HOW STRONG ARE U.S. TEACHER UNIONS? A STATE-BY ...

HOW STRONG ARE U.S. TEACHER UNIONS?A STATE-BY-STATE COMPARISON

BY AMBER M. WINKLER, JANIE SCULL,

& DARA ZEEHANDELAAR

FOREWORD BY CHESTER E. FINN, JR. AND MICHAEL J. PETRILLI

OCTOBER 2012

Foreword ................................................................................................................................................................4

Executive Summary ...........................................................................................................................................8

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 15

Background ........................................................................................................................................................20

Part I: Evaluating Teacher Union Strength ..............................................................................................22

Methodology .............................................................................................................................................. 26

Part II: Findings ................................................................................................................................................. 32

America’s Strongest Teacher Unions ................................................................................................ 36

America’s Weakest Teacher Unions .................................................................................................... 41

Part III: Taking a Closer Look—Teacher Union Influence by Area ..................................................44

Area 1: Resources and Membership ...................................................................................................44

Area 2: Involvement in Politics ............................................................................................................ 45

Area 3: Scope of Bargaining .................................................................................................................48

Area 4: State Policies ..............................................................................................................................49

Area 5: Perceived Influence ..................................................................................................................50

Part IV: Conclusions and Takeaways ......................................................................................................... 53

Part V: State Profiles .......................................................................................................................................60

Alabama ........................................................................................................................................................ 61

Alaska ............................................................................................................................................................ 67

Arizona...........................................................................................................................................................73

Arkansas ....................................................................................................................................................... 79

California ...................................................................................................................................................... 85

Colorado ........................................................................................................................................................ 91

Connecticut ................................................................................................................................................. 97

Delaware .....................................................................................................................................................103

District of Columbia ............................................................................................................................... 109

Florida ........................................................................................................................................................... 115

Georgia ......................................................................................................................................................... 121

Hawaii ........................................................................................................................................................... 127

Idaho. ............................................................................................................................................................ 133

Illinois............................................................................................................................................................139

Indiana .........................................................................................................................................................145

Iowa ................................................................................................................................................................ 151

Kansas .......................................................................................................................................................... 157

CONTENTS

Kentucky .....................................................................................................................................................163

Louisiana .....................................................................................................................................................169

Maine ............................................................................................................................................................ 175

Maryland .......................................................................................................................................................181

Massachusetts ........................................................................................................................................... 187

Michigan ......................................................................................................................................................193

Minnesota ...................................................................................................................................................199

Mississippi ..................................................................................................................................................205

Missouri .........................................................................................................................................................211

Montana ....................................................................................................................................................... 217

Nebraska ....................................................................................................................................................223

Nevada ........................................................................................................................................................229

New Hampshire .......................................................................................................................................235

New Jersey .................................................................................................................................................241

New Mexico ...............................................................................................................................................247

New York ....................................................................................................................................................253

North Carolina ..........................................................................................................................................259

North Dakota ............................................................................................................................................265

Ohio .............................................................................................................................................................. 271

Oklahoma ................................................................................................................................................... 277

Oregon ........................................................................................................................................................283

Pennsylvania .............................................................................................................................................289

Rhode Island .............................................................................................................................................295

South Carolina ..........................................................................................................................................301

South Dakota ............................................................................................................................................307

Tennessee ...................................................................................................................................................313

Texas .............................................................................................................................................................319

Utah ..............................................................................................................................................................325

Vermont .......................................................................................................................................................331

Virginia ........................................................................................................................................................337

Washington ...............................................................................................................................................343

West Virginia ............................................................................................................................................349

Wisconsin ...................................................................................................................................................355

Wyoming .....................................................................................................................................................361

Appendix A: Detailed Methodology and Rationale ..........................................................................367

Indicators and Weighting ....................................................................................................................367

Detailed Metric and Rationale ...........................................................................................................369

Appendix B: State-Level NEA and AFT Affiliates ............................................................................. 402

Endnotes ..........................................................................................................................................................404

4 HOW STRONG ARE U.S. TEACHER UNIONS? A STATE-BY-STATE COMPARISON

Foreword

So we resolved to dig deeper, determined

to parse the differences in strength across

state-level unions in the fifty states plus the

District of Columbia.

We were delighted and appreciative when

Education Reform Now—an affiliate of

Democrats for Education Reform—agreed

to join, co-sponsor, and help fund this

endeavor.

Which turned into one of the most

challenging research projects we have ever

undertaken at the Fordham Institute.

Let us acknowledge at the outset that

it’s not a perfect study. (We offer some

thoughts as to how we and others might

approach this thorny topic in the future.)

Let us admit that its conclusions are

more nuanced, even equivocal, than we’re

accustomed to. And let us recognize that,

just as we were gathering and analyzing

reams of data, multiple factors—economic

difficulties, political shifts, court decisions,

changing policy agendas, the arrival of

many new players—conspired to produce

enormous flux in precisely the realms that

we were examining. Sometimes we found

that a mere month could render part of our

laboriously-assembled data obsolete; we

adjusted where we could, but eventually

had to cease collecting and start making

sense of our data.

In the end, we learned a ton—about

individual states, about national patterns,

Everyone knows that teacher unions matter

in education politics and policies, but it’s

hard to determine just how much they

matter—and whether they wield greater

influence in some places than in others.

There’s plenty of conventional wisdom on

this topic, mostly along the lines of, “unions

are most powerful where they represent

most teachers and least consequential

where their bargaining rights and revenues

are restricted.”

But is that really true? And even if it is, does

it oversimplify a much more complex and

nuanced situation?

Veterans of the ed-policy wars—including

our own trustee Rod Paige, who is both

a former U.S. Secretary of Education

and a former local superintendent in the

biggest district in the biggest state that

bans collective bargaining—insisted to

us that teacher unions exert influence in

many ways at many levels, not just at the

bargaining table.

This deserved deeper investigation,

particularly since union critics (many of

them also ardent education reformers)

generally assert that unions are the

greatest obstacle to needed changes in

K–12 schooling, while union defenders (and

supporters of the education status quo)

insist that these organizations are bulwarks

of professionalism and safeguards against

untested innovation.

FOREWORD


Foreword

about unexpected relationships, and

surprising exceptions.

Here are a few highlights:

• Teacher strikes, like the one recently

concluded in Chicago, are legal in

fourteen states and illegal in thirty-

seven.

• Thirty-two states require local school

boards to bargain collectively with

their teachers, fourteen states permit

local boards to do this, and five states

prohibit collective bargaining altogether

(Georgia, North Carolina, South

Carolina, Texas, and Virginia).

• Twenty-three states are “right to

work” states, which prohibit unions

from collecting agency fees from non-

members.* Twenty-eight jurisdictions

allow agency fees.

• In the 2010 state election cycle, teacher

unions in twenty-two states were

among the top ten overall donors

(excluding individual donations) to

candidates for governor and other

executive positions, legislature, high

court, and elected education positions.

In twenty-one states, they were among

the top five highest-giving interest

groups (including Colorado and Indiana,

where they ranked first).

• In just two states (Pennsylvania and

New Jersey) did our survey of insiders

unanimously deem teacher unions

to be the most influential entities in

shaping education policy over a recent

three-year period. But informants

in twenty states found the teacher

unions to be generally more influential,

on average, than all other entities

(including the state school board, state

superintendent, governor, legislators,

business interests, and advocacy

groups).

• The unions’ influence may be waning

at the state level. For the three years

prior to the 2011 legislative session,

education policies in most states

reflected union priorities. But in 2011,

a growing number of legislatures were

enacting policies that were less in line

with union priorities.

Note that we did not link our overall

rankings to state-level student

achievement. Of all the data included in

our metric, only a few of them (like teacher

employment policies) might affect student

achievement. Others, like state spending

on education, could “touch” students

indirectly, but there’s no strong evidence to

support their link to student performance.

We also have a timing problem since

many state policies are in flux and don’t

align with point-in-time snapshots of

achievement. Plus, we know that many

other factors at both the state and local

level could impact students, so theorizing

that a relationship exists between

state-level union activity and student

achievement strikes us as short-sighted.

Still, we can’t resist eyeballing whether

policies in a few high-performing states are

more in line with the positions of reformers

or traditional unions (without pointing

fingers either way). Massachusetts, the

highest-achieving state in the land, is a

* Something else we learned: The proper definition of “right-to-work” has nothing to do with denying unions the right to bargain collectively. Right-to-work states stop unions from requiring union membership (and payment of dues or other union fees) as a condition of employment. In any state, teachers are free not to join their local union, but in non-right-to-work states the union can still charge “agency fees” to non-member teachers. In right-to-work states, unions cannot charge agency fees, only membership dues. While just five states ban collective bargaining by teachers, twenty-three are right-to-work states that prohibit agency fees.


Foreword

mixed bag—some policies are aligned to

union goals, others not. Two other high

achievers, Virginia and Colorado, part

ways: In the Old Dominion, policies are

highly aligned to union interests, but that’s

not the case in the Centennial State. And

education policies in California, with its

dismal achievement record, largely do

not reflect union interests, while those

in Mississippi, another notorious low

performer, are more aligned to them than

nearly anywhere else.* All of that to say

that no one on either side of the ed-reform

divide should be glib about this topic.

Plenty more is waiting to be learned about

teacher unions, how to gauge their strength

in the many venues and mechanisms

by which they exert it, and their role in

education policy. View this study as adding

another powerful lens to a telescope that’s

still being assembled. But peer through that

lens and you will see a lot—including some

surprises, paradoxes, and mysteries.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This big study was the product of many

hands and heads. We’re grateful to the

Bodman Foundation, the Lynde and Harry

Bradley Foundation, and Education Reform

Now for their financial support, as well as

to our sister organization, the Thomas B.

Fordham Foundation.

We extend special thanks to Mitch Price,

former legal analyst at the Center for Rein-

venting Public Education, who assisted in

data collection and report writing. Former

Education Pioneer Laurent Rigal assisted

with survey development. Project advisors

provided tremendously useful input on the

* See 2011 NAEP state averages on 4th and 8th grade reading and math assessments, available http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/naepdata/dataset.aspx

study design and on successive drafts of

this complex report. In that capacity, we’re

grateful to Emily Cohen, independent con-

sultant and former district policy director

at the National Council on Teacher Quality

(NCTQ); Jonathan Gyurko, co-founder and

senior vice president, Leeds Global Part-

ners, LLC; Michael Hartney, doctoral can-

didate in Political Science at the University

of Notre Dame and a National Academy of

Education/Spencer Foundation Dissertation

Fellow; Frederick Hess, director of educa-

tion policy studies, American Enterprise

Institute; and Van Schoales, chief executive

of A+ Denver. Needless to say—but we’ll say

it anyway—we could not incorporate every

suggestion of every advisor, so complaints

and criticisms should be addressed to the

authors, not the advisors.

Others who provided useful feedback on

the study design and/or survey instrument

include Katharine Strunk, Tim Daly, Joe

Williams, Bill Koski, Mike Antonucci, Dan

Goldhaber, Terry Moe, and Marc Porter-

Magee. Denise Roth Barber at the National

Institute on Money in State Politics was

helpful in providing and explaining the

Institute’s data on campaign contributions.

Sandi Jacobs, vice president and managing

director of NCTQ, clarified various aspects

of state teacher policies and provided her

organization’s most recent data to us; staff

at the National Alliance for Public Charter

Schools did likewise.

We also appreciate the time and care

that stakeholders in each state took to

complete our survey during summer 2011.

These included state legislators, chief state

school officers and school board members,

staff in governors’ offices, charter school


Foreword

organizations, and education advocacy

organizations, as well as knowledgeable

journalists.

At Fordham, Matt Richmond assisted in

report writing and oversaw production.

Daniela Fairchild and Chris Irvine (former

Fordham policy and operations associate)

assisted in survey administration and Tyson

Eberhardt and Joe Portnoy managed

dissemination. Numerous Fordham interns

and others also lent their capable hands:

Amanda Olberg, Remmert Dekker, Marena

Perkins, Gerilyn Slicker, Josh Pierson, Alicia

Goldberg, Keith McNamara (TFA Fellow),

Laura Johnson, Michael Ishimoto, Layla

Bonnot, Lisa Gibes, Anthony Shaw, Kai

Filipczak, and Ben Bennett. Special thanks

to current interns Asa Spencer and Pamela

Tatz for research assistance, proofreading,

and copy editing. Shannon Last served as

copyeditor and Bittersweet Creative as

layout designer and cover illustrator.

But the heaviest of heavy lifting on this

ambitious project was done by report

authors Amber Winkler, Fordham’s vice

president for research, her recently

arrived deputy and research manager,

Dara Zeehandelaar, and Janie Scull,

former research analyst and production

manager. We bow in admiration and

gratitude to the trio.

By Chester E. Finn, Jr. and Michael J. Petrilli


Executive Summary

In recent years, debates over school reform

have increasingly focused on the role of

teacher unions in the changing landscape

of American K–12 education. On one hand,

critics argue that these unions, using

their powerful grip on education politics

and policy to great effect, bear primary

responsibility for blocking states’ efforts

to put into place overdue reforms that will

drive major-league gains in our educational

system. Such critics contend that the

unions generally succeed at preserving

teacher job security and other interests,

and do so at the expense of improved

opportunities for kids.

On the other side, we find union

defenders who stoutly maintain that

these organizations are bulwarks of

professionalism in education, that their

power is greatly exaggerated, that their

opposition to misguided reforms is

warranted, and that they couldn’t possibly

account for achievement woes—considering

that highly unionized states perform at

least as well as any others (and better

than many) on the National Assessment

of Educational Progress (NAEP) and other

indicators.

This debate has taken on an international

aspect, too, as critics of U.S. reform

initiatives (and defenders of unions)

point out that teachers are unionized all

over the world, including nearly all the

countries that surpass us on comparative

achievement measures such as the Trends

in International Mathematics and Science

Study (TIMSS) and Programme for

International Student Assessment (PISA).

Both sides agree that, for better or worse,

teacher unions look out for teacher

interests. This study sheds light on how

they use politics to do this, by measuring

teacher union strength, state by state, more

comprehensively than any other study to

date. It sought answers to three questions:

1. What elements are potential sources of

a union’s strength (i.e., inputs)?

2. How might unions wield power in terms

of behavior and conduct (i.e., processes

and activities)?

3. What are signs that they have gotten

their way (i.e., outcomes)?

We do not limit the answers to those

questions to routinely-studied channels

of union strength such as membership

density and bargaining status, though we

do include those. We also include such

other measures as alignment between state

policies and traditional union interests,

union contributions to political campaigns,

and the impressions of union influence held

by knowledgeable participant-observers

within the states. We chose to focus on

state-level unions rather than local ones,

because the state organizations are apt to

affect education policy on a large scale.

OUR APPROACH

To gauge union strength at the state level,

we gathered and synthesized data for

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


Executive Summary

thirty-seven different variables across five

broad areas:

Area 1: Resources and Membership

Internal union resources (members and

revenue), plus K–12 education spending

in the state, including the portion of such

spending devoted to teacher salaries and

benefits.

Area 2: Involvement in Politics

Teacher unions’ share of financial

contributions to state candidates and

political parties, and their representation

at the Republican and Democratic national

conventions.

Area 3: Scope of Bargaining

Bargaining status (mandatory, permitted,

or prohibited), scope of bargaining, right of

unions to deduct agency fees from non-

members, and legality of teacher strikes.

Area 4: State Policies

Degree of alignment between teacher

employment rules and charter school

policies with traditional union interests.

Area 5: Perceived Influence

Results of an original survey of key

stakeholders within each state, including

how influential the unions are in comparison

to other entities in the state, whether the

positions of policymakers are aligned with

those of teacher unions, and how effective

the unions have been in stopping policies

with which they disagree.

Using these data, we rank the relative

strength of state-level teacher unions in

fifty-one jurisdictions as compared to one

another (fifty states plus Washington, D.C.).

To do this, we score the state separately on

each of the five areas and rank the states

according to those scores. We then average

the five area scores and re-rank the states

accordingly.

RANKINGS

Table ES-1 displays the overall and area

ranks of each state.

TABLE ES-1. TEACHER UNION STRENGTH BY STATE

StateOverall Rank

Area 1: Resources & Membership

Area 2: Involvement in

Politics

Area 3: Scope of

Bargaining

Area 4: State

Policies


Alabama 20 24* 1* 45* 18* 25

Alaska 15 13* 36* 4* 21* 36

Arizona 51 40* 49 45* 49* 48

Arkansas 48 50 47* 45* 20 37

California 6 20* 18* 1 37 1

Colorado 35 37* 18* 25 48 29

Connecticut 17 9* 29* 13 13 27

Delaware 19 9* 29* 15 36 18

District of Columbia 33 17 N/A 21 49* 41

Florida 50 47* 36* 35* 46* 50

Georgia 45 35* 36* 48* 26 45


Executive Summary

StateOverall Rank



Politics

Area 3: Scope of

Bargaining

Area 4: State

Policies


Hawaii 1 3* 1* 9 9 23

Idaho 36 30 4* 42 45 42*

Illinois 8 18* 12 3 39 28

Indiana 31 9* 13* 39 44 32

Iowa 27 27 23* 32 11 31

Kansas 32 33* 18* 31 14 30

Kentucky 28 35* 26* 26 10 11*

Louisiana 42 40* 44* 24 33 44

Maine 22 20* 44* 16 7* 11*

Maryland 23 26 40* 20 16 4

Massachusetts 21 13* 40* 12 21* 16

Michigan 16 6* 4* 22 51 20

Minnesota 14 3* 32* 2 46* 19

Mississippi 46 49 40* 43* 7* 51

Missouri 38 33* 47* 23 40 24

Montana 3 20* 10* 6 6 5

Nebraska 26 18* 13* 37 27 38

Nevada 25 28* 18* 27 28 10

New Hampshire 30 24* 40* 14 17 40

New Jersey 7 1* 26* 17* 5 2

New Mexico 37 46 32* 35* 29 8

New York 9 1* 13* 19 24* 21

North Carolina 40 47* 29* 48* 12 11*

North Dakota 24 28* 23* 33* 2* 14

Ohio 12 20* 17 10 23 35

Oklahoma 43 44* 26* 40 43 46

Oregon 2 9* 8* 4* 34* 3

Pennsylvania 4 13* 10* 7 41 7

Rhode Island 5 6* 4* 17* 15 15

South Carolina 49 51 35 43* 38 47

South Dakota 34 40* 1* 33* 34* 49

Tennessee 41 37* 18* 38 42 42*

Texas 44 44* 36* 48* 30* 34

Utah 39 37* 25 28* 30* 39

Vermont 11 6* 44* 8 2* 22

Virginia 47 40* 50 48* 4 33

Washington 10 3* 32* 11 18* 9

West Virginia 13 31* 4* 28* 1 6

Wisconsin 18 13* 8* 41 24* 17

Wyoming 29 31* 13* 28* 30* 26

* Indicates that a state is tied with one or more other states for this rank.


Executive Summary

TABLE ES-2. TEACHER UNION STRENGTH BY RANK AND TIER

Tier 1Strongest

Tier 2Strong

Tier 3Average

Tier 4Weak

Tier 5Weakest

STATE OVERALL RANK STATE OVERALL

RANK STATE OVERALL RANK STATE OVERALL

RANK STATE OVERALL RANK

Hawaii 1 Vermont 11 Massachusetts 21 Kansas 32 Louisiana 42

Oregon 2 Ohio 12 Maine 22District of Columbia

33 Oklahoma 43

Montana 3 West Virginia 13 Maryland 23 South Dakota 34 Texas 44

Pennsylvania 4 Minnesota 14 North Dakota 24 Colorado 35 Georgia 45

Rhode Island 5 Alaska 15 Nevada 25 Idaho 36 Mississippi 46

California 6 Michigan 16 Nebraska 26 New Mexico 37 Virginia 47

New Jersey 7 Connecticut 17 Iowa 27 Missouri 38 Arkansas 48

Illinois 8 Wisconsin 18 Kentucky 28 Utah 39 South Carolina 49

New York 9 Delaware 19 Wyoming 29 North Carolina 40 Florida 50

Washington 10 Alabama 20 New Hampshire 30 Tennessee 41 Arizona 51

Indiana 31

Note: With fifty-one total jurisdictions, each tier comprises ten except Tier 3—the middle tier—which comprises eleven.

TABLE ES-3. TEACHER UNION STRENGTH BY RANK, TIER, BARGAINING STATUS, AND AGENCY FEES

Tier 1Strongest

Tier 2Strong

Tier 3Average

Tier 4Weak

Tier 5Weakest




RANK



33 Oklahoma 43









Indiana 31


MANDATORY BARGAINING PERMITTED BARGAINING PROHIBITED BARGAINING AGENCY FEES PROHIBITED


Executive Summary

We divided the fifty-one jurisdictions into

five tiers, from strongest to weakest. Table

ES-2 (page 11) shows the overall rank and

tier for each state.

Many of the states whose teacher unions

rank in the strongest tier—such as

California, New Jersey, and Washington—

are widely recognized for their powerful

teacher unions. Likewise, in many of the

weakest Tier 5 states, unions have suffered

some major defeats (Louisiana and Arizona)

or do not have much of a presence at all.

To be sure, bargaining status and agency

fees help define—but not completely

determine—the rankings (see Table ES-3,

which adds these variables). Mandatory

bargaining states are shaded in tan,

permitted-bargaining states are shaded in

green, and bargaining-prohibited states

in yellow. Red text indicates that the state

does not allow agency fees.

Most of the twenty strongest states (Tiers

1 and 2) require collective bargaining. But

so does Florida (Tier 5), ranked next-to-

last. Three of the twenty-strongest—Ohio,

West Virginia, and Alabama—permit but do

not require bargaining. Most of the twenty

weakest states (Tiers 4 and 5) prohibit

agency fees (red text), but three allow this

practice (Washington, D.C., New Mexico,

and Missouri). Nor do bargaining-prohibited

states invariably land in the weakest tier;

North Carolina, for instance, is in Tier 4.

GEOGRAPHY

Figure ES-1 maps states by tier. As

is evident, there are strong regional

associations. The West Coast and the

Northeast have nearly all of the strongest

unions in the nation (shaded light orange

and red), while southern states have the

weakest (in brown).

FIGURE ES-1. MAP OF TEACHER UNION STRENGTH BY TIER


Executive Summary

Obviously there is nothing inherent to

geography that dictates union strength.

But it is correlated with factors that do—

the history of collective bargaining, the

rhetoric of unionism, and overall political or

ideological orientation. Places where unions

have long been regarded as necessary

and valuable parts of the economy and

polity are more apt to mandate bargaining

and to allow the collection of agency

fees. Employees are also more likely

to join unions themselves in areas with

long-standing favorable attitudes toward

organized labor. And in places that are

ideologically liberal, voters are more prone

to hold favorable views of unions and to

elect Democrat leaders, who in turn tend to

be more receptive to union interests.

The states with the strongest teacher

unions (Tier 1, mapped in red) are in the

Northeast and on the West Coast. All of

these states have mandatory bargaining,

allow agency fees, and have high

membership rates. They are politically and

ideologically liberal, and unions there rank

highly in perceived influence. The Tier 2

states in light orange are mostly in the

Midwest, which is also historically (and

currently) pro-labor but politically more

moderate. These states allow agency fees,

and the unionization rate is high even

though some permit rather than mandate

bargaining. Unions there tend to be

politically active, since elections and policy

outcomes are less predictable than in the

Tier 1 states.

In contrast, the western and central states

are largely rural and politically conservative,

with little history of unionism. They

generally rank in Tiers 3 and 4 (blue and

green). Many of them bar agency fees and

have low unionization rates, even where

bargaining is mandated. But unions there,

as well as most in New England, benefit

from the value placed on local control over

restrictive state mandates. As a result, the

policy environment tends to be aligned

with union interests because there aren’t

many statewide education policies as

such. Finally, the South is home to the

Tier 5 states with the weakest unions,

mapped in brown. These jurisdictions

are both ideologically conservative and

historically anti-union. Here bargaining

is either prohibited or permitted, but not

mandatory; union membership is low, even

where bargaining is allowed; and education

policy is not aligned with union interests.

FOUR KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Mandatory bargaining appears

to tilt the playing field in favor of

stronger unions. At the very least, it is

a sufficient (though not an essential)

condition by which unions are made

strong. Where bargaining is optional

or prohibited, unions tend to score

“weaker” on our overall metric.

2. Resources make a difference. Dollars

and members are both important. With

higher revenue, a state union can not

only better finance its lobbying and

advocacy efforts, but also increase its

capacity to support the activities of

its local affiliates. Greater membership

means more union representation at

the ballot box, more letters and calls to

state leaders, and more boots on the

ground during rallies and campaigns—

and in turn, more revenue from member

dues.

3. The scope of bargaining matters a lot,

too, as does the right (or not) to strike.

Local unions can and do use collective

bargaining to protect teacher interests,

which can (among other things)

result in iron-clad job protections for


Executive Summary

ineffective teachers. When a wide scope

of bargaining combines with ill-defined,

timid, or absent state policies, local

unions have more room to negotiate

contracts that serve their goals. And

local bargaining isn’t the only way to

secure teachers interests; sometimes

such protections are written directly

into state law.

4. The fact that a state has mandatory,

permissive, or broad bargaining

laws—or its unions enjoy abundant

resources—does not mean that state

policies are union-favorable and vice-

versa. Many states in our top two tiers

have education policies that are not

particularly favorable to teacher unions.

Conversely, states without strong

collective bargaining rights nonetheless

have union-friendly policies. That’s

because other factors matter, too,

sometimes greatly—beginning with

state leadership (both past and

present), federal policy, the condition

of the economy, the influence of other

key stakeholders, and the state’s own

macro-politics.


Introduction

In recent years, debates over school reform

have increasingly focused on the role of

teacher unions in the changing landscape

of American K–12 education. On one hand,

critics argue that these unions, using

their powerful grip on education politics

and policy to great effect, bear primary

responsibility for blocking states’ efforts at

reforms that would otherwise drive major-

league gains in our educational system

by preserving teacher job security at the

expense of improved opportunities for

kids.1 Their defenders maintain that teacher

unions are bulwarks of professionalism

in education, that their power is greatly

exaggerated, and that highly unionized

states perform at least as well as any

others—and better than many—on the

National Assessment of Educational

Progress (NAEP) and other indicators.2

This debate has taken on an international

aspect, too, as critics of U.S. reform

initiatives (and defenders of unions) point

out that teachers are unionized all over the

world, including in nearly all the countries

that surpass us on measures such as the

Trends in International Mathematics and

Science Study (TIMSS) and Programme for

International Student Assessment (PISA).

What to believe?

A few facts are indisputable, beginning

with the fact that teacher unions are most

definitely large and highly visible. (Consider

recent goings-on in Chicago, for example.)

Education employs more unionized staff

than does any other profession in either the

public or private sector.* Between them,

the National Education Association (NEA)

and American Federation of Teachers

(AFT) have some 4.6 million members,

a combination of active teachers and

other public school employees, college

faculty and staff, retirees, and students.3

AFT President Randi Weingarten (much

like the man who built her union, Albert

Shanker) is among the most-quoted

education commentators in the land.

Washington watchers peer closely into

the latest federal policy or proposal for

evidence of changing relations between the

Obama White House and the unions. And

their activities are not just limited to the

national level, with teacher unions receiving

widespread attention for their battle to

protect bargaining rights in Wisconsin

and Ohio, their position as political and

financial heavyweights in California, and

their dogged struggle (and strike) against

change in Chicago.

INTRODUCTION HOW STRONG ARE U.S. TEACHER UNIONS?A STATE-BY-STATE COMPARISON

* As reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The BLS also reports that of the active “education, training, and library occupations” workforce, 37 percent comprise members of unions or employee associations similar to a union. A total of 41 percent of that workforce are either union members or covered by a union/association contract. BLS does not disaggregate K–12 public school teachers from its figures (see Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, “Economic News Release: Union Membership 2011 (Table 3),” January 27, 2012). Further, as of 2007, 65 percent of school districts nationwide had either a collective bargaining agreement (54 percent) or meet-and-confer agreement (11 percent) (see National Center for Education Statistics, “Characteristics of Public School Districts in the United States (NCES 2009-320),” June 30, 2009).


Introduction

Much ink is spilled over the influence that

these organizations do or do not wield

on the federal, state, and local levels.

And there’s little doubt that they do their

utmost to influence policy on behalf of their

members. In many a capital, the teacher

union office building looms large on the

streetscape within a block or two of the

statehouse. In many a city, the first question

asked of any proposed education change is

“will the teacher union be okay with it?”

Serious books have been written about

the political power of teacher unions, of

which the most prominent recent example

is by Stanford political scientist Terry Moe.4

Much of their focus is on the local collective

bargaining process and its capacity to

frustrate change (and raise costs) by

writing requirements and prohibitions

“into the contract.” Also typically meriting

chapters in such books are the effects of

contract provisions on teacher quality, the

various ways that unions engage in political

activity by running, endorsing, financing,

supporting—and opposing—candidates

for public office, and examples of clashes

between union and education leaders over

reform.

Yet while we know that unions have

multiple channels through which they

can exert strength—including but not

limited to bargaining, striking, lobbying,

and participating in political campaigns—

most research to date uses hazy or overly

narrow definitions of such “strength.” What

proportion of teachers are unionized? Is

collective bargaining mandatory, permitted,

or illegal? Can unions collect agency

fees from teachers who choose not to be

members?* It’s a good start—but it’s not

enough. Answers to these questions alone

don’t accurately reflect a union’s power;

they merely frame the context in which it

works. It is like trying to determine whether

a runner is fast by measuring his shoe size.

So when we (and our colleagues at

Education Reform Now, an affiliate of

Democrats for Education Reform) wanted

to know which teacher unions are more (or

less) influential in their respective states,

we knew we had to do better. We asked

ourselves: What data do we need to more

accurately gauge union strength? What

else, besides bargaining status, agency

fees, and the ability to strike might make a

union strong, and on what scale? (Veteran

ex-superintendents from states that don’t

mandate bargaining tend to chortle when

we ask whether their teacher unions are

less “powerful,” almost instantly replying

that “what they can’t get at the bargaining

table they get at the statehouse,” or words

to that effect.) And once we devised a

better measure of strength, how would the

unions stack up? Is it possible that in some

places they are indeed eight-hundred-

pound gorillas, but in others more like

hamsters?

We were aware going in, and are more

aware today, that “teacher union strength”

comes in many forms and can be wielded—

and measured—in many ways. (That’s

true of strength in general, of course. Ask

yourself: Who is stronger, the person who

can lift one hundred pounds while standing

still or the one who can run around

the block while carrying fifty pounds?)

Carrying out such measures in comparable,

* While states that prohibit collective bargaining are often casually referred to as “right-to-work” states, this is not a correct use of the term. “Right-to-work” specifically refers to laws that prohibit union membership as a condition of employment; under such legislation, unions cannot automatically collect “agency fees” in lieu of dues from non-members and employers need not consider whether an individual belongs to the union or not. Bargaining status and right-to-work are different, and independent, concepts. For example, Florida requires bargaining but is nevertheless a right-to-work state. Should employees wish to form a union, the district must recognize them, but that union cannot collect agency fees from teachers who choose not to join. (See sidebar, Getting the Terminology Straight.)


Introduction

defensible ways is no small undertaking,

however. On-point and contemporary data

are extremely hard to come by and, while

we wanted opinions and impressions from

knowledgeable folks on the ground, as well

as “hard” information, it’s no simple thing

to determine whom to ask, and what to ask

them—much less to get them to respond.

So we acknowledge at the outset that

this is a pioneering study, fraught with

methodological challenges, data difficulties,

and judgment calls. We’re wary of drawing

simplistic conclusions from a large and

complex body of data and loath to slice and

dice the inter-state comparisons too finely.

(You will find, for example, that Illinois is

exactly one notch above New York in terms

of the “strength” of its teacher unions, 8th

versus 9th in the national rankings. One

would, we think, be crazy to make a huge

deal of such a difference.)

Accordingly, we are humbler than usual

in the conclusions that we distill from this

investigation. We hope that this is a start

to future work, and we look forward to

feedback and commentary from others

and for access to better and newer data

that we can use to refine future analyses.

But this research is a necessary step

toward answering the Big Questions: How

is union strength related to securing more

funding for teachers and education? To the

promulgation or obstruction of reform? To

student achievement? We can’t begin to

answer such questions with accuracy until

we have a better definition and index of

“strength.”

Nothing that we learned, however, changed

the impression with which we began: Love

‘em or hate ‘em, teacher unions must be

taken seriously by educators, reformers,

and policymakers. Such folks may decide,

whether out of expediency or earnest

conviction, to woo or placate union leaders,

to compromise with them, or to ride

roughshod over them (insofar as that’s

possible to do), but they cannot avoid

paying attention to them.

Nor should they. Public education in the

United States is an exercise in democratic

decision making. Indeed, nearly every

significant decision about the organization

and operation of American schools is

established through the political process.5

Moreover, public education in the United

States is governed by an intricate web

of overlapping institutions and decision-

making mechanisms spread over multiple

levels of a federal political system.6

Teacher unions—like other interest-based

membership organizations—use power to

try to influence decisions made within this

policy-making maze, and they, like other

stakeholders in the system, have every right

to do so. Others entering that maze must

contend with those who already inhabit

it. The more new entrants know about the

methods, strengths, and weaknesses of

existing inhabitants, the better they are apt

to fare.

ORGANIZATION

This study compares the strength of state

teacher unions via a systematic examination

of how these organizations wield power,

examining them from multiple angles,

including the obvious—such as alignment of

state policies to traditional union interests—

and some that are less obvious, such as the

perceptions of local insiders.

We start with the background research

relevant to teacher union influence; Part I

explains the five areas in which we chose

to gauge union strength and the methods

we used for doing so; Parts II and III present

the findings—first the overall state results,


Introduction

The language surrounding organized labor is often confusing and misunderstood. We define a few essential terms below.

Employee organizations: professional associations vs. unionsAn association is simply a group of individuals united under a common interest. If these individuals have the same occupation and see their purpose as advocating for and maintaining the legitimacy of that occupation, then they are a professional association. Regardless of where they work, teachers can always form a professional association. An association is a union only if it has bargaining rights, meaning that terms and conditions of teacher employment must be negotiated between the group and the school district, should the employees wish to do so. (Most unions do use their bargaining rights, but they don’t have to.)

The vast majority of local teacher unions, and most local teacher associations, are affiliated with a larger state association. Most of these in turn are affiliated with either the National Education Association or the American Federation of Teachers.

Types of agreements: collective bargaining vs. meet-and-conferA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is a binding contract between a union and a school district or other employing entity. The contract can contain only certain provisions, as defined by state law (or allowed by virtue of silent state law), and is open for negotiation only at certain times, typically every three years. Disputes over the contract are settled by outside arbitration. Only unions can negotiate CBAs—although some may choose not to. A meet-and-confer agreement is a non-binding memorandum of understanding between an employee organization and a district. Under its terms, a dispute must get worked out locally, and the district can override the agreement in the event of a conflict. The agreement can be discussed, and altered, at any time, and the contents are not limited to certain provisions. Both unions and associations can enter into meet-and-confer agreements.*

Bargaining status: mandatory, permitted, or prohibitedBargaining status refers to the district’s relationship to the employee organization. Three types of bargaining status are possible: In mandatory bargaining states, all employee organizations have bargaining rights. In these states, it is up to the employees if they want to organize; if they want to be a union or an association; and if they want to negotiate a CBA, enter into a meet-and-confer agreement, or work under no agreement at all. The law requires that if employees wish to organize and use their bargaining rights to negotiate a contract, the district must recognize them as a union—and bargain with them. The employer must accept the employees’ choice.

In permitted bargaining states, districts may decide to grant employee organizations bargaining rights, to enter into a meet-and-confer agreement, or not recognize the employee organization at all. In these states it is still up to employees whether to organize. If they then wish to negotiate a CBA, they must first request recognition as a union—but districts are not obligated to recognize them as such. Even if the employees seek a non-binding meet-and-confer agreement, the district is not required to grant that request. The employees must accept the district’s choice.

In prohibited bargaining states, districts may not grant bargaining rights to employee organizations. Employees may still organize, but those organizations are associations, not unions. In such states, a district may still enter into non-binding meet-and-confer agreements with the association if it wishes to; the employees must accept the employer’s choice.

GETTING THE TERMINOLOGY STRAIGHT

* For multiple and diverse examples of district CBAs, see the National Council on Teacher Quality’s Teacher Rules, Roles, and Rights (TR3) database, http://www.nctq.org/tr3/home.jsp.


Introduction

then by each of the five areas; Part IV sets

forth the conclusions and takeaways as we

interpret them; and Part V presents the

state-level profiles. The appendices include

a full explanation of our scoring metric and

data sources, as well as the rationale for

each indicator, and a list of state-level NEA

and AFT affiliates.

Right-to-work status and agency fees vs. automatic payroll deductions of member duesRight-to-work refers to the union-employee relationship in states where unions are allowed (mandatory or permitted bargaining states). (Prohibited bargaining states are right-to-work by default, because they have no unions.) Right-to-work laws stipulate that no union can require membership as a condition for employment. They also dictate that, should employees choose not to be members (which they are free to do, in any state, at any time), the union cannot charge them involuntary agency fees in lieu of membership dues. In states where unions are allowed, right-to-work status is independent from (and often confused with) bargaining status. Bargaining status describes the district-employee organization relationship; right-to-work status describes the union-employee relationship. So a mandatory bargaining state can also be right-to-work (for example, Nevada, Iowa, Indiana, and Florida), and a permitted bargaining state does not have to be right-to-work (permitted bargaining states Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, Ohio, and Colorado do not have right-to-work laws).

Regardless of right-to-work status, employee organizations are allowed to charge membership dues to those teachers who want to be members. Most organizations collect these dues via automatic payroll deductions—they subtract member dues from each teacher’s paycheck. In a handful of states, employee organizations are barred by state law from doing this if those deductions (or portions thereof) are used for political purposes.

GETTING THE TERMINOLOGY STRAIGHT


Background

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON

TEACHER UNION INFLUENCE

Scholars and education policy observers

acknowledge that teacher unions are active

players in education policymaking and

decision making. Historically, research has

focused on a few key questions: How do

unions influence spending on education?

How do they shape policies (and other

political processes, like elections)? And how

do they influence student achievement?

The quest for a link between union strength

and education spending—particularly

on teacher wages—has received the

most attention.* Studies have generally

concluded that districts with strong unions

pay their teachers more.7 Other work

explored the relationship between union

strength and larger policy outcomes,

like NCLB-style accountability, teacher

merit pay, per-pupil expenditures, and the

adoption of charter school laws.8

Some research has focused not on policy

outcomes but rather on the political

activity of teacher unions as they lobby

for congenial policies and work to elect

candidates that are sympathetic toward

union interests. One study found that most

legislators rank teacher unions as the most

active lobbying organization in the state

capital, while another found that school

board candidates who are endorsed by

teacher unions win 76 percent of their

elections, compared with just 31 percent

of candidates who do not receive such

endorsements.9, 10

A host of studies has looked beyond

policy to probe for an association

between teacher union strength and

student achievement outcomes. These

analyses are complicated by the fact

that teacher unions cannot be randomly

assigned to some students or districts

in the same way that a new curriculum

or instructional strategy can, and so it is

difficult to assign causal credit or blame

to teacher unions for student achievement

outcomes. While some studies have found

a generally positive correlation between the

presence of a teacher union and student

performance on standardized tests, unions

are also associated with a widening gap

between low- and high-achieving students.11

Additional studies have linked unions

with standardizing education practices

and driving additional dollars into public

education and classroom instruction.12

The majority of existing studies rely on

narrow measures of union strength, either

the legality of collective bargaining or

the percentage of teachers who belong

BACKGROUND

* It is notoriously difficult to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between union membership and teacher salaries. For example, does a high membership rate better enable a union to negotiate for higher salaries, or are high membership rates and high wages the result of some other variable, such as a union-friendly political climate? We recognize this limitation in our own report and mitigate it by not limiting our definition of union influence to one variable (teacher salaries, for example, or union-favorable policies) but rather including multiple measures of potential union strength.


Background

to a union (also known as “unionization

density” or the “unionization rate”). Neither,

however, captures the nexus between union

power and the processes and outcomes of

policymaking. Worse, each is potentially

misleading: union density is often simply a

proxy for bargaining status (or geography

and history—some areas of the country

are simply more unionized than others).

In turn, bargaining status (which applies

at the local level) has not stopped many

state-level unions from exerting substantial

power in the capital. Given the narrow

scope of these measures, some scholars

have questioned the findings of studies that

use them to define and gauge strength,

while others have called for more robust,

inclusive measures of union influence.13

Luckily, a more recent wave of research

on union influence has heeded that call,

recognizing that existing (and limited)

approaches have yielded an incomplete and

inconclusive picture of how unions affect

policymakers, education spending, and

ultimately, students. One study measured

union strength by combining bargaining

status, union density, and union campaign

contributions and found that higher

rates of union political giving correlate

with the adoption of fewer education

reform policies.14 A handful of researchers

have quantified local union strength by

measuring how much a district’s collective

bargaining agreement constrains the

unilateral authority of its leaders; their

findings suggest that restrictive labor

agreements have a negative impact on

student achievement (the most likely cause

being a contract that limits the principal’s

authority to manage and allocate personnel

for student benefit).15

Still, a common dilemma pervades all

of these recent studies. Resolving how

teacher unions influence salaries, political

outcomes, and student achievement is

impossible without an accurate definition of

what an “influential” union actually means—

and that definition is currently lacking.

Undaunted by this challenge (others might

say naïve!), we set out to bridge this gap,

assuming up front that a single variable is

a poor proxy for union strength. We posit

that the whole is greater than the sum of

its parts, and instead combine a number

of variables—thirty-seven, to be exact—to

rank the relative strength of state teacher

unions. Some of these variables, like

bargaining status and union density, are

familiar from earlier analyses. But we’ve

added many more—some publicly available

information but also new data of our own

design. (To our knowledge, this dataset

comprises the most data points to date

relative to the assets and activities of and

perspectives on state-level unions.) In the

end, we explain what this complex data

quilt tells us. But we’re getting ahead of

ourselves. Let’s turn to an explanation of

those data next.


Part I: Evaluating Teacher Union Strength

This study attempts to measure teacher

union strength at the state level by

answering three broad questions. First,

what elements are potential sources of

a union’s strength (i.e., inputs)? Second,

how might unions wield power in terms of

behavior and conduct (i.e., processes and

activities)? And third, what are potential

signs that they have gotten their way (i.e.,

outcomes)?

Note that we do not attempt to separate

inputs, such as membership, from

outcomes, such as blocked legislation. We

count them both. Our rationale is simple: It

is nearly impossible to draw a line between

the two. Union-friendly state education

policies, for instance, are likely viewed as

outcomes—yet they also infuse a union with

additional strength (an input), whether or

not the union had a strong hand in creating

them. More revenue received by a union

(frequently viewed as an input) may bolster

its political giving (a process) and thus

give it more allies among state leaders

(an outcome of activities, but also now a

source of union strength)—who in turn may

favor policies that help the union gather

more revenue. High membership gives a

union a broader support base from which

to fight for legislation, for example, that

might limit the growth of charter schools—

which in turn may help maintain those high

membership numbers. The sources of union

strength (inputs) and the effects of a strong

union are simply inseparable.

No single attribute of teacher unions

defines their strength. Rather, strength

results from a blend of resources,

leadership, initiative, relationships, and

earlier effectiveness. Each of these

characteristics functions on a continuum;

each affects and is affected by the others.

Nor can one assume that the balance or

mix of these characteristics is uniform

across the country. The importance of

a union’s resources or relationships, its

leadership and initiative, or its effectiveness

in open versus behind-the-scenes political

debates, is largely related to the context

in which it operates. Teacher unions in

states that allow agency fees, for example,

may be able to amass greater financial

resources than their counterparts in

other states, and direct those resources

toward campaigning openly—even

confrontationally—for politicians and/or

policies. A union without extensive revenue

may instead work on building relationships

through quiet conversations behind closed

doors—but ultimately enjoy as much

success, demonstrating equivalent power

on the outcomes side. Likewise, a teacher

union in a state where few stakeholders

introduce reform initiatives, or even criticize

the status quo, need not invest copious

time and money rebuffing challenges,

whether they have adequate resources

or not; moreover, that lack of challengers

itself may—or may not—indicate the union’s

influence. Thus, we’ve attempted in this

study to capture both visible and invisible

(some may say “hard” and “soft”) elements

PART I: EVALUATING TEACHER UNION STRENGTH



Part I: Background

In our metric, we use “teacher union” to connote state-level affiliates of either the National Education Association (NEA) or the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). In the strictest of terms, these are professional associations, not unions, since state associations do not have bargaining rights themselves—and unions do (see sidebar, Getting the Terminology Straight, page 18). That said, local affiliates often ask a representative of the state association to negotiate on its behalf or advise it as the negotiation proceeds. While conventionally state-level NEA and AFT affiliates are called “unions” (and we maintain that convention here), they are technically all professional associations or teaching federations, not unions, regardless of whether the state allows collective bargaining or not. (The only exception is the Washington Teachers’ Union in the District of Columbia, which has bargaining rights.)

We refer to district-level employee organizations as “local unions” (for those that have bargaining rights) and “local associations” (for those that do not).

Every state is home to at least one NEA or AFT state-level teacher union; thirty states have two. They are largely advocacy and political action groups, helping organize teachers and gather resources to influence state policy and protect the interests of education professionals. Additionally, they provide support, training, and resources to their local affiliates, which in turn negotiate contracts or other agreements with school district leaders. Some also offer teacher professional development, health and liability insurance, legal and financial services, discounts, travel, and retiree resources. In some states, there also exist “independent professional associations” not affiliated with either the NEA or AFT. Most of these do not engage in political activity, and some simply provide insurance, teacher professional development, or other services. We do not include data for any state-level organization not affiliated with the NEA or AFT.

A NOTE ABOUT DICTION

of strength, such as annual revenues and

how insiders view the union’s status.

Taken together, these inputs, processes,

and outcomes paint a reasonably

comprehensive picture of power. In

this report, we consider indicators of

power in five categories: Resources and

Membership, Involvement in Politics, Scope

of Bargaining, State Policies, and Perceived

Influence. Below we describe each.

Area 1: Resources and Membership

This area measures the internal resources

on which unions rely (members and

revenue), and the financial resources

dedicated to education in the state. While

size and funds do not automatically make

one union more powerful than another,

the ability to amass people—to lobby

lawmakers, volunteer in campaigns, sign

petitions, vote in elections—and to bring

in more money are, in many cases, an

indicator of influence. Thus we examine

teacher union membership and revenues

relative to all public school teachers in

the state, judging that a critical mass of

membership and high revenue per teacher

build a necessary foundation for strong

unions. We also examine K–12 education

spending, including allocations by the

state, total per-pupil expenditures, and

the percentage of spending that goes to

teacher salaries and benefits.

Area 2: Involvement in Politics

State teacher unions do not negotiate

contracts. Their local affiliates do. The

state union’s place is in the state capital,

lobbying for or against (or helping design,

alter, or dismantle) policies that run the

legislative gamut: state budgets and



expenditures, revenue streams and taxes,

pensions and benefits, public employee

and education bargaining rules, charter

school and voucher laws, and teacher

employment policies. One way that unions

work for policies aligned with their interests

is by ensuring that elected officials favor

those interests—or at least do not actively

oppose them. Political giving is a key tactic

that unions use to support candidates

who champion their priorities, eliminate

candidates who do not, and encourage

incumbent office-holders to remain true

to their campaign promises. If a significant

proportion of donations to candidates and

parties comes from teacher unions, those

unions function as key political players and

thereby possess significant sway.

This category measures the extent to

which unions are positioned to influence

policymaking, including but not limited

to K–12 schooling. The majority of data

in this category represents teacher

unions’ political contributions to state

candidates and political parties. Due to

time and resource constraints, we could

not investigate more nuanced data such as

union contributions to winning candidates

or union support of one candidate in an

effort to remove his competitor. Rather, this

category gauges giving to all candidates for

state office, regardless of political party or

election outcome. We examine giving both

to candidates and to political parties, and

we compare teacher union contributions to

contributions from other politically active

sectors and industries in the state. We also

examine the percentage of delegates to

national political conventions that were

teacher union members; those data are

another reasonable clue as to the union’s

influence on the political process.

Area 3: Scope of Bargaining

This area links union strength to state laws

directly related to collective bargaining.

Is such bargaining mandatory, permitted,

or prohibited? How broad is the scope

of that bargaining (i.e., which issues can

or must be negotiated in a collective

bargaining agreement? Which are barred

from consideration?)? And do unions have

legally protected revenue sources, like

the right to collect agency fees from non-

members, or do right-to-work laws stop

them from doing so?

Bargaining status and agency fees measure

state union strength because both affect

the resources, status, and leverage of

unions at all levels. Not only can bargaining

bring a union increased membership and

revenue from those members, it also gives

a union visibility and status. And with

high membership, a state union can more

credibly claim that it represents teachers as

a constituency, which in turn lends weight

to its lobbying and advocacy campaigns

and increases state-leader receptivity to its

efforts. Mandatory bargaining laws facilitate

(and/or signal) a strong union presence,

and with that presence unions can better

use their political muscle to influence state

policy. Agency fees allow unions to collect

revenue from all teachers, not just union

members, which in turn can be used to

fund political (and other) activities.

Many past observers have assumed that

bargaining status and agency fees were the

only important indicators of union strength,

with strong unions in mandatory bargaining

states and in places where they can collect

agency fees. (These two ideas—bargaining

status and right-to-work laws—are separate

from one another but often conflated. See

Getting the Terminology Straight, page 18.)

While limited ability to secure funds from

non-members (part of the right-to-work

definition) might weaken a union, we also

found that many teacher unions in such



states are able to amass resources and

exert authority using other channels of

influence. Likewise, we found a number of

unions in permitted-bargaining states that

ranked higher (on our overall metric) than

their counterparts in mandatory-bargaining

states. That’s because bargaining status

alone did not determine their might.

In addition to bargaining status and agency

fees, we examine the scope of bargaining,

the legality of teacher strikes, and whether

or not unions can automatically deduct

dues from the paychecks of their members.

States that limit the scope of bargaining,

prohibit strikes, and prevent automatic

payroll deductions are limiting unions’

financial resources and leverage.

Area 4: State Policies

This area measures teacher union strength

by the degree of alignment between

state education policies and certain

traditional union priorities. The indicators

examine two types of policies in which

unions have shown considerable interest:

teacher employment rules and charter

school laws. The former policies include

teacher evaluations, tenure, layoffs, class

size, pensions, and performance pay. The

latter include laws related to the number

and variety of charter schools; the ease

with which they are authorized; and

whether or not charters are exempt from

state laws (including teacher certification

requirements), district regulations, and

collective bargaining agreements.

By including these policies in our metric,

we do not assume that teacher unions

shaped them. Even if “union-preferred”

policies are not direct outcomes of

union activity, a favorable policy climate

nevertheless represents a status quo that

protects the union. For example, to the

degree that school choice is constrained

within a state, teacher unions need not

fear that district schools will lose market

share or, by extension, that teachers will

sever their union ties while working in the

charter or private school sectors. Even if

the unions did not influence the policy,

they still benefit from the status quo—and

preserving that is a lot easier than

changing it.

Note, though, that our indicators are

neutral as to the policies and reforms

themselves. In other words, rather than

measure whether a union’s support of a

certain policy or reform is “good” or “bad,”

the metric assumes that teacher unions

will take a particular stance on each of the

policies, and simply measures the extent to

which existing policies align or do not align

with that stance. Yes, it oversimplifies a bit

to assume that all teacher unions share the

same stance on a given policy. Across the

nation, a handful of teacher unions have

bucked national trends—and the National

Education Association and the American

Federation of Teachers differ somewhat

in their policy positions. But while some

state unions may take a more nuanced or

multifaceted view toward certain policies,

teacher unions do act in the interest of their

members; hence, most will react similarly to

the same policies.


This area gauges the unions’ perceived

influence through the eyes of

knowledgeable observers in the state.

Resources may give a union leverage,

but in some states revenue and members

do not equate to influence. Campaign

contributions reflect teacher-union

behavior but do not guarantee that a union

has real sway with candidates once (and

if) they are elected. Permissive bargaining

laws give unions room to maneuver and

may yield a key source of revenue, but



they do not, in and of themselves, impact

state policy outcomes. Further, a union-

favorable policy environment may be the

result of a strong, active union, or of long-

time public allegiance to an establishment-

friendly culture—allowing labor to lay low

rather than needlessly devoting financial

or political capital to further an agenda

that’s already reasonably satisfactory. Or

vice versa: The unions are major donors

to campaigns—but the state is already

predisposed against them or their interests.

In such circumstances, a union that

gives heavily to campaigns may be more

desperate than powerful.

Given these complexities, we use data

from an original survey of key stakeholders

within each state to capture perceived

influence: How much sway do these insiders

believe the teacher unions carry in their

state and in what ways? The survey asks

whether the positions of policymakers are

aligned with those of teacher unions, how

effective the unions have been in stopping

policies with which they disagree, and how

influential the unions are in comparison

to other entities in the state, among other

areas.

Table 1 summarizes each area and indicator

examined, as well as the percentage of the

total score that each represents. We discuss

the indicators (and data sources for each)

and the weighting system broadly below,

and with much greater detail in

Appendix A.

METHODOLOGY

Designing the Metric

To develop a metric that measured

potential sources, processes, and outcomes

of union influence, we first examined

the existing research on union activity,

asking how others quantified “strength”

and measured its manifestations. We

paid special attention to researchers’

reflections on future work needed, as many

acknowledged the limitations of their

methods and offered recommendations

to others in the field. We also assembled

an expert team of study advisors (see

Acknowledgments, page 5), some of whom

are prolific researchers on the topic, and

solicited their input on recommended

measures of union strength (and the data

we might gather to measure it).

Combining research, advisor input, and

our own experience, we devised the five

general areas described above. Next we

examined potential data sources, and

divided each area into “indicators” of

strength. Each major indicator is comprised

of one or more specific “sub-indicators”

that represent individual data points. For

example, Area 4 encompasses “State

Policies”; major indicator 4.4 constitutes

“Employment Policies”; and sub-indicators

4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.3 measure the degree

to which state policies on teacher tenure,

layoffs, and dismissal, respectively, align

with traditional union interests. (More on

the weighting of indicators below.)

For the full rationale behind the inclusion of

each indicator, see Appendix A.

Data Sources

Data for this study were collected in two

ways. First, we drew extant data from both

public and proprietary sources. Sources

are listed alongside each indicator in

Appendix A, and include the National

Center for Education Statistics, the National

Institute on Money in State Politics, the

National Council on Teacher Quality, and

the National Alliance for Public Charter

Schools. These data informed indicators in

Areas 1–4.



TABLE 1: WEIGHTING OF INDICATORS AND SUB-INDICATORS

AreaMajor Indicator and % of Total Score

Sub-Indicator and % of Total Score

AREA 1: RESOURCES & MEMBERSHIP

20%

1.1: Membership 6.7% 1.1.1: What percentage of public school teachers in the state are union members? 6.7%

1.2: Revenue 6.7% 1.2.1: What is the total yearly revenue (per teacher in the state) of the state-level NEA and/or AFT affiliate(s)?

6.7%

1.3: Spending on education 6.7% 1.3.1: What percentage of state expenditures (of state general funds, state restricted funds, state bonds, and federal “pass-through” funds) is directed to K-12 education?

2.2%

1.3.2: What is the total annual per-pupil expenditure (of funds from federal, state, and local sources) in the state?

2.2%

1.3.3: What percentage of total annual per-pupil expenditures is directed to teacher salaries and benefits?

2.2%

AREA 2: INVOLVEMENTIN POLITICS

20%

2.1: Direct contributions to candidates and political parties

6.7% 2.1.1: What percentage of the total contributions to state candidates was donated by teacher unions?

3.3%

2.1.2: What percentage of the total contributions to state-level political parties was donated by teacher unions?

3.3%

2.2: Industry influence 6.7% 2.2.1: What percentage of the contributions to state candidates from the ten highest-giving sectors was donated by teacher unions?

6.7%

2.3: Status of delegates 6.7% 2.3.1: What percentage of the state’s delegates to the Democratic and Republican conventions were members of teacher unions?

6.7%

AREA 3:SCOPE OF BARGAINING

20%

3.1: Legal scope of bargaining 6.7% 3.1.1: What is the legal status of collective bargaining? 3.3%

3.1.2: How broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 3.3%

3.2: Automatic revenue streams 6.7% 3.2.1: What is the unions’ legal right to automatically collect agency fees from non-members and/or collect member dues via automatic payroll deductions?

6.7%

3.3: Right to strike 6.7% 3.3.1: What is the legal status of teacher strikes? 6.7%

AREA 4:STATE POLICIES

20%

4.1: Performance pay 2.9% 4.1.1: Does the state support performance pay for teachers? 2.9%

4.2: Retirement 2.9% 4.2.1: What is the employer versus employee contribution rate to the teacher pension system?

2.9%

4.3: Evaluations 2.9% 4.3.1: What is the maximum potential consequence for veteran teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluation(s)?

1.4%

4.3.2: Is classroom effectiveness included in teacher evaluations? If so, how is it weighted? 1.4%

4.4: Terms of employment 2.9% 4.4.1: How long before a teacher earns tenure? Is student/teacher performance considered in tenure decisions?

1.0%

4.4.2: How are seniority and teacher performance considered in teacher layoff decisions? 1.0%

4.4.3: What percentage of the teaching workforce was dismissed due to poor performance? 1.0%

4.5: Class size 2.9% 4.5.1: Is class size restricted for grades 1-3? If so, is the restriction larger than the national average (20)?

2.9%

4.6: Charter school structural limitations

2.9% 4.6.1: Is there a cap (limit) placed on the number of charter schools that can operate in the state (or other jurisdiction) and/or on the number of students who can attend charter schools?

1.0%

4.6.2: Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools?

1.0%

4.6.3: How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? 1.0%

4.7: Charter school exemptions 2.9% 4.7.1: Are charter schools automatically exempt from state laws, regulations, and teacher certification requirements (except those that safeguard students and fiscal accountability)?

1.4%

4.7.2: Are charter schools automatically exempt from collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)? 1.4%





AREA 5:PERCEIVEDINFLUENCE20%

5.1: Relative influence of teacher unions

4.0% 5.1.1: How do you rank the influence of teacher unions on education policy compared with other influential entities?

4.0%

5.2: Influence over campaigns 4.0% 5.2.1: How often do Democrat candidates need teacher union support to get elected? 2.0%

5.2.2: How often do Republican candidates need teacher union support to get elected? 2.0%

5.3: Influence over spending 4.0% 5.3.1: To what extent do you agree that, even in times of cutbacks, teacher unions are effective in protecting dollars for education?

2.0%

5.3.2: Would you say that teacher unions generally make concessions to prevent reductions in pay and benefits, or fight hard to prevent those reductions?

2.0%

5.4: Influence over policy 4.0% 5.4.1: To what extent do you agree that teacher unions ward off proposals in your state with which they disagree?

1.0%

5.4.2: How often do existing state education policies reflect teacher union priorities? 1.0%

5.4.3: To what extent were state education policies proposed by the governor during your state’s latest legislative session in line with teacher union priorities?

1.0%

5.4.4: To what extent were legislative outcomes of your state’s latest legislative session in line with teacher union priorities?

1.0%

5.5: Influence over key stakeholders

4.0% 5.5.1: How often have the priorities of state education leaders aligned with teacher union positions in the past three years?

2.0%

5.5.2: Would you say that teacher unions typically compromise with policymakers to ensure that their preferred policies are enacted, or typically need not make concessions?

2.0%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding

Second, to capture those unseen aspects

of influence and power, we fielded a

survey of key stakeholders in each state

in Summer 2011. These data were used to

calculate Area 5. Stakeholders were asked

only to respond for the state in which

they reside/are most knowledgeable. We

reached out to state legislators, chief

state school officers and school board

members, governors’ offices, state-

level charter-schooling organizations,

education advocacy organizations,

and education journalists in each state.

These stakeholders are not meant to be

representative of all state residents, but

rather of a targeted group of nearly six

hundred key policy movers and shakers

with direct knowledge or experience with

unions in their respective states; hence,

they hold more informed perceptions

than the general public. For each state,

data are only included for those individual

survey questions for which we received

at least three responses (“not applicable”

and “don’t know” were counted as

non-response). We acknowledge that

this threshold response rate is low; but

given that our survey targeted specific

knowledgeable stakeholders in each state

(and we asked only an average of eleven

persons per state to participate), this small

sample is not as problematic as it would

be in a large-scale survey. Further, survey

data comprise only 20 percent of our

metric—and these stakeholder responses

showed a high degree of alignment with

the indicators used to compile the other 80

percent.

Note that many of the survey questions

asked respondents to characterize teacher

union activity over the last three years or

during the most recent legislative session.

As with the state policies included in Area

4, we recognize that the education policy

sector has undergone significant change



Four points related to our methods merit special attention.

First, state ranks are reported relative to each other, not on an absolute scale. Our work is premised on the assumption that there is no objective definition of “strong” and “weak” against which unions can be compared, and creating an absolute scale requires that very definition. As such, a state’s final score is a combination of measures of potential union influence in that state. Using that score to then rank states against each other gives meaning to the raw numbers—we can say a state with a higher score has unions that are “stronger” within that state as compared to unions in a state with a lower score. Second, the education policy is dynamic, but our data are static. As a result, the rankings might lag behind current conditions. This has the potential to affect some areas more than others. Data in Area 4, State Policies, reflect teacher employment and charter policies through the end of 2011. This captures most of the policies recently enacted by states, many of which were motivated by the federal Race to the Top competition and in anticipation of applying for waivers to the No Child Left Behind Act, and some of which are consequences of the 2010 election. Similarly, our stakeholder survey (Area 5) reflects conditions at the end of summer 2011. Some data are older, however. For example, the most recent available numbers on teacher union membership are from 2009. Including multiple measures mitigates this lag, but given the rapidly changing nature of politics and policy, we realize that what was true on the day this report goes to press might not be true the day after.

Third, the indicators in Areas 3 and 4, related to bargaining, teacher employment, and charter laws, reflect what is codified in state law (and, in a handful of cases, decided by the courts). However, a state’s constitution (and its interpretation by the courts) can also have a significant (or negligible) impact on education laws in that state. We discuss this more specifically in Appendix A.

Finally, while our measures are commonsensical, they nonetheless represent an inexact science. Further, sometimes only small numerical differences separate the states. Thus, after we ranked the states, we divided them into five broad “tiers” of union strength, from strongest to weakest. We report the tier in which each state falls, along with its overall ranking, area scores, and indicator scores. The use of tiers is meant to acknowledge the imprecision of the data. As with any exploratory analyses, we invite others to tweak our metric and weighting—and update our data sources—to craft potentially more accurate and robust methods.

METHODS HOUSEKEEPING

of late, particularly given the federal Race

to the Top competition, applications for

No Child Left Behind waivers, and state

elections (in 2010 and 2011) that ushered

in many new faces, often Republicans

eager to overhaul particular policies (see

Methods Housekeeping sidebar). We asked

respondents to focus on teacher union

strength in these more recent years, rather

than historically, to capture current trends.

(This is not to say that their responses were

not shaped by their overall perspective on

union strength, apt to have been formed

over many years.) But given the pace of

change in just the last year or two, policy

over a three-year period is not as static as

one would assume. Further, recent changes

do in many ways reflect a new weakening

of teacher union influence over education

policy in some states; whether that waning

of teacher union strength will last is another

question entirely. As in any research study,

our data reflect a moment in time—and the

current national and state policy climate



made that moment more temporal than

most. That said, we note recent education

policy changes in the state profile reports—

and indicate whether our data were able to

accommodate them as of press time.

In addition to the data sources noted

above, the state profiles (Part V) include

brief essays about recent policy-related

union activity (typically occurring in 2011–

12). These narratives, which appear at the

end of each profile, serve as additional

context for the more static quantitative

data. They are informed by both online

and print media, and in a few cases we

contacted state insiders when news reports

were conflicting.

Data Analysis: Grading and Ranking

After we gathered data for each sub-

indicator described in Table 1, we graded

them on a 0 to 4 scale, much like a

traditional college GPA scale, with “0”

reflecting an attribute of a weak teacher

union and “4” representing an attribute

of a strong one. To score a sub-indicator

that used continuous quantitative data—

for example, unionization rate, per-pupil

expenditures, or union donations to

candidates—we put the states in rank order

from greatest to least and divided that

list into quintiles. The states in the highest

quintile were scored “4,” in the next-highest

“3,” in the middle “2,” near the bottom “1,”

and in the lowest quintile “0.” For example,

on sub-indicator 1.1.1: Membership, we

ordered states based on the proportion

of their teachers who are unionized. The

highest quintile—the ten states that had

the highest unionization rate—scored “4.”

The ten with the lowest unionization rate

scored “0.”*

We translated qualitative information into

categorical data by assigning a grade

from 0 to 4 to particular outcomes. For

example, sub-indicator 4.1.1: Performance

Pay was drawn from the National Council

on Teacher Quality’s 2011 State Teacher

Policy Yearbook. In response to NCTQ’s

question, “Do states support performance

pay?” a state received “0” for “performance

included in salary schedule for all teachers”;

“1” for “performance bonuses required

to be available to all teachers”; “2” for

“performance pay permitted/encouraged

by the state”; “3” for state-sponsored

performance-pay initiatives offered in

select districts”; or “4” for “does not

support performance pay.” In cases where

there were not five possible outcomes, not

all scale points were used. When no data

were available for a state, or when a given

indicator did not apply to a particular state,

scores were coded as “N/A.”†

To calculate the overall rank of each state,

we first averaged the sub-indicators within

a major indicator; then major indicators

within the same area; and finally all five

areas (with each area thus comprising

20 percent of the overall score), resulting

in a final 0 to 4 score. States were then

ranked according to their final score, and

the list was again divided into quintiles.

The ten states with the highest scores—

those closest to “4”—were those with

the strongest unions. We call these “Tier

1” states. The ten states with the lowest

scores—those closest to “0”—were those

* With fifty-one jurisdictions overall, each quintile comprises ten jurisdictions, except the quintile scored as “2”—the middle quintile—which comprises eleven.

† We did not count the absence of a charter law in the metric because doing so required us to make an assumption we knew to be false: that unions had a hand in that absence in all nine states without charter laws. For example, neither Washington State nor North Dakota is home to a charter school law. The union role in each state is markedly different: In Washington, teacher unions have fought tooth and nail against a charter law for over a decade; but in North Dakota, other realities—such as the state’s overwhelmingly rural population—are stronger impediments to a charter law than teacher unions. Because we could not assign these states’ teacher unions (and those in the other seven without charter laws) a uniform score relative to their influence on the absence of a state charter law, we graded these states as “N/A” for those particular data points.



with the weakest unions, which we term

“Tier 5.”

Before finalizing the rankings, we used the

data to conduct a preliminary evaluation

of our measure: Did including multiple

indicators truly give us a more robust

definition of union strength? Or were they

all so tightly correlated that any union

that scored highly in one area was scoring

highly in all of them? Our analysis indicated

that it was the former. Unions that ranked

highly in one area did not necessarily rank

high (or low) in the others. The highest

significant correlation (0.7) was between

Area 1: Resources and Membership and

Area 3: Scope of Bargaining. This is not

surprising, because bargaining status is

tied to membership and agency fees to

union revenue. But the other significant

correlations ranged from 0.2 to 0.5,

and some areas were not significantly

correlated at all.* This reinforced our

contention that strong unions do not

look the same everywhere and that it is

therefore important to incorporate different

measures when defining “strength.” This

is also why the five areas are weighted

equally: we could not justify any one of

them determining more of the final score

than another.

*Of the ten possible pairings among areas 1-5, only six showed significant correlations. Data available upon request.


Part II: Findings

OVERALL RANKS

Table 2 displays the overall rank and area

scores of each state.

We divided our fifty-one jurisdictions into

five tiers, from Tier 1 (the strongest) to Tier

5 (the weakest). Table 3 shows the overall

rank and tier for each state.

Many of the states whose teacher unions

fall into our top tier—such as California,

New Jersey, and Washington—are widely

recognized for having powerful teacher

unions. But others—such as Oregon,

Montana, and Rhode Island—may come

as a surprise. Further, the rankings are

only partially aligned to bargaining

status (widely used as a proxy for union

strength). All of the Tier 1 states mandate

TABLE 2. TEACHER UNION STRENGTH BY STATE

StateOverall Rank



Politics

Area 3: Scope of

Bargaining

Area 4: State

Policies


Alabama 20 24* 1* 45* 18* 25

Alaska 15 13* 36* 4* 21* 36

Arizona 51 40* 49 45* 49* 48

Arkansas 48 50 47* 45* 20 37

California 6 20* 18* 1 37 1

Colorado 35 37* 18* 25 48 29

Connecticut 17 9* 29* 13 13 27

Delaware 19 9* 29* 15 36 18

District of Columbia 33 17 N/A 21 49* 41

Florida 50 47* 36* 35* 46* 50

Georgia 45 35* 36* 48* 26 45

collective bargaining, but so does Florida,

which ranked next-to-last. Restrictions on

bargaining likewise do not automatically

determine that a union is weak—not all five

states that prohibit collective bargaining

are in Tier 5 (North Carolina is in Tier 4),

and bargaining is only permitted, not

mandated, in three of the twenty strongest

(Ohio, West Virginia, and Alabama).

We saw this pattern of trends and

exceptions across not just bargaining

status but every variable we examined.

This emphasizes our core assumption:

bargaining status, agency fees, and

unionization rate alone do not determine

what makes a strong union. But a few key

factors appear to have a heavy hand in how

unions operate in each state. We expand on

those factors in the text that follows.

PART II: FINDINGS


Part II: Findings

StateOverall Rank



Politics

Area 3: Scope of

Bargaining

Area 4: State

Policies


Hawaii 1 3* 1* 9 9 23

Idaho 36 30 4* 42 45 42*

Illinois 8 18* 12 3 39 28

Indiana 31 9* 13* 39 44 32

Iowa 27 27 23* 32 11 31

Kansas 32 33* 18* 31 14 30

Kentucky 28 35* 26* 26 10 11*

Louisiana 42 40* 44* 24 33 44

Maine 22 20* 44* 16 7* 11*

Maryland 23 26 40* 20 16 4

Massachusetts 21 13* 40* 12 21* 16

Michigan 16 6* 4* 22 51 20

Minnesota 14 3* 32* 2 46* 19

Mississippi 46 49 40* 43* 7* 51

Missouri 38 33* 47* 23 40 24

Montana 3 20* 10* 6 6 5

Nebraska 26 18* 13* 37 27 38

Nevada 25 28* 18* 27 28 10

New Hampshire 30 24* 40* 14 17 40

New Jersey 7 1* 26* 17* 5 2

New Mexico 37 46 32* 35* 29 8

New York 9 1* 13* 19 24* 21

North Carolina 40 47* 29* 48* 12 11*

North Dakota 24 28* 23* 33* 2* 14

Ohio 12 20* 17 10 23 35

Oklahoma 43 44* 26* 40 43 46

Oregon 2 9* 8* 4* 34* 3


Rhode Island 5 6* 4* 17* 15 15

South Carolina 49 51 35 43* 38 47

South Dakota 34 40* 1* 33* 34* 49

Tennessee 41 37* 18* 38 42 42*

Texas 44 44* 36* 48* 30* 34

Utah 39 37* 25 28* 30* 39

Vermont 11 6* 44* 8 2* 22

Virginia 47 40* 50 48* 4 33

Washington 10 3* 32* 11 18* 9

West Virginia 13 31* 4* 28* 1 6

Wisconsin 18 13* 8* 41 24* 17

Wyoming 29 31* 13* 28* 30* 26

* Indicates that a state is tied with one or more other states for this rank.


Part II: Findings

TABLE 3. TEACHER UNION STRENGTH BY RANK AND TIER

Tier 1Strongest

Tier 2Strong

Tier 3Average

Tier 4Weak

Tier 5Weakest






33 Oklahoma 43









Indiana 31


FIGURE 1. MAP OF TEACHER UNION STRENGTH BY TIER


Part II: Findings

Figure 1 maps each state’s overall rank by

shaded tiers. As shown, there are strong

regional trends. The West Coast and the

Northeast have nearly all of the strongest

unions in the nation (shaded red and light

orange), while southern states have the

weakest (in brown).

What might be the cause of these trends?

There is nothing inherent to geography

that dictates union strength, whether we’re

talking about teaching or other lines of

work. But geography is correlated with

factors that do: the history of collective

bargaining, the rhetoric of unionism, and

overall political or ideological orientation.

Places where unions have long been

regarded as necessary and valuable parts

of the economy will mandate bargaining,

and allow unions to collect agency fees

to do their work. The scope of bargaining

will be wide, because at some point state

leaders believed unions should have

leeway to negotiate with their employers.

Workers are more likely to be unionized if

organized labor is part of the state culture,

and as a result the unionization rate will

be high. Places where the rhetoric and

public opinion surrounding unionism is

favorable are more likely to trust and value

union positions rather than challenge them;

these values in turn are reflected in state

policies. And in places that are ideologically

more liberal, voters are more apt to hold

favorable views toward unions and to elect

Democrat leaders, who in turn tend to be

more receptive to the interests of organized

labor.

These factors are highly aligned with

geography. Organized labor in America

began with workers in the factories of the

Northeast and the railroads of the West,

and soon spread to manufacturing in the

Midwest. (Compare the economies of

these areas to the agrarian economy of

the South, which did not have corporatist

structures that facilitated organizing and

employee participation.) These same areas

tend to have long-standing favorable views

toward organized labor as a necessary

means to protect workers’ rights. They are

also the parts of the country that in recent

years have been lumped together as “blue

states.” The opposite is true in the South

and central parts of the United States—the

“red states.” Employers rejected organized

labor in the South and in the rural central

states there was not much need for it.

Neither history nor rhetoric nor ideology

favors unions in these parts of the country.

Given this alignment of geography with

factors that contribute to union strength in

general, the correlation between location

and our rankings shown in Figure 1 is

not surprising. The Tier 1 states with the

strongest teacher unions, mapped in red,

are in the West and Northeast—areas with

a history of organized labor, pro-union

sentiment, and a liberal ideology. All of

these states have mandatory bargaining

and allow agency fees, and all ranked highly

in Area 5 (Perceived Influence). The Tier

2 states in light orange are mostly in the

Midwest, which is also historically (and

currently) pro-labor but generally more

moderate politically. These states also allow

agency fees and, while some permit rather

than mandate bargaining, the unionization

rate is high regardless. Further, unions

tend to be politically active there (Area

2), where political and policy outcomes

are somewhat less predictable than in the

Tier 1 states. The Tier 3 and Tier 4 states

(blue and green) in the West and central

parts of the country are largely rural, with

little history of unionism, and often fairly

conservative in ideology. As such, most

of these states prohibit agency fees and

have low membership rates, even where

bargaining is mandated. On the other hand,


Part II: Findings

in many such states local control is valued

over restrictive state mandates, and as a

result we see the policy environment (Area

4) aligned with union interests because

there aren’t many statewide education

policies as such. Finally, the Tier 5 states

with the weakest unions, mapped in brown,

are in the South, where states are both

ideologically conservative and historically

anti-union. In these states, bargaining is

either permitted or prohibited, membership

is very low even in states where bargaining

is allowed, and education policy is not

aligned with union interests.

In the pages that follow, we present the

overall strongest and weakest of the

bunch. Then we examine the strength of

state unions by each of the five major

areas that we analyzed: Resources and

Membership, Involvement in Politics, Scope

of Bargaining, State Policies, and Perceived

Influence.

AMERICA’S STRONGEST TEACHER UNIONS

Table 4 lists the ten states with the

strongest teacher unions according to our

analysis, both the state’s overall rank and

its rank within each of the five areas of our

metric. As the table shows, even states with

Tier 1 teacher unions vary widely across

those areas. Hawaii’s teacher unions, for

example, can claim the greatest political

involvement among the top ten states

(though Hawaii is tied in that category

with Alabama and South Dakota, which

fall into Tiers 2 and 4, respectively); New

Jersey and New York boast the most

significant membership and resources; and

California is home to the broadest scope

of bargaining and the strongest perceived

influence.

What do these strong teacher unions have

in common?*

* It is not surprising that “top” states do well on the indicators that we chose to include, but there is no expectation that they will share commonalities. Sometimes they did (for instance, relative to high membership, high revenue, and strong reputation) and sometimes they did not (e.g., mixed policy environments).

TABLE 4. TIER 1 (STRONGEST) TEACHER UNIONS

StateOverall Rank



Politics

Area 3: Scope of

Bargaining

Area 4: State

Policies


Hawaii 1 3* 1* 9 9 23

Oregon 2 9* 8* 4* 34* 3

Montana 3 20* 10* 6 6 5


Rhode Island 5 6* 4* 17* 15 15

California 6 20* 18* 1 37 1

New Jersey 7 1* 26* 17* 5 2

Illinois 8 18* 12 3 39 28

New York 9 1* 13* 19 24* 21

Washington 10 3* 32* 11 18* 9

* Indicates that a state is tied with one or more other states for this rank


Part II: Findings

The ability to amass people and money,

and maneuver within wide legal rights

It’s unlikely that a teacher union would

have much clout if it lacked a strong base

in at least one of the following: money,

members, or strong collective bargaining

rights. Table 4 shows this to be true. Every

state that falls into the top tier can claim

teacher unions with strong resources

and membership (Area 1); none of these

states ranks below 20th in this area. In

New Jersey and New York, for example,

nearly all teachers are unionized (97.1 and

Hawaii (Tier 1), Montana (Tier 1), and Alabama (Tier 2) are seeming outliers. Although Hawaii is now politically liberal, organized labor could not gain a foothold in the state until the 1950s (despite decades of trying). Yet it has some of the most permissive bargaining laws and union-favored education policies in the nation, and the state union has more resources—and is more politically active—than nearly anywhere else. Montana is a politically conservative, rural state surrounded by others in the midst of enacting anti-teacher-union legislation by the fistful—yet it mandates collective bargaining, gives it a wide scope, and allows agency fees. Unions are highly active in politics there, and state policies are highly aligned to union interests. Alabama prohibits agency fees and is firmly in the anti-labor, socially conservative south, yet its union is the most politically active in the nation, has one of the highest unionization rates in the permitted bargaining states, and generates a significant amount of revenue per teacher. What might explain the high ranking for these states?

Hawaii has only one school district, Alabama only 133. Having fewer local affiliates may allow an otherwise weak state union to direct more of its resources up to the statehouse instead of down to the districts, to mobilize its members more efficiently, and to present a unified front.

Hawaii and Montana unified early. The “unification date” is when local unions were required to affiliate with, and pay dues to, the state and national association. The three strongest state unions in this report—Hawaii, Oregon, and Montana—were among the first three NEA affiliates to unify, doing so between 1944 and 1946. Early unification gives state unions time to build infrastructure, develop leaders, amass resources, gain allies, and establish a position within the political culture.

Alabama is socially conservative but politically liberal. While Alabama voters have supported Republican presidential candidates for 50 years, the Alabama legislature was dominated by Democrats for more than a century (2010 marked the first time in 136 years that Republicans were the majority in both houses). This, coupled with the Alabama Education Association’s position as a storied cultural institution, led to a number of labor-friendly policies in what is generally perceived to be a “red” state.*

THREE SURPRISING HEAVYWEIGHTS

98.4 percent, respectively). No other state

spends more of its K–12 dollars on teacher

salaries and benefits than New York, at

63.5 percent; and New Jersey’s unions

collect the third-highest yearly revenue

per teacher, at $935.62. Washington State,

meanwhile, claims both the tenth-largest

yearly revenue per teacher ($633.59) and

the tenth-largest proportion of its state

budget spent on K–12 education (24.3

percent).

*Of course, there are exceptions to the exceptions. Florida and Louisiana (Tier 5) have fewer than eighty districts each. Idaho (Tier 4) and Arizona (Tier 5) unified early too. Mississippi (Tier 5) is also socially conservative but politically liberal. We explore these, and other apparent contradictions, in the individual state reports in Section V.


Part II: Findings

Similarly, every state with teacher unions

in the top tier has permissive bargaining

laws (Area 3). Once again, none of these

states ranks below 20th on this indicator.

All ten are mandatory bargaining states and

allow unions to collect agency fees, a key

source of union revenue. California, which

ranks first overall in this area, ranks second

in terms of the number of items that fall

within the scope of negotiations: wages,

hours, transfers, layoffs, evaluations, fringe

benefits, leave, class size, and class load

are all mandatory subjects of bargaining

(along with others). The state also allows

teachers to strike. Illinois, Oregon, Montana,

Pennsylvania, and Hawaii are also among

the top ten most permissive bargaining

states.

A state’s scope of bargaining is likely

both an input and an outcome of union

strength. The ability to bargain and collect

agency fees is an input that confers greater

resources and leverage to local unions. This

is passed along to the state organizations,

which in return infuse their local affiliates

with additional strength by which to

expand bargaining rights—or to use the

other tools in their toolkit more effectively.

(See Part II: Evaluating Teacher Union

Strength.)

A strong perception of influence

among insiders

All of the states whose teacher unions

fall into the strongest tier score relatively

high in terms of perceived influence

(Area 5). Six are perceived to be among

the ten strongest in the nation, and only

one (Illinois) falls below 25th in this area.

With a strong foundation in people and

dollars (Area 1), unions maintain a visible

presence in the state; and even if they

are not always successful in advocating

for policies they favor, they are routinely

at the table (or very close by). In eight of

the Tier 1 states, for example, stakeholders

unanimously agreed that teacher unions

had fought hard to prevent any reductions

in pay and benefits during the recent

period of budgetary constraint, rather than

conceding that reductions were inevitable.

(Only in Illinois and Rhode Island did some

stakeholders indicate otherwise.)

This does not necessarily demonstrate that

the unions were successful, but another

set of survey responses suggests that

Tier 1 unions do have a voice in the policy

design process, even if they could not

prevent policies from being introduced. We

asked stakeholders whether the education

policies proposed by the governor in the

last legislative session were in line with

union priorities, and also whether the

outcomes of that session were in line

with union priorities. The answers to both

questions were mixed. In Montana and

Washington, the proposed policies were

fairly in line with union priorities, while in

Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York

they were not. In Oregon and Illinois, the

legislative outcomes aligned with union

goals. But one thing most Tier 1 states had

in common is that the legislative outcomes

were more in line with union priorities

than were the policies initially proposed.

This was the case in Hawaii, California,

New Jersey, Illinois, and New York. New

Jersey stakeholders reported the biggest

difference that we found anywhere (see

New Jersey state profile for more), and the

change in all five of those states was larger

than the national average. In Washington,

there was no change between the

proposed and enacted policies.

Further, when we asked stakeholders to

select and rank the five most influential

entities in education policy in their state,

the national average put the teacher

unions third. No Tier 1 state fell below that


Part II: Findings

average, and all but Hawaii ranked their

unions as one of the top two major players

in education policy. So while unions might

not be successful everywhere—and in many

places, they were not—they still serve as

visible and active authorities in the thick of

policy debates.

A mixed state policy environment

Despite these perceptions of union

influence, however, many of the states

in the top tier have policies that are not

particularly favorable to those unions

(Area 4). Only three—Hawaii, Montana and

New Jersey—rank in the top quintile in

this area and four rank in the bottom half

nationally. We learn from this that abundant

resources, permissive bargaining laws, and

a strong reputation do not necessarily yield

a favorable state policy environment. For

example, Pennsylvania’s teacher unions

are strong in every other area, ranking

among the fifteen strongest on resources

and membership, political activity, scope

of bargaining, and perceived influence. Yet

the state is 41st for its policy environment:

It has in place many charter laws that

teacher unions typically oppose. Similarly,

Illinois’s teacher unions, which enjoy

permissive bargaining laws and a relatively

high level of political involvement, reside

in a state with several policies that unions

typically spurn: student achievement must

be the preponderant criterion in teacher

evaluations, some evidence of student

learning is considered in tenure decisions,

and districts must consider performance

when determining layoffs.*

A mixed level of political activity

The strongest teacher unions also vary

in their generosity to political campaigns

(Area 2). Some, such as those in Illinois

and Oregon, contribute a great deal, with 3

percent or more of all contributions to state

candidates coming from teacher unions.

But others, such as those in New Jersey

and California, donate less than 1 percent

of all contributions to state candidates.

This does not mean that the unions are

not major players—in California, between

2003 and 2010, they donated $7.3 million

dollars to candidates, the second-most in

the nation (Illinois was first at $17.2 million).

But in California, the total donations to

candidates exceeded $1 billion, meaning

that the union’s dollars made up a very thin

slice (just 0.7 percent) of that enormous

pie. Compare California’s Area 2 rank of

18th to Hawaii (1st), Rhode Island (4th),

and Montana (10th), all of which gave less

than $650,000 to candidates (in Montana,

only $42,000). In those states, candidates

simply do not receive that much campaign

money, which gives the union dollars

relatively greater heft. Perhaps the most

impressive entry on this list is Illinois, where

elections are among the most expensive in

the nation ($474 million, third-most after

California and Texas) and unions donated

$17.2 million of that to state candidates—a

percentage ranking them 1st on that

particular sub-indicator.

It may seem paradoxical that state teacher

unions could be perceived as influential

without proving successful—or even

participating—in the state policy realm.

* Note that two Tier 1 states—Montana and Washington—do not have charter legislation at all and thus received “N/A” on those indicators. They, along with the seven other states without such laws (Alabama, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia) may see a slight bump in their scores since fewer indicators comprise their total score for Area 4. A plausible argument can be made that the absence of a charter school law is itself evidence of strong unions that have successfully deterred charter legislation. Washington State is an example of this. Yet it is also true that charter schools have simply been a non-issue in some states. The Center for Education Reform, for instance, reports that West Virginia has been “silent” about charter schools and “even the state’s teacher union recognized the need for alternatives.” And South Dakota “has not heard much discussion of charter schools…so a debate on [them] would be new.” (See “The Final Ten: How The States Without Charter Schools Can Make It To The Goal Line,” the Center for Education Reform, February 1, 2007, http://www.theparentsnetwork.org/_upload/CER_FinalTenCharterStates.pdf). For these reasons (and others detailed in Appendix A), we deemed “N/A” the appropriate mark for non-charter states.


Part II: Findings

But keep in mind that state-level education

policy is just one arena where unions

can exert strength; equally, if not more

important to them, are their local affiliates’

capacity to affect district rules through

involvement in school board elections,

collective bargaining agreements, and such

collective actions as rallies, marches, and

lobby campaigns to pressure a district’s

board or superintendent. Unfortunately,

measuring local union activity exceeded

this project’s scope (see Appendix A)—

and a lot of what state unions do is train

their local affiliates on bargaining and

organizing, and advocate on their behalf.

Further, we’re more mindful than ever that

that influence and strength do not always

get manifested in public. Often what

happens behind the scenes can be more

consequential. We’re also aware that the

absence of visible activity or influence can

itself be an illustration of strong influence.

In some places, the unions have been so

influential for so long that they do not face

challenges to their power; thus, they need

not fork over sizeable contributions to

parties or candidates in order to preserve

a favorable status quo. This is most

prevalent in states that have consistently

had Democratic leadership, although we

saw it elsewhere as well (see state profiles,

Part V). Similarly, unions that enjoy wide

collective bargaining rights already may not

need to engage in state politics, inasmuch

as their local affiliates can protect teacher

interests at the district level instead.

We’re mindful, too, that it’s impossible

to tally everything that active unions

do, even when they do it publicly. Some

activities simply cannot be quantified.

Unions encourage their members to write

letters and make phone calls to legislators

in support of (or opposition to) certain

policies. They have “lobby days” where

union leaders and members meet with state

lawmakers, or rally at the state capitol—and

will often provide transportation so that

their numbers are large. During elections,

state unions organize their members to

volunteer for campaigns, walking precincts

and staffing phone banks. Union members

and their families represent a sizeable block

of voters themselves. But our analyses in

Area 2 also taught us a frustrating lesson—

campaign finance law simply does not

allow us to track every dollar that unions

spend on politics. We can track their

reported donations to candidates and

political parties. But we can’t account for

what they spend on behalf of a candidate

(or against another candidate)—for

example, in advertising and mail campaigns,

on member mobilization, or on general

advocacy and lobbying.

Yet, while some unions see favorable

policies but don’t visibly participate much

in politics, others engage intensely, though

state policies are not in their favor. Perhaps

their activities are an indication of their

attempts to reverse existing policies. Or

perhaps they are spending sizable sums not

in support of a candidate who will embrace

their interests, but simply to defeat one

whom they know will act against those

interests.*

* Likely, it is a bit of both. The New York Times recently reported that nationwide, union donations to Republican candidates have doubled since the 2010 election cycle (see Motoko Rich, “Seeking Allies, Teachers’ Unions Court G.O.P., Too,” New York Times, September 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/challenged-by-old-allies-teachers-unions-court-gop.html). In our state reports, we found evidence for this as well.


Part II: Findings

AMERICA’S WEAKEST TEACHER UNIONS

Table 5 lists the ten states with the weakest

teacher unions, again showing each state’s

rank on every one of the five areas in

our metric. As before, no single measure

dictates the overall ranking of a state’s

teacher unions: South Carolina claims the

least amount of resources; Mississippi

the frailest perception of influence; and

Georgia, Texas, and Virginia tie for the least

permissive bargaining laws.

Still, we can see several patterns—pretty

much the converse of those discussed

above—across the ten states.

Limited people and resources, and

restricted legal rights

Not surprisingly, these unions have

restricted legal rights. Few would expect

unions in states that prohibit collective

bargaining to amass as many people and

dollars as their counterparts in union-

friendly states, and here we see that

teacher unions that rank among the

weakest overall tend to have the fewest

members and thinnest resources. Six of the

ten states in Tier 5 are among the bottom

ten in unionization rates and the other four

fall in the bottom twenty. South Carolina

has the lowest membership rate—just 26.9

percent of the state’s teachers are union

members.* The Palmetto State union also

collects the least revenue per teacher in the

state—just $51.75 annually, versus a high of

$1,370.77 in Alaska. Together, this lack of

human and financial resources amounts to

feeble power for the state’s teacher unions.

Table 6 groups states by bargaining

status, and shows this to be the case: nine

of the ten Tier 5 states either permit or

prohibit—rather than require—collective

bargaining. (Only Florida mandates it.)

Further, all ten states in Tier 5 prohibit

TABLE 5. TIER 5 (WEAKEST) TEACHER UNIONS

StateOverall Rank



Politics

Area 3: Scope of

Bargaining

Area 4: State

Policies


Louisiana 42 40* 44* 24 33 44

Oklahoma 43 44* 26* 40 43 46

Texas 44 44* 36* 48* 30* 34

Georgia 45 35* 36* 48* 26 45

Mississippi 46 49 40* 43* 7 51

Virginia 47 40* 50 48* 4 33

Arkansas 48 50 47* 45* 20 37

South Carolina 49 51 35 43* 38 47

Florida 50 47* 36* 35* 46* 50

Arizona 51 40* 49 45* 49 48

* Indicates that a state is tied with one or more other states for this rank

* Even if bargaining is prohibited, recall that teachers are always free to form a local professional association, and to affiliate with the state-level union. And teachers may also join the state association directly if their district does not have an employee organization. So while prohibiting bargaining does not render it impossible for a state to have a high unionization rate, it certainly makes it substantially more difficult for a state union to amass (and subsequently unify and mobilize) members.


Part II: Findings

the automatic collection of agency fees.*

These states are indicated in red. While this

study demonstrates that many factors can

affect—or reflect—the overall influence of a

teacher union, residing in a state that allows

unions to collect funds from non-members

bodes well for that influence.

The perception of weak influence

With limited ability to collect resources

and members, and restricted bargaining

rights, it comes as no surprise that the

weakest teacher unions carry little weight

in the eyes of observers. Seven of the Tier

5 unions rank in the bottom ten states in

perceived influence (Area 5). Stakeholders

in all of these states routinely report that

other entities—such as school boards,

governors, and business roundtables—

are more influential in shaping education

policy. Many note that their state’s teacher

unions, particularly those in Mississippi,

are not effective in protecting dollars

for education, nor are they effective in

* While states that prohibit collective bargaining are often casually referred to as “right-to-work” states, this is not a correct use of the term. “Right-to-work” specifically refers to laws prohibiting union membership as a condition of employment; under such legislation, unions cannot automatically collect “agency fees” in lieu of dues from non-members. Bargaining status and right-to-work are different, and independent, concepts. For example, Florida both requires bargaining and is a right-to-work state. Should employees wish to form a union, the district must recognize and bargain with that union, but that union cannot collect agency fees from teachers who choose not to join. Note, too, that barring agency fees is not the same as prohibiting automatic payroll deductions of members’ dues; in the latter case, unions cannot automatically deduct dues from the paychecks of their own members. (See sidebar, Getting the Terminology Straight.)

TABLE 6. BARGAINING STATUS, AGENCY FEES, AND OVERALL RANKING

Bargaining Mandatory Bargaining Permitted Bargaining Prohibited

STATE OVERALL RANK STATE OVERALL RANK STATE OVERALL RANK STATE OVERALL RANK

Hawaii 1 Delaware 19 Ohio 12 North Carolina 40

Oregon 2 Massachusetts 21 West Virginia 13 Texas 44

Montana 3 Maine 22 Alabama 20 Georgia 45

Pennsylvania 4 Maryland 23 Kentucky 28 Virginia 47

Rhode Island 5 North Dakota 24 Wyoming 29 South Carolina 49

California 6 Nevada 25 Colorado 35

New Jersey 7 Nebraska 26 Idaho 36

Illinois 8 Iowa 27 Missouri 38

New York 9 New Hampshire 30 Utah 39

Washington 10 Indiana 31 Louisiana 42

Vermont 11 Kansas 32 Oklahoma 43

Minnesota 14District of Columbia

33 Mississippi 46

Alaska 15 South Dakota 34 Arkansas 48

Michigan 16 New Mexico 37 Arizona 51

Connecticut 17 Tennessee 41

Wisconsin 18 Florida 50

Bold red type indicates right-to-work states, which prohibit the automatic collection of agency fees.


Part II: Findings

warding off education proposals with which

they disagree—particularly in Arizona,

Florida, and Louisiana. Stakeholders likely

perceive this weakness for a number of

reasons: little financial involvement in

elections (unions in Mississippi, Arkansas,

and South Carolina do not give much to

campaigns even though elections are

relatively inexpensive); an active union

donating heavily but facing competition

(unions in Florida, Texas, Georgia, and

Virginia all donate a lot of money, but

so do many other organizations); strong

Republican governors (Jeb Bush in Florida,

Bobby Jindal in Louisiana, and Jan Brewer

in Arizona); and Republican legislative

majorities (all but Arkansas and Virginia).

A mixed state policy environment

As with the strongest teacher unions,

the weakest unions are not necessarily

found in states with the most union-

unfavorable policy environments. Two

of them—Mississippi and Virginia—are

indeed in states with extremely union-

friendly policies.* In both places, teacher

evaluations need not include student

achievement data; evaluations need not

inform dismissal policies; and tenure is

conferred virtually automatically (after

three years in Virginia, and after just one

year in Mississippi).

But other teacher unions in Tier 5 inhabit

states with policies that don’t align

nearly so well with traditional union

interests. In Oklahoma and Florida,

student achievement must serve as

the preponderant criterion in teacher

evaluations; evidence of student learning

must be the major consideration in tenure

decisions; and administrators must consider

performance in determining layoffs. Further,

* Observers in Virginia, for instance, tell us that the state constitution is interpreted as granting control over all education issues to local school boards; thus the legislature is constrained when it comes to changing existing establishment-friendly policies. See Virginia state profile for more.

Oklahoma dismisses teachers at a higher

rate due to poor performance than nearly

every other state—3.7 percent annually,

compared to Arkansas, which dismisses

just 0.2 percent. The policy paradoxes

we discussed above apply in these states

as well.


Part III: Taking a Closer Look— Teacher Union Influence by Area

As we’ve already seen, teacher union

influence varies greatly across the

dimensions that we examined. Strong

unions are not strong in the same ways, and

weak unions are not necessarily weak on all

fronts. This variation underscores the fact

that teacher unions are rarely uniform in

how they derive influence—and where they

direct it. They also differ in their goals and

the extent to which they strive to shape

policy in public (and quantifiable) ways. In

this section, we take a closer look at the

teacher unions that ranked strong and weak

in each of our five areas.

AREA 1: RESOURCES AND MEMBERSHIP

This area measures the internal resources

on which unions rely (members and

revenue), and the financial resources

dedicated to education in the state. While

size and funds do not automatically make

one union more powerful than another, the

ability to amass people and money is, in

many cases, an indicator of influence. Thus

we examine teacher union membership

in each state (relative to all public school

teachers) and revenues of each state-

level teacher union, judging that a critical

mass of membership and high revenue per

teacher build a necessary foundation for

strong unions. Though we have no way of

knowing whether high spending in a state

is the direct result of union influence, it is

nonetheless a source of union strength,

because unions—and the teachers they

represent—certainly benefit from it. Thus

we also examine K–12 education spending,

by the state and by the districts in the state,

and the percentage of that spending that

goes toward teacher salaries and benefits.

Table 7 shows the strongest and weakest

states in this area.

The strongest unions in this area uniformly

boast high membership densities—all

five rank in the top ten nationally on

this single indicator, with the lowest—

Minnesota—ranking 9th, with 95.7 percent

of its teachers unionized. They also bring

in substantial revenues per teacher in the

state—all rank in the top twenty nationally

here, with New Jersey collecting $935.62

per teacher (3rd-highest), and New York

pulling in $536.38 per teacher (20th).

(Compare that to Alaska with the highest

revenue, $1370.77 per teacher, and South

Carolina with the lowest, $51.75.)

These states also boast high overall

spending on education. Most see either

high spending on education writ large or a

large proportion of per-pupil expenditures

going toward salaries and benefits. Few

states, however, spend copious dollars on

education and direct a large proportion of

those funds toward salaries and benefits.

For example, New Jersey only directs

52.5 percent of K–12 spending toward

teacher salaries and budgets (just eleven

jurisdictions direct less), yet overall K–12

spending in the Garden State is large:

PART III: TAKING A CLOSER LOOK–TEACHER UNION INFLUENCE BY AREA



$15,116 per pupil (6th-highest).* On the

other hand, Minnesota directs a high

percentage of its K–12 expenditures to

teacher salaries and benefits (59.4 percent;

3rd), but disburses less money per pupil

($11,472; 24th). New York is noteworthy

because annual per-pupil expenditures

total $15,863 (5th) and a high percentage

of those generous expenditures goes to

teacher salaries and benefits (63.5 percent;

1st).

Conversely, the weakest unions in this area

report thin membership and low revenues

per teacher. As previously noted, South

Carolina posts the smallest figures for

both. Even Florida, which posts the highest

figures on these measures among the

bottom five states, has a unionization rate

of just 55.8 percent and annual revenues

of only $181.56 per teacher. Still, there are

a few surprises in this area. A substantial

percentage of K–12 expenditures in North

Carolina go to teacher salaries and benefits

(58.5 percent; 4th). In real dollars, however,

that does not amount to much, considering

that the Tarheel State spends just $9,024.13

annually per pupil (44th). Florida ranks in

the middle, rather than at the bottom, in

terms of state spending on education (20.1

percent of state expenditures; 22nd). And

Arkansas falls in the middle when it comes

to per-pupil expenditures, with $10,756.66

(30th).

AREA 2: INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

This category measures ways in which a

state union might influence laws, policies,

and budgets. Because many forms of

influence are impossible to quantify and

compare, most of the data in this category

represent the unions’ financial donations

to candidates and political parties (their

share of total contributions, and how they

stack up against other sectors like police

and firefighter unions, farm bureaus, and

major oil and gas producers). And we tally

how many delegates to the Democratic

and Republican National Conventions were

themselves teacher union members.

Two methodological notes warrant

mention—the first regarding what

we counted and the second what we

compared—because our report of unions’

share of financial contributions is apt to

strike the reader as low. First, for the years

examined, we combine direct contributions

from any national, state, or local teacher

union (and the political action committees

TABLE 7. RESOURCES AND MEMBERSHIP

Strongest Unions

Area 1 Rank Overall Rank Weakest Unions Area 1 Rank Overall Rank

New Jersey 1 7 Florida 47 50

New York 1 9 North Carolina 47 40

Hawaii 3 1 Mississippi 49 46

Minnesota 3 14 Arkansas 50 48

Washington 3 10 South Carolina 51 49

*States like New Jersey that do not spend large fractions of their K–12 funds on teacher salaries and benefits tend to spend more money on support services—including administration, operations and management, and instructional staff support—than other states.



connected to those unions) to candidates

or parties in a particular state. This is not

to say that unions did not spend money

in other ways. However, campaign finance

law does not require unions to tabulate

every dollar they spend on politics and how

it was spent. Reporting requirements are

even more lax for corporations, so the only

way to calculate unions’ share of political

spending is by comparing donations to

candidates and political parties. We cannot

report or compare spending on behalf of

candidates (on advertising, for example, or

electioneering communications), spending

on member communications (meaning

unions advertise to their own members,

encouraging them to vote), and support

not quantifiable by a dollar amount (such

as providing volunteers to walk precincts

or make telephone calls). For the same

reasons, we must also omit union spending

on lobbying and general advocacy.* Further,

while we were able to link union-connected

political action committees (PACs) with

their associated union, we could not do so

for single-issue/ideologically-oriented PACs

that were only union-supported; these non-

connected PACs donate to candidates (or

again, spend on their behalf) but we cannot

tabulate those dollars.†

Second, when we compared union

contributions with total donations to

candidates and parties, the “total”

amount included both inside and outside

money. “Inside money” for candidates are

those funds provided by the candidate

himself, donations from individuals to the

candidate’s political action committee

(PAC), and contributions from political

parties. “Outside money” refers to

donations from external PACs, lobbyists,

interest groups, and (depending on

state election laws) labor unions and

corporations. Between 2003 and 2010,

inclusive, candidates for state office

raised over $8 billion, with about 36

percent originating from “outside

money” (from state to state, outside

money ranged anywhere from 5 to 60

percent of candidates’ total finances).‡

Likewise, political parties are funded by

“inside money”—in this case, donations

to parties’ PACs from individuals—and

“outside money” (see above). Between

2003 and 2010, parties raised $1.6 billion,

nearly equally divided between inside and

outside sources. Because inside money

is such a large share of campaign funds,

when we divide union contributions to

candidates/parties by total dollars amassed

by candidates/parties, the union’s share

(and that of any outside donor) will seem

disproportionately small. For further details,

see Appendix A.


teacher unions in this area.

The seven unions that rank strongest in

this area vary greatly. Alabama is the only

one with teacher unions that donate large

proportions to both political candidates

and parties: they supplied 2.8 percent of all

contributions to candidates (4th) and 9.7

percent of all contributions to parties (1st).

* A recent Wall Street Journal report found that donations and lobbying activities account for a small share of union political spending compared with union expenditures on member mobilization and advocacy. Even the AFT agreed, arguing that since its mission is organizing and activism, it will naturally spend significant amounts on these activities. Thus, the percentages we report here are extremely conservative representations of what unions actually spend on politics. For more information, see Appendix A, Area 2; Tom McGinty and Brody Mullins, “Political Spending by Unions Far Exceeds Direct Donations,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2012; and Jeff Hauser, “Wall Street Journal Compares Union Political Spending to Corporate Donations,” AFL-CIO, July 10 2012.

† Contributions are self-reported by donors. Most union-affiliated PACs (meaning the PAC is simply the political arm of the union) report that affiliation on their donor forms, and we include donations from these PACs with those of their related union. But unions are free to support any PAC they choose, and campaign finance law and the record-keeping that aligns with it do not permit us to track the way that those donations eventually make their way to candidates.

‡ Data provided to authors by staff at the National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2011.



(Compare this to Maine’s teacher unions,

which contributed just 0.02 percent of total

contributions to state-office candidates,

and Alaska’s, which contributed no money

at all to state political parties—both ranked

in last place in those respective categories.)

Most teacher unions targeted either

political candidates or parties. For example,

Hawaii’s unions gave the 9th-largest

percentage to candidates (1.5 percent) but

the 26th-largest percentage to parties (1

percent); conversely, Michigan’s teacher

unions gave 0.9 percent to candidates

(18th) but 4.2 percent to parties (3rd).

The strongest state teacher unions all

gave significant amounts to candidates

vis-a-vis the highest-giving outside

sources (grouped by economic sector) in

their states, although their percentages

varied. Teacher union contributions in

Hawaii equaled 15.4 percent of the total

contributed by the ten highest-giving

sectors (7th), highest among the top states

in Area 2. (Compare this to teacher union

contributions in Colorado, which equaled

25.8 percent (1st); and to those in Maine,

which only equaled 0.03 percent, the

smallest.) It bears repeating, however, that

strong unions sometimes have the luxury of

not spending money on politics.

The strongest unions in this area also

sent lots of delegates to the national

conventions. In Rhode Island, a full 33.3

percent of delegates were members of

teacher unions (compare this to Kentucky,

in which no delegates identified as teacher

union members). Among the seven strong

teacher unions in Area 2, only West Virginia

fell below the top ten for this particular

measure. (It ranked 19th with 15.2 percent

of its delegates identifying as teacher union

members.)

Teacher unions ranking weakest in this

category were not necessarily uninvolved

in politics—sometimes they faced

competition. This was the case in Virginia,

where the union did give a substantial

amount of money, but total campaign

spending from all sources was high as well.

Other unions faced a similar situation—

expensive elections—and chose not to

give much (Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas).

Then, there were those that stayed out of

the game all together—unions in Vermont,

Maine, and Arizona did not give much,

TABLE 8. INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

Strongest Unions


Hawaii 1 1 Vermont 44 11

Alabama 1 20 Maine 44 22

South Dakota 1 34 Louisiana 44 42

Michigan 4 16 Missouri 47 38

Rhode Island 4 5 Arkansas 47 48

Idaho 4 36 Arizona 49 51

West Virginia 4 13 Virginia 50 47

Note: Due to ties in the ranking, more than five teacher unions are represented among both the top and bottom five teacher unions.



even though elections in their respective

states were not particularly expensive.

Regardless of the context, however,

donations from these unions amounted to

a very small share of both total money and

contributions from the sectors representing

the ten highest-giving outside sources;

nearly all of the weak teacher unions ranked

in the bottom quintile in both of these

categories.*

AREA 3: SCOPE OF BARGAINING

Here we examine bargaining status

(mandatory, permitted, or prohibited);

the scope of subjects that can (or must)

be addressed through bargaining; the

union’s legal right to collect agency fees

automatically and/or to collect member

dues via automatic payroll deductions;

and the legality of teacher strikes. Table 9

shows the strongest and weakest states in

this area.

The teacher unions that rank among

the strongest in this area all reside—

unsurprisingly—in states that require

collective bargaining, permit agency fees

to be collected automatically, and allow

teachers to strike. Where they differ is in

the range of items that can be negotiated

under local collective bargaining.

California’s unions enjoy the second-

broadest scope of bargaining in the nation.

Of the twenty-one items that we examined,

eleven must be bargained in the Golden

State: wages, hours, terms and conditions

of employment, grievance procedures,

transfers, layoffs, evaluations, fringe

benefits, leave, class load, and class size.

(Nevada had the broadest scope, requiring

fourteen.†) The remaining ten items may

also be bargained, at the discretion of

the districts. None of the provisions we

examined is explicitly excluded from

negotiations. Minnesota, with the next

broadest scope, mandates that seven

TABLE 9. SCOPE OF BARGAINING

Strongest Unions


California 1 6 Alabama 45 20

Minnesota 2 14 Arkansas 45 48

Illinois 3 8 Arizona 45 51

Oregon 4 2 North Carolina 48 40

Alaska 4 15 Georgia 48 45

Texas 48 44

Virginia 48 47

Note: Due to a tie in the ranking, more than five states are represented among the bottom five teacher unions shown above.

*A few did, however, contribute above-average proportions to political parties: Teacher unions in Maine, Louisiana, and Arizona gave 1.14 percent (23rd-largest), 1.09 percent (24th-largest), and 0.95 percent (25th-largest) of all party contributions, respectively. These teacher unions also varied in their representation at national party conventions, from those in Missouri, which comprised 12.1 percent of delegates (31st-largest), to Vermont, which only comprised 5.0 percent (47th-largest).

† While Nevada allows its teacher unions the broadest scope of bargaining in the nation, it does not rank among the top five states in this category because it prohibits its unions from automatically collecting agency fees, and also prohibits teacher strikes.



items be negotiated through collective

bargaining, explicitly permits two, and does

not address the remaining twelve (implicitly

allowing their inclusion in the scope of

bargaining as well).

The four weakest unions in this area—North

Carolina, Georgia, Texas, and Virginia—all

prohibit collective bargaining, agency fees,

and teacher strikes. Alabama, Arkansas, and

Arizona—tied for second-to-last place—

do not address collective bargaining in

education in state law. Districts, then, may

decide whether to negotiate with employee

organizations, and what may be bargained.

These three states do, however, prohibit

agency fees.*

AREA 4: STATE POLICIES

This area gauges the extent of alignment

between state-level education policies and

traditional union interests. The indicators

address policy issues largely considered to

be important to unions, including teacher

employment policies (performance pay,

retirement benefits, evaluations, tenure, and

dismissal), class size, and charter school

policies (limits on the number and variety

of charters, the range of authorizers, and

collective bargaining exemptions from state

laws, district policies, and local collective

bargaining agreements).† Where state

policies align with traditional teacher

union interests, we rank those unions as

strong; where policies are not aligned, they

are rated weaker. (See Appendix A for

rationale.)



The strongest teacher unions in Area 4

reside in states with teacher policies that

align well with traditional union interests.

Teacher employment policies in West

Virginia, North Dakota, and Vermont are

very much in line with union priorities.

In all three, the state does not support

performance pay; does not require that

TABLE 10. STATE POLICIES

Strongest Unions


West Virginia 1 13 Minnesota 46 14

North Dakota 2 24 Florida 46 50

Vermont 2 21 Colorado 48 35

Virginia 4 47 District of Columbia 49 33

New Jersey 5 7 Arizona 49 51

Michigan 51 16

Note: Due to a tie in the ranking, more than five states are represented among the bottom five teacher unions shown above.

* The degree to which bargaining occurs in bargaining-permitted states varies greatly. As of 2008, no Alabama districts were covered by a collective bargaining agreement, while 43.5 percent had meet-and-confer agreements (and 56.5 percent had no agreement at all). In Arkansas, 1.5 percent of districts had a CBA, 9.7 percent a meet-and-confer agreement, and 88.7 percent no agreement. And in Arizona, 0.4 percent had a CBA, 14.4 percent a meet-and-confer agreement, and 85.2 percent no agreement. Compare these with other bargaining-permitted states such as Ohio, where 75.5 percent of districts have CBAs. See National Center for Education Statistics, Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), 2007-08.

† States without charter school laws are coded as “N/A” for those data points and thus have fewer indicators in this area. See Appendix A.



student achievement data factor into

teacher evaluations; and does not require

tenure or layoff decisions to weigh teacher

effectiveness. North Dakota grants tenure

after only two years, West Virginia and

Vermont after three (the national norm).

In all three states, there is no mandate that

ineffective teachers be immediately eligible

for dismissal. In North Dakota and Vermont,

the state articulates no consequences for

unsatisfactory evaluations, and in West

Virginia such teachers must be put on

an improvement plan first. All three also

have K–3 class size restrictions (whereas

twenty-four states do not), and none of

the three has a charter school law. West

Virginia has the further distinction of having

employers that contribute more, relative

to teachers, to employee pensions than

every other state save Louisiana. In 2011,

West Virginia employers were responsible

for contributing to teacher pensions at

a rate of 29.2 percent of salary (35.4

percent including social security), while

the employee only contributed at a rate of

6.0 percent (12.2 percent including social

security).

Virginia and New Jersey do have charter

laws, but they drastically limit the

expansion and autonomy of the charter

sector. In New Jersey, only the state

commissioner of education can authorize

charters, while local districts cannot. And

in Virginia, both the local district and the

state board of education must approve

charter applications—the fact that the

Old Dominion is home to just four charter

schools is evidence of this constraint.

Both states limit charter autonomy as

well: charters fall under all state laws and

district regulations, including those which

require full teacher certification, and cannot

apply for exemptions. Further, in Virginia,

all charters fall under their authorizing

district’s collective bargaining agreement,

and in New Jersey only charter start-

ups are exempt (conversion schools are

not). Both states also have union-favored

teacher employment laws nearly identical

to those in West Virginia, North Dakota, and

Vermont.

Weak teacher unions in Area 4 are found

in states where employment law does not

offer blanket job security for teachers

(that is, without consideration of their

performance), and in states where charter

law promotes the expansion and autonomy

of the sector. In Florida and Michigan,

the state requires that performance be

factored into teacher pay; that student

achievement be the preponderant criterion

in evaluations; and that districts consider

teacher performance when making layoff

decisions. In Arizona, employees are

required to contribute to their pension

plans at a higher rate than employers

(through 2011, just four other states did

likewise). Further, Idaho and Minnesota

both dismiss relatively high proportions

of teachers due to poor performance

relative to other states—3.5 and 3.7

percent annually, respectively. Finally,

four of these five states have no class size

restrictions (Florida does), four permit

the widest variety of charter-school types

(all but Michigan), and all five exempt

charter schools from collective bargaining

agreements.

AREA 5: PERCEIVED INFLUENCE

To capture the “invisible” side of

teacher union strength, we surveyed key

stakeholders in each state. We had them

rank a number of influential entities in their

state, teacher unions included, and asked

them the degree to which unions affected

policy (both education and financial),

influenced elections, and had allies in the



capital. We also asked whether existing

policies, policies recently proposed by the

governor, and policies recently enacted

by the legislature, aligned with their state

union’s priorities.



It is not surprising that California and New

Jersey top the list; both states’ teacher

unions are famous for the extent of their

political and policy influence. Four of the

five strongest state unions (not Maryland)

are also in the top ten strongest overall.

According to stakeholders, in all five of

these states teacher unions are either the

most or second-most influential entities

on education policies (more so than

other key players such as superintendent

associations, school boards, and

governors). Unions in all five states fought

hard to prevent cuts in pay and benefits

during the recent period of budgetary

constraint. And respondents in all five

states agreed that the unions generally

succeeded in preventing or minimizing

cuts. In most of these states, the union

benefitted from allies inside government:

Respondents in every state but New

Jersey indicated that the priorities of state

education leaders tend to align with the

positions held by teacher unions. And for

every state but Montana, respondents

noted that, more often than not, their

unions need not compromise to ensure

that their preferred policies are enacted at

the state level. Finally, respondents in all

five states agreed that Democrats often

need teacher union support to get elected;

in Maryland and Montana, Republicans

sometimes do, too.

One thing the top-five states have in

common is that Democrats tend to be in

charge. In California, Maryland, and Oregon,

that party has a majority in the legislature

and also controls the governorship.

Montana has a Republican legislature

and a Democrat governor, and in New

Jersey it is the reverse. But this does not

guarantee that the top-five unions in Area

5 have a strong command over recent

education policies—which may reflect

a wave of challenges to teacher union

authority initiated by Race to the Top

competitions and No Child Left Behind

waiver applications. Stakeholders noted

that existing policies in all five states

largely aligned with union priorities. But

stakeholders also said that the policies

proposed by governors during the latest

legislative session were less aligned with

union priorities than the existing ones. New

Jersey stood out among the five; there,

stakeholders reported that education

policies proposed by Governor Christie

were not at all in line with the priorities

TABLE 11. PERCEIVED INFLUENCE

Strongest Unions


California 1 6 South Carolina 47 49

New Jersey 2 7 Arizona 48 51

Oregon 3 2 South Dakota 49 34

Maryland 4 23 Florida 50 50

Montana 5 3 Mississippi 51 46



held by teacher unions, although existing

policies often were. Yet respondents went

on to indicate that the outcome or fate

of those proposals after legislative action

were mostly in line with union priorities in

that state.

For those teacher unions with the weakest

perceived influence, respondents uniformly

rank the unions as the fourth- or fifth-

most influential entity in the state when it

came to education policy. In these states,

neither proposals nor outcomes of the

recent legislative session were in line with

union priorities, nor were existing policies.

In some states, however, this was not from

lack of trying. South Dakota tied for first on

its involvement in politics (Area 2), Arizona

unions have been fighting tooth and nail

against a spate of anti-union legislation

(see Arizona’s state profile, page 72), and

stakeholders in Florida, Mississippi, and

South Dakota noted that their unions have

struggled forcefully to prevent cuts in

teacher pay and benefits. Respondents in

Florida and Arizona agreed that Democrats

in their states need union support to get

elected, but those states, as well as the

other three, have Republican governors and

legislative majorities.


Part IV: Conclusions and Takeaways

PART IV: CONCLUSIONS AND TAKEAWAYS

We conducted this analysis during a period

of change, even turmoil, in education

policies and politics. The Race to the Top

(RTTT) competition, the advent of NCLB

waivers, state elections (in 2010 and 2011)

that ushered in Republican candidates

eager to overhaul particular policies, anti-

union sentiment—all of these drove reform

in many of the states, even in jurisdictions

(such as California and Michigan) where

unions have traditionally enjoyed safe

shelter. The arrival on the scene of pro-

reform Democrats (most visibly in the

form of Democrats for Education Reform

and its many state-level affiliates, as well

as Secretary of Education Arne Duncan’s

spirited leadership of federal policy in

this realm) has half-erased the old truism

that Democrats can be counted upon to

do the unions’ bidding. In response to

these and other changes in the political

landscape, the unions are compromising,

trading, sometimes conceding on things

that they wouldn’t have before. For them,

these are uncertain and unpredictable

times, particularly in the face of epochal

reforms such as the universalizing of

school choice, the demand for results-

based accountability, and the widening

use of student achievement in teacher

evaluations. In many cases, the unions

cannot stop such developments, so instead

they are mobilizing to shape (some might

say weaken) them. We found this kind of

behavior in many places, including New

Jersey, Arkansas, Minnesota, Nevada, and

Kentucky.

Labor policy itself has also undergone

massive change in the past few years.

Wisconsin is the most visible case in point

here, but other states have had similar

battles. In Ohio, for example, voters

repealed S.B. 5 in November 2011 after

vigorous union campaigning against the

bill. It would have prohibited public-sector

strikes, eliminated binding arbitration for

employee-management disputes, and

narrowed the scope of bargaining. Across

the state line in Indiana, Governor Mitch

Daniels signed a 2011 bill that restricted the

scope of bargaining to wages and benefits.

A year later, the Hoosier State became

the first right-to-work state in the rust

belt (thus prohibiting unions there from

collecting agency fees from non-members).

The fiscal crunch of the past four years

has also imperiled some long-standing

assumptions and earlier teacher-union

victories. Despite the cushion of federal

“stimulus” money, states and districts

have raised class sizes, closed schools, cut

programs, laid off teachers, frozen salaries,

reduced health benefits (or required

teachers pay more for them), and propped

up shaky pension systems by a combination

of diminished benefits and increased

employee contributions.

Recognizing the fluidity of the present

situation and acknowledging that our data

are a snapshot in time—in some cases an

earlier time—we nevertheless leave this

analysis with four over-riding impressions.

We make no causal claims, nor are any of



these assertions free from exceptions, but

it would be irresponsible not to share with

readers the picture that these data have

drawn in our minds.

1. Mandatory bargaining appears to tilt the

playing field in favor of stronger unions.

Where bargaining is optional or prohibited,

unions tend to rank “weaker” on our overall

metric.*

Consider Table 12. Seventeen of the top

twenty strongest unions are in mandatory

bargaining states. Nine of the weakest ten

are in states where bargaining is prohibited

altogether or permitted but not required.

But what about the four states that don’t

follow this pattern? Why are unions in Ohio,

West Virginia, and Alabama strong (even

though bargaining is not mandatory), and

in Florida weak (even though bargaining is

mandatory in the Sunshine State)? On to

our next point…

2. Resources make a difference. It’s no

surprise, but it needs to be underscored.

Funding (from member dues and agency

fees) and membership matter. Revenue

is important to unions, as it is to other

* While this seems tautological given that the calculation of overall rank includes bargaining status, recall that the metric also includes thirty-six other sub-indicators, not all of which are related, even indirectly, to whether local districts must, may, or cannot negotiate binding contracts with teacher associations.

TABLE 12. TEACHER UNION STRENGTH BY RANK, TIER, BARGAINING STATUS, AND AGENCY FEES

Tier 1Strongest

Tier 2Strong

Tier 3Average

Tier 4Weak

Tier 5Weakest






33 Oklahoma 43









Indiana 31


MANDATORY BARGAINING PERMITTED BARGAINING PROHIBITED BARGAINING AGENCY FEES PROHIBITED



organizations—regardless of whether they

use it to donate to political campaigns,

lobby policymakers, finance public relations

and advertising campaigns, mobilize

members to write letters and rally, or

train their local affiliates to bargain and

organize. (Indeed, the more money they

have, the less they are forced to choose

among such power-enhancing activities.)

Likewise, membership is important, not

only as a source of revenue but also

because members themselves are key to

boots-on-the-ground efforts. And agency

fees allow unions to collect dollars from

non-members, enabling them to continue

their work (and gain visibility and policy

victories, which in turn encourage more

teachers to join). This iterative relationship

between fees, membership, and revenues

virtually guarantees the organizational

health of unions in many states.

The ability to collect agency fees is

especially crucial for unions in states with a

low percentage of dues-paying members.

Permitted bargaining status can reduce

the unionization rate because districts

are not required to recognize employee

organizations as unions (77 percent of all

districts in mandatory bargaining states

have unions, compared to 17 percent in

permitted bargaining states). Bargaining

status alone is not the only contributing

factor to low unionization—recall that

permitted bargaining states are mostly

located in parts of the nation where

organized labor is not particularly popular.

In all states, regardless of bargaining status,

teachers can choose not to organize, or

opt to operate as an employee association

rather than a union.* Further, in all states,

individual teachers can opt out of union

membership (and thus union dues).

When states allow unions to collect agency

fees from non-members, it lessens the

effects of decreased membership (and

member dues) owing to bargaining status

or other factors. Unions in mandatory

bargaining states collect an average of

$581 annually per teacher in the state; in

permitted bargaining states, $296. The

nearly $300 difference isn’t surprising—

mandatory bargaining states have more

unionized teachers (83 compared to 61

percent). But the average union revenue

in mandatory bargaining states that allow

agency fees is a whopping $650, compared

to $405 in mandatory states that do not.16

The fiscal advantage gained by unions

in mandatory bargaining states is nearly

completely lost if they cannot collect

agency fees—especially if mandatory

bargaining does not translate into higher

unionization.†

Now back to the four states that rank

differently than their bargaining status

seems to indicate that they should.

Ohio, West Virginia, and Alabama do not

mandate collective bargaining but do allow

agency fees. Not all Tier 5 states prohibit

bargaining (Florida requires it, and five

others permit it), but they all forbid agency

fees. And 18 of the 20 weakest states

restrict union revenue in some way, either

by prohibiting agency fees (sixteen of

them) or barring unions from automatically

collecting dues from members’ paychecks

(Colorado and New Mexico). That’s

* For example, New York and Michigan are both mandatory bargaining states, with about 700 districts each. In New York, approximately 80 percent of districts have unions, while in Michigan only 65 percent do. Compare this to Ohio, where bargaining is only permitted, yet 75 percent of 600 districts have unions, while only one percent of nearby Missouri’s 525 districts are unionized despite the fact that it permits bargaining as well.

† Florida is a prime example: Although bargaining is mandatory, only 56 percent of Florida teachers actually belong to unions, and because the state forbids agency fees the state association collects only $182 in annual revenue per teacher. Compare this to Kentucky, where bargaining is permitted. The unionization rate is nearly comparable to Florida, at 58 percent. Yet the state permits agency fees, and the state association there sees annual revenue of $521 per teacher.



more decisive than mandatory collective

bargaining, which we found in thirty-two

states—but six of these end up in the

bottom two tiers (Kansas, Washington, D.C.,

South Dakota, New Mexico, Tennessee, and

Florida). The message for union opponents

is fairly clear: If you want to weaken unions

politically, focus on prohibiting agency fees

and/or mandatory payroll deductions (via

“paycheck protection” measures), not just

on ending the right to bargain collectively.

3. The scope of bargaining matters a lot,

too, as does the right (or not) to strike.

Consider this observation by Michelle

Rhee, former chancellor of the District of

Columbia school system, who now heads

the StudentsFirst reform-advocacy group:17

Collective bargaining for wages and

benefits is not the reason American schools

fail. Even in…states that do not have

collective bargaining, we still see many

of the problems that hurt our schools:

bureaucratic inertia, red tape limits on

parent choice, seniority-based layoffs,

and fiscal irresponsibility. Overseas, many

countries see teachers unions drive high

standards and expectations for all teachers.

The problem is not collective bargaining.

The problems arise when unions use

collective bargaining to push for policies

that devalue great teachers, such as

insisting that all teachers should be treated

as interchangeable in terms of performance

and pay.

Unions should have every right to continue

representing their members, speaking up

for teachers as they negotiate salaries,

professional development and benefits. But

they should not actually be co-managing

school systems, and many decisions do

not belong on the bargaining table. For

example, it would present a huge conflict

of interest for unions to be negotiating

performance evaluations when unions

have to represent effective and ineffective

teachers alike. Districts should be able

to create evaluations, reward teachers’

success, empower parents with more

choices, and run the school system while

held to high standards for accountability

and success.

The problem, of course, is that in many

states the scope of local bargaining is

nearly boundless, often including relentless

protection of the jobs of ineffective

teachers. This is a matter within the

purview of state policy, however. In fact,

Lorraine McDonnell and Anthony Pascal

concluded that the scope of provisions of

a state law were “significant predictors” of

what contracts included.18

When permissive bargaining rules combine

with ill-defined state policies, local unions

have a lot of wiggle room to negotiate

contracts that serve their goals more

than those of their pupils. Moreover,

some state laws protect union interests

outright, making bargaining unnecessary.

For example, when laying off teachers,

only Idaho and Utah prohibit districts from

considering seniority, and just eight states

allow districts to impose their own layoff

rules without negotiations. Contrast this to

the sixteen states where the law protects

teacher interests (seniority is the sole

criteria for layoffs in five states and must

be considered as one of several factors

in eleven) and the remaining twenty-

five, where the state sets no rules at all

and layoffs are within the scope of local

collective bargaining.

The recent Chicago teacher strike illustrates

the impact of strong local collective

bargaining policies that intersect with

permissive state laws. Illinois law requires



that student growth be a “significant

factor” in teacher evaluations, but does

not specify further.* Districts are free to

develop their own evaluation systems, or

can opt-in to a system designed by the

state (in which student achievement counts

for half of a teacher’s overall evaluation).

State law also implicitly allows bargaining

over evaluations, meaning that each district

can decide whether it will negotiate over

the issue, and Chicago Public Schools

(CPS) agreed to do so. (Insiders assert

that the Chicago Teachers Union, or CTU,

refused to negotiate with the district over

health care and other benefits unless CPS

agreed to negotiate over evaluations.)†

During those negotiations, the CTU insisted

that no more than 30 percent of a teacher’s

evaluation be based on student scores,

while CPS wanted 45 percent. When labor

and management could not come to an

agreement on evaluations, the teachers

went on strike, which is legal under Illinois

law. (Ostensibly, the walkout was over

salaries, since technically teachers cannot

strike over evaluations.) Facing intense

pressure to resolve the dispute, CPS leaders

agreed on 30 percent. But had the state

defined and mandated evaluation criteria

(rather than suggested it), not included

evaluations within the scope of bargaining,

and/or not given teachers the right to

strike, CPS would likely have been able

to impose its own standards. (Of course,

whether 0 percent, 10 percent, 30 percent,

or some other percentage is the “right”

proportion allocated to student results

has been, and continues to be, open to

vigorous debate.)

Contrast the Illinois situation with the

present state of play in Wisconsin, where

Act 10 limited collective bargaining to wage

increases only. Existing legislation also

banned teacher strikes in the Badger State

and barred teacher evaluations from the

scope of bargaining. That meant Wisconsin

districts had the power unilaterally to

impose higher health premium shares on

employees, to shift pension contributions

to workers, and to cut other personnel

costs. In fact, raising eligibility for retiree

health benefits and redesigning health

plans—changes made possible by Governor

Walker’s reforms—was estimated to save

Milwaukee Public Schools $117 million in

2012 alone.19 (Subsequently, a Wisconsin

judge struck down the limitations on

bargaining; Walker has vowed to appeal.)

4. The fact that a state has mandatory,

permissive or broad bargaining laws—or

its unions enjoy abundant resources—does

not mean that state policies are union-

favorable, and vice-versa. Many of the

states in our top two tiers are home to

state-level policies that are not particularly

favorable to teacher unions. Take California,

Illinois, and Minnesota (overall ranks: 6th,

8th, and 14th). They have the widest scopes

of bargaining in the country. Sundry areas

must be bargained, spanning salary and

benefits to teacher evaluations to working

conditions. Agency fees are allowed, and

teachers are permitted to strike. Nearly

all teachers are union members, and state

unions there see some of the highest

revenue in the nation. Yet, education

policies in those same three states are less

aligned with traditional union positions

than in many other states (37th, 39th, and

46th, respectively). All three have charter

*Incidentally, the Illinois Education Association played a central role in shaping the state law on evaluation.

† Further, once a topic has been negotiated in the past, that precedent stands for the future. So CTU’s approach was not unusual.



caps with room for growth or no cap at all.

All allow a variety of public charter schools

(new charter school startups, public school

conversions, and virtual schools) and

automatically exempt them from most state

laws and district regulations, including local

collective bargaining agreements. Two

(Minnesota and Illinois) require that teacher

evaluations be significantly informed by

student achievement or growth measures,

and two (Minnesota and California) support

performance pay. Minnesota also requires

that teacher performance be considered

before granting tenure. Clearly, these

are not the policies that unions tend to

advocate.

Conversely, states without strong collective

bargaining rights may nonetheless have

union-friendly policies. Take Mississippi

and North Carolina. The former does not

address collective bargaining in state law

and the latter prohibits it; both have low

membership and revenue. Yet policies

in both states are generally favorable to

teacher union interests. Mississippi has

some of the strictest due-process laws in

the nation, thanks to the state’s Education

Employment Procedures Law, so teacher

jobs rest secure. And North Carolina’s

teacher association has a strong ally in

Democratic governor Beverly Perdue (not

to mention that twenty-seven of the last

thirty governors in the Tar Heel state have

been Democrats). Negotiating rights and

resources, then, become less critical when

unions have other aprons to hide behind.

All of which goes to say, collective

bargaining is far from the whole story when

it comes to shaping education policy at the

state level and the role of unions therein.

Other factors—and players—obviously

matter, too, often greatly, beginning with

state leadership (past and present), federal

policy, the condition of the economy,

the influence of other key education

stakeholders, and the state’s own macro-

politics.

Why do some state unions (Pennsylvania,

Minnesota, and Michigan) have what look

like vital elements of power—bargaining is

mandatory, agency fees are allowed, and

union membership is high—yet fail to enjoy

policy environments aligned with their

interests (at least in this study’s current

snapshot)? How is it that state policies

are so union-friendly in states like West

Virginia and Kentucky, despite the fact that

bargaining is permitted or prohibited and/

or agency fees banned?

A closer look reveals an unsurprising

insight. What did most of the “should-be-

weak-but-aren’t” unions have in common?

Democratic governors and legislative

majorities. What did most of the “should-

be-strong-but-aren’t” unions share?

Republican state leadership. Indeed the

political climate can do much to constrain

the influence of resource-rich unions and

magnify the strength of those without

ample resources of their own.

The bottom line? Unions do not have carte

blanche at the statehouse even if they

do wield enormous influence over pay

and working conditions on the ground.

Historically, they were dominant voices in

state-level debates over education because

particular issues of enormous interest to

them and their members were not high

priorities for most other interest groups.20

On other issues, teacher unions could

easily find allies among other sectors of

organized labor, thus adding to their clout.

Moreover, elected state education board

members (and local board members, too)

typically gain office in low turnout elections

that can be swayed relatively easily by



organized groups with keen interest in

who wins them. With the recent explosion

of education reform advocacy groups,

however, teacher unions now have more

adversaries and rivals, and fewer automatic

allies, in statehouse politics and policy

decisions.21, 22

The venue is changing, too, as hard-

fought policies move from statehouse to

schoolhouse. One recent study actually

found that states with strong unions

appeared more likely to pass teacher

evaluation measures with union support,

because their unions were confident

they could shape the terms by which

such programs would actually function.23

Another focused on teacher performance

pay and found that unions have just as

much influence in the implementation

phase of reform as they did in the design of

the bill that eventually became law. In some

cases, unions shaped proposals for merit

pay so drastically that the resulting law was

impossible to implement, and in other cases

they undermined implementation such that

the laws were reduced to token reforms.24

For the future: This kind of research is

hard—but more of it needs to be done. We

found previous efforts to gauge teacher

union strength to be in the ballpark, but

imprecise. Most of the states we ranked on

the “stronger” side of the distribution will

come as no surprise to veteran observers of

the education-policy wars. Most are known

to be strongholds of union influence. Many

are in the old industrial Northeast, and

several others would be termed “deep blue”

by political analysts. Similarly, the “weak”

side of the distribution displays a lot of

predictable states. But there are surprises,

too.

For those who tackle this complicated

topic in the future, we suggest three

improvements.* First, include indicators

of a state’s political climate: What is the

party affiliation of the governor, legislators,

and education leaders (e.g., the state

superintendent, the members of state

board of education), and how many were

endorsed by the union? Second, mindful

of the complexity and inconsistency of

state election laws, it would be enormously

valuable to obtain a complete accounting

of the union’s share of all types of political

spending—not just donations, but also

advertising, member mobilization, lobbying,

and advocacy. Finally, a revised measure

would account for political brick walls—

provisions of state constitutions (although

in theory these can be amended); long-

standing labor-friendly policies that may

be regarded as sacred (although such

cattle may be slaughtered); and seemingly

permanent elements of a state’s political

culture (although these, too, may turn out

to be malleable). Surely there are other

methodological and data improvements to

be made. We trust that readers won’t be

shy in sharing them with us.

* Raw data are available upon request. Send email to [email protected].


Part V: State Profiles

PART V: STATE PROFILES

IntroductionPart IV: Taking a Closer Look–Teacher Union Influence Area


TIED FOR 24TH

With 85.6 percent of its teachers unionized,

the Yellowhammer State posts the

18th-highest unionization rate in the

country (and has a far higher than average

rate among states where bargaining is

similarly permitted but not mandatory).

The Alabama Education Association (AEA)

brings in $501 per teacher annually (24th

of 51 jurisdictions). The state devotes a

considerable portion of its own budget to

K–12 education—25.3 percent of total state

expenditures (8th). But the number of

total dollars from state, federal, and local

sources is only moderate: Alabama spends

$10,320 per pupil (34th). Of those funds,

52.9 percent are directed toward teacher

salaries and benefits (36th).

AREA 2: INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS2

TIED FOR 1ST

Alabama’s union plays a larger role in state

politics than do its counterparts in nearly

every other state, with contributions from

the AEA far outstripping those from any

other source (it ties with Hawaii and South

Dakota for first in this area). In the past ten

years, contributions from teacher unions

accounted for 2.8 percent of all donations

received by candidates for state office

(4th). Those donations also equaled 7.7

percent of the funds from the ten highest-

giving sectors in the state (18th). Further,

9.7 percent of contributions to Alabama

political parties came from teacher unions,

the highest proportion we found in any

state. These donations represent a key

part of the AEA’s political strategy (see

sidebar). Adding to the union heft was

ALABAMA OVERALL RANK: 20TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

STRONGER WEAKER

1. RESOURCES AND MEMBERSHIP

OVERALL

2. INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

3. SCOPE OF BARGAINING

4. STATE POLICIES

5. PERCEIVED INFLUENCE

Overall Rank: 20thTier 2 (Strong)

ALABAMA

20

1

18

24

25

45

its representation at the Democratic and

Republican national conventions, where

27.3 percent of all Alabama delegates

identified themselves as teacher union

members (2nd).3


TIED FOR 45TH

Alabama law does not address the

legality of collective bargaining in

education, implicitly permitting it (and

implicitly including all twenty-one

provisions examined in this metric within

the scope of bargaining). However, the

state does not permit teacher strikes, nor

can unions automatically collect agency

fees from non-member teachers. (This

limitation hinders the AEA less than similar

restrictions in other states. It has higher

per-teacher revenue than the unions in all

but two other states that prohibit agency

fees—see Area 1.)


TIED FOR 18TH

Many Alabama policies align with

traditional teacher union interests.

The state does not require that student

achievement data factor into teacher

evaluations or tenure decisions, and it

does not articulate specific consequences

for those who receive unsatisfactory

evaluations. Further, the criteria for layoffs

are left to the discretion of districts,

which are not required to consider

teacher performance. On the other hand,

Alabama dismisses teachers due to poor

performance at a higher rate than all but a

handful of states, and it does not mandate

class-size restrictions for grades K–3.

Alabama has no charter school law.4


25TH

Stakeholders report that Alabama’s state

teacher union is powerful, but it faces

competition in education policy debates.

They rate the union as about equal, in terms

of influence, to education advocacy groups,

the state school board, and the association

of school administrators. Stakeholders

note that the teacher union is effective

in protecting dollars for education and

warding off education reform proposals

with which it disagrees. But they also

report that policies proposed by the

governor in the latest legislative session

were only somewhat in line with teacher

union priorities and that the outcomes of

the latest session were mostly not in line

with those priorities (consistent with the

state electing a Republican supermajority

in 2010—see sidebar).5 Respondents report

that the priorities of state education leaders

rarely aligned with teacher union positions

in the last three years.

OVERALL

20TH

Alabama’s state teacher union is highly

involved in state politics, contributing large

sums to political campaigns (although that

may change if its revenue declines because

it cannot automatically collect dues—see

sidebar). It is ranked stronger than its

counterparts in eleven other states where

bargaining is permitted but not required;

among similar states, only Ohio (12th) and

West Virginia (14th) had higher overall

scores.


ALABAMA

For over fifty years, the Alabama Education Association (AEA) and Paul Hubbert, its long-time executive director, have been staunch and respected defenders of civil rights. Hubbert, along with second-in-command Joe Reed, spearheaded the unification of the white and African American state teacher unions, fought to protect education funding against cuts from segregationist Governor George Wallace, and secured a living wage for school employees. In the process, he created one of the best-organized and funded state unions in the nation.6

During the 2010 gubernatorial election, however, Hubbert and the AEA might have taken the state motto Audemus Jura Nostra Defendere (“We Dare Defend Our Rights”) a bit too far. The Republican primary run-off that year pitted Bradley Byrne against Robert Bentley. Byrne was a former senator, former Alabama State Board of Education member, and former Democrat.7 Bentley was a relatively unassuming two-term legislator who defeated the third-place candidate by only 200 votes to force the run-off.8 The AEA usually stayed out of Republican politics—Hubbert was vice chairman of the Alabama Democratic Party, Reed its chair for minority affairs. But not this time.

Over his long career, Byrne had clashed with the union over mandatory background checks for teachers and tenure reform, among other things. He was also blunt about his opinion of the AEA: “I don’t think AEA stands for the best of their profession. AEA stands for the worst of it,” he once said at a news conference. “…Over my time as a board member I learned more and more about their control not just over education issues, but over business taxation issues, economic development issues and even blocking certain types of ethics reform.”9 But during the primary campaign, Byrne went further than public criticism—he spent $8 million on an advertising campaign against the AEA. Hubbert pounced. “If Bradley Byrne had left us alone, we would have been only slightly involved in the governor’s race,” he said, “…[but instead] he threatened to burn our house down.”10 Thus, the AEA spent $3 million on advertising against Byrne and gave hundreds of thousands of dollars more to PACs which supported Bentley.11 But voters reacted against Byrne’s attacks on the respected union by resoundingly electing Bentley, who went on to defeat Democrat Ron Sparks—who also received contributions from the AEA—in the general election. In total, the union spent $8.6 million on the 2010 campaign.12

Outgoing GOP Governor Bob Riley, a Byrne supporter, was livid, and made sure to get in a parting shot. In an unusual December 2010 session, he enlisted the newly-elected Republican legislature and passed a bill barring any public-employee union from automatically collecting dues from its members via payroll deductions—teacher unions included.13 Riley and his supporters said this measure would curtail undue lobbying influence.14 The AEA described the statute, and the $2.4 million a year that it stood to lose, as a “mortal threat to our schools, our profession, and our association.”15 Not surprisingly, it sued the state, where federal courts are now deciding the matter.16 That law, however, was only the first of several passed by Republicans, who are clearly enjoying their first majority in decades. Despite the efforts of the AEA, teachers saw their pay cut and their generous deferred-retirement plan killed.17

When Hubbert and Reed both retired in 2011, the AEA’s future seemed even more uncertain. “We were staring down the barrel of a loaded cannon,” said Gregory Graves, the AEA’s new second-in-command.18 But financially savvy Executive Director Henry Mabry surprised everyone in 2012. He and the AEA vigorously opposed a bill to legalize charter schools, which the Senate subsequently voted down. This was the third such failed attempt since 1999, and Governor Bentley indicated he would not push for round four.19,20 And with AEA support, lawmakers preserved teacher jobs (even though state revenue decreased), saved teacher tenure (against pressure to eliminate it), and blocked the use of student achievement data in layoff decisions (despite a host of similar bills in neighboring states).21,22,23 Given these recent successes, and with Mabry at the helm and Bentley in the governor’s office, it looks like 2011 was only a bump in the road for the AEA.

ALIVE AND KICKING


ALABAMA

OVERALL RANK: 20TH

Area and Ranka General Indicator Sub-IndicatorSub-Indicator Rank/Statusb


Membership By rank, what percentage of public-school teachers in the state are union members? 18th

Revenue By rank, what is the total yearly revenue (per teacher in the state) of the state-level NEA and/ or AFT affiliate(s)?

24th

Spending on education By rank, what percentage of state expenditures (of state general funds, state restricted funds, state bonds, and federal “pass-through” funds) is directed to K-12 education?

8th

By rank, what is the total annual per-pupil expenditure (of funds from federal, state, and local sources) in the state?

34th

By rank, what percentage of total annual per-pupil expenditures is directed to teacher salaries and benefits?

36th


Contributions to candidates and political parties

By rank, what percentage of the total contributions to state candidates was donated by teacher unions?

4th

By rank, what percentage of the total contributions to state-level political parties was donated by teacher unions?

1st

Industry influence By rank, what percent of the contributions to state candidates from the ten highest-giving sectors was donated by teacher unions?

18th

Status of delegates By rank, what percentage of the state’s delegates to the Democratic and Republican conventions were members of teacher unions?

2nd


Legal scope of bargaining What is the legal status of collective bargaining? Neither required nor prohibited

By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 38th*

Automatic revenue streams What is the unions’ legal right to automatically collect agency fees from non-members and/or collect member dues via automatic payroll deductions?

Agency fees prohibited

Right to strike What is the legal status of teacher strikes? Prohibited


Performance pay Does the state support performance pay for teachers? State does not support

Retirement By rank, what is the employer- versus employee-contribution rate to the teacher pension system? 33rd

Evaluations What is the maximum potential consequence for veteran teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluation(s)?

No consequences articulated

Is classroom effectiveness included in teacher evaluations? If so, how is it weighted? Not required

Terms of employment How long before a teacher earns tenure? Three years

Is student/teacher performance considered in tenure decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Not included

Is seniority considered in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Optional; Weighted at district discretion

Is teacher performance included in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Not required

By rank, what percentage of the teaching workforce was dismissed due to poor performance? 47th

Class size Is class size restricted for grades 1-3? If so, is the restriction higher or lower than the national average (20)?

No restriction

ALABAMA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

24

1*

45*

18*


ALABAMA

Area and Rank General Indicator Sub-IndicatorSub-Indicator Rank/Status


(cont.)

Charter school structural limitationsc

Is there a cap (limit) placed on the number of charter schools that can operate in the state (or other jurisdiction) and/or on the number of students who can attend charter schools?

N/A

Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools? N/A

How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? N/A

Charter school exemptionsc Are all charter schools automatically exempt from state laws and state/district regulations (except those that safeguard students and fiscal accountability)? If not, are they eligible for exemptions?

N/A

Are all charter schools automatically exempt from state teacher-certification requirements? If not, are they eligible for exemptions?

N/A

Are all charter schools automatically exempt from collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)? If not, are they eligible for exemptions?

N/A

AREA 5:PERCEIVED INFLUENCEd

Relative influence of teacher unions

How do you rank the influence of teacher unions on education policy compared with other influential entities?

Second- or third-most influential

Influence over campaigns On a scale from always to never, how often do Democratic candidates need teacher-union support to get elected?

Often/Always

On a scale from always to never, how often do Republican candidates need teacher-union support to get elected?

Sometimes

Influence over spending To what extent, from strongly agree to strongly disagree, do you agree that even in times of cutbacks, teacher unions are effective in protecting dollars for education?

Agree

Given recent budgetary constraints, would you say that teacher unions generally make concessions to prevent reductions in pay and benefits or fight hard to prevent those reductions?

Fight

Influence over policy To what extent, from strongly agree to strongly disagree, do you agree that teacher unions ward off proposals in your state with which they disagree?

Agree

On a scale from always to never, how often do existing state education policies reflect teacher-union priorities?

Sometimes/Often

To what extent, from totally in line to not at all in line, were state education policies proposed by the governor during your state’s latest legislative session in line with teacher-union priorities?

Somewhat in line

To what extent, from totally in line to not at all in line, were legislative outcomes of your state’s latest legislative session in line with teacher-union priorities?

Mostly not in line/Somewhat in line

Influence over key stakeholders

On a scale from always to never, how often have the priorities of state education leaders aligned with teacher-union positions in the past three years?

Rarely/Sometimes

Would you say that teacher unions typically compromise with policymakers to ensure that their preferred policies are enacted, or typically need not make concessions?

Compromise

* Tied with another state

a Area ranks are calculated using a weighted average of sub-indicators. For a more detailed description, see Appendix A.

b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Alabama has the 18th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Alabama, collective bargaining is neither required nor prohibited, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c Alabama does not have a charter school law.

d For all survey questions, stakeholders were asked specifically about teacher unions, candidates, policies, and leaders in their state. In addition, we asked about unions and policies in the “current legislative session,” but because legislative calendars vary from state to state, responses refer to policies proposed and enacted within the 2010-11 window.


ALABAMA

18*

25

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Alabama are shown in the table, Alabama Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Alabama is ranked 24th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.

2 Readers should note that these figures include only direct donations from unions and union-connected PACs, but not their spending on electioneering/advertising, mobilizing the union’s own membership, lobbying, or advocacy. A recent Wall Street Journal report found that donations and lobbying activities account for a small share of union political spending compared with their expenditures on member mobilization and advocacy. Even the AFT agreed, making the argument that since its mission is organizing and activism, it will naturally spend significant amounts on these activities. Thus, the percentages we report here are extremely conservative representations of what unions actually spend on politics. For more information, see Appendix A, Area 2; Tom McGinty and Brody Mullins, “Political Spending by Unions Far Exceeds Direct Donations,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2012; and Jeff Hauser, “Wall Street Journal Compares Union Political Spending to Corporate Donations,” AFL-CIO, July 10, 2012.

3 At the time of publication, the 2000 conventions were the most recent for which such detailed data were available in forms that met rigorous standards. However, 2008 data provided by the Democratic National Convention were highly correlated with the reliable figures from 2000.

4 We do not include data for sub-indicators pertaining to charters when calculating the ranking of states that do not have charter school laws. While some might argue that the lack of such a law is in itself evidence for union strength, we do not have sufficient data to link that absence to union activity. The nine states without charter laws are home to very different contexts—while teacher unions in some states may have played a significant role in keeping charter laws at bay, in others, they played little or no role. Still, in Alabama, the state union can take substantial credit for the absence of a charter law (see sidebar).

5 We asked stakeholders about unions and policies in the “current legislative session,” but because legislative calendars vary from state to state, responses refer to policies proposed and enacted within the 2010-11 window.

6 Dana Beyerle, “Alabama Education Association Leader Paul Hubbert Retires After 42 Years Of Service,” Tuscaloosa News, January 2, 2012, http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20120102/news/120109997?p=1&tc=pg.

7 Kim Chandler, “Campaign 2010: Bradley Byrne’s Clash With AEA Marks His Career,” Birmingham News, July 4, 2010, http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2010/07/campaign_2010_bradley_byrnes_c.html.

8 Charles J. Dean, “Robert Bentley Formally Kicks Off Campaign In Alabama GOP Governor’s Race,” Birmingham News, June 21, 2010, http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2010/06/bentley.html.

9 Chandler.

10 Bob Lowry, “AEA Executive Secretary Paul Hubbert: Bradley Byrne ‘Threatened To Burn Our House Down,’” Huntsville Times, July 14, 2010, http://blog.al.com/breaking/2010/07/hubbert_byrne_threatened_to_bu.html.

11 “Alabama Mystery Solved,” Factcheck.org, September 30, 2010, http://www.factcheck.org/2010/09/alabama-mystery-solved/.

12 Associated Press, “Bill To Curb AEA, ASEA Moves Forward,” Tuscaloosa News, December 20, 2010, http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20101210/NEWS/101209608.

13 Sean Cavanagh, “Alabama Lawmakers, Unions, Spar Over Payroll Deductions,” Education Week, December 15, 2010, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2010/12/alabama_lawmakers_unions_spar_over_payroll_deductions.html.

14 Campbell Robertson, “Ethics Plan Is Offered By Governor In Alabama,” New York Times, December 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/us/02alabama.html.

15 Cavanagh.

16 Challan Stephens, “Alabama Education Association Survives Appeal, Payroll Deductions To Continue,” Huntsville Times, April 5, 2011, http://blog.al.com/breaking/2011/04/alabama_education_association_5.html.

17 George Talbot, “Henry Mabry’s Success At Helm Of AEA Surprise Story Of Legislative Session,” Press-Register, May 16, 2012, http://blog.al.com/live/2012/05/george_talbot_1.html.

18 Ibid.

19 Charles J. Dean, “Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley Eases Off Charter School Push,” Birmingham News, June 28, 2012, http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2012/06/alabama_gov_robert_bentley_eas.html.

20 Larry Lee, “Alabama Voices: Charter School Loss A Victory For State,” Montgomery Advertiser, August 3, 2012, http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/article/20120805/OPINION/308050002/Alabama-Voices-Charter-school-loss-victory-state.

21 David White, “Alabama House Of Representatives Passes State Education Budget,” Birmingham News, April 29, 2009, http://www.al.com/news/birminghamnews/statebriefs.ssf?/base/news/1240993112264050.xml&coll=2.

22 “Legislative Success,” Alabama Education Association, accessed August 10, 2012, http://www.myaea.org/AEAPolitics.html.

23 Joy Resmovits, “Alabama House Passes Bill That Maintains Teacher Tenure But Dilutes Its Protections,” HuffingtonPost.com, May 26, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/26/alabama-house-passes-teacher-tenure-bill_n_867585.html.


ALABAMA

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



(TIED FOR 13TH)

Alaska’s two state teacher unions enjoy

high membership and revenue totals.

With 89.3 percent of the state’s teachers

belonging to unions, the unionization rate

in the Last Frontier is 17th-highest of 51

jurisdictions. More impressive, the NEA

and AFT state-level affiliates bring in a

whopping $1,371 per teacher annually—

the most of any state. External funding

for K-12 education is more complicated.

While Alaska spends $16,174 per pupil

annually (3rd), only 49.8 percent of these

expenditures go toward teacher salaries

and benefits (50th of 51).


TIED FOR 36TH

Despite high revenue, teacher unions

contribute proportionally less to Alaska

state politics than they do in most other

states. Between 2003 and 2010, donations

from unions accounted for just 0.45 percent

of the money received by candidates for

state office (31st). Alaska is also the only

state in which the unions gave no money to

state political parties. And only 12.9 percent

of Alaskan delegates to the Democratic

and Republican national conventions were

teacher union members (27th).3

ALASKA OVERALL RANK: 15TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

15

36

21

13

36

4

Overall Rank: 15th Tier 2 (Strong)

ALASKA


TIED FOR 4TH

Alaska has very permissive bargaining laws.

Not only is collective bargaining mandatory

in public education, but the state also lets

its unions automatically collect agency fees

from non-member teachers and allows its

school teachers to strike. Alaska education

leaders value bottom-up decision making

(see sidebar); rather than mandating

statewide terms of teacher employment,

Alaska’s bargaining laws require that eight

of the twenty-one items examined in this

metric be bargained between districts

and their teachers: wages, hours, terms

and conditions of employment, grievance

procedures, transfers, insurance benefits,

fringe benefits, and extra-curricular duties.

Ten provisions are not addressed by law,

which implicitly includes them in the scope

of bargaining as well. Only three items are

explicitly excluded from bargaining: class

load, class size, and length of the school

year.


TIED FOR 21ST

Many of Alaska’s education policies,

particularly those relating to teacher

employment, align with traditional union

interests. The state does not require that


teacher evaluations or tenure decisions,

and it does not require its districts to

consider teacher performance in layoff

decisions. Other policies, however, do not

reflect union priorities. Teachers are eligible

for dismissal after multiple unsatisfactory

evaluations and are dismissed due to poor

performance at a higher rate than in all but

one other state (South Dakota). Unions

also typically favor limiting charter school

expansion; and while Alaska does not place

a cap on the number of charters allowed

in the state, it does limit potential school

operators to a single authorizing option.

Alaska also holds charters to all state and

district laws, including those related to

teacher certification, and requires that they

participate in existing collective bargaining

agreements (though schools may apply for

exemptions).


36TH

Stakeholder rankings place the strength

of Alaska teacher unions toward the

bottom of the national list. They rate the

unions’ influence on education policy

below that of the state school board,

state association of school administrators,

and education advocacy organizations.

Further, they note that state education

leaders only sometimes align with teacher

union positions. Like unions in many other

states, Alaska teacher unions often turn to

compromise to see some of their preferred

policies enacted. Survey respondents

report that policies proposed and enacted

in the latest legislative session were only

somewhat in line with teacher union

priorities.4

OVERALL

15TH

Alaska’s teacher unions enjoy a wide scope

of bargaining and significant internal

resources. They maintain a low profile in

state elections and are not viewed as the

loudest voice in education policy; still, many

policies at the state level align with their

interests.


ALASKA

Two of the biggest battles between legislators and unions in the Lower 48—education reform and money—simply aren’t being waged to the same degree in Alaska. Traditionally a Republican state, the Alaskan State Department of Education decided to opt out of the Race to the Top competition in 2010. Education Commissioner Larry LeDoux explained, “Alaska has the right to be suspicious of an initiative where we hand over authority.”5 Alaska is also one of just five states that did not adopt the Common Core State Standards, preferring to let districts decide their own academic standards.6 And in 2012, Alaska received a waiver from No Child Left Behind, which for one year will freeze the increasing proficiency levels required by federal law. Education leaders argued that the law is too rigid; applying its urban-centric philosophies to Alaska is “just illogical” said Les Morse, the Deputy Education Commissioner.7 State leaders will use the breathing room to further exercise their autonomy: “At the same time we’re doing this freeze, we’re also putting together an application for a comprehensive waiver in which the state would implement its own accountability system,” said Eric Fry, spokesperson for the Alaska Department of Education, “so it wouldn’t make sense to run the schools and districts through another year of the old NCLB when we’re going to be changing things pretty soon.”8

With state leaders not pushing very hard for controversial reforms, the teacher unions have little to argue about. And with an abundance of natural resources, Alaska has witnessed fewer of the recession-tinged budgetary issues plaguing most of the country.9 (Still, NEA-Alaska president Barb Angaiak noted, “The slight increase of just over 1 percent [in education funding for the 2012 fiscal year] is not acceptable in light of increased operational costs.”)10 The state has witnessed significant conflict over just one issue: pensions. The mandatory shift in 2005 away from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution pension plan for all state workers (including teachers) provoked six years of union efforts to reverse the law.11 In April 2012, the union’s push to let teachers choose between the two options was nearly successful, as SB 121 passed in the Senate before dying in the House.12 NEA-Alaska may get another chance: a new appointee to the Alaska Retirement Management board announced in July 2012 that he supports a return to the defined-benefit system.13 With little else to fight about, however, for now it’s pretty quiet on the Last Frontier.

PEACE AND QUIET


ALASKA

OVERALL RANK: 15TH





1st


49th


3rd


50th




31st


50th


33rd


27th


Legal scope of bargaining What is the legal status of collective bargaining? Mandatory



Permitted

Right to strike What is the legal status of teacher strikes? Permitted



Retirement By rank, what is the employer- versus employee-contribution rate to the teacher pension system? 17th


Eligible for dismissal




Is seniority considered in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Required; Considered among other factors




No restriction

ALASKA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

13*

36*

4*

21*


ALASKA



(cont.)

Charter school structural limitations


No state cap

Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools? Yes

How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Single option, Some activity

Charter school exemptions Are all charter schools automatically exempt from state laws and state/district regulations (except those that safeguard students and fiscal accountability)? If not, are they eligible for exemptions?

Yes


No; Schools cannot apply for exemption


No; Schools can apply for exemptions

AREA 5:PERCEIVED INFLUENCEc



Fourth-most influential


Sometimes/Often


Sometimes


Neutral


Fight


Neutral


Sometimes/Often




Somewhat/Mostly in line



Sometimes/Often


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Alaska has the 17th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Alaska has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c For all survey questions, stakeholders were asked specifically about teacher unions, candidates, policies, and leaders in their state. In addition, we asked about unions and policies in the “current legislative session,” but because legislative calendars vary from state to state, responses refer to policies proposed and enacted within the 2010-11 window.


ALASKA

21*

36

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Alaska are shown in the table, Alaska Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Alaska is ranked 13th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.

2 Readers should note that these figures include direct donations only, not union and union-connected PAC spending on electioneering/advertising, mobilizing the union’s own membership, lobbying, or advocacy. A recent Wall Street Journal report found that donations and lobbying activities account for a small share of union political spending compared with their expenditures on member mobilization and advocacy. Even the AFT agreed, making the argument that since its mission is organizing and activism, it will naturally spend significant amounts on these activities. Thus, the percentages we report here are extremely conservative representations of what unions actually spend on politics. For more information, see Appendix A, Area 2; Tom McGinty and Brody Mullins, “Political Spending by Unions Far Exceeds Direct Donations,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2012; and Jeff Hauser, “Wall Street Journal Compares Union Political Spending to Corporate Donations,” AFL-CIO, July 10, 2012.



5 Jeremy Hsieh, “Alaska Opts Out Of Race To The Top School Grants,” Daily News Miner (Fairbanks, AK), May 4, 2010, http://www.newsminer.com/view/full_story/7295348/article-Alaska-opts-out-of-Race-to-the-Top-school-grants.

6 Lisa Demer, “Comeau Presses For Adoption Of National School Standards,” Anchorage Daily News, March 14, 2012, http://www.adn.com/2012/03/13/2369208/comeau-presses-for-new-school.html.

7 Rosemary Shinohara, “Feds Grant Waiver To Alaska On No Child Left Behind,” Anchorage Daily News, July 12, 2012, http://www.adn.com/2012/07/11/v-printer/2539128/feds-give-alaska-waiver-on-no.html.

8 Dave Donaldson, “State Gets First Federal Waiver For No Child Left Behind,” Alaska Public Radio Network, July 6, 2012, http://www.alaskapublic.org/2012/07/06/state-gets-first-federal-waiver-for-no-child-left-behind/.

9 Phil Oliff and Michael Leachman, “New School Year Brings Steep Cuts In State Funding For Schools,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 7, 2011, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3569.

10 Barb Angaiak, “Statement On Governor Parnell’s FY2012 Budget And State Of The State Speech,” NEA-Alaska, January 20, 2011, http://www.neaalaska.org/nea/node/392.

11 “Priority Legislation,” NEA-Alaska, accessed September 10, 2012, http://www.neaalaska.org/nea/node/19.

12 Pat Forgey, “Senate OK’s Traditional Retirement Plan For Public Employees,” Juneau Empire, April 15, 2012, http://juneauempire.com/state/2012-04-15/senate-oks-traditional-retirement-plan-public-employees#.T-nV2hdDzId.

13 Pat Forgey, “Retirement Board Gets New Appointments,” Juneau Empire, July 17, 2012, 2012, http://juneauempire.com/local/2012-07-17/retirement-board-gets-appointments.


ALASKA

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



TIED FOR 40TH

Arizona’s two state teacher unions contend

with low membership numbers and thin

resources. Just 44.5 percent of teachers

in the Grand Canyon State are unionized,

47th out of 51 states. (Its unionization

rate is even 15 percent lower than the

average among the fourteen states where

bargaining is similarly permitted but

not required.) The state’s NEA and AFT

affiliates bring in just $208 annually per

teacher in the state (40th). Education

resources are low as well: While the state

directs 21.5 percent of its own expenditures

to K-12 education (16th), Arizona spends a

total (from state, local, and federal sources)

of only $8,655 annually per pupil (48th).

Teachers do, however, receive a relatively

large slice of that small pie, with 55 percent

of those expenditures dedicated to their



49TH

Teacher unions have not been major donors

to Arizona politics in the past decade

(perhaps seeing the futility of giving to

campaigns in so red a state—see sidebar).

Of the contributions received by state

political candidates, just 0.16 percent came

from teacher unions; unions in only five

states contributed less. Union donations to

political parties were just as paltry (0.95

percent; 25th). Further, only 6.3 percent

of the delegates to the Democratic and

Republican national conventions from this

historically conservative state identified as


ARIZONA OVERALL RANK: 51ST1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

51

49

49

40

48

45

Overall Rank: 51stTier 5 (Weakest)

ARIZONA


TIED FOR 45TH

Arizona state law does not address

collective bargaining in education; districts

may decide whether to negotiate with

employee organizations (and are not

legally bound by the resulting agreements).

The scope of bargaining is likewise at

the discretion of districts. State law

does prohibit unions from automatically

collecting agency fees from non-members.

It also does not permit any public employee

strikes, teachers included.


TIED FOR 49TH

Arizona teacher-employment and charter

policies are less aligned with traditional

teacher union interests than in any

other state, save Michigan. Arizona law

requires that student achievement data

significantly inform teacher evaluations,

and it does not allow districts to consider

seniority in determining layoffs—positions

typically opposed by unions. While unions

favor limiting charter schools, Arizona

promotes their growth. The state does

not cap the overall number of charters

and allows for multiple authorizers

(although the vast majority are overseen

by the state, with local school boards

authorizing only a handful). Moreover,

charter schools are automatically exempt

from most state laws (including those

related to teacher certification) and district

regulations (including collective bargaining

agreements).


48TH

Stakeholders in Arizona view teacher

unions as weak. Survey respondents rank

their influence on education policy behind

that of the business roundtable/chamber of

commerce, education advocacy groups, the

state school board, and the charter school

association. They report that teacher unions

are not effective in protecting dollars for

education or in warding off education

proposals with which they disagree, and

that state education leaders are only

sometimes aligned with teacher-union

positions.

OVERALL

51ST

Arizona’s teacher unions are the weakest

in the nation. Even though bargaining is

permitted, they have low membership and

few financial resources. State law limits the

unions’ power to strike and gather revenue,

supports charter school expansion, and

does not offer teachers many of the job

securities seen in other states.


ARIZONA

For the Arizona Education Association (AEA), “strength in numbers” seems like an appropriate mantra. One example of joining forces: The AEA supported Republican Governor Jan Brewer’s Proposition 100—a temporary increase in sales tax to help finance education—and put its money where its mouth was by donating to the campaign and raising additional funds on the initiative’s behalf. The AEA acknowledged that it was “quite unusual” for it to support a Republican-led proposal, but its appetite for funding made for a temporary truce.4 With the short-term tax increase about to expire, the union aligned with numerous other groups—including education advocates, business alliances, and state Democrats—to support an initiative on the November 2012 ballot to make Proposition 100 permanent (and the courts have twice-thwarted opponents’ attempts to stop the initiative before the vote).5,6

The tax increase isn’t the only time other organizations, and the courts, gave the AEA a hand. The union couldn’t stop lawmakers from increasing employee pension contributions, but it supported a lawsuit filed by the Arizona State Retirement System citing the state breached its contract with retirees. Before the suit went to court, the legislature not only passed a bill returning to the old rate but also refunded the money back to the teachers, and the AEA celebrated.7 The union also won an injunction against a 2011 statute that would have stopped unions from deducting dues from members’ paychecks without annual authorization, if that money were to be used for political purposes. Adamant that this law inhibited free speech, AEA President Andrew Morrill declared “our voice for quality public schools will not be silenced.”8 But Brewer and fellow Republicans may do more than silence the union voice—they may well destroy it. If SB 1485, proposed in early 2012, passes, it will prohibit all public employees from unionizing with a law even more devastating than the one recently passed in Wisconsin (which only limited the scope of bargaining).9 The bill is currently tabled until the Senate reopens in 2013. Until then, all the unions in Arizona can do is wait and hope that they won’t have to go it alone.

ON PINS AND NEEDLES


ARIZONA

OVERALL RANK: 51ST





40th


16th


48th


20th




46th


25th


49th


44th








Performance pay Does the state support performance pay for teachers? State supports/ encourages

Retirement By rank, what is the employer- versus employee-contribution rate to the teacher pension system? 46thc


Teacher improvement plan

Is classroom effectiveness included in teacher evaluations? If so, how is it weighted? Required; Significantly informs evaluation



Is seniority considered in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Optional; May be considered among other factors


By rank, what percentage of the teaching workforce was dismissed due to poor performance? 33rd


No restriction

ARIZONA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

40*

49

45*

49*


ARIZONA



(cont.)



No state cap (but authorizers are capped)


How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Two or more w/ limited activity


Complete automatic exemptions for all schools


Yes


Automatically exempt




Fourth- or fifth-most influential


Sometimes/Often


Rarely


Disagree


Generally concede


Disagree


Rarely/Sometimes







Sometimes


Generally compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Arizona has the 47th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Arizona, collective bargaining is neither required nor prohibited, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected]. c At the time our metric was calculated, a lawsuit over Arizona pension contributions was ongoing (see sidebar); at press time, Arizona amended its layoff policy to prohibit a district from retaining teachers based on seniority.


49*

48


ARIZONA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Arizona are shown in the table, Arizona Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Arizona is ranked 40th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.



4 Jeremy Duda, “Brewer, Allies Make Final Plea For Prop. 100,” Arizona Capitol Times, May 17, 2010, http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2010/05/17/brewer-allies-make-final-plea-for-prop-100/.

5 E.J. Perkins, “Understanding Arizona’s Propositions: 2012 Series, Prop 204,” Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State University, August 2012, http://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/2012-understanding-arizonas-propositions/2012-proposition-204-quality-education-and-jobs-act.

6 “Prop. 204 Wins Second Court Victory,” Arizona City Independent, August 22, 2012, http://www.trivalleycentral.com/arizona_city_independent/news/prop-wins-second-court-victory/article_69760958-afc1-553e-83d6-68d6d1f5e79d.html.

7 Craig Harris, “Arizona Public Workers Will Get Refunds,” Arizona Republic, February 10, 2012, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2012/02/08/20120208arizona-public-workers-will-get-refunds.html.

8 “AEA Wins Injunction Against Educator Gag Bill,” Arizona Education Association, accessed July 23, 2012, http://arizonaea.org/home/403.htm.

9 Sarah Jaffe, “Arizona’s Vicious War On Workers,” Alternet.com, February 6, 2012, http://www.salon.com/2012/02/06/arizonas_vicious_war_on_workers/.


ARIZONA

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



50TH

Arkansas’s state teacher union has low

membership and scant resources. With

just 35 percent of its teachers belonging

to the union, the Natural State posts the

second-smallest membership density

in the country. Further, the Arkansas

Education Association (AEA) brings in

only $140 per teacher annually, 46th out

of 51 jurisdictions. State spending on

education is low: 17.4 percent of state

expenditures in Arkansas are directed

toward K–12 education (35th). Overall

dollars for education (from local, state, and

federal sources) are relatively low as well—

Arkansas spends $10,757 per pupil (30th),

with 51.1 percent of that money going

toward teacher salaries and benefits (45th).


TIED FOR 47TH

Teacher unions have been relatively

uninvolved in Arkansas state politics over

the past decade. Just 0.27 percent of

donations to candidates for state office

came from the AEA (38th of 51).3 Further,

only 0.21 percent of the donations received

by state political parties came from teacher

unions (44th). Unions had a comparatively

quiet presence at the Democratic and

Republican national conventions as well:

11.8 percent of Arkansas delegates were

teacher-union members (32nd).4

ARKANSAS OVERALL RANK: 48TH1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

48

47

20

50

37

45

Overall Rank: 48th Tier 5 (Weakest)

ARKANSAS


TIED FOR 45TH

Arkansas neither grants nor denies

collective bargaining rights to teachers

and other public employees. While the law

requires that districts maintain personnel

policies that stipulate a number of teacher

working conditions (including salaries,

benefits, and evaluations), it does not

explicitly require (or prohibit) bargaining

over any of these provisions. As such, all

twenty-one items examined in this metric

are within the scope of bargaining. The

state bars unions from collecting agency

fees automatically, however, and does not

allow teachers to strike.


20TH

Arkansas’s state policies are a mixed

bag; some align or partially align with

traditional union interests, while others do

not. For example, the state requires that

objective measures of student learning be

included in teacher evaluations (counter

to union goals), but it does not specify

what those measures are or how much

weight they should be given. The state

allows charter schools to apply for waivers

from district regulations and teacher-

certification requirements (again counter

to union goals), but it also does not grant

charters automatic exemptions from such

policies, as does the law in many other

states. Arkansas does not require districts

to consider teacher performance when

determining layoffs and has the nation’s

lowest annual rate of dismissal due to poor

teacher performance (0.16 percent). Other

state policies are not union-favorable,

however: For example, the consequences of

unsatisfactory teacher evaluations are more

stringent than in many states.


37TH

Stakeholders in Arkansas indicate that

the state teacher union is active but

not universally successful in politics.

They report that it fought hard, given

recent budgetary constraints, to prevent

reductions in teacher pay and benefits.

But they also note that policies proposed

by the governor in the latest legislative

session, and those actually enacted,


union priorities.5 Stakeholders rank union

influence on education policy behind that

of the business roundtable/chamber of

commerce, education reform advocacy

groups, the state association of school

administrators, and the state charter school

association. They also note that the union

often turns to compromise to see some

favorable policies enacted rather than

maintaining a hard line.

OVERALL

48TH

While some of Arkansas’s policies favor

union interests, its state-level teacher union

struggles to build a strong foundation of

resources and a powerful reputation in

policy debates. Even though bargaining is

permitted, the strength of the state union

is comparable to that of unions in states

where bargaining is explicitly prohibited by

law.


ARKANSAS

“You win some, you lose some” might best describe politics in 2011 and 2012 for the Arkansas Education Association (AEA). Although it supported the state’s Race to the Top (RTTT) application, it actively fought against a number of state policies that would have strengthened the state’s bid but threatened teacher job security and traditional union interests.6 Reform proponents did manage to overturn a policy that maintained seniority as a key factor in teacher dismissals,7 but it was likely too little, too late. Federal reviewers ultimately dinged the state for its inability to link student and teacher data, its limited alternative routes for educators and principals to enter the profession, and its still-weak enthusiasm for performance-based teacher evaluations.8 Arkansas’s RTTT application was ultimately rejected.

In other legislation, the AEA can claim victory for its role in killing off a “parent trigger” bill—which would have allowed parents to remove their children from failing schools. But the AEA failed to advance legislation that would have added yet another way for teachers and staff to appeal disciplinary actions and performance reviews.9 And despite union opposition, Arkansas increased the cap on the number of charter schools. Act 987 (passed in 2011) removed the fixed cap, which had been twenty-four, and allows for deliberate (some might say sluggish) growth.10 The union’s argument that raising the cap would “result in more segregation [and] fewer resources for students” apparently fell on deaf ears.11 So while the tug-of-war in Arkansas continues, one thing is certain: The AEA has been very busy pulling on its end of the rope.

PUSH AND PULL


ARKANSAS

OVERALL RANK: 48TH





46th


35th*


30th


45th




38th


44th


41st


32nd


Legal scope of bargaining What is the legal status of collective bargaining? Permitted










Is classroom effectiveness included in teacher evaluations? If so, how is it weighted? Evidence of student “learning” required

Terms of employment How long before a teacher earns tenure? Three yearsc


Is seniority considered in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Optional; May be considered among other factorsc


By rank, what percentage of the teaching workforce was dismissed due to poor performance? 1st


Yes; Higher

ARKANSAS RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

50

47*

45*

20


ARKANSAS



(cont.)



State cap with ample room for growth


How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Single option; Some activity






Partially; Full automatic exemption for some schools




Third- or fourth-most influential


Sometimes/Often


Rarely/Sometimes


Neutral


Fight


Neutral


Sometimes


Somewhat in line


Somewhat in line



Sometimes


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Arkansas has the 50th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Arkansas permits collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c As of March 2011, Arkansas teachers do not have tenure; after a three-year probationary term, they reach “non-probationary” status. State law allows districts to set their own criteria for granting such status and does not require that they consider teacher effectiveness. However, “non-probationary” teachers receive the same basic protections as those who have tenure in other states in that their contracts are permanent unless the district chooses not to renew them (as opposed to continuing contracts which must be renewed on an annual basis).


20

37


ARKANSAS

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Arkansas are shown in the table, Arkansas Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Arkansas is ranked 50th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 Arkansas is one of just four states where local teacher associations did not contribute to candidates and political parties. In Arkansas, the AEA was the lone union donor to candidates; it also gave to parties, as did national teacher unions.



6 “Race To The Top,” Arkansas Education Association, accessed July 27, 2011, http://www.aeaonline.org/members/RTT.asp.

7 “AEA Supports HB2178 ‘Teacher Evaluation Bill,’” Arkansas Education Association, accessed July 27, 2011, http://msg4svc.net/servlet/Pv?c=703d6e6561617226733d30266d3d32323326743d4826723d302664613d30267469643d30.

8 Race To The Top Technical Review Form – Tier 1, accessed June 29, 2012, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/phase1-applications/comments/arkansas.pdf.

9 Arkansas Senate Bill 884, 88th General assembly, March 2011, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2011/2011R/Bills/SB884.pdf.

10 According to the Arkansas Senate newsletter: “When the number of charter schools gets to within two of the limit, the limit increases by five. (For example, if the state Board of Education approves 22 charter schools the maximum number allowed will go up to 29.)” See http://www.arkansas.gov/senate/newsroom/index.php?do:newsDetail=1&news_id=302.

11 “Clarification: HB 1894 ‘Parent Trigger’ Bill Fails In House Education Committee,” Arkansas Education Association, accessed July 27, 2011, http://msg4svc.net/servlet/Pv?c=703d6e6561617226733d30266d3d32323526743d4826723d302664613d30267469643d30.


ARKANSAS

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



TIED FOR 20TH

California’s NEA and AFT state affiliates

have relatively robust resources, although

education spending in the state, and on

teachers in particular, is not particularly

high. The Golden State has the 11th-highest

rate of teacher union membership—93.6

percent of teachers are unionized. The

two state unions bring in $597 annually

per teacher in the state (13th of 51). But

California is infamous for its financial

struggles (see sidebar). While a relatively

high percentage of state expenditures

go to K-12 education (20.9 percent; 19th),

when combined with federal and local

funds, that state money amounts to just

$8,667 in annual per-pupil spending (47th).

Teachers receive a comparatively small

piece of that already-small pie, with 53.2

percent of expenditures going toward their

salaries and benefits (33rd).


TIED FOR 18TH

California’s teacher unions invest heavily

in building a strong presence in state

politics.3 In the past decade, 0.69 percent

of donations to California state candidates

came from teacher unions (21st). Those

contributions amounted to 6 percent of

the money from the state’s ten highest-

giving sectors (22nd). The unions also

gave 4.3 percent of the funds received by

state political parties, ranking 2nd. Finally,

12.3 percent of California delegates to

the Democratic and Republican national

conventions were teacher union members

(30th).4

CALIFORNIA OVERALL RANK: 6TH1

TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

6

18

37

20

1

1

Overall Rank: 6thTier 1 (Strongest)

CALIFORNIA


1ST

California has the most union-friendly

bargaining laws in the nation. The state

requires collective bargaining in education,

lets its unions automatically deduct

agency fees from non-member teachers,

and permits teacher strikes. Further, of

the twenty-one items examined in this

metric, California mandates that eleven are

bargained (only Nevada requires more).

The remaining ten provisions are implicitly

within the scope of bargaining, as state law

is silent on them.


37TH

California’s charter school policies are not

nearly as union-favorable as its bargaining

laws. Unions typically want to limit

charter school expansion, but California

encourages it: The state cap on the number

of charters allows ample room for growth,

and charters are automatically exempt from

district collective bargaining agreements

and nearly every state law and district

regulation (although the state does place

stringent application and accountability

requirements on virtual schools). Teacher-

employment policies are a mixed bag.

The state supports performance pay

for teachers, but only in underachieving

schools. Teachers are not automatically

eligible for dismissal after an unsatisfactory

evaluation, but California teachers are

dismissed because of poor performance

at a higher rate than in most other

states. Student learning is not a required

component to either tenure or teacher

evaluations, but the state also does not

mandate class-size restrictions.


1ST

The responses from California stakeholders

put the state’s unions at the top of the

most-powerful list. They rank unions as one

of the most influential forces on education

policy and report that, even under recent

budgetary constraints, they have been

effective in protecting dollars for education

and in warding off education reform

proposals with which they disagree (for

example, K-12 education avoided massive

mid-year cuts in 2011, a considerable

accomplishment given California’s fiscal

problems, but one that may not last long—

see sidebar). Survey respondents also

reveal that while policies proposed by the

governor in the latest legislative session

were only somewhat in line with union

priorities, outcomes of the session were

mostly in line with those priorities.5 Finally,

they report that state education leaders are

often aligned with teacher union positions,

and they unanimously agreed that teacher

unions need not compromise to see their

preferred policies enacted.

OVERALL

6TH

The Golden State’s teacher unions are quite

powerful; in a state that does not spend

much on K-12 education, they’ve gathered

considerable internal resources (and

do not shy away from dedicating those

resources to state politics—with apparent

success, given their present reputation

for influence). Although charter and

employment policies are not well aligned

with traditional union interests, California is

exceptionally permissive when it comes to

teacher bargaining rights.


CALIFORNIA

These days, everyone in the Golden State is counting their pennies. In 2010, lawmakers seeking Race to the Top (RTTT) dollars passed bills that removed the cap on charter schools; created a “trigger law” that let parents petition for new staff, management, or programs at their children’s school; encouraged districts to improve failing schools by firing staff or converting them to charters; and included student achievement in teacher evaluations.6 Not surprisingly, the state’s teacher unions did not support these measures.7 And when California’s first and second RTTT applications were rejected, reviewer comments indicated that the lack of union support had a lot to do with the decision. Noting that the first application was not endorsed by the unions in 74 percent of California districts (including six of the state’s largest ten), one reviewer stated that “the lack of union buy-in at this stage raises serious concerns about the ability of the State to implement the Race to the Top reforms.”8 The California Federation of Teachers president Marty Hittleman reacted positively: “These ideas [in the new bills] will create more harm than good. Now at least California will not be the guinea pig for these misguided proposals.”9

Rather than try again, pro-labor Governor Jerry Brown shelved RTTT and turned his attention to the state’s impending financial crisis. At first, union interests seemed safe: In June 2011, legislators passed a last-minute bill that prohibited teacher layoffs during the 2011–12 school year. 10 Then Brown announced the bad news: California had anticipated a 2011 revenue increase of $4 billion but might fall an astounding $3.7 billion short. If the projections became reality, public education would share in $2 billion of automatic cuts. State unions and their local affiliates rallied, and by year’s end, K-12 districts (and their teachers) could breathe a sigh of relief—they would see only $330 million in cuts, most of which would come from transportation.11 To the chagrin of education advocates, however, Brown now threatens to slash nearly $5 billion from K-12 education if voters don’t pass his November 2012 initiative to increase sales tax and income tax for the wealthy. As the unions again rally to protect funds for education, they face a challenge to their own funds as well—another November initiative, Proposition 32, would limit union political contributions and payroll deductions, a major source of union power.12 With their livelihood, as well as precious dollars for teachers and students, on the ballot, it is shaping up to be an active—and expensive—campaign season for California teacher unions.13

DOLLARS AND SENSE


CALIFORNIA

OVERALL RANK: 6TH





13th


19th


47th


33rd




21st


2nd


22nd


30th



By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 2nd


Permitted



Performance pay Does the state support performance pay for teachers? State-sponsored initiatives offered in select districts





Terms of employment How long before a teacher earns tenure? Two years






No restriction

CALIFORNIA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

20*

18*

1

37


CALIFORNIA



(cont.)





How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Two or more w/ limited jurisdiction


Yes


No; Certification is required but terms are flexible


Yes




Most or second-most influential


Often/Always


**


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often




Mostly/Totally in line



Often


Does not concede


** Insufficient number of responses to this particular question


b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, California has the 11th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: California has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


37

1


CALIFORNIA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for California are shown in the table, California Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, California is ranked 20th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 While our overall metric reports the strength of state teacher unions, this area also captures contributions to state campaigns and parties from national unions and local union affiliates. Typically, their contributions are much smaller than the donations from the state unions. But in California, total donations from a large number of local unions account for about 10 percent of total union dollars.



6 Corey G. Johnson, “We Lost Again In Race To The Top. Now What?” California Watch, August 25, 2010, http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/we-lost-again-race-top-now-what-4258.

7 Howard Blume, “Schwarzenegger Signs School Legislation,” Los Angeles Times, January 8, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/08/local/la-me-race8-2010jan08.

8 U.S. Department of Education, “States’ Applications, Scores, And Comments For Phase 1,” last modified February 12, 2012, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/phase1-applications/index.html.

9 Jill Tucker, “California Misses Cut For US Education Funds,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 5, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/education/article/California-misses-cut-for-U-S-education-funds-3271306.php.

10 John Fensterwald, “Brown Names Seven To State Board,” Silicon Valley Education Foundation, January 6, 2011, http://toped.svefoundation.org/2011/01/06/brown-appoints-majority-to-state-board/.

11 Associated Press, “Budget Shortfall Triggers $1b In California Midyear Cuts,” December 13, 2011, http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/12/13/california-midyear-california-to-learn-extent-of-midyear-budget-cuts/.

12 Joe Garofoli, “Calif. Prop. 32 In Unions’ Crosshairs,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 18, 2012, http://www.sfgate.com/politics/joegarofoli/article/Calif-Prop-32-in-unions-crosshairs-3718306.php.

13 As of this writing, the California Teachers Association has put aside $7.5 million to fight Prop 32. Another $9 million has been authorized by the board to defeat Prop 32 and help pass Prop 30 (which provides education dollars by increasing the tax rate for wealthy individuals). See http://blogs.sacbee.com/the_state_worker/2012/08/california-teachers-association-gives-75-million-to-no-on-32.html.


CALIFORNIA

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



TIED FOR 37TH

Colorado’s two state teacher unions have

limited financial resources and membership.

With 62.4 percent of its teachers unionized,

the Centennial State posts the 34th-highest

rate of teacher union membership out of

51 jurisdictions. The state unions bring

in $256 annually per teacher in the state

(36th). State spending on K–12 education

is relatively high, but high spending

does not translate into expenditures on

teachers. While 25.5 percent of the state

expenditures go toward K–12 education

(7th), total K–12 per-pupil expenditures

from all sources ($9,155) and the

percentage of that total money directed to

teacher salaries and benefits (50.9 percent)

are lower than in nearly every other state in

the country.


TIED FOR 18TH

Teacher unions have been quite active

donors in Colorado state politics over

the past decade.3 Their contributions

accounted for 2.1 percent of all the funds

received by state-level political candidates,

placing them 6th compared to unions in

other states. A whopping 25.8 percent

of all money donated by the ten highest-

giving sectors in the state came from

teacher unions, the largest such proportion

in the country. In addition, teacher union

contributions comprised 0.84 percent

of the total donations to state political

parties (28th). Despite high levels of

giving, however, only 4.2 percent of

Colorado’s delegates to the Democratic


teacher union members—only Kentucky

had fewer.4

COLORADO OVERALL RANK: 35TH1

TIER 4 (WEAK)

35

18

48

37

29

25

Overall Rank: 35thTier 4 (Weak)

COLORADO


25TH

Colorado neither grants nor denies

collective bargaining rights to teachers

and other public employees. While it does

allow unions to collect agency fees from

non-members, unions cannot automatically

deduct dues from the paychecks of its own

members without their written consent.

The state permits teacher strikes.


48TH

Many state policies in Colorado do not

align with teacher union interests. The

state requires that student achievement


evaluations and mandates that teachers

be eligible for dismissal (rather than

improvement plans) after multiple

unsatisfactory ratings. Districts must also

consider teacher performance alongside

seniority when making tenure and

layoff decisions, and they must include

performance as a basis for compensation.

Further, the state does not cap the number

of charter schools allowed to operate; it

exempts charters from many state and

district laws and regulations; and charter

schools do not typically participate in

district collective bargaining agreements.


29TH

The reputation of teacher unions in

Colorado is strong in some areas, weak in

others. Stakeholders rank teacher unions

as the second-most influential entities

on education policy, behind education

advocacy organizations. In addition, they

report that teacher unions fought hard


stringency to prevent reductions in pay

and benefits, and that they are generally

effective in protecting dollars for education.

On the other hand, survey respondents

note that policies proposed by the

governor and those subsequently enacted


partly in line with union priorities.5 They

report that state education leaders are

only sometimes aligned with teacher

union positions and that teacher unions

more often than not turn to compromise

to see some of their policies enacted.

This perception may stem from the union

role in the design and implementation of

Colorado’s teacher-evaluation system (see

sidebar).

OVERALL

35TH

Despite limited resources, Colorado’s

teacher unions are active in state politics.

And, despite a state policy environment

that is not particularly union-favorable, they

have garnered moderate influence in the

state, as perceived by stakeholders.


COLORADO

Eyes across the nation will closely monitor the implementation of Colorado’s new teacher-evaluation system, slated to take effect in 2013-14. The “Educator Effectiveness” legislation, passed in Spring 2010 as part of Senate Bill 191, requires that at least half of a teacher’s evaluation be based on student academic growth. Opponents, including the vocal Colorado Education Association (CEA), offered staunch resistance when the bill was first proposed, arguing that the new law was vague, underfunded, and ill-conceived. CEA President Beverly Ingle remarked, “CEA has been involved in every education reform measure in this state—CAP4K, longitudinal growth, accountability, and accreditation. We know what works in education in Colorado—and SB 191 doesn’t.”6

Lawmakers went back to the drawing board. They added, among other changes, a provision that permitted seniority to be considered in layoffs and an appeals process for teachers placed on probation. Soon after, the bill was endorsed by Randi Weingarten, president of the American Federation of Teachers: “What’s happened here is they [Colorado lawmakers] have totally worked, in terms of the amendments, to ensure that evaluations are done with teachers—not to teachers.”7 Yet the NEA-affiliated CEA was slower to come around, bemoaning that the bill still “…punish[es] teachers and undermine[s] the profession.”

State Senator Michael Johnson, key architect and champion of the bill, appeared to welcome the criticism: “I honestly say to people that those who opposed the bill did more to improve it than anyone.”8 As Colorado districts gear up to implement the new law, however, it is clear that this duel is far from over.

A ROCKY START


COLORADO

OVERALL RANK: 35TH





36th


7th


43rd


46th




6th


28th


1st


49th





Automatic payroll deductions prohibited







Is classroom effectiveness included in teacher evaluations? If so, how is it weighted? Required; Preponderant criterion


Is student/teacher performance considered in tenure decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Required; Preponderant criterion


Is teacher performance included in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Required; Considered among other factors



No restriction

COLORADO RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

37*

18*

25

48


COLORADO



(cont.)



No state cap




Yes


No; Certification is required but can be waived


Yes






Sometimes/Often


Never/Rarely


Agree


Fight


Neutral


Sometimes







Rarely/Sometimes





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Colorado has the 34th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Colorado, collective bargaining is neither required nor prohibited, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


48

29


COLORADO

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Colorado are shown in the table, Colorado Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Colorado is ranked 37th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 Colorado is noteworthy because of the activity level of its local unions, both in terms of the large number of unions that gave to state candidates and the high dollar amounts given by those local unions, especially in comparison with contributions from the state affiliates.



6 “CEA Teachers Hold Rally At State Capitol To Tell Lawmakers ‘We Know What Works,’” PR Newswire, April 23, 2010, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cea-teachers-hold-rally-at-state-capitol-to-tell-lawmakers-we-know-what-works-91928204.html.

7 Jeremy Meyer, “AFT’s Randi Weingarten Weighs In,” Denver Post, May 6, 2010, http://blogs.denverpost.com/coloradoclassroom/2010/05/06/afts-randi-weingarten-weighs-in/318/.

8 Yesenia Robles, “Colorado’s Education-Reform Leader Spreads Ideas Nationwide,” Denver Post, January 16, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_17109350#ixzz1tw1vjOBx.


COLORADO

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



TIED FOR 9TH

Connecticut’s NEA and AFT state affiliates

have a broad foundation of resources from

a variety of sources. With 98.8 percent of

its teachers unionized, the Constitution

State posts the largest percentage of

unionized teachers in the nation. The unions

see $516 per teacher each year, the 22nd

highest revenue among all states. While

education spending by the state places

Connecticut in the middle of the pack

(the state is 21st in the percentage of its

expenditures directed to K-12 education),

total per-pupil revenue from all sources is

high: $13,959 annually, the 9th-highest in

the country.


TIED FOR 29TH

Connecticut’s teacher unions have been

moderately involved in state politics over

the last ten years. Their contributions

made up a relatively small portion of

total donations received by candidates

for state office (0.32 percent, putting the

state in 35th place). Teacher unions were

a bigger presence among donors to state

political parties, giving 2.0 percent of all

donations received by parties (14th). Of the

Connecticut delegates to the Democratic

and Republican national conventions, 15.4

percent were teacher union members

(18th).3

CONNECTICUT OVERALL RANK: 17TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

17

29

13

9

27

13


CONNECTICUT


13TH

Connecticut is one of thirty-two states that

require collective bargaining for public

school teachers, and state law allows

unions to automatically collect agency fees

from non-member teachers—a key source

of union revenue. The state allows for a

broad scope of bargaining: Of twenty-one

items examined in this metric, the state

explicitly excludes just one as a subject of

bargaining: pension/retirement benefits.

The remaining twenty are either mandated

topics for bargaining (seven items),

permitted subjects (one item), or the

state is silent on their inclusion, implicitly

permitting them (twelve items). The state

does not allow teacher strikes.


13TH

Most Connecticut policies align at least

partially with traditional teacher union

interests. While state requires that

objective evidence of student learning

factor into teacher evaluations, it does

not specify what weight those data

should carry. While it takes teachers four

years to earn tenure (the national norm is

three), as of May 2012, the state granted

tenure nearly automatically and required

all ineffective teachers to go through

remediation before they were dismissed.

(As of press time, however, the law now

requires teacher effectiveness to factor into

tenure decisions and provides channels

to dismiss ineffective teachers without

intervention; unfortunately, the changes

made were too late to be included in

our calculations.) Unions traditionally

oppose individual performance pay, and

Connecticut does not provide it. Further,

state law caps the number of charter

schools allowed to operate and only offers

one viable authorizer to prospective

charter operators. In addition, Connecticut

teachers contribute proportionally less to

their pensions than their employers do, as

compared to teachers in all but two other

states. A handful of policies, however, run

counter to union goals: The state does

not mandate a maximum class size for

grades K-3 and is permissive in the types

of charters it allows (meaning new start-

ups, public-school conversions, and virtual

charter schools).


27TH

Stakeholders in Connecticut perceive

the teacher unions to be one influential

entity of many. Survey respondents rank

teacher unions second- or third-most

influential, along with education advocacy

organizations and the state school board.

They agree that teacher unions are effective

in protecting dollars for education and in

warding off most statutory proposals with

which they disagree. But they note that

both policies proposed by the governor

in the latest legislative session and those

actually enacted were only somewhat in

line with union priorities.4 Moreover, they

report that state teacher unions, like many

of their counterparts in other states, more

often than not turn to compromise to see

some of their preferred policies enacted.

OVERALL

17TH

Connecticut boasts the highest teacher

union membership in the nation. Its unions

enjoy a broad scope of bargaining and

favorable state policy environment, and

they have garnered a reputation among

stakeholders as moderately influential.


CONNECTICUT

With education his main priority for the 2012 legislative session, Governor Dannel Malloy set his sights on reforming teacher tenure. He declared in his state of the state speech, “In today’s system, basically the only thing you have to do is show up for four years. Do that, and tenure is yours.”5 The comment quickly inflamed teacher tempers across the Constitution State. “There was no need for the governor to kick off his ‘year of education reform’ by being so adversarial to teachers,” said Kristen Record, the state’s 2011 Teacher of the Year. “He made purposeful statements that were outright lies and damaged his relationship and credibility with teachers.”6

Malloy appeared to learn from his mistake. In March 2012, he back-pedaled: “In my state of the state speech I used some words to describe tenure which, taken in isolation, did not do a good job of describing my feelings on the subject... Every day, Connecticut’s teachers do far more than show up.”7 Despite his reversal, however, unions seized upon the gaffe to paint Malloy as out-of-touch and anti-teacher, and the education reform bill passed by the legislature in May 2012 lacked many of his original proposals, including provisions to make tenure rules more stringent, link teacher evaluations with pay and certification, and strip teachers in the lowest-performing schools of many rights guaranteed by collective bargaining.8

On the other hand, the reform bill did redesign the teacher evaluation system: While evaluations will not have a significant impact on teacher job security (a major union victory), student performance will count for 45 percent of a teacher’s rating—changes also endorsed by the governor.9 And teacher tenure must be “informed by” the results of the evaluations. The Connecticut Education Association (CEA) charged that the evaluation guidelines are ill-advised: “This bill puts the cart before the horse,” said CEA president Phil Apruzzese. “These systems aren’t properly developed yet.”10 After seeing only partial success with the reform bill, Malloy may have learned a valuable lesson here: It’s important to play nice with the CEA.

MIND YOUR MANNERS


CONNECTICUT

OVERALL RANK: 17TH



Membership By rank, what percentage of public-school teachers in the state are union members? 1st


22nd


27th


9th


21st




35th


14th


47th


18th





Permitted






Teacher improvement planc


Terms of employment How long before a teacher earns tenure? Four years

Is student/teacher performance considered in tenure decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Not includedc





No restriction

CONNECTICUT RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

9*

29*

13

13


CONNECTICUT



(cont.)



State cap with limited room for growth


How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Single option; No or limited activity




No; Certification is required but can be partially waived


Partially; Full automatic exemption for some schools, others must apply for waivers






Sometimes/Often


Rarely/Sometimes


Agree


Generally fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often




Somewhat in line



Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Connecticut has the highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Connecticut has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c See note in Area 4, above.


13

27


CONNECTICUT

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Connecticut are shown in the table, Connecticut Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Connecticut is ranked 9th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, “Malloy Clarifies The ‘Only Thing You Have To Do Is Show Up’ Comment About Teachers,” CT Mirror, March 21, 2012, http://www.ctmirror.org/blogs/malloy-backtracks-all-you-have-do-show-comment-about-teachers.

6 Ken Dixon, “This Time, Malloy Swallowed Compromises,” CT Post, May 12, 2012, http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/This-time-Malloy-swallowed-compromises-3553866.php.

7 Thomas.

8 Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, “Education Reform Bill Passes, Praised As Good Step, Clears legislature,” CT Mirror, May 8, 2012, http://www.ctmirror.org/story/16286/education-reform-bill-clears-legislature.

9 Associated Press, “Conn. Endorses New Teacher Evaluation Methods,” CT Post, February 10, 2012, http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Conn-endorses-new-teacher-evaluation-methods-3252498.php.

10 Jacqueline Rabe Thomas and Uma Ramiah, “Teachers Unions Say ‘No’ To Malloy’s Tenure Plan,” CT Mirror, February 21, 2012, http://www.ctmirror.org/story/15501/teachers-unions-battle-governor-education-committee-hearing.


CONNECTICUT

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



TIED FOR 9TH

Delaware’s state teacher union benefits

from reasonably strong resources from its

own members and sees substantial funding

for K-12 education. Fully 90.1 percent

of teachers in the First State are union

members, the 16th-highest unionization

rate among 51 jurisdictions. The NEA-

affiliated Delaware State Education

Association (DSEA) brings in $547

annually per teacher in the state (18th).

Spending on K-12 education in general,

and specifically on teacher salaries and

benefits, is comparatively high in the state

(see sidebar). Education accounts for 24

percent of state expenditures (12th). Of the

$11,905 that is spent per-pupil in the state

each year (22nd), 56.5 percent goes toward

teacher salaries and benefits (11th).


TIED FOR 29TH

Compared to teacher unions elsewhere,

Delaware’s gave moderately to state politics

in the past ten years. Contributions from

the union amounted to 0.32 percent (36th)

of donations to candidates for state office

and 0.55 percent (36th) of donations to

state political parties. Union representation

at the Democratic and Republican national

conventions was moderate as well, with 12

percent of Delaware’s delegates identifying

as teacher union members (tying for 28th).3

DELAWARE OVERALL RANK: 19TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

19

29

36

9

18

15


DELAWARE


15TH

Delaware gives its teacher unions a fair

amount of room to bargain. It requires

collective bargaining—one of thirty-

two states that do so—and the scope

of bargained provisions is broad. Of

twenty-one items examined in this metric,

just one is prohibited as a subject of

bargaining: transfer/teacher reassignment.

Five provisions are required subjects of

bargaining, one is explicitly allowed, and

fourteen are implicitly included because

the state does not address them. Only

one item—teacher transfers—may not

be bargained. Delaware lets its unions

automatically collect agency fees from

teachers who are not union members (a key

source of union revenue), but it does not

permit teacher strikes.


36TH

Delaware policies are less aligned with

traditional union interests than are policies

in most other states. Student achievement

data must be the preponderant factor in

teacher evaluations and taken into account

when granting tenure. Teachers are eligible


ratings, and districts can decide on the

criteria for layoffs. Still, districts are not

obligated to base layoff decisions on

teacher performance (as opposed to

seniority), and Delaware teachers are

dismissed due to poor performance at a

lower rate than in all but one other state

(Arkansas). While many state policies

encourage the expansion and autonomy

of charter schools (positions typically

opposed by unions), the state offers

prospective school operators only limited

authorizing options.


18TH

Delaware stakeholders reported a stronger

union than most. They rank teacher unions

as the second- or third-most influential

entity on education reform, alongside the

business roundtable/chamber of commerce

and education advocacy organizations.

They report that both Democrats and

Republicans often need teacher union

support to be elected; the former is similar

to responses from other states, but in

most states, Republicans rarely need union

support. Delaware stakeholders note that

even given budgetary constraints, teacher

unions are effective in protecting dollars

for education and in warding off education

reform proposals with which they disagree

(see sidebar). Interestingly, the union may

play a role in changing legislators’ minds:

Respondents report that policies proposed


session were only somewhat aligned with

union priorities, but that enacted policies

were mostly in line with those priorities.4

OVERALL

19TH

Delaware’s teacher union has substantial

resources from its members and sees

higher spending on K-12 education than

in many other states. State laws give it

ample room to bargain and, while many

teacher-employment and charter policies

are not aligned with typical union positions,

Delaware stakeholders report that it is

actually quite influential—perhaps due to its

reputation for collaboration (see sidebar).


DELAWARE

Delaware, “The First State,” was also first to receive Race to the Top (RTTT) funds (about $119 million) in April 2010, in part due to all of its local unions endorsing reform legislation.5 The Delaware State Education Association (DSEA) had previously collaborated with politicians, philanthropists, business leaders, and advocacy groups on education reform, and the state’s RTTT application was no exception: Then-president Diane Donahue even co-presented Delaware’s application to the RTTT judges along with Governor Jack A. Markell. Markell lauded the team effort: “In Delaware, you don’t have to choose between consensus and bold [action]. In Delaware, you get both.” Donahue’s thoughts on the collaboration were more blunt: “We’re taking a risk…[but] I’d rather be at the table than on the menu.”6 As a part of the application, the unions agreed to teacher evaluations that include student-growth data, bonuses for highly-effective teachers who work in high-need schools, and decreased job security for ineffective and probationary teachers. But as of January 2012, the evaluations as originally designed are on hiatus. The state secretary of education announced that Delaware would not be using the value-added metric for teacher evaluations in the upcoming school year due to insufficient test data and an unproven system. Instead, state officials and teachers would develop measures based on data other than standardized tests. (Note that other states are implementing value-added teacher evaluations despite union objections that the systems are untested—see, for example, the District of Columbia, Colorado, and Connecticut.)7

Other news in early 2012 made it clear that the unions are very much not “on the menu.” In a February statement to the state finance committee, the DSEA gave thanks for past salary increases, praised increases to education spending in the budget, and asked for another raise (which it got).8,9 With bargaining rights, teacher employment policies, and dollars for education in the crosshairs of legislatures across the country, the DSEA’s mode of collaboration appears to pay dividends.

THERE’S NO “I” IN “TEAM”


DELAWARE

OVERALL RANK: 19TH





18th


12th


22nd


11th




36th


36th


30th


28th*



By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 13th


Permitted












By rank, what percentage of the teaching workforce was dismissed due to poor performance? 2nd


No restriction

DELAWARE RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

9*

29*

15

36


DELAWARE



(cont.)




Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools? Start-ups and conversions only



Yes


Partially; All schools receive automatic exemptions for some teachers


Yes






Often/Always


Sometimes/Often


Strongly agree


Generally fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often







Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Delaware has the 16th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Delaware has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


36

18


DELAWARE

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Delaware are shown in the table, Delaware Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Delaware is ranked 9th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Nick Anderson, “Input Of Teachers Unions Key To Successful Entries In Race To The Top,” Washington Post, April 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/02/AR2010040201022.html.

6 Ibid.

7 Esme E. Deprez and John Hechinger, “Grading Teachers Sparks Conflict As States Vie For Grants,” BusinessWeek.com, February 24, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-24/grading-teachers-sparks-conflict-as-states-vie-for-grants.html.

8 Fredericka Jenner, “JFC Testimony: Education,” Delaware State Education Association, February 14, 2012, http://www.dsea.org/PDF/JFCTestimonyFSJ021412.pdf.

9 Seanna Adcox, “SC Lawmakers Approve Budget, Keep Government Going,” Associated Press, June 29, 2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/sc-lawmakers-approve-budget-keep-123723843.html.


DELAWARE

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



17TH

The Washington Teachers’ Union (WTU)

has significant financial resources from its

members, who enjoy high spending for K-12

education. 84.5 percent of D.C. teachers

belong to the WTU (21st-highest among

51 jurisdictions). With sizable member

dues, the union brings in $729 annually per

teacher (6th). But while per-pupil spending

in D.C. is the 4th-highest in the nation,

at $16,034 per year, the District does not

allocate much—just 33.2 percent—of those

dollars to teacher salaries and benefits, the

lowest such proportion nationwide.2

AREA 2: INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

N/A3


21ST

The District of Columbia joins thirty-one

states where collective bargaining is

required by law. The District also allows the

WTU to collect agency fees automatically

from non-members, which buttresses

the union’s financial resources. Further,

of the twenty-one items we examined

for this report, five must be negotiated:

wages, hours, terms and conditions of

employment, insurance benefits, and

fringe benefits. However, D.C. explicitly

excludes more provisions than most

states: management rights, transfers

and assignments, layoffs, dismissals,

and evaluations cannot be bargained.

Bargaining over the remaining items is

permitted, but not required. The District

prohibits teacher strikes.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OVERALL RANK: 33RD1

TIER 4 (WEAK)

33

n/a

49

17

41

21

Overall Rank: 33rdTier 4 (Weak)



TIED FOR 49TH

Most D.C. teacher-employment policies do

not align with traditional union interests.

From its inception, the District’s new

(and much-discussed) teacher evaluation

system, IMPACT, has been the subject of

prolonged acrimony between the WTU

and District leaders (see sidebar). The

system requires that student achievement


evaluations, and those who receive

ineffective rankings are eligible for

dismissal. Further, while the probationary

period for teachers is nominally two years,

a teacher can be dismissed for ineffective

evaluations at any time in her career

regardless of tenure status.4 The District’s

charter school policies are even less

aligned with the traditional union position,

which seeks to limit charter expansion and

autonomy. The District caps the number of

charters that are allowed to open, but the

cap is high—and some 40 percent of D.C.

students are enrolled in charter schools.

Further, charter law allows for a variety of

school types and provides charters with

automatic exemptions from many laws

and regulations, including the District’s

collective bargaining agreement.


41ST

Stakeholders report that the WTU has

limited clout. Survey respondents rank

several other entities as more influential

over education policy: the mayor (who

in turn appoints the school chancellor),

the Washington Board of Trade, and the

association of school administrators.

Respondents note that the union is not

effective in warding off education proposals

with which it disagrees or in protecting

dollars for education—a marked change

from the WTU’s stronghold over D.C.

education policy prior to the administration

of Mayor Adrian Fenty and Chancellor

Michelle Rhee. But when the District

of Columbia Public Education Reform

Amendment Act of 2007 put administration

of D.C. schools under mayoral control, it

also greatly expanded the discretionary

power of the office, consequently reducing

that of the union. The combination of a

strong chancellor, limited union authority,

and a membership divided over whether

their union should fight reforms—or

embrace them—led to a significant drop in

the WTU’s influence over District leaders.5

OVERALL

33RD

While the WTU enjoys substantial revenue

from its members, the union has a weak

reputation in a jurisdiction where a limited

scope of bargaining and two successive

reform-minded school chancellors used

that position’s expansive authority over

evaluations, dismissals, and personnel

decisions to create a policy environment

that is not at all union-favorable. The

Race To The Top initiative has brought

some of those policies into the national

education- policy mainstream, and because

evaluations and dismissals are out of the

WTU’s hands, it is unlikely that the union

will see its former strength fully restored.

(Still, it may have a chance to regain some

of its former clout, as current Chancellor

Kaya Henderson appears open to a less

antagonistic relationship with the District’s

teachers—see sidebar).



Three years after its 2009 adoption, the District’s high-profile value-added teacher-evaluation model known as IMPACT—developed during Michelle Rhee’s colorful stint as Chancellor—continues to rattle the Washington Teachers Union (WTU). IMPACT was the first such system to be implemented in the country, and although the WTU grudgingly agreed to it, the union did not have much of a choice since evaluations are strictly within the purview of DCPS management. Union leaders contended that it was implemented prematurely and was unreliable, punitive, and based on a false premise: that student test scores accurately measure teacher ability and only teacher ability (as opposed to conditions outside the classroom).6 “The scores don’t reflect the existing conditions that students bring into the classrooms, issues pertaining to family dysfunction, economic circumstance, poverty,” said WTU president Nathan Saunders.7 But the union had no actual say over evaluation and dismissal rules, and consequently, the results of IMPACT led to the termination of 542 teachers for poor performance between 2010 and 2012.8, 9 On the other hand, D.C. also ranked 988 of its approximately 4,100 teachers “highly effective” in 2012, making them eligible for bonuses of up to $25,000—which have so far been funded by outside donors but, as of 2013, will be paid for from the district’s pocket.10 Unlike teacher evaluations and dismissals, performance pay is a part of the collective-bargaining agreement—and was the subject of a high-profile and prolonged round of contract negotiations that was finally resolved in April 2010 with the help of AFT president Randi Weingarten.

When Henderson took over from Rhee as chancellor of DCPS, WTU leaders pressed to de-emphasize the role of standardized testing in the IMPACT metric.11 Beginning in 2013, student achievement will still be half of a teacher’s evaluation, but standardized test scores will be just one part of that score (35 percent of the total evaluation, down from 50 percent); teacher-developed assessments of student learning will make up the rest (15 percent of the total). Henderson explained that the change was “in response to feedback from teachers,” and she clarified that “while we believe strongly that value-added is the fairest and most accurate method of capturing a teacher’s impact on student achievement, we recognize that this measure does not reflect everything your students have learned.”12 The WTU applauded the move.13

In another successful campaign, the WTU ensured that the District made good on its obligations to teachers who had their positions eliminated due to budget cutbacks and declining enrollments. A provision in the 2010 collective bargaining agreement specified that those “excessed” teachers with good evaluations and twenty years of service were eligible for early retirement with full benefits. When first asked to hand over the funds to carry out this provision, the District said it lacked the money.14 WTU then accused the District of questionable accounting; the District replied that the union had not filed the necessary paperwork; but by May 2012, they had come to agreement, announcing that the District will allocate $10.2 million over the next five years to fund these benefits.15 Politics appear to be alive and well in the nation’s capital.

MAKING AN IMPACT IN WASHINGTON, D.C.



OVERALL RANK: 33RD

Area and Ranka General Indicator Sub-IndicatorSub-Indicator Rank/Statusb,c




6th


_


4th


51st




_


_


_


_





Permitted


AREA 4:STATE POLICIESD












No restriction

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

17

n/a

21

49*



Area and Rank General Indicator Sub-IndicatorSub-indicator Rank/Status


(cont.)







Yes


Yes


Yes

AREA 5:PERCEIVED INFLUENCEDe





Sometimes/Often


**


Disagree


Generally fight


Disagree


Rarely/Sometimes


**


**



Sometimes


Compromise

** Not applicable or insufficient number of responses to this particular question


b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 jurisdictions, the District of Columbia has the 21st-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: the District of Columbia has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for D.C., send an email to [email protected].

c Our data sources for certain indicators did not always include the District of Columbia. In Area 1, the National Association of State Budget Officers’ State Expenditure Report does not include the District in its analyses because its revenues and expenditures are not comparable to other states. In Area 2, the National Institute on Money in State Politics collects campaign finance reports filed by candidates for state, but not local, office.

d See notes in Area 4, above, and in Appendix A regarding our treatment of D.C. policy mandates.

e For all survey questions, stakeholders were asked specifically about teacher unions, candidates, policies, and leaders in their jurisdiction or state.

49*

41



ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Washington, D.C. are shown in the table, District of Columbia Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, the District is ranked 17th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.

2 We understand that this percentage appears very low, especially given the attention the District receives for its high per-pupil expenditures and teacher salaries. There are numerous explanations that might account for this: First, D.C. is unique because the majority of employer pension contributions to teacher pensions is the obligation of the U.S. Treasury, not the school district. Second, the NCES cautions against comparing the District of Columbia to other states because it has only one school district, and therefore per-pupil expenditures (and allocations for salaries and benefits as compared to other operating expenses) are not similar to those in other states. Third, per-pupil spending in urban districts tends to be considerably higher than non-urban districts in the same, but D.C. does not see its high expenditures averaged with lower ones from non-urban districts. Finally, the District used external funding sources for its teacher performance bonuses (although as of 2013 that will no longer be the case).

3 The National Institute on Money in State Politics collects campaign-finance reports filed by candidates for state, but not local, offices, and hence does not report any data for Washington, D.C. Further, the Consortium for Political and Social Research’s 2000 Convention Delegate Survey does not include information on D.C. delegates to the Democratic and Republican national conventions. As such, we could not score the WTU on its involvement in politics.

4 DCPS also has a performance-pay system, where teachers earn bonuses after receiving one “highly effective” yearly rating and are eligible for raises to their base salary after multiple years of positive evaluations. To receive the bonuses and raises, they must also waive job protection should they be excessed and unable to find another placement (see DCPS Impactplus, http://www.dc.gov/DCPS/In+the+Classroom/Ensuring+Teacher+Success/IMPACT+(Performance+Assessment)/IMPACTplus). However, this is a negotiated program between the WTU and the District rather than a policy mandate from the District, and as such, we do not record D.C. as having state-required performance pay. See Appendix A, note in sub-indicator 3.1.2, for a detailed explanation.

5 We administered our survey in Summer 2011, after contract negotiations between Michelle Rhee and the WTU closed. Although the WTU called AFT president Randi Weingarten to help resolve the two-and-a-half-year dispute over (among other things) merit pay, transfers based on teacher performance, and the elimination of tenure, the resulting contract was heralded as a victory for Rhee. Although the union added clauses for transparency, the spirit of Rhee’s original provisions remained intact. The contract (and 2009’s student achievement-based IMPACT system for teacher evaluations and dismissals, over which the WTU had no say) confirmed that the WTU’s strength had significantly diminished since the district came under mayoral control.

6 Bill Turque, “D.C. Launches Rigorous Teacher Evaluation System,” Washington Post, October 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/30/AR2009093004729.html.

7 Lisa Gartner, “D.C. Urges Schools To De-Emphasize Standardized Testing For Teacher Evaluations,” Washington Examiner, May 23, 2012, http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/646356.

8 “D.C. Schools Fires More Than 400 Teachers,” HuffingtonPost.com, September 14, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/15/dc-schools-fires-more-tha_n_900120.html.

9 Emma Brown, “98 D.C. Teachers Fired For Poor Performance,” Washington Post, August 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/98-dc-teachers-fired-for-poor-performance-school-officials-say/2012/08/01/gJQAu67vPX_story.html.

10 Ibid.

11 Nathan Saunders, “Impact 3.0,” Washington Teachers’ Union, August 3, 2012, http://wtuteacherslounge.org/2012/08/03/impact-3-0/.

12 Evaluations for General Education Teachers with Individual Value-Added Student Achievement Data (DCPS IMPACT guidebook 2012–13), http://www.dc.gov/DCPS/In+the+Classroom/Ensuring+Teacher+Success/IMPACT+(Performance+Assessment)/IMPACT+Guidebooks.

13 Gartner.

14 Bill Turque, “D.C. Says There’s No Money For Contract Early Retirement Provision,” Washington Post, November 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dc-schools-insider/post/dc-pleads-poverty-for-teacher-early-retirement/2011/10/25/gIQAXaxRUN_blog.html.

15 Bill Turque, “DCPS, Union Reach Accord On Teacher Retirement,” Washington Post, May 14, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dc-schools-insider/post/dcps-union-reach-accord-on-teacher-retirement/2012/05/14/gIQA1HPBPU_blog.html.



AREA 2: INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS 2

TIED FOR 36TH

Compared to other states, Florida teacher

unions were not major donors during the

past decade of state politics (that said, our

calculations are conservative and unions

have certainly been active, especially in the

courts—see sidebar). Contributions from

teacher unions made up just 0.21 percent

(42nd) of total donations to candidates

for state office.3 Those contributions

comprised just 1.4 percent of the donations

to candidates from the ten highest-giving

sectors in the state (45th). Teacher unions

did, however, contribute 1.7 percent of

all donations received by state political

parties (17th). But the union presence at


conventions was not particularly strong,

with 12.5 percent of Florida’s delegates

identifying as teacher union members

(28th).4

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES



TIED FOR 47TH

Florida’s state-level teacher union contends

with limited financial resources and low

membership. Just 55.8 percent of the

state’s teachers are union members (40th

of 51 jurisdictions). Further, the merged

state-level NEA and AFT affiliate, the

Florida Education Association (FEA),

brings in a mere $182 annually per teacher

in the state (42nd). The union also does

not see high spending on education as

compared to other states: While the state

directs 20.1 percent of its expenditures to

K–12 education (22nd), dollars per-pupil

(a combination of state, federal, and local

money) amounts to just $9,576 (40th).

Only 49.9 percent of those dollars go

toward teacher salaries and benefits—just

two states spend smaller portions.

FLORIDA OVERALL RANK: 50TH1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

50

36

46

47

50

35

Overall Rank: 50thTier 5 (Weakest)

FLORIDA


TIED FOR 35TH

While Florida is one of thirty-two states

that require collective bargaining, unions

are not allowed to automatically collect


and therefore union revenues are limited

(see Area 1). State law also prohibits

teacher strikes. Florida does, however,

have a relatively permissive scope of

bargaining: Of twenty-one items examined

in this metric, four must be negotiated—


employment, and grievance procedures—

and only teacher dismissal is prohibited.

Bargaining is permitted over the remaining

sixteen items—the inclusion of insurance

benefits is explicitly left to the discretion of

the districts, and fifteen items are implicitly

within the scope of bargaining because the

state does not address them at all.


TIED FOR 46TH

Florida education policies are less aligned

with traditional union interests than

the policies of nearly every other state.

Recent laws eliminated tenure for new

teachers, required student achievement

data to be the predominant criterion

in teacher evaluations, and outlined

stringent consequences for unsatisfactory

evaluations (see sidebar). Teacher

performance must be considered in layoff

decisions (while seniority is an optional

criterion), and Florida is one of just three

states with a state-supported mandatory

system of merit pay for all teachers.

Further, the state does not limit the number

and type of charter schools allowed to

operate, and it automatically exempts

them from district collective bargaining

agreements. On the other hand, Florida is

one of just two states that have a state-

mandated class size limit that is smaller

than the national average (Nevada is the

other).


50TH

Stakeholders report that Florida’s state

union is very weak—only Mississippi

respondents perceived their unions to

be weaker. Florida stakeholders rank the

union’s influence on education policy

below the state charter school association,

education advocacy groups, the state

association of school administrators,

and the business roundtable/chamber

of commerce. While respondents report

that Democrats running for state-level

office often need teacher union support

to get elected, they also note that state

education leaders are rarely aligned with

union positions and that the union was not


and in warding off proposals with which it

disagrees. Finally, respondents indicate that


latest legislative session were mostly not in

line, and the policies actually enacted were

not at all in line, with union priorities (an

unsurprising response given that recently

the FEA seems unable to sway lawmakers

and has on several occasions turned to the

courts instead—see sidebar).5

OVERALL

50TH

Florida’s state teacher union is one of

the weakest in the nation: It has scant

resources, few recent policy successes,

a feeble reputation, and few allies in the

capitol. Florida’s state union is by far the

weakest of any state in which bargaining is

mandatory.


FLORIDA

On its face, Florida’s 2012–13 budget looked good for schools, promising a $1 billion increase to K–12 education.6 But according to Florida Education Association (FEA) president Andy Ford, that’s not enough for local districts, which must find a way to fill the hole left by depleted local funds (caused by plunging property values) and the end of federal “bailout” money. It’s not just inadequate dollars for education, but also how those dollars are used that has the FEA upset: The budget allocated money for charter school expansion and increased tax credits for corporations that donate to voucher-like scholarships for attending private schools, which Ford pans as “another example of political leaders favoring unproven and less-accountable schools over our traditional neighborhood schools.”7,8 (Of course, the FEA has long opposed voucher programs.)9 Perhaps the FEA will take its objections to court, as it did in response to a 2011 law requiring state employees to contribute 3 percent of their salaries to pensions (they did not previously pay into the system). That law was overturned in circuit court in March 2012, but the FEA will have to wait until the end of the year, or beyond, for the state supreme court to make a final decision.10

With no allies in the Republican-led governor’s office and legislature, the FEA again turned to the courts. In March 2011, legislators passed SB 736, despite the union’s warning that it would result in “unfair decisions about pay and employment, potential lawsuits, and lost educational opportunity for tens of thousands of the state’s schoolchildren.”11 Praised by Michelle Rhee (and slammed by AFT president Randi Weingarten), the law eliminated tenure for new teachers, tied teacher pay and dismissals to evaluations rather than seniority, and required that at least half of a teacher’s evaluation be based on student growth on standardized tests.12 Resorting once more to the courts, the FEA sued to block the bill on grounds that it was unconstitutional. But it’s unlikely that the union will halt the reforms in the long run—the state denied the allegations of the suit, districts have already started implementing the evaluation system, and the FEA does not actually oppose merit pay (but believes that teacher evaluations should be bargained).13 With two lawsuits pending and Republican-majority state leaders set on education reform, the FEA may soon find the gavel insufficient protection.

TELL IT TO THE JUDGE


FLORIDA

OVERALL RANK: 50TH





42nd


22nd


40th


49th




42nd


17th


45th


28th*








Performance pay Does the state support performance pay for teachers? Required for all teachers





Terms of employment How long before a teacher earns tenure? Annual contracts only






Yes; Lower

FLORIDA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

47*

36*

35*

46*


FLORIDA



(cont.)



No state cap




Partially; Some automatic exemptions for all schools


No; Schools cannot apply for exemptions


Yes




Fifth-most influential or below


Often/Always


Never/Rarely


Disagree


Fight


Disagree


Rarely


Not at all/Mostly not in line


Not at all in line



Rarely


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Florida has the 40th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Florida has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


46*

50


FLORIDA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Florida are shown in the table, Florida Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Florida is ranked 47th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 The indicators in Area 2 are calculated using total contributions to state candidates and political parties from local, state, and national unions. In the majority of cases, the state unions gave much higher sums than all the local unions combined, with the national associations giving little (or nothing). Florida is an exception because the sum of the donations from individual local affiliates is far greater than the contributions from the state union.



6 Lizette Alvarez, “Florida Higher Education May Face Big Budget Cuts,” New York Times, March 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/education/florida-higher-education-may-face-big-budget-cuts.html.

7 Andy Ford, “Public Education Shortchanged — Again,” Star-Banner, April 22, 2012, http://www.ocala.com/article/20120422/OPINION/120429969.

8 Jeff Solochek, “Voucher Debate Spreads As Florida Expands Access,” Tampa Bay Times, April 9, 2012, http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/gradebook/content/voucher-debate-spreads-florida-expands-access.

9 Most famously, the FEA (along with the NEA and AFT) supported a group of parents in filing a lawsuit against former Governor Jeb Bush’s Opportunity Scholarships—a voucher program which proposed public money to pay private school tuition. After a six-year court battle led by NEA lawyers, the Florida Supreme Court ordered the voucher program closed. See Sam Dillon, “Florida Supreme Court Blocks School Vouchers, New York Times, January 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/06/national/06florida.html; the Institute for Justice, “Safeguarding Educational Freedom: Latest Legal Showdown For School Choice Heads To Florida Supreme Court,” accessed August 27, 2012, http://www.ij.org/florida-school-choice-background.

10 Kathleen Haughney, “Judge Overturns Public Employee Pension Contribution Requirement,” Florida Sun-Sentinel, March 6, 2012, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-03-06/business/fl-judge-to-rule-on-pension-20120306_1_florida-retirement-system-public-employees-retirement-age.

11 “Teachers, Researchers: SB 736 Takes Wrong Track,” Florida Education Association, February 22, 2011, http://feaweb.org/teachers-researchers-sb-736-takes-wrong-track.

12 Bill Kaczor, “Gov. Scott Signs Florida Teacher Pay, Tenure Bill,” Associated Press, March 25, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9M68VQ01.htm.

13 Jeff Solochek, “Florida Teacher Lawsuit Over SB736 Moves Slowly,” Tampa Bay Times, November 15, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/gradebook/content/florida-teacher-lawsuit-over-sb-736-moves-slowly.


FLORIDA


GEORGIA



TIED FOR 35TH

Georgia’s two state-level teacher

associations (one affiliated with the NEA,

the other with the AFT) have limited

financial and membership resources.

Collective bargaining is prohibited in the

state, and just 54.8 percent of its teachers

belong to teacher associations (41st of 51

jurisdictions). They bring in $87 per Georgia

teacher annually (49th, ahead of just Texas

and South Carolina). On the other hand,

Georgia spends a relatively large portion

of its state budget on K-12 education (24.4

percent, placing it 9th). Total per-pupil

spending is on the low side of the middle

($9,827 per year; 38th), but a relatively high

proportion of those dollars goes to teacher

salaries and benefits (57.5 percent; 7th).


TIED FOR 36TH

Compared to teacher unions in other states,

Georgia’s associations are not particularly

involved in state politics. In the past

decade, just 0.33 percent of contributions

to candidates for state office came from

them (34th); these donations made up

only 2.9 percent of the funds contributed

by the ten highest-giving sectors in the

state (37th). In addition, the associations

gave only 0.34 percent of the contributions

to state political parties (42nd). Finally,

13.4 percent of Georgia’s delegates to the

Democratic and Republication national

conventions identified as teacher union

members (25th).3

GEORGIA OVERALL RANK: 45TH1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


45

36

26

35

45

48


GEORGIA


TIED FOR 48TH; LAST PLACE

Georgia is one of only five states that

explicitly prohibit collective bargaining.

Although teachers can opt to join local

and/or state professional associations,

those entities may not automatically collect

agency fees from non-members who work

in districts they represent (a limitation that

contributes to the low association revenues

noted in Area 1). The state also prohibits

teacher strikes.


26TH

While some Georgia policies, particularly

those dealing with teacher employment,

align with traditional union interests, others

do not. Teachers earn tenure after three

years (the national norm), and student

learning is not considered in tenure

decisions. Although teacher evaluations

must include evidence of student learning,

state law lets districts decide how learning

is defined and measured and how much

weight it carries among all evaluation

criteria. On the other hand, unions typically

do not support charter schools, and

Georgia law encourages charter expansion

and autonomy—it does not cap the

number of charters, and it allows start-ups,

conversions, and virtual schools. While not

automatically exempt, charters can apply

for exemptions to state laws (including

teacher certification requirements) and

district regulations.


45TH

Georgia stakeholders describe teacher

associations that are comparatively weaker

than those in nearly every other state.

Survey respondents rank them as less

influential than the state school boards

association, the state charter school

association, and education advocacy

groups. They note that state education

leaders only sometimes align with

teacher association positions and that the

associations are not effective in protecting

dollars for education. Further, they report

that policies both proposed by the

governor and those actually enacted during

the latest legislative session were generally

not in line with teacher association

priorities.4

OVERALL

45TH

Georgia’s teacher associations are weak

across the board, not surprising in a state in

which collective bargaining is prohibited—

and whose politics are fairly conservative.

They have few resources and a weak

reputation. While teacher employment

policies are somewhat union-favorable,

charter laws are not, and the associations

stayed out of the way when lawmakers

enacted reforms en route to receiving a

Race to the Top award (see sidebar).


GEORGIA

The NEA-affiliated Georgia Association of Educators (GAE) has kept a fairly low profile in the Peach State. When in 2010 state leaders required districts to design and implement teacher evaluation systems based on student growth—to meet the requirements of their successful Race to the Top application—the GAE did not vociferously object (although the GAE did express dismay that the system was punitive, lacked teacher input, and would be implemented inconsistently).5,6 It did successfully lobby to kill SB 469, a 2012 proposal that would prohibit automatic payroll deductions of member dues—but only with the help of an array of strange bedfellows, including the Tea Party, the Occupy movement, civil rights activists, and religious leaders.7

The GAE is also keeping a relatively low profile on a constitutional amendment allowing the state to authorize charter schools. Voters will decide on the issue in November 2012, but so far the union has limited its activities to issuing press releases and fundraising.8 The charter conflict began in 2009 when the legislature established the Georgia Charter Schools Commission and granted it power to approve and fund new charters, just as local districts could.9 In May 2011, however, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the Commission violated the constitutionally protected authority of local districts and revoked the charters of the seventeen Commission-authorized schools (out of a total of 127 charters in the state), affecting 16,000 students.10 Pro-reform lawmakers responded with the pending constitutional amendment, which drove a rift between Governor Nathan Deal, who supports it, and State Superintendent John Barge, a former rural superintendent who broke with fellow Republicans to come out staunchly against it. Barge stated that the amendment is unnecessary, redundant, and would cost district schools $430 million over the next five years: “Until all of our public school students are in school for a full 180-day school year, until essential services like student transportation and student support can return to effective levels, and until teachers regain jobs with full pay for a full school year, we should not redirect one more dollar away from Georgia’s local school districts.”11 The GAE applauded Barge, stating, “His announcement shows he fully understands the negative ramifications for our public school children.”12

September 2012 polls show voters are divided: half support the amendment, one-quarter oppose it, and one-quarter are undecided. To date, the GAE hasn’t begun advertising or otherwise campaigning in earnest.13 Given that Deal’s endorsement helped two candidates narrowly win their tight primary races in August, and that teacher unions are embroiled in a public-relations nightmare (despite negative public opinion statewide, the GAE and AFT publicly defended the rights of 178 Atlanta teachers caught in the biggest testing scandal in history), the union could find it has little support from voters come November. 14,15

WINNERS NEVER CHEAT, CHEATERS NEVER WIN


GEORGIA

OVERALL RANK: 45TH





49th


9th


38th


7th




34th


42nd


37th


25th


Legal scope of bargaining What is the legal status of collective bargaining? Prohibited



Bargaining is not allowed



Performance pay Does the state support performance pay for teachers? Available to all teachers











Yes; Higher

GEORGIA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

35*

36*

48*

26


GEORGIA



(cont.)



No state cap








Yes






Sometimes/Often


Rarely


Disagree


Generally fight


Neutral


Rarely







Rarely/Sometimes


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Georgia has the 41st-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Georgia, collective bargaining is prohibited, and teacher strikes are also prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


26

45


GEORGIA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Georgia are shown in the table, Georgia Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Georgia is ranked 35th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Jaime Sarrio, “Teachers To Be Graded On Student Test Scores,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, January 2, 2011, http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/teachers-to-be-graded-on-student-test-scores/nQpLG/.

6 “Evaluations and Peer Review” and “GAE Emphasizes That New RT3 Teacher Evaluation Instrument Must Be Implemented Uniformly,” Georgia Association of Educators, accessed August 31, 2012, http://gae2.org/content.asp?contentid=736 and http://gae2.org/content.asp?ContentId=1555.

7 Gloria Tatum, “Occupy Atlanta, Tea Party Patriots Defeat SB 469,” Atlanta Progressive News, March 30, 2012, http://www.atlantaprogressivenews.com/interspire/news/2012/03/30/occupy-atlanta-tea-party-patriots-defeat-sb-469.html.

8 Walter Jones, “Half Of Polled Voters Favor Charter School Amendment,” Morris News Service, September 11, 2012, http://www.cedartownstd.com/view/full_story/20114157/article-Half-of-polled-voters-favor-charter-school-amendment?instance=home_news_lead_story.

9 D. Aileen Dodd, “Georgia Charter School Ruling To Reverberate Across Nation,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, March 21, 2011, http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/georgia-charter-school-ruling-to-reverberate-acros/nQrm6/. HB 881, the legislation creating the Commission (http://gcsc.georgia.gov/gcsc/HB881/hb881.pdf), granted it permission to authorize (§20-2-2081) and fund (§20-2-2090) “commission charter schools” as “special schools” allowable by Article VIII, Section V, Paragraph VII(a) of the Georgia constitution. House Bill 881 also provides that commission charter schools receive extra state funding equal to the local funding they would miss by not being chartered by a local district. When it created and funded commission charter schools, the Commission was operating within the power given to it by HB 881. However, the May 2011 Supreme Court ruling found HB 881 unconstitutional, saying that the constitution did not intend for “special schools” to supersede local district’s exclusive control over K-12 education. The state could authorize special schools but could not give them additional money, because that money was taken from the students’ original district’s share of state funding.

10 Ibid.; “Georgia Charter Schools Weigh Options After State Court Declines To Revisit Decision,” HuffingtonPost.com, June 14, 2011,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/14/georgia-charter-schools_n_877014.html. The commission charter schools can reapply as special schools but would receive direct state and federal funds only, without the state-matched local funds.

11 Dave Williams, “Georgia Schools Chief Opposes Charter School Amendment,” Atlanta Business Chronicle, August 14, 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2012/08/14/georgia-schools-chief-opposes-charter.html.

12 Deanna Allen (ed.), “GAE Lauds State Superintendent’s Stance Against Charter School Constitutional Amendment,” Patch Network, August 15, 2012, http://barrow.patch.com/announcements/gae-lauds-state-superintendents-stance-against-charter-school-constitutional-amendment.

13 Jones.

14 Greg Toppo, “AFT teachers Union To Defend Educators In Cheating Scandals,” USA Today, July 12, 2011,http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2011-07-11-teachers-union-cheating_n.htm.

15 “GAE pleased To See Fair Dismissal Process Working,” Georgia Association of Educators, June 28, 2012, http://gae2.org/content.asp?contentid=1649.

Overall Rank: 1stTier 1 (Strongest)

HAWAII



TIED FOR 3RD

Hawaii’s state teacher union, the Hawaii

State Teachers Association (HSTA),

benefits from abundant resources and a

high membership rate. It is also Hawaii’s

only teacher union—the state consists of

a single school district—and 96.7 percent

of teachers are members (the 7th-highest

unionization rate of 51 jurisdictions

nationwide). The HTSA brings in $705

annually per teacher in the state, also

the 7th-highest. In addition, per-pupil

expenditures in the Aloha state are 13th-

highest across the country at $13,090

per student, and 54.4 percent of those


and benefits (23rd).


TIED FOR 1ST

Hawaii’s teacher union has been a major

player in state politics in the past ten years.

Its donations accounted for 1.5 percent of

total contributions received by candidates

for state office (9th); those contributions

equaled 15.4 percent of all contributions

from the ten highest-giving sectors in the

state (7th). In addition, a full 20.2 percent

of Hawaii’s delegates to the Democratic




9TH

Hawaii is one of twenty-one states that

require collective bargaining and permit

unions to automatically collect agency

HAWAII OVERALL RANK: 1ST1 TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


1

1

9

3

23

9


HAWAII

fees from non-member teachers—a key

source of union revenue. Still, the state

limits the scope of bargaining in some

ways: Of twenty-one subjects examined in

this analysis, Hawaii law explicitly prohibits

bargaining over four: management rights,

transfers, layoffs, and pension/retirement

benefits. On the other hand, the remaining

seventeen items are either required (wages,

hours, insurance benefits, fringe benefits,

and terms and conditions of employment)

or permitted bargaining subjects.


9TH

In part because they tend to protect

teacher job security, Hawaii policies are

closely aligned with traditional union

interests. State law does not require

that teacher evaluations include student

achievement data. Further, it grants

tenure virtually automatically after just

two years (one of only six states that

confer tenure in fewer than three years),

and layoff decisions are based solely on

seniority rather than teacher performance.

Compared to most other states, Hawaii

teachers contribute less to their pensions

than their employers do, and the state’s

teacher-dismissal rate is the 12th-lowest in

the country, with just 1.1 percent dismissed

each year because of poor performance.

Hawaii law also does not favor charter

schools: The state places a cap with limited

room for growth on the number of charters

that can operate, allows for only a single

authorizer, and requires that all charter

schools be part of existing collective

bargaining agreements (although they can

apply for exemptions).


23RD

Despite the union’s considerable resources,

when compared to respondents in other

states, Hawaii stakeholders perceive the

strength of their union to be moderate, on

par with that of the state school board and

association of school administrators. They

agree that the HSTA fought hard in light

of recent budgetary constraints to prevent

reductions in pay and benefits and that the

union is generally effective in protecting

dollars for education. But they report that


latest legislative session and those actually

enacted were only somewhat in line with

union priorities.4 The perception of limited

influence despite substantial resources

could indicate that the state union is

maintaining a low profile in a favorable

environment, may reflect the union’s recent

clashes with state leaders (see sidebar), or

potentially illustrates the union’s waning

reputation after the state famously (or

infamously) briefly implemented a four-day

week in the fall of 2009 as a belt-tightening

measure.

OVERALL

1ST

Hawaii’s teacher union enjoys substantial

financial resources, a large, unified

membership, and a favorable policy climate.

It is actively involved in state politics,

and—despite its local reputation for only

moderate influence—it is the strongest

state union in the nation.


HAWAII

In December 2011, Hawaii received a letter from the U.S. Department of Education warning that it risked losing the $75 million that the Aloha State had won through the Race to the Top (RTTT) competition because it had failed to make significant progress on the goals outlined in its application.5 In response, the state and its union leaders quickly drafted a tentative contract that included a new teacher evaluation system incorporating student growth, thus fulfilling one of the main components of the state’s RTTT plan.6 However, union members rejected the proposed contract by a two to one margin, the first time in the history of the Hawaii State Teachers Association that the “rank and file” refused a recommendation by their leaders.7 Legislation intended to pave the way for the new evaluation system died in the Senate in April 2012.8,9

The following month, the Department of Education announced that while it would remain on “high-risk” status, Hawaii would keep its RTTT grant for now. After visiting Hawaii, Department officials commended state and local leaders for their attempts to fulfill their RTTT plan. Later that month, the HSTA re-voted on the original contract deal—and this time, the members of this strongest state union in the nation approved it by 66 to 34 percent. (One reporter covering the story wrote, “In reconsidering the contract, the union stressed to members that it’s the best deal they can get.”)10 It isn’t clear whether Governor Neil Abercrombie will accept the union’s second-chance approval, as he had previously insisted that after HSTA rejected the contract the first time, the offer was no longer valid.11 But it may behoove both sides to come to an agreement soon, unless they’d like more visitors from Washington.

ALOHA FROM WASHINGTON


HAWAII

OVERALL RANK: 1ST





7th


35th*


13th


23rd




9th


26th


7th


9th



By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 31st


Permitted










Is seniority considered in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Required; Sole factor




No restriction

HAWAII RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

3*

1*

9

9


HAWAII



(cont.)







Yes










Often


Sometimes


Neutral


Fight


Agree


Sometimes




Somewhat in line



Sometimes


Sometimes compromise, sometimes do not need to concede



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Hawaii has the 7th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Hawaii has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


9

23


HAWAII

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Hawaii are shown in the table, Hawaii Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we then use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Hawaii is ranked 3rd of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Michele McNeil, “Ed Dept. Takes Action Against Hawaii For Race To Top Stumbles,” Education Week, December 22, 2011, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2011/12/_this_is_the_departments.html.

6 Michele McNeil, “In Big Setback For Race To Top, Hawaii Teachers Reject Contract,” Education Week, January 20, 2012, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2012/01/big_setback_for_hawaiis_race_t.html.

7 Katherine Poythress, “Hawaii Teachers Reject New Contract With State,” Honolulu Civil Beat, January 19, 2012, http://www.civilbeat.com/articles/2012/01/19/14624-hawaii-teachers-reject-new-contract-with-state/.

8 Michele McNeil, “Is Hawaii One Step Closer To Losing Race To Top Grant?” Education Week, April 13, 2012, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2012/04/with_the_fate_of_hawaiis.html.

9 Alyson Klein, “Hawaii Hangs On To Race To The Top Grant, For Now,” Education Week, May 4, 2012, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2012/05/hawaii_hangs_on_to_race_to_the.html.

10 Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, “Hawaii Teachers Union Approves Union Contract,” BusinessWeek.com, May 24, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-05-24/hawaii-teachers-union-approves-union-contract.

11 Ibid.

Overall Rank: 36th Tier 4 (Weak)

IDAHO



30TH

While Idaho’s state teacher unions have

limited resources from their members,

they see relatively high spending on

education—and teachers—in the state. Only

62.2 percent of teachers in the Gem State

are union members, the 35th-highest rate

of 51 jurisdictions (and about equal to the

average unionization rate in states where

bargaining is similarly permitted but not

required). Union revenue is also low: Idaho’s

NEA and AFT state-level affiliates see $444

annually per teacher in the state (29th).

But the state directs 26.1 percent of its

expenditures toward K–12 education—only

four other states spend a higher proportion.

Although state money, combined with

federal and local, amounts to not much per

pupil ($8,840; 45th), 55.9 percent of those

dollars go toward teacher salaries and

benefits (13th).


TIED FOR 4TH

Idaho’s teacher unions have been a

significant presence in the state politics

over the past decade. Their contributions

comprised 1.4 percent of total donations


(11th) and 11.7 percent of candidate

donations from the ten highest-giving

sectors in the state (also 11th). Moreover,

teacher unions contributed 3.1 percent of

the donations received by state political

parties (6th). The unions’ involvement

extended beyond financial, with 23.1

percent of all Idaho delegates to the

IDAHO OVERALL RANK: 36TH1 TIER 4 (WEAK)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


36

4

45

30

42

42


IDAHO

Democratic and Republican national

conventions identifying as teacher union

members (very few states had more).3


42ND

Idaho is one of fourteen states that permits,

but does not require, collective bargaining,

and the scope of that bargaining is limited.

At the time that we calculated our data,

Idaho prohibited three of the twenty-one

items we examined from being included

in collective bargaining: tenure, teacher

transfer/reassignment, and layoffs. Should

districts choose to negotiate with their

employees, they must bargain wages,

insurance benefits, fringe benefits, and

leave. State law did not address the

remaining fourteen items on our list, leaving

them to the discretion of districts. (Note,

though, that the recently-passed SB 1108

limits the scope of collective bargaining

further: Only cost-of-living adjustments

to wages and benefits are now allowable

bargaining topics, although voters may

overturn the law later in 2012—see sidebar.

The law was passed after we calculated our

metric, and thus, its provisions were not

included in our analyses.) Further, Idaho

does not permit teacher strikes.


45TH

Teacher policies in Idaho are among

the least-aligned with traditional union

interests of any state. For instance, Idaho

requires that student achievement data


evaluations and bans seniority from

consideration in layoff decisions. Recent

legislation eliminated tenure for new

teachers, who instead will work on annual

contracts. Further, with 3.5 percent of

all teachers laid off annually due to poor

performance, its dismissal rate is the

7th-highest in the country. Finally, the

state does not require charter schools to

participate in district collective bargaining

agreements.


TIED FOR 42ND

When compared to other states,

stakeholder responses indicate that Idaho’s

teacher unions are relatively weak. While

they note that Democrats always need

teacher union support to be elected,

consistent with the high levels of giving

discussed in Area 2, they report that the

unions are weak in nearly every other

respect. Survey respondents rank their

influence on education policy below that

of the state school board, state association

of school administrators, and state school

boards association. They also report

that teacher unions are not effective in

protecting dollars for education, that the

positions of state education leaders rarely

align with those of teacher unions, and

that policies proposed the governor and

enacted in the latest legislative session

were not at all in line with teacher union

priorities.4

OVERALL

36TH

While Idaho’s teacher unions are

relatively significant donors and party-

convention-goers—and have rendered

their endorsement crucial to Democratic

political candidates—they operate within

an unfavorable policy environment and

have not garnered much of a reputation for

changing that environment.


IDAHO

A 2010 Republican sweep of the Idaho legislature and governor’s office gave reformers (and opponents of collective bargaining in education) a major opportunity for action—one which they immediately exploited. In early 2011, lawmakers passed a bill that gutted teacher bargaining rights and completely changed state employment and evaluation policies. Under SB 1108, all existing contracts are void and the scope of bargaining is now limited to wages and benefits, and if a district and its union cannot agree on the terms of compensation, district leaders are allowed to impose them. Evaluations, transfers, and workload (among many other things) are now off the table and completely in the hands of state and district leaders.5,6 The bill also eliminates tenure for new teachers, placing them on annual contracts (which districts can extend to two years at their discretion), and removes seniority as a factor in layoff decisions. A companion bill, SB 1110, established merit pay.7 Republican Sen. John Goedde emphasized that SB 1108 “isn’t about collective bargaining; it’s about putting students first.”8 But Democrat Rep. Brian Cronin (a former public school teacher) countered, “Let’s stop pretending that SB 1108 has anything to do with [student achievement]. The bill intends to dismantle the Idaho Education Association, put teachers in their place, and make sure that teachers are effectively silenced.”9

Despite the pushback from the capitol, teachers and the IEA are doing their best to make sure that they are heard, organizing teacher protests and student walkouts across the state.10 The Idaho Education Association filed a lawsuit against the state, Governor C.L. Otter, and State Superintendant Tom Luna, alleging that they “overstepped their legal bounds” by enacting a law that is unconstitutional on a number of fronts; the court initially rejected the suit, and the union is currently appealing the decision.11 But the IEA has another opportunity to overturn both SB 1108 and SB 1110: It collected enough signatures to place veto referendums on the 2012 ballot (and tried, but failed, to put a recall of Luna before the voters as well).12 In June 2012, meanwhile, twenty-one school districts took advantage of SB 1108. They unilaterally decided on provisions relative to teacher wages and benefits when negotiations with local unions reached an impasse.13 An overstep or the right step? Voters will decide in November.

WATCH YOUR STEP


IDAHO

OVERALL RANK: 36TH





29th


5th


45th


13th




11th


6th


11th


6th*

AREA 3:SCOPE OF BARGAININGC


By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 32nd










Terms of employment How long before a teacher earns tenure? Annual contracts only


Is seniority considered in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Not considered




No restriction

IDAHO RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

30

4*

42

45


IDAHO



(cont.)











Yes






Often/Always


Rarely


Disagree


Generally fight


Neutral


Sometimes







Rarely/Sometimes





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Idaho has the 35th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Idaho permits collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected]. c See note in Area 3, above, and sidebar.


45

42*


IDAHO

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Idaho are shown in the table, Idaho Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Idaho is ranked 30th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Laura Zuckerman, “By A 20-15 Vote, The Idaho Senate On Thursday Approved Legislation That Curtails Collective Bargaining By Public School Teachers,” Reuters, February 24, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/24/us-idaho-teachers-idUSTRE71N7A220110224.

6 “Idaho Educators Challenge Constitutionality Of SB 1108,” Idaho Education Association, April 27, 2011, http://idahoea.org/news/iea-challenges-constitutionality-of-senate-bill-1108.

7 Betsy Z. Russell, “Bill Limits Teachers’ Bargaining Powers,” Spokesman-Review, March 9, 2011, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2011/mar/09/bill-limits-teachers-bargaining-powers/.

8 Zuckerman.

9 Russell.

10 KTVB and Associated Press, “Proposed Education Reforms Prompt Strong Reaction From Students,” KTVB.com, February 28, 2011, http://www.ktvb.com/news/Students-walk-out-of-class-in-protest-of-education-reform-plan-117064878.html.

11 Idaho Education Association.

12 Sean Cavanagh, “Idaho Schools Superintendant Won’t Face Recall,” Education Week, June 28, 2011, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2011/06/idaho_school_superintendent_wont_face_recall.html.

13 Betsy Z. Russell, “21 Idaho Districts Unilaterally Set Contracts For Teachers,” Spokesman-Review, June 21, 2012, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/jun/21/21-idaho-districts-unilaterally-set-contracts-for/.


ILLINOIS



TIED FOR 18TH

While the two state-level teacher unions

in Illinois have high membership rates

compared to other states, the union

revenues and spending on K–12 education

are both in the middle of the pack. Fully

96.2 percent of teachers in the Land of

Lincoln belong to unions (8th-highest out

of 51 jurisdictions). But the state’s NEA and

AFT affiliates bring in just $497 annually

per teacher in the state (25th). Spending

on K–12 education by the state is moderate,

accounting for 18.7 percent of Illinois’s

expenditures (29th). Education dollars

from all sources (local, state, and federal)

are moderate as well—$11,229 per pupil

annually (27th), with 53.1 percent of that

money going toward teacher salaries and

benefits (34th).


12TH

Teacher unions have been significant

contributors to state political campaigns in

Illinois over the past decade: Teacher-union

donations to state candidates comprised

3.6 percent of all such donations, the

largest proportion in the land.3 Of the

money donated by the ten highest-giving

sectors, teacher unions gave 18.2 percent

(3rd). Unions focused their contributions

on candidates as opposed to state political

parties: a mere 0.6 percent of donations to

parties in Illinois came from teacher unions

(33rd). Finally, 14.2 percent of all delegates

to the Democratic and Republican national


(23rd).4

ILLINOIS OVERALL RANK: 8TH1

TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


8

12

39

18

28

3


ILLINOIS


3RD

Illinois is one of twenty-one states that

both require collective bargaining and allow


from non-member teachers, a key source

of union revenue. The state also has one of

the broadest scopes of bargaining in the

nation—of the potential contract provisions

examined in this metric, all twenty-one

may be bargained. State law mandates that

five be negotiated: wages, hours, terms

and conditions of employment, class load,

and extracurricular duties.5 The remaining

sixteen provisions are either explicitly

permitted (four items) or implicitly allowed

because the state takes no position; and,

as recently demonstrated by the Chicago

Teachers Union, Illinois law permits teacher

strikes.


39TH

Many of Illinois’s state policies do not align

with traditional teacher union interests. The

state specifies that teacher evaluations be

significantly informed by student growth.

Tenure is granted after four years (three

years is the national norm) and the tenure

decision must take student growth into

consideration. Layoff decisions must take

teacher performance into account rather

than relying on seniority alone. Further,

Illinois law allows new and virtual charter

schools, as well as conversions of traditional

public schools. Charters are not required

to participate in collective bargaining

agreements. A handful of policies, however,

are more favorable to unions: The state

does not support performance pay, and

it places a cap on the number of charter

schools allowed to operate. The paucity of

favorable policies may have encouraged

union donations to state politics (Area 2),

which more than doubled between 2004

and 2010.


28TH

Stakeholders in Illinois perceive teacher

unions to be an active—if not always

effective—force in state politics. Survey

respondents rank the union among the

entities with the greatest influence on

education policies, after the state school

board. They report that Democrats

often need teacher union support to be

elected, and that state education leaders

often align with union positions. But they

note that education policies proposed

by the governor and those enacted in

the most recent legislative session were

only somewhat in line with teacher union

priorities.6 They also report that, in a time

of recent budgetary constraints, teacher

unions conceded from the outset that

some reductions in pay and benefits were

acceptable.

OVERALL

8TH

Illinois state teacher unions operate

in a favorable collective bargaining

environment and are very active in state-

level politics. Yet despite these advantages,

they do not have a particularly favorable

policy environment, and their perceived

effectiveness is moderate when compared

with unions in other states.


ILLINOIS

In contrast to the political war waged in many neighboring states, Illinois state legislators, teacher unions, and the governor reached détente in Spring 2011. They jointly backed SB 7, a sweeping education-reform bill that considers teacher performance (not just seniority) in teacher pay, tenure, and dismissal; streamlines the dismissal process; and makes legal strikes more difficult.7,8 (The spirit of cooperation clearly didn’t extend to Chicago, where implementing SB 7 was a major part of the September 2012 Chicago Teachers Union strike—the first strike in twenty-five years.9) Despite support for the bill, however, there has been a major hang-up to implementing it: dollars. “We keep [making aggressive reforms] for less and less money…and there’s a breaking point,” warned State Superintendent Chris Koch.10

To avoid that financial cliff, in late 2011 Senate Democrats, along with Democrat Governor Pat Quinn, proposed a comprehensive plan to reform the state pension system. As of July 2012, the bill remained stalled in the legislature due to an unlikely meeting of the minds between labor unions and Republican representatives.11,12 Reacting to the requirement that local districts make up for state cuts, Dan Montgomery, president of the Illinois Federation of Teachers, railed that “there’s no free choice here, but a coercive dilemma where a public servant must choose between harm on the one hand or more harm on the other.”13 Republican lawmakers agreed: The bill would force districts to raise property taxes or make cuts in the classroom, neither of which is palatable. Democrat Representative Elaine Nekritz countered that moving the burden away from the state was essential: “With this change, we can move away from being financial laughingstocks.” With the clock ticking down on the state’s gravely underfunded pensions and lawmakers acting with no sense of urgency, time may make a fool of them all.

DOWN TO THE WIRE


ILLINOIS

OVERALL RANK: 8TH





25th


29th


27th


34th




1st


33rd


3rd


23rd





Permitted









Is student/teacher performance considered in tenure decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Required; Included as one of multiple criteria





Yes; Higher

ILLINOIS RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

18*

12

3

39


ILLINOIS



(cont.)



State cap with some room for growth




Yes




Yes






Often/Always


Sometimes


Neutral


Generally concede


Agree


Sometimes/Often







Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Illinois has the 8th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Illinois has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


39

28


ILLINOIS

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Illinois are shown in the table, Illinois Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Illinois is ranked 18th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 While our overall metric reports the strength of state teacher unions, this area also captures contributions to state campaigns and parties from national unions and local union affiliates. Typically, the total contributions from each are much smaller than the donations from the state unions. But in Illinois’s case, a local union (the AFT-affiliated Chicago Teachers Union) gave almost as much as the state unions did.


5 Illinois Senate Bill 7, passed June 2011, stipulates that hours are a permissive rather than mandatory subject in districts that serve cities with a population greater than 500,000 people (in other words, Chicago). In such cases, district leaders can decide whether to negotiate or impose the length of the work and school day/year. See Note 9, below, for more.


7 Ellen Alberding, “Illinois: The New Leader In Education Reform,” Chicago Tribune, June 13, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-13/news/ct-oped-0613-reform-20110613_1_piece-of-education-legislation-teachers-kimberly-lightford.

8 Illinois Senate Bill 7, accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/97/SB/09700SB0007sam001.htm.

9 The Chicago strike touched on many of the contentious issues in education reform: merit pay (and teacher pay more generally), evaluations, and length of school day. The conflict began in July 2012 when an arbitrator ruled that while the city could lengthen the school day, it could not demand teachers work more hours without additional compensation. However, both union and management rejected the plan laid out by the ruling, and talks stalled through the summer, resulting in a seven-day strike at the start of the school year in September. The agreement that eventually ended the walkout does maintain Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s stated primary goals: Students now have a longer school day and principals kept their right to decide which teachers to hire. But the settlement’s other provisions reflect the union’s goals, perhaps because Democratic leadership—including the well-connected Emanuel—was concerned about the strike’s effect on the presidential election. The agreement does not contain merit pay; gives teachers across-the-board raises of 3 percent, 2 percent, and 2 percent over the next three years; sets the portion of evaluations based on student growth at 30 percent, nearly at the minimum level of 25 percent required by state law; leaves teacher work hours untouched while requiring the city to hire additional teachers to cover the lengthened school day; and ensures that half of all new district hires are teachers who were laid off in 2010 due to budget constraints. As of publication, details of the new contract were being finalized, after which it must be approved by rank-and-file union members. But it appears safe to say that the CTU got most of what it wanted. See “Chicago Teachers Strike: Union, Emanuel Disagree On Bottom Line,” HuffingtonPost.com, September 9, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/10/chicago-teachers-school-b_n_1869477.html; “Chicago Teachers Agree To End Strike, Classes To Resume Wednesday,” NBC News, September 18, 2012, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/18/13938248-chicago-teachers-agree-to-end-strike-classes-to-resume-wednesday?lite.

10 Ray Long, “Education Reforms Underfunded, Illinois School Chief Warns,” Chicago Tribune, July 18, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-07-18/news/ct-met-education-reform-funding-20110718_1_evaluations-teacher-performance-education-reforms.

11 “Schools Predict Local Burdens From Pension Plan,” Illinois Daily Herald, May 30, 2012, http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20120530/news/705309938/.

12 Associated Press, “Illinois Governor Hints At Calling Legislative Session Next Month Over Pensions,” Chicago Tribune, July 18, 2012, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/sns-ap-il--illinois-pensions-quinn-20120718,0,5084344.story.

13 Dave McKinney and Andrew Maloney, “Unions: Pension Bill Forces Choice ‘Between Harm…Or More Harm,’” Chicago Sun-Times, May 29, 2012, http://www.suntimes.com/news/cityhall/12844079-418/unions-pension-changes-force-choice-between-harm-or-more-harm.html.

Overall Rank: 31stTier 4 (Average)

INDIANA



TIED FOR 9TH

Indiana’s state teacher unions have

substantial internal resources, and see that

K–12 education (and teacher salaries and

benefits) accounts for a high percentage

of spending in the state. With 73.7 percent

of its teachers belonging to unions, the

Hoosier State posts the 29th-highest

unionization rate of 51 states. The NEA

and AFT state-level affiliates bring in

$679 annually per Indiana teacher (8th

of 51). Further, a hefty 30.1 percent of

state expenditures to go K–12 education

(2nd; only Vermont allocates a higher

percentage toward education).2 While total

per-pupil expenditures are right around

the national mean ($10,419 annually; 33rd),

teachers benefit from a large share of those

dollars—55.3 percent goes toward their



TIED FOR 13TH

Indiana’s teacher unions have been a

larger presence in state politics than their

counterparts in most other states. In the

past decade, 2.8 percent of contributions


teacher unions (3rd). Of the donations

originating from the top ten highest-

giving sectors in the state, 16.7 percent

were from the unions (5th). The unions

focused on candidates rather than state

political parties, however, contributing

only 0.2 percent of all donations to Indiana

parties (45th). And 14.3 percent of all

Indiana delegates to the Democratic and

Republican national conventions were

teacher union members (22nd).4

INDIANA OVERALL RANK: 31ST1

TIER 4 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


31

13

44

9

32

39


INDIANA


39TH

Indiana is one of thirty-two states that

require collective bargaining, but on

this indicator it ranks lower than every

other mandatory-bargaining state except

Wisconsin (and lower even than seven of

the fourteen states where bargaining is

permitted but not required—see sidebar).

The low rank is largely due to state law that

sharply limits the number of issues that can

be bargained: Indiana explicitly prohibits

bargaining over sixteen of the twenty-one

items examined in this report. Only four

must be bargained—wages, and insurance,

pension/retirement, and fringe benefits—

and bargaining over grievance procedures

is permitted but not required. Unions’ legal

rights were further limited by recently

enacted right-to-work legislation that

stops them from collecting agency fees, a

key source of revenue, from non-member

teachers. The new law will likely diminish

the now-abundant financial resources

discussed in Area 1. Indiana also does not



44TH

Indiana policies are less aligned with

traditional union interests than those

in nearly every other state. Per recent

legislation, Indiana is one of only three

states with a state-supported mandatory

system of merit pay for all teachers.

Further, evidence of student learning must

significantly inform teacher evaluations,

and teachers are automatically eligible for

dismissal after unsatisfactory evaluations.

Indiana charter laws are also contrary to

the typical union position, which looks

to limit charter expansion and autonomy.

Indiana allows new, conversion, and virtual

charter schools, offers multiple authorizing

options for school operators, and does not

cap the total number of charters. Nor are

charters required to participate in district

collective bargaining agreements. They can

also apply for exemptions to state teacher

certification requirements. The unfavorable

bargaining (Area 3) and state policy (Area

4) environments may account for the high

level of teacher union campaign donations

(Area 2), as unions try to change existing

conditions.


32ND

Indiana’s stakeholders view teacher unions

as active players in state policy debates,

but agree that unions have not pulled much

sway of late. While they strongly agree that

Democrats need teacher union support

to get elected, they rank teacher unions

as less influential in shaping state policy

than education advocacy organizations

and the governor. Further, their responses

indicate state education leaders are the

least aligned with the union position than

they are in any other state, and the unions

have not seen much success of late in this

Republican-dominated state (see sidebar).

In fact, respondents report that policies

proposed by the governor and enacted in

the latest legislative session were mostly

not in line with teacher union priorities.5

OVERALL

31ST

Indiana teacher unions are stronger

than those in some states but weaker

than those in many others—and Indiana

ranks low among the states in which

bargaining is mandatory (27th of 33).

They have considerable internal resources

(and contribute relatively generously to

candidates for state office), but while the

state dedicates a high proportion of its


INDIANA

2011 was not a good year for the Indiana State Teachers Association (ISTA). Mirroring his 2005 executive order that eliminated collective bargaining for state workers, Republican Governor Mitch Daniels signed a bill that restricted the scope of teachers’ bargaining to wages and benefits. With evaluations, transfers, and dismissals off the negotiating table, Daniels and State Superintendent of Education Tony Bennett proposed SB 1, which Republican lawmakers quickly passed. The law mandates that teacher evaluations be based in part on student growth, and requires merit pay while lessening the weight of seniority and advanced degrees on salaries (although, in a nod to local autonomy, district leaders may choose their own evaluation model).6,7 The ISTA organized a boisterous rally at the statehouse in what ISTA director Heidi Miller called “an indication of how serious, how concerned, our teachers are about how the so-called education reform is going to impact their students.”8 The protest saw no success, although it did prompt Daniels to issue a written statement saying “as always, the union’s demand is more money, no change…Their priority is their organization, not the young people of Indiana.”9 In the same session, the legislature removed the state’s cap on charter schools, expanded the number of charter authorizers, and required that district schools share transportation funds with charters. This was immediately followed by HB 1003, which created a publicly funded voucher program, implemented tax deductions for private school tuition, and expanded tax credits for organizations offering private school scholarships.10 Bennett praised lawmakers for their work, and sent a message to the unions: “I commend the committee members…for their courage to do what is right in the face of considerable opposition from those whose primary objective seems to be protecting a system of school buildings rather than advocating for all Indiana children.”11

As if 2011 weren’t bad enough, in 2012 another resounding piece of anti-union legislation made Indiana the first right-to-work state in the Rust Belt.12 The ISTA also discovered that it couldn’t rely on the courts for protection against anti-union state leaders: Although it filed a successful lawsuit against a portion of SB 1 on grounds that it violated Indiana labor law, the overall restrictions on collective bargaining still stand.13 The union also supported a lawsuit to stop HB 1003, claiming that it violated the state constitution by directing taxpayer money to religious institutions, but a Superior Court judge upheld the measure.14 With Bennett up for re-election in November 2012 in a race receiving national attention (and out-fundraising his union-supported Democrat challenger nearly ten-to-one), the union might not have allies in the capitol any time soon.15 So while nearby Wisconsin has received national attention for its anti-labor stance, the wide range of education-specific policies in Indiana may actually make it a better contender for most teacher-union-unfriendly state in the nation.

FROM BAD TO WORSE

money to K–12 education, the laws that

limit the scope of bargaining, prescribe

teacher employment policies, and set forth

charter school policies show little alignment

with traditional union interests. Their

resources and already-weak reputation will

likely diminish due to new legislation and

a Republican-led legislature (again, see

sidebar).


INDIANA

OVERALL RANK: 31ST





8th


2nd


33rd


19th




3rd


45th


5th


22nd



















Yes; Higher

INDIANA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

9*

13*

39

44


INDIANA



(cont.)



No state cap


How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Two or more active/available options


Partially; Some automatic exemptions for some schools




Yes




Third-most influential


Always


Rarely


Neutral


Fight


Neutral


Sometimes




Mostly not in line



Rarely





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Indiana has the 29th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Indiana has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


44

32


INDIANA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Indiana are shown in the table, Indiana Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Indiana is ranked 9th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.

2 Readers may be aware that Indiana passed legislation in 2009 that required all of a school district’s general-fund revenue come from directly from the state, therefore eliminating local property taxes and by necessity increasing K–12 education’s share of overall state expenditures. See Robert S. Michael, Terry E. Spradlin, and Fatima R. Carson, “Changes in Indiana School Funding,” Center for Evaluation and Education Policy, Summer 2009, accessed August 28, 2012, http://ceep.indiana.edu/projects/PDF/PB_V7N2_Summer_2009_EPB.pdf.




6 Elle Moxley, “How Districts Are Preparing For State-Mandated Teacher Evaluations,” StateImpact Indiana, May 16, 2012, http://stateimpact.npr.org/indiana/2012/05/16/how-school-districts-are-preparing-for-mandatory-teacher-evaluations/.

7 Maureen Hayden, “Gov. Daniels Signs ‘Landmark’ Education Bill,” Herald Bulletin, April 30, 2011, http://heraldbulletin.com/local/x833654119/Seniority-degrees-lose-value-under-new-plan.

8 Mark Peterson, “Charter School Bill Passes Test,” WNDU Indiana, February 12, 2011, http://www.wndu.com/localnews/headlines/Charter_school_bill_passes_test_115983179.html.

9 Kent Erdahl, “Teachers Fill Statehouse, Rally Against Proposed Education Reforms,” WXIN-TV (Fox59.com), February 9, 2011, http://www.fox59.com/news/wxin-education-reform-indiana-educators-packed-the-statehouse-on-tuesday-to-voice-their-concerns-about-education-reforms-proposed-by-governor-mitch-daniels-and-making-their-way-through-20110208,0,7282343.story.

10 Sean Cavanagh, “Indiana Education Package Bears Conservative Stamp,” Education Week, Issue 31, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/05/12/31indiana.h30.html.

11 Indiana Department of Education press release, “Bennett Statement Of Education Bills Passing Committee,” February 16, 2011, http://www.doe.in.gov/news/bennett-statement-education-bills-passing-committee.

12 Mary Beth Schneider and Chris Sikich, “Indiana Becomes Rust Belt’s First Right-To-Work State,” Indianapolis Star, February 2, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-01/indiana-right-to-work-bill/52916356/1.

13 NSBA Legal Clips, “Indiana Court Preliminarily Enjoins State Department Of Education From Requiring School Districts To Use Teacher Contract Form,” National School Boards Association, August 25, 2011, http://legalclips.nsba.org/?p=8296.

14 Associated Press, “Judge Upholds Indiana School Voucher Law,” January 13, 2012, http://www.ibj.com/judge-upholds-indiana-school-voucher-law/PARAMS/article/31962.

15 Kyle Stokes, “Interactive Map: Who’s Giving Money In The Campaign For State superintendent,” StateImpact Indiana, August 2, 2012, http://stateimpact.npr.org/indiana/2012/08/02/interactive-map-whos-giving-money-in-the-campaign-for-state-superintendent/.

Overall Rank: 27thTier 3 (Average)

IOWA



27TH

Compared with unions in other states, the

membership and financial resources of

Iowa’s state teacher union is in the middle

of the pack. Approximately three out of

four teachers in the Hawkeye State are

union members (its membership rate of

73.3 percent is 30th out of 51 jurisdictions).

From its members, the Iowa Education

Association brings in $496 annually per

teacher in the state (26th of 51). And

while 57.3 percent of total K–12 education

spending in Iowa goes to teacher salaries

and benefits (8th), just 17.4 percent of state

expenditures go toward K–12 education

(34th), giving teachers what amounts to a

large slice of a small pie.


TIED FOR 23RD

Teacher unions have been moderately

active in Iowa state politics over the past

decade.3 Their donations amounted to

0.59 percent of the total contributions to

candidates for state office (25th) and 2.2

percent of donations received by state

political parties (12th). Further, 16.6 percent

of Iowa’s delegates to the Democratic and




32ND

While Iowa is one of thirty-two states

that require collective bargaining, the

state does not permit its unions to


IOWA OVERALL RANK: 27TH1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


27

23

11

27

31

32


IOWA

non-member teachers, and it prohibits

teacher strikes. Still, the state allows a

broad scope of bargaining: Of twenty-

one provisions examined in this metric,

nine must be negotiated: wages, hours,

grievance procedures, transfers/teacher

reassignments, layoffs, evaluation processes

and instruments, insurance benefits, fringe

benefits, and leave. Only one item, pension/

retirement benefits, is explicitly excluded

from negotiations. Bargaining over the

remaining eleven items is implicitly allowed

because the state is silent on them.


11TH

Iowa’s education policies generally

align with traditional teacher union

interests. State law does not require that

student achievement factor into teacher

evaluations; does not support teacher

performance pay; and grants tenure

virtually automatically after three years.

Further, charter schools are limited;

although there’s no cap on the number

of such schools, Iowa does not allow new

or virtual charters, only conversions of

existing district schools. It also requires

all charters to be approved by both a

local school board and the state board of

education—a more restrictive authorizing

policy than in many other states. All charter

school teachers must be certified and all

charter schools must participate in district



31ST

Stakeholders report that the Iowa union

has limited reach. Survey respondents rank

its influence on education policy slightly

behind that of the state school board

and slightly ahead of the association of

school administrators, the school board

association, and education advocacy

organizations. But they note that state

education leaders only sometimes align

with teacher union priorities, and that

unions often turn to compromise to

see their preferred policies enacted. In

addition, stakeholders report that policies

proposed in the latest legislative session

were mostly not in line with union priorities,

while policies actually enacted were only

somewhat in line.5

OVERALL

27TH

While Iowa teachers see a comparatively

large share of overall spending on K–12

education going to teacher salary and

benefits, their state union does not have a

large degree of financial and membership

resources itself. Even though unions

contribute significant amounts to state

political parties, and enjoy a favorable

policy environment at the state level,

stakeholders do not perceive the union as

particularly influential.


IOWA

The slide of Hawkeye students from well above the national average in reading and math in the early to mid-1990s down to average in 2011 garnered significant concern from state leaders.6 In July 2011, Republican governor Terry Branstad hosted the Iowa Education Summit, and Chris Bern, then president of the Iowa State Education Association (ISEA), was pleased with the results: “It was a good exchange of a lot of different ideas.”7 He was not so enthusiastic when Branstad presented the blueprint for his education reform bill, which included a progressive plan for compensation, increased tenure requirements, and a plan to decertify teachers on the basis of unsatisfactory evaluations.8

Discussion of the plan in the legislature quickly broke along party lines, with Republicans supporting the governor while Senate Democrats insisted on amending provisions related to student testing, the expansion of charter schools, and online education. The ISEA also pushed hard for such amendments.9 The reform bill that the Senate finally passed replaced the formal annual evaluations that Branstad sought with peer reviews two out of every three years, omitted a value-added assessment system, and reduced opportunities for online learning.10 “Unfortunately, I think the Senate bill is a much watered-down version,” lamented Branstad.11 But the two chambers of the legislature passed the bill, which the governor signed in May 2012 (although not without taking one last swipe at the law, calling it “a first step” but affirming that “bold reform is still needed”).12

Turns out more than just Iowans were paying attention to the outcome. When the federal government issued a stack of NCLB waivers in June 2012, Iowa was conspicuously omitted. The state’s department of education and governor both pointed fingers at lawmakers, indicating that legislative (in)action was to blame. “Responsibility for the denial of this request lies squarely at the feet of the Iowa Legislature, which did too little to improve our schools despite repeated warnings,” said Branstad.13 Whether the legislature is to blame for its toothless reform bill or the union for pressuring lawmakers to remove the teeth, little help is in sight for Iowa’s still-sliding students.

MIRED IN MEDIOCRITY


IOWA

OVERALL RANK: 27TH





26th


34th


21st


8th




25th


12th


35th


16th



















No restriction

IOWA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

27

23*

32

11


IOWA

Area and Rank General Indicator Sub-IndicatorSub-indicator Rank/Status


(cont.)



No state cap

Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools? Conversions only







No; No allowable exemptions




Second-most influential


Sometimes


Rarely


Disagree


Generally fight


Neutral


Sometimes




Somewhat in line



Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Iowa has the 30th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Iowa has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


11

31


IOWA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Iowa are shown in the table, Iowa Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Iowa is ranked 27th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 In this metric, we include contributions from state unions and their local and national affiliates. While in most states the state-level union is the largest donor, in Iowa the AFT-national is a major contributor as well.



6 “State Profiles,” National Center for Education Statistics, accessed July 20, 2012, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states/.

7 Steve Woodhouse, “ISEA’s Bern Pleased That Teachers Have Role In Education Reform,” Journal Express, August 5, 2011, http://journalexpress.net/local/x850291497/ISEAs-Bern-pleased-that-teachers-have-role-in-education-reform.

8 Jeff Ignatius, “No Poison Apple? Terry Branstad’s Education Proposal Aims To Be Palatable To Varied Legislators And Interests. They’re Open To Reform But Leery,” River Cities’ Reader, January 19, 2012, http://www.rcreader.com/commentary/branstad-education-reform/.

9 “Education Reform Talking Points,” Iowa State Education Association, March 7, 2012, http://www.isea.org/assets/document/TP_ed_reform_bill-revised.pdf.

10 Jason Clayworth, “Iowa Senate Passed Education Reform; Hurdles Ahead,” Des Moines Register, April 9, 2012, http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2012/04/09/iowa-senate-passed-education-reform-hurdles-ahead/.

11 Ibid.

12 Jason Clayworth, “Branstad Signs Education Reform; Shakes Finger For Using ‘One-Time Money,’” Des Moines Register, May 25, 2012, http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2012/05/25/branstad-signs-education-reform-shakes-finger-for-using-one-time-money/.

13 Mary Stegmeir, “Iowa Denied NCLB Waiver,” Des Moines Register, June 21, 2012, http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2012/06/21/iowa-denied-nclb-waiver/.

KANSAS Overall Rank: 32nd1

Tier 4 (Weak)



TIED FOR 33RD

Kansas’s state teacher unions do not

receive substantial resources from their

members, but spending on education in the

state is high. With just 54.7 percent of its

teachers unionized, the Sunflower State’s

membership rate is only 42nd of 51 states.

The state’s NEA and AFT affiliates bring

in $336 annually per teacher in the state

(32nd). On the other hand, Kansas directs

26.0 percent of its expenditures towards

K–12 education—only five states allocate

a higher percentage. Further, annual per-

pupil expenditures total $12,056 (20th),

with 55.6 percent of that going to teacher



TIED FOR 18TH

Kansas’s teacher unions are reasonably

active participants in state politics. Over

the past ten years, 0.92 percent of the total

donations received by candidates for state

office came from the unions (19th). Those

contributions amounted to 6.9 percent

of donations to candidates from the ten

highest-giving sectors in the state (20th). In

addition, teacher unions contributed 0.49

percent of the money received by state

political parties (37th). Finally, 13.1 percent

of all Kansas delegates to the Democratic



KANSAS OVERALL RANK: 32ND1

TIER 4 (WEAK)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


32

18

14

33

30

31

Overall Rank: 32ndTier 4 (Weak)

KANSAS


31ST

While Kansas law requires collective

bargaining, it does not allow unions to


non-members. The law also forbids teacher

strikes, but it does include a wide scope

of provisions in collective bargaining:

Of twenty-one items examined in this

metric, Kansas mandates ten be subjects

of bargaining: wages, hours, terms and

conditions of employment, grievance

procedures, dismissal, insurance benefits,

pension/retirement benefits, fringe benefits,

leave, and class load. Only one item (length

of the teacher school year) is explicitly

outside the scope of bargaining; the state is

silent on the remaining ten items, implicitly

permitting them all.


14TH

Compared to other states, policies

in Kansas are generally aligned with

traditional union interests. The state does

not require that student achievement data

factor into teacher evaluations, and it does

not outline consequences for unsatisfactory

evaluations. Teachers earn tenure after

three years (the national norm), and

student achievement data are not a factor

here, either. The state does not support

performance pay, nor does it require that

districts consider teacher performance

when determining layoffs. Further, state

law does not exempt charter schools from

teacher certification requirements, and it

requires charters to participate in district

collective bargaining agreements (though

individual schools may seek waivers).


30TH

According to Kansas stakeholders, teacher

unions are a moderately powerful force

in state politics but may not face much of

a challenge, noting that state education

leaders often align with the union position.

Survey respondents rank unions as the

second- or third-most influential entity on

education policy, behind the state school

board and alongside the association of

school administrators. While they note that

outcomes of the latest legislative session


union priorities, they agree that teacher

unions are generally effective in protecting

dollars for education and warding off

education reform proposals with which

they disagree.4

OVERALL

32ND

Kansas teacher unions are strong in a

handful of key areas—state spending

on education and the general policy

environment—but relatively weak in

others, including financial and membership

resources, and the scope of bargaining.

While close to the middle of the pack

nationwide, they are among the least-

powerful unions in states in which

bargaining is mandatory (South Dakota,

Tennessee, New Mexico, and Florida rank

below them, while 27 other mandatory-

bargaining states rank higher).


KANSAS

The past few years have seen a massive budgetary battle waged in the Jayhawk State—with education on the front lines. In 2011, the Kansas National Education Association (KNEA) teamed up with school board members, superintendents, and liberal lawmakers to fight against funding cuts that would, according to them, set spending levels back twenty years and severely impact students.5 While conservative legislators argued that education spending should rise and fall with tax revenues (and Kansas had certainly seen its revenues fall with the recession), the KNEA countered that the legislature should follow the advice of its own Kansas Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, which recommended raising revenue by discontinuing a $196 million sales tax exemption for industry. Despite concerns about the economic impact of removing the exemption, KNEA President Blake West declared that the state must end the “decade of continuous tax cuts that have crippled the state’s ability to provide essential services to its citizens.”6 KNEA director of governmental affairs Mark Desetti went a step further: “If this Legislature can’t support our schools, maybe we should find one that will.”7 But in May 2012, to the chagrin of the union (but with the approval of pro-business groups), Governor Sam Brownback signed into law yet more breaks; the new law included reductions in individual income tax rates and the exemption of most small business income from any state taxes.8

In the summer of 2012, the KNEA set about making its threat to the legislature a reality. The month before the August primaries, the union released its list of recommended legislative candidates. Of the 131 incumbent House and Senate members running for re-election, it endorsed only 60.9 “Do not allow a candidate to say, ‘I believe in public schools.’ Hold their feet to the fire,” said Desetti.10 Predictably, the KNEA did not have a single endorsement in common with those of the Kansas Chamber of Commerce, the union’s foe during the push to remove tax breaks for industry. Jeff Glendening, the Chamber’s vice president of political affairs, proclaimed that the teacher union is “wholly about money. How much money is going into the system.”11 The Kansas primary, and 2012 general election, will see the voters decide where the money should go.

ALL ABOUT THE MONEY


KANSAS

OVERALL RANK: 32ND



Membership By rank, what percentage of public-school teachers in the state are union members? 42nd


32nd


6th


20th


17th




19th


37th


20th


26th



By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 3rd
















No restriction

KANSAS RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

33*

18*

31

14


KANSAS



(cont.)



No state cap














Sometimes/Often


Sometimes


Agree


Generally concede


Agree


Sometimes/Often


**





Often


Compromise




b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Kansas has the 42nd-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Kansas has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


14

30


KANSAS

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Kansas are shown in the table, Kansas Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Kansas is ranked 33rd of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Angela Deines, “Education Advocates Rally Against Budget Cuts,” Capitol Journal, July 30, 2011, http://cjonline.com/news/2011-07-30/education-advocates-rally-against-budget-cuts#.TkVL4GFl8oE.

6 Blake West, “What’s Important, What’s Urgent,” Kansas National Education Association, n.d., http://www.knea.org/home/614.htm.

7 Deines.

8 Emily Behlmann, “What Does The Kansas Tax Reform Plan Mean For You,” Wichita Business Journal, May 11, 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/wichita/blog/2012/05/what-does-the-kansas-tax-reform-plan.html?page=all.

9 Mark Desetti, “KNEA Makes Preliminary Candidate Recommendations For The August 7 Primary Election,” Kansas National Education Association, August 7, 2012, http://www.knea.org/home/1618.htm.

10 Dawn Bormann, “Education Is Key In Kansas Primaries,” Kansas City Star, July 26, 2012, http://www.kansascity.com/2012/07/20/3724067/education-is-at-focus-of-kansas.html.

11 Ibid.


KENTUCKY



TIED FOR 35TH

In Kentucky, collective bargaining is

permitted but not required, which means

the single state-level teacher union has

relatively sparse financial and membership

resources. With only 58.4 percent of its

teachers unionized, the membership

rate in Bluegrass State is 37th out of 51

jurisdictions. And the Kentucky Education

Association brings in just $304 annually

per teacher in the state (35th). Even

though 55.8 percent of K–12 expenditures

are directed toward teacher salaries and

benefits (14th), that amounts to a big piece

of a small pie: Per-pupil spending puts

Kentucky 36th ($10,231 annually).


TIED FOR 26TH

Compared to other states, union

involvement in state politics ranks Kentucky

in the middle of the pack. In the past

decade, 0.54 percent of the total donations

to state candidates came from teacher

unions (28th). While not particularly hefty

overall, those contributions amounted

to 16.1 percent of the money donated


state (6th). In addition, 0.57 percent

of the total donations to state political

parties came from teacher unions (35th).

Despite this financial presence, however,

none of Kentucky’s delegates to the

2000 Democratic or Republican national

conventions identified as a teacher union

member.3

KENTUCKY OVERALL RANK: 28TH1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


28

26

10

35

11

26


KENTUCKY


26TH

Kentucky law addresses neither collective

bargaining nor agency fees in public

education, thus implicitly permitting

both. The omission opens all twenty-one

provisions examined in this metric for

bargaining. The state does not permit

public employees, teachers included, to

strike.


10TH

Policies in Kentucky are aligned

more closely with traditional teacher

union interests than in most other

states. State law does not require

that student achievement data factor

into teacher evaluations, nor does it

outline consequences for unsatisfactory

evaluations. Districts are not required

to consider teacher performance when

making layoffs. An additional handful of

policies partially align: Tenure is conferred

virtually automatically, but only after four

years (the national norm is three). There

is a class size restriction for K–3, but it is

larger than the national average class size.

Kentucky does not have a charter school

law.4


TIED FOR 11TH

Compared to stakeholders in other

states, those in Kentucky report that

their teacher union is quite influential.

Survey respondents rank it as the most-

or second-most influential organization

in state education policy. They agree that

it is effective in protecting dollars for

education and very effective in warding

off education proposals with which it

disagrees. They note that policies proposed

by the governor and enacted in the latest

legislative session were mostly in line

with teacher union priorities, and that the

positions of state education leaders often

align with those of unions (see sidebar).5

OVERALL

28TH

Kentucky’s state teacher union operates

in a favorable policy environment, and

although it has limited resources and

donates relatively modestly to state politics

compared to unions in other states, in

Kentucky it has quite a reputation for

influence. Further, the Kentucky union is

stronger than those in nine of the other

thirteen states in which bargaining is

permitted but not mandatory.


KENTUCKY

With a governor like Steve Beshear, it’s hard for the Kentucky Education Association (KEA) to complain. In June 2011, the National Education Association (NEA) crowned him “America’s Greatest Education Governor” for “f[ighting] to preserve resources for K–12 education and the Commonwealth’s students and classrooms.”6 Under Beshear’s watch, Bluegrass State lawmakers passed proposals that supported preschool programs and preserved education funding (and teacher pensions and health benefits) despite statewide budget cuts. “The most important investment a state can make is in the education of its children, and that’s why I have fought hard to protect the basic funding for our classrooms despite nine rounds of budget cuts,” Beshear remarked after receiving the award.7

The union-friendly policies were not lucky accidents. The Bluegrass Institute, a conservative watchdog group, reported that the Kentucky Education Political Action Committee and Better Schools Kentucky (both union PACs) were the biggest spenders on the campaigns of politicians “friendly to their cause” in 2010, giving more than $850,000 combined.8 Beshear won re-election in November 2011 by a landslide with the help of another PAC, Kentucky Family Values, to which the Kentucky Education Association and its affiliates were major donors.9 Already a KEA ally before the election, Beshear is likely to remain a friend of the union. Sharron K. Oxendine, president of the Kentucky Education Association, raved, “There is not a better friend of public education and educators than Steve Beshear.”10 Jim Waters of the Bluegrass Institute isn’t so smitten. “Is it any wonder that politicians ‘friendly’ to the unions’ cause are stubbornly refusing to allow reform measures that give parents a choice, hold teachers and administrators accountable, cut wasteful spending and demand measurable results from the bureaucracy?”11

FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES


KENTUCKY

OVERALL RANK: 28TH





35th


24th*


36th


14th




28th


35th


6th


50th



By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 33rd*


Neither required nor prohibited



Performance pay Does the state support performance pay for teachers? State supports/encourages











Yes; Higher

KENTUCKY RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

35*

26*

26

10


KENTUCKY



(cont.)



N/A




N/A


N/A


N/A




Most- or second-most influential


Sometimes/Often


Sometimes


Agree


Fight


Strongly agree


Sometimes/Often


Mostly in line





Sometimes/Often


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Kentucky has the 37th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Kentucky, collective bargaining is neither required nor prohibited, and union agency fees are also neither required nor prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c Kentucky does not have a charter school law.


10

11*


KENTUCKY

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Kentucky are shown in the table, Kentucky Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Kentucky is ranked 35th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.



4 We do not include data for sub-indicators pertaining to charters when calculating the ranking of states that do not have charter school laws. While some might argue that the lack of such a law is in itself evidence for union strength, we do not have sufficient data to link that absence to union activity. The nine states without charter laws are home to very different contexts—while teacher unions in some states may have played a significant role in keeping charter laws at bay, in others, they played little or no role.


6 “NEA Honors Steve Beshear With America’s Greatest Education Governor Award,” National Education Association, accessed June 28, 2012, http://www.nea.org/home/45673.htm.

7 Ibid.

8 Jim Waters, “Teachers Unions Top Spending By Kentucky PACS,” Bluegrass Institute, January 31, 2011, http://www.bipps.org/teachers-unions-top-spending-by-kentucky-pacs/.

9 Tom Loftus, “Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear Reports Raising $4 Million For Campaign; David Williams Takes In $1 Million,” Courier-Journal, October 12, 2011, http://cincinnati.com/blogs/nkypolitics/2011/10/12/beshear-raises-4-million-williams-raises-1-million/.

10 National Education Association.

11 Waters.

Overall Rank: 42ndTier 5 (Weakest)

LOUISIANA



TIED FOR 40TH

Louisiana’s state teacher unions contend

with limited resources and low membership;

teachers there do not see particularly

high (or low) spending on K–12 education.

Collective bargaining is permitted but not

required, and only 57.8 percent of teachers

in the Pelican State belong to unions (the

38th-largest unionization rate among 51

jurisdictions). The NEA and AFT state-level

affiliates bring in a mere $144 annually per

Louisiana teacher (45th). Louisiana directs

18.1 percent of state expenditures toward

K–12 education (30th), and overall per-pupil

expenditures are $12,253 each year (18th),

with just 52.8 percent of those dollars spent

on teacher salaries and benefits (37th).


TIED FOR 44TH

Louisiana’s teacher unions are less involved

in politics than unions in nearly every

other state. In the past decade, just 0.18

percent of the donations to candidates

for state office came from them (45th).

Union contributions made up 1.75 percent

of the money from the ten highest-giving

sectors in the state (43rd). The unions

gave relatively more to state political

parties, giving 1.1 percent of the total

donations (24th). But just 8.3 percent of

Louisiana delegates to the Democratic

and Republication national conventions

identified as teacher union members

(39th).3

LOUISIANA OVERALL RANK: 42ND1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


42

44

33

40

44

24


LOUISIANA


24TH

Louisiana law does not explicitly address

collective bargaining in public education,

implicitly permitting it (and opening all

twenty-one provisions examined in our

metric to bargaining). The state allows its

public employees, teachers included, to

strike, although it prevents unions from

automatically collecting agency fees from

non-members.


33RD

While a few of Louisiana’s state policies


interests, many do not. The state requires

that student achievement be the main

criterion in teacher evaluations, and

teachers are automatically eligible for

dismissal if they receive unsatisfactory

evaluations. At the time we calculated

our metric, the state mandated seniority-

based layoffs and did not consider student

learning in tenure decisions, positions it

reversed in April 2012. Louisiana is also

known for its charter-friendly environment

(see sidebar): The state does not cap

the number of charter schools and

automatically exempts them from many

state laws and district regulations (but

charters must apply for exemptions to

teacher certification requirements).


44TH

Stakeholder responses reflected teacher

unions that are weaker in Louisiana than in

nearly every other state. Respondents rank

the governor (Bobby Jindal), the charter

school association, the state school board,

and the state school board association as

more influential than the teacher unions

when it comes to education policy. They

report that the unions are not effective in


they disagree, and that state education

leaders rarely align with union positions.

Further, they note that policies proposed by

the governor in the latest legislative session


priorities, and that the session’s outcomes

were mostly not in line with their priorities.4

Finally, they report that teacher unions

more often than not turn to compromise

to see some of their preferred policies

enacted.

OVERALL

42ND

State teacher unions are weaker in

Louisiana than unions in other states on

nearly every metric that we examined. They

have thin internal resources. They see a low

investment in K–12 education by the state

and operate in a largely unfavorable policy

environment. They have a weak reputation

among stakeholders, perhaps belying a

union that sees futility in donating heavily

to politics in a state famous for its union-

opposed reforms.


LOUISIANA

To many observers across the land, education in Louisiana is inextricably linked with choice. In 2003, the state legislature created the Recovery School District, paving the way for rapid charter school growth.5 Louisiana charters are automatically exempt from nearly every state education policy, and in 2010 the legislature passed Governor Bobby Jindal’s Red Tape Reduction Act, which allowed traditional districts to ask for waivers from the laws as well. (The Louisiana Federation of Teachers tried, but failed, to stop the Act in the state supreme court.)6 The state also recently enacted bills supporting home schooling, permitting (and paying for) students to take courses online if they are dissatisfied with what is offered at their local school, expanding the number of charter school authorizers, and creating a “parent trigger” mechanism.7,8

But no choice policy has received as much attention as Louisiana’s voucher programs. In 2008, the state offered vouchers for private school tuition to students in the Recovery School District, and also allowed individuals to claim private school tuition as a tax deduction (a rarity among the states). Two years later, lawmakers extended the voucher program to include special education students across the state, and in 2012 they enacted tax rebates for donors to school tuition organizations, which in turn provide private school scholarships.9 But when in 2012 the legislature passed Jindal’s proposal to expand the voucher program to students statewide, and not just those in low-income families, the already-infuriated unions had had enough. The Louisiana Association of Educators (LAE) and the Louisiana Federation of Teachers (LFT) sued, calling the program an unconstitutional use of taxpayer money to fund private institutions. LFT President Steve Monaghan accused Jindal of using the voucher program as a vehicle to further everyone’s interests except the students’: “If this administration cared as much about children as it does about satisfying corporate donors and national political ambitions, it would concentrate on improving all our schools for all our children.”10 Jindal responded forcefully: “The coalition of the status quo have fought reform every step of the way, so it is no surprise they are making this last ditch effort to convince the courts to overrule the vote of the people and the Legislature. Holding up these reforms in court will only deny parents and students the opportunity to escape failing schools. Our kids do not get a second chance to grow up.”11

In August 2012, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied an injunction to suspend the voucher program while awaiting a trial on its constitutionality, scheduled for October 2012 (post-press time for us, unfortunately). The LFT expressed disappointment and vowed it would keep fighting the law (and that it would rally to change the “sham” accountability standards for private schools in the meantime).12 The LAE went further, threatening to sue any private school that accepted state voucher money. An angry Jindal declared that “union leaders are stooping to new lows and trying to strong-arm schools to keep our kids from getting a quality education.”13 As yet, however, the state is going forward with the program and the LAE’s threat remains empty. Louisiana’s motto is “Union, Justice, and Confidence.” The unions are confident they’ll get justice; but so is Jindal.

ALL EYES ON THE PELICAN STATE


LOUISIANA

OVERALL RANK: 42ND





45th


30th


18th


37th




45th


24th


43rd


39th









Retirement By rank, what is the employer- versus employee-contribution rate to the teacher pension system? 1st




Terms of employmentc How long before a teacher earns tenure? Three years






Yes; Higher

LOUISIANA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

40*

44*

24

33


LOUISIANA



(cont.)



No state cap


How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Two or more w/limited activity


Yes










Often


Sometimes


Neutral


Sometimes concede, sometimes fight


Disagree


Rarely/Sometimes


Not at all in line





Rarely


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Louisiana has the 38th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Louisiana, collective bargaining is neither required nor prohibited, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c See Area 4 above.


33

44


LOUISIANA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Louisiana are shown in the table, Louisiana Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Louisiana is ranked 40th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 “The Public Charter Schools Dashboard,” National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2012, accessed August 29, 2012, http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/overview/state/LA/year/2012.

6 Joe Gyan Jr., “La. High Court: Red Tape Reduction Act Suit Premature,” Advocate, July 5, 2012, http://theadvocate.com/news/3260826-123/la-high-court-red-tape.

7 “Louisiana Course Choice,” Louisiana Department of Education, accessed August 29, 2012, http://www.doe.state.la.us/coursechoice/.

8 Sean Cavanagh, “La. School Choice Options Expand After Sweeping Education Overhaul,” Education Week, April 13, 2012, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2012/04/13/28louisiana.h31.html.

9 “School Choice In Louisiana,” The Friedman Foundation, last updated August 27, 2012, http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/State/LA.aspx.

10 “Supreme Court Won’t Enjoin Jindal’s Voucher Scheme,” Louisiana Federation of Teachers, August 16, 2012, http://la.aft.org/index.cfm?action=article&articleID=fcba6bd0-f65d-498a-866e-e587b22c5a6f.

11 Kevin Mooney, “Louisiana Voucher Applications Roll Forward Despite Union Lawsuits,” ThePelicanPost.com, July 2, 2012, http://www.thepelicanpost.org/2012/07/02/louisiana-voucher-applications-roll-forward-despite-union-lawsuits/.

12 “Voucher Accountability A Sham, LFT Says,” Louisiana Federation of Teachers, July 24, 2012, http://la.aft.org/index.cfm?action=article&articleID=709b83c2-b450-4708-9b33-e06de028e0a6.

13 “Louisiana Teachers Union Threatens To Sue Private Schools Over Voucher Program,” FoxNews.com, August 6, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/06/louisiana-teachers-union-threatens-schools-over-voucher-program/.

Overall Rank: 22ndTier 3 (Average)

MAINE



TIED FOR 20TH

The state teacher unions in Maine see

somewhat substantial resources. 77.1

percent of Maine teachers are union

members, the 25th-highest unionization

rate of 51 jurisdictions. The state-level NEA

and AFT affiliates generate annual revenue

of $621 per teacher in the state (11th).

In addition, teachers see considerable

resources dedicated to K–12 education: The

state ranks 7th in annual per-pupil spending

($14,591), and 54.0 percent of education

expenditures go to teacher salaries and

benefits (25th).


TIED FOR 44TH

In the past decade, Maine’s teacher unions

have not shown much of a financial

presence during elections. Their donations

amounted to a mere 0.02 percent of total

contributions to candidates for state office,

and accounted for just 0.03 percent of

the contributions to candidates from the

top ten highest-giving sectors (unions

in no other state gave a smaller percent

on either measure). The teacher unions

gave comparatively more to state political

parties (1.1 percent of donations to parties

came from unions; 23rd). Raising Maine’s

ranking in this area are its delegates

to the Democratic and Republican

conventions—11.1 percent identified as

teacher union members (33rd).3

MAINE OVERALL RANK: 22ND1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


22

44

7

20

11

16


MAINE


16TH

Maine is one of thirty-two states that

require collective bargaining, and its laws

permit a wider scope of bargaining than

most. Of the twenty-one items examined

in this metric, four must be bargained in

Maine: wages, hours, terms and conditions

of employment, and grievance procedures.

Bargaining over the remaining seventeen

is implicitly permitted since they are not

addressed by state law. While teacher

strikes are prohibited, unions are allowed

to automatically deduct agency fees from

the wages of non-member teachers, an

important source of the high revenue

reflected in Area 1.


TIED FOR 7TH

At the time we calculated our data, Maine

policies were more aligned with traditional

union interests than in nearly every other

state. As recently as March 2012, the state

did not support performance pay, there

were no articulated consequences for

unsatisfactory teacher evaluations, and

neither teacher evaluations nor teacher

tenure decisions needed to take student

achievement into account. (Maine, however,

is one example of many where the policy

environment is rapidly changing. In April

2012 the state approved, though it has

yet to implement, a student-achievement-

based evaluation system. It also decreased

the pre-tenure probationary period

from three to two years, although the

change occurred after we concluded

our calculations.) While unions typically

oppose the expansion of charter schools,

the state made them legal in 2011. Still,

that legislation attends to some union

interests. Though charters are automatically

exempt from many state laws and district

regulations, they must follow state teacher

certification requirements and cannot apply

for exemptions. Similarly, while charters are

exempted from district-union contracts,

employees at a school may opt to bargain

collectively.


TIED FOR 11TH

Maine stakeholders report that their

teacher unions are strong, but perhaps

not as strong as they used to be. Survey

respondents rank teacher unions, along

with the state association of school

administrators, as the most influential

entity in shaping education policy. They

report that the unions are highly effective in

fending off education proposals with which

they disagree and (in a time of budgetary

constraint) are successful in protecting

dollars for education. However, respondents

also indicate that policies proposed by

the governor and enacted in the latest

legislative session (which include the

charter law referenced in Area 4) were not

in line with teacher union priorities.4

OVERALL

22ND

Despite their significant financial resources,

Maine teacher unions are not particularly

active donors to state politics and they’ve

recently lost some key battles. However,

they enjoy a strong reputation and many

state policies still align with union interests.


MAINE

Despite the shift in Maine politics in 2010 that gave Republicans control of both houses and the governorship, the Maine Education Association (MEA) has seen a number of potentially devastating bills land far from the mark.5 The union blocked Governor Paul LePage’s proposal to end collective bargaining for public employees and his push for right-to-work laws.6,7 Budget cuts did land a jab, however: the state cut cost-of-living adjustments for the pensions of retired teachers (as of August 2012, a lawsuit supported by the MEA is pending) and the union ultimately couldn’t prevent a measure that allows local school districts to seek less expensive health plans for current employees.8 Legislators also increased the pre-tenure probationary period for teachers from two years to three, the national norm, and passed a bill legalizing charter schools (Maine previously had no such thing).9 Yet the law limits the number of charters and their enrollment, and charter teachers are allowed to bargain collectively—alleviating a major point of conflict between charter supporters and unions.10

So far, 2012 is shaping up to be an equally mixed bag for the MEA. Sponsored by Governor LePage in anticipation of the state’s NCLB waiver request, LD 1858 required that teachers be evaluated on student learning (among other criteria), and after two years of ineffective ratings teachers would be eligible for dismissal. The union objected, not to the use of student data (a requirement for the waiver) but to evaluations that could potentially be based entirely on standardized test scores and developed without teacher input. “Ninety-five percent of it, we can completely embrace,” said John Kosinski of the MEA.11 With amendments that ensured due process for fired teachers, and left the details of data use to the discretion of the districts and their local unions, the bill passed in April 2012.12 Despite the compromise, Governor LePage seems set on limiting or eliminating collective bargaining for public employees, and the MEA may soon see the gloves come completely off.13

IT COULD BE WORSE


MAINE

OVERALL RANK: 22ND





11th


33rd


7th


25th




50th


23rd


50th


33rd





Permitted





Evaluationsc What is the maximum potential consequence for veteran teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluation(s)?









Yes; Higher

MAINE RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

20*

44*

16

7*


MAINE



(cont.)





How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Two or more w/limited jurisdiction


Yes




Yes; Teachers at each school can choose to bargain collectively






Often/Always


Rarely/Sometimes


Agree


Fight


Strongly agree


Sometimes/Often




Mostly not in line



Sometimes/Often


Does not generally concede



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Maine has the 25th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Maine has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c See Area 4, above, and sidebar.


7*

11*


MAINE

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Maine are shown in the table, Maine Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Maine is ranked 20th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 “Leadership Matters,” Bangor Daily News, July 22, 2011, http://bangordailynews.com/2011/07/22/opinion/leadership-matters/.

6 Abby Rapoport, “The Union Fight You Might Not Have Been Watching,” American Prospect, June 7, 2012, http://prospect.org/article/union-fight-you-might-not-have-been-watching.

7 “Hard Realities, Some Good News,” Maine Education Association, accessed June 28, 2012, http://www.maineeducationassociation.org/home/875.htm.

8 “125th Maine Legislature Wreaks Havoc,” Maine Education Association, accessed June 28, 2012, http://www.maine.nea.org/home/1245.htm.

9 Harry R. Pringle, “Legislature Increases Probationary Period To Three years,” School Law Advisory, http://www.schoollaw.com/html/pdf/687.pdf.

10 “Charter School Laws Across The States 2012,” Center for Education Reform, April 2012, http://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CER_2012_Charter_Laws.pdf.

11 Susan McMillan, “Teacher Evaluations: Differences About Appealing Dismissals Key,” Kennebec Journal, March 15, 2012, http://www.kjonline.com/news/differences-about-appealing-dismissals-key_2012-03-14.html.

12 Eric Russell, “Committee Approves System For Evaluating Maine’s Teachers,” Bangor Daily News, March 21, 2012, http://bangordailynews.com/2012/03/21/politics/teacher-evaluation-bill-takes-strange-turn-in-committee/.

13 Rapoport.

Overall Rank: 23rd Tier 3 (Average)

MARYLAND



26TH

Maryland posts moderate financial and

membership resources for its teacher

unions. On the one hand, collective

bargaining is mandatory in the Old Line

State, and 84.8 of Maryland’s teachers are

union members (the 20th-highest rate of 51

jurisdictions). Yet its NEA and AFT state-

level affiliates generate annual revenues of

just $329 per teacher in the state (33rd).

Spending on education is also moderate:

20.6 percent of the state’s expenditures go

to K–12 education (21st), and funds from

local, state, and federal sources amount

to $12,703 per pupil each year (17th) with

56.0 percent of those dollars dedicated to



TIED FOR 40TH

Compared with their counterparts

nationwide, Maryland’s teacher unions do

not have a strong financial presence in state

elections. In the past ten years, only 0.43

percent of the donations to candidates

to state office came from teacher unions

(32nd); those contributions amounted to

4.2 percent of the donations from the top

ten highest-contributing sectors in the state

(31st). Teacher unions gave at a slightly

higher rate to state political parties—1.3

percent of all contributions (20th). But only

5.4 percent of delegates to the Democratic



MARYLAND OVERALL RANK: 23RD1 TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


23

40

16

26

4

20


MARYLAND


20TH

Maryland is one of thirty-two states that

require collective bargaining for public-

school teachers, and the scope of that

bargaining is wider than most. Of twenty-

one possible contract items examined in

this report, Maryland requires that four—

wages, hours, terms of employment, and

transfers/reassignments—be negotiated.

By not addressing them, the state implicitly

includes fifteen additional provisions in

the scope of bargaining. Only two items

are explicitly prohibited: length of the

school year and class size. Further, unions

are allowed to automatically collect


a key source of union revenue. Still, the

state limits the strength of its unions by

prohibiting teacher strikes.


16TH

Maryland teacher policies generally align

with traditional teacher union interests. The

state does not articulate consequences for

unsatisfactory evaluations, and districts

need not consider student achievement

when awarding tenure (although they must

include it as the preponderant criterion

in teacher evaluations). Layoff decisions

are at the discretion of the district, and

they are not required to include teacher

performance in those decisions. The state’s

charter laws are also mostly in line with the

typical union position. While there is no

cap on the number of charters in the state,

and new, conversion, and virtual schools

are all allowed, only local school boards

can authorize charters. Further, charter

schools are bound by state laws, district

regulations, and collective bargaining

agreements (although schools may apply

for exemptions to all three, save for state

teacher certification rules).


4TH

Based on stakeholder perceptions,

Maryland teacher unions are among the

strongest in the nation. Stakeholders agree

that teacher unions are effective in warding

off proposals with which they disagree,

and that they need not compromise to see

their preferred policies enacted at the state

level. They also note that the state board

of education and state education chief are

often in line with union policy positions. In

addition—and unlike many other states—

respondents in Maryland agreed that

policies both proposed by the governor

and enacted in the latest legislative

session were mostly in line with teacher

union priorities (not surprising given the

overwhelming Democrat majority in the

capitol—see sidebar).4

OVERALL

23RD

Maryland’s teacher unions may not spend

a lot of money on political campaigns, but

they may not need to. They enjoy a strong

reputation and a relatively favorable policy

climate. Given that education policies in

Maryland are more closely aligned with

traditional union interests than in most

states, perhaps the state unions are

exhibiting power quietly, or perhaps the

favorable climate permits them to stay

uninvolved unless threatened.


MARYLAND

In 2010, Maryland unions had an ally in Democrat Governor Martin O’Malley. He has publically praised his partnerships with organized labor, and the National Education Association (NEA) even gave him its “America’s Greatest Education Governor Award.”5,6 In April of that year, O’Malley signed the Education Reform Act as part of the state’s bid for Race to the Top (RTTT) money. He promoted the Act (which increased the pre-tenure probationary period from two to three years—the national norm—and incorporated a student growth component into teacher evaluations) as a compromise with state teacher unions because it did not detail how student performance would be incorporated in the evaluations. Instead, the details were left to local districts and their unions.7,8 Education reformers were unimpressed: “It’s still a pretty tame, modest proposal compared to what other states have done,” said Matthew Joseph, director of Maryland’s Advocates for Children and Youth.9

The Maryland Department of Education agreed. Its RTTT application ignored the Act’s requirement that student growth be no more than 35 percent of a teacher’s evaluation. Instead, it promised that growth would comprise 50 percent.10 Local unions were livid, and only two out of twenty-four signed the application.11 Maryland State Education Association (MSEA) President Clara Floyd tried to smooth over the schism, remarking in a press release that “the Governor and his staff worked tirelessly to improve the application. While the decision whether or not to sign on to the application was a local one, we can all join together in thanking the Governor for his work.”12 But she also expressed concerns to the state Department of Education that the proposed evaluation rules “usurp the authority granted to local boards of education through the Education Reform Act and existing collective bargaining statutes.”13

Despite the union opposition, Maryland’s RTTT application was accepted, and Maryland unions rallied in Annapolis against former ally O’Malley to fight a proposed increase in pension contributions from 5 to 7 percent (they lost). Further salt in the wound: Only one-third of the increased revenue was allocated to the pension fund; the other two-thirds went to plug holes in the state’s general budget.14 Districts also took a hit with a 2012 law requiring they take on $130 million of state pension costs for teachers.15 With O’Malley torn between labor demands, financial constraint, and pressure from reformers, the union may soon second-guess that commemorative plaque.

ON SECOND THOUGHT


MARYLAND

OVERALL RANK: 23RD





33rd


21st


17th


12th




32nd


20th


31st


46th





Permitted














No restriction

MARYLAND RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

26

40*

20

16


MARYLAND



(cont.)



No state cap














Often/Always


Sometimes/Often


Agree


Fight


Agree


Often







Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Maryland has the 20th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Maryland has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected]. c For all survey questions, stakeholders were asked specifically about teacher unions, candidates, policies, and leaders in their state. In addition, we asked about unions and policies in the “current legislative session,” but because legislative calendars vary from state to state, responses refer to policies proposed and enacted within the 2010-11 window.

16

4


MARYLAND

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Maryland are shown in the table below, Maryland Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Maryland is ranked 26th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Mike Hall, “Workers And Their Unions Key To Economic Turnaround, Election outcome,” AFL-CIO Now, June 17, 2012, http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-Legislation/Workers-and-Their-Unions-Key-to-Economic-Turnaround-Election-Outcome.

6 Aaron C. Davis, “NEA Names O’Malley Education Governor Of The Year,” Washington Post, June 30, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/annapolis/2010/06/nea_omalley_education_governor.html.

7 “Governor Martin O’Malley To Introduce Education Reform Legislation,” Office of Governor Martin O’Malley, February 15, 2010, http://www.governor.maryland.gov/pressreleases/100215.asp.

8 Michael Birnbaum, “Bill Targets ‘Race To Top’ Contest’s Goals,” Washington Post, April 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/12/AR2010041204264.html.

9 Ibid.

10 Andrew Ujifusa, “O’Malley Eyes Compromise On State Teacher Evaluations,” Maryland Gazette, November 18, 2010, http://ww2.gazette.net/stories/11182010/prinsch175028_32542.php.

11 “Race To The Top Application Assurances,” U.S. Department of Education, May 27, 2010, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/phase2-applications/maryland.pdf.

12 “MSEA Applauds Governor O’Malley’s Work On Maryland’s Race To The Top Application,” Maryland State Education Association, June 2, 2010, http://www.marylandeducators.org/detail.aspx?id=928.

13 Erica Green, “Teachers Union Challenges Race To The Top Application,” May 7, 2012, Baltimore Sun, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-05-07/news/bs-md-msea-letter-20100507_1_teachers-union-million-in-federal-race-maryland-state-education-association.

14 Andrew Schotz, “Part Of Maryland Pension Hike To Go Toward Balancing State Budget,” Herald-Mail, April 14, 2011, http://articles.herald-mail.com/2011-04-14/news/29419953_1_pension-system-pension-fund-maryland-state-retirement.

15 David Hill, “MD Senate Approves Tax Hike, Pension Shift,” Washington Times, May 15, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/15/md-senate-approves-tax-hike-pension-shift/?page=all.


MASSACHUSETTS



TIED FOR 13TH

Massachusetts’s teacher unions benefit

from a high density of unionized teachers,

financial resources from their members,

and a significant dedication of funds for

education in the state. With 92.8 percent of

its teachers unionized, Massachusetts posts

the 13th-highest rate of 51 jurisdictions.

The state’s NEA and AFT affiliates bring

in annual revenue of $615 for each teacher

in the state (12th). Per-pupil expenditures

are high—local, state, and federal funds

combine to $13,361 annually per student

(12th), and 58.4 percent of those dollars are

directed to teacher salaries and benefits

(5th). Yet the state itself allocates just 12.6

percent of its own expenditures to K–12

education (just three states allocate less).2


TIED FOR 40TH

Despite their ample financial resources,

compared to unions in other states

Massachusetts teacher unions did not

spend much money on state candidates

and political parties.4 In the past decade,

just 0.2 percent of the donations to

candidates for state office came from

teacher unions (43rd nationally). Union

contributions to state political parties were

also comparatively small (0.25 percent of

the total received by parties; also 43rd).

These low numbers may be indicative of

unions that do not feel that high spending

will benefit them or that are satisfied with

the current political environment (see Areas

3, 4, and 5). In addition, the percentage of

Massachusetts delegates to the Democratic

and Republican national conventions who

identify as teacher union members (9.4

percent) is ranked 35th.

MASSACHUSETTS OVERALL RANK: 21ST1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


21

40

21

13

16

12


MASSACHUSETTS


12TH

Massachusetts is one of thirty-two states

that require collective bargaining, and

the scope of bargaining is wider there

than in most other states. All twenty-one

items examined in this metric are within

the scope of bargaining: Eight provisions

must be negotiated (wages, hours, terms

and conditions of employment, layoffs,

insurance benefits, fringe benefits, class

load, and class size) and thirteen are

implicitly permitted. While the state does

not permit teacher strikes, it does allow


from non-member teachers.


21ST

Taken together, Massachusetts policies are

more union-favorable than those in some

states, but less than in others. Teacher

employment policies are mixed. Districts do

not need to consider teacher performance

when making layoff decisions but must

consider seniority; both are in line with

traditional union interests. But student

achievement is factored into teacher

evaluations and tenure decisions—policies

contrary to union goals. The state’s charter

laws are also mixed. While some charter

schools are exempt from district collective

bargaining agreements, others are not.

While the state grants some automatic

exemptions to laws and regulations to

selected schools, it does not give them

to all schools (and does not exempt them

from all regulations). The state also has

a fairly restrictive cap on the number of

charter schools and does not allow virtual

schools.


16TH

State stakeholders perceive teacher unions

to be relatively strong, ranking them the

most influential entity in shaping education

policy (slightly ahead of the state board

of education). They report that Democrats

need teacher union support to get elected,

and that the state education chief and

board often align with teacher union

positions. While they indicate that policies

proposed by the governor and enacted


somewhat in line with union priorities,

stakeholders actually reported more union-

policy alignment than did those in many

other states.5

OVERALL

21ST

While Massachusetts is often described

as a state with powerful teacher unions—a

perception echoed in our survey of

stakeholders in the state—the Bay State’s

teacher unions rank near the middle of

the pack nationwide. Many Massachusetts

laws are favorable to union interests,

but, considering their meager campaign

contributions, unions may be enjoying a

friendly environment rather than creating it.


MASSACHUSETTS

Massachusetts teacher unions have a decades-long history of working with education reformers and state leaders to enact significant reform measures, assenting to (and even helping design) progressive policies so long as core union interests are attended to. The most recent example: Stand for Children, a national education reform group, set its sights on Massachusetts policy. The group wanted to replace seniority with teacher performance as the primary factor in layoff decisions; rather than wait for lawmakers to take the lead, it gathered enough signatures in late 2011 to place the issue on the November 2012 ballot.6 The Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA) reacted fiercely, basing its objections on the fact that the state’s teacher evaluation system had not yet been implemented, let alone tested. Its website asserted that “a national organization with no particular expertise in education—Stand for Children—is seeking to disrupt the implementation of this system…This divisive proposal is a gimmick that will divert time, money and energy away from important priorities for our students.”7 To stop the measure, the MTA filed a lawsuit questioning its constitutionality in January 2012.

But rather than wait for the court (or the voters) to decide, the MTA opted to compromise. It agreed to support SB 2315, a bill with the same intent but different specifics than Stand for Children’s initiative. Performance still replaced seniority in layoff decisions, but the bill also funded principal training and a data reporting system. It also did not contain some of the initiative’s more aggressive options, such as giving the state the right to veto any evaluation system negotiated between a district and its union, and requiring principals’ approval in teacher transfers).8 In exchange, the reform group took its measure off the ballot, and in June 2012, the legislature passed the bill and Democrat Governor Deval Patrick signed it into law.9,10 The effects of the compromise: Both sides avoided an expensive autumn campaign, and the negative image that would likely have accompanied it. Plus, the union proved to be an architect of teacher policy rather than a bystander (and in control of its own destiny rather than leaving it up to the voters). In this case, the MTA seemed to decide that fighting it out was not the best choice.

FIGHT OR FLIGHT


MASSACHUSETTS

OVERALL RANK: 21ST





12th


47th


12th


5th




43rd


43rd


24th


35th





Permitted














No restriction

MASSACHUSETTS RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

13

40*

12

21


MASSACHUSETTS



(cont.)











Partially; Some schools are not exempt, others can choose to bargain or not






Often


Rarely


Agree


Fight


Neutral


Sometimes/Often


Somewhat in line


Somewhat in line



Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Massachusetts has the 13th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Massachusetts has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


21

16


MASSACHUSETTS

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Massachusetts are shown in the table, Massachusetts Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Massachusetts is ranked 13th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.

2 Two factors explain the disparity between the high ranking on per-pupil expenditures and the low ranking for the percentage of state spending that goes to education. First, Massachusetts districts rely on local funds more heavily than in most other states (largely because of the state’s affluence). Second, total spending is higher in Massachusetts than in nearly every other state; as such, 12.6 percent of state expenditures still amount to an extremely high allocation of dollars per student by the state alone.


4 The AFT-affiliated Boston Teachers Union donated nearly as much to state candidates as did the Massachusetts Federation of Teachers, and substantially more than the state’s NEA affiliate, the Massachusetts Teachers Association. Further, the Boston union donated more to state political parties than the two state-level unions combined.


6 Will Richmond, “Massachusetts Ballot Question Takes On Teacher Seniority,” Herald News, June 4, 2012, http://www.heraldnews.com/news/x1842810767/Fall-River-ballot-question-takes-on-teacher-seniority.

7 “Stand For Children Ballot Initiative Fails To Deliver,” Massachusetts Teachers Association, http://www.massteacher.org/news/archive/2011/12-07.aspx.

8 Frank Phillips, “Massachusetts Teachers Union Agrees To Give Up Key Rights On Seniority,” Boston Globe, June 8, 2012, http://articles.boston.com/2012-06-08/metro/32104943_1_ballot-question-teachers-union-ballot-initiative/3.

9 Associated Press, “Mass. Teacher Union Oks Deal On Ballot Question,” Boston Globe, June 7, 2012, http://www.boston.com/news/education/articles/2012/06/07/mass_teacher_union_oks_deal_on_ballot_question/.

10 Text of Senate Bill No. 02315, June 20, 2012, http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/BillHtml/119213?generalCourtId=1.


MICHIGAN



TIED FOR 6TH

Michigan’s state teacher unions benefit

from both substantial internal resources

and relatively high state spending on

education. The majority of Michigan

teachers—92.0 percent—are union

members (the 14th-highest membership

rate out of 51 jurisdictions), and the state-

level NEA and AFT affiliates bring in $903

per Michigan teacher each year (4th of 51).

Members of the Wolverine State’s teacher

unions also benefit from state spending:

K–12 education’s share of state expenditures

is 28.2 percent (also 4th of 51). However,

per-pupil spending (a combination of local,

state, and federal funds) is in the middle of

the pack at $10,624 (31st), with 51.7 percent

of those dollars directed to teacher salaries

and benefits (43rd).


TIED FOR 4TH

Over the past decade, teacher unions in

Michigan have been more active in politics

than those in nearly every other state.

They contributed 4.2 percent of total

donations received by state-level political

parties; only in California and Alabama did

teacher unions give a higher percentage

to their states’ political parties. They were

only slightly less generous with their

contributions to candidates for state office:

Donations from teacher unions accounted

for 0.9 percent of the funds received by

such candidates (18th), and 10.0 percent

of such Donations from the ten highest-

giving sectors in the state (14th). Finally, a

full 23.1 percent of Michigan’s delegates to


conventions were members of teacher

unions (5th).3

MICHIGAN OVERALL RANK: 16TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


16

4

51

6

20

22


MICHIGAN


22ND

Though Michigan is one of thirty-two

states that require collective bargaining

in public education, it restricts the scope

of that bargaining more than many others

do. Of the twenty-one items examined

in this metric, Michigan law requires that

only three—wages, hours, and terms of

employment—are included in negotiations.

It explicitly prohibits six provisions, more

than most mandatory-bargaining states:

transfers/teacher reassignments, layoffs,

dismissal, evaluations, insurance benefits,

and length of the school year. The twelve

remaining subjects are either explicitly left

to the discretion of the districts or implicitly

permitted because state law is silent. While

Michigan allows its unions to collect agency

fees from non-members—a key source of

the revenue reflected in Area 1—it prohibits

teacher strikes.


51ST

Michigan policies are the least-aligned to

traditional teacher union interests of all

the states; given that a number of these

policies were passed in 2011 and 2012, this

lack of alignment is in spite of, or perhaps

explains, the unions’ high level of political

activity. For example, teacher performance

is included in the salary schedule for all

teachers; student achievement must be


evaluations; and teachers are eligible for

dismissal after multiple unsatisfactory

ratings (as opposed to being placed on

an improvement plan). Michigan is one

of only five states that wait five years

before granting tenure to teachers (the

national norm is three), and one of only

eight where evidence of pupil learning

is the preponderant criterion in tenure

decisions. (In most states, tenure is granted

without considering student achievement

at all). The state’s charter school laws are

no better aligned: Michigan’s cap on the

number of charters now leaves ample room

for growth, the state offers many viable

authorizing options for charter schools,

and it automatically exempts charters from

district collective bargaining agreements.


20TH

Despite the adverse policy environment,

stakeholders in Michigan report having

stronger teacher unions than do our

informants in many other states.

Survey respondents strongly agree that

Democratic candidates for state office need

teacher union support to win, reflecting

the high degree of union contributions to

Michigan politics (Area 2). But respondents

rank teacher unions the second- or third-

most influential entity on state education

policy, not the first, and note that unions

are neither especially effective nor

ineffective in warding off proposals with

which they disagree. Further, stakeholders

note that policies proposed by the

governor during the latest legislative

session were not at all in line with teacher

union priorities, and those that were

enacted were mostly not in line with those

priorities, reflecting a shift in Michigan’s

historically pro-labor environment (see

sidebar).4

OVERALL

16TH

Michigan’s teacher unions show a striking

disparity in resources and political

involvement on the one hand and their

actual influence on policy on the other.

Although Michigan is traditionally held as a

bastion of unionism, teacher unions began


MICHIGAN

Both 2010 and 2011 were rough for unions in Michigan. The 2010 election brought a new Republican governor who made it clear that he was no friend of organized labor.5 Republicans also won majorities in both houses of the state’s legislature, as well as on the Supreme Court, and immediately looked to undermine union protections and prerogatives. Toward the end of the 2011 legislative session, one labor advocacy group denounced that the eighty-five proposed bills with an anti-labor message “start from the view that Michigan’s economic problems are the fault of public employees and the poor, rather than driven by a merciless recession and the auto industry’s contraction.”6,7

Teacher unions, in particular, found themselves facing a clutch of new laws aimed at their traditional rights: Public Acts 100 through 103 reduced the scope of collective bargaining to salary, benefits, and hours; made it more difficult for teachers to gain tenure; removed seniority from dismissal decisions; and required annual teacher evaluations that heavily weighed student growth.8

The biggest blow was Public Act 4. That 2011 statute gives the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the governor the authority to intervene in governmental bodies facing bankruptcy, school districts included. In such districts, they can appoint an “emergency district manager” to control finances, which includes the right to eliminate or modify an existing union contract.9 By early 2012, the Detroit and Highland Park school districts had emergency managers at the helm, and they did not shy away from making cuts.10 For example, faced with an $86.3 million deficit, Roy Roberts, the emergency manager for Detroit, unilaterally imposed a 10 percent wage cut on employees and increased employee contributions to their health benefits plan to 20 percent.11 He converted low-performing schools into charters, closed others, and placed some in a new state-wide district—saving $7.5 million in annual operating costs along the way.12 Labor may yet have the last word, however. In November 2012, Michigan voters will decide whether to repeal Public Act 4. This referendum is the result of a massive campaign by an advocacy coalition called Stand Up For Democracy, which gathered the 162,000 necessary signatures—and then 64,000 more—to put the repeal on the ballot (and suspend the Act in the meantime). But after a union-supported campaign to recall Governor Rick Snyder fizzled in June 2012, the outcome of the repeal vote is far from certain.13 Michigan is known as the Wolverine State, but its teacher unions may no longer have the same bite.

STATE OF EMERGENCY

to lose influence under Governor John

Engler in the mid-1990s and recently lost

key allies at the state level. Without state

leaders on their side, they have only limited

avenues to leverage their resources into

policies they support (see sidebar).


MICHIGAN

OVERALL RANK: 16TH





4th


4th


31st


43rd




18th


3rd


14th


5th





Permitted




Retirement By rank, what is the employer- versus employee-contribution rate to the teacher pension system? **




Terms of employment How long before a teacher earns tenure? Five years






No restriction

MICHIGAN RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

6*

4*

22

51


MICHIGAN



(cont.)




Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools? Start-ups and virtual schools only







Yes






Often/Always


Never/Rarely


Agree


Fight


Neutral


Sometimes







Sometimes/Often




** Insufficient data; see Appendix A.


b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Michigan has the 14th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Michigan has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


51

20


MICHIGAN

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Michigan are shown in the table, Michigan Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Michigan is ranked 6th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Nathan Bomey, “Rick Snyder, Virg Bernero Will Test Voters’ Opinions On Organized Labor, Outsourcing,” Annarbor.com, August 5, 2010, http://ww.annarbor.com/elections/rick-snyder-virg-bernero-will-test-voters-opinions-on-organized-labor-outsourcing/.

6 Evan Rohar, “Michigan Unions And Poor Face 85 Hostile Laws,” Labor Notes, October 26, 2011, http://labornotes.org/2011/10/michigan-unions-and-poor-face-85-hostile-laws.

7 John Rummel, “Michigan Warning: Republican Extremism Goes Too Far,” People’s World, December 16, 2011, http://peoplesworld.org/michigan-warning-republican-extremism-goes-too-far/.

8 “Anti-Collective Bargaining And Tenure Bills Enactment,” AFT Michigan, August 16, 2011, http://aftmichigan.org/files/tenure-cb-pkg2011.pdf.

9 “Local Government And School District Fiscal Accountability Emergency Manager,” AFT Michigan, April 20, 2011, http://aftmichigan.org/files/emergencymanager.pdf.

10 Simone Landon, “Public Act 4, Michigan Emergency Manager Law, Marks First Anniversary,” HuffingtonPost.com, March 16, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/16/public-act-4-michigan-emergency-manager-law-anniversary_n_1353510.html.

11 Associated Press, “Emergency Manager Roy Roberts To Impose 10 Percent Wage Cuts In Detroit Public Schools,” July 29, 2011, http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/07/emergency_manager_roy_roberts.html.

12 Simone Landon, “Detroit To Close 9 Schools, Convert 4 To Charters,” HuffingtonPost.com, February 8, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/08/detroit-school-closings_n_1263165.html.

13 Dave Murray, “Michigan Rising Ending Effort To Recall Gov. Snyder, Looks To Form Progressive Think Tank,” MLive.com, June 7, 2012, http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/06/michigan_rising_ending_effort.html.


MINNESOTA



TIED FOR 3RD

Minnesota’s merged NEA-AFT affiliate and

its members benefit from both substantial

resources and relatively generous state

spending on K–12 education. Indeed,

95.7 percent of teachers are unionized

in the North Star State, the 9th-highest

rate among all 51 jurisdictions. The state

union brings in $582 per teacher in the

state (15th). Further, 23.3 percent of state

expenditures go to K–12 education (13th),

and Minnesota teachers see a substantial

amount of the $11,471 spent per pupil

(24th) allocated to their salaries and

benefits (59.3 percent; 3rd).


TIED FOR 32ND

Despite its financial resources, Minnesota’s

teacher unions were less involved in the

last decade of state politics than were their

counterparts in most other states.3 Their

donations to candidates for state office

amounted to just 0.46 percent of the total

(30th); these contributions constituted

2.5 percent of the donations to candidates

from the ten highest-contributing sectors

in the state (39th). A relatively higher

proportion—2.2 percent—of total donations

to state political parties came from

Minnesota teacher unions (13th). The union

voice at the Democratic and Republican

national conventions was also quieter than

in most other states, with 9.4 percent of

Minnesota delegates identifying as teacher

union members (34th).4

MINNESOTA OVERALL RANK: 14TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


14

32

46

3

19

2


MINNESOTA


2ND

Minnesota is one of thirty-two states that

require collective bargaining, and its laws

give unions a wider scope of bargaining

(and more organizational prerogatives)

than in every other state save California.

Minnesota requires seven items to be

bargained (wages, hours, terms and

conditions of employment, grievance

procedures, fringe benefits, class size, and

length of teacher planning periods) and

permits another two (management rights

and pension/retirement benefits). State

law is silent on the remaining twelve items,

implicitly including them in the scope of

bargaining. Further, Minnesota allows its

unions to collect agency fees from non-

member teachers (a key source of union

revenue) and is one of only twelve states

where teachers explicitly possess the right

to strike.


TIED FOR 46TH

While Minnesota’s state teacher union

sees abundant resources and permissive

bargaining laws, it also faces many state-

level policies that do not align with

traditional union interests. Minnesota

permits performance pay and requires

that student achievement significantly

informs teacher evaluations (but not

tenure decisions). Further, the state’s

charter laws—the oldest in the land—run

decidedly counter to the union preference

for limiting the expansion and autonomy

of such schools. Minnesota does not cap

the number of charters; permits new,

conversion, and virtual schools; and

provides multiple authorizing options.

Charters are also automatically exempt

from collective bargaining agreements,

district regulations, and state laws, except

for those related to teacher certification.


19TH

Despite the adverse policies, Minnesota

stakeholders rate their union as more

influential than do stakeholders in many

other states. Along with the business

roundtable/chamber of commerce, they

place the union as the most influential

entity in shaping education policy. They

further note that it not only fought hard

to prevent reductions in pay and benefits,

but also that it is effective in protecting

dollars for education. On the other

hand, they report that state policies only

sometimes reflect union interests and that

outcomes of the latest legislative session


union priorities.5 Perhaps this is because, as

survey respondents indicate, the priorities

of the current state education chief and

board of education are only sometimes

aligned with teacher union priorities.

OVERALL

14TH

Minnesota’s teacher union is strong in

terms of resources and membership, and

the state has generous bargaining laws

that favor unions. While its union has a

reputation for strength, it does not have

many present-day allies in state politics and

the current policy environment is one of the

most union-unfriendly in the nation (and

with union rights under constant attack,

may become even less friendly in the near

future—see sidebar).


MINNESOTA

Minnesota is one of the only states in the Midwest where the governor is not mired in intense clashes with public unions. In 2012, Democrat Mark Dayton vetoed two GOP-sponsored measures that would have severely limited collective bargaining rights for teachers. In his veto letter of HF 1974, Dayton affirmed his position: “The Legislature is well aware that I have opposed, and will continue to oppose, unilateral changes to the collective bargaining process.”6 He also vetoed a 2012 bill requiring districts to base layoffs on teacher performance and not seniority, calling it another in a series of proposals that are “anti-public schools, anti-public school teachers, or anti-collective bargaining rights.”7 To circumvent the governor, House Republicans began discussion of a constitutional amendment to make Minnesota a right-to-work state—an amendment that the voters, not the governor, would decide. But against heavy lobbying from the state’s labor unions, the amendment never got off the ground (although the idea itself still has supporters in both the House and Senate).8

When it comes to the budget, however, Dayton takes less of a pro-union hard line. In an attempt to pave the way for later bipartisan compromise on the 2011 budget, he signed a Republican-backed (and union-opposed) bill that authorized alternative licensure options for nontraditional and mid-career teachers.9 But no such compromise resulted, and to break a budget deadlock and a twenty-day government shutdown, Dayton agreed to Republican demands and took tax increases for the wealthy and for corporations completely off the table (despite the contributions of Education Minnesota, the state’s NEA-AFT affiliate, which helped fund a $1 million campaign in support of Dayton’s original plan).10,11 Without the revenue from tax increases, and to the immense frustration of education leaders, the state delayed already-overdue payments to school districts.12 And it looks like lawmakers aren’t done with licensure yet either; in 2012 they enacted a bill that requires more stringent testing for new teachers. But for Education Minnesota, these defeats are small potatoes compared to the averted-for-now crisis of the elimination of teacher bargaining rights. For that, the NEA repaid Dayton in July 2012 by naming him “America’s Greatest Education Governor.”

SHELTER FROM THE STORM


MINNESOTA

OVERALL RANK: 14TH





15th


13th


24th


3rd




30th


13th


39th


34th





Permitted














No restriction

MINNESOTA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

3*

32*

2

46*


MINNESOTA



(cont.)



No state cap




Yes




Yes






Often/Always


Rarely


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often




Somewhat in line



Rarely/Sometimes





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Minnesota has the 9th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Minnesota has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected]. c For all survey questions, stakeholders were asked specifically about teacher unions, candidates, policies, and leaders in their state. In addition, we asked about unions and policies in the “current legislative session,” but because legislative calendars vary from state to state, responses refer to policies proposed and enacted within the 2010-11 window.

46*

19


MINNESOTA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Minnesota are shown in the table, Minnesota Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Minnesota is ranked 3rd of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 While our overall metric reports the strength of state teacher unions, this area also captures contributions to state campaigns and parties from national unions and local union affiliates. Typically, the total contributions from each are much smaller than the donations from the state unions. But in Minnesota’s case, local unions in Minneapolis and St. Paul together gave as much to state politics as did the state-level union.



6 Office of Governor Mark Dayton, press release, April 12, 2012, http://mn.gov/governor/images/Ch_245_HF1974_veto-attach.pdf.

7 Jon Collins, “Dayton Vetoes Bill That Would Weaken Teacher Seniority,” Minnesota Public Radio, May 3, 2012, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/05/03/teacher-seniority-bill-veto/.

8 Tom Scheck, “House Forced To Deal With Right-To-Work Amendment,” Minnesota Public Radio, April 27, 2012, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns/polinaut/archive/2012/04/house_forced_to.shtml.

9 Tim Pugmire, “Dayton Signs Minn. Teacher License Bill Into Law,” Minnesota Public Radio, March 7, 2011, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/03/07/teacher-licensure/.

10 “U.S. State Of Minnesota Ends Longest Government Shutdown,” People’s Daily Online, July 21, 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90852/7447021.html.http://www.startribune.com/opinion/otherviews/125667103.html?page=1&c=y

11 David Taintor, “Furloughed In Minnesota – The Story Of One State Worker,” TPM.com, July 11, 2011, http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/07/how-minnesotas-government-shutdown-is-affecting-one-laid-off-state-employee.php.

12 Tom Weber, “Budget Deal Draws Criticism From Education Officials,” Minnesota Public Radio, July 14, 2011, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/07/14/shutdown-budget-education-reaction/.


MISSISSIPPI



49TH

Mississippi’s teacher unions face low

membership and a dearth of resources.

With just 36.8 percent of all teachers

unionized, the Magnolia State posts the

3rd-lowest unionization rate nationwide. A

smaller percentage of Mississippi teachers

are unionized than in twelve of the other

thirteen states in which bargaining is

permitted (and smaller even than in four

of the five states in which bargaining is

illegal). Mississippi’s NEA and AFT affiliates

bring only $89 in revenue per teacher in

the state (48th out of 51 jurisdictions).

Spending on education is low in Mississippi,

too: Just 17.0 percent of state expenditures

go toward K–12 education (38th) and,

of the annual $9,708 spent per pupil (a

combination of local, state, and federal

funds; 39th), only 53.5 percent goes toward

teacher salaries and benefits (31st).


TIED FOR 40TH

Mississippi’s teacher unions are less

involved in state-level political campaigns

than their counterparts in most other

states. In the past decade, their donations

amounted to only 0.14 percent of total

contributions received by candidates for

state office (48th). Their share of donations

to state political parties was equally small

(just 0.07 percent, also 48th). These

limited financial donations are somewhat

offset by the fairly high percentage of

Mississippi delegates to the Democratic

and Republican national conventions who

identified as teacher union members (18.8

percent; 11th).3

MISSISSIPPI OVERALL RANK: 46TH1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


46

40

7

49

51

43


MISSISSIPPI


TIED FOR 43RD

Mississippi does not address collective

bargaining in education, neither prohibiting

nor requiring it (and consequently all

twenty-one contract items examined in

this report are implicitly within the scope

of bargaining). However, the law does

specifically prohibit teacher strikes. Further,

teacher unions fall under the purview of

state labor laws, which bar any union from

automatically collecting agency fees from

non-members.


TIED FOR 7TH

Despite other indications that its teacher

unions are weak, Mississippi policies are

more closely aligned with traditional union

interests than in nearly every other state.4

Mississippi grants tenure after only one

year—the only state to do so that quickly

(the national norm is three years); further,

student learning is not a criterion in tenure

decisions. Districts may decide their own

standards for layoffs (with no requirement

that teacher performance be included), and

there are no articulated consequences for

unsatisfactory evaluations. Further, when

we calculated our metric, the state did not

require that student achievement factor

into teacher evaluations. (At press time,

however, Mississippi had approved—but

not yet implemented—a policy requiring

that student achievement on state tests

comprise half of a teacher’s evaluation.)

Charter laws are equally favorable to

union positions (see sidebar): The state

has a tight cap on charters with no room

for growth, and allows only conversion

charters, not start-ups or virtual charter

schools. Nor does it exempt charter

schools from state teacher certification

requirements or district collective

bargaining agreements. Further, the state

board of education is the sole authorizer,

and can convert a failing district school to

a charter only after a petition from parents

at that school. With these limited avenues

for authorizing, the state has only a single

charter school.5


51ST

Mississippi stakeholders perceive their

teacher unions to be quite weak, indeed the

least influential in the nation. Respondents

rank their influence below that of the state

school board, the governor’s office, and

parent coalitions. They report that the

teacher unions are not effective in warding

off proposals with which they disagree or

in protecting dollars for education. Further,

they note that the positions of state

education leaders are only sometimes in

line with those of teachers unions, and that

Democrats only sometimes need teacher

union support to get elected—whereas

respondents in most states reported that

Democrats often or always need union

support.

OVERALL

46TH

Mississippi’s teacher unions are among

the least potent in the nation, ranking

alongside unions in states where bargaining

is prohibited. Membership is notably low.

The unions do not have a reputation for

strength among stakeholders, and do not

participate in state politics to a significant

degree. Yet Mississippi policies are well

aligned with union positions (especially in

comparison to its neighboring southern

states). Perhaps it is because these

policies are in place that the union is not

more active: many of its goals are already

realized (see sidebar).


MISSISSIPPI

The Mississippi Association of Educators (MAE) and AFT-Mississippi (AFT-MS) don’t have much to work with. Not only does Mississippi law stop unions from collecting agency fees, it also prevents them from automatically collecting dues from the paychecks of their own members.6 Then again, the MAE and AFT-MS don’t have that much to do, because teacher jobs in the Magnolia State are among the most secure in the nation, thanks to the state’s Education Employment Procedures Law. (That law and its predecessors date back the 1970s, a period of staunch Democratic leadership in the state, and give new meaning to “due process.”)7

Despite their self-defined primary roles as advocates, not political heavyweights, the MAE and AFT-MS have recently engaged in two major policy debates. First, Governor Phil Bryant is pressing districts hard to switch from seniority-based salary schedules to merit pay. Both associations are hesitant to support pay based on evaluations that use standardized test scores, and worry that the system may be punitive rather than productive.8 MAE president Kevin Gilbert doubts that merit pay is money well spent, pointing out that a better alternative is raising overall teacher pay in a state where educator salaries are, on average, the second-lowest in the nation.9 But the state’s achievement-based evaluation system, developed in order to improve the state’s chances of receiving an NCLB waiver, is still in its infancy, and it is unlikely that merit pay based on that system will find a foothold in the near future.10

Second, lawmakers sought to amend the state’s existing charter law with the Mississippi Public Charter Schools Act of 2012. While charter schools have been legal in Mississippi since 1997, because of the tight restrictions on authorizing, the state has only a single one. According to the Center for Education Reform (CER), the Magnolia State’s current law is one of the nation’s weakest. (The National Alliance for Public Charter Schools concurs.) It was passed only to increase the odds of winning money in the federal Race to the Top competition.11,12 The 2012 Charter Schools Act proposed to expand authorizing options, permit charters in all districts rather than only underperforming ones, allow new and virtual as well as conversion schools, and exempt charter teachers from state certification requirements and the Education Employment Procedures Law.13 The MAE took a hard line against the proposal, objecting that it would undermine due process for educators and allow uncertified, under-qualified teachers into high-needs classrooms. The measure later died in committee. While the resources of Mississippi’s teacher association are limited, their bully pulpit is not.

THE STRONG, SILENT TYPE


MISSISSIPPI

OVERALL RANK: 46TH





48th


38th


39th


31st




48th


48th


48th


11th













Terms of employment How long before a teacher earns tenure? One year






Yes; Higher

MISSISSIPPI RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

49

40*

43*

7*


MISSISSIPPI



(cont.)



State cap with no room for growth

Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools? Conversions only







No; Staff are exempt from state employment laws, not bargaining agreements






Sometimes


Never/Rarely


Disagree


Generally fight


Disagree


Rarely/Sometimes







Sometimes/Often


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Mississippi has the 49th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Mississippi, collective bargaining is neither required nor prohibited, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected]. c For all survey questions, stakeholders were asked specifically about teacher unions, candidates, policies, and leaders in their state. In addition, we asked about unions and policies in the “current legislative session,” but because legislative calendars vary from state to state, responses refer to policies proposed and enacted within the 2010-11 window.

7*

51


MISSISSIPPI

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Mississippi are shown in the table, Mississippi Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank-order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Mississippi is ranked 49th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.



4 The presence of union-friendly policies in states with weak unions presents a conundrum (see main report). Mississippi’s unique political history serves as partial explanation. The Magnolia State was basically a one-party state until 1992, and Democrats led one if not both houses of the legislature until 2011. Still, Democrats in rural areas tend to be socially conservative and align their views with those of Republican presidential candidates, which is why observers tend to think of Mississippi as a “red state.” The state’s labor laws relative to teachers (who unionized in the mid 1960s) originated from an era of Democratic leadership.

5 Mississippi first enacted its original charter law in 1997, but lawmakers did not renew it before it lapsed in 2009. At that time, only one charter was in operation in the entire state, and it was a charter in name only (the school was part of its local district and did not have an independent board). When the 1997 law expired, the school was taken over completely by its district. Between 1997 and 2009, lawmakers discussed renewing and expanding the law but no bill ever passed, for reasons varying from fear of segregation and cherry-picking high performers to the diversion of money from district schools. A new law enacted in 2010 is nearly identical to the 1997 original. See Marquita Brown, “Charter School Law May Get Strengthened,” Hattiesburg American, January 11, 2009, http://www.hattiesburgamerican.com/article/20090112/NEWS01/901120318/Charter-school-law-may-get-strengthened.

6 Mississippi Association of Educators, http://maetoday.nea.org/images/ProductImage_34.pdf.

7 Ward Schaefer, “Teachers Fire Back At Film,” Jackson Free Press, November 10, 2010, http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2010/nov/10/teachers-fire-back-at-film/. According to Rachel Hicks, executive director of the education advocacy organization Mississippi First, state law is equivalent to tenure, even if statute avoids that term. She elaborates: “Essentially, we have a system where if you breathe in a district for two consecutive years, you essentially cannot be fired unless you do something really bad that jeopardizes the health and welfare of your students. Even though we say we don’t have tenure, we have a shadow system of tenure.” (See also Note 4, above.)

8 Associated Press, “Governor Phil Bryant touting new attempt to pay teachers based on student performance,” Gulflive.com, July 28, 2012, accessed August 20, 2012, http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-news/2012/07/gov_phil_bryant_touting_new_at.html.

9 Ibid.

10 Annie Gilbertson, “Inside Mississippi Teacher Evaluations,” Mississippi Public Broadcasting, February 24, 2012, http://mpbonline.org/News/article/inside_mississippi_teacher_evaluations.

11 Alison Consoletti, ed., Charter School Laws Across the States, Center for Education Reform (Washington, D.C.: April 2012), http://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CER_2012_Charter_Laws.pdf.

12 Todd Ziebarth, Measuring Up to the Model: A Ranking of State Public Charter School Laws, National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (Washington, D.C.: January 2012), http://www.publiccharters.org/data/files/Publication_docs/NAPCS_2012_StateLawRankings_Final_20120117T162953.pdf. Ziebarth, vice president at the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools and lead author of the report, explains: “Significant improvements are needed in every aspect of Mississippi’s law, most notably by allowing start-up charter schools and virtual charter schools, providing additional authorizing options for charter applicants, beefing up the law in relation to the model law’s four quality control components, increasing operational autonomy, and ensuring equitable operational funding and equitable access to capital funding and facilities.” See http://www.wdam.com/story/16535878/mississippi-charter-schools-rated-worst-in-the-nation.

13 “MAE Legislative Update,” Mississippi Association of Educators, March 9, 2012, http://maetoday.nea.org/News.asp?s=1&nid=74.


MISSOURI



TIED FOR 33RD

Missouri’s teacher unions stand out neither

for their member-generated resources nor

for the level of education expenditures in

their state. Just 76.6 percent of Missouri

teachers are unionized, the 26th-highest

unionization rate across 51 jurisdictions

(although well above the average rate of

60.9 percent where bargaining is permitted

but not required). The Show Me State’s

state-level NEA and AFT affiliates bring in

$167 annually per teacher in the state (44th

of 51). While state spending on education

is relatively high (K–12 education accounts

for 21.7 percent of state expenditures; 15th),

overall per-pupil spending is moderate

($10,935 per year; 29th). Roughly 54

percent of total K–12 education dollars go



TIED FOR 47TH

Missouri’s teacher unions are less involved

with state political campaigns than their

counterparts in nearly every other state. In

the past ten years, their direct donations

equaled only 0.25 percent of contributions

to candidates for state office (40th), and

0.39 percent of contributions to state

political parties (41st). Their presence at


conventions was also minimal, with just 12.1

percent of Missouri delegates identifying as

teacher union members (31st).3

MISSOURI OVERALL RANK: 38TH1

TIER 4 (WEAK)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


38

47

40

33

24

23


MISSOURI


23RD

Missouri is one of three states that explicitly

permit—but not require—collective

bargaining by teachers (eleven other states

implicitly allow it by neither prohibiting

nor requiring it). However, few provisions

of collective bargaining are addressed

in state law: Of the twenty-one items

examined in our metric, two—wages and

terms and conditions of employment—must

be negotiated (should a district choose

to bargain at all). State statute does not

address the remaining nineteen. Unions

may automatically collect agency fees from

non-member teachers, but teacher strikes

are not allowed.


40TH

Teacher employment and charter school

laws are less aligned with traditional union

interests in Missouri than in most other

states. Missouri is one of only eleven

states where districts must consider

teacher performance in determining which

teachers are laid off. It is also one of just

five states in which teachers must work

five years before receiving tenure (the

national norm is three), although it does

not require that student learning factor into

tenure decisions or teacher evaluations.

Unions typically oppose autonomy for

charter schools, but Missouri law grants

them partial exemptions from state laws

and teacher certification requirements,

and full exemption from district collective

bargaining agreements. The state also

permits new, conversion, and virtual charter

schools—although only in 2012 did the state

allow charters in districts other than Kansas

City and St. Louis.


24TH

Stakeholders report that Missouri’s teacher

unions are active in shaping education

policy but do not dominate the process.

They indicate that the unions, along with

the state school board association and

association of school administrators, are all

influential in education policy. Respondents

note that the unions are effective in


they disagree, and that policies proposed


session were in line with union priorities,

although the outcomes of that session

were only somewhat in line.4 Finally, they

report that state education leaders are

only sometimes aligned with teacher union

priorities.

OVERALL

38TH

Missouri’s teacher unions do not distinguish

themselves across any of the areas of

strength examined in our metric, and the

state’s overall rank places it in the middle of

the fourteen bargaining-permitted states.

The state is one of only nine that did not

rank higher than 20th in any single area.


MISSOURI

Unions in states seeking Race to the Top funding or NCLB waivers tend to find themselves on the defensive, and the Missouri National Education Association (MNEA) is no exception. At the close of the 2012 legislative session, its legislative director wrote, “MNEA defends public education against extremist attacks: Legislative leaders push extreme agenda and fail to act on real needs of students and educators.”5 Among the measures most offensive to the MNEA were proposals to eliminate tenure and “last in, first out” layoff policies, ensure that ineffective teachers were eligible for dismissal, require that at least half of every teacher’s evaluation be based on student test scores, and implement performance-based pay. After heavy amending, none of those measures passed—not because lawmakers didn’t want the reforms, but because House-Senate bickering and union-supported amendments left the bills without teeth.6,7,8 Despite the fact that it could not enact statewide teacher evaluation standards, however, Missouri secured a 2012 NCLB waiver after it agreed that districts would develop, pilot, and implement student-achievement-based systems locally.9

The legislature did manage to put politics aside and pass a bill expanding charter schools from St. Louis and Kansas City to all failing districts, despite MNEA’s opposition that they should be limited until the charter accountability system is improved (and until charter teachers receive due process rights).10 But with an NCLB waiver in their pocket, and state leaders who can’t seem to agree, Missouri’s teacher unions may be able to rest easy for awhile. At least until lawmakers take up discussions over tenure and evaluations again—which they’ve vowed to do.

DEFENSIVE PLAY


MISSOURI

OVERALL RANK: 38TH





44th


15th


29th


28th




40th


41st


42nd


31st





Permitted




Retirement By rank, what is the employer- versus employee-contribution rate to the teacher pension system? 42nd*










Yes; Higher

MISSOURI RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

33*

47*

23

40


MISSOURI



(cont.)











Yes






Often/Always


Sometimes


Neutral


Sometimes concede, sometimes fight


Agree


Often







Sometimes





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Missouri has the 26th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Missouri, collective bargaining is permitted, and union agency fees are also permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


40

24


MISSOURI

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Missouri are shown in the table, Missouri Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Missouri is ranked 33rd of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Otto Fajen, “MNEA Defends Public Education Against Extremist Attacks,” Missouri National Education Association, accessed August 30, 2012, http://www.mnea.org/Missouri/News/MNEA_defends_public_education_against_extremist_at_268.aspx.

6 Ibid. See also Otto Fajen, “Legislative Update,” Missouri National Education Association, May 25, 2012, http://www.mnea.org/Uploads/Public/Documents/Capitol/LegUpdates/2012/19-May25.pdf.

7 Virginia Young, “Pressure Builds For Teacher Tenure Reform,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 8, 2012, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/pressure-builds-for-teacher-tenure-reform/article_ad0134b0-0e8b-5a75-8222-294e43da6c5c.html.

8 Elisa Crouch, “Missouri To Develop New Teacher Evaluation Tool,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 4, 2012, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/missouri-to-develop-new-teacher-evaluation-tool/article_25b7c53c-9cc4-52ba-a831-f252f67b6c08.html.

9 “ESEA Flexibility Requests and Related Documents,” U.S. Department of Education, accessed September 4, 2012, http://www.ed.gov/esea/flexibility/requests.

10 Fajen.

Overall Rank: 3rdTier 1 (Strongest)

MONTANA



TIED FOR 20TH

Though Montana’s single state teacher

union derives a substantial amount of

internal resources from its own members,

it does not see much funding from the

state. A total of 82.6 percent of Montana

teachers are unionized, the 23rd-highest

membership rate across 51 states. And the

merged NEA-AFT state-level affiliate brings

in $814 annually per Montana teacher (5th

of 51). But while overall K–12 education

spending is high (local, state, and federal

funds amount to $13,773 per pupil per

year, 10th-highest), only 51.1 percent of

those funds go toward teacher salaries and

benefits (44th). Montana itself does not

allot a large proportion of its expenditures

to K–12 education—just 15.3 percent (43rd).


TIED FOR 10TH

While state politics in Montana was not

a big-money game in the past decade,

Montana’s teacher unions were among the

more active players (and played a bigger

role than their counterparts in many other

states).3 Contributions from the unions

accounted for 2.7 percent of the donations

to political parties in the Treasure State

(10th). Even though their donations to

candidates for state office did not add

much to candidates’ overall totals (0.2

percent came from unions; 44th), about $1

out of every $10 given to candidates by the

ten highest-giving sectors in the state came

from teacher unions (15th). They also had a

non-monetary presence: 22.4 percent (8th)

of Montana’s delegates to the Democratic


teacher union members.4

MONTANA OVERALL RANK: 3RD1

TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


3

10

6

20

5

6


MONTANA


6TH

Montana is one of thirty-two states

that require collective bargaining. It

also permits teacher strikes, and allows


fees (a key source of revenue) from non-

member teachers. In addition, state law

gives teacher unions greater scope of

bargaining than in most other states. Of

twenty-one items examined in this analysis,

Montana requires that four be subjects

of collective bargaining—wages, hours,

terms and conditions of employment, and

fringe benefits. It’s silent on the remaining

seventeen provisions, implicitly including

them all in negotiations.


6TH

Many of Montana’s education policies

are closely aligned with traditional

teacher union interests. The state does

not support performance pay, does not

articulate consequences for unsatisfactory

evaluations, and does not require that

student achievement data be part of

teacher evaluations or tenure decisions.

Districts need not consider teacher

performance when determining teacher

layoffs. Finally, though not calculated

into our metric, Montana does not have a

charter school law—in fact, no such bill has

even made it to the legislature floor since

2002 (see sidebar).5


5TH

While stakeholders in Montana do not

consistently rank teacher unions as the

strongest force in education policy, they

do report a very powerful union influence.

Survey respondents note that it is effective

in protecting dollars for education, and

strongly agree that it has been successful in


it disagrees. Furthermore, they indicate that


state’s latest legislative session were mostly

in line with teacher union priorities (though

they note that enacted policies were only

somewhat in line), that the priorities of

state education officials are often aligned

with those of the teacher union.6

OVERALL

3RD

Montana’s teacher union shows consistent

strength across the board. It benefits from

high annual revenue; has a significant

financial presence in political campaigns;

enjoys a broad scope of bargaining; and

maintains a favorable policy climate. Its

perceived influence is significantly higher

than the union in Hawaii (1st overall), and

its state policy environment is significantly

more union-friendly than that in Oregon

(2nd overall).


MONTANA

Because of, or perhaps in spite of, its strength, the Montana Education Association-Montana Federation of Teachers (MEA-MFT) is in the calm at the eye of a virtual storm of anti-union sentiment. Surrounded by states undergoing a flurry of activity to limit union rights—Idaho, Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin among them—the MEA-MFT has not faced significant threats from the governor, and in April 2011 it successfully blocked several major proposals from lawmakers.7 First, the MEA-MFT came out hard against a plan to legalize, and fund, charter schools. The union spared no hyperbole in dubbing HB 603 “one of the most dangerous school privatization bills ever introduced.”8 Had it survived to be heard on the House floor, the bill would have been the first such charter measure to make it that far since 2002. But HB 603 died in committee in April 2011.9 Charter opponents dodged another bullet when language that would have again allowed and funded charters was struck from SB 329.10 The MEA-MFT also rallied its troops against a bill that would redefine “good cause” for teacher terminations and “truncate due process” for dismissals; SB 315 was rejected on the floor, 42-57.11

The union also made a few proposals of its own, including one seeking a 2011 reinstatement of salary raises for public employees after a two-year freeze. The MEA-MFT joined other public employee unions and Democrat Governor Brian Schweitzer in support of the raises, and 500 of its members attended a rally to “Save Public Services and Education.”12 Apparently, however, Montana lawmakers are not as amenable to union interests when they involve asking for money: Two different iterations of the bill were voted down in April 2011, and lawmakers won’t vote on the governor’s third attempt until after Schweitzer’s successor is chosen in November 2012.13 Depending on what that election brings, the powerful MEA-MFT may see more clear skies or face stormy weather ahead.

WEATHERING THE STORM


MONTANA

OVERALL RANK: 3RD



Membership By rank, what percentage of public-school teachers in the state are union members? 23rd


5th


43rd


10th


44th




44th


10th


15th


8th





Permitted




Retirement By rank, what is the employer- versus employee-contribution rate to the teacher pension system? 32nd










Yes; Higher

MONTANA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

20*

10*

6

6


MONTANA



(cont.)



N/A




N/A


N/A


N/A






Often/Always


Sometimes


Agree


Fight


Strongly agree


Often


Mostly in line





Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Montana has the 23rd-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Montana has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c Montana does not have a charter school law.


6

5


MONTANA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Montana are shown in the table, Montana Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Montana is ranked 20th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 The indicators in Area 2 are calculated using total contributions to state candidates and political parties from local, state, and national unions. In the majority of cases, the state unions gave much higher sums than all the local unions combined, with the national associations giving little (or nothing). Montana is an exception because the sum of the donations from local affiliates is comparable to the total from the state union.




7 Gail Schontzler, “Public Enemy Or Middle-Class Champion?” Bozeman Daily Chronicle, March 21, 2011, http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/article_5c3616ee-527a-11e0-8cd4-001cc4c03286.html.

8 “Dangerous: HB 603,” MEA-MFT, April 8, 2011, http://www.mea-mft.org/Articles/dangerous_hb_603.aspx.

9 “Legislative Detail: MT House Bill 603 – 2011 Regular Session,” LegiScan, April 28, 2011, http://legiscan.com/gaits/view/296309.

10 Cody Bloomsburg, “K–12 Funding Bill Takes A Shaky Step Forward In The House,” Session ’11, April 27, 2011, http://session11dotorg.wordpress.com/2011/04/27/k-12-funding-takes-a-tentative-step-forward/.

11 “Victory On Teacher Tenure,” MEA-MFT, April 28, 2011, http://www.mea-mft.org/Articles/victory_on_teacher_tenure.aspx.

12 “500+ Attend Rally To Save Public Services & Education,” MEA-MFT, February 21, 2011, http://www.mea-mft.org/Articles/500_attend_rally_to_save_public_services_education.aspx.

13 Charles S. Johnson, “Montana House Rejects Employee Pay Plan,” Missoulian State Bureau, April 20, 2011, http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/article_097d1448-6bbb-11e0-8105-001cc4c002e0.html; Charles S. Johnson, “House Rejects Pay Plan Bill Again,” Helena Independent Record, April 27, 2011, http://helenair.com/news/article_3c32b03e-708c-11e0-85e9-001cc4c002e0.html.


NEBRASKA



TIED FOR 18TH

Nebraska’s state teacher union has

comparatively moderate resources but

its members benefit from relatively high

spending on education in the state. With

85.3 percent of its teachers identifying as

union members, the unionization rate in

the Cornhusker State is 19th-highest of 51

jurisdictions. The Nebraska State Education

Association (NSEA) brings in $467 per

teacher each year (28th). Funds from

local, state, and federal sources amount to

$12,823 per pupil, per year (15th), with a

full 59.6 percent of those dollars allotted

to teacher salaries and benefits (2nd; only

New York’s allotment is higher). Yet the

state’s own spending is relatively modest,

with just 15.8 percent of its budget directed

to K–12 education (40th).


TIED FOR 13TH

Teacher unions contribute significantly to

state politics in Nebraska, at least when

compared with other states.3 In the past

decade, union donations amounted to 2.4

percent of total contributions to candidates

for state office (5th). Those donations

came to 17.4 percent of the funds donated


state (4th). Moreover, 2.9 percent of the

donations to Nebraska political parties

came from teacher unions (8th). Taken

together, those figures indicate that unions

were a major player in Nebraska elections.

On the other hand, only 7.7 percent of the

state’s delegates to the Democratic and


teacher union members (41st).4

NEBRASKA OVERALL RANK: 26TH1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


26

18

13

27

38

37


NEBRASKA


37TH

Though Nebraska is one of thirty-two


for public-school teachers, unions are not

allowed to automatically collect agency

fees—a key source of union revenue—

from non-member teachers. State law is

relatively indifferent regarding the scope

of bargaining: Of the twenty-one items

examined in our metric, Nebraska requires

just three to be negotiated—wages, hours,

and terms and conditions of employment.

It takes no stand on the remaining eighteen

items, implicitly permitting them all. Finally,

Nebraska prohibits teacher strikes.


27TH

While many of Nebraska’s teacher

employment policies align with traditional

teacher union interests, some do not. The

state does not require student achievement

factor into teacher evaluations or tenure

decisions. Tenure is conferred after three

years (the national norm), and must be

considered in layoff decisions (when

districts need not consider teacher

performance). But it also requires that

employees contribute a greater share of

their pension funds (relative to employer

contributions) than forty other states.

Nebraska does not have a charter school

law.5


38TH

While stakeholders in Nebraska do not

perceive teacher unions to be dominant in

shaping education policy, they do view the

unions as active participants in the process.

Nebraska is one of just four states in which

stakeholders indicated that both Democrats

and Republicans often need teacher union

support to be elected. (Nebraska even has

an NSEA-endorsed Republican governor—

see sidebar.) But survey respondents rank

the union as only the third- or fourth-most

influential entity in state education policy,

consistently placing the school board and

administrator associations above it. In

addition, respondents indicate that, in light

of recent budgetary constraints, the union

acceded to reductions in pay and benefits

rather than fighting against them. Given the

high percentage of district spending that

goes to teacher salaries but the relatively

low proportion of state spending that goes

to K–12 education (see Area 1), perhaps

respondents are reflecting on the union’s

failure to secure higher salaries from the

state (see sidebar).

OVERALL

26TH

Nebraska’s teacher unions are a strong

presence in state politics—and have made

their election endorsements important

for both Democrats and Republicans.

Bargaining laws and teacher employment

policies are no more or less aligned with

union interests than in other states—

although unlike many other states, these

policies seem less vulnerable to change

(see sidebar).


NEBRASKA

The NSEA knows a good investment when it sees one. In 2006, it endorsed Republican Dave Heineman for governor, and was the single biggest donor to his 2010 re-election campaign—after he backed raises and better benefits for teachers.6 Two years later, the union successfully lobbied Heineman to increase state aid for education from the proposed $814 to $853 million (though still a $27 million decrease from 2011–12). It also mobilized its members against the governor’s tax relief plan and successfully curbed tax cuts by two-thirds of the original proposal.7 This was all firmly in line with the vision of NSEA president Nancy Fulton, who explained the importance of investing in lobbying to her members: “I firmly believe that money matters, and that when it comes to education spending, policymakers are ‘pennywise and pound foolish.’ Pushing those policymakers to provide adequate funding for our public schools will pay dividends in the long run.”8

That push included demands for higher teacher salaries, which are among the lowest in the nation, and again the NSEA had the governor on its side.9 Heineman wrote to NSEA leaders, urging them to help their members negotiate pay raises with the help of federal stimulus funds. To the amazement (and chagrin) of lawmakers, he even told the union to use his letter to pressure school boards during collective bargaining. (His letter read, in part, “I am skeptical of mandating how school districts spend their state aid, but I’ve grown increasingly concerned that the substantial increases in state aid have not been reflected in teacher pay.”)10

The NSEA enjoyed only partial success here: Instead of awarding teachers across-the-board raises, in 2010 Nebraska became one of a handful of states that both require performance pay and fund it. However, merit pay is an exception to the more general durability of the education status quo in Nebraska. The state did not enact major education reforms before submitting its Race to the Top applications (which were, unsurprisingly, rejected), and it did not try for an NCLB waiver. Most recently, the legislature passed an NSEA-endorsed plan to evaluate schools and districts (but not teachers) using student performance, with the details yet to be determined by the State Board of Education.11 So far, it seems that the NSEA’s political investments are paying off.

WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS


NEBRASKA

OVERALL RANK: 26TH





28th


40th


15th


2nd




5th


8th


4th


41st



















Yes; Higher

NEBRASKA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

18*

13*

37

27


NEBRASKA



(cont.)



N/A




N/A


N/A


N/A






Often/Always


Often


Neutral


Concede


Agree


Sometimes


Somewhat in line





Sometimes/Often


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Nebraska has the 19th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Nebraska has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c Nebraska does not have a charter school law.


27

38


NEBRASKA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Nebraska are shown in the table, Nebraska Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Nebraska is ranked 18th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 While our overall metric reports the strength of state teacher unions, this area also captures contributions to state campaigns and parties from national unions and local union affiliates. However, in Nebraska only three local unions contribute to state politics, and their donations were relatively tiny compared to the NSEA.


5 When calculating the ranking of states that do not have a charter school law, we do not include any sub-indicators related to charters. While some might argue that the lack of such a law is in itself a statement of union strength, we do not have sufficient evidence to connect the absence with actions of the union.

6 Sean Cavanagh, “GOP governor backed by teachers’ union wins Nebraska,” Education Week, November 2, 2010, accessed August 28, 2012, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2010/11/dave_heineman_backed_by_teachers_union_is_re-elected_in_nebraska.html; “Heineman, The Teachers’ Union, And Irony,” NebraskaStatePaper.com, February 27, 2011, http://nebraska.statepaper.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2011/02/27/4d6b6cff2bc6f.

7 “Legislative Update,” Nebraska State Education Association, April 19, 2012, http://www.nsea.org/policy/LegUpdate.htm.

8 Nancy Fulton, “What I Believe,” Nebraska State Education Association, May 2012, http://www.nsea.org/news/all.htm?articleno=1223.

9 Teacher Portal, accessed August 31, 2012, http://www.teacherportal.com/teacher-salaries-by-state.

10 Margaret Reist, “Heineman Calls For Teacher Pay To Reflect State Aid Increases,” Lincoln Journal Star, June 19, 2009, http://journalstar.com/news/local/article_89655884-137c-5296-bb8f-dcf2a7710e39.html.

11 Bert Peterson, “War On Teachers Waged Across Nation,” Independent, May 5, 2012, http://www.theindependent.com/opinion/another_opinion/war-on-teachers-waged-across-nation/article_4e05aa74-9632-11e1-b52b-0019bb2963f4.html.


NEVADA



TIED FOR 28TH

Nevada’s state teacher union enjoys a fair

amount of resources from its members

but does not see much spending on K–12

education in the state. With 74.6 percent

of the state’s teachers unionized and

annual revenue of $435 per teacher, the

NEA-affiliated Nevada State Education

Association (NSEA) is in the middle of the

pack compared with unions in other states.

Spending on K–12 education is relatively

high—21.3 percent of the state’s budget

goes to K–12 education (the 17th-highest

proportion out of 51 jurisdictions). But

Nevada is at the bottom of the list when it

comes to total dollars for education from

local, state, and federal sources: Annual

per-pupil expenditures are just $8,363—

only one state spends less.


TIED FOR 18TH

Over the past ten years, teacher unions

contributed significant sums to state

political campaigns in Nevada.3 Donations

from unions constituted 1.7 percent

of the money received by state-level

candidates (the 7th-highest percentage

in the nation) and 2.8 percent of all giving

to state political parties (9th-highest).

But teacher unions faced competition:

Their contributions to political candidates

amounted to 6.5 percent of all donations

from the ten highest-giving sectors (21st).

Nor was the union voice at the Democratic

and Republican national conventions as

loud as in other states: Just 9.1 percent of

Nevada’s delegates were teacher union

members (37th).4

NEVADA OVERALL RANK: 25TH1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


25

28

18

28

10

27


NEVADA


27TH

Though Nevada is one of thirty-two

jurisdictions that require collective

bargaining, teachers are not allowed to

strike. The Silver State also prohibits unions

from automatically collecting agency fees, a

key source of revenue, from non-members.

Nevada nonetheless empowers unions

with a wide scope of collective bargaining;


metric, Nevada explicitly requires that

fourteen be subjects of bargaining—more

than any other state.


28TH

Nevada’s state policies are not perfectly in

line with traditional teacher union interests,

but neither are they badly misaligned.

Nevada permits, but does not require,

performance pay for teachers. State law

requires that student achievement be


evaluations, but teachers can earn tenure

after just three years. It also mandates

that factors other than seniority—but not

student achievement—be considered in

layoff decisions. The state’s charter laws

are also a mixed bag: Nevada does not cap

charter schools (though some districts do),

but neither does it give them automatic

exemptions from most district regulations.

Collective bargaining agreements apply

only to charter employees on leave from

traditional schools.


10TH

Stakeholders perceive teacher unions in

Nevada to be among the most influential

entities in shaping education policy, and

they report that both Democrats and

Republicans seeking state-level office often

need teacher union support to get elected.

Further, they agreed that teacher unions

are often effective in protecting dollars for

education and note that they fought hard

to prevent reductions in pay and benefits


constraints. Respondents indicate, however,

that Nevada’s teacher unions have faced

struggles of late: Policies proposed by

the governor during the state’s recent

legislative session were mostly not in

line with teacher union priorities, and the

legislative outcomes were only somewhat in

line with them.5

OVERALL

25TH

Nevada’s teacher unions are more

involved in state politics than many of

their counterparts in other states, and

they enjoy a relatively strong reputation

for influence. The scope of bargaining and

state policy environment are middle-of-

the-road, neither particularly favorable nor

unfavorable to union interests.


NEVADA

The Clark County Education Association (CCEA) didn’t heed Superintendent Dwight Jones when he said in early 2012 that there was simply no money to raise teacher salaries. Jones had warned that layoffs would be inevitable if wages were not held steady. An arbitrator hired to mediate the dispute ruled in favor of the union, and the district paid teachers a total of $64 million in pay raises.6

In June 2012, however, Jones’s warning became reality. To offset the cost of the raises, the Clark County School District mailed pink slips to 419 teachers and let another 600 newly-vacated positions go unfilled. While the union contract stipulates that both performance and seniority are key criteria for layoffs, in reality, early-career teachers bore the brunt of the firings: Because only thirty-six veteran teachers met the union’s stringent definition of poor performance, roughly 380 newer teachers were let go instead. Teachers who survived the culling face an increase of three students per class, which brings the average to a hefty thirty-five students—one of the highest in the nation.

Faced with threats to teacher job security in Clark County (Las Vegas) and elsewhere, the Nevada state union proposed a solution that would increase state education funding and, ultimately, protect teacher salaries and jobs. The NSEA backed a ballot measure that would impose a 2 percent tax on businesses earning over $1 million a year, with the revenue going to the state’s general fund (and eventually reaching local school districts). Nevada businesses claimed the tax was illegal and misleading, and they are suing to stop the “Education Initiative.” If the union can muster over 72,000 signatures by November 2012, the 2013 legislature will consider approving the statutory initiative.7 Meanwhile, CCEA and Clark County district leaders are negotiating their 2012–13 contract; early observers say the talks “haven’t been promising.”8

BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR


NEVADA

OVERALL RANK: 25TH





30th


17th


50th


26th




7th


9th


21st


37th



By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 1st
















Yes; Lower

NEVADA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

28*

18*

27

28


NEVADA



(cont.)







Yes










Often/Always


Sometimes/Often


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often




Somewhat in line



Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Nevada has the 28th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Nevada has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


28

10


NEVADA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Nevada are shown in the table, Nevada Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Nevada is ranked 28th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 While our overall metric reports the strength of state teacher unions (in this case, the Nevada State Education Association, Nevada’s NEA affiliate), this particular indicator also captures contributions from local (and national) affiliates. Typically, the contributions from locals are significantly smaller than the amount given by state unions. But in Nevada’s case, a local affiliate (Clark County Education Association) gave nearly as much as the state union.



6 Trevon Milliard, “More Than 400 Teachers, Personnel Receive Pink Slips,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, June 11, 2012, http://www.lvrj.com/news/more-than-400-teachers-personnel-receive-pink-slips-158446925.html.

7 Associated Press, “Lawsuit Filed Against Nevada Tax Initiative,” Las Vegas Sun, June 26, 2012, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/jun/26/nv-nevada-tax-initiative-1st-ld-writethru/.

8 Milliard.


NEW HAMPSHIRE



TIED FOR 24TH

The Granite State’s financial resources,

unionized teaching force, and funding

for education all nudge its state teacher

unions toward the middle of the national

pack. With 84.4 percent of public school

teachers unionized, the Granite State posts

the 22nd-highest membership rate of 51

jurisdictions, and the state’s NEA and AFT

affiliates bring in $504 per teacher in the

state (23rd). State dollars for education

are roughly average, with 21.1 percent of

New Hampshire’s budget directed to K–12

education (18th). It ranks higher on overall

spending—local, state, and federal funds

combined amount to annual per-pupil

expenditures of $13,519 (11th), and teachers

see 55.6 percent of those dollars go toward

their salaries and benefits (16th).


TIED FOR 40TH

Compared to their counterparts elsewhere,

New Hampshire’s teacher unions were

relatively uninvolved in the past decade of

state politics. Their contributions amounted

to just 0.28 percent of all donations


(37th), and 0.45 percent of donations

to state-level political parties (39th).

Further, they did not have a significant

presence at Democratic and Republican

national conventions: just 7.1 percent of

the delegates from New Hampshire were

teacher union members (42nd).3

NEW HAMPSHIRE OVERALL RANK: 30TH1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


30

24

40

17

40

14


NEW HAMPSHIRE


14TH

New Hampshire’s teacher unions enjoy

relatively permissive bargaining laws. It is

one of twenty-one states that both require

collective bargaining and allow unions

automatically to collect agency fees from

non-member teachers (a key source of

union revenue). The scope of bargaining is

also wide: Of twenty-one items examined

in our metric, New Hampshire requires that

six be negotiated: wages, hours, terms

and conditions of employment, dismissal,

leave, and extra-curricular duties. The state

only excludes one provision—management

rights—and implicitly permits the remaining

fourteen items by taking no position.

However, state law does not allow teacher

strikes.


17TH

New Hampshire’s teacher employment

policies generally align with traditional

union interests. It does not support

performance pay, does not require

student achievement data to factor into


and does not articulate consequences

for unsatisfactory evaluations. Further,

districts do not have to consider teacher

performance when making layoffs

(although they do not have to consider

seniority, either). On the other hand, it takes

teachers five years to earn tenure versus

the national norm of three. Moreover, the

state’s charter policies are somewhat more

opposed to typical union positions. While

there is a cap on the number of charters, it

leaves ample room for growth, and charters

get partial automatic exemptions from

state certification rules and full exemptions

from collective bargaining agreements and

most other state laws.


40TH

Stakeholders in New Hampshire perceive

teacher union strength to be more limited

than in most other states. Not a single

survey respondent said that the teacher

unions were among the influential entities

in education policy; only in Florida did

stakeholders say the same. They instead

report that the state school board,

association of school administrators,

and association of school boards were

influential. They also note that the unions

often rely on compromise to see their

preferred policies enacted, that they are

unable to ward off proposals with which

they disagree (although that may be less

true lately—see sidebar), and that the

positions of state education leaders are

not particularly aligned with those of the

teacher union.

OVERALL

30TH

While New Hampshire’s teacher unions are

not very involved in state politics and do

not garner a strong reputation, they do

enjoy many favorable state-level policies.

Perhaps it is because current state policies

already align with traditional union interests

that they are not more involved politically.


NEW HAMPSHIRE

State leaders and unions in the Granite State have been playing hardball for most of 2012. First, lawmakers considered three constitutional amendments that would reduce (or eliminate) the state’s obligations to fund public education—no surprise in a state with no sales or personal income tax. CACR 12 would permit the state to give fewer dollars to districts that could afford to raise money locally. CACR 8 would eliminate the state’s obligation to give local districts any funds (while also granting districts complete autonomy over curricula, hiring, and budget). And CACR 6 would require a legislative supermajority to pass new taxes, essentially freezing state revenues.4 NEA-New Hampshire came out hard against all three amendments; on CACR 12, president Rhonda Wesolowski lambasted that “schoolchildren lose when politicians play favorites and that is exactly what this amendment allows.”5 The House approved CACR 6 and 12, but not with enough votes to place them on the November ballot; CACR 8 died before lawmakers voted on it.6,7 Three failed amendments mean three strikes, one out, for legislators. Early 2012 also found New Hampshire’s unions battling three measures that AFT-New Hampshire called “union-busting bills and more attacks on our public employees and middle class families.”8 Senators tabled a proposal to make New Hampshire a right-to-work state after it didn’t gain enough momentum to prevail against a likely veto by Democrat Governor John Lynch. Next, they tabled a measure requiring employees and districts share the cost of any health insurance increases should a contract expire while a new one is being negotiated. A third proposal, allowing districts to ask that their local union be decertified as a legal bargaining unit if its membership became small enough, is locked in Senate committee.9,10 Three more strikes, two outs. In June 2012, however, school-choice proponents almost knocked one out of the park. The legislature passed a bill giving tax credits to businesses for donations to scholarship funds for private- and religious-school vouchers. The law also provided grants to parents who choose to home-school their children. Governor Lynch made a diving catch at the wall, vetoing the bill on the grounds that public money should not pay for private schools, and proponents couldn’t raise enough votes in the House to overturn the veto.11 That makes three outs for reformist lawmakers, and so, for the time being, New Hampshire’s teacher unions are safe at home.

COVERING ALL THE BASES


NEW HAMPSHIRE

OVERALL RANK: 30TH





23rd


18th


11th


16th




37th


39th


29th


42nd





Permitted














Yes; Higher

NEW HAMPSHIRE RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

24*

40*

14

17


NEW HAMPSHIRE



(cont.)







Yes




Yes






Often


Rarely


Neutral


Generally concede


Neutral


Sometimes/Often







Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, New Hampshire has the 22nd-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: New Hampshire has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


17

40


NEW HAMPSHIRE

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for New Hampshire are shown in the table, New Hampshire Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, New Hampshire is ranked 24th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.



4 Matt Murray, “Taxes And Schools: An In-Depth Look Into CACR6, CACR12, and CACR13,” Hampton-NorthHamptonPatch.com, June 2, 2012, http://hampton-northhampton.patch.com/blog_posts/taxes-and-schools-an-in-depth-look-into-cacr-6-cacr12-and-cacr13.

5 “CACR12 Wrong for New Hampshire’s Schoolchildren,” NEA New Hampshire, May 31, 2012, http://www.neanh.org/home/29.htm.

6 Holly Ramer, “NH Education Amendment Fails In House,” Associated Press, June 6, 2012, http://www.boston.com/news/local/new_hampshire/articles/2012/06/06/nh_school_funding_amendment_faces_key_vote/.

7 Laura Hainey, “CACR’s 6 And 12 Defeated,” New Hampshire Labor News, June 7, 2012, http://nhlabornews.com/2012/06/aft-nh-cacrs-6-and-12-defeated/.

8 “AFT-NH Member Action Needed – Defeat House Bills 1667, 1645, 1685, And 1206,” AFT New Hampshire, http://nh.aft.org/index.cfm?action=article&articleID=fca8369c-70b5-43d0-9edd-ec0e800fe39c.

9 Jake Berry, “Labor Remains Issue For Legislators,” Nashua Telegraph, March 18, 2012, http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/953922-196/capitol-watch-labor-remains-issue-for-legislators.html

10 Garry Rayno, “House Passes Right To Work Bill, But Well Short Of Votes Needed To Override Likely Veto,” New Hampshire Union Leader, March 14, 2012, http://www.unionleader.com/article/20120314/NEWS06/703149975.

11 “Governor’s Veto Message Regarding SB 372,” Office of Governor John Lynch, June 18, 2012, http://www.governor.nh.gov/media/news/2012/061812-sb372.htm.


NEW JERSEY



TIED FOR 1ST

New Jersey’s state teacher unions benefit

from abundant internal resources: With

97.1 percent of its teachers unionized,

the Garden State has the 6th-highest

membership rate of 51 jurisdictions. On

top of that, the NEA and AFT state-level

affiliates post $936 in annual revenue per

teacher (3rd of 51). Further, New Jersey

teachers see an unparalleled financial

commitment to K–12 education: 24.3

percent of state expenditures are devoted

to this domain (10th) and annual per-pupil

spending is high at $15,116 (6th).


TIED FOR 26TH

Despite ample revenues, the political

activity of New Jersey state teacher unions

ranks them in the middle of the national

pack. In the past decade, 0.58 percent of

total donations to candidates for state

office, and 0.68 percent of the donations to

state political parties, came from teacher

unions (27th and 31st, respectively).

Fifteen percent of the state’s delegates to



(20th).3

NEW JERSEY OVERALL RANK: 7TH1

TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


7

1

26

5

2

17


NEW JERSEY


TIED FOR 17TH

New Jersey is one of twenty-one states

that both require collective bargaining in

education and allow unions to automatically

collect agency fees, a key source of

revenue, from non-member teachers. The

state slightly limits the breadth of that


in our metric, New Jersey requires that six

(more than most states) be bargained—


employment, grievance procedures, leave,

and class load. It prohibits three (also more

than most states) items from inclusion—

teacher transfer/reassignment, layoffs/

reductions in force, and pension/retirement

benefits. The remaining twelve are implicitly

permitted because the state does not

address them. In addition, teacher strikes

are not permitted.


5TH

At the time we calculated our metric, New

Jersey’s teacher employment policies

were closely aligned with traditional

union interests, and its charter laws were

only slightly less so. The state does not

support performance pay and, up until

June 2012, it did not require student

achievement to factor into either teacher

evaluations or tenure decisions (which

teachers received after three years, the

national norm). In addition, there were no

articulated consequences for unsatisfactory

evaluations. This is changing, however.

S-1455, enacted but not yet implemented as

of press time, requires that tenure decisions

be informed by evidence of student

learning, makes ineffective teachers eligible

for dismissal, and extends the probationary

period from three to four years (see

sidebar). As for charter laws, the state

does not cap the number of such schools

and allows all forms (new, conversion, and

virtual). Charters are automatically exempt

from district laws and state regulations,

with the exception of teacher certification

requirements, and start-up charters are

fully exempt from collective bargaining

agreements as well. However, only the state

commissioner of education may authorize

charters of any kind.


2ND

New Jersey’s teacher unions rank behind

only California’s in their reputation for

influence in state education policy. Indeed,

stakeholders unanimously rate them

as the most important shapers of such

policy. They also agree that the unions are


(even in times of cutbacks), and strongly

agree that they are effective in warding off

policy proposals with which they disagree.

Though they report that policies proposed

by the governor during the latest legislative

session were not at all in line with teacher

union priorities, they counter that the

session’s policy outcomes were mostly in

line with union priorities—a likely example

of the union’s power.4 Finally, they note,

again unanimously, that teacher unions

need not make concessions to ensure that

their preferred policies are enacted.

OVERALL

7TH

New Jersey’s teacher unions have leveraged

their robust resources and membership

to build a strong reputation and maintain

favorable policies at the state level. It is

likely because their reputation is so strong

that they need not contribute significantly

to state political campaigns (although they

do spend significant dollars on their own

political advertising—see sidebar).


NEW JERSEY

Republican Governor Chris Christie is not exactly a fan of unions. Exhibit A: In 2011, he co-authored a bill with Senate president (and Democrat) Steve Sweeney that raised pension contributions from current employees and eliminated cost-of-living increases in retiree benefits.5 As passed, the law also stripped teachers and other public employees of the right to bargain over those provisions in the future.6 In response, New Jersey Education Association (NJEA) President Barbara Keshishian rebuked state leaders: “A legislature and governor who will raid the pension checks of retirees and the paychecks of middle-class workers but lack the courage or integrity to ask the very wealthy to share the sacrifice of even a modest tax increase are not the representatives of the people who elected them.”7 (The NJEA also launched a million-dollar ad campaign against Sweeney, who won re-election anyway.)8

Exhibit B: After a year-and-a-half of debate on teacher tenure, in May 2012 Christie admonished the Democrat-led legislature—with his trademark charm and subtlety—“Do not send me watered down B.S. tenure reform.”9 Whether they followed instructions is arguable. The bill did extend the pre-tenure probationary period from three to four years, link tenure to teacher performance, and make ineffective teachers eligible for dismissal. The NJEA declared the overhaul a “win-win,” however, and praised Christie for including the union when crafting the bill.10 It’s not surprising that the union supported it: “last in, first out” layoffs remained untouched, and firing a tenured teacher first requires the approval of an independent arbitrator.11 Perhaps more surprising is that Christie included the NJEA at all, considering his comments on Face the Nation a year earlier: “the teachers of New Jersey deserve a union as great as they are…and they don’t have it.”12 Could this be a sign of a kinder, gentler Christie? Unlikely. It’s more like the mark of a governor who knows that bipartisan collaboration plays well: Christie boasted at the 2012 Republican National Convention that “They said it was impossible to touch the third rail of politics, to take on the public-sector unions and to reform a pension and health benefits system that was headed to bankruptcy. But with bipartisan leadership…we did it. [And] they said that it was impossible to speak the truth to the teachers’ union, [they said that real teacher tenure reform] would never happen. But for the first time in 100 years, with bipartisan support, you know the answer. We did it.”13 Seems like everyone in New Jersey is claiming a victory.

A TRUE WIN-WIN?


NEW JERSEY

OVERALL RANK: 7TH





3rd


10th*


6th


39th




27th


31st


27th


20th*





Permitted




Retirement By rank, what is the employer- versus employee-contribution rate to the teacher pension system? **










Yes; Higher

NEW JERSEY RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

1*

26*

17*

5


NEW JERSEY



(cont.)



No state cap




Yes








Most influential


Often


Rarely/Sometimes


Agree


Fight


Strongly agree


Often/Always




Mostly in line



Sometimes/Often


Does not concede


** Insufficient data; see Appendix A.


b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, New Jersey has the 6th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: New Jersey has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c See note in Area 4, above.


5

2


NEW JERSEY

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for New Jersey are shown in the table, New Jersey Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, New Jersey is ranked 1st of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Sean Cavanagh, “N.J. Latest State To Move On Pension, Health Care Changes,” Education Week, June 24, 2011, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2011/06/new_jersey_latest_state_moving_forward_with_pension_changes.html.

6 Mark J. Magyar, “Collective Bargaining A Casualty Of The Christie-Sweeney Deal,” NewJerseySpotlight.com, June 16, 2011, http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/11/0616/0319/.

7 Barbara Keshishian, “Assembly Vote Strips Public Employees Of Rights,” June 23, 2011, http://www.njea.org/news/2011-06-23/assembly-vote-strips-public-employees-of-rights.

8 Magyar.

9 Maryann Spoto, “Christie To Dems: No ‘Watered-Down’ Teacher Tenure Bill,” NorthJersey.com, May 8, 2012, http://www.northjersey.com/news/Christie_to_Dems_No_watered-down_tenure_bill.html.

10 “A Win-Win For Students, Teachers, And The Public,” New Jersey Education Association, August 6, 2012, http://www.njea.org/news/2012-08-06/a-win-win-for-students-teachers-and-the-public.

11 Ben Velderman, “Despite Spin, Unions Win And Students Lose In Jersey,” EAGnews.org, June 19, 2012, http://eagnews.org/despite-spin-unions-win-and-students-lose-in-jersey/.

12 Sharon Harris-Zlotnick, “Gov. Christie Says NJ Teachers Deserve Better Than NJEA,” NewJerseyNewsroom.com, March 2, 2011, http://www.nje3.org/?p=5105.

13 “Transcript Of Chris Christie’s Speech At The Republican National Convention,” August 28, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/28/transcript-chris-christie-speech-at-republican-national-convention/.


NEW MEXICO



46TH

New Mexico’s teacher unions have few

internal resources, and the state’s districts

commit relatively little money to teacher

salaries and benefits. With just 41.0

percent of its teachers unionized, the Land

of Enchantment has by far the lowest

unionization rate of any state in which

bargaining is mandatory (and is 48th of

51 jurisdictions overall). Low membership

contributes to low annual revenue—the

state-level NEA and AFT affiliates bring

just $236 for every New Mexico teacher

(37th). Compared to other states, per-pupil

expenditures are middling, $11,101 annually

(28th), and just 52.0 percent of those

dollars goes toward teacher salaries and

benefits (42nd).


TIED FOR 32ND

Union involvement in the past decade

of New Mexico politics puts the state

near the middle of the national pack.3

Union contributions accounted for 0.90

percent of total donations to candidates

for state office (20th), and 4.6 percent of

the donations to candidates from the ten

highest-giving sectors in the state (28th).

Teacher unions also gave 0.78 percent

of the contributions received by state

political parties (29th). Finally, just 5.9

percent of all of New Mexico’s delegates



(only five states had fewer).4

NEW MEXICO OVERALL RANK: 37TH1

TIER 4 (WEAK)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


37

46

32

29

8

35


NEW MEXICO


TIED FOR 35TH

New Mexico is one of thirty-two states that

require collective bargaining. The scope

of bargaining is not particularly narrow or

permissive: Of twenty-one items examined

in our metric, New Mexico mandates that

four be bargained: wages, hours, terms and

conditions of employment, and grievance

procedures. Only one item is excluded—

pension/retirement benefits. Bargaining

over management rights is explicitly

permitted, and state law implicitly includes

the remaining fifteen items in the scope

of bargaining by not addressing them

at all. The state allows teacher unions to

collect agency fees from non-members,

but they cannot automatically deduct

dues from member paychecks unless they

first negotiate with their district to do so.

Teacher strikes are prohibited.


29TH

While some of New Mexico’s teacher

employment policies align with traditional

union interests, many do not. The state

does not support performance pay, does

not require student achievement data to

factor into teacher evaluations or tenure

decisions, and does not compel districts

to consider performance in determining

which teachers are laid off. But teachers

pay a greater share of their retirement

contributions than their employers do—

the same is true in only four other states.

And, teachers are automatically eligible for

dismissal after unsatisfactory evaluations.

The state’s charter laws are equally mixed.

While charter schools must abide by the

state’s teacher certification requirements,

they are automatically exempt from



8TH

Despite low indications of strength in the

other four areas, New Mexico’s teacher

unions have a strong reputation among

education stakeholders. Our survey

respondents rank the unions one of the

top two most influential entities in state

education policy (the association of school

administrators is the other), and note

that Democrats (often) and Republicans

(sometimes) need teacher union support

to be elected. According to stakeholders,

teacher unions fight rather than concede

to prevent reductions in pay and benefits,

although they are neither effective nor

ineffective in protecting dollars for

education in general. Interestingly, while

stakeholders report that the policies

proposed by the governor in the latest

legislative session were mostly not in line

with union priorities, the policies enacted

in the latest session were mostly in line

with those priorities, and existing policies

frequently reflect union priorities. This is

perhaps a sign that the unions’ power lies in

their ability to shape the outcomes of state

politics, since it appears that legislators are

open to union input on measures related to

education (see sidebar).

OVERALL

37TH

While New Mexico’s unions ranked among

the least powerful in four of the five areas

reported here, stakeholders perceived that

their actual influence is quite substantial.


NEW MEXICO

New Mexico’s new evaluation system may be a tool to evaluate the teachers, but the state’s teacher unions give it an F and called the state’s education leader a cheater.

With 87 percent of the state’s schools failing to meet federal accountability requirements for student achievement, in February 2012 state Secretary-Designate of Education Hanna Skandera sought a waiver from provisions of the No Child Left Behind act. She wanted to reward schools for growth, even if they were unable to bring students up to the required proficiency levels. The waiver touted a new evaluation system, jointly developed by a task force of teachers, administrators, parents, and teacher union representatives, under which half of a teacher’s rating would be based on student test scores—an evaluation system that had not actually been passed yet by the state legislature.5,6 After working with the NEA-NM to ensure due process for teachers was protected, the House approved the new system, but the Senate did not.7

Skandera was left with two choices: put the future of the waiver at risk, or take matters into her own hands. With the blessing of Governor Susana Martinez, Skandera opted for the latter. Using an executive order rather than statute, the state moved ahead with a standardized-test-based evaluation system (this time with test results comprising 35 percent, not 50 percent, of the total).8 In explaining why the Public Education Department circumvented the legislative process, Skandera stated bluntly, “We just can’t wait.”9 Predictably, her action incensed the state’s unions. Albuquerque Teachers Federation (ATF) president Ellen Bernstein called Skandera’s and Martinez’s policies “slogan reform,” image-boosting ploys with no real benefits for students.10 They issued a “no confidence” vote for Skandera in May 2012.

In July 2012, the ATF and the American Federation of Teachers New Mexico organized a massive rally, during which president Stephanie Ly proclaimed, “the state needs to go back to the drawing board.”11 But despite the conflict, it appears that New Mexico unions are more open to reform than their counterparts in other states—their objection, they say, is not to the inclusion of test scores in teacher evaluations, but that state education leaders steamrolled what began as a collaborative process.12

PLAYING BY HER OWN RULES


NEW MEXICO

OVERALL RANK: 37TH





37th


23rd


28th


42nd




20th


29th


28th


45th





Automatic payroll deduction must be negotiated














Yes; Higher

NEW MEXICO RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

46

32*

35*

29


NEW MEXICO



(cont.)











Yes






Often/Always


Sometimes


Neutral


Fight


Agree


Often







**






b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, New Mexico has the 48th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: New Mexico has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


29

8


NEW MEXICO

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for New Mexico are shown in the table, New Mexico Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, New Mexico is ranked 46th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 The indicators in Area 2 are calculated using total contributions to state candidates and political parties from local, state, and national unions. In the majority of cases, the state unions gave much higher sums than all the local unions combined, with the national associations giving little (or nothing). New Mexico is an exception: combined donations from the NEA, the AFT, and the AFT-affiliated Albuquerque Teachers Federation nearly matched the donations from the state unions.


5 Hailey Heinz, “Education Waiver Needs Work,” Albuquerque Journal, February 1, 2012, http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/02/01/news/education-waiver-needs-work.html.

6 Robert Nott, “Trio Of Bills Push For New Teacher Evaluation System,” New Mexican, February 2, 2012, http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/2012-Legislature-Bills-push-for-teacher-evaluation-system.

7 “Legislative Advocacy Update,” National Education Association New Mexico, February 16, 2012, http://www.nea-nm.org/2002legislature/2012/2012%20current.html.

8 Milan Simonich, “Face-Off Looms On NM Teacher Evaluation,” El Paso Times, July 19, 2012, http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_21107108/face-off-looms-teacher-evaluation.

9 Ibid.

10 Eddie Garcia, “Report Shows Decline In New Mexico Graduation Rates,” New Mexico Eyewitness News, March 19, 2012, http://www.kob.com/article/stories/S2544887.shtml.

11 Andra Cernavskis, “Protesters Rally Against Proposed Teacher Evaluation System,” New Mexican, July 18, 2012, http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/071912teacherrally.

12 Hailey Heinz, “‘No Confidence’ Vote for Skandera,” Albuquerque Journal, May 9, 2012, http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/05/09/news/no-confidence-vote-for-skandera.html.


NEW YORK



TIED FOR 1ST

New York’s state teacher union has

substantial internal resources and its

members benefit from generous funding

levels. Fully 98.4 percent of teachers are

unionized in the Empire State, and the

joint NEA-AFT New York State United

Teachers (NYSUT) brings in $536 annually

per teacher (the 20th-highest revenue

among 51 jurisdictions). New York also

spends more of its budget on K–12

education than do many other states (20.9

percent; 20th). These funds, combined

with local and federal dollars, amount to

per-pupil expenditures of $15,862 annually

(5th), of which a full 63.5 percent goes

toward teacher salaries and benefits

(by a considerable margin the highest

percentage in the nation).


TIED FOR 13TH

Over the past decade, New York’s teacher

unions have been more involved in politics

than those in many other states.3 Their

donations accounted for 0.68 percent of

total contributions received by candidates

for state office (22nd), and 5.0 percent

of the contributions to candidates from

the ten highest-giving sectors in the state

(26th). They are also prominent donors

to state political parties, contributing

3.4 percent of total party funds (5th).

Moreover, unions were comparatively

well-represented at the Democratic and

Republican national conventions, with

eighteen percent of New York delegates

identifying as teacher union members

(13th).

NEW YORK OVERALL RANK: 9TH1 TIER 1 (STRONG)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


9

1

13

24

21

19


NEW YORK


19TH

New York is one of twenty-one states that

require collective bargaining and allow


from non-member teachers. But the state

limits the scope of that bargaining: Just

four of the twenty-one items examined

in our metric are required subjects of

bargaining: wages, hours, terms and


procedures. Of the remaining seventeen,

New York prohibits bargaining over tenure

and pensions, lets districts decide whether

to bargain over class size, and implicitly

includes the other fourteen items in the

scope of bargaining by not addressing

them in state law. The state prohibits

teacher strikes—though it must be noted

that some of the country’s largest and

longest teacher strikes have occurred there.


TIED FOR 24TH

Many New York policies align with

traditional teacher union interests. For

example, the state does not support

performance pay for teachers and

seniority is the sole factor in layoff

decisions. In addition, employers pay

a greater share of employee pensions

(relative to teacher contributions) than

in many other states. However, teacher

evaluations must be significantly informed

by student achievement, and teachers

are automatically eligible for dismissal

after unsatisfactory ratings. Charter law is

an equally mixed bag: the state caps the

number of schools (but there is room for

ample growth under the gap), allows new

and conversion charters (but not virtual

schools), and partially (but not fully)

exempts charters from state laws, district

regulations, and collective bargaining

provisions.


21ST

Stakeholders in New York perceive teacher

unions to be an active, but not necessarily

effective, presence in policymaking.

Respondents rank teacher unions among

the most influential entities in education

policy (along with the board of regents and

education advocacy organizations). But

they also note that the policies proposed


session were mostly not in line with

teacher union priorities, and outcomes of

the session were only somewhat in line.4

(Likely because the policy landscape is in

flux; see sidebar.) Further, they report that

state education leaders only sometimes

align with teacher union priorities, and that

teacher unions need to compromise to see

some of their preferred policies enacted.

OVERALL

9TH

New York is the birthplace of the teacher

union movement, and its state teacher

union ranks as one of the strongest

in the country. Bargaining laws and

teacher employment policies are union-

favorable (especially those codified during

New York’s decades of labor-friendly

leadership), and the union has significant

resources from its members. It falls short of

garnering a strong reputation, however—

likely because it faces stiff competition

from high-profile education reformers and

a governor with extensive powers over

education policy (see sidebar).


NEW YORK

New York City is home to some of the biggest names in education reform—Joel Klein, Geoffrey Canada, Eva Moscowitz, and Michael Bloomberg, to name a few—yet in 2012, the most significant progress in New York came from Albany. When the state passed legislation in 2010 guaranteeing that it would implement a statewide high-quality teacher evaluation system as part of its $700 million Race to the Top application, Governor Andrew Cuomo had no idea that it would take education leaders so long to work out the details. But after more than two years, and with millions of dollars at risk, the New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) and state education officials had yet to agree on what those evaluations would look like. So Cuomo gave them a deadline, and an ultimatum: Decide, or else he would decide for them.5 After an all-night negotiating session, New York had new teacher evaluations: 40 percent of a teacher’s score would be based on student achievement (measured at least in part by growth on state standardized tests), and 60 percent on classroom observations and other subjective measures.6 Cuomo called the agreement “a victory for all New Yorkers” and NYSUT President Richard Iannuzzi conceded (or simply put on a brave face) when he said it is “good for students and fair to teachers.”7 Iannuzzi’s comments were a stark contrast to those he made less than a year earlier when the state board initially proposed increasing the role of state test scores from the previously-mandated 20 percent to up to 40 percent: “[the Board] chose politics over sound educational policy and the cheap way over the right way, doubling down on high-stakes tests of dubious worth.”8 Perhaps Cuomo’s ultimatum changed his mind, or perhaps Iannuzzi didn’t want to be left holding the bag if the state, and its teachers, lost their RTTT award.

Not a week after the agreement, New York City Mayor Bloomberg released the performance rankings of 18,000 individual teachers (the city had been using value-added evaluations for four years). NYC’s United Federation of Teachers (UFT) had tried legal avenues to block the disclosure, but to no avail, and now everyone in the city, and the nation, could see teachers’ names and ratings in the Wall Street Journal.9 Outraged, the UFT turned to state lawmakers and Cuomo, pressing for legislation to protect its members’ privacy. The NYSUT joined the fray, calling the release “a betrayal of the essential purpose of evaluations” and worrying that publicizing the ratings would undermine the new statewide system;10 even Bill Gates wrote in a New York Times editorial that “the surest way to weaken [evaluations] is to twist it into a capricious exercise in public shaming.”11 The result: Cuomo proposed a bill that allowed parents to see individual teachers’ rankings but blocked districts from releasing that information to the public—although the measure would not stop parents from sharing the scores themselves. Bloomberg opposed the bill outright, while the NYSUT wanted even stricter privacy measures; in the end, each took what they could get as lawmakers overwhelmingly approved the measure. “I’m glad it’s over,” said Iannuzzi.12 Considering the amount of time state leaders and the union have spent debating the evaluations, so is everybody else.

FULL DISCLOSURE


NEW YORK

OVERALL RANK: 9TH





20th


20th


5th


1st




22nd


5th


26th


13th





Permitted














No restriction

NEW YORK RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

1*

13*

19

24*


NEW YORK



(cont.)







Yes










Sometimes/Often


Sometimes/Often


Neutral


Fight


Neutral


Sometimes/Often


Mostly not in line





Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, New York has the 2nd-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: New York has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


24*

21


NEW YORK

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for New York are shown in the table, New York Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, New York is ranked 1st of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 While our overall metric reports the strength of state teacher unions, this area also captures contributions to state campaigns and parties from other NEA- and AFT-affiliated state and local organizations. In New York, the NEA-affiliated New York State Council of Educational Associations was also a significant donor to state politics (albeit not at the level of the NYSUT), although it is officially a professional association/advocacy group and not a teacher union.


5 Lisa Fleisher, “Deal Clears Way For Teacher Evaluations In New York,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2012/02/16/deal-clears-way-for-teacher-evaluations-in-new-york/.

6 Fernando Santos and Winnie Hu, “A Last-Minute Deal On Teacher Evaluations,” School Book, February 16, 2012, http://www.schoolbook.org/2012/02/16/as-deadline-nears-a-compromise-on-teacher-evaluations/.

7 Ibid.; “NYSUT says Teacher Evaluation Agreement Is ‘Good For Students And Fair To Teachers,’” New York State United Teachers, February 16, 2012,http://www.nysut.org/cps/rde/xchg/nysut/hs.xsl/mediareleases_17505.htm.

8 Yoav Gonen, “Teachers Sue Over New State Ratings System,” New York Post, June 29, 2011, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/teachers_sue_over_new_state_ratings_Gx09N5GyGyXlxcjNA0xfMI.

9 Fernanda Santos and Sharon Otterman, “City Teacher Data Reports Are Released,” School Book, February 24, 2012, http://www.schoolbook.org/2012/02/24/teacher-data-reports-are-released/.

10 “NYSUT: Publicizing Teacher Ratings ‘Deplorable,’” New York State United Teachers, February 27, 2012, http://www.nysut.org/cps/rde/xchg/nysut/hs.xsl/mediareleases_17564.htm.

11 Bill Gates, “Shame Is Not The Solution,” New York Times, February 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/opinion/for-teachers-shame-is-no-solution.html?_r=2&ref=opinion.

12 Thomas Kaplan, “Albany To Limit The Disclosure Of Teacher Evaluations,” New York Times, June 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/nyregion/albany-to-limit-disclosure-of-teacher-evaluations.html.


NORTH CAROLINA



TIED FOR 47TH

North Carolina’s NEA-affiliated state

teacher union has few internal resources

and its members enjoy relatively little

spending on K–12 education in the state.2

Collective bargaining in education is

prohibited in the Tarheel State, and just

49.5 percent of teachers are voluntary

members of teacher associations (the

46th-highest rate among 51 jurisdictions).

As a result, the North Carolina Association

of Educators (NCAE) brings in a mere

$111 in revenue each year per teacher in

the state (47th). North Carolina teachers

do, however, receive an unusually sizable

slice of a small pie when it comes to

expenditures on public education: While

annual per-pupil expenditures amount to

$9,024 annually per student (44th), 58.5

percent of those dollars go toward teacher



TIED FOR 29TH

Over the past decade, teacher unions gave

a significant amount to North Carolina

political parties, but were otherwise

relatively uninvolved in state campaigns.4

Union donations amounted to 2.7 percent

of all contributions received by political

parties (11th), but only 0.25 percent of total

dollars received by candidates for state

office (39th). Compared to other states,

union representation was moderate at


conventions: 13.9 percent of North

Carolina’s delegates to the conventions


(24th).5

NORTH CAROLINA OVERALL RANK: 40TH1

TIER 4 (WEAK)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


40

47

29

12

11

48


NORTH CAROLINA



North Carolina has the most restrictive

bargaining laws in the nation. It is one of

only five states that prohibit collective

bargaining in education. No union or

professional association may collect agency

fees from non-members (and recent

legislation also bars teacher associations

from automatically collecting dues from

their own members—see sidebar). The state

does not allow teacher strikes.


12TH

Collective bargaining aside, North

Carolina’s teacher employment policies

are more aligned with traditional union

interests than in most other states. North

Carolina does not support performance

pay, does not require districts to consider

teacher performance in determining layoffs,

and does not include student learning in

tenure decisions. Further, teachers are

dismissed due to poor performance at a

lower rate than most other states. (Despite

these union-friendly policies, however,

North Carolina earned an NCLB waiver in

2012, which may alleviate pressure from

reformers to change these policies.) On

the other hand, teacher unions typically

seek to limit the expansion and autonomy

of charter schools, but North Carolina

does not limit the number of charter

schools allowed to operate. It also allows

new, conversion, and virtual schools, and

provides some charters with full or partial

automatic exemptions from state laws and

district regulations.6


TIED FOR 11TH

Stakeholders in North Carolina perceive

their state teacher association to be

relatively strong. Respondents agree that

the association fights hard to prevent

reductions in pay and benefits and is

effective in protecting dollars for education,

even in times of cutbacks. They also note

the association is able to ward off policy

proposals with which it disagrees, and that

state education leaders often align with

teacher union preferences. But they do

indicate that, while policies proposed by

the governor during the latest legislative

session were mostly in line with teacher

union priorities, the outcomes of that

session were only somewhat in line, a trend

similar to that in many other states.7

OVERALL

40TH

Despite low measures of resources and

membership and highly restrictive labor

laws, North Carolina’s teacher union has

built a strong reputation and has been

able to fend off a number of unfavorable

employment policies (a situation that may

soon change as the state is likely to regain

Republican leadership—see sidebar).


NORTH CAROLINA

Caught up in partisan politics, the North Carolina Association of Education (NCAE) has Democrat Governor (and former teacher) Beverly Perdue on its side. In 2011, the legislature passed SB 727 (a bill Democrat Rep. Jennifer Weiss denounced as a “smackdown on teachers”), which prevents the teacher association from collecting dues from its own members via automatic payroll deductions.8 Democrat lawmakers and the NCAE called the bill revenge for their heavy criticism of GOP-initiated education-funding cuts. Perdue vetoed the measure.9 But at 1:00 a.m. just a few days into 2012, Republicans overrode her veto. Despite the ensuing outcry from Democrats, who called the move “vindictive” and “insane”—and from the governor, who termed it an “unprecedented, unconstitutional power grab”— the law stood.10

That fractious cycle portended further confrontation between Perdue on one side and the GOP-controlled legislature on the other, with the NCAE caught in the middle. Early in 2012, the legislature passed a budget that Perdue subsequently vetoed, worried that it did not provide sufficient funds for public education.11 It was the second year in a row that the governor vetoed the state budget, and the second year in a row that the legislature overrode her veto.12 In addition to cutting funding for education, the new budget contained another potential hit for teacher associations: a modified version of SB 795, the Excellent Public Schools Act. The original version would have introduced merit pay for teachers and an A-F rating system for schools, created a new K–3 literacy program, and overhauled tenure so that all teachers would be placed on one-year contracts and only after three or more of those could qualify for multi-year (but not more than four-year) contracts.13 But while some of the less controversial components of the bill (such as the school rating guidelines and the literacy program) made it through to the final version, after intense NCAE lobbying, hot-button issues like merit pay and tenure reform did not.14,15 Despite this partial victory, however, the momentum seems to be against the NCAE, and Perdue isn’t seeking re-election (she cited concerns that she was politicizing education policy, although her unpopularity in the traditionally Republican state made re-election an unlikely possibility).16

HIDING BEHIND THE APRON


NORTH CAROLINA

OVERALL RANK: 40TH





47th


26th


44th


4th




39th


11th


40th


24th



















Yes; Higher

NORTH CAROLINA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

47*

29*

48*

12


NORTH CAROLINA



(cont.)



No state cap




Yes










Often/Always


Never/Rarely


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often







Often/Always


Does not concede



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, North Carolina has the 46th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In North Carolina, collective bargaining is prohibited, and teacher strikes are also prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


12

11*


NORTH CAROLINA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for North Carolina are shown in the table, North Carolina Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, North Carolina is ranked 47th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.

2 North Carolina, like other states (especially those in which collective bargaining is prohibited or permitted), has state-level professional teacher associations other than those affiliated with the NEA and/or AFT. These associations range from advocacy groups active in state policy and political campaigns to organizations offering teachers insurance and benefits. In this report, we do not include data for these independent professional associations.


4 North Carolina is one of just five states where local teacher associations did not contribute to candidates and political parties. In North Carolina, the NCAE was the major donor to candidates, while the NEA gave a small amount as well. The opposite was the case in regard to political parties, with the NEA giving the bulk of the donations and the NCAE giving little.


6 Still, according to the Center for Education Reform, the chartering process “remains very restrictive and the state’s leadership does not advocate for opening more high quality charter schools without explicit district support.” See http://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CER_2012_Charter_Laws.pdf.


8 Bruce Mildwurf and Laura Leslie, “Legislature Saw Drama And Shifts,” WRAL News, July 25, 2011, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/31/2493402/legislature-saw-drama-and-shifts.html.

9 John Rottet, “GOP Overrides Veto Of Bill To Weaken Teachers Group,” News & Observer, January 5, 2012, http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/01/05/1754535/gop-passes-late-night-bill-to.html.

10 Ibid., Mildwurf.

11 Gary Robertson, “N.C. Gop Lawmakers Mix Dem. Gov. Perdue’s Vetoes On Budget, Racial Justice, Fracking,” Associated Press, July 3, 2012, http://www2.hickoryrecord.com/news/2012/jul/03/nc-gop-lawmakers-nix-dem-gov-perdues-vetoes-budget-ar-2404409/.

12 Associated Press, “Legislature Overrides Governor Perdue Budget Veto,” July 2, 2012, http://www.witn.com/home/headlines/Legislature_Overrides_Governor_Perdue_Budget_Veto_161170655.html.

13 Jack Mercola, “N.C. Senate Considers Teacher Tenure Cut,” Duke University Chronicle, May 31, 2012, http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/nc-senate-considers-teacher-tenure-cut.

14 Tess Liegeois, “Back To School: Education Reform In North Carolina,” Heritage Foundation, August 13, 2012, http://blog.heritage.org/2012/08/13/back-to-school-education-reform-in-north-carolina/.

15 Emery P. Dalesio, “Senate In N.C. Works To Revamp Education Policy,” Associated Press, May 29, 2012, http://hamptonroads.com/2012/05/senate-nc-works-revamp-education-policy; NCAE Daily Political Briefing, “Senate Leader Meets With NCAE Lobbyists,” May 12, 2012, http://one.mansellgroup.com/servlet/Pv?p=neanc&m=525&s=0&t=H&r=N.

16 Gary D. Robertson, “NC Democratic Governor Perdue Won’t Seek Re-election,” Associated Press, January 26, 2012, http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/NC-Democratic-Gov-Perdue-won-t-seek-re-election-2720864.php.


NORTH DAKOTA



TIED FOR 28TH

North Dakota’s teacher unions are near

the middle of the pack when it comes

to both internal resources and spending

on public education in the state. Nearly

three-quarters (74.7 percent) of the

Peace Garden State’s teachers belong to

unions, the 27th-highest unionization rate

across 51 jurisdictions. The state NEA and

AFT affiliates also post the 27th-largest

annual revenue, at $472 per teacher

in the state. While North Dakota itself

directs a comparatively small portion

of its expenditures to K–12 education

(15.4 percent; 42nd), overall spending on

K–12 education is higher. North Dakota

spends $12,225 per student annually (a

combination of local, state, and federal

funds), and 53.8 percent of total education

dollars go to teacher salaries and benefits

(27th).


TIED FOR 23RD

Teacher union involvement in politics ranks

the state in the middle of the national

pack.3 Their contributions comprised 0.64

percent of total donations received by

candidates for state office (23rd) and 4.0

percent of donations to candidates from


(32nd). Further, 0.59 percent of donations

received by state political parties came

directly from teacher unions (34th). (These

small percentages are not surprising given

the overall lack of activity in Bismarck—see

sidebar.) The unions had another source of

NORTH DAKOTA OVERALL RANK: 24TH1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


24

28

23

2

14

33


NORTH DAKOTA

influence besides their dollars, however:

A whopping 26.7 percent of all North

Dakota delegates to the Democratic and


teacher union members (3rd).4


TIED FOR 33RD

North Dakota is one of eleven states

that require collective bargaining in

education but do not allow its teacher


fees from non-member teachers (a key

source of union revenue). It also prohibits

teachers from striking. Still, the state has a

relatively permissive scope of bargaining:

Of twenty-one items examined in this

analysis, the Peace Garden State requires

bargaining over the terms and conditions

of employment, and explicitly permits

negotiations over transfers/reassignments,

layoffs, evaluation procedures, leave,

curriculum, and class size. State law is silent

on the remaining fourteen items, implicitly

permitting bargaining over all of them—and

prohibiting none.


TIED FOR 2ND

North Dakota’s teacher employment

policies are closely aligned with traditional

teacher union interests, and the state has

no charter law, neither of which is likely to

change in the near future (see sidebar).5

North Dakota grants teachers tenure after

only two years (the national norm is three)

and does not require that student learning

factor into tenure decisions or teacher

evaluations. Nor need districts consider

teacher performance in layoffs.


14TH

Stakeholders in North Dakota report

that teacher unions play a prominent

role in education politics, especially

when compared with responses from

other states. While unions may not be

the dominant political force—survey

respondents rank their influence as

equivalent to that of the state association

of school administrators and the state

school boards association—they do carry

clout: Respondents note that Democrats

always need union support to be elected

and that Republicans often do. Further,

they report that state education leaders are

often aligned with teacher union positions.

Stakeholders agree that the unions are


even in times of budgetary constraint, and

that both the proposals and the outcomes

of the latest legislative session were in

line with teacher union priorities.6 Still, like

stakeholders in most other states, they note

that the teacher unions often compromise

to ensure enactment of favored policies.

OVERALL

24TH

North Dakota’s teacher unions are neither

the strongest nor the weakest political force

in the nation. They enjoy a favorable policy

environment, however, and stakeholders

report that they are influential at the state

level, even without major internal resources

or donations to state politics.


NORTH DAKOTA

These days, the North Dakota Education Association (NDEA) doesn’t have much on its plate, as it benefits from the fact that state finances have been largely unaffected by the recent economic downturn: North Dakota is one of only two states that have not reported a budget shortfall these past several years. Nor is there much need for activity when no legislative session is planned for 2012, and lawmakers were in session for just four months in 2011.7,8 Further, state leaders don’t seem particularly interested in changing the status quo of education policy. They did not apply for Race to the Top funds and voted repeatedly to postpone submitting an application for an NCLB waiver, both of which would require the state to rethink its current employment and evaluation policies and enact charter legislation (which the state does not have, and which State Superintendent Wayne Stanstead doesn’t imagine his rural state will adopt any time soon).9,10

With little trouble being made for it or its members in the state capital, the NDEA focused its attention on maintaining funding for education and improving working conditions for its members. In June 2012, it helped defeat a ballot initiative that would have eliminated local property taxes (and the resulting dollars for education); the initiative was proposed by a conservative group that deemed such taxes unnecessary given the state’s budget surpluses. With over 70 percent of voters siding with the coalition of unions and local interests that opposed the measure, it was easily voted down.11 The following month, the NDEA lent its support to one of its local affiliates fighting for higher salaries and better housing opportunities for teachers in a district where an oil boom pushed average wages to $80,000 per year, but a starting teacher’s salary can be as low as $31,000.12 NDEA President Dakota Draper used the opportunity to call out lawmakers who have yet to decide “how much [money to give education], where it will come from and who will pay for it.”13 But with no pressure from leaders to change the state’s education policies, and no impending fights over state dollars, for the moment all is peaceful in the Peace Garden State.

“PEACE GARDEN STATE” SOUNDS ABOUT RIGHT


NORTH DAKOTA

OVERALL RANK: 24TH





27th


42nd


19th


27th




23rd


34th


32nd


3rd

AREA 3;SCOPE OF BARGAINING


















Yes; Higher

NORTH DAKOTA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

28*

23*

33*

2*


NORTH DAKOTA



(cont.)



N/A




N/A


N/A


N/A






Always


Sometimes/Often


Agree


**


Agree


Sometimes/Often




Mostly in line



Often


Compromise




b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, North Dakota has the 27th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: North Dakota has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c North Dakota does not have a charter school law.


2*

14


NORTH DAKOTA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for North Dakota are shown in the table, North Dakota Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, North Dakota is ranked 28th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 North Dakota is one of just five states where local teacher associations did not contribute to candidates and political parties. In North Dakota, the North Dakota Education Association (NDEA) was the lone union donor to candidates, while the NEA and AFT were the primary donors to parties (and the NDEA giving relatively little in comparison).


5 We do not include data for sub-indicators pertaining to charters when calculating the ranking of states that do not have charter school laws. While some might argue that the lack of such a law is in itself evidence for union strength, we do not have sufficient data to link that absence to union activity. The nine states without charter laws are home to very different contexts—while teacher unions in some states may have played a significant role in keeping charter laws at bay, in others, they played little or none.


7 “North Dakota Legislative Assembly,” Ballotpedia, last modified May 17, 2012, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/North_Dakota_Legislative_Assembly.

8 Phil Oliff, Chris Mai, and Vincent Palacios, “States Continue To Feel Recession’s Impact,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 27, 2012, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711.

9 Alyson Klein, “Is Race To The Top An Urban Game?” Education Week, December 15, 2009, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2009/12/some_state_officials_have_a.html; Mara van Ells, “N.D. education committee recommends NCLB waiver,” Bismark Tribune, August 28, 2012, http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/n-d-education-committee-recommends-nclb-waiver/article_0d6e50c0-f18f-11e1-b2aa-0019bb2963f4.html.

10 After a year of delays, education leaders voted in September 2012 to apply for an NCLB waiver; the NDEA formally supported the state’s application. Sanstead, an incumbent not seeking re-election, stated that he believes the state should take advantage of the opportunity presented by the waiver. However, neither of the two candidates for his position as state superintendent are in favor of North Dakota submitting an application. In addition, the state did not enact any new reform policies to bolster its chances. See Mara van Ells, “North Dakota applies for waiver from No Child Left Behind,” Bismark Tribune, September 10, 2012, accessed September 14, 2012, http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/north-dakota-applies-for-waiver-from-no-child-left-behind/article_b5bbbc38-fb74-11e1-a6a4-0019bb2963f4.html.

11 Associated Press, “ND Voters Reject Ending Local Property Taxes,” Daily News, June 13, 2012, http://www.wahpetondailynews.com/article_824dc114-b553-11e1-87d0-001a4bcf887a.html.

12 Associated Press, “ND Oil Town’s Prosperity Doesn’t Reach Teachers,” July 6, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/06/nd-oil-town-prosperity-doesnt-reach-teachers/.

13 Ibid.


OHIO



TIED FOR 20TH

Ohio’s teacher unions enjoy broad

resources from their members, but do not

see high spending on K–12 education in

general as compared with other states.

Despite the fact that collective bargaining

is optional in the Buckeye State, a full 91.5

percent of teachers are union members

(the 15th-highest unionization rate of 51

jurisdictions). Ohio’s NEA and AFT state

affiliates bring in $587 per Ohio teacher

(14th). But just 19.1 percent of state

expenditures go to K–12 education in Ohio

(28th) and total per-pupil expenditures

(a combination of local, state, and federal

funds) are moderate, too, at $11,382 per

year (25th). Of those dollars, just 50.2

percent go toward teacher salaries and

benefits (47th).


17TH

In the past decade, Ohio’s teacher unions

have been more active in politics than

unions in other states (and are among the

most active in the fourteen bargaining-

permitted states). Their contributions

amounted to 1.0 percent of total donations


(17th) and 10.0 percent of donations to

candidates from the ten highest-giving

sectors in the state (13th). Further, they

contributed 3.0 percent of the money

received by state political parties (7th).

The unions are not, however, particularly

well-represented among Ohio’s delegates


conventions, only 7.9 percent of whom


(40th).3

OHIO OVERALL RANK: 12TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


12

20

17

23

35

10


OHIO


10TH

While bargaining is allowed but not

required in Ohio, the remainder of

the state’s bargaining laws are highly

permissive compared with other states.

Should a district choose to negotiate a

collective bargaining agreement with its

employee organization, it must negotiate

four of the twenty-one provisions we

examined: wages, hours, terms and


procedures. Bargaining over five more

items is explicitly permitted, and at

the time we calculated our metric, the

remaining twelve were implicitly allowed

because the state is silent on them. (The

state has since taken evaluations off the

table—see sidebar.) Further, the state

allows unions to automatically collect

agency fees from non-member teachers (a

key source of union revenue), and permits

teacher strikes.


23RD

While some of Ohio’s teacher-employment

policies align with traditional union

interests, many do not (and those that

do are changing). Ohio does not grant

tenure easily—non-tenured teachers

licensed before 2011 must go through a

five-year probationary period, and those

licensed after 2011 face a seven-year

probationary period (the national norm

is three). And, student achievement must

be the preponderant criteria in teacher

evaluations. On the other hand, there is

no statewide system of performance pay,

teacher effectiveness is not considered

in tenure decisions, and at the time we

calculated our metric, seniority (not

teacher performance) was the primary

consideration in layoffs. (By press time,

however, legislation prohibited seniority

as a layoff criterion unless it was the

deciding factor between two teachers with

identical evaluations and may have laid

the foundation for statewide performance

pay via approval of the Cleveland Plan—

see sidebar.) The state’s charter laws

are equally mixed. They allow new,

virtual, and conversion schools and give

operators multiple authorizing options.

Ohio education leaders can cap the total

number of charters that each authorizer

may approve, but the cap is not a part

of state law and incorporates room for

growth. The state automatically exempts

start-up charters (only) from collective

bargaining agreements.


35TH

Ohio stakeholders perceive the influence of

teacher unions to be somewhat limited. On

average, respondents place the unions as

the third- or fourth-most influential entity

in the state in shaping education policy,

behind the governor, state association

of school administrators, and education

advocacy organizations. They neither

agree nor disagree that teacher unions are


or in warding off proposals with which they

disagree—and report that both proposals

and outcomes of the latest legislative

session were mostly not in line with teacher

union priorities (likely due to the near-

elimination of collective bargaining rights

for public employees—see sidebar).4 But

teacher unions have been and remain an

active force in the state, if not necessarily

an effective one: Stakeholders note that

they fought hard, given recent budgetary

constraints, to prevent reductions in pay

and benefits.


OHIO

In November 2011, Ohio voters repealed SB 5, and unions in the Buckeye State popped the champagne. Originally passed in the same month that Wisconsin stripped collective bargaining rights from its public-sector employees (March 2011), SB 5 prohibited public-sector strikes, eliminated binding arbitration for employee-management disputes, and drastically narrowed the scope of collective bargaining.5 In one of the most expensive campaigns ever waged over a state ballot initiative, teacher unions (both state and national) joined forces with the influential police and fire fighter associations, and the highly organized (and well-funded) political action group We Are Ohio. The Ohio Education Association (OEA), Ohio Federation of Teachers (OFT), and National Education Association (NEA) contributed some $7 million to the successful campaign to repeal the law.6,7 AFT President Randi Weingarten boasted after the vote, “Those who would dare try to strip collective bargaining rights away from hard-working citizens will now think twice”; OEA President Patricia Frost-Brooks chimed in, declaring that “Ohioans refused to turn their backs on the people who guard our safety and teach our children.”8,9

But it’s not the same when the OEA and OFT do not have their heavyweight interest group allies. For example, the biennial budget passed in 2011, as originally proposed by the governor (covering school years 2011-13) contained many provisions in the same spirit as SB 5. After three months of wrangling among the House, Senate, and governor, the version that passed omitted the language that would have barred collective bargaining over salaries and would have increased employee pension contributions. Still the OEA was not happy: “Despite these victories in the substitute bill, a number of changes to the bill represent significant steps backwards,” reported the union to its members.10 Among other items, the OEA objected to provisions opening the door to performance pay, reducing tenure protections, and requiring that half of a teacher’s evaluation be based on student growth as measured by standardized test scores. They were furious, too, when, a year later, lawmakers proposed that evaluations be removed from the scope of collective bargaining entirely. OEA Director of Education Policy Randy Flora argued to the House Education Committee that “the best teacher evaluation systems are those created collaboratively through the [local] collective bargaining process.”11 But once again, it could not stop the bill from becoming law, and evaluations are now entirely off the bargaining table.

Perhaps the OEA might learn from the OFT that resisting reform is not the best strategy in Ohio. During the budget debate, OFT staff did not object to the state’s evaluation mandates: “Those are things we pretty much agreed make a teacher a good, solid teacher,” commented OFT leader Deb Tully.12 The OFT even supported elements of Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson’s reform plan, which, among other provisions, ties pay to teacher (and student) performance, eliminates seniority as a primary determinant for transfers and assignments, and allows the district to circumvent the union contract when intervening in failing schools. Its most vociferous objections pertained to “the precedent of local levy money going to support charter schools,” said OFT president Melissa Cropper. 13,14 It appears that Ohio unions must choose their battles carefully.

MONEY TALKS

OVERALL

12TH

Ohio’s teacher unions are fairly influential

compared with those in all states, and

are the most influential among the

bargaining-permitted states. They do not

rate particularly low in any of the five areas

examined here; however, the state is not

a particularly friendly place for organized

labor in general (see sidebar).


OHIO

OVERALL RANK: 12TH





14th


28th


25th


47th




17th


7th


13th


40th





Permitted








Terms of employmentc How long before a teacher earns tenure? Five years






Yes; Higher

OHIO RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

20*

17

10

23


OHIO



(cont.)







Yes










Often


Rarely


Neutral


Fight


Neutral


Sometimes


Mostly not in line


Mostly not in line



Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Ohio has the 15th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Ohio permits collective bargaining, and union agency fees are also permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c See Area 4 above.


23

35


OHIO

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Ohio are shown in the table, Ohio Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Ohio is ranked 20th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Michael Scott, “Issue 2 Defeated: Million Votes Are In And 63 Percent Say No, AP Says,” Plain Dealer, November 8, 2011, http://www.cleveland.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/11/issue_2_early_ohio_election_re.html.

6 Glenn Thrush, “Ohio Senate Bill 5’s Repeal Buoys Dems,” Politico.com, October 8, 2011, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/67918.html.

7 Sean Cavanagh, “Unions, Businesses Spend On Ohio Collective-Bargaining Fight,” Education Week, November 1, 2011, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2011/11/money_flows_into_ohio_fight_over_collective_bargaining.html.

8 Sean Cavanagh, “Ohio Voters Reject Law Limiting Teachers’ Collective Bargaining,” Education Week, November 8, 2011, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2011/11/ohio_1.html?qs=ohio+collective+bargaining.

9 “OEA Thanks Ohio For Defeating Issue 2,” Ohio Education Association, accessed July 19, 2012, http://www.ohea.org/victory-for-collective-bargaining.

10 “OEA Legislative Watch,” Ohio Education Association, April 29, 2011, http://www.ohea.org/Document/Get/21361 (for details of the modifications of the bill, see the OEA’s Legislative Watch Archive, http://www.ohea.org/legislative-watch-archive).

11 “Ohio Education Association Senate Bill 316 Testimony To House Education Committee,” Ohio Education Association, May 16, 2012, http://aces.ohea.org/site/DocServer/SB_316_Testimony_-_House_Education_Committee_Testimony_-.pdf?docID=661.

12 Patrick O’Donnell, “Ohio Teachers To Be Watched And Graded On Classroom Performance—And Many Are Ok With That,” Plain Dealer, January 2, 2012, http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2012/01/ohio_teachers_to_be_watched_an.html.

13 Harry Graver, “Cleveland’s Education-Reform Plan,” National Review, July 23, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/310205/cleveland-s-education-reform-plan-harry-graver?pg=1.

14 Reginald Fields, “Ohio Sen. Nina Turner At Odds With State Teachers Union,” Plain Dealer, May 10, 2012, http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/05/ohio_sen_nina_turner_at_odds_w.html.

Overall Rank: 43rdTier 5 (Weakest)

OKLAHOMA



TIED FOR 44TH

Oklahoma’s state teacher unions do not

have substantial resources from their

members, nor do they see a significant

dedication of funds to K–12 education

in the state. First, a relatively low

proportion of Sooner State teachers are

union members—57.5 percent (39th of 51

jurisdictions). The NEA and AFT state-

level affiliates bring in just $233 annually

per Oklahoma teacher (38th). Moreover,

education spending in Oklahoma is

comparatively low. The state directs just

14.3 percent of its own budget into K–12

education, and total per-pupil spending

(from all sources, state, federal and local) is

$9,369 per pupil per year, with 52.0 percent

of that dedicated to teacher salaries and

benefits. Oklahoma ranks among the

bottom ten states in the nation on all three

of those spending measures.


TIED FOR 26TH

Compared with unions in other states,

Oklahoma teacher unions rank in the

middle of the pack in terms of their political

involvement over the past ten years. Their

contributions accounted for 0.42 percent

of total donations received by candidates

for state office (33rd), and 0.18 percent of

the total donations to state political parties

(46th). However, the unions had a strong

presence at the Democratic and Republican

national conventions, with 24.2 percent of

Oklahoma’s delegates being teacher union

members (only three states ranked higher).3

OKLAHOMA OVERALL RANK: 43RD1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


43

44

26

43

46

40


OKLAHOMA


40TH

Oklahoma unions have limited, and

shrinking, freedom to bargain. Recently

the state repealed the law that mandated

collective bargaining; in major cities,

bargaining is now permitted, but not

required (see sidebar). The law also

prohibits teacher strikes and prevents

unions from automatically collecting

agency fees, a key source of union revenue,

from non-members. The state is fairly

permissive, however, on the scope of

bargaining. Of twenty-one items examined

in this report, Oklahoma mandates that

four be negotiated should districts choose

to bargain collectively with unions—


employment, and fringe benefits—and

implicitly permits all of the remaining items.


43RD

Compared with other states, Oklahoma

policies are largely out of line with

traditional teacher union priorities. By law,

student achievement is the preponderant

criterion in both teacher evaluations and

tenure decisions. Teachers are eligible


evaluations, and districts must consider

teacher performance (rather than seniority

alone) when making layoffs. Likely related,

Oklahoma dismisses teachers due to poor

performance at the fourth-highest rate

in the country. The unfavorable policy

environment extends to charter school

laws as well: Oklahoma’s charters are

automatically exempt from collective

bargaining agreements, state teacher

certification rules, and many other state

and district laws and regulations.


46TH

Stakeholders in Oklahoma perceive that

the teacher unions are relatively weak.

On average, survey respondents rate the

teacher unions as less influential than

the business roundtable/chamber of

commerce, superintendent, and education

advocacy organizations. They report that

unions are not effective in protecting

dollars for education or in warding off

reform proposals with which they disagree.

Stakeholders also observe that policies

proposed by the governor and enacted in



OVERALL

43RD

Oklahoma’s teacher unions are weaker

that those in most other states: They claim

only limited membership and financial

resources, few favorable policies at the

state level, and a relatively weak reputation

among stakeholders. Like many other

states, Oklahoma is experiencing a high

degree of flux among state leaders—and

their positions—with respect to both unions

and education reforms (see sidebar), and

its position on any of these indicators is far

from certain.


OKLAHOMA

In spring 2012, Oklahoma teacher unions avoided a veritable knockout punch. Anti-labor legislators had already landed a powerful blow the previous year, replacing the law that mandated collective bargaining in public education with one that permitted, but did not require, bargaining in the state’s 13 largest cities.5 Then, in early 2012, the senate passed SB 1530, also known as the “deregulation bill,” which gave traditional public schools in all cities the same autonomies granted to the state’s charter schools—including allowing local school boards to void their existing collective bargaining agreements if they so choose.6

Worried that districts would reduce teacher salaries, take away sick and personal leave, and eliminate special-duty pay, the Oklahoma Education Association (OEA) mobilized against the bill.7 At the union’s annual “Lobby Day,” members bent the ear of Rep. Todd Thomsen, who then asked fellow representatives during the hearing for the bill, “Can you name one thing the legislature has done for teachers’ best interest?”8 Lawmakers may have been considering those teacher interests instead of the best interests of the students when SB 1530 died in House committee. One superintendent pointed out the negative consequences of the defeat: “[My district] receives about $30,000 for textbooks...I would rather spend this money on technology and use online books that are a small fraction of the cost”—a sensible solution that would have been possible under SB 1530.9

In the wake of this fight, however, the OEA found its image tarnished (a problem made more urgent by the fact that it was losing membership due both to the new bargaining law and to net teacher job losses).10,11 The union began a massive “Stand Up for Public Education” campaign, aimed at improving the unions’ own public image, preserving the rights of teachers, and increasing funding for the traditional education system. The success of the campaign remains to be seen, but the tide seems to be turning against labor in Oklahoma; ironic for a state whose motto is Labor Omnia Vincit: “Labor Conquers All Things.”

ON THE ROPES


OKLAHOMA

OVERALL RANK: 43RD





38th


44th


41st


41st




33rd


46th


34th


4th



















Yes; Higher

OKLAHOMA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

44*

26*

40

43


OKLAHOMA



(cont.)




Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools? Start-ups and conversions only w/limited jurisdiction



Yes


Yes


Yes






Often


Rarely


Disagree


Generally fight


Disagree


Sometimes


Mostly not in line


Mostly not in line



Sometimes


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Oklahoma has the 39th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Oklahoma collective bargaining is permitted, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


43

46


OKLAHOMA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Oklahoma are shown in the table, Oklahoma Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Oklahoma is ranked 44th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Sean Murphy, “Oklahoma Senate Panel Votes To Ax City Union Rights,” Associated Press, March 28, 2011, http://normantranscript.com/archive/x10256592/Okla-Senate-panel-votes-to-ax-city-union-rights.

6 Victor Skinner, “Oklahoma’s Teachers Unions Determined To Preserve Collective Bargaining,” News Blaze, April 3, 2012, http://newsblaze.com/story/20120403111136zzzz.nb/topstory.html.

7 Rob Anderson, “School ‘Deregulation’ Bill Controversial,” Tahlequah Daily Press, March 21, 2012, http://tahlequahdailypress.com/local/x715444021/School-deregulation-bill-controversial.

8 Kandis West, “Inspired Members Help Kill SB 1530,” in “The Education Focus,”Oklahoma Education Association, April/May 2012, http://okea.org/assets/files/2012%20April%20May%20Focus%20for%20web.pdf.

9 Anderson.

10 Ibid.

11 Stacy Martin and Patrick B. McGuigan, “Oklahoma’s Largest Teachers’ Union Losing Members,” CapitolBeatOK.com, June 21, 2011, http://capitolbeatok.com/reports/oklahomas-largest-teachers-union-losing-members.

Overall Rank: 2ndTier 1 (Strongest)

OREGON



TIED FOR 9TH

While Oregon’s state teacher unions benefit

from substantial internal resources from

their members, they and their members do

not see generous spending on education

overall. A high percentage of teachers in the

Beaver State—95.2 percent of them—belong

to unions (the 10th-highest unionization

rate of 51 jurisdictions). The NEA and AFT

state affiliates bring in the second-largest

annual revenues, a very substantial $984

for each teacher in the state. The state does

not contribute much of its own budget

(12.8 percent) to K–12 education (46th), and

while total spending (from state, federal,

and local sources) is in the middle of the

national pack at $10,517 per pupil per year

(32nd), just 52.2 percent of those dollars go

to teacher salaries and budgets (40th).


TIED FOR 8TH

Teacher unions have been highly active in

Oregon politics over the past decade. Of

the total donations to candidates for state

office, 3 percent came from the unions; only

in Illinois did candidates receive a higher

percentage from unions. Contributions

from unions accounted for 15.3 percent of

the donations to candidates from the ten

highest-giving sectors in the state (8th).

Unions also gave to the state’s political

parties, although not quite as heavily—1.2

percent of party donations in Oregon

came from teacher unions (21st). Finally,

18.1 percent of Oregon delegates to the


conventions were teacher union members,

ranking the state 12th.3

OREGON OVERALL RANK: 2ND1

TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


2

9

8

34

3

4


OREGON


TIED FOR 4TH

Oregon bargaining laws are more

permissive and union-friendly than in

nearly every other state. The state requires

collective bargaining, allows unions to


non-member teachers (a key source of

union-revenue), and permits teacher

strikes. The state also has a broad scope of


in this analysis, Oregon explicitly requires

or permits ten to be included in bargaining

(wages, hours, terms and conditions

of employment, grievance procedures,

insurance benefits, pension/retirement

benefits, fringe benefits, leave, curriculum,

and extracurricular duties). State law

is silent on another seven provisions,

implicitly opening them for bargaining, and

prohibits only four (evaluation process/

instruments, length of the school year, class

load, and class size).


TIED FOR 34TH

Oregon’s teacher employment policies

are relatively in line with traditional union

interests: Oregon does not require that

teacher evaluations or tenure decisions

include student achievement data, nor

does it mandate that layoff decisions

take teacher performance into account.

Employers contribute 1.7 times more

to pensions than teachers do, a higher

proportion than in many other states.

However, while unions usually favor limiting

charter schools, Oregon law encourages

them. The state does not cap the number of

such schools, which may be virtual schools,

new charters, or conversions. All charters

are automatically exempt from most state

and district laws and regulations, and they

are not required to participate in district



3RD

Oregon stakeholders identify teacher

unions as very strong. Respondents rank

them as one of the two most influential

entities on education policy (along with

education advocacy organizations), and

note that they are effective in protecting

dollars for education and warding off

education proposals with which they

disagree. According to stakeholders,

between 2009 and 2011 the position of

state education leaders always aligned with

those of the teacher union, and Democrats

often needed teacher union support to get

elected. But while stakeholders report that

state-level education policies often reflect

teacher union priorities, the outcomes of


not in line with those priorities—indicating

that the unions may be facing more

opposition than they have in the past (see

sidebar).4

OVERALL

2ND

Oregon’s teacher unions have substantial

internal resources, are active donors to

politicians and parties, and enjoy highly

favorable bargaining rules. But other state

policies (especially related to charter

schools) do not align with traditional union

interests. Still, stakeholders report that they

are a strong force in the state.


OREGON

What a difference two years makes. In 2010, the Oregon Education Association (OEA) enthusiastically endorsed Democrat John Kitzhaber’s run for governor.5 His election looked to be a boon for the already-strong OEA: Teacher unions had consistently had a powerful presence with Oregon’s lawmakers, and the 2011 legislative session was shaping up to be no exception. As in years past, the unions gave generously to Democratic candidates and already counted many legislators as allies.6

But something went awry. Only 13 of 31 bills that the state union supported passed in 2011; moreover, 11 of the 37 measures they opposed actually passed.7 Worse, the OEA saw former allies turn into foes. Kitzhaber endorsed GOP-sponsored laws to increase parental choice and expand charter schools in return for Republican support on measures that would increase his financial oversight and decision-making authority over education.8 Even Democratic legislators were no longer sure bets: In its traditional end-of-session report card, the OEA gave Fs to 8 Democrats (and 40 Republicans) out of 90 legislators. No senator, Democrat or Republican, earned higher than a C.9

With Oregon’s 2012 assembly session open for business, it is unclear how lawmakers will react to the OEA’s report card. Representative Matt Wingard, the author of last year’s Republican education bills, thinks the report card undermines the union’s position: “It hurts their credibility.”10 (That said, Wingard later had some credibility issues of his own.11) Currently, Oregon teacher unions are among the strongest in the nation. But with potentially damaged credibility, and evidence from other states that lawmakers’ sentiments are turning against union interests, it remains to be seen whether 2011 was a blemish on a strong record or indicative of things to come.

BURNING BRIDGES


OREGON

OVERALL RANK: 2ND





2nd


46th


32nd


40th




2nd


21st


8th


12th





Permitted














No restriction

OREGON RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

9*

8*

4*

34*


OREGON



(cont.)



No state cap




Yes




Yes






Often


Rarely/Sometimes


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often







Always


Does not concede



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Oregon has the 10th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Oregon has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


34*

3


OREGON

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Oregon are shown in the table, Oregon Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Oregon is 9th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 OEA Leader Letter, “OEA-PIE Recommends Kitzhaber For Governor,” Oregon Education Association, accessed July 17, 2012, http://www.oregoned.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=9dKKKYMDH&b=5186993&ct=8519601.

6 Jeff Mapes, “Oregon Teachers Union Hands Out Harsh Grades, Even To Longtime Legislative Allies,” Oregonian, August 18, 2011, http://blog.oregonlive.com/mapesonpolitics/2011/08/oregon_teachers_union_hands_ou.html.

7 2011 Legislative Summary, Oregon Education Association, accessed July 18, 2012, http://www.oregoned.org/atf/cf/%7B3F7AF7EC-F984-4631-A411-148CD1FB8421%7D/2011_OEA_legislative_summary.pdf.

8 Mapes.

9 2011 Legislative Summary.

10 Mapes.

11 Jeff Mapes, “Matt Wingard Leaves Oregon House Leadership Post After Allegations of Misconduct,” Oregonian, June 13, 2012, http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/06/matt_wingard_leaves_oregon_hou.html.


PENNSYLVANIA



TIED FOR 13TH

Pennsylvania’s teacher unions benefit

from relatively high membership, ample

resources, and generous public education

funding. The Keystone State has the 12th-

highest rate of teacher union membership

in the nation (93.4 percent). In addition, its

state-level NEA and AFT affiliates bring in

the 19th-highest annual revenue, at $538

per teacher. Funding for K–12 education in

Pennsylvania is also substantial with 19.6

percent of state expenditures going toward

K–12 education (24th). Per-pupil spending,

a combination of local, state, and federal

funds amounts to $12,906 per year (14th).


TIED FOR 10TH

For at least the last ten years, teacher

unions have been quite active in

Pennsylvania state politics. Union

donations made up 1.5 percent of the

total contributions to candidates for state

office (10th-highest among states). Their

contributions also accounted for 7.4 percent

of direct donations from the ten highest-

giving sectors in Pennsylvania (19th).

The teacher unions prioritized giving to

candidates rather than parties, however,

giving the latter just 0.04 percent of total

monies received (less than everywhere

but Alaska). Further, a full 20.0 percent of

Pennsylvania delegates to the Democratic

and Republican national conventions

identified as members of teacher unions—a

proportion ranking 10th-largest nationwide.3

PENNSYLVANIA OVERALL RANK: 4TH1

TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


4

13

10

41

7

7


PENNSYLVANIA


7TH

Pennsylvania is one of thirty-two states

that require collective bargaining for

public school teachers, and one of twenty-

five that permit the automatic collection

of agency fees from all such teachers (a

key source of union revenue). The state

also allows for a relatively broad scope

of bargaining: Of twenty-one items

examined in this metric, Pennsylvania

law explicitly requires or permits four

as subjects of bargaining: wages, hours,

terms and conditions of employment, and

management rights. Its laws are silent on

the remaining seventeen items, implicitly

permitting them all. Pennsylvania also

permits teachers to strike.


41ST

While a handful of Pennsylvania policies

are aligned with traditional teacher union

interests, many others, particularly those

bearing on charter schools, are not.

Relative to those that unions traditionally

support: The state does not require that

student achievement factor into teacher

evaluations, nor does it require that districts

consider teacher performance when

determining layoffs. Further, Pennsylvania

dismisses a smaller percentage of teachers

due to poor performance than all but two

other states. Yet many other policies do

not parallel traditional union interests:

The Keystone State’s charter school law

does not cap charter growth (although

some districts have restrictions), provides

automatic exemptions for charters

from many state and district laws and

regulations, and does not require that

charters participate in district collective

bargaining agreements. Further, the state

does not limit K–3 class sizes.


7TH

Stakeholders perceive teacher unions

in Pennsylvania to be quite strong,

unanimously rating them as the most

influential entity in the state on matters

of education policy. They also strongly

agree that unions are effective in warding

off education proposals with which they

disagree and that, in a time of budgetary

constraints, they fought hard to protect

dollars for education. Further, they indicate

that Democrats seeking office almost

always need union support to be elected.

Still, stakeholders note that, despite the

unions’ past successes, education policies

proposed by the governor in the latest


with their priorities.4

OVERALL

4TH

Pennsylvania’s teacher unions enjoy broad

financial resources and membership,

are highly involved in politics, and wield

considerable influence at the state level.

The state’s NEA and AFT affiliates are some

of the most powerful in the nation.


PENNSYLVANIA

A recent survey of Pennsylvania districts concluded that school finances will descend from “difficult” to “desperate” in 2012-13—prompting cuts “unheard of since the Great Depression.”5 District leaders are not simply being fatalistic: On top of austerity cuts, the districts’ share of employee pension obligations will reportedly rise by 45 percent this year. When Governor Tom Corbett asked local unions to take a one-year salary freeze to lighten the fiscal load, James Testerman, the president of the Pennsylvania State Education Association, encouraged members to “seriously consider” the request.6 But they didn’t take the bait. In fact, one survey found that just 140 of the state’s 500 school districts froze employee pay in 2011-12—and freezes included teachers in just 83 districts.7 Teachers did not escape completely unscathed, however, as districts enacted other cuts (including layoffs) and state leaders are calling for even more belt-tightening in the years ahead.8

Pennsylvania’s teacher unions have had diminishing success in fending off school choice in its various forms, and state laws are relatively charter-friendly. In addition, in June 2012 the governor signed a new educational tax credit program into law while also bolstering the state’s existing system. AFT Pennsylvania calls the programs, which give tax credits to businesses that contribute to private school scholarship funds, “stealth vouchers” for kids in low-performing schools.9 Governor Corbett made vouchers his top priority coming into office in January 2011, and so far has triumphed over union objections.10 Still, given the unions’ record of success in staving off other reforms that threaten their members’ pay and job security, it could be that vouchers will be Corbett’s only victory.

VOUCHING FOR CHOICE


PENNSYLVANIA

OVERALL RANK: 4TH





19th


24th*


14th


30th




10th


49th


19th


10th

AREA 3;SCOPE OF BARGAINING




Permitted














No restriction

PENNSYLVANIA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

13*

10*

7

41


PENNSYLVANIA



(cont.)







Yes




Yes




Most influential


Often/Always


Rarely


Neutral


Fight


Strongly agree


Sometimes/Often




**



**






b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Pennsylvania has the 12th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Pennsylvania has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


41

7


PENNSYLVANIA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Pennsylvania are shown in the table, Pennsylvania Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Pennsylvania is ranked 13th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Associated Press, “Pa. School Groups’ Survey Sees Grimmer Finances,” Sentinel, May 22, 2012, http://cumberlink.com/news/local/state-and-regional/pa-school-groups-survey-sees-grimmer-finances/article_baacda5e-a41e-11e1-bb89-0019bb2963f4.html.

6 Tony Rhodin, “PA Teachers Union Urges Members To ‘Seriously Consider’ Wage Freeze,” Express-Times, March 16, 2011, http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/breaking-news/index.ssf/2011/03/jim_testerman_head_of_pennsylv.html.

7 Charles Thompson, “In Pennsylvania, Most Teachers Rejected Gov. Corbett’s Urging Of Pay Freezes In Face Of Budget Cuts,” Patriot News, September 5, 2011, http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/09/in_pennsylvania_most_teachers.html.

8 “PSEA President Responds To Governor’s Call For A One-Year Pay Freeze,” Pennsylvania State Education Association, March 16, 2011, http://www.psea.org/general.aspx?id=7903.

9 “Governor Signs $27.7m Budget; Flat Funding, New Teacher Evaluation, Stealth Vouchers,” AFT Pennsylvania, accessed July 11, 2012, http://pa.aft.org/index.cfm?action=article&articleID=e6ec35b0-f50b-4b23-b816-7b0bcae3138b.

10 “Governor Corbett Cites School Vouchers As Priority For Fall Legislative Session,” CBS Philadelphia, September 19, 2011, http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2011/09/19/governor-corbett-cites-school-vouchers-as-priority-for-fall-legislative-session/.


RHODE ISLAND



TIED FOR 6TH

Rhode Island’s teacher unions benefit from

resources from its members, as well as

from spending on K–12 education in the

state. First, the Ocean State has one of the

highest membership rates in the nation

with 97.4 percent of its teachers belonging

to unions. Rhode Island’s NEA and AFT

state-level affiliates bring in $552 annually

per teacher in the state (17th out of 51

jurisdictions). What’s more, the unions see

high per-pupil expenditures ($14,567; 8th),

and 54.5 percent of those funds go toward

teacher salaries and benefits (22nd).


TIED FOR 4TH

Rhode Island’s teacher unions have been

extensively involved in state politics in

the past ten years.3 Donations from them

amounted to 1.2 percent of all donations

to candidates for state office (15th). Those

contributions made up 8.3 percent of the

money donated by the ten highest-giving

sectors in the state (16th), making unions

a major player in campaign seasons. They

gave to political parties at a similar level,

with 3.7 percent of total donations to Rhode

Island parties coming from teacher unions

(4th). In addition to money, the unions had

another source of influence: A whopping

one out of three Rhode Island delegates to



(no state was higher on this metric).4

RHODE ISLAND OVERALL RANK: 5TH1

TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


5

6

4

15

15

17


RHODE ISLAND


TIED FOR 17TH

Rhode Island is one of thirty-two states

that require collective bargaining, and

one of twenty-five that permit unions

to automatically collect agency fees—a

valued source of union revenue—from

non-member teachers. But despite its

supportive stance toward bargaining in

general, state law is fairly neutral about the

specifics. Of twenty-one items examined

in this report, the state requires only three

to be subject to mandatory bargaining

(wages, hours, and terms and conditions

of employment, including benefits)

and is silent on the remaining eighteen

(implicitly including them all in the scope

of bargaining). The state does not permit

teacher strikes.


15TH

While many Rhode Island policies align

with teacher union interests, others do

not. Rhode Island’s charter school laws, in

particular, mirror traditional union positions

by restricting how many such schools may

operate in the state, prohibiting virtual

charter schools, and allowing only the state

board of regents to authorize charters.

It also restricts charter autonomy—state

law requires all that charter teachers

are certified, and automatically exempts

some but not all schools from collective

bargaining agreements. District

employment policies, however, are less

in line with union interests: Rhode Island

requires that student achievement be


evaluations, and teachers are eligible for

dismissal after multiple unsatisfactory

ratings. Still, not all employment policies

are union-averse. In Rhode Island, teachers

are dismissed due to poor performance at a

lower rate than in almost every other state.

And, compared to most other states, in the

past Rhode Island employers contributed

a higher proportion to pensions than

employees did—although that may soon

change (see sidebar).


15TH

Stakeholders in Rhode Island perceive that

their teacher unions are relatively strong.

Respondents rate them as the second

or third most-influential entity in state

education politics, behind the board of

regents and alongside education advocacy

groups. They agree that, at a time of

budgetary constraint, unions are effective

in protecting state dollars for education,

and in warding off proposed reforms with

which they disagree. Further, they note that

Democrats running for state office always

need teacher union support to be elected

(see Area 2). Still, stakeholders report

that policies proposed by the governor


somewhat in line with union priorities, and

those enacted were mostly not in line with

them, showing that the union’s power in

Rhode Island may be in flux–especially

when it comes to lawmakers.5

OVERALL

5TH

Rhode Island’s teacher unions enjoy robust

resources. Although they are active and

powerful participants in state politics, state

policies on teacher employment and the

scope of bargaining are not completely

union-favorable and recent defeats seem

to indicate that the unions, while still

strong, face a political environment that

has become more contentious of late, or at

least more divided (see sidebar).


RHODE ISLAND

After its first Race to the Top (RTTT) proposal was rejected in March 2010, Rhode Island education commissioner Deborah Gist knew she had to have the unions on board. “Every point is going to count, so [we were] very concerned and really wanted that sign-on,’’ she said.6 While she didn’t get universal support—the National Education Association of Rhode Island (NEARI) refused to endorse the second proposal—Rhode Island’s AFT affiliate, and many of its local unions, fell in line after their demands to rehire laid-off teachers were met.7 The state’s revised RTTT application was ultimately accepted in September 2010.8

The tenuous harmony between labor and management shattered in November 2011 when lawmakers overhauled the state’s troubled pension system. The Retirement Security Act forced state workers and teachers to move a portion of pension funds to a 401(k)-style account and suspended cost-of-living adjustments for current retirees.9 Democratic State Treasurer Gina Raimondo maintained that the law was “carefully designed by the General Assembly in an effort to save our state-administered retirement system” amid escalating costs to an already-underfunded pension.10 But in June 2012 the state’s major unions filed a suit against the Act, declaring that, under the law, benefits must be negotiated.11 Bob Walsh, president of NEARI, is confident that the courts will overturn the Act, declaring that the changed pension system “is going to be short lived—because it was illegal.”12 Now we’ll see if the courts agree…and if they don’t, who is going to foot the bill.

A SHORT-LIVED TRUCE


RHODE ISLAND

OVERALL RANK: 5TH





17th


45th


8th


22nd




15th


4th


16th


1st





Permitted














Yes; Higher

RHODE ISLAND RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

6*

4*

17*

15


RHODE ISLAND



(cont.)











Partially; Full automatic exemption for some schools, others must apply for waivers






Always


Rarely/Sometimes


Agree


Generally fight


Agree


Sometimes







Rarely/Sometimes


Does not concede



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Rhode Island has the 5th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Rhode Island has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


15

15


RHODE ISLAND

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Rhode Island are shown in the table, Rhode Island Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Rhode Island is ranked 6th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 A large number of local NEA and (especially) AFT affiliates in Rhode Island contributed nearly as much to state politics as did the Rhode Island Education Association and the Rhode Island Federation of Teachers, making those unions significant players at the state level as well.



6 Michelle R. Smith, “More Teachers’ Unions Throw Support Behind R.I.’S Race To Top,” Associated Press, May 25, 2010, http://articles.boston.com/2010-05-25/news/29307687_1_teachers-unions-broad-stakeholder-support-districts.

7 Ibid.

8 Jennifer D. Jordan, “NEARI Declines To Sign On To Race to the Top,” Providence Journal, May 27, 2010, http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2010/05/neari-declines-to-sign-on-to-r-1.html.

9 Michael Corkery, “Rhode Island Public Workers To See Reduced Benefits,” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203611404577045132098830806.html.

10 David Klepper, “RI Unions Sue To Block State Pension Overhaul; Chafee, Raimondo Say State Ready For Challenge,” The Republic, June 22, 2012, http://www.therepublic.com/view/story/d1e1076843934123abf565d26fe7ef57/RI--Pension-Lawsuit.

11 Ibid.

12 Ted Nesi, “Unions To RI: Negotiate A Pension Deal Before You Lose In Court,” WPRI.com, February 7, 2012, http://blogs.wpri.com/2012/02/07/unions-to-ri-negotiate-a-pension-deal-before-you-lose-in-court/.


SOUTH CAROLINA



51ST

South Carolina’s teacher association claims

fewer resources and a smaller membership

base than unions in any other state.

Collective bargaining between local districts

and teacher associations is prohibited in the

Palmetto State, and only 26.9 percent of

its teachers—the lowest rate in the nation—

belong to the state association. The state-

level NEA affiliate brings in the smallest

annual revenue in the country, just $52 per

South Carolina teacher. Teachers see scant

spending on education. Only 15.5 percent

of state expenditures are directed to K–12

education (only nine states allocate less).

Total dollars for education (a combination

of local, state, and federal funds) are low

as well: $10,237 per pupil, per year, with

52.9 percent of those dollars going toward

teacher salaries and benefits (both 35th).


35TH

Given the low revenue and membership

of South Carolina’s teacher association, it

comes as no surprise that its involvement in

state politics over the past decade has been

limited. Donations from the association

accounted for just 0.16 percent of the total


(unions in few states contribute less), and

those donations equaled only 1.32 percent

of the donations from the ten highest-giving

sectors in the state (46th). The association

did, however, contribute 1.2 percent of

the total funds received by state political

parties, the 22nd-largest proportion across

states. Boosting the state’s ranking in

political involvement is the fact that 16.4

percent of South Carolina delegates to



members, 17th in the nation.3

SOUTH CAROLINA OVERALL RANK: 49TH1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


49

51

35

38

47

43


SOUTH CAROLINA


TIED FOR 43RD

South Carolina is one of only five states

that prohibit collective bargaining,

and employee associations may not


non-members. Teacher strikes are neither

authorized nor prohibited by state law.


38TH

State policies in South Carolina are

generally not aligned with traditional union

interests. Bonuses based on performance

must be available to all teachers. The state’s

charter law does not limit the number of

schools allowed to operate; provides for

two viable authorizing entities; and allows

automatic exemptions for charters from

many state and district laws, regulations,

and personnel policies. The union does,

however, benefit from two favorable

policies regarding teacher job security:

Student achievement need not factor

into teacher evaluations, and tenure is

conferred virtually automatically after two

years (the national norm is three). The

ratio of employer to employee pension

contributions and the dismissal rate due

to poor teacher performance rank in the

middle of the pack.


47TH

Stakeholders in South Carolina perceive

teacher association strength to be very

limited. Survey respondents rank its

influence on education policy below that of

numerous other entities, such as the state

school board association, charter school

association, business roundtable/chamber

of commerce, and education advocacy

organizations; stakeholders in just two

other states ranked their teacher unions

as less influential. Respondents also note


and enacted during the latest legislative


association priorities. Further, they observe

that in a time of budgetary constraint, the

association conceded from the outset that

some reductions for pay and benefits were

inevitable.

OVERALL

49TH

With few resources, limited involvement in

state politics, and no legal authority, South

Carolina’s teacher association carries a

relatively weak reputation and faces many

unfavorable policies at the state level.


SOUTH CAROLINA

State Superintendent Mick Zais has been a very unpopular guy with the South Carolina Education Association (SCEA). In 2011, he refused to apply for $50 million in Race to the Top funds, calling it a “losing game…offering pieces of silver in exchange for more strings attached by Washington.”4 For the same reason, later that year he did not seek $144 million in federal “stimulus” money, making South Carolina the only state not to do so. SCEA president Jackie Hicks lamented “I think it’s sad that today we’re not keeping our children first in public education.” According to the SCEA, the funding could have provided salaries for 2,880 teachers and reduced class size as a result.5 Two SCEA briefs entitled “Superintendent of Education Mick Zais: Dead-Beat Dad” and “Superintendent is Derelict in His Duty” fanned the anti-Zais flames.6

The superintendent has instead focused on reforms to increase choice and offer schools regulatory relief. Zais’s chief legislative priority for 2012 has been charter schools, which he describes as “a tremendous step [on] the way to providing a personalized and customized education for every student.”7 In May 2012, the state passed a bill that more than doubles the number of charter schools.8 The law also requires district schools to host charter students for extracurricular activities when those activities are not provided by the charters themselves, and allows universities to sponsor their own schools. While the SCEA says that it does not object to charters overall, it stands firm that charter funding should not diminish funds for traditional district schools. The SCEA did block a voucher bill before the close of the 2012 legislative session, and worked doggedly to secure state funds to give teachers a 2 percent pay raise after four years of freezes and cuts.9,10 But it could not diminish the momentum of Zais and other charter-school supporters.11 The SCEA might not be pleased with its state superintendent, but school-choice advocates give him a gold star.

(NOT) THE TEACHER’S PET


SOUTH CAROLINA

OVERALL RANK: 49TH





51st


41st


35th


35th




47th


22nd


46th


17th





Prohibited

Right to strike What is the legal status of teacher strikes? Neither prohibited nor permitted













Yes; Higher

SOUTH CAROLINA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

51

35

43*

38


SOUTH CAROLINA



(cont.)



No state cap


How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? Two or more options but must be pre-approved


Yes










Sometimes/Often


Rarely


Neutral


Generally concede


Neutral


Rarely/Sometimes







Sometimes





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, South Carolina has the 51st-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In South Carolina, collective bargaining is prohibited, and teacher strikes are neither prohibited nor permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


38

47


SOUTH CAROLINA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator scores for South Carolina are shown in the table, South Carolina Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, South Carolina is ranked 51st of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.



4 Mick Zais, “’Race to Top’ Is A Losing Game,” Post and Courier, June 1, 2011, http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20110601/ARCHIVES/306019940.

5 Adam Pinsker, “Educators Rally For More Funding,” MidlandsConnect.com, August 15, 2011, http://www.midlandsconnect.com/news/story.aspx?id=651622#.T9GbZuJYua4.

6 Jackie Hicks, “Superintendent Of Education Mick Zais: Dead-Beat Dad,” South Carolina Education Association, August 10, 2011, http://www.thescea.org/assets/document/Superintendent_of_Education_Mick_Zais.pdf.

7 Staff and wire report, “Governor Nikki Haley Signs Charter Bill Into Law,” Post and Courier, May 15, 2012, http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20120515/PC16/120519503/1177.

8 Ibid.

9 Associated Press, “SC Senate Overrides Budget Veto Of $10 Million To Help Districts Increase Teacher Salaries,” July 18, 2012, http://www.therepublic.com/view/story/aa2e446856434adba2f60bcd8ad4b16a/SC-XGR--Veto-Session-Education.

10 “2012 Legislative Session Updates,” South Carolina Education Association, accessed July 2, 2012, http://www.thescea.org/home/1524.htm.

11 Ibid.


SOUTH DAKOTA



TIED FOR 40TH

South Dakota’s state teacher union has

limited resources from its members, and

does not see a large commitment of dollars

to K–12 education in general, or to teacher

salaries and benefits in particular. Only 54.1

percent of teachers are unionized in the

Mount Rushmore State (an unusually low

percentage compared to the other states

that also require collective bargaining, and

only the 43rd-highest membership rate

of all 51 jurisdictions nationwide). Its state

NEA affiliate brings in $370 annually South

Dakota per teacher (31st of 51). Further,

while South Dakota schools, many of them

rural, spend a fair amount of money on K–12

education—$11,232 annually per student

(26th)—just half of those funds go toward

teacher salaries and benefits (only three

states spend a smaller percentage).

AREAS 2: INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS2

TIED FOR 1ST

The teacher union has been a significant

contributor to South Dakota politics over

the past ten years. It ties with Alabama and

Hawaii for most active union involvement.

Specifically, 1.4 percent of the donations


the South Dakota Education Association

(12th).3 Those contributions amounted

to roughly 14 percent of total donations

from the ten highest-giving sectors in the

state (10th). Unions donated to political

parties as well: 1.54 percent of total party

donations came from them (18th). (These

high rankings do not appear to make sense

given that the South Dakota Education

Association (SDEA) is relatively resource-

poor (see Area 1), until we consider that

the sum of donations from any source

SOUTH DAKOTA OVERALL RANK: 34TH1

TIER 4 (WEAK)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


34

1

34

40

49

33


SOUTH DAKOTA

to state candidates and parties in South

Dakota is one of the smallest totals in the

nation. Thus, the SDEA is able to be heavily

involved in state politics, without actually

giving much money.) The union voice was

also represented at the Democratic and

Republican national conventions—23.1

percent of South Dakota’s delegates were

union members (6th).4


TIED FOR 33RD

South Dakota is one of thirty-two states

that mandate collective bargaining and

it is relatively permissive regarding the

scope of negotiations. Of twenty-one items

examined in this report, South Dakota

law dictates that four must be subject

to bargaining: wages, hours, terms and


procedures. The state is silent on the

remaining seventeen items, implicitly

permitting them. South Dakota does

limit the strength of its unions, however,

by prohibiting them from automatically

collecting agency fees from non-member

teachers, and teachers are not allowed to

strike.


TIED FOR 34TH

While some of South Dakota’s state

policies align with traditional teacher union

interests, others do not. South Dakota does

not have a charter school law.5 Neither

teacher evaluations nor tenure decisions

must include student achievement data

(although the former may soon change,

see sidebar), and there are no articulated

consequences for teachers who receive

unsatisfactory evaluations—all policies that

unions typically support. Despite its tenure

and evaluation policies, however, South

Dakota dismisses teachers due to poor

performance at a higher rate than any other

state. And the state does not require that

class size be restricted.


49TH

Despite (or perhaps motivating) the union’s

involvement in state politics, stakeholders

in South Dakota report that it is relatively

weak. They indicate that several other

organizations have greater sway over

education policy: the state school board,

the school board association, and the

association of school administrators.

South Dakota is the only state in which

stakeholders report that Democrats rarely

need teacher union support to get elected

(elsewhere, Democrats at least sometimes

need that support). Respondents also note

that teacher unions are not effective in

protecting dollars for education or warding

off education reforms with which they

disagree, and that policies enacted in the

state’s latest legislative session were mostly


OVERALL

34TH

Despite its perceived ineffectiveness,

the South Dakota teacher union is highly

active in state politics. Such activity may

well illustrate the union’s effort to alter

unfavorable policies and hostile legislative

environments (see sidebar).


SOUTH DAKOTA

The South Dakota Education Association (SDEA) has no love for a massive education-reform bill signed into law in February 2012. HB 1234 provides a $5,000 one-year bonus for up to 20 percent of every school’s top teachers, bases half of teacher evaluations on quantitative data (such as test scores), requires uniform teacher evaluations, and gradually phases out teacher tenure.7

Unable to stop legislators from passing the measure, the SDEA took it to the voters, collecting nearly 26,000 signatures (fewer than 16,000 were needed) to put its repeal on the November 2012 ballot. Union leaders insist that the bill will create unnecessary competition among teachers, undermining their work without addressing the real problem: Teachers do not have enough resources to do their job well. SDEA leader Amanda Mack lamented: “This bill is not the solution to the problems facing education in South Dakota. If we were able to fund the formula properly and able to give schools the resources that they need to determine what teachers to hire, what textbooks they need, [and] what supplies they need, we’d be in a much better position than we are.”8 To prove its point that overall, not selective, funding will do more for South Dakota students, the SDEA took to door knocking again—and this time gathered 34,000 signatures to put another measure on the ballot. The “Penny Tax” would add one cent to the state sales tax and is projected to yield $90 million for education.9 SDEA President Sandy Arseneault is pleased with the campaign thus far: “What a wonderful example of what we can accomplish if we come together with one voice.”10 Come November, voters will decide whether their voices harmonize with the union or the legislature.

THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE


SOUTH DAKOTA

OVERALL RANK: 34TH





31st


39th


26th


48th




12th


18th


10th


6th*



















No restriction

SOUTH DAKOTA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

40*

1*

33*

34*


SOUTH DAKOTA



(cont.)



N/A




N/A


N/A


N/A






Rarely


Never/Rarely


Disagree


Generally fight


Disagree


Rarely/Sometimes







Sometimes


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, South Dakota has the 43rd-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: South Dakota has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c South Dakota does not have a charter school law.


34*

49


SOUTH DAKOTA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for South Dakota are shown in the table, South Dakota Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, South Dakota is ranked 40th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 South Dakota is one of just four states where local teacher associations did not contribute to candidates and political parties. In South Dakota, the SDEA was the lone union donor to candidates, while the SDEA along with the NEA and AFT gave to state political parties.




7 Associated School Boards of South Dakota Issue Briefs, accessed June 7, 2012, http://www.asbsd.org/page174.aspx.

8 Jill Johnson, “SD Teacher Bonus Bill On November Ballot,” KDLT News, July 2, 2012, http://www.kdlt.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18666&Itemid=57.

9 “Penny Sales Tax Vote Coming in November,” The Educator’s Advocate, December 2011/January 2012, http://sdea.org/assets/document/Advocate_DecJan_2011-2012.pdf.

10 Ibid.


TENNESSEE



TIED FOR 37TH

Tennessee’s state teacher union contends

with relatively low financial resources and

membership. Only 58.7 percent of teachers

in the Volunteer State are unionized

(the 36th-highest percentage out of 51

jurisdictions), and its NEA state affiliate

sees just $211 annually per Tennessee

teacher (39th). The state directs just 17.7

percent of its expenditures toward K–12

education (32nd). Total per-pupil spending

is low (just $8,695 per student annually,

46th), although 55.8 percent of those funds

go toward teacher salaries and benefits

(15th).


TIED FOR 18TH

Tennessee’s teacher union is in the middle

of the pack compared with those in other

states when it comes to involvement in

politics. Over the past ten years, donations

from the union accounted for 0.59 percent

of the total contributions received by

candidates for state office (26th), with

5.5 percent of the funds going to such

candidates from the ten highest-giving

sectors in the state (23rd). The union

gave to state political parties at a similar

level: 0.89 percent of total donations to

Tennessee’s parties came directly from its

teacher union (27th). And 15.0 percent of

Tennessee’s delegates to the Democratic


teacher union members (tied for 20th).3

TENNESSEE OVERALL RANK: 41ST1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


41

18

42

37

42

38


TENNESSEE


38TH

While Tennessee is one of thirty-two


by teachers, it restricts the scope of that

bargaining fairly severely.4 The state

explicitly prohibits negotiations over eight


metric: management rights, tenure, teacher

transfers/reassignments, layoffs, dismissal,

evaluations, pension/retirement benefits,

and curriculum. State law requires six items

must be bargained, and implicitly permits

the remaining seven by taking no position.

The state also prohibits the automatic

collection of agency fees from non-member

teachers, a key source of union revenue.

Tennessee teachers are not permitted to

strike.


42ND

Many state education policies do not


interests. State law permits performance

pay, requires that student achievement


evaluations, and renders teachers eligible


ratings (the most stringent possible

consequence). Tenure is conferred

after five years (three is standard) and

depends primarily on evidence of student

learning. Districts must also consider

teacher performance, not only seniority,

in determining teacher layoffs. Tennessee

law does not cap the number of charters

that can operate in the state, and charter

teachers do not have to participate in

collective bargaining agreements. However,

authorizing options are limited and charts

are not automatically exempt charters

from state and district laws (although the

schools may apply for such exemptions).


TIED FOR 42ND

Stakeholders in Tennessee currently

perceive teacher union strength as limited.

Survey respondents rank union influence on

education policy behind that of the state’s

education advocacy organizations, business

roundtable/chamber of commerce, and

school board association, among others.

They note that the union is not effective in


it disagrees, and indicate that the priorities

of state education leaders only sometimes

align to teacher union positions. Finally,

stakeholders report that policies proposed

by the governor during the latest legislative


union priorities, while the outcomes of that

session were not at all in line.5

OVERALL

41ST

Tennessee’s state teacher union is

relatively weak across the board: While it

is moderately involved in state politics, it

faces thin resources and membership, an

unfriendly state policy environment, and

a restricted scope of bargaining. These,

taken together, have likely contributed

to its weakened reputation among state

stakeholders. Of the unions in states where

bargaining is mandatory, Tennessee’s is one

of the weakest.


TENNESSEE

The Tennessee Education Association (TEA) is trying to recover from a major re-write of Tennessee’s collective bargaining laws. While negotiations between a district and its teachers are still mandatory, the 2011 law calls for “collaborative conferencing,” where teachers can choose to be represented by a union—or not—and instead bargain as an organization of non-unionized professionals. The statute also prevents any union revenue garnered from employee payroll deductions from being used for political purposes.6 Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey touted the act as a defeat of the TEA: “For years upon years, one union has thwarted the progress of education in Tennessee…The barrier that has prevented us from putting the best possible teacher in every classroom will soon be removed.”7 TEA government relations director Jerry Winters declared that Ramsey’s interpretation went too far and that he “is beating his chest for political reasons.”8 Yet many Tennessee teachers agreed with Ramsey. Looking to escape what J.C. Bowman, the executive director of the Professional Educators Association of Tennessee (PEAT), calls the “partisan climate that created the political environment Tennessee teachers have faced in recent years,” hundreds left the TEA (and its local affiliates) for PEAT, its non-union rival.9,10

Despite its losses of membership and clout, the TEA rebounded somewhat in 2012, securing a 2.5 percent state-funded pay raise for teachers and a requirement that lawmakers must get comprehensive input from teachers before making any changes to the existing teacher evaluation system. It also defeated licensure changes, voucher legislation, and Governor Haslam’s controversial proposal to completely eliminate the state-mandated teacher salary schedule.11 However, with the traditional role, and power, of the Tennessee union now in flux, it’s difficult to say whether the TEA will make a full recovery.

HOLDING ON, BARELY


TENNESSEE

OVERALL RANK: 41ST





39th


32nd


46th


15th




26th


27th


23rd


20th*














Is student/teacher performance considered in tenure decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Required; Preponderant critera





Yes; Higher

TENNESSEE RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

37*

18*

38

42


TENNESSEE



(cont.)



No state cap








Yes






Often/Always


Never/Rarely


Neutral


Generally fight


Disagree


Sometimes







Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Tennessee has the 36th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Tennessee has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


42

42*


TENNESSEE

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Tennessee are shown in the table, Tennessee Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Tennessee is ranked 37th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.



4 While Tennessee law mandates collective bargaining, it does not require that districts bargain with teacher unions, only with professional organizations—which may or may not be a union, at the discretion of the local employees (see sidebar).


6 “Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011 Frequently Asked Questions,” Tennessee Department of Education, accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.tn.gov/education/doc/PECCAFAQ_June17.pdf.

7 Tim Ghianni, “Tennessee Limits Collective Bargaining Rights For Teachers,” Reuters.com, June 1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/01/us-unions-states-tennessee-idUSTRE75071I20110601.

8 Ibid.

9 J. C. Bowman, “A Note From The Executive Eirector,” Professional Educators of Tennessee, accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.proedtn.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=40.

10 Chas Sisk, “TN Teachers Union Gets Mixed Grades,” Tennessean, February 27, 2011, http://www.wbir.com/news/article/159016/0/TN-teachers-union-gets-mixed-grades.

11 “Many Wins For Teachers in 2012 Legislative Session,” Tennessee Education Association, accessed July 16, 2012, http://www.teateachers.org/news/many-wins-teachers-2012-legislative-session.


TEXAS



TIED FOR 44TH

Texas’s teacher associations have limited

membership and revenue, and do not

see high spending on education in the

state. Collective bargaining in education

is prohibited in the Lone Star State, and

62.7 percent of its teachers belong to

professional associations (still the 33rd-

highest percentage out of 51 states). But

even then, Texas’s state-level NEA and AFT

affiliates see just $53 annually per teacher

in the state—only the state association in

South Carolina takes in less. The state does

direct 29.8 percent of its total expenditures

toward K–12 education (3rd). But overall

K–12 expenditures are low: At $8,654 per

student per year, they are lower in just two

other states. And, 53.4 percent of those


and benefits (32nd).


TIED FOR 36TH

In the past decade, teacher associations

participated less in state politics in

Texas than did unions in many other

states (although their involvement was

comparable to that in the four other

states in which bargaining is prohibited).

Contributions from independent, NEA-

affiliated, and AFT-affiliated associations

accounted for just 0.60 percent of the

total donations received by candidates

for state office (24th of 51).3 Their share of

contributions to state political parties was

equally small—0.47 percent (38th). Further,

9.2 percent of all of Texas’s delegates to



(36th).4

TEXAS OVERALL RANK: 44TH1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


44

36

30

44

34

48


TEXAS



Texas is one of five states that prohibit

collective bargaining, and associations are

not allowed to collect agency fees. The

state does not permit teacher strikes.


TIED FOR 30TH

A number of Texas policies align with

traditional teacher union interests—but

not all. Some union-friendly policies

relate to teacher evaluations and job

security: The state does not require that


teacher evaluations, and confers tenure

on teachers virtually automatically after

three years (the national norm). Further,

unions typically support policies that

limit the expansion of charter schools,

and Texas places a cap on some (but not

all) types of charter schools. In addition,

while it allows both the state and local

school boards to authorize charters, the

state essentially serves as the only viable

authorizing option. On the union-averse

side, state law requires districts to consider

performance in determining teacher layoffs,

permits performance pay, does not require

charter school teachers to be certified, and

exempts state-authorized charters from

district personnel policies.


34TH

Stakeholders in Texas report that the

reach of their state teacher associations

is somewhat limited. Survey respondents

rank their influence on education policy

alongside that of education advocacy

organizations but behind the business

roundtable/chamber of commerce. They

note that state policies only sometimes

reflect association priorities, and that

Texas education leaders only sometimes

align with those priorities. While they

report that the associations fought hard

given recent budgetary constraints to

prevent reductions in pay and benefits,

they also report that policies proposed

by the governor during the state’s latest


with association priorities, and that policies

actually enacted were only somewhat in

line with those priorities.5

OVERALL

44TH

Texas prohibits collective bargaining, and

its NEA and AFT affiliates have little in the

way of financial or membership resources.

While the state’s teacher associations

participate to a limited extent in state

politics and enjoy some favorable policies

at the state level, overall, Texas teacher

associations are comparatively weaker than

unions in nearly every other state.


TEXAS

Texas teachers don’t seem to mind that collective bargaining is prohibited in the Lone Star State. To the contrary, many of them have chosen to avoid the politics, and the conflict, that traditionally follows teacher unions. The state’s two largest independent teacher professional associations boast more combined revenue than the NEA-affiliated Texas State Teachers Association (TSTA) and AFT-affiliated Texas Federation of Teachers.6 The Association of Texas Professional Educators (ATPE) explains, “collective bargaining and exclusive consultation policies create an adversarial relationship between employees and employers that compromise students’ education.”7 With over 100,000 dues-paying members of the ATPE alone, it’s apparently a popular opinion.

The voice of labor is not completely silent in Texas, but it is louder in the state’s capital than in its districts. In 2011, Texas lawmakers slashed $4 billion in education over two years to help close a state budget shortfall, and the TSTA reacted by imploring Governor Rick Perry to dip into the state’s rainy day fund. Perry reluctantly agreed to a one-time use of the funds to stave off an impending budget crisis, but vowed, “I remain steadfastly committed to protecting the remaining balance.”8 A year later, he stayed true to his word. The TSTA called for a special legislative session, requesting another bailout for 2012-13: With an estimated 12,000 teacher jobs already lost and 8,200 elementary classes above legal class size limits,9 TSTA President Rita Haecker argued that “[u]ltimately, these cuts and crowded classrooms harm our students’ learning environment.”10 Governor Rick Perry responded, “I understand that [using the fund] seems like a logical answer for them…[but] the reality is everybody’s got to give and education’s the biggest part of [the state] budget.”11 Apparently his mind is made up, and this time the TSTA’s pleas fell on deaf ears.

SMALL FISH IN A BIG POND


TEXAS

OVERALL RANK: 44TH





50th


3rd


49th


32nd




24th


38th


36th


36th



















Yes; Higher

TEXAS RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

44*

36*

48*

30*


TEXAS



(cont.)

















Sometimes/Often


Rarely


Neutral


Generally fight


Neutral


Sometimes/Often


Mostly not in line


Somewhat in line



Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Texas has the 33rd-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Texas, collective bargaining is prohibited, and teacher strikes are also prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


30*

34


TEXAS

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Texas are shown in the table, Texas Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Texas is ranked 44th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 Major donors in Texas include the state-level NEA and AFT associations, the national AFT and a handful of AFT-affiliated local associations, and two large, active professional associations not affiliated with either the NEA or AFT (see sidebar).



6 Revenue calculated using publicly-available tax returns, downloaded from http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/charitablestats/article/0,,id=97186,00.html.

7 “Collective Bargaining/Exclusive Consultation,” Associated of Texas Professional Educators, accessed July 18, 2012, http://www.atpe.org/advocacy/issues/ColBarExcCon.asp.

8 Reuters, “Rick Perry Reverses Course on Rainy Day Fund,” HuffingtonPost.com, March 16, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/15/rick-perry-rainy-day-fund_n_836339.html.

9 “TSTA Urges Special Session On Rainy Day Fund,” Texas State Teachers Association, February 1, 2012, http://www.tsta.org/sites/default/files/RainYDayFund.pdf.

10 “TSTA Calls For Special Session,” Coleman Chronicle, February 6, 2012, http://colemannews.com/tsta-calls-for-special-session/.

11 Allison Morrison, “TSTA Urges Governor Perry To Call Special Session,” EverythingLubbock.com, February 3, 2012, http://everythinglubbock.com/fulltext/?nxd_id=97992.


UTAH



TIED FOR 37TH

The internal resources of Utah’s state

teacher unions are limited, and teachers do

not enjoy high levels of spending on K–12

education in the state. Bargaining between

districts and unions is permitted, but not

required in the Beehive State, and 63.6

percent of its teachers belong to unions

(the 32nd-highest unionization rate among

51 jurisdictions). The low membership rate,

combined with low dues, contributes to low

revenues for the NEA and AFT state-level

affiliates, which bring in just $170 annually

per Utah teacher (43rd). K–12 education

accounts for a relatively large share of state

spending (22.1 percent; 14th), although total

per-pupil funds (a combination of state,

local, and federal dollars) amounts to only

$7,217 per pupil annually, the lowest in the

nation. Of these dollars, a full 58.1 percent

go to teacher salaries and benefits (6th).


25TH

The political involvement of Utah’s teacher

unions places them in the middle of the

national pack. In the past decade, 1.2

percent of donations to candidates for state

office (14th) and 0.66 percent of donations

to political parties (32nd) came from

teacher unions. In addition, 8.8 percent of

Utah’s delegates to the Democratic and



UTAH OVERALL RANK: 39TH1

TIER 4 (WEAK)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


39

25

30

37

39

28


UTAH


TIED FOR 28TH

Utah law explicitly permits, but does not

require, collective bargaining in education

(but it takes no position on bargaining over

any specific provision, implicitly permitting

all twenty-one we examined for our report).

However, no union may automatically

collect agency fees from non-members

and teacher strikes are neither allowed nor

prohibited.


TIED FOR 30TH

While some Utah policies align with

traditional union interests, others do not.

Teachers earn tenure after three years (the

national norm) and student learning is

not a required factor in tenure decisions;

while student achievement data must be

considered in teacher evaluations, how

much weight those data carry is at the

discretion of each district. However, when

making layoffs, districts must consider

teacher performance, and may not consider

seniority at all. Furthermore, the state does

not restrict class size (which is generally

large). State charter laws are also a mixed

bag. Unions traditionally support laws that

limit the expansion and autonomies of

charters, yet the state provides multiple

charter authorizers, allows all three kinds of

charter schools (new, conversion, virtual)

and automatically exempts charters from

the collective bargaining agreements of

districts that have them. Yet charters are

not automatically exempt from state laws

and district regulations and, while they may

seek waivers from some of them, they are

bound by the state teacher certification

rules.


39TH

Stakeholders report that the state’s teacher

unions are not particularly strong, and

their responses rank Utah fairly low on the

national list. Teacher unions are described

as less influential than education advocacy

groups, the state school board, and the

legislature. Respondents note that state

education leaders are often aligned with

positions held by teacher unions, but that

the unions typically need to compromise to

see their preferred policies enacted. Finally,

respondents report that, while policies

proposed by the governor during Utah’s

latest legislative session were mostly in

line with teacher union priorities, enacted

policies were mostly not in line with those

priorities (although union influence in the

capitol appears to have strengthened in

2012—see sidebar).4

OVERALL

39TH

Utah’s teacher unions do not rank

particularly high in any area of strength.

They also land in the middle of the unions

in permitted-bargaining states.


UTAH

In early 2011, Utah Education Association (UEA) President Sharon Gallagher-Fishbaugh was concerned that lawmakers would target her organization, seeking payback for the union’s involvement in Utah politics (and perhaps they hadn’t forgotten UEA’s hand in defeating a 2007 voucher law in a fierce battle that received national attention). “We have become the scapegoat,” she said. “We are being blamed for a situation we did not create.”5,6 So when Republican Senator Aaron Osmond, chair of the Senate Education Committee, announced later that year that he wanted to spearhead a massive overhaul to teacher employment policies in the upcoming 2012 legislative session, alarms went off for the UEA. Osmond explained that his (as-yet unwritten) plan would eliminate tenure and make all employees “at-will,” limit the scope of bargaining to salaries and benefits (and force all negotiations to occur in public), eliminate due process protections from state law, and require that 25 percent of teachers’ base salary be contingent on their performance.

But Osmond then took an unprecedented step: he asked educators for feedback on his ideas. First, he toured schools around the state. Then, he sat down with the UEA, representatives of the state school boards and superintendents associations, and state education leaders to design the actual policy that he would propose to the legislature.7 “For the first time that I can remember, UEA was at the table and an integral partner in the creation of a major reform bill,” said Gallagher-Fishbaugh, “…[and] being part of the process allowed us to focus on student learning while protecting teacher rights.” 8 And protect those rights they did: teachers kept tenure, bargaining, due process, and their seniority-based salary schedule. As passed, the bill did require that evaluations include (yet-to-be-specified) measures of student growth but allowed districts to develop their own evaluation systems. Teachers would lose their automatic yearly pay increases if they received poor evaluations, but they would not be eligible for immediate dismissal either (instead they first go through remediation). Administrators, not teachers, would see their base salaries affected by poor evaluations.9 And if that weren’t enough, lawmakers’ enthusiasm for this bill consigned other union-opposed bills—student-based “backpack” funding, vouchers, performance pay, the elimination of automatic payroll deductions, and more restrictions on collective bargaining—to failure.10,11

The media heralded Osmond as a “courageous lawmaker,” the state superintendent called the bill “a step forward,” and Senate President Michael Waddoups heralded the compromise as “a great kumbaya moment.”12,13 Others were skeptical—including Senator Stuart Adams, who worried that the union voice dominated discussions—but their criticism went unheard amidst the accolades showered on Osmond.14 In the end, it was unclear whether Osmond had experienced a true change of heart or whether he determined that a political turnaround was in his best interests. Still, with its new alliance with Osmond, the UEA’s recent successes in the state capital may be a sign that they have gone from sacrificial lamb to political lion.

STILL THE SCAPEGOAT?


UTAH

OVERALL RANK: 39TH





43rd


14th


51st


6th




14th


32nd


17th


38th















Is seniority considered in teacher layoff decisions? If so, how is it weighted? Not considered




No restriction

UTAH RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

37*

25

28*

30*


UTAH



(cont.)











Yes






Often


Rarely


Neutral


Generally fight


Neutral


Sometimes/Often







Often


Compromise



b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Utah has the 32nd-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Utah, collective bargaining is permitted, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


30*

39


UTAH

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Utah are shown in the table, Utah Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Utah is ranked 37th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Sara Lenz, “Teacher Unions Under Attack Nationally And In Utah,” Deseret News, March 6, 2011, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700116124/Teacher-unions-under-attack-nationally-and-in-Utah.html?pg=all.

6 Glen Warchol, “Vouchers Go Down In Crushing Defeat,” Salt Lake Tribune, November 7, 2007, http://www.sltrib.com/ci_7392263.

7 Aaron Osmond, “Seeking Input And Perspective From Our Educators: Comments And Thoughts On The Education Employee Reform Act Proposal,” UtahPublicEducation.org, November 4, 2011, http://utahpubliceducation.org/2011/11/04/seeking-input-and-perspective-from-our-educators/.

8 “Politics and Legislation,” Utah Education Association, accessed August 29, 2012, http://www.myuea.org/politics_legislation/uea_under_the_dome/2012_issue_public_education_employment_reform.aspx.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 “Utah Bill Would Give Public Education Money Directly To Student ‘Savings Accounts,’ Not Schools,” HuffingtonPost.com, March 4, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/15/utah-bill-would-give-publ_n_1279978.html.

12 Frank Pignanelli and LaVarr Webb, “In A Quiet Year, Here Are Some Courageous Lawmakers,” Deseret News, March 4, 2012, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/765556047/In-a-quiet-year-here-are-some-courageous-lawmakers.html?pg=all.

13 Benjamin Wood, “Public Education Stakeholders Endorse Evaluation Bill,” Deseret News, February 27, 2012, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865551046/Public-education-stakeholders-endorse-evaluation-bill.html?pg=all.

14 Lisa Schencker, “Utah Teacher Employment Bill Gets Early Nod, But Only After Debate,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 28, 2012, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/53601824-90/adams-administrators-bill-education.html.csp.


VERMONT



TIED FOR 6TH

Vermont’s teacher unions benefit from

substantial resources from their members,

who in turn enjoy generous education

funding. A substantial 82.4 percent of

teachers in the Green Mountain State

belong to unions (the 24th-highest rate

of 51 jurisdictions), and the NEA and AFT

state-level affiliates bring in $672 annually

per Vermont teacher (9th). Further, 33.2

percent of state expenditures go to K–12

education, the highest such proportion

in the nation. Per-pupil spending (a

combination of state, federal, and local

funds) amounts to $17,847 annually, the

2nd-highest nationwide (behind Wyoming).

Although only 52.8 percent (38th) of those

dollars go to teacher salaries and benefits,

the pie itself is quite large.


TIED FOR 44TH

Vermont’s teacher unions are relatively

uninvolved in state politics, at least on the

metrics we examined. In the past decade,

their donations amounted to just 0.08

percent of all contributions to candidates

for state office (49th) and accounted for

only 0.72 percent of contributions to state

political parties (30th). These low levels

of financial involvement are particularly

interesting considering that it’s possible

to be a major donor in Vermont without

actually giving much money (the total of all

donations to candidates and parties is one

of the smallest in the nation). The teacher

unions’ low level of activity in this regard

may indicate that they are satisfied with

the status quo (see sidebar). Note, too, that

just 5 percent of the state’s delegates to

VERMONT OVERALL RANK: 11TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


11

44

2

6

22

8


VERMONT



(47th).3


8TH

Vermont is one of thirty-two states that

require collective bargaining in education,

and its bargaining laws are more union-

friendly than in most other states. Unions

can automatically collect agency fees

(a key source of their revenue) from

non-members, and teacher strikes are

permitted. Vermont also grants unions a

broad scope of bargaining: Of twenty-one

items examined in this analysis, wages,

hours, and grievance procedures are

mandatory subjects of bargaining; the

state is silent on the remaining eighteen,

implicitly permitting negotiations on all of

them.


TIED FOR 2ND

State policies in Vermont are more closely

aligned with traditional teacher union

interests than in any other state save

West Virginia. Vermont does not support

performance pay, does not require student

achievement data to be factored into


and does not articulate consequences

for unsatisfactory evaluations. Further,

teachers earn tenure after two years (the

national norm is three), and districts need

not consider teacher performance when

making layoffs. Vermont has no charter

school law.4


TIED FOR 22ND

Vermont’s teacher unions enjoy only a

fair reputation for political influence when

compared with unions in other states.

Survey respondents rank their influence

behind that of the state school board and

legislature, but agree that they are effective

in warding off education proposals with

which they disagree and in protecting

dollars for education. They note that while

policies proposed by the governor during

the latest legislative session were only

somewhat in line with union priorities,

enacted policies were mostly in line with

those priorities (especially noteworthy

given their lack of involvement in state

politics). But they also observe that the

positions of state education leaders

are only sometimes aligned to those of

teacher unions, and that unions typically

compromise to see some of their favored

policies enacted.

OVERALL

11TH

Vermont’s teacher unions benefit from

permissive bargaining laws and abundant

resources. With state policies that are

strongly aligned with their interests, and

education leaders who show no strong

appetite for changing the current state

of affairs (see sidebar), they are strong

without having to be major donors to state

politics.


VERMONT

Not every state is pressing for drastic education reform. In fact, lawmakers in the Green Mountain State—known for its long history of local control—don’t seem to be seeking much change at all. In 2010, Education Commissioner Armando Vilaseca expressed little desire to overhaul current policies to meet federal Race to the Top (RTTT) guidelines: “What we’re hearing from [Secretary of Education Arne Duncan] is a pretty strong line: [no] charter schools, you lose points. You don’t have a teacher evaluation system that is tied into student outcomes, you lose points.”5 Rather than pass a charter law or change its evaluation system, Vermont did not apply (although in a letter to Duncan, Vilaseca attributed the choice to RTTT’s seeming bias against rural states, critically noting that “based on the culture and demographics of our communities, some states [like Vermont] may take a different approach to accomplishing the same goals of ensuring each student is given the education they need to thrive in the 21st century.”)6 That same year, lawmakers and the Vermont-NEA agreed on a pension plan that saved the state $15 million per year—after considerable horse trading. “What we’ve all produced is better: teachers working a bit longer, paying a bit more, but getting more when they retire,” says Vermont-NEA president Martha Allen.7

Vermont’s “thanks but no thanks” attitude to RTTT persisted when, in June 2012, the state board rescinded its NCLB waiver application, citing heavy constraints—especially the requirement that teacher evaluations be tied to yearly test results. “We feel it should be left up to districts as to how much they want to do that and make sure they have multiple indicators,” said Allen.8 John Fischer, deputy commissioner of the Vermont Department of Education, also expressed confidence in Vermont schools and the seeming irrelevance of waivers: “Generally, in Vermont, we’ve got great schools. We [are] looking at a continuous improvement cycle, not turning around failing schools.”9 While it is true that student performance rankings consistently put Vermont near the top of the country, it’s also true that their students are some of the more advantaged in the land.10,11

IF IT AIN’T BROKE…


VERMONT

OVERALL RANK: 11TH





9th


1st


2nd


38th




49th


30th


38th


47th





Permitted














Yes; Higher

VERMONT RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

6*

44*

8

2*


VERMONT



(cont.)



N/A




N/A


N/A


N/A






Often


Rarely/Sometimes


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often







Sometimes/Often



* Tied with another state a Area ranks are calculated using a weighted average of sub-indicators. For a more detailed description, see Appendix A. b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Vermont has the 24th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Vermont has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected]. c Vermont does not have a charter school law.


2*

22


VERMONT

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Vermont are shown in the table, Vermont Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Vermont is ranked 6th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 John Dillon, “Education Chief Says Vermont A Longshot For Federal Grant,” VPR News, April 19, 2010, http://www.vpr.net/news_detail/87803/education-chief-says-vermont-longshot-for-federal/.

6 Armando Vilaseca, “Commissioner Villaseca’s Letter to Secretary Duncan,” August 25, 2009, http://education.vermont.gov/new/pdfdoc/dept/recovery_act/vilaseca_duncan_letter_082809.pdf.

7 Stephen C. Fehr, “Unlike Some States, Vermont Works With Teachers Union To Solve Pension Problems,” NewJerseyNewsroom.com, March 25, 2010, http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/nation/unlike-some-states-vermont-works-with-teachers-union-to-solve-pension-problems.

8 Lisa Rathke, “Vermont Opts Out Of No Child Left Behind Waiver,” Associated Press, June 3, 2012, http://www.boston.com/news/education/articles/2012/06/03/vermont_opts_out_of_no_child_left_behind_waiver/.

9 Ibid.

10 “NAEP State Comparisons,” National Center for Education Statistics, accessed August 15, 2012, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/statecomparisons/.

11 The demographics in Vermont reveal that 95.5 percent of its population is white, with an above-average per-capita income and one of the lowest levels of inequality in the country (http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs-16.pdf). This may be one of the reasons why Vermont lacks a charter law, as there is a common public sentiment that middle-class children do not need more schooling options.


VIRGINIA



TIED FOR 40TH

The NEA-affiliated Virginia Education

Association (VEA) predictably does

not see high membership or generate

large resources in this state where

bargaining is prohibited: Just 51.1 percent

of Old Dominion teachers are association

members (the 45th-highest rate of 51

jurisdictions), and the VEA brings in just

$194 annually per teacher in the state

(41st). Spending on K–12 education is

also toward the bottom of the national

list: 17.3 percent of state expenditures go

to education (37th), and total per-pupil

expenditures (from local, state, and federal

sources) amount to $10,095 (also 37th).

Still, 57.1 percent of those dollars go toward

teacher salaries and benefits (9th), quite a

large slice of a relatively small pie.


50TH; LAST PLACE

Over the past decade, teacher unions were

less involved in Virginia state politics than in

any other state. Their donations amounted

to just 0.22 percent of contributions


(41st) and 0.17 percent of contributions

to state political parties (47th).3 The

union voice was not well-represented at


conventions either: only 6.7 percent of

Virginia delegates identified as members of

teacher unions (43rd).4

VIRGINIA OVERALL RANK: 47TH1

TIER 5 (WEAKEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


47

50

4

40

33

48


VIRGINIA



Virginia is one of just five states that

prohibit collective bargaining in education,

and professional associations cannot

automatically collect agency fees from non-

members. Further, teachers are not allowed

to strike.


4TH

State policies are more closely aligned

with traditional teacher union interests in

Virginia than they are in nearly every other

state. (Clearly this presents a paradox: no

bargaining, little political involvement, but

favorable policies. The state constitution

offers a partial explanation. It specifies that

“The supervision of schools in each school

division shall be vested in a school board,”

which has apparently been interpreted over

the years as meaning that the local school

board has total control over key areas.)5

The state does not articulate consequences

for unsatisfactory evaluations, nor does

it mandate that districts consider teacher

performance when making layoffs, and

it recommends, but does not require,

student achievement data to be factored

into teacher evaluations and tenure

decisions. Its weak charter laws are as

union-friendly as its employment policies:

While there is no cap on the number of

charters, only local school boards may

authorize them and—perhaps as a result—

there is little charter activity in the state.

Charters are not automatically exempt

from any state laws (and all their teachers

must be certified), and are held to all

district regulations and personnel policies

(although they can apply for waivers from

the former).


33RD

Stakeholders in Virginia perceive that its

state teacher association has limited clout.

They rank its influence on education policy

behind that of the state board, governor’s

office, and school boards association.

They note that state education leaders are

only sometimes aligned with association

positions, and that the association typically

compromises to ensure that its preferred

policies are enacted (versus having

the clout to avoid compromise). Still,

stakeholders agree that the association

is effective in warding off proposals with

which it disagrees, and in protecting dollars

for education even in times of cutbacks.6

OVERALL

47TH

Though Virginia’s teacher association

operates without many resources and with

low levels of membership, and though

it is a minor donor to state politics, it

has a stronger reputation than unions in

many other states (including those where

bargaining is permitted or required) and

enjoys a very favorable state policy climate.


VIRGINIA

While union armor in other states has been dented by reformers, the Virginia Education Association (VEA) has done an impressive job side-stepping some major policy overhauls. True, it could not stop a 2012 law granting tax credits to donors to private school scholarship programs. Nor could it defeat a revised pension plan requiring all teachers to pay into the retirement system despite a recent reduction in benefits for new teachers (but the measure also required that teachers get raises to offset the increased contributions—and that local districts should foot the bill).7

But the VEA claimed victory when a bill died in committee that would have allowed state funding to follow the child into virtual schools. Furthermore, Virginia’s teacher evaluation guidelines are much less stringent than in other states: When initially passed in 2011, they recommended (but did not require) that only 40 percent of a teacher’s rating be based on student achievement as determined by “multiple measures,” not necessarily just standardized test scores.8 The 40 percent became mandatory only after the weak evaluations put the state’s NCLB waiver request in danger, with the Department of Education expressing concern that “because the weightings [for Student Academic Progress] are determined locally, it will likely produce a fragmented system that will have limited impact on student learning…[and] it can easily be watered down.”9

Finally, in early 2012, the VEA helped defeat HB 576, which threatened teacher job security. Proposed by Republican Governor Robert F. McDonnell as a way to root out ineffective teachers, that bill would have extended the probationary period for new teachers from three to five years, replaced permanent contracts with ones that administrators would decide whether to renew (or not) every three years, and removed the requirement for pre-dismissal improvement plans and appeal procedures for sub-par teachers.10 The VEA felt the bill gave administrators far too much power and left teachers defenseless against arbitrary firing. When the measure failed in the senate, VEA lobbyist Robley Jones breathed a little easier: “We’re very, very relieved. What was proposed was just overkill.”11 Governor McDonnell called the vote a “disappointing” rejection of a “bipartisan, national movement underway to bring more accountability to our schools,” foreshadowing, “Today’s vote is a delay. It is not a defeat.”12 As yet, McDonnell’s hopes for improvements to the state’s teacher employment policies remain unfulfilled. And Virginia was awarded an NCLB waiver anyway—which may signal that the status quo rests comfortably again.

VIRGINIA IS FOR (TENURE) LOVERS


VIRGINIA

OVERALL RANK: 47TH





41st


37th


37th


9th




41st


47th


44th


43rd



















Yes; Higher

VIRGINIA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

40*

50

48*

4


VIRGINIA



(cont.)



No state cap








No; No allowable exemptions






**


**


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes


**


Somewhat in line



Sometimes/Often


Compromise




b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Virginia has the 45th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Virginia, collective bargaining is prohibited, and teacher strikes are also prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].


4

33


VIRGINIA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Virginia are shown in the table, Virginia Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Virginia is ranked 40th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 The indicators in Area 2 are calculated using total contributions to state candidates and political parties from local, state, and national unions. In the majority of cases, the state unions gave much higher sums than all the local unions combined, with the national associations giving little (or nothing). Virginia is an exception because the NEA and AFT gave as much (or in some years, more) to Virginia candidates and parties than did the VEA.


5 See Article VIII, Section 7 of the Virginia State constitution. Further, Virginia courts have upheld the rights of local school boards to decide matters of employment and educational policy such that consequences for unsatisfactory evaluations cannot be mandated by the state, nor can the state require student achievement results be a component of teacher evaluations. Moreover, as indicated, charter schools are solely authorized by school boards and charter school employees “supervised” by them.

6 One insider indicated that the “VEA has the ability to push the ‘send’ button and generate hundreds and thousands of communications to the General Assembly demanding a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote on this or that. In a very short legislative session, this gives them the capacity to exercise outsized influence in the legislative process. They are also helped greatly by the alliance with VSBA (school boards) and VASS (school superintendents). I’ve found that school superintendents have a very powerful influence on General Assembly members, largely because— particularly in rural areas—they are frequently the area’s largest employer… As an elected official, wouldn’t you listen carefully to someone who employed 25,000+ constituents?”

7 Michael Martz, “General Assembly: Legislators Approve Far-Reaching State Pension Reforms,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 11, 2012, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/virginia-politics/2012/mar/11/tdmain01-general-assembly-legislators-approve-far--ar-1756593/.

8 Virginia Department of Education, http://www.doe.virginia.gov/teaching/performance_evaluation/#teachers; most states require a higher percentage and place a pre-determined weight on standardized test scores.

9 “ESEA Flexibility Peer Panel Notes,” U.S. Department of Education, March 16, 2012, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/eseaflex/panel-notes/va.pdf.

10 Emma Brown, “Tenure Proposal Revived In VA Senate,” Washington Post, February 23, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/bill-to-end-teacher-tenure-protections-revived-in-va-senate/2012/02/23/gIQAnRbVWR_story.html.

11 Emma Brown, “Bill To Cut Tenure For Virginia Teachers Is Shelved,” Washington Post, March 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/bill-to-cut-tenure-for-virginia-teachers-is-shelved/2012/02/27/gIQAEMaL0R_story.html.

12 Ibid.


WASHINGTON



TIED FOR 3RD

Washington’s teacher unions benefit

from high membership and substantial

member-based revenue. Fully 98.0 percent

of the Evergreen State’s teachers are

union members, the 4th-highest rate of

51 jurisdictions. The NEA and AFT state-

level affiliates bring in $634 annually per

Washington teacher (10th). About one-

quarter (24.3 percent) of Washington’s

expenditures are directed toward K–12

education (10th), despite the fact that

overall K–12 spending is not particularly

high—$9,320 annually per student (from

federal, state, and local sources; 42nd). In

addition, 54.2 percent of total education

dollars go toward teacher salaries and

benefits (24th).


TIED FOR 32ND

Even with their ample financial resources,

Washington’s teacher unions are not heavy

donors to state politics. In the past decade,

their donations amounted to only 0.49


for state office (29th), and 5.0 percent of

the donations to candidates contributed by


(25th). Still, they contributed 2.0 percent

of the total donations received by state

political parties (15th). Union representation

among Washington’s delegates to the


conventions was also thin at 4.3 percent

(48th).3

WASHINGTON OVERALL RANK: 10TH1

TIER 1 (STRONGEST)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


10

32

18

3

9

11


WASHINGTON


11TH

Washington is one of twenty-one states

that both require collective bargaining

and allow unions to automatically collect

agency fees, a key source of revenue, from

non-members. State law does not address

teachers’ (or any public employees’)

right to strike. The law is, however, quite

permissive when it comes to the scope

of bargaining for teachers: Of twenty-

one items examined in this analysis,

Washington requires bargaining over four

(wages, hours, terms and conditions of

employment, and insurance benefits) and

explicitly permits another (retirement

benefits and pensions). Only management

rights are excluded from bargaining, which

means the remaining fifteen items are

implicitly open to bargaining.


TIED FOR 18TH

Washington’s teacher employment

policies tend to align with traditional union

interests. The state does not support

performance pay for teachers. Further, at

the time we calculated our rankings, the

state did not require student achievement

data be part of teacher evaluations, nor

did districts need to consider teacher

performance when making layoffs. (By

press time, however, the state enacted,

but had not yet implemented, SB 5895,

requiring that student data be used in

teacher evaluations and allowing teacher

performance to factor in layoff decisions).

Still, not all employment policies are

favorable to unions. For example, the state

does not mandate class size restrictions

and teachers are eligible for dismissal after

unsatisfactory evaluations, as opposed

to first being placed on an improvement

plan. Nevertheless, Washington teachers

were dismissed due to poor performance

at one of the lowest rates in the country.

Washington does not have a charter school

law.4


9TH

Stakeholders in Washington perceive

their teacher unions to be quite strong

(especially when compared with

perceptions of union influence in other

states). They rank the unions the most

influential entity in shaping education

policy (with education advocacy groups as

a close second). Respondents agree that

teacher unions are effective in warding off

proposals with which they disagree and in

protecting dollars for education. They note


and enacted in the latest legislative session

were mostly in line with teacher union

priorities, and that the positions of state


those of teacher unions.5

OVERALL

10TH

Washington’s teacher unions benefit from

a strong membership and resource base, a

broad scope of bargaining, and favorable

teacher employment policies. While they

don’t contribute large sums to political

campaigns, stakeholders report that they

are active (and typically successful) in

shaping state policy. With such a strong

reputation, the teacher unions may find that

their dollars are better spent elsewhere—

such as trying to influence voters (see

sidebar).


WASHINGTON

School choice proponents in the Evergreen State are nothing if not persistent—and deep-pocketed. Voters rejected charter-school initiatives in 1996, 2000, and 2004, but choice advocates hope they’ve changed their mind: An initiative slated for the November 2012 ballot would allow up to forty charter schools to open in the next five years. Sponsors amassed about 350,000 signatures (100,000 more than necessary to be put on the ballot) and a whopping $3.3 million war chest from Bill Gates and others.6 Lawmakers such as Eric Pettigrew, D-Seattle, agree that the bill is necessary: “This initiative will finally bring Washington into the 21st century in terms of educational opportunities for public school students.”7

Voters aren’t the only ones in Washington talking about charters. In 2004, the legislature passed ESSHB 2295, which permitted charters so long as they were under contract with local school districts, but opponents brought the measure to referendum where it was soundly rejected by popular vote.8,9 In 2012, lawmakers once again debated a charter measure but, concerned that these schools would hire nonunion teachers and divert funds from already-strapped district schools, they never actually voted on the issue.10 With the fate of charters back in the hands of voters this autumn, the Washington Education Association (WEA)—which refers to charters as a “failed concept”—is bent on again blocking the reform.11 Citing the state’s already “numerous innovative public schools” and pointing out that charters would “siphon already limited dollars from existing public schools” but can show no proven record of success, the WEA has the money and members to ensure that it will remain a major force in this heated, and expensive, ongoing battle.12

FOURTH TIME’S THE CHARM?


WASHINGTON

OVERALL RANK: 10TH





10th


10th*


42nd


24th




29th


15th


25th


48th





Permitted














No restriction

WASHINGTON RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

3*

32*

11

18*


WASHINGTON



(cont.)

Charter school structural limitationsd


N/A



Charter school exemptionsd Are all charter schools automatically exempt from state laws and state/district regulations (except those that safeguard students and fiscal accountability)? If not, are they eligible for exemptions?

N/A


N/A


N/A

AREA 5:PERCEIVED INFLUENCEDe





Often


Rarely/Sometimes


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often


Mostly in line


Mostly in line



Sometimes/Often





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Washington has the 4th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Washington has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are permitted. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c See explanation in Area 4 above.

d Washington does not have a charter school law.

e For all survey questions, stakeholders were asked specifically about teacher unions, candidates, policies, and leaders in their state. In addition, we asked about unions and policies in the “current legislative session,” but because legislative calendars vary from state to state, responses refer to policies proposed and enacted within the 2010-11 window.

18*

9


WASHINGTON

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Washington are shown in the table, Washington Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Washington is ranked 3rd of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.



4 We do not include data for sub-indicators pertaining to charters when calculating the ranking of states that do not have charter school laws. While some might argue that the lack of such a law is in itself evidence for union strength, we do not have sufficient data to link that absence to union activity. The nine states without charter laws are home to very different contexts—while teacher unions in some states may have played a significant role in keeping charter laws at bay, in others, they played little or none. However, in Washington, the state union can take substantial credit for the absence of a charter law (see sidebar).


6 Brian M. Rosenthal, “Latest Big Gift To Charter Schools Initiative: $600,000 From Wal-Mart Heiress,” Seattle Times, July 17, 2012, http://blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2012/07/17/latest-eye-popping-gift-to-charter-school-initiative-600k-from-wal-mart-heiress/.

7 Schrader, Jordan, “Charter School Advocates Make Last-Minute Attempt To Reach 2012 Ballot,” News Tribune, May 22, 2012, http://blog.thenewstribune.com/politics/2012/05/22/charter-school-advocates-make-last-minute-attempt-to-reach-2012-ballot/.

8 “General Election,” Stevens County, Washington, January 25, 2006, http://www.co.stevens.wa.us/auditor/election/election/Ballot%20Titles/2004/110204.htm.

9 “R-55 Is Losing, But Hope Is Still Alive!” Washington Charter School Resource Center, November 3, 2004, http://www.wacharterschools.org/learn/history-nov04r55.htm.

10 Brian M. Rosenthal, “Well-Funded Charter School Initiative Has Nearly Enough Signatures To Make Ballot,” Seattle Times, July 2, 2012, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2018585780_charterschools03m.html.

11 Ibid.

12 “Charter Schools Drain Money From Already Underfunded Public Schools,” Washington Education Association, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.washingtonea.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3343:charter-schools-drain-money-from-already-underfunded-public-schools&catid=180.


WEST VIRGINA



TIED FOR 31ST

The resources and union membership of

West Virginia’s teacher unions ranks them

in the middle of the national pack. Roughly

68 percent of teachers in the Mountain

State are unionized, the 31st-highest rate

of 51 jurisdictions. Its NEA and AFT state-

level affiliates post annual revenues of

$325 per teacher in the state (34th of 51).

Further, K–12 education accounts for just

10.5 percent of state spending, the smallest

percentage in the nation. Despite this low

allocation by the state, total per-pupil

expenditures (a combination of state, local,

and federal funds) are fairly high at $12,780

annually (16th), of which 55.3 percent goes



TIED FOR 4TH

In the past ten years, West Virginia’s

teacher unions were more involved in

state politics than their counterparts

in nearly every other state. Their

donations accounted for 1.6 percent of

all contributions to candidates for state

office (8th); those donations amount

to 14.3 percent of contributions from

the ten highest-giving sectors in the

state (9th), demonstrating the unions’

significant financial role in political

campaigns. They also contributed 1.5

percent of total donations to state political

parties (19th)—and 15.2 percent of West

Virginia’s delegates to the Democratic and

Republican national conventions identified

as teacher union members (19th).3

WEST VIRGINIA OVERALL RANK: 13TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


13

4

1

31

6

28


WEST VIRGINA


TIED FOR 28TH

West Virginia state law does not address

collective bargaining in education; districts

may decide whether to negotiate with

employee organizations. The scope of

bargaining is likewise left to the local

districts, should they choose to negotiate

with their employees. The state is also silent

on agency fees. Although public employee

strikes are not addressed by the state, the

courts have deemed them illegal.


1ST

West Virginia’s policies are better aligned

with traditional union interests than those

in any other state. (Predictably, its first

Race to the Top application failed. Equally

predictably, all fifty-five local unions had

endorsed it, and there was no second

attempt—see sidebar). The state does

not support performance pay and does

not require student achievement data

to factor into either teacher evaluations

or tenure (which is granted after three

years, the national norm). Seniority is

the sole factor in layoff decisions, while

teacher performance is not considered at

all. Further, employers contribute nearly

three times more to teacher pensions

than employees do—only in Louisiana do

teachers give comparatively less to their

pensions. Nor does West Virginia have a

charter school law.4


6TH

Although West Virginia has voted for

Republicans in the last three presidential

elections, it is traditionally Democratic

and pro-labor, particularly at the local

level—conditions reflected in the teacher

unions’ strong reputation among education

stakeholders. Survey respondents rank

them as one of the two most influential

entities in shaping education policy, behind

only the state board of education. They

note that Democrats running for state-

level office need teacher union support to

get elected, and that the positions of state


those of the union. Further, stakeholders

agree that teacher unions are effective

in protecting dollars for education even

in times of cutbacks, and in warding off

education reform proposals with which

they disagree. Finally, while they report


during the latest legislative session were

only somewhat aligned with teacher

union priorities, those that were enacted

were mostly aligned with union priorities

(perhaps a sign that much of the unions’

strength lies in their ability to change

proposals already on the table rather than

determine the policy agenda—see sidebar).

OVERALL

13TH

Despite the absence of mandatory

collective bargaining and moderate

financial resources, West Virginia’s teachers

unions have a strong presence in politics,

enjoy favorable state policies, and have

garnered a reputation for influence. Unions

in West Virginia join those in neighboring

Ohio (12th) as the strongest in permitted-

bargaining states.


WEST VIRGINA

Labor unions have been a strong presence in the Mountain State since the 1870s, and its teacher unions—even without mandatory collective bargaining—share in that tradition. “The unions in West Virginia … are some of the most powerful state teachers unions in the nation,” said Marc Oestreich of the Heartland Institute, a conservative research group.5 Former Governor Joe Manchin agreed: After lawmakers could not agree on a slate of reform measures required for its second Race to the Top application (the first was rejected), he lamented, “The protection of [state] law gives our unions a much better comfort level than sitting down bargaining with the facts.”6 The state dropped its application, and subsequently convened a special committee of senators and outside members, including union representatives; not surprisingly, the special education legislative session that followed did not amount to much.7

In 2012, with the help of the West Virginia Education Association (WVEA), lawmakers again showed their resistance to change. In search of an NCLB waiver, in March the legislature passed what seemed like a watershed teacher evaluation bill, but was actually a watered-down version of the evaluation systems in many other states.8 After the WVEA successfully lobbied for amendments, HB 4236 now specifies that 80 percent of a teacher’s evaluation be based on adherence to teaching standards and 20 percent on student growth. That 20 percent is further broken down: 15 percent from evidence determined by the teacher and just 5 percent tied to student assessment results at the school-wide level.9 A report from the National Council on Teacher Quality gave the state’s new evaluation procedures a D+.10 WVEA President Dale Lee nonetheless apologized to his members: “I understand many people will question the student growth component in the evaluation bill. I am not crazy about it either, but it is a requirement if we are to get a waiver of NCLB and continue to receive some of our federal funds…some states are including student growth components of as much as 50 percent.”11 With West Virginia’s student performance among the lowest in the nation—the 2011 NAEP results place the state in the bottom 10 percent for math and the bottom 5 percent for reading—it would surely benefit youngsters if unions focused more on their achievement and less on teacher comfort.

THE NUMBERS JUST DON’T ADD UP


WEST VIRGINA

OVERALL RANK: 13TH





34th


50th


16th


18th




8th


19th


9th


19th





Neither required nor prohibited














Yes; Higher

WEST VIRGINIA RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

31*

4*

28*

1


WEST VIRGINA



(cont.)



N/A




N/A


N/A


N/A






Often


Rarely/Sometimes


Agree


Fight


Agree


Sometimes/Often


Somewhat in line





Sometimes/Often


**




b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, West Virginia has the 31st-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In West Virginia, collective bargaining is neither required nor prohibited, and teacher strikes are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c West Virginia does not have a charter school law.


1

6


WEST VIRGINA

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for West Virginia are shown in the table, West Virginia Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, West Virginia is ranked 31st of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.




5 Walt Williams, “Few happy with state’s shot at school reform,” West Virginia Education Association, July 29, 2010, http://www.wvea.org/News---Events/2010-Archive/July/Few-happy-with-state-s-shot-at-school-reform.aspx.

6 Ibid.

7 Kallie Cart, “Manchin Drops Request For Federal School Grants; Ends Special Session,” Associated Press, May 20, 2010, http://www.wsaz.com/news/headlines/94284889.html.

8 “2011 State Teacher Policy Yearbook: National Summary,” National Council on Teacher Quality, 2011, accessed July 25, 2012, http://www.nctq.org/stpy11/reports/stpy11_national_report.pdf.

9 “H.B. 4236 – Annual Evaluations for Teachers and Administrators,” West Virginia Education Association, Final Legislative Update, March 14, 2012, http://www.wvea.org/Legislative-Action-Center/Legislative-Update.aspx.

10 National Council on Teacher Quality.

11 Ibid.


WISCONSIN


Note: As of this writing, collective

bargaining nationwide was experiencing

a high degree of unpredictability and, in

some cases, volatility. Nowhere was that

more apparent in 2012 than in Wisconsin,

where major transformations to collective

bargaining laws portend significant

changes in the resources and strength of

its public employee unions. As such, we

present Wisconsin rankings, and those of

all the states, as a snapshot at the time of

publication. (See main report for additional

discussion.)


TIED FOR 13TH

Wisconsin’s teacher unions currently have

abundant resources and high membership

totals, and their members enjoy a larger

public investment in K–12 education than

in many other states. A full 98.3 percent of

Wisconsin teachers belong to unions, the

3rd-highest rate of 51 jurisdictions. Further,

the Badger State’s NEA and AFT state

affiliates bring in $520 annually per teacher

(21st of 51). In Wisconsin, K–12 education

expenditures account for 18.0 percent

of state spending (31st). Total funds for

education (a combination of local, state,

and federal dollars) amount to $11,783

per pupil (23rd), with 56.9 percent going



TIED FOR 8TH

Wisconsin’s teacher unions have been

active donors over the past decade.3 Not

only did their contributions amount to 1.0

percent of donations to candidates for state

office (16th), but those donations equaled

WISCONSIN OVERALL RANK: 18TH1

TIER 2 (STRONG)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


18

8

24

13

17

41


WISCONSIN

a whopping 22.7 percent of all donations

to candidates from the ten highest-giving

sectors in the state (2nd), indicating

that the unions were real heavyweights

in Wisconsin politics. They also gave 1.9

percent of the donations received by

state political parties (16th). Finally, 17.2

percent of all Wisconsin delegates to



members (15th).4


41ST

Wisconsin is one of thirty-two states that

require collective bargaining. Although

2011’s Act 10 severely limited the scope of

bargaining to cost-of-living wage increases,

the Wisconsin court struck down the law

in September 2012 (see sidebar); Governor

Scott Walker vowed to appeal the outcome.

(Unfortunately, the court’s decision came

too close to our publication date for us

to take it into account when calculating

our metric.) Further, teacher unions may

collect agency fees from non-members and

automatically deduct dues from members’

paychecks. (As passed, Act 10 also

prohibited automatic payroll deductions,

but the court ruled that specific provision

unconstitutional in March 2012. The state

appealed, and as of September 2012, the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was

hearing the matter.) Wisconsin does not



TIED FOR 24TH

While Wisconsin’s teacher employment

policies generally align with traditional

teacher union interests, its charter laws are

less aligned. The state does not require

student achievement data to factor into


does not articulate consequences for

unsatisfactory evaluations, and does

not support statewide performance pay.

Further, seniority is the sole consideration

in teacher layoffs. Charter law, on the other

hand, allows new, conversion, and virtual

schools and multiple authorizers. While

charter teachers must be certified, their

schools are automatically exempt from

many other state laws. Schools authorized

by entities other than local districts receive

additional exemptions, and regardless

of where they are located, they are not

bound by district regulations and collective

bargaining agreements.


17TH

While Wisconsin stakeholders generally

perceive teacher unions to be strong, recent

challenges to both state bargaining laws

and the historically pro-labor environment

have weakened their foundations. On the

one hand, survey respondents rank teacher

unions as the entity with the greatest

influence on education policies. (Education

advocacy groups, the school boards

association, and the association of school

administrators also rank high, but not as

high.) They also note that state education

leaders always align with teacher union

positions. On the other hand, they report


and enacted in the latest legislative session


priorities, showing the widening gap

between the union’s reach on education

policies specifically, as opposed to state

policies in general. Further, respondents do

not believe unions are effective in warding

off education proposals with which they

disagree and in protecting dollars for

education—unsurprising in a state where

teacher unions, like those in Arizona and

Indiana, have seen their power significantly

curtailed.


WISCONSIN

The nation witnessed firsthand the legislative blow dealt to public unions in the Badger State—and then their failure to recall the governor who landed that blow. In March 2011, Governor Scott Walker and his legislative allies limited the scope of public-sector bargaining to cost-of-living wage increases only. Act 10 also stopped local teacher unions from automatically collecting dues from their members and required that they hold a yearly vote in which the majority of all eligible employees must agree to recertify the union as their official bargaining agent. But public-safety unions such as those for police and firefighters were exempt, which ultimately proved to be the law’s undoing.5 The Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC) filed a lawsuit against the ban on payroll deductions and the recertification requirement, asserting that it violated workers’ equal-protection rights and their First Amendment right to organize. In March 2012, a federal judge agreed that teachers were being unfairly singled out—noting that the unions receiving exemptions were those that had endorsed Walker in 2010—and removed both provisions from the law.6 The ruling came just in time: twenty-eight local teacher unions were about to lose their bargaining status because they fell short of the required approval from the majority of bargaining-unit members.7,8 In spite of the court’s decision, however, in the fifteen months since Act 10 passed, the AFT-Wisconsin lost 6,000 of its 17,000 members; the NEA-affiliated WEAC refused to comment on its losses.9

Organized labor also sued to stop Act 10’s bargaining limitations, asserting that it unfairly singled out unionized public-sector workers and violated the “home rule” charter of the Wisconsin constitution that bans the state from imposing pension contribution rates on Milwaukee city workers. That suit was successful as well; as of September 2012, no part of the Act remained in effect, and unions hurried back to the negotiating table to bargain new contracts.10

In addition, organized labor backed the 2012 attempt to unseat Walker, with AFT-Wisconsin’s president Bryan Kennedy warning that failure to oust him “spells doom.”11 When the recall failed, he forced a smile: “We are disappointed, but not defeated.”12 In some respects, he was correct. Not only did the courts overturn Act 10, but the unions defended the traditional pension system and stopped further expansion of private school vouchers.13,14 They also revealed themselves to be open to teacher-quality reforms: AFT-Wisconsin helped education leaders develop a new evaluation system under which half of a teacher’s score is based on student growth and test scores.15 The WEAC then supported using those evaluations as a basis for merit pay.16 Of course, the unions’ motivations may not be entirely altruistic—with substantial losses in membership and bargaining power and the rulings to overturn Act 10 currently under appeal, it is more likely they are seeing the writing on the (classroom) wall.

WEATHERING THE STORM

OVERALL

18TH

Wisconsin teacher unions currently have

substantial resources from their members

and have been an active force in Wisconsin

state politics. But recent legislation, which

sharply erodes their collective bargaining

rights, likely heralds an era of diminished

strength for public unions in general, and

teacher unions in particular in the Badger

State.


WISCONSIN

OVERALL RANK: 18TH





21st


31st


23rd


10th




16th


16th


2nd


15th



By rank, how broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 46thc


Automatic payroll deductions prohibitedc














No restriction

WISCONSIN RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

13*

8*

41

24*


WISCONSIN



(cont.)







Partially; Full automatic exemptions for some schools










Often/Always


Never/Rarely


Neutral


Generally fight


Neutral


Sometimes/Often


Not at all in line





Always





b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Wisconsin has the 3rd-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: Wisconsin has mandatory collective bargaining, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected].

c See notes in Area 3 and sidebar, above.


24*

17


WISCONSIN

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Wisconsin are shown in the table, Wisconsin Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Wisconsin is ranked 13th of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 The indicators in Area 2 are calculated using total contributions to state candidates and political parties from local, state, and national unions. In the majority of cases, the state unions gave much higher sums than all the local unions combined, with the national associations giving little (or nothing). Wisconsin is an exception because the sum of the donations from local affiliates is comparable to the total from the state union.


5 “Wisc. Governor Officially Cuts Collective Bargaining,” NBC News, March 11, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41996994/ns/politics-more_politics/t/wis-governor-officially-cuts-collective-bargaining/#.UBFms2FDzIc.

6 Clay Barbour and Mary Spicuzza, “Federal Court Strikes Down Parts Of Collective Bargaining Law,” Wisconsin State Journal, March 31, 2012, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/federal-court-strikes-down-parts-of-collective-bargaining-law/article_562c581e-7a9f-11e1-9aea-0019bb2963f4.html; Brendan Fischer, “Federal Court Strikes Down Key Provisions Of Walker’s Act 10 As Unconstitutional,” PRWatch, March 30, 2012, http://www.prwatch.org/news/2012/03/11404/federal-court-strikes-down-key-provisions-walkers-act-10-unconstitutional.

7 Tom Tolan and Erin Richards, “Majority Of Education Unions Vote To Recertify,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, December 8, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/education-unions-vote-to-recertify-sd3caui-135285458.html.

8 Matthew DeFour, “Nearly All State Teachers Unions Without Pact Seek Recertification,” Wisconsin State Journal, October 13, 2011, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/education/local_schools/article_14750bca-f51e-11e0-b9d0-001cc4c002e0.html. Teachers in 148 districts voted to recertify their unions, twelve opted not to vote, and only one district had a majority of its teachers vote against recertification. For the other twenty-seven unions about to lose their bargaining status, a majority of the teachers who chose to vote wanted to recertify as a union, but to keep bargaining status the vote required approval from a majority of all eligible employees whether they voted or not.

9 Douglas Belkin and Kris Maher, “Wisconsin Unions See Ranks Drop Ahead of Recall Vote,” Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304821304577436462413999718.html

10 Judge Colas ruled that the law violated the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, essentially creating a separate class of workers with different rules based only on their decision to join the union. See Mark Guarino, “Court Decision Produces Twist in Wisconsin Union Fight,” Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0924/Court-decision-produces-twist-in-Wisconsin-union-fight.

11 Belkin and Maher.

12 “‘We Are Disappointed, But Not Defeated,’ Says AFT-Wisconsin President,” AFT-Wisconsin, June 6, 2012, http://www.aft-wisconsin.org/.

13 “Moving Education Forward: Bold Reforms,” Wisconsin Education Association Council, February 2011, http://www.weac.org/Libraries/PDF/WEACBoldReformsPlatform.sflb.ashx (on WEAC “Take Action” page, accessed August 14, 2012, http://www.weac.org/Issues_Advocacy.aspx).

14 “News Headlines,” Wisconsin Education Association Council, accessed July 19, 2012, http://www.weac.org/News_and_Publications.aspx.

15 Erin Richards, “Student Results Would Account For Half Of Teacher Evaluations,” November 7, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/133412398.html.

16 Tony Galli, “Largest Teacher Union Backs Merit Pay,” WKOW Madison, February 8, 2011, http://www.wkow.com/Global/story.asp?S=13993642.


WYOMING



TIED FOR 31ST

Though Wyoming’s state-level teacher

union has sparse membership, the state’s

teachers benefit from a fairly substantial

public investment in K–12 education. Just

53.2 percent of teachers in the Equality

State are unionized. (Only seven states

have lower rates; most other states where

bargaining is permitted but not required are

in the same range as Wyoming.) Despite

the underwhelming level of membership,

however, the Wyoming Education

Association (WEA) posts $573 in annual

revenue per teacher in the state (16th;

while not included in this metric, it also

has one of the three highest per member

revenues in the nation as well). Per-pupil

expenditures are the highest of any state in

the nation at $18,068 annually, more than

double that of last-place Utah. Further,

53.7 percent of those dollars goes toward



TIED FOR 13TH

Wyoming’s teacher union is more involved

in state politics than are its counterparts

in most other states.3 Over the past ten

years, its donations amounted to 1.3


for state office (13th) and 10.7 percent of

the money donated by the ten highest-

giving sectors in the state (12th). Its high

rankings on those measures are likely aided

by the union’s considerable revenues (see

Area 1) and the fact that candidates and

parties in Wyoming generally receive little

money—candidates get fewer total dollars

WYOMING OVERALL RANK: 29TH1

TIER 3 (AVERAGE)

STRONGER WEAKER


OVERALL



4. STATE POLICIES


29

13

30

31

26

28


WYOMING

than in any other state, making entry into

the political arena fairly low-cost. Finally,

17.9 percent of Wyoming’s delegates to

the Democratic and Republication national


(14th).4


TIED FOR 28TH

Wyoming is one of fourteen states that

permit, but do not require, collective

bargaining (seven of those states, Wyoming

included, explicitly allow it, while the other

seven permit it by omission). The law

does not outline the scope of collective

bargaining for districts that choose to

negotiate with their local unions, nor

does it address the legality of teacher

strikes. Wyoming does limit the revenue

potential of its unions by preventing them

from automatically collecting agency

fees from non-members; the fact that the

WEA still posts high revenue despite low

membership rates and no agency fees

shows its ability to generate significant

financial resources from its existing

members.


TIED FOR 30TH

While Wyoming’s teacher employment

policies are reasonably well aligned with

traditional union interests, its charter

laws are less so. At the time our data

were analyzed, the state did not support

performance pay for teachers, nor did it

set forth consequences for unsatisfactory

evaluations. (By press time, the state

had passed measures in support of

performance pay and consequences for

poor teacher evaluations, yet actual plans

and implementation remain unresolved;

assuming these questions are resolved,

they will take effect in 2013—see sidebar.)

Further, districts do not have to consider

teacher performance when making layoffs,

and student learning does not factor into

tenure (which teachers earn after three

years, the national norm). Districts must

consider evidence of student learning

when evaluating their teachers, but the law

does not stipulate what that evidence is

or how much weight it must carry. On the

other hand, unions typically seek to limit

the number, the variety and the autonomy

of charter schools, but Wyoming does not

cap the number of schools and allows new,

conversion, and virtual schools. However, it

provides only a single authorizing option—

local districts—and there is little authorizing

activity (out of 344 public schools in the

state, only four are charters). Charter

schools are automatically exempt from

district collective bargaining agreements

where such exist, but they must follow all

other state laws and district regulations

unless they receive waivers from them and

all charter teachers must be certified.


26TH

While stakeholders perceive Wyoming’s

teacher union to be active in shaping

policy, they also report that it is not

always successful in achieving its goals.

Respondents say it is one of the most

influential entities on education policy

in the state, along with the school board

association and association of school

administrators. They note that the union is

effective in warding off education proposals

with which it disagrees, but indicate that it

often must compromises with policymakers.

(Such compromises are evident in the

state’s new evaluation system, which the

union agreed to in principle. See sidebar.)

Stakeholders observe that the union also

makes concessions to prevent reductions

in pay and benefits, and that the outcomes

of the latest legislative session were only

somewhat in line with teacher union

priorities.5


WYOMING

In February 2011, it seemed like teacher tenure in Wyoming would become history. Yet to the relief of the Wyoming Education Association (WEA), the legislature eventually defeated a bill to make all teachers at-will employees. Lawmakers’ reasons ranged from support for teachers to fear of lawsuits from dismissed educators.6 The WEA’s position: better teacher evaluations, not the elimination of tenure, would improve education. Next came SF 114, an attempt to put video cameras in every classroom to evaluate teachers; given privacy and cost concerns, however, the idea did not make it past the Senate floor.7

Lawmakers did pass three related reform-oriented bills in 2011, but these amounted more to plans than actions. They established measures of student performance, required districts use performance-based evaluation systems (but did not specify what those systems were), and made recommendations on how to link evaluations to pay (but did not require districts do so). The WEA endorsed all three.8,9 Finally, SF 57, passed in 2012, outlined how accountability-based evaluations would actually work—but only applied to schools, not teachers. Significantly amended from the original proposal with the help, and ultimately blessing, of the WEA, the new legislation required that schools be evaluated using a combination of state standardized tests and non-test measures like graduation rates and credit accumulation. Individual teachers will not be evaluated until 2013, at which point unsatisfactory evaluations could lead to suspensions or dismissals.10 But the nuts and bolts of the teacher evaluation system—what exactly will comprise the evaluations and how much weight student performance will be given—remain to be developed. As a result, Wyoming did not follow through on its stated intent to apply for an NCLB waiver (since waiver applications require performance-based evaluations for teachers). Cindy Hill, Wyoming’s Superintendent of Public Instruction, was less than optimistic about whether the state will ever meet that requirement: “While efforts are ongoing to link student performance to teacher evaluation, it has not been successfully demonstrated elsewhere nor can I promise when it could be in Wyoming.”11 So plans remain just that for now in the Equality State, and with state leaders not pressing for more reforms, the WEA can rest easy for now.

PLANS ON PAPER ONLY

OVERALL

29TH

Wyoming’s teacher union is squarely in

the middle of the national pack in terms of

political clout, compared to all states and

to states in which bargaining is permitted

but not mandatory. Its revenues afford

it a significant presence in state politics,

although it does not have a reputation

among stakeholders as a political

heavyweight and state policies themselves

are not particularly aligned with union

interests.


WYOMING

OVERALL RANK: 29TH





16th


48th


1st


29th




13th


40th


12th


14th



















No restriction

WYOMING RANKINGS BY AREA AND INDICATOR

31*

13*

28*

30*


WYOMING



(cont.)



No state cap








Yes






Sometimes/Often


Rarely/Sometimes


Neutral


Generally concede


Agree


Sometimes/Often


**


Somewhat in line



Sometimes/Often






b Where possible, we report a state’s rank as compared to other states on a given metric. For example, out of 51 states, Wyoming has the 44th-highest percentage of teachers who are union members. Otherwise, we report a status: In Wyoming, collective bargaining is permitted, and union agency fees are prohibited. For a more detailed description of our metrics and methodology, see Appendix A. To request the raw data for your state, send an email to [email protected]


30*

26


WYOMING

ENDNOTES

1 A state’s overall rank is calculated as follows: First, we score it on multiple sub-indicators (sub-indicator data and scores for Wyoming are shown in the table, Wyoming Rankings by Area and Indicator). Second, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of five areas. In each area, we use that average to place the states in rank order: For example, in Area 1: Resources and Membership, Wyoming is ranked 31st of 51 based on the weighted average of its sub-indicators. To generate the state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then re-order the states. For a more detailed description of data sources and methodology, see Appendix A.


3 Wyoming is one of just five states where local teacher associations did not contribute to candidates and political parties, and the only state in which the state association was the lone donor to both (in the other four states, the NEA and/or AFT gave money as well).



6 Joan Barron, “Wyoming Senate Keeps Teacher Tenure,” Casper Star-Tribune, February 9, 2011, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/wyoming-senate-keeps-teacher-tenure/article_b3224066-7ed9-529d-9bb8-1e25733795dc.html.

7 Becky Orr, “Bill To Install Classroom Cameras Fails In Senate,” Wyoming Tribune Eagle, February 10, 2011, http://www.wyomingnews.com/articles/2011/02/03/news/20local_02-03-11.txt.

8 Joan Barron, “Wyoming House Committee Endorses Expanded School Year Bill,” Casper Star-Tribune, January 15, 2011, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/article_bb0ceae9-b1a3-57e0-b873-bd3a090a255c.html.

9 Joan Barron, “Education Accountability Bills Clear Wyoming Senate,” Casper Star-Tribune, February 10, 2011, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/article_d308a8d4-cd68-5a70-bcb2-f8b63995e7b3.html.

10 Wyoming Education Association, http://www.wyoea.org/home/539.htm; http://wyoea.org/home/537.htm.

11 Elysia Conner, “Wyoming Department Of Education Seeks Waiver Of Federal Progress Requirements,” Casper Star-Tribune, July 5, 2012, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_79e95b82-23d8-5d64-a3af-69868297f9c1.html.

367 HOW STRONG ARE U.S. TEACHER UNIONS? A STATE-BY-STATE COMPARISON.

Appendix A:Detailed Methodology and Rationale

APPENDIX A: DETAILED METHODOLOGYAND RATIONALE

The methodology for this report comprises numerous data sources and multiple

discrete data points. This appendix provides a detailed account of each. We also include

a short rationale for the inclusion of all data relative to their role in elucidating teacher

union strength.

INDICATORS AND WEIGHTING

To calculate a state’s overall rank, we scored it in five areas: Resources and Membership,

Involvement in Politics, Scope of Bargaining, State Policies, and Perceived Influence. Each

area is comprised of multiple sub-indicators, explained below. To get from sub-indicator to

area rank to overall rank, we take a weighted average of the sub-indicators in each of the

five areas (for example, Area 1, Resources and Membership, comprises five sub-indicators

that report various aspects of union revenues and membership, as well as overall spending

on K-12 education). We use that average to place the states in rank order in that area.

To generate a state’s overall rank, we average the five area ranks together, then order

the states based on that average. Table A-1 shows the sub-indicators in each area and

how much weight each is given when calculating the overall rank. (For clarity, we do not

show the weight of each indicator in the area rank. However, each major indicator carries

equal weight in its area. For example, 1.1 Membership, 1.2 Revenue, and 1.3 Spending on

Education are one-third of the Area 1 score. Likewise, each sub-indicator carries equal

weight in its major indicator.)

Preliminary analyses found that unions that ranked high in one area did not necessarily

rank high (or low) in the others. The highest significant correlation among the areas (0.7)

was between Area 1 (Resources and Membership) and Area 3 (Scope of Bargaining), not

a surprising result because bargaining status is tied to membership and agency fees to

union revenue. The other significant correlations ranged from 0.2 to 0.5, and some areas

were not significantly correlated at all.* This reinforced our guiding principle that strong

unions do not look the same everywhere and that it’s therefore important to incorporate

different measures when defining “strength.” This is also why the five areas are weighted

equally: We could not justify any one of them dictating more of the final score than

another.

In Table A-1, we explain the indicators and sub-indicators that comprise each of the five

areas. Text highlighted in tan describes the data, data sources, and methods. The rationale

for inclusion of those data follows (in teal).

* Of the ten possible pairings among Areas 1-5, only six showed significant correlations. Data available upon request.



TABLE A-1: WEIGHTING OF INDICATORS AND SUB-INDICATORS




20%

1.1: Membership 6.7% 1.1.1: What percentage of public school teachers in the state are union members? 6.7%

1.2: Revenue 6.7% 1.2.1: What is the total yearly revenue (per teacher in the state) of the state-level NEA and/or AFT affiliate(s)?

6.7%

1.3: Spending on education 6.7% 1.3.1: What percentage of state expenditures (of state general funds, state restricted funds, state bonds, and federal “pass-through” funds) is directed to K-12 education?

2.2%

1.3.2: What is the total annual per-pupil expenditure (of funds from federal, state, and local sources) in the state?

2.2%

1.3.3: What percentage of total annual per-pupil expenditures is directed to teacher salaries and benefits?

2.2%


20%

2.1: Direct contributions to candidates and political parties

6.7% 2.1.1: What percentage of the total contributions to state candidates was donated by teacher unions?

3.3%

2.1.2: What percentage of the total contributions to state-level political parties was donated by teacher unions?

3.3%

2.2: Industry influence 6.7% 2.2.1: What percentage of the contributions to state candidates from the ten highest-giving sectors was donated by teacher unions?

6.7%

2.3: Status of delegates 6.7% 2.3.1: What percentage of the state’s delegates to the Democratic and Republican conventions were members of teacher unions?

6.7%


20%

3.1: Legal scope of bargaining 6.7% 3.1.1: What is the legal status of collective bargaining? 3.3%

3.1.2: How broad is the scope of collective bargaining? 3.3%

3.2: Automatic revenue streams 6.7% 3.2.1: What is the unions’ legal right to automatically collect agency fees from non-members and/or collect member dues via automatic payroll deductions?

6.7%

3.3: Right to strike 6.7% 3.3.1: What is the legal status of teacher strikes? 6.7%


20%

4.1: Performance pay 2.9% 4.1.1: Does the state support performance pay for teachers? 2.9%

4.2: Retirement 2.9% 4.2.1: What is the employer versus employee contribution rate to the teacher pension system?

2.9%

4.3: Evaluations 2.9% 4.3.1: What is the maximum potential consequence for veteran teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluation(s)?

1.4%

4.3.2: Is classroom effectiveness included in teacher evaluations? If so, how is it weighted? 1.4%

4.4: Terms of employment 2.9% 4.4.1: How long before a teacher earns tenure? Is student/teacher performance considered in tenure decisions?

1.0%

4.4.2: How are seniority and teacher performance considered in teacher layoff decisions? 1.0%

4.4.3: What percentage of the teaching workforce was dismissed due to poor performance? 1.0%

4.5: Class size 2.9% 4.5.1: Is class size restricted for grades 1-3? If so, is the restriction larger than the national average (20)?

2.9%

4.6: Charter school structural limitations

2.9% 4.6.1: Is there a cap (limit) placed on the number of charter schools that can operate in the state (or other jurisdiction) and/or on the number of students who can attend charter schools?

1.0%

4.6.2: Does the state allow a variety of charter schools: start-ups, conversions, and virtual schools?

1.0%

4.6.3: How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are those authorizers? 1.0%

4.7: Charter school exemptions 2.9% 4.7.1: Are charter schools automatically exempt from state laws, regulations, and teacher certification requirements (except those that safeguard students and fiscal accountability)?

1.4%

4.7.2: Are charter schools automatically exempt from collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)? 1.4%



DETAILED METRIC AND RATIONALE

Area 1. Resources and Membership (20%)

This first area captures two quantitative measures of union resources. We examine a

union’s membership rate and revenue to determine the human and financial reserves on

which it can draw, which presumably augments or constrains its influence. While a larger

union (relative to the number of teachers in the state) with more funds is not inherently

more powerful than another, the ability to amass people (to lobby lawmakers, volunteer in

campaigns, sign petitions, and vote in elections) and monies is, in many cases, a precursor

to larger influence. So, then, greater spending on education does not necessarily imply a

strong union (and we have no way of determining whether high spending in a particular

state is the direct result of union influence). However, it is certainly in the unions’—and

their members’—best interest if the state makes a substantial investment in education.

We examine teacher union membership and revenues of each state-level teacher union.

We also examine the financial resources dedicated by the state and its districts to K-12

education in general, and to teacher salaries and benefits in particular.

Indicator 1.1: Teacher union membership (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 1.1.1: What percentage of public school teachers in the state are

union members? (6.7%)



AREA 5:PERCEIVED INFLUENCE

20%

5.1: Relative influence of teacher unions

4.0% 5.1.1: How do you rank the influence of teacher unions on education policy compared with other influential entities?

4.0%

5.2: Influence over campaigns 4.0% 5.2.1: How often do Democrat candidates need teacher union support to get elected? 2.0%

5.2.2: How often do Republican candidates need teacher union support to get elected? 2.0%

5.3: Influence over spending 4.0% 5.3.1: To what extent do you agree that, even in times of cutbacks, teacher unions are effective in protecting dollars for education?

2.0%

5.3.2: Would you say that teacher unions generally make concessions to prevent reductions in pay and benefits, or fight hard to prevent those reductions?

2.0%

5.4: Influence over policy 4.0% 5.4.1: To what extent do you agree that teacher unions ward off proposals in your state with which they disagree?

1.0%

5.4.2: How often do existing state education policies reflect teacher union priorities? 1.0%

5.4.3: To what extent were state education policies proposed by the governor during your state’s latest legislative session in line with teacher union priorities?

1.0%

5.4.4: To what extent were legislative outcomes of your state’s latest legislative session in line with teacher union priorities?

1.0%

5.5: Influence over key stakeholders

4.0% 5.5.1: How often have the priorities of state education leaders aligned with teacher union positions in the past three years?

2.0%

5.5.2: Would you say that teacher unions typically compromise with policymakers to ensure that their preferred policies are enacted, or typically need not make concessions?

2.0%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding



Membership percentages are drawn from the National Center for Education

Statistics’ Schools and Staffing Survey (2009) for 2007-08. Teachers were asked,

“Are you a member of a teachers’ union or an employee association similar to

a union?” States are ranked and divided into quintiles; those with the lowest

membership ratios receive “0,” while those with the highest membership ratios

receive “4.”

Rationale: If a large proportion of a state’s teachers are unionized, unions can

make a powerful argument to lawmakers that they represent the collective needs

of teachers.2 They are also better able to mobilize a visible and widespread

advocacy force. This is a key source of leverage during policy battles fought at the

ballot box as well as in the state capital; a large membership can lobby lawmakers

and state leaders, volunteer during campaigns, rally and protest, circulate

petitions and collect signatures for ballot measures, canvass and engage in media

campaigns for or against those measures, and mobilize its members to vote.

Indicator 1.2: Teacher union revenue (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 1.2.1: What is the total yearly revenue (per teacher in the state) of

the state-level NEA and/or AFT affiliate(s) (adjusted by the NCES Comparable

Wage Index)? (6.7%)

Revenue data are drawn from state-level teacher unions’ 990 forms submitted

between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010, collected by GuideStar, Inc. at www.

guidestar.org. Federally tax-exempt organizations such as unions file 990 forms

with the IRS every twelve months, but their reporting period does not necessarily

coincide with the fiscal year, which begins July 1. We therefore counted 990 forms

that had a start date within the Fiscal Year 2010 period.3 Union revenue (Part I, line

12) includes program service revenue (membership dues, fees from local affiliates,

and support from national unions) plus income from investments, contributions,

grants, and fundraising. Revenues for NEA and AFT state affiliates are combined

when both exist in the same state. (For a full list of state-level affiliates, see

Appendix B.)

We then divide total revenue by the total number of teachers in the state, drawn

from the NCES Common Core of Data for 2009-10. (Unions often argue that they

work on behalf of every teacher in the state, regardless of whether each teacher

pays dues or is a union member.) Dollar amounts are normed against the NCES

Comparable Wage Index from 2005, which adjusts financial data by geographical

2 For more information on the median voter theorem, see Randall G. Holcombe, “An empirical test of the median voter model,” Economic Inquiry 18, no. 2 (1980): 260-274 and Roger D. Congleton, “The Median Voter Model,” in The Encyclopedia of Public Choice (1st edition), eds. C. K. Rowley and F. Schneider, (New York, NY: Kluwer, 2003).

3 The Georgia Federation of Teachers’ 990 forms for FY2010 and FY2009 were not available from GuideStar, nor were FY2010 990 forms for AFT Oregon, AFT Pennsylvania, the Ohio Federation of Teachers, and AFT Utah. Instead, we use Georgia’s FY2008 form, FY2009 forms for Oregon and Pennsylvania, and Ohio’s and Utah’s FY2010 revenues (drawn from the Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract at www.irs.gov/taxstats; posting data February 2, 2012). Further, the Idaho Federation of Teachers and Tennessee Federation of Teachers are not required to file a standard 990 because their annual incomes fall below $25,000; thus, we count those unions’ incomes as $0.



differences in wages and cost of living in order to better make comparisons across

states.4

States are ranked and divided into quintiles; those with the lowest revenue per

teacher receive “0,” while those with the highest revenue per teacher receive “4.”

Rationale: Like membership, a large yearly income does not ensure a strong

teacher union. But it does allow a teacher union to invest in political campaigns,

advocacy, and public relations (among other activities). We acknowledge that local

affiliates sometimes play a role in state politics, especially in large urban districts

such as Chicago, New York City, and Los Angeles. But we do not include their

revenue here because doing so risks double-counting: State unions usually do not

collect dues directly from teachers. Rather, local unions collect dues, then direct a

portion of that money to the state (and national) affiliate. We account for locals’

financial capital by including their direct contributions to political campaigns and

parties in Area 2.

Indicator 1.3: Spending on education (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 1.3.1: What percentage of the state’s total expenditures (of state

general funds, state restricted funds, state bonds, and federal “pass-through”

funds) go toward to K-12 education? (2.2%)

We report state spending on K-12 education as a portion of total state

expenditures. These funds are derived from four sources: state general funds, state

restricted funds, state bonds, and federal funds for education passed through

a state to its districts. Data are drawn from the National Association of State

Budget Officers’ State Expenditure Report (2010). We average the 2009, 2010, and

projected 2011 percentages.5

States are ranked and divided into quintiles; those with the smallest proportions

of expenditures on K-12 education receive “0,” while those with the largest

proportions receive “4.”

Rationale: A state is responsible for distributing money to K-12 education from

two sources. First, it allocates its own funds (the state general fund and state

restricted funds specifically earmarked for education and/or specific education

programs) to provide districts with general formula assistance, as well as

money for compensatory programs, special education, vocational programs,

and transportation. These funds are also used for expenses not affiliated with

4 See the National Center for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2006865.

5 We include two important notes to the reader when interpreting this indicator. First, the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) asked states to report K-12 education expenditures as a portion of state general, state restricted, state bond, and federal pass-through funds. However, K-12 spending is sometimes reported in relation to the state operating budget, which does not include restricted or capital project funds. K-12 expenditures as a portion of the operating budget will be larger than those same expenditures as a portion of total funds, as reported here. Second, “operating expenditures” are self-reported by the states. NASBO indicated that states should include employer contributions to current employees’ pensions and health benefits, student transportation, adult literacy programs, handicapped education programs, gifted and talented programs, vocational education, capital spending, and expenditures to support the state’s department of education. However, some states excluded (in whole or part) certain types of expenditures. For more information, see the National Association of State Budget Officers, “State Expenditure Report 2010,” http://www.nasbo.org/publications-data/state-expenditure-report.



districts, such as charter schools, voucher programs, and state-level department

of education operations and administration. Second, the state is responsible for

passing federal funds on to districts; these funds are for compensatory (Title I)

programs, special education, and nutrition (free- and reduced-price federal lunch

programs). Districts, in turn, receive these state allocations, plus local funds and

direct federal aid.

Indicator 1.3.1 measures the state to district funding channel—state general

funds, state restricted funds, and federal money passed through the state. Many

competing forces affect the amount that a state spends on education: States

have multiple financial obligations, and state political leaders, voters, and interest

groups all influence how much money the state allocates to education and to other

areas of its budget. As labor organizations, teacher unions work to protect and

further the interests of their members within an employment context—securing

dollars for K-12 education (or at least preventing or minimizing cuts) is a first step

toward higher salaries, better benefits, smaller class sizes, fewer layoffs or furlough

days, and better working conditions for teachers. To that extent, one measure of

union strength is its ability to influence state leaders to direct a large proportion of

overall expenditures toward K-12 education.

It is well known that some states opt to shoulder more of the K-12 budget

themselves, reducing the local share. We address this by including local funds in

sub-indicators 1.3.2 and 1.3.3. We also acknowledge that a large percentage of

overall expenditures directed to K-12 education might not translate into a high

dollar amount for K-12 education, if the state does not spend much money overall.

Indicator 1.3.1 reflects the way a state prioritizes education spending with respect

to its other financial obligations. Indicator 1.3.2 (below) captures the actual dollars

spent per pupil, and 1.3.3 indicates what percentage of those dollars goes to

teacher salaries and benefits.

Sub-indicator 1.3.2: What is the total annual per-pupil expenditure (of funds from

federal, state, and local sources) in the state (adjusted by NCES Comparable Wage

Index)? (2.2%)

Per-pupil expenditure data are drawn from the National Center for Education

Statistics’ (NCES) National Public Education Finance Survey (2011) for 2008-09.

NCES reports expenditures by all the Local Education Agencies (LEAs) in the state

on instruction and instruction-related activities (salaries and benefits for teachers

and teaching assistants, teacher training, instructional supplies, curriculum

development, student assessment, instructional technology, and libraries), student

support (guidance, social work, attendance, health and psychological services,

speech pathology, and audiology), administration (at the district and school level),

and operations (facilities, maintenance, transportation, and food services). It does

not include expenditures on capital outlay, interest on long-term debt, or programs

not part of public elementary and secondary education such as adult education,

community colleges, private schools, and community services. NCES then divides



total expenditures by the number of students in the state.

Dollar amounts are normed against the NCES Comparable Wage Index from 2005,

which adjusts financial data by geographical differences in wages and cost of

living in order to better make comparisons across states.

States are ranked and divided into quintiles; those with the smallest per-pupil

expenditures receive “0,” while those with the largest per-pupil expenditures

receive “4.”

Rationale: Districts spend funds received from three principal sources: state

allocations of state and federal money (as described in indicator 1.3.1), direct

federal aid, and local funds.9 District expenditures are reported as total per-pupil

spending (total expenditures divided by the number of students).

While 1.3.1 captures the way a state prioritizes education in relation to its other

financial obligations, 1.3.2 reflects the actual dollars spent by LEAs on educating

students. In general, teachers benefit from higher per-pupil expenditures: More

dollars per student can translate into higher teacher salaries and benefits, smaller

class sizes, greater spending on instructional programs, materials, support staff,

and other potential improvements to teacher capacity, working conditions,

and resources. A union that can generate high per-pupil expenditures is indeed

strong.10 This sub-indicator reflects that ability (as well as other influences on per-

pupil spending). Further, unlike 1.3.1 above, this indicator includes local monies,

which is important since state unions also lobby for increases in local funds (for

example, pressuring the state to allow counties to enact property taxes or raise

local sales taxes). Also, some states do not invest heavily in education because

local districts do; this indicator captures that.

Still, while higher per-pupil expenditures likely create favorable working conditions

for teachers, they do not necessarily translate into greater spending on teacher

salaries and benefits—data that comprise our next indicator.

Sub-indicator 1.3.3: What percentage of total annual per-pupil expenditures is on

teacher salaries and benefits? (2.2%)

Data for 2008-09 are drawn from the National Center for Education Statistics’

National Public Education Finance Survey (2011), Tables 2 and 9.11 States are ranked

and divided into quintiles; those with the smallest percentages receive “0,” while

those with the largest percentages receive “4.”

9 Data provided to authors by staff at the National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2011.

10 Recall that state and national teacher unions are not technically unions—they do not have bargaining rights—but, rather, trade associations called “unions” by convention. Depending on state law, true unions (such as local teacher unions) are allowed to donate to state candidates and parties directly.

11 State unions may donate to PACs and interest groups with ideological or single-issue missions, using money from member dues and agency fees. Some question the legality of such donations, given that members’ dues are ultimately being used for political purposes without members’ direct consent. Unions maintain that these contributions fall under the umbrella of their advocacy work.



Rationale: As labor organizations, teacher unions seek to ensure (and protect)

competitive pay commensurate with similarly-educated professionals in other

industries. Therefore, one potential indicator of union strength is the degree to

which K-12 expenditures in a state are directed to teacher salaries and benefits.

At first glance, indicator 1.3.3 reflects what appears to be a district-level rather

than a state-level decision. In all but five states (and the District of Columbia),

salaries are within the scope of bargaining between local districts and their unions.

Benefits are within the scope of bargaining in all but seven. Still, state unions

play an important role in how districts allocate money. First, they impact state

policy on, among other areas, retirement (including employer contributions to

pensions, retirement age, and benefits), class size (which in turn affects district

staffing ratios), and statewide cost-of-living adjustments to teacher salaries. All of

these, in turn, affect how many teachers a district hires and how much it spends

on their salaries and benefits. Second, state unions devote much time and energy

at the local level, advising their affiliates during negotiations (or even conducting

negotiations on their behalf). High allocations for teacher salaries and benefits

at the local level can therefore reflect a strong state union that is equipped—and

motivated—to help its local affiliates.

Area 2. Involvement in Politics (20%)

This category measures ways in which a state union might influence state laws, policies,

and budgets. Many forms of influence are impossible to quantify and compare, so most of

the data in this category represent teacher unions’ financial contributions to candidates

and political parties, capturing their influence among state lawmakers, executives such as

the governor, and education leaders (should these be elected officials in that particular

state). We also measure union representation in a state’s delegation to the Republican and

Democratic national conventions.

But first, a brief explanation of how state elections are financed is in order. (See A Lesson

in Campaign Finance sidebar for details on union political spending in general and during

elections in particular.) Campaign funds can be divided into two categories, depending

on the source: “inside money” and “outside money.” The former refers to funds provided

by the candidate himself, donations from individuals to the candidate’s political action

committee (PAC), and contributions from political parties. The latter refers to donations

from external PACs, lobbyists, interest groups, and (depending on state election laws)

labor unions and corporations. Between 2003 and 2010, inclusive, candidates for state

office raised over $8 billion, with about 36 percent originating from “outside money”

(from state to state, outside money ranged anywhere from 5 percent to 60 percent of

candidates’ total finances).12 Likewise, political parties are funded by “inside money”—in

this case, donations to parties’ PACs from individuals—and “outside money” (see above).



We know that unions devote a lot more resources to politics than the amount they and their PACs donate during elections. Campaign finance law makes it possible to compare union donations with those from other organizations to (very roughly) gauge their relative influence OR to get a (somewhat) complete idea of what unions, but not any other organization, spend on all political activities—but not both. We chose the former. Here’s why, and here’s what we’re missing.

What Is Political Spending?There are five general types of political spending. First, individuals and groups may make direct donations to state candidates, political parties, and ballot measures. Second, individuals and groups use independent expenditures to fund electioneering—for example, an advertising campaign on behalf of a candidate. Third, organizations engage in member communications to relay endorsements and policy positions to members and to mobilize members to volunteer and vote. Finally, organizations spend on non-electoral politics—activities like rallies, letter-writing campaigns, and petitions. Such expenditures are lobbying if they are related to a specific piece of legislation and advocacy if they support general union interests. What Are State Teacher Unions Allowed and Not Allowed to Do?As a federal tax-exempt nonprofit organization, a state union is not allowed to “influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any person to any Federal, state, or local public office or to an office in a political organization.” As such, it cannot endorse candidates, donate to candidates or parties (or candidate and party PACs), or distribute campaign materials for or against a particular candidate via electioneering.6 The only way a state union can participate in partisan politics is through member communications—that is, it may encourage its members to vote a certain way or mobilize them on behalf of a candidate. Otherwise, its efforts must be non-partisan: It can lobby for or against issues (so long as it does not connect those issues to candidates) and give money to ideological/single issue PACs and advocacy groups that are not connected with candidates or parties. It can also advocate on its members’ behalf. Funds for these activities come from member dues (and agency fees, in states where they are legal).7

How Do We Track Union Political Spending?There are two ways to track union spending on state politics. Candidates and parties file recipient disclosures with their state’s election agency, listing how much money they receive and from whom. Although the details of disclosures vary from state to state, they are a fairly uniform way of both tracking donations (not just from unions but from all individuals and groups) and comparing a union’s share of donations with those from other sources across states. For these reasons, we use recipient disclosures in our calculations. However, the disadvantage is that disclosures capture only direct donations from unions but not all political spending by them. They don’t include independent expenditures by the union-connected PAC, nor do they include spending on member communications, lobbying, or advocacy by the union itself.

A LESSON IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE

6 Some also receive monies from non-public sources, such as grants from philanthropic organizations or private donations—although tracking and comparing these funds among states is difficult (or in some cases, impossible) because of the variation in state accounting policies.

7 Further, the inclusion of sub-indicator 1.3.2 is premised on research showing that strong state teacher unions do help increase district per-pupil expenditures. See Michael Berkman and Eric Plutzer, Ten Thousand Democracies (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005).



Between 2003 and 2010, parties raised $1.6 billion, nearly equally divided between inside

and outside sources. This inside-outside distinction is important as it applies to our

indicators below.

Indicator 2.1: Direct contributions to candidates and political parties (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 2.1.1: What percentage of total contributions to state candidates was

donated by teacher unions? (3.3%)

Sub-indicator 2.1.2: What percentage of the total contributions to state-level

political parties was donated by teacher unions? (3.3%)

A LESSON IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE

The other way to track union spending on state politics is through expenditure reporting. While these reports give a more complete picture of political spending, they do not allow us to compare unions to other organizations, nor do they allow us to compare unions across states (because precise reporting requirements vary). For example, in forty-four states, individuals and organizations (such as the union-connected PAC) must report independent electioneering expenditures to state election agencies. But what gets reported and when is roughly comparable in only twenty states. The IRS also requires expenditure reporting: Federal tax-exempt nonprofits, state unions included, must file their lobbying expenses (usually spent on advertising, rallies, and consultants) plus donations to ideological/single issue PACs. But these are simply line-items, not traceable to a particular recipient or activity. We also can’t use IRS reports to compare union spending to that of organizations which are not nonprofits. And neither the state-agency reports nor the IRS reports include all types of political spending.

There is one type of expenditure report that does include all political spending: that required by the U.S. Department of Labor. Unfortunately, only unions must file these, so we cannot compare union political spending to that of any other organization in the state. And again, expenditures are line-items, so we cannot trace them to a particular recipient or activity.8

8 The Census Bureau, which collects fiscal data on behalf of NCES, cautions that “the characteristics of elementary-secondary school finance data are influenced by accounting requirements mandated by each state education agency. The level of financial detail that school systems must maintain varies from state to state. Different state financing methods, such as making payments on behalf of school systems to fund teacher retirement, and the use of different accounting handbooks also cause variation.” However, they take great care to make adjustments to improve accuracy and comparability across states. See http://www.census.gov/govs/school/ for further details.

12 The Department of Labor requires unions with more than $250,000 in annual receipts to report donations and lobbying expenditures (the same information that they file with the IRS), plus the cost of member communications and advocacy and any internal expenses associated with political activities—for example, the salaries of union employees who engage in member mobilization or money spent organizing a pro-labor rally. By including member communications and advocacy, these reports capture two crucial ways that unions influence elections and policy writ large. While we cannot compare unions to other organizations, a recent Wall Street Journal report found that donations and lobbying account for only a small share of union political spending compared to member mobilization and advocacy. Even the AFT agreed, arguing that given its mission of organizing and activism, it will naturally spend money on these activities. See: Tom McGinty and Brody Mullins, “Political Spending by Unions Far Exceeds Direct Donations,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2012; Jeff Hauser, “Wall Street Journal Compares Union Political Spending to Corporate Donations,” AFL-CIO, July 10, 2012.



For sub-indicators 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, data are drawn from the National Institute

on Money in State Politics, which collects recipient disclosure forms.13 These

forms report direct union-to-candidate and union-to-party donations (including

donations from union-connected PACs), but they do not include other types of

political spending.14 We aggregate union donations for the campaign seasons

between 2003 and 2010, inclusive.15

To calculate 2.1.1, for each state, we combine direct contributions from any

national, state, or local teacher union and their connected PACs to all candidates

running for state office, including those running for governor, legislature, high and

appellate court, state executive (attorney general, treasurer, secretary of state,

etc.), and education leadership positions (state board of education and chief state

school officer). Total union donations to candidates are then divided by the total

contributions to candidates (both inside and outside sources).

To calculate 2.1.2, for each state we combine direct union contributions from any

national, state, or local teacher union and their connected PACs to political parties

in that state. We then divide by the total contributions to parties (both inside and

outside sources).

States are ranked and divided into quintiles; those states in which teacher unions

gave the smallest percentages of all contributions receive “0,” while those in which

teacher unions contributed the largest percentages of all contributions receive “4.”

Rationale: Political giving is a key way that unions support candidates who align

with their interests, handicap candidates who do not, and encourage incumbent

candidates to remain true to their campaign promises. If a significant proportion of

donations to candidates and parties come from teacher unions via their connected

PACs, those unions can act as key political players and possess significant sway.

We include candidate and party donations as separate indicators because states

often strictly limit direct PAC-to-candidate donations. But union-connected PACs

can also support candidates indirectly by donating to parties instead; most state

laws make this an appealing option because PAC-to-party and party-to-candidate

13 The National Institute on Money in State Politics collects campaign finance reports filed by candidates to state (but not to local) office. As such, we could not calculate sub-indicators 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.2.1 for Washington, D.C.

14 Union-connected PACs register their affiliations with state election agencies, and we include donations from them in union-to-candidate and union-to-party contributions. But state unions are free to support any ideological/single-issue PAC they choose, and campaign finance law does not permit us to track those dollars—thus, they are not included here.

15 By including these eight years, we were able to capture two presidential-election seasons—though national-level contributions were not included in our measures, presidential-election seasons tend to be more active politically at the state level—as well as two off-year elections for the majority of states. In some states, state elections occur in odd years, rather than in even years; and in other states, state elections are held every single year. By adding contributions across all eight years and then dividing, we ensured that we did not unfairly weight states with different election cycles.



caps are much less tight than PAC-to-candidate limits.16 Unions may also contribute

to parties for reasons other than indirect candidate support. By including

donations to candidates and parties as two separate measures, we present a more

accurate (although, admittedly, still incomplete) picture of union spending on

elections.

A note on the donors: For these indicators (and 2.2.1, below), we count donations

to state-level candidates and parties from state-level unions and their connected

PACs, plus those from national and local unions. Local unions are affiliated with

their state union, and state unions with their parent national association; as such,

they frequently have similar political interests. Local and national unions may be

motivated to enter state politics to bolster general union interests at the state level

and/or if state issues are of particular importance to local districts.

A note on the recipients: For indicator 2.1.1 (and 2.2.1, below), we include

candidates to all state offices rather than only education positions because every

state leader has a hand in influencing, and in some cases virtually dictating, a

state’s education policy agenda—see the state profiles for countless examples.

Further, in no state are both the board and chief school officer elected. In some

states, the chief school officer is elected; in others, he is appointed by the

governor; and in still others, he is appointed by the board. Likewise, in some states,

the board itself is elected; in others, it is appointed by the governor. By including

contributions to all candidates for state office, we take this into account.

A note on the results: Observers may find that the percentages we report for

these sub-indicators are sometimes dubiously small. In thirty-three states, for

example, unions gave less than 1 percent of the total funds received by candidates

for state office. These small percentages belie the fact that “inside money”—from

the candidate’s party PAC, his own PAC, and his personal funds—accounts for a

significant percentage of candidate and party funds. (Nationally, 64 percent of

candidate campaign funds were inside money, while 36 percent were outside.) We

include inside money in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 to measure the union’s role in the election

writ large, but we excluded it in 2.2.1, as indicated below.

Finally, due to time and resource limitations, we did not investigate more nuanced

data such as union contributions to winning candidates or union attempts to force

out one candidate by supporting his or her opponent. Rather, these indicators

gauge the unions’ overall presence in state-level political activity.17

16 Parties can donate much more to candidates than can PACs. In twenty-two states, there are no (or virtually no) limits on party-to-candidate donations, and in twenty states, the party-to-candidate limit is at least twice (but up to one hundred times) higher than the PAC-to-candidate limit. PAC-to-candidate and party-to-candidate limits are the same in only eight states. In addition, PACs can easily donate much more to parties than they can to candidates. In twenty-eight states, there is no PAC-to-party limit. In most others, the PAC-to-party limit is two- to five-times higher than the PAC-to-candidate limit.

17 Research shows, however, that teacher union endorsement does increase a candidate’s chance of winning, at least in school board elections. See Terry M. Moe, “Political Control and the Power of the Political Agent,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 22, no. 1 (2006): 1-29.



Indicator 2.2: Industry influence (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 2.2.1: What percentage of the contributions to state candidates from

the ten highest-giving sectors was donated by teacher unions? (6.7%)

Data are drawn from the National Institute on Money in State Politics. As in sub-

indicator 2.1.1, for the campaign seasons between 2003 and 2010 (inclusive), we

combine direct contributions in each state from any national, state, or local teacher

union and their affiliated PACs to state-level candidates. We compare total union

donations with the contributions from the ten highest-giving outside sectors in

the state, where a sector is defined as a group of organizations within the same

donor class—for example, energy producers, attorneys and law firms, construction

unions, chambers of commerce, etc. Sectors are assigned by the National Institute

on Money in State Politics and are closely modeled after designations used by the

federal government for classifying industry groups. Where teacher unions are one

of the top ten sectors in a given state, the eleventh-ranked sector is included as

well.

The highest-giving sectors do not include any source of “inside money” (state

party committees, candidate PACs, and personal candidate funds).

States are ranked and divided into quintiles; those states in which teacher unions

have the smallest contributions relative to the top ten sectors receive “0,” while

those in which teacher unions have the largest relative contributions receive “4.”

Rationale: Here we compare contributions from teacher unions against the

highest-giving sectors in the state. The sectors compete with one another for

resources, benefits, and the attention of policymakers (among other things) at

the state level, hoping that legislators will prioritize their interests and allocate

accordingly. We exclude donations from parties and candidate PACs (whose

purpose is candidate-driven rather than interest-oriented) to measure how

powerful teacher unions are relative to other interest groups. We can also ascertain

whether political activity is concentrated among a few power players in a given

state. As sectors compete over the entire legislative agenda, if unions are big

donors compared to other interests, they can nudge education policy toward the

top of a legislator’s or governor’s agenda; this is a sign of a strong union.

One additional note: In indicators 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.2.1, we do not include

teacher union contributions to ballot measures. Although ballot measures are

an important vehicle through which teacher unions can help enact (or stop)

legislation aligned with their interests, states vary wildly in the way that ballot

measures are proposed, certified, and voted on—and some states do not allow

them at all. Hence, we could not compare this aspect fairly across states, and

we do not include it in the metric. Nor can we include electioneering, member

communications, lobbying, and advocacy expenditures by unions and their PACs,

because campaign finance law prohibits us from tracking and comparing these



data (see sidebar: A Lesson in Campaign Finance). However, we acknowledge that

there are other channels through which unions exert political influence, and in our

state profiles, we note instances in which the unions were particularly involved

in politics (such as supporting a ballot measure, lobbying or electioneering, or

turning to the courts to stop a piece of legislation) in ways not captured by our

indicators.

Indicator 2.3: Status of delegates (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 2.3.1: What percentage of the state’s delegates to the Democratic

and Republican National Conventions were members of teacher unions? (6.7%)

Data are drawn from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social

Research’s 2000 Convention Delegate Survey. Democratic and Republican

convention percentages are averaged for each state. States are ranked and divided

into quintiles; those states in which teacher union members represent the smallest

percent of delegates receive “0,” while those in which they represent the largest

percent receive “4.”

At the time of publication, the 2000 Convention Delegate Survey was the most

recent report in which such detailed data were available in forms that met rigorous

standards. The 2000 survey is routinely used by researchers in work similar to

ours. In addition, 2008 data provided by the Democratic National Committee

were highly correlated with the reliable figures from 2000. We did not use the

2008 figures because they did not have information on Republican delegates and

contained some errors and ambiguities. As of yet, no data have been released

regarding delegates to the 2012 conventions. And, to our knowledge, there are

no comparable data on delegates to state-level conventions (which not all states

have).

Rationale: If teacher unions represent a vital constituency to one party (or both),

those unions will have greater sway over public officials—legislators, education

leaders and state school board members, and the governor—and over the

decisions that they make. Examining a state’s proportion of national convention

delegates who are teacher union members is one proxy for measuring how vital

a constituency the unions are to their respective parties in that state; and, in turn,

this measurement can illustrate the influence that unions have over politics in

general, particularly in ways not captured by direct donations (see Indicator 2.1).

Area 3. Scope of Bargaining (20%)

This area links union strength to state laws directly related to collective bargaining. Like

many analysts, we see bargaining status as a measure of union strength: In some states,

teachers are not permitted by law to bargain collectively with their employers. In others,

such bargaining is permitted but not required by state law. In still others, it is mandatory.

We also include the legality of agency fees and other payroll deductions for dues as

measures of unions’ strength—barring unions from collecting agency fees from non-



member teachers and/or from automatically deducting dues from the paychecks of their

members cuts off key sources of union revenue. We examine these areas, as well as the

scope of bargaining and the legality of teacher strikes.

Indicator 3.1: Legal scope of bargaining (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 3.1.1: What is the legal status of collective bargaining? (3.3%)

Data are drawn from the National Council on Teacher Quality’s Teacher Rules,

Roles, and Rights (TR3) database, accessed in February 2012. For the TR3

indicator listed as “legality of collective bargaining,” a state receives “0” for

“collective bargaining is explicitly illegal,” “2” for “collective bargaining is

permissible” (meaning state law either explicitly permits bargaining or implicitly

allows it by not addressing bargaining at all), or “4” for “state requires collective

bargaining.”

Rationale: While it is at the discretion of the teachers in a given district whether

they want to organize, in mandatory-bargaining states, the district must recognize

such an organization as a union and negotiate a binding contract with it per

teachers’ request. (And in mandatory-bargaining states, an average of 75 percent

of districts operate under such contracts.)18 In permitted-bargaining states, the

district can decide whether to recognize the teacher association as a union or

not and then bargain with it; in prohibited states, teachers may still organize into

employee associations, but districts may not recognize them as bargaining units or

negotiate binding contracts with them.

The ability of teacher unions to engage in collective bargaining is an obvious and

powerful gauge of state union strength because mandatory bargaining means

unions at all levels have more resources. Not only is mandatory bargaining apt

to bring increased membership and revenue, it also gives teacher unions status,

which gives weight to their lobbying and advocacy campaigns and increases the

receptivity of state policymakers to their efforts. If teacher unions are a strong

presence in the state in general, they can better use their political muscle to

influence state policy.

18 National Center for Education Statistics Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) 2007-08, Table 7, http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/sass0708_2009320_d1s_07.asp.



Sub-indicator 3.1.2: How broad is the scope of collective bargaining? (3.3%)

Data are again drawn from the National Council on Teacher Quality’s TR3

database, accessed in February 2012.19 A state’s overall score represents its average

across twenty-one potential elements that could be collectively bargained.

The twenty-one provisions are wages; hours; terms and conditions of employment;

grievance procedures; management rights; probationary period (tenure); transfer/

teacher reassignment; layoffs/reduction in force; dismissal; evaluation process/

instruments; insurance benefits; pension/retirement benefits; fringe benefits;

leave; length of the teacher school year; course content, curriculum, and textbook

selection; class load; class size; length of preparation periods; number of parent

teacher conferences; and extracurricular duties.

Each provision is scored according to its bargaining status. Provisions receive “0”

if bargaining over that provision is explicitly prohibited, meaning that the district

may decide that issue unilaterally without negotiations or the state can impose the

provision on its districts. In states that do not allow collective bargaining at all, all

provisions are scored “0.” Provisions that receive scores of “1,” “2,” or “3” are open

to negotiation between local districts and unions, to varying degrees. Areas are

scored with “1” if “there is no state statute regarding collective bargaining,” and

thus all provisions are implicitly within the scope of bargaining. The area is scored

“2” if bargaining in general is allowed but that specific provision is “not addressed

in state law or administrative code.” The issue receives “3” if it is explicitly a

“permissive subject of bargaining,” meaning districts may (but do not have to)

bargain it. Finally, contract provisions are scored “4” if they are a “mandatory

subject of bargaining,” meaning that a district must negotiate it with its teacher

union.20

Rationale: The fewer items that a state or district can impose unilaterally, the more

leverage the union has. The twenty-one items included here, while not all of equal

importance in the eyes of teacher unions, provide a snapshot of that leverage for

teacher unions across our fifty-one jurisdictions.

19 NCTQ notes, “The data represent a comprehensive analysis of state statutes. We do not systematically include other sources of legal authority, such as case law, attorney general opinions, or decisions made by labor relations boards. Where we know of relevant case law on an issue we include it, but the exhaustive nature of case law precluded a systematic search. References to case law that are found in the database have been generously provided to us by the National Education Association.” As such, NCTQ does not consider policies that cover an entire state which are not enacted into law. The difference between statute and policy is semantic because state leaders must use statute in order to mandate policies at the district level—except in Washington, D.C. There, the state, city, and district are concurrent—and only in recent years has there even been a “state” office of education. As such, education policy can be mandated in one of three ways: via D.C. code (passed by the City Council and approved by the United States Congress); through D.C. Municipal Regulations (rules and regulations from the city’s executive and administrative agencies); and by the chancellor of D.C. Public Schools (the District of Columbia Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007, part of D.C. code, states that “The Mayor shall govern the public schools of the District of Columbia” (Section 105.a) and “DCPS shall be administered by a Chancellor” whose duties are outlined in Section 105.c). (Only in Washington, D.C. does municipal code (enacted by the City Council) cover the same geographical area as state code.) Thus, for all indicators in Area 3, as well as Area 4, we consider policy mandates from all three sources, not only those codified by D.C. law. As such, we modified NCTQ’s data for Washington, D.C.; we also made minor changes to their data to correct for errors.

20 If a state prohibits bargaining, or if there is no state statute regarding collective bargaining, we cannot disaggregate the scope of bargaining by provision. This is noted where relevant in the state profiles.



Indicator 3.2: Automatic revenue streams (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 3.2.1: What is the unions’ legal right to automatically collect agency

fees from non-members and/or collect member dues via automatic payroll

deductions? (6.7%)

Data are again drawn from the National Council on Teacher Quality’s TR3

database, accessed in February 2012.

For the TR3 indicator listed as “agency fees permitted,” a state receives “0”

for “no” or “collective bargaining prohibited,” “2” for “neither authorized, nor

prohibited,” or “4” for “yes.”21

Rationale: Automatically collecting revenue is a vital way that a union can build

large reserves of funds and amass dollars to spend on political campaigns and

advocacy. There are two available streams of automatic revenue: agency fees and

member payroll deductions.

In any state, any teacher may decide that he or she does not want to belong to the

local union. Unions argue, however, that they represent all employees in a district

whether those individuals all choose to be union members or not—for example,

all district teachers, not just union members, benefit if the union negotiates for

higher teacher salaries. Unions therefore face a problem: If teachers choose not to

be members (and, therefore, do not have to pay membership dues), they receive

the benefits of union representation without having to pay for such benefits. And

if enough teachers choose not to be members, the union is forced to operate

with little revenue.22 To address this issue, the law in some states permits unions

to automatically charge “agency fees” to non-member teachers. Even if a teacher

opts not to belong to the local union, that union can still deduct the agency fees

from the teacher’s paycheck, thereby securing its revenue.23

State law may also prohibit unions from automatically deducting dues from the

paychecks of teachers who are union members. Instead, members must authorize

such deductions, and reauthorize them periodically as the law requires. Should

a member choose not to authorize those deductions, the union can still charge

them dues, but has no way of actually collecting them. Recently, lawmakers have

enacted (or failed in the attempt to enact) measures prohibiting automatic payroll

deductions as a way to curtail union power in states where agency fees are legal.

21 NCTQ included in its variable for “agency fees permitted” whether or not unions can charge agency fees to non-members and whether they can automatically deduct dues from the paychecks of its own members. The question included in sub-indicator 3.3.1 reflects both of these conditions, although the variable name used by NCTQ does not.

22 This is the classic “free-rider problem,” a familiar concept in labor economics, psychology, and political science.

23 Agency fees are one part of states’ right-to-work legislation. “Right-to-work” specifically means that union membership cannot be a condition of employment. As such, right-to-work status dictates that a union cannot automatically charge all teachers membership dues because not all teachers need be union members. However, there is a legal loophole that would still allow a local union to collect money from all teachers in a district: charge dues to its members, and automatically collect so-called “agency fees” from the paychecks of non-members. Right-to-work states close this loophole by prohibiting agency fees. While right-to-work and prohibiting agency fees are in spirit the same concept (and are often used interchangeably), we refer to agency fees specifically because they are a source of union revenue.



Indicator 3.3: Right to strike (6.7%)

Sub-indicator 3.3.1: What is the legal status of teacher strikes? (6.7%)

Data are drawn from the National Council on Teacher Quality’s TR3 database,

accessed in February 2012. For the TR3 indicator listed as “can teachers strike,” a

state receives “0” for “no,” “2” for “neither authorized, nor prohibited,” or “4” for

“yes.”

Rationale: Where teachers can legally strike, their unions have the benefit of a

straightforward and powerful method of publicly protesting unfavorable policies.

Of course, teachers do sometimes strike in states that do not legally permit

it—which may reflect an even stronger and bolder teacher union. But because

such cases are difficult to evaluate systematically, we limit this sub-indicator to

identifying state-level policies regarding striking. (We recognize another limitation,

too: Some public-employee strike laws pre-date teacher unionization.)

Area 4. State Policies (20%)

This area measures teacher union strength as the degree of alignment between state-

level education policies (as of late 2011) and traditional union interests. The indicators

address two types of policies in which unions have shown considerable interest: teacher

employment rules and charter school laws. The former relate to teacher evaluations,

tenure, layoffs, class size, pensions, and performance pay. The latter include laws related

to the allowable number and types of charter schools, the ease with which they are

authorized, and whether or not charters are exempt from state laws (including teacher

certification requirements), district regulations, and collective bargaining agreements.

The indicators take a neutral stance on the policies themselves; the metric assumes

that teacher unions will take a particular stance on each of them, however, and simply

measures the extent to which an established policy aligns or does not align with that

stance. The indicator does not rank the state policy against a normative standard of

whether it is “good” or “bad.” We’re mindful that not all teacher unions share the same

stance on the same issues at the same time. But while some state unions may take a more

nuanced view toward certain policies, teacher unions exist to act in the interest of their

members; hence, most teacher unions will react to policies in similar ways.

The inclusion of these policies in our metric does not necessarily mean that teacher unions

shaped (or failed to shape) them. Even if union-favored policies are not directly linked

with union activity, a favorable policy climate nevertheless helps to protect the union and

its interests. For example, if state policy constrains charter schools, teacher unions need

not fear that district schools—their members’ principal employers—will lose much market

share to charters. Even if the union did not influence the policy, it and (it presumes) its



members benefit from that policy—and preserving the status quo is generally much easier

than changing it.24

Indicator 4.1: Performance pay (2.9%)

Sub-indicator 4.1.1: Does the state support performance pay? (2.9%)

Data are drawn from the National Council on Teacher Quality’s 2011 State Teacher

Policy Yearbook. Indicator 4-F.2 asks, “Do states support performance pay?” A

state receives “0” for “performance included in salary schedule for all teachers”;

“1” for “performance bonuses required to be available to all teachers”; “2” for

“performance pay permitted/encouraged by the state”; “3” for state-sponsored

performance-pay initiatives offered in select districts”; or “4” for “does not support

performance pay.” The closer the policy is to the typical union position, the higher

the score.

Rationale: Tying teacher pay to student performance is one of the most hotly

contested teacher policies of late, and teacher unions play a significant role in

the debate. Some performance pay systems give teachers bonuses on top of

their base salaries; others tie a portion of a teacher’s base salary to performance

(and give her a raise if she is judged to be effective in the classroom) or prevent

a teacher from receiving automatic yearly salary increases, also called “step

increases,” if she is deemed ineffective.

While education reformers often push districts and states to adopt performance

pay, pushing is sometimes the best they can do. If teacher salaries are mandated

elements of collective bargaining, the state cannot impose a pay scale (unless

the law contains a specific provision that lets the state determine any wages and

bonuses not tied to training and/or experience, as in California, for example).

Where state lawmakers are allowed to enact merit pay, they typically encounter

staunch opposition from teacher unions—the NEA and its affiliates take a

particularly hard line against any policy, merit pay included, which treats teachers

differently on the basis of their performance.25 In the handful of states where merit

pay has become state law, the union was not strong enough to block it.

Indicator 4.2: Retirement (2.9%)

Sub-indicator 4.2.1: What is the employer versus employee contribution rate to the

teacher pension system? (2.9%)

Data are drawn from the National Council on Teacher Quality’s 2011 State

Teacher Policy Yearbook. Indicators 4-H.7 and 4-H.9 list employer and employee

24 The state profiles record several instances in which lawmakers did not pursue reforms—not because of the union, but because they themselves did not want them. This was the case in Vermont, for example, where the state wanted to maintain local district control and therefore eschewed any policies that increased the power of the state at the expense of districts.

25 The NEA’s 2011-12 Policy Handbook, Resolution F-8: “Collective bargaining agreements between education employees…and their employers should contain certain standard contractual concepts. These concepts include (section Q): Salary schedules that are equitable, regardless of the age level of the students being taught, and are based upon preparation, professional growth, and length of service, and that exclude any form of merit pay.” See http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/nea-handbook.pdf.



Our data reflect state-level teacher employment and charter school policies as of December 2011. We’re well aware that this moment in time reflects a good deal of very recent legislation. Many states enacted major reforms in these areas during 2010 and 2011, motivated by the federal Race to the Top competition, changes in state leadership (especially if the occupants of key policy roles changed from one party to the other, as happened in many places in November 2010), and in anticipation of applying for an NCLB waiver. These reforms sometimes altered long-standing policies or provided state officials with greater control over issues that had previously been at the discretion of districts. It’s reason to suppose that some—maybe many—of these recent changes signal that unions are weaker than they once were, or at least weaker than other forces now engaged in state-level education policy. And our deep dives into individual states indicate that in many cases this is correct: Policies are being enacted due to forces other than—or stronger than—the teacher unions.

But our examination also shows that unions typically have a great deal of influence over the design of some reform policies, even if they cannot keep reforms off the policy agenda. Many states, for example, enacted new laws requiring that districts include student achievement data in teacher evaluations. But the design of these laws varies from state to state, and some are significantly more demanding than others. Some laws mandate, for example, that half of the evaluation be based on student test scores—but some require far less, or leave the weighting to individual districts. Some allow for district-created or even teacher-created assessments to be used rather than statewide assessments. And some are only plans or declarations of intent, indicating that at some point in the future, the state will implement a yet-to-be-designed system. Given this reality, we asked not only whether a state had a particular policy such as a statewide evaluation system, but also the degree to which the design of that policy aligns with union interests (e.g., how does it treat the role of student achievement in such evaluations?).

That said, we offer two important caveats. First, our state-level investigations reveal the volatility of state-level education policy circa 2011-12 and a large number of places where it is very much in flux. States are rapidly, and drastically, enacting policies, and our calculations reflect the state of state policies at a certain point in time. Many states are currently altering long-standing policies and some have done so since we gathered our data. (Where possible, we note this in the state profile reports.) Second, the indicators in this metric reflect only the policies codified in state law. We’re mindful that a state’s constitution (and the subsequent interpretation of that document by courts) can also have a significant impact on education laws in that state. In Virginia, for example, the legislature cannot mandate that teacher evaluations include student achievement data or permit entities other than local school boards to authorize charter schools because both actions are prohibited by the state constitution (or at least interpreted as prohibited). (This is not to say that legislatures have not passed laws that are unconstitutional, and that unions have not filed lawsuits to stop them!) However, the state code contains the bulk, if not the entirety, of what is commonly termed “education policy” in each state.

POLICIES IN FLUX

contribution rates, respectively. We use these data to calculate the ratio of

employer-to-employee contribution rates for each state. (For those states in which

teachers participate in Social Security, the flat employer/employee contribution

rate of 6.2 percent is added onto both the state employer and employee

contribution rates before calculating the ratio.) States are ranked and divided into

quintiles; those with the lowest employer-to-employee contribution ratios receive

“0,” while those with the highest ratios receive “4.”

Data were not available for Michigan (which began a new system in 2010 and is not

yet reporting employer contributions) or New Jersey (which reports contributions

as dollar amounts rather than percentages). This indicator was omitted from the

metric calculations for these states.



Rationale: Teacher pensions are a significant avenue through which unions can

boost benefits for their members—and pension policy, with a few exceptions

nationwide, is exclusively the domain of the state.26 At the same time, many states

have massively underfunded pensions, and raising employee contributions is

one way to decrease their liability. However, lawmakers may be reluctant to raise

employee contributions because the repercussions are immediate and tend to

provoke a highly public reaction from the union (and the teachers they represent).

So lawmakers may turn to less visible measures like reducing future benefits, or

choose to do nothing at all, passing the buck to the next generation of legislators

(and taxpayers). Given this context, if a state mandates that districts pay a

significantly greater share of pension contributions than their employees, a strong

labor constituency is likely behind the decision.

Indicator 4.3: Evaluations (2.9%)

Sub-indicator 4.3.1: What is the maximum potential consequence for veteran

teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluation(s)? (1.4%)


Policy Yearbook. Indicator 5-B.2 asks, “What are the consequences for veteran

teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations?” A state receives “0” for “eligible

for dismissal after multiple unsatisfactory ratings”; “2” for “improvement plan

after a single unsatisfactory rating” or “other consequences” (if not superseded

by “eligible for dismissal after multiple unsatisfactory ratings”); or “4” for “no

articulated consequences.”

Rationale: Teacher evaluations have recently emerged as one of the most hotly

contested teacher policies, especially given the Race to the Top push that

evaluations be used to “remov[e] ineffective tenured and untenured teachers and

principals after they have had ample opportunities to improve” and the No Child

Left Behind waiver application, which requires that evaluations should be used to

inform personnel decisions.27

Teacher unions have played a significant role in these debates. Because their

primary role is to protect members’ jobs, they are particularly concerned with

dismissal rules tied to those evaluations. Standard practice is to remediate

teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations, putting them through cycles of

“improvement plans” and offering them multiple channels to appeal poor ratings,

while requiring administrators to gather copious documentation before they can

be dismissed. However, reformers criticize this process as protecting ineffective

teachers and have pushed for more streamlined dismissal procedures—procedures

that teacher unions stoutly resist because they reduce teacher job security (and,

26 In some states, teachers have their own pension funds, and in others they share a fund with all public employees. However, teachers represent a significant proportion of those employees. See Josh Barro and Stuart Buck, “Underfunded Teacher Pension Plans: It’s Worse Than You Think,” Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2010, http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/cr_61.htm.

27 U.S. Department of Education, “Race to the Top Program Executive Summary,” Section (D)(2)(iv)(d), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf; U.S. Department of Education, “ESEA Flexibility Frequently Asked Questions,” Section 3(6), http://www.ed.gov/esea/flexibility.



they say, threaten due process, leaving teachers vulnerable to baseless firings

by capricious or vindictive administrators). Where reformers have successfully

reduced job protections for ineffective teachers, it has typically been because

teacher unions could not stop them.

Sub-indicator 4.3.2: Is teacher classroom effectiveness included in teacher

evaluations? If so, how is it weighted? (1.4%)


Policy Yearbook. Indicator 3-B.2 asks, “Do states consider classroom effectiveness

as part of teacher evaluations?” A state receives “0” for “requires that student

achievement/growth is the preponderant criterion in teacher evaluations”; “1” for

“specifies that teacher evaluations are to be significantly informed by student

achievement/growth”; “3” for “requires that teacher evaluations include objective

evidence of student learning”; or “4” for “student achievement data not required.”

Rationale: The Race to the Top competition and the ESEA waiver process

both emphasized evaluating teachers based on their effectiveness. Race to the

Top requires that states “design and implement rigorous, transparent, and fair

evaluation systems for teachers and principals that differentiate effectiveness

using multiple rating categories that take into account data on student growth

as a significant factor.” The criteria for an NCLB waiver are more flexible,

acknowledging the (union-supported) argument that teacher effectiveness can be

measured in multiple ways; as such, the waiver requires that teacher evaluations

“use multiple valid measures in determining performance levels, including as

a significant factor data on student growth for all students (including English

Learners and students with disabilities) and other measures of professional

practice.”28

Reformers generally push for evaluation systems that include objective measures

of student achievement. And not surprisingly, the unions push back. Their

objections are numerous: Districts, rather than the state, should dictate the terms

of teacher evaluations (and teachers themselves should have a hand in developing

the evaluations). Measuring student achievement using standardized measures

(usually scores on state tests, but also by SAT scores or graduation rates) is

unfair—evaluations need to include (and heavily weigh) more subjective measures

like adherence to professional standards and classroom observations. If a state

insists on using test scores to measure student achievement, it should use teacher-

developed assessments, not just standardized exams. Where states require that

teacher evaluations include student achievement data AND that those data are the

preponderant evaluation criteria, teacher unions were typically not strong enough

to keep such policies out of state law.

28 U.S. Department of Education, “Race to the Top Program Executive Summary,” Section (D)(2)(ii), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf; U.S. Department of Education, “ESEA Flexibility,” Section 3(2), http://www.ed.gov/esea/flexibility.



Indicator 4.4: Terms of employment (2.9%)

Sub-indicator 4.4.1: How long before a teacher earns tenure? Is student/teacher

performance considered in tenure decisions? (1.0%)


Policy Yearbook. Two NCTQ indicators, 3-D.2 and 3-D.3, inform this question.

3-D.2 asks, “How long before a teacher earns tenure?” A state receives “0” for

“state only rewards annual contracts” or “no policy”; “1” for “5 years”; “2” for “4

years”; “3” for “3 years”; or “4” for “2 years” or “1 year.” In other words, once again,

the closer the policy is to what the union would favor, the higher the score.

3-D.3 asks, “How are tenure decisions made?” A state receives “0” for “evidence of

student learning is the preponderant criterion”; “2” for “some evidence of student

learning is considered”; or “4” for “virtually automatically.”

Final scores are the average of the two indicators for each state.

Rationale: As labor organizations, teacher unions focus on job security, and

tenure is the bedrock of that security. Once a teacher earns tenure, it can be

extremely difficult—in some states, according to reformers, all but impossible—to

dismiss them. Thus, reformers normally push for longer pre-tenure probationary

periods (or no tenure at all) to ensure that ineffective teachers are not ushered

into ironclad protection before districts can intervene. They also want districts

to ensure that only effective teachers receive tenure, noting that many existing

systems offer tenure virtually automatically at the end of the probationary period,

without considering teacher performance. Race to the Top also pushed states

to use evaluations when making tenure decisions.29 Where tenure is prohibited

or granted only after a long probationary period and/or tied to measures of

performance, teacher job protection (and union strength, we hypothesize) is

weaker.

Sub-indicator 4.4.2: How are seniority and teacher performance considered in

teacher layoff decisions? (1.0%)


Policy Yearbook. Two NCTQ indicators, 5-D.3 and 5-D.4, inform this question.

5-D.3 asks, “Do states prevent districts from overemphasizing seniority in layoff

decisions?” A state receives “0” for “yes, seniority cannot be considered”; “1” for

“yes, seniority can be considered among other factors”; “2” for “no, layoff criteria

left to district discretion”; “3” for “no, tenure status must be considered” or “no,

seniority must be considered”; or “4” for “no, seniority is the sole factor.”

29 U.S. Department of Education, “Race to the Top Program Executive Summary,” Section (D)(2)(iv)(c), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.



5.D-4 asks, “Do districts have to consider performance in determining which

teachers are laid off?” A state receives “0” for “yes” or “4” for “no.”

Final scores are the average of the two indicators for each state.

Rationale: As teacher evaluation and tenure policies have come under scrutiny

nationwide, layoff policies are also under review—and have become more

significant in a time of tight or declining district budgets. Traditionally, when

districts let go teachers for reasons outside of the teachers’ control (for example,

increased class sizes, cuts to programs, school closures, and/or declining

enrollment), they do so using a “last in, first out” system. Probationary teachers

get laid off before tenured teachers. Tenured teachers with less seniority get laid

off before those with more. Unions favor such a system because it is uniform,

but reformers argue that it is completely counterproductive to student interests:

Districts should be able to keep their most effective teachers in the classroom

regardless of tenure/seniority considerations. Layoffs tied to performance

(not seniority) run counter to traditional union interests, however, and if state

lawmakers enact such a policy, it signals that union efforts to stop them were not

enough.

Sub-indicator 4.4.3: What percentage of the teaching workforce was dismissed

due to poor performance? (1.0%)

Dismissal rates for 2007-08 are drawn from the National Center for Education

Statistics’ Schools and Staffing Survey (2009), Table 8, “Average number of public

school teachers who were dismissed in the previous year or did not have their

contracts renewed based on poor performance.” A state’s dismissal rate is the

average number of dismissed teachers per district divided by the average number

of teachers per district. States are ranked and divided into quintiles; those with the

highest dismissal rates receive “0,” while those with the lowest rates receive “4.”

Rationale: Some states have policies requiring that layoffs and dismissals be

based at least in part on teacher performance, as well as on seniority and/or

tenure status. But the policies themselves might not have teeth, perhaps because

lawmakers are disinclined to fight with unions and other stakeholders. Other

states do not have these policies, allowing districts to determine layoff criteria.

A high rate of dismissal due to poor performance may, then, be a sign of a weak

union, one that could not prevent lawmakers from enacting performance-based

employment statutes and/or could not deter districts from using such policies.

Indicator 4.5: Class size (2.9%)

Sub-indicator 4.5.1: Is class size restricted for grades 1-3? If so, is the restriction

limit larger than the national average (20)? (2.9%)



Data on class size restrictions are drawn from the National Council on Teacher

Quality’s TR3 database, accessed in January 2012. For each state, three NCTQ

indicators ask “what is the class size restriction” for grade 1, grade 2, and grade 3,

respectively.

We compare the average class size restriction for grades 1-3 in each state against

the national average class size in elementary school, which is listed as twenty

students per class in 2007-08 by the Digest of Education Statistics (2010). A

state receives “0” if class size “is not addressed in the scope of NCTQ reviewed

documents”; “2” if the average class size restriction for grades 1-3 is larger than

or equal to the national average size, or if the state encourages, but does not

mandate, a policy smaller than the national average class size; or “4” if the average

class size restriction for grades 1-3 is smaller than the national average class size.

Rationale: State-mandated class size restrictions are beneficial to teacher unions

for two reasons: it creates favorable working conditions for their teachers and

it ensures that districts must hire a certain number of teachers. The latter is

especially important in times of fiscal crisis, when one of the first things districts

do to cut costs is increase class sizes (whereupon they do not need to employ

as many teachers). But if the state puts a cap on class size, districts can only

raise class sizes so far. State policies that restrict class size are favorable to union

interests; therefore, we see these policies as an indicator of a strong union.

Indicator 4.6: Charter school structural limitations (2.9%)

Sub-indicator 4.6.1: Is there a cap (limit) placed on the number of charter schools

that can operate in the state (or other jurisdiction) and/or on the number of

students who can attend charter schools? (1.0%)

Data are drawn from the National Alliance for Public Charter School’s Measuring

Up to the Model: A Ranking of State Charter School Laws (2012). The report rates

state charter laws against the standard “No caps: No limits are placed on the

number of public charter schools or students (and no geographic limits); if caps

exist, there is adequate room for growth.” For the report’s “no caps” indicator, each

state is scored as follows:

0 = The state does not have a cap.

1 = The state has a cap with room for ample growth. OR The state does not have a

cap, but allows districts to restrict growth.

2 = The state has a cap with room for adequate growth.

3 = The state has a cap with room for limited growth.

4 = The state has a cap with no room for growth.

N/A = The state does not have a charter school law.

Sub-indicator 4.6.2: Does the state allow a variety of charter schools (start-ups,

conversions, and virtual schools)? (1.0%)





state charter laws against the standard “A variety of public charter schools is

allowed, including new start-ups, public school conversions, and virtual schools.”

For the report’s “a variety of public charter schools allowed” indicator, each state is

scored as follows:

0 = The state allows new start-ups, public school conversions, and virtual schools.

1 = The state allows new start-ups and virtual schools, but not public school

conversions.

2 = The state allows new start-ups and public school conversions, but not virtual

schools. OR The state allows only new start-ups.

4 = The state allows only public school conversions.


Sub-indicator 4.6.3: How many charter authorizing options exist? How active are

those authorizers? (1.0%)



state charter laws against the standard “Multiple authorizers available: Two or

more viable authorizing options for each applicant with direct application allowed

to each authorizing option.” For the report’s “multiple authorizers available”

indicator, each state is scored as follows:

0 = The state allows two or more viable authorizing options for each applicant.

1 = The state allows two or more viable authorizing options for each applicant,

but requires applicants to get preliminary approval from a state charter school

advisory committee.

2 = The state has only a single viable authorizer option available, and there

is considerable authorizing activity. OR The state allows two or more viable

authorizing options for applicants in some but not all jurisdictions. OR The state

allows two or more viable authorizing options for applicants but the authorizing

activities of such entities is limited.

3 = The state has only a single viable authorizer option available, and there is some

authorizing activity.

4 = The state has only a single viable authorizer option available, and there is no or

almost no authorizing activity.




Rationale: Teacher unions ordinarily object to policies that encourage the

expansion and autonomy of charter schools.30 A system that fosters charter school

growth and grants these schools significant autonomy threatens union interests for

two reasons. First, a robust charter sector endangers the job security of unionized

teachers because students (and money) leave district schools for charters.

Second, as the number of charters increases, so does the number of public school

teachers who are not unionized, jeopardizing the unions’ near-monopoly on

representing educators. The unions argue that this is bad for teachers—if they

are not working under a union contract, they risk unfair or capricious working

conditions. Choice supporters argue that union opposition has nothing to do with

teachers and everything to do with the union’s self-interest (fewer members mean

less money and less political weight) and that teachers are choosing to work at

charters expressly because they feel that unions protect adults to the detriment of

students.

The three sub-indicators under “charter school structural limitations” measure

charter expansion policies (autonomy is examined below).

With sub-indicator 4.6.1, we ask whether the state caps the number of charters

allowed to operate and whether that cap allows the sector to grow. A high cap,

with ample room underneath it for charter expansion, is counter to union interests;

thus, we see these policies as an indicator of a weak union.

With sub-indicator 4.6.2, we examine the diversity of charters allowed by the state.

Unions prefer that states permit only charters that have been converted from

district schools. The reasoning is pragmatic (allowing only conversions limits the

total number of charters because there are only so many eligible schools) but also

ideological: Conversion implies charters are a last-resort solution rather than a

promising practice that should be encouraged to grow. Unions object to opening

up the sector to include new schools and especially virtual schools—both permit

the sector to grow, but virtual schools are particularly distasteful because they

challenge the traditional role of the teacher and typically operate with fewer (often

non-union) teachers per student. State policies that allow a diversity of charters

are counter to union interests; thus, we see these policies as an indicator of a weak

union.

With sub-indicator 4.6.3, we examine charter school authorizing options. It is

difficult for the sector to grow if would-be charter operators have only one

route to authorize the school. Some states allow only local school boards to

authorize charters, while others permit county and/or state boards, a state

charter commission, colleges and universities, and/or other education agencies

to authorize as well. Likewise, it is difficult for the sector to grow if the available

30 Specifically, that “unions focus their attention on certain clusters of [charter school] provisions,” which include “requiring local school districts to approve charters, adherence to existing district collective bargaining agreements, and preventing charters from hiring/firing teachers without district oversight.” See Francis X. Shen and Kenneth K Wong, “Beyond Weak Law, Strong Law: Political Compromise and Legal Constraints on Charter School Laws” (paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA) August 31 - September 3, 2006, http://www.fxshen.com/Shen&Wong_APSA-2006_CharterLaws.pdf.



authorizer(s) are not actually active in authorizing schools (usually due to

restrictive authorizing processes, again determined by the state). State policies

that allow for multiple authorizers and permit those entities to be active are

counter to union interests; thus, we see these policies as an indicator of a weak

union.

Indicator 4.7: Charter school exemptions (2.9%)

Sub-indicator 4.7.1: Are charter schools automatically exempt from state laws,

regulations, and teacher certification requirements (except those that safeguard

students and fiscal accountability)? (1.4%)



state charter school laws against the standard “Automatic exemptions from many

state and district laws and regulations: Exemptions from all laws, except those

covering health, safety, civil rights, student accountability, employee criminal

history checks, open meetings, freedom of information, and generally accepted

accounting principles; exemption from state teacher certification requirements.”31

For the report’s “automatic exemptions from many state and district laws and

regulations” indicator, each state is scored as follows:

0 = The state law provides automatic exemptions from many state and district laws

and regulations and does not require any of a school’s teachers to be certified.

1 = The state law provides automatic exemptions from many state and district laws

and regulations and requires some of a school’s teachers to be certified.

2 = The state law provides automatic exemptions from many state and district

laws and regulations and requires all of a school’s teachers to be certified. OR

The state law provides automatic exemptions from many state and district laws

and regulations and requires all of a school’s teachers to be certified for some

charters and requires some of a school’s teachers to be certified for other charters.

OR The state law allows schools to apply for exemptions from state and district

laws and requires some of a school’s teachers to be certified. OR The state law

allows schools to apply for exemptions from state and district laws, including from

certification requirements. OR The state law provides automatic exemptions from

many state and district laws and regulations for some schools but not others and

requires all of a school’s teachers to be certified but provides exceptions. OR The

state law provides some flexibility from state and district laws and regulations for

some schools but less for others and does not require any of a school’s teachers to

be certified.

3 = The state law allows schools to apply for exemptions from state and district

laws and requires all of a school’s teachers to be certified. OR The state law

does not provide automatic exemptions from many state and district laws and

regulations and does not require any of a school’s teachers to be certified. OR The

31 In this sub-indicator, we consider all state laws (including certification) together, while in our state profiles we present exemptions from teacher certification laws separately for clarity.



state law allows schools to apply for exemptions from state and district laws and

requires some of a school’s teachers to be certified.

4 = The state law does not provide automatic exemptions from state and district

laws and regulations, does not allow schools to apply for exemptions, and requires

all of a school’s teachers to be certified.


Sub-indicator 4.7.2: Are charter schools automatically exempt from collective

bargaining agreements (CBAs)? (1.4%)

Data are drawn from the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools’ Measuring

Up to the Model: A Ranking of State Charter School Laws (2012). The report

ranks state charter laws against the standard “Automatic collective bargaining

exemption: Charter schools authorized by non-local board authorizers are exempt

from participation in district collective bargaining agreements; charter schools

authorized by local boards are exempt from participation in district collective

bargaining agreements.” For the report’s “automatic collective bargaining

exemption” indicator, each state is scored as follows:

0 = The state law does not require any charter schools to be part of district


1 = The state law exempts some schools from existing collective bargaining

agreements, but not others (but allows those not exempted to apply for

exemptions).

2 = The state law exempts some schools from existing collective bargaining

agreements, but not others.

3 = The state law requires all charter schools to be part of existing collective

bargaining agreements, but schools can apply for exemptions. OR The state law

requires all charter school staff to be employees of the local school district, but

exempts the staff from state education employment laws.

4 = The state law requires all charter schools to be part of existing collective

bargaining agreements, with no opportunity for exemptions.


Rationale: These two sub-indicators measure state policies that grant charter

schools autonomy by automatically exempting them from state laws, district

regulations, and collective bargaining agreements.

With sub-indicator 4.7.1, we examine the degree to which state law exempts

charters both from the state’s own regulations (including teacher certification

requirements) and from district regulations, except those relating to student safety

and fiscal accountability. Some states automatically exempt charters from all state

laws and district regulations; some allow all charters to apply for waivers for all of

them; still others permit no exceptions from certain policies but provide automatic

exemptions from others (or allow schools to apply for such exemptions). In other



jurisdictions, only some (but not all) schools are eligible for exemptions. State

policies that allow the broadest exemptions with the fewest conditions are counter

to union interests ;thus, we see these policies as an indicator of a weak union.

With sub-indicator 4.7.2, we measure the degree to which charter schools are

bound by the collective bargaining agreements of the districts in which they are

located. Unions push for states to require that charters operate under the same

bargaining agreements which constrain district schools. State policies specifying

that charters have no obligation to do so are counter to union interests; thus, we

see these policies as an indicator of a weak union.

Area 5. Perceived Influence (20%)

This category seeks to capture the “invisible” side of teacher union influence. For example,

campaign contributions are tangible, if indirect, measures of union influence. But there are

intangible measures as well. Perhaps the union does not contribute to campaigns because

it already has the ear of state leaders and need not expend financial capital to further its

agenda. Perhaps existing policies are already aligned with union interests, and the state

has leaders who are not inclined to change them. Or perhaps the union is a major donor

to campaigns—but the state is already predisposed against teacher unions (or organized

labor in general) and a union that gives heavily to campaigns is more desperate than

powerful.

To capture such “invisible” influence, we gathered the perceptions of state insiders via a

stakeholder survey in each state. To ensure that we had a reasonably accurate gauge of

union strength, we included a diverse group of key state-level insiders in our respondent

pool: legislators, chief state school officers, school board members, officials from the

governor’s office, leaders of charter and other education advocacy organizations, and

education journalists. (We asked them to respond only for the states in which they

worked.) The survey asked about current and recent activities of the state-level teacher

union(s) in that state only; it did not ask respondents whether they view teacher unions

favorably or unfavorably. We invited 578 individuals to participate in the survey in August-

September 2011; we received responses from 191 of them, for a response rate of 33

percent. Their responses are averaged to the state level.

Preliminary analyses showed that respondents from any given state tended to agreed with

one another. We also found that their responses generally correlated with conditions on

the ground. For example, a higher overall rank in perceived influence was highly correlated

to a high rate of union membership (sub-indicator 1.1.1) and with a high level of political

activity (Area 2). Still, while we found many of the associations we expected, we also

witnessed a high degree of variation (perhaps due to the shifting political winds—see

Moving Targets sidebar). Sometimes stakeholders disagreed with the data in surprising,

and enlightening, ways, revealing contradictions in perceived and actual influence. In the

state profiles, we illustrate where this was the case.



Indicator 5.1: Relative influence of teacher unions (4.0%)

Sub-indicator 5.1.1: How do you rank the influence of teacher unions compared

with other influential entities in the state? (4.0%)

Participants were asked to “select and rank the five most important entities in

terms of their influence in shaping education policy in your state over the last three

years.” The list we placed before them consisted of business roundtable/chamber

of commerce; parent coalitions; education-reform advocacy organizations/school-

reform political action committees; civil rights groups; state school board/board

of regents; state association of elementary and secondary school principals; state

association of school administrators (superintendents); teacher unions/teacher

associations; textbook companies; state school board association; state charter

school association; and other (write-in).

Each response receives “0” if teacher unions are listed fifth or not at all; “1” if

teacher unions are listed fourth; “2” if listed third; “3” if listed second; or “4” if

listed first. To generate the value of this indicator for each state, we average the

responses from all informants from that state.

Indicator 5.2: Influence over campaign outcomes (4.0%)

Sub-indicator 5.2.1: How often do Democratic candidates need teacher union

support to get elected? (2.0%)

Participants were asked to rank how often “Democrats running for state-level

office (e.g., governor, legislator, etc.) need teacher union/teacher association

support to get elected” on a five-point Likert scale.

Each response receives “0” for “never”; “1” for “rarely”; “2” for “sometimes”; “3” for

“often”; or “4” for “always. To generate the value of this indicator for each state, we

average the responses from all informants from that state.

Sub-indicator 5.2.2: How often do Republican candidates need teacher union

support to get elected? (2.0%)

Participants were asked to rank how often “Republicans running for state-level

office (e.g., governor, legislator, etc.) need teacher-union/teacher-association

support to get elected” on a five-point Likert scale.


“often”; or “4” for “always.” To generate the value of this indicator for each state,

we average the responses from all informants from that state.

Indicator 5.3: Influence over spending (4.0%)

Sub-indicator 5.3.1: To what extent are teacher unions effective in protecting

dollars for education? (2.0%)



Participants were asked (on a five-point Likert scale) whether they agree or

disagree with the following statement: “Even in times of recession and cutbacks,

teacher unions/teacher associations in my state are effective in protecting dollars

for education, whether by preventing or minimizing cuts in the education budget.”

Each response receives “0” for strongly disagree”; “1” for “disagree; “2” for

“neutral”; “3” for “agree”; or “4” for “strongly agree.” To generate the value of this

indicator for each state, we average the responses from all informants from that

state.

Sub-indicator 5.3.2: Do unions generally make concessions to prevent reductions

in pay and benefits, or fight hard to prevent those reductions? (2.0%)

Participants were asked “Which of these two statements best describes teacher

unions/teacher associations in your state?” They chose between the following

responses:

• Given recent budgetary constraints, teacher unions/teacher associations in my

state have conceded from the outset that some budgetary reductions for pay

and benefits are inevitable.

Many of the survey questions asked respondents to characterize teacher union activity over the last three years or during the most recent legislative session. As with the state policies included in Area 4, we recognize that U.S. education policy has undergone significant change of late, particularly given the federal Race to the Top competition, applications for No Child Left Behind (NCLB) waivers, and state elections (in 2010 and 2011) that ushered in many Republicans eager to overhaul particular policies. We asked respondents to focus on teacher union strength in these more recent years, rather than historically, to capture current trends. But given the pace of change over just the last year or two, three years is a moving target. Further, recent changes do in many ways reflect a new weakening of teacher union influence over education policy in some states—weakening that is not apt to be fully reflected in opinions voiced in late summer 2011. (Whether that waning of teacher union strength will last is another question entirely.)

We’re mindful, too, that even when respondents are asked to reflect on recent teacher union influence, what’s in their minds may well reflect their impressions over a longer period of time. Thus teacher unions may be described as influential because historically they were, even if today they’re less so. The converse is also possible.

We also recognize that policy contexts vary greatly across the states. Some states, for example, have cut education spending despite strong union pushback. So our questions address both intent and action. For example, sub-indicators 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 both address budget cuts. While the former gauges union success in fighting budget cuts, the latter probes the extent to which teacher unions were engaged in the debate at all.

MOVING TARGETS



• Given recent budgetary constraints, teacher unions/teacher associations in my

state have fought hard to prevent reductions in pay and benefits (whether or

not their efforts have proven successful).

Each response receives “0” for the former or “4” for the latter. To generate the

value of this indicator for each state, we average the responses from all informants

from that state.

Indicator 5.4: Influence over policy (4.0%)

Sub-indicator 5.4.1: How effectively do teacher unions ward off proposals with

which they disagree? (1.0%)

Participants were asked (on a five-point Likert scale) whether they agree or

disagree with the following statement: “Teacher unions/teacher associations in

my state are effective in warding off education-reform proposals with which they

disagree.”

Each response receives “0” for strongly disagree”; “1” for “disagree; “2” for

“neutral”; “3” for “agree”; or “4” for “strongly agree.” To generate the value of this

indicator for each state, we average the responses from all informants from that

state.

Sub-indicator 5.4.2: How often do existing state education policies reflect teacher

union priorities? (1.0%)

Participants were asked (on a five-point Likert scale) to rank how often “state-

level education policies reflect teacher unions/teacher association priorities.”




Sub-indicator 5.4.3: To what extent were state education policies proposed by

the governor during your state’s latest legislative session in line with teacher union

priorities? (1.0%)

Using a five-point Likert scale, participants were asked to rank “To what extent

were education policies proposed by the governor during your state’s latest

legislative session in line with the priorities held by teacher unions/teacher

associations?”

Responses receive “0” for “not at all in line”; “1” for “mostly not in line”; “2” for

“somewhat in line”; “3” for “mostly in line”; or “4” for “totally in line.” To generate

the value of this indicator for each state, we average the responses from all

informants from that state.



Sub-indicator 5.4.4: To what extent were legislative outcomes of your state’s latest

legislative session in line with teacher union priorities? (1.0%)

Using a five-point Likert scale, participants were asked to rank “To what extent

were legislative outcomes of your state’s latest legislative session in line with the

priorities held by teacher unions/teacher associations?”

Each response receives “0” for “not at all in line”; “1” for “mostly not in line”; “2” for

“somewhat in line”; “3” for “mostly in line”; or “4” for “totally in line.” To generate

the value of this indicator for each state, we average the responses from all

informants from that state.

Indicator 5.5: Influence over key stakeholders (4.0%)

Sub-indicator 5.5.1: How often have the priorities of state education leaders

aligned with teacher union positions in the past three years? (2.0%)

Using a five-point Likert scale, participants were asked to rank “How often have

the priorities of the state board of education or the state education chief aligned

with the positions held by teacher unions/teacher associations in your state in the

last three years?”




Sub-indicator 5.5.2: Do unions typically compromise with policymakers to ensure

that their preferred policies are enacted, or typically need not make concessions?

(2.0%)

Participants were asked, “Some degree of compromise typically occurs in

policymaking. Understanding that, which statement do you think best describes

teacher unions/teacher associations in your state?” They chose between the

following responses:

• Teacher unions/teacher associations in my state typically compromise with

policymakers to ensure that their preferred policies are enacted at the state

level.

• More often than not, teacher unions/teacher associations in my state need not

make concessions to ensure that their preferred policies are enacted at the

state level.

Each response receives “0” for the former or “4” for the latter. To generate the

value of this indicator for each state, we average the responses from all informants

from that state.



Rationale for Area 5: How teacher unions are perceived by informed observers

on the ground offers us a unique window into their influence. Those perceptions

speak to how much influence the union wields behind the scenes and whether

policymakers (some of whom do not support union interests on principal) are

inclined to accede to union demands. All of our questions relate to state policies,

both because this study targets the activity of state level unions and because our

respondents have in-depth knowledge of politics in their jurisdictions. We chose to

query them about comparative influence; the union’s ability to protect and direct

dollars to their cause; and the extent to which existing, proposed, and enacted

policies reflect their priorities, among other areas.


Appendix B:State Level NEA and AFT Affiliates

APPENDIX B: STATE LEVEL NEAAND AFT AFFILIATES

Every state is home to at least one state-level affiliate of either the National Education

Association (NEA) or the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), often both. (Four

states are home to joint NEA-AFT affiliates: Florida, Montana, Michigan, and New York;

the District of Columbia has only an AFT affiliate.) Below we list these affiliates by

state. In this report, we include data only for these affiliated unions/associations, not for

independent professional associations unaffiliated with either the NEA or AFT.

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

Alabama Education Association n/a

NEA Alaska, Inc. Alaska Public Employees Association AFT

Arizona Education Association Arizona Federation of Teachers Union

Arkansas Education Association n/a

California Teachers Association California Federation of Teachers

Colorado Education Association American Federation of Teachers Colorado

Connecticut Education Association, Inc. American Federation of Teachers CT

Delaware State Education Association, Inc. n/a

n/a Washington Teachers’ Union (District of Columbia)

JOINT: Florida Education Association

Georgia Association of Educators, Inc. Georgia Federation of Teachers

Hawaii State Teachers Association n/a

Idaho Education Association Idaho Federation of Teachers

Illinois Education Association Illinois Federation of Teachers

Indiana State Teachers Association Indiana Federation of Teachers

Iowa State Education Association n/a

Kansas National Education Association AFT Kansas

Kentucky Education Association n/a

Louisiana Association of Educators, Inc. Louisiana Federation of Teachers

Maine Education Association AFT Maine

Maryland State Education Association AFT Maryland

Massachusetts Teachers Association AFT Massachusetts

Michigan Education Association AFT Michigan

JOINT: Education Minnesota

Mississippi Association of Educators AFT Mississippi


Appendix B:State Level NEA and AFT Affiliates

Missouri National Education Association AFT Missouri, AFL-CIO

JOINT: Montana Education Association-Montana Federation of Teachers

Nebraska State Education Association n/a

Nevada State Education Association n/a

NEA - New Hampshire AFT - New Hampshire

New Jersey Education Association AFT New Jersey, AFL-CIO

National Education Association of New Mexico AFT New Mexico

JOINT: New York State United Teachers

North Carolina Association of Educators, Inc. n/a

North Dakota Education Association North Dakota Public Employees Association

Ohio Education Association Ohio Federation of Teachers

Oklahoma Education Association Oklahoma Federation of Teachers

Oregon Education Association AFT Oregon

Pennsylvania State Education Association AFT Pennsylvania

National Education Association Rhode Island Rhode Island Federation of Teachers

South Carolina Education Association n/a

South Dakota Education Association n/a

Tennessee Education Association n/a

Texas State Teachers Association Texas AFT

Utah Education Association AFT Utah

Vermont - NEA United Professions AFT Vermont

Virginia Education Association n/a

Washington Education Association AFT Washington

West Virginia Education Association AFT West Virginia

Wisconsin Education Association Council AFT Wisconsin

Wyoming Education Association n/a


Endnotes

ENDNOTES

1 See Terry M. Moe, Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America’s Public Schools (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

2 See Randi Weingarten, “The states that actually have lots of teachers in teacher unions tend to be the states that have done the best in terms of academic success in this country,” quotation taken from ABC’s This Week, August 29, 2010. See also Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining Education (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

3 EIA Online, “Official NEA State Affiliate Membership Numbers for 2010-11,” July 11, 2012, accessed September 19, 2012, http://www.eiaonline.com/intercepts/2012/07/11/official-nea-state-affiliate-membership-numbers-for-2010-11/ and “Could AFT Membership Really Be Up?” July 31, 2012, accessed September 19, 2012, http://www.eiaonline.com/intercepts/2012/07/31/could-aft-membership-really-be-up/.

4 Moe, Special Interest. See also the earlier work of Myron Lieberman, who has written prolifically on the topic, including The Teacher Unions: How the NEA and AFT Sabotage Reform and Hold Students, Parents, Teachers, and Taxpayers Hostage to Bureaucracy (Free Press, 1997).

5 See John Chubb and Terry Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1990).

6 See Noel Epstein, ed., Who’s in Charge Here? The Tangled Web of School Governance and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

7 See, for example, Michael Berkman and Eric Plutzer, Ten Thousand Democracies: Politics and Public Opinion in America’s School Districts (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005); Henry S. Farber, “Union Membership In The United States: The Divergence Between The Public And Private Sectors,” in Collective Bargaining in Education: Negotiating Change in Today’s Schools, eds. Jane Hannaway and Andrew J. Rotherham (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2006), 27-51; Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson, and John V. Winters, “Teacher Salaries, State Collective Bargaining Laws, And Union Coverage” (paper presented at the Association for Education Finance and Policy (AEFP) Meetings, Seattle, March 26, 2011); Caroline Minter Hoxby, “How Teachers’ Unions Affect Education Production,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, no. 3 (1996): 671-718; and Heather Rose and Jon Sonstelie, “School Board Politics, School District Size, and the Bargaining Power of Teachers Unions,” Journal of Urban Economics 67, no.3 (2010): 438-450.

8 See, for example, studies examining NCLB-style accountability (Bryan Shelly, “Rebels And Their Causes: State Resistance To No Child Left Behind,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 38, no. 3 (2008): 444-468); factors that led states/districts to embrace charter schools (Michael Mintrom, “Policy Entrepreneurs And The Diffusion Of Innovation,” American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (1997): 738-770; Francis K. Shen and Kenneth K. Wong, “Beyond Weak Law, Strong Law: Political Compromise And Legal Constraints On Charter School Laws” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Philadelphia, PA, August 31-September 3, 2006); Arnold F. Shober, Paul Manna, and John F. Witte, “Flexibility Meets Accountability: State Charter Laws And Their Influence On The Formation Of Charter Schools In The United States,” Policy Studies Journal 34, no. 4 (2006): 563-587); additional school spending (Berkman and Plutzer, Ten Thousand Democracies: Politics and Public Opinion in America’s School Districts); and teacher merit pay (Dan Goldhaber, Daniel Player, Michael DeArmond, and Hyung-Jai Choi, “Why Do So Few Public School Districts Use Merit Pay?” Journal of Education Finance 33, no. 3 (2008): 262-289).

9 See Ronald J. Hrebenar and Clive S. Thomas, “Interest Groups In The States,” in Politics in the American States, eds. Virginia Gray and Russell L. Hanson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1996), 100-128.

10 Terry M. Moe, “Political Control And The Power of Agent,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22, no. 1 (2006): 1-29.

11 R. M. Carini, “Teacher Unions And Student Achievement,” in School Reform Proposals: The Research Evidence, ed. A. Molnar (Information Age Publishing, 2002), 197-216.

12 See Carini, “Teacher Unions And Student Achievement,” 197-216; Randall W. Eberts and Joe A. Stone, Unions and Public Schools: The Effect of Collective Bargaining on American Education (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984); Robert M. Carini, Brian Powell, and Lala Carr Steelman, “Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned From State SAT And ACT Scores,” Harvard Educational Review 70, no. 4 (2000): 437-466.

13 See Michael Lovenheim, “The Effect Of Teachers’ Unions On Education Production: Evidence From Union Election Certifications In Three Midwestern States,” Journal of Labor Economics 27, no. 4 (2009): 2009; Terry M. Moe, “Collective Bargaining And The Performance Of The Public Schools,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 1 (2009): 156-174; Katharine O. Strunk, “Are Teachers’ Unions Really To blame? Collective Bargaining Agreements And Their Relationships With District Resource Allocation And Student Performance In California,” Education Finance and Policy 6, no. 3 (2011): 354-397.

14 See Michael Hartney and Patrick Flavin, “From The Schoolhouse To The Statehouse: Teacher Union Political Activism And The U.S. State Education Reform Policy,:” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 11, no. 3 (2011): 251-258.

15 See William S. Koski and Eileen L. Horng, “Facilitating The Teacher Quality Gap? Collective Bargaining Agreements, Teacher Hiring And Transfer Rules, And Teacher Assignment Among Schools In California,” Education Finance and Policy 2, no. 3 (2007): 262-300.

16 Author’s own calculations, based on revenue data drawn from state-level teacher unions’ 990 forms submitted between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010, collected by GuideStar, Inc. at http://www.guidestar.org.

17 Michelle Rhee, “Why StudentsFirst Supports Teachers’ Right To Collective Bargaining,” Huffington Post, March 29, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-rhee/why-studentsfirst-support_b_842220.html.

18 Lorraine M. McDonnell, Anthony H. Pascal, “Organized Teachers in American Schools,” RAND Corporation, February 1979, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2407.html; Andrew P. Kelly, Frederick M. Hess, “Scapegoat, Albatross, Or What?: The Status Quo In Teacher Collective Bargaining,” in Collective Bargaining in Education, ed. Jane Hannaway, et al. (Harvard Education Press, 2006).


Endnotes

19 Allysia Finley, “Wisconsin’s School Choice,” Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2012, http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443995604578004392726892824.html?lpe=WSJ_PRO&mg=com-wsj.

20 Hrebenar and Thomas.

21 “Who’s Who In A Growing Education Reform Movement,” Final Working Draft, PIE network, September 2012.

22 Emily Cohen, Kate Walsh, RiShawn Biddle, “Invisible Ink In Collective Bargaining: Why Key Issues Are Not Addressed,” National Council on Teacher Quality, July 2008, http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq_invisible_ink_20080801115950.pdf.

23 Allison Kimmel, “A New Politics Of Education? The Enactment And Implementation Of Teacher Effectiveness Legislation,” BA Thesis, Harvard College, March 2012 [advisor: Prof. Martin West].

24 Stuart Buck and Jay P. Greene, “Blocked, Diluted, And Co-Opted,” Education Next, Spring 2011, http://educationnext.org/blocked-diluted-and-co-opted/.

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