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The Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific

Pradeep Kaushiva Abhijit Singh

Feb 2014

Knowledge World, New Delhi

9789383649099 | HardBack

138 + xx pp | 2014

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Index

Preface i

Foreword iv

Section I – The Strategic Meta-narrative

1. An Evolving Geostrategic Realm

Sureesh Mehta

2. Emerging Regional Geopolitics

Timothy Hoyt

3. Historical Evolution and Security Debates

Raja K Menon

Section II – The Rebalance: Regional Perspectives

4. An Indian Vantage point

HK Singh

5. Australia’s Indo-Pacific Imperative

Justin Jones

6. Mapping the Maritime ‘Pivot’

Abhijit Singh

Section III – Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

7. Maritime Disputes in the Asia-Pacific – A Chinese Perspective

Hong Nong

8. Japan’s South China Sea Conundrum

Tomoko Kiyota

9. A View from Philippines

Caesar Taccad, Philippines Navy

10. A Model of Collaborative Security

Yuki Sekugichi

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11. An Africa Perspective of Maritime Collaboration

Hanno Tuteberg

Section IV- Geopolitical Challenges and Non-traditional Challenges

12. The Three ‘Geos’

Cleo Pascal

13. Non-Traditional Security Challenges

Vijay Sakhuja

14. Piracy and Private Security

Ibrahim Hilmy

15. A Regional Framework for the Indian Ocean

Vikas Ranjan

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Preface

In a world undergoing dynamic transformation, few regions are changing more rapidly than the

integrated Indian Ocean-Pacific Ocean region. Over the last about a decade, there have been two

important developments that have altered the world’s economic and strategic balance. First, the

“Indo-Pacific” has replaced the Atlantic–Pacific combine, as the new financial and strategic

centre of gravity. Second, the rise of local maritime powers has resulted in the presence of

alternate ‘power-hubs’ within the broader Asia-Pacific region.

As traditional naval powers like the US and UK have reduced their maritime presence in the

Indo-Pacific, growing naval powers like China and India, have rushed to fill the strategic

vacuum. Driven by impressive growth rates, the two Asian giants have steadily improved their

maritime power, reflected most prominently in the growth of their maritime shipping, port

development and the rapid expansion of naval power. Their interests and security role has come

to form a critical component of stability in the Indo-Pacific.

The security of the Indo-Pacific, however, goes beyond a mere consideration of emerging

political equations and great-power interplay. Recent developments in the region have shown

that maritime security challenges in the region straddle the gamut of traditional and non-

traditional issues. These include the scourge of piracy and armed robbery in the Western Indian

Ocean and the Malacca Straits; a simmering maritime conflict in the Persian Gulf; terrorism in

South and Southeast Asia; drugs, arms and human trafficking; and territorial disputes in the

South China Sea and the East Sea. Yet, it is still the Persian Gulf - the world’s most important

source of crude oil – combined with Northern Indian Ocean SLOCs, the Malacca Straits and the

Pacific’s sea-lanes which attract the bulk of the security effort.

While the Indo-Pacific’s centrality to oil trade renders its stability critical, the looming threat of

maritime crime and environmental crises in the region make it an area of vital concern for

maritime forces. Even as trends with worrisome security implications continue to evolve in the

region, there is a distinct possible that the maritime challenges could prevail over the

international and regional community’s ability to effectively respond in a sustained and effective

manner.

Addressing the ‘Regional Flux’

Since it plays a key role in facilitating trade and oil flows, the Indo-Pacific is the principal theatre

of geo-strategic competition between established and emerging powers. However, the sharply

divergent interests of regional and extra-regional states – their contradictory strategic

imperatives; the vast economic disparities and a myriad mix of cultural preferences in the region,

present a unique challenge for security forces. The most significant maritime policy initiatives

within the Asia-Pacific seem to have been taken by the US. Washington’s Defence Strategic

Review of Jan 2012 sought to address the strategic flux in the region by committing a bulk of

American military assets to the region. To inject substance into its policy, the US has announced

a ‘strategic pivot’ – the subject of much discussion and debate among policy makers and

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analysts. While many of the measures announced, haven’t been fully implemented following cuts

in the military budget, it is still a significant political move by the US.

The emerging dynamic in the region is about the simultaneous rise of three maritime powers:

India, the US and China. Although the US still remains the most powerful nation in the world,

both militarily and economically, the situation is rapidly changing due to China’s growing

comprehensive national power. Robert Kaplan, a prominent US security analyst aptly describes

the strategic scenario in the Indo-Pacific as one “where the rivalry between the United States and

China interlocks with the regional rivalry between China and India, and also with America’s

fight against Islamic terrorism in the Middle East, which includes America’s attempt to contain

Iran.”

As analysts often point out, it is the slow erosion of American power combined with the rapid

rise of China’s military capabilities that is leading to an uncertain security situation in the Indo-

Pacific. The new balance-of-maritime-power is what has resulted in the increased intensity of

conflicts in the South China Sea – impacting regional maritime security at large. In the evolving

security matrix, multiple hedging is the order of the day in that there is intense competition even

between traditional allies and new partnerships are being seriously forged with old rivals.

A Mix of Myriad Challenges

The large market in the Indo-Pacific gets defined by nearly half the world’s population

inhabiting the region. The world’s leading and rising economic powers such as China, India,

Korea, Australia and Japan, etc., are principal constituents integrated space. Consequently,

maritime trade flowing through the busy sea lanes of Indo-Pacific region is vital for the

economic prosperity of the entire region and beyond.

The Indo-Pacific is rich in natural resources especially hydrocarbons which fuel the economic

engines of the world’s economies. Earlier, competition among imperial powers for resources and

markets had led to the colonization of many states in this region. In the past few decades,

however, these countries emerged from the shadows of their colonial masters to realize their own

potential.

Economic factors today dominate the regional politics of the Indo-Pacific, otherwise

characterized by a traditional mix of inter-State cooperation, competition, rivalry and sometimes

even conflict. Since over 90% of world’s trade by volume is over sea, foremost amongst

maritime security challenges is ensuring unfettered use of the global commons for freedom of

navigation.

A key economic challenge facing the Indo-Pacific region is the paucity of employment

opportunity. Low Industrial output in several countries in East and Southeast Asia, weak

overseas demand, shrinking of export-oriented manufacturing economies are forcing populations

into high-risk and vulnerable forms of employment. Among the principal challenges in the

region, therefore, is uplifting masses from poverty. The need of the hour is to promote economic

growth, and support the full development and participation of communities in economic, social

and political life to ensure a more inclusive and sustainable future.

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Managing ‘Change’ in the Region

Dealing with security in the Indo-Pacific requires states to come to terms with its altered

dynamics. For this, nations need to adopt a ‘change management’ approach in tackling the

various challenges. While on the one hand, policy-makers need to account for the growing

dangers in the maritime domain - threats from terrorism, trafficking, and piracy – on the other,

they must also deal with economic and human security issues of trade, employment, connectivity

and climate change. The magnitude and complexity of the challenges, demands policy

coherence, imagination, resources, and sustained efforts.

It is therefore, an opportune time to undertake a comprehensive analysis of issues relevant to the

security of the Indo-Pacific. Such an exercise might prove critical in identifying areas of mutual

understanding and cooperation and the exploring of possibilities to enhance collective problem-

solving. The book is an attempt to share perceptions about the developing seascape and presents

perspectives on issues of security that may affect the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific over the next

few decades.

The Editors

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Editors

Vice Admiral (Retd) Pradeep Kaushiva

Director, NMF

Vice Admiral (Retd) Pradeep Kaushiva is the Director of the

National Maritime Foundation. A specialist in Communications

and Electronic Warfare, the Admiral holds an M Sc (Telecom)

degree and is a Fellow of the Institution of Electronics and

Telecommunication Engineers. In a career spanning more than

four decades, Admiral Kaushiva commanded the Indian Naval

Ships Prachand, Veer, Coast Guard Ship Vijaya and the Guided Missile Frigate

‘Ganga’. As a Flag Officer, he served as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff

(Information Warfare and Operations); Deputy Commandant and Chief Instructor,

National Defence Academy at Khadakwasla; Flag Officer Commanding Eastern

Fleet and Chief of Staff, Southern Naval Command at Kochi. He retired as the

Commandant of the National Defence College, New Delhi.

Commander Abhijit Singh

Commander Abhijit Singh is a Research Fellow at the Institute for

Defence Studies and Analyses. Commissioned in the Executive

Branch of the Indian Navy in July 1994, he specialises in Gunnery

and Weapons Systems and has served onboard frontline ships.

Prior to joining the IDSA, Cdr Abhijit was a Research Fellow at the

National Maritime Foundation. He has been the Officer-in-Charge

of the Indian Navy's History Division, where he assisted the late

Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani (Retd) in the authorship of the third volume of

Indian Naval History, “Transition to Guardianship”. He has written extensively on

littoral security and geo-political events in West Asia and South Asia, including

papers on the evolution of Iran’s naval forces and the Pakistan Navy.

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Contributors

Admiral (Retd) Sureesh Mehta

Chairman, NMF

Admiral Sureesh Mehta is the Chairman, National Maritime Foundation

- an appointment he took over on 18 Jan 2012. The Admiral served as

Chief of the Naval Staff from 01 Nov 2006 until 31 August 2009, and

served concurrently as the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. After

retirement, he was appointed as India's High Commissioner to New

Zealand. An alumnus of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington,

India and the National Defence College, New Delhi, Admiral Mehta was

a naval aviator who flew Sea Hawk jets from the aircraft carrier, INS

Vikrant. He went on to skipper INS Beas, INS Godavari and INS Garuda - the premier

Naval Air Station of Indian Navy. His illustrious career saw him command the Western

Fleet and the Indian Coast Guard. He also served as the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff,

Chief of Personnel and the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval

Command.

Rear Admiral (Retd) K Raja Menon

India

Admiral Raja Menon is a submariner and has commanded seven ships

and submarines. He retired in 1994 as the Assistant Chief of Naval

Staff (Operations). He has authored four books, ‘Maritime Strategy

and Continental Wars’, A Nuclear Strategy for India’ ‘The Indian

Navy: A Photo Essay’ and ‘A Long View from Delhi’. Admiral Menon

was a member of the Arun Singh Committee to restructure the National

Defence set up in India and a member of the National Defence

University Committee.

Dr Hong Nong

China Dr Hong Nong is Deputy Director, Research Centre for Ocean Law

and Policy, National Institute for South China Sea Studies. Dr. Nong

holds a PhD in Political Science specialising in the law of the sea,

international relations and comparative politics. Her areas of research

include China politics and foreign policy; ocean governance in

Northeast and Southeast Asia, international security and dispute

settlement/conflict resolution. Dr Nong was ITLOS-Nippon Fellow for

International Dispute Settlement, Germany from July 2008- March

2009 and a visiting fellow at Centre of Oceans Law and Policy,

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University of Virginia, Charlottesville, U.S.A in February 2009. She has been a Visiting

Fellow at International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Court (ICC),

European Commission, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Captain Justin Jones

Australia

Captain Justin Jones, RAN is the Director of the Sea Power Centre,

Australia. A Principal Warfare Officer with specialisations in surface

warfare and advanced navigation, he has had diverse experiences

ranging across maritime counter terrorism, peace monitoring,

operations in the Middle East and extensive engagement with navies

throughout Indo-Pacific Asia. He was the Commanding Officer of the

Guided Missile Frigate HMAS Newcastle in 2009-10, prior to a short

period as Navy Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in

2010.

Ambassador H K Singh

India

Ambassador H.K. Singh retired from the Indian Foreign Service in

December 2010. His last posting was as Ambassador of India in

Japan. The Ambassador has an M.A. degree from the University of

Delhi and joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1974. He has been

India's envoy to Indonesia and Colombia. He has also served as

India's Deputy Permanent Representative at the Indian Mission to the

UN in Geneva, Switzerland.

Prof. Timothy Hoyt

US Naval War College, USA

Timothy D. Hoyt, Ph.D, is an Associate Professor of Strategy and

Policy at the U.S. Naval War College and has done credible work in

military strategy. Prof. Hoyt has designed and coordinated political-

military simulations for various universities, the Department of

Defense and the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research

in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. He has written on a variety of

subjects, including the diffusion of military technologies and

practices, the proliferation of conventional and unconventional

weapons, regional security in the Middle East and South Asia and

the evolution of strategy and arms production in the developing world.

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Dr Vijay Sakhuja

Director (Research), ICWA

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Director (Research), Indian Council of World

Affairs, New Delhi. A former naval officer, he is also Visiting

Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore since 2006. Earlier, he was Senior Fellow at the Centre

for Airpower Studies, Observer Research Foundation, and Research

Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and United

Service Institution of India, all at New Delhi. Dr Vijay Sakhuja has

authored ‘Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic

Transactions - China, India and Southeast Asia’. His recent

manuscript titled ‘Politico-Strategic Developments in the Arctic’ is under publication

while another, titled ‘Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Bay of Bengal’ is under

review.

Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Hilmy

Maldives

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Ibrahim Hilmy joined Maldives National

Defense Force on 25th April 1988. He is a naval executive branch

officer with specialization in Naval Communication from Indian Navy

and Electronic Warfare from Pakistan Navy. LTC Ibrahim Hilmy is an

aluminous of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India

and has obtained MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies from

University of Madras. LTC Ibrahim Hilmy is presently the Principal

Director of Department of International Defence Cooperation and Policy (DIDC & P) of

Ministry of Defence and National Security, Maldives.

Ms Cleo Paskal

Canada

Cleo Paskal is an Associate Fellow in the Energy, Environment and

Resources Department at Chatham House, London as well as Adjunct

Faculty in the Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University, India.

She is an Adviser to the Global Change programme at SCMS, Kochi

and has consulted for and briefed, a wide range of stakeholders

including the US Department of Energy, US Army War College, UK

Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Royal College of Defence

Studies. Ms Paskal researches the confluence of the '3 geos':

geopolitical, geo-economics, and geophysical changes. She has contributed to the Sunday

Times (UK), The Telegraph (UK) and the BBC, and is a Huffington Post columnist.

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Rear Admiral (JG) W.H.O. Teuteberg

South Africa

Rear Admiral Teuteberg joined the South African Navy (SAN) in

1977. He has the rare distinction of serving onboard both submarines

and ships. The Admiral served as the Director Maritime Warfare and

has been Chief of Fleet Staff at Fleet Command in Simon's Town. He

is presently Director Joint Force Preparations and Training with Chief

of Joint Operations in Pretoria.

MsTomoko Kiyota

Japan

Ms. Tomoko KIYOTA is currently teaching at the Department of

Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University,

Karnataka as a Visiting Fellow. She is also a doctoral candidate at the

Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Takushoku

University, Tokyo. She was a Research Intern at the Institute of Peace

and Conflict Studies (Nov 2008 to May 2009), and a Visiting Fellow

at the Institute for Defence Studies Analyses (Jul 2009 to Jan 2010).

Her doctoral thesis explores India’s arms development.

Commodore Caesar C Taccad AFP

Philippines

Cmde Caesar Taccad is the present Commander of Naval Forces

Northern Luzon. Prior to his present position, Cmde Taccad held

different positions in the Philippine Navy that gave him the necessary

training to hold a key position. He took different military courses in

preparation for duties and responsibilities in the higher command. He

underwent various training and studies locally among which are

Intelligence Surface Warfare Officer Course, Naval Command and

Staff Course, Naval Command General Staff Course, Executive Course in National

Security, Strategy Development Program for the Fleet and Master in National Security

Administration (MNSA).

Dr Vikash Ranjan

India

Dr.Vikash Ranjan is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World

Affairs. A recipient of Junior Research Fellowship by University

Grants Commission and Japanese Government’s Monbukagakusho

Scholarship, Dr.Ranjan has worked in various editorial and research

fellow’s capacities, before joining the present organisation. His

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research interests include Southeast Asia, East Asia, Developing Economies, and Socio-

Cultural issues.

Captain Yuki Sekiguchi

Japan

Capt Yuki Sekiguchi is Deputy Director of Plans and Programs

Division, and Chief, Operations Evaluation Section, Maritime Staff

Office, Japan. He joined the National Defense Academy in 1989 and

later MSDF Officer Candidate School in 1990. Captain Sekiguchi joined

Operations Support Division, MSO, 1st Operations Division, JSO and

Programs Division, JSO and MOFA in 2009. In Aug 2012, he was

Chief, Operations Evaluations Section, MSO, Japan.

Cdr Abhijit Singh

Commander Abhijit Singh is a Research Fellow at the Institute for

Defence Studies and Analyses. Commissioned in the Executive Branch

of the Indian Navy in July 1994, he is a specialist in Gunnery and

Weapons Systems and has served onboard frontline ships. Prior to

joining the IDSA, Cdr Abhijit was a Research Fellow at the National

Maritime Foundation. He has been the Officer-in-Charge of the Indian

Navy's History Division, where he assisted the late Vice Admiral GM

Hiranandani (Retd) in the authorship of the third volume of Indian Naval History,

“Transition to Guardianship”. He has written extensively on littoral security and geo-

political events in West Asia and South Asia, including papers on the evolution of Iran’s

naval forces and the Pakistan Navy.

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Foreword

The contents of this volume have primarily been drawn from the proceedings of the National

Maritime Foundation’s Annual Seminar 2013. The NMF, every year, takes up a maritime issue

of topical interest for discussion by scholars, academics and practitioners. This year the subject

for discussion was ‘Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific in the next two decades’. Apart from the

insightful presentations, the seminar brought forth some eager audience participation and lively

discussions on the various security related sub-themes.

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a significant strategic space and a theatre of great-power

competition. Besides traditional rivalries over maritime territory, sovereignty and resources, the

region is also witnessing the rise of non-traditional threats. Maritime security challenges in the

region include piracy, terrorism, gun running, illegal fishing, human and drug trafficking, climate

change, global warming, and natural disasters. Significantly, the maritime threats have a

transnational nature, where events in one part of the system impact another, thereby creating a

need for strategic relationships.

The papers in the book highlight issues and trends in the Indian Ocean-Pacific Ocean combine

and analyze maritime security issues within the region. Alongside evaluating common

challenges, the writings also explore prospects for inter-state cooperation. While most chapters

assess broad trends, the emphasis is on defining their implications in the Indian and Pacific

oceans.

The first section is dedicated to the evolution of the Indo-Pacific as a viable strategic construct.

Sureesh Mehta traces the progression of the Indo-Pacific from an idea that had limited

acceptance to one that is now seen as a feasible strategic notion. The pendulum of global

maritime significance, he brings out, has swung to the east, and that various markers of societal

progress - interdependent economic activity, vital trade exchanges, energy flows, strategic

resources development – seem to all endorse the idea of a strategically integrated region.

Timothy Hoyt, in his paper, assesses the maritime geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, which he

predicates on four different sets of issues – the region’s acceptance as a contiguous maritime

environment; the international importance of the regional maritime environment; sub-regional

issues spread within a wider geographic area, and local concerns with a potential to escalate

across the region. Raja Menon traces the historical evolution of the Indo-Pacific and analyses the

various security debates surrounding it. India’s emerging partnerships with new Asian powers,

he rightly points out, are of critical importance to the larger security of the region.

The second section is a detailed discussion of the US ‘rebalance’ – a defining subtheme within

the larger regional strategic narrative. HK Singh presents an Indian perspective of the Pivot to

Asia. Given the diffusion of strategic power in the region and the creation of alternate power-

centres, the US Pivot, he posits, may be a long-term measure aimed rectifying the strategic

imbalance in the wider Asia-Pacific. Justin Jones brings out Australia’s Indo-Pacific imperative

and highlights recent internal security developments – some meant singularly to strengthen the

US Pivot. Abhijit Singh, in his paper, details recent developments that seek to impart greater

focus and definition to the Pivot. America’s security initiatives, he avers, are intended at

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strengthening its strategic presence in Asia, and turning the Pivot into a broader diplomatic,

economic and security endeavor.

The next section deals with conflict and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Hong Nong presents a

Chinese perspective of the disputes, highlighting developments between 2009 and 2012 that

raised tensions between China and its neighbours over maritime sovereignty issues in the South

China Sea and the East Sea. Tomoko Kiyota gives a Japanese view of the South China Sea

disputes. She emphasizes Japan’s recent security moves to position itself as a strategic hub

within the region, including Prime Minister Abe ‘Security Diamond’ formulation. In his chapter,

Caesar Taccad highlights Philippines’ position on the regional maritime disputes. Yuki

Sekiguchi enunciates a model of maritime cooperation that Japan endorses and advocates – one

premised on operational collaboration and reciprocity. Hanno Teuteberg presents an African

perspective on security in Africa’s Indian Ocean littorals. Within the integrated realm of the

Indo-Pacific, he emphasizes, the need for Africa to be given its due importance.

The last section of the book deals with geo-political challenges and non-traditional security

(NTS) issues. Cleo Pascal lays out a grand narrative of the ‘three geos’ – geo-political, geo-

economic and geo-physical changes – a theoretical conception that now challenges fundamental

assumptions in the conduct of national and international affairs. Vijay Sakhuja attempts to

address some uncomfortable questions that non-traditional security threats have been throwing

up with increasing regularity. The author makes a pitch for transnational cooperation in the NTS

domain, which he deems ‘inherently feasible’.

In his paper, Ibrahim Hilmy presents a perspective on piracy and private maritime security

companies in the Indian Ocean Region. The legality of the use of force by private security guards

onboard ships is, indeed, one the most vexed issues agitating the minds of policymakers in the

region. India’s recent experience with Italian marines onboard the Enrica Lexie is a testament to

the complex nature of the problem. The author tries to being balance to the debate by

highlighting both the needs and the risks of private onboard security. The last chapter of the book

delves into regulatory frameworks for addressing maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region.

Vikas Ranjan highlights the potential of the IOR-ARC (now renamed IOR-A) in establishing an

inclusive regional architecture for security and prosperity.

The chapters are an attempt to closely analyze and summarize events and trends within the

broader Asia Pacific region. The intention is to accurately assess future security needs and

highlight measures that need to be adopted expeditiously to address the security lacunae in the

region. Despite the differing perspectives on common security issues, what shines through is

appositive spirit with which all authors approach the various subjects – even where their national

state interests are clearly at odds with each other.

It is hoped that this book will make a meaningful contribution in the study if the emerging Indo-

Pacific domain.

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The Strategic Meta-narrative

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Chapter 1

The Emergence of a Geostrategic Realm

Admiral (Retd) Sureesh Mehta

For many long years, India tended to view the Indian Ocean as a cohesive entity, which

drove diplomatic relations between countries on its periphery, whilst a fairly dominant Asia-

Pacific was seen more through the eyes of regionalism. It is only of late that the integrated arena

of the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, commonly referred to as the Indo-Pacific, has

become a key strategic area in the 21st century with the world seeing it as a singular maritime

theatre. The shift in the strategic balance of power to the East makes it necessary to explore the

emerging security imperatives in the broader Indo-Pacific region, amidst a rising constellation of

economic and political stars such as China, Indonesia, Japan, Australia and India, on the geo-

strategic horizon.

As global economic power shifts from the West to the East, the vast geo-strategic and

geo-economic realm spanning the western Pacific Ocean right up to the western Indian Ocean

along the eastern coast of Africa is rapidly eclipsing the once dominant Asia-Pacific as

the centre of trade, investment, rivalry, competition and cooperation. Today, it makes more

sense to think of this maritime region of interest as an organic and integrated strategic entity

rather than as two separate distinctive geographic and strategic theatres i.e. the Indian Ocean and

the Pacific. More significance also accrues from the fact that this newly defined entity places

security and commerce at the centre of Asia’s strategic matrix. Of course, it connects the Indian

and Pacific Oceans in a way that underlines the crucial role that the maritime environment is

likely to play in the region’s future economic development and strategic planning.

A Strategically Relevant Space

The Indo-Pacific is important because it represents the centre of gravity of the world’s

economic and strategic interests. As the world’s most economically dynamic region, it is home to

resources that can help power many developed and developing economies. Needless to say,

Maritime security in this region is expected to be a key factor in the development of many

countries.

The Indo-Pacific contains close to half the world’s population, including in its ambit the

dynamic sub-regions of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia and the resource rich and sometimes

volatile Middle East and Africa. The integrated region consists of several of the world’s

important choke-points for global commerce including the Straits of Malacca, through which

almost a quarter of world trade passes and is arguably the most critical as the artery of the world

economy. It is the transit passage for not just the bulk of China’s trade, but also for the entire lot

of east-bound commercial traffic and oil and gas shipments from Europe and the Middle East.

One reason for the growth of Asia in the past decade has been the increasing flow of raw

materials, including energy from the Middle East. It has also led to an increase in the flow of

Asian labour, capital, and consumer goods, particularly to the rich countries in the Arabian

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Peninsula. With growing trade, port infrastructure in the region has grown exponentially serving

to expand economic ties. New ports, airports, roads, rail systems and pipelines now traverse Asia

from West to East and are making access between the landmass of Eurasia and the Indian Ocean

much easier. The pace and scope of infrastructure development has been so dramatic that

sometimes entirely new ports have been developed on sites that were earlier little more than

fishing harbours such as Gwadar in Pakistan or Hambantota in Sri Lanka. The boom in port

construction has only heightened the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific and this in turn is

likely to generate greater commercial traffic and the possibility for greater strategic competition.

Geo-strategically speaking, the Straits of Malacca dominates more than the commercial

and economic lifelines into and out of the rapidly expanding economies of East Asia. The global

strategic growth and expansion of aspiring powers can be contained and regulated through the

mere control on the movements of their naval forces through these Straits. With more than 80000

vessels transiting through the Straits every year it is the world’s hottest and most crucial strategic

choke point and with new ‘maritime trading hubs on the drawing boards in India, Sri Lanka,

Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand, use of the Straits will only grow once this new

infrastructure is operational.

Dealing with Regional Conflict

The security situation in the Indo-Pacific is complicated by maritime boundary disputes.

As energy security becomes important for nations, maritime boundary delineation has turned into

a potent source of international conflict. While potentially rich oil and gas resources lie within

national maritime zones, they are inaccessible for exploitation so long as the hundreds of

overlapping offshore boundary claims remain in dispute. While long standing maritime

boundary disputes in the South China Sea attract much media attention, disagreements over

territorial waters and in the Bay of Bengal are also on the rise. India, Bangladesh and Vietnam

today find themselves in the middle of such a dispute. There is a need for clear principles and

mutually agreed upon framework on the basis of which such maritime boundary disagreements

can be resolved.

For some time now there has been concern that the Indian Ocean Region could witness a

major military surge by China, turning it into an arena of great power competition in Asia. Well

aware of Beijing’s efforts towards looking to exploit the string of pearls, the term is used only as

a colloquial term for Chinese-funded ports and related infrastructure along the Indian Ocean

littorals, to keep Delhi off-balance. As China strengthens its ties with Indian Ocean rim

countries India has sought to improve its naval and security cooperation with countries of East

Asia including Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines and Japan. However, India’s strategic leverage

in East Asia is not comparable with China’s significant clout in the Eastern Indian Ocean, gained

primarily on the basis of the huge maritime infrastructure that it has funded. These facilities may

be commercial outposts at present but have a considerable scope for military application. We

need to acknowledge that China’s ability to put India under strain in the Indian Ocean is a

growing factor shaping the broader dynamic of Asian security.

Worries have also been expressed about the developing relationship of great power

competition between US, China and India. It is sometimes suggested that the intense rivalry

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between India and China will result in an India-US alliance to counter China. This is, it must be

said, not the most accurate portrayal of the trilateral relationship as there are elements of

cooperation and confrontation apart from collaboration between India and China that are rarely

spoken about. Indeed, India’s official take on its bilateral relationship with China is that there is

space enough in the region for both nations to co-exist and grow.

Meanwhile, maritime developments in the Western-Pacific region continue to dominate

headlines. The vital maritime zone spanning the Asian littorals in the South China Sea and the

Western Pacific has been the focus of regional and global attention. With much diplomatic

wrangling and military manoeuvring for maritime zones and island territories in vogue, efforts

by multilateral governance institutions have failed to find acceptable common ground for a

viable framework for governance and dispute resolution. Against this backdrop, East Asian

countries have begun beefing up their naval power. From Vietnam to Philippines and Indonesia

to Japan, regional navies are all looking to build their offensive and defensive maritime

capabilities. Many of these states have expressed fears about China’s growing blue water

capability and its dominance of the South China Sea and its islands. They have also supported

India in its aspiration for naval outreach in South East Asia.

Asymmetric Threats

In any security assessment accounting for asymmetric threats and defining an appropriate

response strategy against such threats is particularly challenging, necessitating as it does not only

creative conjecturing, but also mobilization of policymaking consensus. Ironically, as use of the

trade routes has grown, so has the prevalence of crime and illicit activity, turning the region

volatile and increasingly unstable, leading to a need for greater maritime security. The presence

of extra-territorial elements and non-state actors in the region has only complicated the security

matrix. Each regional State today finds itself combating elements that threaten not just its own

maritime security, but also that of its contiguous neighbours. For its part, India has been

coordinating joint patrolling with Indonesia and Thailand in the Andaman Sea, cooperation that

has led to the curbing of arms smuggling and drug trafficking. These are steps aimed at creating

common stakes in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

Regional Diplomacy

To enhance regional diplomacy, a case does exist for greater regional cooperation

amongst the Indo-Pacific community. Whilst a range of multilateral regional organizations in

the IOR viz. IOR-ARC, IONS, SAARC and BIMSTEC have been working with other groupings

in the West Pacific region viz. ASEAN, ARF, ADMM+ and the East Asia Summit, to ensure

better governance in the broader Indo-Pacific region, there is need for greater coherence in

regional efforts to establish a community of stakeholders. In recent days there have been efforts

by countries in South and South East Asia to revive the Indian Ocean Rim Association for

Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) giving it an expansive and ambitious mandate that includes

security. The idea of such a community is to form an integrated neighbourhood, which could

pave the way for the formation of a comprehensive regional economic and security partnership.

Such regional cooperation would indeed be fruitful in reducing tensions between the littoral

states.

20

The nations of the region share many of these common concerns. Most of us accept the

need for greater multilateral and bilateral cooperation and therefore choose to constantly engage

each other in addressing our concerns. But there is also the need to harmonize ourselves in such

a way that we can effectively address the multidimensional challenges of the future. It is for this

reason that we need to take a collective consideration of future strategies that would help address

the many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and identify the trends that are likely to shape

the Asian strategic landscape over the next two decades.

21

Chapter 6

Mapping the Maritime ‘Pivot’

Abhijit Singh

As the Indo-Pacific theatre gains geo-political importance, the U.S. has sought to

adjust its maritime Pivot for an effective accrual of its strategic objectives. This

has involved nuancing the operational details and clarifying the ambiguities

involved in the practical staging of the military maneuver. The paper aims to map

the shifting contours of the maritime ‘rebalance’ to Asia.

The integrated arena of the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific has become a key theatre of

maritime operations in the evolving geostrategic dynamic. As the world’s economic power shifts

from West to East, “Asia-Pacific”, the once popular term to describe the thriving economic and

strategic environs of Asia, has been substituted by the more analyst-friendly “Indo-Pacific”. The

new construction depicts a vast geo-strategic and geo-economic realm spanning the western

Pacific Ocean to the western Indian Ocean along the eastern coast of Africa and represents an

integrated strategic entity, rather than as two diverse geographic and strategic theatres: the Indian

Ocean Region and the Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific places security and commerce at the centre of Asia’s strategic template. The

organic connection of the two oceans underlines the crucial role that the maritime environment

plays in the region’s economic and strategic dynamic. A growing number of analysts now see the

term as an accurate description of a greater regional system witnessing the rise of regional

powers whose expanding economic interests have created a strategic and diplomatic imperative

for increased influence in the Asia-Pacific’s primary maritime zone of interest.1 Proponents of

the Indo-Pacific point out that the growing energy interests of regional powers, such as China,

India and Japan, have created the need for a unified strategic construct that encompasses the sea

lines of communication and connects the littorals of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

Opponents of the term, however, see it differently. No single strategic system, they hold, is

capable of capturing all the complex contingencies of the region. For detractors, the Indo-Pacific

construct has still not been developed sufficiently to simultaneously address the existing sub-

regional tensions, and other non-traditional challenges. If anything, skeptics point out, it is code

for balancing China, which only allows the US and its allies to build coalitions to contain

growing Chinese power and influence in the Asia Pacific.

Notwithstanding the debates over the validity of the notion, however, there is little to doubt its

increased acceptance in strategic circles. The fact is that the Asian strategic order has been

rendered complex by sub-regional contests and the prevalence of maritime crime, natural

disasters, and climate change. These are issues common to both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific,

and the Indo-Pacific is valuable framework to start identifying and addressing challenges within

the broader region.

22

The Rebalance to Asia

A defining subtheme within the Indo-Pacific is the US Pivot to Asia. America’s turn to the East

is an economic and military strategy to revitalize its presence in the region but its real

significance lies in its acceptance of maritime Asia. The ‘rebalance’ became a foreign policy

buzzword after former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used it in an article published in the

Foreign Policy Magazine in Nov 2011. The article, evocatively titled “America’s Pacific

Century”, set out the broad contours of a new US policy towards Asia – a move deemed essential

in the wake of the wasteful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. “The US needs to wind down” Clinton

noted sagely “and accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities”. But while the essay was a

good starting point, it was the US Strategic Guidance Document, officially pronouncing the

‘rebalance to Asia’ in Jan 2012, which led to concept being widely accepted as the centre-piece

of US diplomatic and military policy towards the Asia-Pacific.

As expected, the Pivot ran into rough weather. The US government’s ambiguity about the

essentials of the strategy, and the many policy flip-flops - necessitated by the need to walk a fine

balance between America’s Southeast Asian allies and China - led to many awkward questions

about the Pivot’s validity and efficacy. Then, West Asia was thrown in to turmoil diverting

valuable US resources and policy attention. The developing political crises in Asia, combined

with an adverse fiscal climate in the US, have been testing foundational features of the Pivot. To

complicate matters, the Chinese navy’s rapid modernization has presented a challenge to the US

military’s dominance of the Asia-Pacific.

Yet, there is been some innovative thinking to ensure the Pivot achieves its eventual objectives.

In recent months, America’s political and military leadership appears to have been hard at work

attempting to rectify the Pivot’s shortcomings - tailoring it suitably to meet the emerging

challenges in the region. As challenges within the broader Asia-Pacific region mount for the US,

Washington seems to be devising a dual-edged strategy, to both counter China and wield

decisive influence in the Asia-Pacific.2

Washington’s first order of business has been to clarify misgivings about the viability of a

strategy based on assurances of a stronger military presence in the region. Indeed, while the

Pivot was always projected as a long-term US national strategy, there have been doubts

America’s ability to service its military commitments. The remodeled approach has sought to

dispel the chronic ‘doubts’ on the operational details of the pivot.

In military operational terms, the Pivot’s principal objective was the deployment of 60 percent of

U.S. naval capabilities in the broad Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific region, instead of 50 percent as in

the past. This involves a net increase of one carrier, seven destroyers, ten Littoral Combat Ships,

and two submarines, and also includes air assets, intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and

unmanned aerial vehicles. 3

In the past two years, however, the US showed itself to be sorely lacking in both resources and

intent to be able to adequately meet the challenges that it had initially resolved to confront with

all seriousness. As a result, it faced growing criticism from its Southeast Asian allies, suffering

23

the heat of increasing Chinese aggressiveness. The US reboot of the Pivot has served to nuance

the strategy’s essentials, and give it greater vigour and purpose.

New deployments and agreements

Under the present plan, the U.S Marine Expeditionary Units in Iraq and Afghanistan are to return

to their home stations in the Pacific theatre.4 But following substantial cuts to the defence

budget, the US is now planning a more distributed presence with a focus on the Southern Pacific.

Other salient aspects of the developing Pivot strategy are as follows:

Emphasis on ‘flexible’ troop deployment, with smaller, more agile, expeditionary, self-

sustaining, and self-contained forces in the pursuit of specific operational missions.5

Greater military integration with partners and allies to allow them to share greater burden

in the overall security endeavor. The overall thrust of efforts to be in the Southern and

North Western Pacific.

Strengthen existing basing facilities, while increasing efforts to search for more access

options. Develop Guam as an alternate strategic hub.

‘Rotational deployments’ of military units to different parts of the region and less

reliance on permanent bases. A leaner and more effective military presence and to avoid

large expenditures on maintaining permanent new bases.

A greater dependence on Australia and Japan to support US forces in the region. An

intensive deployment of marines to aid the security effort.

In pursuance of the broader strategy, USS Freedom - the first of four littoral combat ships (LSC)

– has been positioned in Singapore, with the first crew change having occurred is Sept 20136. As

part of its deployment strategy, 250 marines have been positioned in Darwin with plans to

increase the complement to 2500 by end-2016.7 Australia, an important component of the

reworked Pivot strategy, has offered to upgrade an airfield for P-8 surveillance aircraft and

Global Hawk drones on the Cocos Islands.8 The US navy is also looking at a possible expansion

of HMAS Stirling, the Royal Australian Navy’s primary base in Western Australia - to

accommodate US warships and attack submarines, and a new Australian fleet base in Brisbane

(Australia) to accommodate US ships and submarines.9 Washington is also mobilizing its other

treaty ally, South Korea with plans for the deployment of a US Army attack helicopter

reconnaissance squadron.10

A key consideration for the US is to expand its access arrangements. For this, it needs greater

operational support from its partners and allies in the Asia-Pacific. In the past few months, US

political functionaries have been in discussions with Southeast countries to expand naval access

agreements. As an initial measure, Washington has increased security aid, and augmented the

joint training exercise program in the Asia Pacific.

24

Efforts are also on to reinvigorate the US alliances – particularly with Australia, Japan, the

Philippines, and South Korea – as well as the relationship with Singapore. The objective is two-

fold: first, to expand America’s strategic presence and establish operational dominance in key

maritime spaces and SLOCs; second, to establish a network of bilateral military partnerships and

alliances on its periphery will act as a countervailing force to balance China.11

Besides regular

allies and supporters, Washington is working to co-opt other regional countries like India,

Vietnam and Indonesia in its strategic game-plan.12

Indonesia, in particular, has lately developed

a closer convergence with US political and maritime interests in the region. Manila has been

playing an important role in regional diplomacy – keenly participating in the ASEAN, the

ADMM plus, and the East Asia Summit, and strongly advocating maritime cooperation in the

region.13

US efforts to expand its military force posture in Asia, by strengthening security ties with allies

and partners, and enhancing the role of regional institutions are viewed by many in Beijing as

strategic moves aimed directly at constraining China’s orbit of influence, and as the principal

cause of regional instability and insecurity.

A Balanced Relationship with China

An oddity about the Pivot has been the U.S. attempt to simultaneously compete and cooperate

with China. Indeed, the US policy of assuaging China when not challenging has upset America’s

Southeast Asian allies who perceive this to be a politically expedient and shortsighted approach.

But amidst the criticism of its security commitment being inconsistent with its political promise

of confronting Chinese aggression, the US has sought the construction of a balanced relationship

with Beijing.14

With the growing number of provocative incidents in the East Sea and the South

China Sea, the US efforts have understandably been to contain conflict. Even so, the balance of

narrative so far appeared largely in favour of cooperation and accommodation with Beijing,

downplaying the possibility of military confrontation.

The Pivot’s stated objectives now are being adjusted to emphasize adherence to rules and an

exertion of greater US military control over the Pacific’s strategic spaces, albeit with an essential

caveat: without, to the extent possible, aggravating Chinese sensibilities. In operational terms

the new maritime initiative appears to be a tactical counter-balancing move, where the US has

signaled its willingness to cooperate with the PLA-N to lower tensions – but only in areas where

it may be absolutely necessary to do so.15

The first part of the ‘balanced posture’ template, promotes maritime convergence with the PLA-

N. Since September 2013, there have been a series of interactions between the US and China

aimed at forming a working relationship. This involves operational exercises involving guided

missile frigates16

, and visits by senior military and political figures. 17

Despite the seeming

bonhomie,18

however, China remains apprehensive of Washington’s attempts to expand the

scope and intensity of its military engagement in the Asia Pacific. 19

Beijing’s suspicious of Washington is on account of the significant rise in high level military

exchanges and exercises recently involving the US and Southeast Asian states. A case in point is

the expansion of the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Exercise (CARAT) with

25

Malaysia. Limited in form and participation for many years, the 2013 edition had eight other

Southeast Asian navies join the exercises.20

In like fashion, the 2013 ‘Cobra Gold’ exercise

brought together 13,000 personnel from Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and

South Korea. 21

Chinese analysts point out the presence of high-end military assets in the recent

exercises – including an active participation by the USS Freedom, the new American Littoral

Combat Ship deployed in Singapore.22

Aware, perhaps, that its recent endeavors have given the rebalance the appearance of an ‘anti-

China’ strategy, the US has invited China to join its largest regional multilateral exercise,

RIMPAC, to be held in 2014.23

While the Chinese seem to have willingly accepted the offer,

there has been an acknowledgement of the limits of the strategic cooperation. Therefore in the

PLA-N’s operations in the South China Sea and East Sea, there has been no attempt at

cooperation with the US (as starkly revealed by the USS Cowpens incident when Chinese

warships confronted a US navy ship operating close to the Chinese aircraft carrier, the Liaoning). 24

Such incidents reveal the artificial nature of cooperation between the US and China in the

maritime realm. America, it appears, is eager to cooperate in areas that aren’t mutually contested

and where it would augur well for both US navy and PLA-N to combine resources.25

At the same

time, American forces are expanding their presence in large pockets of Southeast and Northeast

Asia where Chinese territorial claims are contested by other states, and focusing on improving its

‘maritime relationships’ with friendly nations – a fact not lost on Beijing.

The Rebalance within Asia

The most interesting aspect of the reworked strategy is the ‘rebalance within Asia’.26

In order to

make up for shortage of resources and personnel, the US plans to undertake a redistribution of

assets within the Asia-Pacific – both by stationing more American ships and troops in the

Southern Pacific, and by mobilizing greater regional support in terms of resource commitments

and basing arrangements. The plan is to get US allies and to support and sustain maritime

security endeavours in the region, in exchange for greater financial assistance from the US27

.

America realises the importance of expanding its basing options in the region and onshore troop

facilities remain important symbols of US military strategy. From a basing perspective, a focal

point of interest is the Philippines28

. In July 2013, America began serious consultations with

Manila for long-term military bases in the country, pushing for a 20-year basing agreement29

.

The American proposal is to have rotational forces in the Philippines, in the form of a ‘semi-

permanent’ deployment (rather than a full-fledged military presence).

Meanwhile, the US has been increasing its military presence in Australia. America’s force

posture initiative, announced during President Obama’s trip to Canberra two years ago, has

already seen two companies of Marines have rotated through Darwin. The size of the rotation

will expand to 1100 Marine Corps personnel by 2014 and to 2,500 by 2016.30

Canberra has

allowed greater access by American military aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force facilities,

and discussions are on to let US Naval ships berth in Australia’s Indian Ocean naval bases.

26

For its part, Washington has allowed the deployment of an Australian warship in a U.S. carrier

strike group in the Western Pacific. That Australia is a key contributor to the US rebalance is

evident from the fact that during the annual AUSMIN meeting in Washington in Nov 2013,

Australia reaffirmed its commitment to the US force posture in the Asia-Pacific by promising to

operate more closely with the US across Asia31

.

The most significant contribution to the rebalance has come from Japan. Tokyo has been strident

in its desire to expand security cooperation with Southeast Asian nations involved in territorial

standoffs with China. It has actively provided military aid and played a key role in coordinating

"territorial issues and ocean policies" with other regional states 32

In August 2013, Japan agreed

to host a US X-band missile defence radar near Kyoto – a move likely to lessens the burden on

U.S. Aegis ships33

. Tokyo has also announced it is forming a national security council, a

precursor - some analysts fear - to a more proactive security posture. This also foreshadows a

move to send Japanese troops overseas – a possibility that has irked the Chinese.34

Washington, meanwhile, is strengthening Tokyo’s security posture by deploying two squadrons

of MV-22 aircraft, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, and rotationally deploy Global Hawk UAVs in

Japan. 35

By 2017, the US also plans to position a squadron of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters - the

aircraft’s first deployment outside the US.

Operational and Doctrinal Measures

A key element of the maritime Pivot is the ‘Air Sea Battle’ concept (ASB) – a military

operational measure that has for some time been causing China great anxiety. The ASB is

essentially a method of improving the joint operating effectiveness of U.S. Navy and Air Force

units, with the final objective of counterbalancing China’s anti-access and area denial (A2 / AD)

strategies in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Since its initial announcement, it has been perceived

as a dangerous idea with the potential of sparking a full-fledged war with China. In order to

clarify misperceptions about the original operations concept, the US military in May 2013

released the new ‘Air-Sea Battle’ document that shows the concept as a much-evolved idea since

its original articulation. The new document validates the ASB’s objective as preserving “access

to global commons” and “breaking the enemy’s kill chain”, dispelling - in some measure - the

pervasive notion of it being a punitive measure aimed solely at destroying enemy core

capabilities.

To improve its readiness to face the emerging challenges the US has been developing Guam as

the new fulcrum of the Pacific Pivot.36

The plan is to relocate almost 9000 marines from

Okinawa that hosts a bulk of the US marine troops in Japan, to a new facility in Guam. The US

and Japanese governments have agreed upon a realignment roadmap that envisages the build-up

of Guam as a facility for hosting marines. Japan had agreed to contribute 60% of the cost in an

endeavour planned to relocate 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, including the III

Marine Expeditionary Force at Futenma Air Station.37

27

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the Pivot appears aimed at establishing American primacy in the Asia

Pacific without having provoking conflict with China. While even as it facilitates an American

economic revival and a reassertion of US military dominance in the Asia-Pacific, the US is wary

of an open-ended confrontation with China. Given the enormous pressure from the U.S

Southeast Asian allies to check rising Chinese assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, Washington can

neither afford a strategic accommodation with Beijing nor a muted Pivot. Its efforts are,

therefore, focused on finessing the existing plan to make it more effective, yet less aggressive. In

that sense, the new Pivot appears to be an attempt to walk a cautious line between China and

American allies in the Asia-Pacific.

The new Pivot’s end-objective may eventually be about maintaining the status quo in the Asia-

Pacific and get ASEAN nations to collectively apply pressure on China to sign up to a code-of-

conduct in the South China Sea38

. Until then, US security assurances against growing Chinese

power will continue as earlier. The re-worked plan signals the US determination to maintain

force levels and defence capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region – no matter how daunting the

challenges might be. In the end, however, the diplomatic and economic aspects of the Pivot

might be just as important as its military dimension.

NOTES 1 C Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace (Washington, DC, 2012)

2 David Barno, Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp, “Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging

in the Middle East”, Journal of World Affairs, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Spring 2012, p 158-159

3 Ernest Z. Bower, Victor Cha, Karl F. Inderfurth, Christopher K. Johnson, Gary A. Powell, Stephanie Sanok; US

Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC,

August 2012, available at http://csis.org/files/publication/120814 _FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf (accessed Sep

20, 2013)

4 “The US approach to regional security”, Remarks by Chuck Hagel, US Secretary of Defence, at the 12th

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit, June 1, 2013

5Defence Budget Priorities and Choices – Fiscal Year 2014, US Department of Defence, Apr 2013, p-5

6 “Littoral Combat Ship Crew 102 Returns to San Diego”, US Department of Navy, Aug 6, 2013, available at

201http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75798

7 Matt Siegel, “U.S. Marines Arrive in Australia, in China’s Strategic Backyard, The New York Times, Apr 4, 2013

8 “US/Australia Cocos Islands spy plan”, StratRisks, May 16, 2012

9Ely Ratner, “Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China”, The Washington Quarterly, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, Spring 2013, p 26.

28

10

Donna Miles, “First Rotational U.S. Army Unit to Deploy to South Korea”, American Forces Press Service, US

Department of Defence, Sept 18, 2013

11

James Catfield, “Is Obama's 'Pivot to Asia' Really a Hedge Against China?”, The Atlantic, June 8, 2012

12

C Raja Mohan, “China’s rise, America’s pivot, and India’s Asian ambiguity”, Paper presented at Symposium India

2012

13

Gregory Poling, “Dynamic Equilibrium: Indonesia’s Blueprint for a 21st Century Asia Pacific”, Mar 8, 2013,

Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

14

Joan Johnson-Freese, “ The Need for a Consistent, Balanced US-China Policy” September 28, 2013, China-US

Focus, available at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-need-for-a-consistent-balanced-us-china-policy/

15

“From DC to Pearl, China-US military ties deepen”, China Daily, Sept 9, 2013

16

In early September, an operational interaction was arranged between three PLA-N and US Navy ships at Hawaii .

Three Chinese naval ships - Qingdao, a Luhu-class destroyer; Linyi, a Jiangkai-class frigate; and Hongzehu, a

Fuqing-class fleet oiler carried out coordinated exercises with the American guided missile cruiser, USS Lake Erie,

close to the Hawaii coast; See “Chinese navy ships arrive in Hawaii for joint drill”, China Daily, Sep 8, 2013,

available at http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-09/08/content_16952123.htm

17

The US, is Sept 2013, sent out an invitation to Wu Shengli, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's

Liberation Army Navy to visit Washington significantly, only three weeks after China's new Minister of Defence,

Chang Wanquan, toured both the Pacific Command in Hawaii. \Both China and the US expressed the need for more

interactions and exercises to strengthen their maritime relationship; See “Chinese admiral visits US Navy in San

Diego” , San Francisco Chronicle, Sept 9, 2013, available at http://www.sfgate.com/news/us/article/Chinese-

admiral-visits-US-Navy-in-San-Diego-4799046.php

18

The developing bonhomie seemed borne out by exercises a few days later between the USS Mason, a guided

missile cruiser, and PLA-N ships Harbin (destroyer) and Weishanhu (replenishment oiler). The ships conducted

evolutions requiring a high degree of coordination, including combined visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS)

operations, live-fire drills and cross-deck landings ; See “US, Chinese sailors participate in anti-piracy exercise”,

Stars and Stripes, Aug 25, 2013, available at http://www.stripes.com/news/us-chinese-sailors-participate-in-anti-

piracy-exercise-1.237271

19

Scott W. Harold, “Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability: A Strategy for Improving U.S.-China Military-to-

Military Relations”, Asia Policy (No.6), The National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, p 4,5, available at

http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free /AP16/Asia_Policy_16_ Harold_ advance.pdf

20

CARAT Malaysia Wraps Up After Nine Days of Exercises, US Department of Navy, June 24, 2013, available at

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75001

21

By Donna Miles, “Exercise Cobra Gold 2013 Kicks Off in Thailand”, American Forces Press Service, Feb 11,

2013, Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx? id=119256

22

Ibid

23

Zachary Keck, “China, RIMPAC and Containment”, The Diplomat, at http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-

blog/2013/04/03/china-rimpac-and-containment/

24

Carl Thayer, “USS Cowpens Incident Reveals Strategic Mistrust Between U.S. and China”, The Diplomat, Dec17,

2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/uss-cowpens-incident-reveals-strategic-mistrust-between-u-s-and-

china/

29

25

Keck, n-23

26

Ibid

27

Robert Sutter et al, n-8, p 4

28

Sheldon Simon, “Philippines – An Exemplar of the US Rebalance“, CSIS, available at

http://csis.org/files/publication/1302qus_seasia.pdf

29

“More US boots on Philippine soil”, Asia Times Online, Sept 9, 2013, at

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-090913.html

30

“US increasing number of Marines on rotation to Australia”, Stars and Stripes, June 14, 2013, available at

http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-increasing-number-of-marines-on-rotation-to-australia-1.225843; also see

“Joint Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, and

Australian Defence Minister David Johnston”, Nov 20, 2013, available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/

content/kerry-hagel -speak-diplomatic-and-military-cooperation-australia

31

Press Release by US Department of State, “Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN)”, Nov

20, 2013, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217794.htm (accessed Nov 30, 2013)

32

Japan’s most significant recent contribution has been the offer of ten Coast Guard ships to Philippines; see “Japan

aid to the Philippines a warning to China”, East Asia Forum, August 29, 2013, at

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/29/japan-aid-to-the-philippines-a-warning-to-china/

33

“US military to set up X-Band Radar in Kyoto to monitor missile launches”, Japan Daily Press, Aug 2, 2013,

available at http://japandailypress.com/us-military-to-set-up-x-band-radar-in-kyoto-to-monitor-missile-launches-

0233282/ (accessed Nov 12, 2013)

34

“Japan launches Security Council”, The China Daily, Dec 05, 2013, available at

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-12/05/content_17152573.htm (accessed Dec 08, 2013) 35

“US to rotate Global Hawks through Japan”, IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, Oct 3, 2013, available at

http://www.janes.com/article/27959/us-to-rotate-global-hawks-through-japan (accessed Dec 5, 2013)

36

Ernest Z. Bower et al, n-3, p 54-56

37

Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart , “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base

Controversy”, Congressional Research Service Report, August 3, 2012, available at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf

38

“Kerry to push China, SE Asia to discuss sea dispute”, Reuters, Oct 9, 2013, available at

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/09/us-asia-summit-idUSBRE9980A320131009 (accessed Dec 5, 2013)