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Perspectives on Science 21 (2013): 358–378.

Fortunio Liceti on Mind, Light, and

Immaterial Extension

Andreas Blank

Abstract

Almost half a century before Henry More, the Padua-based

natural philosopher Fortunio Liceti (1577-1657) formulated a

distinction between material extension and immaterial

extension. While More’s version of the distinction is seen as

one of the most characteristic features of his metaphysics—

underlying both his theory of individual spirits and of

absolute divine space—Liceti’s metaphysics of immaterial

extension has not received much attention by commentators.

Liceti ascribes immaterial extension to light and the human

mind and, like More, he uses the analogy between light and mind

to explicate the structural differences between material and

immaterial extension. In this article, I explore how Liceti—

following some aspects of Albert the Great’s eclectic

Aristotelianism—tries to combine broadly Aristotelian accounts

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of light and mind with the Platonic concept of emanative

causation. I argue that, in Liceti, the notion of existential

independence from matter lies at the heart of his conception of

extended, but actually indivisible, immaterial beings: Such

beings cannot be divided through the division of matter because

their existence, due to the role of emanative causation, does

not depend on the potencies of matter.

1. Introduction

In the history of seventeenth-century philosophy,

the distinction between material and immaterial

extension is closely associated with the Cambridge

Platonist Henry More (1614-1687). The aspect of

More’s conception of immaterial extension that

proved most influential is his theory of absolute

divine space. Very plausibly, the Newtonian

conception of space owes a great deal to More’s

views on space. More’s views on space in turn were

closely linked to his views on the nature of

3

individual spirits—the souls of brutes and humans,

as well as the intelligences of the angels. It has

been acknowledged that More’s theory of absolute

space was not without precedents. Most importantly,

Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529-1597) developed

the view that space is dimensional and independent

of the objects located in it (although Patrizi

remained rather evasive as to the material or

immaterial nature of space).1 Are there similar

precedents for More’s views about immaterial but

extended individual spirits? I have not seen any

concrete suggestions concerning this issue in the

literature on More. Hence, it might be worth

pointing out that the distinction between material

extension and the extension of immaterial minds can

be found, almost 40 years before More’s first

explicit formulation of the distinction in the

Appendix to An Antidote Against Atheism (1655), in a work

by the Paduan natural philosopher Fortunio Liceti

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(1577-1657), aptly entitled On the Coextension of Soul and

Body (1616). In The Immortality of the Soul More includes

references to another area of Liceti’s work, the

theory of monsters.2 In fact, Liceti’s contribution

to the theory of biological reproduction has been

given some attention in recent scholarship.3 By

contrast, his contribution to the metaphysics of

immaterial extension has not yet been explored. This

is what the present paper aims to make a start at.

There are substantial similarities between

Liceti’s and More’s views. Just as More compares the

relation between spirits and matter with the

relation between light and illuminated matter, so

does Liceti compare the relation between mind and

matter with the relation between light and

illuminated matter. More is explicit that what he

has in mind when he makes this comparison is the

Aristotelian conception of light as intentional

species.4 On first sight, however, it is not obvious

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how this comparison could be of any help for More.

Certainly, influential medieval Aristotelian

theories of light, such as those of Robert

Grosseteste (ca. 1168-1253) and Roger Bacon

(1214/1220-1292), regard light as a corporeal being.

Bacon maintains that the dimensionality of light is

derived from the dimensionality of its medium.5

Grosseteste maintains that light is constitutive of

bodily extension.6 In neither case was the extension

of light conceived as being independent of the

extension of matter.7

When Liceti claims that the extension of light

differs from the extension of matter he may have

gone substantially beyond other Later Aristotelian

thinkers. The closest historical antecedent of

Liceti’s theory of light can be found in Albert the

Great’s (d. 1280) highly eclectic De anima commentary.

Most importantly for present purposes, Albert

connects the Aristotelian view that light perfects

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the body that it illuminates by making it actually

perspicuous or “diaphanous”8 with the Platonic notion

of emanative causation.9 Liceti takes up this

eclectic approach to light but makes some

implications that such a theory of light has for the

relation between the extension of light and the

extension of body. Exploring Liceti’s usage of the

analogy between mind and light thus may help us to

understand the sense in which, in Liceti’s view,

mind can be at the same time immaterial, extended,

and indivisible. I will proceed as follows. In

section 2, I explore how Liceti argues for the

extension of the mind and how he distinguishes the

mind’s extension from the extension of vegetative

and sensitive souls. In section 3, I investigate how

Liceti, in his early and middle years, argues for

understanding light as an extended but indivisible

being. In section 4, I bring together both strands

of thought to explicate the role of the notion of

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existential independence in Liceti’s usage of the

analogy between light and mind. Finally, in section

5, I spell out how Liceti integrates some forms of

dependence of mental activities on the body with his

account of indivisible immaterial extension.

2. The Coextension of Soul and Body

Liceti ascribes extension to all kinds of souls

(vegetative, sensitive, and rational), and the

grounds for this are closely connected with his

account of the coextension of soul and body. In

particular, he understands the coextension of the

rational soul and the body in close analogy to the

coextension of the vegetative and sensitive soul and

the body. Therefore, it will be helpful first to

consider his conception of the coextension of the

vegetative soul and the organic body of a living

being. With respect to the nutrition of plants, he

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argues that the vegetative soul is where the

operations occur, of which the soul is the primary

efficient cause since according to Aristotle all

physical action is by contact;10 moreover, according

to Aristotle everything that is nourished is

1 See Patrizi 1943, p. 237 (on dimensionality), p. 241 (on

independence from other objects and on the question of the

material or immaterial nature of space). On Patrizi’s

conception of space, see Grant 1981, ch. 8; Kochiras 2012, pp.

54-56.

2 Immortality, III, 7, 3, p. 174.

3 See Ceard 1977, pp. 442-447, 451-456; Daston and Park 1998,

pp. 191, 200, 209, 213.

4 Immortality, I, 5, 2, p. 25.

5 Lindberg 1983, pp. 190/191. On Bacon’s theory of light, see

Lindberg 1986, pp. 19-22.

6 Baur 1912, p. 51. On Grosseteste’s metaphysics of light, see

Baur 1917, pp. 76-84; McEvoy 1982, pp. 151-158.

7 To be sure, Nicolaus Oresme’s theory of light may be a less

clear-cut case. Oresme maintains that light belongs to the

“corporeal accidents or qualities” but qualifies this claim by

ascribing a “spiritual being” to it. One clear sense associated

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nourished with respect to the smallest part of its

body.11 He develops analogous arguments for the

coextension of sensitive souls and the organic

bodies of animals. The most telling argument for our

present concerns is an argument based on the

relation between the sensitive soul and the

with this qualification is that light does not follow from

primary qualities (see Patar 1995, p. 276). But as Annelise

Maier has remarked about cases such as Oresme: “That it is not

a ‘proper’ esse spirituale like that of rational souls and

intelligences went without much saying; but it never came to a

precise and generally accepted clarification of the special

intentional being that was ascribed to the species in a medium”

(Maier 1963), p. 7). And, in any case, Peter Marshall seems to

be right when he points out that “Oresme never made clear how

there could be dimensionality without material being” (Marshall

1981, pp. 361-362).

8 See Aristotle, De an. II, 7. On Aristotle’ notion of the

diaphanous and its influence in medieval thought, see Vasiliu

1997.

9 On the origins of the emanation theory of light, see Lindberg

1976, pp. 96-98.

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vegetative soul of an animal. Liceti starts from the

observation that when the sensitive soul is occupied

with something and applies all its forces of passion

to it, then nutrition, augmentation and the

functions of sexual reproduction that are governed

by the vegetative soul are impaired or interrupted.

Liceti interprets these observations as indicating

that in a sensitive being the vegetative soul is

dominated by the sensitive soul.12 He comments:

“[Y]ou can derive the fact that the dominating

sensitive soul is coextensive with the dominated

vegetative soul from the fact that all physical

domination takes place by means of contact and

contiguity.”13

As far as vegetative and sensitive souls go,

Liceti believes that division of souls is not only a

genuine possibility but something actually involved

in every case of the generation of a living being:

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[A]s long as twigs are on the tree, they live by

the same soul as the tree is said to live by; the

soul of the tree subsequently is multiplied and

divided according to the division of the subject

… Almost in this way, I believe the seed enjoys

the same soul as the father; which I believe is

divided and multiplied according to the division

10 Liceti refers the reader to Aristotle, Phys., VII, 10-12;

VIII, 33; De an., 2, 3. On scholastic views on the “no action

at a distance” principle, see Kovach 1990, pp. 161-171.

11 ACC, p. 12. See De an. II, 4.

12 ACC, p. 36.

13 ACC, p. 36: “[S]ensitricem gubernantem coextensam esse

vegetali animae gubernatae inde apertissime colligas, quia

gubernatio physica fit per contactum, & contiguitatem:

Aristoteles enim alicubi sanxit necessarium esse mundum hunc

inferiorem contiguum extare supernis lationibus, ut omnis huius

mundi virtus gubernetur inde [Meteor. I, 2].” For a more

detailed discussion of Liceti’s view on vegetative and

sensitive souls, see Blank 2010.

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of the subject when the seed is separated from

the body of the father.14

Thus, for Liceti plant souls are extended beings

that are divided when the organic body of the plant

is divided. The two parts of a divided plant live by

the two parts of a divided plant soul. Likewise,

animal souls are extended beings that are divided

when the organic body of the animal is divided. When

the body of the seed is separated from the body of

the parent the seed lives by a part of the soul of

the parent. Liceti’s ontology of vegetative and

14 OAH, p. 329: “[F]ructus, dum arbori haerent, eiusdem animae

beneficio vivunt, qua & arbor ipsa vivere dicitur, quae arboris

anima postmodum plurificatur, dividiturque ad subiecti

divisionem … Ita prorsum arbitror semen in corpore patris eadem

anima potiri, quae & pater ipse fruitur; quam dividi, ac

plurificari censeo ad subiecti divisionem, dum semen a patris

corpore seiungitur …”

13

sensitive souls thus would evidently allow such

souls to be actually divided.

Still, while Liceti is committed to the material

and divisible nature of vegetative and sensitive

souls, he also holds that “the more potent,

intellective part of the human soul is not educed

from matter but created out of nothing, and is

immortal …”15 His argument for the extended nature of

this immaterial part of the human soul starts with

the assumption that “as the sentient soul governs

the vegetative soul in producing each of its

functions, the rational soul evidently governs the

vegetative and sensitive souls in all of their

operations.”16 In fact, in his early De vita he offers

a (partial) argument for this assumption:

[T]he vegetative soul does not operate anything

in us unless it is governed by the sensitive

soul; likewise, the sensitive soul does not

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operate anything in a human being unless the

intellective soul assists it; from whence it

comes about that while the sensitive or rational

soul is vehemently occupied with something, as in

big passions of the soul, the usual assistance to

the vegetative soul is interrupted; and for this

reason it is often forced to desist from its

usual duties and to interrupt nutrition and its

other functions …17

Thus, what speaks for the dependence of the

operations of the vegetative soul on operations of

the sensitive or rational soul is that the former

can be impeded by the malfunctioning of the latter.

15 OAH, p. 301: “potior humanae animae pars intellectiva sit

non educta de sinu materiae, sed creata ex nihilo, & immortalis

…”

16 ACC, p. 40: “quemadmodum sentiens anima gubernat vegetalem in

quibusque suis functionibus edendis; ita plane rationalis &

vegetalem, & sentienten regit in omnibus earum operationibus.”

15

Even though Liceti does not offer an explicit

argument for the dependence of the operations of the

sensitive soul on the operations of rational soul,

constructing such an argument along similar lines

would be easy. For Liceti, the dependence of the

operations of the vegetative and sensitive soul on

the operations of the rational souls implies that

the rational soul acts upon the vegetative and

sensitive souls.

As in the case of sensitive souls that govern

vegetative souls, he applies the principle that

something has to be where it operates: “if what

governs must be contiguous to the governed …, the17 DV, pp. 137-138: “[V]egetalis anima in nobis nihil operatur

nisi a sensitrice gubernetur; perinde ac neque sentiens in

homine suo munere fungitur nisi ab intellectrice fuerit adiuta;

unde fit ut anima sentiente, aut rationali vehementius occupata

circa obiectum aliquod, ut in magnis animi passionibus,

consuetum auxilium vegetali animae intercipiatur; & iccirco

haec a solitis officiis saepe desistere cogitur, ac

nutritionem, aliaque sui munia multoties intermittere …”

16

rational soul must be coextensive with the

vegetative and the sensitive soul.”18 This is why

Liceti believes that the rational soul must also be

coextensive with the body that it animates: “If

these functions of the mind and the will are

considered in so far as they are the conditions that

constitute the existence of a principle of motion

for the human being that contains them, intellection

and appetition, in so far as they lead to motion,

are necessarily coextensive with the whole body …”19

In Liceti’s view, intellection and appetition, taken

separately, do not depend on the body: “[B]ecause

intellection is produced without the help of any18 ACC, p. 40: “si ergo gubernans gubernato contiguum esse

oportet …; profecto rationalis anima & vegetanti, & sentienti

coextensa esse debet …”

19 Ibid.: “[si] hae functiones mentis, & voluntatis

considerentur quatenus sunt conditiones constituentes in esse

principium motivum hominis continentis …; necessario

intellectio, & appetitio, ut ad motum diriguntur, toti corpori

sunt coextensae …”

17

bodily organ, intellection is properly not a bodily

action, if you understand it precisely as mere

cognition; … the same I will say about pure

appetition …”20 Nevertheless, he argues that they

must be present jointly in every region of the body:

[T]he two potencies of the rational soul, namely,

intellect and will, insofar as they come together

in a single principle of local motion of the

entire human being in which they are contained,

as well as of each of its parts, they are

coextensive with the whole body and reside in

each particle of the body.21

20 ACC, pp. 51-52: “[I]ntellectio quum nullius organi corporei

ministerio edatur, si eam ut mera cognitio est praecise

sumpseris, proprie actio corporea non est … Idipsum iudicavero

de appetione pura …”

18

That certain mental potencies are coextensive with

the body, in turn, implies that the substance that

possesses potencies is coextensive with the body:

[W]hen any function is an act of an agent which

is entirely inseparable from it because the act

cannot be without the entity whose act it is,

indeed also the essence of the intellectual souls

from which operations of this kind proceed … will

be present as a whole in the whole and as a whole

in the single parts.22

21 ACC, p. 51: “[H]ae duae facultates animae rationalis,

intellectus nimirum, atque voluntas, quatenus coincidunt in

unum principium loco motivum totius hominis continentis, &

singulorum membrorum illius, sunt universo corpori coextensae,

deguntque in singulis corporis particulis.”

22 Ibid.: “[Q]uando functio quaevis est actus operantis ab eo

penitus inseparabilis ea ratione, ut actus non sit sine illo,

cuius est actus; profecto & animae intellectricis essentia, a

qua huiusmodi operationes prodeunt … tota in toto & tota in

singulis partibus inerit.”

19

Due to the role of the rational soul as principle

of local motion, Liceti would thus subscribe to a

traditional notion of the relation between soul and

body that goes back to Plotinus and was widely

accepted in scholastic thought: the notion that the

soul is present as a whole in the whole body and as

a whole in each part of the body.23 Such a view

clearly implies that the rational soul cannot be

divided into parts that possess different essences.

Still, it leaves open the question why the rational

soul could not be divided into parts that possess

the same essence. Does Liceti’s natural philosophy

contain resources to answer this question? I think

23 On the influence of this view, often dubbed “holenmerism”, in

the Neoplatonic and scholastic traditions, see Grant 1981, 222-

225; Des Chene 2000, pp. 191-202; Rozemond, 2003; Reid 2007,

pp. 88-89. For authoritative formulations of the doctrine, see

Plotinus 1984, 4:418; 4:294; Ficino 2001-2006, 1: 237-239; 2:

229.

20

it does. The relevant material can be found in

Liceti’s discussion of the relation between the

extension of the rational soul and the extension of

the body animated by it. To explicate this relation,

he invokes the analogy between minds and light. In

order to get a grip on how this analogy is meant to

work, we thus have first to look into Liceti’s

analysis of the structure of light.

3. Light and Existential Dependence

In his later years, Liceti wrote extensively about

light. In his later writings, he understands lumen to

be “a quality perceptible by vision that is

physically produced by a luminous body.”24 According

to his later theory of light, the mode of physical

production is reduced to efficient causation by

means of local motion. And the product that is24 Liceti 1640a, p. 99: “lumen esse sensibilem visu qualitatem

physice productam a corpore lucido”

21

produced in this way stands in the relation of

inherence to the illuminated body: “Lumen is an

accidental quality, and a corporeal quality, for the

reason that it requires the underlying body in which

it inheres …”25 Hence, it is a quality that depends

for its existence on the illuminated body. Moreover,

it is a quality that is divisible, “for everything

that is received is received in the mode of the

receiver: but the disposed matter that receives in

it the form of light is a perspicuous body that is

itself a quantum and divisible”26 Evidently, such a

conception of light would not be helpful in

25 Liceti 1640b, p. 179: “lumen esse qualitatem accidentalem, &

qualitatem ea ratione corporea, quia subiecti coporis indiget,

in quo haereat …”

26 Liceti 1642, p. 328: “omne quod recipitur, per modum

recipientis recipitur: materia vero disposita recipiens in se

formam luminis est diaphanum corpus per se quantum ac

divisibile.” See also Liceti 1640a pp. 115-116. On Liceti’s

later theory of light, see Zoubov 1936.

22

explicating the immaterial and indivisible nature of

mind.

Yet, the conception of light in his later

writings diverges considerably from his much shorter

treatment of light in De vita and De animarum coextensione

corpori, and it is his earlier treatment that matters

for our present purposes. In his early De vita (1607)

he clarifies his own understanding of the similarity

between soul and light by discussing Albert the

Great’s theory of light. He notes that Albert holds

that life is, not so much an operating soul, but

rather some work of the soul, which he calls

internal act, or essential perfection immediately

proceeding from the soul and into the body …

[T]his perfection is described by Albert as the

essential act proceeding immediately from the

soul into the body entirely in the same way as

the sun that is present is used to send forth

23

lumen into the perspicuous body, such that lumen is

the perfection of the perspicuous body

proximately flowing from the lux of the sun that is

present in the perspicuous body … 27

In this passage, the traditional distinction between

light as an entity present in a luminous body and

light as an entity present in an illuminated

perspicuous body plays a crucial role. The

distinction goes back at least to the eleventh-

century Arabic Aristotelian natural philosopher

Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and in the Latin tradition was

27 DV, pp. 68-69: “vitam esse, non certe animam operantem, sed

bene opus quoddam animae, quod ipse appellat actum internum,

seu essentialem perfectionem immediate prodeuntem ab anima in

corpus … [A]tque ista perfectio ab Alberto nuncupatur actus

essentialis immediate profluens ab anima in corpus eodem

prorsus modo, quo a Sole praesente prodire consuevit immediate

lumen in corpus diaphanum, & quemadmodum lumen est perfectio

corporis perspicui proxime profluens a luce Solis praesentis in

corpus diaphanum …”

24

expressed in terms of the distinction between lux and

lumen.28 Unsurprisingly, both the nature of this

relation and the nature of lumen were objects of

controversy within medieval and early modern

philosophy. Albert the Great suggested an analysis

of the relation between lux and lumen that involves

only the essence of lux: “The soul is said to live

causally in itself because it is the cause of life

and living in itself, as lux is said to be luminous

and the cause of lumen; and because of this even the

higher beings are said to live a more noble life,

because in them there is nothing relating to a

moving or moved being …”29 Thus, for Albert the

relation between lux and lumen does not involve any

28 See Avicenna Latinus 1972, pp. 170-172.

29 Albertus Magnus 1968, p. 74: “Anima autem etiam in se dicitur

vivere causaliter, quia est causa vitae et viva in seipsa,

sicut lux dicitur luminosa et causa luminis; et proter hoc

etiam superiora dicuntur vivere nobiliri vita, quia nihil est

in eis ex parte motoris vel mobilis …”

25

motion but rather is constituted by emanative

causation. This is how he further explicates this

relation:

[L]ux is the being and the first actuality of the

luminous body, and sending forth lumen is its

essential secondary actuality, in so far as this

is its activity, which consists in some essential

diffusion of its form; for each essence has a

proper and essential operation, of which it is

never deprived, provided it is essential, as lux

is not deprived of sending forth lumen which is

its activity.30

30 Ibid., p. 65: “[L]ux lucentis est esse et actus primus, et

lucere est actus essentialis eius secundus, eo quod haec est

actio eius, quae suae formae diffusio quaedam est essentialis;

omnis enim essentia propriam et essentialem habet operationem,

qua numquam destituitur, quando est essentialis, sicut lux non

destituitur a lucere, quod est eius actio.”

26

And he is explicit that the same kind of relation

holds between forms and their operations in general:

“[I]n this way, things are with each natural and

substantial form that is by itself the principle of

its essential operations and not by something else

added to it.”31 Thus, being by itself the source of

activity is what, for Albert, constitutes an analogy

between lux and other substantial forms such as the

human soul.

Liceti accepts certain aspects of Albert’s theory

of light. Most importantly, Liceti shares the view

that the production of lumen involves emanative

causation:

Heaven and nature is said to depend on god as an

efficient cause …; the sun possesses an efficient

cause from which it proceeds eternally by simple

31 Ibid.: “[I]ta etiam est de omni forma naturali et

substantiali, quod ipsa est principium suarum operationum

essentialium per seipsam et non per aliud sibi additum.”

27

emanation without any novelty of being; in the

same way, from the lux of the sun … lumen proceeds

eternally through simple emanation as from its

proximate and immediate efficient cause …32

Due to its origin in emanative causation, he takes

lumen to be “nothing other than an image of lux from

which it proceeds …”33 Liceti also accepts that there

is a strong analogy between soul and light but has

objections against using the analogy in the way

suggested by Albert:

32 ARI, p. 154: “A Deo …, ut a causa efficiente, pendere

dicitur caelum, & natura …; solem obtinet causam effectricem, a

qua per simplicem emanationem absque novitate essendi ab

aeterno prodierit; sic a Solis luce … lumen ab aeterno prodiit

absque novitate essendi per simplicem emanationem ut a sui

causa effectrice proxima, & immediata …”

33 ARI, p. 156: “lumen revera nihil aliud est, quam imago

lucis, a qua proficiscitur …”

28

for the soul by itself is the first actuality and

the essential and internal perfection of the

natural body, which is the living potency … but

the sun cannot similarly be said to be the first

actuality and internal and essential perfection

of the perspicuous body, which is illuminated

through the potency; but lumen is rather something

like that, namely an actuality, or a perfection

of the perspicuous body; … and hence the soul is

proportional to lumen, but not to the sun, from

which lumen proceeds …34

34 DV, pp. 75-76: “anima etenim secundum se ipsamet est actus

primus, perfectio essentialis, & interna corporis illius

naturalis, quod est potentia vivens [De an., II 6] … non autem

consimiliter Sol dici potest actus primus, perfectioque

internum & essentalis corporis perspicui, quod est potentia

illuminatum; sed lumen est potius tale quid, nempe actus, sive

perfectio corporis perspicui … & ideo anima proportione

respondet lumini, non Soli, a quo lumen proficiscitur.”

29

From the central role that Liceti ascribes to

lumen for understanding the structure of the human

soul derives his strong interest in analyzing the

relation between lumen and material extension. And on

this issue, he is in fact much more explicit than

Albert. On the suggestion (which Liceti, probably

erroneously, ascribes to Aristotle’s Rhetoric) that

“intellect in the soul is kindled by God as lumen is

kindled by the sun in the perspicuous body,”35 he

comments: “Since lumen in the perspicuous body is not

there as an indivisible point but rather is

coextensive with every dimension of the perspicuous

body.”36 Still, due to the emanation relation between

lux and lumen, lumen is existentially independent of

30

the perspicuous body: “[L]umen is said to be external

to the air whose assisting form it is since it does

not depend on the air, even though it actualizes the

innermost parts of the air.”37 Accordingly, he

describes the relations of existential dependence

relevant for lumen as follows:

We deny … that whatever is in matter, instantly

is affected by the conditions of matter; because

it can be in matter in various ways, both

dependent on it, and independent from it; of

course, those things that are in matter and

35 ACC, p. 54: “Intellectum in anima esse a Deo accensum ut

lumen a sole in perspicuo”; I have not been able to trace this

quotation in the Aristoteles Latinus database.

36 ACC, p. 54: “Quum autem lumen in perspicuo sit non ut

prunctum indivisibile, sed perspicui dimensionibus omniquaque

coextensum …”

37 ARI, p. 151: “[L]umen dicitur esse aeri extrinsecum, cuius

est forma assistens, quoniam ab aere non pendet, quamvis

intimas quasque partes aeris actuet.”

31

depend on it are affected by the conditions of

matter and are inseparable from matter; but these

things that are in matter and do not depend on

it, are not affected by the conditions of matter;

in this way lumen is in a dirty and stinky body,

independent of such subjects; for it depends only

on the luminous body …38

Obviously, lumen does not become dirty and stinky by

illuminating a dirty and stinky body. But what is

more important for our present concerns is that

local motion belongs to the conditions of the

38 ARI, p. 71: “Negamus …, quicquid est in materia, id affici

statim conditionibus materiae; quia multifariam quid in materia

inesse potest, tum dependenter ab ea, tum independenter: sane

quae sunt in materia dependenter ab ea, conditionibus materiae

afficiuntur, & a materia sunt inseparabilia; quae vero sunt in

materia independenter ab illa, conditionibus materiae non

afficiuntur: sic lumen in luto, & in foetido corpore inest,

independenter a talibus subiectis; quum a solo corpore lucido

dependeat …”

32

illuminated matter that do not affect lumen. Of

course, lumen can be moved through the motion of the

luminous body from which it originates; the same,

however, is not true of the body that it

illuminates:

Nothing can be moved through the motion of

something else unless it exists either in it as

something located there as in a place; or as a

form, either an accidental form in the subject of

inherence, or a substantial form in the subject

of inexistence; or as an organ in the potency of

the primary agent; or generally not unless it

depends for its existence on it in some way. But

an assisting form is where its underlying body is

located and guides it, but is not in it as in a

place, nor as in a subject of inherence or of

inexistence, nor as an organ in the potency of

33

the primary agent, and generally does not depend

on the body that it assists.39

That lumen does not depend on the illuminated body as

on a place seems to be a straightforward consequence

of Liceti’s acceptance of an Aristotelian conception

of place. As Liceti puts it: “The reason why

something is a place is that it contains and

preserves what is located …; for place is defined to

be the boundary of what contains something …”40 Thus,

it is not the illuminated body that defines a place

39 DIA, p. 184: “[N]ihil moveri potest ad motum alterius nisi

in eo insit vel tamquam locatum in loco; vel tamquam forma,

sive accidentalis in subiecto inhaesionis, sive substantialis

in subiecto inexistentiae; vel tamquam organum in potestate

agentis praecipui, ac omnino nisi quoquopacto ab eo dependeat

in esse. Forma vero assistens adest quidem, ac praeest subiecto

corpori, sed in eo non inest ut in loco, nec ut in subiecto aut

inhaesionis, aut inexistentiae, nec ut organum in potestate

agentis praecipui, atque omnino a corpore non dependet, cui

assistit.”

34

and, hence, lumen cannot depend on the illuminated

body as on a place. Moreover, Liceti’s

categorization of lumen as an assisting form implies

that lumen cannot depend on the illuminated body as

on a subject of inherence or information. Also,

because it emanates from lux, lumen cannot be

understood as an instrument that depends on some

bodily agent. In this way, Liceti excludes the

various ways in which the motion of lumen could

depend on the motion of the illuminated body. This

conclusion has far-reaching implications for the

divisibility of lumen:

lumen that is not movable through the local motion

of the underlying air; which shadows that are

immobile in moved air indicate …; evidently, they

cannot be said to be divisible through the

40 ARI, p. 292: “ratio loci sit in eo, quod est continere,

consevareque locata …; definitur enim locus esse terminus

continentis …” See Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1, 209a5-10.

35

division of the underlying air because with real

division the local motion of the parts that are

divided is necessarily conjoined. 41

Because parts of shadows do not undergo local motion

at the separation of parts of perspicuous bodies,

also the lumen that brings about these shadows does

not undergo motion through the motion of the parts

of perspicuous bodies. Hence, the perspicuous body

that is illuminated by lumen can be divided without a

division of lumen.

4. Mind, Light, and Immaterial Extension

41 ACC, p. 69: “Lumen etenim, quod non est ad subiecti aeris

motum localem loco mobile; quod indicant umbrae stabiles in

aere moto …; plane ad eiudem substrati aeris divisionem

partibile dici non possunt, quia cum reali divisione coniunctus

necessario est eorum, quae dividuntur, motus localis.”

36

Thus far, Liceti has given an account of how the

existential independence of lumen from matter implies

a kind indivisibility of lumen: lumen does not

undergo division through the division of matter.

Does this structure carry over to the relation

between mind and matter? Liceti acknowledges

profound dissimilarities between lumen and mind.

Whereas he regards lumen as an assisting accidental

form, he accepts the Aristotelian view that the mind

is “inexisting and informing.”42 This difference

between lumen and mind implies that minds behave

differently from lumen with respect to local motion:

“An assisting form is not necessarily moved through

the motion of the body that it assists; but in

contrast, the informing form is necessarily moved

through the motion of the body that it informs.”43

37

These differences given due attention, Liceti

nevertheless believes that there is an informative

analogy between lumen and mind:

[I]t is plain that the rational soul is in the

whole human soul and entirely in the body as

light is in the perspicuous body; or that the

intellect … is infused by god into the irrational

soul of the fetus, as lumen is infused by the sun

into the perspicuous body; namely, lumen is not

educed out of the potency of the perspicuous body

by any change of the perspicuous body brought

about by the luminous body; but the luminous body

infuses lumen into the perspicuous body, as a

foreign form reaching the perspicuous body from

the outside …; for visible species are not educed

42 DV, p. 326.

43 DIA, p. 240: “[A]ssistens forma non necessario movetur ad

motum corporis, cui assistit; informans e contra forma

necessario movetur ad motum corporis, quod informat …”

38

from the potency of the medium; but as something

independent from the medium, they arrive from the

outside of some object: a visible species is so

independent from a medium, and especially lumen

from the perspicuous body in which it is, that it

is not moved through the motion of the body, and

is not corrupted through the corruption of the

body …44

44 ARI, p. 167: “[C]onstat apertissime rationalem animam esse

in humana anima tota, & omnino in corpore, ut lumen in

perspicuo; seu Intellectum a … Deo in animam irrationalem

faetus immitti, ut lumen a Sole in perspicuum immittitur: porro

lumen non educitur ex potentia diaphani per transmutationem

ullam translucidi factam a lucido; sed a corpore lucido inditur

ipsi transparenti lumen, ceu forma peregrina exterinsecus

adveniens diaphano …; modo species visibiles non educuntur ex

potentia medii, sed independenter a medio illi extrinsecus

adveniunt ab obiecto: species visibiles a medio, & speciatim

lumen a diaphano, in quo est, ita est independens, ut ad eius

motum non moveatur, & ad eius interitum non corrumpatur …”

39

Hence, the analogy has to do with the emanation

relation and the ensuing existential independence

from matter: as lumen is existentially independent

from matter because it emanates from lux, so is mind

existentially independent from matter because it

emanates from God. For Liceti, the existential

independence of mind from matter entails that minds

possess several structural features that distinguish

them from material beings. One of these features,

already noted in the passage just cited, is that a

mind is not affected in its existence through the

corruption of a portion of matter associated with

it. A second feature is that minds confer being onto

composite substances—human beings that possess mind

and body—but do not derive their being from any

other constituent of a composite:

A form is not to a lesser degree a being than the

composite; because from it the composite has it

40

that it is a being. But a form that can exist in

a composite and also separate from it, is of all

things a being in the highest degree; both

because it makes the composite a being, and

because it is an individual substance by itself,

even separated from the body … A form is … by

itself a substance and a being; and what is

through something else or dependently on

something else, is a being in a lesser degree

than what is a being by itself and

independently.45

45 ARI, p. 15: “[F]orma non minus est hoc aliquid quam

compositum; quum ab eo compositum habeat id, ut sit hoc

aliquid: at forma, quae in composito & ab eo separata esse

potest, omnium maxima est hoc aliquid: tum quia composito

tribuit esse hoc aliquid; tum quia ipsa secundum se a composito

separata est substantia individua … [F]orma … est de se

substantia, & hoc aliquid; quod autem est per aliud, seu

dependenter ab alio tale, minus est tale quam id quod est de se

tale, ac independenter.”

41

A third feature of mind is its separability from

matter—a feature that minds share with lumen:

“Absolutely all forms, be it informing or assisting,

…that have an operation proper to them, can be

separated from their underlying bodies …”46 In fact,

this property both in the case of lumen and in the

case of mind is closely connected with emanative

causation:

Those beings whose operation emanates immediately

from their mere essence are rightly said to be of

the kind whose operations exist and come about …

through their simple substance; not because the

function in them was not formally distinguished

from their essence; but because they operate

alone through their simple substance, not through

the intervention of any other thing; in this way,

46 DIA, p. 275: “[F]ormarum absolute, sive informatium, sive

assistentium, … qui habent operationem propriam, hae possunt a

subdito sibi corpore separari …”

42

lumen illuminates only through its presence and

its simple essence, without using any instrument

…; the active intellect has this attribute in

common with the passive intellect …47

The next section will return to the question what

the mental operations emanating immediately from the

mind’s essence are. For now, it is sufficient to

note that Liceti grounds the separability of both

mind and lumen from matter in the existence of

operations emanating immediately from essences.

47 DIA, p. 287: “Haec sane, quorum operatio immediate a nuda

sui essentia promanant, recte dicuntur esse talia, ut ipsoum

operationes sint, ac fiant … simplici eorundem substantia; non

quia functio formaliter in eis non distinguatur ab essentia;

sed quia sola sui substantia simplici, non alterius interventu

rei, operantur: ita sane lumen sola sui praesentia, suaque

simplici essentia illuminat, nullius instrumenti ministerio

utens … quod attributum habet commune intellectus agens cum

intellectu possibili …”

43

A fourth feature that mind, in Liceti’s view,

seems to share with lumen is immortality: “Every

substantial form that proceeds like lumen from the

luminous body, is not educed from the potency of

matter though its transmutation but reaches it from

without; and something that is so independent from

matter is immortal …”48 Of course, one might wonder

whether the notion of immortality that Liceti has in

mind here is sufficient to fill out the theological

doctrine of the immortality of the human. But

certainly, Liceti’s notion of immortality captures

that an entity that does not arise from material

potencies also cannot be destroyed through the

destruction of the potencies of matter. Finally, the

analogy between lumen and rational souls is meant to

bring out that the extension of rational souls

44

relates to material extension in a different way

than the extensions of vegetative and sensitive

souls do:

Some forms that are coextensive with their

underlying bodies are accidental quanta relative

to the quantity of the underlying body, such that

their quantity depends on the quantity of the

underlying body in every respect; and forms of

this kind are accidentally divisible through the

division of the underlying body; of this kind are

all perishable forms that are educed at their

origin from the womb of matter by a generating

being. But of a different kind are forms that are

quanta by themselves that possess some

proportional immaterial quantity and that are

48 ARI, p. 168: “omnis forma substantialis, quae ut lumen a

lucido provenit, ea non educitur de potentia materiae per huius

transmutationem, sed huic extrinsecus advenit; atque adeo

independens a materia est immortalis.”

45

coextensive with the dimensions of the underlying

body; the quantity of these forms by no means

depends on the dimensions of the underlying body.

This is how forms are that are not accidentally

divisible through the division of the underlying

body; in themselves they are only divisible

through designation and in the mind, but not in

reality; and of this kind are lumen and immortal

souls …49

It is the existential independence of the extension

of lumen and rational souls on the extension of

bodies that leads Liceti to the conclusion that in

nature there are two different kinds of extension:

“We affirm that in things there are two kinds of

extension: one material and belonging to magnitude …

, the other formal, belonging to power and

incorporeal substance, without which power cannot

exist.”50

46

Taken together, Liceti’s claim that rational

souls are coextensive with the body and his claim

that the extension of rational souls is independent

of the extension of the body have a further

consequence. Even if rational souls cannot be

divided through the division of the body, the

extension of the rational soul changes and is

diminished when the body loses parts: 49 ACC, p. 69: “[F]ormarum subiacenti sibi corpori coextensarum

aliae sunt quantae per accidens ad subiecti corporis

quantitatem, ut quarum quantitas a substrati corporis

quantitate omnino dependet; ac huiusmodi formae revera sunt per

accidens divisibiles ad subiecti corporis partitionem; tales

autem sunt formae caducae omnae e materiae sinu eductae a

generante in earum origine … [A]liae vero sunt formae quantae

per se immateriali quadam quantitate, proportionata coextensae

subiacentis corporis dimensioni; quae formarum propria

quantitas a subiecti corporis quantitate minime dependet:

huiusmodi autem formae sunt, non quidem divisibiles per

accidens ad subditi sibi corporis partitionem; sed per se

divisibiles sunt sola designatione, ac mente, non reipsa, ut

lumen, & immortales animae …”

47

The mind dilates and contracts itself in the

augmentation and diminution of the body

independently of the body, such that the

proportion of the extension with the body is

preserved … as long as it does not exceed the

limits of its extension prescribed by nature;

which it never can do; and this is why the human

intellect in no way can actualize a portion of

matter as large as a big mountain nor as small as

a grain of mustard … Otherwise, if the human

intellect did not have such a limited extension

of its substance and power but were without any

extension at all, a human being as small as an

atom could be born … 51

50 ACC, p. 71: “[A]sseveramus duplicem in rebus inveniri

extensionem; alteram materialem, ac magnitudinis; … alteram

formalem, ac virtutis, & substantiae incorporeae, sine qua

virtus esse non potest.”

48

In this way, Liceti combines his view that the

coextension of mind and body implies that the mind

always occupies the same part of space as its

underlying body with a traditional element of the

Aristotelian theory of natural minima and maxima.

According to this theory, the notion of natural

minima and maxima is essentially bound to the notion

of substantial form.52 For example, Thomas Aquinas

argues that each determinate form is accompanied by

51 ACC, p. 63: “[M]ens extenditur, & contrahitur per se in

augmento, & in decremento corporis independenter a corpore, ut

servet cum corpore proportionem extensionis … [D]ummodo non

excedat limites extensioni suae a natura praescriptos; quod

nunquam efficere potest; atque hinc est, quod intellectus

humanus haudquaquam potest actuare materiam mole magno monti

aequalem; nec vicissim parvam aequalem grano sinapis … Secus

enim si extensionem substantiae, ac virtutis ita limitatum non

haberet intellectus humanus, sed esset omnino sine ulla

extensione; iam posset homo nasci pusillus ut atomus …”

52 On this sense of minimism, see Maier 1949, pp. 181-186;

Emerton 1986, pp. 90-91; Murdoch 2001, 101 n. 28, 104-106.

49

determinate accidents, including quantity. This is

why he believes that every body, by possessing a

determinate form, also has a determinate quantity

with respect to a lower and an upper limit.53 Roger

Bacon goes one step further, asking why it is that a

substantial form is bound to determinate minimal

body size and considers both the possibility that

this could be due to the function of forms to confer

being and the possibility that this could be due to

the function of form to be principles of operation.54

With respect to homogenous mixtures such as bone or

flesh Bacon’s answer is clear. With respect to their

maximal size, the function of forms to confer being

53 Aquinas, STh, I, q. 7, a. 3: “[O]mne corpus naturale aliquam

formam substantialem habet determinatam: cum igitur ad formam

substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad

determinatam formam consequantur determinata accidentia; inter

quae est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet

determinatam quantitatem et in maius et in minus.”

54 Bacon 1928, pp. 153-154.

50

could well be relevant; but not so for their minimal

size: If such mixtures fall below a minimal size,

their substantial forms could not operate at all.55

William of Ockham, in turn, gives voice to a more

general conception of the relevant sense of

operation when he clarifies the sense in which he

wants the concept of a “minimum in natural things”

to be understood: It is a “minimum that can perform

the action of the species in question.”56

Understanding minima in this way opens up the

possibility to apply the notion of a natural minimum

not only to elements and homogeneous body parts but55 Ibid., p. 156: “Si autem sit corpus mixtum simile in specie,

vel ommogenium, ut caro, tunc non contingit stare a parte

materie, nec a parte forme ut dat esse nisi in suppremo, set in

infimo vel dividendo contingit stare ut est operis principium,

et hoc quia amplius operari non possit.”

56 Ockham 1984, q. 82: “[U]bique dicunt Philosophus et

Commentator quod contingit dare minimum in rebus naturalibus,

intellecto de minimo quod potest agere actionem illius speciei,

sicut dicit Commentator VII Physicorum commento 2.”

51

also to entire living beings: The minimal size of a

living being belonging to a particular species is

the size below which the substantial form of this

living being would cease to be able to operate.

Liceti’s view that the human intellect could not

animate an organic body below and above a certain

size is a straightforward application of this

traditional line of thought to the minimal and

maximal size of humans. In particular, Liceti seems

to allude both to the view that form as a principle

of being is bound to a body of a size with

determinate limits when he mentions the form’s

function to actualize the body and to the view that

the same applies to form as a principle of operation

when he mentions the form’s powers. However, he

combines these traditional ideas with his novel

conception of immaterial extension. Doing so leads

to a quite unprecedented consequence: As long as the

body is not diminished below the natural lower

52

limit, the rational soul not only continues to

animate the body even after the body has lost some

of its parts; it also diminishes its own extension

to the same extent as the extension of the body is

diminished. In this sense, extended rational souls

have the capacity of contracting and expanding

themselves within the limits set by the minimal and

maximal size of their bodies.

5. Conclusion

Liceti’s usage of the analogy between light and mind

thus is central to his understanding of the

distinction between immaterial and material

extension. The independence of lumen from the motion

of the matter that it illuminates indicates that the

extension of lumen does not derive from the extension

of matter. For Liceti, lumen depends for its

existence on a principle from which it emanates

53

(lux), in such a way that is existentially

independent from illuminated matter. Lumen is

indivisible in the sense of not being capable of

being divided through the division of illuminated

matter. This is gives the clue to the sense in which

mind can be at the same time extended and

indivisible. It is extended due to its capacity of

moving the whole body and as well as its parts

indicates. Nevertheless, it does not derive its

extension from the matter animated. For Liceti, this

is so because mind, too, has a principle from which

it emanates (God), in such a way that it is

existentially independent from animated matter. This

is why mind is not divisible through the division of

animated matter. To be sure, for Liceti there are

structural dissimilarities between lumen and mind.

Most notably, lumen is understood as assisting

accidental form, while mind is understood as a

substantial informing form. For this reason, mind

54

does not behave exactly as lumen does on the occasion

of the division of matter. Still, Liceti’s usage of

the analogy between light and mind makes clear in

which the sense a being that possesses immaterial

extension can at the same time be indivisible.

Liceti’s metaphysics of immaterial extension—one

of the earliest in seventeenth-century philosophy—

certainly is of considerable interest in itself. But

it might also be helpful, by comparison and

contrast, to understand the role that immaterial

extension plays in other positions of early modern

philosophy. In particular, it raises the question of

whether a similar pattern of thought may be found in

More’s usage of the analogy between individual

spirits and Aristotelian intentional species. A full

discussion of this question obviously would go

beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless,

there are some hints that More had in mind the

existential independence of individual spirits from

55

matter when he compared spirits with light. He holds

that what he calls the “secondary substance” of an

individual spirit—e.g., its vegetative parts—

emanates from the “primary substance” of a spirit

and, for this reason, depends for its existence only

on the persistence of the primary substance but not

on any portion of matter that it animates.57 Also, he

maintains that individual spirits depend for their

existence only on God.58 Likewise, he explicates the

sense in which he takes Aristotelian intentional

species to be something substantial in terms of

their existential independence from the medium that

they illuminate.59 And he is aware that the

observation that motion of the air does not cause

motion of shadows in the Aristotelian tradition was

used to argue for the existential independence of

light from the medium.60 Having the conceptual

pattern developed by Liceti in mind could thus be

helpful in making visible the connection between

56

some of More’s rather scattered remarks concerning

existential independence from matter and the

physical indivisibility of beings that possess

immaterial extension. To substantiate this

suggestion, however, will be the task of another

paper.

57 Immortality, I, 6, 2, “Axiome XIX”, p. 28.

58 Immortality, III, 16, 8, p. 215.

59 Immortality, I, 5, 2, p. 25.

60 Jacob 1995, 2: 147 (ch. 19, sec. 2).

57

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