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Harassing the Enemys Diplomats The Embassy of Azmi Effendi Travelling through the Austrian-Occupied Balkans and Habsburg Lands during the Austro-Ottoman War (1787-1791)

CHARALAMPOS MINAOGLOU

The conduct of diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire and Europe was quite differshyent during the 18th century The Ottoman diplomacy was pre-modern there were no permanent embassies and no diplomatic protocol at all On the other hand the European diplomatic practice was at a stage of shaping although some protocol and rules had been already in use for centuries The difference in the way Ottomans and Europeans were practicing diplomacy was provoking some problems to the embassies of both sides Such was the case of the Ottoman emshybassy that was harassed by the Austrian authorities traveling to Berlin in 1790 The research on the embassys journey was conducted during the preparation of my dissertation under the title Greek diplomats in the service of the Ottoman Empire Constantine Karatzas the Ban and his journey to Prussia (1790-1792)1 My thesis is integrated in the general theme concerning the Phanariots role in the Ottoman Empire2 and especially in the conduct of the Ottoman diplomacy during the second half of the 18th century Using Constantine Karatzas as a case study of the middle level of the Phanariots social hierarchy it examines his life and career pointing out new aspects as far as the extent of the European political network and the political power of his social group are concerned Among other services he served as the dragoman (= interpreter) of the Ottoman embassy to Berlin in 1790 During this mission he kept a detailed extended (its transcripshytion consists of 900 pages) and still unpublished diary3 which among other

1 I am preparing my dissertation at the Department of History and Archaeology of the University

of Athens under the supervisio n of Prof Olga Katsiardi-Hering

2 The Phanariots were the Greek-orthodox elite in the Ottoman Empire Throughout the 18th censhy

tury and till the Greek revolution in 182 1 they were attaining all the offices for Christians in the Ottoman Empire Among those the most prestigious were the Princes ofWalJachia and Moldavia

and the Great Dragoman (= interpreter of the Ottoman government)

3 Constantine KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1 792 National Library of Greece manuscript 3106

This manusc ript (in Greek) is the basic source r wo rk with and it is going to be published as an appendix to my thesis The second most valuable sources are the Prussian documents concerning

the embassy that are gathered in four files in the Prussian archives Secret State Archives of

Prussian Cultural Heri tage (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz = GStA PK) I Hausarchiv (= HA) Geheimer Rat (= GR) Repositorium (= Rep) 11 Akten Nr 274a Fasz 34

5 and Nr 275d Fasz 76

16 Charalampos Minaoglou

things - such as the negotiations between the Ottoman embassy and the Prusshysian officials his personal conducts and relationships in Berlin the different unshyderstanding of Prussias institutions society and intellectual life4 between the Greek dragoman and the Ottoman ambassador - presents the embassys journey through the territories controlled by the Emperor Leopold II during the AustroshyOttoman war of 1787-1791

That embassy was the last hope of the Ottoman Empire to gain Prussia as an ally in Europe An alliance between the Sultan and the Prussian monarch had been signed in January 1790 but since Frederick-William II was reluctant to join the war Ahmed Azmi Effendi (c1740-1821) was sent in order to clear things out

As it is obvious my topic is related to Greek Ottoman and European hisshytory of the 18th century Apart from the biography of the unknown middle-level Phanariot C Karatzas it contributes to the Ottoman and European diplomatic history of that period as far as it concerns the events and negotiations of the Otshytoman embassy of 1791 to Berlin Although there are some previous studies concerning that embassy they do not examine the whole of the Prussian docushyments and they are based mainly to the relation of the ambassador Ahmed Azmi to the Porte which does not include any of the discussions with the Prussian ofshyficials in Berlin that Karatzas mentions in every detaiI5

The description of Ahmed Azmis diplomatic delegation to Berlin by Kashyratzas enables us to determine the terms and conditions under which an Ottoshyman diplomatic mission was conducted in the 18th century in more detail and precision than in any other case The reason is that the sefaretnames6 ie the reshyports of the facts concerning the embassies that the Ottoman ambassadors subshymitted to the Porte upon their return to Constantinople dealt usually solely with the description of the execution of the orders they had received Through these reports the ambassadors gave justification for their actions and thus they were giving attention only to their actions corresponding to what they had been orshydered to do while omitting other events situations and actions as Azmi Effendis case proves

The Austrians were aware of the mission of the embassy and so they tried to harass the Ottoman diplomats in many ways causing them every possible

4 Here is the point that my research meets with oth er papers of this volume and especially those of

Christian STEPPAN and Veronika HYDEN-HANSCHO

5 Otto MOLLER- KOLSHORN Azmi Efendis Gesandtschaftsreise an den preussischen Hof Ein Beishy

trag zur Geschichte der diplomatischen BeZiehungen Preussens zur Hohen Pforle unter Friedrich

Wilhelm 11 Berlin 1918 Giime~ KARAMuK Ahmed Azmi Effendis Gesandtschaftsbericht als

Zeugnis des osmanischen Machtverfall s und der beginnenden Reformara unter Selim I1I Bern shy

Frankfurt 1975

6 Azmi SOSLO Un Aper~u sur les ambassadeurs ottomans et leurs sefaretnames In Tarih Ara~tlrshy

malan Oergisi 14 (198182) 233-260

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 17

delay As the Greek dragoman of the embassy Constantine Karatzas describes things all Austrian officials were aiming at causing every possible trouble to the embassy The embassys members were quarantined taxed by the customs that had all their belongings checked twice - including the chest where the Sultans letter to the Prussian King was being carried - denied access to new horses at the post stations misled to wrong route of travelling and being spied in all their movements

The ambassador tried to avoid the harassment by asking the intervention of the Prussian ambassador in Vienna Jakoby-Kleist The latters efforts provided the Ottoman embassy with little help Through the talks and the arrangements between the Ottoman ambassador and the Austrian officials we come across the every day life and troubles of an 18th century diplomat Furthermore in this pashyper we examine the different context of the diplomats status in the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empire taking into consideration the different interpretation of the diplomatic immunity

In autumn 1789 the Ottoman forces suffered serious defeats Wherever they fought against the Austrians or Russians whether in Rimnik Belgrade Bender Akkerman or Bucharest they were crushed The undeniable fact of the European troops suprimacy in conjunction with the expulsion of the most capable Ottoshyman military commander Yusuf Pasha (died 1800) from the office of Grand Vishyzier seem to have acted as catalysts and dissolved any illusions that the new Sulshytan Selim III might have had about the outcome of the war7

At that time it was evident that only the dynamic action of a strong Euroshypean force could supposedly save the Porte Certainly Sweden was not such a force Having signed an alliance with the Sultan in July 1789 Sweden did not have the power which could cause the Tsarina to fall at the Ottoman-Russian front It could simply engage the Russian forces in Finland as well as the Russian Baltic Fleet In any case the alliance was never put into practices

Hence the only credible potential ally able to impose conditions on Peshytersburg and stop the Austrians was Prussia Although the famous Hertzberg Plan9 assumed that pressure was mainly put on Vienna in particular it excluded armed conflicts both with the Austrians and Russians The role of the Prussian ambassador Friedrich von Diez (1751-1817) in Constantinople seems to have been catalytiC in the signing of the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty He advocated that Prussia should seek to work together with the already allied countries England and Holland but he also sought the involvement of the Porte and the Poles in

7 Stanford SHAW Between Old and New the Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 Cambridge 1971 36- 39

8 SHAW Selim as note 7 37-40 9 It was named after the Prussian minister of foreign affai rs Ewald Hertzberg (1725- 1795) who inshy

troduced it

18 Charalampos Minaoglou

the imposition of conditions both on Vienna and Petersburg To achieve this Diez did not exclude military confrontation He rather recommended it as he thought that the time was right to further strengthen the position of Prussia against Austria in the Holy Roman Empire 10

The instructions that Diez had already received in the spring imposed the signing of the alliance given that the Porte would agree to make territorial conshycessions to both Austria and Russia To achieve that goal his government gave him 100000 ducats to bribe the members of the Ottoman government (Divan) Another 300000 ducats were given to include terms in the treaty stating that the Porte would not sign a truce until Petersburg and Vienna agreed that Thorn and Danzig would be handed to Prussia 11 Only the second term and that partl y was included in the treaty 12

On 23rd October 1789 the case of a truce both with the Russians and the Austrians was discussed Although the climate was favorable for a fair capitulashytion given the acceptance of the Russian rule ove r Crimea Selim III refused to take any decision To push the Prussians further to sign the alliance he apshypointed the leader of the antiwar party and for many years Kapoudan Pasha Hassan (1713-1790) to the post of the Great Vizier a mOllth later This action suggested that he was seriously thinking at the time to surrender even without any European intervention Hassan Pasha immediately began unofficial negotiashytions with Gregory Potemkin (1739-1791) and the Austrian commander Ernst Gideon von Laudon (1717-1790) The proposals received from both sides were peace based on the status quo ante bellum and although not final they can be classipoundied as slightly better for the Porte than those expressed in the treaties fishynally Signed (Treaty of Sistov in 1791 Treaty of Iasi in 1792) Hassan immediately sent the proposals to the Sultan suggesting their immediate acceptance But the discussions held those days with Diez to proceed to a formal proposal for an allishyance prompted the Sultan to reject them 13

In January 1790 the Ottoman-Prussian treaty was Signed which temposhyrarily boosted the Ottomans morale But they soon realized that Frederick-Wilshyliam II did not seem willing to enter the war as he agreed in the treaty Indeed the Emperor Joseph IIs death and his succession by his brother Leopold II strengthened the effort of approach between Berlin and Vienna The new emshy

10 Jo hann Wilhelm ZlxKEISEx Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa Bd VI Gotha

1859470-471 SHAW Sewn as note 7 41-42

11 Allan CtxfNGrLA The Ochakov Debate 1n Allan CUNNINGHAM (Ed) Anglo-Ottoman enshy

counters in the Age of Revolu lion London 1993 10-11 12 Gabriel NORADOCNGHHN Recueil dac tes internationaLLx de lempire ottoman t 2 Paris 1900 4

Karatzas ITites in his diaries that he lea rnt in Berlin that Diez had won 250000 tallers during his

embassy in Constantinople and that he had paid the O ttoman officials a total sum of 202000

taUers to bribe them in order for the treaty to be signed KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as

note 3 86r

13 SHAI Selim as note 7 43-45

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 19

peror appeared less intransigent than his brother towards Prussia as he deemed that a conflict with them could have unpleasant consequences for the empire Thus in July 1790 the two sides reached an agreement in Reichenbach 14 A few days earlier the new Ambassador of Prussia Wilhelm von Knobelsdorff (1752shy1820) had handed a letter from Frederick-William to the Sultan in which the Pruss ian monarch informed the Ottoman of the negotiations with the Austrians and raised them as a reason for delaying the ratification of the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty At the same time he assured him that during the Reichenbach negotiashytions he had always taken into account the Ottoman interests15

After the agreement of Reichenbach it was then clear that any conflict beshytween Prussia and Austria was excluded However in some sense this agreement rather than weakened strengthened the resolve of Selim III to continue the war Although the participation of Prussia in the war was certainly the most unlikely thing the Austro-Prussian Agreement provided the Porte with something imporshytant which was the securing of its territory of at least one enemy Austria As a condition of the Treaty was the Emperors acceptance of the status quo ante belshylum as the basis for capitulation to the Sultan So in essence one enemy was neutralized and only Russia and the eastern front of the war remained 16

At the same time and in particular in August 1790 Knobelsdorff inshyformed the Porte that the Ottoman- Prussian Treaty had been ratified by Fredershyick-William and that soon the Prussian military operations against the Russians would definitely begin In September a nine-month truce was Signed between the Ottoman Empire and Austria and the Porte declared that it accepted the terms of the agreement of Reichenbach as a basis for negotiations while calling the members of the Triple Alliance (Prussia England Holland) to become meshydiators and guarantors to the antiCipated peace treaty Then the Sultan decided to send Ahmed Azmi Effendi as an ambassador to persuade the Prussian side to enter at least the war against RussiaY

The journey of the embassy

The embassy started its travel from Constantinople on 3 pt October 179018 at a time when the Porte had signed a truce with the Austrians and was entering neshy

14 Michael HOCHEDLINGER Krise und WiederhersteUung Osterreichische Gro~machtpolitik

zwischen Tiirkenkrieg und Zweiter Diplomatischer Revolution 1787- 1791 Berlin 2000 353shy

367

15 Constantine KARATZAS Ephemerides 1789-1790 Metochion of Panagios Taphos manuscript 768861

16 SHAW Selim as note 7 54

17 SHAW Selim as note 755- 57

18 The dates are given according to the Julian calendar which was in lIse with the Greeks Adding

eleven days to it one can reach the same date according to the Gregorian calendar KARATzAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 2r KARAvlUK Ahmed as note 5 222

16 Charalampos Minaoglou

things - such as the negotiations between the Ottoman embassy and the Prusshysian officials his personal conducts and relationships in Berlin the different unshyderstanding of Prussias institutions society and intellectual life4 between the Greek dragoman and the Ottoman ambassador - presents the embassys journey through the territories controlled by the Emperor Leopold II during the AustroshyOttoman war of 1787-1791

That embassy was the last hope of the Ottoman Empire to gain Prussia as an ally in Europe An alliance between the Sultan and the Prussian monarch had been signed in January 1790 but since Frederick-William II was reluctant to join the war Ahmed Azmi Effendi (c1740-1821) was sent in order to clear things out

As it is obvious my topic is related to Greek Ottoman and European hisshytory of the 18th century Apart from the biography of the unknown middle-level Phanariot C Karatzas it contributes to the Ottoman and European diplomatic history of that period as far as it concerns the events and negotiations of the Otshytoman embassy of 1791 to Berlin Although there are some previous studies concerning that embassy they do not examine the whole of the Prussian docushyments and they are based mainly to the relation of the ambassador Ahmed Azmi to the Porte which does not include any of the discussions with the Prussian ofshyficials in Berlin that Karatzas mentions in every detaiI5

The description of Ahmed Azmis diplomatic delegation to Berlin by Kashyratzas enables us to determine the terms and conditions under which an Ottoshyman diplomatic mission was conducted in the 18th century in more detail and precision than in any other case The reason is that the sefaretnames6 ie the reshyports of the facts concerning the embassies that the Ottoman ambassadors subshymitted to the Porte upon their return to Constantinople dealt usually solely with the description of the execution of the orders they had received Through these reports the ambassadors gave justification for their actions and thus they were giving attention only to their actions corresponding to what they had been orshydered to do while omitting other events situations and actions as Azmi Effendis case proves

The Austrians were aware of the mission of the embassy and so they tried to harass the Ottoman diplomats in many ways causing them every possible

4 Here is the point that my research meets with oth er papers of this volume and especially those of

Christian STEPPAN and Veronika HYDEN-HANSCHO

5 Otto MOLLER- KOLSHORN Azmi Efendis Gesandtschaftsreise an den preussischen Hof Ein Beishy

trag zur Geschichte der diplomatischen BeZiehungen Preussens zur Hohen Pforle unter Friedrich

Wilhelm 11 Berlin 1918 Giime~ KARAMuK Ahmed Azmi Effendis Gesandtschaftsbericht als

Zeugnis des osmanischen Machtverfall s und der beginnenden Reformara unter Selim I1I Bern shy

Frankfurt 1975

6 Azmi SOSLO Un Aper~u sur les ambassadeurs ottomans et leurs sefaretnames In Tarih Ara~tlrshy

malan Oergisi 14 (198182) 233-260

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 17

delay As the Greek dragoman of the embassy Constantine Karatzas describes things all Austrian officials were aiming at causing every possible trouble to the embassy The embassys members were quarantined taxed by the customs that had all their belongings checked twice - including the chest where the Sultans letter to the Prussian King was being carried - denied access to new horses at the post stations misled to wrong route of travelling and being spied in all their movements

The ambassador tried to avoid the harassment by asking the intervention of the Prussian ambassador in Vienna Jakoby-Kleist The latters efforts provided the Ottoman embassy with little help Through the talks and the arrangements between the Ottoman ambassador and the Austrian officials we come across the every day life and troubles of an 18th century diplomat Furthermore in this pashyper we examine the different context of the diplomats status in the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empire taking into consideration the different interpretation of the diplomatic immunity

In autumn 1789 the Ottoman forces suffered serious defeats Wherever they fought against the Austrians or Russians whether in Rimnik Belgrade Bender Akkerman or Bucharest they were crushed The undeniable fact of the European troops suprimacy in conjunction with the expulsion of the most capable Ottoshyman military commander Yusuf Pasha (died 1800) from the office of Grand Vishyzier seem to have acted as catalysts and dissolved any illusions that the new Sulshytan Selim III might have had about the outcome of the war7

At that time it was evident that only the dynamic action of a strong Euroshypean force could supposedly save the Porte Certainly Sweden was not such a force Having signed an alliance with the Sultan in July 1789 Sweden did not have the power which could cause the Tsarina to fall at the Ottoman-Russian front It could simply engage the Russian forces in Finland as well as the Russian Baltic Fleet In any case the alliance was never put into practices

Hence the only credible potential ally able to impose conditions on Peshytersburg and stop the Austrians was Prussia Although the famous Hertzberg Plan9 assumed that pressure was mainly put on Vienna in particular it excluded armed conflicts both with the Austrians and Russians The role of the Prussian ambassador Friedrich von Diez (1751-1817) in Constantinople seems to have been catalytiC in the signing of the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty He advocated that Prussia should seek to work together with the already allied countries England and Holland but he also sought the involvement of the Porte and the Poles in

7 Stanford SHAW Between Old and New the Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 Cambridge 1971 36- 39

8 SHAW Selim as note 7 37-40 9 It was named after the Prussian minister of foreign affai rs Ewald Hertzberg (1725- 1795) who inshy

troduced it

18 Charalampos Minaoglou

the imposition of conditions both on Vienna and Petersburg To achieve this Diez did not exclude military confrontation He rather recommended it as he thought that the time was right to further strengthen the position of Prussia against Austria in the Holy Roman Empire 10

The instructions that Diez had already received in the spring imposed the signing of the alliance given that the Porte would agree to make territorial conshycessions to both Austria and Russia To achieve that goal his government gave him 100000 ducats to bribe the members of the Ottoman government (Divan) Another 300000 ducats were given to include terms in the treaty stating that the Porte would not sign a truce until Petersburg and Vienna agreed that Thorn and Danzig would be handed to Prussia 11 Only the second term and that partl y was included in the treaty 12

On 23rd October 1789 the case of a truce both with the Russians and the Austrians was discussed Although the climate was favorable for a fair capitulashytion given the acceptance of the Russian rule ove r Crimea Selim III refused to take any decision To push the Prussians further to sign the alliance he apshypointed the leader of the antiwar party and for many years Kapoudan Pasha Hassan (1713-1790) to the post of the Great Vizier a mOllth later This action suggested that he was seriously thinking at the time to surrender even without any European intervention Hassan Pasha immediately began unofficial negotiashytions with Gregory Potemkin (1739-1791) and the Austrian commander Ernst Gideon von Laudon (1717-1790) The proposals received from both sides were peace based on the status quo ante bellum and although not final they can be classipoundied as slightly better for the Porte than those expressed in the treaties fishynally Signed (Treaty of Sistov in 1791 Treaty of Iasi in 1792) Hassan immediately sent the proposals to the Sultan suggesting their immediate acceptance But the discussions held those days with Diez to proceed to a formal proposal for an allishyance prompted the Sultan to reject them 13

In January 1790 the Ottoman-Prussian treaty was Signed which temposhyrarily boosted the Ottomans morale But they soon realized that Frederick-Wilshyliam II did not seem willing to enter the war as he agreed in the treaty Indeed the Emperor Joseph IIs death and his succession by his brother Leopold II strengthened the effort of approach between Berlin and Vienna The new emshy

10 Jo hann Wilhelm ZlxKEISEx Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa Bd VI Gotha

1859470-471 SHAW Sewn as note 7 41-42

11 Allan CtxfNGrLA The Ochakov Debate 1n Allan CUNNINGHAM (Ed) Anglo-Ottoman enshy

counters in the Age of Revolu lion London 1993 10-11 12 Gabriel NORADOCNGHHN Recueil dac tes internationaLLx de lempire ottoman t 2 Paris 1900 4

Karatzas ITites in his diaries that he lea rnt in Berlin that Diez had won 250000 tallers during his

embassy in Constantinople and that he had paid the O ttoman officials a total sum of 202000

taUers to bribe them in order for the treaty to be signed KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as

note 3 86r

13 SHAI Selim as note 7 43-45

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 19

peror appeared less intransigent than his brother towards Prussia as he deemed that a conflict with them could have unpleasant consequences for the empire Thus in July 1790 the two sides reached an agreement in Reichenbach 14 A few days earlier the new Ambassador of Prussia Wilhelm von Knobelsdorff (1752shy1820) had handed a letter from Frederick-William to the Sultan in which the Pruss ian monarch informed the Ottoman of the negotiations with the Austrians and raised them as a reason for delaying the ratification of the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty At the same time he assured him that during the Reichenbach negotiashytions he had always taken into account the Ottoman interests15

After the agreement of Reichenbach it was then clear that any conflict beshytween Prussia and Austria was excluded However in some sense this agreement rather than weakened strengthened the resolve of Selim III to continue the war Although the participation of Prussia in the war was certainly the most unlikely thing the Austro-Prussian Agreement provided the Porte with something imporshytant which was the securing of its territory of at least one enemy Austria As a condition of the Treaty was the Emperors acceptance of the status quo ante belshylum as the basis for capitulation to the Sultan So in essence one enemy was neutralized and only Russia and the eastern front of the war remained 16

At the same time and in particular in August 1790 Knobelsdorff inshyformed the Porte that the Ottoman- Prussian Treaty had been ratified by Fredershyick-William and that soon the Prussian military operations against the Russians would definitely begin In September a nine-month truce was Signed between the Ottoman Empire and Austria and the Porte declared that it accepted the terms of the agreement of Reichenbach as a basis for negotiations while calling the members of the Triple Alliance (Prussia England Holland) to become meshydiators and guarantors to the antiCipated peace treaty Then the Sultan decided to send Ahmed Azmi Effendi as an ambassador to persuade the Prussian side to enter at least the war against RussiaY

The journey of the embassy

The embassy started its travel from Constantinople on 3 pt October 179018 at a time when the Porte had signed a truce with the Austrians and was entering neshy

14 Michael HOCHEDLINGER Krise und WiederhersteUung Osterreichische Gro~machtpolitik

zwischen Tiirkenkrieg und Zweiter Diplomatischer Revolution 1787- 1791 Berlin 2000 353shy

367

15 Constantine KARATZAS Ephemerides 1789-1790 Metochion of Panagios Taphos manuscript 768861

16 SHAW Selim as note 7 54

17 SHAW Selim as note 755- 57

18 The dates are given according to the Julian calendar which was in lIse with the Greeks Adding

eleven days to it one can reach the same date according to the Gregorian calendar KARATzAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 2r KARAvlUK Ahmed as note 5 222

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 17

delay As the Greek dragoman of the embassy Constantine Karatzas describes things all Austrian officials were aiming at causing every possible trouble to the embassy The embassys members were quarantined taxed by the customs that had all their belongings checked twice - including the chest where the Sultans letter to the Prussian King was being carried - denied access to new horses at the post stations misled to wrong route of travelling and being spied in all their movements

The ambassador tried to avoid the harassment by asking the intervention of the Prussian ambassador in Vienna Jakoby-Kleist The latters efforts provided the Ottoman embassy with little help Through the talks and the arrangements between the Ottoman ambassador and the Austrian officials we come across the every day life and troubles of an 18th century diplomat Furthermore in this pashyper we examine the different context of the diplomats status in the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empire taking into consideration the different interpretation of the diplomatic immunity

In autumn 1789 the Ottoman forces suffered serious defeats Wherever they fought against the Austrians or Russians whether in Rimnik Belgrade Bender Akkerman or Bucharest they were crushed The undeniable fact of the European troops suprimacy in conjunction with the expulsion of the most capable Ottoshyman military commander Yusuf Pasha (died 1800) from the office of Grand Vishyzier seem to have acted as catalysts and dissolved any illusions that the new Sulshytan Selim III might have had about the outcome of the war7

At that time it was evident that only the dynamic action of a strong Euroshypean force could supposedly save the Porte Certainly Sweden was not such a force Having signed an alliance with the Sultan in July 1789 Sweden did not have the power which could cause the Tsarina to fall at the Ottoman-Russian front It could simply engage the Russian forces in Finland as well as the Russian Baltic Fleet In any case the alliance was never put into practices

Hence the only credible potential ally able to impose conditions on Peshytersburg and stop the Austrians was Prussia Although the famous Hertzberg Plan9 assumed that pressure was mainly put on Vienna in particular it excluded armed conflicts both with the Austrians and Russians The role of the Prussian ambassador Friedrich von Diez (1751-1817) in Constantinople seems to have been catalytiC in the signing of the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty He advocated that Prussia should seek to work together with the already allied countries England and Holland but he also sought the involvement of the Porte and the Poles in

7 Stanford SHAW Between Old and New the Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 Cambridge 1971 36- 39

8 SHAW Selim as note 7 37-40 9 It was named after the Prussian minister of foreign affai rs Ewald Hertzberg (1725- 1795) who inshy

troduced it

18 Charalampos Minaoglou

the imposition of conditions both on Vienna and Petersburg To achieve this Diez did not exclude military confrontation He rather recommended it as he thought that the time was right to further strengthen the position of Prussia against Austria in the Holy Roman Empire 10

The instructions that Diez had already received in the spring imposed the signing of the alliance given that the Porte would agree to make territorial conshycessions to both Austria and Russia To achieve that goal his government gave him 100000 ducats to bribe the members of the Ottoman government (Divan) Another 300000 ducats were given to include terms in the treaty stating that the Porte would not sign a truce until Petersburg and Vienna agreed that Thorn and Danzig would be handed to Prussia 11 Only the second term and that partl y was included in the treaty 12

On 23rd October 1789 the case of a truce both with the Russians and the Austrians was discussed Although the climate was favorable for a fair capitulashytion given the acceptance of the Russian rule ove r Crimea Selim III refused to take any decision To push the Prussians further to sign the alliance he apshypointed the leader of the antiwar party and for many years Kapoudan Pasha Hassan (1713-1790) to the post of the Great Vizier a mOllth later This action suggested that he was seriously thinking at the time to surrender even without any European intervention Hassan Pasha immediately began unofficial negotiashytions with Gregory Potemkin (1739-1791) and the Austrian commander Ernst Gideon von Laudon (1717-1790) The proposals received from both sides were peace based on the status quo ante bellum and although not final they can be classipoundied as slightly better for the Porte than those expressed in the treaties fishynally Signed (Treaty of Sistov in 1791 Treaty of Iasi in 1792) Hassan immediately sent the proposals to the Sultan suggesting their immediate acceptance But the discussions held those days with Diez to proceed to a formal proposal for an allishyance prompted the Sultan to reject them 13

In January 1790 the Ottoman-Prussian treaty was Signed which temposhyrarily boosted the Ottomans morale But they soon realized that Frederick-Wilshyliam II did not seem willing to enter the war as he agreed in the treaty Indeed the Emperor Joseph IIs death and his succession by his brother Leopold II strengthened the effort of approach between Berlin and Vienna The new emshy

10 Jo hann Wilhelm ZlxKEISEx Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa Bd VI Gotha

1859470-471 SHAW Sewn as note 7 41-42

11 Allan CtxfNGrLA The Ochakov Debate 1n Allan CUNNINGHAM (Ed) Anglo-Ottoman enshy

counters in the Age of Revolu lion London 1993 10-11 12 Gabriel NORADOCNGHHN Recueil dac tes internationaLLx de lempire ottoman t 2 Paris 1900 4

Karatzas ITites in his diaries that he lea rnt in Berlin that Diez had won 250000 tallers during his

embassy in Constantinople and that he had paid the O ttoman officials a total sum of 202000

taUers to bribe them in order for the treaty to be signed KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as

note 3 86r

13 SHAI Selim as note 7 43-45

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 19

peror appeared less intransigent than his brother towards Prussia as he deemed that a conflict with them could have unpleasant consequences for the empire Thus in July 1790 the two sides reached an agreement in Reichenbach 14 A few days earlier the new Ambassador of Prussia Wilhelm von Knobelsdorff (1752shy1820) had handed a letter from Frederick-William to the Sultan in which the Pruss ian monarch informed the Ottoman of the negotiations with the Austrians and raised them as a reason for delaying the ratification of the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty At the same time he assured him that during the Reichenbach negotiashytions he had always taken into account the Ottoman interests15

After the agreement of Reichenbach it was then clear that any conflict beshytween Prussia and Austria was excluded However in some sense this agreement rather than weakened strengthened the resolve of Selim III to continue the war Although the participation of Prussia in the war was certainly the most unlikely thing the Austro-Prussian Agreement provided the Porte with something imporshytant which was the securing of its territory of at least one enemy Austria As a condition of the Treaty was the Emperors acceptance of the status quo ante belshylum as the basis for capitulation to the Sultan So in essence one enemy was neutralized and only Russia and the eastern front of the war remained 16

At the same time and in particular in August 1790 Knobelsdorff inshyformed the Porte that the Ottoman- Prussian Treaty had been ratified by Fredershyick-William and that soon the Prussian military operations against the Russians would definitely begin In September a nine-month truce was Signed between the Ottoman Empire and Austria and the Porte declared that it accepted the terms of the agreement of Reichenbach as a basis for negotiations while calling the members of the Triple Alliance (Prussia England Holland) to become meshydiators and guarantors to the antiCipated peace treaty Then the Sultan decided to send Ahmed Azmi Effendi as an ambassador to persuade the Prussian side to enter at least the war against RussiaY

The journey of the embassy

The embassy started its travel from Constantinople on 3 pt October 179018 at a time when the Porte had signed a truce with the Austrians and was entering neshy

14 Michael HOCHEDLINGER Krise und WiederhersteUung Osterreichische Gro~machtpolitik

zwischen Tiirkenkrieg und Zweiter Diplomatischer Revolution 1787- 1791 Berlin 2000 353shy

367

15 Constantine KARATZAS Ephemerides 1789-1790 Metochion of Panagios Taphos manuscript 768861

16 SHAW Selim as note 7 54

17 SHAW Selim as note 755- 57

18 The dates are given according to the Julian calendar which was in lIse with the Greeks Adding

eleven days to it one can reach the same date according to the Gregorian calendar KARATzAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 2r KARAvlUK Ahmed as note 5 222

18 Charalampos Minaoglou

the imposition of conditions both on Vienna and Petersburg To achieve this Diez did not exclude military confrontation He rather recommended it as he thought that the time was right to further strengthen the position of Prussia against Austria in the Holy Roman Empire 10

The instructions that Diez had already received in the spring imposed the signing of the alliance given that the Porte would agree to make territorial conshycessions to both Austria and Russia To achieve that goal his government gave him 100000 ducats to bribe the members of the Ottoman government (Divan) Another 300000 ducats were given to include terms in the treaty stating that the Porte would not sign a truce until Petersburg and Vienna agreed that Thorn and Danzig would be handed to Prussia 11 Only the second term and that partl y was included in the treaty 12

On 23rd October 1789 the case of a truce both with the Russians and the Austrians was discussed Although the climate was favorable for a fair capitulashytion given the acceptance of the Russian rule ove r Crimea Selim III refused to take any decision To push the Prussians further to sign the alliance he apshypointed the leader of the antiwar party and for many years Kapoudan Pasha Hassan (1713-1790) to the post of the Great Vizier a mOllth later This action suggested that he was seriously thinking at the time to surrender even without any European intervention Hassan Pasha immediately began unofficial negotiashytions with Gregory Potemkin (1739-1791) and the Austrian commander Ernst Gideon von Laudon (1717-1790) The proposals received from both sides were peace based on the status quo ante bellum and although not final they can be classipoundied as slightly better for the Porte than those expressed in the treaties fishynally Signed (Treaty of Sistov in 1791 Treaty of Iasi in 1792) Hassan immediately sent the proposals to the Sultan suggesting their immediate acceptance But the discussions held those days with Diez to proceed to a formal proposal for an allishyance prompted the Sultan to reject them 13

In January 1790 the Ottoman-Prussian treaty was Signed which temposhyrarily boosted the Ottomans morale But they soon realized that Frederick-Wilshyliam II did not seem willing to enter the war as he agreed in the treaty Indeed the Emperor Joseph IIs death and his succession by his brother Leopold II strengthened the effort of approach between Berlin and Vienna The new emshy

10 Jo hann Wilhelm ZlxKEISEx Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa Bd VI Gotha

1859470-471 SHAW Sewn as note 7 41-42

11 Allan CtxfNGrLA The Ochakov Debate 1n Allan CUNNINGHAM (Ed) Anglo-Ottoman enshy

counters in the Age of Revolu lion London 1993 10-11 12 Gabriel NORADOCNGHHN Recueil dac tes internationaLLx de lempire ottoman t 2 Paris 1900 4

Karatzas ITites in his diaries that he lea rnt in Berlin that Diez had won 250000 tallers during his

embassy in Constantinople and that he had paid the O ttoman officials a total sum of 202000

taUers to bribe them in order for the treaty to be signed KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as

note 3 86r

13 SHAI Selim as note 7 43-45

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 19

peror appeared less intransigent than his brother towards Prussia as he deemed that a conflict with them could have unpleasant consequences for the empire Thus in July 1790 the two sides reached an agreement in Reichenbach 14 A few days earlier the new Ambassador of Prussia Wilhelm von Knobelsdorff (1752shy1820) had handed a letter from Frederick-William to the Sultan in which the Pruss ian monarch informed the Ottoman of the negotiations with the Austrians and raised them as a reason for delaying the ratification of the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty At the same time he assured him that during the Reichenbach negotiashytions he had always taken into account the Ottoman interests15

After the agreement of Reichenbach it was then clear that any conflict beshytween Prussia and Austria was excluded However in some sense this agreement rather than weakened strengthened the resolve of Selim III to continue the war Although the participation of Prussia in the war was certainly the most unlikely thing the Austro-Prussian Agreement provided the Porte with something imporshytant which was the securing of its territory of at least one enemy Austria As a condition of the Treaty was the Emperors acceptance of the status quo ante belshylum as the basis for capitulation to the Sultan So in essence one enemy was neutralized and only Russia and the eastern front of the war remained 16

At the same time and in particular in August 1790 Knobelsdorff inshyformed the Porte that the Ottoman- Prussian Treaty had been ratified by Fredershyick-William and that soon the Prussian military operations against the Russians would definitely begin In September a nine-month truce was Signed between the Ottoman Empire and Austria and the Porte declared that it accepted the terms of the agreement of Reichenbach as a basis for negotiations while calling the members of the Triple Alliance (Prussia England Holland) to become meshydiators and guarantors to the antiCipated peace treaty Then the Sultan decided to send Ahmed Azmi Effendi as an ambassador to persuade the Prussian side to enter at least the war against RussiaY

The journey of the embassy

The embassy started its travel from Constantinople on 3 pt October 179018 at a time when the Porte had signed a truce with the Austrians and was entering neshy

14 Michael HOCHEDLINGER Krise und WiederhersteUung Osterreichische Gro~machtpolitik

zwischen Tiirkenkrieg und Zweiter Diplomatischer Revolution 1787- 1791 Berlin 2000 353shy

367

15 Constantine KARATZAS Ephemerides 1789-1790 Metochion of Panagios Taphos manuscript 768861

16 SHAW Selim as note 7 54

17 SHAW Selim as note 755- 57

18 The dates are given according to the Julian calendar which was in lIse with the Greeks Adding

eleven days to it one can reach the same date according to the Gregorian calendar KARATzAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 2r KARAvlUK Ahmed as note 5 222

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 19

peror appeared less intransigent than his brother towards Prussia as he deemed that a conflict with them could have unpleasant consequences for the empire Thus in July 1790 the two sides reached an agreement in Reichenbach 14 A few days earlier the new Ambassador of Prussia Wilhelm von Knobelsdorff (1752shy1820) had handed a letter from Frederick-William to the Sultan in which the Pruss ian monarch informed the Ottoman of the negotiations with the Austrians and raised them as a reason for delaying the ratification of the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty At the same time he assured him that during the Reichenbach negotiashytions he had always taken into account the Ottoman interests15

After the agreement of Reichenbach it was then clear that any conflict beshytween Prussia and Austria was excluded However in some sense this agreement rather than weakened strengthened the resolve of Selim III to continue the war Although the participation of Prussia in the war was certainly the most unlikely thing the Austro-Prussian Agreement provided the Porte with something imporshytant which was the securing of its territory of at least one enemy Austria As a condition of the Treaty was the Emperors acceptance of the status quo ante belshylum as the basis for capitulation to the Sultan So in essence one enemy was neutralized and only Russia and the eastern front of the war remained 16

At the same time and in particular in August 1790 Knobelsdorff inshyformed the Porte that the Ottoman- Prussian Treaty had been ratified by Fredershyick-William and that soon the Prussian military operations against the Russians would definitely begin In September a nine-month truce was Signed between the Ottoman Empire and Austria and the Porte declared that it accepted the terms of the agreement of Reichenbach as a basis for negotiations while calling the members of the Triple Alliance (Prussia England Holland) to become meshydiators and guarantors to the antiCipated peace treaty Then the Sultan decided to send Ahmed Azmi Effendi as an ambassador to persuade the Prussian side to enter at least the war against RussiaY

The journey of the embassy

The embassy started its travel from Constantinople on 3 pt October 179018 at a time when the Porte had signed a truce with the Austrians and was entering neshy

14 Michael HOCHEDLINGER Krise und WiederhersteUung Osterreichische Gro~machtpolitik

zwischen Tiirkenkrieg und Zweiter Diplomatischer Revolution 1787- 1791 Berlin 2000 353shy

367

15 Constantine KARATZAS Ephemerides 1789-1790 Metochion of Panagios Taphos manuscript 768861

16 SHAW Selim as note 7 54

17 SHAW Selim as note 755- 57

18 The dates are given according to the Julian calendar which was in lIse with the Greeks Adding

eleven days to it one can reach the same date according to the Gregorian calendar KARATzAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 2r KARAvlUK Ahmed as note 5 222

20 Charalampos Minaoglou

gotiations with them on the other hand it seemed determined to continue the war against Russia 19 The embassy was traveling within the boundaries of the Otshytoman Empire just as a numerous escort20 The first major stop of the trip was Edirne in Thrace on 6th November where they were hosted in the house of a loshycal Ottoman official 21 On 11th they passed through Plovdin22 in Bulgaria and on 17th they arrived in Sofia 23 In Vidin where it seems that the governor had been ordered to host them - as Azmi had sent him prior notice to his coming - they arrived on 24th November24 From there Azmi sent Karatzas and Ludwig Gross the escort of the Prussian embassy in Constantinople to Kalafati at the opposite bank of the Danube to arrange their crossing because Kalafati was held by the Austrians 25

From there the first characteristics of a diplomatic journey appeared as the embassy entered on land controlled by the emperors troops Then the quesshytion of the passport arose which was necessary as the two countries were at war In fact it was received in an unofficial form something like a passport just one month after leaving Constantinople on 26 th November 1790 They were conshysidering the letter of the Prussian ambassador in Vienna Jacoby- Kleist who inshytervened to allow their passage through the Austrian territories as a kind of passport 26

The next day 27 th November 1790 they reached the Austrian-occupied Craiova where they faced the double welcome both by the local Wallachian rulshyers as individuals and by the Austrian governor of the city Lieutenant General Kraus The hospitality was quite poor and commissioned in consultation with the new sovereign of the local Wallachian rulers who were friends of Karatzas Matshythew Palatzesku and Tomitza Kallinesku But the actual causes of the poor recepshytion were revealed when the Austrian commander asked Azmi to give him the passport from Vienna Azml replied to Kraus that his passport was the mighty Sultans firman and also mentioned the letter of the Prussian ambassador in Vishyenna which he submitted to Krauss when the latter insisted that he had no noshytice from Vienna Azmis response had diplomatic Significance suggesting that the region of Craiova remained for the Ottomans an Ottoman possession and

19 SHo Selirn as note 7 56-60

20 The unofficial character of the embassy was kn ow n to Berlin from the beginning GStA PK I HA GR Rep 11 ~1en Nr 274a Fasz 3 lr

21 K-IRHZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 2r-v KARAMVK Ahmed as note 5 223

22 K-illATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 3r

23 K-RoTZ AS Eph emerides 1790-1792 as note 3 5r

24 KARUZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 7r KARAMUK Ahmed as note 5 223

25 KARoTZAS Ephemerides 1790-1 792 as note 3 8r KARAMUK Ahmed as note 5 223-224

26 GS tA PK I HA GR Rep 11 Ahen Nr 274a Fasz 3 lr- v KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1 792

as note 3 8 KoRA~ lK Ahmed as note 5225

21 Harassing the Enemys Diplomats

thus he needed at least to that point no permissive documents from the emshy27peror

f-t1EO ZJ EFEtiOIS HEISE - ffOITi

itanbul- B erlln Boriln - IstanbJi

r _ ~ C~ II ~J ~ ~ _ - r -~ 1_ -r

~ iI_ ~

middotmiddot IIlhrr~~ _1

~ - -iJmiddot middot

Map 1 Azmi Effendis route to Berlin [GUMElt KARAMUK Ahmed Azmi Effendi Gesandtschaftsbericht als Zeugnis des osmanischen

Machtverfalls und der beginnenden Reformara unter Selim ill Bern - Frankfurt 1975]

On pt December Kraus informed them that General Ansev commander ofBushycharest had sent him an order which allowed their passage but also was confinshying them to ten days quarantine In fact they recorded their names seventeen in all - twelve Ottomans Karatzas with tvvo servants28 and the Prussian escort Gross with his servant To Karatzas it was clear that all this was done in order to

27 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 9v KARAMUK Ahmed as note 5 225-226

28 The members of the embassy were later recorded in detail by the Prussians despite the fact that

they conducted only with Azmi Karatzas and the person serving as secretary of the embassy Mustafa In the Prussian records the following names of the embassy members are stated Asmi

Said Effendi Mustapha Effendi All Aga Constantin Caraisa Hattmann which is being corrected by another hand aside (Caradja) Mehmet Aga Osmann Aga Osmann Aga (sic) Hussen Aga

Mehmet Aga All Aga Sehm Aga Zachri Mehmet Ibraina (sic) Gross Contantin Antoni

Antoni Tori GStA PK I HA GR Rep 11 Akten Nr 274a Fasz 3 23r

22 Charalampos Minaoglou

delay them29 Of particular interest are the descriptions of the comic scenes of the visits delivered by the doctor who was commissioned to monitor their quarshyantine and was laughing himself because they had no sign of illness3o On Deshycember 4th this comic pretext of the Austrians to delay them was ended in just four days with a further order which arrived from Bucharest31

In order to set off however they needed at least two small carriages which the Austrians did not intend to give them although the Imperial Court of Vienna had promised the Prussian Ambassador Jacoby-Kleist that their trip would not be blocked in any way Thus Azmi bought a carriage for himself condemning the rest to appalling conditions for the onward journey32 Even the rented postal horses and the victuals were excessively charged Nevertheless when leaving Azmi sent gifts to the Austrian commander for the hospitality shOWing rare generosity Especially because the Ottomans considered the foreign ambassadors as guests and covered all accommodation and travel expenses within the frontiers of the Empire In contrast according to European diplomatic practice foreign missions had to cover their expenses themselves 33

On 6th December starting from Craiova Azmi instructed all his followers to sell their saddles to ride faster and thus make up for the delay 34 On the 10th of the month when they arrived in Old Orsova the Major who escorted them from Craiova handed them over to the local commander General Hahn35 From Orsova they took another military escort headed by the Dalmatian captain Boushygasovitzi who accompanied them to Timisoara 36 In Orsova the abuse towards the embassy continued mainly as far as it concerns the horses provided to them Under the pretext that there were no postal horses available they gave them vilshylagers horses which further delayed their progressY

In Timisoara where they arrived on 16th December they were hosted by General Soros himself 38 who gave them an honorable guard which guarded the

29 KA RATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1 792 as note 3 lOr KARAMUK Ahmed as note 5 226 30 KAR-ITZAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 lOr 31 KA RuZA S Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 lOr-v KAR AMU K Ahmed as note 5 226 32 KARUZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 II v 33 Thomas N HF Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III [789shy

1807 In Journal of the American Oriental Society 83 (1 963) 295-31 5 Heinz DUCHHARDT Balshyance of Power und Pentarchie lnternationale Beziehungen 1700-1 785 Paderborn - Wien -Munchen - Zurich 1997 32-34 Klau s MULLE R Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrshyhundert lach dem Westfalischen Flieden (1648-1740) Bonn 1976 163-164

34 KRTZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note3 121 35 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1 792 as note 3 14r 36 KAR-IT ZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 15r KA RAMUK Ahmed as note5227 37 K-I RATZAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 15r 38 It seems that General Soros was paying special attention to ever) foreigner he was admitting and

not only to the ambassadors He took similar measures when the English traveler Lady Elisabeth Craven passed from Timi soara heading towards Vienna Elizabeth CRAVEN A Jou me) through

23 Harassing the Enemys Diplomats

hotel where they stayed At this point they realized that they were going to have the same treatment and so they decided to buy cheap shoddy cars in order to proceed on their journey and to avoid reloading their luggage 39 On the evening of 17th December General Soros sent the military band to play in honor of Azmi and the latter gave the band a tip40 On 22nd December in Segedin they were welcomed by the city authorities the military commander the police chief and the mayor They even invited Azmi to attend a luncheon in his honor which deshyspite his doubts he finally accepted following Gross urging suggestion 41

On Christmas Eve of 1790 in Ketzkemet in particular Gross persuaded Azmi to visit the home of the director of posts somethiJ1g that Karatzas found totally inappropriate and therefore did not participate in provoking the vrath of Gross42 On 24th December they arrived ill Ketzkemet where Karatzas had the opportunity to attend the Christmas service together with some Greek mershychants and an old friend the Archimandrite Paisios of the monastery of Iviron (Mount Athos)43

On 2rh December ill Pest Karatzas understood that the Austrians were spying on them rather than showillg their appreciation for the embassy Colonel Kolovrat who had been entrusted with their hospitality exceeded all limits reshycording even who visited the embassy and demanding to be present at Azmis encounters with his visitors On the same day the Austrians handed a draft for the Embassys remaiJ1ing travel course through the Emperors territories which of course was deliberately designed to further delay and bluff the embassy Azmi became aware of these immediately but his half-hearted protestations did not bend the Austrians decision 44

The next day in Buda they were given informal hospitality as the presishydent of the trade association of the city prOVided them with everything they needed but on their own purchase 45 At this point actually the Austrian authorishyties started another harassment to the embassy - that of the customs Karatzas asked Kolovrat to convey Azmis request to Ernest Frederick Prillce of SaxeshyCoburg (1724- 1800) commander of Hungary in order to receive a letter from the prince with which he would equip them with customs immunity These aushythorizations were applied to foreign ambassadors ill the Ottoman Empire but some times in the past also to Ottoman ambassadors such as Iyirmisekiz Efendi

the Crimea to Constantinople in a series of letters to hi s serene Highness the 2vlargrave of Brandebollrg written in the year 1786 London 1789 325

39 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 18r- 19r KR-~[CK Ahmed as note 5 227 40 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 19v 41 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 22v KR-~lCK Ahmed as note 5 228-229 42 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 23v 43 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 23-2Sv KARgtICK Ahmed as note 5 229- 230 44 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 26v 45 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1 792 as note 3 27-

24 Charalampos Minaoglou

in France in 172146 The response from the prince was that he did not get inshyvolved with the Customs Office virtually refusing to grant the Ottoman ambasshysadors request but if they wished so they could ask the customs authorities to check if they had something marketable and be given some relevant documents from the customs officer The head of the office during a discussion with Azmi and Karatzas had told them that they had nothing to fear from customs charges given that they did not carry anything tradable Although Karatzas insisted to be given a document of relief they were not given one on the pretext that it was not needed47

After leaving with captain Hogul accompanying them they arrived in Nantes There a new surprise waited for them as the city authorities had decided not to obey the command of Prince Coburg who had resolved to award free horses to the Embassy to continue the journey48 But before arriving in Brin they faced the latest and perhaps most humiliating harassment by the Austrian aushythorities In Godin the first city in Moravia the customs office director obliged them to unload all their possessions in the middle of the Central Square to be checked even though the escorting officer confirmed their content as well as the fact that in Buda they had asked themselves to be checked by the Customs This fact created a huge problem great inconvenience and delay to the Ottoman deleshygation Finally they paid no tax but after sealing all of their chests including that in which they transferred the letter of the Sultan to the King of Prussia the Customs Officer sent them two officers to accompany them to his registered sushyperiors headquarters in Brin so that he could do whatever he found appropriate But he charged them with a toll despite the miserable road they had crossed 49

On the night of the Epiphany of 1791 they arrived in Brin and then camped at a hotel in a suburb of the city There a man of the Prussian ambassashydor in Vienna Jakoby-Kleist was waiting for them bringing an answer to a letshyter by Gross to the Ambassador50 gifts and the information that the Austrian court would not permit them to enter Vienna 51 Jacoby-Kleist immediately inshyformed Berlin of Azmis intentions and the progress of his journey52

Spying on the movements of the embassy was so close by the Austrian aushythorities that they attended the messenger of Jacoby-Kleist and rebuked a trader

46 GiUes VEINSTEIN (Ed) Mehmed Efendi Le paradis des infideles Un ambassadeur ottoman en France sous la Regence Paris 2004 57-171

47 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 27v-28r 48 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 30v-3 Ir 49 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 32r-v Godin is the only case that Azmi mentions

the harassment they suffered from the Austrians KARAMUK Ahmed as note 5 232-234 50 In this letter Gross informed the ambassador about their journey through the Emperors lands

and asked for his intervention in order to redu ce for the Austrian harassment and to grant a permission to enter Vienna GStA PK1 HA GR Rep 11 Akten Nr 274a Fasz 3 9r- l0r

51 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as no te 3 32v-33r 52 GStA PK 1 HA GR Rep II Akten Nr 274a Fasz 3 Dr- v

Harassing the Enemys Diplomats 25

called Herring who watched over the gifts brought to the Ottomans when the messenger had to leave them to his custody The next day Azmi received a visit from all the military administration of the region who offered to serve him as he wished Then he complaining about the conduct of officials of both the post and the customs only asked them to prepare immediately good horses in order to depart In the meanwhile he compared and contrasted the behavior of the Ausshytrian authorities towards him to that of the Ottoman authorities to foreign amshybassadors in order to point out how superior the Ottomans were to the Austrishyans in this field Customs officers in Brin assured them that they were not going to be bothered again while the local military commander had tried to appease Azmi53 General Hoof talked to him about Alexander Ypsilantis (1724- 1807) the Fanariot Prince of both Wallachia and Moldavia who had been imprisoned by the former Emperor in Spielberg accompanied only by Kamlnaris Chaviartshyzoglou and a doctor But the new Emperor released him and confmed him to a house in the suburbs of Brin with an escort of apprOximately thirty people among them George Mavrocordatos Constantine Soutsos and Dimitrios Rally The Austrian general informed Azmi that Ypsilantis intended to go and greet him but that this was banned from Vienna as well as any COTIUllunication beshytween Ypsilantis people and the Ottoman embassy54

Meanwhile Hoof acting as an intermediary demanded AZmi s assurance that the Porte wOlud permit Ypsilantis repatriation and that he was no longer considered indicted on any charge of misconduct Azmi responded that he was free and welcome to return and that captivity was considered to be a circumshystance of war Obviously mostly Hoof wished to inform his government if Ypsishylantis could be considered even then as an important factor for the interests of Austria in the Ottoman Empire and secondarily on behalf of the former ruler If Azmi had expressed himself differently describing a negative climate at the Porte towards Ypsilantis this would mean that he could no longer serve the Austrians in anything And even if he saved his life on his return he would never again beshycome Prince55

Despite the expressed prohibition of the Austrian authorities there was a contact between the Ottoman Embassy and Ypsilantis entourage Karatzas exshychanged messages with people of the Prince who informed him that they were aware of the facts in Constantinople as they were receiving letters from their relatives there which after having been censored from Vienna were delivered to them That evening there was also a contact between a servant of Karatzas named Constantine and a servant of Demetrius Rally56 Perhaps because of these contacts the Austrians continued their harassment to the embassy also restoring

53 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792 as no te 3 33r 54 KARATZAS Ephemer ides 1790-1792 as no te 3 33v 55 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1 792 as note 3 33v 56 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1 792 as n o te 3 33v

26 Charalampos Minaoglou

in Brin the question of taxes required for what the ambassador was carrying esshypecially tobacco In this particular case the dealing with customs was directly asshySigned to Karatzas himself His negotiation with the customs officers cost a days delay to the embassy 57

On the next day 8th January 1791 in Proznitz a notice was given to the Prussian escort from Constantinople Gross to the Prussian authorities in Silesia that the embassy was near the Prussian lands 58 After Olmutz they arrived in Troppau where Prussian officers had been expecting them and asked them about their needs in order to prepare whatever they needed once they would enter the Prussian SOil59 which occurred on the 11th January 179160 Indeed the Prussians prOvided them with more than they needed6 1 On the border a reception cereshymony was held in which the Prussian king was represented by the person reshysponsible for their transport to Berlin Major Reider 62 The arrival at Prussian territories meant the end of their suffering as the Prussian welcome reception and hospitality were high corresponding to the foreign embassies in the Ottoshyman Empire

57 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 34r 58 KARATZ~S Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 35r 59 KARATZ~S Ephemerides 1790-1792 as note 3 35v- 36r 60 The reception of the Ottoman Embassy h ad been organized a month earlier by Hertzberg himshy

self GStA PK 1 HA GR Rep 11 Akten Nr 274a Fasz 3 3r 61 KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790- 1792 as note 3 36r 62 GStA PK 1 HA GR Rep 11 Akten Nr 274a Fasz 3 8r- v KARATZAS Ephemerides 1790-1792

as note 3 36r-v KARMllUK Ahmed as note 5 235 - 236