Harvesting the Waters - World Bank Documents & Reports

Report No. 4984

Harvesting the Waters-A Review of Bank Expefience with FishefiesDevelopment

March 13, 1984

Operations Evaluation Department

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Document of the World Bank

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipientsonly in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disdosed without World Bank authorization.

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WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

1 short ton = 0-91 metric ton

ABBREVIATIONS

ha - hectarehp - horsepowerm - meter

ADB - Asian Development BankAGR - Agriculture and Rural Development DepartmentCP - Bank/FAO Cooperative ProgramEEZs - Extended Economic ZonesIDB - Inter-American Development BankOED - Operations Evaluation DepartmentOPS - Operations Policy StaffPCR - Project Completion ReportPPAM - Project Performance Audit MemorandumPPAR - Project Performance Audit ReportSAR - Staff Appraisal Report

GLOSSARY

purse-seiner - a fishing boat using a net which, when set to sur-round a fish shoal, hangs vertically in the wacer andis then "pursed" by drawing the footrope and bottomof the net together.

long-liner - a fishing boat which uses lengthy main-lines havingattached branch-lines each ending with one or morebaited hooks.

trawler - a fishing vessel which drags a cone-shaped net eitheralong the sea-bed or at pre-determined mid-waterdepths.

pelagic - fish living close to the surface or at intermediatedepths above the sea-bed.

demersal - fish living in very close proximity to or on thesea-bed.

fry - small fish, especially young, recently hatched fish.

fingerling - young or small fish.

hatchery - where fish are spawned and the fertilized eggshatched (produced from eggs).

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington. D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Office of DiN,esr-CAWfalOpwatiom Ewabation

March 13, 1984

EMORANDID4 TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Harvesting the Waters - A Review of Bank Experience withFisheries Development

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled"'Harvesting the Waters - A Review of Bank Experience with FisheriesDevelopment" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department.

Attacbment

| This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornancecof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

t FOR OMCwLL USE ONLY

HARVESTING THE WATERSA REVIEW OF BANK KXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTSPage No.

Preface ..... ...................................................... iKey Data on risheries Projects Audited by OED ..................... iiSummary and Highlights ......................... , v

MAIN REPORT (Part I)

I. INTRODUCTION ................... , 1

II. BANK INVOLVEMENT IN FISHERIES ............................ 2

- The Rationale for Bank Lending in theFisheries Sector .................................... 2

- The Scope of Fisheries Lending to Date .... ............ 3- Bank Lending - Intentions, Methods and Approach ... .... 4

III. EXPERIENCE WITH COMPLETED FISHERIES PROJECTS .... ......... 5

- The Completed Fisheries Project Portfolio .... ......... 5- Issues Relating to Fisheries Projects in General ...... 10- Particular Project Design Issues ...................... 13

IV. EXPERIENCE WITH ONGOING FISHERIES PROJECTS .... ........... 16

- The Portfolio ......................................... 16- Application of Past Lessons to Current Activities ..... 17

V. EXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES COMPONENTS IN OTHER PROJECTS ... 17

- The Projects Completed to Date ........................ 17- Ongoing Fisheries Components - Overall

Findings ............. ............................... 20- Issues Specific to Project Components .... ............. 22

VI. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE BANK LENDING IN THE FISHERIESSECTOR ................................................. 23

- Current Policy ........................................ 23- The Pipeline .......................................... 25- Future Lending ........................................ 28

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................... 29

IThis document has a restricd dismbuti and may be used by repicnts only in the performsnce ofoi* ocial duties. Its contents May not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoritiona.t

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)Page No.

Annexes:

1 - World Bank Lending for Fisheries Projects ........ .......... 332 - World Bank Lending for Projects tiith Fisheries Components ... 343 - Regional Distribution of Bank Lending for Fisheries ........ 354 - Projected World Bank Lending Program for Fisheries ......... 375 - Costs of Fisheries Projects, by Project Components ......... 386 - Completed Fisheries Projects - Supervision Effort as

Recorded in PPAR ................. 397 - Project Performance Data Tables, Completed Fisheries

Projects ...... ......... 408 - List of OED Reports on Completed Fisheries Projects ........ 469 - List of OED Reports on Completed Projects with Fisheries

Components ............................................... 4810 - Brandt Commission Recommendations ..... ..................... 49

BACKGROUND INFORMATION (Part II)

Supplements:

1 - Implementation Summaries on Completed Fisheries Projects ... 512 - Implementation Summaries on Ongoing Fisheries Projects ..... 1073 - Implementation Summaries on Completed Fisheries Components.. 1254 - Implementation Summaries of Ongoing Fisheries Components ... 141

Map IBRD 18143 - Location of Fisheries Projects

HARVESTING THE WATERSA REVIEW OF BANK EXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT

PREFACE

Bank Group support for the fi3heries sector, from 1969 up to mid-1983, totals US$330 million in loans and credits for 31 fisheries projects in19 countries. In the absence of a Fisheries Division within the Bank, 27 ofthese projects have come under the responsibility of the Agriculture andRural Development Department, three under the Transportation Department andone under the Education Department. In addition to these 31 fisheriesprojects, at least another 48 projects, dating from 1972, have includedfisheries components.

This report presents the findings of a desk review of Bankexperience with fisheries development. By July 1983, 14 projects from themain fisheries lending portfolio and ten projects with fisheries componentshad been audited. The record of experience, problems and achievementscontained in the relevant PPARs forms the principal basis for this overview,amplified by the appraisal reports and supervision records of ongoingprojects. The completed projects under review were appraised between 1968and 1977, and completed between 1977 and 1981.

An attempt has been made to reflect on experience with projectscontaining fisheries components, but the emphasis of the review has been onBank-supported projects dealing exclusively with fisheries.

Extensive discussions were held with Bank staff involved in Bank-supported fisheries activities and comments received on the draft report havebeen taken into account. The assistance by numerous Bank staff in updatingthe reference documentation contained in the Supplements of this report isgratefully acknowledged.

A SnUMg OF mm C1IUZMK Kln FISHERIMS DUVflPShl

ar Data oen Fisheries Prolects Audited by ago

lass/CreiteOSIID. 7Erc _et Project Cot. NtO2

Na Data Iimated lTy/A Nletiated ApprablbHMOe_ lI Actl atu Actual Audit DoncrltlonOutca.s-.

A. Agriculture

i. rauma - irmt 257b 3.4 A - 07127171 5.3i 15-22 Thu prujuct pro-ided for the bullding of 40 vesselsPieburium Project 06/2S/79 2.1 5 - 09,02/71 5.42 0 (shriap trawlerm) to replc obolets crafts. for

(Loas 7W-IS) a - 12011/71 captain training and for prupring a faiebilty studyc - 03/30/76 for a ns fisbing port. Couples tachcalCL- 10/3 1 /771C upucifiecateim ad the luitd umer of espuri

*hipbuilders reuulted in - nitil twwyur delay;delay couplud uith inflatios peruitted conetructioe of26 nasal. only at double euit costs. the anticipatudruplace_se of old eatu di nt take placs, ad the

sdsmel. Wear added to the mutattg flaet contrary toproject coneept and tbiu reselted is a rats of returnruuntiseted at ean. After some delays captai

training -ae_uccemful; th poret feaibility utudy mmcompleted on tim ant resulted In a NaIk-fian cedfiuheriun port project (Loas 1114-FAN; 0505).

2. Cena - Fisheries 2794 1.3 a - 09/221/69 2.3 50 The project prowidad for buildilg 40 ps meInrs (toProject I1212i79 1.3 S - 09/25/69 1.B/ 10 he mold am crdit). precuring *pr P-rts. tacaiceal

(Credit 163-CR) I - 01121/70 aauistance and port studisa. Project deigs. wesC - 12/31/72 subusantially ch-eegd durin apleuntatian 4ad ouly 10

CL 0*125 1 *7d bots wur uilt (ifLtlos aid dmig. changaa). lbsveumael' engines proved udurpousrud fer traulig. buttheir re-ngining vwn finncsd by the ownarathm"alve. rather than under the project. Fdollnuigdilagremment bhtweun the Borrower ad tbe anok. theeacond pbhse of the part study va_ mat filancd under

the project Ihe remaining credit procde. tare, afterprotractad diucussiona. used for spare parts. The aimeveuse (ane ank) only provide lIited landinga. butthe benfits from the spmre part pregrm mre subata_-tist. lncreaad fish pricea more thn offset Itcreedcoats resulting in high fiancial rates of retumn.

2. Iadonesia - lret 2306 3.5 A - 07107/70 4.3 26 Tbh projet cumulatd of eoutrrction of hrun facili-Fisheries ProJect 01/09/60 3.5 5 - 07/13/70 8.3 negtive ties (Ice plent, cold utars" wharf, *lipey, work-

(Credit 211-IND) * - 1/15/71 sblps. aet.) and 30 skipjack pole-and-lilne fLsaing wee-C - D6/3076 sels of 30 groom tonn each. At cmpletion all vauseluCL- 06/30/73 provided undr the project had not ben dalivrad *and

tbhe that ra, owre ineffective and substandard(de4ign flawn. poor coostrscton. indeqnte minatersec.) and as result tuna catches vu far belw, tar-

et-. The *ber facilities tare alm or lproperdesign and poorly constructed. Thu long s*ri_ of

d.lyae and iplasantation problem mrioe_ly affectedprojected viability at empletino./f

4. Ira Fshebrie 3145 12.5 A - 09/19/74 15.0 35 ThW project wee to inproee organireticul structure.

Project 091301/0 0.6 S - 10/14/71 n.a.lh U.a.Lb operational pollcl-e. serhtlng activities and ragula-(ltn 1047-IU) 1 - 04/30174 tory function of the Southern Fiaberies Company;

C - 12/31178 trainiwg traditionl fiahbemu; and credit to tradi-CL- 06/20/79/A tional and ommercial fi-bhru_ for beatu mid quLp-

snt. The project suffered frm poor organiationaldesign, lack of comiteent and letarnal conflictsbetween macsting s nclee little control mrcis_d bythe Borrwe_r and rather poamiv early supervision.lxcept for a co_eltant's study on anagement improve-sent thu project em eanntimlly not ipletented andIts main objective therefore not ahievd.

5. tDuder - Fisheri_e 3731 5.3 A - 0S903ff6 6.6 21 The project wp espocted to belp finae ad dasgl.Projact 12/23/01 3.3 S - 09/05/68 6.7/i eative cenatruction and equippitq Of 12 tee purse-r mIeirs. a(Loan 555-2C) 2 - 09/04/69 study of harbor factlitie mm alao included. Only 4

C - 10/31/74 purme-seiners woe built at imt coe double oriinlCL- 10/31i/S1i estimates. the upin of the training usechaged from

a small crew trating pogrom to construction of anon-ihore fishing scheol. Ihe project took 12 yeara to

Sapleent due to delsy in mffectivenaess lack ofinteret by poasible beneficiarl, raision ad delayin completing thb traig component and setieportantly stretching nut the cmpletion of the hsrborstudy. Only 3 vessels wer operational at empletion.ueh lover than mpected ad the resti_ated rat ofreturn is ngative.

6. Tunisia - First 3753 2.0 A - 09114/71 3.1 36 The projet a to provlde credit to fisherman for

nshArle Ftoject 12/31/a1 2.0 5 a 09/24/7l 2.9/k 43 replacement of obsolete ilahore craft by 335 fully(Credit 270-TtN) I - 05/24/72 - equippWd torised boats; institution building ad

C - 12/31/76 oera training ars an icludad. Unit enecCL- 12/31/it turned out to be uchb bhibgr dn to lack of detailed

design. delayn aid inflation. Project ecope usreduced to 190 boats: to cut costs improved dssignfeatures were elinidntd. Frequnt rnge breakd_with eauive repair time r eulted in realatne-

esog fisbhrn to buy bta. At completion. 151 betswere fully operational; 12 had sunk ad 24 werimobilied or abandoned. Pricu roe substntidalyoffsttiog lower catcbhu and higbhr coats aid therestliated economic return ia mab hibthr than at

appralFsl. Vevrthbee. loan recovery i poor.

- iii -

MRBTDIC TOM WATA SYZEM OIW MAM ERPoIDO WXnu FI3E DgigtOpy

Key Dmate - Pishrie Project. Audited by OD

la/wcredit02D Reot rt Aee_t Projct COat &OR

Imber RetMeted ey/a Eatiatd Appraienl lb_________________ fl'Date Antl flt.. Actual Audlt D-ecription/Ostem

7. People.s Dinera- 3755 3.5 A - 04110173 4.191' 30 Tbe prDoect inteadod to deelep traditional fisblng istic Republlc of 12131/81 5 /

1S - 04/12173 e.l 11 _13 m goverate by coetructlon of shore f*eilitles

YTeae - First z - 0212174 (6ODD-too cold storage and rulated iacilitiea), fishingFiasbrl-e Project C - 12/31/78 vessels. (95 Improved traditional _otorieod m*mbeal)(Credit 370-T0R9 Ce, 09/3D/l6 and snagmnt support and studile. Although the

ProeJC macsioded in bulidieg an institutionalcapability for the adnlnistration of fisberieAdevelopmet projects ad in providing fishing vesselsloe productivity turrAd out to be bhgher thenexpected* ths reults fell short of appraisalexpectatilos. Tlb sait probl- refleted defici nciasin prepratinon sd design besd - ladted knowldge ofthe sector. UtilimtiLn of abore facilities mainsLow. ieb pricing policy ed *eblenn raceeriem havalso en riously deficlint.

3. Rpublic of tbr - 4222 11.6 A - 05/15/73 18.5 22-43 The projet alSd at devloping inland .An _mrin-Philippines - 12/31/62 11.6 S - 05/21/73 18.5 20-43 flberies through credit for 60 fiahilg vmm_ , 10Pirat Piaberlee e - 12/12/73 second-hed limb carriere. and leproeemmut of 100proj et C - 06/30/79 obalete ves_la* thre ice plast end tme mtLpwm(Loan 391-n) CL- 06/23/79 rehabilltatton Of typhoon damged brackish weter

fithpoedm (4,500 ha) and fishpend lepremet anddevelopment (7.500 he). Telmicsl medstence andatudies were else Included. Coat Increaees sharplyeffected the project. Ae a remult only half tbh nueberof vemils we comtrwcted; no secord-h-ad carrirrwere acquired and only ow ice plant aSd elipway "refiseced and e loan sppliestieoo for vssel moderal-atioo uore approved. Tntl ftshpond hectsrege

developed eso in line with ppraial estimstee.On the beels of listed date only. the project-ce Isc returns at completion were estiatedto be stiafactory. The noe-quntifiable benefits ofthe project bhw been sigeifitmot including inetituitnbuilding. increr_e employment opportuoitcis. spendedheowledge of ne tchnologieo end lproved disemlnatieo through elarged xtension org-nfrtien.

9. lepublic of the 422Z 12.0 A - 05/26/76 Z3.5 20-43 This vm a cootlnutico of the first project aedPhilippi-m - 12/311H2 12.0 S - 07/02/76 26.0 2093 provided for the constructie a ds/r rehebilitton ofSoond nshoriee Z - 11/12/76 n additional 9,000 be of fibhponds. cowtroctlon of 17Project C - 04/30/1l weasels. sdification of 4 vesls into carrier and(Lon 1270-Pu) CL- 06/30/81 construction of 3 Ice plnt . o ne- slipwy. The

treed touards Imalir and le"s coatly vsmsls continueand o a reult 47 bts were constructed. Asubstantial number of *eall-r -ver-ge sin fish penedwere constructed with total hctaruge larger tbheestimatd at apprais-l (+30?). Thre iceplonte merecontructed hut on slipways. Ugh pest dwe end lloon collectins bave resulted in a negative fiancialfepwet on the onleding eney. larger trawlore arenot finaially attractive; financial returmaon newfilhponds inveetoate are no longer setiefactery. buteotine at a satisfactory level for rehabilitatedpDeds.

10. lIdonsia - 44689/ 6.5 A - 06/04/74 L2.9 34 The project had three *ubeeopoent: li) skipjack tonsFisberiee Credit 05/03/1 6.5 S - 06/14/74 16.5 29 devlopment cempls in Asbon involvin 20 pole and lioProject K - 01/0o/15 fishing bots. 2 carrier veseels and onsbore _pportilg(Credit 48D-DD) C - 06/30/179 failities; (it) 15.000 he eilkfifh and shriap peed

CL- 12/31/81 iaprowwtO to Jlava and Sooth Sulswesi; ad (iii)acquILition of 24 trwlerm for cnoperative.Objective- were ahied scept for the poor financialcentrol on operstloe and the limted number of fiebfarmers. albeit with lrger ponds. sstated (3.000rabhr then 9.000). Actual catchbe. aIthogh beloeppraisal ets tes. are stisfactory mad rapidlyincreasing. Higher prices have offet productilnshortfslls md the reeninastd eonmiec rturn Is orethan stIsfactory.

II. Faoma - SOeoed 4597 7.5 A - 04/05/77 12.6 15 Tke project provided technical assItance.Fiebhrios Project 06/30/83 4,9 5 - o4/2/77 8.3 9 dilnistrative serics and financieg for: (C)(loan 138-PAI) Z - 11114/77 contructing ten pnrs-_in_r veseals for the fismseal

C - 12/31/Il indatry; (b) contructing five new ebriep vemee aendCL- 12/31/81 rehabilitating ten old wooden ve_1-; (c) relocating

sil shriep proceeinzg plant frm mtropolitan ranmCity to the ew Yacmente fiehing port; ad (d) theintrodatien of freshwater fisb culture end oysterferiong. lTo events ld et cancelling tSS2.6 dllion:(a) the te puree-iner veesIe were purchased forsubstantially lower nit prie : aSnd b) new shrimpves_-l proved unaesry as vee-Ie rotir_ent did eetoccur sad aew coentruction would only bhoe added tostatig overcapaity. Recosatruction of wsmele ensalso curstiled to only thre Albeit witb *e_ deay.the sic shriap plants were sacesfully trafTrred toVacaeonte and ahriep proeesimng hs mubetantillyImproved s- a r eslt. The freshetr fish cultere adoyster faming components were wel sucmted e*d shriapfatalg added. inncially. the project baa bee aelzed success: the relocated shrlep proeeelng plantsare properieg. but althnugh the tan projectpur_e-_ane r hsve performed well. averag inceme pervessel baa been iuff icest. Ho_vr. the project'rate Of return was serginel.

A 9E OF UeK UPEC WMH PEUE UnLOr

cy Date.. fleberiee Prolatoe Audited by OSD

IoesCreditOUD Deport eAmt Project Cat Dot

_ber bti_t d q tt Appreal bNEWS______ _ Date Actual DatActual Au di: cr__t e___0____

a. Tr_eprt

12. Iceland - Piehins 1960 7.0 A - 10/16173 11.24 28 User thl project. the Desk helped to fieance laprove-Harbore lohebill- 03110DB 7.0/0 3 - 05/26173 20 e_ote to eov fiehirg paste s the man island oftetio Project a - 12/20173 13.55fP lCelAnd. Th project wee counted as An wergecy(Loan 941-IC) C - 0131177 opratlon after a flcbleg part a a n"rby emal 1e1 id

CL- 0331/77 hb to be evacuated d_ to a volcesic erpties. a*dfacilitl of the _*areot parr mre leufficiast forberbortis the additisal kte. The Eergecy wicherter thee mpccted ed only ac_ wart dn imedi-ately by tore account haefitted the ref g flsher-_. Te eels merba doe _-der regular istereatloicepetlttve biddla procedures bd not yet aterted whenthe Eergency ma ever. lu_ r. it _oe decided toCarry out the project. *irce the lproe mt would bevalu_ble to the Cabins bhoe tnelly uing theeherbore. *ad 1i would eal waee a an Ineurance incae of se ereptlo. 3h project mc estiesfacorilyroapleted* but dm to *nzfaiIs ther wm a catoverrun of 212S ble at the _- tiw the ecope ef tbhproject we reduced.

13. Parn_ - tahig 4618 24.00 A - 06/22/75 34.0 13 TIn project eselted In the r_ oal of abrimp laudlgFart Project 06/30/53 24.00 3 - 05127/75 47.1 7/q eadt em,ocitd facllitle tfre th r atral erea of(loan 1114-PAN) C - 09/25/75 Prame City to a ccw locatiso (Vccaot-) about 30 keC - 12/31/60 away. where lt aml provided other fisherl-relatedCL- 01/30/80 lntallatise uecb * bhrthiog, *terag aSd crketins

facilitle aSnd chip ervlciLg facilltis. The projectwe Iapleeted *xpedltoasly. aitheoa withcigsiflcnat cot overruna. MAd _m esefltredecigned. Hswver. n"s hav not devloped asepotted ad s a comaoace thre Is a subotantialredactlo in bhoesnits raclting In a low rate of returnan poor fInancail parftora e.

14. Ierintasia - 4037 6.00 A - 11/25175 27.55 30-18 The project propoaed a apanded flahiwg part withondhbibon Port 12/19/83 7.95 5 - 11/31175 26.36 0 - 1 3 1r aecill-rary cilitie dacignad to seue cub-Project Z - 06/02/76 atantlally Increesed fiah l-ading. After ame(Credit 588-NI) C - 03/31/79 dlfficulten and with conalderabl-a toe overru. an

CL- 12/31/SO cpaeded port ka baa built. Iuevr, prserutlyutilizatio of the port La greatly balo expectationsend, an a consequence. ecounic and financlal parforaneare euhetantially bhlm projectloe. initially.davelop_nt of part activities va _loucly hindered bythe Pollario war and the aseociated ecommic. pollticaland comercial dislocations. te contsianns low volumeof fieh lendlneo is ds prdirily to a majer eber toflaheriec policy (1979); all fiehing rights mcecancelled and Coveroent hbc attempted to eaotiate newagrement. bad an joiot fiahari-e d clhersearsdproccainog.

la A- Approval; 5- SIned; 1-C ffectiv C - Orginal Cloesi Data; CL- Actual Cloams Date.7i Prne Hg4hlgbht semttione of the rlcsot adIt reports.7; bait Data Sheet. bet State_nt of Lana. 06/30/77.71 Deale Data ghot. bat Stat_mnt of Credits. 06/30/78.7; Redectloe in cpep (10 rather than 40 vessels) but cubtetantial imream ian ut costs.7F eportedly project performane imprvd aima ceaplstion after praieolon of better anagement.7i Belt Date Shet (dote Iran aoke *ek to confim clocrins of loan ectount); Statent of Isaac, 06/30/79.7 The project moe ot lsplemeted d its main objective woe nt achieved.7 Dealt Date Sheot. bt Statemet of Lans, 03/31/SO.fl subsetantil coat nerru are eat vicibl h eonee of (C) effecte of deveolntioe ad (IL) liminatlon of a of

the 12 puree-ealnre and the training vessel./k Dat project _* wid down frin 335 bots to 190 kba he becw of coot overruns of 57S par boat financed.71 letludee eupplaetary credit of 0551.6 mllio.7a Devisd Estlate ced In late 1974 for eppmentary credit munec to 056.21 *lllon.

nii Pae-threuah PCL7T Of Icpo of32 53 olljet a raled (Str tt of dtc datd .ber 30. 1962)

O wc o 3 elp iet p repdu (tae o n r dae As recalculated by the audit; the PM rate of retura Is 9Z.Sa te of retur fiehins bnrthe 30 (eatisted), 0 (reestt_tod). Crcial cargo berth andapproac my IS (Estimated). 13 (PCR reeetl_atsd).

v


SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS

This review of Bank experience in the field of fisheries develop-ment (the completed and current program consists of 31 fisheries projects and48 other projects containing fisheries components) was undertaken in order torelate the lessons of experience from work already completed to ongoing andfuture lending for fisheries.

Overall, the performance of the Bank's fisheries portfolio has notbeen good. Six (46%) of the 13 completed fisheries projects were adjudged ataudit to have failed in their major objectives, or to offer uncertain ormarginal outcome. As for the fisheries components in other projects, withfew exceptions they have received scant attention and have not performedwell.

Most of the problems stemmed from technical and administrativeweaknesses in the implementation agencies, and from the Bank's limitedfisheries expertise and technical input during the design, appraisal andsupervision of these investments. Technica' preparation, especially offisheries components, was often inadequate. There was frequent failurewithin the Bank to use in-house fisheries expertise to review fisheriescomponent proposals, and to be informed of problems at an early enough stageto take appropriate preventive rather than remedial action.

The paramount lesson of experience to date is that if the Bank isto continue operating in this sector, future fisheries lending must beaccompanied by no less cohesive an approach to the sector than is the normfor other sectors. This review contains a number of recommendations to thisend. The recent appointment of a Fisheries Development Advisor is a stepforward in this direction.

Major lessons learned and other points of interest are:

- fisheries components should not be included in other projectspurely for administrative convenience if they are large enough tohave a separate identity; the reduced level of technical attentionaccorded to such components can too easily result in poor perfor-mance;

- preparation and appraisal missions should evaluate realisticallythe technical and administrative capacity of national fisheriesagencies with a view of providing for needed training and technicalassistance in projects and to avoiding unrealistic projectimplementation timetables;

- vi -

deficiencies in basic fish resource and national fisheries statis-tics should be identified during preparation and remedial measuresbe provided for in projects;

wherever the biological, sociological and economic backgroundinformation needed to design potentially successful fisheriesprojects is unavailable, needed research should be undertakenbefore project commencement or be provided for in the project;

more effective communication and liaison within the Bank -- betweendivisions, Regions and fisheries staff in AGR -- and also withCooperative Program fisheries staff and other FAO fisheries expertsis needed if past errors and inadequacies in nroject formulationare to be avoided; and

in designing fisheries projects, particularly those involving sub-components concerned with vessels design and construction, fishingport or harbor development and on-lending to artisanal or othersmall-scale fishermen, special attention should be given to therecommendations contained in existing PPARs, as summarized in thisreview.

HARVESTING THE WATERS

A REVIEW OF BANK EXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT

PART I

MAIN REPORT


I. INTRODUCTION

1.01 The Bank Group has been supporting fisheries development over thelast fifteen years. During that time (through July 1983), there have been atotal of 31 fisheries projects (see Annex 1), with more in the pipeline. Inaddition, at least an additional 48 projects, dating from 1972 or later andmainly addressing other topics, have also included mostly minor, but in somecases quite substantial, fisheries components (see Annex 2).

1.02 Audit reports are available on 14 completed fisheries projects,l/(see Supplement 1) and also on ten of the projects containing small fisheriescomponents.2/ The data and Qther information contained in these reportsform the principal basis for the present study on fisheries lendingexperience.

1.03 Assessment of the achievements of fisheries sector lending to dateindicates that the Bank has experienced numerous and varied problems but alsosuccesses during project implementation. This outcome pointed to the need,at this time, for a more systematic overview of project experience than canbe provided in individual audit reports. In this way, lessons from the past,amplified by present experience, can be more readily displayed for study andapplication to future project implementation and lending activities.

1/ Twelve of these projects were handled by agricultural divisions and two(port) by transport divisions (see Annex 1). The Iceland FishingHarbors Rehabilitation Project (Loan 941), one of the twelve"agricultural' projects, was handled by the EMENA Agricultural Creditand Agro Industries Division, initially because it was intended toinclude financing for fish processing plants.

2/ Bangladesh Chandpur Irrigation II (Credit 340), Malawi Shire ValleyAgricultural Development Phase II (Credit 363), Philippines Third RuralCredit (Loan 1010), Thailand Chao Phya Irrigation Improvement (Credit379), Chile Technical Assistance (Loan 978), India Drought Prone Areas(Credit 526), Korea Third Education (Loan 1096), Somal'a SecondEducation (Credit 511), Mexico Integrated Rural Development PIDER (Loan1110), and India ARDC II (Credit 715). See Supplement 3.

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II. BANK INVOLVEMENT IN FISHERIES

The Rationale for Bank Lending in the Fisheries Sector

2.01 The importance of fisheries worldwide and to developing nations inparticular is comprehensively described in the Bank' s 1982 Fishery SectorPolicy Paper. There is no need to repeat the conclusions of this Paper here,other than to emphasize the principal benefits to developing countries ofsubstantial employment of fishermen and ancillary workers in small-scalefisheries, and the sector's contribution to domestic food supply and tonational economies from the proceeds of exportable surplus catches.3/

2.02 FAO projections indicate that world marine fish stocks, which arenow being exploited at the rate of about 70 million tons per annum, couldsupport catches of at least 120 million tons, given better management ofalready heavily exploited resources and from more intensive fishing of otherunderutilized fish stocks. Of this potential increase, 30 million tons couldbe harvested from the shallow coastal waters of developing countries bymodernized local artisanal or other small-scale fishing enterprises. 4 1

2.03 The UN Law of the Sea Conferences over the last decade5/ haveresulted, inter alia, in the creation and international acceptance ofExtended Economic Zones (EEZs) from shore baselines. 6 / Coastal states are,therefore, now responsible for the effective management of fish and othermarine resources lying within their much extended zones of jurisdiction andfor the regulation of their exploitation. EEZs also provide many developingcountries with the opportunity to consider using such resources for their ownbenefit. These countries have looked upon the World Bank and other inter-national agencies 7 / as important sources of finance and technical assistancein enabling them to undertake the necessary expansion of their fishing capa-bility.

3/ Fishery Sector Policy Paper, Chapters 1 and 3.

4/ Review of the State of World Fishery Resources, Marine Resources Series,Fisheries Department, FAO (Fisheries Circular No. 2, March 1981).

5/ Signing by 119 countries of the convention on the law of the sea tookplace in Jamaica in December 1982.

6/ Fishery Sector Policy Paper, Chapter 2.

7/ The Asian and Inter-American Development Banks have also been active inlending for fisheries. Reportedly, ADB is also completing a specialstudy on the impact of ADB lending to the marine fisheries sector.

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The Scope of Fisheries Lending to Date

2.04 In response to the demand from developing countries for assistancein supporting their fisheries development needs, the Bank Group has alreadyfinanced 79 projects in 33 countries that are aimed wholly or in part atfisheries development. The total cost of these projects and fisheriescomponents, based on appraisal estimates, is US$961 million, of which Banklending, including IDA Credits, totals US$432 million.

2.05 The Regional distribution of Bank lending for fisheries projectsand components by number, total project costs and loan amounts, based onactual results for completed projects and appraisal estimates for ongoingwork, is detailed in Annex 3 and sunmmarized in Table 1 below. East Asla andPacific amounted for 36% of Bank lending, South Asia 22%, Europe, Middle Eastand North Africa 21%, Latin America and the Caribbean 1OZ, Eastern Africa 6;and Western Africa 5%.

Table 1. SUJMMARY OF LENDING (BY REGION) FOR FISHERIES, FY69-83

Region Fisheries Projects Components TotalTotal Bank Total Bank Total Bank

No. Cost /a Loan No. Cost Loan No. Cost Loan

(US$ million) (US$ million) (uJS$ million)

E. Africa 3 35.9 25.0 5 2.8 1.7 8 38.7 26.7W. Africa 3 52.2 15.3 5 10.9 4.6 8 63.1 19.9S. Asia 6 139.3 69.7 10 102.4 24.0 16 241.7 93.7EMENA 9 202.2 90.6 1 7.3 2.5 10 209.5 93.1LAC 4 67.5 35.8 9 25.9 8.2 13 93.4 44.0EAP 6 176.9 94.0 18 142.4 60.6 24 319.3 154.6

Total 31 674.0 330.4 48 291.7 101.6 79 965.7 432.0

/a For completed fisheries projects, total cost expressed as actual costrather than appraisal estimate; hence, slight discrepancy in total withthat shown in Annex 1.

2.06 Most of the fisheries projects financed by the Bank to date haveaddressed a wide range of needs and have set out to provide various combina-tions of fishing port and harbor facilities, fishing vessels and gear; pro-cessing, storage and marketing facilities, other infrastructure such asboatyards, workshops, access roads and fuel and water supplies; fish ponds

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and hatcheries; plus technical assistance and training. Annex 5 showsdetails of components included in individuai projects ana the overall alloca-tions to groupings of components. A summary is provided in Table 2 below.Only a few projects have concentrated on just one aspect of fisheries. Whilethere are some shifts as to the type of components financed in completed andongoing fisheries projects, it is difficult to specifically identify thesetrends, with one possible exception. Initially, substantial investments weremade under fisheries projects in vessel construction. This appears to bemuch less the case in the newer fisheries projects.

Table 2. SUMMARY OF FISHERIES PROJECT COMPONENT COSTS /a

Completed Projects Ongoing Projects Overall ProgramAmount Z Amount X Amount Z

(US$ mln.) (US$ mln.) (US$ mln.)

Vessels and Crew 41.5 22 48.6 10 90.1 13Ports and 'Harbors 68.7 36 103.7 22 172.4 26Processing and Marketing 12.5 7 5.7 1 18.2 3Other Infrastructure 15.1 8 88.2 18 103.3 15Fish Ponds 31.4 16 33.4 7 64.8 10Working Capital 1.9 1 6.2 1 8.1 1Technical Assistance 15.1 8 61.2 13 76.3 11Incidentals/Contingencies 4.0 2 136.8 28 140.8 21

Total 190.2 483.8 674.0

/a Excludes value of fisheries components in other projects.

Bank Lending - Intentions, Methods and Approach

2.07 The Bank's lending program for fisheries to date reflects aresponse by the Bank to national needs for fisheries development in certaincountries. The aim in most cases has been to increase each country's produc-tion capacity and marketing ability by various means so as to expand fishsupplies for local consumption and, in many cases, for export. However, itis clear, as has also been noted in the Fishery Sector Policy Paper, 8/ thatthe approach hitherto has been largely ad hoc. Lending has been undertakenin the absence of any clearly defined fisheries lending policy or program,without the benefit of any authoritative assessment of the potential contri-bution of fisheries to the economies of the developing world, and without

8/ Fishery Sector Policy Paper, Chapter 5, page 49.

assessment of the overall means (especially the role of the Bank) needed toachieve such potential. It is time that a more cohesive and forward-lookinglending program for fisheries be developed.

2.08 Arrangements for processing and supervising fisheries projectshave not differed from those in other sectors. Projects have been identifiedeither through national initiatives, as consequences of earlier FAO work inthe country, or as outcomes of Bank agricultural sector reviews or economicstudies. With the exception of South Asia,91 Regional offices have reliedupon the IBRD/FAO Cooperative Program and consultants to provide the expertsneeded for project preparation and appraisal.

2.09 Two fisheries specialists, located in the Agricultural and RuralDevelopment Department of OPS,JO/ have invariably been consulted duringagricultural sector fisheries project preparation and appraisal, but lessfrequently in the case of fishing projects initiated in other sectors andonly very rarely in the case of fisheries components included in other pro-jects. They have also often been called upon to assist in supervision.Fisheries projects, in line with other projects in the agricultural sector,appear to bave been allocated about 12-14 manweeks per year for supervison,approximately a third of which is spent in the field.11 / Further details onproject supervision efforts in the field are provided in Annex 6.

III. EXPERIENCE WITH COMPLETED FISHERIES PROJECTS

The Completed Fisheries Project Portfolio

3.01 Overview. A total of 14 Bank-financed fisheries projects have nowbeen completed. Twelve of these projects were undertaken by Regional agri-cultural divisions and two by transportation divisions. They were allstarted between 1969 and 1977 and completed between 1977 and 1981. PPARshave been published on all of these projects. Further details are in Annexes1, 3 and 5 and in Supplement 1.

3.02 Five projects were directed almost wholly at single objectives:the construction and distribution of new fishing vessels in the case ofTunisia Fisheries I and Panama Fisheries I; and the construction of fishing

9/ South Asia is exceptional in this regard being the only Region to haveia-house fisheries expertise.

10/ A Fisheries Advisor has only been appointed recently.

11/ In addition, of course, technical assistance allocations can be includedin project budgets to help borrowers whose technical and managerialcapability require strengthening.

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ports and harbors in the case of Iceland Fishing Harbors Rehabilitation,Panama Vacamonte Fishing Port and Mauritania Nouadhibou Fishing Port. Theremaining nine projects each provided, in varying proportions, all or most ofthe sub-components listed above (para. 2.06).

3.03 The projects having single objectives, although in theory simplerthan the more complex, multi-component projects, did not prove to be mucheasier to implement. The 'simple" projects took, on average, 1.4 years aboveappraisal estimates to complete, compared with an average 2.6-year overrunfor the "complex" projects, and an overall two-year average. On the otherhand, three out of fivel2/ 'simple' projects exceeded appraisal cost esti-mates compared with five of the eightl3/ 'complex" projects. Positive ratesof return of IO or above, as reestimated at completion, were recorded bythree out of five simple projects and four of eight complex projects.

3.04 Project Results. The list of completed fisheries projects includesexamples of performance ranging from almost total success through partialsuccess and/or failure to almost total disaster. Performance indicators com-pare outcome with appraisal estimates. These performance indicators includeproject duration, cost, rate of return and institution building effect.Indicators for 14 completed fisheries projects for which PPARs have beenissued are sulmmarized in the key data listed at the beginning of this reportand are also tabulated in greater detail in Annex 7.14/ The Iranian projectwas cancelled after five years of almost total inactivity, and this projecthas therefore not been taken into account in the analysis that follows whichis limited to the 13 remaining projects.

3.05 For seven of the 13 audited projects (or 54%), total project costswere in line with or below appraisal estimates. However, all 13 projectswere affected, to varying degrees, by serious cost escalations. Vesselcomponents were particularly affected. Cost increases for these componentscannot only be explained by the effects of the 1973 oil prices crises butalso are due to the fact that normally insufficient analysis was made of thelocal or national boat and net making industry. While in many instancesprojects caused great pressures on such local industries, these seldombenefited from technical ass'stance or other activities supported by theseprojects. In most cases, the greatly increased unit costs for fishingvessels and other equipment could only be accommodated by reducing thenumbers of boats to be provided under each project. The case of Yemen PDR

12/ Tunisia Fisheries I, Panama Fisheries I, Iceland Fishing HarborsRehabilitation, Panama Fishing Port, and Mauritania Nouadhibou Port.

13/ Ghana Fisheries, Indonesia Fisheries I, Ecuador Fisheries, Yemen PDRFisheries I, Philippines Fisheries I and II, Indonesia Fisheries II, andPanama Fisheries II.

14/ Annex 7 contains information on completed and evaluated projects as theyappear in respective Annual Review annexes (Project Performance DataTables).

Fisheries I was an exception; the Bank agreed to make a supplementarycredit,15/ thus enabling the boat construction component of that project toproceed without substantial reduction.

3.06 Worldwide, the fishing industry was particularly hard-hit by thepost-1973 oil price rises, not only because of the fuel used during fishingoperations but also, even in the case of fishermen using non-mechanizedboats, because most fishing gear nowadays is made from synthetic fibers pro-duced by the petro-chemical industry. The scale of worldwide inflationduring the 1970's could hardly have been foreseen by those responsible forplanning projects up to and including 1974, around which time nine out of 13audited projects were executed. By reducing quantities, however, costoverruns were contained. As a result, the aggregate cost overrun for the 13audited fisheries projects amounted to only 12%, a record substantiallybetter than for agricultural projects in general.16/

3.07 The 13 fisheries projects took, on average, six and one-half-yearsto implement instead of the four and one-half-year appraisal estimateaverage; but four of the projects (31%) were completed within six months oftheir planned completion dates. The most common cause of time overruns wasdifficulty and delay in procurement and in recruitment of project personnel,reflecting in some cases administrative constraints in the executing agenciesconcerned and in other cases a degree of over-optimism at appraisal bysetting unrealistic time targets.

3.08 As shown in Annex 7, seven17/ of the 13 completed and auditedprojects (54%) had satisfactory rates of return, ranging from 10% to 46%, asreestimated at the time of completion. Two projects were marginal with ratesof return at audit of 7% and 9%118/ and four projects (31%)19/ werecalculated at audit to result in negative or zero rates of return. Onlyfour20 / projects were calculated at completion to have achieved rates of

15/ Original credit amount, US$3.5 million; supplementary credit, US$1.6million.

16/ Average cost overrun for agricultural projects reviewed in the NinthAnnual Review, 16%; in the Eighth Annual Review, 26%; and the SeventhAnnual Review, 29%.

17/ Ghana Fisheries, Tunisia Fisheries I, Yemen PDR Fisheries I, PhilippinesFisheries I and II, Indonesia Fisheries II, and Iceland Fishing HarborsRehabilitation.

18/ Panama Fishing Port and Panama Fisheries II, respectively.

19/ Panama Fisheries I, Indonesia Fisheries I, Ecuador Fisheries andMauritania Nouadhibou Port.

20/ Tunisia Fisheries I, Philippines Fisheries I and II, and Iceland FishingHarbors Rehabilitation.

return as good or better than their appraisal estimates. Thus, just overhalf of the projects were judged worthwhile at completion. The projectdisappointments21 / amount to 46% of the number of projects reviewed, cer-tainly worse than the record of the agricultural sector as a whole (around20%) but not much worse than results in the livestock subsector.22/ Thereare many factors which explain these results (para. 3.15).

3.09 Projects, however, continue beyond completion of the investmentphase and changes can take place subsequent to completion which in some casescan substantially alter the audit conclusions. For example, IndonesiaFisheries I had a negative reestimated rate of return at audit; but about twoyears later, project performance had improved considerably as a result ofmore effective local management and better motivation for fishing vesselcrews. However, no impact evaluations of fisheries projects have been madeto date by OED and in the absence of other data the audit results will remainthe only performance indicators (see also para. 5.04).

3.10 On the basis of judgements made in PPARs as recorded in OED'sAnnual Review Project Performance Data Tables (Annex 7, page 5), institutionbuilding was rated substantial in four cases.23/24/ Two of these casesinvolved national development banks concerned with the administration andsub-lending of project funds. Thus, only in two cases -- Yemen PDR andIndonesia Fisheries - did the fisheries administration responsible for guid-ing the development and regulation of their respective fishing industriesbenefit significantly from institution building efforts undertaken as part ofthe fisheries projects.

3.11 Project Execution, Management and Supervision. The diversity ofthe sub-components (paras. 2.06 and 3.02) greatly increased project complex-ity and compounded the difficulties of project management and supervision,especially when considering the commonly experienced weakness of nationalfisheries administrations and the general shortage of skilled technicalstaff. Even though project complexity is not unique to fisheries projects(many agricultural projects encounter complex technical, economic, institu-tional, political and social issues), it may occur here more frequently sinceinstitutional structure and political support is probably less than for

21/ Marginal, uncertain or unsatisfactory projects (see Ninth Annual Reviewof Project Performance Audit Results, OED Report No. 4720 datedSeptember 16, 1983, Volume I Chapter III).

22/ See Ninth Annual Review op. cit. Volume II, paras. 5.97-5.107.

231 Philippines Fisheries I and II, Panama Fisheries II and Panama FishingPort.

24/ Institution building was rated partial in four cases (Ghana, Ecuador,Yemen PDR I and Indonesia II) and negligible in one case (IranFisheries); no judgements were made for the remaining five projects.

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agriculture in general. Projects of such a wide and varied nature imposeparticularly heavy demands on expertise during project preparation and imple-mentation, necessitating unusually large, multi-disciplinary missions thatcould include, in addition to economic, legal and financial expertise, amarine biologist, port engineer, naval architect, fish processingtechnologist/systems engineer, a mechanical engineer, gear technologist ormaster fisherman, a training/extension specialist, a fisheries statistician,a business management expert, an international fish marketing expert and asociologist. In reality, it has never been possible to field such teams, andit is possible, therefore, that project quality may have suffered on occasionin consequence.

3.12 The Bank musters very little in-house technical expertise infisheries. Recently a Fisheries Development Adviser was appointed; twofisheries technologists have been with AGR for some time, and in the Regionsonly South Asia has three fisheries specialists. The Bank's ability to pro-vide continuity of expert staff input during project formulation and imple-mentation is, therefore, limited. In practice, the Bank has relied heavilyon outside experts (consultants and staff of the IBRD/FAO Cooperative Pro-gram) for fisheries project preparation, appraisal and to a lesser extent,supervision.

3.13 Project performance does not necessarily depend on the adequacy oftechnical skills provided during supervision. Nevertheless, it is clear thatin most cases had the Bank been able to provide more relevant experience dur-ing supervision, the Bank would have been better informed about the natureand origin of problems as they arose and better able to help borrowers dealwith them.

3.14 The inability of national development banks and national fisheriesadministrations or agencies to manage fisheries projects expeditiously andefficiently has been a severe constraint in many cases. Preparation andappraisal missions have frequently been over-optimistic in appraising manage-ment capacities and have failed to adequately provide project estimates forthe necessary training of local staff and for the provision of importedskills to fill the gap until local staff could take over, Philippines Fisher-ies I being a notable exception.

3.15 Common Problems Experienced with Fisheries Projects. Reference hasbeen made to the range of problems experienced in the course of implementingthe fisheries lending program. The kinds of problems which have occurred, insome cases repeatedly, can be categorized as follows:

(i) Cost escalation especially from 1973 onwards, affecting mostprojects and in particular boat building (Panama I, Tunisia I,Ecuador, Yemen PDR I, Philippines I) and port construction (Panamaand Mauritania).

(ii) Fish catches lower than appraisal estimates, resulting frominadequate resource information, insufficient attention to level ofexploitation, or over-optimistic appraisal estimates about catches

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aud fishermen's capabilities (Panama I and II, Indonesia I,Ecuador, Tunisia I, Philippines I and II).

(iii) Government actions detrimental to project aims, such as changes inGovernment fisheries policy (Mauritania), price controls (Yemen PDRI25/ and Panama II).

(iv) Design faults in harbor construction (Panama Fishing Port).

(v) Poor construction and inadequate maintenance of shore facilities(Yemen PDR I and Indonesia I).

(vi) Poor construction of boats, causing delays while defects were beingrectified (Indonesia I).

(vii) Design faults in boats, discovered after entering service, such asinadequate carrying capacity for economic use (Ecuador),insufficient power (Ghana), and wrong type of engine (Tunisia I).

(viii) Poor project management, caused by local institutional inadequacy(Indonesia I, Yemen PDR I, Ghana and Iran) or lack of trained localpersonnel (virtually all projects).

(ix) Delays in procurement (affected most projects).

(x) Delays in recruitment (affected many projects, especially YemenPDR I, Philippines I and Ecuador).

(xi) Non-compliance with covenants (Panama II, Yemen PDR I and Iran).

(xii) Faulty record keeping and failure to comply with Bank procedures(affected most projects, at least initially).

(xiii) Poor rate of sub-loan repayment, a common and major problem(Tunisia 1, Yemen PDR I, Philippines I and II).

Issues Relating to Fisheries Projects in General

(a) The Nature of Fisheries Projects Compared with OtherSectors

3.16 Review of the audited portfolio confirms that the Bank has expe-rienced numerous and varied problems with many of the fisheries projects dur-ing implementation. The range, and at times intensity, of these problems hasgiven rise to a frequently expressed view by many staff (very few of whomhave any fisheries background) that fisheries projects per se are especially

25/ The price regime was relaxed somewhat toward the end of the projectperiod largely as a result of the dialogue between IDA and Governmentcarried out during supervision and preparation of the follow-on project.

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difficult to administer. While understandable, it would be unfortunate ifsuch adverse views about fisheries led to a reluctance to engage any furtherin this admittedly complex but challenging area of investment.

3.17 The pattern of fisheries project "starts" which rose to a peak inthe late 1970's has since declined (see Annex 1). The very small number ofpipeline projects (see Annex 4 and paras. 6.08-6.10) under active consider-ation for new starts between now and 1986 could well be a consequenceof this lack of enthusiasm, although, limited in-house expertise and the lackof a focal point for advice and coordination has probably also contributed tothis situation.

(b) Project Formulation

3.18 A number of audit reports draw attention to inadequacies in theprocess of project identification, preparation and appraisal, and theseaudits focus most frequently on the limited range of relevant technicalexpertise deployed at these times. In addition, three audits (Indonesia I,Panama Fishing Port and Mauritania Fishing Port) suggest that not only wasthere insufficient technical input but even that the limited inr-housefisheries expertise available to the Bank was not fully utilized. The twofishing port audits stress the need for all fisheries and fisheries-relatedprojects to address, at a minimum, five related issues:

- the resource and its level of exploitation;

- the market and its capacity to absorb increased catches at realis-tic prices;

- the fleet, fishing gear and fishermen's levels of competence;

- the port and/or other infrastructure needs; and

- Government policy and institutional capability.

3.19 It is clear that unless all the relevant technical, institutional,financial and economic issues pertaining to a particular project proposal arefully covered during preparation and appraisal, the project is unlikely toperform satisfactorily or to attain its targets. Thorough preparation cannotguarantee success, but it can at least minimize the risk of failure. Theaudit record indicates that project formulation is too often undertaken bymissions containing insufficient expertise, working to timetables that some-times allow insufficient time to do the job properly.

3.20 The Bank, as noted earlier, has very little in-house technicalexpertise in fisheries and relies heavily on outside experts to fill thisgap, especially during preparation. It would, of course, be better iflocally available knowledge and experience could be used for preparation.However, in most countries, the fisheries administrations are also weak intechnical capability, and although they do contribute, their ability to do sois limited. The IBRD/FAO cooperative program also has only two in-house

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fisheries technologists, and given the budgetary and time constraints thatfrequently are imposed on preparation studies, it does not necessarily followthat preparation by CP includes all the technical inputs that the wide rangeof FAO staffing and experience, especially in its Fisheries Department, couldmuster and which ideally should be deployed for such studies.

(c) Project Management and Supervision

3.21 Project management, which is a borrower's responsibility, has notalways been as effective as it should be, especially not in such cases asYemen PDR I and Indonesia I where the projects were under the direct controlof the local fisheries administrations. As noted earlier, such organizationsare often weak in technical, administrative and particularly managerialskills, and as government departments, they are vulnerable to day-to-dayshifts in political direction which can often be arbitrary and, not infre-quently, perverse. Projects which were managed by national development bankswere, on the whole, managed rather better; yet even they were not immune tosudden and sometimes detrimental changes in government policy. An examplewas the decision by Panama to subsidize its poultry industry at the expenseof the catchers and processors of pelagic fish for fishmeal.26/

3.22 Institution building under certain projects has been quite effec-tive, especially in relation to strengthening national development banks. Sofar, however, relatively little effort has been directed at the fisheriesadministrations, despite the inclusion of technical assistance components ina number of the projects. Not infrequently, project management has sufferedbecause of conflicts between the sub-lending agency and the local fisheriesdepartment, as in the cases of Tunisia, Iran and to a lesser extent thePhilippines. When these difficulties occured, they placed a much heavierburden on Bank supervision in technical as well as financial matters but, asstressed in several audit reports, supervision has also not been as effectiveas it should have been, particularly as regards technical coverage. Annex 6analyzes supervision effort in the field" for the 14 audited projects, asrecorded in basic data sheets of PPARs. It shows that the Bank devoted anoverall average of 4.3 field man-weeks per annum to each project but only 0.9man-weeks per annum of fisheries expertise which, given the range of problemsexperienced, hardly seems to be sufficient.

3.23 Some borrowers, for example Ghana and Indonesia, expectedsupervision missions to be an additional source of managerial and technicalguidance and were disappointed by what they saw as a lack of continuity and adeficiency in technical supervision.27f Supervision missions cannot, of

26/ The domestic price of fishmeal was controlled at levels well belowinternational prices and the export of fishmeal was also prohibiteduntil domestic demand was satisfied.

27/ This finding is not necessarily unique to fisheries projects.Nevertheless, institutional weaknesses make such support more desirable.

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course, accept responsibility for project management, which must remain withthe borrower, nor can they compensate for deficiencies in managerial experi-ence and technical skills. Where such deficiencies exist, technical andmanagerial guidance should be provided on a more regular basis by includingsufficient short-term consultancies under the project.

Particular Project Design Issues

(a) Selection and Design of Fishing Vessels

3.24 Nearly one-third of fisheries lending to date has been directed atthe design, construction and sale of fishing vessels to fishermen, often withthe aim of replacing obsolete craft and modernizing the fleet. Most of theearlier projects (Ecuador, Ghana, Tunisia I and Panama I) were almost solelyintended for this purpose, and many of the others included substantial vesselconstruction components. It is not always clear how decisions were arrivedat concerning the choice of vessel design or engine specification. The aim,in most cases, was the production of a standard vessel, to be built in quant-ity under contracts awarded after international competitive bidding, and atwhat were expected to be significantly lower unit costs and better standardsof construction than would be possible if a series of one-off orders wereplaced with different boat yards.

3.25 The trouble is that nearly every fisherman has his own idea aboutvessel specification, even in artisanal fishing communities. Therefore,unless the standard design is based on very thorough analysis by a qualifiedand experienced naval architect of fishermen's needs, likes and dislikes,fishing methods, local sea-going conditions, kinds of boats fishermen areaccustomed to using and engine servicing and spare parts supply, etc., it iseasy to end up with a design that satisfies nobody. If such an analysis isnot made at the outset of a project, the slightest mishap will destroy anyremaining confidence and negate the whole purpose of the project. Tunisia Iand Ecuador were prime examples of this, and to a lesser extent Ghana andPhilippines I.

3.26 A lesson to be learned, in cases which involve supplying fishingvessels, is that if there is to be any departure from existing vessel design,the need for such changes should be unequivocally established before proceed-ing with any large-scale construction program, and fishermen's acceptance ofthe new design features should be thoroughly studied, preferably with proto-types for trial by fishermen.

(b) Provision of Credit and Arrangements for Sub-LoanRepayments

3.27 Providing loans in cash or in kind to fishermen, particularly toartisanal fishermen, has given rise to more difficulties than has any otherarea of fisheries development - not only in the Bank-financed projects under

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review, but generally. Host countries with flshing industries have estab-lished fisherman credit schemes of one sort or another and almost withoutexception have experienced difficulties with repayments and high rates ofarrears or default.

; :8 Although there is no easy answer, there are some aspects to thefisherman's way of life that ara not always appreciated and taken intoaccouxt, some rules of thumb exist, which can be of assistance, but they areoften not applied. The main points to conslder are these: the fisherman Isperinatetic and has to move to wherever the fishing is best. His earningsderive from daily, or at least very frequent, sales of highly perishablecatch and amount on each occasion to only a very small proportion of thecapital value of his boat and flshing gear (usually the object of any out-standing loan). Unlike the farmer, he rarely If ever has a substantialamount of cash on hand at any one time. Furthermore, his earnlngs will fluc-tuate widely from one season of the year to another depending on seasonalchanges in the abundance of fish. Finally, his earnings depend on his goingto sea each day, and a day ashore - for whatever reason - costs him a day'sincome.

3.29 Thus, if the lending agency seeking repayment is to maintainday-by-day contact with Its clients, It must also become peripatetic and beflexible as to the frequency and amount of repayment Installments. Mobilebank branches, making frequent visits to fish landing sites, or sub-branchesestablished at several local fish markets where small daily or weekly pay-ments can be received at different places and recorded centrally, would be apositive and realistic response to the flsherman's situation. All too oftenthere is rigid Insistence that regular, seai-annual Installments be paid atthe office holding the particular account, requiring fishermen to make longland journeys, sometimes at the loss of two or three days' earnings. TunisiaI was an example of the Incompatibility of the fisherman's way of life andstandard banklng procedures, and although the situation was different, PanamaII was an excellent example of the rapport which can be established betweenbanker and fisherman when the bank Is prepared to establish a presence on thefisherman's home ground.

(c) Fishing Port and Harbor Projects

3.30 Expenditure on fishlng port and harbor development accounted for32X of completed project costs for the projects under revlew. Two of theprojects involving such expenditure were handled by Bank transportationdivisions, and a further seven were under agriculture. Harbor works in agri-culture projects have frequently been carried out without reference totransportation staff even In the same Region and have, therefore, lacked the

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benefit of their experience.28/ Conversely, port projects handled bytransportation units have received little or no input from the Bank's ownfisheries staff. These deficiencies in staff deployment are unfortunate andneed to be prevented in future projects. All harbor works requiresubstantial specialist civil engineering expertise to avoid costly e-rors andminimize problems such as wave erosion and siltation, but must also take fullaccount oil the needs and practices of the fishermen, fish traders and otherswho are to use the new port facilities. This can only be ensurDd byinvolving sufficient fisheries expertise during project planning andimplementation.

(d) Fisheries Resource and Exploratory Fishing Surveys andFisheries Statistics

3.31 The state of knowledge about fish resources in project areas andtheir levels of sustainable yield has been raised as an issue quite fre-quently during project preparation and appraisal because future economic per-formance depends largely on the ability to forecast catches. This ability inturn depends on the country's organizations, physical resources and scienti-fic capacity in studying the resources, calculating biomass and productivityand thereafter monitoring the impact of progressive increases in fishingeffort until the stage of maximum sustainable yield is reached.29 / Very fewdeveloping countries have the scientific staff or equipment to do this jobproperly, and in many cases have relied on FAO or bilateral programs to per-form the task on their behalf. Nevertheless, the future well-being of thefishing industries in these countries depends on their developing this abi-lity to do these studies for themselves.

3.32 Catch forecasting is difficult. Furthermore, a number of envirol-mental variables can also influence catch rates, over and above fishingeffort. Also, there Is an international dimension to the movement of fishresources. The response of the Bank projects to this consideration has beeninadequate, even in cases where it was raised as an issue. Whenever studieswere begun they were later discont'nued because of cost or complexity. Therewere fishing survey components in the Philippines I and II Fisheriesprojects; however, they were to bc wholly locally funded, no technicalassistance was provided and the surveys were never implemented. The FisherySector Policy Paper (page 55) also points to the need for substantiallyincreased support for various types of fisheries research programs. Suchresearch should be organized regionally as well as nationally. The Bank, as

28/ A similar conclusion was also drawn in the internal review of fisherieslending prepared for the Transportation Department.

29/ Resource monitoring is critical. In certain cases, ignorance of thishas caused projects to further deplete resources beyond the renewableyield level.

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an international institution, is well placed to provide for coordination ofregional and international dimensions making maximum use of already experi-enced institutions such as FAO and certain bilateral aid agencies.

3.33 The whole process of fisheries resource evaluation and monitoringalso depends on the existence of a reliable system foor the collection andanalysis of basic fisheries statistics covering catches and fishing effort.Too often statistical coverage is inadequate and its reliability suspect.Yet so far, very little attention or financial resources have been directedat improving national fisheries statistics in any of the Bank-funded proj-ects.

3.34 The development of reliable statistics is also a matter of consi-derable ilportance for project evaluation purposes,3O/ insofar as projectsmay aim at increasing fish production or improving vessel utilization ratesand fishing efficiency, etc. Reliable data are needed to assess projectresults and to provide sound basis for planning future fisheries development.

IV. EXPERIENCE WITH ONGOING FISHERIES PROJECTS

The Portfolio

4.01 The current fisheries portfolio (as of July 1983) contains 17 onr-going fisheries projects, three of which - Burundi Fisheries, TanzaniaFisheries I and Maldives Fisheries I - are on the verge of completion. Threeof the projects - Egypt Fish Farming, India Inland Fisheries and BangladeshOxbow Lakes - are aimed primarily at fish breeding and commercial-scalefarmed fish production and are the first projects to concentrate on thisaspect of fisheries development, although a number of earlier projects, not-ably in the Philippines, have included aquaculture as a component. TheBurundi project, and part of the Tanzania project, concern freshwater capturefisheries on Lake Tanganyika, and parts of the Kenya project concern fisher-ies on Lake Victoria and fish farming development. Philippines FisheriesTraining and Yemen PDR Fisheries III provide for much-needed training toovercome critical manpower shortages at professional and technical levels andpractical training for artisanal fishermen. The fishing port project inSenegal is exceptional in that it is the only remaining project directed atproviding facilities for industrial-scale marine fishing. The remainder of

30/ A good example is provided by the Ghana project. First, when furtherdata became available it was found that project purse-seiners wouldcontribute to depletion of pelagic stock. Second, after the decisionwas made to transform project vessels for trawling, annual catch levelshad to be revised downwards, making the fishing effort less profitable.

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the program has small-scale and artisanal marine fisheries development as itsprimary objective. Details of ongoing work are provided in Annexes 1 and 3and implementation summaries of each project are included in Supplement 2.

4.02 Problems of much the same range and nature as have been experiencedin the completed portfolio continue to be experienced in the group of ongoingprojects. The most serious problems concern the inadequacies of some localand national agencies to provide effective project management. Although Bankmissions are now making more realistic assessments of national administrativecapacity, particularly in cases of follow-on projects where they can drawupon the experience gained during earlier work, there still seeas to be atendency to set over-optimistic timetables. Preparation and appraisal mis-sions should be directed to give more critical attention to the question oflocal managerial potential especially in new@' countries.

Application of Past Lessons to Current Activities

4.03 An encouraging number of cases can be identified where lessonsgained from audited projects are being applied to more recent ongoing work.For example, the Second Fisheries Project in Tunisia, benefiting from theexperience of the First project, has established from the outset a more pre-cise working relationship between the two main agencies involved, which wassadly lacking previously. As a result, sub-loan administration has becomemore effective, and a clearer understanding has been reached by all concernedas to the bona fides and qualifications of sub-loan applications. A moreflexible approach has also been adopted with regard to fishing vessels pro-curement, allowing fishermen to choose the yard where their boat is to bebuilt and encouraging the fishermen to exercise a degree of supervision dur-ing boat construction.

4.04 The Third Fisheries Project In the Philippines has taken up thelesson from earlier experience regarding the need to strengthen the technicaland administrative capability of the existing agencies. The Third FisheriesProject in Yemen PDR is also addressing the need for trained fisheries staffat all levels - an aspect that was lacking from the two earlier projects andwas consequently detrimental to performance.

4.05 The record indicates that, despite continuing problems in dealingwith fisheries matters, the Bank's secto= portfolio is somewhat improving.

V. EXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES COMPONENTS IN OTHER PROJECTS

The Projects Completed to Date

5.01 A total of ten audit reports (Annex 9 and Supplement 3) are avail-able on completed projects that have included, among other provisions, a

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fisheries component. Two of the projects (Bangladesh Chandpur II and Thai-land Chao Phya I) addressed irrigation development; two more were educationprojects (Somalia Education II and Korea Education III) and included provi-sion for fisheries training, mainly at the technical level; five projects(Malawi Shire Valley II, India Drought Prone Areas, Philippines Rural CreditIII, India ARDC II and Mexico PIDER) concerned improving agriculture incertain areas and included small-scale capture fisheries and fish farmingcomponents; the last project was a technical assistance exercise in Chile,which originally included but never implemented a substantial fisheriescomponent.

5.02 The Second Chandpur Irrigation project in Bangladesh proceeded asfar as the post-appraisal stage before any consideration was gJven to thelikely effect of the flood control works on already existing capture and fishfarming operations. No fisheries expertise was included in any of the mis-sions and the project was not referred to the Bank's own fisheries expertsfor comment and advice. Following appraisal, the Borrower's FisheriesDirectorate became concerned and a survey by a consultant of the fisheriessituation was commissioned, which confirmed that the livelihoods of some3,000 local fishermen would be jeopardized by barriers placed across fishspawning migration routes. The study proposed the establishment of fishbreeding centers to assist in maintaining the riverine fish population andother measures to help the fishing comaunities at an estimated cost ofUS$0.45 million. In the event, the IDA Credit was not increased but theequivalent of US$0.2 million in local funds was included in overall projectcosts for this purpose. Unfortunately, no effective precautions were takento ensure that even a minimal level of work was undertaken. Shortage oflocal funds resulted in the small fisheries component not being implemented,with disastrous consequences for all the fishermen concerned and theirfamilies.3 1/ However, as a direct result of this experience, a similarfisheries breeding component was subsequently included in a successor, nearbyirrigation project (Bangladesh Karnafuli Irrigation). Supervision recordsindicate that this component was implemented, albeit rather late for thefishermen affected by Second Chandpur Irrigation project.

5.03 The First Chao Phya Irrigation Improvement project in Thailandincluded the maintenance and development of fish production among its objec-tives and as far as can be ascertained from the records, about US$0.2 millionwas included for the establishment of fish fry centers and restocking work.Once again, this project was not referred to the Bank's in-house fisheriesstaff for comment. As there is no information on this component in the PCR,it is doubtful whether this component was executed, and if so, whether anybenefits were derived from this effort.

5.04 Tne three agricultural projects in Malawi, India and the Philip-pines produced better results. The Second Shire Valley project in Malawiexceeded almost all the appraisal expectations for fisheries development andmay quite reasonably be regarded as having been a success despite minimAlfisheries expertise input during preparation and supervision. As it happens,the fisheries administration in Malawi is particularly strong, and this no

31/ For further details see the Appendix of Supplement 3.

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doubt contributed substantially to project results.32 / The fisheries com-ponent of the Drought Prone Areas project in India likewise benefited manymore people than estimated at appraisal and contributed to the establishmentof 41 fisherman societies and a moderate increase in annual fish production.In the Philippines, the Third Rural Credit project was to assist small- andmedium-scale farmers, including fish farmers and fishermen; it achievedmodera:e success as regards the fish farming component. A number of loansfor small fishing craft (up to 20 tons) were also financed under the project,but the precise impact is unknown because of the lack of any monitoringsystem for sub-loans at that time. Under the Mexico PIDER and India ARDC IIprojects, financing for fisheries was also included, but in both cases it wasonly a small component.33/ No monitoring and evaluation data are availableto assess impact of the Mexico PIDER fishing component, either. A studyundertaken in a district of an Indian state indicated that fishing withmotorized vessels (financed under the ARDC project) was fully satisfactory.

32/ Recently an OED impact evaluation mission visited the Shire Valley andalso reviewed the fisheries activities there (Impact Evaluation Report,Malawi: Lower Shire Valley Agricultural Development Projects (Credit114, 363 and 823-MAI) OED Report No. 4850 dated December 23, 1983,paras. 3.14-3.16). "The development of the fishing industry receivedemphasis in both Phase II and Phase III of the project. Up and down theriver landing sites and beaches were constructed, improved smoking kilnserected and fishermen trained in new techniques. Boats built of plankswere introduced to replace the traditional dugout, for which timbex.wasnow remote, scarce and expensive. Credit facilities were provided toenable fishermen to buy improved gear and plank canoes. Procedures werealso successfully implemented to sample catches more accurately, thusimproving estimates of production. Much of the work done by the Fisher-ies Section during the last two phases of the project is impressive.There are many visible, tangible structures, but there is also, lessvisible and tangible, the emergence of a new spirit among fishermen. Insome ways they have been given a new dignity and a significance withinthe local and national economies which they did not previously have andwhich, quite noticeably, has given them a sense of pride. Unfortuna-tely, despite the development of the impressive physical and socialinfrastructure, catches have declined somewhat. In the main this is dueto the difficult water regime with which fishermen have had to contend.Their gear and their knowledge and skill are at advantage when the riveris rising or falling. High and relatively stable water conditions donot suit their mode of fishing. For some years now, river levels, main-tained by the high level in Lake Malawi itself, have remained relativelystatic through the wet and dry seasons. The unfortunate failure toappoint a research officer early in Phase III to develop new gear forsuccessful fishing under the water conditions now prevailing hasimpeded, until recently, the introduction of new techniques."

33/ Less than 1% of total project costs under the Mexico PIDER project andaround 4.5% of total project costs under the India ARDC II project.

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5.05 The Technical Assistance project in Chile was intended to promoteinvestment studies in industry, transportation, nutrition and fisheries,which were regarded by Government as high priority matters. However, in 1973there was a change in Government and, as a consequence, policies and priori-ties changed and the fisheries component34/ - previously some 30% of Banklending for the project - was deleted, with Bank concurrence.

5.06 Two remaining projects were directed at educational development inSomalia and Korea. The Somalia project included provision for relocating,equipping and staffing a marine and fisheries training institute inMogadishu, for pupils at roughly junior high school level, to be trained overfour years for subsequent service in Somalia's merchant fleet, fishingindustry and fisheries administration. Considerable implementation delayoccurred, and as noted in the PCR, many of the facilities provided wereeither not being used or were in an unsatisfactory state of repair. Moreimportantly, a subsequent fisheries manpower needs study in Somalia, organ-ized by PAO and undertaken around 1980/81, concluded that actual needs werevery different from those around which the project had been designed and thatmajor changes ia curriculum, entry qualifications and specializations wererequired. Fisheries staff in the Bank were not involved at any stage in theimplementation of this project.

5.07 All of the fisheries components mentioned above have been small interms of cost, involving specific Bank lending of no more than US$2.0 millionin any one case, and considerably less than that in most cases. However, inthe case of the Third Education project in Korea, the fisheries componentcosts were US$8.4 million and accounted for nearly US$3.0 million of the Bankloan. This component was as large or larger than a number of fisheriesprojects then in the main lending portfolio and thus poses the question:should it not have been dealt with as a separate fisheries education project?

5.08 The Korea Education project was implemented fairly expeditiouslyand institutional performance was noted as being good. A fisheries expertwas in the field for four weeks during preparation and appraisal but did notreturn during the course of implementation. Information on the fisheriestraining facilities component is scant in most records. It is thus difficultto assess the project's impact in meeting the fishing industry's needs fortrained manpower.

Ongoing Fisheries Components - Overall Findings

5.09 The group of ongoing projects containing fisheries componentsamounts to at least 38 projects. Projects containing fisheries componentscan be classified on the basis of their major activities as follows:

34/ The original component included two subprojects. One was for theexploration and development of shrimp-like fish called krill which areabundant between the southern part of Chile and the Antarctic region.The other was to finance a research fishing vessel.

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Rural Development/Area Development . ............. 18Agricultural Credit ... .. ....... ................... 8Irrigation, Drainage and Hydro-electric ......... 5Urban Development and Tourism ...* ............... 3Others35/ ..................................... 4

Total ........................................ 38

These projects are listed in Annexes 2 and 3 and further details are providedin Supplement 4. In some cases, the fisheries component has a direct linkwith the other parts of the project. For example, the Wildlife and Tourismproject in Kenya provided for, among other things, tourist and wildliferesearch activities, including the establishment of a Wildlife and FisheriesTraining Institute comprising a number of departments, one of which was forfisheries staff training. One of the urban development projects36/ providedfor the relocation of a fishing harbor complex away from the immediate urbanenvironment as part of a regional development plan. The Agro-industry proj-ect37/ also provided funding for fish processing along with other processingactivities. Irrigation and hydro-electric projects, because of the directimpact of barriers and other engineering components on existing fish andfishing populations, also included fishing components. But although the linkwas direct, the components were normally small.

5.10 For the remainder, particularly the large groups of Rural Develop-ment, Area Development and Agricultural Credit projects, the inclusion offisheries components appears to have been motivated more for administrativeconvenience than for substantive links or technical reasons. In some ofthese cases (for example, Philippines Fourth Rural Credit, Indonesia FirstRural Credit, Mexico Seventh Agricultural Credit, the series of IndianAgricultural Refinance and Development Corporation projects, and the Philip-pines Third Livestock and Fisheries project), the fisheries component itselfwas large enough to have warranted separate treatment.

5.11 It is not yet possible to arrive at definite conclusions regardingperformance and impact of these 38 components, as the projects are stillongoing. However, examination of the project implementation summaries inSupplement 4 gives rise to some concern. While fisheries was listed amongthe projects' objectives in all cases, a number of appraisal reports containlittle information or analysis of the fisheries situation. Supervisionrecords, in many instances, contain little or no reference to the fisheries

35/ Includes a small rural activities project and an investment promotionproject in Senegal, a research project in Indonesia and a processingproject in Korea.

36/ Korea Secondary Cities. An audit of this project is being completed andthe PPAR is expected to be distributed in a few months.

37/ Korea Second Agricultural Products Processing.

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components. This raises questions on how much attention was devoted to thesefisheries components during preparation and their implementation.38/

5.12 Reportedly, hardly any of the projects with fisheries components(listed in Annex 2) were referred to the Bank's own fisheries experts andonly very rarely was there any fisheries staff involvement in supervision,with the exception of South Asian projects which benefited from Regional inrhouse expertise. This lack of attention to fisheries components is especial-ly worrysome in the case of irrigation schemes because of their potential fordamaging fish stocks and fishing interests.

5.13 AGR has a computerized data base from which it is relatively easyto identify fishery components in agricultural and rural developmentprojects. However, there is no systematic data collection system forcompiling information on fisheries components across sectors. This in itselfmakes the management and application of Bank expertise in this fielddifficult. After compiling the list of 48 projects containing fisheriescomponents for purposes of this review, OED's attention has been drawn toother projects with fisheries components. For example, a series of threeloans to the Republic of Korea Long Term Development Finance Corporation(Loans 735, 905 and 1461) did uot separately identify sub-lending forfisheries at appraisal. However, they supported substantial on-lending toKorean fishing companies for vessel construction and other fisheries-relatedactivities.39 / Others, such as Spain Ports I and II (Loans 429 and 884),have included works that also benefited the fishing industry, as have theKainji Multipurpose Hydroelectric projects in Nigeria (Loans 383 and 572).Almost certainly, therefore, the listing in Annex 2 is incomplete. However,the number of project components covered is large enough to enable conclu-sions to be drawn. But a more systematic assessment of Bank lending forfisheries development would require a more comprehensive sector operationsdata base than is now available.

Issues Specific to Project Components

(a) Technical Input During Project Formulation and Implementation

5.14 The greatest area of concern arising from the record of projectcomponents to date is the minimal use of fisheries technical knowledge andexperience. The Fisheries Development Advisor and the two fisheries specia-lists in AGR function as in-house consultants in support of Regional staffwho may be considering or overseeing the implementation of fisheries projects

381 This is not unique. The situation for fisheries components inmulti-disciplinary projects is similar to that of other minor componentsin projects; they are frequently given little or no attention by theborrower and/or the Bank during implementation.

39/ IDF projects pose particular data collection problems as onlending deci-sions are taken during implementation, and it is therefore difficult atappraisal to predict with certainty if a particular IDF project will beinvolved in onlending for fisheries. A recent review of the IDF lendingportfolio by the Fisheries Development Advisor identified about US$32million for fisheries development.

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or components. It is difficult to see why their considerable experience infisheries worldwide is not applied to all Bank lending for fisheries develop-ment, beginning at the outset of the project and continuing at intervalsthroughout project implementation. If these experts are unavailable, use canbe made of the fisheries expertise available under the IBRD/FAO CooperativeProgram or in FAO; or failing that, of consultants.

5.15 Although fisheries components in projects clearly require technicalsupport, the evidence to date shows that such components, like other minorcomponents in multi-disciplinary projects (see para. 5.11, footnote 40),generally receive only scant attention.

(b) Special Consideration for Irrigation and Other Water Use Projects

5.16 Although the use of fisheries expertise for advice and guidanceshould apply to all fisheries components of projects, whether they be orient-ed towards agriculture, transportation, education or any other sectoral acti-vity, this is particularly necessary in the case of irrigation or other pro-jects affecting water use because of their potential for damage to existingnaturally occurring fish stocks and, as a result, the fishing communitiesthat depend on such stocks.

5.17 To prevent another situation from developing similar to the onedescribed in the Second Chandpur Irrigation PPAR (para. 5.02; see alsoSupplement 3, Appendix), all further water use projects should proceed toappraisal only after a thorough investigation of the consequences for localfishing communities is made. Adequate provision to safeguard fishermen'sinterests or to compensate them for the loss of their livelihood should beincluded in projects wherever adverse consequences are identified.

gc) Components versus Separate Projects

5.18 Most fisheries components are small. Nevertheless, Annex 2 clearlyshows that a significant number of them involved substantial expenditure.Bank funding for fisheries components range from US$0.1 million to more thanUS$18 million. Under the India Agricultural Refinance Corporation loans andvarious, rural credit and agricultural credit loans to Indonesia, Portugal,Mexico and the Philippines, packaging was done because the loans were beingchanneled through a single organization for onr-lending for a variety of agri-cultural, livestock, fish farming and capture fisheries purposes. Adminis-tratively, it may be more convenient to process one loan than a multitude ofloans to the same entity. As pointed out earlier, however, a consequence ofthis packaging has been to weaken the Bank's contribution to project planningand supervision, especially in terms of technical input.

VI. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE BANK LENDING IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR

Current Policy

6.01 The Bank's position regarding future fisheries sector lending isset out in the Fishery Sector Policy Paper which states, inter alia: 'Thenew strategy will be followed only in those situations where developing

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nations themselves desire to develop fisheries as part of their developmentstrategy and seek the Bank's assistance in the fisheries sector. It assumesthat sufficient flexibility exists to include fisheries projects and fisher-ies components in the Bank's lending programs for individual countries."4 0/

6.02 This "new strategy' refers to a trend in fisheries lending whichhas developed over the last few years: a shift in emphasis from industrial-scale fisheries to financing inshore and predominantly small-scale fisheries,with the aim of increasing the flow of benefits to artisanal and small-scalefishing communities and raising their standards of living. Attention willfocus on improving small-scale fishing efficiency and productivity by: (i)applying modern fishing gear technology; (ii) providing fishing vessels withimproved design and performance features; (iii) providing ice-plants, freez-ing facilities, cold storage and transport to minimize spoilage losses and totransport surplus marketable production quickly to consumption centers withthe least possible loss of quality; and (iv) providing properly designed andstrategically located wholesale and retail fish markets to streamline distri-bution to the point of sale. In some cases, intermediate fish processingfacilities will be required, e.g., for drying and/or smoking fish to servemarkets which prefer that type of product, and occasionally there will be aneed for centralized facilities to channel surplus production into exportmarkets.

6.03 Careful consideration will have to be given to the organization,management and maintenance of all these operations and to ancillary activi-ties such as boatbuilding, fishing gear supply and manufacture, fuel, spareparts and service supply, etc. In each case, the respective roles of indivi-dual entrepreneurs, larger-scale private investment, cooperatives and state-financed enterprises will have to be identified and an appropriate blendestablished to avoid the dangers of undue reliance upon a single approach.Inherent in all this is the need to assess the availability and competence ofall levels of manpower and skills involved and to establish what additionaltraining is needed and what level of short-term expertise is to be importedto cover the period until local expertise can take over.

6.04 Many, if not most, of the countries concerned will have made someprogress already in developing their fisheries, adhering in some cases to alogical sequence of development actions, recognizing that certain informationmust be gained from preliminary studics and other tasks before progressing tothe next stage of development. In other cases, poor advice or refusal toaccept advice has resulted in disjointed and premature actions with adverseconsequences. The needs, therefore, will vary widely from one country toanother, and the Bank has recognized that its response to country requestsmust be based on thorough analysis of each particular situation and that thiswill require time, a substantial outlay of finance and expertise and the needfor close consultation and cooperation with other international and bilateralagencies involved with fisheries development in the countries concerned.

6.05 The Fishery Sector Policy Paper acknowledges that the exploitationof any renewable natural resource, such as fish, must be based on exhaustivestudy and understanding of the resource, its size and the various natural and

401 Fishery Sector Policy Paper, 1982, page 54, para. 4.

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introduced factors that impinge on its regenerative capacity. It is alsorecognized that fish stocks extend beyond the jurisdiction of singlecountries and, in many cases, range widely across oceans. The Bank, there-fore, must continue to support national, regional and international researchprograms that address the resources available to developing countries forcapture or farm fisheries and to examine the extent to which such resourcescan be exploited or developed through the expansion of aquaculture to includenew species, new areas and new breeding techniques, etc.

6.06 Over and above research of a biological and technical nature, theFishery Sector Policy Paper recognizes the need for sociological and economicresearch to support fisheries development planning for the coastal artisanaland rural communities in developing countries. The customs, cultures, andmotivations of such communities and their interrelationships with the moreadvantaged sections of country are important factors that must be taken intoaccount in the design of projects and sub-components to minimize the risk ofresistance to the introduction of new techniques and equipment, to ensurethat the new technologies are relevant to their needs and abilities, and topromote their understanding and acceptance of measures that may have to beintroduced in the interests of resource management.

6.07 In at least implicit recognition of the fact that some of the ear-lier attempts to promote fisheries development were not prepared as compre-hensively as they might have been, the Bank in its Fishery Sector PolicyPaper has now defined the range of considerations that will be applied duringthe formulation of new projects in the future, and has thus set the scene fora more professionally-directed lending program to come which, while unable toguarantee the attainment of all objectives, can at least safeguard borrowersfrom some of the earlier misjud-ements and disappointments.

The Pipeline 41/

6.08 The Brandt Commission Report of 1980 stressed the important rolethat increased fish consumption could have in reducing hunger and

41/ OED data collection for the preparation of this report was mainlyconducted during the summer of 1983. The section on the pipeline hasbeen updated to reflect information having become available since. Someprojects, in the pipeline when this report was prepared, have, in themeantime, been approved. For example, the Sri Lanka Rural DevelopmentIII Project, approved by the Board in May 1983 (Credit 1363-CE), wouldimprove fish marketing and input supply by providing for a servicecenter to supply ice and space for the sale and servicing of fishingequipment and supplies. Beacon lights would be installed on six on-shore locations. A feasibility study would be made for the improvementof a landing facility. A training component is also included under theproject, and the Ministry of Fisheries would be strengthened by provid-ing additional staff, transport and equipment (SAR No. 4377-CE datedApril 18, 1983, paras. 3.23-3.24).

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malnutrition as well as increasing employment (Annex 10). In response, theBank42/ indicated its support for these objectives and also noted the risingtrend towards focusing on lower income groups. It was estimated at that timethat the Bank might be lending some US$200 million for fisheries annuallyover the next five-year period. In fact, the magnitude of lending forfisheries has been much lower. The Fishery Sector Policy Paper 4 3 / talks ofestimated Bank funding of US$540 million for the same peri 1. ProjectedWorld Bank lending, as estimated at that time, is listed in Annex 4. Infact, even this lending program44/ was optimistic. Instead of the 17projects listed in that lending program, the most recent monthly operationalsuimmary45/ lists only four fisheries projects, although a few more are underco.aderation (para. 6.09):46/

- Somalia Fisheries (Negotiations substantially completed). Pilotproject to support small fisheries development including financingof infrastructure and processing facilities; financial and tech-nical assistance to artisanal fisheries.47/

42/ Brandt Commission Recommendation No. 11 -- Developing an Action Programto Increase Food Output in Low-Income, Food-Importing Countries duringthe 198 0's, Memorandum to Executive Directors dated September 26, 1980(R80-294).

43/ Fishery Sector Policy Paper, 1982, page 53.

44/ This program was compiled in early 1982 and is now out of date, butefforts to keep the fisheries subsector lending program up-to-date haveonly recently begun. While it is relatively easy to identify fishingcomponents (projects) among agricultural and rural development projects(especially once they are approved, as they are then entered into an AGRcomputerized data base), it is much more difficult to compile suchinformation from other sectors.

45/ Monthly Operational Summary of Bank and IDA-proposed projects(SecM84-126 February 14, 1984).

461 In addition, two projects listed in that operational summary indicatedthey contained fisheries components: Sri Lanka Rural Development IIIand Seychelles Port/Land Reclamation (includes improvement of fishingports) and Thailand Agricultural Support Services (strengthening ofthree departments - land development, fisheries and livestock - of theMinistry of Agriculture and Cooperatives).

471 In the notice of intention to negotiate a US$11.6 million credit for aFisheries Exploration/Pilot Project, circulated to the Board (IDA/SecM84-6 of January 9, 1984), the project was described as follows: 'Themain objectives of the project are to (a) test critical assumptions forthe development of the artisanal fisheries in the project area; (b)determine the feasibility and financial viability of offshore commercialfishing of a variety of pelagic species in the northern Somali waters;and (c) develop an institutional framework for long-term public andprivate sector activities in fishing through the operation of an autono-mous enterprise." Board presentation of this project is scheduled formid-March 1984.

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- Zambia Fisheries (Appraisal Report being prepared; post-appraisalmission in the field). Improvement of fish production systems andmarketing channels.

- Bangladesh Fisheries II (Appraisal mission tentatively scheduledfor September 1984). To assist in the development of the brackishwater shrimp culture industry and to provide a foundation forexpanded future development of aquaculture.

- Morocco Fisheries (Preparatory studies underway). Development offishing fleet and related port infrastructure, support services tofishing industry and marketing facllities.48/

6.09 On the basis of details regarding projected Bank lending (Annex 4),reinforced by information from monthly operational summarles, discussionswith staff and other sources, the situation, by Region, regarding pipe-line49/ development can be summarized as follows.

- Eastern Africa has two projects under active consideration: one inSomalia concerning primarily artisanal-scale fisheries developmentalong the north coast of Somalia, centered in the port of Berbera,and another in Zambia focussing on linking some of the more remoteminor lake fisheries with the 'Copper Belt' towns where there is asubstantial demand for fish. Earlier project ideas about afollow-on project In Tanzania, and a fisheries project in Zaire areat this stage less likely to be pursued. However, further workmight be undertaken in relation to shrimp and tuna development inMadagascar. Furthermore, the Seychelles project mentioned abovewill contain a fisheries component.

- Western Africa has no projects under active consideration. Theearlier-identified Cape Verde Fisheries/Shipping Project has beenreplaced by the Praia Port Project (Credit 1322, approved in early1983) with only a minor component for fish fleet berthing. How-ever, possibilities for an aquaculture/lagoon fisheries project inIvory Coast are being explored. Further, reconnaissance work mightbe undertaken in Mauritania, Guinea Bissau and Gabon.

- Latin American and the Caribbean has no projects under active conrsideration. An earlier-identified fisheries project in Mexico isno longer under active consideration.

- EMENA has ldentified a large number of possible fisheries projects,but many are at this stage uncertain. A considerable amount oftime and money has already been spent in preparing the Moroccan

48/ However, the future of this project is uncertain given serious budgetaryand resource constraints (serious overfishing and depletion ofpractically all stocks).

49/ Relates to major fisheries projects only; components are difficult toidentify at this stage.

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project, vhich would cover fishing harbor improvements and Inshorefishing; the project has yet to reach the appraisal stage and facesmany critical issues which are yet unresolved.

- East Asia and the Pacific has no speclflc flsherles projeccs underactive consideration.

- South Asia is identifying a Second Inland Fisherles Project, anda brackish water fisheries project In India in additlon to theSecond Fisheries Project in Bangladesh under preparation.

6.10 A somewhat paradoxical situation has thus developed. The project-ed number of fisheries projects has been declllng just when the Bank wasmaking efforts to Increase Its fisheries expertise.

FuLure Lending

6.11 Although the Bank Is not the only agency involved in providing sup-port for fisheries development, the current Bank fisheries program does notreflect the potential in the developing world for expansion of thelr fishingindustries. Excluding component projects, the addltional projects wouldincrease the number of countries served by the Bank's fisheries lending pro-gram to 24. This is only a small proportlon of the total number of develorIng countries that have access to fish resources, even though, as noted Inthe Fishery Sector Policy Paper,501/ the Bank does not antlcipate that all ofthe countries having such cccess will necessarily wish to promote thedevelopment of their flsheries much further, at least at this stage.

6.12 The Inshore waters of the developing world - as Indicated by FAO -are capable of contributing an additional 30 million cons of fish per annumto world supply. Based on flgures quoted In PPARs or on the most favorableassumptions, incremental production resulting from B'-tk-financed fisheriesprojects completed to date has amounted to less than 1uO,OO0 tons per annum.Philippines I was assessed to have produced some 28,000 tons and PhilipplnesII perhaps a slailar amount. Other projects because of their nature, such asfishing ports, did not contribute directly to licreased catches and theremallng projects produced much smaller quantities. The total program ofcompleted, ongoing and prospective projects is, therefore, not likely to conr-tribute more than about 200,000 tons, or less than 1Z of the potential.

6.13 Although the overall scope is vast, the majority of developmentneeds and opportunities will concern small-scale fisheries and wlll comprise,therefore, large numbers of quite small projects. One consequence is that Infuture even more fisheries projects may have to be Included as components in

501 -There is no expectation that all countries that have fishery resourceswill wish to develop them further. However, in those sltuations whereresources and markets are favorable, and where interest in suchdevelopment exists, the Bank stands ready to provide assistance.Fishery Sector Policy Paper, 1982, page 9.

-29 -

larger package loans. The issue already raised of ensuring adequate prepara-tion and supervision of the components in such cases is thus a critical onefor future fisheries lending.

6.14 The Fishery Sector Policy Paper declares that the Bank stands readyto provide assistance when requested, but that the Bank should not take anactive role in promoting fisheries activities in developing countries.Although this neutral stance is coupled with an explicitly assumedflexibility in lending programs to accommodate requests when presented (seequote in para. 6.01), the likelihood in this context is that fisheriesprojects, no matter how good, will only be financed if there happen to begaps in the country program, and that the total fisheries program will thusremain small.

6.15 Much of the Bank's past lending in fisheries has resultedA from theBank's own initiatives, via country sector review and project identificationmissions. Bearing in mind that the fisheries administrations in most devel-oping countries are small and poorly staffed, such identification and reviewactivities would need to continue if Bank lending for fisheries is not todwindle even further. Although more in-depth knowledge of the sub-sector,perhaps through country-specific fisheries sub-sector reviews, is probably aprerequisite for further lending of signifYcance, the passive stance of theFisheries Policy Paper toward future lending suggests that this essentialpre-investment work is not in prospect.

6.16 Many fisheries projects have an international dimension. The Bank,as an international institution, is particularly well placed to deal withthese issues, although so far this has only been done haphazardly. In theprocess of dealing with these issues, the Bank might find it useful todevelop a much closer collaboration with FAO, which has considerableexperience with regional and international fisheries matters such as thecoordination of national activities within regional fisheries managementprograms.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.01 Although more completed fisheries projects and components haveachieved a creditable proportion of their original aims and objectives thanis generally perceived, the overall performance of the fisheries portfoliohas not been good.

7.02 Virtually all of the problems encountered can be traced back totechnical and managerial inadequacies in the countries concerned, and to thelack of a cohesive Bank approach to the sector coupled with a shortage ofin-house fisheries staff. Consequently, complex projects have not receivedadequate technical study by the full range of experts which is needed duringpreparation and appraisal. Supervision has also been frequently deficient inthis respect.

7.03 Is the importance of fisheries to the economies of developingcountries such as to warrant continued Bank involvement in fisherieslending? The Bank's Fishery Sector Policy Paper considers Bank involvement

- 30 -

to be justified. However, experience to date suggests that continuedinvolvement is justified only if the Bank is prepared to accord the samelevel of professional consideration to the formulation and supervision offisheries lending as it does to other sectors. A start in this direction hasbeen made with the recent appointment of a Fisheries Development Adviser inAGR.

7.04 The very small numLer of fisheries projects in the pipelinescheduled for commencement between 1983 and 1986 does not adequately reflectthe potential for small-scale fisheries expansion in the inshore waters ofdeveloping countries. A more cohesive and forward-looking program ofsub-sector review and project identification would need to be developed incollaboration with FAO and other international and bilateral agencies iffuture operations are to be more significant; but this does not appear to bein prospect at this time.

7.05 Up to now, comparatively little effort has been made in promotingnational capabilities in fisheries resource assessment and resource manage-ment. Indeed a number of projects have been initiated in the absence ofsatisfactory evidence as to resource availability, and although such studiesand exploratory fishing have been included in project provisions, they haveusually not been fully implemented. Future lending should place moreemphasis on upgrading national fisheries research capabilities and on thecreation in national fisheries administrations of units capable of convertingresearch results into effective and enforceable fisheries management systems.

7.06 Inherent in the establishment of fisheries management is the needfor improving the reliability of national fisheries statistics. Futurelending should place particular emphasis on this as well as the country'sability in carrying out surveillance over their EEZ and enforcing themanagement and regulatory systems which they must develop in order to protecttheir fisheries resources from being pirated and depleted by both their ownand foreign fishing fleets.

7.07 A number of recommendations and other proposals to improve thefuture performance of Bank lending for fisheries, assuming that it is to con-tinue, have been made in this review. Specific recommendations in additionto those made in the paragraphs above can be summarized as follows:

(i) the Bank should develop a cohesive sub-sector review program insupport of its future involvement in fisheries operations and afirm decision regarding the scope of these activities is required(paras. 6.01, 6.14, 7.03 and 7.04);

(ii) all proposals for fisheries lending, whether in the form of mainprojects or components, should be referred to the FisheriesDevelopment Adviser in AGR for review and advice, irrespective ofsize, cost or initiating sector (paras. 3.15 and 5.13);

(iii) as most proposals for irrigation,51 / drainage or hydro-electricdevelopments have implicit or explicit effects on fisheries

51/ Tubewell irrigation, for example, can be excluded.

- 31 -

development, they would also need to be referred to the FisheriesDevelopment Adviser, whether or not they contain a fisheries comr-ponent (para. 5.15);52J

(iv) supervision missions responsible for projects containing fisheriescomponents should make specific reference to the component'sprogress in their reports; such missions should also include afisheries expert at reasonable intervals (para. 5.13);

(v) the newly appointed Fisheries Development Advisor should ensurethat all in-house expertise relevant to fisheries projects istapped as appropriate (paras. 3.15 and 3.27);

(vi) the newly appointed Fisheries Development Advisor should ensurethat technical input by FAO Fisheries Department staff, in projectdesign and preparation in particular, is arranged as appropriate(para. 3.17);

(vii) preparation and appraisal missions should evaluate the status offish resources in project areas and the reliability of localfisheries statistics, and in cases where there is a lack ofknowledge, more specific provisions for resource survey work,exploratory fishing trials and improvement of statistical systemsshould be provided for (paras. 3.29 and 3.30);

(viii) preparation and appraisal missions should give particular attentionto institution building of national fisheries agencies and tomaking provisions for technical assistance, importing expertise andtraining local staff as may be necessary. Such institutionbuilding objectives should not be limited to the execution of theproject but should include building viable institutions for themanagement of the sub-sector as a whole (paras. 3.18, 3.29 and3.30);

(ix) projects proposing use of fishing vessels different from typesalready in use in project areas should make a clear case for devia-tion in design; new designs should only be proposed on the basis ofthorough and professional study of local conditions and users' pre-ferences, to minimize the risk of non-acceptability. Ideally,these studies should take place under a Project Preparation Faci-lity and result in pilot testing before the project is appraised(paras. 3.22 and 3.23).

52/ AGR is developing a modus operandi in this respect.

S -?

/ og;- :::sep - ,/,,g /<

-33 - ANNEX 1

HARVESTING THE WATERSA REVIEW OF BAwK EXPERIENCE RITtH FIS ES DEVELOPsSNM

WORLD BANIK LENDING FOR FISHERIES PROJECTS

Total/b Total/c TotalYear (FY) Year (FY) Loan/Credit Project Bank Projected Actual/d.Approved Completed Region /a Country Number Nme Lending Cost Cost

- -(US$ million)-

A. AGRICULTURE SECTOR FISHERIES PROJECTS

1969 1980 LAC Ecuador Ln. 555 Fisheries 3.8 6.6 6.71970 1978 WA Ghana Cr. 163 Fisheries 1.3 2.3 1.81971 - EAP Indonesia Cr. 211 Fisheries 3.5 4.3 8.31972 1979 ENENA Tunisia Cr. 270 Fisheries I 2.0 3.1 2.9

1977 LAC Panama Ln. 784 Fisheries I 3.1 5.3 5.41973 1981 EMMA Yemen PDR Cr. 370 Fisheries I 5.1 6.2 6.2

- 1979 EAP Philippines Lu. 891 Fisheries I 11.6 18.5 18.51974 1977 ENENA Iceland Ln. 941 Fishing Harbors 1.4 11.3 13.5

1981 EAP Indonesia Cr. 480 Fisheries Credit 6.5 12.9 16.91975 1979 ENEA Iran/e Ln. 1047 Fisheries 0.6 18.0 2.11976 1981 EAP Philippines Lu. 1270 Fisheries II 12.0 23.5 26.0

- E Burundi Cr. 626 Fisheries 6.0 8.6 -1977 1981 LAC Panama Ln. 1398 Fisheries II 4.9 12.6 8.3

- EA Tanzania Cr. 652 Fisheries I 9.0 12.4 -- SA India Ln. 1394/Cr. 695 Gujarat Fisheries 18.0 38.0 -

1978 - SA India Cr. 815 Andhra Prad. Fish. 17.5 36.5 -1979 - EMENA Tunisia Ln. 1746 Fisheries II 28.5 67.5 -

- EMEMK Yemen PDR Cr. 932 Fisheries II 10.0 32.0 -- SA Bangladesh Cr. 890 Oxbow Lake Fisherles 6.0 7.5 -- SA Maldives Cr. 907 Fisheries 3.2 3.9 -

1980 - EA Kenya Cr. 1051 Fisheries 1 10.0 14.9 -- ENENA Yemen AR Cr. 1025 Artlsanal Fisheries 17.0 30.3 -- SA India Cr. 963 Inland Fisheries 20.0 40.8 -

1981 - EMENA Egypt Cr. 1111 Fish Farming 14.0 26.3 -1982 - EAP Philippines Ln. 2156 Fisheries III 22.4 36.6 -

- EAENA Yemen PDR Cr. 1274 Fisheries III 6.0 21.4 -

1983 - SA Haldives Cr. 1320 Fisheries I$ 5.0 12.6 -

254.5 513.9

B. TRANSPORT SECTOR FISHERIES PROJECTS/f /g

1975 1980 WAP Mauritania Cr. 588 Fishing Port 8.0 27.5 26.4LAC Panama Ln. 1114 Fishing Port 24.0 34.0 47.1

1977 V WA Senegal Lu. 1405 Fishing Port 6.0 24.0 -

38.0 85.5

C. EDUCATION SECTOR FISHERIES PROJECTS

1975 - EAP Philippines Ln. 1786 Fisheries TrainiUg 38.0 70.6

GRAND TOTALS 330.5 670.0

/a ZAP - East Asia and Pacific; LAC - Latin America and the Caribbean; WA - Western Africa; EHENA - Europe,Middle East and North Africa; EA - Eastern Africa; SA - South Asia.

/b Actual amounts lent for completed projects, approved amounts for the rest.

/c Appralsal estimates.

/d Audit/PCR estimtes.

/e Project cancelled In 1979 after several years of inactivity.

If The 1974 Iceland Fishing Harbor Rehabilitation Project was not included in the transportation sector becauseorlginally It also contained provision for fishing processing development and was, therefore, handled byEMENA's Agro-industries division.

A number of the other agriculture sector fisheries projects include provision for fishing port studies andlesser harbor works.

-34 -

ANNEX 2

HARVESTING THE WATERSA REVIEW OF RANK EXPERIENCE wITH FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT

WORLD BANK LENDING FOR PROJECTS WITH FISHERIES COMPONENTS(USS million)

Total TotalYear Year/a & Loan/Credit Project Bank Flaheries Component

Approved Completed Re1ion Country Number Project Name Cost Lending Total Bank Loan lb- -- ------- USS $tn--- -

1972 1980 SA Bangladesh Cr. 340 2nd Chandpur Irrigation 47.5 13.0 0.2 nil1973 1979 LAC Chile tc Ln. 978 Technical Assistance 5.25 5.25 nil nil

1979 EA Hleant Cr. 363 2nd Slahre Valley Agric. 13.0 10.5 0.3 0.21978 EAP Thailand Cr. 379 Chao Phya Irrtgation 16.6 5.5 0.2 0.1

1974 1981 EA India Cr. 526 Drought Prone Areas 102.7 35.0 1.5 0.51979 EAP Philippines Lna 1010 3rd Rural Credit 43.9 22.0 4.0 2.01981 SA Somalia Cr. 571 2nd Education 11.9 7.9 1.0 0.7

1975 1981 EAP Korea Ln. 1096 3rd Educttion 47.5 22.5 8.4 2.9- EAP Korea Ln. 1070 Secondary Cities Reg'l. 25.0 15.0 14.7 10.3- EAP Thailand Ln. 1149 Phitsanulok Irrigation 257.0 95.0 0.1 0.1

1983 LAC Mexico Ln. 1110 Integr'd. R:ral Dev't. II 294.5 110.0 0.1 0.11976 - SA Bangladesh Cr. 631 Rural Development I 24.7 16.0 0.7 0.5

- SA Bangladesh Cr. 605 Karnafuli Irrigation 30.3 22.0 3.3 1.8- EA Kenya Ln. 1304 Wildlife & Tourism 36.4 17.0 1.2 0.5

1977 - EA Rwanda Cr. 668 Rural Development 23.3 14.0 0.1 0.1- EAP Phtlippines Lu. 1399 4th Rural Credit 91.3 36.5 14.6 5.8- WA Nigeria Ln. 1455 Agric. Dev't. Ayangba 114.0 35.0 2.3 0.7- WA Nigeria Ln. 1454 Agric. Dev't. Lfsia 85.0 27.0 0.5 0.2- LAC Hexico Ln. 1462 Rural Dev't. III 255.0 120.0 0.5 0.2- EAP Thailand Ln. 1468 Chao Phya Irrigation II 112.0 55.0 0.2 0.1

1981 SA India Cr. 715 2nd Agric. Ref. Dev't. Corp. 583.0 2(0.0 10.0 3.41978 - EA Malavi Cr. 823 Shire Valley Consolidatlon 12.6 10.7 0.2 0.2

- EAR Indonesia Cr. 827 1st Rural Credit 60.0 30.0 14.5 7.3- WA Ghana Cr. 1009 Volta Regl. Agric. Dev't. 49.8 29.5 0.3 0.2- WA Senegal Cr. 991 Small Rural Projects 14.1 11.0 0.1 0.1- EENEA Portugal Ln. 1603 Agric. Fisheries Credit 256.5 70.0 7.3 2.5

1979 - SA India Cr. 947 3rd Agr. Ref. A Dev't. Corp. 1005.0 250.0 32.8 8.2- LAC Argentina Ln. 1761 Yacyreta Hydroelectric 3781.0 208.2 0.1 0.1

1980 - EAP Indonesia Cr. 946 Yogyakarta Rural Dev't. 19.0 12.0 0.4 0.3- EAR Indonesta Ln. 1840/Cr. 1014 Nat. Agricultural Research 101.5 65.0 11.6 5.5- EAR Thailand Ln. 1816 Agricultural Credit 1 37.6 19.0 4.8 2.4- LAC Mexico La. 1891 7th Agricultural Credit 1179.9 325.0 11.7 3.2- EAP Philippines Ln. 1894 3rd Livestock & Fisheries 140.7 45.0 57.7 18.5- EAP Korea Ln. 1758 2nd Cwangju Regional 154.8 65.0 7.1 4.0

1981 - EAP Korea/d Ln. 1851 2nd Agrtc. Products Processing 83.8 50.0 - -- LAC Brazil Ln. 2015 Piaui Rural Develop'r. 84.4 29.0 2.8 1.0- SA Bangladesh Cr. 1184 2nd Drainage & Flood Control 41.4 27.0 0.4 0.3- LAC Mexico Ln. 2045 3rd Integr'd. Rural Dev't. 505.7 175.0 9.0 3.1- WA Senegal La. 1973/Cr. 1136 Investment Promotion 17.9 6.5 7.7 3.4- EAP Malaysia Ln. 1899 Kelantan Land Schemes Rehab. 70.2 25.0 0.6 0.2- EAP Malaysia Ln. 1957 Roapin-Endau Area Dev't. 141.0 40.0 0.2 0.1- SA India Ln. 1097 Kandi Watershed 60.8 30.0 0.7 0.3- SA Sri Lanka Cr. 1079 2nd Rural Develop't. 50.0 33.5 0.5 0.3

1982 - LAC Brazil Ln. 2177 Maranhao Rural Dev't. 122.2 42.7 1.2 0.4- EAP Malaysia La. 2147 Malacca Agric. Dev't . 76.4 25.4 1.8 0.6- SA India Ln. 2095/Cr. 1209 4th Agric. Refin. 6 Dev. 2086.2 350.0 52.3 6.7

1983 - LAC Peru Ln. 2219 Alto Mayo Rural Bev. 84.0 30.0 0.5 0.1- EAR Malaysia La. 2220 Kedah Valley & Agric. Dev't. 195.1 56.9 1.5 0.4

12650.5 2945.5 291.7 101.6

/a Audited by OED.

/b In most cases. Bank lending for the fisheries component is not quantified separately, and the figures are thereforeestiates based on appraisal report references.

/c Chile: Technical Assistance origtnally included provision for fisheries studies. but this was deleted by Chileanauthorities during implementatton.

/d Korea: 2nd Agric. Products Processing contains provision for onlending to Eisheries along with other agro-industrialactivities, but no spectfic allocation earmarked at appraisal.

-35-

ANNEX 3

ARVESITING THE WATERSA REVIEW OF DANK EXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES DEVELOPMEINT

REGIONAL DISTRIDUTION OF DANK LENDING FOR FISHERIES FT 1969-1983(USS millions)

Project/aApproved/ Component Dank

1. EAST AFRICA RECION (CompLeted) Cost Contribution

(a) Main ProjectsBurundi - Fisheries Development 1976 8.6 6.0Tanzania - Fishertes Development 1976 12.4 9.0Kenya - Fisheries 1 1960 14.9 10.0

35.9 25.0

(b) Component ProjectsMslavi - 2nd Shire Valley Agric. 1973/(1979) 0.3 0.2Somalls - 2nd Education 1974 1.0 0.7Kenya - Wildlife Tourim 1976 1.2 0.5Rwanda - Rural Development 1977 0.1 0.1Hal-wl - Shire Valley Conaolidat-on 1978 0.2 0.2

2.8 1.7

2. WESTERN AFRICA REGION

(a) main ProjectsGhana - Fisheries 1969/(1978) 1.8 1.3Mauritania - Nouadhibou Fishing Port 1975/(1980) 26.4 8.0Senegal - Dakar Fishing Port 1977 24.0 6.0

52.5 15.3

(b) Component ProjectsNigeris - Agricultural Devt. Ayangba 1977 2.3 0.7Nigeria - Agricultural Devt. Lafia 1977 0.5 0.2Ghana - Volta Region Agric. Dev t 1978 0.3 0.2Senegal - Smell Rural Projects 1978 0.1 0.1Senegal - Investment Promotion 1981 7.7 3.4

lO0 4.6

3. SOUTH ASIA REGION

(a) Main ProjectsIndia - Guaarat FiSheries 1977 38.0 18.0India - Andhra Pradesh Fisheries 1978 36.5 17.5Bangladesh - Oxbow Lakes Finhery 1979 7.5 6.0Maldives - Fisheries I 1979 3.9 3.2India - Inland Fisheries 1980 40.8 20.0Maldives - Fisherles II 1963 12.6 5.0

139.3 69.7(b) Component Projects

Bangladesh - 2nd Chandpur Irrigation 1972V(1980) 0.2 nilIndia - Drought-Prone Areas 1974/(1981) 1.5 0.5Bangladesh - let Rural Development 1976 0.7 0.5Bangladesh - Karnafuli Irrigatlon 1976 3.3 1.8India - 2nd Agrlc. Refinance D.C. 1977 10.0 3.4India - 3rd Agric. Refinance D.C. 1979 32.8 8.2India - Kandi Watershed 1981 0.7 0.3Sri Lanka - 2nd Rural Development 1981 0.5 0.3Bangladesh - 2nd Drainage 1981 52.3 8.7India - 4th Agric. Refinance D.C. 1982 0.4 0.3

102.4 24 0O

4. EUROPE. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION

(a) Main ProjectsTunisia - Fisherien I 1972/(1979) 2.9 2.0Yemen PDR - Fisheries I 19731(1981) 6.2 5.1Iceland - Fishing Harbors 1974/(1977) 13.5 7.4Iran - Fisheries Development 19751(1979) 2.1 0.6Yemen PDR - Fisheries II 1979 32.0 10.0Tunisia - Fisheries II 1979 67.5 28.5Yemen AR - Artisanal Fisheries 1980 30.3 17.0Egypt - Fish Farming 1981 26.3 14.0Yemen FDR - Fisheries III 1982 21.4 6.0

202.2 90.6

(b) Component ProjectsPortugal - Agriculture and

Fisheries Credit 1978 7.3 2.57.3 2.5

/a In any cases, fiSheries component costs and related Hank funding are not quantifledseparately and figures are, therefore, etimtens, bhsed on appraisal reportreferences.

- 36 - ANNEX 3Page 2


REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF BANK LENDING FOR FISHERIES, FY 1969-1983(US$ millions)

Project/aApproved/ Component Bank

5. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION (Copleted) Cost Contribution

(a) Main ProjectsEcuador - Fisheries 19691(1980) 6.7 3.8Panama - Fisheries I 1972J(1977) 5.4 3.1Panama - Vacamonte Fishing Port 1975/(1980) 47.1 24.0Panama - Fisheries II 1977/(1981) 8.3 4.9

67.5 35.8

(b) Component ProjectsChile - Technical Assistance 1973/(1979) nil nilMexico - 2nd Integrated Rural Dev't. 1975 0.1 0.1Mexico - 3rd Rural Development 1977 0.5 0.2Argentina - Yacyreta Hydroelectric 1979 0.1 0.1Mexico - 7th Agricultural Credit 1980 11.7 3.2Brazil - Piaul Rural Dev't 1981 2.8 1.0Hexico - 3rd Integrated Rural Dev't. 1981 9.0 3.1Brazil - Maranhao Rural Dev't. 1982 1.2 0.4Peru - Alto Mayo Rural Dev't. 1983 0.5 0.1

25.9 0.2

6. EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION

(a) Main ProjectsIndonesia - Fisheries I 1971/(1978) 8.3 3.5Philippines - Fisheries I 1973/(1979) 18.5 11.6Indonesia - Fisheries Credit 1974/(1981) 16.9 6.5Philippines - Fisheries II 1976/(1981) 26.0 12.0Philippines - Fisheries Training 1979 70.6 38.0Philippines - National Fisheries (III) 1982 36.6 22.4

176.9 94.0

(b) Component Projects

Thailand - Chao Phya Irrigation 1973 0.2 0.1Philippines - 3rd Rural Credit 1974/(1979) 4.0 2.0Korea - 3rd Education 1975 8.4 2.9Korea - Secondary Cities Regional 1975 14.7 10.3Thailand - Phitsaulok Irrigation 1975 0.1 0.1Philippines - 4th Rural Credit 1977 14.6 5.8Thailand - Chao Phya Irrigation II 1977 0.2 0.1Indonesia - lat Rural Credit 1978 14.5 7.3Indonesia - Yogyakarta Rural Dev't. 1980 0.4 0.3Indonesia - Nat. Agricultural Research 1980 11.6 5.5Thailand - 1st Agricultural Credit 1980 4.8 2.4Philippines - 3rd Livestock & Fisheries 1980 57.7 18.5Korea - 2nd Gvanju Regional 1980 7.1 4.0Korea - 2nd Agric. Products

Processing 1981 n.a. n.a.Malaysia - Kelantan Land Rehab. 1981 0.6 0.2Malaysia - Rompin-Endau 1981 0.2 0.1Malaysia - Malacca Agric Dev't. 1982 1.8 0.6Malaysia - Kedah Agric. Dev't. 1983 1.5 0.4

142.4 60.6

/a In many cases, fisheries component costs and related Bank funding are not quantifiedseparately and figures are, therefore, estimates, based on appraisal reportreferences.

- 37 -ANNEX 4


PROJECTED WORLD BANK LENDING PROGRAM FOR FISHERIES,_ FY 1983-86 /b(US$ million)

Bank IDARegion Country Project Name Scheduled Loan Credit

EA Somalia Fisheries 1984 - 7.0EA Tanzania Fisheries II 1984 (R)/C - 25.0EA Zambia Fisheries 1985 - 7.0EA Zaire Fisheries 1986 (R) - 15.0

WA Cape Verde Fisheries/Shipping 1983 (R) - 7.0

EMENA Algeria Fisheries I 1983 (R) 59.0 -

EMENA Algeria Fisheries II 1984 (R) 40.0 -

EMENA Portugal Fisheries I 1984 (R) 40.0 -

EMENA Tunisia Fisheries III 1984 (R) 30.0 -

EMENA Morocco Fisheries I 1985 40.0 -

EMENA Yemen AR Fisheries II 1985 (R) - 10.0EMENA Portugal Fisheries II 1986 48.0 -

EMENA Morocco Fisheries II 1986 (R) 60.0EMENA Yemen PDR Fisheries IV 1986 - 5.0

LAC Mexico Fisheries 1983 30.0 -

EAP None

SA Bangladesh Fisheries II 1984 - 20.0Pakistan Fisheries 1986 (R) 100.0

347.0 196.0

/a Fisheries projects only; projects with possible fishing comments not taken intoaccount as it is almost impossible to identify such components systematically duringthe preparation process. In particular, this is almost impossible for IDF projects.

lb Based on AGR-supplied listing of fisheries projects in pipeline, prepared in early1982.

/c (R) indicates -Reserve Project" for fiscal year.

HAIRVEStINC THE WATERSA REVIEW OF BANK CCPERIENCE WITH PISHIEIES DEVELOPHNUT

COST OF FISHERIES PROJECTS. BY PROJ7CT COltPONENTS, FY 1969-1983(US$ *GoO)

Fishtng Processing, Repair Facilities Total Costs /a BankVessels 6 PoTte & Marketinge & Other Flbh Ponds Working Technical Including Lending

Te1ar Country Project Name fishing Gear Harbor Works A Storage, aet. infrastructure H atcheries Capital Assistance Contingencies (Loans A Credits)

1969-80 Ecuador lisheries 3z73 1001 - - - 913 1549 6739 38381970-78 Ghana Fisheries 881 176 - - - - 756 1813 13001971-78 Indonesia Fisheries 4027 397 ISIS 883 - 504 979 8305 35001972-79 Tunisia Fisheries 1 2868 - - - - - 62 2930 20001972-77 Fanaua fiaheries 1 4493 577 - - - 333 41 5444 31001973-81 Yemen FDR Fisheries 1 1897 - Z673 - - 193 1411 6174 S1001973-79 Philippines Fisheries 1 7740 100 30 - 10230 - 400 18500 116001914-77 Iceland Fishing harbor - 13053 - - - - 199 13552 74001974-81 Indonesia fisheries Credit 4676 2960 2950 - 4716 - 1570 16872 65001974-79 iran Fisheries - - - - - 2100 2100 6001916-81 Philippines fisheries It 8214 - 2254 - 15532 - 2600 120001917-S1 Panmes Fisheries 11 3310 3090 900 1040 8340 4900

197FoO Nauritania Fishing Port 120 Z0770 - 4630 - - 840 26360 7950197F-80 Panam Flehing Port - 29670 - 9600 - - 3830 47120 24000

Sub-Total, Completed Projects *1501 68704 12512 1133 31378 1943 15097 (190249)/b 93788

1976 Burundi Fisheries 1721 - 757 - - - 3081 8619 60001977 Tansania Fisheries 1 3877 294 385 - - 402 2857 12375 90001977 todia CuJarat lisheries 8000 11200 600 2600 - - 2900 38000 180001978 India Andhra Pradesh Fisheries 6900 13500 1200 3600 - - 1400 36500 175001979 Tunitsi Fisheries It 14IS5 35868 - - - - 5398 67531 288W01979 Yemn R Fisheries 11 - 13340 1340 4400 - 200 3610 32000 100001979 Bangladesh Oxbow Lake Fislheries - - 600 1862 1637 397 788 7458 60001979 Maldives Fisheries 1 2960 tO - ISO - - 10 3890 32001980 Kenya Fisharib s I 1100 3100 - - 1600 - 5300 14900 100001980 Yemen AR Artlsanal Fisheries 4840 9600 820 1000 - - 2640 30300 170001980 India Inland Fleheries - - - 3600 18700 - 6500 *0500 200001981 Egypt Fish Farming - - - 1300 1100 3600 2700 26300 140001982 Philippines Fisheries III 1200 - - 10100 - 900 9600 36600 224001982 Yawn FDR Fisheries III 292 - - 10386 - 705 2314 21400 60001983 Maldives Fisheries It 1582 37 - 5051 - - 12600 2173 50001917 Senegoal Fishing Port - 16660 - - - - 1760 23950 60001919 Phttippines FIsheries Trainins 2200 - _ 44100 - - 7200 70600 38000

Sub-Totel 48627 103659 5702 88149 33437 6204 61231 (483823)/b 236600

Grand Total, On-goins Projects 90128 172363 8147 103262 64813 8147 75328 (074072)/b 330388

Percentage of Total Cost 16.03 24.38 2.60 14.73 9.24 1.47 10.74 100.0

/a Actual costs used for cospleted projects.

/b Totals add up vertically but not horinontally (not only for sub-total but for wmt projects) as conttngencies only itncluded in total costs, not in component costs. or In other words, sucept forcompleted projects, In which case actuals are used, the differance between total costs and total project costs is estisated to be the contingencies at appraisal.

- 39 -ANNEX 6


COMPLETED PROJECTS: SUPERVISION EFFORT AS RECORDED IN PPARs

Supervision Effort in the FieldProject Total Mean Fisheries Mean

Country Project Appraisal Duration Man-vks. per Year Man-wks. per Year(Man-weeks) (Years)

Ecuador Fisheries 16 11 43 3.9 n.r. -Ghana Fisheries 12 8.0 30.5 3.8 n.r. -Indonesia Fisheries I 16 8.5 57 6.7 n.r. -Tunisia Fisheries I 15 9.5 52 5.5 n.r. -Panama Fisheries I 10.5 6 24.7 4.1 n.r. -Yemen PDR Fisheries I 12 7.5 34.1 4.5 8.5 1.1Philippines Fisheries I 4.5 6.5 14.2 2.2 6 0.9Iceland Harbors 29 3 15.0 5.0 n.r. -Indonesia Fisheries II 21 7 26.8 3.8 10.5. 1.5Iran Fisheries 12 4.5 13.2 2.9 n.r. -Philippines Fisheries II 12 6.0 36 6.0 6 1.0Panama Fisheries II 16.7 4.5 14 3.1 5.3 1.2

Mauritania Fishing Port 9 4.5 34 7.5 0 0Panasa Fishing Port 7 5.5 9 1.6 0 0

(92.0) (403.5) (60.6) (36.3) (5.7)Overall Average 6.6 28.8 4.3 7.3 0.9

n.r. - not recorded

aMO 7w

M=Wz" M1W -10- hum!?

A U OF MMUA IU D s. n _

300330 PULPOUVMUE DATA TAXZIS. CO1ZLUD vzinm mains

Table It POJECM PO MUUIC M1Wr SPMf AUDIT 331051 S Ng'

*Dsta oAnoint bard laJCremit Finrl

lecta by Succor (of m*l") Acerovl Agreemet Dishbursemet grief Pojlct Decrtitias

1. atna First Fishoria 3.4 07/71 S7il 10/77 Cstructiio of 40 lnsWp trawler. to replace bobole craft.La. 714 Ppartie af f ealsiblty *eudy for a maw fl_king port.

2. Ghana Fiabwila 1.3 eJlH S/H 12/71 al ctirtuia of 40 putse-aaar e to mpes float. reparatio orCr. 163 ftaabllty indy for a ama flmbi port.

3. Indonesi first narIss 3.3 07170 07/70 12/76 Dswaapnsst of fsldh.r industry an wAprts tlirough cntructlonCr. 211 of share * nglin md processing fanllltia, aid tUrty akipjack

ikno" vessels.

4. ILrs Fiabstia 12.3 5/74 10/74 05/79 D11_op... of fisking lnd_etry ad ilcraaIng f la and abrimpLa. 107 prductla by 1r000 iow pw yer throngh ItWvirs *r lea tlo

and mamagesat of governmet fishing cmanpey. aed techalcalassst-ac mud creit for ce_arciae l ad traditlemal fiba.r_

3. Ecuador naharie 5.3 09/68 0S/U 4OW1 To mr fully supLlit Ecudere ah.da,t offskore flshiega. 3335 r_amrea tah vamt snt imdern tus fla ing veasl MA

tratini et ohy c*r maber. Twelve t_a peras-silsrs with acaryig capcity of 130 sahrt rons ch _era tso h constructed.The sutintid &ncree In tot catch of 24,000 sbort tan peryear would dneb thCM e amas tun ach to the coetry.

6. Tonisia First Piabhries 2.0 0m/71 0/710 o01o Daplmemoa et ehablate ilusDra risking craft by 335 fully-Cr. 270 eqipped noori btets; imtaltution euildlq ti asit the

sector edilt in fishermam a m ee training were almicludad.

7. Tan bF Firt Fes.eries 3.1 /b 04/73 04/73 0061 Cssrn ctia of cold strsam al rnd cetructie of cbhrCr. 370 factl ite_al cnstructims of 93 improvd riskng .ealsg

agma_ t enscultawces sad studia for furtbr flbhrilm andhsrber dcv-lepemst.

S. Phllippines Fsh eeri 11.6 03n3 0V/73 C/79 Ususlopest of islad ad mri flberiee in suprt of theLa. 191 Govermnt's objectives of self-erttficescy in fish production.

The arwine ceposent "ldd flnscing for coestructlon of 60fishing wmls. - acusition of 10 s*emd-taud fish carrirs.three iceplasis aid itwo slpsy. sad replaceset ot obeolatmscbim In 100 v sesel*. The Inlad compeet inclidodrebsbilities oe tiypheon-dsmaaed hracldh enter fichpoids (4.500he) aid flsdpoid Impro_nssrt and deelopeat (7.300 ha).

9. FbilippInes Seeasd I.0 05/76 07/76 02/81 Thin projct won a continsatiom of the first project nod _ea tirlhseriss provie credit for th cmetructies ad rehabilitatis of am

In. 1270 adttesl 9.000 ha cf fiahpnids. coestructioe of 17 fish-igemss1 . tih madfiestlor four vaml-e Ist crries. a

consructstm t ohf eiplnts sad e sllpy.

1o. Znsodnos nibcsi Credit 6.3 06/74 06/74 02/62 to win mae of ftishries rstourcs for desetictle manpier.Cr. 4No0 *slg foreitn tchsngs ad cr_etlg mloyust aed Imaw

-pport_ntic fe eubeist-em fiselar_ by. (a) buildig aSkpjak tue devlot copias; (k) improvn U3.000 ha of

-MIkf b avd shimp pFed Is Javs gAA South Sulawesi; and (c)acuicdtlos of t_niy trawlers for cooperstiese.

11. reaama eco_nd Fiseres 7.5 04577 04o77 01/62 Tbi r oject *om a coetJinclos of the first project and adre_sdIa. 139 a oider _sng of _seds affectlg both urine aid frahunter flab

predtismd mras_ ar* flah predln,g opersten s by constrtlnit_ 260 hp pu_s-se_r,. tlfv 220 hp sbrimp trawlars. reloctrngsi shrimp procesesng "practlss. *tabllshlg ftmr_ter flihhatce ris ad facilities for oyster cultwr reserch. aidstrenthoeinlg of fnah.. anIts se up nder the ftrst project.

12. Scela Fihneeg b ror 7.0 10175 10173 01/76 Eriqnsb rhabilitatidn for tbr-s fisnblg parts m mai Irlae:reebblitation consultant servics for dstailed enginserlng. assistanc In tomfsr

Ln. "91 dscnt P eciman hid evaluation.

13. Pams lFiLnit Port 24.0 04/75 09/75 03/10 _ 1 *l of shriup landing and mmscstd proessing tCetlita. 1114 ftr_ the central area of Famos City to a mv pot sits. F_ta

Vscimcs - ame, 7 In waw. It else iteaded to provide etherfisheries-reltei int_lletinn. berthig *te" aa arbatingfaclltes for anlrmal mnd larger sale fis.erie to _ply tOlocal inrwht ad flk servicg faclities for all tbhs w_sals._n for _ein ddck spply smoral Panmana fi_h_nA* plets.

1. Ibm!is-4. UoeObibeS 5.0 U1/73 11175 O/so Mh rqoject v- eto eped the fihng pert at llusr_ibS saFort consistd of the follodig elamt s*tenS_ t fisbin sad

CC. me cimsrcisl car harkltb.. roevstrwetuim of the casee_y to thece _rclal cso bsrtb. nh etructia of a *__rap syti sad

erio_s Port hididigs, prc resnt of MOVsaICi" squIpi.trebiecal saistamv, ad stdiels o a repsr faclity.

to _sn 7 contain Iefortion ma It appoz in rIespetive hona _svlw Anens.

lb Inclding supplemenary credit of USl1.6 l il.

a menuw a so maima Wmi n.s.a muuwiuuntus..wr * soya ysiag -. l ll mam pasilaIa2,unsy am caa wnS nu ss asmims

Toal C_as Ihctiasto is_ai Isrosuan/ Cases. ti m t- bilt C_sa Is Uit

Prai-cts by ketw r4 aim.) arra . 1jz C Al _ fprstF. f c.c.

1. as. it Vis hrim 5.35 5.42 1 L I. Gay 34 os s lu . built t a amit a t toms am high -km. Th4 m ilcipstad.

2. Canm Vishrias 2.3 1.5 -2 - UL K biJ tas nas*al aw koilt at a mit eat tug" - hiob asit. 155 amilalpatad.

S. Isi-smis First 4.2 5.3 93 L 3 projct delays sa dawsanoa t of 1adasi DaphSInfishris sampassid mat martr..

Cr. 211

4. trs isbauts 15.0 a.g. a.m.Ia. ash7

1. leuSor Pisbhrisa 4.4 4.7 2 U - a Da to hga alt cmts*. projest - asstieaily msaLa. 553 d-ur.

4. Thlais first nisbariss 2.1 2.5 -6 Od bas to issisqam praparacios .5 "asprrisloa (sasate -Cr. 210 tacibsiel aspaorvslaal *.i ast tistam 1 st hasarea for

t- I sd _ bs wren sqasars vers ""tlis. abs. tbssashr at h_ta otnracid esd_r the projast -aslIbsUtSatlsl reduced.

7. Tsans ph noat 4.2 4.2 As - I bl lie is catitm sa otrtc at oI tltnatl rallad toPisbtis itet esd sat prices. S, atudiam saf d_ latad.

cr. 310

S. Vallopisas, fiaarlss i3 17.5 lbs sari eamponast wftlcuiselfr - ftr acia by tlb1711. S1 l crials hbleb rasid Is rsepd a sc arncrasesafar ts esntruectio sf ms yamml sad Is rspwat afspsftia cata. 0D1a bol of tow assal. "am _ ctsilyconstructed.

9. PhIlippisas, faces 23.5 24.0 it R11.5 sais camtrctlss and aparacla costs offtctad bathLawriDs espseata bht partie-larly tb ilatd flharls.Le. acm Fi lsascil racaras ara as lamar attyactiws tar cbs

deal.pai aft asa _a. siha)t e rater tarratibllitatssa pads c*g_tiar ba h tisfactory. Pr,jct- curtailed ti sopes a ws tbs ftitt project.

iC. lisdasta nih 12.9 13.5 43 L a Cast _rrsas "ro Is pan da to charam is pt aect dasigaCrDit (IC) sad thb rsidar ta proeact Sla7s MA higar

it. ems oqeitdpat sad materil tt t a emia and A highaccoasultant cs.ts tha sapcted.

11. las_ scss F_t laeces 112. 5.3 -24 0 L 1eisl cnts dcraemad *w_ t tea re mst Ca) _mtad afLe. is tbs prajsctad 50.4 ailaJ par W es el, tam prejct

Pera-SaISar W1asls are perC168so far laos thAS NMI.aillion eack sa (bh - abrla vasal. ta be gsccaaaasdr tbs project prayS tsassy am tbs Vatican8t Of".aal trm tbw float du sat stew as mpaeti.

I2. uslowd niabiq lmhbrs 11.2 13.4 21 3 -Usshltstitt

Ia. 941

13. Pass Piahi Part 36.0 £17. 1 - - 1 ism et srras da a am mr-titlam st cbs ctlm Ls. 1114 preliiminr y aqmaraleas cathas than trm siaifisost daslga

chsasa. Alas astrt' lier m am c too .f amf okasgarate 4adj'siaia.. tow et af lAed perh. sadrspti aSt tsi atrsties sad saparvisiam casts, atcb AMtelrtar luoroam casts duing laplamstsatisoe

14. KNmrltmei Nasadkibas, 27.55 24.2436 LI I Caasidersbl. cast avarra is tlbs awl"s ma" is lowfoci ewrarato. ha this doam sat sham p in dealI* ttras hasamm,

e. Su at the dit tarnc is t io t erroey cas-ris rots asod.DOesis sd csctrati flow t1- Is- lbpan. o_ti at. iLte.earrsttd*. added ts Cast errM.

1- * -p Sih a - raattsa; d_sl lettacs lteadiosta sja cho s.- highe i. a spprsetl astiat; L - lsrI dashla loiters la te stor obssesa.

A UXVIN GP UK5 UWIU ItEV2 WEL5IwW

racr rMImm uuX TANAu. _ zm n_min rnzcr

Pabslo Sm 311318AM A019*1. TMIS MU 0VIETION AM 2840111 1W NUllt UVPUOUIW TIM0

a_e..-c_>~~~usisses?sPrues: de las te ireesut 1w. Au u Iw"l T is *res t Uus eu mte

itim-e isa is elui hs bzestie. T_.La. 764 OVIIPU esusVOW lueas IsSUes. Or gujess

qusikies. ogre" _sdilstvsns.

2. Oes_ ftnbuife, 549 O/7t W7ITS 57 Ila * nte?t.sd aseuuus to equ_ us ftialCf. 142 ulleaties .1 Cldt town wel usettad.

2. is_uL. Filt 07110 12/74 10/79 1* lo U x 2 La" or *sesieuts in lulmusiegnishwius isteldepwAisu plejuil esppuuuts sustibtatud

Cf. M1 Lu dula,e.

4. l*e_ Vl. 10174 Not uapletedLu. 1047

3. Iswuer nVbsne U/4 04174 10/50 74 [IC x 3 Tie. delay,4spite Lh_ag-sls redtis laLut. Su5 plS5 atmse. me laresly dusto peow p-leut

issit saEw am usud of p*t urit ofpuruer-wedns.u

6. Tusilia niet 01171 0417 12179 42 723 x3 stl a u* t_rout1 deispe.ndm"

or. 270

7. lmeus 1 nilt 0417n 12170 Will 22 49 3 3 Ex *sse s erats. 5 d1 _sDisburses us liitud hueslaige of tbs nusie.

Cc. 270 cooetLs oft share M* t eslls teu Almottut. asu les as suPessi at s9prti1l.

B. hIilppisuu Fires 05172 04177 04179 24 A*s x ftyuissI ispLinetei ess dsleed _es teLe. "I start-up problem sA tow reltse

tameeelumw at &es& baLlfieva uLlA sheUnu-uIitleul doeuls 4iuhrsuto ma,,eel, tue seethf 1.41. _pr1_l s *imstes.

9. lhtlippless Uesseu WIN7 0400 02110 -2 -4 a Ti. prejui me semplstsi tblu inoth. simF.eheis at eJhudeul. a i suckt o i_a sw it _

La. 1270 5 SE 1. vis .8 o the dlltisultl ies tu siof sat sut leerms.. eupuriuas durt"

10. lw_ee i nFirls 04/7* 0e7 niel 27 45 pe ncesr erati_se wre atm at tebbuil seet Gseslis a tue-es dse in pruest

Cr. an0 1e,lints_tle. e. Ie ts. .1,% an _SCot esslteme. preemet iorowd

it. ns leses 04177 0461m O410 0 0 Project - esuleted us ties.

La. 12Pm

12. Zsslesd Fises 1017 02170 04/74 4 20Pert E.labLlltaties

Le. 941

iI. P5mm nFiau Port 04ns 17 12a7 I/71 11 25 x Delays is preject splinutetLes moI due toLa. 1114 biddius pissed.?. .5 a mrl el .

4111 teultles ehith _pve s t_welmeduring su_ tructls. the est *rile ofwub me blab mome e'stsPPtm the

sevufter. 400ther lese for edu1ya mWSrabllis tohe upply oif leufeiss

concrete.

14. bearttls _msuiht_ 11172 02179 12/00 21 40 * DeIe la iupleseutatie dusto dsot _pact ssestiuttie fi . to etia peel. lh.55ev?

Cr. 21 .wetey srgetad.

b u Ibeh-e.tat pwsln. such *s pretsisan ee 5o estster. techesl sproem. ete.Peusurmt of terlala oU eq.iput iIladft Utterances la tie isquizu fei kUiss Is ossau deie at eqiue.

.A s -trstte GM *&aff lucIne ue emut j tec1Iis1, C esp _gsu of reuro_e staff.

P50W s Im DATA TAMES. m mu nsa VASS

PROS 1eWTJU DM TAQS CONDl=0 VT Q IM PRDM

Table s ZSTSAfl OF sumac r M AT TDES OF AFSRIISM AND AUlT

&n/Ctedit Teal Ptoject Cast Stuares I')

insec. hp sceeo 7 of eth (Alual.10 rppraisal s-Nsetientedprdets by C temr os' Zatim (V% a-I _) *t3ed Act_i RtImet at AuiSt Commu

1. Proete to. Ihich eeneSte Seture mre Setlted at Asraisal

1. Pan First nFihres 3.4 5.35 5.42 15-22 0 oShr coete. lower ehriep prices. Project expmdedI- 73 fleet beots oprtI Die ad the tatel erVIp cetchs

hve aot lSermes.

2. Chess Fieherie 1.3 2.3 L.a 50 10 Ten veeele beit comptd with appraial etimte ofCr. 163 40.

3. Indonesia First Fiaheries 3.5 4.3 6.3 26 meg. ISeufficiant Sonsement; probls of bat deeigu;Cir. 21.1 averoptinietic FppraleL~d aesptimes on aversg. ties

heats %ould spead -n the hio eas.

4. IranFierie 12.5 16.0 n.e. - -Lo. 1047

5. Ecuwdor Fiserlies 5.3 6.4 6.7 21 eg.- lnntatie- deles, oet iscr_esse. Only fLerLa 555 istad of 12 po-eti-e contructed, of whlch ai1-

tru re ceeo tinoly op r atloal; catch meb loserthee expected.

6. TD eisie First Fiaheries 2.0 3.1 2.1 36 43 De to higahr rea vale of flat.Cir. 270

7. Tn PM rst Tisheries 5.1 4.7 6.2 30 13 FrisipAely due to delay Is starting fih eporte.Cr. 370

S. PhiliPiWe rb5ti_5 1.6 14.5 16.5 34 34 I It ie Claar that the prectso genatad substantalLa. 391 b befits d had Isportsun n-qaustflabla enefite

(each - iaetitction buildina). lbs raeas of rtutre9. PiPe Secoad 12.0 23.5 26.0 32 46 ) reft thi, althoug the rccurecy Of their absoluts

nishrise IlWIs is ePs to questin given insufficInt date ndto. 1270 Gaseetise counficting statistics.

10. IadoWes11 Fisheries Credlt 6.5 12.9 16.5 34 24 The relatirvy hi US r_eetisted at aeuit, vnCr. 40 thoug level then SA1. reotistd productian level. iS

due to higbhr prices then eeti_uted In SAX.

11. Pause Secnd isbhrisa 7.5 12.6 8-3 15 9 PCX feoed ER to be 12I, witg the hi 5 bsr productine DfLa. 139g 1950 as the inn. Actul catch levels In 1951 and 1912

ar evilable ad are leer. Te audit feels tlhttbhe eetua figures sould he _wd ilsysd of tbh 1980

- wa. sad the USE ehudd thee be Isut, at 9S.

12. Iceland bis-ing Fort 7.0 11.2 13.6 20 20Sbshbhlitstit

I.. 941

13. Fauma Fishiug pert 24.0 34.0 47.1 1S 7 Tbs PCX sistains that hed the costs r_neined at thlirin. 111.4 orgeinal lels. the 2 oud hae rise ftr 7 to

101. On the other heed, the nEt wuld have bee.sinficantly leer then 7S bed sbrip prices sat gonup en other sforeseen factors at apprdi_l,benefical to the prjet. Mt arisn.

14. ihuritmnds Nouadflhou Port 1.0 27.53 26.36 30-lU 0-l3Ye Developount of port activities meN seriously himndeeCr. 5me by tbh Poliesrie War and tbe asocied economic.

poltl and cee_rcil dislocatio. Also, thecontinud l_ vos_ of fish ladige *Is due prierilyto tbe ajor chag in fisheries policy that weprolgted in 1979.

/s Rate of ren for fihe bertbh retatblished at OZ ad for cme_rcal cargo berths and approech my at 131.

A~ 7

I D~~~~~~AVSESfl TM WAiaA 31Df 0? NM Z ZIuin WM l FISHR DE T

PRIJCr T rflUU DATA TAMEZS. WtLETD PISEIES PnJrcs

Table 6: DUTStTTfrM UILDfIG: CAES WNI THE BANK MAN SPECrS. zFFOSTS To s57G11-URRON'S AHI ISTRATIE AND TECIXAL CAPAL S

Praiscr by Sector Vacua of Effort Means Achivement of Obiectwes C tet

. r Firstc Fiheries La. 7M

2. Gbhana barles Strengtbhning the Provding Partial The expatriate left ecau .f disareeents -n wrkCr. 163 Boatyard Divialon managemnt acheduling.

staff

3. Indonsia Firt nbries, - -Cr. 211

4. Irm Fisheriss lEproveant of ZEploysnt of Negligible Pr-Sect not comleted.Ln. 1047 orgasiation. _anaget

anegnt and consultantspolicies ofgoverement fishingcompany

5. Ecuador Fisheries Strenghenasg skills Construction of partial Graduates of traidnig school bad difficulties inLa. 555 of fisbhrman to mn school sad ftnding employmnt. Quality of intruction has oat

purse-seiner training been goad.

6. Thniaia First Fisheries --- This was essmeltally a credit project hut the omisodingCr. 270 abnk mm ot very interested. The project lpoeped

technical liietation -n the sub-borwwror which wregenerally net acceptable. Technical aDtOsitancealthough sch needed. we not o perceivd by theborrower.

7. Isa YDE First Fisheries The miniatry of Fish rInagesent Partial It was the firec of the ftiseries project and aely tbeCr. 370 Wealth consultant- secoed Bu/IDA operation in the country whcb has

limted msapower resmurcs. The project trld to dotoo sch in the fisheries setor-

S. Phillppins Fisheries ) Strengthenig eze- Providing Substantlel The provision of mrline specalsts reulted InLn. b91 ) cuotin agncies marine and substatial qutlity lspre ts The training prngs

) flishrles expertise - qusculture produced a nuaber of bigly qualified staff. altbough9. Phlitppines Second Fisheries ) specialiata. thelr nauber is Still smil in relacton to the ares to

La. 1270 ) training he covered.

10. Inda do...Fisheries Credit Aesistance provided tsployment of Partial Performane of consultants Uwer tisfactory withCr. 410 to PFI for technical respect to sasitig their counterparts, training local

Organization and adviser, miler employes and fishermen, and Organizing andesnagent purposs ihorsan. and establshing a functonal werktn stem. Howver. tbe

refrigeration impact of their activity In accelerating projectngineer implementation was a1iss1!, as none of than VS put In

a semagerlal position.

11. Pans Secod Fisheries Training of two 16 man-sonthe Substanta Product quality standard iroved substatially. andLn. 1391 sefood lspectors. of coaultancy tbhre were so itance of US market rejection to a

establishnlg proi ed to the large extent. due to the consultancy provided In tequlity testing Itoitry of Preject.laboratory at the Healthport and conductingclasses for shrmopboat captains.processin plantstaff, etc.

12. Iceland Fiabing Harbors - -

EshablitatltonLa. 9P1

13. Pones Fishing Port Developin the Technical Substntial For developing the manageaent capability of APE,La. 1114 _onemat aaistancs and technical ssistatnce ad a progrm for trani4n tbe

capabillty of APE training Port Autbhrity's staff was undertaken. This objectiveprogrem for the as fully aevbed In the asner foreseen atPart appraisal. The Dank mabde significant cootribstiounAutbhoity's when the Port Authority is greatly ezpended to sassstaff enlarged resposlbilities after the Pas. Canal

Trety.

14. turitaes Vouadbibou Fort - - - All the institutional goals Of the projOCt erCr. 5S directed towrds port finane and adeinitratin to tbe

exclusin of fisheries policy ad fisberies iostitutionbuildlng.

IAIWSTIU Tim DAlSsA 4L5313V OF hMM =SIIU2 V IT UII 3816 Vmiciws?

liit f"llUoICJC DAT TAILU * COIZTU F1132811I IZAztS

Table 7, SU3921I0.1 Of n nct UASTUS

lashk Cost1ibutieue totoao/Credit iseoutlou F. 3ltOih*T Ieonmic Bogstle lselitetieo- Diir Sector

___le_t_ _ matter A iot met t totet et Audit Estimate Cveottsa ... %Ransotm10 161 . . Congests

. soa firet Flibriel 'Ulll 2.4 4.3 5.3 5.35 5.42 0 oveteipeeii sead Toease tploawist wale ratsiliem Metla5. 784 adequ4tell appaisid.

2. Cesa Isbuiee 0 6/9 3.2 2.7 5J 1.1 I.41 t0 Project delas eobetsotitlly elatged duluCf. 363 Impleentation.

3. tdessejsi tfirst tfbvtes 07/10 3.5 4.4 922 4.3 1. Negstive rroJejt btiled to mbley. obj.elive d.. to lsedeqatlCf. 233 imstitstiteal perfome,um. It illuetfitie fagotsofei

,as,, tesad .:praiul 2b of e tboolsepulstae, figinmtiooue Gope teta and ulsosad etedyrFcurinmt praimdri.

4. 1as hablmt. 10/74 12.5 Not cesplot 13.0 se. a.m. r03JE0 Got lupliteotd ad its smae ebjective MtI.M. 1047 aeblayed.

S. oede. Fllearlo 09/48 5.3 3.6 12.1 3 6. 4.1 6ati" I ftojetL vas . e09(itt eas eC mId dow di tO 1bh OfLa. 352 doausd for credit to prebaue pmwm-utsevs. Trailing

of crave tae boen pavt1alll eegcoe,oui.

C. 2a;0 WI ahiII 2.0 4.3 5.7 3.1 2.9 43 CAulibett1inS to osetut doos,Iuust wTe mt v.,7Ci. 210 offeltisv, bvl Project iNt th stage t f aete

sesaloful etffrt odes tb c*ued project.

7. TMM, "S Firlt Fish.,i.e 04/73 2.2 *.7 6.4 4.2 .7 I1 s a e lot but * l way to log laws eastiv. natiteCu. 310 partlalpatioa ad trailing support.

I. Pbilippie Fflbebri. 03503 21.4 4.1 4.1 18.5 18.3 34 I ioist pleuasssttiee mm abrply aitectid by tIbtne. 493 so31374 oll crlelel as a result sell shau& ball ef the

60 weamat aspected to be built .dat tba paleact inca"Nouatemd. llmlq cautruatte adl epratsli casst

eb aetedl4b t slats isb peed d..el.r:.. Ibeee-qus"ltble baeutite of lb ptoject bate baseisoifieolimit eadiug istlilulteo buildiug, tuogrmedgeploysout eppeslwiliee. supended bevioda of mmetsebtseiq god iuitsed diem ulites Ibsab eulaqgedotautee .rgaatuttes.

9. ntelippmee s4ced Isebisre 07/14 12.0 *.9 3.7 23.2 26.0 46 X The tted tiesria mallet a d lose oatly libkluwI.a. 3210 veemsel. Coatslaed ded itlbe eaedi ptjitat. finauciel

t1t4ei age PA IDMle t atrfoti,e tat s" ftib pods.Aithoug retsre1 otr rehabilitated flub peed. ceetas a I-oel which to eati.t..9teY.

10. Ildaseia liehefte. Cidit 04/74 4.5 5.0 7.3 12.9 18.5 24 1 The sail paojs et es e ves. teptereuest isCt. 480 preleet deslp ipaid te t b firtt IAi eacd

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11. ftv.. head Vi.boiese 04/11 1.5 4.2 4.2 I2A 6.2 9 I Visasatally. lb projeet bas bo_ a atd smeieess. 0aL.e. 1396 lbe om bed, lbe uelecaled ,ebtup ptceesteg iaslte

are proepartwu a1 tb W pelt are. 0 lb otburbad, aIbovgh tb oe4 prtJoeb t purs selor. bTparferud "Il 3 a to.ei.aa sod OPeret91tel bet.,

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12. lee162d ISILbiu hWAb.S 30o3 1.0 2.4 2.9 13.2 13.4 20IsIbAltitataell

A. 941

13. P.wa Itebleg PFort 0O/71 24.0 I .J 3.7 24.0 47.1 7 lb projec we built quite ip_ith uiy sod imied, id2.. 2324 all lbe faciilities er,saad St eppratmal. 'cv. .i it

eec .bolredeteudad tuie nto ieeficast cml oerros. Tb p101441 aI reewite to lb -

estbIlebaet of as eftfectie pn asthertly.

14. PuAitasi b dI b Ibeu ot n 11/75 *.0 4.4 *.1 28.55 24.34 0.13 DvSelpUl at prt etie'itlee mu eotteeiiy hideidCF. 366 by lbs reiteerle war NMd lbm ae6CLatd eceemla,

poilteil aod cmrcal diltol"iou. Aio, tblnstslteltsl ad orgastseltoual o682 of tb pjutbc

Ire directed terds pen ti h e ad daisistltiesso tb eaueto142 of fisebigr policy dea,lapea adfibs ee t ilttlttts bi3ddt.g. at all eppriab1lstae. This onstage Ws dulrtu.tal to lba pbjoit.

- 46 -

ANNEX 8Page 1


LIST OF OED REPORTS ON CONPLETED FISHERIES PROJECTS

Report No. Date Title

1960 03/10/78 Project Performance Audit Report, Iceland -Fishing Harbors Rehabilitation Project (Loan941-IC) SECM 78-211, March 16, 1978

2578 06/29/78 Project Performance Audit Report, Panama -First Fisheries Project (Loan 784-PAN) SECM79-504, June 29, 1979

2794 12128179 Project Performance Audit Report, Ghana -Fisheries Project (Credit 163-GH) SECM 80-64,January 23, 1980

2806 01/09/80 Project Performance Audit Report, Indonesia -First Fisheries Project (Credit 211-IND) SECM80-27, January 10, 1980

3145 09/30/80 Project Performance Audit Report, Iran -Fisheries Project (Loan 1047-IRN) SECM 80-776,October 15, 1980

3731 12/23/83 Project Performance Audit Report, Ecuador -Fisheries Project (Loan 555-EC) SECM 81-1017,December 28, 1981

3753 12/31/81 Project Performance Audit Report, Tunisia -First Fisheries Project (Credit 270-TUN)SECH 82-26, January 13, 1982

3755 12/31/81 Project Performance Audit Report, People'sDemocratic Republic of Yemen - First FisheriesProject (Credit 370-YDR) SECH 82-63, January28, 1982

4222 12/13/82 Project Performance Audit Report, Republic ofthe Philippines First and Second FisheriesProjects (Loans 891-PH and 1270-PH) SECM 83-17,January 5, 1983

4468 05/03/83 Project Completion Report, Indonesia -Fisheries Credit Project (Credit 480-IND) SECM83-565, June 9, 1983

- 47 -

ANNEX 8Page 2


4618 06130/83 Project Performance Audit Report, Panama -

First Fishing Port Project (Loan 987-PAN)SECM 83-738, July 15, 1983

4597 06/30/83 Project Performance Audit Report, Panaama -Second Fisheries Project (Loan 1398-PAN)SECM 83-713, July 8, 1983

4837 12/19/83 Project Performance Audit Report, Mauritania-Nouadhibou Port Project (Credit 588-MAU)

-48- ANNEX 9

HARVESTING THE WATERSA REVIEW OF BANK EXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES DEVELOPNENT

LIST OF OED REPORTS ON COMPLETED PROJECTS WITH FISHERIES COMPONENTS


2593 06/29/79 Project Performance Audit Report, Malawi -Shire Valley Agricultural Development ProjectPhase II (Credit 363-NAI) SECM 79-507,July 2, 1979

2784 12/27/79 Project Performance Audit Report, Philippines -Third Rural Credit Project (Loan 1010-PH) SECH80-24, January 9, 1980

2850 02/14/80 Project Performance Audit Report, Thailand -Sirikit Dam and Chao Phya First IrrigationImprovement Projects (Loan 514-TH and Credit379-TH) SECM 80-164, March 10, 1980

3103 08/22/80 Project Performance Audit Report, Chile -Technical Assistance Project (Loan 978-CH) SECM80-686, September 3, 1980

3436 04/30/81 Project Performance Audit Report, Bangladesh -Chandpur II Irrigation Project (Credit 340-RD)SECM 81-382, May 6, 1981

3518 06/23/81 Project Performance Audit Report, India -Agricultural Refinance and DevelopmentCorporation Second Credit Project (ARDCII)(Credit 715-IN) SECM 81-556 June 25, 1981

3984 06/16/82 Project Performance Audit Report, India -Drought Prone Areas Project (Credit 526-IN)SECM 82-623, July 7, 1982

4544 06/14/83 Project Performance Audit Report, Korea - ThirdEducation Project (Loan 1096-KO) SECM 83-625,June 20, 1983

4573 06/24/83 Project Completion Report, Somalia - SecondEducation Project (Credit 511-SO) SECM 83-681,July 1, 1983

4617 06/30/83 Project Performance Audit Report, Mexico -Integrated Rural Development Project (PIDER I)(Loan 1110-ME) SECM 83-731 July 13, 1983

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ANNEX 10Page 1


BRANDT COMNISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

"Importance of Fish

Increased consumption of fish could also help to reduce hunger andmalnutrition. This requires increased supplies and often promotion of newfood habits. Most developing countries remain considerably below averageworld intake of fish protein per capita. However, many smaller developingcountries have technical and managerial difficulties which prevent the ade-quate exploitation of this resource. A new FAO program has just beenlaunched to help Third World countries develop and manage their ExclusiveEconomic Zones (EEZs - the 200 mile zones defined in the draft Law of theSea) within which over 90 percent of the world commercial fish catch istaken. International cooperation to ensure conservation of ocean fish stocksis essential. In addition, the development of freshwater fish-farming hasconsiderable potential in many countries. It could provide an attractiveopportunity especially for landlocked countries to improve the diets of theirpeople.

Technical and managerial problems affect not only the actual fish-ing operations; they are also a major obstacle in bringing the fish to con-sumers: cooling chains and refrigerated transport are not sufficientlydeveloped in many countries. Furthermore, modern technology is only begin-ning to develop means of processing large quantities of small fish for directhuman consumption, and of exploiting resources not utilized so far, forexample the krill of the Antartic. At present, ocean fishing is largely inthe hands of developed countries. To obtain a fair share in ocean fishing,developing countries would have to organize cooperation among themselves,especially among the smaller island states which are potential managers ofsome of the largest EEZs but which individually are not capable of developingan efficient fishing industry. Such efforts deserve the support of multila-teral institutions and of advanced countries."

Excerpted from: North-South, A Program for Survival, MIT Press, 1980,pp. 9o-97.

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ANNEX 10Page 2

Fisheries Development. The Commission report stresses theimportant role that increased fish consumption could have in reducing hungerand malnutrition as well as increasing employment (p. 97). The report notesthat most developing countries consume relatively little fish despite afavorable resource base. It identifies technical and managerialdifficulties, particularly for smaller countries, and requests internationalsupport for finance of training and technical assistance to organizecooperative fishing efforts among these countires (p. 97).

The Bank supports these objectives and is currently reviewing itsapproach to fisheries development. Lending for this activity has been small,accounting for only 1% of the Bank's total agricultural and rural developmentlending in FY74-79, but it is expanding rapidly. During FY78 and FY79, lend-ing for fisheries, either in fisheries projects or for fisheries componentsin other projects, totalled nearly US$200 million (compared with totalfisheries lending of about US$360 million over the FY64-79 period). No lessimportant is the sharp change in Bank strategy and emphasis: the earlyBank-supported projects were largely oriented toward commercial fisheriesdevelopment and frequently based on capital-intensive marine fisheries tech-nology. Today most Bank-supported projects focus on lower-income groupswhose livelihood depends on capture fisheries and aquaculture. Looking for-ward, the Bank might lend some US$200 million annually over the next fiveyears for fisheries development. Projects already under preparation accountfor approximately one-third of that amount. Most of it is expected to bechannelled into rural areas in support of small-scale fisheries while thebalance would support large-scale industrial fisheries projects.

Brandt Commission Recommendation No. 11 -- Developing An Action Program ToIncrease Food Output in Low-Income, Food-Importing Countries During the1980's, Memorandum to Executive Directors, September 26, 1980 (R80-294).

HARVESTING THE WATERS

A REVIEW OF BANK EXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT

PART II

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

- 51 -SUPPLENENT 1Page 1


IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARIES OF COMPLETED FISHERIES PROJECTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Project Name Loan/Credit

1. Iceland - Fishing Harbors Rehabilitation ... ........... Loan 9412. Panama - First Fisheries .............................. Loan 9873. Panama - Fishing Port .... .................. .............. Loan 11144. Panama - Second Fisheries ............................. Loan 13985. Ghana - Fisheries ................ ..................... Credit 1636. Indonesia - First Fisheries .......... ................. Credit 2117. Indonesia - Fisheries Credit Project .......... ........ Credit 4808. Iran - Fisheries ...................................... Loan 10479. Ecuador - Fisheries ........... ......................... Loan 55510. Tunisia - First Fisheries ............................. Credit 27011. Yemen PDR - First Fisheries .................... . ....... Credit 37012. Philippines - First Fisheries ......................... Loan 89113. Philippines - Second Fisheries ........................ Loan 127014. Mauritania - Nouadhibou Port .................... ...... Credit 588

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Page 2


IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARIES OF COMPLETED FISHERIES PROJECTS 1/

1. Leeland - Fishing Harbors Rehabilitation (Loan 941-IC)

1. Iceland, located just south of the Arctic Circle, suffers from fre-quent volcanic activity. In January 1973, a volcanic eruption caused theevacuation of the only inhabited island of the Vestmannaeyjar group, justsouth of the main island. The entire population and all 76 fishing boatswere safely evacuated, but four out of the seven fish processing plants wereseverely damaged, while two plants were evacuated. Fishing ports on the mainisland did not have the capacity to safely shelter the refugee boats from thefrequent North Atlantic gales, nor to efficiently handle the extra volume offish.

2. In February 1973, the Government of Iceland (GOI) requested emer-gency assistan-e from the Bank. In October 1973, a loan of US$7.0 millionwas approved, which was to finance 62% of the cost needed to provide emer-gency harborage for the entire Vestmannaeyjar fleet and permanent harboragefor one-third to one-half of the boats which were expected to permanently usemain island harbors. The Agricultural Credit and Agro-industries Division ofEMENA handled the project, because initially it was intended to also includefinancing for fish processing plants.

3. The rehabilitation of Vestmannaeyjar was far faster and more com-plete than foreseen at the time of appraisal. The net result of the eruptionon the island's harbor was to improve it through the formation of a naturalbreakwater. The undamaged capelin plant operated during the 1973 fishingseason and the evacuated filleting plants were reconstructed during the sum-mer of 1973. Almost all of the fishing boats returned for the 1974 (January- May) fishing season. The island is 80% repopulated, including 20% newsettlers. According to Icelandic experts, the probability of damage fromfuture eruption is low. The result of this had been to largely eliminate theneed for the permanent harborage for the Vestmannaeyjar fleet on the main-land. The project was still carried out, largely as planned, and has greatlyimproved safety of the fishing boats during bad weather and the speed of un-loading at the project harbors, while damage to fish has been reduced. Theextra capacity of the harbors also serves as an insurance for theVestmannaeyjar fishers in case of an (unexpected) repeat eruption.

4. Project implementation was generally good, although some delays andtechnical difficulties occurred. Cost overruns have been substantial andwere almost entirely due to inflation. Expressed in US dollars, the overrunwas 21%, but this does not take into account the reduction in scope which wasnecessitated because of financial constraints. The PCR has found, however,

1/ Adapted, to a large extent verbatim, from the respective audit reports.

- 53 -SUPPLEMENT 1Page 3

that specially due to the sharply increased prices of fish (after adjustmeutfor inflation), the project still had the satisfactory economic return of 20Xagainst an appraisal estimate of 28Z.

5. The fact that the project helped to alleviate some of the imediateneeds of the emergency was more the result of circumstances prevailing inIceland than the rapid reaction of the Bank. Loan funds could not bedisturbed until 10 months after the application by Iceland, in spite ofshortcuts used in the normal Bank procedures. However, work in this casestarted immediately. Because some plans were already available, works couldbe carried out by IHA2 / itself and the Government could advance the costuntil loan funds, including retroactive financing, became available. Thepart of the project which was carried out by consultants and contractorsillustrates the difficulties of the Bank in reacting quickly to meetemergency needs where there are no plans, construction capacity and localfinancial resources available. In such circumstances, even in emergencies,it seem:. to require 1 - 2 years before civil works can start under Bankprojects.

6. Delays in IHA's work were at least partially due to over-extensionof their resources, in an attempt to cope with the emergency. Changes inboth IHA's work and the part done by contract have been caused in part byshortages of funds due to rapid inflation and also by the disappearance ofthe emergency. Modification of the entire project was not seriously con-sidered once the emergency did no longer exist, but is appears questionablewhether changes could have been made at a point where bidding procedures hadalready started. The project as executed still appears essential to improvefacilities for the fleet normally using the harbors of the main island.Also, it was to provide insurance in case the volcano would show renewedactivity.

7. The economic return, which according to the PCR declined to 20%from 28% at appraisal, is still satisfactory - especially since it was notpossible to quantify the reduction in damage to the fishing boats. Projectbenefits decreased when congestion in the ports eased after the return of theVestmannaeyjar fleet to its own home port. In part, however, this was com-pensated by a sharp increase of fish prices, even after adjustment for in-flation.

2/ IHA - Iceland Harbour Authority.

- 54 - S

Page 4

2. Panama - First Flsbing Project (Loan 987-PAN)

1. The possibility of promoting a fisheries project in Panam was sug-gested by an FAO-IBRD/CP reconnaissance mission in November 1968. In July1969, the project was identified, and the final version of the preparationreport was completed in July 1970. The project was appraised in February1971 and approved in July of the same year. The Loan Agreement was signed inAugust and became effective in December 1971.

2. The project was designed to assist the Panamanian shrimp fishingindustry by preventing a decline in the catch through the replacement of 40obsolete vessels. Captains to operate project vessels were to be trained inbasic navigation and the use of modern fishing gear. The project also pro-vided funds for a consulting firm to study the feasibility of a new fishingport outside Panama City.

3. In March 1974, 27 months after the loan became effective, a con-tract for the building of ten vessels was signed. In 1975, ten additionalunits were built and in 1976 the last six were completed, for a total of 26.

4. Delays in procurement resulted In fishing vessels being constructedduring a period of exceptional international inflation. Unit costs of theproject vessels averaged US$165,000 instead of US$81,000 estimated atappraisal, so that only 26 boats could be constructed out of the proceeds ofthe Loan, instead of the 40 units initially planned. All vessels were builtby Construcciones Navales de Panama (CONAPAN), a local shipyard.

5. The oil crisis which caused inflationary increases in both con-struction and operating costs also resulted in a world-wide economic re-cession that caused international demand for shrimp to drop and prices tofall in 1974. It became preferable for boat owners to continue operating oldboats which were still marginally profitable or, for those small owners whohad financial resources, to rehabilitate them, rather than to invest in newexpensive boats. At that time project management would have been unable tofinance the debt service out of its operations. In order to prevent furtherconcentration of fleet ownership in thc hands of processors and largecompanies, project maragement suggested reserving 26 boats for captains whohad never owned a boat, but who were willing to take this opportunity tobecome self-employed. The total number of shrimp fishing licenses has beenlimited to 238 since 1968, in order to avoid fleet overcapacity. However,the Government issued another decree creating the additional 26 licensesunder a special regime set up to enable individual captains to benefit fromthe project.

6. Prices of shrimps increased again in 1975, when most project boatsstarted operating. The project boats have, therefore, been in operation foronly about three years, but so far appear to meet appraisal expectations bothtechnically and financially. On the basis of actual initial results and ofprojections of future returns, their financial rate of return would be around15Z, within the range of initial estimates (14% to 20Z).


7. After some delay, training in boat operations was provided to theproject captains by an FAO shipmaster and was completed satisfactorily onSeptember 30, 1976.

8. The feasibility study for a new fishing port was started in June1971 by a consulting firm from the UK and completed in March 1974. On thebasis of its findings, a fishing port project was appraised by the Bank and aport loan (Loan 1114-PAN) of US$24 million was approved by the Bank in April1975.

9. Technically and financially, Banco Nacional de Panama (NationalBank of Panama, BNP) has managed the project well and prov ded sub-borrowerswith adequate support services. The Bank helped BNP to set up a routine pre-ventive maintenance program for the project boats by financing an initialstock of spare parts out of the loan proceeds. None of the subloans is inarrears and BNP is keeping sub-borrowers under close financial 3upervision.

10. The economic impact of the project on the shrimp fishing industryis, at this stage, difficult to assess because of uncertainties about futurechanges in shrimp prices, in the total catch and in the size of the nationalfleet. Moreover, all project boats have been operating for too short a timefor accurate estimates to be made of their operating efficiency. However,the economic rate of return is likely to be substantially lower than the 15%to 22% range expected at appraisal. This is because the obsolete vesselswhich the project boats were supposed to replace remained in operations.So, at present, averted losses may not be counted as a benefit. Atappraisal, the total catch capacity of the fleet was assumed to be around themaximum yield of the traditional shrimp grounds. Consequently, the projectboats were not expected to raise the national catch and no overfishing wouldoccur. In 1976, the construction of new trawlers was prohibited until 1980,when it was expected that natural retirement of old boats will have broughtthe shrimp fleet capacity back to the estimated maximum catch. Only then, itwas assumed, by averting losses to the sector, would the project boats startyielding substantial econouic benefits. On the basis of past trends and ofthe information available so far, the economic rate of return has beenrecalculated to be zero.

11. The follow-on loan (Loan 1398-PAN), Second Fisheries ProJect) wassigned in April 1977 and became effective in November 1977. It includes aline of credit for the replacement of five old shrimp trawlers with five newvessels and the rehabilitation of 10 old wooden trawlers. Issuing of the1976 decree freezing the construction of new trawlers until 1980 was acondition of negotiations. Assurances also were obtained that, from 1980 to1985, construction or rehabilitation of shrimp trawlers would be limited to amaximum of 3,260 effective horsepower annually and, according to regulations,that would have LO be acceptable to the Bank.

12. To summarize, this project has certainly checked the trend of con-centration of the shrimp trawler fleet in the hands of large compan,es andprocessors and has contributed to redistributing the currently-substaucialbenefits of the shrimp sector among a larger number of individuals. It hasalso successfully contributed to building up project management capabilitieswithin BNP and training ship captains.

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Page 6

3. Panama - Fishing Port Project (Loan 1114-Pm)

1. Identification/Preparation. The Panama Fishing Port Project (Loan1114-PAN) was originally identified and prepared b; an FAO/IBRD CooperativeProgram mission which visited the country in July and August of 1969. Atthat time, the mission proposed construction of a new port with three broadobjectives: (a) the regrouping at a new location away from central PanamaCity of the then existing fisheries activities in the interests of economyand efficiency; (b) the further development of Panamanian fisheriesactivities (beyond the then existing shrimp fishery which was already beingexploited at or in excess of maximum sustainable yield); and (c) theservicing of foreign fleets and their diversion from existing transfer andservicing operations from an anchorage near Taboga Island.

2. In pursuit of these objectives, the identification/preparationreport envisaged a port that would provide shelter and service facilities for240 shrimp trawlers, 25 large purse-seiners, 10 small seiners, and 60 inshoreboats all based in Panama and for a number of international tuna vesselsoperating in Eastern Pacific tropical waters. The facilities would includeunloading and service berths, freezing and cold storage plants, and ashipyard.

3. The feasibility study was carried out by a consortium of Panamanianand British consultants; the consultants' draft report was issued in February1974. This was discussed during a Bank pre-appraisal mission. A revisedreport was issued in July 1974, which indicated substantially higher returnsthan initially calculated. A second pre-appraisal mission visited Panama inAugust 1974. This mission reviewed the consultants' report, made suggestionsfor further modifications, and gathered materials for the staff appraisalreport. As a result of the above changes, the relative importance oftuna-related benefits to the viability of the project was considerably en-hanced. A visit was made by a Bank official to San Diego, California wherediscussions were held with representatives of the tuna fishing industry.

4. Appraisal. The appraisal report was prepared in March 1975 with-out a formal appraisal mission, as sufficient information had been gatheredduring two pre-appraisal missions, in addition to the details included in thefeasibility study. The project as appraised had the following objectives:

(a) to promote the efficient operation and growth of the shrimp in-dustry in Panama by providing adequate port facilities;

(b) to provide improved trans-shipment and other services to thenational and international tuna fleets by installing a cold storageplant on the mainland;

(c) to provide better facilities for inshore fishermen operating inPanama Bay;

- 57 - SUPPLEMENT 1

Page 7

(d) to facilitate the improvement of the Maranon section of Panama Cityby the removal of the fisheries industry from the city; and

(e) to assist in developing the management capability of APN3/ throughtechnical assistance and staff training programs.

5. In order to meet these objectives the principal components of theproject were:

(a) construction, at Punta Vacamonte, of a fishing port with a pro-tective breakwater, a dredged access channel, ten berths for shrimptrawlers, four berths for tuna clippers, adequate quays forberthing inshore fishing vessels and for servicing trawlers, a shiprepair berth and yard, buildings for shrimp processing and tunacold storage plants, a fish market, administrative and otheroffices, storage areas, roads and utility services within the portarea;

(b) provision of consultant services for design and supervision of con-struction, preparation of administrative and operational proceduresand cost accounting and budget control systems required by APN andeach of its ports; and

(c) a program for training the Port Authority's staff (to be financedby UNDP).

6. Implementation. The project was approved by the Board on April 22,1975. The Loan Agreement was signed on May 27 and became effective onSeptember 25, 1975. The contract for detailed engineering was awarded to aconsortium of two foreign and one Panamanian firm in June 1975. The sameconsortium later (November 1976) was awarded the contract for supervision.

7. Early in the supervision process, the detailed design indicatedthat the actual cost of the port would substantially exceed appraisal esti-mates and attempts were made to find economies. (It should be pointed outthat the current procedure of having detailed design precede Board presenta-tion reduces the probability of this problem in current and future Bankprojects.) Among the economies selected was a realignment of the southwestcorner of the breakwater to save 90-100 m of length and a shortening of theeastern end of the breakwater to save an additional 50-60 m in length. Thisdecision may have left the tuna berths exposed to swell and wave action morethan the original design contemplated and has added to the unattractivenessof the port to the tuna industry. It appears that when the recommendation toshorten the eastern end of the breakwater was formulated, the consultantrealized the effect of swell and wave on the tuna berths and concluded thatvessel motion though increased would be within acceptable limits. However,there have been problems with vessel motion in the port as observed by theaudit mission and as reported by users. The Bank's Regional staff believe,

3/ APN - National Port Authority.


nevertheless, that suitability of Vacamonte for tuna operations remainsunaffected by the change in the breakwater.

8. The lateness of the original bid documents and the need to rebidresulted in a delay of about eight months in contract award for marine andharbor works compared with the original schedule. Thereafter, the projectwas built quite expeditiously and problems encountered during constructionwere quickly solved.

9. Actual costs, at US$47 million, were much higher than the costsestimated at appraisal. This is due to higher costs for buildings and equip-ment, but also substantially higher costs for consultant services. Mostimportant was the exchange rate adjustment arising from the weakening of thedollar against the Japanese Yen, which amounted to US$4 million in currentterms. Finally, some items, such as costs of land purchase and capitalizedadministrative and supervision costs of APN, had not been included atappraisal.

10. The economic rate of return was reestimated by the audit at sevenpercent, compared to fifteen percent at appraisal.

11. The project proposed removal of shrimp landing and associated pro-cessing facilities from the central area of Panama City tc a new locationabout 30 km away. It also intended to provide other fisheries-relatedInstallations, including berthing and storage facilities for tuna vessels,berthing, storage and marketing facilities for artisanal and larger-scalefisheries to supply the local market and ship servicing facilities for allvessels and for seiners which supply several Panamanian fishmeal plants. Theproject was built quite expeditiously and included all the foregoing facili-ties. However, it was somewhat redesigned and there were significant costoverruns. The project also resulted in the establishment of an effectiveport authority and the Bank made significant contributions when that author-ity was greatly expanded to assume enlarged responsibilities after the PanamaCanal Treaty.

12. While the Panamanian shrimp fleet is using the harbor and associ-ated facilities as anticipated, other uses have not developed in accordancewith projections. Most importantly, use by tuna vessels is very low and thefishery for the local market has not developed. However, some internationaltrawlers (notably from Cuba and East European countries) are calling atVacamonte, a use that was not foreseen at appraisal. The net effect of thesedevelopments is a substantial reduction in henefits and a reduction of theERR to about 7% and poor financial performance. The economic and financialperformance of the project will continue to be poor unless the internationaltrawler fleet increases its use of Vacamonte to replace the major shortfallsin use by the international tuna fleet and by domestic fishermen (other thanshrimpers).

13. The overestimate in potential use of the harbor resulted from weak-nesses in the economic analysis of the identification report, which were car-ried over into the appraisal. The analysis overestimated potential fisheries


resources and gave inadequate appreciation to the factors influencing thechoice of fishing harbors by fisheries operators. Particular failings in-cluded:

(a) Shortening the eastern end of the breakwater as a cost savingdesign change; this problem, coupled with other unfavorable aspectsof Vacamnonte for tuna vessels has helped to compromise the suit-ability of the port for the tuna industry even though the Bank'sregional staff believe that the suitability of Vacamonte for tunaoperations remains unaffected by the change in the breakwater.

(b) The depth and dimensions of both the access channel and the turningbasin; as built, they are ample for the shrimp fleet but barelyadequate for the tuna fleet, because of the resulting operationalconstraints on the tuna fleet and the economic disincentive, theport design is inappropriate for this user group.

(c) The acceptance by the Bank and APN of informal verbal assurances ofthe tuna industry concerning the need for Vacamonte, its probableutilization and the problems of using Taboga, the project designand projection of benefits depended heavily on verbal reports thatshould have been more carefully scrutinized and supported by docu-mentary evidence.

(d) The analysis of the economic incentive for users of Taboga toswitch to Vacamonte, including the omission of a sensitivity analy-sis of the most important variables; such a sensitivity analysiswould have cast severe doubt on the economic viability of theentire project and, at the lest, would have significantly alteredthe design.

(e) Too optimistic estimates of growth potential in the coastal fisheryand overrestimate of resulting benefits; these benefits were amajor part of total projected benefits and were based on antici-pating substantial changes in Panamanian domestic fish consumptionpatterns accompanied by rapid and sustained growth in catch. Thegrowth in catch was predicated on a concurrent project for fishingvessels by IDB, a project which might have made a greater contri-br-tion to the Vacamonte scheme had the two projects been more closelycoordinated but which in any event attained only half itsobjectives and had only minor effects on Vacamonte.

(f) The calculations of the economic incentive for tuna boats to useVacamonte; tuna vessel calls therefore are substantially belowappraisal estimates, as vessels continue to use the Tabogaanchorage in preference to Vacamonte. Overall tuna activity inPanama is following projections, but shifts in the internationalmarket and fishing patterns suggest that this pattern may notcontinue.

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14. An important factor in the insufficiency of analysis at appraisaland in inadequacies in supervision was the limited experience with fisheriesmatters of the Bank unit handling the project. This raises the issue as tohow fisheries projects can most suitably be handled by the Bank Group, howsuch operations are best staffed and how various units in the Bank Group canbest collaborate on such projects.


4. Panama - Second Fisheries Project (Loan 1398-PAN)

1. The Second Fisheries Project was appraised in July 1976, at a timewhen the First Fisheries Project had been in operation for over four years,and only 14 months before it was closed. The Second Fisheries Project was,therefore, admirably timed to take maximum advantage of experience gainedduring the earlier project. In contrast with the First Fisheries Project,which was mainly directed at improving the efficiency of the shrimp trawlingfleet and correcting an imbalance between the amount of fishing effort andthe size of the shrimp resource, the Second Fisheries Project addressed awider range of needs affecting both marine and freshwater fish production andonshore shrimp processing operations. Both projects were executed by theNational Bank of Panama (BNP) in conjunction with other Government Ministriesand Departments.

2. Identification of the Second Fisheries Project was carried out bythe Ministry of Planning iv consultation with the Directorate of Marine Re-sources (DMR) of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the project wassubsequently prepared by a series of Bank missions between Deceaber 1975 andMay 1976. The original aims of the project provided for:

(a) the construction of ten 260 hp purse-seiners for the catcher fleetserving the local fishmeal industry;

(b) the construction of five 220 hp shrimp trawlers to replace anequivalent number of obsolete wooden vessels;

(c) the rehabilitation of ten wooden shrimp vessels;

(d) the relocation of six shrimp processing operations from Panama Cityto the new fishing port at Vacamonte;

(e) the establishment of freshwater fish hatcheries, demonstrationponds and technical assistance for an aquaculture development pro-gram in rural areas;

(f) the establishment of facilities for an oyster culture research anddevelopment program in the Bocas del Toro area; and

(g) strengthening the BNP fisheries unit set up under Fisheries I andthe recruitment of six short-term consultancies in naval archi-tecture, fisheries training,. aquaculture, fish processing, qualitycontrol and oyster farming.

3. The only major change in project aims concerned the provision forshrimp trawlers. During the course of project appraisal and subsequentnegotiations, based on experience gained during Fisheries I regarding thevery slow rate of attrition of even the oldest components of the shrimpfleet, agreement was reached to defer the proposed new shrimp trawler con-struction and rehabilitation of older vessels under the project until 1980.


The Government also agreed to prohibit the operation of any new shrimp ves-sels until January 1, 1980, and thereafter to limit annual construction, andthe combined effect of these measures would be the elimination by naturalattrition of at least 15 of the oldest vessels by 1980.

4. The Loan Agreement was signed on April 28, 1977, but the loan didnot become effective until November 14, 1977. This initial delay was causedby the time needed to prepare new legislation in fulfillment of the con-ditions of effectiveness and to process it through Congress. The legislationconcerned limits to the size and number of purse-seiners and exemptions forvessels and other goods acquired under the project from existing import regu-lations. Very few delays were experienced thereafter during project imple-mentation and the loan account was closed on schedule in January 1982.

5.. The construction of ten purse-seiners for the Panamanian fishmealindustry (the principal component of Fisheries II) was accomplished not onlywithin the scheduled time but at substantially lower cost than originallyestimated. An unusually favorable combination of circumstances enabled ashipyard in Peru to supply the vessels, complete with fishing gear and fuel -ready to fish - for approximately US$300,000 each, which was only 752 of theappraisal unit cost estimate.

6. Prior to the start of Fisheries II, over 90% of the 35 mostlyrather elderly vessels comprising the purse-seiner fleet were owned by thefishmeal processing companies, and in view of the high cost of the new ves-sels as estimated at appraisal, it was envisaged that most of them would besold to these factories. In this way, the much lower cost per vessel createdboth the opportunity and demand for the project vessels to be sold toexperienced purse-seiner skippers who had previously been company employees.The Bank responded favorably to BNP's proposals to make this change and alsoapproved amendments to the Loan Agreement which reduced the prospectiveowner's equity from 15% (US$45,000) to 5% (US$15,000), in order to easedifficulties which the skipper concerned might otherwise have experienced inproviding his contribution. Thus, by early 1980, when the purse-seiner fleethad grown from 35 to 45 vessels, the company-owned portion had diminishedfrom over 90% to about 70%. It diminished even further over the next twoyears, as companies took advantage of the arrival of the new vessels to scrapor otherwise dispose of a number of their oldest and least efficientvessels. By 1982, the number of operational vessels was once again down to35, but it was of course a newer and more efficient fleet than the one whichexisted in 1976.

7. The first full year of operation for the new purse-seiners was1980. It produced the second-highest recorded industrial fish catch and allvessels turned in a modest profit despite the low e3-vessel price of US$30per short ton. Notwithstanding Bank supervision warnings, the price remainedunchanged during the 1981 and 1982 seasons when the fleet experienced lowercatch rates. Especially in 1982, an unusually short fishing season caused byadverse weather conditions which delayed the migration of fish stocks intothe Gulf of Panama, there were quite serious losses for all vessel owners,and only prompt action by BN? in providing the necessary short-term financeprevented many of the sub-loans from falling into arrears. The audit mission

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was pleased to learn of an agreement to increase the 1983 ex-vessel price toUS$35 per short ton and it is hoped that this measure, together with morefavorable weather conditions leading to better catch rates, will enable thefleet to recoup some of their recent losses.

8. The excessive size of the shrimp trawling fleet in relation to sus-tainable yields from the shrimp resource has been one of the main issuesthroughout both fisheries projects, and both had, as a common aim, an overallreduction in numbers of vessels while, at the same time, replacing some ofthe oldest trawlers with more efficient new craft. In the economic circum-stances which prevailed following the 1973-74 fuel oil crisis, the expectedreduction in vessel numbers did not materialize and the operational fleetgrew, according to data shown in the Fisheries I PCR, from 222 vessels in1971 to 262 in 1976.

9. Based on this experience it was agreed to defer the construction offive additional new trawlers and the rehabilitation of ten older ones fromthe start of Fisheries II until early 1980 in the hope that a sufficientnumber of obsolete vessels would have been scrapped by then to allow thebuilding of new vessels to proceed without jeopardizing the aims of anoverall fleet size reduction. Unfortunately, the 1971-76 experience wasrepeated. In 1976, there were 280 licensed shrimp trawlers, of which 262were operational. By late 1979, there were still 280 licensed vessels ofwhich 261 were operational. By the end of 1982, according to informationsupplied to the audit mission, the number of licensed vessels had increasedto 307.4/ In these circumstances, there was clearly no justification for anynew construction; 5/ rehabilitation of older vessels was limited by BNP toonly three of the ten envisaged at appraisal and this part of the loan wastherefore cancelled.

10. Although there was about a six-month delay in starting the re-location of shrimp processing operations from Panama City to the new fishingport of Vacamonte, all six plants had transferred and resumed operations atthe new site before loan closure. 6 / Five of the companies concerned tooksub-loans under the project totalling US$2.5 million to finance their moves.Plant owners consider the move to have been generally beneficial because ofthe consolidation of fuel, repair and other facilities at one location andbecause of the ability to unload fishing vessels at any state of tide. Thehygienic and other conditions of shrimp processing have greatly improved as

4/ It must be added that there is some confusion about the accuracy ofthese fleet statistics. Conflicting figures appear in various reports,although all cite the Directorate of Marine Resources (DMR) as thesource of the data.

5/ Construction of five shrimp trawlers was envisaged at appraisal.

6/ Two additional processing plants were also established at the new port.


a result of the move.7/ Product quality standards were such that there wereno instances of US market rejection since the move, whereas products from theold Panama City-based plants were occasionally rejected as substandard orbecause of contamination.

11. To a large extent this satisfactory outcome is due to the 16 man-months of consultancy provided under the project to the Ministry of Health totrain two seafood inspectors at Vacamonte, to establish a quality testinglaboratory at the port and to conduct classes for shrimp boat captains,processing plant staff and others in the handling of shrimp and other fisheryproducts. More than 800 people attended these classes.

12. By project closure the Divisa hatchery was fully established withoffices, laboratory and workshop facilities, over 50 earth ponds of 400-1,000m2 each and 40 concrete holding tanks of 6-25 m2 each. Hatchery staffare well advanced on an ambitious program of experimental fish culture usinga range of introduced species of Tilapias, carps and perches for differentapplications. The rural program resulted in the completion by December 1981of 118 ponds, mostly communally-owned and smaller than originally envisaged,compared with the appraisal target of 150 ponds totalling 55 ha. However,the audit mission was informed that the total now exceeds 300 ponds and thatmany of the earlier ponds are in the process of being improved and enlargedto reduce the villagers' dependence on the Divisa hatchery for annualrestocking.

13. Although shrimp farming was not part of the project as envisaged atappraisal, the Bank subsequently agreed to finance 16 man-months of fishfarming consultancy on a feasibility study of salt water shrimp farming. Asa result of this work, the National Directorate of Aquaculture (NDA)established an experimental station and hatchery at Aguadulce, in support ofcommercially- and IDB-fundedg/ developments in the area which already extendover about 2,500 ha with potential for expansion to as much as 12,500 ha.

14. A modest research and development program into mangrove oystercultivation was initiated in 1977 by DMR with financial assistance and twoyears of consultancy aid provided under the project. The site chosen for thework was at Bocas del Toro on the Atlantic shore of northwestern Panama andwae inaccessible from the rest of the country except by air, or by sea from

7/ A special Bank environmental mission visited the project in November1981. -...This is one rare instance in Bank-financed industrialproducts where the results are better than the commitments made by thesponsors. Pollution from the shrimp processing plants is negligible andeasily taken care of by the ocean regenerative capacity. This is a verynice operation. Inside and outside the plants, the area is very cleanand the plant owners which four years ago were dead-set against the movefrom Panama are now very happy about it." (BTO dated November 23,1981).

8/ IBD - Inter-American Development Bank.

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Colon. Results were disappointing in that growth rates were smaller thanexpected, leading to problems of market acceptance. Also, the localresidents of Bocas del Toro showed little interest in taking up oysterfarming. DMR,9/ therefore, closed the laboratory in 1981 and reassigned thestaff and moveable assets to other activities elsewhere.

15. Although this part of the Second Fisheries Project did not attainthe perhaps overly optimistic appraisal expectations, it was far from a deadloss. Two local biologists have gained considerable experience in oystercultivation which they are utilizing elsewhere on other species of molluscs,and DMR is optimistic that commercial interests may be ready to take up anddevelop this activity when the Bocas del Toro area is opened up by a newaccess road now under construction.-l/

16. BNPIl/ performance during Fisheries II can fairly be described asexcellent, and although there were a total of four project directors between1977 and 1981 caused by promotions within BNP, this did not have any adverseaffect because of the high priority and support always accorded to the proj-ect by BNP's top management. Reimbursement requests were processed ratherslowly at first, reportedly, due to project unit staff's unfamiliarity withBank procedures; but this improved as the project progressed.

17. The establishment of a BNP branch at Vacamonte Port, staffedlargely by fisheries project personnel, is thoroughly commended not only be-cause it put BNP into direct and day-by-day contact on its home ground withthe majority of fishermen and fish processors who were sub-borrowers, butalso because it enabled BNP management to be more reliably and regularlyinformed about changes and problems affecting the fishing industry, as theyarose. Thus BNP was able to react promptly and appropriately when the com-bination of poor fishing and low ex-vessel prices caused genuine cash flowproblems to the purse-seiner fleet during 1981 and 1982. As an incrementalbenefit, BNP's presence at Vacamonte has resulted in the cransfer of a numberof important non-project-related accounts from other banks. The Vacamontebranch, therefore, has a regular commercial banking function in support ofthe Vacamonte fishing and related industries at the port, as well as theresponsibility for supervision of project sub-loans.

9/ DMR - Directorate of Marine Resources.

10/ Following the audit, the Region comments that as of end 1983 only thefirst section of the road is under construction. Because of substantialcost overruns the Bank has also recommended to Government a reduction indesign standards. In retrospect, the assessment that commercial inter-ests might be ready to develop oyster cultivation at Bocas del Toromight be too optimistic.

11/ BNP - Banco National de Panama (National Bank of Panama).


18. BNP and the Government complied with most of the Loan Agreement andGuarantee Agreement conditions or, in two cases of non-compliance in thestrict sense, dealt with the matters concerned in other ways that wereacceptable to the Bank. Only one covenant to the Guarantee Agreementremained outstanding to the end and this was an undertaking by Government toproduce a plan for regulating the fishing industry. In spite of repeatedreminders, no progress was ever made on such a plan, notwithstanding itscrucial importance to the future success of the shrimp trawling sub-sector inparticular.

19. The revised economic rate of return for the project at completionhas been estimated in the PCR at 12X compared with an appraisal estimate of15Z. The audit mission considers that the PCR revised estimate is incorrectin the light of 1981 and 1982 purse-seiner results. Given that 1980 wasclearly a good year for the industrial fishery and that the limited dataavailable suggests that there could be one good year and one bad year in eachfour-year cycle, it may be dangerous to assume that the 1980 catch per vesselyear can be treated as the mean level of catch over an extended period.Furthermore, as actual catch levels are available for 1981 and 1982 thesemust be used rather than a mean. The audit has reestimated the economic rateof return at 9%.

20. Supervision of the Second Fisheries Project by Bank staff was quiteadequate in terms of numbers and frequency of visits. A total of 11 super-vision missions visited Panama at roughly six-month intervals between July1977 and February 1982 and a fisheries technologist participated in six ofthe missions. The project was accorded a problem-free performance rating byall the missions and there was thus no occasion for believing that there wasany need to strengthen supervisory input. In retrospect, this may have beenan over-optimistic assessment. A more critical review, admittedly with thebenefit of hindsight, can detect some weaknesses both in project concept andin Bank response to events, such as Government's failure to produce a planfor regulating the fishing industry and Government's action in imposingunrealistic price controls on the fishmeal industry.


5. Ghana - Flsherles Project (Credit 163-GE)

1. Ghana is favorably located in relation to Atlantic deep sea fishinggrounds and its coastal waters are rich in fish. In 19 61, the Governmentdecided to develop a deep sea fishing fleet and by 1967 Ghana had become oneof the larger producers and consumers of marine fish in West Africa. Fishingactivities involved a wide variety of techniques and fishing vessels, in-cluding large long-distance trawlers, providing employment for about 66,500full- and part-time fishermen. Consumption of fish, including imports,represented 68% of the country's animal protein intake (1964-1966), which,however, remained at low a level in absolute terms. Government thereforesought to increase local fish production to improve nutrition and saveforeign exchange.

2. In 1965, a Bank agricultural sector review noted that fishingoffered opportunities for Bank investment. Subsequently, the Bank identifiedthe Fisheries Project in 1966 and, together with the FAO/IBRD Cooperativeprogram, prepared it in 1967. The Government submitted the project proposaland requested finance in August 1968. The September 1968 appraisal did notaccept the proposed increase in boat tonnage because of insufficientsupporting evidence on fisheries potential. The mission also recommendedexempting boat construction from international competitive bidding. Theproject was negotiated in April 1969 and approved in September 1969, and thecredit was declared effective in January 1970.

3. The project objectives of increasing local fish landings, improvingnutrition and reducing fish imports were to be achieved through:

(a) Constructing 40 vessels with a hold capacity of 20 tons each andfully equipped for purse-seiner operations;

(b) providing credit through the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) tofishermen to purchase vessels;

(c) procuring spare parts for project vessels;

(d) providing management staff for the Boatyard Division (BD); and

(e) funding studies for further fisheries development.

The cost of the three-year project was estimated at US$2.3 million, supportedby an IDA credit of US$1.3 million. The project was to increase fish sup-plies by about 9,000 tons per annum, to provide employment for about 800fishermen previously engaged in less efficient canoe fishing, and to enableBD to operate at full capacity for two years. Its financial rate of returnwas estimated at 30% and its economic rate of return at 50%.

4. The 40 purse-seiners were not constructed. One reason was that avessel equipped for purse-seining only was no longer (1971) considered fi-nancially viable because: (a) annual catch estimates per vessel had to berevised downwards to a more realistic level of 180 tons (appraisal: 225


tons); (b) average price for landed fish went down to C140/ton (appraisal:C150/ton); (c) costs of the vessels increased by 11%; and (d) operating costalso went up. Another reason for abandoning the purse-seiner constructionwas that, according to new data, expanding fisheries would contribute to adepletion of pelagic (surface feeding) fish resources. To avoid over-exploitation and provide a financially more attractive alternative, it wasdecided that ten trawlers assigned to fish demersal (bottom feeding)resources should be added to the existing fleet. The ten hulls, alreadyunder contruction, were subsequently completed as dual purpose vessels.Actual cost per vessel increased by 75Z to US$75,000 (appraisal: US$43,000),due to inflation, increase in engine size and additional fishing gearrequired for trawling.

5. Sub-borrowers received loans totalling C771,242 for the purchase ofvessels, engines and equipment and their repayment rate was satisfactory.Procurement of spare parts proceeded satisfactorily for the BoatyardDivision, but was delayed for sub-borrowers' vessels until after September1977, due to disagreement on the amount of spares required. The credit fundsallocated to expatriate technical assistance were never used because UNDPprovided funds for such assistance. The studies on fisheries and portdevelopment were carried out but disagreement between the consultant, Govern-ment and the Bank prevented a satisfactory conclusion and no further Bankproject evolved from the studies.

6. Because of revisions during implementation, credit proceeds werereallocated, mainly from the categories "materials, components and gear forfishing vessels" and "staff for the Division' to -spare parts and equipmentfor the Division". The final reallocation of credit proceeds was agreed uponin September 1977. Actual estimated project cost was US$1.8 million(appraisal: US$2.3 million), due to the reduction in number of vessels con-structed. The credit was closed in June 1978, 8s years after it becameeffective.

7. There was no major institution building objective other than pro-viding an expatriate to improve management at the Boatyard Division. The ex-patriate, funded by UNDP, left because the Division was not prepared to ad-just its labor and overhead cost to the production schedule. Banksupervision has been critical of the Division's operations, the insufficientcontrol of the Division by the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIROC)and the poor coordination of project activities. Recommendations toestablish a proper Department of Fisheries, intended to be more carefullyappraised in a proposed second fisheries project, were not pursued becausethe second project never materialized. Reports required to be submitted byADB were received promptly in most cases. GIROC and its Boatyard Division,however, failed to submit most of their quarterly reports. The consultantretained for the studies performed poorly: recommendations were notsupported by proper studies; it appeared the consultant failed to exerciseindependent judgement. The consultant who appraised equipment requirementssubmitted recommendations which were found to be inadequately supported.

8. Fish landings increased from 170,000 tons in 1970 to 250,000 tonsin 1978. The nine project vessels (one sank) contributed only 1,400 tons perannum (appraisal: 9,000 tons for 40 vessels). But, through spare parts,

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(purchased with over half of the credit proceeds) which keep many vessels atsea, the project's contribution - although not quantifiable - is muchhigher. Increase in value of landed fish to about C300/ton (appraisal:C140/ton) exceeded increases in investment and operating costs of thevessels. The financial rate of return, therefore, increased to over 10OZ(appraisal: 30%). The economic rate of return of the project is currentlyre-estimated at 10%. This is much belov the appraisal estimate (50Z) becauseof: (a) the reduction in the number of vessels; (b) the 2.5-year delay fromthe beginning of the project to the fitting of engines in the completedboats; (c) the increase in boat construction and operating costs; and (d)reduced catch per vessel.12/

9. The project was not a success. While not a complete failureeither, the project can perhaps best be described as beset with majorimplementation problems but still achieving some acceptable productionobjectives and an acceptable rate of return. Inappropriate design was theprime cause of problems in a project which became an unhappy experience forboth the Borrower and the Bank. Delays in project implementation resultedmainly from the long time required for agreeing on alternative allocation ofunutilized credit funds which became available through reducing the number ofboats from 40 to 10 early in the project and from the impasse between theBorrower and the Bank on which fishing port should be selected for detailedengineering studies.

10. Some aspects of the Bank's performance can be criticized:appraisal was done without sufficient basic information on fish resources;supervision lacked continuity, produced differing recommendations and was

12/ It must be explicitly mentioned that the opposite developments would nothave necessarily resulted in a higher rate of return. If no delay inproject implementation had taken place, and if unit costs had not in-creased, the project's re-estimated economic rate of return would havebeen higher. But since fisheries are common property resources, in-crease in the fishing effort by someone may decrease the catch of some-one else. Therefore, a straight-eorward relation with the rate ofreturn as mentioned above may or may not hold true for the ot;.er twofactors: (a) more vessels might have resulted in a larger, a simi'ar,or a smaller overall fleet catch, depending on the rate at which fishwere being exploited previously, with the consequent effects on theproject returns to the Ghanaian economy; and (b) if reduced catch pervessel is the result of inefficient vessel use, the larger the catch pervessel the higher the rate of return and vice versa; if it is the resultof overexploitation of the fish resource, the higher the catch pervessel the lower the project return. Therefore, if the project hadactually built the 40 vessels originally anticipated, the rate of returnfor the economy might have been much lower, due to the productionexternalities involved.

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indecisive on how to reallocate the remaining US$670,000, and follow-up onsubmission of reports and audited financial statements by GIHOC and BD wasinsufficient. While as a whole the working relationship between the Bank andthe Government was cordial, there were some serious disagreements concerningoperational autonomy of the Boatyard Division and coordination of fisheriesactivities. Considering the cost of supervising a project, it isquestionable whether the Bank should continue disbursing relatively smallamounts of a loan/credit over very long periods. The combination of port andfishing components in one project requires a large set of different types ofexpertise. This makes Bank appraisal and supervision more complex (actually,it is becoming more and more difficult for one person - i.e., the "fisheriesspecialist' - to deal with all the problems) and project implementation morecomplicated for the Borrower.


6. Iudonesia - First Fisheries Project (Credit 211-IND)

1. Most key ingredients for success of the First Indonesia FisheriesProject (Credit 211-IND) appeared to exist at the time of appraisal; skipjacktuna in offshore areas was adequate and largely unexploited and bait wasreadily available; there were reliable local and international markets forskipjack tuna (and real prices have increased well beyond appraisal esti-mates); and skipjack fishermen in the project area were highly skilled. Analmost unbroken series of implementation problems, however, have made thisprobably the Bank Group's least satisfactory project in Indonesia.

2. The project consists of the construction of shore facilities (iceplant, cold storage, wharf, slipway, workshop, etc.) and thirty sk.pjackpole-and-line fishing vessels of 30 gross tons each, 15 intended for the pri-vate sector and 15 for the State Fisheries Enterprise for North and CentralSulawesi (SFE), which would also own the shore facilities at Aer Tembaga.The objective is export development, both by the Enterprise directly and bydemonstrating feasibility to the private sector.

3. Project production began about four-and-a-half years behindschedule, due to delays in:

(a) obtaining the initial consultant (six months);

(b) changing consultancy (one year);

gc) design and bidding for the shore facilities (one year and sixmonths);

(d) construction of shore facilities (ten month3); and

(e) vessel construction (six months).

Efforts to advance construction of the later vessels were frustrated byfurther construction delays, and ten vessels are still not completed. Manyof the shore facilities and vessels are seriously defective due to poordesign, inadequate supervision of construction, and lack of maintenance.Project costs, after adjusting for inflation, exchange rate changes, elimi-nation and addition of some items, and delays, exceed appraisal estimates by7 1X.

4. Project fish production rate until recently was 5% of appraisalprojections, s/ due to poor vessel utilization (primarily because of thetime needed for repairs), poor catches, the non-completion of the final tenboats, and the excessively high appraisal estimate of both daily catch rateand annual fishing dats. SFE is now losing $750,000/year and is $1.8 million

13/ During the past six months, catches and boat utilization improved,bringing the production rate to about 35%.

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overdue in interest payments. Improved management could probably improveboat utilization and the daily catch rate, bringing the catch up to the levelof nearby private vessels, but the economic rate of return would still benegative. No serious effort has yet been made to induce private sectorpurchase of vessels under the project.

5. One of the basic problems has been poor SFE management and poorconsultant and contractor performance, which in turn has burdened the projectwith many technical defects. This situation was partially caused and corpounded by interagency disputes, conflicting objectives, and inadequatesupervision by GOI. The first three President Directors of SFE were all Un-successful, and support staff have been very weak, especially in technicaland financial areas. Relationships with the local public and private sectorshave beer. poor. Management and staff dedication and motivation have been lowand opportunities for improved performance have seldom been utilized. Untillate 1975, the Directorate General of Fisheries (DGF) had full responsibilityfor supervising SFE and played the major role in selection of SFE managersand consultants, and in procurement. The subsequent division of responsi-bility between DGF and an Assistant to the Minister of Agriculture only comr-pounded the problems, as did disputes between DGF and the North Sulawesiprovincial government.

6. Insofar as the Bank is concerned, although the project objectivesand technical design were generally sound, the implementation schedule andthe catch and cost estimates were excessively optimistic, and inadequate pro-visions were made to obtain private sector participation. Both the appraisalreport and the supervision missions noted the managerial weaknesses of SFE.However, they failed to appreciate the seriousness of the problems or todevise effective solutions. Supervision of the project has largely beenlimited to procurement and financial matters and there has been little tech-nical assistance to the borrower.14 / For example, inadequacy in boat designwas noted in supervision reports, but this information was not passed on tothe borrower in follow-up letters. Supervision continuity has been minimal;largely as a result of Bank reorganizations, the project has been handled bysix divisions and nine different supervision mission leaders. Seldom didanyone remain responsible long enough to obtain an adequate perspective onthe project. The excessive optimism and caution of the early supervisionmissions prevented the Bank from pressing for radical reforms while there wasstill a reasonable chance to rescue the project. Shortage of technicalexpertise also limited the Bank's effectiveness.

7. Experience in Indonesia over the past decade has shown that stateenterprises, while often the only choice for operation of shore facilities,are not very efficient at fishing. Nevertheless, the vastly superior per-formance of two similar projects (at Ambon, under Credit 480-IND1 and at

141 The Region disagrees with these conclusions and points out that muchtechnical assistance was provided to the project informally whilesupervision missions were in the field, and that of the 11 supervision,Lssions 10 contained a fisheries expert. The audit considers that thepresence of a fisheries expert on supervision missions does notnecessarily mean that effective technical assistance was provided.

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Sorong, with Asian Development Bank finance) shows how much difference goodmanagement and close relations with the local government can make, andreflects in part the lessons learned under Credit 211-IND.

8. Among the general lessons for the Bank Group are the need for morecareful attention to project management, implementation schedules and localgovernment involvement; the importance of having contingency plans ready incase of implementation problems and of making special efforts once such prob-lems develop; the dangers of excessive optimism in appraisal and supervision;the need for continuing technical input and review; the need for involvementbeyond formalities and technicalities in the procurement process; thedesirability of casting the net widely for and being very selective aboutconsultants; the complexity of even small agro-industries projects; and theproblems of using state enterprises for fisheries development.

9. Although the SFE has shown dramatic improvements in its dailyoperations in the six months it has been under new management - boat utili-zation has increased from an average of less than four days to 14 days perboat and monthly catches increased to about 300 t - the project's economicrate of return is negative.


7. Indonesla - Fisheries Credit Project (Credit 480-IDD)

1. The project design was essentially defined in GOI's original requestfor a second IDA-financed fisheries project, which was reviewed and discussedby an FAO/IBRD identification mission in August/September 1972. In January1973, FAO/IBRD visited Indonesia and prepared the project along the lines ofGOI's request. The project was appraised by IDA in June 1973. Negotiationstook place in April 1974, and the credit was approved by the Board in June1974. The principal objectives of the project were: (a) to make further useof Indonesia's fisheries resources for domestic consumption and the earningof foreign exchange, and (b) to increase employment and income opportunitiesfor subsistence fishermen. The SAR consisted of three subprojects and atechnical assistance components to support project implementation. The sub-project components were: (a) a skipjack tuna development complex in Amboninvolving: (i) the provision of ten pole-and-line fishing boats of 30 GTeach for the PPM; (ii) the provision of ten additional boats for fishermen'scooperatives whose production output was to be sold to PPM; and (iii) thepurchase for PPM of two 100 GT carrier vessels and construction of onshoresupporting facilities including ice making, freezing and cold storage,Jetties, workshop slipways and nets to catch live bait; (b) milkfish andshrimp pond improvements over 15,000 ha in Java and South Sulawesi, and theestablishment of nine small ice plants to preserve fish during the marketingphase; and (c) the acquisition of twenty-five trawlers for cooperatives.Technical assistance for the execution of the skipjack subproject was to beprovided by a group of specialists in management, boat building, andmechanical, electrical and civil engineering. Three pondfisheries expertswere to assist in milkfish and shrimp aquaculture. Loans for fisheriescooperatives and for other subborrowers were to be extended by BRI, and theDirector General of Fisheries (DGF) was to coordinate, supervise and guideproject implementation.

2. The design of the project differed from the previous IDA-financedproject (Credit 211-IND) in that it allotted about half of its funds to aqua-cultural development. This was an important innovation. Aquaculture, whichproduces only 10% of Indonesian fisheries output, is of paramount importanceto the economy of the coastal areas as it provides essential employment andincome to a large number of subsistence fish farmers. With regard to marinefisheries, the project design incorporated some of the recommendations andlessons learned from the earlier project. The Ambon cold storage system wasdesigned to minimize loading and unloading time, which resulted in suD-stantial cost savings and better preservation of fish. And, in contrast tothe previous project in which a wharf was located in shallow water accessibleonly to skipjack fishing boats, the positioning of the wharf in Ambon was insuff'ciently deep water to allow large refrigerator ships to come alongside.

3. Another important improvement in project design was the provisionof experienced consultants to strengthen PPM's management and organizationalstructure. Two project components, ice plants and trawlers had to be droppedduring project implementation. Ice plants were not needed because there wasa sufficient number of private commercial ice-making facilities operating in

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the market. The trawlers were dropped because GOI and IDA agreed that theincreasing number of private trawlers and purse-seiners fishing illegallywithin the three mile coastal strip reserved for small fishing boats wasjeopardizing the catches of subsistence fishermen. These components should,in fact, have been excluded from project design at appraisal. As in the caseof Credit 211-IND,15/ the project implementation schedule was somewhatoptimistic, and there was a two-year slippage.

4. Implementation was as follows:

(a) Shore facilities. The contract for the construction of the Azbonfisheries complex was awarded in early 1976, and construction wascompleted within two years - on schedule. Contrary to what hadhappened under the earlier project, construction and maintenance ofonshore facilities proceeded smoothly. At completion the con-dition of these facilities was good to excellent, and the oper-ational equipment was working satisfactorily.

(b) Fishing Vessels. Soon after effectiveness, specifications anddraft tender documents for the wooden hulls, engines and equipmentfor twenty 30-GT fishing boats were prepared with the assistance ofconsultants hired under the project. RSI suggested some technicalchanges to introduce more cost-effective equipment and to insurethat the specifications would open bidding to all potential sup-pliers. DGF agreed. Delivery of the ten boats to PPM wasscheduled for October 1977, while the remaining ten boats for thecooperatives were scheduled for completion in April 1978. Deliveryof the first set of boats to PPM posed no problem. However, thecriteria of eligibility of primary fisheries cooperations as bene-ficiaries of the second set of ten boats became a controversial is-sues which delayed boat deliveries by about a year. An additionalproblem developed because of a disagreement between the DirectorateGeneral of Cooperatives (DGC) and PPM on construction cost re-covery. Although PPM had pre-financed the cooperatives to permitmore expeditious implementation of the subproject, DGC was un-willing to reimburse PPM. The Director of External Funds of theMinistry of Finance (MOF) eventually solved this problem byauthorizing PPM's reimbursement by the state insurance company(LJKK). The questions regarding institutional responsibilitiesconsiderably delayed boat deliveries and caused cost overruns forboth PPM and the cooperatives. These might have been avoided bymore careful investment planning at appraisal and closer super-vision during the early stages of implementation.

(c), Fishpond Development. Implementation of this component started inSeptember 1975 soon after signing of the subsidiary loan agreementbetween MOF and BRI. By the end of 1978 - slightly behindschedule - BRI had almost completed disbursements equivalent to

15/ See Project Performance Audit Report, Indonesia - First FisheriesProject (Credit 211-IND), OED Report No. 2806 dated January 9, 1980.

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about US$3.5 million in subloans to about 2,700 pond owners for thedevelopment of about 8,000 ha of ponds. The number ofbeneficiaries was far less than the SAR estimate (9,000), as theaverage pond borrower had a larger (5 ha) pond and borrowed morecapital than estimated at appraisal. Despite quick projectimplementation, BRI's inexperience with long-term fisheries lendingresulted in a number of technical problems, which resulted in apoor portfolio. This was paralleled by poor backup from DGF'sextension services. Earlier inspection of BRI subloan appraisalmethodologies and the establishment of stricter project monitoringand auditing by IDA supervision missions might have preventedportfolio deterioration. As it turned out, because of thedeteriorating quality of its fisheries portfolio, in May 1977 BRIunder IDA advice suspended disbursements and reappraised allfisheries subloans in accordance with guidelines provided by IDA.The exercise resulted in the cancellation of a number of bad loansand in a substantial improvement in subsequent lending operations,supervision and disbursement procedures. At the same time DGF tooka number of steps to improve the quality of its extension services,principally by establishing demonstration fishponds and trainingponds in the project area. At completion there were some signs ofimprovement in loan recovery, especially in 5 out of the 12 BRIbranch offices implementing the project, where fishpond lending wasa major activity. However, as early errors had already severelyjeopardized the quality of the BRI portfolio, the levels of arrearsand defaults (44Z) was extremely high.

S. In summary therefore, the project's objectives were achieved exceptfor the poor financial control on operations, and the limited number (3,000)of fish farmers assisted (SAR 9,000). Actual narine fish catches and aqua-culture's yields, although about 40% below the targets set in the StaffAppraisal Report (SAR) are satisfactory and show rapidly increasing produc-tion trends. Ten 30-GT fishing vessels and two 100-GT catcher carriers builtfor the use of the Perum Perikanan Maluku (PPM), a state fisheries enter-prise, and ten 30-GT vessels built for the use of fishermen's cooperatives,are fully operational. Onshore facilities, including cold storage and boatrepair workshops, are being used by PPM and the Ambon fishermen community atlarge. PPM now has a sound organization and technIcal management, and mightserve as a nucleus for a fisheries Nucleus Estate (NES) project. Procurementoperations were slow at the outset causing a two year delay in project imple-mentation. However, later on with RSI and GOI assistance procurement im-proved remarkably.

6. Total project costs were US$16.9 million compared to the SAR'sestimate of US$12-8 million. Financial results were reasonable. PPMexperienced net profits after depreciation and interest allowances only in1981. However, a more adequate capital structure and more accurateaccounting would have improved its financial standing from project inr-ception. Accounting and project reporting were poor during most of theimplementation period. The PPM financial rate of return (26Z) is slightlyless than the SAR's (34Z). The financial rate of return for aquaculture(28%) is better than that estimated at appraisal (22Z). The economic rate ofreturn for PPM is 29X (SAR 34%) and for aquaculture 30% (SAR 24%).


7. The main project successes were: improvement in project designwhen compared to the first IDA-financed fisheries project (211-IND) andsubstantial improvement in management. The principal weaknesses were thelack of a proper accounting and reporting system and loose financial controlover cooperatives and PPM operations. Five main lessons were learned:

(a) adequate management and training are key factors in project suc-cess; management requirements and the use of experienced con-sultants in managerial positions, if need be, should be consideredas priorities in future projects;

(b) project design is important and should be realistic as to theimplementation time schedule and the nature of the components(e.g., trawlers and iceboxes should have been omitted) to be in-cluded in the project;

(c) the capital structure (Debt/Equity) of project beneficiaries shouldbe adequate to prevent deterioration of the financial standing ofbeneficiari ;

id) credit recovery from cooperatives should take place at the time offish catch delivery or of fishpond marketing and not once yearly,to improve project financial control;

(e) there is substantial potential for investment in marine fisheriesactivities and intensive aquaculture given the level of fisheriesresources and the present income and export elasticities of demand.

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8. Iran - Fisheries Project (Loan 1047-IRN)

1. The potential for a fishing project was identified by an IBRDsector mission that visited Iran in April-Nay 1970. Identification andpreparation missions were carried out in February and April 1973, re-spectively, and the project was appraised in November 1973. Negotiationswere not completed until August 1974. The Loan Agreement was signed onOctober 14, 1974 and became effective in April 30, 1975.

2. The objectives of the project were: to improve the organizationalstructure, operating policies, marketing activities and regulatory functionsof Shilat Jonoub,16/ to train additional fishermen in improved fishing tech-niques and to assist commercial and traditional fishermen by providingcredits for fishing boats and equipment. At full development, the projectwas expected to increase annual production of fish and shrimp by over 18,000tons per year. The total loan amount was US$12.5 million, with US$600,000allocated for consultant services, US$400,000 for the training of fishermen,US$600,000 to support investment credits to small-scale fishermen and theircooperatives and the balance of US$10.9 million, to support investmentcredits for commercial fishermen. Total project cost was estimated atUS$18.0 million.

3. The Agricultural Development Bank of Iran (ADBI)17/ and ShilatJonoub were to be responsible for implementing the project. ADBI was to actas a channel for all funds including those for consultants to Shilat andthose going through Shilat to small-scale fishermen and for Shilat's trainingprogram. Shilat was to be responsible for selecting its management con-sultants, implementing the fishermen training program and approving loans tosmall-scale fishermen. In addition, Shilat was expected to promote all com-mercial and traditional fishing activities along the southern coast of Iran.ADBI was to supervise Shilat procurement, sales and credit activities and tocollect Shilat payments on Government loans.

4. The project achieved little in terms of its overall objectives.Only US$600,000 was disbursed for the employment of management consultants byShilat Jonoub. Although these consultants performed well according to super-vision reports, there is no available evidence of any impact on ShilatJonoub's operating efficiency. The total cost of these services were aboutUS$2.1 million of which the Bank financed US$600,000. The contract with theconsultants was only signed in September 1975, about a year after Shilat

161 'Lhe Southern Fisheries Company which was responsible for development,regulation and licensing of commercial fishing along the southern coastof Iran - the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea areas.

17/ The Agricultural De7elopment Bank of Iran was the executing agency ofthree loans for agricultural credit (Loans 662, 821 and 1046).


Jonoub initiated action to hire a consultant team. The delay was due toextensive correspondence between Shilat Jonoub and the Bank on resolvingterms-of-reference and contract issues.

5. From the onset of the project, supervision missions noted lack ofprogress in making subloans to commercial fishermen, citing lack of demandfor loans and refusal by Shilat to grant licenses to some sub-borrowers whohad already been approved by ADBI.13/ Furthermore, in 1975, the Borrowerrequested that, due to lack of demand for loans by fishermen, funds bereallocated to finance construction of cold storage facilities which werealready adequate. One request was sent to the Bank for approval of a US$6.8million subloan to a commercial fish_ng enterprise. The Bank raised severalobjections to the proposed conditions of the subloan, which were not incompliance with the loan agreement. Eventually, ADBI financed the subloanout of its own resources.

6. Several attempts were made by Shilat to implement the training pro-gram for traditional fishermen, but they got nowhere because training expertscould not be hired, needed equipment could not be purchased or student re-quests for the training were lacking.

7. No requests were received by the Bank to disburse subloans made totraditional fishermen under the project. After the project commenced,Shilat - according to supervision reports - focused its efforts on setting upcooperatives of small-scale (traditional) fishermen. If any loans were madeto cooperatives they were financed entirely out of Shilat's own resources.

8. The Bank's position throughout implementation was that both Shilatand ADBI were not making sufficient efforts to solicit loans and to educatecommercial and traditional fishermen in the benefits of such loans. Finally,in mid-1978 the Bank agreed to support financing of fish cold storagefacilities an! also of used fishing vessels, which had become plentiful dueto overbuilding and the decline in world marine catch. Shortly thereafter,the Bank approved several subloans for fishing vessels and for cold storage.However, with the change in Government no requests to disburse against thesesubloans were received by the Bank. At the same time, the Bank approved thecancellation of US$5.0 million (US$4.4 million of Category III - fishingvessels and equipment for commercial fishermen and the total of US$600,000 inCategory IV - fishing gear and equipment for traditional fishermen). In May1979, at the request of the new Government, the Bank agreed to cancel the re-maining US$6.9 million.

9. By not being implemerted, the project failed to achieve its mainobjective of increasing fish production from the Persian Gulf by providingtraining, as well as funds for boats and equ'pment in the commercial sectorand fishing gear in the traditional sector. Failure was due to a host ofpolitical and institutional factors, including lack of commitment in theearly stages by managemenc of the two government agencies involved (ADBI andShilat Jonoub) and - wken some commitment did appear in the later stages - tothe onset of the Ira-ian Revolution. Other factors, Euch as availability ofcheaper finance from other sources and difficult procurem'ent conditions, also

18/ ABDI - Agricultural Development Bank of Iran.


played a role in effecting a poor result, but could have been overcome ifGovernment had shown stronger commitment to the project duringimplementation.

10. The efforts made to introduce efficient organization and managementmethods into Shilat Jonoub's operations were partly successful. Aspects ofpersonnel management, cost accounting, storage and marketing techniques andefficient fishing operations were absorbed and acted upon by some Shilatstaff at middle management levels. If these staff have remained in an organ-ization dealing with fisheries development, then this effort would have beenworthwhile. However, the Bank has no information on their activities underthe present disturbed conditions in Iran.

11. Two major lessons emerge from this project which might be usefrllyapplied to similar projects with other Bank borrowers.

(i) Loan cancellation should not be a lingering process, once it isapparent that a reasonably flexible approach has not worked and theBank has become convinced that the Government is no longer comr-mitted to the project objectives or willing to adhere to major pro-visions in the legal agreements. However, deciding when this pointhas been reached and risking the Bank's overall relations with acountry that might soon become a net lender to the Bank remain mootquestions.

(ii) Consumption of fish may be as much of a problem as its catch, par-ticularly in countries where consumer acceptance of fish productsis still uncertain and where rising incomes are also expanding de-mand for other meat products. Project design should explicitlytake these marketing elements into account.


9. Ecuador - Fisheries Project (Loan 555-EC)

1. At the time of appraisal, it was found that substantial scopeexisted for modernization and investments in the tuna industry in Ecuador.The industry was then characterized by inadequate technology and availableresources were not fully exploited. The Fisheries Project was a first stepto engender development to modernize the tuna industry in order to spur pro-duction.

2. Although the tuna industry in Ecuador has grown significantly sinceappraisal, the direct influence of the project on this process appears tohave been slight. The promulgation of a Fisheries Law (Ley de Pesca) in1974-which allowed, inter alia, certain tax incentives to exporters ofprocessed tuna-provided impetus to the tuna industry and induced substantialgrowth in investments by multinational companies.

3. The project as appraised in November 1967 was one of the first Bankprojects in fisheries and aimed to construct, equip, train crews, and operate12 tuna purse-seiners in order to expand Ecuador's production and export oftuna. A study of harbor facilities was also included and the total projectcost was estimated at US$6.6 million (Bank Loan US$5.3 million). The Govern-ment of Ecuador on-lent loan proceeds relating to construction of the purse-seiners at 6.5% interest to a public development finance corporation, tieCorporacion Financiera Nacional (CFN), which in turn on-lent to fishing com-panies at 10% interest. The project took about 12 years to implement(appraisal estimate was 5 years), and Schedule I of the Loan Agreement wasamended twice (August 21, 1974 and August 5, 1977). Of the original US$5.3million Bank loan, only about US$3.8 million was actually disbursed as of thefinal closing date of October 31, 1980.

4. Only four of twelve purse-seiners were actually constructed, due toreported lack of interest from additional buyers in 1973, after which theoutstanding balance of loan proceeds for purchase of boats was either re-allocated or cancelled. The final cost of making the boats operational wassignificantly above appraisal estimates (US$0.58-0.80 million versus US$0.35million). Two of the boats were purchased by subsidiaries of multinationalcompanies and the remaining two by local firms (one in the public sector).At present, only three of the boats are operational, all now owned by multi-national companies. At appraisal, the annual catch per boat at full develop-ment was estimated at 2,000 tons. This was revised downward by a Bank super-vision miqsion in 1974 to 1,200 tons per annum, and actual catches in 1980reached only about 700 tons. It should be noted, however, that tuna catchesby all Ecuadorian vessels in recent years, have significantly declined as aresult of movements in the 'El Nino- current in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.

5. The training component was changed during implementation. Theoriginal objective to train crews for the 12 purse-seiners was abandoned whenonly four boats were constructed and the owners themselves conducted on-boardtraining using expatriate captains. Consequently, the consultants.- -initially hired under the project to draw up training programs - were


requested by Government to design, equip and prepare curricula for anon-shore Fisheries School at Manta, which was to provide general training forpurse-seiner crews. The school opened in 1976, but due to Government'sreluctance to allow private sector representation on the Board of Management,private boat owners remain skeptical of the school's usefulness. As aresult - although well equipped - the school does not appear, at this time,to provide a major benefit to the industry.

6. The harbor studies component of the project was a major cause ofdelay between 1976 and 1980. Disputes over the conclusions of initial con-sultant feasibility studies combined with indecision by the Bank and Govern-ment prolonged the process of deciding whether a follow-up Fishing Port Pro-ject was justified. Consultants hired by the Bank in 1976 considered thereto be little scope for large scale investment in port facilities and asimilar conclusion was reached again by a Bank mission which visited Ecuadorin February 1981 to prepare a Fishing Port Project - although small scaleinvestment in boat repair facilities is now considered appropriate.

7. The initial closing date of October 31, 1974 was first extended toJune 30, 1976 in a Loan Agreement Amendment dated August 21, 1974. Afterthis period, there was a series of short term extensions which resulted inthe project continuing until its ultimate closing date of October 31, 1980.All key investments had be-n made by the end of 1976, namely: the four boatswere operational, the school was constructed and staffed, and the preliminaryport feasibility studies had been completed. The only activiries whichoccurred in the 1977-80 period were procurement of additional items for theHanta School (in 1980) and extension of the studies component of the proj-ect.

8. Although the conditions prior to appraisal were favorable in justi-fying substantial investments in the tuna industry, project results fellshort of appraisal targets. To some extent, the Bank loan contributed to theintroduction of modern purse-seiner technology in Ecuador, which was lateraccelerated by the Fisheries Law of 1974, providing fiscal incentives toentrepreneurs and multinational companies.

9. Overall, the project was marred by several shortfalls and defi-ciencies, which impaired project implementation. First, the appraisal failedto study the demand for purse-seiners, legislation to regulate the growth ofthe industry and alternative sources for financing, both local and foreign.Potential beneficiaries who could own and operate purse-seiners were notadequately identified. During the course of Bank supervision, these con-straints could have been identified and highlighted, with necessary measuresadopted to alleviate problems. During project implementation, the Bank wasnot effectively associated with the formulation of the Fisheries Law of 1974,which has led to the current, nationally-registered fleet size of 56 purse-seiners - 73% of which were built after 1974. While the Fishing Law providedincentives and boosted investments, it also contributed to an uncontrolledgrowth and over-investment in the tuna industry. There were no provisions inthe law to regulate the growth of the industry; consequently, as the number

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of purse-seiners rose dramatically, the Government was unable to balance tunaresources with fleet capacity in order to remain at maximum sustainable yieldlevels.

10. The important lesson learned from this project is that, with theright incentives and proper legislation, a healthy and strong private sectorparticipation can emerge. Special attention should be focussed on: (i)greater private sector participation in project design and implementation;(ii) incentives for investments; (iii) effectiveness of key legislation; and(iv) soundness of pertinent policies and institutions concerning thefisheries subsector.


10. Tulisia - First Fisheries Project (Credit 270-TOU)

1. The project was appraised in December 1970, following which aUS$2.0 million Credit was approved by the Board in September 1971. TheCredit was fully disbursed in January 1980, some three years later than theoriginal target Closing Date of December 1976.

2. The initial project idea came from the Tunisian Office National desPeches (ONP) in 1967, in the form of proposals for the replacement of 3,000fishing boats out of a total of 4,700 registered non-mechanized craft withnew motorized units. These proposals resulted from studies by an FAO/CPreconnaissance mission in 1968, an FAO/CP preparation mission in May 1969, aBank preparation mission in June 1970 and fina'lly by a Bank appraisal missionin December 1970.

3. Based on a 1969 fleet composition survey which showed that, of the2,400 active boats comprising the Tunisian inshore fishing fleet, about 600were mechanized, but that at least 300 of these were 10 years old or olderand in urgent need of replacement. The number finally retained in theproject by the appraisal mission was 335 boats of 10.65m length overanll.Smaller craft were excluded as being uneconomic.

4. The appraisal cost estimates were based on a preliminary boat lay-out prepared by a naval architect at the preparation stage. The AppraisalReport (AR) specified that detailed design would have to be undertaken by aconsultant naval architect during project implementation (design criteriabeing given in the AR). The lack of detailed design as a basis for costestimates and the absence of a qualified naval architect (who could haveworked out more precise figures) in the appraisal team were the main reasonsfor a serious underestimation of unit costs. This was aggravated byimplementation delays and inflationary pressure in the wake of the oil crisisof 1973. Boat unit costs finally turned out to be some 57% more thanappraisal estimates. The total number of project boats had to be reducedfurther to 190 (only 57% of the envisaged number) because of their costoverruns, and at the same time, most of the improved design features whichwere originally intended also had to be eliminated to cut costs. The outcomewas a 10.4 meter boat which differed from the traditional craft only insofaras it had an electrically started Perkins diesel engine in place of the morefamiliar and locally manufactured, hand-started Tubukh diesel.

5. The project represented the first IDA operation in the fisheriessubsector in Tunisia. It followed a Bank/IDA co-operative farm project (Loan484-TUN/Credit 99-TUN), which was signed in 1967 but ran ilto difficulties in1969 when Government made membership of farmers in collective co-operativescompulsory. Following strong antagonistic reaction by farmers, this policywas reversed one year later, and co-operative membership was again madevoluntary. However, these events had negative effects on the co-operativemovement and also on the existing fishermen's service co-operatives.Fishermen were afraid of collectivization of their boats in productionco-operatives, of which they were genuinely distrustful, and therefore

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SUPPLEMT 1Page 35

discontinued their membership. As a consequence, nearly all fishermen'sco-operatives ceased to exist and are only now just starting to bere-established, 10 years later.

6. The demise of fishermen's co-operatives resulted in importantchanges in the project's proposed organization and management duringpreparation. Originally, management intended to entrust ONP with projectimplementation and to oblige project boat owners to sell their catch throughco-operatives to ONP,19/ which would retain a certain percentage of thecatch value as debt service. Since co-operatives no longer existed at theend of 1970 when the project was appraised, ONP was rejected as the executingagency because the Tunisian Government, in agreement with the appraisalmission, decided that boat owners should be free to market their catchwherever they wanted. No need was seen under these circumstances to retainONP in the project management which was transferred to the FisheriesDirectorate, a department within the Ministry of Agriculture. However, inretrospect, it proved to be a serious deficiency that no firm arrangementslinking catch marketing and debt service were made. ONP still markets morethan 50% of all catches from coastal fisheries and could have beeninstrumental in avoiding at least some of the loan recovery problems whichdeveloped as the project progressed.

7. According to the AR, the main project objective was to enableproject-financed boats to achieve production of inshore demersal fish ofabouit 4,900 tons per annum, of which 2,650 tons would be additional to pro-duction without the project. This was based on an estimated annual catch perproject boat of 14.5 tons, compared to an average catch of 9.6 tons/year bysimilar sized traditional craft. The increase was explained as the effect ofusing better fishing gear, better boat efficiency and an increase in the num-ber and duration of fishing trips. Issues were indicated to be procurement,sub-loan conditions and project financing. The organization, management andrecovery of sub-loans were not mentioned as issues, despite the fact thatwarning signs were already present in the poor recovery performance of loansto private fishermen under the existing Special Fund for Fisheries Develop-ment (FOSEP).

8. Project funds were passed on by the Tunisian Government to theBanque Nationale de Tunisie (BNT) under a subsidiary loan agreement. BNT wasthe executing agency for the financial part of the project: (a) upon requestof the Fisheries Directorate it handled contract financing for the procure-ment of marine Diesel engines and boat hulls; (b) it appraised sub-borrowers'creditworthiness based on technical recommendations from the FisheriesDirectorate; (c) it concluded the sub-loan agreements with the new boat-owners; and (d) it was responsible for recovery. IDA funds were obtained byBNT at 3% annual interest and onlent to sub-borrowers at 6%. Loan applicantswere asked to contribute 10% equity, and the Government gave them an invest-ment grant of 15%. Sub-loans covered three quarters of the investment costs,of which IDA refinanced 67.5% and the Government 7.5Z. The default risk wasshared in equal parts by the Government and BNT.

19/ ONP - Office National des Peches (National Fisheries Office).

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9. Project management was to be in the hands of the Fisheries ProjectDivision (FPD), to be created in the Fisheries Directorate prior toeffectiveness and incorporating three qualified consultants: a fisheries ex-pert as project manager, a naval architect for boat design and constructionsupervision and a master carpenter for construction supervision and main-tenance training. Another condition of effectiveness was the alignment ofthe concessionary terms granted by FOSEP to the terms specified in the proj-ect. Again in retrospect, it is unfortunate that there was no inclusion ofexpertise on the organization of fisheries credit during preparation andappraisal and that the consultants employed to facilitate project managementdid not also include at least a few man-months specifically to advise andassist BNT in setting up realistic and effective arrange-znts to service itssub-loans.

10. Effectiveness and project start-up were considerably delayed.While the FOSEP lending terms were quickly adjusted to the project terms, ittook eight months to recruit suitable consultants. The credit was declaredeffective after a consultant contract was signed in May, 1972. The projectmanager and the naval architect started work in Tunisia in October 1972.However, the procurement process for the boat engines did not start until May1973, and for the hulls until February 1974, for two reasons:

(i) upon recommtndation of the naval architect, the procurement pro-cedures were modified to reflect a change in the bidding sequence;bids for hulls were obtained only after a decision on the engineawa..d had been made so that its specifications could be incor-porated in the tender for hulls; and

(ii) the new boat design pz-pared by the naval architect was rejectedfor cost reasons, and the decision was made to return to thetraditional Mediterranean design with some minor improvements.

A disagreement arose between IDA and the Government during engine procurementover the recommendation made by the Fisheries Directorate to award the enginecontract to a local firm which assembled in Tunisia engines of Danish cour-ponents - even though their bid after allowing for the 15% preference marginwas still 47Z higher than the lowest evaluated bid. After lengthy discus-sions, during which cancellation of the Credit Agreement was considered,IDA's view prevailed and the contract was awarded to the lowest evaluatedbidder. Unfortunately, frequent engine breakdowns with occasionallyexcessive repair times resulted in some resistance among fishermen to buy thenew boats. Some owners even abandoned their immobilzed boats when they hadno money to pay for repairs. In September 1980, 151 boats were fullyoperational, 12 boats had sunk and 27 were immobilized 2 0 / and partlyabandoned by their owners. Every effort must be made to improve thissituation, which would seriously affect the attitude of fishermen towardacquisition of boats in the Second Fisheries Project. The Government and BNThave committed themselves to this objective.

20/ According to the Region, 11 of these were repaired by August 1981.


11. Construction of hulls in Tunisian shipyards went more smoothly thanengine procurement; in fact, the institutional peformance of the shipyardsunder close supervision of a CP naval architect was very satisfactory. All190 boat hulls were completed in about four years, but construction speedslowed down when demand for project boats began to decline in 1976, as aconsequence of the emerging problems with the engines. To revive interest inboat acquisition, FPD started approving sub-loans for applicants who did notpossess the necessary professional experience. At the same time FPD beganaccepting financing of the boatowner's 10% equity contribution by the SpecialFund for Rural Development. Although the latter was discussed by supervisionmissions, no objections were raised by IDA because the detrimental effects onrepayment performance were not foreseen. By September 1978, all hulls wereconstructed, but because some engines were missing and because of lack ofdemand, the last boat was not sold until January 1980 - three years after thetarget closing date.

12. Recovery performance for boat loans has been very poor and wascharacterized, at least until the last two years, by poor co-operationbetween the Fisheries Directorate and BNT21 / in establishing an effectiverecovery system. The main objective for the Fisheries Directorate was an in-crease in fish production and, consequently, it was less concerned about thefinancial soundness of the project. BNT, in turn, believed that thecentralized recovery system which produced more or less acceptable results inagriculture would also work in fisheries and failed to recognize essentialdifferences between the two areas of activity. No special staff wasrecruited for recovery purposes, and no endeavors were made in the firstthree project years to establish new and more appropriate procedures. Onlyin 1978, while negotiating a Second Fisheries Project - and after therecovery rate had fallen to 11% - could BNT be persuaded to recruit sevenloan recovery officers. Besides the lack of attention paid to recovery, theattitude of boat owners toward their repayment obligations was also animportant factor. Due to long and sometimes excessive dowa-times, many boatowners did not have the funds to take care of their debt service or used thetechnical difficulties as an excuse to avoid payment. Legal proceedings tookexcessive time, and one attempt to auction off a boat under court orderfailed when the boat was sold to the only bidder at about 20% of its marketvalue.

13. Performance has improved slightly since 1980, with greaterawareness of the consequences by all concerned. Representatives of theFisheries Directorate (now called the Commissariat General a la Peche - CGP)and BNT have been meeting regularly in Tunis to concert their efforts. Since1978, the collaborative process has been extended to the certain regions sothat the local BNT and CGP staff, who are in direct day-to-day contact withfishermen, can work together more effectively.

21/ BNT - Banque Nationale de Tunisie (National Bank of Tunisia).

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Page 38

14. Unit costs for the project boats with prices contingencies wereestimated at appraisal at D4,210, while actual unit costs were D6,630, 57Zmore. In dollar terms, the difference is 88Z due to a 38Z depreciation ofthe average dollar exchange rate against the dinar during the projectperiod. As a consequence, only 190 boats could be constructed and soldinstead of 335. Total catch of all project boats in 1969 is estimated at780 t. The reason for this disappointing result is the reduction in numbersof boats built and also the frequency of engine breakdown, which reduced theproduction per boat to about 6.5 t per annum - less than half of appraisalestimates. Despite the low catch figures, it is estimated that slightly morethan half of all boats had acceptable financial rates of return (between 21and 31%) because fish prices rose much faster than inflation. This samereason led also to the surprising fact that, despite the low production per-formance, the project's expected economic rate of return is higher than esti-mated at appraisal: more than 40% if calculated without benefits derivedfrom wholesale and retail activities but with shadow pricing of labor cost asin the AR. If marketing benefits are taken into account (as was done for thesubsequent Second Fisheries Project), the ERR increased to about 80%. It isestimated that about 250 new jobs have been created; 300 was the estimate atappraisal. Figures about improved employment opportunities are incon-clusive. About 160 man-years of employment have been created in the ship-yards.

15. Among the general lessons for the Bank are:

(i) the realization that fisheries projects are not easy to manage andnecessitate the deployment of more technical expertise duringsupervision than has been the case hitherto; the lack of in-houseexpertise means, in consequence, that supervision costs will behigh;

(ii) the need for careful scrutiny of client government requests tolimit the use of consultants, to guard against premature ter-mination and ensure reasonable continuity of project management;

(iii) the need for firm and appropriate arrangements regarding cost re-covery, particularly in cases involving sub-lending to inshorefishermen;

(iv) the need to plan all procurement activities carefully at appraisal,so that appropriate specification and adequate maintenance areassured; and

(v) the need to adhere more strictly to the terms of project agree-ments, especially as regards project objectives and to permit vari-ations only after careful prior consideration of the reasons forand implications of such changes.


11. People's Democratic Republic of Yeinn - First Fisheries Project(Credit 370-YTDR)

1. The project - the first major project to be undertaken by IDA inthe People's Democratic Republic of Yemen - was appraised in May 1972,following which a US$3.5 million Credit was approved by the Board in April1973. A supplementary Credit of US$1.6 million was approved in January 1975to cover inflation and cost escalations in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis.The Credit was fully disbursed in August 1981, some two and one-half yearslater than the original target closing date of December 31, 1978. The proj-ect, designed to develop PDRY's traditional coastal fishing sector in theFifth Governorate, was to be executed by the Public Corporation for FishWealth (PCFW), which was later redesignated the Ministry of Fish Wealth(MFW).

2. FAO/CP missions identified and prepared the project during visitsto PDRY in July and December 1971 and February 1972. Originally it providedfor:

(a) the construction of an 800 ton cold store and related facilities atMukalla and a fish receiving station at Shihr;

(b) the construction of 95 improved traditional motorized sambuks forthe co-operatives at Shihr and Nukalla and five similar vesselsfitted with line/net haulers to be used by PCFW for demonstrationpurposes;

(c) finance for engineering consultants to design, procure and super-vise construction of the Mukalla and Shihr facilities and for ex-pert staff to operate and maintain them during the first two work-ing years;

(d) provision for the employment of an expatriate project manager tohead the Fisheries Project Department (FPD) of PCFW;

(e) provision for management consultants to review PCFW's organizationand working systems; and

(f) further provision for three studies of fisheries and harbordevelopment in the Sixth Governorate, agriculture development inthe Wadi Hadramut and the water supply for Mukalla.

The fisheries study was expected to result in a second-phase project to ex-ploit the fishing grounds in the Sixth Governorate.

3. Following approval of the original Credit in April 1973, PCFW ex-perienced considerable difficulty and delay in recruiting a suitable projectmanager and in selecting engineering consultants. In consequence, the proj-ect did not become effective until February 1974, by which time project costshad escalated by about 56X. A supervision mission in June 1974 considered

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that cost cutting by reducing activities and limiting the number of boats to35 would endanger the project's economic viability and therefore recommendeda supplementary credit, which was approved in January 1975. However, somesavings were achieved because the Government had obtained alternativeassistance which enabled the Wadi Hadramut and Mukalla water supply studiesto be deleted from the project.

4. The original intention was that the supply, construction and in-stallation of the shore facilities were to be covered by a single turnkeycontract, but a lack of contractor interest resulted in the contract havingto be split into separate components. Site preparation at Mukalla and Shihrand construction of the Mukalla buildings were undertaken by the Government'sPublic Works Department, and the building at Shihr was constructed by a localprivate contractor. Although the Project civil works thus encouraged thedomestic building industry, it was at some sacrifice in terms of speed andeconomy of construction. Completion of the shore facilities took almosttwice as long as expected and cost about 38% more than the re-appraisal esti-mate.

5. The operating conditions of both the cold store and the receivingstation since they were completed have been far from satisfactory, due mainlyto an acute shortage of trained personnel in PDRY, made worse by the pre-mature termination one year early by Government of the contracts of the twoexperts whose services were provided under the project to run the shorefacilities. The situation was particularly bad at the time of the projectcompletion mission visit in May 1981, but has improved as a result ofpositive action taken by Government.

6. Utilization of the shore facilities remains low at about 20%, butthis is not solely the result of poor management. Seasonal factors (es-pecially at Shihr, which has an unprotected beach landing exposed to heavysurf during the monsoon period) severely limit fishing effort and catches.At Mukalla, where the cold store was to be established concurrently with thedevelopment of new port facilities under a quite separate project agreement,operations have suffered from major delays in port construction, which havethus far precluded any possibility of direct shipment of frozen produce fromthe cold store by sea. Thus, there has been no incentive hitherto for thecold store management to press for maximum fish production and factorythroughput, because of their inability to dispatch frozen produce except inrelatively small quantities by road.

7. The fishing sambuks provided under the project have been much moresuccessful, and their productivity exceeds appraisal estimates. Boat con-struction was carried out locally in yards at Mukalla and Aden, and the ves-sels are well liked by the fishermen. Vessel delivery from the yards wassubject to considerable delays caused by shortages of materials and skilledlabor. Although construction commenced in 1974, the last vessels were notdelivered until January 1980. A matter of greater concern, however, is thatthe distribution of the vessels was changed during the course of projectimplementation. Instead of 95 boats going to Fifth Governorate co-operativesas originally intended, 23 were retained by the Government's Coastal Fishing

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Corporation, 37 went to co-operatives in the First, Third, Fourth and SixthGovernorates, and only the balance of 40 vessels went to Fifth Governoratecooperatives. It seems inevitable that when Mukalla port is complete, andthereby enables tl-B cold store to start operating at full capacity, therewill be insufficient boats in the vicinity to produce the necessary volume offish. At that stage it will be necessary either to provide additional fi-nance for construction of the missing sambuks or to make good the shortfallin factory fish supply by landing catches from offshore trawlers. Althoughthe latter course of action may help factory economics, it would not con-tribute towards the original aim of the project, which was to promote theinterests of the traditional coastal fishing sector.

8. The project succeeded in building an institutional capability forthe administration of fisheries development projects through its estab-lishment of the Fisheries Project Department (FPD) within the Ministry ofFish Wealth. The FPD has assumed administrative responsibility for theSecond Fisheries Project and will be similarly involved with the ThirdFisheries Project which is currently under preparation. However, theMinistry has made little progress in collecting loan repayments for fishingvessels from the co-operatives and the Coastal Fishing Corporation as re-quired under the terms of the Credit and Subsidairy Loan Agreeuaents. As aresult, almost US$1.0 million or 66% of the amounts due to April 30, 1981,remains uncollected.

9. Total project cost was US$6.17 million of which approximately83Z was anticipated foreign expenditure. This is a saving on overall projectcosts of about 1Z compared to the re-appraisal estimate of US$6.21 million(appraisal estimate was US$4.19 million). The costs of individual componentswere: shore facilities, US$2.67 million; fishing vessels, US$1.90 million;technical assistance, US$1.41 million; and incremental working capital,US$0.19 million.

10. Annual project benefits were originally expected to consist of5,700 tons of increased fish production (of which 63% or 3,600 tons would beexported) and cost savings and quality improvements in lobster processing.The project's ERR at appraisal was estimated to be 30X. At re-appraisal, theERR was expected to be 35% with the increase caused by higher fish prices.To date, little or no fish have been exported from the Mukalla cold store,although it was envisaged at appraisal that exports would begin in the thirdyear of project implementation. All incremental fish production has beensold locally, much of it bypassing the cold store and being taken directly tolocal markets. The old lobster processing facilities which were establishedsome years prior to project commencement have been rehabilitated and are nowin excellent working condition. Consequently, the project shore facilitieshave not been involved in lobster processing, nor are they expected to be soin the future.

11. Assuming that the necessary conditions for exporting fish fromMukalla will be fulfilled, i.e., that the port at Mukalla will be completedin 1986 and that, by that time, operation and management of the shorefacilities will be substantially improved, the project's ERR has been

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tentatively reassessed at 13X. Should administrative and organizationalproblems at the shore facilities not be satisfactorily resolved before thecompletion of the port, fish exports will not reach their projected levels(700 tons in 1986 increasing to 3,500 tons by 1990), and the project's ERRwill be correspondingly reduced. Under the extreme assumption that no fishwill be exported from Mukalla, the project's ERR drops to 6%.

12. The project financed preparation work for a Second Fisheries Proj-ect (Cr. 932-YDR), which was appraised in November 1978. Total project costis currently estimated at about US$40 million. The Second Fisheries Projectis much broader in scope than the first project and focuses heavily on pro-viding infrastructure for the fisheries sector in the Sixth Governorate - oneof the least accessible and poorest regions in the country. Specifically, afisheries and general cargo port will be constructed, nine villages will beprovided with 35 fishing vessels and related equipment and a 19 kilometerroad will be constructed to enable fish to be transported quickly from thevillages to the port. A relatively small amount of technical assistance isprovided to manage the project's port facilities.

13. Because preparation of the Second Fisheries Project began early inthe implementation period of the first project, project design could benefitlittle from the operational experience of the first project. This was mostunfortunate. In terms of development priorities in PDRY's fisheries sector,the provision of additional infrastructure is demonstrably of secondary im-portance to the provision of technical assistance, for the purpose ofalleviating the severe manpower constraints. The country's acute shortage oftrained and experienced personnel has been largely responsible for theinadequate standards of operation, maintenance and management of the projectshore facilities hitherto. The recent improvement in them has only occurredas a result of diverting scarce manpower from other projects - notably threeRussian technicians and other local staff working under the personalsupervision of a Deputy Assistant Minister from MFW headquarters in Aden.The problem is not unique to this project because, since independence, theGovernment her made investments of about US$200 million in the fisheriessector for fleets of trawlers, cold storage, canning and fishmeal processingfacilities, etc., all of which suffer from poor management and operate at lowlevels of capacity utilization. It is therefp=e pleasing to note - albeitrather late in the day - that one of the two components of the ThirdFisheries Project, which is currently under preparation and which is expectedto be appraised at the end of 1981, is the establishment of a FisheriesManpower Development Center to increase the supply of trained personnel tothe sector.

14. Supervision of the project by Bank staff was adequate in terms ofnumbers and frequency of visits. There were 15 visits between November 1973and July 1980, at roughly six-monthly intervals. However, although the first10 missions, up to and including the visit of October/November 1977, producedcomprehensive and formal reports on official supervision report proforma,thereafter the findings of the remaining five missions are recorded only inthe form of correspondence and internal informal memoranda. Staff continuityon the supervision missions appears from the file record to have been quiteadequate. Fisheries technologists were included in nine of the 15 missions.


15. According to an internal study still under preparation, the Bankhas encountered significant problems in several fisheries projects. The pro-ject under review offers the following lessons:

(a) the need for more critical examination of a country's trained man-power resources during the preparation and appraisal phases, toensure that adequate provision can be included in project estimatesfor technical assistance and ad-hoc training of key local person-nel;

(b) the need for careful assessment of the needs for and availabilityof heavy equipment and machinery for all projects involving civilengineering construction work;

(c) the need for careful scrutiny of client government requests tolimit the use of consultants and technical assistance personnel, toguard against premature termination and ensure reasonable continu-ity of project management;

(d) the need for firm and appropriate arrangements regarding cost re-covery, particularly in cases involving sub-lending to inshorefishermen; and

(e) the need to adhere more strictly to the terms of project agree-ments, especially those which relate to fish purchase prices and toproject objectives, and to permit deviations only after carefulconsideration.


12. & 13. Philipplues - First and Second Fisheries Projects(Joans 891-PU and 1270-PR)

1. The First Project was appraised in November 1972; the Second Prot-ect in September 1975, very shortly after the launching of the first trawlercompleted under Fisheries I. Both projects were designed to increase fishproduction by expanding the fish farming and offshore commercial fishing sub-sectors and were executed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) incollaboration with the Government's Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources(BEAR).

2. An FAO/CP mission identified and prepared the First Project duringa visit to the Philippines in January-February 1972. Originally, it providedfor:

(a) the construction and/or rehabilitation of 12,000 ha of fishpondsmainly for milkfish (Chanos chanos) production;

(b) the construction of 60 fishing vessels of between 70 gross tons and130 G.T. each;

(c) the acquisition of 10 imported second-hand fish carrier vessels;

(d) the modernization of up to 100 existing fishing vessels;

(e) the construction of 3 ice plants and 2 slipways;

(f) the cost of two studies by consultants, one focussing on thenational fish marketing and distribution system and the other on asmaliholder fish pond project;

(g) further technical assistance by a marine specialist and a navalarchitect to undertake vessel design and construction specificationand generally to assist DBP marine sector lending, and a fish farm-ing extension expert to train BFAR extension works and DBP inlandfisheries appraisal staff. The recruitment of these three expertswas stipulated as a condition of loan effectiveness; and

(h) the project also included agreement that BFAR would undertake atits own expense an exploratory fishing survey, using its existingresearch vessel fleet in Southern Philippines waters, in an effortto locate new fishing grounds and additional fish stocks for thegrowing commercial fishing fleet.

3. The Second Fisheries Project, which was essentially a continuationof the First, was prepared by DBP and provided for:

(a) the construction and/or rehabilitatiou of an additional 9,000 ha offishponds;

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(b) the construction of 17 fishing vessels of 45-90 G.T. each;

(c) the modification of four local vessels to become carriers; and

(d) the construction of three ice plants and one slipway.

4. Following approval of the original loan in May 1973, DBP experi-enced some delay in recruiting the two marine specialists. Consequently,the fish pond component was declared effective in June 1973, although themarine fisheries component did not become effective until December 1973,following a bilateral aid agreement with the United Kingdom to provide thenecessary expertise. The Second Project became effective in November 1976,on schedule, some four months after the Agreement was signed.

5. The 1973/74 oil crisis and resultant steep cost escalation had afundamental effect on the First Project's marine component and to a lesserextent also on that of the Second Project. The cost of a 70 G.T. vessel,which at appraisal in 1972 was estimated at US$60,000 has increased toUS$200,000 by 1976. Part of this increase was, however, caused by there-design of traditional hulls to more acceptable stability standards, by in-creasing beam-to-length ratios and by insistence on stricter constructionspecifications and timber quality standards. The sharply-increased cost ofsteel directly attributable to oil-price rises, meant that new steel vesselswere no longer economical under local conditions and the 15 projected vesselsof this type had to be eliminated. Consequently, only 35 of the projected 60vessels under Fisheries I were financed, all in the 70-95 G.T. class andbuilt of wood, despite the fact that wood also doubled in price during thecourse of the project. Furthermore, as time went on, it became increasinglydifficult to obtain lumber of suitable size and quality.

6. The effect of rising oil prices on vessel operating costs also in-creased in severity during the project period. Diesel fuel more than quad-rupled in cost between 1975 and 1980, and by 1979 accounted for about 55% oftrawler operating costs. Fishing gear, mostly made nowadays frompetroleun-rbased synthetic fibers, also showed similar price rises, whereascatch values only increased by about 50% over the same period. Purse-seinerswere found to be more fuel efficient than trawlers - fuel accounting for onlyabout 40% of operating costs - so that 12 of the 35 vessels built underFisheries I were equipped as purse-seiners, whereas at appraisal, it was en-visaged that all of the vessels would be trawlers, except for the 130 G.T.class steel vessels which were eliminated from the project. In addition, the1975 Presidential Decree which among other measures, excluded trawlers fromthe coastal zones was a necessary step, but one which caused a marked declinein trawler catch rates.

7. The trend continued into Fisheries II, with 29 purse-seiners builtout of a total of 47 craft. 2 2 ! A further consequence was a progressivedeparture from appraisal guidelines in the matter of vessel size and power in

22/ Includes 4 conversions and rehabilitations.


favor of smaller and less costly vessels. This was particularly true InFisheries II when, in place of the projected fourteen 90 G.T. and three 45G.T. vessels, 16 vessels were built ranging in size from 12 to 50 G.T., and27 larger vessels (80 G.T. and up),23/ most of which were purse-seiners de-signed to work the more distant Palawan fishing grounds. Rising costs alsotended to limit fishing by most vessels - other than the larger purse-seiners, to nearby already heavily-fished waters and to a reduced number offishing days - 215 days/year for trawlers and 218 days for most purse-seiners, in both cases only about 80% of DBP projections. The trend towardssmaller vessels has also continued into the third Fisheries and Livestockproject.

8. Only one of the three ice plants projected in Fisheries I was fi-nanced, apparently because clients could obtain better terms under the Smalland Medium Industry Development project (Loan 1120-PH). Conversely, allthree loans for the ice plants projects in Fisheries II were made.24/ Twoslipways were projected in Fisheries I and one in Fisheries II, but only onewas built. The two projects contained provision for 14 fish carriers, butpartly because of the requirement for international competitive bidding, nonewas taken up, although BFAR statistics do show an increase in the carrierfleet from 241 in 1977 to 302 in 1980. Few applications for vesselmodernization were approved because the main interest of the industry was inre-engining generally obsolete vessels rather than upgrading serviceable ves-sels with additional modern equipment.25 /

9. The inland fish ponds component was also affected by inflation.The total area financed from Fisheries I at 12,728 ha exceeded appraisalestimates by 7%, with average yields also slightly better than appraisalestimates. The area developed during Fisheries II is 13,459 ha which com-pares very favorably with the appraisal targets of 9,100 ha of new and re-habilitated ponds. The average cost of pond development per ha was P6,000during Fisheries I against the appraisal estimate of P5,000 per ha. Thelatest figures for Fisheries II indicate a development cost of P35,000-40,000per ha for the fishponds and P19,900-22,800 for partially-developed ponds.

10. Fish pond operating costs are also increasing at a rate which isgiving rise to some concern. The ex-farm price of fish has been stable forthe last two years at P5.50 to P6.50 per kg, but Input costs have increased,in the case of fertilizer by 19%, organic naure by 20X, and milkfish fry by30% in the same period. Recent increases in interest rates charged by DBP onloans are also worrying many borrowers, to the extent that the cumulativeeffect of rising costs may cause some fish farmers to start economizing oninputs, even though this will cause a decline in yield from their ponds.

23/ Total 43 vessels (net of conversions and rehabilitations).

24/ But only one is in operation.

25/ Under Fisheries II, two 90 G.T. trawlers were converted to purse-seinerswhile two trawlc. were re-engined.

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11. The provision of marlne speciallsts envisaged at appralsal butsupplied under bilateral ald arrangements had an Important institution-building effect for the project In general and for DBP in particular. Theirservices produced significant Improvements in the quality of vesselconstruction in several Phillppine boat yards, and by a combination ofon-the-job and overseas training of key DBP specialist staff, oromoted ahigher degree of staff capability, and deepened DBP's involvement in andunderstanding of the fisheries sector.

12. The training program for BFAR26/ fish farming extension personneland DBP27/ inland fisheries appraisal staff, under BFAR direction andutilizing the services of an expatriate aquaculture extension expert, provedhighly successful. The program has produced a number of highly-qualifiedstaff and teaching aides whose services are clearly well-appreclated by thefish farming lndustry. However, the numbers of trained extension works lnrelation to the geographic areas they have to cover is still far fromadequate.

13. The project's test fishing program - carried out by BFAR to explorethe potentlal of new fishing grounds in the southern part of the Philippines- was less successful, mainly because of operational difficulties experiencedwith the three rather elderly BFAR research vessels. In consequence,relatively little informatlon was obtained of value to the comercial fishingfleet.

14. The Smallholder Fish Pond Study developed a -fish pond estate' con-cept and, although of interest to Government In terms of providing suall-holder Involvement on a large scale, it has not found practical applilcationso far, mostly because of its substantial minimum size and the need for ex-tensive prior engineering studies and costs. The Fish Marketing and Dis-tribution Study resulted in the collation of a large volume of lnforation,but unfortunately did not result in the identification of any specificprojects for future external financing.

15. Development of cooperative arrangements between DBP and BFAR pro-ceeded very slowly and only became significantly operationally towards theend of Flsheries I, after an agreement was concluded in 1978 to collaborateIn the provision of technical support to fish pond borrowers. As regardsmarine fisheries, technical support has been extended only by DBP's ownmarlne staff and consultants, and mainly In respect of vessel design andconstruction. DBP has not sought, and BRAF has not extended on Its own, anyassistance In this field, although there Is clearly an unfulfilled need.Many marine proponents have stressed the need for technical assistance afterthe completion of vessel construction and during the start up period ofvessel operations, when new operators are galning famliarity with their new

26/ BFAR - Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.

27/ DBP - Development Bank of the Philippines.

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vessels and equipment. Tais particularly applies to such matters as thecorrect design and use of fishing gear, the use and maintenance of electronicand acoustic fishing aids, care and the handling of the catch and crewtraining, etc. There is evidence to suggest that DBP/BFAR''s inability toprovide such assistance, as part of the general supervisory function, is acontributory factor to the rapid increase in the number of subloans whichhave fallen into arrears. The lack of appropriately-qualified staff in thesefields should have been identified in time for remedial provision to havebeen included in Fisheries II.

16. DBP performance in general appears to have been very good. Withthe establishment of a Fisheries Group within its Agricultural ProjectsDepartment, DBP was able to deploy an effective and well qualified team tothe tasks of appraising and supervising loan applications and their imple-mentation. During both projects and especially during the latter stages ofFisheries II, extra emphasis was placed on subloan recoveries - despite whichthe growth in arrears must occasion considerable concern. Foreclosure actionhas already had to be taken on some fishing vessel subloans, and more casesare under- consideration.

17. It is not possible to measure the overall impact of either projectwith any degree of accuracy because of insufficient data and often con-flicting statistics. However, it is clear that the fish ponds financed underFisheries I achieved higher levels of productivity than estimated at apprais-al, and that Fisheries II fish ponds appear to have performed at least aswell as projected. In contrast, the Fisheries I marine sector seems to haveachieved little better than half of the incremental production estimated atappraisal. The sector is, however, well-known for its reluctance to fullydisclose quantities of fish caught or details of earnings, and the statisticsare, therefore, in doubt. As regards Fisheries II vessels, the smallertrawlers (19-40 G.T.) and the larger purse-seiners are proving mostproductive, whereas trawlers and seiners in the 50-95 G.T. classes are havingdifficulty breaking even.28/ Comparison with appraisal estimates forFisheries II is difficult because the majority of vessels were built in sizeseither smaller or larger than appraisal guidelines.

18. In mid-1980, the completion mission for Fisheries I assessed thefinancial rates of return on an average 25 ha fish farn as ranging between29% and 59% (depending on the state of development) with economic rates ofreturn varying from 26% to 53%. The FRR on a 75 G.T. trawler was assessed atabout 22% and the ERR at about 28%. At that stage, the returns were in linewith or better than the rates estimated at appraisal. As regards FisheriesII, and pending competion of a sub-borrower survey which DBP was only justbeginning at the end of 1981, no figures are available on which to base ratesof return calculations. It is believed, however, that fish farm returns

28/ DBP points out that in its survey, undertaken in preparation of the PCRfor Fisheries II, there are strong indications that all classes offishing vessels, except purse-seiners with inadequate facilities, arecurrently operating profitably because of higher prices for fish.

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should show only a marginal reduction, if any, on appraisal estimates, but inthe marine sector it seems inevitable that the 50-95 G.T. vessel classes willfail to achieve appraisal target rates. Their failure may be sufficientlyoffset, however, by better returns from the smaller trawlers and largestpurse-seiners to give overall FRR and ERR figures close to appraisalestimates.

19. The non-quantifiable benefits of the projects have been signifi-cant. Fisheries I, in particular, represented an important institution-building undertaking as far as DBP was concerned and, to a lesser extent,also BFAR. Both projects provided incremental employment opportunities, ex-panded the knowledge of new technologies and improved the dissemination ofsuch information by means of enlarged extension operations. The projectspromoted vessels with better sea-keeping qualities, and the vessel con-struction programs not only created additional employment in small boatbuilding yards but spread the improved designs and higher standards of vesselconstruction to various parts of the country.

20. Supervision of the two projects by Bank staff was generally ade-quate in terms of numbers and frequency of visits. During the early stagesof Fisheries I, supervision mission members undertook several field visits toinspect work in progress, but, few if any of the later supervision reportsinclude any mention of visits to centers outside Manila. W4hile the Bank wascertainly responsive to changed circumstances resulting from the 1973/74 fueloil crisis, performance might have been significantly improved by morefisheries technological input during the later stages of superivision, morefield inspection visits and - notwithstanding the need for economies insupervision costs - by less frequent recourse to the practice of assigningmulti-project responsibilities to single missions.

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14. Maritana - NoPadhibo Nbrt (Credit 588-NAB)

1. Identification and Preparation. The original concept for a fishingport expansion at Nouadhibou originated with the Government of Mauritania.Consultants financed by the French Fond d'Aide et de Cooperation (PAC)carried out a feasibility study and detailed engineering in 1972/73. TheBank Group found the consultants' recommendations to be too elaborate andexpensive, and it was eventually appraised in modified form in which theproposed breakwaters to the east were eliminated.

2. Appraisal. she project was presented to the Board in October 1975after an appraisal in March 1974. Appraisal of the project was basedon the consultants' feasibility study for the engineering, financial and portmanagement aspects of the project; analysis of the fishing sector was basedon various other sources of information.

3. At the time of appraisal, Mauritania claimed territorial waters toa limit of 55 km from its shores, though the limit of 12 miles had beenclaimed until 1972. (In 1980, the limit was further extended to 200 miles inaccordance with the pending Law of the Sea Treaty.) There were no purelyMauritanian industrial fishing activities in operation, though climatic andmarine conditions have resulted in the waters off Mauritania being relativelyrich in marine resources. The only traditional Mauritanian fishery was anartisanal fishery operated by about 200 Imraguen fishermen on islands off-shore between Nouadhibou and Nouakchott.

4. The fish resources in Mauritanian territorial waters and waterslater claimed by Mauritania were exploited almost exclusively by foreignfleets. Fish processing in Mauritania was limited and was supplied mainly bySpanish-Canarian vessels in the case of salting and drying; Japanese vesselsin the case of freezing; and Dutch vessels in the case of reduction to mealand oil. Foreign fleets operating in Mauritanian waters paid a license feeto Mauritania and frequently had agreements to base certain numbers ofvessels in Nouadhibou or to land certain tonnages of fish in Nouadhibou. Ingeneral, these agreements were not fully honored by the foreign fleets, norwere they enforced by Mauritania.

5. Even with the limited use of the port by foreign vessels at thetime of appraisal, however, the port facilities were barely adequate and theappraisal correctly concluded that some measure of port expansion andmodernization was a necessary condition to growth of the shore-based fishingindustry and the contribution of fisheries to the economic development ofMauritania. Accordingly, the appraisal recommended a project consisting of:

(a) extension of the fishing berths;

(b) extension of the commercial cargo berth;

(c) reconstruction of the causeway to the commercial cargo berth;

(d) construction of a sewerage system;

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(e) construction of various port buildings;

(f) procurement of navigation equipment;

(g) technical assistance; and

(h) studies of a repair facility.

Items (a), (b), (c), (g) and (h) were co-financed by the Association, theKuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), and the Caisse Centrale deCooperation Economique (CCCE). Items (d), (e) and (f) were covered by KFAEDand CCCE through parallel financing and the Government covered local costsfor all items.

6. Implementation. The location that was selected for the extensionof the fishing berths was contiguous to the existing berths. the site wasthen occupied by a rudimentary fishing boat repair facility, the only suchfacility in Nouadhibou. The extension of the fishing berths required thedemolition of this facility and, although the project contained a technicalassistance component to prepare a feasibility design for a new ship repairfacility, no new facility was funded in the project or elsewhere and none hadbeen built as of the time of the audit mission (Fall 1982). The reason thata ship repair facility was not included in the project as presented to theBoard was the desire of the Government for a facility that the Associationthought was more extensive and costly (US$10 million or more) than the portcould support. The study of a facility under the project was the compromisestruck between the parties. The audit concurs with the appraisal judgment asto the appropriate scale of the facility, as the Eastern Central Atlanticregion then already had sufficient large repair installations to serve themarket and it would have been risky -or Nouadhibou to compete with largefacilities at Dakar and Las Palmas which additionally had better ancillaryservices in recreation, international banking and so forth.

7. Nouadhibou did have a need for a more basic repair station forroutine repair and maintenance of the local fleet and for some emergencyrepairs for the international fleet such as propellers and rudder work whichwould avoid expensive towing charges. The audit concludes that the compro-mise adopted entailed the immediate loss of the only repair facility inNouadhibou and made no firm provision for its replacement, thereby substan-tially detracting from the attractiveness of the port. However, PortAutonome de Nouadhibou (PAN) has acquired independently of the project afloating dry dock but this facility is not operative yet. The Associationhas recommended PAN to lease the dock to an experienced ship repair organiza-tion which would be completely responsible for its operation.

8. Based on the traffic forecasts at preparation and appraisal and onthe physical characteristics of the site, the port facilities built under theproject are appropriate. There were design and construction flaws in theport, but they have been corrected. The main result of the flaws was some

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schedule slippage and considerable cost overrun for the dredging. Indica-tions are that the main fault for these problems lies with the designconsultants, though some persons interviewed felt that the culpability of thedesign consultants should be mitigated because the level of funding was notsufficient to the task. Discussions with fleet operators reveal no unusualoperational problems arising from the layout of facilities or the approach tothe port, though the area near the lighter berth on the south side of thecauseway can become extremely rough in some wind directions, apparently dueto unforeseen diffraction effects. There have been some problems with berthcongestion at the fishing berths recently, but these are related to the in-appropriate use of the berths for dead storage of seized vessels rather thanexceptionally heavy traffic or underdesign of the facilities.

9. The main operational problem that follows directly from the facil-ity design relates to the relative lack of handling equipment for quickly andefficiently unloading frozen fish from the vessels and moving it to coldstorage. In part, this lack of handling facilities arises from the greateremphasis on fish for meal and oil than was foreseen at the time of apprais-al. Actual landings for meal and oil production have fallen to zero, andeven though the levels of landings of frozen fish are still below appraisalprojections, the facilities have proved inadequate. In the Nouadhibouclimate and without cold storage, frozen fish can deteriorate in quality orspoil in a very short time. This is especially true of octopus and the othercephalopods, and fleet operators have reported several instances of losses ofthese valuable cargoes due to excessive unrefrigerated storage and handling.The fact of these losses and the knowledge of the problem has contributed tothe poor reputation of Nouadhibou and has been a factor in holding down porttraffic.

10. Outside the port itself, there are many elements of infrastructurethat are missing or inadequate and these all contribute to the general un-attractiveness of Nouadhibou to the international fleet. Supplies and equip-ment are generally not readily available for either the vessels or theirfishing gear. The city of Nouadhibou offers little or no attraction to thecrews of fishing vessels and, as a result, the crews pressure the owners tocall at other more attractive ports such as Las Palmas and Dakar.

11. Though the improvement of navigational aids that was envisionedunder the project has not been accomplished, discussions with port usersindicate that this has not of itself presented major impediments to using theport. The channel is broad and stable and relatively well-known and themarkers that were in place are thought to be adequate for those captains whohave at least some familiarity with the port. The need for navigational aidsfor strangers, as recognized at the time of appraisal, remains unfulfilledand should be addressed by PAN.29/ Near the port area and on the edges ofthe anchorage area are a number of sunken derelicts of both recent and moreremote origin, and while the majority are outside the port traffic lanes andunlikely to affect port operations, some are in locations that couldconstitute potential hazards to navigation. Whatever problems the derilictsrepresent, there are now no funds available to salvage or remove them.

29/ PAN - Port Autonome de Nouadhibou (Nouadhibou Port Authority).


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12. Outcome. At the time of appraisal, the port of Nouadhibou wasnearly fully-utilized by foreign fleets then fishing in Mauritanian waters.The project proposed an expanded fishing port with ancillary facilities de-signed to service substantially-increased fish landings. After some diffi-culties arising from a large underestimate in dredging volumes, an expandedport has been built at a total project cost that is slightly below appraisalestimates. The cost overrun in the dredging component was covered by acombination of reduction in dredged depth, savings and cancellations in otherproject components, and application of physical and price contingencies.However, utilization of the port is presently greatly below expectations andeconomic and financial performance are substantially below projections.

13. Development of port activities was seriously hindered by thePolisario War and the associated economic, political, and commercial dis-locations. The war could not be foreseen at the time of appraisal and it isunlikely that any efforts by the Association could have mitigated the effectsof the war on the port. Hostilities have ceased and no longer are a factorin port performance. However, activities at the port, even in the post-warera, are substantially below both actual levels and projections atappraisal. In 1981, fish landings stood at 8X of the tonnage projected bythe Appraisal Report for 1981 and also greatly below actual landings at thetime of appraisal. General cargo imports stood at 49% of projected levels in1981 and at 83% of the 1973 level.

14. The present continued low volume of fish landings, is due primarilyto the major change in fisheries policy that was promulgated in 1979. Allfishing rights were cancelled and the Government has since attempted to ne-gotiate new agreements based on joint ventures and shore-based processing.As a result, several operators have withdrawn from Mauritanian waters. Whilethe new policy is still evolving and has had some short term benefits, it isunclear whether the policy will be a long term success. Unless and until itis, the port of Nouadhibou will continue to perform at a fraction of pro-jected levels. The Association's role was either passive acceptance or anactive encouragement of the new policy. Neither role was appropriate in viewof the lack of analysis of the implications of the policy change for the per-formance of this project.30 1 With the completion of the project theAssociation's opportunity to contribute to policy development and to thesuccessful outcome of the project has become more limited. However, theMauritania (Second) Technical Assistance Credit (Credit 1292 of September1982) provides for financing technical assistance in the industry andfisheries sectors, which can include a review of future fisheries policy ifconsidered necessary.

15. The financial performance of the port falls short of appraisal pro-jections, though not as seriously as in the case of fish landings. Whenpresented consistently with the Appraisal Report, financial reports of PANshow a loss for all three most recent years, though 1981 indicates an im-proving trend. The Borrower did not conform with several covenants of the

30/ The Region notes that several studies prior to adoption of the policyprovided the necessary analysis.


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Credit Agreement; however, market factors limit the actions it can take tocorrect the situation. Additional increases in tariff levels in order toraise more revenue could further reduce traffic levels and total revenue.

16. The success of the port through increased fish landings was predi-cated on diversion of fish traffic to Nouadhibou from Las Palmas or Dakar orfrom transshipment operations at sea rather than on increased catches from analready fully exploited resource. There was no financial analysis of fishingfleet operations to determine whether this diversion would occur and, in thecase of Las Palmas and Dakar, the audit questions whether the Associationgave sufficient consideration to the competing interests of these ports.Such a question may be especially germane in the case of Dakar in view of theconcurrent fishing port project (Loan 1405-SEN).

17. Several significaut failings occurred during project appraisal, allrelating to the fact that construction of an expanded port was a necessarybut not on its own sufficient condition for the growth of the fisheriessector in Mauritania. These included:

- the appraisal projections of growth in fish landings and other car-go movements through the port of Nouadhibou were drawn mainly fromthe feasibility study and were primarily based on the availabilityof fish and the goals and intentions of the Government. Insuffi-cient attention was given to financial and operational needs of theintended port users. According to the Association staff this isbecause they observed the rapid increase of use by the inter-uational fleets and concluded that this would continue and becausethey were unable to obtain data on fishing fleet operations andcosts;

- the design of the project included the removal of the only repairfacility in the port and funds for technical assistance to preparea feasibility study for a new and larger ship repair yard; the pro-ject included no funds to build the new facility and it has notbeen built. The failure to provide an operating repair yardseriously detracts from the usefulness and drawing power of theharbor;

- economic analysis showed that the economic return of the projectwas relatively insensitive to variations in underlying assump-tions. However, sensitivity analysis of global variables obscuredthe effect of those variables that were both most uncertain andmost likely to affect port traffic and revenues such as fishprices;

- all of the institutional and organizational goals of the projectwere directed towards port finance and administration to the detri-ment of fisheries policy development and fisheries institutionbuilding. In retrospect, more emphasis should have been placed onthe developmeat of a coherent fisheries policy and an institutionalstructure to implement it;


- weaknesses in the infrastructure and ancillary facilities availableat Nouadhibou have contributed to the poor performance of the port,both before and since this project. In addition to repair facilit-ies, problem areas include supplies, communications, banking, andcrew recreation. Cumbersome and inflexible customs and immigrationprocedures have also served to make the port relatively unattrac-tive to potential users;

- the Appraisal Report indicated the need for stbstantial investmentin shoreside facilities by private or public Mauritanian or foreigninvestors if the port were to achieve the projected levels of traf-fic. However, the project provided no funds or the promise offunds for such investments. Association staff indicated that theyhad relied on the private sector which had made the necessaryinvestments near the port during the years before the project; and

- some of the failings may be explained by the fact that the projectwas appraised and supervised by a ports division with limited know-ledge of fisheries operations. This meant that Association staffwere somewhat limited in their ability to evaluate the analysisprovided by outside experts and this contributed to the weaknessesin project design and economic analysis. This raises the issue asto how fisheries projects can most suitably be handled by the BankGroup, how such operations are best staffed, and how various unitsin the Bank Group may best collaborate on such projects.

18. While the project achieved its physical objectives, it has not sue-ceeded so far as an economic venture. The experience demonstrates the needfor a thorough analysis of all systems affecting a project and of designingpolicies and facilities to conform to the potential market.

q I9\

) 6IrR-l

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IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARIES OF ONGOING FISHERIES PROJECTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS


1. Burundi -Fisheries Development ..... ................. Cr. 6262. Tanzania- First Fisheries ........................... Cr. 6523. India- Gujarat Fisheries ............................ Lu. 1394/Cr.6954. India - Andhra Pradesh Fisheries .................... . Cr. 8155. Tunisia - Second Fisheries ........................... Ln. 17466. Yemen PDR - Second Fisheries Development ............. Cr. 9327. Bangladesh - Oxbow Lakes Fisheries .. ................. Cr. 8908. Maldives- First Fisheries ................... ........ Cr. 9079. Kenya- First Fisheries .............................. Cr. 1051

10. Yemen AR - Artisanal Fisheries ...................... Cr. 102511. India- Inland Fisheries ............................. Cr. 96312. Egypt - Fish Farming Development ..... ................ Cr. 111113. Philippines - National Fisheries Development ......... Lu. 215614. Yemen PDR - Third Fisheries Development .... .......... Cr. 127415. Maldives- Second Fisheries ........ Cr. 132016. Senegal - Dakar Fishing Port ....... Ln. 140517. Philippines - Fisheries Training ..................... Lu. 1786


1. Burundi - Fisheries Development (Credit No. 626-BU)

Approved: April, 1976 Project Cost: US$8.6 million

Effective: February, 1977 Credit Amount: US$6.0 million

Closing Date: June, 1983

A. Background, Project Preparation and Appraisal:

Fishing is the principal economic activity along the Burundi shoreof Lake Tanganyika. The project was proposed by Bank staff in cooperationwith GOB and locally-based FAO/UNDP staff, based on results of FAO/UNDPfisheries projects. Appraisal was undertaken by an IDA mission to Burundi inSeptember/October 1975.

B. Project Objectives:

The project aimed at providing fishing materials and equipment tofishermen; developing and expanding fishing centers and stations; improvingfish marketing; strengthening fisheries extension services and training forfisherman; developing management capability of the Rural Development Society(SUPOBU); providing technical assistance including training, studies andpilot development activities for the Lake Tanganyika Coastal Region. Themain objective was the development of artisanal fisheries on Lake Tanganyika.

C. Implementation:

From the start the project experienced a number of difficultiesresulting in initial implementation delays and eventually in curtailment orelimination of certain project components. Supervision reports indicate somedegree of success in the objective of supplying lake fishermen with boats andfishing gear. But productivity has been very low, well below targets andexpectations, and it has been largely influenced by management problems withthe parastatal SUPOBU, which was responsible for the fish marketing and formanaging the project.

The Project Completion Report will be drafted shortly, following a12-month extension of the original closing date. An audit mission isscheduled for mid-1984.


2. Tanzania - First Fisheries Development (Credit No. 652)

Approved: July, 1976 Project Cost: US$12.4 million

Effective: October, 1976 Credit Amount: US$ 9.0 million

Closing Date: December, 1981


Tanzania has considerable freshwater and marine fish resources,capable of much greater rational exploitation, and the project was seen as ameans to this end. The project was prepared by Tanzanian authorities withUNDP assistance. An IDA appraisal mission visited Tanzania during June/July1975.


The project is a first stage in developing fisheries production inTanzania and aimed at supporting the establishment of commercial fisheries atthree Marine centers and one at Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika; developing anUjamaa pilot fisheries program, providing fish transport facilities in LakeTanganyika; providing for studies on marketing and pollution; future projectpreparation and the provision of related technical services.

C. Implementation:

Supervision reports indicate a long history of poor administrativeperformance by the institution responsible for project management, longdelays in procurement (especially regarding the supply of locally-built boatsof which only 10 were built out of 30 planned) and in the provision of facil-ities at selected 'Ujamaa' villages on Lake Tanganyika. Project targets weresubstantially reduced, but even these were not fully attained by the date ofthe last supervision mission.

The Project Completion Report was issued in August 1983 and anaudit mission is scheduled for mid-1984.

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3. India - Gujarat Fisheries (Loan No. 1394-IN, Credit no. 695-IN)

Approved: March, 1977 Estimated Project Cost: US$38.0 millior

Effective: July, 1977 Loan/Credit Amount: US$18.0 million



Fisheries in India as a whole and Gujarat State whilst alreadylarge have considerable development potential, constraints being shortage ofharbors and processing facilities. Preparation was by GOG with IBRD/FAO/CPassistance during late 1974 and 1975. An IBRD appraisal mission completedthe process of formulation following a visit to India in May 1976.


The project provides funds to:

(a) The Government of Gujarat for improvements to two (2) fishingharbors and for basic infrastructure in eight (8) villages;

(b) private fishermen, fisheries cooperatives and private entre-preneurs through credit from participating banks under refinance arrangementswith the Agriculture Refinance and Development Corporation for canoes,fishing vessels, ice plant, cold storage, fish processing and net manufactur-ing facilities and equipment;

(c) The Government of India for test fishing off Gujarat andAndhra Pradesh, a fish marketing study and for consultants needed for proj-ect implementation.

C. Implementation:

Contractual disputes caused a three-year delay in civil engineeringwork, now scheduled for completion by mid-1984. The credit program was sub-stantially reduced following a severe drop in demand for vessel financing,and mounting loan recovery problems, caused by decreasing vessel profit-ability and a general worsening of the repayment climate for vessel loans.The fishing fleet in the project area expanded nevertheless due to seasonalmigration of vessels from other areas. Lending for fish processing facili-ties was largely cancelled as private investment in processing facilitiesexceeded local requirements. The fish marketing survey was successfully con-cluded. Exploratory fishing did not provide necessary data to reach reliableconclusions. The project area was hit three times by hurricanes during theconstruction season, each time severely damaging facilities already con-structed. Implementation will be concluded in mid-1984.

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4. India - Aidbra Pradesh Pi-borls (Credlt Mo. 815-IN)

Approved: May, 1978 Estimated Project Cost: US$36.5 million

Effectlve: October, 1978 Credit Amount: US$17.5 million

Closing Date: September, 1984


Fisheries in Andhra Pradesh, as In India as a whole, has consider-able potential for development. Project was Identified by FAO/IBRD/CP lnJuly/September, 1975. Preparatlon was by the Department of Flsherles, COAP,and appralsal by an IBRD mossion that visited India during September/October1977.


The project finances fishing harbor development at three (3) sltes,credit financing for 420 mechanlzed and non-mechanized fishing craft and two(2) seafood processing plants, access roads for about 100 fishing villages Inthe project area, and technical assistance. Except for the village accessroads, the primary focus of the project is on the catching and processing ofexport-grade shrimp.

C. Implementation:

Harbor works were hindered by technical and design problems whichtook some time to overcome. The vessel flnancing program was lnitiallydelayed because of participating bank Insistence on unrealistlc securityrequirements. Subsequently the credit program was substantially reducedfollowing a deterioration of vessel profltability and rapidly increasingproblems with loan recovery fcr fishing vessels throughout India. Neverthe-less, the fishing fleet in the project area expanded substantially due toseasonal migration from other areas. A project processing plant at one portwas dropped because of overcapacity In already existing plant; a smallerplant at another site was substituted In Its place.

Overall progress generally satisfactory, but project completionwill be nlne months late.

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5. Tunisia - Second Fisheries (Loan No. 1746-TUN)

Approved: June, 1979 Estimated Project Cost: US$67.5 million

Effective: May, 1980 Loan Amount: US$28.5 million



Physical and institutional constraints hindered development of theTunisian fisheries sector. As a follow-on project to Fisheries I, it wasprepared by consultants financed by an IBRD/PPF advance. Pre-appraisal wasby a joint IBRD/FAOICP mission in June 1978 and in October 1978, ar. IBRD mis-sion visited Tunisia to complete the appraisal task.


The project provides for the construction and equipping of 10 newcoastal fisheries ports and for additional shore facilities in several exist-ing ports; the production of about 430 inshore fishing boats; refrigeratedtrucks, pickups and vans for extension and training purposes and for consult-ing services covering training, the preparation of detailed technical studiesfor the extension of two harbors and for research into lagoon fisheries andfish resources.

C. Implementation:

The cost of harbor works and boats seems likely to exceed prepara-tion estimates by around 50%, necessitating Government action to cover thecost overrun. Revised project cost now US$74.8 million. Harbor infrastruc-ture works are completed at four sites and nearing completion at anotherfive. The project credit component is proceeding slower than expected due tomanagement problems. Lessons from Fisheries I applied in two importantareas: prior detailed agreement between BNT and CGP relending criteria,policies and procedures for loan recovery, and a more flexible arrangementregarding vessel construction to give fishermen greater choice o' boat yard,but with safeguards of standard design and cost.


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6. Yem- PDR - Second Fisberies Development (credit No. 932-YDR)


Effective: April, 1981 Credit Amount: US$10.0 million



South Yemen is known to have large and underdeveloped fish re-sources which already contribute 10 of GDP. The First Project dealt withdevelopment needs in the Mukalla area some 220 miles west of the Second Proj-ect Area. Preparation was undertaken by consultants during 1978 under a PPFadvance, and on the basis of this report, the project was appraised inNovember 1978 by a joint IDAIFAO/CP team.


The project is designed to develop the fisheries sector in theeastern part of the country through construction of a fisheries and generalcargo port and related shore facilities. The project will also provide fish-ing vessels, engines and gear to nearby village fishermen. By generallyImproving communication and supply conditions, the project is expected tobenefit the entire population of the hitherto remote eastern Sixth Governor-ate.

C. Implementation:

The project is still in a relatively early stage following the longdelay in attaining effectiveness, caused by the need to obtain co-financing.Despite some technical problems concerning port design, and contractual dis-putes, civil engineering work is progressing and it is assumed that therewill be no change in the target date for project completion. The lack ofimprovement in cost recovery from Fisheries I sub-loans remains an issue,since better performance is a condition to IDA disbursement for fishing ves-sels and gear under the Second Project.

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7. Banl-adesh - Oxbow Lakes Fisheries (Credit No. 890-ED)

Approved: March, 1979 Estimated Project Cost: US$7.4 million

Effective: February, 1980 Credit Amount: US$6.0 million



As a deltaic country laced with rivers, estuaries, ponds, andlakes, Bangladesh is well suited for inland farmed fish development. Theproject was identified in June 1973, and detailed surveys of 15 Oxbow Lakesfollowed in 1975/76 under IDA Credit 409-BD. Preparation was by GOB staffwith assistance from resident FAO personnel. Pre-appraisal in April, 1978proposed certain changes, and final appraisal by IBRD staff took place inAugust, 1978.


The project provides for the development of fish culture opera-tions in six Oxbow Lakes in Jessore District. Key components include acentral hatchery complex and five satellite hatcheries for carp fry produc-tion; nursery and rearing ponds; lake embankment and water control works;electrical and telephone connections and necessary access roads.

C. Implementation:

Construction of the central hatchery complex proceeded well afterinitial teething problems and buildings were complete by early 1983. Thefirst ponds were readied for breeding about the same time. Land acquisitionfor the satellite hatcheries took longer and construction could not startbefore early 1983. Project management suffered from cumbersome and ineffi-cient Government administration, but has improved. Unlikely that Projectcompletion will escape the need for some extension.


8. Maldives - First Fisberies (Credit No. 907-NAL)


Effective: August, 1979 Credit Amount: US$3.2 million

Closing Date: August, 1981


Fishing is the most important economic activity in the Maldives andan IBRD reconnaissance mission in 1978 concluded that it would be an appro-priate area for Bank assistance. GOM with Kuwait Fund financing had commis-sioned a preparatory study by German consultants, and their report was usedby an IBRD appraisal mission which visited the Maldives during October, 1978.


The project supplied funds to:

(a) private fishermen through a credit scheme administered by theMinistry of Fisheries for mechanization of 500 fishing vessels;

(b) the Government for engine spare parts, maintenance and repaircenters, basic navigation aids and consultants required for project implemen-tation. In addition, a UNDP-financed technical assistance component providedconsultancy services including for future project preparation and six fishingvessels of improved design.

C. Implementation:

After some initial delays, 425 engines were installed by April 1983and the remainder by July. All five repair centers have been constructed andthree are operational. Installation of navigation lights is slightly behindschedule due to shipping delays but well in hand, and the technical assis-tance component is virtually completed.

The Government has prepared a draft PCR which requires some addi-tions. The credit was closed on March 31, 1983, about 21 years later thanoriginally scheduled, but despite the delay appears to have achieved vir-tually all of its objectives. An audit mission is scheduled for mid-1984.


9. Kenya - First Fisberies (Credit No. 1051-YE)


Effective: October, 1980 Credit Amount: US$10.0 million



In June, 1979, GOK requested Bank assistance for fisheries develop-ment. The project had been prepared by GOK staff with assistance from IBRD/FAO/CP, to promote fisheries development in the Nyanza and Coast Provinces.Appraisal was undertaken by an IDA mission that visited Kenya in July-August,1979.


The project will assist traditional coastal and lake fishermen topromote commercial fish farming and the fisheries sector generally throughresearch, training and studies. Major components include shore facilitiesfor fish transport by land and water, credit for fishermen to acquire fishingboats and gear and the establishment of a Fish Farming Development Center.

C. Implementation:

Project implementation, which started promptly, is now considerablybehind szhedule. Simplification and scaling down of certain componentsshould improve performance. Major problems relate to: (i) severe projectunderstaffing; (ii) weak project management; (iii) extremely weak managementcapabilities of most fisheries cooperatives; and (iv) delay in recruitment oftechnical assistance.


10. Yemen AR - Artianal Fisberies Development (Credit No. 1025-YAR)


Effective: April, 1981 Credit Amount: US$17.0 million



The fisheries sector of YAR has potential to supply substantialamounts of high quality, inexpensive animal protein for domestic consumptionand export. A project was identified by an FAO/IBRD/CP mission in 1975 andsubsequently, FAO undertook 3 feasibility studies covering fish marketing,resources and suitable landing sites for development. The project wasappraised in September/October, 1979.


The project is designed to develop the artisanal fisheries sectorthrough the construction of a fishing port, a fish landing pier, and shore-based fish processing, storage and marketing facilities along the coast andfish retail markets in main consumption centers inland. Construction ofimproved fishing vessels and shrimp trawlers, and provision for technicalassistance and training are also components.

C. Implementation:

Project is now at halfway stage, but behind schedule as a result ofmanagement problems and delays in land acquisition and expatriate recruit-ment. Local boat building is being reconsidered in favor of cheaper importedcraft from Sri Lanka and India. Major problems occurred when the imple-menting agency (GCDFR) decided to launch its own commercial fishing operationin competition with project activities. Bank representatives persuadedGovernment to countermand GCDFR's actions and it is hoped that performancewill improve from now on.


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11. Indla - Inland Flsberies Development (Credit No. 963-3DN)

Approved: December, 1979 Estimated Project Cost: US$40.8 million

Effective: May, 1980 Credit Amount: US$20.0 million



Fresh water fish farming for carp is an economically-important andcenturies old activity in India, and capable of considerable expansion. Thepresent project was identified in India and prepared by IBRD and Indian staffin 1978. Appraisal was undertaken by a mainly IBRD team which visited Indiain January/February 1979, and which included fish culture and general fish-eries expertise.


The project is designed to increase carp production in five IndianStates (West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) throughconstruction of fish-seed hatcheries, improvements to fish ponds, strengthen-ing fisheries extension services, establishment of training centers and pro-vision of technical assistance.

C. Implementation:

After a slow start during the first 18 months project implementa-tion improved considerably, with a Central Project Unit at national level andState Project Unit for each state all functioning satisfactorily. Hatcheryconstruction is well underway in four States. In one State construction issubstantially delayed due to land acquisition problems and credit for pondimprovement has started slowly. It is expected that extension of the Creditby about one year is needed for four States to reach their lending targets.In another State, difficulties in the pond improvement scheme are of suchmagnitude that it is unlikely that the lending target can be reached. Inthis State lending targets and the number of hatcheries might be reduced. Areservoir study is largely completed. Some increases have been experiencedin hatcherv construction costs.


12. Egypt - Fish Farming Developient (Credit No. 1111-EGT)

Approved: March, 1981 Estimated Project Cost: US$26.3 million

Effective: January, 1982 Credit Amount: US$14.0 million



Egypt is a major consumer but net and growing importer of fish withan urgent need to increase domestic production, especially from fish farms.The project was identified by an IDAlFAO/CP mission in 1977, prepared partlybv consultants financed under IDA-PPF and by IDAlFAO/CP in 1979 and wasappraised by two IDA missions in early 1980.


The project is intended as a demonstration of commercial aquacul-ture on both small and large scales using land and water having no betteralternative use at present. Includes establishment of a 3100 feddan fishfarm at Maryut; credits for about 100 small farms on 1800 feddans in theDelta; improvements to El Mex mullet fry collection station; facilities andequiument for training; programs for strengthening extension services andmonitoring and evaluation; fish marketing and project preparation studies andconsultant services.

C- ITmplementation:

Although still at an early stage in implementation, the project hasrun into substantial problems in regard to local management and procurementdifficulties and in the process has lost much time which will be difficult tomake up before the target closing date.

Note: 1 feddan - 1.04 acres


13. Philippin - National Fisheries Developenmt (Loan No. 2156-pY)


Effective: March, 1983 Loan Amount: US$22.4 million



This is the third in a series of fisheries projects, plus a numberof substantial fisheries components and in particular addresses the need forinstitutional strengthening of the 3 main fishery agencies. Identified bythe Government, the project was prepared by FAO/CP and appraised in October1980 by a joint IBRD/FAO/CP mission.


The project provides for an area development sub-project to improvethe efficiency of marketing for the municipal (artisanal) sector, comprisingthe construction at 7 sites of landing areas, jetties, iceplants, auctionhalls, bulk fuel and related facilities and the provision of carrier boats,vehicles and other input supplies. Secondly, it provides for training pro-grams, technical assistance and equipment for the three fisheries agencies -BFAR, PFDA, and FIDIC.

C. Implementation:

Following effectiveness in March, 1983, the project has barelybecome operational. Management of the area development subproject haschanged and new management wishes to alter appraisal designs for marketinginfrastructure, expand area coverage and stimulate mariculture. Procurementfor the institutional development subproject has been halted due to admini-strative bottlenecks. Training consultancy is well underway and a marineresearch consultant is to be selected shortly. Monitoring and evaluationproposals have not yet been made and nothing has been done to prepare pro-posals for fishery related studies. Reorganization proposals are stillsubject to internal review. The number of regional fishing ports planned hasfallen from ten to five and then three as Government priorities have changedto favor municipal ports; loan funds will have to be reallocated.


14. Temen PDK - Third Fisberies Develop et (Credit No. 127 4-7Tm)


Effective: February, 1983 Credit Amount: US$ 6.0 million



South Yemen's very large fish resources and past massive over-investment in industrial fisheries produced critical shortages of skilledtechnical and managerial personnel. Two earlier Bank projects for artisanalfisheries and shore infrastructure were unable to fill the gap in manpowertraining, a gap which the Third project seeks to fill. Identification was byFAO, followed by Kuwait Fund-financed feasibility studies. Final preparationand appraisal was undertaken by joint IDAIFAO/CP missions during April andOctober 1981.


The project provides for the establishment of a self-containedFisheries Manpower Development Center; finance for teaching equipment fortraining refrigeration technicians; and a Fisheries Village Developmentcomponent promoting four existing fisheries cooperatives by providing inte-grated fish landing, handling, storage, marketing, transport and repairfacilities. There is also a provision for 156 man/months of technicalassistance.

C. Implementation:

The project has only just started, and implementation experience istherefore limited. There have been delays in the recruiting of the FisheriesTraining Advisor and the establishment of the project implementation unit.In addition, delays in recruitment of engineering consultants is likely toresult in a one-year delay in project completion.


15. Maldives - Second Fisberies (Credit No. 1320-MNL)

Approved: January, 1983 Estimated Project Cost: US$12.6 million

Effective: August, 1983 Credit Amount: US$ 5.0 million



Fishing is the dominant sector of the economy and the project is acontinuation and development from the First Project now on the point ofcompletion. The project was identified by GO[ with IDA assistance duringFisheries I, and was prepared in September, 1981 with assistance from IDA andwith UNDP funding. Appraisal was undertaken by a joint IDA/IFAD missionwhich visited the Maldives in March/April 1982.


The project is designed to increase foreign exchange earnings andfishermen's incomes from increased tuna exports, by strengthening fisheriesinfrastructure, provision of a fuel distribution system, improved fishpricing mechanism and technical assistance for training and management. Newmarkets for frozen fish exports is also an objective. Main components are arefrigeration complex; fish collection and fishing vessels; fuel distributionfacilities; other infrastructure and technical assistance for detailed designof project facilities, management, training and preparation of a follow-upproject.

C. Implementation:

The project has only just been launched and experiences delays inrecruitment of consultants, responsible for detailed project design.


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16. Senegal - Dakar Flahiug Port (Loan No. 1405-SE)

Approved: April, 1977 Estimated Project Cost: US$24.0 million

Effective: March, 1978 Loan Amount: USO 6.0 million



Landings of the Dakar-based industrial fishing industry accountedfor 25% of total catch - about 80,000 tons in 1974 - but the port lackedsatisfactory facilities for the service and control of industrial fishing.Identification of the proposed fishing port extension occurred during finalsupervision of the First Dakar Port Project (Loan 493-SE), in 1973. Prepara-tion was by consultants, and project appraisal was undertaken by an IBRD/FAO/CP mission in May 1976.

B. Project Objectives-

The main project components are firstly, land reclamation and con-struction of new fishing port and auxilliary services including access road;secondly, technical assistance for Management and Operation of the new port,including accountancy and new tariff structures; thirdly, consulting servicesto study the introduction of container traffic at Dakar port and to study thecurrent industrial and traditional fisheries situation for preparation of aten year fisheries development plan.

C. Implementation:

All civil works, technical assistance and consultancy studiesprovided for under the project were completed prior to the September 1981supervision mission and below cost estimates. The project was extended toSeptember 1983 to utilize remaining uncommitted funds to finance an urgentlyneeded audit of 1980, '81 and '82 accounts, and secondly to provide time forthe Port Authority to introduce the recommended new cost accounting systemand to complete the study on the container port.

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17. Philippine - ilherles Traloiog (Loan No. 1786-PN)

Approved: December, 1979 Estimated Project Cost: US$70.6 million

Effective: May, 1980 Loan Amount: US$38.0 million



The Bank has financed 5 earlier education projects with a substan-tial agriculture and forestry bias, but no previous action to resolvenational skilled manpower shortages affecting fisheries development. Theproject is based on an IBRD preparation mission in July, 1978 and thefindings of a Bank appraisal mission which visited the Philippines inAugust/September 1979.


The project seeks to support the fishery sector development strate-gies by strengthening fishing technology and human resources with particularemphasis on assistance to small-scale fishermen. Provision is Included fordeveloping the College of Fisheries at the University of Philippines in theVisayas as a center of excellence for professional training and research;establishing 7 regional Institutes of Fishery Technology for technicianlevels of training and an additional 7 regional centers for Fishermen'sTraining.

C. Implementation:

Project facilities about half completed as of September 1983,lagging somewhat behind schedule by about a year. Main problems are finan-cial, managerial and administrative, with inadequate communication betweenproject entities. Some doubts expressed about manpower needs data on whichproject was originally based. There have been delays in procurement oftraining vessels (more than one year). Retendering might be needed.



IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARIES Of COMPLETED FISHERIES CONPONENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS


1. Bangladesh - Chandpur Irrigation II ................ Cr. 3402. Chlle - Technical Assistance ........ ...... Ln. 9783. Malawi- Shire Valley II ................. Cr. 3634. Thalland - Chao Phya Irrigation ......... Cr. 3795. India - Drought Prone Areas .... Cr. 5266. Phillppines - Rural Credit III ..................... Ln. 10107. Sonalla - Education II ............................. Cr. 5718 Xorea - Educatlon III .............................. Ln. 10969. Mexico - Integrated Rural Development, PIDER ....... Ln. 111010. India - ARDC II .................................... Cr. 715

Appendix: Bangladesh Chandpur Irrigation, PPAR Issue - Fisheries

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Page 2

1. Bangladesh - Chanfpur II Irrigation Project (Credit 340)

I. Project Description:

Objective of the project was to increase production of paddy andother high-value crops, thereby contributing towards Government's objectiveof achieving foodgrain self-sufficiency. The project provided flood controland drainage to about 130,000 ac, and irrigation to about 68,000 ac. Theproject included embankments, regulators with navigation locks, a primarypumping plant, improved natural channels, and secondary 2 cuaec low-liftpumps.

II. Fisheries Component:

(a) Objective: The project would provide facilities for propagation offingerling carp and juvenile prawn to annually stock rivers, canalsand ponds in the Chandpur area, in order to compensate for thereduced spawning of natural carp and prawn by the shuting off of alarge portion of the area by project works.

(b) Implementation: The above fisheries component was prepared in avery short time after the reappraisal mission had already returnedfrom the field and hence lacked implementation structure. Aresurvey concluded that at least 3,000 fishermen would be adverselyaffected by the project itself and thus established the need forthe fisheries component. The proposed program was estimated tocost US$450,000 compared with only US$200,000 allocated under theproject, all of which was to be provided by local funds but was notcovered by any form of covenant and was ultimately dropped. Thisreflected an acutely inadequate preparation of the fisheries com-ponent which resulted in the loss of employment of 3,000 fishermenwithout any form of compensation and the loss of income of US$0.3million.

(c) Outcome: The outcome of the fisheries component of this project(which was very sketchily designed to provide sustenance to the3,000 fishermen who would lose their employment due to the irriga-tion project) has been very insignificant. Practically none of themoney was spent, and because of this development, in 1975 a fisher-ies sub-project component was added to the Karnafuli IrrigationProject so that a similar situation would not arise in other Bank-financed irrigation projects in Bangladesh (for full details seeAppendix 1).


. chile - Technical Assistance (Loan 978)


The proceeds of the loan were intended to be allocated to thefinancing of high priority investment studies in industry, metallurgy,mining, transportatiin, nutrition and fisheries sectors, as weln as consult-ing and advisory services, and training for staff of agencies responsible forproject planning or implementation.

11. Fisheries Component:

(a) Objective: In line with financing of high priority investmentstudies in all the above sectors, the fisheries component reflectedthe public investment priorities of the Government at the time.

(b) Implementation: Technical assistance initially provided forfisheries studies but was dropped from 80% to 3% of the Bank fundsallocated, by the new Chilean Government after September 1973.

(c) Outcome: The new government began introducing fundamental economicpolicy changes signaling a total reversal of earlier policies andthe state ownership of a US$1.5 million fishing vessel for researchwas not considered desirable.


Page 4

3. Nalm i - Shire VaEFey Agricultural Development Phase II(Credit 363)


The objectives of the project were to increase crop, livestock andfish production and the incomes of farm families in the Shire Valley under aset of programs to: increase crop production on 16,000 farms, increaselivestock production and the amount and value of the catch of about 1,000fishermen, improve health services, maintain and control wildlife, improveagricultural research, hire consultants, assist farmers and stockmen in landregistration, and carry out engineering studies.


(a) Objective: One of the objectives of the project was to increasefish production by setting up a program designed to iucrease theamount and value of the catch of about 1,000 fishermen throughextension services, better fishing gear, kiln drying, training ofboat builders and improved access to fish landings.

(b) Implementation: All targets of the fisheries component were metand in some cases even slightly exceeded. The fishermen receivedtraining in the use of modern gill nets for fishing and in the useof the kilns for smoking fish. The kilns proved so popular thatadditional ones were built by the project. One central boatyardwas constructed at project headquarters rather than five smallerones, and although there were some delays in obtaining thematerials, by the end of Phase II boat construction had almostachieved its target. Landing sites were improved and the monitor-ing of pesticides was carried out.

(c) Outcome: The fisheries component of this project has been success-futl. About 1,000 fishermen were trained in improved methods offishing. As a result, fish catch increased by about 2,100 st peryear compared to an appraisal estimate of 3,300 st. Because mostof the catch was processed in the project's improved smoke-dryingkilns, fishermen could obtain higher prices in the markets. Theproject introduced an improved kiln which required less fuel and atthe same time produced a much more palatable product.


4. Thalnd - Chso Phya (First) Irrigtiom Improvement(Credit 379)


The project was designed to improve existing irrigation systemscovering a gross area of 17,000 ha in the Northern Chao Phya plain, about 140km north of Bangkok. The project aimed at increasing production of irrigatedcrops (mainly rice) through higher wet season yields and an expansion of dryseason cultivation. The project included rehabilitation of main and lateralcanals, drains and roads, on-farm development works and supporting agricul-tural services to farmers. US$0.2 million was involved in project provisionsto cover fish fry production for stocking canals and fish ponds.


No mention of fisheries component in the PPAR.


5. India - Drought Prone Areas (Credit 526)


The main objective of the project was to increase and stabilizeproduction from agriculture and related activities in six drought-prone dis-tricts of Western and Central India. The project was designed as a multi-component pilot project to test and implement technical and organizationalmeans to economically improve the productivity of drought-prone areas inIndia. Each component, in support of agricultural development, was to befinancially and economically viable, but the need of the weaker sections ofrural populations for government-supported subsidy schemes was recognized.The project was to provide a -shelf of works' in order to use drought reliefoperations for the creation of productive assets.


(a) Objectives: The objectives of the fisheries component of this pro-ject were not specifically mentioned in the PPAR. The inlandfisheries component was part of a diversification program of thisproject to develop the skills and opportunities for communities inparticular areas. Fisheries development was to create droughtimmune opportunities for perennial water impoundments.

(b) Implementation: During implementation the capacity for the produc-tion of fingerlings was expanded and 41 fishermen societies wereformed.

Cc) Outcome: The inland fisheries component was estimated at appraisalto benefit 1,000 families but it actually reached about 4,000 fami-lies, mostly small and marginal farmers and members of the schedul-ed castes and tribes. An incremental 283 tons of fish were caught.

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6. Philippimes - Third Rural Credit (Loan 1010)


The project was basically a continuation and expansion of thesecond loan. A nationwide system to channel mediumr- and long-term credit byusing a rural banking system was to be set up. Several new subloan categor-ies were added and savings and loan associations weSe included as new lendingchannels. The beneficiaries were expected to be approximately 8,000 small-and medium-sized farmers and local enterpreneurs who would invest in farmmechanization, transportation facilities and farm equipment, and the develop-ment of fisheries, livestock or cottage and agro-industries to increase foodproduction and farm income and to generate employment opportunities.


(a) Objectives: Development of fisheries but channeling medium- andlong-term credit through rural banking to increase food productionand farm income and to geaerate employment opportunities.

(b) Implementation: During implementation the Rural Banker's Associa-tion of the Philippines requested that the tonnage of fishing boatswhich were being financed by the credit be increased to 20 grosstons because boats up to 5 gross tons were too small to be profit-able.

'c) Outcome: Development of fisheries was promoted by this project,although on a very small scale. Farm income and rural employmentopportunities increased only somewhat. However, it was not pos-sible to measure the precise impact because a monitoring systemcould not be established to assess project impact at the farmlevel. This has been subsequently undertaken in the fourth loan.


Page 8

7. Somalia - Second Education (Credit 511)


The project was part of the Government's *education programcontained in its Five-Year Development Plan (1974-78) and would assistSomalia's strategy by: (a) establishing an elementary teacher trainingcollege; (b) developing an Academy of Somalia Studies in support of theGovernment's policy to promote basic education and reduce illiteracy; (c)improving secondary education by the addition of facilities to schools toenable agriculture, fisheries science and co;imerce to be taught; and (d)providing rural training facilities for nomads including student hostels,staff housing and communal services.


(a) Objectives: Objectives of the fisheries component was two-fold:Ci) to provide training programs to assist fishery and marinetransport development projects by rebuilding the Fishery and MarineInstitute, where 288 students and 80 boarding places would beprovided, and (ii) to provide for staffing and training ofpersonnel for project management as well as reinforcement of theProject Unit by means of technical assistance of nine man-years ofspecialist services for the Fishery and Marine Institute and sevenman-years of specialist services for the Project ImplementationUnit.

(b) Implementation: The physical implementation of the project was 49months behind schedule. The fisheries component was likewiseaffected (Section II. c. below gives further details of implementa-tion and outcome of the fisheries component).

(c) Outcome: For component (i) of II. a., the outcome was as follows:(a) the institute was built for the specified capacity, but enroll-ment was around 400 students; (b) the workshops were built but werenot equipped and therefore serve no purpose. The same was the casefor the library; (c) the science labs were under-utilized; (d)boarding facilities were not used at all due to the recurrent costimplications; and (d) the furniture was in a poor state of repair.For component (ii) of II. a., the outcome was as follows: (a)under direct contract the Government recruited five specialistsfrom India for the Fisheries and Marine Institute; (b) one civilengineer was also directly contracted to strengthen the ProjectUnit which was less than the initial proposal. quality of design,construction, supervision, quality control, etc., suffered as aresult; and (c) about 100 man-months were added to the originalproposal to support the technical and vocational teacher training.


8. Korea - Third Education (Loan 1096)


The project objectives were to: (a) meet manpower requirements atthe skilled worker and technician levels for specific economic sectors whileimproving the quality of instruction in the respective segments of theeducation system; (b) lay a sound basis for a flexible, employment-orientedsystem of non-formal vocational training; and (c) assist from the perspectiveof manpower development the government's policy of geographic deconcentrationof industries. In meeting these objectives the project comprisedconstruction and equipment for nine institutions under the MOE and sevenvocational training institutes under OLA.


(a) Objective: (i) extension of one fisheries college and equipment tobe supplied to it for an added enrollment of 180 students; and (ii)extention of three fisheries high schools and equipment to besupplied to them for an added enrollment of 1080 students.

(b) Implementation: during implementation the loan allocation for theBusan Fisheries College was changed from US$1.64 million to US$3.47million by a transfer from unallocated funds. An appreciable partof the unallocated funds was transferred to boost equipmentallocations.

(c) Outcome: Enrollments in the project fisheries high schools were tohave increased from 3,140 to 4,220 but have, in fact. remainedstationary at 3,250 in 1981. The Busan Fisheries College was theonly project institution at university level and is the onlyinstitute of its kind in the country. At the beginning of theproject, the enrollment quota was 1,160 and by 1981 had grown to2,540. Regarding the equipment, the purchase of sophisticatedmaterials-testing and research equipment by the Busan FisheriesCollege amounted to 30% of the total equipment allocation. Thispurchase was marginal to teaching of sea-going marine engineeringand less so to fisheries, even if it stimulated the researchinterests of staff.

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SUPPLEIMEN 3Page 10

9. Nezico - Integrated Rural Developmnt, PID=L (Loan 1110)


The project would assist the implementation of investment plans in30 micro-regions with a rural population of 1.5 million. The project wouldalso improve and consolidate planning coordination and implementation byexisting government agencies involved in rural development agencies, andsupport an intensive evaluation effort. The project was designed to supportdirectly-productive investments (66Z), productive support investments (22X),and social infrastructure (12%) and evaluation by supporting the activitiesof a new center of Research in Rural Development.


(a) Objective: Under Other Productive Investments (1X), the projectwould support limited investments in the project micro-regions infisheries development (US$0.12 million) along with beeking andforestry. In the two micro-regions, Sinaloa and Baja California,supporting fisheries infrastructure in the form of cold storageswould be assisted.

(b) Implementation: Less than 1% of overall project allocations wasspent on fisheries development.

gc) Outcome: Lack of efficient monitoring and evaluation prevents anyanalysis of the fisheries investments.


10. InAiA - Second Agricultural Refinance Developmemt Corporation(Credit 715)


The project would finance the continuation of onr-going programs ofminor irrigation development and of other agricultural, livestock and fisher-ies development activities planned for implementation during the two yearsbeginning July 1977 and for which a need for refinancing by ARDC wasanticipated. Project funds would be channeled through ARDC which wouldrefinance loans made by participating banks.


(a) Objective: Fisheries loans would be mainly in the marine fisheriessector and be both for the purchase of mechanized vessels andtraditional canoes. The typical mechanized vessel would be an 11 mtrawler cum gillneter. Loans to small, traditional fishermen wouldbe for the purchase of canoes whose average cost would be Rs15,000 and outboard motors whose average cost would be Rs 5,600.

(b) Implementation: Total costs of the fisheries component amountea toRs 182.7 million or 4.5% of total project costs. About 1,000 boatswere financed, as well as pisciculture on 750 acres and 175 tanks.

(c) Outcome: An evaluation study has been made of mechanized fishingboats in a district of Karnataka which shows fully satisfactoryfinancial results.

IyI I

N14 -

- 137 -SUPPLEMENT 3AppendixPage 1


BANGLADESH CHANDPUR IRRIGATION PPAR1 / ISSUE - FISHERIES

Shortly after the appraisal of Chandpur II, in early 1970, theFisheries Directorate became concerned about the possible impact of irriga-tion and flood control development on the fishing industry in the projectarea. Hence, before the reactivated project was approved, a survey wasundertaken by a consultant to estimate the possible impact that the shuttingoff of the area from the adjacent Neghna and Dakatia rivers by project workswould have on natural carp and prawn restocking and, subsequently, the levelof catch. The problem would arise because both carp and prawn progeny werespawned outside of the project area and brought into the area by flooding andnormal currents. It was believed, at that time, that the livelihood of15,000 to 20,000 people might be affected by the enclosure of the projectarea. After a brief survey, a fisheries specialist (consultant) concludedthat there were about 3,000 full-time and an unknown number of part-time sub-sistence fishermen in the project area. Further, he estimated that the totalannual catch of these fishermen was around 1,000 mt of carp and 55 mt ofprawn. Total value of this catch, at that time, was estimated at almost TK 2million (US$0.3 million).

The reactivated project, therefore, included a component which wasexpected to provide facilities for propagation of fingerling carp and juve-nile prawn to annually stock rivers, khals and ponds in the Chandpur area.It should be pointed out that this component was prepared in a very shorttime, after the re-appraisal mission had returned from the field, and lackedimplementation structure. Consequently, a consultant was hired whore-surveyed the catch in the project area and drew up a proposed fisherydevelopment program. The re-survey concluded (1974) that the first estimateof the number of fishermen to be affected by the project (3,000) was probablycorrect, but that the total fish and prawn catch might be 50 percent higher,or about 1,600 mt. This proposed program did not recommend that giant prawnsbe cultured and juvenile prawns be stocked in the project area as wasrecommended by the first consultant and included in the project's fisheriescomponent. Instead, it recommended that an investigation be undertaken todetermine whether prawn fishing could be maintained by other means such ascontrolled replacement of naturally-produced young shrimp - a method that wasbeing experimented with in other countries. Although the consultant's reportwas completed and presented to BADC in June 1974, it was not submitted to theFisheries Directorate until April 1975. This inaction indicated a lack ofappreciation on the part of the executing agency (BADC) of the relevance andimportance of fisheries in the Chandpur area. In addition, a shortage ofGovernment funds prevented any action being taken on the proposed program.

1/ Project Performance Audit Report, Bangladesh - Chandpur II IrrigationProject (Credit 340-BD), OED Report No. 3436 dated April 30, 1981.


AppendixPage 2

(The proposed program was estimated to cost US$450,000 compared withUS$200,000 allocated under the project, all of which was to be provided bythe Government.)

Because of these developments and the Bank's general concern forthe development of the fisheries sector, in 1975 a fisheries sub-project orcomponent was added to the Karnafuli Irrigation Project (Credit 605-ED) whichwas being appraised. This subproject focussed on general fisheries develop-ment in south Bangladesh as well as fisheries maintenance and development inthe irrigation projects of Chandpur, Muhuri and Karnafuli. With respect tofisheries maintenance, the fisheries component of the credit provided supportto the Fisheries Directorate in preparing and implementing programs to insurethat the three IDA-financed irrigation projects (Chandpur, Muhuri and Rarns-fuli) did not cause a decline in fisheries production. Funds were providedfor, inter alia, a carp hatchery in the Chandpur Project area to remedy theproject's negative effects on the carp fishery and to serve as a focus ofresearch and the design and operation of research facilities. There was nospecification as to when the carp hatchery was to be completed, but expendi-tures on this component were expected to be completed by the end of 1978. InMay 1980, the hatchery was partially operational. Funds were provided, also,to employ consultants to assist the Fisheries Directorate in implementing thesubproject. The consultants were only employed in June 1977 some 16 monthsafter the effectiveness date.2/

Work on the carp hatchery facility (at Raipur) was delayed mainlyby escalaLing costs that resulted in demands by contractors to re-negotiatecontracts. Work stoppages occurred while re-negotiation of contracts wasgoing on. In 1980, about ten million fisheries and fingerlings were producedand about a third of these were sold to private carp nursery operators forfurther rearing and some of these have been sold to fish farmers in the pro-ject area. No fingerlings have been released into the khals and rivers ofChandpur to support the traditional fishing of the past. Still under inves-tigation is the design and the location of a prawn hatchery which is to beused to periodically re-stock in the Chandpur area as well as other loca-tions.

2/ This memorandum is concerned only with the fisheries component of Karna-fuli as it relates to Chandpur II and not with the full fisheries deve-lopment program of Karnafuli. The Regional Office, with respect to thisparagraph, notes that the primary objective of the fisheries developmentprogram as stated in the SAR for the Karnafuli Irrigation Project wasto create a Bengali ability to carry out field investigations to assessthe impact of irrigation and flood control projects and to designfisheries development projects. This is true, but in a prior paragraphof the same annex (annex 4, para. 1 of the SAR), it is stated, '... thiscredit would provide support to the Department of Fisheries, under theMinistry of Forestry, Fish and Livestock, in preparing and implementingprograms to insure that three IDA-financed irrigation projects do notresult in a decline in fisheries production."


In early 1977, when the regulators were first closed, it wasreported that there were strong complaints from the fishermen th.@ dailycatch had declined sharply and that the number of fishing days has beensignificantly reduced. At that time, a number of fishermen reportedly hadpawned their fishing equipment to village moneylenders who then employed themon a share-catch basis to fish various ponds which the moneylenders hadrented. Because of these developments and the delay in construction of thecarp hatchery, an interim action program was set up in March 1977 with themain objective of releasing one million fries (fingerlings) by mid-year.There is no information on how this program fared; however, see para. 12above.

Under the present fisheries program for Chandpur, as it hasevolved, only fishermen who own or lease ponds will benefit from the carprestocking program. There are no plans to restock rivers and khals as wasdone naturally before the project area was enclosed by embankments andregulators. One proposal to partially restore carp catch in rivers and khalsis by a highly technical cage culture. But this will take time to develop.However, it was recommended in 1974 by a consultant, and continues to berecommended by the current consultants, that the borrow pit or ditch that hasbeen formed by the irrigation and flood control development be used to createponds for fish farming by fishermen directly affected by the project - thosewho had fished in public khals and rivers.

It is not possible to have a precise measure of the impact of theproject on fish catch in the Chandpur area. Scientific surveys were nottaken before the regulators were first closed in 1977. Since then, threesurveys have been taken by the consultants which show that annual catch with-in the project area declined almost 40 percent, or 2,000 mt, between 1977 and1979.3/ If the decline from 1976 to 1977, when regulators were first clos-ed, was of an equal annual magnitude, the present annual loss would be 3,000mt. Further, It is not stated whether these estimates include those forprawn catch; likely they do not. On the basis of these numbers and the 1979average retail price of TK 13 per kg for fish, the total value of the lostcatch may range from TK 39 to TK 78 million or US$2.6 to US$5.2 million.4/

3/ Snell Environmental Group, Fishery Development in Irrigation and FloodControl Systems. Third Annual Report, August 1980.

4/ Although the prawn catch is a fraction of that for fish, their totalvalues have been estimated at about an equal level.


This level of losr. may continue for several years or more before the fisher-ies development program is fully effective. Even then, the restoration ofthe level of prawn catch may take even more time, because, as noted above,the prawn hatchery has not been started or even funded.5/

In light of this result, it is probable that Chandpur II has sig-nificantly reduced the incomes of commercial and part-time fishermen in theproject area. The loss of fish catch represents a negative benefit or a lossto the project. In calculating the economic rate of return to the project,the PCR, Annex II Table 10, assumes that TK 7.2 million is required to main-tain fish production in the area as a result of the project. The additionalinvestment cost of the fishery component of the Karnafuli project is notincluded, however; nor is account taken of the loss of fishery productionthat has already resulted from the project and of future losses that are nowvery likely. The cost of the fishery development component of the Karnafuliproject is now estimated at US$6.0 million. A re-estimated rate of returnwas calculated in which these costs are roughly taken into account: it wasassumed that US$2.0 million of fishing development cost should be charged toChandpur II, spread over a three-year period beginning in 1977 and with aloss of fish and prawn catch of TK 20 million in 1977, TK 40 million in 1978,TK 60 million in 1979, TK 40 million in 1980, and TK 20 million in 1981.Under these additional cost and loss of benefit assumptions, the rate ofreturn is 12.5%, compared with the PCR re-estimate of 13%. Similarly, theERR is 17.5% if the costs of Chandpur I are not included, compared with thePCR re-estimate of 18%. The difference in both cases is marginal.

5/ The Regional Office objects to the use of these data on annual losses offishermen, objecting to them as estimates of actual losses and to theiruse in recalculating the rate of return. However, these data are basedon a survey of fisheries catch undsrtaken under the Karnafuli Project bythe Snell Environmental Group which, in the audit's opinion, werecollected in an objective and scientific manner.

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Page 1

HARVESTING THE WATERSA REVIEW OF BANK EXPERIENCE WITH FISHERIES DEVELOPMNT

IMPIENTATION SUMARIES OF ONGOING FISEERIES COMPONENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS


1. Korea- Secondary Cities ............................. Ln. 10702. Thailand - Phitsanulok Irrigation .................... LU. 11493. Bangladesh - Rural Development I ....... .............. Cr. 6314. Bangladesh - Karnafuli Irrigation .................... Cr. 6055. Kenya - Wildlife and Tourism ....................... Ln. 13046. Rwanda-Rural Development ...... .................... Cr. 6687. Philippines - Fourth Rural Credit ................... Lu. 13998. Nigeria - Ayangba Agricultural Development .......... Lu. 14559. Nigeria - Lafia Agricultural Development .......... e... Lu. 145410. Mexico - Integrated Rural Development, PIDER II ...... Lu. 146211. Thailand - Chao Phya Irrigation ................. e..... Ln. 146812. Malawi - Shire Valley Consolidation .................. Cr. 82313. Indonesia - First Rural Credit ................ *....... Cr. 82714. Ghana - Volta Region Agricultural Development ........ Cr. 100915. Senegal - Small Rural Operations .............. eoeoe.. Cr. 99116. Portugal - Agricultural and Fisheries Credit ......... Ln. 160317. India - Third ARDC ............ ................ *.D. Cr. 94718. Argentina - Yacyreta Hydroelectric ..... .............. Lu. 176119. Indonesia - Yogyakarta Rural Development ............. Cr. 94620. Indonesia - National Agricultural Research ........... Lu. 1840/Cr. 101421. Thailand - Agricultural Credit I ..................... Lu. 181622. Mexico - Seventh Agricultural Credit ................. Lu. 189123. Philippines - Third Livestock and Fisheries .......... Lu. 189424. Korea - Second Ghangju Regional ..................... Lu. 175825. Korea - Second Agricultural Products Processing ...... Lu. 185126. Brazil - Piaui Rural Development u..................... L. 201527. Bangladesh - Drainage and Flood Control ........ *...... Cr. 118428. Mexico - Integrated Rural Development, PIDER III ..... Lu. 204329. Senegal - Investment Promotion Loan .................. Lu. 1973/ar. 113630. Malaysia - Kelantan Land Rehabilitation ....... ...... Ln. 189931. Malyasia - Rompin Endau Area Development ............. Lu. 195732. India - Kandi Watershed .............................. Lu. 189733. Sri Lanka - Second Rural Development ................. Cr. 107934. Brazil - Maranbao Rural Development ................... Lu. 217735. Malaysia - Nalacca Agricultural Development .......... Ln. 214736. India - Fourth ARDC ................................. . Ln. 2095/Cr. 120937. Peru - Alto Mayo Rural Development .... e........9 ... see Lu. 221938. Malaysia - Kedah Valley Agricultural Development ..... Lu. 2220

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SUPPLENENT &Page 2

1. Korea - Secondary Cities Regional (Loan 1070)


The project would support government initiatives in establishing aregional development program in Gvangju and other planning regions throughinstitutional development and regional planning assistance. The projectfocussed on Gvangju's four major cities as potentially dynamic centers in theregion and provided for investments in public service and facilities that arevital to the cities' long-term objectives of greatly-expanded employmentopportunities and an efficient pattern of development.


(a) Objectives: The Fisheries component consisted of two parts:(i) a fishing harbor complex with an industrial processing zonein Yeosu, and (ii) technical assistance to provide advisoryassistance for the management and operation of the Yeosufishery harbor complex.

(b) Implementation: Substantial design changes were made in thefishing harbor involving shortening of berthing quay and reduc-tion of berthing depth. Implementation was generally satisfac-tory and within cost estimates, with higher unit costs offsetby reduction in scale. Some of the industrial plots, less thanhalf, have been sold but construction haIs not yet started.

(c) Outcome: The main benefits to the port were to be derived fromexpansion of fishing activities. However, industrial fishlandings are far below appraisal estimates. As a result,although harbor revenues barely cover operating expenses, theeconomic return on the investment is low or probably negative.Furthermore, no construction has taken place in the industrialzone of the fishing port and is unlikely to take place in thefuture. A second stage of investments in the Gwangju regionhas also been supported by the Bank. in a follow-on project(Loan 1758). The project completion report was issued inAugust 1981 and an audit mission recently visited Korea.


2. Thailand - Phitsanulok Irrigatiou (Loan 1149)

I. Project Descriptions

The project would include a diversion dam, irrigation canal sys-tems, drainage, flood control and on-farm works for some 97,000 ha. It wouldalso include agricultural supporting services for extension, credit,research, and farmers organizations. The project would also include: (a)detailed preparation of a second phase development of 42,000 ha; (b) a waterresource study of the Chao Phya and Meklong Bais; (c) an administration andorganization study of institutions concerned with irrigation development; and(d) the preparation of further irrigation projects.

II. Fisheries Component

There is no mention of a fisheries component in the AppraisalReport or in the two latest supervisionureport, but a fisheries objective isincluded in the project abstract supplied by the Internal DocumentationManagement Service. The appraisal report does mention (para. 4.25), however,that the project would have both beneficial and adverse effects on fish pro-duction. 'Construction of canals and roads would create many borrow pitswhich are prized by the local people for fish and frog production. On theother hand, the provision of drainage and the reduction of swampy areastogether with a marked increase in the use of chemical pesticides could bedetrimental to fish production, especially in the lower reaches of thesystem."


3. baugladesh - Bnral D!elopmnt I (Credit 631)


The project would strengthen a number of production-oriented on-going rural programs in the project thanas (sub-districts). To ensure thatbenefits reach the smaller farmers, physical inputs and rural credit providedunder the project would be channeled through the Comilla type of coopera-tives. A major effort would be made to improve the operation and managementof these cooperatives. Technical services to the cooperative members wouldbe strengthened. The project would comprise rural works, minor irrigationfacilities, thana facilities, and rural credit. The project would also aimat strengthening rural institutions and services and would include technicalassistance, and monitoring and evaluation.


(a) Objective: The primary objectives vould be to bring intoproduction the derelict ponds and to provide an additionalsource of income for landless people in the villages. Some500 ac of publicly-owned fishponds would be selected by ThanaFisheries Officers and reclaimed by the rural works program.Landless people would be organized into TCCA Fishery Coopera-tives, to manage the reclaimed ponds. District FisheryOfficers would conduct demonstration ponds, advise coopera-tives on pond management and supply fish fries.

(b) Implementation: As of December 1982, some 348 ac of fishponds, against a project target of 500 ac have been ex-cavated. This shows that implementation :ontinued to be slowas only an additional 27 ac had been excavated since February1982. Despite some improvements in the procedures for leasingof ponds to landless cooperatives, progress on leasing conr-tinues to remain unsatisfactory. For example, in Bogradistrict, only 46 out of 113 ponds re-excavated have beenleased out to BSS so far. With the nearing of the projectcompletion date, additional Thana Fisheries Officers posted inthe project districts are being withdrawn, which has resultedin unsatisfactory extension services coverage of the coopera-tives.

(c) Outcome: Implementation is still going on and a final evalu-ation has not yet been made.


4. Bangladesh - Karnaf1li Irrigation (Credit 605)


The project would provide irrigation, flood control and drainage toa net area of about 38,000 ac in the lower Halda River Basin and 8,000 ac inthe lower Ichamati River Valley. Because of the irrigation facilities to beprovided under the project, the dry season rice area would expand from thepresent 20,000 ac to 38,000 ac. In the wet season, project work would reduceflooding and provide supplementary irrigation to permit a shift tohigh-yielding varieties of rice on 15,000 ac. Irrigation would depend on lowshift pumps drawing from an improved khal system, which would be supplied bytidal recharge in the Halda Unit and a main pumping plant in the Ichamatiunit. The pumping would also be used for drainage during the monsoonseason. In addition to pumps and civil works, the project would provide afisherias development program as well as workshops, equipment and vehiclesfor both operation and maintenance and agricultural supporting services.


(a) Objective: Because of the importance of the carp spawnfishery on the Halda River, the credit would provide fordetailed specialist studies of the fish habitat on the HaldaRiver with particular regard to the potential effect of theproject on fisheries in the area. The planned research pro-gram would also encompass fisheries in the Ichamati and MuhuriRiver and Chandpur II Irrigation Project. The studies wouldinclude recommendations regarding location and costs of prawnand carp hatchery facilities that would serve the three proj-ect areas. Expatriate consultant services would also berequired.

(b) Implementation. All civil works at the Raipur hatchery havebeen completed, and since April 1982 the hatchery is in fulloperation. The completed hatchery received very positivecoverage from the Bangladesh Government and news media as anexample of a very successful IDA project. The hatchery is thelargest of its kind on the subcontinent. Hatchery productionis within its target. The hatchery is experiencingsubstantial financial problems because it is part of theMinistry of Agriculture and has to operate according to itsfinancial directives and rules. Attempts are made to create aseparate Corporation to facilitate the hatchery to operate ona commercial basis. The Credit was closed on December 1982.

(c) Outcome. The project component technically operatessatisfactorily, in part because it was supervised concurrentlywith an other IDA fish culture project in Bangladesh.Measures to establish a Fish Seed Corporation of which theKarnafuli Hatchery would be the nucleus have not yet beencompleted.


5. Kenya - Vildlife and Tourism (Loan 1304)


The project would consist of a coordinated package of capital andsome incremental operating expenditures on: (i) facilities to increase thetourist capacity at Amboseli National Park, the Masai Mora National Reserveof the Inner Northern Circuit; (ii) improvements at Lake Turkana NationalPark; (iii) game-proof barriers; (iv) a Wildlife and Fisheries TrainingInstitute; (v) leases for the Wildlife Clubs of Kenya; (vi) a WildlifePlanning Unit; (vii) policy and feasibility studies on wildlife and tourismdevelopment; (viii) support for anti-poaching activities, subject to agree-ment in detail between the Bank and the Government; and (ix) a ProjectManagement Unit.


(a) Objective: Finance capital costs of an Institute at Naivashamainly to train staff of the wildlife conservation and manage-ment service and of the Fisheries Department. The trainingcomponent was particularly important in view of the require-ments for more intensive management of wildlife and fisheries,including extension efforts.

(b) Implementation: Supervision report of April, 1983 reportsthat construction of the academic facilities commenced inMarch, 1981, but only 50% had been completed. The death ofthe main contractor in a traffic accident had left legalissues to be resolved. Construction of the Fishery Station,which originally was included in the contract of the insti-tute, was deleted from the contract because the site for tneestablishment of the Station at the shore of Lake Naivashabecame unavailable. A new site was acquired by Government.Surveying of the site and redesigning of the station are inprogress. However, unless the present Closing Date is post-poned, it is unlikely that construction of the Fishery Stationwill be completed under the project.


6. Rwanda - Rural De-elopmeat (Credit 668)


The project would be a broadly based five-year program to promotemixed farming and rural development in Bugesera Est and Gisaka/Nigongo andstrengthen central services for rural development. It would especiallyinclude: (i) tsetse control; (ii) development of field extension services;(iii) provision of inputs to farmers on a credit basis; (iv) access andfeeder road improvement; (v) development of water facilities; (vi)construction of schools and health centers; (vii) development of two ranches;(viii) a plot irrigation scheme; and (ix) technical assistance and training,agricultural training center and studies to prepare for future projects.


(a) Objective: Fishing gear was included under part I(C) of theproject as provision of inputs to farmers on a credit basis.Credit would also be extended for small communuity veDtures forfood processing such as smoking ovens for fish.

(b) Implementation: The September, 1982 supervision missionreported that the project provided extensicn services to 332fishermen in the Bugesera. No information on number offishermen and on volume of catches were availabie for theGisaka-Migongo District.


7. Philippines - Fourth Rural Credit (Loan 1399)


The project would provide medium- and long-term credit for threeyears. Qualified rural bank and SSLAs would lend project funds to about16,000 farmers and rural entrepreneurs for investment in: (i) farm mechani-zation; (ii) light transportation; (iii) cottage and agro-industries; (iv)coastal and inland fisheries; and (v) small-scale livestock development. Theproject would also include funds for: (i) a study to assess the impact offarm mechanization in the Philippines; (ii) an agricultural machinery test-ing, evaluation, and standardization project to standardize the quality offarm machinery; (iii) a training program to improve the lending capability ofCB and rural bank staff; and (iv) service vehicles for CB field staff engagedin the project.


(a) Objectives: Fisheries sub-projects would include about 45small coastal fishing boats and equipment, and about 1,200inland fishponds and fishpens with a total area of 6,000 ha.Boats of simple traditional design would be manufactured insmall local yards, purchased by local entrepreneurs and crewedby local fishermen usually on a catch-sharing basis. Themaximum size of a boat financed would be 40 gross tons inorder to permit access to better, more distant fishinggrounds. The average size of fishponds and fishpens would be5 ha.

(b) Implementation: No details available in the supervisionreport of August, 1981, except that about 23Z of the portionof the loan disbursed was for the fisheries component. Nodetails in the April, 1982 supervision report either.


8. Nigerla - Ayangba Agricultural Development (Loan 1455)


The project would provide for a Basic Service Package for the area(crop development, roads, supporting and commercial services), supplementedby additional livestoe:k, forestry, fishery and water supply development andwould specifically involve production and associated investment in crop,livestock, forestry and fisheries development, infrastructure and supportingand commercial services.


(a) Objectives: Through better-trained fishery extension staff,the project would provide improvements in fishing technologythat would have a considerable impact on catch. A fisheriesexpert would be employed to advise on the long-term planningand implementation of fisheries development. A fisheriestraining center, with a capacity for 20 students, would 'eestablished at Bagona. Fifteen 30-acre bunded lagoons, con-trolled by sluice gates, would be constructed and operated (ona licensed fee basis) as intensive fishing areas. The lagoonswould provide for better water control, breeding and growinghabitats. Fishing staff would promote FAO-designed fishdrying kilns in an effort to improve quality.

(b) Implementation: This relatively small component has notdeveloped as expected. The concept of improving the manage-ment of lagoons for the benefit of the fishermen who use themhas been modified by giving greater emphasis to the construc-tion of new ponds. This change is, in part, the result oftraditional tenure practices which have restricted the bene-fits received by the fishermen and given a greater share thanexpected to the lagoon owners. Perhaps the same reason hasrestricted fisherman interest in FAO-designed drying kilns.

(c) Outcome: This project has now been completed and the PCR willmake a more indepth assessment of this component. The PCRwill likely indicate that appraisal was deficient in assessingland tenure, customary practices and fishermen's needs,causing at least some project activities to be misdirected.


9. Migeria - Lafia Agricultural Develop cst (Leon 1454)


The project provides for a Basic Service Package for the area (cropdevelopment, roads, supporting and commercial services) supplemented by addi-tional livestock, forestry, fisheries, and water development and would speci-fically involve production and associated investments in crop, livestock,forestry and fisheries development, infrastructure and supporting and commer-cial services.


(a) Objective: The project would provide some small improvementsin fishing technology through better-trained fishery extensionstaff. Four 30-acre bunded lagoons, controlled by sluicegates, would be constructed and operated on a licensed feebasis as intensive fishing areas. The lagoons would providefar better water control, breeding and growing habitats.Fishery staff would promote improved FAO-desLgned fish dryingkilns in an effort to improve quality.

(b) Implementation: This relatively small component has not deve-loped as expected. The concept of improving the management oflagoons for the benefit of the fishermen who use them has beenmodified by giving greater emphasis to the construction of newponds. This change in part is the result of traditional.tnure practices which have restricted the benefits receivedby the fishermen and given a greater share than expected tothe lagoon owners. Perhaps the same reason has restrictedfisherman interest in FAO-designed drying kilns.

(c) Outcome: The project has now been completed and the PCR willmake a full assessment of this component. The PCR is likelyto conclude that appraisal was deficient in its assessment ofland tenure, customary practice and fishermen's needs result-ing in the misdirection of at least some project activities.


10. Mexico - Integrated Rural Developuent. PIDER I1 (Loan 1462)

I. Projection Description:

The principal project objective was to reinforce PIDER efforts toraise income, production and employment levels of the rural poor living in 20selected micro-regions. The project would also improve social services andfacilities for persons living in these regions. Under the project, attentionwould focus on reforms which affect the PIDER program as a whole, including:{i) increasing effectiveness of extension, credit and farmer organizationservices; (ii) improving the operation and maintenance of existing infra-structure; (iiI) strengthening PIDER capability to address specific issues;and (iv) providing resources for feasibility studies for productive invest-ment and elvaluation services. In addition, the project would also include alarger portion of directly-productive investments, a rural industries com-ponent and soil conservation efforts.


(a) Objectives: Fishery development would receive limited invest-ments with fruit production and forestry. In one micro-re-gion, fishery infrastructure in the form of cold storagefacilities would be assisted.

(b) Implementation: Fisheries development was supported in twomicro-regions, but serious problems were encountered. Boatswere given for free to young farmers without fishing experi-ence. In other cases, complex social problems regardingfishing rights were encountered. From the institutional sidethere was lack of coordination between responsible agencies.This project has now been completed; some further support forfisheries is included under PIDER III (Loan 2043).

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11. ThiLand - Chao Phra IrrigatIon II (Loan 1468)


The project was divided into four semi-independent components: (1)rehabilitation of the main irrigation, drainage and road networks and on-farmdevelopment works to improve water control and farm access; (ii) rehabilita-tion works only to improve water control and operational efficiency; (ili)topographic and cadastial mapping; and (iv) consultant services for imple-menting the above works, preparing feasibility studies, etc.


(a) Objective: The Department of Fisheries would initiate a pro-gram of demonstration fishponds under the project to help off-set the decline in fishing opportunities caused by theimprovement of water control, the increasing use of pesticidesand the provision of more productive dry-season farm employ-ment.

(b) Implementation: The fishing component was never implementedalthough after some urging, a few impractical demonstrationponds were constructed. The Region further comments:"Incidentally, the outcome in this case is entirely bene-ficial. The SAR identified a problem which did not exist.Under the intensive cultivation regime in full land consolida-tion areas of Chao Phya, farmers have no time or inclinationfor extra activities, such as operating small fish ponds. Atthe same time fully commercial fish farming operations haveboomed in the Central Plains. So a process of specializationleading to higher economic efficiencies has taken place,assisted by the above project. The proposed fish ponds wereIrrelevant."

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12. MNaLai - Sblre alley Consolidation (Credlt 823)


The project would constitute a third consolidation phase of theShire Valley Agricultural Development program. The major objectlves were(i) to increase the number of farmers applying improved crop practices, and(ii) to provide technical assistance to these farmers to increase land underimproved practices. The project would: (a) contlnue to support developmentof rainfed agricultural production throagh reorganization and strengtheningof the extension service, provision of the improved seed varieties, andthrough provision of credit; (b) improve the quantity and quality of meat andfish production; (c) continue support of the land husbandry program with anadded forestry unit; and (d) extend water health and road services.


(a) Objective: The project would expand the fisheries developmentprogram Initiated under the Second Phase Project. Thisprogram would include construction of infrastructure,expansion of credit for purchase of canoes, training offishermen and pollution monitoring. In order to implementthese activities, the project included provision for staffsalaries, vehicles, a motorboat, a VHF radio and operatingcosts.

(b) Implementation: Fisheries production has reportedly dimin-ished. All parent Ministries and Departments have resumedfull responsibilities for funding and staffing operationsfalling under their jurisdiction, and arrangements for asmooth takeover of project-provided facilities, vehicles,equipment, etc., are being made.

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13. Indonesia - First Rural Credit (Credit 827)


The project would, over three years, expand and improve the supplyof term credit to smallholders by (a) providing funds through BRI for long-term lending in selected geographic areas for a range of agricultural activi-ties, and (b) strengthening BRI through technical assistance, to enable it toimplement properly the lending both under the project and under its otherterm credit programs.


(a) Objective: Four of the seven sibloan categories requiringterm-finance beyond five years contained fisheries components:(i) brackish-water fishponds improvements of about 22,000 haof existing ponds; (ii) freshwater fishponds - pond deepeningand improvement of dikes and inlets for some 1,500 ha; (iii)fishing boat motorization - a pilot program involving inboardmotors for about 250 existing payang sailing boats; and (iv)iceplauts - about 10 small iceplants, primarily at the sameports.

(b) Implementation: About 8,000 subloans, amounting to Rp 16.2billion, have been granted as of March 1983. Whilecooperation between DGF and BRI has been good in the field,extension support has been uneven because of a limited numberof fishery extension officers.

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1k. Ghana - Volta Region Agricultural Development (Credit 1OO9)


The primary objectives of the project would be to increaseagricultural production, farm incomes, welfare and standards of living of thefarming population, particularly the smallholders, by introducing anddiffusing improved farming technology, providing farm support services, anddeveloping rural infrastructure. To ensure sustained and accelerated sectorgrowth in the long-run, the project would also strengthen MOA's operationalcapabilities by providing training to extension and technical staff andstreamlining existing institutional arrangements in the project area.


(a) Objectives: Fisheries extension activities would bestrengthened by providing additional vehicles, equipment andother supporting facilities. The project would primarilyconcentrate on improving traditional fishing methods in theinland lagoons and streams. Small fishing nets and other gearwould be provided in addition to some outboard motors formarine fishing by small fisherman groups. Extension staffwould provide advice on fish-rearing techniques, stock andrestocking, better curing and storage, and identify fisheriesprojects for future development.

(b) Implementation: The latest supervision mission recommendedthe reappraisal of the needs of the coastal fishermen beforefurther procurement of equipment while the inland fisheriesprogram also needs review since it is proposed to use heavyequipment for pond digging in contrast to the NationalFisheries Department recommendation to use manual labor.


15. Senegal -S-Sall Rural Operations (Credit 991)


The objectives of the project would be to encourtge localinitiatives and thereby broaden popular participation in decision-making oninvestments in the rural sector. The project would include the followingitems: (a) construction, equipment and technical services for perimeters forirrigation of rice, vegetables and bananas, and processing of honey; (b)provision of 20 smanll fishing boats with outboard motors and auxiliaryequipment; (c) provision of management structure, equipment for an open weflbrigade; and (d) for unidentified activities.


(a) Objectives: On the coast of Louga Region, 20 groups of fiveyoung men would be provided with fishing canoes equipped with20 hp outboard motors and fishing equipment (nets). Theproject would provide common drying stands, salt tanks andother processing equipment. The Fisheries Department at LougaRegion would be responsible for installing the facilities andwould provide technical assistance for both processing andmarketing. Producer groups would be responsible for allfishing and processing operations and for paying formaintenance of their boats, nets and processing equipment.

(b) Implementation: Twenty fishing canoes were ordered under ICBfor the subcomponent. However, the canoes were incorrectlyconstructed and the fishermen found them unsuitable forfishing in the Louga area. New canoes have had to be orderedfor the first ten fishing groups at Lompoul. These areexpected to be available by end 1983. The subcomponent willnot furnish canoes for the other ten groups at Tase until theproject monitoring unit and the Fisheries Department at Lougaare sure that these groups are seriously interested in theproject.


16. Portugal - Agricultural and Fisberies Credit (Loan 1602)


The project was designed specifically to: (a) strengthen thenewly-defined institutional framework for agricultural and fisheries credit;(b) increase the amount of credit supplied to private and cooperative farmsin the Alentejo region and to fishermen throughout the country; and (c)contribute to the improvement of the fisheries stock management and to theformulation of a plan for future investments and policy actions in thissubsector.


(a) Objective: in the fisheries subsector, the project's majoremphasis would be on providing the information needed to drawup a plan for long-term development of the subsector includinginter-alia improved management of fisheries stocks and neededinvestments in infrastructure. Credit would be provided forthe construction of a small number of fishing vessels, despitethe on-going construction of an estimated 50 engine-poweredlongliners, mostly financed by skippers themselves, to assurethe Bank's involvement in the medium- and long-term develop-ment of the subsector.

(b) Implementation: The supervision summary of December, 1981reports that the fisheries component, which was progressingwell until March, 1981, was halted by a new Secretary ofState. However, assurances were obtained for reactivation ofthe fisheries component.


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17. India - Third Agricultural Refinance and Developent Corporation(Credit 947)


The objectives of the project were to: (a) raise agriculturalproduction and productivity of farmers; (b) encourage institution-building;(c) improve the quality of investments, particularly minor irrigation; and(d) increase small farmer preparation and help regional imbalances bypromoting development in lesser-developed states. The credit would finance athird two-year time slice of the Agricultural Refinance and DevelopmentCorporation's lending program. Features of the project included minorirrigation works and land development, diversified lendings in livestock,forestry, fisheries, etc., training of staff and purchase of equipment forvarious agencies.


Ca) Objectives: Lending would go mostly into the marinesubsector where it would be used for purchase of mechanizedfishing vessels (including accessories), mainly on the uppereast coast where there exists the possibility for an increasein shrimp catch. Loans would also be granted for traditionalfishing operations such as canoes with outboard motors, or formechanization of existing canoes to extend their reach ofoperation. In inland fishing, a typical loan would be forestablishing or rehabilitating fish farm tanks or ponds,either for individuals or cooperatives, and would also includethe cost of fingerlings, nets and other implements.

(b) Implementation: Total costs of the fisheries componentto date amounts to Rs 257.0 million or 4.1% of total projectcosts.


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18. Argentln - Yacyreta Hydroelectric (Loan 1761)


The main objective of the project was to provide base-load hydro-electric energy for Argentina's power sector. Other objectives were to: (i)improve navigation on the Parana River by eliminating the rapids of Apipe;(ii) provide possible irrigation for both Argentina and Paraguay in theadjoining provinces; and (iii) augment the fisheries industry in the region.The project would comprise an earthen dam, two spillways, and a conventionalcovered powerhouse, fish passage facilities, navigation locks, irrigationintakes, the Aguapey dike, permanent villages, roads, bridges,infrastructure, resettlement, and studies.


(a) Objective: To augment the fisheries industry in the region byinstituting fish passage facilities to preserve the enormousfisheries resources of the Parana River.

(b) Implementation: Project construction is expected to commenceby end 1983.


19. Indonesla - Yogyakarta Rural Development (Credit 946)


The project would be one of the pilot projects for Government'sArea Development Program. It would comprise the following components: (a)agricultural development (45%) including technical development, inlandfisheries, livestock and incremental agricultural credit; (b) non-farmdevelopment (14%) including small-scale enterprise support and incrementalcredit; (c) social services support (13%) including rural health and watersupplies; (d) rural infrastructure (15%); and (e) institutional development(13%) including project organization, coordination and community participa-tion.


(a) Objectives: The fisheries component was designed to increaseboth (i) the quantity of fish available for local consumptionand (ii) the disposable income of fish farmers in Gunung Kiduland Kulon Progo. The project would finance the build-up offreshwater fish hatchery capacity through the rehabilitationand expansion of the two existing Fisheries Service hatcher-ies and the construction of two new hatcheries. An estimated56 new extension and hatchery workers would be appointed underthe project. Provision for marketing surveys was also includ-ed under the projects.

(b) Implementation: Good progress continues to be made. Con-struction of hatcheries is now complete except for Ponjong,but final selection and appointment of the contractor will becompleted by February 28, 1983 so that the completion date forconstruction, of August 1, 1983, can be achieved. The villageextensionists are now up to full strength, at 16, and aregradually being integrated into the perimanent staff of theDinas. Similarly, the component is working towards integra-tion with RECs; demonstration fish ponds have been installedat the four RECs in Gunung Kidul and steps are being taken toassign the fisheries village extensionists to work with thesame farmers groups organized under the National AgriculturalExtension project.

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20. Indonesia - National 4 ricnltural Research(Loan 1840 and Credit 1014)

I. Project Description;

The project would assist the development of fruits, lowland vege-tables, livestock, forestry, and estate crops (other than rubber and indus-trial crops), and strengthen the overall institutional framework for agricul-tural research, in order to ensure the success of NARI. The project wouldhelp provide the consultancy, training and physical facilities to assist areorganization of AARD including: (a) training for AARD staff; (b) technicalassistance for research activities; (c) physical development of existingresearch and institutes; and (d) incremental operating expenses associatedwith (a) and (c) above.


(a) Objective: Project expenditure for the fisheries componentwould be 21Z of total project cost and would meet AARD's needsfor training, technical assistance, civil works and equip-ment. Studies would also cover fish processing, preservation,use of by-products, packaging, and feed for prawn and fishculture.

(b) Implementation: Recent supervision indicates a continuedexpansion of research facilities, without specific referenceto fisheries. However, among the eight long-term specialistposts being filled during this period are for a marine biolo-gist and an aquaculture specialist. With the participation ofthese two specialists, the fisheries research program isexpected to move more rapidly. The total mumber of traineesunder the project is now 132, but no breakdown of how many ofthese were for fisheries is yet available.


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21. Thila-md-Agricultural Credit I (Loan 1816)


The proposed project is designed to expand the term lending capa-city of BAAC and help strengthen the cooperative system as a vehicle forchanneling credit and other services to small farmers. The credit componentof the project would support BAAC's lending program for three specified cate-gories (on-farm development, shrimp culture and oil palm development), aswell as unspecified categories, which would be identified and appraised byBAAC during project implementation.


(a) Objective: The project would finance 225 shrimp farmers withlandholdings of about 5 ha in two settlement schemes covering1,080 ha in the southern region. Settlers for these schemeswould be selected by a local committee. Investments wouldinclude land clearing, construction of shrimp ponds, dikes anda water control system, construction of living quarters andpurchase of fishing nets, traps and other small shrimp farmingtools.

(b) Implementation: The BAAC lending component of the project isnow complete. Under the shrimp culture component, infrastruc-ture works and lending were able to proceed in only one of thesettlement schemes. The other scheme has been faced withsquatter problems so the works have been at a complete stand-still.

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22. Mexico - Seventh Agricultural Credit (Loan 1891)


The project would be a continuation of Bank assistance to FIRA'slending program, which had received financing under six Bank loans, and wouldhelp finance a wide range of investments in crops, livestock, fisheries andagro-industry development throughout the country. The thrust of the proposedproject would be toward increasing agricultural production and productivityand in institution-building. In contrast to the on-going Sixth CreditProject, this project would include an additional category for medium-incomeproducers and would designate about 15% of the total program for their use.


(a) Objectives: Funds would be available to FIRA for a modestprogram (US$8.0 million, excluding contingencies) to promotefisheries development and meet credit needs. An integratedinvestment program (encompassing small boats or launches withoutboard engines, fishing equipment, ice storage facilities,and refrigerated trucks) would be promoted among low-income,in-shore fishermen. This simple, low-cost package wouldenable small, low-income fishermen groups to increase theirincomes through direct sales of fresh fish in majorconsumption centers. For larger fishermen groups andestablished cooperatives, funds would be provided for vesselsand equipment.

(b) Implementation: Despite the fact that a fisheries componentis included in this project, FIRA has not been active inlending for fisheries.


23. Pbilippines - Tbird Livestock and Fisberie. (Loan 1894)


The project would, over a period of three years, support theGovernment's policy of increasing animal protein supply by providing mediumrand long-term credit through DBP to the livestock and fisheries subsectorsand by strengthening the institutional capability for planning and imple-menting this and similar future programs.


(a) Objectives: Marine Fisheries. Subprojects were expected tofinance fishing vessels ranging from 12 gt to 150 gt and tosupport large traditional outrigger canoes (bancas) operatedby municipal fishermen in fishing f or tuna for export mar-kets. Other investments were expected in re-equiping vesselsand establishing a limited number of stationary fishtraps.Inland Fisheries. Typical subprojects would improve milkfishproduction technology levels in existing fishponds throughrehabilitation and expansion of pond dikes and water controlstructures. Lending was also expected for shrimp culture,eels and tilapia cage culture.

(b) Implementation: The supervision report of May, 1982 notesproblems of subloan arrears, though improving. Of non-creditcomponents, FIDC studies on Marine Regulation and MarineResources were approved but remain to be implemented.


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24. Korea - Second cwingju Re gdonal (Loan 1758)


The project was designed to further enhance the development of theGwangju Region. The project was aimed at: (a) promoting industrializationin the region's cities to expand employment opportunities; (b) improvingliving conditions in the urban areas; and (c) increasing the income earningopportunities of the region's island population through improved transportlinkages and fisheries activities. The project would consist of housing,industrial estates, water supply, transportation, fisheries and technicalassistance.


(a) Objective: An aquaculture development program aimed atenhancing fishermen's incomes and a storage facility at ImjaIsland for tiny salted shrimp used to prepare Kimche (nationaldish). Also technical assistance for aquaculture development.

(b) Implementation: Construction of the shrimp storage facilityhas been completed. However, recent financial projectionsprepared by the Shinan County Fisheries Cooperative estimatedthat the shrimp storage facility would not be profitable andstorage fees might have to be raised. The aquaculture programwas modified to take into account current over-production andreduced demand for facilities, and the modified program willbe completed in 1983.

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25. Korea - Second 4gricultural Products Processing (Loan 1851)


The project would provide medium- and long-term loans to theprivate sector through AFDC for investments in agro-processing facilities,and funds for technical assistance to AFDC. A wide variety ofagro-processing enterprises were expected to apply for financing, namely,freezing and cold storage, canning, drying, pickling and other preservationof fruits, vegetables, meat, and fisheries products, oil seed extraction,grain-based food, fruit juice-based beverages, dairy processing, animal feeds(mainly for pigs and poultry) and raw silk spinning.


(a) Objective: As part of the support for investments in theentire agro-processing subsector, it would include a largeportion of the loan for fisheries products, as well astechnical assistance in the form of overseas training toobtain short-term foreign expertise.

(b) Implementation: By mid-1983, a total of 88 sub-projects worthWon 37.0 billion were financed under the loan, with 41sub-projects worth Won 20.0 billion in the marine sector. Ofthese, 14 sub-projects for Won 7.5 billion were for freezingand cold storage facilities, 19 sub-projects for Won 9.5billion for fish meat processing, and 8 sub-projects for Won3.0 billion for fish and seaweed drying.


26. Brazil - Plaul Rural Develop ut (Loan 2015)


The specific objectives of the project would be: (a) to improvethe standard of living and socio-economic conditions, and (b) to increasecapacity of state and local Institutions to produce adequate services. Theproject activities would be: (i) land-related activities; (ii) agriculturaldevelopment; (Iii) fisheries development, (iv) physical and social infras-tructure; and (v) project administration.


(a) Objecti.es: The project's coastal fisheries developmentactivities would seek to remove production, marketing andorganizational constraints currently facing small fishermen.It would strengthen the artisanal fishing sector by increasingthe availability of known technology. The project would pro-vide funds for: (a) extension, technical assistance andtraining; (b) experimentation and research; and (c) coordina-tion of project activities.

(b) Implementation: A fisheries expert participated in the super-vision mission which reviewed project start-up. Later super-vision summaries report that fisheries extension work is goingsatisfactorily. Research activities, which got off to a veryslow start, have shown recent progress. The cooperative whichwas to have been a key element in marketing has experiencedadministrative and financial difficulties. To assist instrengthening the cooperative and project fishing activitiesin general, a UNDP Technical Assistance Project, partiallyfinanced by the Bank loan, placed an FAO fisheries expert inPiaui.


27. Banldeh - Dralnage and Flood Control II (Credlt 1184)

1. Project Description:

The project would empolder the three subproject areas (Chalan Beel,Satla Bagda and Hail Haar) by building embankments to eliminate flooding fromthe surrounding rivers. With the gravity drainage provided, substantialflooding would still occur during monsoon season. However, there would be areduction in the risk of flooding during monsoon season because the projectwould enable both a reduction in the depth and a substantial delay in theincidence of flooding. This would promote an increase in crop production.The main components in the project area would include the construction andimprovement of embankments and drainage facilities, the improvement of mainroads, construction of miscellaneous auxillary facilities and secondarydrainage systems, purchase of equipment and vehicles, and groundwater inves-tigation orks and a fisheries development study.

Il. Fisheries Component:

(a) ObjecLive: The fisheries component would finance a study ofthe fisheries situation in the Hail Haar area, forecast thelikely future of the fisheries environment and make recommen-dations for a fisheries enhancement program. The study woulddemonstate how the adverse impact of flood control and irriga-tion projects in terms of annual fish yield from the projectarea could be offset. The prospects for continued implementa-tion of drainage and flood control projects and the sigoif-icance of fisheries in the general area points to the need forproper integration of floodplain fisheries development withinsuch projects.

(b) Implementation: Project Proforma for fisheries component isbeing prepared.

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28. Mexico - Integratd Rural Developuent, PIDfl III (Loan 2043)


PIDER's central objective was to promote a self-sustained develop-ment process within rural communities and to guarantee access to goods andservices which provided adequate living standards. The main objective ofthis loan was to increase the development impact of the existing program bysupporting Government's efforts to expand and intensify activities in 17selected micro-regions in four states. The purpose of the specific invest-ments would be: (a) to increase production of basic goods; (b) to generatehigher productivity and per-capita income levels; (c) to raise the level ofemployment in rural communities; and (d) to improve living conditions interms of nutrition, health, education, housing and drinking water.


(a) Objective: The project would attempt to increase the effi-ciency of production and marketing of fish in two mico-regionsof Guerrero and Litoral Norte in Yucatan. The project wouldinclude: (a) construction of small docking, reception, pro-cessing and marketing facilities; (b) establishment of train-ing courses and extension activities; and (c) installation ofrepair shops with the necessary tools and equipment. In thestate of Yucatan, special emphasis would be given to technicalassistance and training for fishermen, with an initial focuson organization of fishermen, in-the-field training formanagement of cooperatives and promotion of associations forindependent fishermen.

(b) Implementation: The loan has been effective since the beginn-ing of 1982, but fisheries is only a minor component of thisproject. In general, however, the fisheries sub-projects inthe States of Yucatan and Guerrero are gradually improving.


29. Senegal - Imvestemt Pr otion (Loan 1973 and Credit 1136)


The objectives of the project would be to: (a) provide equity andterm resources for sound industrial, tourism, and fisheries investment; (b)strengthen SOFISEDIT financially and institutionally; (c) improve SME promo-tion in Senegal; and (d) identify appropriate changes in Government policyand procedures to enhance productive investment. Thus, the project wouldconsist of: (i) a line of credit to SOFISEDIT; (ii) a program to help SONEPIto improve the quality of its project preparation and assistance; and (iii)policy-oriented studies and training for the Ministry of Industrial Develop-ment.


(a) Objective: Part of the SOFISEDIT loan would be for agro-pro-cessing and fisheries. Also, two man-years of a fisheriescredit specialist with previous experience in setting upfisheries credit programs and exposure to fishing conditionsin West Africa would be provided.

(b) Implementation: A fisheries advisor has already been recruit-ed and about US$850,000 have been approved for investments inthree enterprises involved in fisheries.


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30. Malaysla - Kelatan Land Rehabilitation (Loan 189")


The principal objective of the project would be to increase theincomes and improve the living conditions and well-being of 7,500 low-incomehouseholds in Kelantan. Main project components were: (a) developmentthrough replanting; (b) improved TAKDIR management through additional staff-ing; (c) technical assistance to RISDA to strengthen extension services; and(d) consultant services to EPU for a road construction sector study.


(a) Objective: Fishponds. Settlers who had already establishedabout 30 ac of fishponds on the schemes would be assisted bythe project to expand this area by 300 ac. Ponds would bebetween 0.25 - 0.50 ac in size and would be operated by indi-vidual settlers. Settlers would receive grants of US$580 forponds of this size, which would cover the cost of a contractordigging the ponds and its initial stocking.

(b) Implementation: About 147 ac of fish ponds had been con-structed and stocked by the end of December, 1982. This pro-gram is part of a Government subsidy scheme implemented by theDepartment of Fisheries.

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SUPPLEMENT 4Page 32

31. Malaysia - Rn-pin Eudau Area Development (Loan 1957)


The project would develop one of the last major undeveloped areassuitable for rice cultivation remaining in Peninsular Malaysia. Irrigationwould be developed on a net area of about 11,400 ha under cover of tropicalforest. Settlement would be provided for 4,750 settler farm families.


(a) Objective: Objectives of DOF in the project area were toraise project participants' incomes through aquaculture and toincrease the supply of low-cost protein for families in theproject area. The Department's operations to supportachievement of these objectives would include extensionservices, specific training of farmers in the various aspectsof fish culture, regular stocking of irrigation canals andfinancial assistance for fish-cage culture.

(b) Implementation: The project is in the construction stage andimplementation of the fisheries component cannot begin untilthe dams and irrigation canals are finished.


32. India - Kaudi Watershed (Loan 1897)


The project would be the first comprehensive attempt to tackle theproblems of the Himalayan sub-mountainous zone. Its primary objective wouldbe to lay the basis for future sound investment, on a larger scale, whichwould reverse man-made ecological degradation and protect and developagricultural land that is subject to serious erosion and flooding. The focusof the project would, therefore, be institution-building, particularly instrengthening GOP's capability to plan, implement and monitor similarprojects in the sub-mountainous zone. The project would comprise:rehabilitation of upper catchments, flood protection, irrigation, anddevelopment of farm land as well as technical assistance, studies, research,staff and farm training and project administration, monitoring andevaluation.


(a) Objective: In order to ensure an adequate supply of fry forstocking, dams were to be constructed under the project; andto improve the overall fingerling position in the State as awhole, the project provided for the establishment andoperation of a hatchery to be located on the banks of theSutlej River near Ropar.

(b) Implementation: No supervision reports are yet available.


33. Sri Lanka - Second Rural Development Project (Credit 1079)


The project would Improve the productivity, income and living stan-dards of people in Matale and Puttalam districts by: (a) improving the pro-vision of inputs and services required by the agricultural sector; (b) stimu-lating increased plantings of coconut and minor export crops; (c) waterresources development; (d) rehabilitating and improving the economic infras-tructure; and (e) improving the social infrastructure, project coordinationand management.


(a) Objective: Emphasis would be on improving landing and shorefacilities at ma4or fishing centers in Puttalam. To ensuresafer and quicker access from the sea to landing centers, theproject would install beacon lights at 12 selected 'Locationsalong the district's coast. The project would provide for theestablishment of a fisheries service center, at a site to bedetermined, to serve as a demonstration of the effectivenessof such a facility in improving the fisheries industry. Themain function of this facility would be to make available tofishermen and traders a local supply of ice as well as providespace for sale and service of fishing equipment and supplies.

(b) Implementation: All works related to the two office complexes- one at Mahawera and the other at Puttalam - and three-quar-ters have been completed and are being used. The work at theKalpitiya Jetty, costing about Rs 3 million, has just beencompleted while the work on Wellamankarai Jetty is still underconstruction and expected to be completed by the end of 1984.Three out of 12 beacon lights have been installed; installa-tion delays have been due to problems with the quality oflights procured. Work at the Kalpitiya Fisheries ServiceCenter has just started. These investments are being comple-mented with investments in economic infrastructure such asprovision of electricity to the main fishery villages andimprovements to fishery roads.


34. Brazil - Naraniao Rural Developmnt (Loan 2177)


The primary objective of the project woulx be (a) to increase pro-duction and productivity and to improve the living standards and incomes ofthe rural population, and (b) to improve the capacity of the state executingagencies and COLONE to serve current and future farmer beneficiaries else-where in Maranhao through staff recruitment, training, technical assistanceand the provision of equipment. The project would comprise three subpro-jects: (i) the Baixada subproject aimed at reaching some 12,000 low-incomefarmers; (ii) the Alto Turi subproject would complete settlement in the AltoTuri area, consolidating activities initiated under the Alto Turi LandSettlement Project; and (iii) the Mearim-Pindare subproject would providepriority land regularization activities in support of on-going or plannedcomplementary rural development activities.

HI. Fisheries C inponent:

(a) Objective: The project would help to maintain and improveartisanal inland fisheries in five municipalities in Baixada,largely through the provision of technical assistance toredress the current depreciation of fish stocks through over-fishing. The component would provide for: (i) an increase inthe technical assistance capacity of COPENAT; (ii) trainingcourses for fishermen and women, including those engaged infish processing and marketing; and (iii) studies of potentialimprovements in fishing technology directed towards increasingfish stocks, and of improvements in the marketing and trans-port of the catch.

(b) Implementation: No consultants have yet been hired to assistCOPENAT in carrying out the necessary marketing study. By endMarch 1983, two fishermen groups (of 40 members each) werereportedly established.


35. Malaysia - Nalacca Agriciltural Develop e t (Loan 2147)


The project would provide for development of rubber areas,construction and improvement of irrigation and drainage works, suallholderdairy development, fishpond development, farm roads, and improvement ofagricultural support services. The main features of the project were: (a)smallholder rubber development; (b) infrastructure development; (c) cropdevelopment programs; (d) dairy and fish development programs; and (e)implementation of pilot schemes.


(a) Objective: The project would assist DOF with its freshwaterfishpond development program by constructing about 1,200 pondswith a total area of about 260 ha. This would increase thetotal area of ponds in the state to about 370 ha. Existingidle paddy lands would be eligible on conversion of their landuse titles.

(b) Implementation: About 30 ha of freshwater fishpond con-struction (encompassing about 150 ponds) was approved underthe subsidy scheme for 1982, and 14 ha had been completed byend 1982.


36. India - Fourth Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation(Loan 2095 and Credit 1209)


The project is a continuation of predecessor projects and would,over a two-year period (1982 and 1983), help to finance ARDC lending tofarmers through participating credit institutions for minor irrigation anddiversified lending. The project would also continue to help financetraining programs organized by ARDC mainly for staff of participating banks.Main objectives would be to: (a) help increase agricultural production,rural incomes and employment; (b) give continuing emphasis to assisting smallfarmers and less-developed areas; (c) continue institution-building throughfurther strengthening of ARDC; (d) improve CD agricultural lending and giveparticular emphasis to rehabilitation and strengthening of LDBs; and (e)continue programs for improving quality of investments.


Ca) Objective: Previously, the main part of the lending had beenfor motorized shrimp boats, which had made a notablecontribution to Indian export earnings. However, since theshrimping fleet had reached the capacity of the shrimpstock, project investments would, therefore, be directedtoward shrimp boats in the areas with further developmentpotential as well as for replacement of engines and hulls. Inaddition, loans would be given for gill netters andpurse-seiners that could catch fish for the local market.Loans for inland fisheries would be mostly for improvement offish ponds. ARDC would support lending to State corporationsfor hatcheries.

(b) Implementation: Disbursements for fisheries projects undarimplementation amounted to Rs 75.4 million or 1.6% of totaldisbursements to date.


37. Peru - Alto Mayo Rural Development (Loan 2219)


The project would be a prototype for the development of the Ceja deSelva and would cover an area of 120,000 ha and benefit a total of about12,800 families (8,700 of whom would be farmer settlers and Aguerunanatives). Main components of the project would be: (a) short- and mediumrterm credit; (b) construction of a small diversion structure; (c) supply ofland-clearing equipment; (d) improvement and construction of access road; and(e) establishment of an applied research capability. It could also includeother complementary activities such as: (a) construction of a fisheriesfacility with storage; (b) strengthening of forestry authorities; (c)improvement of health and education infrastructure; (d) studies to mcnitorthe project's impact on tribal groups; (e) training and short-term technicalasistance; (f) local mapping and land titling; and (g) national mapping toprepare a new map of the country.


(a) Objective: The project's fisheries component aimed to improvethe protein content of the local diet and to diversify agri-cultural production into farm fishponds by financing the conr-struction of two stations for the Ministry of Fisheries.Extension support would be provided by three incremental tech-nicians located at the station.

(b) Implementation: This project is just starting up and noimplementation results are therefore available.


38. Malaysia - Iedah Valleys Agricultural Development (Loan 2220)


The project would provide for the replanting of old rubber areas,construction and improvement of irrigation works and of farm and accessroads, development of fruit and fish production, strengthening of farm train-ing and other agricultural su port services, and consultant services foragricultural studies, design End construction supervision. About 20,500smallholder families would bene.2it. The mnin features of the project wouldbe smallholder rubber, irrigation', access road, and fruit fisheries develop-ment.


(a) Objective: The construction and stocking of some 160 ha offreshwater fishponds on farmers' land; the development ofabout 50 ha of ponds in aquaculture schemes on state land; theextension of training facilities and rehabilitation of pondsand hatcheries at the Inland Fisheries Training Center and theconstruction of training laboratory facilities at the BrackishWater Aquaculture Center in the State of Kedah.

(b) Implementation: In 1982, the year prior to project effect.ve-ness, some 190 ha of freshwater ponds (676 ponds and 400farmers) were constructed in Kedah State. Howevvr, due toadministrative oversights, no budget allocations for fishpondconstruction were made under the project in 1983.

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Harvesting the Waters - World Bank Documents & Reports

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