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Political Transition in Post-Soviet Georgia: The Impact of the Post-Rose
Revolution Constitutional Amendments
Toghrul Novruzlu
October, 2014
Abstract
The collapse of the USSR left the dismembered Union’s newly independent former constitutive
units with the challenging tasks of the management of the political and economic transitions.
Already teetering on the verge of flaring up ethnic conflicts, impending domestic power
struggles, an economic crisis in the last years of the USSR, many former Soviet States did not
have a lubricated transition process. The paper views the developments in the political
landscape of Georgia, a state in South Caucasus, standing out with a turbulent and dynamic
political transformation history subsequent to the independence reclaiming. Particularly studied
is the impact of the constitutional amendments made in the light of the Rose Revolution of 2003
on the development of a constitutional democracy. The findings of the study are indicative of
the inadequacy of the amendments to further the institutionalization of constitutionalism in
Georgia, a pre-requisite for precipitating the build-up of a liberal democracy. The reforms fell
short of effecting a division of power among state institutions competent to fully enact the
checks-and-balances system, a strong stumbling block for Georgia’s political establishment to
morph into a fully functioning constitutional liberalism-based democracy.
Introduction
Georgia, a mid-size South Caucasian state restored its independence of the USSR in 1991.
However, this young country’s rendezvous with the liberal democracy was soon postponed
indefinitely with the ensuing turbulence brought over by the coup ousting the President Zviad
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Gamsakhurdia which enmeshed the state in a civil war lasting until 1995. The state-building was
also further hampered with the separatist sentiments flaring up in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
exhausting the country’s already little resources. The late 1990s saw in Georgia the emergence
and consolidation of an illiberal democracy permissive of the exercising of certain liberties to a
limited extent. The accumulating indignation with the election frauds, corruption, and poverty
effected a government change with the systematic non-violent protests known as the Rose
Revolution in 2003. The upcoming period witnessed wide-reaching reforms in many sectors
transforming Georgia. Also, in 2004 and in 2010 the Georgian constitution was amended twice.
The first series of amendments reinforced the presidential system by allocating further
authorities to him, while the reforms of 2010 strengthened the position of the prime minister
at the expense of the weakened president. The scope of both of the amendments of both 2004
and 2010 was mostly constrained to the executive branch, which rendered the reforms
inadequately wide-reaching for the constitutionalism to be further consolidated.
The Turbulent 90s
After the long-lasting independence movement, Georgia became one of the first countries to
declare its independence. On 26 May, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a former dissident, the first
Georgian associate of Amnesty International in the USSR, known for his harsh rhetoric on ethnic
minorities won the presidential elections. Thought to be incompetent to rule by some,
Gamsakhurdia made a grave error during the August coup against Gorbachev by failing to
condemn the coup launched by the hard-line Communists. This shored up suspicions around his
being more skewed to consolidate his position than securing the country’s independence. Later
Gamsakhurdia’s relations with the National Guards led by Tengiz Kitovani, one of two main
paramilitary groups the other being Jaba Ioseliani’s Mkhedrioni deteriorated as the former
sought the disbanding of the National Guards. This along with Gamskhurdia’s non-tolerance of
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the opposition and other factors paved the way for the coup against him in December, which
succeeded in January of 1992. The coup left the country on the verge of a political anarchy as a
way out which Kitovani and Ioseliani invited Shevardnadze from Moscow to Georgia in 1992.
Inviting Shevardnadze assuming the post of the head of the State Council proved to be a
strategically correct decision. His being part of the troika including him, Kitovani, and Ioseliani
ruling the country soon earned Georgia the West’s attention and support. Shevardnadze also
acted quickly to achieve a ceasefire in South Ossetia. In August, the Abkhaz Conflict broke out.
Complicating the matters further was Gamsakhurdia’s return to Georgia’s political arena in
1993’s fall whereby Georgia became a battle ground of a civil war, which also encumbered the
mobilization of the state resources to subdue the separatists in Abkhazia. Eventually,
Gamsakhurdia was defeated and towards 1995, Shevardnadze gradually managed to
consolidate his power sidelining his rivals. Already in 1992 on October 11, Shevardnadze had
been elected as the chairman of the Parliament, the highest position in the country at the time
and was also appointed as “Head of State” ultimately becoming the leader of both the
executive and the legislative branches. 1995 marked the milestone of the approval of the
constitution of Georgia. The constitution though flawed in different ways especially vis-à-vis the
executive branch enjoying more than other branches and the President being almost
unaccountable to any other institution, still ensured independence of the judiciary and the
parliamentary.1 2Thus, Georgia, albeit a “competitive authoritarianism (for example, elections
were not free and fair)”3 was still guaranteeing the exercising of different political liberties. In
Shevardnadze for his second term won the presidential elections “marred with irregularities”
1 Anna Kapanadze, “Constitution-Making Politics in Georgia”, Budapest, Central European University, 2010, p.18,
file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/kapanadze_anna.pdf 2 Irakly Areshidze, “Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition”, East Lansing, Michigan State
University Press, 2007, p. 39 3 Ibid, p.39
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after which OSCE stressed the need for “considerable progress”.4 Overall, Freedom House
noted a decline in the success the elections were held with towards the late 1990s and rise in
authoritarianism setting the foundation of Shevardnadze’s upcoming fall.5
The Rose Revolution
November of 2003 brought Georgia a political change that significantly redirected its
development trajectory, echoing outside Georgia’s borders as well. This was the bloodless
regime change through peaceful protests that forced Shevardnadze to step down. Triggering
the cycle of events was the parliamentary elections held on November 2, having involved
election frauds. The announcement of Shevardnadze’s For a New Georgia Bloc coming first in
the ballots “contradicted exit polls conducted by Rustavi-2 and a PVT by ISFED”.6 Particularly,
apparent fraudulence in the elections in Ajaria pointing out the pro-Abashidze(the autocratic
leader of Ajaria) Revival Union party as a winner proved to be the last straw kick-starting the
mass protests .7 The opposition came mainly from the troika of Mikheil Saakshvili, the leader of
the National Movement Party, the real winner of the elections, Zurab Zhvania and Nino
Burjanadze both from the Burjanadze-Democrats Bloc.8 The zenith of the protests was reached
with the demonstration involving more than 100000 people on November 20th. Some of the
protesters including Saakashvili stormed the Parliament during Shevardnadze’s speech carrying
red roses, which the movement took its name from. 3 days later Shevardnadze resigned and
the Rose Revolution succeed without bloodshed. What led to the Rose Revolution has been
4 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Georgia, 2001,
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/europe/georgia.html 5 Freedom House, Countries at Crossroads: Georgia, 2006, http://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-
crossroads/2006/georgia#.VEEVD_l_tSs 6 Giorgi Kandelaki, Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant Perspective, United States Institute of Peace, p.4
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf 7 Kandelaki, Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant Perspective , p.4
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf 8 Lincoln Mitchell, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution”, Current History, 2004, p. 343,
file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/rose_revolution.pdf
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recurrently discussed. Among different factors, S. Cornell notes Shevardnadze’s weak rule
enabling the corruption to burgeon, the criminal groups to proliferate with the ineffective state
institutions.9 Another widely referred to factor is the extent of the political freedom
Shevardnadze had allowed which created a political environment conducive to the
strengthening of the civil society.10 The groups like KMARA played a significant role in shaking
the political apathy of the youth.11Also, Shevardnadze had failed to restore the state’s full
control over Ajaria, Samegrelo, Svaneti provinces and also Pankisi Gorge controlled by different
gang groups.12 13 The foreign intervention, particularly the US assistance is ruled out as a major
accountant factor by some experts.14 15Debated is also the legitimacy of the Rose Revolution as
some regard it as a coup against a president who was forced to step down. I. Areshidze even
argues that the Rose Revolution impinged on the consolidation of democracy.16 L. Mitchell
however draws attention to the peaceful nature of the mass demonstrations, contending that
even the parliament storming was not violent as the President’s security had not been
imperiled as many of those breaking in were parliamentarians.17 Irrespective of whether the
Rose Revolution came about democratically or not, or what brought it about or the extent of its
inexorability which was repudiated even by some leaders of the revolution – Zhvania and
Burjanadza, the Rose Revolution definitely had a far-reaching effect on the domestic politics of
9 Svante Cornell, “Georgia After the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for US Policy”, in
Georgia After the Rose Revolution ,p.31, 32 10 Lincoln Mitchell, “How Democratic was the Rose Revolution”, in Uncertain Democracy: US Foreign Policy and
Georgia’s Rose Revolution, p.73, 76-77 11 Kandelaki, OsCit, p.5
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf 12 Mitchell, “How Democratic was the Rose Revolution”, p.76 13 Cornell, “Georgia After the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for US Policy” 14 Mitchell, Oscit, p.77 15 Kandelaki, Oscit, p. 10
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf 16 Areshidze, “Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition”, 17 Mitchell, OsCit, p.69-70
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Georgia and beyond its borders earning Georgia the famous nickname of “the beacon of
democracy”.18
The First Constitutional Reforms in the Post-Rose Revolution Period
With Shevardnadze stepping down, the troika of M. Saakashvili, Z. Zhvania, and N. Burjanadze
emerged triumphantly from the victorious Rose Revolution and set out to work on the power-
sharing arrangements. The discussions among the three brought out this outcome: Saakashvili
would become the president; Zhvania would become the Prime Minister (a position not present
at time); Burjanadze would be the chairwoman of the parliament. On January 4, the
presidential elections were held which were won by Mikheil Saakashvili with a whopping
percentage of 96% of the votes. The elections were praised by the OSCE. Accounting for
Saakashvili’s landslide victory in the elections regarded as free and fair mostly was his running
for the presidency with no serious rival.19
After the elections, hastily the constitutional amendments were brought under discussions.
The amendments shaping a new framework of the power-distribution were of critical
importance for the future of the constitutionality in Georgia. On 3rd February, the 1999
parliament started its spring session as the results of the 2003 November 2 parliamentary
elections had been annulled. Soon, it was announced by the end of the week that the draft law
on the constitutional amendments should have been discussed. The parliament debated on
such amendments of vital importance only for one day and on 6th February approved the
draft.20 Allegedly, the parliament members had been threatened to approve of the
amendments. The short time allocated for discussions disabled productive public discussions.
18 Interview with Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze, in “the Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia”, eds.
Zurab Karumidze, James V. Wertsch 19Mitchell, OsCit, p.72 20 Marina Muskhelishvili, Constitutional Changes in Georgia, Center for Georgian Studies, p.49
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Even the Venice Commission whose opinion had been asked for issued its opinion just to have
the amendments already endorsed by the parliament.21 The new amendments concerned the
establishment of the position of a prime minister and a cabinet of ministers to be nominated by
the prime minister. As decided before Zhvania assumed the post of the prime minister. Overall,
the reforms strengthened the executive branch, particularly, the position of the president. The
president would be the head of state, having a right to dismiss the government, “force”
ministers, to disband the parliament on the grounds pertaining to the budget rejections, the
government approval, to appoint the Prime minister, the cabinet.22 23 Thus, the checks on the
president’s power would remain as an open-ended question contradicting Saakashvili’s
statement of the new political model which “limits the presidential powers to some extent”.
The parliament thus overall remained weaker than the executive branch although parliament
had been empowered in certain respects which are “limiting of the scope of the cases which
can become grounds for the Parliament's dismissal and the giving to Parliament the power to
disband the cabinet unconditionally”.24 European Stability Initiative also highlighted how the
amendments curtailed the power of the parliament by the executive branch in particular the
President as the president simply had not been empowered to have its own say on the budget
or the prime minister who would be appointed by the President, doing which would cost the
parliament its dissolution.25 The Venice Commission with its issued opinion stressed the lack of
coherence amongst the amendments and the President’s entitlement to ignore the
parliament’s will.26
21 Mitchell, Oscit, p. 80 22 Ibid, p. 80 23 Kapanadze, OsCit, p. 23 24 Muskhlishvili, Constitutional Changes in Georgia, p.51 25 No Country for Old Men, European Stability Initiative, 2010,
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate_ID=3&slide_ID=12 26 Kapanadze, OsCit, p.24
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The new constitution thus bolstered the president’s already well-established power. After
consolidating his power further, Saakashvili embarked on ambitious reforms on the police
sector, economic liberalization, and notable success was achieved in these fields. However, in
2007, Saakashvili had to face the first great challenge against his power with the large
opposition protests. The police cracked down hard on the protesters. The opposition TV
channel Imedi was taken off the air. Eventually, Saakashvili had to compromise promising early
elections in 2008 which Saakashvili again won. During this time, Freedom House also expressed
concern over the pluralism in the broadcast media. Also, there were serious concerns over the
independence of the judiciary branch as almost all the judges had been dismissed and replaced
with the ones who were perceived to be skewed to support Saakashvili.27 28
The Second Round Post-Rose Revolution Constitutional Amendments
In 2009, with the order of the president, the National Constitution Commission composed of
opposition parties, the ruling party, NGO representatives was established.29 Thus, the
discussions around new amendments to the constitution arose. The new amendments in a
stark contrast to the amendments of 2004 would devolve the power away from the president
to the prime minister to enable the country’s transformation to the semi-presidential system
from the presidential system. Thus, the new amendments would make the prime minister the
head of government. He would be elected by the parliament. So, effectively, the winner party
in the parliament would also dominate the executive branch as well. The prime minister would
be responsible for the domestic and foreign affairs of the country. The president would have his
authorities with the new amendments reduced. He would still remain as the head of state, the
27 Mitchell, Oscit, p.93 28 Kapanadze, OsCit, p.28 29 Georgia’s Constitutional Changes, The International Crisis Group, 2012,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcasts/2012/georgia-turashvili-georgias-constitutional-
changes.aspx
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commander-in-chief having a right to declare a war. He would also have a right to dissolve the
parliament on the grounds concerning the government establishment. Thus, the president
would not be reduced to a ceremonial figure as is the case in the parliamentary systems. The
amendments were adopted in 2010. There were a lot of concerns that Saakashvili was pushing
for the changes to the constitution as his second-term would come to an end in 2013, and he
could technically become a prime minister.30 31 These concerns did not prove true as
Saakashvili’s United National Movement came second in the Parliamentary elections to the
Georgian Dream Bloc in 2012. But the serious flaws in the amendments obstruct the effective
functioning of the establishment. The parliament as before had not been empowered
adequately as the Prime minister though elected by the parliament later has no accountability
before the parliament. Also, the president’s power to disband the parliament though not easily
executable impinges on the constitutionality. The parliament has no competence to make any
change to the budget without the permission of the government, which was noted by the
Venice Commission in its opinion.32 Besides this, there was a concern related to the vague
differentiation of the authorities of the president and the prime minister in the constitution,
which has a potential to lead to clashes. The Venice Commission in advance had warned of the
possible confrontations.33 For example, it is stated in Clause 69, Paragraph 3 that “the president
represents Georgia in foreign relations”. “However, just below that, Clause 78,Paragraph 1
declares that the cabinet “implements foreign policy” and further down, Paragraph 4 of the
same clause states that the“prime minister […] represent[s] Georgia in foreign relations within
30 The International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcasts/2012/georgia-turashvili-georgias-constitutional-
changes.aspx 31 Alexander Jackson, The New Georgian Constitution: Reading Saakashvili, The Foreign Policy Centre, 32 International Crisis Group,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcasts/2012/georgia-turashvili-georgias-constitutional-
changes.aspx 33 Ibid, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcasts/2012/georgia-turashvili-georgias-constitutional-
changes.aspx
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his competence.” ”34 The prognosis proved true when this year the rift between the Prime
Minister Gharibashvili and the President Margelashvili was unraveled. Especially, it captured
the attention when there was indecision regarding whether the prime minister or the president
would represent Georgia in one of the UN summits.35 The rift had started before this when the
president was criticized because of using Saakashvili-era presidential palace and blocking a
number of bills by the former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. In return, the president vowed
to use his power to disband the parliament though it does not seem to be easy to accomplish.36
Apart from the standoff, attracting attention is the interference of the former Prime Minister
Ivanishvili into the state affairs from time to time. The dispute over Georgia’s representation in
the UN summit had also come to an end after the president had announced his plan had come
under pressure by “some serious, organized efforts” clearly pointing out to the former prime
minister Ivanishvili who according to the survey is believed by 50% of Georgians to be still
playing an important role in the political decision-making. The institution of presidency
influenced by a strong tycoon who was a former prime minister having officially no position is
also a sign of concern. The Transparency International also has stated the “reproving” and even
“disregarding of the institution of presidency”.37Besides these clashes, currently a lot of
discussion has concentrated around the independence of the judiciary. One of the first steps
the Georgian Dream Bloc took was the crackdown on the officials of the former administration.
Many police officers were dismissed peaking with the arresting of the former Minister of
34 Vasili Rukhadze, “New Georgian Constitution Deepens Rift between the President and the Prime Minister”,
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2014
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42843&cHash=23464f71facbd2cc
28ac00643fb4845c#.VEGGUPl_tSs 35 Rukhadze, “New Georgian Constitution Deepens Rift Between the President and the Prime Minister”
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42843&cHash=23464f71facbd2cc
28ac00643fb4845c#.VEGGUPl_tSs 36 Georgian President Says He May Resign, DfWatch, 2014,
http://dfwatch.net/georgian-president-says-he-may-resign-21575 37 Robert Coalson, “Spat Over Who Speaks To UN Hints Of Looming Political Crisis In Georgia”, RFERL, 2014,
http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia-garibashvili-margvelashvili-ivanishvili-political-crisis/26602307.html
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Interior and the former Prime Minister, Vano Merabishvili. After Saakashvili lost the elections
and left the country, some charges were also brought against him raising suspicions that the
new government might be after the political retribution to the pursuit of which the
inadequately independent judicial institutions have been subjected.38 Thus, the unequal power
distributions, particularly the lack of checks on the executive branch remained as the major
stumbling block for the rise of a liberal democracy in Georgia, hindering the advance of
constitutional liberalism.
Conclusion
A former Soviet country of South Caucasus, Georgia had an uneven political transition path
going through the civil war, weak institutionalization. Towards late 1990s, the state became
more centralized. Under Shevardnadze’s rule, exercising different liberties were allowed. But
towards the last years of his rule, the elections were marked more frequently with the
fraudulence. Shevardnadze had to step down with the Rose Revolution following which two
rounds of constitutional amendments were approved. Overall, after both rounds, the executive
branch maintained its dominance. The constitutionality was ensured as the checks-and-
balances system was not ensured. Georgia still qualifies as an illiberal democracy as the
relatively free and fair elections are the realities of the political life just like not fully guaranteed
political liberties, unchecked powers of the state institutions.
38 Anna Nemtsova, Vendetta Politics in Georgia, Foreign Policy, 2013 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/vendetta_politics_in_georgia
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