Competition of Geopolitical Interests in Post-Soviet Space:

Future Prospects for the Eastern Partnership Countries

Chisinau

2013

Publication financially supported by the Soros Foundation Moldova, through the East East Beyond Borders

Program. The content of this publication and/or opinions expressed therein do not necessarily reflect the views of

Soros Foundation Moldova, but solely those of the authors.

Authors:

Sergiy Gerasymchuk

International Programs Director at Strategic and Security Studies Group (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Yaroslav Matiychyk

Executive Director at Strategic and Security Studies Group (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Oazu Nantoi

Program Director at Institute for Public Policy (Chisinau, Republic of Moldova)

FOREWORD

Expert team consisting of experts from Institute for Public Policy (Republic of Moldova) and Strategic and

Security Studies Group (Ukraine)

Supporting the willingness of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova to promote the values of freedom and

democracy within the area from the Baltic to the Caspian Sea;

Considering that the EU is one of the key actors in the region of Eastern Partnership and keeping in mind that one

of the key objectives of the Eastern Partnership Program moving towards the common European space;

Stressing the importance of the Transnistrian issue for the further strengthening and consolidating of the above-

mentioned space, as well as for regional security and stability;

Deeply regretting that Russia perceives the progress of the Eastern Partnership countries as the element of

geopolitical competition;

Admitting that Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and other Eastern Partnership states face the same threats and

risks generated by Russian soft power interventions;

Welcoming all international actors to be deeper involved in the process where they can contribute added value to

it;

Considering recent international and regional political developments and changes as a window of opportunity for

solving this crisis;

PRESENTS to national governments, international organisations, national and international NGOs and expert

community the Policy Paper below.

The paper includes three interconnected chapters. The first one touches upon the issue of Russian soft power, its

application in Eastern Partnership countries and the challenges it causes; the second one focuses on the concrete

example of Russian interference into the internal affairs of Eastern Partnership country – Moldova and possible

outcomes of such interference for the region and for the prospects of further Europeanisation of the region,

whereas the third one focuses on the direct impact of Russian soft power on the foreign policy strategies of

Eastern Partnership countries and defines most vulnerable of them.

RUSSIAN SOFT POWER AS AN INSTRUMENT OF GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Sergiy Gerasymchuk

Russian Federation is the geopolitical subject which due to the historical reasons and strong economic, cultural and

historical ties with the countries of Eastern Europe (in particular post-Soviet countries) plays a significant role in

the region. These days in particular within the context of forthcoming Vilnius summit there are lots of speculations

regarding this role: if it is positive or negative? Is it rooted in the desire to promote new promising initiatives or

reflects post-imperial syndromes of Kremlin.

In this study, grounding on the research papers of both Western and Russian scholars we try to answer the

question what do we mean by Russian soft power and is it “powerful” enough to shape the direction of Eastern

Partnership countries foreign policy.

The first step is the reference to Russian political scientists. We believe that studying their findings will be helpful

for understanding the origin of Russia’s soft power from inside. From this perspective the research studies of

Russian political scientist Andrei Tsygankov seem to be most helpful since in his studies he both touches upon the

field of international relations but also the schools of Russian political thought referring to the application of soft

power.

In his article dated by late nineties Tsygankov compares the approaches to foreign policy and international

relations in Russian Federation and defines few ideal types: the international institutionalists or "mutual security"

school, the realists or "balance of power" school (separated into defensive and aggressive realists), and the

revolutionary expansionists or the "security through expansion" school.1

The key features of the abovementioned schools are reflected in the tables below:

Table 12

Image School of thought

International

Institutionalism

Defensive

Realism

Aggressive

Realism

Revolutionary

Expansionism

Culture Russia is a

Western country

Russia is a

mixture of East

and West; a

Slav-Turk

community

Russia is a Eurasian

anti-Western

country

Russia is a Eurasian anti-

American country

International Status Normal great

power, one of

many

Great power,

temporarily in

crisis

Superpower, one

of two

Superpower, one of two

1Tsygankov,Andrei (1997), From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary

Russia, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Nov., 1997), pp. 247-268, p. 249.

2Ibid., p. 254.

Type of State Confederation of

nation states

“Postimperial”

state

Stable empire with

fixed borders

Constantly expanding

empire

Method of

Maintaining Internal

Stability

International

cooperation on

economic and

security issues;

domestic political

democracy and

market economy

Leadership in

organizing and

developing CIS;

High degree of

centralization;

economic and

military

modernization;

prudent leadership

Permanent geopolitical

expansion

Geopolitical Borders Russian

Federation -

national borders;

former Soviet

Union-

confederation

with possible

exception of the

Baltic states

Russia-borders

with Near

Abroad former

Soviet Union-

borders with

Far Abroad

Former Soviet

Union

Much beyond the former

Soviet Union

Table 23

Image School of thought

International

Institutionalism

Defensive Realism Aggressive Realism Revolutionary

Expansionism

Degree of Hostility Mostly friendly Hostile Hostile Hostile

Main Sources of

Hostility

Conflicts Conflictson Russian

periphery

Differences

inculture and values

between Russia and

the West

U.S. geopolitical

plot against Russia

Cause of Soviet

decline

Domestic causes,

economic decline

Both domestic and

external causes

External causes External causes

Attitude Toward

Former Soviet

Republics

Not threatening Some are

threatening

because of internal

military and ethnic

conflicts

Threatening

because are

becoming

influenced byalien

geopolitical powers

Threatening until

they are

reintegrated into

the Russian empire

3Ibid., p. 256.

AttitudeToward

West

Friendly, in favor of

cooperation with

West

Neutral, or

implicitly hostile;

can cooperate on

some issues

Openly hostile;

West is alien

culture

Openly hostile

toward U.S. but not

toward Europe as it

may become an ally

in Russian-U.S.

geopolitical struggle

Attitude Toward

East and South

Generally

friendlybut cool;

Russia's interests

are in the West

Neutral; Russia has

special interests in

East and South

Generally

suspicious and

hostile, especially

toward China

Generallyhostile

Although such matrixes provide us with the ideal types the analyses of the foreign policy of Russian Federation in

recent decade from this perspective provides us with the opportunity to assess current trends and define

dominating school of thought.

In this regard it is important to emphasize that Russian foreign policy assertiveness under Putin has been well

documented. Russia has disrupted energy supplies to Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine for political, as well as,

economic reasons. It has also used trade sanctions against Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In 2005, Putin convinced

Uzbekistan to deny US forces access to the Karshi-Khanabad air base, a site used for combat missions to

Afghanistan. In May 2007, Putin compared US foreign policy to that of the Third Reich and threatened to re-target

armed nuclear missiles at Western Europe. Rhetoric aside, Putin has imposed a “moratorium” on the Conventional

Armed Forces (CFE) treaty. In August 2007, in response to US plans to station interceptor missiles in Poland and a

radar station in the Czech Republic, Russia threatened to place its own missiles in Kaliningrad. Putin also

announced the resumption of regular, long-range bomber patrols. In August 2007, Russia orchestrated a series of

military exercises in Southern Urals involving 6500 troops from Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,

and Tajikistan. Russia’s arms trade and strategic cooperation with China and Iran has also raised concerns among

Western policy makers. The 2008 armed conflict with Georgia involving South Ossetia and Abkhazia demonstrated

Russia’s resolve to affirm itself as a geopolitical force. In September 2008, Russian naval ships were dispatched to

Venezuela for joint maneuvers. In February 2009, Abkhaz officials announced that the separatist region will host

two Russian military bases. In August 2009, Russia announced that it would spend $500 million in 2010 to

strengthen its military bases in Abkhazia. In the same month, Kyrgyz officials announced that it would close a U.S.

air base that was used by American forces fighting in Afghanistan. The announcement came after Kyrgyzstan

secured over $2 billion in financial aid and credit from Moscow.4

Quite important indicator regarding the role of the United States in the foreign policy of Russia was the situation

related to protests at Bolotnaya Square in Russia which were described by Russian state-owned media as coming

from foreign and domestic enemies who work for the U.S. State Department and seek to destroy Russia5. No less

important indicator of the relations with the U.S. was the recent situation in Syria when speaking to his human

rights council in September 2013 Putin said commenting on the American position: "This was very unpleasant and

4Mohsin Hashim S., Power-loss or power-transition? Assessing the limits of using the energy sector in reviving Russia’s geopolitical stature.

Communist and Post-Communist Studies Journal.

5http://imrussia.org/en/politics/461-bolotnaya-square-one-year-later

surprising for me. We talk to them (the Americans), and we assume they are decent people, but he is lying and he

knows that he is lying. This is sad."6

Considering the mentioned facts as well as other recent developments we can fill another table which describes

the trends in Russian foreign policy and Russian self-perception from the contemporary perspective.

Table 3

Culture Russia is a Eurasian anti-American country (the recent

anti-American rhetoric during the postelection

protests in 2012, Snowden case and Syria case only

prove this fact) – Revolutionary Expansionism

International Status Superpower, one of two – Revolutionary

Expansionism

Type of State “Post-imperial” state with the trend of converting into

constantly expanding empire (although we do not

mean the direct expansion of borders as in case but

rather expansion of the influence) – combination of

Defensive Realism transforming into Revolutionary

Expansionism

Method of Maintaining Internal Stability High degree of centralization; economic and military

modernization; prudent leadership transforming into

permanent geopolitical expansion – Aggressive

Realism transforming into Revolutionary Expansionism

Geopolitical Borders Much beyond the former Soviet Union (the case of

joint maneuvers with Venezuela is among the

brightest examples of this fact) – Revolutionary

Expansionism

Degree of Hostility Hostile– Revolutionary Expansionism

Main Sources of Hostility U.S. geopoliticalplot against Russia– Revolutionary

Expansionism

Cause of Soviet decline Externalcauses– Revolutionary Expansionism

Attitude Toward Former Soviet Republics Threatening until they are reintegrated into the

Russian empire– Revolutionary Expansionism

AttitudeToward West Openly hostile toward U.S. but not toward Europe as

it may become an ally in Russian-U.S. geopolitical

struggle– Revolutionary Expansionism

Attitude Toward East and South Neutral; Russia has special interests in East and South

– Defensive Realism

The suggested table proves that despite the fact that Russian foreign policy and self-perception contain the

elements of realism of both types – defensive and aggressive the dominating trend is Revolutionary expansionism.

6http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2013/09/05/obama-kerry-putin-syria-russia-g-20/2769683/

We may assume that the elements of realism are still present due to the fact that Russia faced a severe economic

crisis which limited its ambitions. However the recovery rooted in the raise of prices for natural resources provided

the levers for the implementation of plans of revolutionary expansionists.

Beside, Tsygankov also focuses at the attitude towards the application of soft power observed in Russian

Federation. In this regard he also focuses at the key schools of thought dealing with the issue of soft power.

Table 4

Objective of exploiting

soft power

Western-style democracy Stability and security Political and economic

dominance

Method of exploiting soft

power

Tacit cooptation Mixture of cooptation

and coercion

Coercion

* Political pressures

* Economic sanctions

* Support for separatism

Awareness of soft power

positive sum potential

Yes Yes No

Attitude toward hard

power and military force

Should be minimized Remains essential Remains essential

In this regard it is important to note that both Russian and international researchers admit that Putin's frequent

references to the 'historic unity of people' in the region and creation of a special department for Interregional and

Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at the Kremlin indicate that the authorities are beginning to take the soft

power dimension more seriously.

Putin's critics insist that soft power is just another tool for restoring an imperial control 'if not by tanks, then by

banks'. In other words 'we are facing a restoration of the Russian empire through economic means'. Soft power is

therefore viewed in a similar light to the hard power of coercion and military force and the additional facility for

gaining the objectives of the revolutionary expansionists. This view is reinforced by Russia's recent reluctance to

dismantle its military bases in Georgia, occasional promises to 'preventively' use military force outside its own

territory to respond to terrorist threats.

Another indicator of soft power has been Russia's growing presence in the economies of the former Soviet

republics. Russia participated in energy privatization in the former Soviet region, and as a result of bilateral

negotiations, the Kremlin asserted control over the strategic property and transportation of the former republics

and further expands its influence towards Central European and even Western European states.

As a result of the division of Caspian resources, Russia secured partnerships with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In

Georgia, the Russian state electric company obtained the right to be the main electricity provider, which provided

it with a formidable opportunity to influence Georgian economic development. In Armenia, Russia obtained

several strategic assets including a nuclear power station, to offset a debt of 40 million dollars, and in April 2006,

the Russian energy giant Gazprom became the sole owner of the republic's gas transportation system. In addition,

AnatoliiChubais, the head of the Russian state electric company, also expressed further interest in participating in

energy privatisation in Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet region.

Finally, there is considerable progress in increasing the attractiveness of Russia's cultural values in the region.

Beginning with the October 2001 Congress of Russian Compatriots in Moscow, the Kremlin, assisted by the regions,

has been allocating funds to support Russian Diasporas in the post-Soviet area. For instance, in 2003, the

government allocated R210 million towards this goal and in 2004 such funds grew by 20%. Russia has devised the

'Russian language' federal program led by Lyudmila Putin, the president's former wife. Slavic universities have

been successfully functioning in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Despite efforts by nationalist elites

in the Soviet successor states to squeeze out Russian language from public and social life, millions still prefer to

converse and do business in Russian.7 In case of Ukraine and Moldova Russian language is often used as the

instrument for the political speculations. Most often the problems with Russian language-speakers who claim to be

allegedly oppressed rise in the period of elections. The Russian-speakers are presented as the opposition to the

majority of the state which enforces potential separatist trends or existing secessionist problems (e.g. Crimea and

Transnistria).

In addition, Moscow is increasingly aware of the new opportunities presented by electronic media. Russian

language is ranked as the tenth most used language on the Internet and it dominates the region. Many people in

the region have access to Russian telecommunication networks and prefer them to those of the West-partly

because of their knowledge of the language, and partly because of the already established historic ties.8

One cannot omit the fact that Moscow has been trying to establish a sphere of influence in its “near abroad” since

the break-up of the Soviet Union. Its soft power is built on a bedrock of historical and cultural affinity — the

presence of Russian minorities in neighbourhood countries, the Russian language, post-Soviet nostalgia and the

strength of the Russian Orthodox Church etc. Another interesting trend is the attempt to convert any ethnic

minority into first Russian-speaking and further Russian-oriented minority. In this regard Moldova regrettably can

be an example.

However the turning point came with the Orange revolutionin 2004 in Ukraine, when Russia’s clumsy tactics of

interference in support for Viktor Yanukovych backfired, triggering a serious Russian tactical rethink. Drawing its

lessons from the central role played by civil society groups and NGOs in the Orange revolution, Russia began

developing a rival “counter-revolutionary” ideology, supporting “its” NGOs, using “its” web technologies, and

exporting its own brands of political and economic influence. GlebPavlovsky describes the Orange revolution as “a

very useful catastrophe for Russia. We learnt a lot”.9

The outcome of the experience of the knowledge obtained by the Russian elites was the creation of “quasi-

institutes of civil society”. These are those financed by Russia (directly or indirectly), guided by neo-imperial

7Tsygankov,Andrei (2006), If Not by Tanks, Then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin's Foreign Policy, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 7

(Nov., 2006), pp. 1079-1099, p. 1082.

8Tsygankov,Andrei (2006), If Not by Tanks, Then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin's Foreign Policy, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 7

(Nov., 2006), pp. 1079-1099, p. 1084.

9The Limits of Enlargement-lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled NeighbourhoodNicuPopescu& Andrew Wilson POLICY REPORT, p.

29

ideology and aiming to discredit civil society from inside. On the one hand such organizations can act for

discrediting civil society in general and on the other hand can act as the provocateurs under the status of

“independent analytical center” or “NGO”. Quite often experts define as such type of the organizations MMK

“Proryv” (“Breakthrough”) or headed by StanislavBelkovskiy National Strategy Institute known both in Ukraine and

Romania as the official mouthpiece of Kremlin10

, Ukrainian Choice (Ukraine),League of Russian Youth (Moldova)

etc. Such organizations or their branches emphasize their non-governmental and non-partisan status, however

indirectly or directly demonstrate their pro-Russian orientation and underline the fact that what they do is

representation of the majority of population.

The mentioned organizations can be described as strong institutionally and having a significant level of impact.

If applying the impact indicators one would see the following picture

Table 5

NGOs – Russia’s Soft Power Instruments

Resource indicator

Being a part of the Russian soft power strategy quite often the think tanks and NGOs of this group do not face

financial difficulties. Moreover, quite usually they have the access to the institutional support which provides

them with the opportunities for the activities which are not limited to the projects but enable them to

operate within a wider context. This feature means that the think tanks have either persuasive institutional

sustainability or descent financing for the activities which correspond with the priorities of Russian foreign

policy agenda.

Issue articulation indicator

Most often due to the fact that the think tanks and NGOs of this group do not refer to the issues of

democratization and can be less critical towards semi-democratic governments they are more welcome with

their suggestions and pieces of advice by the decision-makers than the representatives of traditional civil

society groups and have better chances to involve the decision makers into the discussion since guarantee the

absence of criticism at the public events.

Media visibility is provided not only by the favorable climate for the access to media in Eastern Europe but

also by means of using the tool of Russian media which is quite important if taking into account the fact of

Russian media-domination in post-Soviet space.

Policy formulation indicator

Obtaining the institutional support alongside with the ideological background and being guided by the Russian

long- and midterm interests, the think tanks of this group have long term strategies and can operate in rather

American than European fashion which means direct or indirect lobbying of certain interests, close ties with

the decision-makers, etc.

The research activities of the mentioned think tanks and NGOs are rather targeting the concrete state or refer

to the wider context of recently emerged concept of Russian world – ‘russkiymir’.

10

http://www.salut.md/news/15944.html

Demand indicators

Demand indicator can be hardly measurable in this case. However, taking into account the fact that civil

society actors of this Group abstain from criticizing the authorities and avoid any speculations on the issue of

democratization, it would be justified to assume that they are perceived by semi-democratic and

authoritarian governments with less idiosyncrasy than the representatives of traditional civil society

By possessing the necessary for their activities resources pro-Russian NGOs and think tanks can also use flexible

hypocrites as the instrument of influence.

Finally, another important function of pro-Russian think tanks and organizations is related to the public need. If in

case of traditional civil society groups the democratization/westernalization ankle is the prevailing one, in case of

technocratic government-funded and government oriented organizations the public need definition belongs to the

authorities and in case of flexible hypocrites public need is a flexible variable, in case of “russkiymir”-oriented

organizations public need is perceived through the lens of neo-imperial ambitions which corresponds with the

views of Russian revolutionary expansionists. Actually this group of instrumental for Russian soft power NGOs does

not care much about the changes of the public opinion regarding the public need. On the contrary, it makes the

efforts to persuade the decision makers that the prevailing interest of the society is reintegration into post-Soviet

space and in case of need without hesitation manipulates with the results of public opinion polls.

Pro-Russian NGOs and think tanks belong to the newly emerged phenomena and this fact causes their low

quantity. Therefore despite the significant potential and good record of impact indicators they are not dominating

in the sector of non-governmental think tanks. However, the resources they obtain, as well as the ideological

background which provide them with certain sustainability prove that the perspectives of this group are quite

promising. In particular they might achieve certain success in improving the impact on the national governments

and system of decision-making in the field of foreign policy and security policy. The decline of the influence of

traditional think tanks and organizations, trend of turning flexible hypocrites into the satellite of pro-Russian NGOs,

actually provides this quasi-segment of civil society with the opportunity to occupy the niche of the key civil society

player interacting with the decision-makers and with the high level of possibility shaping their decisions and

influencing public opinion by commenting the implementation of such decisions.

It’s also obvious that Vilnius summit, notwithstanding its results will not be the point of no return. Most probably

both after success or failure of Vilnius summit the role of revolutionary expansionism will not decline in Russia and

the countries of Eastern Partnership will face new challenges of Russian soft power. Presumably, the new actors in

this field will emerge and traditional civil society has to be aware of the growing threats. In this regard its seems to

be a vital necessity to pay attention to the vulnerabilities within EaP countries’ societies and to get prepared for

the new interventions of Russia ‘if not by tanks’ then by soft means in the Russian manner of understanding of soft

power.

USING A PROTRACTED CONFLICT TO PROMOTE GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS:

RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S POLICY TOWARDS THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Oazu Nantoi

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova faced serious problems in the process of state-

building. The flawed democracy, dysfunctional institutions and unsustainable economy make Republic of Moldova

unprepared to maintain and sustain its national interests against negative external influence. The unsolved conflict

in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistrian region), illegal stationing of Russian troops on its

territory, and inability to ensure its energy security create opportunities for scenarios that would prevent the

consolidation of the Republic of Moldova as a sovereign and democratic rule of law, free to choose on its own its

geopolitical vector.

On May 7, 2009, at the EU Summit in Prague, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership that envisages helping

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to implement reforms and promote political,

economic, and legislative convergence with the EU. Trade, visa liberalization and funds for promotion of

democratic values and good governance are the main incentives of Eastern Partnership.

In the framework of Eastern Partnership, EU increased substantially its assistance directed towards the

implementation of reforms aimed at drawing the Republic of Moldova closer to European standards. On December

16, 2010, in the framework of EU-Moldova dialogue, an Action Plan for Visa Liberalisation was signed. Progress in

negotiations regarding Moldova visa liberalization with the EU and the Association Agreement (including a Deep

and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement) has been saluted by various European officials. On November 15,

2013, Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission announced that that Moldova has fulfilled

the criteria for the visa-free travel and that the European Commission has recommended the lifting of visa

requirements for Moldovan citizens entering the European Union who hold biometric passports. It is expected

that during the Eastern Partnership summit in November 2013 in Vilnius EU will initial the Association Agreement

with the Republic of Moldova. This could result in a more dynamic modernization process and a boost for EU-

related reforms in the Republic of Moldova. The partnership between the Republic of Moldova and the EU offers a

chance to change attitudes in the Moldovan society, to break-up with the past and undemocratic mentality.

At the same time, Russian Federation is rebuilding its influence in the six post-soviet countries targeted by the

Eastern Partnership. The return of Vladimir Putin to Presidency of the Russian Federation marked an activation of

Russian Federation’s efforts to maintain its interests in near abroad through the Customs Union and the idea of

Eurasian Union integrationist project. The Republic of Moldova, which is a member of CIS, is influenced by Russian

Federation through a wide range of instruments – access to Russian market (including labor market), Transnistrian

conflict settlement, energy dependence, etc. Currently important segments of Moldovan society are easily

manipulated with slogans of “nostalgia for USSR”. Moldovan ethno-linguistic diversity and regional specificity are

also being used to hamper European perspectives.

The socio-economic problems faced by some EU countries, coupled with the active promotion of the Customs

Union, have led to the substantial decrease of Moldovan citizens supporting the European integration aspirations

for Moldova. This fact worries not only Moldovan expert community, but also the decision-makers and experts

from European Union. It is becoming more evident that the Russian soft-power in the region will work towards

impeding Moldova’s rapprochement with the EU and compromising the European agenda of the country, in order

to change the vector of Moldova’s foreign policy towards the Eurasian project.

Citizen support for Moldova’s integration with the European Union reached its peak during the rule of the Party of

the Communists11

. The Barometer of Public Opinion from November 2007 showed 76% of citizens being in favor of

EU integration. Paradoxical but the number of supporters of Moldova’s European perspective began to decline

after a coalition of parties that called itself the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) took over power after the

early elections of July 29, 2009. The low level of civic and political culture and the internal scandals and mutual

accusations within AEI also led to the substantial decline in the number of followers of the European perspective in

the Republic of Moldova. The Barometer of Public Opinion from April 2013 measured at 50.2% the support of the

citizens for EU integration. The same opinion poll showed that 52% of the population was in favor of Russian-led

Customs Union12

.

The conflict in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistrian region) remains to be an instrument

of blackmail for Moldova applied efficiently by the Russian Federation. It continues to support economically the

bankrupt regime in Transnistria. Also, the Russian Federation keeps refusing to withdraw its troops from the

territory of the Republic of Moldova, blocking any attempts to transform the current peacekeeping operation into

a civic mission under international mandate. Russian diplomacy promotes its own vision of the settlement of the

Transnistrian conflict, with the same goal – to maintain influence and control over Moldova.

The essence of the issue known as «Transnistrian conflict»

The issue known as Transnistrian conflict in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistrian region)

exists since the beginning of 1990s. It is a consequence of political struggles meant to preserve the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the Transnistrian conflict has been categorized as «frozen» and hasn’t seen lately any positive dynamic

in the process of settlement.

The situation began to change in particular after the launch of the Eastern Partnership at the Prague Summit on

May 7, 2009. It is thought that signing by Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova of the Association Agreements with

the EU will have a direct impact on the self-proclaimed «Transnistrian Moldavian Republic» («TMR») – the narrow

strip of land between the Ukraine and the rest of the Republic of Moldova.

In the Republic of Moldova, and elsewhere, there is a widespread opinion that «TMR» is a tool that will be used by

the Russian Federation to hamper the European path of the Republic of Moldova. Against this background, in

2013, the situation in the Security Zone of the Republic of Moldova has repeatedly become tense. In some cases

involvement of OSCE officials was needed in order to calm down the situation.

Questions arise regarding the possible scenarios of the development of the conflict settlement process after the

Vilnius Summit when Ukraine will sign and Republic of Moldova will initial the Association Agreements with the EU.

The developments around Transnistrian conflict settlement require a critical review in the light of new realities.

The term «Transnistrian conflict» indicates the geographical area in which the conflict appeared; however it says

nothing about its genesis and essence.

11

The Party of the Communists changed the country’s foreign policy vector from Russia-Belarus Union to European Union at the end of 2003,

when Vladimir Voronin’s refusal to sign the Kozak Memorandum resulted in the deterioration of relations with Russian Federation.

12 Barometer of Public Opinion, April 2013, p. 118 // http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&id=655&idc=156

The roots of the conflict come from the historical past, notably in 1812, when the Russian Empire annexed

Bessarabia (the territory between the Prut and Nistru rivers). But the actual conflict erupted against the backdrop

of political processes which resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union in fifteen new countries, including

the Republic of Moldova (former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic - MSSR).

The analysis of processes that took place in the former MSSR starting in 1989 allows the following conclusions:

- The conflict arose within the population from the left bank of Nistru river - between supporters and opponents of

MSSR withdrawal out of the Soviet Union. The dividing line between these two categories of residents of MSSR,

with incompatible political views, did not coincide with the Nistru river line. The conflict outbreak took place in

Dubasari district on the left bank. Dubasari city administration promoted policies against Moldova's independence,

while Dubasari district administration supported the transformation of MSSR into an independent state.

- On June 23, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of MSSR, with the participation of deputies elected on the whole territory

of the republic, including Transnistrian region, adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty. According to instructions

from Moscow, on September 2, 1990, in Tiraspol, «the Congress of deputies of all levels» proclaimed the

establishment of the «Soviet Socialist Transnistrian Moldavian Republic as part of USSR». The purpose of this

proclamation was to be used as a blackmail tool, in order to keep it MSSR within the «updated» Union.

- The «TMR» was established through violence. The fragile state structures of the Republic of Moldova could not

oppose the Russian military power. The paramilitary troops of the «TMR» were created with the input of former

military units of the Soviet 14th Army, which were under Russian control since April 1, 199213

.

- In 1992 the Russian Federation has committed an act of aggression against the Republic of Moldova. As a result,

the Republic of Moldova has lost control of part of its territory (about 12%). This was accompanied by serious

violation of fundamental human rights, including ethnic cleansing. About twenty-five thousand political opponents

of the «TMR» regime became internally displaced persons.

- Russian Federation's role in triggering and preserving the conflict is found in the Judgement of the European

Court for Human Rights on the case of Ilascu and others vs. Moldova and Russia group from 2004.

- The Transnistrian conflict is neither internal nor ethnic. For example, only in Chisinau live more ethnic Russians

(citizens of the Republic of Moldova) than in the whole «TMR». There is also no legal basis to justify the existence

of the anti-constitutional regime in the eastern district of the Republic of Moldova.

The issue known as «Transnistrian conflict» is a conflict between Republic of Moldova’s state-building project

within internationally recognized borders and Russian geopolitical interests.

What is «Transnistrian Moldavian Republic» today?

The authoritarian «TMR» insists on the existence of «Transnistrian people». This «nation» allegedly repeatedly

expressed its desire to be «closer to Russia» (i.e. the «referendum» from September 17, 2006) and categorically

rejects any rapprochement with the Republic of Moldova.

The authorities of «TMR» insist that it is a democratic and rule-of-law state. In reality, right from its creation,

«TMR» was established as an authoritarian regime, which annihilates any political opposition to the idea of «TMR»

13

Указ Президента РФ от 01.04.92 N 320 о переходе под юрисдикцию РФ воинских частей вооруженных сил бывшего СССР,

находящихся на территории Республики Молдова // www.lawrussia.ru/texts/legal_555/doc555a314x671.htm

existence. This ensures a false unanimity inherent to all non-democratic political systems. The «TMR» has

instituted an atmosphere of fear, conformity and obedience to the existing regime.

The main repressive body of the «TMR» is the «Committee for State Security» (Комитет Государственной

Безопасности, КГБ, KGB)14

, which is acting as political police. The «TMR» KGB is constantly blocking any

independent civic initiatives. It exercises a strict control over all of the NGOs on the left bank of Nistru and does

not allow free cooperation and communication between ordinary citizens on the two banks of Nistru. The «KGB»

trails all representatives of diplomatic missions and international organizations visiting «TMR» and has

representatives in all the confidence-building working groups. The actions of the representatives of «TMR» in

these working groups are closely monitored by «KGB», which consistently blocks any decisions directed towards

confidence-building.

With Russian Federation’s support, defying all previously concluded agreements, which provide for «free

movement of people, goods and services», the «TMR» regime established a de facto border along the

administrative line, separating the territory controlled by the regime from the rest of the Republic of Moldova. The

«TMR» regime prohibits the passing on the left bank of Nistru of all the Members of Parliament and Government

of the Republic of Moldova. Also, there were cases when foreign diplomats accredited in Moldova were prohibited

to visit the left bank of Nistru. The „TMR» regime has black lists of citizens of the Republic of Moldova, who are

refused the access to the territories controlled by it.

For more than twenty years there is a brainwashing mechanism working in «TMR» (newspapers, radio and TV) that

continues to reinforce the romanophobia inherited from the Soviet period. The image of the enemy is created

from everything that relates to the Republic of Moldova, Romania, USA, NATO etc. The armed conflict in 1992 is

presented as an act of aggression of the Republic of Moldova over «Transnistrian people». All pupils are repeatedly

led to «museums» that show the «atrocities committed by Romanian-Moldovan fascist aggressors» in 1992. All

young people from the «TMR», regardless of their nationality, are enrolled by force in the paramilitary units

(«army») which are subject to the same «brainwashing» practices and are trained to «rebuff the aggression of the

Republic of Moldova».

These practices have remained unchanged after December 2011, when Yevgeny Shevchuk has substituted Igor

Smirnov as «President» of the «TMR» - for example, websites and internet forums that publish critical opinions

about Yevgeny Shevchuk are blocked on the left bank of Nistru.

In the «TMR» continues the Soviet practice of forced russification of the population. Despite the fact that the

«TMR» has declared «three state languages» - Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan (using the Cyrillic script), the

Russian language dominates exclusively in all public areas. Of the total number of pupils, only about 10% study in

«Moldovan language» and about 5% - in Ukrainian15

. If for teaching in Russian and in Ukrainian languages usually

are used books published in Russia and respectively in Ukraine, then for teaching «in Moldovan» (using the Cyrillic

script) there are no manuals. Therefore the pupils studying in «Moldovan» language are disadvantaged and

discriminated from the start.

In Transnistrian region there remained only 8 educational institutions that teach Romanian language, using Latin

alphabet, under the curriculum of the Republic of Moldova16

. However, these pupils, their parents and their

14

Official website of the Committe for State Security of «TMR» // www.kgb-pmr.com

15 Статистический ежегодник ПМР 2013, p. 59 // http://mepmr.org/pechatnye-izdaniya/statisticheskij-ezhegodnik-pmr; p.59.

16 The lyceum „Mircea Eliade» is functioning in Tiraspol – the only institutions in the capital of „TMR» that educates citizens of Moldova.

teachers have to overcome tremendous pressure from the authorities of «TMR». On October 2012, ECHR adopted

a Judgement on the case of Catan and others vs. Moldova and Russia in which it concluded that the right to

education of students in Transnistrian region violated through actions of pressure and intimidation by «TMR»

authorities.

Due to the realities in Transnistrian region, the graduates of these educational institutions have little or no

opportunity to find jobs on the left bank of Nistru river. «TMR» regime’s policy in fact promotes the departure

from the region of the category of people which are not loyal to the regime.

The people living in «TMR» cannot be seen as a community of free people, whose opinions are expressed by

traditional instruments of a democratic society, such as free and fair elections, referendums, opinion polls etc. If

Moldovan citizens residing in the territory controlled by constitutional authorities, have the experience of

participation in elections deemed by international observers as free and fair, if in Moldova there is a pluralism of

opinions, including mass-media, then the people living in «TMR», immediately after the collapse of the Soviet

Union, have passed under the control of a xenophobic and authoritarian regime and live in an atmosphere of fear,

when censored media mimes for decades the «unity of Transnistrian people».

Several pseudo-referendums have been conducted in „TMR» in order to demonstrate the unwillingness of

«Transnistrian people» to be part of the Republic of Moldova. The last one took place on September 17, 2006.

According to the announced results 97.1% of participants allegedly pleaded for «independence of the republic and

subsequent joining Russian Federation». The regime could have announced any numbers desired by the Kremlin.

«Pluralism» is allowed in the «TMR» only within a rigid official ideology. The political parties from «TMR» also bear

the imprint of local specificity. The political party «Obnovlenie», which controls the majority in the «Supreme

Soviet» (29 out of 43 seats) is a political tool of «Sheriff» company. This company is the most powerful local

business and has a monopoly on many areas of economic activity in «TMR». If the main sponsor of the party

«Obnovlenie» would withdraw its support, the party will certainly disappear. All other political parties, the

existence of which is announced in the «TMR», are completely nonviable structures. On March 1, 2012, the first

congress of the «pro-presidential» party «Vozrojdenie» was held. It was created by the «president of TMR»,

Yevgeny Shevchuk, with the goal to split the «Supreme Soviet» and create a «pro-presidential» majority. However,

it failed to reach this aim and currently there are no signs of activity of this party. The Communist Party of

Transnistria, taking advantage of the financial support of the Communist Party of Russian Federation, succeeded to

promote one of its members in the «Supreme Soviet». The other political parties of the «TMR» have no weight and

are decorative structures of the authoritarian political regime.

There exists a formal «Transnistrian citizenship» in the «TMR». This means that the regime issues local passports

to the residents. It is obvious that this «citizenship» and the local passports are not recognized by any state. People

residing on the territory controlled by «TMR» which want to travel outside the Republic of Moldova have to obtain

the citizenship of a real state. The «TMR» regime requires the «citizenship» as a condition for obtaining local

pension or employment in the budgetary sphere.

To correctly understand the citizenship factor in the Transnistrian region, it is necessary to take into account the

population «pragmatism» as the socially active population from Transnistrian region usually has several passports

of different countries, and uses them according to the destination of their travel.

Russian Federation promotes the conversion of the inhabitants of the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova

in Russian citizens. It has repeatedly urged the Moldovan leadership to open a consulate section in Tiraspol. Since

the leadership of the Republic of Moldova did not accept this, Russian Federation opened a de facto consulate in

Tiraspol. The process of obtaining Russian passports is corrupt, while mediation services to expedite the process

are provided for a certain fee. The fact is that Russian Federation wants to bring the number of Russian citizens in

the region to a level that would allow declaring that «Transnistrian region is inhabited mainly by Russian citizens».

For the moment, the number of Russian citizens announced in «TMR» is about 170 thousand people. However,

there are doubts about the veracity of these figures, in particular in terms of the real presence of these people on

the left bank of Nistru, because many residents of this economically and socially depressed region finally depart to

Russian Federation (since the onset of the conflict, the population of the region decreased by about 30%).

The announced number of Ukrainian citizens in «TMR» is about 80 thousand people. Despite the discrimination by

the regime, most of the population of «TMR» (over 60%) are citizens of the Republic of Moldova. This means that

many people on the left bank of Nistru identify themselves with the Republic of Moldova, although do not

manifest this due to the authoritarian character of the regime.

Often diplomats accredited in Moldova are seeking meetings with representatives of the «TMR» authorities in

order to document on the position of the other «party» to the conflict, even though there are a lot of proofs that

the leadership in Tiraspol are puppets of the Russian Federation and the concepts with which they operate

(«Transnistrian people», «Eurasian vector», «aggression of the Republic of Moldova») were developed by Kremlin.

It is a rather humiliating practice for the Republic of Moldova, which creates psychological comfort for the

authorities in Tiraspol and contributes to the erroneous perception of the conflict.

The artificial character of the conflict is confirmed, inter alia, by the following facts from various fields of activity:

- About 4,000 young people from the left bank of Nistru study in educational institutions in Chisinau;

- In several sports, including football, championships are common for the both banks of Nistru;

- All businesses on the left bank of Nistru that export their products are registered at the Chamber of Commerce

and Industry of the Republic of Moldova17

.

Russian Federation’s military presence on the territory of the Republic of Moldova

Unlike the example of Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) during «perestroika», Moldova couldn’t

obtain the evacuation from its territory of the military units subordinated to Moscow and escape the blackmail

from the Union center. As a result, state-building in Moldova was affected by the issue of regional separatism, led

and supported by the Union center.

Subsequently, Russian Federation began using the unresolved conflict in Transnistrian region in order to maintain

the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of influence.

Russia’s behaviour towards Moldova is determined by the low level of competence and corruption of Moldovan

political class. Russian Federation illegally keeps its troops on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, contrary to

its own international commitments18

, thus defying the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova.

17

They have to obtain compliance certificates and customs documents from relevant Moldovan authorities. However, these businesses do not

pay taxes in the state budget (positive discrimination).

18 Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 19, 1999 //

www.osce.org/library/14114

The military presence of Russian Federation on Moldova’s territory has two components. The first component is

represented by the military units that are part of the peacekeeping operation, established by the Agreement on

the principles of peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Transnistrian region of Moldova (signed on July 21, 1992

in Moscow)19

. The second component is represented by the military units that are illegally stationed by Russia in

Transnistrian region to allegedly guard the ammunition depots in the town of Colbasna. To justify their presence,

Russia deliberately does not discharge about 20 tons of ammunition. Both categories of Russian troops are united

under the command of the Operational Group of Russian Forces. This military presence is also a cover for Russian

intelligence services, which from the territory on the left bank of Nistru extend their business throughout the

territory of the Republic of Moldova.

In 2012 Russian Federation has re-equipped its military units in Transnistrian region with weapons and new

transport means. Moreover, over the last two years (2012-2013) Russian representatives have repeatedly insisted

that the Republic of Moldova allow the use of Tiraspol military airport without control from the border guards and

customs officers of the Republic of Moldova.

The so-called «Transnistrian army» was created, and is equipped with arms and ammunition by the Russian

Federation. Formally retired Russian officers are in command of these paramilitary forces. It is known that the

officers of these troops receive cash supplements, bigger than their «official» salaries, directly from the Russian

Federation, according to their grade.

Russian economic support for «Transnistrian Moldavian Republic» regime

With a budget deficit of about 70%, «Transnistrian Moldavian Republic» is bankrupt in terms of economic and

social development. However, Russian Federation ensures its survival through different types of support. The most

visible of these are the pension supplement for the elderly and natural gas delivered on favourable terms.

All elderly in «TMR» (about 140,000 people) receive a monthly pension supplement from the Russian Federation

(about 10-20$).

As concerning the supply of natural gas, its price in Transnistrian region is several times lower than on the rest of

the territory of the Republic of Moldova20

. However, for many years «TMR» fails to pay for the natural gas supplied

by Gazprom. Instead, the money collected from the population and businesses in the region for natural gas are

accumulated on a separate bank account and further used to cover «TMR» budget deficit.

Gazprom announces regularly the soaring debt of «TMR» for the natural gas consumed21

, but fails to take actions

in order to stop the practice. However, Gazprom has repeatedly tried to claim «the debt» from MoldovaGaz (65%

of which it owns) through the International Commercial Arbitration Court in Moscow.

19

Соглашение о принципах мирного урегулирования вооруженного конфликта в Приднестровском регионе Республики Молдова, 21

июля 1992 г. // www.peacekeeper.ru/ru/?module=pages&action=view&id=89

20 According to leaked information, the Moldovan Metallurgical Plant in Rybnitsa (Transnistrian region), one of the largest enterprise in

Moldova and a substantial contributor to „TMR» budget, pays for the consumed Russian gas 42 USD per 1000 cubic meters, while consumers

on the right bank of Nistru pay about 380 USD per 1000 cubic meters.

21 About 4.5 billion USD in summer 2013

Confidence building measures: is there any impact?

Over the whole period of the Transnistrian conflict many attempts have been undertaken to initiate confidence

building activities. These efforts have intensified in recent years, especially after the Republic of Moldova became

an EU neighbour country in 2007.

The idea is that through confidence building the parties in conflict reach step by step a fair and reasonable

compromise. However, this approach assumes that the conflict is internal – between people on the left and right

banks of Nistru river. In reality the situation is quite different.

«TMR» authorities, following indication from Kremlin, consciously and consistently block any attempts to initiate

direct communication between ordinary people and counterpart organizations from the two banks of Nistru,

without the control of the «KGB».

The example of Euroregion Dniester/Nistru is very pertinent22

. Initially it was thought that the northern districts of

Transnistrian region (Kamenka and Rybnitsa) will join the Euroregion. However, after a phase of optimistic

expectations linked to the emergence of the new leader of the region – Yevgeny Shevhuk, it became clear that it

was denied to the administration of these districts to involve in the project.

Typically, donors, guided by a mistaken perception of the conflict, require Moldovan NGOs to have partners from

Transnistrian region for projects in the field of confidence building. In the situation when the «KGB» controls all

the non-governmental activities on the left bank of Nistru, the impact of such «joint projects» is at least

questionable.

Many representatives of the current administration in Tiraspol, former «Transnistrian civil society

representatives», were previously involved in confidence building activities funded by EU and U.S. donors.

However, since obtaining «official» positions these individuals consistently hamper and neutralize confidence

building activities (i.e Nina Shtanski – the current «minister of foreign affairs of TMR»).

Also, conditioned by «TMR» authorities, donors accept to initiate projects on the territory controlled by «TMR»

without co-involvement of Moldovan authorities. Disregarding official Moldovan authorities and seeking the

approval of the «TMR» authorities for certain projects is weakening Moldova’s image in the eyes of the population

on the left bank of Nistru.

Even though Western donors implement projects that improve the lives of ordinary people on the left bank of

Nistru river, this support is not perceived as coming from the West due to censorship, media manipulations and

the pro-Russian discourse of «TMR» authorities. Thus, western taxpayers’ money strengthen the positions of

«TMR» authorities and Russian Federation on the left bank of Nistru and postpone conflict resolution.

Russian anti-EU efforts in Moldova prior to the Vilnius Summit: between Tiraspol and Chisinau

In its aim to shift Moldova’s geopolitical vector, Russian Federation consistently uses the tools provided by the

Transnistrian issue, both in Chisinau and Tiraspol.

The initialling and further signing of the Association Agreement with the EU is worrying for «TMR» regime.

Moldova’s signing of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), as a key part of the Association

22

Official website of Euroregion Dniester/Nistru // www.dniester.eu

Agreement, will deprive the businesses in the Transnistrian region of the benefits they currently enjoys under the

GSP+ system of trade preferences, provided to the Republic of Moldova by the EU since March 200823

.

A negative information campaign against the Associaion Agreement and DCFTA was launched on the left bank of

Nistru. Even though representatives of «TMR» were invited to participate in the negotiations talks, only one

person from the so-called «Ministry of Foreign Affairs» attended the meetings. It was clear that Russian Federation

has instructed «TMR» authorities to ignore the negotiations.

Obviously, Russia is concerned regarding the effects of the Association Agreement and DCFTA on Transnistrian

region24

, because it is aware that «TMR» integration in the EU economic area will certainly lead to the erosion of

the regime from the inside. To avoid this unwelcome prospect Russia imposes on «TMR» authorities self-isolation

that is detrimental for the businesses in the region25

.

On March 21, 2011, Dmitry Medvedev, then President of the Russian Federation, issued a Decree appointing

Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister, as special representative of the President in Transnistria. However, the role

assigned to Dmitry Rogozin, as proved by his repeated interventions in the political process in Chisinau, is mainly to

hamper the progress of the Republic of Moldova in its partnership with the EU.

Russian Federation wants to destabilize the political situation in the Republic of Moldova, and trigger the dismissal

of the Government and early parliamentary elections, in order for anti-European political forces to reach power.

The main opposition party, the Party of the Communists, can be currently viewed as a Russian tool to reach this

goal. It is also joined in its anti-European rhetoric by other «left-wing» Moldovan parties, such as the Party of the

Socialist, the Party of the Regions etc.

On March 2013, the Party of the Communists and Democratic Party have dismissed the Government headed by

Vlad Filat. Against the backdrop of this political crisis, the Party of the Communists insisted on the dissolution of

the Parliament and early parliamentary elections. This scenario coincided with the position of the Russian

Federation – deterioration of the political situation, controlled political chaos, undermining the European

perspective within Moldovan society, anti-EU government led by the Party of Communists26

and a geopolitical

reorientation of the Republic of Moldova towards Customs Union and Eurasian Union. All this was avoided by a

compromise in the Parliament and the formation of a new Government on March 30, 2013, headed by Iurie

Leanca.

Aiming to maintain the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of influence, Russian Federation officials do not miss any

occasion to point to the Moldovan officials that Moldova could encounter problems with Transnistrian region if

23

About 30% of exports from the region reach EU market. Export to Russia is steadily declining and is currently at about 20%.

24 Russian Presidential Administration ordered policy studies on the impact of Moldova’s accession to the DCFTA and its effect on Russian

business opportunities in Transnistrian region. It should be noted that the most important enterprises in Transnistrian region were illegally

privatized by Russian public and private capital.

25 Considering the circumstances, the EU agreed to extend the GSP+ for Transnistrian region up to January 1, 2016.

26 The aggressiveness of anti-EU rhetoric of the Party of the Communists can be seen in the speech of the Communist MP Grigorii Petrenco at

the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, when he compared the Vilnius Summit with the Munich Agreement.

they will continue the EU integration path. On September 3, 2013, after a visit to Tiraspol27

, Dmitry Rogozin openly

threatened that Moldova could lose the Transnistrian region after the Vilnius Summit28

.

In order to maximize its soft-power efforts the Russian Federation is rethinking its development cooperation

framework. Vladimir Putin signed in May 2013 a decree regulating the activity of Rossotrudnichestvo (the agency

managing Russian development aid). Russian Federation will redirect $500 million from multilateral aid provided

through international organizations to bilateral projects, primarily in the Community of Independent States (CIS). A

number of NGOs registered in the Republic of Moldova are actively discrediting the EU project and promoting the

ideas of joining the Customs Union of Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan and changing the geopolitical

vector towards the Eurasian Union.

The Russian Embassy, through NGOs that it funds, tries to manipulate public opinion, both in Chisinau and Tiraspol,

discredit the EU integration process and promote the Eurasian geopolitical vector. The Embassy organized a grand

event on May 9, 2013, in the main square of Chisinau, aiming to channel the Soviet-era nostalgia towards the

Eurasian geopolitical vector.

On October 25, 2013, in Moscow, Yevgeny Shevchuk and Dmitry Rogozin signed a Protocol which shows Russia’s

intentions to continue its policies of tacit annexation of Transnistrian region29

. Taking into consideration the

prospect of Moldova signing the Association Agreement in autumn 2014, there are fears that this Protocol could

become a framework document for the ongoing annexation of the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova to

the Russian Federation. It is also possible that this protocol is a tool to encourage the bureaucracy in «TMR», highly

concerned by the prospect of rapprochement of Moldova and Ukraine to the EU.

However, it is certain that after this meeting Yevgheny Shevchuk for the first time presented officially the idea of

civilized divorce, during the conference on confidence building measures in the Transnistrian conflict settlement,

held on October 30, 2013 in Landshut, Germany30

. The idea of civilized divorce is incompatible with any existing

settlement efforts, but it fully meets the interests of the Russian Federation.

Against this background, over the duration of 2013, «TRM» regime has returned to the practices that destabilize

the situation in the security zone, especially in the town of Bender. The latest issue, on October 23, 2013, was a

«KGB» announcement that Moldovan policemen will have to pass border control when entering the Security Zone.

Coupled with a propaganda campaign in the local media, it can be assumed that the «TMR» regime has began the

removal from Bender municipality of any Moldovan state authorities, through pressure and under the protection

of «Russian peacekeepers».

At the same time, the work of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which is responsible for the situation in the

Security Zone in general and Bender in particular, is inoperable due to bottlenecks imposed by the «TMR»

27

On September 2, 2013, Dmitry Rogozin intended to participate in the manifestations that celebrated the independence of «TMR» (September

2, 1990). Due to the protest of the Government, Rogozin postponed his visit until after «official manifestation» ended.

28 Рогозин: Саммит в Вильнюсе может оставить Молдову без Приднестровья // www.omg.md/ru/111481

29 ПРОТОКОЛ по итогам рабочей встречи Заместителя Председателя Правительства Российской Федерации, специального

представителя Президента Российской Федерации по Приднестровью Д.О. Рогозина и Президента Приднестровья Е.В. Шевчука, 25

октября 2013 г. // http://president.gospmr.ru/ru/news/protokol-po-itogam-rabochey-vstrechi-zamestitelya-predsedatelya-pravitelstva-

rossiyskoy

30Евгений Шевчук обратился с речью к участникам Конференции, посвященной мерам по укреплению доверия, 30 ноября 2013 г. //

http://president.gospmr.ru/ru/news/evgeniy-shevchuk-obratilsya-s-rechyu-k-uchastnikam-konferencii-posvyashchennoy-meram-po

representatives with the tacit support from Russia. The situation in the Security Zone has become so tense that

Iurie Leanca, Moldovan Prime Minister, appealed to the participants of the 5+2 negotiations format to conduct an

international mission to monitor the situation.

It is clear that the two big geopolitical actors - EU and Russian Federation – are in a geopolitical competition to

enhance their influence on post-soviet countries, including the Republic of Moldova, which has two alternatives:

remain in the sphere of influence of Russian Federation as a non-functional state or consolidate its statehood and

undertake democratic progress on the path to EU integration.

In this context, it is very important to enhance and support the efforts towards democratization and European

reforms in the Republic of Moldova. However, this should be done on the basis of an in-depth analysis and

comprehension of the real interest of different actors and decision makers which influence the situation in the

Republic of Moldova and overall in the region, in order to avoid unpleasant scenarios for Moldovan society.

Conclusions

• The issue known as Transnistrian conflict is not an internal conflict between people on the left and right

banks of river Nistru. It is a conflict between Republic of Moldova’s state-building project within

internationally recognized borders and Russian geopolitical interests. Russian Federation, and not

«Transnistrian Moldavian Republic» and its puppet authorities, is the other side in the conflict.

• Russian Federation uses Transnistrian conflict as a tool to control the Republic of Moldova. It wants to

impose a settlement solution which would permanently maintain the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of

influence.

• After the launch of the Eastern Partnership, Russian Federation has intensified its tacit policy of

annexation of the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova. Through the puppet authorities in Tiraspol,

it blocks any attempts in the field of confidence building.

• In order to prevent the integration of «TMR» in the EU economic area, following the implementation of

the provisions of DCFTA on the whole territory of the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation imposes

the isolation of the region, disregarding the economic interests of the businesses in the region.

• Russian soft-power in the Republic of Moldova has the aim to cause political instability in the perspective

of Vilnius Summit and the next parliamentary elections (end 2014 - early 2015) and ultimately change the

geopolitical vector of Moldova towards the Customs Union and Eurasian Union.

• There is a real risk of provocations in the security zone of the Republic of Moldova in the period around

the initialling / signing and ratification of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, especially with the

illegal Russian troops stationing and the intensified activity of Russian intelligence services on the territory

of the Republic of Moldova.

• To avoid destructive scenarios, EU, U.S. and OSCE should closely monitor the situation in the security zone

and the dialogue between the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and EU on the issue of Transnistrian conflict

settlement should be enhanced.

• The implementation of European standards in Ukraine and Moldova and the responsible dialogue and

joint actions of the EU, Moldova and Ukraine will create conditions for regional security and the peaceful

settlement of the conflict in the eastern districts of Moldova.

THE PROSPECTS OF EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AFTER VILNIUS-2013:

CHALLENGES – LESSONS – ANSWERS

Yaroslav Matiychyk

After the last wave of enlargement when the EU’s absorption capacities were almost exhausted, Brussels started

elaborating the new kind of foreign policy which was to a less scale oriented at further enlargement but rather at

setting relations with the neighbors. The EU’s objectives in external relations can broadly be divided into: (1)

values of democracy promotion and human; and (2) soft security values. 31

By following these objectives the EU is investing its resources both of political and economic origin into forming

two belts around the Union – security belt and democracy belt. While referring to value the EU is making an

attempt to meet the expectations of idealists for whom the European values were the core idea of the Union,

whereas by creating the belt of security the EU was following quite rationalistic and pragmatic interests of citizens

and political elites.

One of the outcomes of such policy alongside with the attempts to deal with Russian influence in Post-Soviet states

was launching of Eastern Partnership which was officially launched at Prague summit in May 2009.32

Strong side of EaP was the prospect of bilateral association agreements which offer some important advantages

for the EaP countries which are not applicable in accession negotiations and were not offered to the EFTA

countries in the context of the EEA: The AAs (1) are based on a promise of real differentiation between the

countries as each country will be in the position to decide the extent and pace of integration with the EU; (2)

differentiation will stand a greater chance of being effective as the countries will negotiate independently of each

other; (3) the EU seems prepared to consider supporting specific countries beyond the EaP multilateral dimension,

for instance in the area of energy; and (4) the promise to include cooperation on foreign and security policy is an

indication of EU’s willingness to address the region’s strategic issues and specific security concerns.33

The latter

was of significant importance for the region which hosts number of frozen conflicts, challenges of environmental

security as well as significant dependence on the supplies of natural resources.

One of the sources of threats which might undermine EaP is the presence in the region of a third actor which is

Russia. There is no one who doubts that EU’s relations to Russia have an important impact on the overall political

context of the EaP as well as its more immediate implementation. Official EU documents have stated as much by

pledging that the EaP ‘will be pursued in parallel with the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia’ (Commission

Communication) while the Prague summit declaration reiterated that the EaP ‘will be developed in parallel with

the bilateral cooperation between the EU and third states’. The summit declaration’s failure to mention Russia by

name may be an indication of the signatories’ wish to recognize that other third countries, for instance Turkey,

also have a stake in the development of the EaP or maybe out of concern to avoid the impression that Russia

would be given sway over the future direction of the partnership.34

31

Bosse, Giselle(2009) 'Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership: the values/security nexus in EU-

Belarus relations', Contemporary Politics, 15: 2, 215 — 227, p.218

32 Anna MICHALSKI, The Eastern Partnership: Time for an Eastern Policy of the EU?, SIEPS European Policy Analysis, issue 14, December 2009, p.

2.

33 Ibidem, p. 4.

34 Anna MICHALSKI, The Eastern Partnership: Time for an Eastern Policy of the EU?, SIEPS European Policy Analysis, issue 14, December 2009, p.

10.

At the same time, Russia voiced its concerns regarding EaP implementation and focuses at designing its own

neighborhood policy towards the same recipients – Eastern partnership member countries aimed to

counterweight EaP. Basically Russia was acting within realpolitik pattern and perceived the EU’s week attempts to

set the rules for the Eastern neighbors as the direct intrusion into the Russian sphere of influence.

What caused even greater nervousness of Kremlin was the clear prospect of signing AA by some of Eastern

partnership countries. The recent exchange of declarations between the European Parliament and State Duma of

Russian Federation is a clear indicator of tension and geopolitical competition over the region. In its resolution on

the pressure exerted by Russia on Eastern Partnership countries (in the context of the upcoming Eastern

Partnership Summit in Vilnius) (2013/2826(RSP)) dated by September 12, 2013 European Parliament emphasizes:

“whereas the Russian pressure most recently faced by Eastern Partnership countries progressing on the road to

Association Agreements, including targeted sanctions against Ukraine’s exports, allusions to the possibility of

stepping up pressure on Moldova through an export ban on its wine industry, additional obstacles impeding

progress towards resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, and security-related threats with respect to Armenia,

which are aimed at forcing the Eastern Partnership countries not to sign or initial the Association Agreements or

DCFTAs but instead to intensify their cooperation with the Russian-led Customs Union, which Russia intends to

transform into a Eurasian Union, has put them in a precarious position as a result of geopolitical constraints to

which they should not be subject.”35

Russian State Duma reacted promptly and in its statement dated by September 20, 2013 noted “European

Parliament wrongly accused Russia of putting pressure on a number of states that participate in the European

Union’s Eastern Partnership programme, in particular, on Ukraine in connection with the plans of these countries

to join the European free trade area by concluding association agreements with the European Union.”

The Russian lawmakers believe that “the desire to undermine the relations of the peoples living in Russia and

Ukraine, as well as in other post-Soviet countries, and to include these states in the EU exclusive zone of interests”

is behind the resolution of the European Parliament. “We absolutely cannot agree with this approach, which

savors of neo-imperial ambitions,” the declaration emphasizes36

.

Certainly the mentioned competition effects the design of Russian neighborhood policy ideologically shaped by

“russkiy mir” concept. In comparison to EaP Russian neighborhood policy is informal (often extremely informal),

but has more substance. The EU has a strategy, but no tactics. Russia may have less strategic appeal as a long-term

model of society, but it is tactically adroit. Russia sees itself as meeting an explicit challenge on ‘home’ territory.

Both EUs and Russian Federation policies, as well as a presence of interest of other actors in the region create the

environment for designing the foreign policy strategies of the countries – members of EaP.

Definitely, shaping foreign policy in the EaP countries under the circumstances of competing EU’s and Russian

initiative and facing the impact of the US failed ‘reset’ policy with Moscow is a challenging task. No less challenging

is formulating of Common foreign policy agenda for the EU. The same is true for the EaP countries.

In this regard, it makes sense to differentiate them into two groups: Caucasian states and Eastern European

states37

. The groups have some similar features. Each of them includes three countries and each country plays its

specific role.

35

http://ukrainianweek.com/Officially/89212

36 http://pda.itar-tass.com/en/c32/883356.html

37 http://www.gsbs.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/Gerasymhuk_Sep_2010.pdf

Eastern Europe Caucasus

Belarus

Quite often the country is defined as the last

dictatorship in Europe. It has close links with Russia and

quite often subordinates its foreign policy to Russian

priorities.

The country does not object the presence of Russian

military units on its territory and depends on Russian

economic support.

Civil society in the country is underdeveloped and

oppressed by the regime.

Armenia

The country has strong links with Russia and quite often

subordinates its foreign policy to Russian priorities.

It is dependant on Russian economic support and

military presence. It also has tensed relations with the

neighbors (frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and

complicated relations with Turkey).

Civil society in the country is underdeveloped and

oppressed by the regime.

Moldova

Due to the so called ‘twitter revolution’ the country

managed to get liberal pro-European government and

to improve democracy indicators, although dependence

on Russia is high and democratic developments are still

under the question.

The country also faces the threat of melting ‘frozen

conflict’ in Transnistria – unrecognized secession region

on the left bank of Dniester river, with a significant

presence of Russian military units.

At the political level relations with Russia are close to

confrontation.

Civil society in the country is relatively well-developed

Georgia

After the revolution of roses the country managed to

get the attention of the EU and demonstrated certain

progress in democracy building, although 2008 war with

Russia resulted in the recognition of secessionist

regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by few countries

and undermined country’s progress on the path of

European and Euroatlantic integration.

Relations with Russia are close to confrontation.

Civil society in the country is relatively well-developed

Much less similarities might be found between two more states of the region – Azerbaijan and Ukraine.

Oil-rich Azerbaijan deserves special consideration, as a pivotal country with the largest population in the Caucasian

region. Today this Muslim state has close contacts with the Islamic world, while it is simultaneously influenced by

neighboring Christian countries oriented towards Western culture. Its position on the junction of the West and

East has enabled Azerbaijan to develop a synthesis of the values of both cultures.38

In other words Azerbaijan is

equally eager to benefit from EaP and to impose Russian-like model in its internal policy (e.g. Azerbaijan replicates

the Russian discourse on ‘sovereign democracy’ – albeit under local brand name ‘responsible democracy’ in

Azerbaijan. Immediately after Medvedev proposed in November 2008 that Russia move to a six-year presidency,

pro-government forces in Azerbaijan started to do the same)39

.

38

Nuriyev, Elkhan(2008) 'Azerbaijan and the European Union: new landmarks of strategic partnership in the South Caucasus-Caspian basin',

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8: 2, 155 — 167, p.156.

39 Wilson, Andrew and Popescu, Nicu(2009) 'Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared', Southeast European and Black Sea

Studies, 9: 3, 317 — 331, p. 320.

Moreover, Azerbaijan is implementing the policy of balancing not only between Russia and the EU but also

between Iran, U.S. and Turkey. While Ankara is strongly backed by Washington, Tehran and Moscow collaborate in

the military and political realms in their attempt to resist growing Turkish and American weight in the Caspian

basin. Turkey has chosen Azerbaijan as its strategic ally, and Iran, in turn, collaborates closely with Armenia, whose

relations with Turkey are hostile.40

However, the ground for maneuver is guaranteed by the natural resources which are at disposal of Baku.

Therefore, among six countries of EaP Azerbaijan can afford itself the position of ‘armed neutrality’. On the one

hand it is close to the EU and US since provides its natural resources to the European market. On the other hand it

quite realistically assesses the impact of Russia on European policies and avoids any confrontation with Moscow,

although does not express any willingness to develop such close relations as Armenia and Belarus have.

The situation is a bit different with Ukraine. Like Azerbaijan in the Caucasus Ukraine is the biggest country among

three Eastern European countries of EaP. As the result of ‘Orange revolution’ the country gained visibility in

Western media and declared pro-European and pro-NATO foreign policy.

However, a weak and corrupt judiciary and a distinct lack of good governance constituted further problems for

Ukraine’s democratisation process. Large industrial-economic groups prefer to secure their economic interests via

links with politicians, not by empowering the judiciary as an impartial arbiter. The fact that the Ukrainian

parliament is home to some of the richest Ukrainians does not encourage the independence of the judiciary, but

instead makes it a tool in a daily political and economic dog-fight. Similarly, the public sector is highly politicised

and subject to far-reaching patronage. This results in a low institutional capacity and bad governance in general

throughout Ukraine, as is confirmed by various international indices.41

Moreover, the results of president’s elections 2010 demonstrated that Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities were not

irreversible. Sustainability of the foreign policy of Ukraine was interrupted by the significant decisions to freeze the

relations with NATO at the existing level and to reorient foreign policy to Moscow instead of both pro-Western (at

least in rhetoric) policy typical for Victor Yushchenko presidency and multi-vector policies typical for his

predecessors.

Cold shower of the high gas prices, inability to find compromise with Russian president and complete failure to

exploit Russian resources for the internal political and economic caused recent reverse of Ukrainian foreign policy,

however it is still not clear if the new vector is irreversible and if the EU will close eyes on a number of irregularities

that Ukraine will hardly correct properly on the eve of summit in Vilnius in November.

This fact as well as short analyses of foreign policy of EaP states’ priorities give a possibility for another kind of

grouping them.

Armenia and Belarus are dependant on Russia, however with the absence of any alternative they conduct Russian-

oriented policy and perceive such kind of dependence as beneficial protectorate of a ‘great power’. Simultaneously

Ukraine has the risk of moving at the same direction.

40

Nuriyev, Elkhan(2008) 'Azerbaijan and the European Union: new landmarks of strategic partnership in the South Caucasus-Caspian basin',

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8: 2, 155 — 167, p.164

41 Jos Boonstra, Julia Choucair Vizoso, Ana Echagüe, Balázs Jarábik, Kristina Kausch, Richard Youngs, (2008) Is the European Union Supporting

Democracy in its Neighbourhood ?, p.83.

The mentioned behavior of the named three countries is supplemented by Russian soft power operations aimed at

limiting the expression of the alternative agendas, invigorating the sentiments towards ‘common glorious history’,

inserting into educational process the formulas typical for the Soviet Union etc.

Georgia and Moldova have a different approach. Both countries faced the challenge of fighting with the Russian

troops on their own territory. Both countries, with the direct Russian interference faced the problem of separatism

and frozen conflicts. In such circumstances it is quite difficult for Russia to exercise soft power and to

counterweight the negative image of invader. However, in particular in case of Moldova, another instrument is

exercised – Russian orthodox church. By now it is difficult to assess how successful such approach might be.

However, the very attempt of using the faith as a uniting idea deserves mentioning.

One observation is that the only country out of six which avoids confrontation with Russia but is not dependant on

it is Azerbaijan – the only EaP Muslim country rich in natural resources.

Current situation in the region and the existing trends in defining foreign policy objectives as well as discovered

similarities among the EaP countries give the floor for further forecasts of foreign policy of the EaP states.

It will be quite a realistic if we forecast that there will be two key dimensions which will shape the further

development of EaP area after Vilnius summit:

– implementation of the statements/agreements/decisions within the framework of bilateral

Association agreements and multidimensional monitoring of the implementation;

– Moscow’s policy of preventing of strengthening of Eastern Partnership and of integration of EaP

countries to the EU.

It is noteworthy that the strategic importance of both dimensions is equal and demands political attention of EaP

countries and consolidation of their efforts. In these regard the key questions will be the following:

1. What are the main scenarios of the development of situation on these dimensions?

2. What are new problems/challenges/risks that can emerge?

3. What should be done in each forecasted case?, – what should be (in accordance with the national

interests and EU integration goal) strategy and tactics of EaP countries behavior?

Thinking over the answers to the mentioned questions it should be noted that the events within the first direction

will take place with the consistent, mostly invisible although permanent participation/presence of Moscow

whereas the events on the second direction will be the direct results of Moscow’s open intentions and in case of

lack of consolidated assessment by the EaP states there will be no chance to have any impact on Russian policy. In

this regard we should pay attention to useful experience of Baltic States, which also implemented reforms policy

and integrated to the EU and NATO under the pressure of Moscow. At that time as well as now one can witness

Russian propaganda campaign, hysterical and threatening diplomatic, economic and military steps. However, by

uniting their efforts three small Baltic States manage to counterweight Russian geopolitics. Such an experience

inspires politically, encourages European expectations of Eastern partnership countries and gives the lesson of

consolidation and partnership for the sake of common progress and common European destiny.

A good example in the contemporary history is the case of Russian-Georgian war in 2008: if Tbilisi abstained from

expression of self-confidence and instead tried to assure the consolidated support of global and regional

international organizations Moscow would hardly had a chance to implement such a brutal and voluntarism-

oriented scenario.

Continuing and extrapolating the aforementioned another Eastern Partnership member and strategic partner of

Kyiv – Baku should also pay attention to not that much visible but gradually increasing escalation of Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict where Moscow rises the tensions between Yerevan and Baku in order to provoke hotheaded

steps and to support the policy of “hawks”. It should be clear for both states that historical and international

experience proves that having such a neighbor as Russia in your backyard you cannot resolve such conflicts by

“one drastic strike”. By such strike you can only diddle yourself and ruin the perspective of the development.

For all the countries of Eastern Partnership (as well as for all the states of the European continent although within

a little bit different context) it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the threats to their development and

historical perspective are rooted in one source – Russian imperialism, strategy of geopolitical revenge of Moscow

shaped in a form of new “Trojan horse” – “russkiy mir”. All the components of Russian policy: informational,

military, economic (trade, investment, energy), diplomatic, cultural are subordinated to “russkiy mir” – Russia-

centric integration project. This project aims at ideological, geo-economical and geopolitical counterweighing

European integration and to set exclusive geopolitical control over the Eastern Partnership states, adopting their

reforms and development to Russian preferences, and to redirect by these means the potential of Eastern

Partnership into completing the tasks and achieving the goals of “russkiy mir”.

The policy of counteracting the process of strengthening of EaP countries contains the instrument of Russian

influence in these countries, string “hooks” that keep these states and their elites under control. By applying this

instrument Moscow can successfully slow down the policy of reforms and destroy inconvenient foreign contacts

and plans of these states.

Moreover, Moscow is brutally and widely using its influence within the EU against the legitimate interests of

Eastern partnership countries, although this problem is often concealed. Observations of the content of European

informational and analytic environment give the evidence of long propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting

business and political reputation of the Eastern Partnership states.

Among other aspects, it is excessive political, economic, religious and conspiracy influence of Moscow on Kyiv

which invigorates internal corruption in Ukraine, leads to external corruption and makes all the efforts of

democratization, rising efficiency of state, incipience of Ukrainian political nation, strengthening of national

security, as well as reforms in economic, social and justice policy just vain. Any cooperation between Kyiv and

Moscow converts into the instrument of strengthening Russian influence and increasing Ukrainian dependence (by

the way the same is true for the EU–Russia relations). That’s the reflection of destructive Russian influence even in

case it’s not excessive.

Summarizing, strategic priority for the EaP countries is not only policy of reforms and European integration but

also the policy of diminishing the excessive Russian influence and interference. Without consolidation of positions,

combining of efforts and joint expression of distrust to Moscow accompanied by peaceful Fronde the Eastern

Partnership countries will not be a success. If those who try to counteract the implementation of “russkiy mir” will

stay alone they will be terminated by Moscow one by one.

Taking into account all the above mentioned facts and seeking for the proper answers for the questions raised it

seems that now it’s time for initiating new practice/mechanism of permanent consultations on the expert and

political level in order to consolidate and coordinate the actions of the Eastern Partnership states, monitor the

implementation of the reforms and European integration in general. Such an instrument can become a universal

tool for joint political assessment and elaboration of new approaches and decisions. It is important to use it within

the process of implementation of Association Agreements and multi-dimensional evaluation of the progress as

well as for preventing Moscow’s attempts to counteract strengthening of Eastern Partnership and integration of

EaP countries to the EU.

SUMMARY

FOREWORD

RUSSIAN SOFT POWER AS AN INSTRUMENT OF GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Sergiy Gerasymchuk

THE PROSPECTS OF EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AFTER VILNIUS-2013: CHALLENGES – LESSONS – ANSWERS

Yaroslav Matiychyk

USING A PROTRACTED CONFLICT TO PROMOTE GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS: RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S POLICY

TOWARDS THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Oazu Nantoi