and

Georgia continued a pro-EU foreign policy and decided to sign the Association Agreement

and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. Finally, military crisis in Crimea and

armed separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine proved the inability of the EU to solve

security issues at its borders. This relative failure of EU to stabilize its Eastern borders

could be explained by weak leadership or underestimation of Russian power in Former

Soviet States. However, it could be another explication, based on structural factors of

international relations: geography, anarchy, security interest and capabilities.

Eastern Partnership countries have a geographical position between two emerging

blocks: a western block which is composed by EU and USA from one side, and Russia

from the other. It makes them subjects and objects of a new “Great Game” in Europe.

Eastern Partnership countries are situated in so called Rimland, a notion introduced by

Nicholas Spykman. He called Rimland the geopolitical area between Sea Powers and Land

Powers which are in perpetual struggle for world dominance. Rimland states have both

Sea-Power features and Land Power features4. Therefore, they could become or a Western

Sea-Power type of country: democratic, more oriented to free trade and cooperation, or a

Land-Power type of country: autocratic both in political and economic areas5. Democratic

states would be the allies of the West whereas undemocratic and authoritarian states would

be tempted to be the ally of Russia. A democratic Eastern Europe and Caucasus would

have more economic, political and cultural ties with the West, because their regimes would

be similar and states situated there would not be tempted to ally with an authoritarian

Russia, because of lack of common values and a different political culture and international

behavior. In contrast, if Eastern European and Caucasus countries would be undemocratic,

the West would not consider them desirable partners for cooperation. Without an

alternative, these states would look for closer ties with Russia, to enhance their negotiation

4 F.Sempa, Spykman’s world, American Dimplomacy, april 2006

http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/0406/semp/sempa_spykman.html, visited 16.06.2014 5 A.Dughin, Bazele Geopoliticii vol.1,Bucuresti, Editura Eurasiatica.ro,2011, p.23

11

capacities with the whole world. The real problem of Eastern Partnership countries is that

they are caught into two big security complexes: from one side the Western security

complex; from the other side Russian security complex. Their security also depends both

on West and on Russia. Consequently, the duality of Eastern Partnership countries: not

West not East, is due to both geopolitics and to their security issues. If geopolitical factors

are more or less stable, security issues are dynamic and could change quickly. According

the Copenhagen School of security, it is a construct and it is up to securitizing actors to

choose what and who is a security threat. As result, securitizing actors can choose

themselves to which security complex they identify themselves: to Western or to Russian.

The topic of my research was: Geopolitics of Eastern Partnership. In my paper I studied

the influence of Eastern Partnership countries security on Rimland’s dynamic. The aim of

my dissertation was to study the Rimland, because its importance was underestimated in

the majority of academic papers on geopolitics. The West or Russia could have enough

power to control Eastern Europe and Caucasus, but it will take time to transform this space

and to control all security issues in the region. In fact, the power who will control and

transform the security issues in the region will reach full control over it. Thus, it is

important to study the security of Eastern Partnership in order to analyze how deep Russian

and Western influence in the region is. My question research question was: does the

Rimland in Caucasus and Eastern Europe is so homogeneous or there are regions which

have more evident orientation towards Heartland or Euro-Atlantic world? Another question

was: what are real and fake Rimland states in Eastern Partnership? My main hypothesis

was that the duality of these countries: they are not West nor East, is related both to

security issues and geopolitics, and it is not possible to understand one without another.

Thus, it is not enough to study only the geopolitics or only the security of Eastern

Partnership, it is important to make a bridge between geopolitics, security and international

relations theories to understand how Eastern Partnership countries will behave and why

they will take some foreign policy decisions and will not take other.

To prove my hypothesis, I used the analytical framework of Copenhagen School of

Security. We know a lot about Former Soviet Union, Russian influence there. There are

brilliant papers which explain how Russia threatens the security of its neighbors. In his

book called “Cold Peace: Russian new imperialism” Janusz Bugajski studied the

weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Former Soviet Union and Russian policies to restore its

12

empire.6 He did not explicitly use any security or geopolitical theory, but he made an

insight in Russian policies in Eastern and Central Europe. A different approach was chosen

by Andrei Tsygankov who used constructivist theory to explain economic behavior of

Latvia, Belarus and Ukraine, and he concluded that their economic successes are related to

identity problems.7 In my paper I used tools of geopolitics, of constructivist theory of

international relations and of Copenhagen School of security. This school emerged after

the Cold War as a constructivist alternative to realist security studies. Nevertheless,

Copenhagen School is a synthesis of neo-realist and constructivist approaches to

international security. Therefore, as in traditional security studies, the Copenhagen School

argues that the state is the main actor in international relations. As well as in neo-realist

theory of international relations, the state has two main goals: to survive and, eventually, to

maximize his power8. However, the Copenhagen School is not as rigid as neo-realist

approach to security. The first goal is common for all states; the other depends on state’s

identity and perception of its place in international system. Both in neo-realism and

Copenhagen School, security is about survival. Ole Waever defines a security issue as:

“when an issue is presented as poising existential threat to a designed referent object.

The special nature of these threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle

them.” 9

Traditional realist security studies consider that only military threats have to be analyzed.

In contrast, constructivist studies highlight that each issue has to be understood only in

reference to specific conditions of the society. Also, each referent object of security also

has to be analyzed in relation to the context and the nature of threat. Therefore,

Copenhagen School of Security considers that security must be analyzed in a broader

framework and gives a more disaggregated view on it. Barry Buzan considers that state’s

security has at least five sectors: societal, political, economical, military and

environmental10

. Each of these sectors has its referent object as well as its structural

threats. Thus, the concept of security is not a rigid one and is up to security actors to decide

what a security issue is and what is not. When some actors move an issue from the political

field to security area, or in other words, there is a move from politicization to

6 J.Bugajski Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism ,Praeger, 2004

7 A.Tsygankov, Farewell to the empire? National identity, domestic structures, and foreign economic policies

of the post-soviet states, Faculty of the Graduate School University of Southern California,2000 8 John J. Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International

Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.72 9 B.Buzan, Security. A new framework for analysis, London,Lynne Riner publishers, 1998, p 21

10 Ibidem p.8

13

securitization, it is called securitizing move. It is a subjective process: is not right or

wrong, or good or bad move because securitization depends on actors view and perception

of security and threats. 11

Every actor perceives some subjects as security issues and some

objects as security referents, so, the security is a construct. The securitizing move must be

legitimized; consequently, the public have to agree with securitizing actors’ view on

security and this legitimacy is constructed by speech12

. Being accepted by the public,

securitizing actors are legitimized to use all necessary means to solve the security issue.

The neo-realist theory says that the second goal of the state is to maximize its power. It

means that in some cases, a state which tries to maximize its relative power could be a real

threat to international security. The neo-realist theory of international relations affirms that

other states have two options: to balance or to bandwagon the aggressor13

. The state will

balance or bandwagon until the moment when the issue will be de-securitized and will not

be perceived as threat. Using the Copenhagen School logic, we could conclude that an

emerging state, which tries to maximize its power, could be a security threat for one or

more security sectors of other states. This threat would generate reaction of others, because

their security would be threatened on a disaggregated view- to one or more security

sectors, or to security as a whole-national security. Using the framework of Copenhagen

School, I tried to study Eastern Partnership security issues and their relation with the West

and Russia. To improve the quality of my analysis I used the constructivist theory of

international relations to analyze the data. Also, I related Eastern Partnership security

issues to a larger dynamic: the dynamic of Rimland.

In the first part of my paper, I tried to build a bridge between Heartland-Rimland

theory of geopolitics and the theory of Regional Security complexes. I observed that in

Europe some of geopolitical regions described by Spykman and Mackinder could be

considered as Regional Security Complexes. Therefore, Spykman’s geopolitical Outer

Crescent could be considered a large Regional Security Complex: the West, composed

from the EU, USA and their allies. Surely, the Heartland power is Russia and its closest

allies: Belarus and Kazakhstan. Finally, the Rimland, region between Eurasian Heartland

and the West is composed from Former Soviet states, or, today’s members of Eastern

Partnership: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In this part,

first, I presented and explained Heartland-Rimland theory, next, I explained the theory of

Regional Security Complexes (RSC). Also, using geopolitical theory and RSC theory I

11

Ibidem p.23 12

Ibidem p.25 13

S.M.Walt, The origin of alliances, London Cornell University Press,1987, p.17

14

identified main RSC in Europe. Finally, I explained why Eastern Partnership (EaP)

countries could be considered members of two RSC: the West+EaP and Russian Former

Soviet Union (FSU). This assumption is against classical theory of RSC, which argues that

a country could be member only of one of RSC, but, it brings necessary tools to link the

theory of international relations with Anglo-Saxon geopolitics. If these countries could be

considered to belong to two competing RSC, we could assume that Eastern Partnership

countries are Rimland countries.

In the second part of my paper I used tools of Copenhagen School of Security to

made sector by sector analysis of Eastern Partnership security. I analyzed four security

sectors: political, military, societal and economic, of all of six Eastern Parnership

countries. For each security sector I identified the main threats and I paid attention on

state’s behavior. The neo-realist theory of international relations says that states have two

options: to balance or to bandwagon the aggressor. Balancing occurs than a state become

too powerful and become a vital threat for other actors14

. States will seek to build

coalitions or to face the threat alone-internal balancing, in order to maintain status quo. In

contrast, to bandwagon means to align the threatening state.15

Both types of behavior could

assure the security of state. However, usually states will tend to balance the power that

threatens their security. States are more likely to balance a powerful opponent to prevent

him to become too strong. It is valid for relatively strong states. However, weak states will

tend to bandwagon stronger states, as well as they will tend to bandwagon proximate

powers and balance the farthest one 16

. In the second part of my paper I analyzed threats

and behaviors in four security sectors. I used this qualitative data and introduced it in a

table for each sector and, later, in a table for all four analyzed sectors. My final table

included information about Eastern Partnership countries perception of the West and

Russia. “YES” meant that the country perceived that Russia or the West is a threat for

their security sector. “NO” meant that the state did not perceive a threat from these actors.

An example of the table could be seen below:

14

John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 2nd Edition Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p.81 15

S.M.Walt, The origin of alliances, London Cornell University Press,1987, p.17 16

Ibidem p.17

15

Perception

of threat

Societal Political Economic Military

West Russia West Russia West Russia West Russia

Country A Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No

Country B No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes

Table I.1 Perception of threat

Next, for each sector I studied the behavior of Eastern Partnership countries. As I have

mentioned before, when the state is threatened by a power, it has two options: to balance or

to bandwagon it. I used the data from Table I.1- perception of threat and drown Table I.2

with state’s reaction to threats: balancing or bandwagoning.

Table I.2: Behavior

In the third part of my paper I used the data from the second part to analyze the culture

of anarchy of Eastern Partnership countries and their behavior in West+EaP RSC and

Russian FSU RSC. This analysis was made using constructivist theory of international

relations developed by Alexander Wendt. His theory of anarchy and cultures of anarchy in

international system were good tools to analyze state’s behavior. Therefore, first, I

explained his models of anarchy and cultures of anarchy. Next, I applied this model to

analyze the behavior of Eastern Partnership countries in Russian and Western security

complexes. I detected some interesting facts: European and Caucasus Rimland are not so

homogeneous and there are countries which have a more cooperative culture with one of

two main geopolitical players in the region. Thus, I identified countries which could be

considered as real Rimland and countries – both Sea and Land type of powers and fake

Rimland states- which are more Land or more Sea type of powers. Finally, I pictured a

possible scenario for European security if today’s trends will continue.

The last part of my paper – Conclusion, I presented six conclusions of my analysis. Also, I

tried to shape a strategy for the West that could help it to win the geopolitical battle in

Europe.

Behavior societal political economic Military

West Russia West Russia West Russia West Russia

Country A Band Band Band Bal Band Bal

Country B Bal Bal Bal Bal Bal

16

A weak point of my thesis is the use of balancing/bandwagoning model of behavior to

analyze Eastern Partnership countries relations with the West and Russia. This model,

which I used in section two could say a lot about current behavior of these countries in

each of security sectors, but needs further analysis to predict future behaviors. Also, it

makes abstraction from the type of threat, because balancing/bandwagoning behavior

could be a reaction to a minor threat as well as for a major threat. A more appropriate

model could be Friendship/Rivalry/Enmity culture in each security sector. This will fit

with Wend’s constructivist theory of international relations and will help us to improve the

depth of the analysis. However, this approach could lack accuracy, because in some cases,

a country could consider another actor as Rival or Enemy, but to bandwagon it, because it

has no other option to assure its own security. The best way to analyze Eastern Partnership

countries behavior could be a mix of balancing/bandwagoning and

Enmity/Rivalry/Friendship models. It could preserve the advantages of constructivism and

realism. A second weak point of my thesis is the hypothesis that Eastern Partnership

countries belong both to Russian RSC and Western RSC. This idea helped me to link the

theory of Regional Security Complexes with Rimland-Heartland theory of geopolitics.

However, it is really difficult to assume that EaP countries belong to both in the same way,

even if their security depends on both.

17

1. Geopolitics and Regional Security Complexes

1.1 Heartland- Rimland theory of Geopolitics

The Anglo-Saxon school of geopolitics affirms that geography means everything for

a state because it influences state’s foreign policy decisions, its security goals and of

course its history. Geography represents the strength and at the same time the weakness of

a state. The basic law of geopolitics is the sea-land antagonism and the whole human

history is the history of struggle between sea powers and land powers. This antagonism is a

classical one: continental Rome and sea power Carthage, Sparta and Athens, United

Kingdom and France and, finally, the Cold War antagonism between USA, a sea power,

and URSS, a continental power. These conflicts shaped the modern world. The conflict

between telucracy (land power) and thalassocracy (sea power) could help us to predict

future conflicts and to explain the history.

Sea-power and Land-power are very different geopolitical entities. A Sea-Power,

due to its free access to navigable oceans and seas, is more mobile and adaptive and this

fact has huge implications on sea-power states.17

Free access to the sea gives a big

opportunity for an explosive development for them. The individual is the engine of the

progress in these types of states, because he is the most mobile part of the society. The

individual seeks for knowledge of the ocean and land, he travels, discovers new land and

resources, he trades and these activities help the society to develop technologies and to

overcome the lack of resources, which are localized mostly on continent. Also, these

societies are less hierarchic, because individuals are their supreme value and their ethical

and juridical norms are variable. An enhanced mobility of individuals does not give the

possibility to set up stable juridical norms or some cultural features for the society. In

addition, the need of expansion enforces society to change, to be dynamic and adaptive. A

Sea-Power develops quickly; controls the sea, makes colonies to assure its own needs.

Furthermore, Alexander Dughin argues that there are meta-ideologies of sea and land

power. During the Cold War, the geographical antagonism between land and sea took an

ideological dimension and we could observe that the ideology of sea-power is the

liberalism and capitalism. 18

17

A.Dughin, Bazele geopoliticii, vol. I, editura Euasiatica.ro, București,2011, p. 22 18

Ibidem p.25

18

In contrast, a land power is more stable and more conservative.19

To manage and

control its territory, a land-power needs harsh juridical norms, centralization and large and

strong military. A land power is less mobile and need to develop extended communications

to centralize its territories. However, unlike a sea power, a land power treats a conquered

territory and its population as its own and that’s why it extends its juridical norms over the

conquered territory. The place of individual in the society is less important, because only

the government has capabilities to control, manage and defend the territory. A consequence

of this culture is that a land power state is hierarchic and centralized. Its society is less

fragmented, it has a more collective spirit, and it has more cultural stability and steady

ethical norms.20

Whereas a land power develops gradually; it posses huge resources, land

and manpower, and is less interested in technological progress. However, when it links its

territories with roads, rail or other communications, and builds technologies, it could

evolve in a super-power. Dughin considers that the meta-ideology of a land power is

Marxism or socialism and therefore, he considers a land power needs to be controlled by

an authoritarian regime.21

Sea and land powers are big players in human history, although not the only

players. The human civilization was born on the continental seashore. This area is a

mobile border between land powers and sea powers. It is influenced by both of them and it

is dynamic and adaptive like sea power and conservative and static like a land power.

Locked between sea and land, the seashore has to protect its borders from all directions. A

sea power considers the continental seashore as potential colony, a territory that needs to

be conquered from the continent. A land power treats the continental seashore as its natural

territory and border. The seashore has its own history and cultural features and can choose

its own fate which is linked to the dualism of sea-land. It has a choice, but has no

alternative to sea-land couple. 22

The seashore is an entire geopolitical region which

includes states or group of states. So, the seashore has not to be considered only a

geographical border, it’s more than that, because it is also a border between two antagonist

civilizations and their meta-ideologies and cultures.

This geopolitical theory was developed in the West by American and English

scholars and had a practical use during the 19th

century, two World Wars, throughout the

Cold War, and is still used by the USA to contain all challengers of US dominance in

19

Ibidem p.22 20

Ibidem p. 22 21

Ibidem p. 25 22

Ibidem p. 28

19

Eurasia. This theory has two basic branches which have two different ideas concerning Sea

and Land power. The first branch is represented by Halford Mackinder’s Heartland theory,

which assumes that Land powers have primacy over Sea Powers and, in fact, are doomed

to world domination. The second branch is Alfred Mahan’s theory of sea power, which

considers that Sea power is superior to Land power and, in fact, the navy and the control

over sea in Northern hemisphere is the key to world dominance.23

Later, this idea was

continued by Nicholas Spykman who used Mackinder’s idea of Heartland, but its idea was

that a Hearland state could be contained by a superior sea power. Also, he introduced the

notion of Rimland- a space between Sea and Land power, the place of struggle and

collision of these blocks. These two branches of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics are named

Hearltand-Rimland theory, because in fact, it is difficult to assume whether Sea power is

superior to Land power, or vice versa. In this chapter, firstly, I presented Mackinder’s

Heartland theory as well as Spykman’s Rimland theory, with their key points, differences

and similarities. Secondly, I proved that Sea powers and Land powers are global security

complexes with their own anarchy, culture of anarchy and order. So, North America and

Europe is a global security complex, which compete for dominance in Eurasia, as well as

Russia, which is another competitor. Thus, Eastern Partnership could be approximated to

Spykman’s European Rimland, the space where the West and Russia collide. But it is a

Western view on Rimland, because, Russia sees Eastern Partnership Countries as “near

abroad”, a part of its security complex, which is threatened by the West. Finally, I

evidenced that Eastern Partnership countries are members both in Western RSC and in

Russian Former Soviet Union RSC.

The first branch of Heartland-Rimland theory is theorized by Halford Mackinder

in “Geographical Pivot of History” written back in 1904.24

He was not the first scholar to

observe the dichotomy of sea-land powers, but, he was probably the first who made an

interesting correlation between geography and human history. His idea was simple: he had

observed that, in 1900, the world became a close political system. There was no other land

to discover, every piece of Earth was been already occupied by great powers. That meant

that the world became a close system and every big political event had its consequences

around the world.25

He is also one of the first scholars to observe that industrialization and

technologies of his times could change the relative balance of world powers. He

proclaimed the end of “Columbian epoch”, during which states with huge navy and

23

Ibidem p. 43 24

G. O Tuathail, The Geopolitics Reader,Routledge,London, 1998, p.16 25

F.P. Sempa, Geopolitics from Cold war to 21 century, Transaction Publishers,London 2002, p. 11

20

commercial fleet ruled the world. This epoch began in 1400, when Europeans discovered

the New World and started to conquer colonies26

. The navy and overseas colonies were a

way to reach lands with precious resources and, thus, resist invasions from the East.

Europeans discovered a sea-route to India to avoid the dangerous land-route which was

controlled by Ottoman Empire, they discovered the North and South Americas and they

began to explore Africa. Mobility on seas gave European Powers a relative advantage and

states like United Kingdom and USA used their navy to control the seas, the world trade

and, obviously, they became the dominant powers in the world. For example, due to its

navy and its mobility, Britain could influence political events all around the world.27

However, Mackinder affirmed that the hegemony of sea powers came to end. New

technologies began to influence the world. At the beginning of “Columbian age” land

powers had low global mobility. Horsemen dominated the steppes of Eurasia, but the seas

were inaccessible for them, so it was not easy to control the shore of the continent.

Enhanced mobility on sea gave the possibility to sea-powers to deploy quickly their troops

on seashore to keep horsemen out of warm seas.28

However, industrialization and

modernization changed everything and gave the land powers big mobility on their

continent. It could link huge territories, move quickly troops from one side of the continent

to another, move big quantities of goods for trade. The railroad, followed by the planes,

alleviated the advantage Sea powers mobility on seas. At that moment, Land powers were

in poll position and had a chance to become the dominant world power. With huge

resources, technologies, industrial development and enhanced mobility on land, a Land

Power could try to conquer the world.

Mackinder correlated geographical conditions and technologies that emerged

during the industrial age. However, the most brilliant idea of Mackinder is that geography

and history are also correlated. He observed that Europe suffered a dozen of invasions

from the East. Franks, the Goths, Huns and Avars, Magyars and Mongols invaded Europe

during the Middle Age. During “Columbian epoch”, great powers from East, especially

Russia, threatened the continental Europe and made wars to expand their influence in

Central Europe, Balkans and to reach warm seas. Mackinder saw the opposition between

land powers and sea powers which were in competition for large territories in Europe.

These invasions from East, from the heart of Asia, influenced the European history;

therefore, Mackinder supposed that the history of Europe is strongly linked to the history

26

Ibidem p.11 27

H.J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, NDU press,Washington,1996, p.189 28

Ibidem p.186

21

of Asia.29

Hence, he affirmed that Europe and Asia is a great geographical and political

area: Eurasia. Later, he affirmed that this area is even greater: Europe, Asia and Africa,

which is the World Island, the most populated region in the world, with huge resources and

industrial capabilities. However, on this continent there is an area with an important

strategic position which is situated in the heart of Eurasia. A power situated in this area

could command the whole Eurasia. Mackinder named this area “the pivot area” or

“Heartland”30

. Heartland is a big natural citadel because it is a big plane from Eastern

Siberia to Eastern Europe, inaccessible from sea. It is a suitable territory for horsemen,

who could control it and build there an empire. It is controlled by land powers and is

inaccessible for sea powers. Volga drains in Caspian Sea, Lena and Yenisei in Arctic

Ocean and they freeze during the winter. Thus, sea powers cannot use their advantage of

mobility on seas and penetrate in Heartland. Geographical inaccessibility, coupled with big

resources, manpower and army make the Heartland a true armed citadel.31

However, harsh

climate and no access to navigable seas forced people from Heartland to move towards the

West. Huge invasions of Slavs, Magyars and later of Mongols came from there. Russia

conquered the seashore of Baltic Sea as well as the Southern Ukraine in order to reach

Black Sea and next, it aimed to conquer the Balkans to reach the Mediterranean Sea.

Without access to warm seas, the Heartland is suffocated, because sea powers pressure the

continental seashore and threats its borders. However, when a power from Heartland

reaches them, continental resources could be used to build a fleet and to challenge sea

powers. Mackinder considered that Russia had the central role in Eurasia because it

controlled the Heartland and it could expand in all directions. 32

Outside the pivot area, in Inner Crescent, Mackinder identified another

geopolitical region. Geographically it is the continental seashore of the World Island. The

Inner Crescent is also called Rimland, a name given by Nicholas Spykman33

. Inner

Crescent has its own history and, in fact, great human civilizations were born in this area.

In Middle East, Mesopotamian and Babylonian civilizations developed due to navigable

Tigre and Euphrates. Egyptian civilization was born on the shore of Nile, Greek

civilization was born on the shore of Mediterranean Sea, and Chinese civilization was born

on the shore of Huang He. Big navigable rivers provided good conditions for development

29

Ibidem p.182 30

Ibidem p.191 31

Ibidem p.54 32

Ibidem p 78 33

Ibidem p. XX

22

of human civilizations.34

Geographically Inner Crescent countries have easy access to

warm seas, navigable rivers and have huge land borders. An example of Inner Crescent

countries in Mackinder’s time was Germany, China, Austria, France and India. Heartland

Map 1.1 Geographical pivot of History35

exercises permanent pressure on Inner Crescent and aims to conquer it and reach navigable

seas. From their side, Sea powers pressure the Inner Crescent to control its resources and to

build bases to threaten the Heartland. Consequently, the Inner Crescent could join one of

the two antagonist geopolitical powers and became a part of Heartland Empire or of Sea

Empire. Also, an Inner Crescent state could be a threat both to Eurasian Heartland and sea

powers. Napoleonic France was an Inner Crescent state which threatened both Russia,

situated in Heartland, and United Kingdom, the sea power. Germany, the European

Heartland, was close to conquer the Eurasian Heartland and, therefore, the whole world.

However, initially, Mackinder considered Germany a Heartland power or, at least a

divided state: the East with Heartland features and the West with Inner Crescent features.

Also, Mackinder highlighted that Eastern Europe is the key area to command the

Heartland. It is a densely populated area, which is historically a region of concurrence of

great Empires: German, Austrian and Russian. It has two main elements: Teutonic and

Slavic, but without a clear territorial distinction between them because Slav minorities

were surrounded by Germanic ones, and vice versa.36

Obviously, each of three European

Empires before 1914 wanted to enhance its control over areas populated by communities

with their cultural element and, as consequence, Eastern Europe became a divided and

34

A.Dughin, Bazele geopoliticii, vol. I, editura Euasiatica.ro, București,2011, p. 39 35

Source http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History#mediaviewer/File:Heartland.png 36

H.J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, NDU press,Washington,1996, p.90

23

unstable region. However, this region is essential to command and reunify the Heartland.37

With its manpower, land and resources, Eastern Europe is strategically important to world

hegemony, so, Mackinder concluded:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:

Who rules the World-Island commands the World.38

Last, but not least, Mackinder identified the Outer Insular Crescent. It is a huge

geopolitical area: North and South Americas, Australia, Oceania, Japan, United Kingdom.

39Compared to Eurasia, these continents are true islands in World Ocean. These states

share the same feature: they are situated outside the Eurasia and they have a big advantage

because they are not under the pressure of Heartland. Insular states outside Eurasia like

United Kingdom conquered colonies in order to overcome domestic lack of resources. Big

fleet and enhanced mobility on seas gave possibility to some states situated in Outer

Crescent to build large empires and during the “Columbian epoch”, sea powers discovered

the New World and expanded there. Also, their mobility did not give the possibility to land

powers, in particular to Russia, to reach warm seas. Sea powers from Outer Crescent

dominated world politics during the “Columbian epoch”, but, their time reached its end.

New technologies enhanced land power’s mobility and opened the way for world

domination. Later, in 1943, Mackinder revised his theory. First of all, he introduced the

concept of Lenaland – least populated and rich in resources Russian territories westward of

Ural Mountains. Also, he spoke about Midland Ocean- Arctic Ocean with North and

Baltic Sea. Because of new technologies, Midland Ocean became navigable and played a

big role in Allies aid to USSR. However, last Mackinder’s papers were not theories, they

were only strategic papers. Mackinder analyzed possibilities to contain Germany and other

Inner Crescent powers, and to not admit another German or Japanese crusade to world

hegemony. He stressed that USA, UK and France had to cooperate with USSR to contain

Germany. 40

One critique of Mackinder’s theory was the overrated Heartland, which was

considered to be the dominant world power. However, two World Wars proved that

Heartland power- Russia, and sea powers- USA and UK, could cooperate to defeat a

Rimland power-Germany. Therefore, the conflict between Sea and Land powers is not a

37

Ibidem p. 99 38

Ibidem p.106 39

Ibidem p. 191 40

Ibidem p 204

24

unique option. Some new theories emerged, and the most influential was Rimland theory,

which was developed by Nicholas Spykman, an American scholar. His theory is the second

branch of Hearland-Rimland theory. He refused to support Mackinder’s argument that

Heartland was the key of Eurasian dominance and he affirmed that the region bordering

with the Heartland, the Inner Crescent, is the key region to world hegemony. If Mackinder

called this region the Inner Crescent, then Spykman renamed it Rimland. 41

Spykman

considered that:

The rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate region, situated…between the

heartland and the marginal seas. It functions as a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land

power. Looking in both directions, it must function amphibiously and defend itself on land and sea42

Spykman’s Rimland included countries from Europe, Middle East, South Asia and East

Asia. During the history some Rimland countries became great powers and were the main

challengers to World hegemony. Napoleonic France in the 19th

century, Nazi Germany and

Japan in the 20th

century were the main challengers to world hegemony. These states were

defeated by coalitions of Rimland, Heartland and Outer Crescent countries, which restored

the world balance of power. Consequently, Mackinder’s idea that the History was shaped

by sea-land antagonism was not completely true, because some Rimland powers could

have enough capabilities to seek world hegemony or to become big world powers.

Spykman considered the biggest threat to US interest was the possibility that the Rimland

would be controlled by a single power or a coalition of land powers. In WW2, it was

possible that the European Rimland could be controlled by Germany, Asian Rimland by

Japan, and, so, USA could be threatened both from the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean. After

WW2, Spykman considered that URSS would try to establish its control over the Rimland

and make a World-Empire. Consequently, Spykman considered that Mackinder’s dictum:

“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland”;

should be changed to :

“Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the

world.”43

Spykman predicted the emergence of two Rimland powers: China and India, which could

become major world powers, because of their manpower, resources and strategic position.

He said that by 1990, China and India, alongside with URSS and USA would be the only

41

F. Sempa, Spykman’s World, American Diplomacy http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/0406/semp/sempa_spykman.html, 30.04.2014 42

Loc. cit 43

Loc. cit

25

global great powers.44

He also predicted that China would be the dominant power in East

Asia, URSS would be the strongest land power, Germany would be balanced by France,

UK and URSS and, finally, the Rimland will continue to be the battlefield of great powers’

interests45

. Spykman passed away in 1943, and didn’t meet the end of the WW2. The

beginning of the Cold War confirmed Mackinder’s theory of land power. URSS tried to

expand its control over the Rimland : in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,

Romania, Yugoslavia, North Korea. In China, URSS helped communist to win the civil

war and to put in place another pro-soviet regime. Everything seemed to confirm the

Mackinder’s theory of aggressive Heartland, which centralize its territories and expand

towards warm seas. However, in the long run, Spykman’s Rimland theory was more

accurate to explain the Cold War. Spykman’s and Mahan’s ideas ,that the big Eurasian

Heartland could be contained by a network of allied states and military bases situated in

Rimland and offshore islands, became the core of US foreign policy. In 1947 Kennan

wrote the famous “Long Telegram” where he described future URSS’s international

behavior and plans for world domination. His basic idea was that URSS perceived itself in

war with world capitalism, thus, a political conflict with the USA could not be avoided. 46

URSS had plans to expand the communist system in Germany, Argentina and Middle East,

thus, USA had to:

“formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive

picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past”47

More practically, this idea was highlighted in NSC-68, the basic document for US foreign

policy in the Cold War: Containment. NSC-68 designed a plan to contain soviet expansion

by all peaceful means:

“As for the policy of "containment," it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1)

block further expansion of Soviet power48

”

In reality, USA had and will continue to have a foreign policy based on Spykman’s and

Mahan’s ideas of the primacy of Sea power over the Land power and that Heartland’s

44

Loc. cit 45

Loc. cit 46

G. Kennan, The long telegram, Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf, accessed 30.04.2014 47

Loc. cit 48

NSC-68 , Federation of American Scientists, https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-6.htm accesed 30.04.2014

26

expansion must be contained by all means. Later, the same idea was used in Domino

Theory, to justify US intervention in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, American support of

some regimes of the Persian Gulf. However, the most obvious example of how this theory

was used in practice is the creation of NATO, which was inspired from Mahan’s and

Spykman’s ideas of Sea-Powers alliance to contain the growing Heartland power.

Map 1.2 Spykman’s Rimland49

The basic idea of Rimland-Heartland theory is the antagonism of land and sea. Both

theories recognize that Land powers and Sea powers are in a struggle over the Rimland.

Also, they recognize that there are a couple of macro geopolitical structures: Heartland-

situated in the middle of Eurasia, Rimland- the Eurasian continental seashore, and Outer

Crescent- other continents. Although, these theories recognize that the key to world

hegemony is the dominance in Rimland. Mackinder affirmed that it was enough to control

Eastern Europe to control the Heartland; Spykman said that the whole Rimland should to

be controlled to command the Heartland. In addition, both scholars argued that is almost

impossible to establish control over the whole Eurasia and, for Sea powers, a strategy of

containment will be a way to prevent the rise of possible challengers for dominance in

World Island. Finally, they affirmed that Rimland powers could become major actors, and,

in fact, human history was shaped by the evolution of Rimland.

1.2 Heartland-Rimland theory and Regional Security Complexes theory

But who represent Sea power and who is Heartland power? There is no obvious

global power which dominates the sea and there is no global power which fully controls

49

Source http://www.oldenburger.us/gary/docs/TheColdWar_files/image008.jpg

27

the Heartland. In fact, Mackinder’s Outer crescent is composed of North American states,

Western European states, South American states, Australia, Japan, South Asian states.

They are very different and they have various global interests and goals. Also, there are

more than seven states in Mackinder’s Heartland: Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,

Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan, Afghanistan and the West of China. Therefore,

nobody could speak about a unified Heartland or unified Outer Crescent, as well as of

unified Rimland. Rimland-Heartland theory speaks about abstract structures which interact

at global level, but could we explain these structures using theories of international

relations, which assume that only states or other human-ruled structures shape international

affairs? My argument is that we could explain these geopolitical structures if we assume

that they are global security complexes. Of course, it is difficult to argue that all

Mackinder’s geopolitical structures are homogeneous, but there are patterns which need to

be analyzed. Also, I argue that for a more accurate analysis, we need to consider Eastern

Partnership countries as members of two overleaping security complexes, because it will

explain their dual orientation and will help us to classify them as Rimland powers. It will

break Buzan’s rule that RSC are mutually exclusive, but, taking into account that Spykman

and Mackinder argued that Rimland powers are both Sea and Land powers, this region

could not be considered as part of only one RSC. My assumption could make the necessary

link between geopolitical and security theory.

First, we need to explain what a security complex is. This notion was theorized by

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and defines a systems of states, linked geographically

“ whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national

securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another”50

Later, this definition was changed to“a set of units whose major processes of

securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems

cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”51

This definition affirms that it is possible that some regions and states, could have

interlinked security sectors and that fact make them a Regional Security Complex. RSC is

build through repetitive interactions and relations of enmity, rivalry and friendship which

make state’s security sectors dependent on regional evolutions and the anarchy of RSC

subsystem. 52

Also, they argue that geography matters in political, societal, military and

environmental sectors, because these sectors depend on the geographical proximity of

50

B. Buzan, Regions and powers,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2003, p. 44 51

Ibidem p.44 52

Ibidem p.44

28

states. Thus, national minorities, territorial struggles, military cooperation are strongly

territorial, because of the slow mobility of these factors. In contrast, economic sector does

not depend only on geographical factors, because finance, capital and merchandise are

more fluid factors. In conclusion, they argue that ethnic, territorial, religious diversity,

differences in military capabilities, regional proximity combined with the anarchy of the

system play a key role in genesis of RSC. 53

A normal state of a security complex is

Rivalry between actors and that builds a Lockean culture of anarchy in RSC. Other states

of the system could be Enmity- Hobbsean anarchy and Friendship- Kantian anarchy. 54

Lockean culture is closely related to the Realist theory of international relations and it is

the reason why this theory offers tools to explain international order trough lenses of the

anarchic structure of world system but have difficulties to explain cooperative RSC, as the

EU or NATO. However, common anarchy and interlinked security sectors are not enough

to consider a system of states a RSC. A system of states could be considered a RSC if they

have interlinked security sectors which form a “common” security which is different from

security of other RSC.55

Therefore, each of RSC must be different from other RSC, in

order to be considered real and not arbitrary constituted unity. A RSC is composed of four

variables: boundaries of RSC, anarchy, polarity of distribution of power and social

construction with patterns of enmity, rivalry and friendship.56

Power relations and social

construction within RSC build three types of RSC orders which are related to Wend’s

cultures or anarchy: conflict formations-Hobbsean type of anarchy, security orders-

Lockean type of anarchy and security community-Kantian type of anarchy.57

However,

Buzan argues that the order of RSC is also shaped by power relations, not only by social

constructions. First two RSC orders could occur when RSC has a big power or a super-

power and a couple of medium-size powers.58

The third type is a security community,

where members could not imagine a war between them; nevertheless power-relations and

rivalry still exist within the RSC.59

But what could we say about RSC dynamics? There are a couple of scenarios

which are predicted by Waever and Buzan. First, an unstructured region could become a

53

Ibidem p.46 54

D.Frazier,R. Stewart-Ingersoll, Regional powers and security: A framework for understanding order within regional security complexes, European Journal of International Relations, 2010 16: 731, p. 743 55

B. Buzan, Regions and powers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2003, p.47 56

Ibidem p.53 57

Ibidem p.55 58

Ibidem p.49 59

Ibidem p.56

29

RSC or get overlaid.60

Further, a RSC could also be transformed or to get overlaid. A

scenario when a RSC could become an unstructured region is also possible, but it’s an

exception and is a long term process when actor’s security becomes less and less

dependent on RSC security. Finally, a RSC could become more integrated, actors could

build common institutions and thus, a RSC could become a big power by itself, and a clear

example is the EU integration.61

Another point is whether RSCs are mutually exclusive or overleaping. Buzan

argues that they are mutually exclusive; however, state’s apparent affiliation to two or

more RSC is due to regional sub-complexes. Therefore, the world system could be

considered a sum of mutually exclusive RSC, which are composed by regional sub-

complexes. 62

Thus, a state could be a member only to one RSC, being a member of a

couple of regional sub-systems within RSC. Buzan argues that a RSC could exist only if it

is different enough from another RSC in terms of security; Lake and Morgan consider that

great powers have to be considered members of every RSC by default, because their

influence in security issues of a RSC could be very large. 63

So, if Buzan wants to separate

regional level from global level, Morgan considers that these levels need to be analyzed

together. Security and evolution of major global players influence regional security;

therefore, behavior of other actors is shaped by security concerns and issues at the global

level. 64

Big powers constant interest in one RSC, their penetration in some RSC as well as

the emergence of rival multi-bloc security systems leaded by global powers alleviates

distinctions between regional and global level.65

Big powers have capabilities to intervene

in foreign RSC, to establish or to destroy a regional security order; consequently, they need

to be considered as part of any RSC. That is the reason why big powers need to be

considered as members of RSC where they are involved.

Finally, to analyze the type of order in RSC, we need to understand power

relations and polarization inside the complex. Regional powers could have huge influence

on RSC order and could also build it. They have enough capabilities, interests and they

socialize with other members of the RSC, to build an order within it. Morgan argues that

an order within a RSC depends on its management, which is realized by one or a couple of

regional powers. Further, he identifies a hierarchical list of security orders: power

60

Ibidem p.66 61

Ibidem p.66 62

Ibidem p.48 63

Ibidem p.80 64

D.Lake,P.Morgan, Regional Orders, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania,1997, p. 27 65

Ibidem p.28

30

restraining power, great power concert, collective security, pluralistic security community

and integration.66

A regional power could shape the whole RSC order and make it a

structured or unstructured entity. In addition, it could have three standard roles in a RSC:

leadership, custodianship or protection.67 Because of the role of regional power and its

ability to manage an RSC, we can use another classification of RSC orders: hegemonic,

collective security, power restraining power, concert and unstructured region.68

A

hegemonic order means that one state successfully managed the RSC and became the only

one to establish rules and norms within it. This regional power has capabilities and is

recognized as regional leader in RSC. A collective security order means that states agree

to establish norms and security arrangements within RSC to preserve order and peace and

to defend members from foreign aggression.69

A power restraining power is an order where

states are concerned about the distribution of power within RSC, and thus, they follow the

balance of power theory. 70

Next, a concert order is when some regional powers within RSC

agree to establish norms to preserve a security order, and their right to manage the RSC is

recognized by other states. 71

Finally, an unstructured order means a lack of any security

arrangement and leading power which could establish a security order.72

Buzan and Waever identified eleven global RSC and orders which cover the whole

Earth. However, as I mentioned, their assumption is that a state could be a member only in

one RSC. If we consider that big powers have capabilities and interest to manage security

orders outside their RSC, then we must assume that they are parts in more than one RSC.

Also, economic integration and globalization bring together some RSC, even if they have

no too much official security arrangements and shared security issues. In his classification

Buzan makes a distinction between North American Security complex and European

security complex. However, I will treat them as a whole, and next, I will argue why. In the

Northern hemisphere, states from Mackinder’s Outer Crescent obviously are part of big

security complex: the West. This assumption is not new and this complex could be

approximated to Samuel Huntinghton’s Western Civilization73

. USA, EU and Canada have

66

D.Frazier,R. Stewart-Ingersoll, Regional powers and security: A framework for understanding order within regional security complexes, European Journal of International Relations, 2010 16: 731, p.735 67

Ibidem p.738 68

Ibidem p.735 69

Ibidem p.735 70

Ibidem p.735 71

Ibidem p.735 72

Ibidem p.735 73

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, May 31, 2007, p.157

31

collective security engagements: NATO, a military alliance which was predicted by Mahan

and Spykman. Their security depends on mutual assistance, their economies have deep

integration and, in EU case, member states build a supranational entity, with common

policies inside and common foreign policy outside. Also, US-Japanese alliance, as well as

US alliance with Australia and New Zeeland is the continuation of the West. Further, US

constant interest in European politics and security, as well as its military presence in

Central Europe, make it an obvious actor in European RSC. In addition, North American

and European RSC have deep economic, political and military links. Finally, these RSC

share same values: democracy, free trade, individual freedoms and are composed of fully

democratic states. Here, we can argue that Kant’s theory of Eternal Peace could be applied,

because a war between actors in these RSCs could not be imagined. Thus, it seems that

NATO is an alliance which makes a linkage between North American RSC and European

RSC and builds the Western RSC. USA has a distinct position in European RSC, because

it is not geographically linked to Europe and because its activity in European security

affairs is not permanent. We can argue, that US interventions in European RSC is an

example of a superpower intervention in a foreign RSC. However, globalization made deep

economic linkages between Europe and America; thus, we cannot imagine how these

regions could survive alone. Economic crisis was a clear example how deep integration of

Western economies is and how a security issue in one Western RSC could affect economic

security in the whole West. Finally, with low military expenditures compared to US, the

EU would have huge problems to contain Russia, a nuclear and a large military power.

Taking into account these factors, I will consider North American and European RSC as a

whole, a global RSC- the West.

The core of the Western security complex is the Euro-Atlantic alliance NATO that

integrates military and political security sectors of member states. Of course, the West is

not homogeneous, because it has two leaders: the USA and the EU, which have some

struggles for leadership in Western security complex. Also, there are rivalries within the

EU, where UK, Germany and France try to establish their leadership. However, this

competition is not a military one, because they are in alliance, is not economic one,

because they have integrated economies and depend one on another, it is not in political

sector, because they have mutual recognition of their sovereignty and integrity, it is a

competition for leadership and recognition of leadership. This is the reason why the

Western RSC has a Kantian culture of anarchy and the West is a region where states

cooperate and do not use military or political means to force one another to take

32

undesirable decisions.74

The struggle for leadership in this integrated security complex is

the only real struggle and balance of power politics within it is a consequence of non-

military disputes between two competitors for dominance of the West. I argue that the

USA, the EU and its allies form a global security complex with a Kantian culture of

anarchy with the second degree of internalization of its norms. These actors cooperate

because they could reach more advantages from cooperation and Friendship than from

Rivalry or Enmity. In relations with the outside of the world, actors from the Western RSC

have convergent foreign policies and they act according shared norms and values for

interaction with outside, which were internalized in their security complex. Obviously, for

now, the West has a multipolar order, where big regional powers compete for leadership.

Also, these states establish rules and norms of behavior in Western security complex, as

result we could consider that this RSC has a Concert of powers order.75

Of course, USA

wants to manage this RSC alone and has a formal leadership, but we cannot argue that

Western RSC is unipolar, because USA is too far from Europe to be constantly enrolled in

all European security issues and because its authority is contested by other actors,

especially by France and Germany. My definition of the Western RSC could be analyzed

not only through RSC theory, but also using Hearland-Rimland theory. Western RSC has

to defend itself only on land, from land or Rimland powers, it is not threatened by other

Sea Powers, because they are in collective security arrangement and thus, they are the

archetype of Mackinder’s Outer Crescent. Trade, investments, economic cooperation and

integrated security sectors are proofs that the West is a global security complex and a

geopolitical region which competes for world dominance. Also, the West has a constant

interest to control Rimland powers: Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Middle East as well as

is interested to contain Russia and China’s attempts to dominate Central Asia-the

Mackinder’s Heartland. Western RSC share same geopolitical goals, which are important

for survival of Western states and have same geopolitical enemies, even if there is constant

struggle for foreign security agenda between members.

74

A. Wendt, Social theory of international politics, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.297 75

D.Frazier,R. Stewart-Ingersoll, Regional powers and security: A framework for understanding order within regional security complexes, European Journal of International Relations, 2010 16: 731, p.736

33

Map 1.3 Western RSC

Following this logic, I will assume that the second big competitor for dominance in

Eurasia is Russia. It is difficult to fix real limits of Russian RSC, because Russia per se is a

competitor for Eurasian Hegemony; other states of Russian RSC have limited interests

outside. Russia has a formal leadership of FSU RSC, even if, according Buzan, Russia

failed to establish a hegemonic order within it. 76

Of course, Russian RSC is formed by

Russia and all FSU countries, that’s why I will call it Russian RSC of Former Soviet Union

(FSU). These states have deep economic, cultural and military links. Also, Russia tries to

build an Eurasian Union and invite FSU states to join it. Further, Russia is the core of the

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), alongside with Armenia, Belarus,

Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kirghizstan. Russia tries to manage this sector, but, obviously,

with some exceptions, it failed to accomplish this goal. However, frozen conflicts and

economic dependencies of FSU states, make their security sectors more or less dependent

on Russia and it is the reason why Russian security complex has a culture of Rivalry,

because its members could not consider Russia as Friend and leader, and because Russia

has constant attempts to build a Hegemonic order in FSU RSC. So, Russian security

complex has a Lockean anarchy, an anarchy where states use balance of power to contain

Russia. However, Russia-Belarus Union State is a paradox, which I will explain in section

three. Belarus security is deeply dependent on Russia and Russia-Belarus Union State

could be considered as a separate RSC within larger Russian RSC of FSU. Other states

from Russian RSC of FSU internalized the second degree of Lockean culture, because all

actors in this complex are concerned about the status quo and could not treat Russia as

76

Ibidem p. 743

34

Friend or Enemy.77

Russia is their Rival, and Rivalry with Russia is in fact a strategy to

contain Russian attempts to establish a hegemonic order. For example, the GUAM group

could be considered an example of containment policy of FSU countries towards Russia,

because they were reunited in a group to establish common policies towards Russian

attempts to intervene in their internal affairs and Russian support for separatist movements

in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Map 1.4 Russian Security Complex of Former Soviet Union

However, we cannot argue that Russian RSC of FSU is a geopolitical block, because it is

very heterogeneous and because the only global and regional power within it is Russia. It

failed to establish a hegemonic order in whole FSU, thus, this RSC is not a competitor for

global dominance. But still, Russia succeeded to build a hegemonic order in some

subregions, like Belarus or Kazakhstan. If we use Rimland- Hearland theory we can

explain real limits of Russian Heartland complex, a sub-complex of RSC of FSU, which is

the real competitor in Eurasian geopolitical “Great Game”. Russia has access to Heartland:

the Central Asia and Siberia, and behaves as Mackinder had predicted: it seeks continuous

expansion to warm seas it is in continuous struggle with Sea Powers and the West, and,

finally, it tries to expand and dominate Central Asia and Eastern Europe. In addition,

Russia is a centralized state, has an authoritarian regime and economic autocracy and it is

different from Sea Powers liberal-democratic world. Russian Heartland could be easily

reduced to Russia, but it will make an abstraction from the complexity of this RSC.

Kazakhstan and Belarus are surely a part of Russian Heartland, because of their military

77

A. Wendt, Social theory of international politics, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.279

35

alliance and deep economic and political integration. The rest of Central Asia lies in

Mackinder’s Heartland and is the region of competition of USA, Russia, the EU and China

for dominance and control over resources of the new Silk Road. Armenia, another Russian

ally, also could not be considered a part of Russian Heartland, because its economic and

political integration with Russia is a limited one and because of geographical isolation.

Armenia and other members of CSTO are surely a part of Russian security complex of

FSU, but are not part of Russian Heartland. Finally, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and

Azerbaijan are not a part of Russian Heartland, because they have no security

arrangements with Russia, and, in fact, seek integration with the West. This is the reason

why Russian Heartland security complex is composed from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,

as well as Russian-controlled separatist states: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Crimea. This security complex has a cooperative culture of anarchy, a Kantian culture, and

Russia established there its leadership and hegemonic order. Russian Heartland RSC has to

defend itself only from the Sea, Sea Powers and Rimland powers, because, they are

competitors for dominance in Eurasia.

Map 1.5 Russian Heartland Regional Security Complex

Finally, the third Geopolitical region in Hearland-Rimland theory is the Rimland. In

fact, it is a large geopolitical region, but I will focus on European and Caucasus Rimland

states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. As I have mentioned

36

before, they are members of Russian RSC of FSU, but, using Spykman’s theory of

Rimland, we can argue that these states are also members of the extended Western security

complex. Therefore, these Rimland states have to defend themselves both from West and

East, are both sea-democratic and land -authoritarian powers, they have possibility to join

the West or to join Heartland and, finally, they are the object of Western and Russian

struggles for dominance in Eurasia. These states are situated in immediate proximity of the

EU and Russia and are geographically liked with the West and Heartland. Their security

sectors are linked both to Western RSC and Russian RSC of FSU. These states, with one

exception: Belarus, are not a part of Russian Heartland RSC, and, also, are not a part of the

Western RSC. They are not geopolitical competitors. However they are in constant

interaction with the West and are treated by it as its own neighborhood. The most obvious

example is Eastern Partnership (EaP), a continuation of EU neighborhood policy, which is

used by the EU to transform, democratize and stabilize these states. Obviously, a first

assumption could be that the West intervenes in Russian RSC of FSU to establish a

regional order. However, a second assumption could be that EaP is an extension of

Western RSC, and, Western attempts to transform and democratize these countries are in

fact a way to manage an order within a West+ EaP security complex. In fact, Russian

political interventions in EaP countries could be considered big power intervention in a

foreign RSC and that’s the paradox of EaP and FSU: it is a geopolitical extension of the

West and of Russia. Thus, following this idea, we could see a Spykman’s Europe, where

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova are Rimland states, which

are perceived by the West as a possible extension of its geopolitical block of Sea powers,

and which are perceived by Russia as potential extension of its Heartland.

In my analysis I used the idea that these six countries are part of West+EaP RSC and

of Russian FSU RSC. This assumption was against Buzan’s opinion that RSC are mutually

exclusive, but, taking into account that these six countries security sectors are more or less

equally dependent both on the West and Russia, they could not be placed only in one RSC.

Also, I proved that these countries have different behaviors in these two RSC, as well as

different perception of threat in their RSC. Finally, the reason why I placed them in two

mutually exclusive RSC is because their security sectors are interlinked with Russia and

the West.

37

Map 1.6 Eastern Partnership

38

2. Sector by sector analysis of the security of Eastern Partnership

countries

In this section I made sector by sector analysis of security issues and behavior of

EaP countries. As I had mentioned in introduction, my goal was to observe whether Russia

and the West are considered as threat by EaP countries and to observe their reaction to

these threats: balancing or bandwagoning. This data helped me in chapter three, where I

analyzed what kind of anarchy is perceived by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus,

Moldova and Ukraine in Western+EaP RSC and Russian FSU RSC.

2.1 Societal sector

Although political speech is about nation, national interest, national state,

traditional view on security considers that the state is the referent object. But still, societal

security is about national identity, nation and culture, ideas that make people identify

themselves as members of a larger community. 78

People define themselves by language,

ethnicity, religion, tradition, history, or other national ideas or perceptions. So, a threat to

national identity is a construct, something that is perceived to threat people’s idea of a

common “we”. 79

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever define four main security issues for societal sector:

i. Migration – when people X is diluted by influxes of people Y. Identity of X

will be changed by a shift in composition of the population.80

ii. Horizontal competition – although X lives on its territory, its identity will

change because of cultural influence of Y.

iii. Vertical competition – people will stop to see them X because of an integration

project or a secessionist project, which pull them to a wider or narrower

identity. 81

iv. Depopulation

Next, I will use these 4 security issues to analyze societal security of six Eastern

Partnership countries.

2.1.1 Armenia

78

B.Buzan, Security. A new framework for analysis, London,Lynne Riner publishers, 1998,p. 119 79

Ibidem p.121 80

Ibidem p.121 81

Ibidem p.121

39

Armenia is by far the most homogeneous country in Eastern Partnership.

Approximately 98% of its population is Armenian.82

Also, Armenian diaspora is one of the

largest in the world, accounting approximately seven million people.83

In Caucasus,

Armenians are a majority in Armenia, in the South of Georgia, Azeri separatist republic

Nagorno-Karabakh and some regions in the East of Turkey. Armenian national identity is a

mix of ethnic, religious, linguistic, racial ideas and the memory of Armenian genocide of

1915. First, the core of Armenian identity is the idea that it is the first Christian nation that

was Christianized in 301 by St. Gregory.84

In fact, the concept of ethnicity and religion are

related one to other for Armenian idea of nation.85

Some nationalist theories say that

Armenians are a pre-Christian nation, with a language and culture going back to 6000 bc.86

They consider that Armenians are indigenous to Caucasus, in contrast to Turkish and Azeri

new-comers. Finally, in 20th

century Armenian identity was shaped by Turkish genocide of

Armenians, when half of total number of ethnic Armenians was killed and Armenia lost

some of its historical territories. The memory of lost territories and cultural centers

enforced some nationalist to say that it is necessary to regain them.87

Obviously,

Armenians have a strong national identity and have almost no horizontal competition in

their societal security sector. The only perceived threat is migration from Iran,

phenomenon that could dilute Armenian culture. However, some cultures could be a threat

for Armenian identity outside Armenia: in Turkey and Azerbaijan. For example, Azeri

national identity is a threat to Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh separatist republic, so we

can detect a clear vertical competition there. As of enemies and their representations, the

common perceived enemy is the Azerbaijani and Turkish Muslim.

Also, some Armenian nationalist identify themselves with the Western civilization,

even if the West ignores Armenia. These nationalists think that Armenia is the bulwark of

Western civilization in Caucasus and the battleground of different civilizations which

collide there. Other nationalist continue to think in the originality of their culture and

continue to blame the West for its support to Muslim Turkey and Azerbaijan.88

These

different ideas generate opposite perception of West: from one side an ally and family,

82

CIA world factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_am.pdf , accessed 30.04.2014 83

Armeniandiaspora.com http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/population.html, accessed 30.04.2014 84

R.Panossian,The past of a Nation : three dimensions of Armenian identity,Routledge,2010, p. 126 85

Ibidem p.126 86

Ibidem p.131 87

Ibidem p.137 88

H. Mikaelian,Nationalist discourse in Armenia, Yerevan, june 2011, p.22 http://www.c-i.am/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/nationalist-discourse-english.pdf

40

from the other – an unreliable partner that ignores Armenian cause. 89

As of Russia and

Russians, they are also perceived dually: a friend and a master.90

Russia is not a threat for

Armenians in Armenia; however, Russian xenophobia is a threat to Armenian identity in

Russia. Finally, the memory of URSS and russification is still alive, even if the fall of

URSS is perceived as harm.

The vertical competition in Armenia is between two supranational projects:

possibility to join the EU and the West or the possibility to join Russian Custom Union.

Both projects have a supranational character and create vertical competition for Armenian

national identity. Despite the fact some nationalist perceive themselves as Europeans, in

September 2013, Armenian government decided to join Russian leaded Custom Union.

That decision was not contested, and around 82% of Armenians agreed with it. 91

Obviously, for now, Armenian government, the securitizing actor, decided that Armenia

will not join European supranational identity project and this choice was legitimized by the

majority of population. I will highlight that the European supranational identity project it is

not the only cause of Armenian refusal to sign Association Agreement with EU, other

security sectors also must be analyzed. However, EU multiculturalism and EU idea of

European common identity, is a threat to Armenian homogeneous society, that perceive

itself in religious, ethnic and linguistic terms. Howverr, the possible Eurasian Union

project, supported by Russia could also become a threat to Armenian identity of Caucasus

nation, but, for now, Custom Union has not an identity projects. Consequently, Armenian

elite preferred it and had enough public legitimacy to do that. It seems that in this case,

Armenia decided to balance EU supranational identity project, but it does not mean that

they bandwagoned the Eurasian one. As I mentioned before, Armenian national identity is

a mix of religious and ethnic elements, as well as the memory of Armenian genocide. They

do not feel Asian; they feel Caucasian, Christian and Armenian. This is the reason why,

eventually, they will balance any supranational identity project.

2.1.2 Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan has a very homogeneous society. Around 91% of its 9,5 mln. citizens are

ethnic Azerbaijani; other 9% are Russians, Armenians and Lezgian.92

It is important to

note that most of Armenians in Azerbaijan live in compact groups in Nagorno-Karabakh

89

Ibidem p. 23 90

Ibidem p.19-20 91

Armenian News http://news.am/eng/news/179803.html 92

CIA world Factbook, Azerbaijan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html , accessed 16.06.2014

41

separatist republic, which is 20% of the whole territory of Azeri state. Nominally, almost

90% of citizens of Azerbaijan are Muslims: Sunni 35%, mostly in the North of country,

and Shi`a 65%. 93

Nevertheless, identity of Azerbaijani is not a religious one. The Shi`a-

Sunni split in 19th

century forced nationalist elite to become secular. European ideas were

transferred in Azerbaijan via Russian Empire; consequently, early nationalist elite

considered that only secularism could unify two Muslim groups.94

As result, after the fall

of Russian Empire, Azerbaijan had become the first democratic secular republic in Muslim

world and became the most progressive Muslim state.95

Being Muslim in Azerbaijan

means to belong to a larger cultural and ethnic community of Azerbaijani.96

Yet,

ethnically, Azerbaijani feel to belong to Turkic world as well as to Persian world.97

No

surprise that the secular republic of Azerbaijan has much to share with Kemalist Turkey.

Thus, national identity of Azerbaijan is a secular, cultural and ethnic. However, the rising

religious feelings after the fall of URSS continue to shape Azerbaijani national identity.

Rising religious feelings in Azerbaijan generate horizontal competition for secular

identity of Azerbaijani. Even if it is a limited revival, it is present, and more and more

religious groups try to define themselves in religious way.98

More and more people are

interested in Islamic model of the state.99

The main causes of this revival are: the

disappointment in USA and the West after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, the nation building

process after the fall of URSS, the relative fail of secular republic to build a state of law. 100

Also, there are another influences, especially from Iran, where is an important Azeri

minority, from rising Islamic movements in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Russian Northern

Caucasus. Thus, there is a potential of conflict between two opposite visions on

Azerbaijani identity: secular and religious.

Concerning the vertical competition, the main threat is Armenian nationalism in

Azerbaijan, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh separatist republic. Armenian separatist

perceive themselves in religious and ethnic way and this view on nation is in clear conflict

93 Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor ,International Religious Freedom Report 2010,US

Department of state http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148912.htm, accessed 16.06.2014

94 Svante E. Cornel, “The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road

Studies Program,2006, p.18, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0610Azer.pdf, accessed 16.06.2014 95

Ibidem p.11 96

Ibidem p. 21 97

Ibidem p.19 98

Ibidem p.23 99

Ibidem p.23 100

Ibidem p.34

42

with secular and ethnic identity of Azerbaijani. Armenians do not want to live in a state

with Muslim majority, even if Azerbaijani have a secular state. After the war of Nagorno-

Karabakh (1991-1994) many Azerbaijani left the separatist republic because their religious

and cultural identity, as well as their live and right to stay in their country was threatened

by Armenian majority from the region. This republic is still unrecognized by international

community and is supported by Armenian government. Azerbaijani perceive this region as

its own territory, as well as Armenians. So, the growing Armenian ethno nationalism in

Nagorno-Karabakh is a threat to Azerbaijani idea of their state and nation.

Russia and the West are considered as indirect threats. Both powers supported

Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh war. Even if, after the fall of URSS, Azerbaijani tried to

build a western-type secular state and looked to stronger ties with USA and Europe, the

disappointment in the West and anti-Americanism is still present in the society.101

As of

Russia, it is also considered to support Armenians because they are Christian. Azerbaijani

do not identify themselves nor with Europe and the West, nor with Russia. They consider

that they are a part of Turkic and muslim world. Muslim republics in Russian Northern

Caucasus influence Sunni people in Azerbaijan. The same threat is Azerbaijani migrants

from Iran, which are Shi`a. As I mentioned, the majority of Azerbaijani perceive

themselves in secular and ethnic way, so rising Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to their

idea of nation. Facing this threat, Azerbaijan tries to balance the religious threat from

Russian Northern Caucasus with closer ties to Turkey and emulation of Turkish Kemalism

in state building. As of the West, it is not perceived as direct threat.

2.1.3 Georgia

Georgia is less homogeneous than its Southern neighbors. Almost 83% of Georgian

population are ethnic Georgians and 17% are Russians, Azerbaijani, Armenian, Abkhaz

and other minorities.102

Georgians are Christian and have their own national independent

Church. Also, only 71% of population speaks Georgian, the official language of the

country, and other 29% speak Russian, Armenian and Azeri.103

Ethnic minorities in

Georgia live in small communities in the North and South of the country. Two minorities:

Abkhaz and Ossetian, live in separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Just like

in all post soviet states, after the fall of URSS, Georgia had an ethnic national identity and

101

Ibidem p. 26 102

CIA world factbook, Georgia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html, accesed 16.06.2014 103

Loc. cit

43

nationalist elite which tried to build a unitary state based on a Caucasian identity, although

almost 20% of Georgian citizens were minorities.104

However, after the war with its two

separatist republics: Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgian national discourse changed to a more

moderate, inclusive and multicultural view of their nation.105

After the “Rose revolution” in

2003, the government launched policies of cultural and social inclusion of minorities, to

guarantee them full access to political, social and economic life of Georgia. In fact, this

Western approach to minorities and nationbuilding started the process of “Westernization”

of Georgian state.106

More and more, political elite declares that Georgia belongs to Europe

and so, assuming that Georgians are Europeans.107

Georgian Western perception of their nation and identity does not mean that there is

no vertical competition in its societal sector. Two separatist minorities: Abkhaz and

Ossetian, are not perceived incompatible with Georgian emerging Western type of nation.

However, Georgian discourse considers that these minorities are manipulated by Russia.108

Russian integration projects: Custom Union, CIS and Eurasian Union are perceived threats

to European identity of Georgians. Old political disputes as well as the memory of soviet

rule, made Russian-Georgian relations very difficult at official level as well as people-to-

people. Georgians considers that using these two separatist minorities, Russia is a threat to

Georgian identity, even if ethnic Russians are only 1,5% of Georgian population. In

relation with the West, after the “Rose revolution”, official government had become pro-

Western, and started to identify Georgia with EU and European Family. Facing two

threats: Russian threat to Georgian identity though two separatist minorities and European

project of supranational identity, Georgia balanced the first and bandwagoned the last.

2.1.4 Belarus

In contrast to Caucasian countries ,which I have analyzed before, Belarus is a very

heterogeneous country, even if statistics say the opposite. It has a population of 9,6 mln

people; 83.2% of them being Belarusian , 8.3% Russians, 3.1% Poles, 1.7% Ukrainians109

.

104 Kevork K. Oskanian, Pointing Fingers: Securitisation, National Ideology and Insecurity in Southern

Caucasia, Istabul, 2012

https://www.academia.edu/3495943/Pointing_Fingers_Securitisation_National_Ideology_and_Insecurity_i

n_Southern_Caucasia p.8

105 Ibidem P.9

106 Ibidem p.9

107 Ibidem p.9

108 Ibidem p.8

109CIA world factbook,Belarus, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bo.html

accessed 16.06.2014

44

However, even if the Belarusian is the official language of Belarus, as well as the Russian,

only 23% of people use this language at home, Russian being preferred by 70% of people.

110 That means that if there is a Belarusian identity, surely it will not rely only to ethnicity

and language. In fact, there are two main types of Belarusian identity. First, is the

nationalistic one, preferred by intellectual elite that considers that Belarusian identity is

ethnic, linguistic and cultural one.111

This is a minority, but a very active one, which is

strongly anti-communist, anti-russian, they blame the soviet past and look for closer ties

with Europe. 112

It is an obvious ethnic nationalism, which rose up after the fall of URSS in

all Former Soviet Union. However, the official discourse, which is widely accepted by

population, prefers a more civic conception of Belarus national identity. It is called “The

patriotic discourse” on identity and it is accepted both by the people and political elite and

it is more or less institutionalized in schools and universities. The core of this identity is

the patriotism, the memory of the World War II, glorification of the soviet past, soviet

values: internationalism, love of the country, tolerance and hospitality. 113

Also, the

bilingualism is also considered a value of Belarus, because both Russian and Belarusian

are used in society. Briefly, to be a Belarusian means to work hard for a prosperous

Belarus, to respect it’s soviet past and values, to glorify Belarusian solider in WW2, to

speak both Russian and Belarusian and , finally, to be tolerant towards other religions and

ethnos. 114

This official view changes the formula “Belarus nation” to “Belarus People”, to

address to people who does not feel that nationalistic view fit with their experiences and

cultural background.115

Basically, the vertical competition in Belarus societal sector is between two

possible scenarios: unification with Russia and the return to Europe as a true nation. These

scenarios are threats to Belarusian national identity because unification with Russia means

that Belarusians have to assume a common “we” with Russians. Recent polls highlight that

Belarusian considers that they share more values with Russia than with the EU. 116

However, being asked if they want to join Russia or EU, respondents prefer equally both

110

Loc.cit 111

L.Titarenko, Post-Soviet Belarus: the transformation of national identity, International Studies, 2011, Vol.

13, No. 1, p.12 112

Ibidem p.11 113

Ibidem 114

Ibidem 115

Ibidem p.10 116

Belarus and Eastern Partnership: National and European Values, Office for Democratic Belarus,2013 http://democraticbelarus.eu/files/ODB%20National%20and%20European%20Values%20Survey%20Key%20Findings_1.pdf , accessed 16.06.2014

45

integration projects. 117

So, even if some people perceive Russians as “us”, the same

amount perceives them as “they” and considers that Belarus is a European nation, distinct

from Russia. Unification with Russia could mean the end of Belarus ethnic and linguistic

identity, because Belarusians will be a minority in a state dominated by Russians. In

contrast, the “return to Europe” could mean that Belarusian identity is ethnically,

linguistically and culturally distinct from Russian, so, this view on Belarusian nation will

assert nationalistic ideas and eventually will threaten Russian identity in Belarus. For now,

Belarus identity is not securitized and the idea of common origins with Russia is the

official discourse. Facing these two threats, Belarus balances the West and bandwagon

Russia, because both Lukashenka and Putin want to build a union with a common neo-

soviet identity. However, two main ideas on Belarus identity: civic and ethnic, are in

competition, and the youngest generation uses more and more Belarusian in their day to

day life. Now, Belarus is bandwagoning Russia but in long run, Belarusian will perceive

themselves as Europeans, not Russians.

2.1.5 Moldova

Republic of Moldova is also less homogeneous than Caucasus countries. Only 78%

of its 3.6 mln population is Moldovan and Romanian. The rest are Ukrainians - 8.4%,

Russians -5.6%, Gagauz - 4.4%118

. Gagauz minority lives in an autonomous region in the

South of Moldova. Russian and Ukrainian minority live in the North of the country and in

separatist republic of Transnistria. Almost 98% of the citizens of Moldova are Christian

but 88% identify themselves with Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is subordinated to

Russian Orthodox Church, and 8% identify themselves with Bessarabian Orthodox

Church.119

Also, there is a debate about the official language of Moldova: one group

considers that it is Moldovan; the other considers that it is Romanian, Moldovan and

Romanian being identical. This duality of religious, ethnic and linguistic identities has one

important consequence: there is a cleavage between those who think that Moldovans has

the same identity with Romanians and those who think that Moldovans has a distinct

identity from Romanians.120

As consequence, there are two main national identities in

117

Loc.cit 118

CIA world factbook, Moldova, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html , accessed 16.06.2014 119

Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor ,International Religious Freedom Report 2010,

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148963.htm, accessed 17.06.2014

120 I.Chifu, Identități post-comuniste în Republica Moldova, Sfera politicii, Volumul XIX, NR.11(165), 2011, P

80

46

Moldova : ethnic and statist.121

Ethnic expression of identity, or „Românism”, was at the

origin of national movement in 1990. Ethnic nationalist recognize that Moldovans and

Romanians have the same language – the Romanian, they were a part of the “Great

Romania” from 1918 to 1940 and they have common culture and civilizational roots. Also,

these groups of nationalists could claim for unification with Romania or could prefer

independence of Moldova, but with more close ties with Romania and the West.122

A

consequence of this view on identity and nation is that nationalist elite is anti-Russian and

anti-soviet. It could be explained using the model of soviet time cleavages: center-

periphery, where nationalist elites rose against Russian-dominated state. The second

identity is statist and is called “Moldovenism”.123

Elites with a statist identity recognize

that Moldova is an independent state populated by Moldovans, with their own distinct

culture, history and language: Moldavian. Also they consider that Romanian and

Moldavian identities are different. 124

This view on nation and state is very inclusive and

recognizes that minorities are a part of Moldavian nation. Statist identity was a reaction to

nationalist movement of 1990. Old communist elite, as well as Russian-speaking

minorities and pro-Russian groups, supported the statist identity to secure their power and

their access to social and political life. From 2001-2009, Moldovenism became an official

ideology, promoted by the Communist Party of Republic of Moldova.125

All of two

identities: ethnic and statist are mutually exclusive, consequently, there are competing for

domination. An ethnic view on Moldovan national identity could exclude non-adapted

minorities from nationbuilding process and eventually could marginalize them because of

weak knowledge of Romanian. In contrast, a statist view on Moldovan nation could be a

threat for groups which assumes Romanian identity, because it would generate a horizontal

competition between Romanian identity and other identities.

There are two vertical competitions in Moldovan societal sector. First, it’s the

competition between national identity and regional identities: Gagauz and Transnistrian. 126

Gagauz minority is linked with Turkic world but is also Russian-speaking and Russian-

oriented group. Transnistrian population has a regional identity deeply rooted in soviet

epoch and considers itself a part of Russian world. Both regions had considered that they

will be marginalized in a Moldovan dominated state and, thus, they took steps to

121

Ibidem p.83 122

Ibidem p.84 123

Ibidem p.82 124

Ibidem p.82 125

Ibidem p.82 126

Ibidem p.80

47

independence. Transnistria declared its independence in 1992 and started a secessionist

war with Moldova, where separatists were supported by Russian army. Gagauzian minority

has an autonomous republic, with large cultural autonomy but still, its long term goal is

independence because both regional identities: Gagauz and Transnistrian are Russian

oriented. In contrast, Moldovan identity, in its ethnic or statist expression, is more Western

oriented, or at least has a more balanced view on its civilizational roots. These two regional

identities are perceived as threat because of their pro-Russian attitudes and, in fact, in

Moldova we can observe the same situation as in Georgia, where minorities are perceived

to be manipulated by Russia. The second type of vertical competition is between national

identity and post-soviet identity. 127

EU enlargement, as well as cultural and linguistic links

with Romania and other countries from Latin Europe, makes some people assume a new

supranational European identity. In contrast, post-soviet identity is Russian oriented and

anti-European and is more a nostalgia for soviet times and for Russian rule. In fact, people

perceive two threats: “Return to Europe” and “Return to Soviet Union”. The “Return to

Europe” is a threat for Gagauz and Russian-speaking minority, as well as for people with

post-soviet identity, mostly Russians and aged people. The “Return to Soviet Union” is a

threat for ethnic Moldovans and Romanians, for Romanian speaking majority and for

people who assume a European identity. So, Russia threats Moldovan societal sector in

two ways: separatist minorities and post-soviet identity. Yet, EU enlargement threats

Moldova also in two ways: the loss of national identity in a supranational European

identity or, the loss of regional identity if Moldova and Romania re-unite. For now, the

government balance Russian threat and bandwagon EU threat, recognizing that Moldovan

and Romanian identity are the same, as well as recognizing that Moldovans have a

supranational European identity.

2.1.6 Ukraine

Ukraine is the most heterogeneous state in Eastern Europe. It has a population of 44

mln people the largest ethnic group being Ukrainian -77% and the second largest being

Russian-17.3%. Other minorities are: Moldovan, Romanian, Tatar and Belarusian. 128

Russian minority is situated in Crimea Autonomous Region and in Eastern regions, close

to the Russian border; Romanian minority live in Chernovtsy; Tatars live in Crimea.

Regional differences are valid also for languages. Ukrainian is the official language used

127

Ibidem p.80 128

CIA world factbook, Ukraine, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html, accessed 17.06.2014

48

by 67% of people, most of them in Western and Central Ukraine. Russian is the second

important language, used by 24% of people, most of them in regions populated by Russian

minority. In fact, Ukraine is a bilingual country, because people know and use both

languages and there are efforts to make Russian a second official language.129

In Ukraine there is a competition between two identities: ethnic and eastern Slavic,

or neo-soviet identity. In fact, during modern Ukrainian history there were cycles of

identities: a period of dominant ethnic Ukrainian identity is followed by a period of

Russophile counter-revolution.130

Ethnic identity is expressed in linguistic, ethnic and

cultural terms. Also, after the fall of the Soviet Union, nationalists condemned their soviet

history and blamed URSS for the Holodomor, when 3.5 mln Ukrainians died because of

organized famine that is considered to be genocide of Ukrainian people.131

Some extremist

nationalist groups began to relate themselves to Ukrainian nationalists of Stepan Bandera,

who were in war with URSS utill 1953. Finally, ethnic nationalists are anti-Russian and

pro-Western. In contrast, eastern Slavic, or neo-soviet identity is strongly pro-Russian. It is

very inclusive and is a form of civic nationalism that is recognized in constitution: “citizens

of Ukraine of all nationalities”.132

Elites with post-soviet identity use the Russian more

than the Ukrainian and consider that Russian has to be a second official language in

Ukraine.133

Also, they do not condemn their soviet past, soviet crimes in Ukraine and do

not recognize Holodomor as genocide. 134

Finally, people with neo-soviet identity share

some soviet values, some soviet myths- especially linked to Second World War and

condemn West-Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.135

There are two vertical competitions in Ukrainian societal sector. The first is the

competition between national identity and regional identities in Eastern Ukraine and

Crimea. Eastern Ukraine and Crimea has an important Russian minority, with more ethnic

Russians and more Russian-speaking population. It is a center-periphery cleavage because

some regions have separatist claims: Crimea and Donbas. Separatism is considered to be

129

O. Haran, National Integration and National Identity in Ukraine , Open Ukraine: changing course towards a european future, U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC)Washington, D.C., Wed, February 8, 2012, p. 22 http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Open_Ukraine/02.Haran.pdf 130

T.Kuzio, Competing National Identities and Democratization in Ukraine: The Fifth and Sixth Cycles in Post-Soviet Ukrainian History, Acta Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 33, p.27 131

Ibidem p.28 132

O. Haran, National Integration and National Identity in Ukraine , Open Ukraine: changing course towards a european future, U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC)Washington, D.C., Wed, February 8, 2012, p.24 133

T.Kuzio, Competing National Identities and Democratization in Ukraine: The Fifth and Sixth Cycles in Post-Soviet Ukrainian History, Acta Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 33, p. 31 134

Ibidem p.32 135

Ibidem p.33

49

supported by Russia, because of large Russian minority in these regions and also because

of separatist claims to reunite with Russia. This problem was more nuanced in Crimea,

which was a part of Russian state until 1954. The second vertical competition is between

national and neo-soviet identity. As I have mentioned, this competition brings one identity

to dominate another for an unfixed period. In fact, it is also a competition between pro-

European ethnic Ukrainian identity and pro-Russian post-soviet identity. Nationalists from

Western and Central Ukraine are pro-European and anti-Russian and, in contrast, post-

soviet identity in East is strongly pro-Russian with anti-American and anti-European

attitudes. To conclude, the West is perceived as threat by people with a post-soviet identity

who do not want to assume a European identity and do not want to join the EU. From its

side, Russia is a double threat: it supports separatism and Russian integration projects of

Eurasian Union are perceived to be a threat to people with strong ethnic identity, which

perceive themselves as part of the Western world. Both the West and Russia are balanced

and it can be explained by cycles of identities in Ukraine. Even if today we see a new cycle

of ethnic identity discourse, in foreseeable future there will be a moment of Russian

counter-revolution.

Table 2.1 Perception of threat in societal sector

Perception of threat Societal sector

West Russia

Azerbaijan No Yes

Armenia Yes Yes

Belarus Yes Yes

Georgia Yes Yes

Moldova Yes Yes

Ukraine Yes Yes

50

Behavior Societal Sector

West Russia

Azerbaijan ----------------------- Balancing

Armenia Balancing Balancing

Belarus Balancing Bandwagoning

Georgia Bandwagoning Balancing

Moldova Bandwagoning Balancing

Ukraine Balancing Balancing

Table 2.2 Behavior in Societal sector

2.2 Military sector

Military security is the subject of traditional security studies. It is the most

institutionalized sector, because it has institutions with duty to assure military security:

army, police, Ministry of Defense, Navy, etc… The Westphalian type of state was build

when the central government disarmed other competitors and assured its monopoly over

violence.136

Therefore, the modern state was build when a community assured its military

security and build institutions to preserve it. Military security concerns the ability of the

government to assure peace, stability, independence, integrity of the state and its own

security, when it faces a military threat. 137

In this sector, main threats are: separatist

movements, terrorists, organized crime or other states. Also, Military security has two

dimensions: internal and external. 138

. Internal military security is assured when the

government assures its own monopoly over legitimate violence. In most of cases it means

that the government disarms citizens and is the only owner of weapons. However, it is

more about its capability to assure its authority, legitimacy and prevent the illegitimate use

of force. External military security is assured when the government can defend itself from

a possible external enemy or to assure military capabilities to face a possible threat.139

Obviously, in Copenhagen School of security, the enemy is also a construct, and military

relations between states are shaped by their social representations. 140

The referent object

of military security is the state, its territory, independence and the ability of the

government to take its own decisions without constraints. However, today, more and more

topics, like religion, ideology or nation are securitized by some state and non-state actors.

136

B.Buzan, Security. A new framework for analysis, London,Lynne Riner publishers, 1998, p. 51 137

Ibidem p.50 138

Ibidem p.51 139

Ibidem p.51 140

Ibidem

51

141 Securitizing actors in military sector are: the government, the ministry of defense, army,

navy or separatist movements or terrorist organizations.142

These actors take decisions and

influence directly military security agenda.

2.2.1 Armenia

Armenian military security is strongly related to Nagorno-Karabakh problem and

Armenian geographical position. Nagorno-Karabakh is a separatist region in Azerbaijan

which is populated by Armenians. From 1988 to 1994 there was a war between Armenian

separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Armenia supported separatists and

claimed that Nagorno-Karabakh is its territory and it seems that Armenia was in an

undeclared war with Azerbaijan during this conflict. 143

That was the second war with

Azerbaijan, the first had happened in 1920-1922. Obviously, the idea that Azerbaijan is an

Enemy shapes Armenian behavior. Also, Armenia is surrounded by Muslim states, and

that’s why Russia is considered a natural ally to balance Azerbaijan and Turkey. There is

no surprise that Armenia is a member of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),

a defensive alliance between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In

fact, in South Caucasus, Armenia is the only state which is a member of a military alliance.

Armenia has borders with Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia and, obviously, Armenia

has a strategic position in Caucasus that assures to CSTO land communication with

another possible candidate for membership in alliance: Iran. Also, Armenia has a common

border with NATO through Turkey. It is an important country, and this is the reason why

in 1996 Russia and Armenia agreed to deploy the 102nd Russian Military base in Gyumri.

Russian military presence was extended in 2010 when a new treaty had been signed, and

since then, Russian soldiers had started to protect Armenian-Turkish border and Armenian-

Azeri border.144

Armenian interest in alliance with Russia is to balance Azerbaijan and its

aim to restore its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Russia is an ally but also

a threat for Armenia because during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Russia supported both

Azerbaijan and Armenia. Finally, Russia has a military base in Armenia and it could

become a vital threat if the government takes serious steps from Russian influence. NATO

is also a threat for Armenia, because the closest member of the alliance is Turkey, another

141

Ibidem p.53 142

Ibidem p.56 143

Carol Migdalovitz, Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 2003, p.3 http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib92109.pdf 144

A.Valiyev, Finlandization or Strategy of Keeping the Balance? Azerbaijan’s foreign policy since the Russian-Georgian war, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 112, p. 3 https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_112.pdf

52

enemy of Armenia. Concerning Armenian behavior to these threats, I affirm that it

bandwagons the Russian threat and balances the West.

2.2.2 Azerbaijan

Again, military security of Azerbaijan is related to Nagorno-Karabakh problem.

From 1988 to 1994 Azerbaijan was in war with its separatist republic Nagorno-Karabakh

and Armenia. Finally, the conflict was frozen, but Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia are still

military threats to Azerbaijan. However Armenian membership in CSTO and Russian

military presence in Armenia is not perceived as threat to Azerbaijan, because Azerbaijan

does not want to invade Armenia.145

Azeri goal is to restore its control over Nagorno-

Karabakh and to secure its borders, but, this conflict is a threat to Azeri independent

foreign policy, because it limits its cooperation with the West. Russia is a key player in this

conflict and it has military presence in South Caucasus. Georgian war proved that Russia

could make military interventions in Former Soviet Union if there is a threat to their

interest and there is no surprise that Azerbaijan pursues a Finlandization scheme – a neutral

foreign and security policy to avoid possible Russian military pressure.146

It is considered

the best path to use Azeri strategic position between the East and the West, to secure Azeri

trade routes and trade partners and to use Azeri energy resources for development.

Consequently, Azerbaijan cooperates with Turkey, USA, Russia and the EU in security

and military issues. Also, Azerbaijan, as a former member, continues to cooperate with

CSTO as well as with NATO.147

Finally, Azerbaijan is a key player in NATO Northern

Distribution Network that supplies NATO troops in Afghanistan.148

In conclusion,

Azerbaijan does not perceive a direct threat from the West and from Russia. However,

Russian presence in Armenia is an indirect threat, because of Nagorno-Karabakh problem.

If the status quo would change, Russia could support Armenia and become a military threat

for Azerbaijan. However, as long as Azerbaijan balances both Russia and the West and has

a neutral foreign policy, it does not perceive direct military threat from these actors.

2.2.3 Georgia

Georgia has two frozen conflicts which shapes its military security: Abkhazia and

South Ossetia. After the fall of the URSS Georgia had fought in two wars to preserve its

145

Ibidem p.3 146

Ibidem p.4 147

Kamal Makili-Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Between East and West, Istituto Affari Internazionali WORKING PAPERS 13, 2013, p.4 http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1305.pdf 148

Ibidem p.9

53

control over these separatist republics: with South Ossetia (1991-1992) and with Abkhazia

(1992-1993). These republics are populated by two minorities which have close ties with

Russia and which perceive Georgian dominated state as threat to their cultural survival.149

After these wars, Russia had deployed peacekeepers corps in Georgia to maintain cease-

fire agreements but, indirectly, Russia also supported pro-Russian separatist republics to

assure its influence in Georgia.150

However, after the Rose Revolution, which brought pro-

Western president Mikhail Saakashvili to power, the status quo had changed. Georgia

aspired for a NATO and EU membership and that was a real challenge for Russia. Despite

Saakashvili’s efforts to solve these frozen conflicts peacefully, Russian and South Ossetian

military provocations forced the president to start a new war.151

Russia intervened in

Georgia and, soon, Russian troops forced Georgian military to leave South Ossetia and

Abkhazia. Under international pressures, Russia stopped the offensive. 152

Later, Russia

recognized the independence of these separatist republics and deployed there two military

bases.153

Russian and Western interest in Georgia is an important one. All gas and oil

pipelines from the Caspian Sea pass through Georgia. Obviously, the future of the EU

Southern corridor depends on Georgia and its capabilities to preserve a stable pro-Western

regime and resist Russian military pressures.154

Also, a pro-Western Georgia isolates

Armenia from its Russian ally and gives opportunity to build gas pipelines from Caspian

Sea to Europe bypassing Russia. In fact, this strategic importance of Georgia was

expressed in US and Eastern and Central European lobby for Georgia accession to NATO.

However, these efforts failed due to the French and German opposition and finally Georgia

failed to become a NATO member.155

As result, it failed to protect its territory from

Russian invasion.

Growing Russian military power is perceived as threat to independent foreign policy

of Georgia and to its sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. NATO is the only

power that could guarantee Georgian military security and that is not perceived as threat to

149

Stefan Wolff, Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/274,

accessed17.06.2014

150 J. Nichol, Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008:context and its implications for US interest, CRS Report

for Congress,2009,p.3 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf 151

Ibidem p.5 152

Ibidem p.7 153

Eurasian.net http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/rp032209.shtml 154

Jon. E. Chicky, "The Russian-Georgian War: Political and Military Implications for U.S. Policy", Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Policy paper, 2009, p.12 http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0902Chicky.pdf 155

Paul Gallis, The NATO Summit at Bucharest 2008,CRS report for Congress, may 2008, p.5 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22847.pdf

54

Georgia. Concerning Georgian behavior in military sector, it balances Russia, because it is

the only threat to Georgian independence and bandwagons the West, even if Georgia is not

a member of military arrangement with it. It bandwagons the West because of Russia.

2.2.4 Belarus

Belarus is considered to be the natural ally of Russia because of cultural, historical,

economical and people-to people ties. It has borders with three NATO members: Poland,

Lithuania and Latvia. Also, during the soviet epoch, in Belarus were deployed military

facilities as well as a large military industry. In addition, during the history, all invasions in

Russia started from Belarus border and there is no surprise that Russia had a huge interest

in this country. From its side, Belarus leadership was interested in military and economic

cooperation with Russia. Consequently, Belarus membership in CSTO and Russian-

Belarus Union state is a clear proof that Belarus has a clear pro-Russian security policy.156

Russian-Belarus military cooperation is a deep one: Russia rents three military bases in

Belarus, where were deployed parts of its anti-ballistic shield. These two countries signed

the agreement for common air defense system in 2012 and have joint military exercises

every year. 157

Finally, Belarusian military industry cooperates with Russian state, because

they produce components for Russian military forces.158

Concerning its relations with

NATO, Belarus has a limited cooperation with the Alliance. Belarus leadership perceives

as threat NATO enlargement to its borders and denies any claims for membership.159

However, Belarus is a member of NATO Partnership for Peace, as well as is a partner in

Northern Distribution Network, a supply line for NATO troops in Afghanistan.160

However, as well as Russia, Belarus considers NATO a threat to their military security.

Russia is considered a military ally and two countries continue to integrate their

anti-ballistic shields and air-defense systems. However, Russia is the largest military

power in Europe and after the Georgian war, it became clear that Russia will use military

force if former soviet states will slip to a pro-European foreign and security policy. For

now, Russia is not perceived as threat, but it does not mean that is could not be perceived

156

Anna Maria Dyner, Prospects and Consequences of Military Cooperation between Belarus and Russia, Polish institute of international affairs Bulletin No. 61 (514), 4 June 2013 , p.1 https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=13796 157

Ibidem p.1 158

Ibidem p.2 159

Steven Woehrel, Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns , CRS reports for Congress, 2013, p.5 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32534.pdf 160

Ibidem p.5

55

so. Belarus bandwagons Russia in military sector and balances NATO that is the military

force that is perceived as real threat for Belarusian security.

2.2.5 Moldova

Moldova is a neutral state, the neutrality being a constitutional norm. Moldova is a

partner in NATO Partnership for Peace but it has no intention to join NATO or other

military alliance. Also, Moldova has no cooperation with CSTO or Russia in military

security. Thus, Moldova has formal neutrality. From the other side, just like Georgia,

Moldova has its own frozen conflict: Transnistria. Moldovan-Russian war (1992) led to

secession of separatist republic of Transnistria. It was not internationally recognized but

separatist authorities built there all necessary state institutions and army. Russia maintained

its peacekeeping troops to preserve the peace and, also, to assure the security of the largest

ammunition depot in the region. 161

The conflict is still frozen, despite OSCE efforts to

solve it peacefully. In this conflict, Russia supports the separatist regime but, it seems that

it is more interested to preserve and expand its military bases in Moldova than in

maintaining a pro-Russian regime in Transnistria. In 2003, Russia proposed a plan to solve

the conflict: the Kozak memorandum. Russia proposed the re-unification of Moldova, its

federalization and, finally, it proposed to legalize Russian military presence in Moldova

until 2020. It was rejected by Moldavian authorities.

The political elite perceive that Russia is the real threat to Moldovan independent

foreign and defense policy. The Kozak memorandum was rejected by a pro-Russian

Communist Party because they were forced to host a Russian military base. New pro-

European authorities also perceive Russian military threat and try to avoid the

modernization of Russian troops in Transnistria. Russia is perceived as threat not only

because it wants to expand its military bases in Moldova but also because Russia supports

separatist republic Transnistria. In 1992 Russian direct intervention helped separatists to

win the war and so, obviously, Russia is a military as well as a political threat to Moldova.

Moldovan relations with NATO have a limited dimension. Moldovan neutrality is a

problem for a deeper cooperation with the alliance, as well as people’s negative perception

of NATO and their idea that NATO is a threat and Russia a friend. These two threats have

different responses. Russia is balanced in all cases, by all regimes in Chisinau. However,

NATO is balanced by pro-Russian regimes and bandwagoned, at least in an informal way,

161

M.Klein, Russia’s military capabilities, SWP research paper, 2009, p.20 http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2009_RP12_kle_ks.pdf

56

by pro-Western leaders. For now, NATO is bandwagoned. However, as I mentioned,

adhesion to NATO will be a problem because of neutrality and negative perception of

NATO in the society. NATO is bandwagoned in an informal way, with no real

commitment to join it.

2.2.6 Ukraine

Ukraine is the most important military force in Eastern Partnership. It is the second

army force in former URSS and, until, 1997 it had nuclear military capabilities. Ukraine

also claims to be a neutral state, although in 2008 it tried to become a NATO member. In

2010, Ukraine adopted the neutrality bill to prevent the adhesion to any military alliance.162

This bill was initiated to prevent a potential NATO membership but this bill also prohibits

the alliance with Russia. However, it is Russia that has military bases on Ukrainian

territory. Russia rented Sevastopol naval base for its Black Sea fleet, the agreement being

renewed in 2011. We could consider that until 2014, Ukrainian balanced both Russia and

NATO in military security. It is simple, in 2008 s pro-european government claimed a

NATO membership but is had no real institutional commitments to adjust its army to

standards of the alliance. In 2010 a pro-russian government claimed complete neutrality to

avoid any Russian claims for military alliance.

However, Crimean military crisis and Civil War in its Eastern regions changed

Ukrainian behavior. Russia occupied Crimea and destabilized the whole South-Eastern

Ukraine. In fact, this military crisis has a potential for a full scale war between Russia and

Ukraine. Obviously, after this aggression, Russia is perceived as the only military threat for

Ukrainian independence and integrity, because it is the only state that used military force

in relations with Ukraine. It is clear that Russian military presence in Crimea will be a

continuous threat to Ukrainian security as well as Russian support to Eastern Ukrainian

separatists. Russian military threat is balanced and NATO is bandwagoned, just because it

is the only power that can defend Ukraine from Russian expansionism. That does not mean

that Ukraine will become a NATO member. People and political elite with post-soviet

identity have a bad perception about NATO and prefer closer ties with Russia. For now,

enhanced cooperation with NATO is a result of war with Russia, not a viable security

option of Ukrainian society.

162

KievPost, Ukraine Parliament Ok’s neutrality bill, june 2010 http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/ukraine-parliament-oks-neutrality-bill-68612.html

57

Perception of threat Military Sector

West Russia

Armenia Yes Yes

Azerbaijan No No

Georgia No Yes

Belarus Yes No

Republic of Moldova Yes Yes

Ukraine Yes Yes

Table 2.3 Perception of threat in military sector

Behavior Military sector

West Russia

Armenia Balancing Bandwagoning

Azerbaijan Balancing Balancing

Georgia Bandwagoning Balancing

Belarus Balancing Bandwagoning

Republic of Moldova Bandwagoning Balancing

Ukraine Bandwagoning Balancing

Table 2.4 Behavior in military sector

2.3 Political sector

The definition of political security is a very controversial subject. Security by default

is political and all threats are defined and constructed politically.163

We can argue that

political sector is the widest one, because political security is strongly related to military,

societal, economic and environmental security. It could be considered more related to

societal and military security but, since the dominant actor in international relations is the

state, which is by definition a political entity, everything in security could be defined as

political.164

Barry Buzan defines political security as:

“Threats aimed at organizational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from

pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government,

to fomenting secessionism and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as weaken it

163

B.Buzan, Security. A new framework for analysis, London,Lynne Riner publishers, 1998, p 141 164

Ibidem p.143

58

prior a military attack. The idea of state, particularly its national identity and organizing

ideology, and institutions which express it are the normal target of political threats.”165

This definition is a proof that political security is related to all security sectors. In fact, it

could be related to a wider concept of national security. As soon as the state is the

dominant international actor, and it is a political unit, all security is political. Political

security could be related to sovereignty and ability of the government to take its own

decisions without external or internal pressures.166

Yet, political security could have the

referent not only the state, but also its institutions, political structures, ideas, ideology.167

Consequently, we can observe that even if political security cannot be defined separated

from other security sectors, there is two basic dimensions of political security : internal and

external. 168

i. Internal political security is related to internal state’s legitimacy as a political

unit, to ideologies and other ideas that define the state.169

Yet, it also relates to

the legitimacy of state’s institutions and their right to act as independent

political units.

ii. External security concerns international legitimacy and recognition of the state

and the government or other ideas that define the state.170

These are systemic

threats to political sector and Copenhagen school identifies nine of this type.

It is also difficult to explain what the referent object of political security is. If the

state is the main political entity, then we can argue that political security focuses on state’s

security. However, new emerging international actors make more difficult to define the

referent object. Supranational structures as the EU or international organizations could be

also considered referent objects, because they claim legitimacy and have international

recognition as political entities. Equally, political legitimacy is claimed by separatist states,

armed groups, minorities, even if they are not internationally recognized. Transnational

movements like religions, ideologies are also more and more securitized by certain actors.

However, the state and its institutions are the main political entities which are securitized.

Finally, another referent object could be also the international system, principles of

165

Ibidem p.142 166

Ibidem p.141 167

Ibidem p.144 168

Ibidem p.144 169

Ibidem p.144 170

Ibidem p.144

59

international society or the humanity as a whole.171

The same problems occur then we have

to define the securitizing actors in political security. Realist theory argues that only the

state could claim legitimacy to define a political threat.172

Supranational institutions and

ideologies are securitized by states which have interest in their survival. However, an

unrecognized separatist government could also claim legitimacy to securitize a political,

societal, military or economic threat. Nowadays, it is clear that the state is the main

securitizing actor, because it’s the basic political entity. However, new actors emerge and

claim their legitimacy to securitize a political issue.

2.3.1 Armenia

Armenian internal political security is related to its legitimacy and its viability as

state. In Failed States Index (FSI), Armenia occupies the 105th

position with 71.3 points.

173 It means that Armenia is by far one of the most stable states in EaP and in the whole

FSU. It has one of the best public services, the most legitimatized state, decentralized

security apparatus and the most homogeneous political elites in FSU. 174

However,

Armenia has huge problems because of high rate of refugees and internal displaced

persons, because of poverty and economic problems, as well as because of external

intervention. Although, compared to other former soviet states, Armenia is a stable and

viable state, globally, Armenia is somewhere between stable and warning state. After

Ukrainian political crisis in 2013-2014, Armenia surely will become the most stable state

in FSU. In long run, the main threat for internal legitimacy of Armenia could be the

problem of refugees, human rights and the legitimacy of the government.

FSI T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Armenia 71,3 4,9 7,0 5,7 6,0 5,6 5,9 6,6 4,4 6,8 5,3 7,0 6,2

Table 2.5 Failed sate index of Armenia175

However, external legitimacy of Armenia is the main problem of the government because

the state is vulnerable to systemic threats. First, it is the international threat on the basis of

state-nation split. In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia claims its sovereignty over this

Azeri separatist republic, populated by Armenians. Azerbaijan does not recognize

171

Ibidem p.147 172

Ibidem p.146 173

Failed states index ,http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable 174

Loc. cit 175

1. Demographic pressures, 2.Refugees and IDP,3.Group grievance,4.Human flight,5.Uneaven development,6.poverty and economic growth, 7.legitimacy of the state,8.Public service, 9.Human rights, 10.Security apparatus, 11.Fractionalized elites, 12.External intervention

60

Armenian claims and tries to regain its control over the region. The conflict between

Azerbaijan and Armenia is still frozen, but the war could start again if Armenia will try to

re-build its nation-state and re-unite Nagorno-Karabakh. The second threat is the threat on

political-ideological basis. Armenia has three borders with Muslim states: Turkey, Iran and

Azerbaijan. The main threat is the different idea of Armenian and Azeri state. The first

claims its sovereignty over Azeri territory because Armenian identity is ethnic and

religious, thus, territories populated by Armenians should be Armenian. In contrast,

Azerbaijan claims its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh because its integrity is

recognized by international community and because Azeri secular state and civic identity is

not a threat for Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Consequently, Armenians in Azerbaijan

will not be discriminated and will have cultural and civil rights. Also, Armenian religious

identity perceives Muslim states as threat; therefore, Azerbaijan and other muslim states

are considered as enemies. These different national ideologies could collide because of

mutual suspicions and rivalry over the Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, the last threats are

regional projects of integration. Armenia has two basic options: Russian Eurasian Project

and EU integration. Both projects have a supranational character and require from Armenia

to give up a part of its sovereignty for membership.

These international- systemic threats are more or less influenced by rivalry of the

West and Russia in South Caucasus. The West has deep cooperation with Azerbaijan and

Turkey-two enemy states for Armenia. Although the West does not officially support

Azerbaijan, and, in fact supports the rights of Armenian minority in Nagorno-Karabakh,

Azerbaijan is the clear ally of the West, in particular in energy sector. EU integration

project is also an obvious threat for Armenia, a threat for the legitimacy of its political

regime. High democracy standards of EU are a challenge for it, because Armenia is far to

be fully democratic state. According The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Armenian

score in democracy index is 4.09 and Armenia is a hybrid regime.176

The EU average is

7.97, thus there is an important gap between Armenian democracy and EU democracies. In

addition, corruption, weak political culture and dysfunctional electoral process are the

main problems for Armenia. This regime does not evolutes, because for the last four

surveys, Armenia obtains the same score. 177

In contrast, Russia is a clear ally of Armenia

in Nagorno-Karabakh problem; it is in military alliance with Armenia and has a military

base there. Also, Russian and Armenian regimes are similar because their democracy

176

The Economist Intelligence unit, Democracy index 2012 ,The economist, 2012, p. 7 https://portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=1034 177

Ibidem p.11

61

indexes are almost the same: 3.74 for Russia and 4.09 for Armenia.178

Even if Russia is an

authoritarian regime, the gap between Russian and Armenian regimes is a small one: 0.3

points. Russian weak democracy standards are compatible with Armenian regime, because

Russia surely will not pressure Armenian government on human rights and democratic

standards. However, even if Armenia had chosen integration with Russia in 2013, there are

suspicions that Russia wants to rebuild the Soviet Union and this is a threat for Armenian

sovereignty. However, Armenia has no real choice: military and economic sectors are

closely linked to Russia. This is the reason why, in political sector, Armenia balances the

West and bandwagons Russia.

2.3.2 Azerbaijan

Azeri internal political security is under huge threat. According the FSI, it is in a

warning state.179

Azerbaijan has one of the highest failed states score in EaP and occupies

76st position in FSI ranking. Azerbaijan has one of the lowest human flight indexes; thus,

it has low levels of immigration, and one of the best economic growths in FSU. However,

state’s legitimacy has a low score, as well as human rights score. The refugee problem is

also a threat, because Azerbaijan has the highest score in FSU on this indicator and that

could be explained by Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In other sectors, Azerbaijan is more or

less equal to other post-soviet states. However, huge human rights problems as well as low

state’s legitimacy could be a problem in long run. Also, the economic growth is determined

by oil and gas sector with high volatility.

T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Azerbaijan 78,

2

5,

3

7,9 6,9 4,7 6,1 4,7 8,2 5,1 7,6 6,9 7,8 6,9

Table 2.6180

Failed states index of Azerbaijan

External legitimacy and sovereignty of Azerbaijan are also under threat. First, Azeri major

problem is international threats on the basis of state-nation split: 3 million Azerbaijani

people live in the North of Iran. Further, the second threat is Nagorno-Karabakh separatist

republic, an Azeri territory populated by Armenian minority that claims independence.

Systemic threats on political-ideological grounds are also present, because Islamism is a

178

Ibidem p. 7 179

Failed States Index http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable 180

1. Demographic pressures, 2.Refugees and IDP,3.Group grievance,4.Human flight,5.Uneaven development,6.poverty and economic growth, 7.legitimacy of the state,8.Public service, 9.Human rights, 10.Security apparatus, 11.Fractionalized elites, 12.External intervention

62

threat for Azerbaijani secular state. Growing fundamentalism in Iran and some

fundamentalist movements in Russian North Caucasus could be exported in Azerbaijan.

Finally, there is a threat of regional integration in Caucasus because both EU and Russia

have interest in integration projects in the region. EU tries to sign Association Agreements

with all countries in Caucasus and Russia prepares the accession to Custom Union of

Armenia and tries to negotiate with Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan has a neutral foreign

policy and does not want any political integration with EU or Russia.

The rivalry of the West and Russia influences Azeri international political security.

Russia is the military ally of Armenia and this fact is a big challenge for Azerbaijan. If

Armenia joins Russian Custom Union, it could have both military and political support in

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. From its side, the West considers that the status-quo in the

region is the perfect solution for the problem. 181

The big threat is that Russia could support

Armenia both politically and military and the West could fail to act and Azerbaijan will

lose Nagorno-Karabakh forever. Next, Azeri government sees both possibilities for

regional integration as possible threats for their interest. Deep integration with the West

will erode Azeri-Russian relations, with possible consequences on international recognition

of Azeri sovereignty over the Nagorno-Karabakh. The second option, deep integration in

Russian Custom Union will reconsider EU-Azeri relations. Also, a deep integration with

EU has its risks, because the kin-state of Azerbaijan, Turkey, by far more important

geopolitical pivot than Azerbaijan, failed to become EU member. Finally, Azerbaijan does

not have fully democratic regime to aspire for an EU membership. According the EIU,

Azerbaijan is an authoritarian state, with democracy score of 3.15, that represents less than

a half of EU average.182

EU supranational institutions and democracy norms could be

uncomfortable for corrupted Azeri political elite. In conclusion, neutrality and cooperation

with both blocks is considered to be the best way to preserve the status-quo in the region.

Obviously, both the West and Russia are balanced in political sector; otherwise, regional

status quo could change, with possible hard consequences for Azeri integrity and its system

of international pipelines.

2.3.3 Georgia

181

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: OBSTACLES TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, CSS analysis in Security policy, 2013, p.3 http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-131-EN.pdf 182

The Economist Intelligence unit, Democracy index 2012 ,The economist, 2012, p. 7

63

According the FSI, Georgia is the most failed state in Eastern Partnership.183

With a

score of 84.2, it has huge problems with the legitimacy of the state. Also, the problem of

refugees after the Georgian-Russian war, fractionalized elites and the problem of security

apparatus are real problems for Georgian state. In addition, a low economic growth and

unequal development are serious threat for Georgian society. Finally, Georgian political

security is linked to Russian intervention and to separatist republics of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia.

Table 2.7. Failed States Index of Georgia

Georgian external legitimacy is also a problem for the government. The main systemic

threat for Georgian state is the threat to international society and law. Russian intervention

in Georgia in 2008 was a proof of the old style Brejnev doctrine, in its modern form called

the Medvedev Doctrine.184

It says that Russia preserves its right to intervene in FSU if their

national interest is under threat and Georgia was the first victim of this doctrine. Russia

intervened in Georgia when the government aimed NATO and EU membership. Using

internal political struggles between separatists region of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and

Georgian government, Russia intervened to secure the independence of separatist pro-

Russian republics. Later, Russia recognized their independence and deployed military

bases there. In fact, Georgian sovereignty was violated and the threat of another Russian

intervention is still alive, because of large military bases which are situated on the Russian-

Georgian border. Another threat for Georgia is the threat from regional integration

projects. Georgia wants to be an EU member and the government already has initialized an

Association Agreement with the EU. However, Russia also declared that it is prepared to

discuss Georgian membership in Custom Union. Both projects have a supranational

character.

The conflict between Russia and the West is obvious in political security of Georgia.

First, Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 was a consequence of a clear pro-Western

policy of Georgian government. The possible NATO membership for Georgia was a

trigger for Russian intervention. Consequently, Russia is perceived as threat for Georgian

183

Failed states index, http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable

184 Stratfor,The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy,September 2008,

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev_doctrine_and_american_strategy

T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Georgia 84,2 5,

2

7,5 8,0 5,2 6,3 6,4 8,6 5,4 6,4 7,9 9,4 7,9

64

independent foreign policy as well as for its integrity and political independence. The West

is not an ally of Georgia, at least in formal way but it is the only option for Georgia to

become a part of an integration project and to join a collective security arrangement. The

threat to be again under Russian-dominated supranational institutions is not what the

Georgian government wants, thus, any integration with Russia is impossible. EU

integration project is more attractive because Georgia is by far more democratic than

Russia. 185

Georgia has a hybrid regime, nor authoritarian nor democratic, however, after

the Rose Revolution, Georgia has enhanced its positions in democracy index and,

nowadays is the most dynamic democracy in Caucasus.186

Georgia is far to be an EU style

democracy, but it is also far to be a Putin-style authoritarian regime. For now, Georgia is

pro-Western regime and builds a liberal democratic regime and this is the reason why, in

political security, Georgia balances Russia and bandwagons the West.

2.3.4 Belarus

Belarus state and government lack people’s legitimacy, so the entire regime is

threatened to lose control over the country. According FSI, Belarus score on legitimacy of

the government is 9 and that’s the highest score in the whole Eastern Partnership. 187

Also,

Belarus has high score on human rights and on fractionalized elites. Finally, although

Belarus has no separatist regions its score on foreign intervention is also very high and that

could be explained by Russian military and political influence. Other indicators of failed

state are more or less comparable to FSU average.

Table 2.8188

Failed states index of Belarus

Concerning external political threats, the first it is the threat of regional integration.

Belarus has strong economic and political ties with Russia and they have a Union State

with deep military cooperation and a possible monetary union. Also, Belarus is the founder

of Custom Union and of the future Eurasian Union. However, the major threat from

integration with Russia is the loose of sovereignty in a Russian-dominated supranational

185

The Economist Intelligence unit, Democracy index 2012 ,The economist, 2012, p. 6 186

Ibidem p. 11 187

Failed states index, http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable 188

1. Demographic pressures, 2.Refugees and IDP,3.Group grievance,4.Human flight,5.Uneaven development,6.poverty and economic growth, 7.legitimacy of the state,8.Public service, 9.Human rights, 10.Security apparatus, 11.Fractionalized elites, 12.External intervention

T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Belarus 76,7

5,

7 3,6 6,8 3,9 5,7 6,2 9,0 5,2 8,3 6,3 8,3 7,6

65

organization. Belarus has no enhanced cooperation with the EU, even if it joined EU’s EaP

in 2009. The second systemic threat is inadvertent threat to state-nation vulnerable states.

The idea of Russia and its territory collides with the idea of Belarus and its national

territory. The soviet past as well as the bilingualism and Russian minority is a permanent

threat to the independent government, which wants to preserve its sovereignty and political

independence, even if it agrees to cooperate and join Russian Custom Union.

Belarus is fully in Russian sphere of influence. Also, Belarus has strong anti-western

attitudes and perceives the West as threat to its political independence. However, another

threat is to be outside any integration project or to become a part of Russian-dominated

supranational Union, where Belarus could lose its sovereignty. Belarus cannot be an EU

member; it is not a European style democracy and according the EIU, Belarus is an

authoritarian state, with the lowest democracy score in EaP. 189

In fact, Belarusian regime

is more authoritarian than Russian one and obviously, this regime is different from EU

democracies. Also, Western pressures on human rights are perceived as intervention in

internal affairs of Belarus. Because of human rights violation, Belarus is ignored by the EU

and USA and there is no surprise that Belarus bandwagon Russia and balance the West; it

shares no democratic values with the Western democracies. In contrast, it has similar

regime with its allied state-Russia. Finally, although Russia is a threat for Belarusian

sovereignty, deep military and political integration between these two states does not give

any other option to the Belarusian government. It will stay only because of Russian

support, otherwise, EU democracy and soft power could change the existing regime.

2.3.5 Moldova

Table 2.9 Failed States index of Moldova190

Republic of Moldova, just like other states in EaP is in a warning state, according the

FSI. Even if it has one of the most legitimated governments in FSU, more or less equal

development and low human rights problems, other indicators of failed state are one of the

189

The Economist Intelligence unit, Democracy index 2012 ,The economist, 2012, p.5 190

1. Demographic pressures, 2.Refugees and IDP,3.Group grievance,4.Human flight,5.Uneaven development,6.poverty and economic growth, 7.legitimacy of the state,8.Public service, 9.Human rights, 10.Security apparatus, 11.Fractionalized elites, 12.External intervention

T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Moldova 76,5 5,9 5,0 6,0 6,9 5,9 6,4 6,9 5,7 6,0 7,2 7,7 6,9

66

highest in EaP. 191

Moldova has high demographic problems and high level of emigration

of their citizens. Also, the poverty and economic decline is the highest in EaP, despite the

fact that Moldova has one of the highest GDP grow rate in this region.192

Finally, Moldova

has one of the worst public service and has real problems with security apparatus and

corruption. However, in long run, only demographic problems will continue to erode the

state because until 2050 its population could drop from 3.6 mln to 2.5 mln.

Moldovan external legitimacy faces a couple of basic threats. The first is on a basis

of nation-state split. Moldova has two separatist regions: Transnistria-populated by

Russian and Ukrainian minorities and Gagauzia Autonomous Region populated by a

Turkic Gagauz minority. Transnistrian separatists have unrecognized independence,

protected by Russian military force. Also, Gagauzia aims closer ties with Russia and

pressures the government of Moldova to refuse to sign the Association Agreement with the

EU and join Russian Custom Union. Therefore, the threat is to lose these separatist

territories which disagree with Moldovan foreign policy. Also, another threat for

Moldovan sovereignty is the Unionist movement that claims reunification of Romania and

Moldova. This threat is not really perceived by the government but is used by minorities

and Russian media to justify a pro-Russian policy. Another systemic threat is linked to

international order and law. Russia has troops in Transnistria and, after the Georgian war in

2008 and Crimea annexation it is obvious that Russia is a threat for international law and

order in Eastern Europe. The big threat for Moldova is that Transnistria could be annexed

by Russia and will be lost forever. Finally, the last threat is linked to regional integration.

Again, Moldova has two integration options: the EU and Russian Custom Union. As I

mentioned before, both options are considered to be threat by different fractions in the

society. However, the trend is that Custom Union is less preferred by the elite. For

example, pro-Russian Communist Party had a pro-EU policy and refused to join a Union

State with Russia, even if they come to power in 2001 with this intention.

In Moldova, the West is a clear winner. Since 2009 Moldova has had a pro-European

government, and has progressed in construction of a viable economy and state of law.

According the EIU, Moldova’s score in democracy index is 6.32 and it is close to EU

democracies indexes.193

It is considered to be a flawed democracy, the only one in EaP.

Being similar to some of EU democracies, Moldovan political regime is different from

191

Failed States Indexhttp://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable 192

IMF. http://www.imf.org/external/country/mda/index.htm 193

The Economist Intelligence unit, Democracy index 2012 ,The economist, 2012, p.5

67

Russian authoritarian one. Therefore, that means that Moldova has many values to share

with EU democracies and its regime is more or less like in Romania and Bulgaria. EU

pressures and direct financial aid help Moldovan government to continue institutional

reforms. In contrast, Moldova has less to share with Russian model. Between 2001 and

2009, when the communist party was at power, Moldovan regime was also closer to EU

type regime than to Russia and no surprise that, despite Russian efforts, since 2005

Moldova have had a pro-EU regime. Also, Russia is perceived as threat for Moldovan

integrity and sovereignty over its separatist regions. Russia directly supports and defends

Transnistrian government and encourages Gagauz separatism. In contrast, the West claims

that Moldova has to preserve its territorial integrity and give no support to separatist

regions. The EU threat is perceived only by a part of Moldovan society and political elite.

Russia is perceived as threat by the whole political elite, thus, we can argue that Russia is

balanced and the West is bandwagoned.

2.3.1 Ukraine

Until 2014 Ukraine has been one of the most stable states in EaP. 194

However, recent

political and military crisis destabilized the state system. Democratically elected president,

Yanukovich left the country and the Parliament appointed an interim president until new

presidential elections. Therefore, Ukrainian society became polarized by Euromaidan

revolution and the central government lost its control over the country. Coupled with

economic crisis and mass human rights violation, separatist movements rose up and aimed

secession from Ukraine. Finally, because of far right parties and their military capabilities,

Ukrainian elite and society was polarized and security apparatus lost control over internal

security of the country. Consequently, Ukraine became a country threatened by chaos and

mass disorder.

Ukrainian crisis also discovered real political threats for Ukrainian state, its

legitimacy and international recognition. The first, it is the threat for international order

and peace. In Mars 2014, Russia occupied Crimea- the sovereign territory of Ukraine.

Also, Russia deployed troops at Ukrainian borders and supported pro-Russian separatist

movements. Finally, Russia violated international law and annexed Crimea. It needs to be

mentioned that Russia is one of the international grant of Ukrainian integrity and

independence. Obviously, international community failed to assure Ukrainian integrity

and, thus, international order and law was compromised. The second threat is inadvertent

194

Failed States index http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable

68

threat to state-nation. Russia and Ukraine have strong historical ties and are considered kin

states. However, Russian idea of great Russia and Novorossia-new Russia in the South-

Eastern Ukraine collides with the idea of Ukrainian national state. This conflict erupted

after Euromaidan revolution when Donetsk and Lugansk region declared their

independence from Ukraine. Finally, in Crimea, pro-Russian movements ended with a

referendum for unification with Russia. The last threat is the threat of regional integration.

Ukraine has two integration options: EU integration and integration in Russian Custom

Union. In September 2013 Ukraine refused to sign the association agreement and preferred

closer ties with Russia. This decision was taken under huge Russian pressures. However,

the newly elected president and the new Ukrainian government aim to sign the agreement

in June 2014.

After 2014, all political elite and most of the population perceive Russia as the real

threat for Ukrainian integrity and independence. Russian claims over Crimea and South-

Eastern regions of Ukraine are permanent threats. Also, the great risk is that Ukrainian

government could lose half of the country because of separatist pro-Russian movements.

Finally, Russian integration project is perceived to be a threat for Western Ukraine, with

strong anti-Russian attitudes and strong pro-EU elites. However, the West is also perceived

to be a threat for Ukraine. As I mentioned before, the South-East is pro-Russian region

which perceives EU and NATO integration as threat for their special relations with Russia.

For now, the government and all political elite share the idea that Russia is the main threat

for Ukraine and the West is the only force which could assure Ukrainian security.

Consequently, it decided to bandwagon the West and to balance Russia, even that is not

agreed by the South-East separatist movements.

69

Perception of threat Political sector

West Russia

Armenia Yes Yes

Azerbaijan Yes Yes

Georgia No Yes

Belarus Yes Yes

Moldova Yes Yes

Ukraine Yes Yes

Table 2.10 Perception of threat in political sector

Behavior Political sector

West Russia

Armenia Balancing Bandwagoning

Azerbaijan Balancing Balancing

Georgia Bandwagoning Balancing

Belarus Balancing Bandwagoning

Moldova Bandwagoning Balancing

Ukraine Bandwagoning Balancing

Table 2.11 Behavior in political sector

2.4 Economic sector

Economic security is also a vague notion because economy could not be treated

separated from politics. In fact, the core of free market economy is the insecurity of every

actor, because it needs to perform and to enhance its efficiency to survive. 195

Nevertheless,

there is a debate about the relation between state and economy and the primacy of first

over the later. At least three theories emerged: mercantilism, socialism and economic

liberalism. Socialism and mercantilism are considered to be a sort of economic

nationalism, because they promote the idea of the primacy of the state over the

economy.196

In contrast, Liberalism considers that economy has to be free of state

regulations because the order will be established by the market. After the Cold War, neo-

liberalism had become the dominant economic theory and, consequently, most of the states

embedded the theory of free market economy. Economic security discourse is also shaped

by neo-liberal theory and the model of Liberal International Economic Order. Finally,

195

B.Buzan, Security. A new framework for analysis, London,Lynne Riner publishers, 1998, p. 95 196

Ibidem p.96

70

globalization accelerates the expansion of this order and creates interdependences between

economies.

It is difficult to establish an economic security agenda in this area, because neo-liberal

theory considers that economy has not to be regulated by states. However, Buzan identifies

at least five big security issues in economic sector.

a. Military-economic security, which means the ability of the state to maintain

independent capabilities of military production in world market and the ability of

the economy to support state’s military capabilities.

b. The fear of economic dependencies within the global market and the fear that they

will be used to reach political ends.

c. The fear that competition on global market will produce more loses than gains for

national economy.

d. The fear of dark side of the capitalism and free market which could be: drugs,

criminality, trade in military and civil technologies, the pressure of growing

consumption and debt.

e. The fear of another international economic crisis and its impact on national

economy.197

Obviously, economic sector has a large spectrum of referent objects. The first is the

national economy with all industries, groups of individuals, financial system.198

In some

cases, even firms could be securitized, surely, if their importance for national economy is

very high and if their bankruptcy will cause instability in national economy. Also, on a

systemic level, international NGO’s like IMF, WTO of WR could be the object of

securitizing move. Finally, Liberal International Economic order is also an object of

economic security.

In my analysis of this sector I will use a couple of indicators: trade, energy

dependence, trade dependence, competitiveness, trade/GDP rapport, labor migrants…

Trade and energy dependence I will relate do the second economic security issue identified

by Buzan. Next, competiveness and trade/GDP indicator I will use to assess the openness

of the economies of EaP and their chances to be competitive in World economy, as well as

their vulnerabilities towards global or regional economic crisis.

2.4.1 Armenia 197

Ibidem p.98 198

Ibidem p.100

71

First, Armenia is deeply dependent on trade and energy. Armenian main trade

partner is the EU – 27% of total trade, 23% of Armenian imports and 39% of exports.

Taking into account US-Armenian trade, imports from and exports towards the West

represents 29% of Armenian trade that is larger than 23% of Armenian-Russian trade.199

However, Armenia has a free trade agreement with Russia and other European former

soviet states, the CISFTA trade agreement, which entered into force in 2013. Also,

Armenia declared its interest to join Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Custom Union and

rejected the Association and Deep and Comprehensive Free trade Agreement with its main

trade partner- the EU. Next, Armenia is deeply dependent on Russian gas supply, which

accounts almost 100% of Armenian consumption. Russian energy giant Gazprom is the

main shareholder in Armenian ArmRosGaz, the only distributor of gas in Armenia.

Finally, Armenian nuclear power plant is also purchasing nuclear fuel from Russia.

Because of Armenian-Azeri struggles over the Nagorno-Karabakh, there are no alternative

energy suppliers for Armenia; consequently, Armenian dependence on Russian gas supply

is always used to force Armenia to follow Russian policies. Azeri oil and gas pipelines to

EU and Turkey bypass Armenia and Western companies support these projects because of

Armenian clear pro-Russian policy. The EU and USA also require from Armenia to close

its nuclear power plant because of its backwardness. Armenia is relatively open economy-

trade/GDP indicator is 57%, and there is no surprise that Armenia is closely linked to

economic evolutions both in EU and Russia. Armenia has one of the lowest tariffs in its

region, lower than in Russia and EU. However, Armenia has a backward economy that is

less competitive than Russian and EU and that is in fact a transition economy.200

Finally,

Armenian labor migration flow is directed more to Russia than to EU, with some 800

thousand people who work in Russian economy, which represents 97% of labor migration

from Armenia.201

Obviously both Russia and the West are threats to Armenian backward economy.

Also, Armenian dependence on trade and energy supply from Russia, as well as huge

amount of Armenian labor which works in Russia, strengths Armenian-Russian political

relations and although Armenian main trade partner is the EU, the government refuses to

sign Association and Free Trade Agreement with it. Closer relations with the EU will not 199

Stat.wto.org http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=AM 200

Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014, World Economic Forum Geneva, 2013, p.11 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf 201

ARKA news agency, Some 700-800,000 Armenian labor migrants live in Russia – migration service ,February 2012 http://arka.am/en/news/society/some_700_800_000_armenian_labor_migrants_live_in_russia_migration_service/, accessed 17.06.2014

72

bring solutions to Armenian economy, because the West is not an alternative for Russian

gas and labor market. In this situation, Armenia bandwagon Russia and balances the EU in

economic sector.

2.4.2 Azerbaijan

The West is Azeri main trade partner absorbing 53,7% of Azeri exports and

providing Azerbaijan with 35,1% of its import needs. Per total, the share of the West in

Azeri international trade is 37% and it is seven times more than the share of Russia. 202

It

is clear that Azerbaijan has deep trade relations with the West because of its large oil and

gas supply. Azerbaijan is not a member of CISFTA and it does not want sign the

Association and Free Trade Agreement with the EU. Obviously, Azerbaijan continues its

balanced foreign policy in its trade relations too. In energy security, Azerbaijan is the most

energy secured EaP country. It is a net exporter of oil and gas and has 0,7% of world oil

reserves and around 2,6 T m3 gas reserves. Moreover, Azerbaijan is situated relatively

close to EU and to Turkey and this position is used to diversify Azeri oil and gas markets.

Finally, Azerbaijan is the key country for EU Southern Corridor- a network of pipelines

from Caspian Sea and Central Asia, which will bypass Russia. Obviously, Azeri trade

security is linked to world gas and oil consumption and its trade/GDP indicator is 62%.

Azeri petroeconomy is vulnerable to economic crisis and to energy consumption of its

main trade partners: EU and Turkey. In the end, Azeri economy is one of the most

competitive in the whole FSU, being the 39th competitive economy in the world even if it

is not diversified and the gas and oil industries have the biggest share in GDP.203

Despite the fact that Azerbaijan has no Free Trade Agreement with the West, it is

clear that it is dependent on EU energy market, as well as the EU is dependent on Azeri

gas supply. Gas pipelines from Azerbaijan bypass Russia, and thus, Azerbaijan is not truly

interested in full scale economic integration with Russia, because Azeri main trade partner

is the EU. However, Azeri balanced foreign policy will not admit any economic

integration with EU because of Russian opposition. Finally, we cannot argue that in

economic sector Azerbaijan balances both Russia and the West. Azerbaijan is more

concerned about its economic ties with the EU, because it is its main market. Thus, in

economic sector, Azerbaijan bandwagons the EU and balances Russia.

202

WTO http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=AZ 203

Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014, World Economic Forum Geneva, 2013, p.15

73

2.4.3 Georgia

Georgia is the least trade dependent country in Eastern Partnership, because it has at

three main trade partners: Azerbaijan, EU, and Turkey. International trade with the EU

represents 27% of Georgian trade and is four times larger than Georgian trade with Russia.

204 Taking into account that Georgia imports from Azerbaijan only fuels and gas, the EU is

the main trade partner of Georgia. However, as I mentioned before, Georgian international

trade is very balanced even if its trade/GDP indicator is 64%. Finally, Georgia is not at all

dependent on Russian gas imports, which were ceased because of political struggles with

Russian government.205

Georgia purchases gas from Azerbaijan and cooperates with it in

energy security. Also, Georgia is the main transit country for Azeri gas and oil in South

Caucasus and is the central piece of energy security of the region. In addition, Georgia is

also a transit country for Russian gas exports to Armenia.

Obviously, Georgia seeks economic integration with the West. Its trade depends on

Western economies; its energy security depends on Azerbaijan and Western energy

companies and finally, Georgia is not dependent on Russia. No surprise that Georgian

government decided to Sign the Association Agreement and Free Trade Agreement with

EU and refused Russian proposal to join its Custom Union. Georgia bandwagon the West

and balances Russia, because of its relative dependence on Western investments and trade,

and its economic independence from Russia.

2.4.4 Belarus

In contrast to other Eastern Partnership countries, Belarus is deeply dependent on

trade with Russia. First, 58% of its import needs comes from Russia, especially fuels and

mining products. Per total, trade with Russia has a 47% share in Belarus international

trade, which is almost two times higher than Belarus trade with the EU. 206

Surprisingly,

but the EU is the main destination for Belarus exports, even if Belarus has no free trade

agreement with the Union. However, Belarus economy depends on Russian supply of gas,

oil and other natural resources. Also, many Belarus firms work for Russian military

industry and rely on Russian investment. It is obvious, that Belarus has no option to

integration with Russian economy, because it’s strongly linked with it. As of energy

204

WTO http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=GE

205Natural Gas Europe, Georgia: No Plans to Import More Russian Gas,

21.05.2013http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/georgia-russian-gas-imports, accessed 17.06.2014

206 WTO http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=BY

74

dependence, Belarus is an interesting case to observe. From one hand, it pays low price on

Russian gas: only 165 $ for 1000 m3, however, it depends 100% on Russian gas. Also,

Gazprom is the owner of Belarustransgaz and of its distribution system and gas pipelines to

EU. 207

Russian company controls 100% of Belarus gas system. However, it needs to be

said that Belarus has no other alternative to Russian gas, has no access to an EU pipeline

and has no gas reserves. Finally, because of the anti-democratic and anti-Western regime

of Lukashenko, it is unlikely that Belarusian Government could interconnect its pipelines

with an EU member state. Finally, it is unlikely that Belarus will seek to trade more with

the West because of its low competiveness compared to EU economies. Belarus is

dependent on Russian gas supply and trade and it is both economic and political

dependence.

2.4.5 Moldova

Republic of Moldova is the only country in EaP which trades with the EU more than

with other trade partners. The share of EU trade is almost 50% of Moldovan international

trade, twice more than the share of trade with Russia. 208

Also, taking into account that

Russia imposed two times embargo on Moldovan wine exports, Moldova, obviously, is

seeking for more safe markets. The government signed an Association and Free Trade

Agreement with the EU and the CISFTA trade agreement with some CIS countries and,

apparently, Moldova tries to use this opportunity to enhance its competitiveness. It is an

open economy, with 100% trade/GDP indicator, so it is also vulnerable to economic crisis

in EU and Russia. However, it is obvious that Moldova seeks for integration with the

West, in particular in energy sector. For now, Moldova is fully dependent on Russian gas

supply and pays one of the highest prices for consumption. Also, only half of imported gas

is consumed in territories controlled by the government, the rest being used in Transnistria

and is unpaid. Consequently, Republic of Moldova has a huge debt: 4 mlrd $ which has to

be paid by Moldavian government. Moreover, MoldovaGaz, the company which manages

all gas imported from Russia, is owned by Russian company Gazprom, which has 50% of

shares in the venture. However, in august 2013, Republic of Moldova and Romania started

the construction of Iasi-Ungheni pipeline, which could assure the whole Moldavian

consumption and which will ease Moldovan dependence on Russian gas. Finally, it needs

207

Natural gas Europe,Gazprom's Offer to Belarus - Modernisation à la Russe?, December

2012,http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/gazproms-offer-to-belarus-modernisation-la-russe, accessed

17.06.2014

208 Wto.comhttp://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=MD

75

to be mentioned that labor migration from Moldova also has to be analyzed because the

share of remittances is equal to 30% of GDP.209

The EU and Russia are the main

destinations for Moldovan labor migration, because almost 90% of labor migrants work

there.210

This dependence on labor migration could also be used to blackmail Moldova,

extremely dependent on remittances. In economic sector, Moldova bandwagons the EU

and Moldovan economy is closely linked to EU economy and labor market, which creates

economic dependences hard to overcome. In contrast, economic dependence on Russian

market is important, but could be eased. Finally, it is Russia who uses economic

dependence for political reasons, not the EU.

2.4.6 Ukraine

According WTO statistics of 2012, Ukrainian trade is equally dispersed between

Russia and the EU; both partners have a 30% share in Ukrainian international trade.211

There is a clear split between the East of Ukraine, economically linked to Russia and the

West, linked to the EU. Also, Ukraine is hugely dependent on Russian gas supply and pays

the highest price in Europe for it. Ukraine has its own gas production, as well as some

shale gas reserves. In long run and with enough investment, Ukraine could become a self-

sufficient major gas player in Eastern and Central Europe. However, for now, Ukraine

depends on gas imported from Russia, and buys only 2 bn m3 from German energy giant

RWE, through interconnections with Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland212

.

Current economic and political crisis left no chances to Ukrainian economy to

recover from 2008 crisis. It signed the Association Agreement and will sign Free Trade

Agreement with the EU and will take IMF credits to stabilize its economy. However, it is

obvious that Ukraine tries to cooperate with Russia in commercial issues because its East

depends on Russian economy. It seems that Ukraine seeks for EU economic integration,

but as long as its East depends on Russian market, Ukraine will balance both EU and

Russia. Otherwise, its economy will fall in another crisis.

209

Ecaterina Buracec, MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS IN A THIRD COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE:The case of EU-Moldova Migration, FIERI working papers, p.6, http://www.labmiggov.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/paper_Ecaterina-Buracec.pdf , accessed 17.06.2014 210

MPC - MIGRATION PROFILE, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Moldova.pdf , accessed 17.06.2014 211

WTO http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=UA 212

N.Popescu, Ukraine’s gas loop, EUISS july 2013 http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_Ukraine_gas_01.pdf

76

Table 2.12 Perception of threat in economic sector

Behavior Economic sector

West Russia

Armenia Balancing Bandwagoning

Azerbaijan Bandwagoning Balancing

Georgia Bandwagoning Balancing

Belarus Balancing Bandwagoning

Republic of Moldova Bandwagoning Balancing

Ukraine Balancing Balancing

Table 2.13 Behavior in economic sector

Perception of threat Economic sector

West Russia

Armenia Yes Yes

Azerbaijan Yes Yes

Georgia Yes No

Belarus Yes Yes

Republic of Moldova Yes Yes

Ukraine Yes Yes

77

3. Analysis of European and Caucasus Rimland

3.1 Cultures of anarchy in international system

The neo-realist theory of international relations says that states have two standard

behaviors when they face a threat for their security: they will balance the threat with a

network of alliances or they will bandwagon the threat and will cooperate with the

aggressor. The decision to balance or to bandwagon an aggressor is a rational choice of the

state. However, the constructivist approach is concerned about identity that is different

from rationality. In fact, Wendt argues that states are actors that behave according their

national interest deeply related to their identity. He defines identity as “relatively stable,

role-specific understanding and expectations about self”.213

However, this identity will

depend on other actor’s expectations from the referent state.214

Also, Wend argues that:

The daily life of international politics is an on-going process of states taking identities in

relation to Others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the

result. These identities may be hard to change, but they are not carved in stone, and indeed

sometimes are the only variable actors can manipulate in a situation.215

That means that anarchy is not a rigid structure, but, as Wend argued: is what states make

of it. It also means that state’s identity is in permanent change because of interaction with

other states. In long run, this interaction helps identities to be sustained and, through

repetitive interactions, states became more predictive in relation with others.216

According

Wendt, state’s behavior is influenced by intersubjective rather than material aspect of

structure of anarchy. 217

Thus, relations between states are shaped by ideas and beliefs and

material factors are less important. Systemic anarchy still plays its role, but it is not

dependent only on distribution of capabilities.

But what kind of anarchy could exist? Wendt argues what there are three types of

cultures of anarchy that generate special behaviors. First, it is the Hobbsean culture, which

213

M.Zehfuss, Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison, European Journal of International Relations 2001 7, p. 318 214

A. Wendt, Social theory of international relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 224 215

Ibidem p.21 216

Ibidem p.335 217

M.Zehfuss, Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison, European Journal of International Relations 2001 7, p. 318

78

could be considered the archetype of Realpolitik.218

This is the culture of Enmity, because

all actors are treated as “Enemy”- a threat for collective “Self”. The Enemy or the “Other”

does not recognize the right of the “Self” to exist as subject of international relations and

will not limit its violence over it. 219

Thus, the “Self” will mirror the “Other” in its behavior

to survive in this anarchy, even if it had no revisionist ideas prior the contact with the

“Other”. 220

This culture has few shared knowledge and is almost a “state of nature”, where

everybody fights everybody and considers them as threat. Also, in this type of anarchy,

states try to maximize their power, because it’s the only way to survive. The second type of

culture of anarchy Lokean culture. It is more or less like the culture of the Westfalian

system of international relations. It is the culture of Rivalry, because all actors share the

respect to sovereignty, territorial integrity and autonomy from external powers.221

This

shared knowledge is internalized and formalized in international law that has deep

influence over the anarchy. This system is considered to be more stable, because states do

not disappear because of external interventions or annexation, because states have by

default the right to exist that is recognized by all states.222

That does not mean that states

are Friends, they are Rivals which compete for power and influence over other states.

However, they prove restraint in their violence and respect basic rules of international law.

Wars could occur, but their aim is to restore status quo and not to conquer territories.223

The third is the Kantian culture of anarchy and it is the culture of Friendship. Some states

do not perceive other actors as Enemies or Rivals, because they really treat them as

Friends. Friends will solve disputes using non military means and will cooperate to assure

their common security.224

Also, actors are sure that their partners obey these rules and

work in a “team” to achieve common goals. This anarchy is always associated with

collective security communities, where members cooperate to achieve common security

and where a threat to one member is a threat to the whole system. All these three cultures

of anarchy have three degree of internalization: actors act in this logic of anarchy because

of external pressures; actors act because it’s a strategy to achieve its goals and finally

actors act in this logic because they believe that norms of anarchy are legitimate.

218

A. Wendt, Social theory of international relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 259 219

Ibidem p.260 220

Ibidem p.262 221

Ibidem p.279 222

Ibidem p.282 223

Ibidem p.283 224

Ibidem p.299

79

We can observe that for each culture of anarchy, there are specific threats. For

Hobbsean anarchy the main threat is to lose sovereignty and disappear as independent

actor or to lose territory during a conflict with another actor. For Lockean anarchy, there is

no threat to disappear as independent actor; however, there is always a threat to lose a part

of the territory or to be forced to behave in an undesirable way. For Kantian anarchy, the

main threat is to lose from cooperation, because the idea of team work means that there is a

clear leader who forces team-members to cooperate and to share gains from this

cooperation and there is always a possibility that these gains could be divided in unequal

shares. Also, the relative loose of sovereignty could also be a threat in a Kantian anarchy,

as well as the possibility to lose national identity in a supranational project.

These anarchies could work at regional-level and at international-level.225

A clear

example of regional level is NATO or the EU, where is a clear Kantian culture of anarchy,

because actors act as together to achieve common goals and to assure their security.

However, at international level, it is the Lockean anarchy which is internalized by almost

all of actors. As I mentioned, at regional-level the anarchy could be different from the

macro-level type of anarchy. An obvious assumption could be that some in RSC, actors

could behave differently when they act inside their security complex and when they act

outside it, because of different internalized norms and cultures of anarchy. For example,

Kantian culture of anarchy in EU does not prevent some member states to act outside the

EU as they are in a Lockean system. Thus, EaP countries could also have two different

behaviors: one type of behavior for interaction within Russian FSU RSC and other kind of

behavior for interaction inside West+EaP security complex. This approach could help us to

explain EaP behavior as well as their perception of threat from Russia and the West. Also,

it will help us to understand the geopolitics of EaP, because it will give us clues to explain

what kind of European Rimland do we have: a standard Rimland, that perceives both

Russia and the West as Rivals or Enemies and that have to defend itself from both, or a

split Rimland, where some states cooperates, have common shared knowledge and

interiorize more values of one geopolitical structure and have dissonance of values and

knowledge with another.

3.2 Cultures of anarchy in EaP , orders and the structure of European and Caucasus

Rimland

225

Ibidem p.257

80

In this section, first I used data from Table 3.1(Threat perception in EaP) to analyze

what kind of threat do EaP countries perceive in their RSC: a threat to be destroyed and to

disappear (Hobbsean culture), threat to be dominated (Lockean culture) or threat to have

Table 3.1 Perception of threat in Eastern Partnership

more loses than gains from cooperation (Kantian culture). This analysis gave me

information about what kind of anarchy is perceived by EaP countries in both RSC to

which they belong. Also, it brought me information about standard reaction of an EaP

country for a threat for their security sectors. Next, the Table 3.4 (EaP countries behavior)

helped me to detect the level of internalization of culture of the anarchy and, also, the level

of internalization of norms for each security sector.In addition, using RSC theory, I studied

what kind of order was established in Western+EaP and Russian FSU, what power

established this order and how this order is recognized by other actors. Finally, I analyzed

trends in EaP countries behavior and I found what countries are attracted more by Western

security complex (Sea powers) and what countries by Russian Heartland security complex.

This data was used to analyze dynamics and homogeneity of European and Caucasus

Rimland. A couple of scenarios could be possible:

1. Some regions could be attracted to Russian Hearland, and thus, they have

integrated security sectors with Russia and are not really dependent on Western

RSC security.

2. Some regions could be attracted by the West, thus they depend only on Western

security and are integrated in Western system.

3. Some regions could be dependent on both geopolitical actors and are not

moving not to the West, not to the East.

Therefore, this information helped me to draw the real map of European and Caucasus

Perception of

threat

Societal sector Military sector Political sector Economic

sector

West Russia West Russia West Russia West Russia

Armenia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Azerbaijan No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Georgia Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No

Belarus Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Republic of

Moldova

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Ukraine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

81

Rimland. Also, using Dughin’s scenarios of Sea-Land antagonism, I will try to predict the

future of European security architecture.

3.2.1 Cultures of anarchy of EaP countries.

3.2.1.1 Anarchy of Russian security complex of Former Soviet Union

Societal and political sector of all EaP countries are threatened by the structure of

anarchy of Russian FSU RSC. Armenia does not want another Russian-dominated

Eurasian Union, Azerbaijan is threatened to lose Nagorno-Karabakh and to face Chechen

type Islamism, Georgia wants to become a nation-state and to regain control over its

separatist republics, Belarus does not want to lose its own culture and sovereignty,

Moldova wants to preserve its integrity and national identity, as well as Ukraine, and all of

these countries fear to be forced to join a Russian dominated supranational structure.

However, threats that are perceived by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are territorial,

political, military and cultural threats. These countries were in state of war with Russia,

who occupied some of their territories: Transnistria, Crimeea, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Also, in Ukrainian and Georgian case, Russia annexed some of their territories and

violated international law and basic norms of Lockean culture of anarchy, thus, Russia

does not gave by default the right to Ukraine and Georgia to exist as sovereign states. In

addition, all three countries are more or less threatened by Russian cultural expansion that

dilutes their own national identity. Russia perceives these territories as its own backyard or

“Near Abroad”, a zone of its exclusive influence and a zone where the Medvedev-Putin

doctrine of limited sovereignty could be applied. The Georgian war of 2008 was a clear

example of this kind of logic, as well as Russian intervention in Crimea and Russian

pressures on Ukraine. However, we cannot argue that these states perceive the Hobbsean

anarchy in FSU RSC. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, as well as Azerbaijan have mutually

recognized sovereignty and independence. Also, these states share common security issues:

separatism and Russian pressures, and thus, they cooperate within GUAM, organization

that has basic purpose to balance Russia. Russian claims to annex separatist regions of

these countries using military force could be a temporary phenomenon, because even if

Lockean culture of anarchy recognizes the right of countries to stay independent, territorial

problems could occur, as well as wars between states. 226

Therefore, at least Moldova,

Georgia and Ukraine perceive that the anarchy of Russian security complex of Former

Soviet Union has a Lockean culture although sometimes some Hobbsean features appear

because of Russian military interventions. However, Russia manifests restraint in its

military actions and has limited territorial claims. It needs to be said that Hobbsean culture 226

Ibidem p.281

82

is internalized in military sector, because all of these countries fought wars with Russia,

and thus, they perceive it as their only Enemy. Lockean culture is internalized in societal,

political and economic sector. Rivalry in these sectors is rationale, because it brings

material and political gains from limited cooperation and non-violence. For example, in

relations with Russia in military sector, Ukraine internalized basic norms of Hobbsean

anarchy, but, in economic, societal and political sector, Ukraine internalized norms of

Lockean anarchy, because Rivalry with Russia is a strategy for nation and state-building,

as well as for economic growth, Russia being an important trade partner of Ukraine. It is

also valid for Moldova and at a lower degree for Georgia. Rivalry with Russia is a strategy

to assure their security, because it could not be treated as Friend, due to territorial and

political struggles, and it could not be considered as Enemy, because of limited capabilities

to mirror some of Russian behaviors. Therefore, for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova,

Russian RSC FSU has a Lockean culture of anarchy.

Armenia is an interesting case, because it also perceives Russia as threat to national

security. However, compared to Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, Armenia does not

perceive vital threats from Russia. It is not a threat for integrity and existence of Armenian

state, nation and sovereignty over its territory. Russia perceives Armenia as its “backyard”

but not as its own territory and it has no territorial claims towards it. It supports Armenian

integrity and sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh that is recognized by international law to

be a part or Azerbaijan. Also, Russia is a military threat, but its military presence in

Armenia guarantee that Azerbaijan will not bring back Nagorno-Karabakh. Next, Russia is

an economic threat, but, because Armenia has no energy resources and has no other

important market for labor migration, Armenia has to cooperate with Russia. Obviously,

Armenia also has internalized the Lockean culture of anarchy in FSU RSC. Of course,

Azerbaijan is perceived as Enemy and some Armenian nationalist argue that it should not

exist. However, the real conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is Nagorno-Karabakh,

so it is a pure rivalry over a territory. Russia is a threat for Armenia, but Armenia

understands that Armenian-Russian alliance is a strategy to maximize its power.

Azerbaijan also has a Lockean culture of anarchy. Russia is not too obvious threat to

their sovereignty and nation. However, Russian support to Armenia generates an

interesting perception of threat in Azerbaijan. Therefore, the government does not perceive

Russian military threat, because Azerbaijan is not a threat to Russia, but to its ally-

Armenia. As long as Azerbaijan has a non-violent policy towards Armenia, Russia will not

83

be perceived as military threat. It is not valid for political and economic sector, because

Russia is treated as Rival in Nagorno-Karabakh problem and is a competitor for EU gas

market. Azerbaijan perceives that the anarchy of Russian FSU RSC has the Lockean

culture, where there is always a possibility to ally the Rival to achieve a goal and to

enhance material capabilities.

Last, but not least, is Belarus and it is a paradox. From one side, it is a clear ally of

Russia and cooperates with it in all security issues; from the other side it also perceives

Russian threat in all of its security sectors. There is a deep integration in economic sector:

Custom Union with Russia economic integration, and military alliance, Union state with

Russia, etc… Belarus and Russia cooperates very much, so, how to explain that Belarus

perceives Russian threat? A simple explanation could be that Belarus has the Lockean

culture of anarchy, and Russia is perceived as Ally and Rival but not Friend. However, for

Belarus, this assumption will not be valid because Belarus has real gains from integration

with Russia and from “team work” with it. Actually, Belarus sees Russia as Friend. It

perceives the threat from non-cooperation with Russia and from Rivalry with it. Friendship

with Russia is a strategy for survival, because other options will bring more material and

political loses. Also, Belarus is promoting Eurasian integration in Russian FSU RSC, so, it

is in a team with Russia, and considers that collective security with it and common

economy is a strategy to survive as an independent and sovereign state. Moreover, Belarus

perceives that Russia really wants to cooperate with Belarus, and despite some struggles,

Russia considers Belarus a “team member” and an independent state. The risk to transform

Russia into Rival will bring another type of anarchy in its system, so, I argue that Belarus

internalized Kantian culture in relation with Russia, because it brings more advantages and

diminish risks of Rivalry with Russia. Also, Friendship with Russia make possible to

maintain status quo in RSC, Belarus being a status quo country.

This data was introduced into a map of Russian Security complex of Former Soviet Union.

States colored in blue have internalized a Kantian culture of anarchy in relation one with

another and Lockean culture in relation with others. States colored in orange internalized

only Lockean culture of anarchy of interaction within their security complex.

84

Map 3.2 Cultures of anarchy in Russian Security Complex of Former Soviet Union

What could we understand from this map? Caucasus is a place where all actors,

including Russia, share the culture of Lockean anarchy. During social learning process and

imitation of its neighbors, Russia also interiorized this culture of anarchy, and so, Russian

“realist” behavior in Caucasus is shaped by the balance of power in this region. In Eastern

Europe, Russia has two different standard behaviors. During interaction with Moldova and

Ukraine, Russia interiorized the Lockean culture of anarchy. However, in relation with

Belarus, Russia has a Kantian culture of anarchy and treats Belarus as Friend. But how in

one region could work two different types of anarchy? As I mentioned before, regional

subsystems could have their own culture and norms of anarchy. However, it does not

prevent states to act in other kind of logic outside the system. Therefore, just because

Belarus and Russia share similar culture of anarchy in their bilateral relation, and work as a

team, I will argue that within the Russian FSU RSC, there is another security complex:

Russia-Belarus. This argument could be supported by the fact that Russia and Belarus are

in collective security alliance and in economic union. Also, it will strengthen the argument

that Belarus is a part of Russian Heartland, because of the Kantian anarchy in their RSC.

Russia failed to establish an order in FSU RSC, because only Armenia and Belarus

recognized Russian leadership in this RSC. Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan do

not perceive Russia as their Leader and prefer a balance of power order in RSC rather than

a hegemonic order of Russia. However, Russia plays a key role to preserve the peace in

this complex, thus it has a role of protection, at least for Armenia and Belarus. The order in

85

FSU RSC is power restraining power, because all actors are concerned about the balance

of power in RSC and are not interested in status quo change.227

However, Russia, the

regional power, has attempts to restore a hegemonic order in complex and to be recognized

as leader of the RSC.

3.2.1.2 Cultures of Anarchy of West+EaP RSC

Apparently, the Western threat is also perceived by EaP countries. First, I will speak

about Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine, countries that perceive Western threat in all of their

security sectors. Armenia feels the threat of common European identity and is concerned

about the loss of sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, because the West could support oil

rich Azerbaijan. Some political elites of Moldova and Ukraine are concerned about the loss

of their post-soviet identity and independent foreign policy in relation with Russia if these

countries join the EU. In military sector, Armenia perceives the West as threat because of

Azerbaijan and its kin-state Turkey, that is a NATO member and because it is perceived as

Enemy and Rival. Therefore, in this sector, Armenia mirrors Russian perception of NATO

threat, because it considers Turkey as its natural Rival. For Moldova and Ukraine, Western

military threat is a construct of political elites with post-soviet identity because, obviously,

NATO is not a threat for the sovereignty of these countries. However, the fear of NATO

was interiorized during the soviet epoch and continues to be perceived by a large share of

population. In military security, Moldova and Ukraine internalized Lockean culture of

anarchy, because the West is not a Friend, but surely is not an Enemy. This culture is

enforced by the fact that these countries are neutral by law, so, every military block could

become a threat for their security. However, in economic sector, Moldova and Ukraine

perceive the threat of non-cooperation with the EU. Both Moldovan and Ukrainian trade is

deeply dependent on the EU and the West. Therefore, non-cooperation with it will bring

material loses. More than that, Moldova and Ukraine want to cooperate with the EU in the

economic sector, even if it will bring loses in economic relations with Russia. However,

the core of Kantian culture of anarchy is not cooperation but collective security. Even if at

discourse level the West treats Ukraine and Moldova as Friends, this “Friendship” lacks

collective security arrangements. Also, during past 23 years, Ukraine and Moldova have

used the “Two seats” foreign policy to capitalize material gains from relations with Russia

and the West. In 2008, Ukraine tried to become a NATO member, but, later, it became a

227

D.Frazier,R. Stewart-Ingersoll, Regional powers and security: A framework for understanding order within regional security complexes, European Journal of International Relations, 2010 16: 731, p.735

86

neutral state and rented Sevastopol naval base for Russia. For Ukraine, the West is a Rival

and temporary Ally, because it can balance Russian influence in Ukraine. Also, Ukraine

and Moldova have a non-cooperative behavior in relations with other actors in EaP. They

cooperate in military security, especially in Transnistrian frozen conflict, but in other

sectors each country wants to go alone and capitalize more material gains. In addition

these states are Rivals for EU market, for EU grants and aids and political support,

therefore, they cooperate only when it could bring material advantages. Obviously,

Lockean culture of anarchy could be easily observed.

As of Armenia, the West is its main trade partner; however, Armenia perceives the

threat from enhanced cooperation with it. An obvious explanation could be that Armenia

pursues a balance of power politics in relation with the West. Armenia refused to sign an

Association Agreement and Free Trade agreement with the EU and decided to join Russian

Custom Union because of its deep dependence on Russian gas supply and military

protection. Therefore, obviously, Armenia interiorized Lockean culture of anarchy in

relation with the West, because it is seen as Rival of Armenia in all security problems.

Armenia treats the West as a partner for some interactions, which could bring advantages,

but, in other cases, Armenia prefers the rivalry with it, because it could help to capitalize

gains from its alliance with Russia.

Next, it’s Azerbaijan. Just like Ukraine and Moldova, Western threat is not a vital

one; it is not a direct threat for sovereignty or territorial integrity and identity of Azeri

people. However, Azerbaijan cooperates with the West only when it could bring material

gains. The West is a Rival, because Azeri dependence on Western market is too deep and

serious and because EU pressures on democracy and human rights are too dangerous for

the authoritarian regime from Baku. The West could not be treated as Friend, because

cooperation and interaction with it will bring loses in relation with Russia and because the

West pressure Azerbaijan on political issues, for example human rights. It seems that the

West could not be treated as Friend because of Russia, but it is not what I am talking about.

In this case, Azerbaijan mirrors Turkey policy of status quo, because it brings more

advantages than deep cooperation with the EU and USA. Azerbaijan is important for the

West, it realizes that, and thus Rivalry with it is a strategy to acquire more material and

political gains. Finally, Azerbaijan is not a “team member” of Western club, because it is

more concerned about its gains from relations with the West, more than about Western

energy security. No surprise that NABUCCO pipeline failure is due to Azeri desire to build

a direct pipeline to Italy and France. Thus, the failure of NABUCCO compromised all

87

plans to ease energy dependence of Central Europe that has no alternatives to Russian gas

supply. Obviously, Azerbaijan internalized a Lockean culture of anarchy within West +

EaP RSC.

If Azerbaijan is not, Georgia surely is the Friend of the West. First, there are no vital

threats coming from the West for Georgian state. The West is not threatening Georgian

independence, integrity, sovereignty. Georgia has gains from cooperation with the West,

and, although its dependence on EU market is a threat, the loss of this market is a greater

threat. It treats EU and USA as Friends, and is treated as Friend, but the lack of collective

security engagement with the West is the clue to explain the real culture of anarchy

internalized by Georgian state. It wants to become an EU and NATO member, although it

will bring loses in relation with Russia, however, the West does not want to accept Georgia

in its club. Georgia has occupied territories: Abkhazia and South Ossetia that are controlled

by Russian military. Just like in Ukrainian and Moldovan case, the West supports Georgian

government to balance Russia but does not want to defend Georgian integrity. Thus, the

lack of real collective security engagement is a proof that in West + EaP RSC, the West

and Georgia have Lockean culture of anarchy.

Finally, it’s Belarus and it perceives that the West is a real threat for all of its security

sectors. It does not mean that Belarus internalized Hobbsean culture of anarchy. The West

is a Rival, it is the Rival of Russia, the Friend of Belarus, and is a threat to status quo for

Belarus. Enhanced cooperation with the West could change the balance of power and could

bring loses for Belarus. Obviously, Belarus internalized Lockean culture in Western

security complex, because it is too deep integrated with Russia to seek integration with the

EU. All changes in status quo could bring loses, so Rivalry with the West is a strategy for

Belarus.

88

Map 3.3 Cultures of anarchy in West+EaP RSC

So, what about this map? Surely West+EaP RSC has a Lockean culture of anarchy,

because only within the Western RSC, states have Kantian culture. Eastern Partnership

was launched to transform this space, to democratize it and to modernize these states by

offering “Everything except EU institutions”, therefore, to maintain status quo. Obviously,

the West does not perceive EaP as region of Friends; it perceives it as region of partners-

Rivals, which could cooperate only when it could bring material gains. Association

Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine established EU zone of interest and

potential extension. However, this RSC has a Lockean culture of anarchy, because the

West has no any security arrangement with any EaP country. The West continues to treat

these states as Rivals and these states continue to play “two seats diplomacy” even if it

seems that, for now, the EU integration is the main goal of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.

This paradox could be explained by the erosion of balance of power in Europe, where

Russia expands its relative economic and military capabilities and where the EU has

identity and economic crisis. Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia behave according basic norms

of Lockean culture of anarchy and want to balance the revisionist Russia with an alliance

with the West. Azerbaijan has deep economic contacts with the West and also internalized

a Lockean culture. It does not give up its relation with Russia for enhanced cooperation

with the West; it continues its “two seats diplomacy” and balancing policy in Caucasus.

Lockean anarchy gives the possibility to maintain status quo and to maximize its gains in

relations with both Russia and the West. This assumption is also valid for Armenia and

Belarus, because they are other status quo countries. Deep cooperation with the West will

89

damage their relations with Russia. Finally, Belarus perception of the anarchy of

West+EaP security complex is the linked to Russia. Being in one team with Russia,

Belarus has no other option than to pursue Russian agenda in relation with the West,

because, otherwise, Russia could be transformed in Rival, with dangerous consequences

for Belarusian security.

The West also failed to manage the order within West+EaP RSC. Only three countries

recognize Western leadership in this RSC and pursue pro-Western policies. However, the

West plays the role of custodianship in this RSC. Just like Russia, it failed to establish a

hegemonic order within its RSC, but successfully established a power restraining power

order, being the arbiter in some of security issues of the region.

3.2.2 Degrees of internalization of cultures of anarchy

We have seen what kind of anarchy is internalized by EaP/FSU countries. Next I will

try to find the degree of internalization of these cultures. Wendt argues that there are three

paths to internalize a culture of anarchy: Force (a pure realist assumption), Price or Gains

(neoliberal assumption) and legitimacy (Idealist and constructivist assumption). 228

Thus,

states could be forced to obey the rules of anarchy and to internalize its norms, they could

internalize and follow rules because it is a strategy to maximize their power, and finally,

they could internalize a culture of anarchy because they perceive it as legitimate. A, B, C

are archetypes of behavior, because A could be associated with Classic realism, B with

Liberalism or Neo-Realism, C with Kantian idealism.

3

2 Internalization

1

H L K

Table 3.4229

Degrees of internalization of cultures of anarchy ( H-for Hobbsean, L for

Lockean, K for Kantian)

In order to explain the EaP countries degree of internalization of culture of anarchy, I

analzed their behavior and I used table 3.5 with Balancing/Bandwagoning behavior.

228

A. Wendt, Social theory of international relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 268 229

Ibidem p.254

C

B

A

90

Behavior Societal sector Military sector Political sector Economic

sector

West Russia West Russia West Russia West Russia

Armenia Bal Bal Bal Band Bal Band Bal Band

Azerbaijan Bal Bal Bal Bal Bal Bal Band Bal

Georgia Band Bal Band Bal Band Bal Band Bal

Belarus Bal Band Bal Band Bal Band Bal Band

Republic of

Moldova

Band Bal Band Bal Band Bal Band Bal

Ukraine Bal Bal Band Bal Band Bal Bal Bal

Table 3.5 Behavior of EaP countries

3.2.2.1 Degrees of internalization of cultures of anarchy in Russian RSC FSU

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia act in South Caucasus according Lockean culture

of anarchy: they try to maximize their gains from interaction with their neighbors and

Russia. Also, with one exception, they recognize the right to exist to all states in their RSC.

Azerbaijan and Armenia are exceptions, because they are in continuous struggle over

Nagorno-Karabakh and sometimes we could observe Hobbsean culture in bilateral

relations, but, as rule, they act according Lockean logic. Are they forced to internalize this

culture or not? No doubt, that in 90’ it could be the right answer, but since then, both states

have behaved according international law because they could capitalize more gains from

peace than form war. It became a strategy, both in bilateral relations, in interaction in

Caucasus, FSU and in International system. These states long time practiced multi-vector

foreign policy and it’s a proof that they internalized Lockean culture of anarchy of second

degree. 230

Nagorno-Karabakh is an exception, but territorial struggles and wars could

occur in Lockean anarchy. Azeri and Armenian behavior is also valid for their interaction

in Russian FSU RSC, and with Russia itself, on the bilateral level. Armenia has a

bandwagoning behavior towards Russia in military and political sector although Russia is

perceived as threat for it. This behavior is a strategy for survival in the anarchy of Russian

FSU, because Armenia could not stand alone against Azerbaijan, has no energy resources

230

Annette Moskofian,Between The Bear and The Eagle: Armenia’s Balancing Act, The University of

Westminster, September 2013, p.30

https://www.academia.edu/4423325/Masters_Dissertation_Between_The_bear_and_The_Eagle_-

_Armenias_Balancing_Act

91

and because this behavior could assure the relative control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azeri

behavior towards Russia is balancing, because it could assure relative gains from gas

exports in the EU and could assure international recognition of its sovereignty over

Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan and Armenia are concerned about status quo in Caucasus

because it brings them material and political advantages.

Georgia also internalized the second degree of Lockean culture of anarchy, because

it also has relative gains from obeying international law and from recognizing integrity and

sovereignty of its neighbors. However, in relation with Russia, especially after Georgian

war, some Hobbsean behaviors could be observed in military and political sectors, but, it

was a forced behavior, because Georgia was constraint to mirror Russian actions. Georgia

treats Russia as rival and balances this threat, as well as other threats in Caucasus and FSU.

Moldova and Ukraine also have a balancing behavior towards Russia, and also

internalized the second degree of Lockean culture of anarchy. Balancing Russia is a

strategy to maximize gains and preserve status quo. These states are threatened by growing

Russian power in all sectors; therefore, balancing is a way to resist to it. Both states are

dependent on Russian gas supply and have separatist regions with Russian military

presence. Obviously, they accept Lockean anarchy in Russian FSU because it could bring

material gains from trade and political cooperation with Russia, but loses cold also occur.

Finally, Belarus, internalized the first degree of Kantian logic towards Russia. I argue

that Belarus is forced by the anarchy of its complex to cooperate with Russia. All of its

security sectors are more or less threatened by Russian power and, to survive, Belarus has

no other options to bandwagoning Russia. This behavior is not a strategy, because Belarus

has deep cooperation only with Russia; other actors in Russian FSU are treated in a

different way. For Belarus, Russia is more than a simple ally, their economies and military

complex are deeply integrated. This integration creates dependencies, and Russia

constantly uses them to force Belarus to follow Russian policies. Thus, we cannot argue

that Belarus behavior is not forced by Russia, so, it internalized the first degree of Kantian

culture in Russian security complex.

3.2.2.2 Degrees of internalization of cultures of anarchy in West+EaP RSC

In contrast, in West+EaP RSC, all states have internalized the second degree of

Lockean culture of anarchy. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are considered the friends of

the West, and they actually capitalize gains from bandwagoning it in security issues.

92

Russia is also an important partner, thus, their bandwagoning behavior towards the West is

an attempt to maximize their power and to balance Russia. In fact, they could easily take

steps for a pro-Russian foreign policy; at least, Moldova and Ukraine have all socio-

demographic conditions for this kind of slip. In fact, for long time, these states have had

the second degree of Lockean culture of anarchy because this behavior brought them more

material gains. However, Eastern Partnership provided a platform for cooperation where

these states learned to cooperate with EU and where they were convinced that this

cooperation could bring more gains than a simple partnership or Rivalry with the West.

Obviously, when stakes rose up, and these countries began to see their EU integration

perspective, in some security complexes they internalized the culture of cooperation and

friendship with the EU and the West. Thus, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova internalized the

second degree of Kantian culture of anarchy in economic, political and societal sector,

because they actually gained from cooperation with the EU and USA in these sectors.

Russian invitation in Eurasian Union was rejected by all of these states, and they gave up

their “special relations” with Russia for closer ties with the West. But still, it’s a strategy,

because the West has no real collective security engagement towards these states, as well

as these three states have no military engagement towards the West. Without the Kantian

culture of anarchy in military sector, these states will not have a fully Kantian culture in

West+EaP RSC. The lack of Kantian culture in military sector makes their culture of

anarchy Lockean.

Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus, also internalized the Lockean culture of anarchy.

Azeri motivations for balancing behavior towards the West are material gains. Its

petroeconomy is dependent on EU market, so, economic cooperation with it is a strategy to

maximize Azeri power. However, in other sectors, Azerbaijan has a balancing behavior

towards the West, as well as towards Russia. Thus, Azerbaijan does not want to sacrifice

its relations with Russia because of the West and vice versa. Consequently, Azerbaijan

internalized the second degree of Lockean culture of anarchy. Armenia also has a

balancing behavior towards the West and has internalized the second degree of Lockean

culture of anarchy. Armenian enhanced cooperation in energy and military sector with

Russia is a strategy to maximize its power and to assure its security. The West is a Rival,

as well as Russia, but the West could not help Armenia to assure its security issues:

Nagorno-Karabakh problem, energy security, struggles with Azerbaijan. Finally, Belarus

culture of anarchy could not be analyzed separated from Russia, because, apparently it has

no independent policy towards the West. It mirrors most of Russian behaviors, because

93

both states have integrated their security sectors. Formally, Belarus obeys to international

law and has limited cooperation with the West, but it balances it in all of its security

sectors. Also, Belarus has no revisionist behavior; it is a status quo country. But is this

behavior a strategy or the result of constraints? The EU is concerned about Belarus

internal policies raised sanctions against Belarus government because of human rights

violation. In reality, Belarus is isolated from the West and so, its behavior is the result of

external constraints. The West forced Belarus to obey basic rules of Lockean anarchy, thus,

I argue that Belarus internalized the first degree of Lockean culture of anarchy in

West+EaP RSC. However, it is clear that Belarus participation in EaP is a way to

transform its culture and to move it from the first degree to the second degree of Lockean

culture, where Rivalry and deeper cooperation with the West could be a strategy to

maximize Belarus power.

3.2.3 Rimland’s dynamics in Eastern Partnership

Eastern Partnership countries could be grouped according their culture of anarchy

and the degree of internalization of this culture. Thus, in West+EaP RSC, the first group is

Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and they have the second degree of Lockean anarchy and

lack only collective security engagement with the West to change their culture to a Kantian

one. The second group is Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are status quo countries. Finally,

the third group is Belarus that is discovering the advantages of cooperation and closer ties

with the West, as well as advantages of Rivalry strategies within Western+ EaP RSC. In

Russian FSU RSC there are also three groups of countries with Lockean culture and one

country with Kantian culture. The first group is Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia which have

balancing strategies towards Russia; the second one is Azerbaijan that pursues balance of

power politics in FSU RSC; the third one is Armenia, whose strategy of survival and

maximization of power is to bandwagon Russia. Belarus is the only EaP state that has

different cultures of anarchy for interaction in Russian and Western security complexes. In

Russian one, Belarus has a Kantian culture and in Western – a Lockean one.

94

Map 3.6 European Rimland and its orientations

Now, I will use Rimland-Hearland theory to explain how European Rimland behaves

and how homogeneous it is. Using my earlier analysis, we could classify Eastern

Partnership countries in frour groups. The first group: Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia,

balance Russia in FSU RSC and bandwagon the West in West+EaP RSC and have a

Lockean culture of anarchy. The second group is Azerbaijan; a status quo country that

balances both Russia and the West and that has a Lockean anarchy. The third group is

Armenia, a state that balances the West and bandwagons Russia, but it is a strategy rather

than a desirable choice. Armenia is aware of Russian desire to re-build URSS, but it has no

alternative to Russian support in Caucasus, thus, it also has a Lockean culture. Finally, the

fourth group is Belarus, that bandwagons Russia and balances the West and that has a

Kantian culture in relations with Russia and Lockean culture in relation with the West.

Therefore, we cannot argue that European and Caucasus Rimland is homogeneous,

because there are regions which are attracted by Heartland and regions which are attracted

by Western Sea Powers. Also, there are regions which are attracted both by Heartland and

Sea powers.

Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia surely are attracted by the West, thus, they begin to

move from Rimland to Outer Crescent geopolitical region. Their security still depends on

Russia, but, also, Russia is their only enemy. In contrast, the West is their Rival but, more

and more, these countries perceive themselves as European-Western powers, and integrate

their security sectors in Western RSC. Actually, if a true Rimland power has to defend

95

itself from Sea powers and Land powers, then Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are not pure

Rimland states, because they have to defend themselves only from Russia. In relations with

Russia they internalized the Hobbsean culture of anarchy in military sector and Lockean in

other four sectors. In contrast, these three states internalize the Kantian culture with the

West in societal, political, economic and environmental sector, thus, in these security

issues they act like they are in a team with the West. More and more, the security of these

states depends on the West and become less dependent on Russia. Also, these states have

pro-Western policies and they want to become members of NATO and the EU, and thus, to

become true West. However, for now, the West seems to be unprepared to assimilate these

countries in its core RSC even if, in long run, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia could

become precious assets in Western RSC because, Ukraine is one of European geopolitical

pivots.231

Its partnership with France, Germany and Poland is considered by Brzezinski the

core of European architecture of security.232 Without a possible Russia-Ukraine military

alliance or union, Russia will cease to be the dominant military power on the continent and

will lose its influence in Central Europe and Balkans. Also, due to interdependent societal

sectors with Russia, Ukraine could be a channel that could be used to transform Russian

society and to change its international behavior. 233

Next, Georgia is the key to South

Caucasus. The future of EU Southern Corridor of pipelines, which aim is to ease energy

dependence from Russia, depends on Georgian pro-Western policies. Thus, without a pro-

Western Georgia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia will be isolated from the West. Finally,

Moldova could be important because of Transnistria. This separatist region, controlled by

Russia, is a continuous threat for the West. In fact, Transnistria could be considered the

extension of Russian Heartland in Eastern Europe. Therefore, to contain this threat, both

Moldova and Ukraine have to be Western states. In conclusion, Moldova, Georgia and

Ukraine are attracted by Western Sea Powers and could join the West; however, for now

the West continues its containment policies towards Russia and treats these countries as

buffer states. In long run, these states could easily become a part of the West, because their

security sectors will be more and more integrated with it and less dependent on Russia.

Belarus is attracted by Hearland and is the extension of Russian Heartland in Europe.

It is in Union State with Russia and is deeply dependent on Russian security. Also, it has

internalized the Kantian culture of anarchy in Russian Heartland RSC, thus, it works in the

same team with Russia and share same security goals in Europe and in the world. The

231

Z.Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books, 1997, p.46 232

Ibidem p.85 233

Ibidem p.46

96

West is the Enemy of Belarus, and Russia is a Friend, therefore, Belarus has to defend

itself only from NATO. Obviously, Belarus does not perceive itself as Western state

because it perceives itself as Eurasian power. In Union with Russia and Kazakhstan,

Belarus could be a major Eurasian player, through Eurasian Supranational Union.

However, Belarus will be always dominated by Russia, because it is the key to Russian

borders. Without Belarus, Russia could be isolated from Central Europe and Baltic states.

Belarus is important for Russia as Poland is important for Germany and Europe. It is the

traditional route for invasions in Russia, it links Russian economy with Europe and give it

more political and military influence. In conclusion, Belarus is a part of Russian Heartland

and has no perspective to drive away from it because it is too dependent on Russian

security.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are true Rimland powers. First, they treat both West and

Russia as threats for their sovereignty. Armenian security depends on Russia, but Armenia

is geographically isolated from it to depend only on it. Without Georgia, Russian-

Armenian alliance makes no sense. In addition, Armenian has a status quo policy and is

not so linked to Russian security sectors as Belarus is. It has internalized a Lockean culture

of anarchy in its relations with Russia, so, it is possible that Armenia could change its

alliance preferences if the West will assure Armenian security. For now, Armenia benefits

from its geopolitical alliance with Russia, but everything could change. Azerbaijan is

another status quo country and is the pivot state in Caucasus. 234

It is crucial to link Central

Asian energy resources with European market. Also, its own resources and military

capabilities, as well as proximity to Iran, make Azerbaijan a strategic region. Azerbaijan is

not interested to become the West and the West does not want to give membership in its

club for Azerbaijan. Thus, it will always be between Hearland and the West, and will

cooperate with both to assure its security goals.

3.3 Geopolitical future of Europe

What will be the geopolitical future of Europe if Eastern Partnership countries will

continue to behave in the same way? Dughin speaks about four possible scenarios of Sea

power-Land power struggle for Rimland.235

The first scenario is the victory of Sea powers

and the creation of new world order. This order will be liberal-democratic, therefore, all

234

Ibidem p.56 235

A.Dughin, Bazele geopoliticii, vol. I, editura Euasiatica.ro, București,2011, p. 26

97

states will be democracies, will share Western values and will be ruled by Western

institutions. In fact, it is Fukuyama’s end of history. The end of Cold War was an example

of this kind of scenario, because the USA became the only global power to manage

security issues in all regions of the world. The second scenario is the victory of Sea

powers, but without the spread of liberal democratic order. The West will become the

dominant power in world affairs and will establish its rules in international relations. The

third scenario is a temporary victory of the West. Eurasian Heartland will rise again and

will force Sea powers to leave Eurasia. The last scenario is the victory of Land powers

who will establish a New Eurasian order, without Sea powers. 236

Applied to realities of EaP, I argue that, now, the first scenario is the most real one. If

Ukraine and Georgia become a part of the West, Russia will be contained in Eastern

Europe and Caucasus. Thus, Russian influence in Europe could be limited to Belarus and

in South Caucasus it could lose all of its influence. Also, without Ukraine, Russian project

of Eurasian empire could be threatened. Russia could lose influence in European affairs

and the West will be the only dominant power on the continent. In addition, threatened

with international isolation and with military and economic power of the West, Russia will

be forced to obey to Western rules in global affairs. Without Ukraine, Russia will become

an Asian Empire with huge identity problems, because its geography and demographics:

European Part of Russia, which is Christian and populated with ethnic Russians are linked

to Europe and Asian Part, which is populated by other populations, is linked to Asia.

236

Ibidem p.26

98

Conclusion

The aim of my dissertation was to study the geopolitics of Eastern Partnership. I used

tools of Copenhagen School and the Constructivist theory of international relations to

analyze what kind of interaction these countries have with main geopolitical players in

Eastern Europe: the West and Russia. Using the theory of Regional Security Complexes I

described what kind of Rimland is the Eastern Partnership and what could be the future

evolutions of this space. Finally, in this section I will present conclusions of my paper.

First, Eastern Partnership became a geopolitical construct, even if EU intention was

the opposite. When it was launched, in 2009, the EU did not want to see EaP as a possible

area for enlargement and wanted to apply the formula: “sharing everything with the Union

but institutions”237

. Also, this space was considered as a space of cooperation with Russia

and not a space of competition with it. Finally, the framework of cooperation had a weak

basis. In fact, even now, Eastern Partnership multilateral dimension is ineffective: four

multilateral platforms help EaP countries to adjust their legislation with the EU regulations

but do not provide a framework for cooperation between members of the partnership.

Therefore, how EaP became a geopolitical block? The reason why EaP started to be

perceived in this way is the bilateral dimension of the partnership. The EU provided

important political and financial support for these countries. Also, it proposed association

and free trade agreements for the most advanced countries in the partnership: Ukraine,

Georgia, Armenia and Moldova and visa-free regime to Ukraine and Moldova. In reality,

the EU, backed by the USA, proposed to these countries an alternative to Russian market

and an alternative to Russian political support in some of international problems in the

region. As I mentioned in the second part, economic and political sectors are two of the

most important issues of EaP security, thus, the EU became the most important player in

the region because his soft and hard power persuaded some of EaP countries to link their

security with the EU. EU standards for merchandise, for energy sector and for democratic

institutions, as well as the possibility of visa free regime with the Union started the

transformation of this space. During four years of the partnership some of the EaP

countries started to trade more with the EU than with Russia and started to apply some of

the EU regulations, in particular in energy sector and trade. For example, Moldova

examined the possibility to apply the Third Energy Package of the European Energy

Community, a set of rules which could destroy the monopoly of Russian company

Gazprom on European Gas market, Ukraine started to import gas from the EU on lower

237

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm

99

prices, Georgia and Azerbaijan continued to cooperate to build pipelines which could link

EU gas market with Caspian Sea and Central Asia. EaP countries political and economic

sectors became more integrated with the EU and the West as a whole. In the third part of

my dissertation I concluded that at least three countries: Moldova, Azerbaijan and Georgia

started to bandwagon the West in economic sector and at least three countries: Moldova,

Georgia and Ukraine started to bandwagon the West in political sector. For Moldova and

Ukraine, states which practiced balancing policies towards the West during their 20 years

of independence it is a huge step forward. Thus, even if EU intention was to keep these

countries out of the Union, security of these countries became more and more linked with

the security of the EU and, obviously, these countries became more integrated with

Western Regional Security Complex. The change which occurred in EaP countries

behavior in security sectors changed their perception of threat and created a solid Lockean

culture of anarchy between the West and some of EaP countries. Bilateral dimension of

Eastern Partnership transformed the security of its members, thus, this dimension could be

considered by default the most effective tool of EU foreign policy. Association agreements

and free trade agreements turned the Partnership in a geopolitical tool, because it created

possibilities for former soviet states to ease their dependence on Russian market and

Russian political support. Transforming EaP states EU security was transformed too.

Second, in the third part of my paper I detected three states which have special

relations with the EU and lack only military security agreements with the West to become

a part of its global Security Complex. Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia have similar

problems and they have similar behavior towards the West: bandwagoning. Their

economic security become more and more dependent on the West, their political security

and integrity depends on Western support and political protection from Russia; their

youngest generations perceive their countries as part of European Civilization. Of course,

these countries lack military agreements with the West to become members of the Western

club, but, surely, these countries could become Western democracies and be the allies of

the West. Eventually, it is a space for future EU and NATO enlargement, because in

midterm, their security could become fully dependent on the West. Moldova, Ukraine and

Georgia have separatist regions which are fully controlled by Russia, both economically

and military. Therefore, for these countries neutrality is not a solution to contain Russia

and, consequently, the only way to preserve their political independence is to become a

part of the Euro-Atlantic military alliance. In fact, it is nothing new, because these

countries were members of the GUAM group: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova,

100

and practiced balancing policies towards Russia since their independence. Azerbaijan

could be also considered a possible space for NATO enlargement, especially due to its

cultural links with Turkey and dependence on energy exports to the West. However, Azeri

balancing policies and multi-vector foreign policy will be a problem. Azeri is situated far

from Europe and close to Russia, thus, western political and military support will be

limited. The loyalty of this group is an advantage for the West. A pro-Western Georgia

closes the South Caucasus for Russian influence, assures the possibility to build pipelines

from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Europe. Georgia is the key to hegemony in South

Caucasus, because without its consent, Armenia could not have any contact with Russia

and Azerbaijan could not build any pipelines to Europe. Georgia is very important for

Europe because without a pro-European Georgia the EU will continue to be dependent on

Russian gas and the West will be unable to build a corridor of friendly states from Black

Sea to Central Asia. Therefore, Georgia could be considered a possible pivot state in

Caucasus, because its future is closely linked to the future of Azerbaijan, the other pivot

state in the region.238

A pro-Western Azerbaijan could be also an advantage for the West,

because it will help to build a friendly “Caucasus Corridor” which will connect Central

Asia and Caspian Sea with Europe. These countries are important for Western security,

because, without them, the West will continue to rely on Russian desire to cooperate in

security issues in Central Asia- the Heartland of Eurasia. Another important advantage for

the West is Ukraine, another pivot state in Europe239

. Ukraine is the key for Russian

security in Eastern Europe and, without her, it cease to have any influence in Central and

Southern Europe. With an European Ukraine, the West will force Russia to behave

according its own rules, because Russian military security will be threatened. Finally,

because of its civilizational links with Russians and Belarusians, Ukraine could become an

example of modernization and Westernization of the state. This model could help to

transform and Westernize Russia. Moldova is important because of Ukraine. Russian

military occupation of Transnistria threatens Ukrainian security, especially after the

annexation of Crimea because a pro-Western Moldova will secure the whole Ukrainian

Black Sea seashore. In fact, a pro-Russian Moldova will allow to Russia the possibility to

establish its hegemony in the Black Sea, because Odessa region will be constantly

threatened by Russian military and political influence. Finally, as I mentioned before, it is

nothing new in EU and US interest and aid for these countries. The West cooperates with

238

Z.Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books, 1997, p.41 239

Ibidem

101

these countries in security issues because they are geopolitically important. These Rimland

countries could become a part of the West, because Russia is their only possible enemy.

Third, there are two countries which could be considered as real “Rimland”. Armenia

and Azerbaijan look both to the West and to Russia for security. If Azerbaijan could

become more westernized in midterm, than, Armenia will continue to depend on both

geopolitical players. For now, Azerbaijan does not want to enhance its cooperation with

the West because of the fear to lose the Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian hesitations are due

to Russian military protection and support in Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict. These

countries have to defend and be prudent with both Russia and the West, so, according

Spykman’s model, they could be considered real Rimland countries, the battlefield of

geopolitical players. These status quo countries practice multi-vector diplomacy to assure

that they will not lose in security if they cooperate with one of the competitors in the

region. In fact, the real problem in South Caucasus is Nagorno-Karabakh, because it

assures to Russia the possibility to control both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia fears to

be more integrated with the West because of Russian military presence on its territory and

because of the fear to lose Nagorno-Karabakh. From its side, Azerbaijan fears to be more

integrated economically and politically with the West because of the fear that Russia will

recognize Armenian sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. If Russia do so, it will be

impossible to restore Azeri integrity without war with Russia. In conclusion, it is Nagorno-

Karabakh frozen conflict which does not allow to Armenia and Azerbaijan to westernize

their states. This conflict could not be solved without Russian arbitrage, thus, Russia uses

this conflict to control Azeri and Armenian Foreign policies.

Fourth, Belarus will continue to be pro-Russian as long as it is diplomatically

isolated from the West. For now, Belarus has no other alternatives to Russian market,

political support and military security; therefore, it will continue bandwagoning policies

towards it. Without interaction and more deep cooperation in economic and political issues

with the West, Belarus could become a Russian puppet state. However, if the West will

ease sanctions on Belarus leadership, will grow its investments and financial support for

the regime, it could change Belarus behavior. For now, there is no important pro-European

support within Belarus society, but, however, it could be build if Belarus is opened for

Western cultural, commercial and political influence.

Fifth, European and Caucasus Rimland are not homogeneous. In Eastern Europe,

there are two states which could become a part of the West and Western Security Complex.

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Ukraine and Moldova have to defend themselves only from Russia, thus, if the West

wants, these democracies could become part of the Western world. Of course it will take

time, but, in midterm, young pro-European generations in these countries could become a

factor which will transform societal security of the region. If these generations will be pro-

European, these countries will link their security with the West. However, as long as

demographically these countries are dominated by people with soviet nostalgia, it will be a

problem to link the societal sector of these states with the societal security of the West.

Also, as long as these countries are dependent on Russian gas and labor market, it will be a

problem to ask these countries serious commitments to confront Russia in military and

political issues. Concerning Belarus, as I have mentioned before, it is a part of Russian

Heartland and there is no signs that the situation will change without serious commitments

from the West. In Caucasus, only Georgia could be considered as possible Sea-Power

state, because it perceives as threat only the Russian state. Finally, Azerbaijan and

Armenia are the only archetypes of Rimland states, because their status quo policies and

the Nagorno-Karabakh problem do not allow the possibility to become a part of the West

or a part of Russian Heartland without serious conflicts.

Finally, five Eastern Partnership countries could be considered members of two

Regional Security complexes: the West+EaP and Russian Former Soviet Union. Only

Belarus security depends on Russia and is independent from evolutions in Western security

complex. Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia are dependent on both

geopolitical players and have relatively deep integration in both regional security

complexes. In section two of my thesis I showed that security of these countries could not

be separated from the security of Russia and of the West. Thus, these countries are

considered a space of influence by both and any evolution there could have consequences

for the stability in Europe. Finally, if we consider these countries members of two RSC, we

could confirm the Rimland-Heartland theory, because, according it, Rimland states are

amphibious, are sea and land powers.

A new policy for the West?

For now, the West has all opportunities to win this geopolitical game and establish

new security architecture in Europe, where Russia will be forced to behave according

Western principles and values. Ukraine, the geopolitical pivot in Eastern Europe have a

pro-Western foreign policy and sees in Russia its only enemy and sees the West as the only

savior of its independence. Georgia also does not see its future with Russia because of

103

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, separatist regions which are de facto annexed by Russia.

Azerbaijan, the key country to reach energy reserves of Caspian Sea and Central Asia is

dependent on EU market and knows that Russia will continue to support Armenia in

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and this is the reason why an alliance with Russia will not

change the status quo but will harm its relations with the West. Thus, for these countries,

as well as for Moldova, Russia is not a friend or partner; it is their only Rival which uses

its economic and military power to force its partners to take undesirable decisions. As

consequence, they look to the West as the only power that could protect them. However,

the West is divided. The struggle for leadership between EU and USA, as well as the

struggle for leadership within the EU between France, UK, and Germany is a huge

disadvantage for a common security policy of the West. The Ukrainian crisis proved that

the West is divided and is not able to take serious decisions to face security threats from

Russia. I will make abstraction from these struggles and I will analyze what could do the

West to accomplish its geopolitical goals and to assure European security.

First, the main attention of the West must be on Ukraine. It is nothing new in this

proposition, because Ukraine is a pivot state in Europe and is considered the key state for

US policies in Former Soviet Union. 240

However, the military crisis in Crimea and the

civil War in Eastern Ukraine forced some analysts to consider the possibility of

“Finlandization” of Ukraine. That means, Ukraine should be neutral and should not join

the EU and become the bridge between the West and Russia. This opinion was supported

by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the scholar who argued in 1997 that Ukraine should join both

NATO and EU. That could work, because Ukraine, as well as other EaP states could play

the role of geopolitical gateways between Russia and the West.241

I do not agree with these

opinions because there is a growing Hobbsean culture of anarchy in military and political

relations between Russia and Ukraine. Actually, many of Russians consider Ukraine and

artificial state where should be the Russian region of Novorossia-New Russia. Some of

influential Russian scholars, as Alexander Dughin, consider that the future of Russia

depends on Novorossia- South Eastern regions of Ukraine that should be annexed. 242

Also, Russian official discourse and Russian Strategy of Foreign Politics highlight that

Russians outside Russia must be protected to conserve and develop their identity.

Obviously, Russian minority in South Eastern Ukraine will be a problem for peaceful

relations between Kiev and Moscow, because growing Russian nationalism will destabilize

240

Ibidem p.72 241

S.B.Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2003, p. 49 242

A.Dughin, Civilization-Russia : South East or death, 11.04.2014 http://evrazia.org/article/2497

104

these regions. Thus, it is impossible to imagine that Ukraine will have peaceful and

cooperative relations with Russia as long as Russia does not recognize Ukrainian

sovereignty over Crimea and as long as Russia promotes separatist messages in South

Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine must be protected from Russian revisionism and this protection

could be established only by NATO. In fact, there is no other option to assure Ukrainian

independence and integrity without NATO. If Ukraine stays neutral, there is a huge risk

that Russia will try to annex the so-called Novorossia, using military force or using

national and linguistic cleavages in Ukraine. That is the reason why the West must give to

Ukraine the possibility to become NATO member state.

Second, the West must build the “Caucasus Corridor”. That means the West must

assure Georgian and Azeri security from possible Russian pressures. “Caucasus Corridor”

will assure to the West the access to Caspian Sea and Central Asia, thus, and will provide

energy independence from Russia. Also, friendly or allied Georgia and Azerbaijan will

isolate Russia from Armenia and will diminish Russian influence in Middle East. The West

must propose membership in NATO for Georgia, because it is the key for South Caucasus

security and is by far the most vulnerable state in the region. If the EU wants to build the

Southern Corridor of gas and oil pipelines, Georgia must be protected because it is the key

transit country for energy resources of Central Asia and Caspian Sea. Finally, it will be

easier to deal with Azerbaijan if Georgian political independence and security will be

assured by the West. Without Georgia, all EU plans for energy independence from Russia

will be compromised. The second state of the possible “Caucasus Corridor” is Azerbaijan.

As I mentioned in the third part, it is a genuine Rimland state and a status quo country. It

will be difficult to make a Western democracy in Azerbaijan and its kin state-Turkey is a

clear example that it is almost impossible. For now, Azerbaijan is a self sufficient state

with huge energy resources disinterested in status quo change. It could look for NATO

membership to assure its security from possible attempts of Russia to disrupt some of

Azeri pipelines to Europe, but it is less possible that Azerbaijan will look for EU

membership or political integration with the West. Azerbaijan needs security to trade its

resources and to maintain its integrity and is not willing to give up its political sovereignty.

Azerbaijan is a status quo country; it will balance both Russia and the West. However, the

West must assure a friendly regime in Baku and preserve Azeri secular state. If it does not,

it is possible that some anti-Western fundamentalist movements could rise up and it will be

difficult to deal with them. There is a considerable risk for Azeri societal sector, because of

Iranian influences and because of Turkish growing Islam. In fact, Azerbaijan is the only

105

fully secular Muslim state in the region and it is a huge advantage for the West, because it

could deal with it according its own rules which are understood and interiorized. Human

rights will be a problem in this case, but Azerbaijan is too important and could become too

vulnerable because of rising Islam to pay attention to morality of the regime. In long run,

Azerbaijan could be transformed, but now, it needs to be protected. The “Caucasus

Corridor” will assure Western energy independence from Russia and will force it to look

for cooperation in economic issues. Without EU gas and oil market, Russian economic

security will be threatened and its power will be considerable diminished. That’s why,

Georgia must become a NATO and EU member and Azerbaijan must become a NATO

member, or, at least, the West must assure all necessary guarantees of Azeri integrity and

independence.

Finally, the West must promote cooperation between Eastern Partnership members,

because it will raise the efficiency of its policies in the region. Ukraine and Moldova could

solve together the issue of Transnistrian separatist region, because it is geographically

isolated from Russia. Without Russian economic and military support, this separatist

region could collapse, being isolated from the world. Being solved, this conflict will

enhance the security of Ukrainian Black Sea seashore, especially in Odessa region.

Ukraine and Moldova have Lokean culture of anarchy in their relations with Russia, and,

in fact, Russia is a threat for their independence and integrity. In some sectors of security,

as military and political, these countries experienced Hobbsean culture of anarchy in

relations with Russia, thus, these historical experiences could help them to cooperate and

to balance Russia. As I proved in the third part of my paper, they have a dominant

balancing behavior towards Russia and bandwagoning behavior towards the West. Their

cooperation could produce mutual gains for everybody, even for the West itself. Georgia

and Azerbaijan could also cooperate to assure security of their borders. First, Georgia

could block any Russian attempts to militarize Armenia, thus, it will ease Azeri concerns

over Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Second, cooperation between these countries could

assure common gains from energy resources of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan could gain

from exports; Georgia could gain from transit of energy resources. Finally, both countries

could be interested to isolate Armenia from Russia. Being economically and

geographically isolated from its ally, Armenia could lose importance in South Caucasus. A

weak Armenia will ease Georgian and Azeri security concerns and will make from

Armenia a more flexible partner in relations with the West. That’s why, the West must

promote cooperation between Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, because

106

together, they could better resist Russian pressures and they could reach their security

goals.

In conclusion, my paper could be a useful tool for scholars and for politicians to

analyze dynamics of international relations in Eastern Partnership. Also, it could be used to

improve Western foreign policy in the region, because I identified security sectors where

Western influence could be more efficient. Finally, my theoretical model could be applied

to analyze other regions of the World, because geopolitical sea-land power antagonism has

a global dimension and this approach could be useful to predict future international

arrangement. Security could not be analyzed without geopolitics, that’s why a

methodology which links these theories could enhance our possibilities to understand the

world.

107

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