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Political Transition in Post-Soviet Georgia: The Impact of the Post-Rose

Revolution Constitutional Amendments

Toghrul Novruzlu

October, 2014

Abstract

The collapse of the USSR left the dismembered Union’s newly independent former constitutive

units with the challenging tasks of the management of the political and economic transitions.

Already teetering on the verge of flaring up ethnic conflicts, impending domestic power

struggles, an economic crisis in the last years of the USSR, many former Soviet States did not

have a lubricated transition process. The paper views the developments in the political

landscape of Georgia, a state in South Caucasus, standing out with a turbulent and dynamic

political transformation history subsequent to the independence reclaiming. Particularly studied

is the impact of the constitutional amendments made in the light of the Rose Revolution of 2003

on the development of a constitutional democracy. The findings of the study are indicative of

the inadequacy of the amendments to further the institutionalization of constitutionalism in

Georgia, a pre-requisite for precipitating the build-up of a liberal democracy. The reforms fell

short of effecting a division of power among state institutions competent to fully enact the

checks-and-balances system, a strong stumbling block for Georgia’s political establishment to

morph into a fully functioning constitutional liberalism-based democracy.

Introduction

Georgia, a mid-size South Caucasian state restored its independence of the USSR in 1991.

However, this young country’s rendezvous with the liberal democracy was soon postponed

indefinitely with the ensuing turbulence brought over by the coup ousting the President Zviad

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Gamsakhurdia which enmeshed the state in a civil war lasting until 1995. The state-building was

also further hampered with the separatist sentiments flaring up in South Ossetia and Abkhazia

exhausting the country’s already little resources. The late 1990s saw in Georgia the emergence

and consolidation of an illiberal democracy permissive of the exercising of certain liberties to a

limited extent. The accumulating indignation with the election frauds, corruption, and poverty

effected a government change with the systematic non-violent protests known as the Rose

Revolution in 2003. The upcoming period witnessed wide-reaching reforms in many sectors

transforming Georgia. Also, in 2004 and in 2010 the Georgian constitution was amended twice.

The first series of amendments reinforced the presidential system by allocating further

authorities to him, while the reforms of 2010 strengthened the position of the prime minister

at the expense of the weakened president. The scope of both of the amendments of both 2004

and 2010 was mostly constrained to the executive branch, which rendered the reforms

inadequately wide-reaching for the constitutionalism to be further consolidated.

The Turbulent 90s

After the long-lasting independence movement, Georgia became one of the first countries to

declare its independence. On 26 May, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a former dissident, the first

Georgian associate of Amnesty International in the USSR, known for his harsh rhetoric on ethnic

minorities won the presidential elections. Thought to be incompetent to rule by some,

Gamsakhurdia made a grave error during the August coup against Gorbachev by failing to

condemn the coup launched by the hard-line Communists. This shored up suspicions around his

being more skewed to consolidate his position than securing the country’s independence. Later

Gamsakhurdia’s relations with the National Guards led by Tengiz Kitovani, one of two main

paramilitary groups the other being Jaba Ioseliani’s Mkhedrioni deteriorated as the former

sought the disbanding of the National Guards. This along with Gamskhurdia’s non-tolerance of

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the opposition and other factors paved the way for the coup against him in December, which

succeeded in January of 1992. The coup left the country on the verge of a political anarchy as a

way out which Kitovani and Ioseliani invited Shevardnadze from Moscow to Georgia in 1992.

Inviting Shevardnadze assuming the post of the head of the State Council proved to be a

strategically correct decision. His being part of the troika including him, Kitovani, and Ioseliani

ruling the country soon earned Georgia the West’s attention and support. Shevardnadze also

acted quickly to achieve a ceasefire in South Ossetia. In August, the Abkhaz Conflict broke out.

Complicating the matters further was Gamsakhurdia’s return to Georgia’s political arena in

1993’s fall whereby Georgia became a battle ground of a civil war, which also encumbered the

mobilization of the state resources to subdue the separatists in Abkhazia. Eventually,

Gamsakhurdia was defeated and towards 1995, Shevardnadze gradually managed to

consolidate his power sidelining his rivals. Already in 1992 on October 11, Shevardnadze had

been elected as the chairman of the Parliament, the highest position in the country at the time

and was also appointed as “Head of State” ultimately becoming the leader of both the

executive and the legislative branches. 1995 marked the milestone of the approval of the

constitution of Georgia. The constitution though flawed in different ways especially vis-à-vis the

executive branch enjoying more than other branches and the President being almost

unaccountable to any other institution, still ensured independence of the judiciary and the

parliamentary.1 2Thus, Georgia, albeit a “competitive authoritarianism (for example, elections

were not free and fair)”3 was still guaranteeing the exercising of different political liberties. In

Shevardnadze for his second term won the presidential elections “marred with irregularities”

1 Anna Kapanadze, “Constitution-Making Politics in Georgia”, Budapest, Central European University, 2010, p.18,

file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/kapanadze_anna.pdf 2 Irakly Areshidze, “Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition”, East Lansing, Michigan State

University Press, 2007, p. 39 3 Ibid, p.39

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after which OSCE stressed the need for “considerable progress”.4 Overall, Freedom House

noted a decline in the success the elections were held with towards the late 1990s and rise in

authoritarianism setting the foundation of Shevardnadze’s upcoming fall.5

The Rose Revolution

November of 2003 brought Georgia a political change that significantly redirected its

development trajectory, echoing outside Georgia’s borders as well. This was the bloodless

regime change through peaceful protests that forced Shevardnadze to step down. Triggering

the cycle of events was the parliamentary elections held on November 2, having involved

election frauds. The announcement of Shevardnadze’s For a New Georgia Bloc coming first in

the ballots “contradicted exit polls conducted by Rustavi-2 and a PVT by ISFED”.6 Particularly,

apparent fraudulence in the elections in Ajaria pointing out the pro-Abashidze(the autocratic

leader of Ajaria) Revival Union party as a winner proved to be the last straw kick-starting the

mass protests .7 The opposition came mainly from the troika of Mikheil Saakshvili, the leader of

the National Movement Party, the real winner of the elections, Zurab Zhvania and Nino

Burjanadze both from the Burjanadze-Democrats Bloc.8 The zenith of the protests was reached

with the demonstration involving more than 100000 people on November 20th. Some of the

protesters including Saakashvili stormed the Parliament during Shevardnadze’s speech carrying

red roses, which the movement took its name from. 3 days later Shevardnadze resigned and

the Rose Revolution succeed without bloodshed. What led to the Rose Revolution has been

4 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Georgia, 2001,

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/europe/georgia.html 5 Freedom House, Countries at Crossroads: Georgia, 2006, http://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-

crossroads/2006/georgia#.VEEVD_l_tSs 6 Giorgi Kandelaki, Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant Perspective, United States Institute of Peace, p.4

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf 7 Kandelaki, Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant Perspective , p.4

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf 8 Lincoln Mitchell, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution”, Current History, 2004, p. 343,

file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/rose_revolution.pdf

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recurrently discussed. Among different factors, S. Cornell notes Shevardnadze’s weak rule

enabling the corruption to burgeon, the criminal groups to proliferate with the ineffective state

institutions.9 Another widely referred to factor is the extent of the political freedom

Shevardnadze had allowed which created a political environment conducive to the

strengthening of the civil society.10 The groups like KMARA played a significant role in shaking

the political apathy of the youth.11Also, Shevardnadze had failed to restore the state’s full

control over Ajaria, Samegrelo, Svaneti provinces and also Pankisi Gorge controlled by different

gang groups.12 13 The foreign intervention, particularly the US assistance is ruled out as a major

accountant factor by some experts.14 15Debated is also the legitimacy of the Rose Revolution as

some regard it as a coup against a president who was forced to step down. I. Areshidze even

argues that the Rose Revolution impinged on the consolidation of democracy.16 L. Mitchell

however draws attention to the peaceful nature of the mass demonstrations, contending that

even the parliament storming was not violent as the President’s security had not been

imperiled as many of those breaking in were parliamentarians.17 Irrespective of whether the

Rose Revolution came about democratically or not, or what brought it about or the extent of its

inexorability which was repudiated even by some leaders of the revolution – Zhvania and

Burjanadza, the Rose Revolution definitely had a far-reaching effect on the domestic politics of

9 Svante Cornell, “Georgia After the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for US Policy”, in

Georgia After the Rose Revolution ,p.31, 32 10 Lincoln Mitchell, “How Democratic was the Rose Revolution”, in Uncertain Democracy: US Foreign Policy and

Georgia’s Rose Revolution, p.73, 76-77 11 Kandelaki, OsCit, p.5

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf 12 Mitchell, “How Democratic was the Rose Revolution”, p.76 13 Cornell, “Georgia After the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for US Policy” 14 Mitchell, Oscit, p.77 15 Kandelaki, Oscit, p. 10

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf 16 Areshidze, “Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition”, 17 Mitchell, OsCit, p.69-70

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Georgia and beyond its borders earning Georgia the famous nickname of “the beacon of

democracy”.18

The First Constitutional Reforms in the Post-Rose Revolution Period

With Shevardnadze stepping down, the troika of M. Saakashvili, Z. Zhvania, and N. Burjanadze

emerged triumphantly from the victorious Rose Revolution and set out to work on the power-

sharing arrangements. The discussions among the three brought out this outcome: Saakashvili

would become the president; Zhvania would become the Prime Minister (a position not present

at time); Burjanadze would be the chairwoman of the parliament. On January 4, the

presidential elections were held which were won by Mikheil Saakashvili with a whopping

percentage of 96% of the votes. The elections were praised by the OSCE. Accounting for

Saakashvili’s landslide victory in the elections regarded as free and fair mostly was his running

for the presidency with no serious rival.19

After the elections, hastily the constitutional amendments were brought under discussions.

The amendments shaping a new framework of the power-distribution were of critical

importance for the future of the constitutionality in Georgia. On 3rd February, the 1999

parliament started its spring session as the results of the 2003 November 2 parliamentary

elections had been annulled. Soon, it was announced by the end of the week that the draft law

on the constitutional amendments should have been discussed. The parliament debated on

such amendments of vital importance only for one day and on 6th February approved the

draft.20 Allegedly, the parliament members had been threatened to approve of the

amendments. The short time allocated for discussions disabled productive public discussions.

18 Interview with Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze, in “the Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia”, eds.

Zurab Karumidze, James V. Wertsch 19Mitchell, OsCit, p.72 20 Marina Muskhelishvili, Constitutional Changes in Georgia, Center for Georgian Studies, p.49

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Even the Venice Commission whose opinion had been asked for issued its opinion just to have

the amendments already endorsed by the parliament.21 The new amendments concerned the

establishment of the position of a prime minister and a cabinet of ministers to be nominated by

the prime minister. As decided before Zhvania assumed the post of the prime minister. Overall,

the reforms strengthened the executive branch, particularly, the position of the president. The

president would be the head of state, having a right to dismiss the government, “force”

ministers, to disband the parliament on the grounds pertaining to the budget rejections, the

government approval, to appoint the Prime minister, the cabinet.22 23 Thus, the checks on the

president’s power would remain as an open-ended question contradicting Saakashvili’s

statement of the new political model which “limits the presidential powers to some extent”.

The parliament thus overall remained weaker than the executive branch although parliament

had been empowered in certain respects which are “limiting of the scope of the cases which

can become grounds for the Parliament's dismissal and the giving to Parliament the power to

disband the cabinet unconditionally”.24 European Stability Initiative also highlighted how the

amendments curtailed the power of the parliament by the executive branch in particular the

President as the president simply had not been empowered to have its own say on the budget

or the prime minister who would be appointed by the President, doing which would cost the

parliament its dissolution.25 The Venice Commission with its issued opinion stressed the lack of

coherence amongst the amendments and the President’s entitlement to ignore the

parliament’s will.26

21 Mitchell, Oscit, p. 80 22 Ibid, p. 80 23 Kapanadze, OsCit, p. 23 24 Muskhlishvili, Constitutional Changes in Georgia, p.51 25 No Country for Old Men, European Stability Initiative, 2010,

http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate_ID=3&slide_ID=12 26 Kapanadze, OsCit, p.24

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The new constitution thus bolstered the president’s already well-established power. After

consolidating his power further, Saakashvili embarked on ambitious reforms on the police

sector, economic liberalization, and notable success was achieved in these fields. However, in

2007, Saakashvili had to face the first great challenge against his power with the large

opposition protests. The police cracked down hard on the protesters. The opposition TV

channel Imedi was taken off the air. Eventually, Saakashvili had to compromise promising early

elections in 2008 which Saakashvili again won. During this time, Freedom House also expressed

concern over the pluralism in the broadcast media. Also, there were serious concerns over the

independence of the judiciary branch as almost all the judges had been dismissed and replaced

with the ones who were perceived to be skewed to support Saakashvili.27 28

The Second Round Post-Rose Revolution Constitutional Amendments

In 2009, with the order of the president, the National Constitution Commission composed of

opposition parties, the ruling party, NGO representatives was established.29 Thus, the

discussions around new amendments to the constitution arose. The new amendments in a

stark contrast to the amendments of 2004 would devolve the power away from the president

to the prime minister to enable the country’s transformation to the semi-presidential system

from the presidential system. Thus, the new amendments would make the prime minister the

head of government. He would be elected by the parliament. So, effectively, the winner party

in the parliament would also dominate the executive branch as well. The prime minister would

be responsible for the domestic and foreign affairs of the country. The president would have his

authorities with the new amendments reduced. He would still remain as the head of state, the

27 Mitchell, Oscit, p.93 28 Kapanadze, OsCit, p.28 29 Georgia’s Constitutional Changes, The International Crisis Group, 2012,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcasts/2012/georgia-turashvili-georgias-constitutional-

changes.aspx

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commander-in-chief having a right to declare a war. He would also have a right to dissolve the

parliament on the grounds concerning the government establishment. Thus, the president

would not be reduced to a ceremonial figure as is the case in the parliamentary systems. The

amendments were adopted in 2010. There were a lot of concerns that Saakashvili was pushing

for the changes to the constitution as his second-term would come to an end in 2013, and he

could technically become a prime minister.30 31 These concerns did not prove true as

Saakashvili’s United National Movement came second in the Parliamentary elections to the

Georgian Dream Bloc in 2012. But the serious flaws in the amendments obstruct the effective

functioning of the establishment. The parliament as before had not been empowered

adequately as the Prime minister though elected by the parliament later has no accountability

before the parliament. Also, the president’s power to disband the parliament though not easily

executable impinges on the constitutionality. The parliament has no competence to make any

change to the budget without the permission of the government, which was noted by the

Venice Commission in its opinion.32 Besides this, there was a concern related to the vague

differentiation of the authorities of the president and the prime minister in the constitution,

which has a potential to lead to clashes. The Venice Commission in advance had warned of the

possible confrontations.33 For example, it is stated in Clause 69, Paragraph 3 that “the president

represents Georgia in foreign relations”. “However, just below that, Clause 78,Paragraph 1

declares that the cabinet “implements foreign policy” and further down, Paragraph 4 of the

same clause states that the“prime minister […] represent[s] Georgia in foreign relations within

30 The International Crisis Group

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcasts/2012/georgia-turashvili-georgias-constitutional-

changes.aspx 31 Alexander Jackson, The New Georgian Constitution: Reading Saakashvili, The Foreign Policy Centre, 32 International Crisis Group,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcasts/2012/georgia-turashvili-georgias-constitutional-

changes.aspx 33 Ibid, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcasts/2012/georgia-turashvili-georgias-constitutional-

changes.aspx

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his competence.” ”34 The prognosis proved true when this year the rift between the Prime

Minister Gharibashvili and the President Margelashvili was unraveled. Especially, it captured

the attention when there was indecision regarding whether the prime minister or the president

would represent Georgia in one of the UN summits.35 The rift had started before this when the

president was criticized because of using Saakashvili-era presidential palace and blocking a

number of bills by the former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. In return, the president vowed

to use his power to disband the parliament though it does not seem to be easy to accomplish.36

Apart from the standoff, attracting attention is the interference of the former Prime Minister

Ivanishvili into the state affairs from time to time. The dispute over Georgia’s representation in

the UN summit had also come to an end after the president had announced his plan had come

under pressure by “some serious, organized efforts” clearly pointing out to the former prime

minister Ivanishvili who according to the survey is believed by 50% of Georgians to be still

playing an important role in the political decision-making. The institution of presidency

influenced by a strong tycoon who was a former prime minister having officially no position is

also a sign of concern. The Transparency International also has stated the “reproving” and even

“disregarding of the institution of presidency”.37Besides these clashes, currently a lot of

discussion has concentrated around the independence of the judiciary. One of the first steps

the Georgian Dream Bloc took was the crackdown on the officials of the former administration.

Many police officers were dismissed peaking with the arresting of the former Minister of

34 Vasili Rukhadze, “New Georgian Constitution Deepens Rift between the President and the Prime Minister”,

Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2014

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42843&cHash=23464f71facbd2cc

28ac00643fb4845c#.VEGGUPl_tSs 35 Rukhadze, “New Georgian Constitution Deepens Rift Between the President and the Prime Minister”

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42843&cHash=23464f71facbd2cc

28ac00643fb4845c#.VEGGUPl_tSs 36 Georgian President Says He May Resign, DfWatch, 2014,

http://dfwatch.net/georgian-president-says-he-may-resign-21575 37 Robert Coalson, “Spat Over Who Speaks To UN Hints Of Looming Political Crisis In Georgia”, RFERL, 2014,

http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia-garibashvili-margvelashvili-ivanishvili-political-crisis/26602307.html

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Interior and the former Prime Minister, Vano Merabishvili. After Saakashvili lost the elections

and left the country, some charges were also brought against him raising suspicions that the

new government might be after the political retribution to the pursuit of which the

inadequately independent judicial institutions have been subjected.38 Thus, the unequal power

distributions, particularly the lack of checks on the executive branch remained as the major

stumbling block for the rise of a liberal democracy in Georgia, hindering the advance of

constitutional liberalism.

Conclusion

A former Soviet country of South Caucasus, Georgia had an uneven political transition path

going through the civil war, weak institutionalization. Towards late 1990s, the state became

more centralized. Under Shevardnadze’s rule, exercising different liberties were allowed. But

towards the last years of his rule, the elections were marked more frequently with the

fraudulence. Shevardnadze had to step down with the Rose Revolution following which two

rounds of constitutional amendments were approved. Overall, after both rounds, the executive

branch maintained its dominance. The constitutionality was ensured as the checks-and-

balances system was not ensured. Georgia still qualifies as an illiberal democracy as the

relatively free and fair elections are the realities of the political life just like not fully guaranteed

political liberties, unchecked powers of the state institutions.

38 Anna Nemtsova, Vendetta Politics in Georgia, Foreign Policy, 2013 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/vendetta_politics_in_georgia