European External Action Service, Evidence to House of Lords (pp.99-106)

EUROPEAN UNION SUB-COMMITTEE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

European External Action Service

Evidence - Written

Contents Anti-Slavery International – Written evidence ................................................................................ 2

Rosa Balfour, European Policy Centre, Brussels and Kristi Raik, Finnish Institute for

International Affairs, Helsinki – Written evidence .......................................................................... 6

Dr Federica Bicchi, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics

and Political Science – Written evidence ....................................................................................... 12

Professor Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow & Head of the EU Foreign Policy

Unit, Centre for European Policy Studies – Written evidence ................................................. 17

Bond – Written evidence .................................................................................................................. 21

Brussels & Europe Liberal Democrats – Written evidence ....................................................... 25

Edward Burke, Associate Researcher, FRIDE / University of St. Andrews – Supplementary

written evidence .................................................................................................................................. 27

Department for International Development (DFID) – Written evidence ............................. 32

Dr Hylke Dijkstra, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of

Oxford – Written evidence .............................................................................................................. 34

The European Centre for Development Policy Management – Written evidence .............. 41

European External Action Service (EEAS) – Written evidence ................................................ 46

European External Action Service – Supplementary written evidence ................................... 56

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office ........................................................................................... 57

Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration – Written

evidence ................................................................................................................................................. 78

Hugo Shorter, Head of Europe Directorate – External, Foreign and Commonwealth

Office – Supplementary written evidence ...................................................................................... 98

Global Governance Institute ............................................................................................................. 99

Professor Elena Korosteleva, Professor of International Politics, School of Politics and IR,

Rutherford College, University of Kent – Written evidence .................................................. 107

Kristi Raik, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki and Rosa Balfour, European

Policy Centre, Brussels ..................................................................................................................... 116

David Spence, London School and Economics – Supplementary written evidence ........... 117

UK Independence Party – Written evidence .............................................................................. 128

Anti-Slavery International – Written evidence

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Engaging with the EEAS on forced labour in Uzbekistan

Introduction

Anti-Slavery International is the world’s oldest international human rights organisation,

working since 1839 on the elimination of all forms of slavery and forced labour from the

world.

Anti-Slavery’s engagement with EEAS on Uzbek cotton

In recent years one aspect of Anti-Slavery’s work has focused on the use of forced labour of

children and adults for the production of cotton in Uzbekistan.

Anti-Slavery has frequently raised this issue with the EEAS, most recently in a letter from the

Cotton Campaign dated 29 October 2012. In light of the systemic nature of forced labour,

including forced child labour, in this industry we have asked the Commission to remove

trade preferences for cotton from Uzbekistan entering the EU. This action has been

supported by almost 14,000 petitioners.

However in a reply dated 29 November 2012 from the EEAS, we are told that “The EU does

not favour a purely sanction-based approach, as this can increase poverty.” This statement

indicates that the EEAS has not understood the nature of our concern in Uzbekistan. It is

true that richer people in Uzbekistan may be able to bribe their way out of participating in

the harvest. However the implication of the EEAS assertion is that, contrary to the available

evidence, the EEAS chooses to presume that people, including children, enter into this

exploitation voluntarily as a result of poverty, rather than being coerced into the

exploitation in order to enrich others.

The reply goes on to say that “we rely on cooperation and dialogue as more effective tools. In this

spirit, the diversification of agricultural production and economic development in rural areas are two

key objectives of a recently launched EU co-operation programme (with funding of €10 million) in

Uzbekistan, which should allow Uzbekistan to reduce its reliance on cotton monoculture.” This

statement raises a number of concerns.

First Anti-Slavery International would argue that relying on cooperation and dialogue with

the government of Uzbekistan is entirely inappropriate when it is the state itself perpetrating


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the use of forced labour. This is despite the fact that the government has, by signing ILO

conventions 105 and 182, committed to protecting its citizens from the abuses it is itself

perpetrating. (It should also be noted that the Uzbek government has been completely

uncooperative with the ILO).

Diversifying agricultural production and economic development in rural areas misses the

point that under the current system farmers are as coerced as those forced to pick the

cotton. They are told what to grow and have little choice or opportunity to diversify into

other products. In other words the reality of forced labour in Uzbek cotton production

fundamentally undermines the aim of the EU programme for diversifying agricultural

production that has been cited by the EEAS.

Given this, there is an enormous risk to the explicit aims of the EU programme, as well as a

further risk that the programme could inadvertently be used to prop up the current

exploitative system. Anti-Slavery has in the past asked what measures are in place to ensure

that the funds are not used in this way but have never received a response.

Finally in our communications with the Commission and EEAS, we have found that these

bodies consistently conflate slavery abuses with child labour. In the letter cited above the

EEAS says “the issue of child labour will also continue to feature prominently on the agenda of the

relations between the EU and Uzbekistan.” Different abuses necessitate different responses. As

ILO Convention182 makes clear, state parties should take immediate and effective steps to

end forced child labour. Contrary to this the EEAS appears to endorse a slowly, slowly

reform approach, which is more reflective of the type of response we’d expect to the

longer-term resolution to, often poverty related, child labour: To reiterate – it is forced

child labour, coerced by the state, that is being perpetrated in Uzbekistan.

Conclusions

Anti-Slavery’s experience with the EEAS relates to only one issue but from this we would

argue a number of points related to the questions raised by the House of Lords Committee:

1. Has the creation of the EEAS led to a more politically informed development policy? If so, has

this been beneficial or detrimental to the efficiency and delivery of EU development assistance?

Has it had an impact on EU development priorities? Are there new reporting obligations?


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It is not clear what is driving the Uzbek-related development policy articulated by EEAS, but

it is, in the opinion of Anti-Slavery, that the policy is lacking in understanding of some of the

most fundamental labour and child rights issues relating to development. This lack of

understanding of how the systemic used of forced labour and forced child labour distorts the

entire rural economy in Uzbekistan certainly poses a considerable risk to the effective

deliver of EU development assistance in that country.

2. What has been the impact on NGOs of the role of the EEAS in development? Are NGOs able to

feed in suggestions and, if so, how? Is this done better directly in Brussels or in Member State

capitals? Has the creation of the EEAS affected the capacity of NGOs to act on the ground? If

so, in what way?

Our experience of trying to engage with EEAS has been frustrating resulting in negligible

impact on the delivery of development assistance. This has been all the more frustrating

because in certain key respects our interventions have related to simply trying to ensure

that the EU adhere to international standards as set by, in particular, the relevant ILO

Conventions. Not only does it appear that EEAS has chosen to disregard these standards,

but also, as noted above, to have failed to understand them.

It should be stated in making these criticisms that there is significant evidence that EEAS has

contributed to building better coordination in-country. For example, the drafting process for

human rights country strategies involved greater coordination and buy-in from Member

States Embassies in-country because it was driven from the ground up. Following the

empowerment of the EU delegations, there has been an increase in EU delegation

statements on human rights issues. For human rights defenders local delegation statements

(rather like the US Embassy Statements) can often have more impact than a statement issued

from Brussels or London. This has been appreciated by human rights defenders where it has

happened.

By contrast, as indicated by Anti-Slavery’s engagement described above, policy coordination

and actions in Brussels have not necessarily become more coordinated, nor the architecture

of decision-making simplified in Brussels as a result of the creation of the EEAS. The Human

Rights Strategic Framework, adopted in June 2012, contains excellent action points, but

there is a sense that it is not linked up to geographical policy when it matters. HR/VP Ashton

made very weak statements on a visit to Central Asia end November 2012, not meeting


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with independent civil society actors and human rights defenders in oil-rich Kazakhstan and

not even mentioning human rights in her statement. A statement on Uzbekistan was weak

and made no reference to the forced child and adult labour problem in the cotton sector

there nor did it call for the release of prisoners.

12 Dec 2012

Rosa Balfour, European Policy Centre, Brussels and Kristi Raik, Finnish Institute for International

Affairs, Helsinki – Written evidence

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Rosa Balfour, European Policy Centre, Brussels and Kristi Raik,

Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki – Written

evidence

The European External Action Service two years on

1. Assessing how the EEAS performed during its first two years is no easy task. There is

no benchmark against which to assess the early steps of a historically unique

diplomatic body. What and whose agenda should provide the criteria against which

to assess change, success, and failure? The fact that the EEAS was inaugurated at a

time of great expectations was one of the reasons behind the very bad press it has

received. Furthermore, the EEAS operated in a context of constraints due not just to

the economic crisis but also to the reluctance of the member states to invest in the

Service that they created.

2. Relations with the Commission have perhaps been the least successful area of the

new Service. Rather than cleavages based on nationality due to the intake of

diplomats and officials from the member states, the key dividing line was, especially

during the first eighteen months of the EEAS, between the EEAS and the

Commission. This had negative repercussions on a number of areas. First of all, a

working culture within the EEAS has been slow to develop. Today, this remains an

area for priority, to be addressed through the EEAS Review, training schemes and

internal management of the Service. Secondly, it has severely hampered the

development of more integrated and coherent policies where the EU can

demonstrate an added value compared to member states’ foreign policies. If the EU

were capable of thinking and linking internal and external policies, the global

dimension of internal areas of competence, it would greatly enhance Europe’s ability

to deal with cross-cutting challenges from migration, the management of global

resources and public goods, and international diplomacy. Finally, one consequence

has been that fears of ‘competence creep’, with both the member states and the

Commission afraid of losing competences to the new body, have put everybody

involved - supranational institutions, member states and the EEAS - in a defensive

position, providing fertile ground for turf battles.

3. By 2012 some signs of improvement in inter-institutional cooperation were showing,

though this evaluation varies according to the field addressed. EEAS officials cite the

Balkans and enlargement as one area of good cooperation, but the officials working

on the Balkans region were already doing so before the Lisbon Treaty in the Council

and in the Commission. It is reported that the Commission and the EEAS

coordinated with each other with regard to the development of the new initiatives to

address changes in North Africa and the Middle East, through the creation of task

forces mobilizing officials from different institutions for bilateral meetings with

Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt.

4. But in other areas EEAS-Commission coordination remains poor and/or ad hoc. The

development of a ‘comprehensive approach’ within the EEAS, for example, has met

very negative responses from the Commission’s directorates dealing with



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Development Cooperation and with Humanitarian assistance. On crisis management

the EEAS spent much of 2011 restructuring internal offices to respond to crises, but

it remains unclear how it is supposed to coordinate with the Commission, which

manages the financial instruments. In other areas there is far more need for

coordination and development of strategic thinking, including the external impact of

internal policies (such as energy).

5. Areas of achievements, in operative terms if not in terms of impact on the ground,

include EU sanction’s policy, where EU member states were able to coordinate

effectively in incrementally upgrading sanctions against Syria and Iran. The member

states and much of the international community also appreciate the role the EEAS is

playing in the talks with Iran, where the unity of the E3+3 group is appreciated

notwithstanding its actual results. Other efforts at international cooperation too have

been commended, such as the dialogue with ‘new’ actors such as the Arab League,

the Organisation for the Islamic Conference, or initiatives to coordinate with other

actors, such as the Cairo Group.

6. With respect to the role of the member states in EU foreign policy,

intergovernmentalism has not been seriously challenged by any of the proposals

stemming from the EEAS or the HR/VP, but the protagonism of the foreign ministers,

after the cacophony during the initial period of the Arab Spring, and the competition

among politicians to get a photo opportunity on Tahrir Square first has somewhat

waned to the benefit of the HR/VP. It is reported that the member states have

become more cooperative with the EEAS during 2012, but the real test will be seen

in the degree of adaptation of the member states and their national diplomacies, and

whether they restructure and re-strategise their priorities taking into account that

many tasks could be more effectively and efficiently carried out by the EEAS.

7. National diplomacies have been slow in adapting to the new situation and, overall,

have adopted a ‘wait and see’ position towards the EEAS. All emphasise the need for

the EEAS to complement rather than substitute national foreign policy, with very

little thought on how the two could reinforce each other in terms of strategies,

capabilities and institutional structures. Most member states have cut their foreign

policy budgets and structures since the creation of the EEAS, but member states have

been slow to start considering the potential economies of scale to be gained through

the EEAS, above all by making better use of its network of delegations. Some early

experiences of division of labour exercises, burden-sharing arrangements, and

rationalization of services already exist, and there is much potential to do more.

8. The creation of a more coherent and integrated foreign policy has been more

challenging in certain issues of key importance, such as representation in the United

Nations or defence related matters, where most member states prefer to limit the

EU’s role to the minimum. Relations with the United States are a different kind of

high priority where member states compete for attention of the White House and

grudgingly accept the fact that Washington increasingly prefers to deal with Brussels

rather than 27. In some other high-priority areas, EU backing or empowerment can

be very important, but there is no question about the EU replacing national



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diplomacy (e.g. relations with Russia and eastern neighbourhood for the eastern

member states). Not surprisingly, member states have a more relaxed attitude

towards allowing a greater role for the EEAS in non-priority areas, above all

geographically remote regions. Yet if the EU only moved forward on the marginal

foreign policy issues, its level of ambition would be low and it could hardly have more

than a marginal role as a global actor. It is the EU’s role in key areas, such as in the

neighbourhood, in relations with major powers and representation on key

multilateral fora, that really determines whether the EU can have a stronger global

voice.

9. Apart from high and low priorities, there are so-called ‘declaratory priorities’ that

are formally high on the agenda, but where member states willingly shift the burden

to the EU. This kind of ‘offloading’ can be observed with regard to value-based issues

such as democracy and human rights. Here member states can converge (in so far as

the so-called ‘values’ do not interfere with some key national interests), or can use

the EU as a protective shield in those cases in which third parties may not appreciate

the EU expressing its concern over such values.

10. From efficiency perspective, the EEAS is one among many opportunities and

solutions for MFAs to ‘do more with less’, the other options being burden-sharing

with partner countries, other national government agencies, non-governmental

actors etc. In order to adjust their capacity for global action to a variety of demands

of the state, citizens and businesses, MFAs need to engage different stakeholders and

re-assess their functions. The EEAS has yet to establish its place in the changing

configuration of actors. Unlike the other stakeholders and collaborators of MFAs, the

EEAS actually has the potential to take over some of the core functions of diplomacy,

in addition to its potential as an innovative policy entrepreneur operating across

sectoral borders.

11. The locus of EEAS added value for national diplomacies lies in the 140 EU

Delegations. EU delegations can offer significant political benefits thanks to common

representation and outreach, access to local players, reporting and information

sharing. They also entail the potential to rationalize European diplomacy and make it

more cost-effective, allowing member states to focus national resources on key

national priorities and to rely on the services of EU network elsewhere. Third

countries now have a single interlocutor to discuss not just trade and aid, but also

political relations, security, energy, natural resources, migration issues. As the

importance of the Delegations becomes evident to non-European interlocutors, this

will feed back not just to headquarters in Brussels but also in the member states.

12. The early phase of upgrading the EU delegations has been relatively successful, and

in most cases the member states accept the new coordinating role, even if there are

important exceptions and variation between locations. EU coordination and a new

representative role has been relatively easy to establish in less important and

peripheral locations where member states have fewer political interests at play and

where the status and rank of their diplomats is more modest and leaves more room

for accepting leadership by EU representatives. The easiest cases from the viewpoint



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of MFAs’ readiness to accept a leading role of EU delegations are locations where

one’s own country has no representation. These delegations provide access and

information and can be used as extensions for the conduct of national foreign policy.

At the same time, they do not compete with national representations and fit neatly

with the principle of EEAS complementarity. But these cases are not limited to

peripheral countries. The EU Delegation in Syria was deliberately kept open while

member states were closing theirs precisely to have an important antenna in the

country, and is reported to be working very well.

13. The most difficult test for the ability of EU delegations to bring value added is posed

by the key locations where member states are not likely to give up national

representations any time soon, if ever, but where concerted action of the EU is all

the more important for Europe’s ability to maintain global relevance and impact. In

international organisations the EU in most cases continues to be represented by the

rotating Presidency – a step back compared to the Lisbon Treaty. In Washington,

Beijing, New Delhi, Moscow, Cairo, and Tokyo it is most challenging for the EEAS to

be more than the 28th member state. It is also in these locations, where each MS

prioritises national representation and reporting, that the coordinating role of the

EEAS is most vital.

14. Staffing in the Delegations has now reached the aim of including one third coming

from national diplomacies. This has considerably enriched the knowledge, skills and

working culture of the Delegations, making them better equipped to become the first

interface with third countries. In a few Delegations there are national military

attachès seconded, such as in New York and in Pakistan. The larger Delegations are

also better staffed with officials dealing with cross-cutting issues.

15. The EEAS has been too slow in involving the Delegations in policy-shaping. Some

member states are willing to give the delegations more leeway and appreciate policy

proposals made by the delegations on their own initiative, but others are more

cautious and stress the role of Brussels and national capitals in defining policy

guidelines. Faced with such contradictory expectations, the delegations have to

gradually build up their role, win trust among the member states and beware of

national sensitivities, while at the same time spending much time in their new

coordinating role.

16. There is considerable interest among the member states and in the EEAS in co-

location arrangements, notably joint embassy premises and the possibility to place

national ‘laptop diplomats’ in the premises of EU delegations. For example, an

embassy of Luxembourg has been established in the premises of the EU delegation to

Ethiopia, and the EEAS and Spain have just agreed on the establishment of the

embassy of Spain in the premises of EU Delegation to Yemen.

17. Many member states have complained of a lack of transparency and information-

sharing as a major problem that has undermined trust in the EEAS and fed suspicions

about the largest three member states controlling the agenda. There have been

problems with both the scope and timing of EEAS information-sharing. During the

early phase of the EEAS, member states were receiving less information on CFSP-



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related matters than in pre-Lisbon times. In particular, many member states

considered reporting on meetings of the HR with external partners to be insufficient.

As for timing, the practice of distributing relevant documents very close to the

meetings (FAC in particular) was broadly criticised by the member states.

Information-sharing in the other direction, from European capitals to the EEAS has

been even more difficult. On the positive side, informal contacts between the EEAS

and MFAs on the lower level have been working reasonably well: member states’

diplomats are fairly satisfied with the responsiveness and openness of their colleagues

in the EEAS when it comes to informal consultations; this goes for both the

headquarters in Brussels and EU delegations abroad.

18. On the local level, a new information sharing system, ACID, introduced recently

among embassies and EU Delegations on the ground, is helping to bring the local

diplomatic networks together, providing concrete added value to all member states.

It is important to get the system to full operation globally; this requires additional

efforts also from the member states.

19. Rotation of staff between national diplomacies and the EEAS is a key element of the

service and one of the main instruments for ensuring a sense of ownership and trust

among member states. It can balance the intergovernmentalism of common foreign

policy, which is oriented to defend national interests, by strengthening a European

mind-set and habit to consider broader European interest among national diplomats,

despite the variety of national backgrounds, as the experience of CFSP institutions

such as the Political and Security Committee or the former Policy Unit of the

Council Secretariat show. The EEAS has the potential to function as an incubator of

European diplomats that complements these processes of socialisation.

20. As of June 2012, the share of national diplomats in the EEAS had reached 27%. So,

despite tensions around the recruitment process, the service is close to reaching the

one-third target and completing the staffing marathon, with a reasonably balanced

representation of each member state. The next challenges are to integrate the staff

from different backgrounds into a common culture and make the rotation work so

that there is regular and smooth circulation between Brussels and national capitals. It

would advance the cross-fertilisation of European diplomats if the permanent staff of

the EEAS could also be rotated to national MFAs, and not just vice versa.

21. Where the EEAS has succeeded is attracting highly qualified and motivated staff from

national diplomacies. There has been tight competition for posts in the EEAS,

indicating a high level of interest among the member states. Promoting their

diplomats to the EEAS has been a priority for most MFAs, although there is variation

as to the intensity of encouraging staff to seek positions in the service. In spite of the

well-known troubles of the transition phase and low morale among EEAS staff,

diplomats posted to the service tend to be highly motivated to make the new

structures work smoothly and deliver.

22. In order to utilise the potential of the highly motivated and professional staff, to draw

people from different backgrounds together and maintain the attractiveness of the

service, an investment in creating an esprit de corps is essential. Variety of

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experiences and perspectives of its staff is an asset of the EEAS, but these need to be

brought together into a joint pool of skills and a sense of community. A shared

working culture should also be consciously reinforced. Common training is necessary

with a view to all of these goals and needs to be designed in line with the unique

nature of the EEAS. Apart from traditional diplomatic skills such as reporting,

negotiation and cross-cultural interaction, a special consideration of Europe’s place in

the world and a European perspective on global problems needs to be nurtured. At

the same time, EEAS staff needs to be able to encounter three different kinds of

audiences: not only those external to the EU, but also those of the member states

who may view the EU and its foreign policy with suspicion, and finally those internal

to the EU machinery where inter-institutional rivalry is a constant threat to the

pursuit of common goals. In addition to passing on specific knowledge and skills,

training always has the function of fostering personal ties and networks that are

invaluable in later careers. Training should not be limited to skills’ transfer and

improvement, but should aim to create more opportunities for EEAS staff to work

with European diplomats. Encouraging joint participation of EEAS and national

diplomats in existing training schemes could also help foster a common diplomatic

culture.

23. A well-functioning system of rotation between the EEAS and MFAs is one way

(though not sufficient) to strengthen such a link and ease the tensions between

national and EU foreign policies. It would be in the interest of MFAs and the EEAS

alike to make it a norm across the EU that the best and brightest European diplomats

serve in the EEAS at some point of their careers. The MFAs need to make an effort

to ensure smooth return of their people from the EEAS and adequate

acknowledgement of the EEAS experience. Once the national diplomats return home,

MFAs have much to gain from their experience in the EEAS and inside knowledge of

the EU.

24. Areas for improvement: coordination and synergies with the Commission needs to

be one of the top priorities, as well as ensuring the full participation of member

states through better consultation and information-sharing. These are political issues

of great consequence. Further concrete priority areas should include: improving

political reporting from Delegations, strengthening the role of Delegations in shaping

policy, creating a deputy/deputies for the HR (and clearer competences/role for the

top management), and developing a common working culture inside the EEAS.

December 2012

Dr Federica Bicchi, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political

Science – Written evidence

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Dr Federica Bicchi, Department of International Relations, London

School of Economics and Political Science – Written evidence

I am a Lecturer in the International Relations of Europe at LSE and currently hold a Visiting

Fellowship in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University

Institute, Florence, Italy. My recent research has focused on communications and

information exchanges in EU foreign policy, as well as on the EU response to the Arab

uprisings. In my comments I would like to use the expertise derived from my recent

research to focus on two of the questions raised by the enquiry.

What are the main achievements of the EEAS since its establishment? Where

has it been less successful?

1.1 The main added value of EU foreign policy is to provide a framework allowing member

states to take into account each other’s national positions while formulating their own. This

‘coordination reflex’ improves the chances of a common voice emerging from 27 unique

foreign policy traditions. There is pressure on member states to converge on a common

position, but the outcome is not necessarily convergence. On certain issues, there is a single

voice and a well-established and legally formalised policy making process to achieve it (such

as on trade). On others, there is an agreement to disagree (use of force and the recognition

of new political actors tend to be among the most divisive issues for EU member states).

1.2 The establishment of the EEAS has strengthened this framework. The EEAS is an

instrument to foster dialogue, improve coordination, and create opportunities for

negotiations between member states and with non-member countries. It has done so by drafting agendas for meetings, impressing momentum to debates and negotiations, and

providing a third party in disputes between member states. The EEAS thus facilitates

consensus when conditions for consensus exist, while trying to do damage control when

they do not. Thus far, its comparative advantage in relation to the previous situation of the

rotating Presidency lies in its continuity and in the absence of a national agenda to be

peddled. Initially, the EEAS has shown a considerable degree of hesitation, mainly linked to

the fact that it was simultaneously setting up working procedures and using them (as Mr

O’Sullivan remarked, this is akin to repairing an engine while it is running). It has since

improved its performance, and time will help it to consolidate the conditions for a more

consistent performance.

1.3 There remains room for improvement in the implementation of the 2010 Council

Decision and related working arrangements. Two issues stand out. First, to add real value to

the EU foreign policy making process, the EEAS must be able to gather and process good

information about international affairs as well as about member states’ positions. What it has

lacked, compared to the rotating Presidency when held by bigger member states, is the

capacity for long-term agenda setting, analysis of potential crisis scenarios (more on the

civilian-political side than on the military side) and the ability to achieve, maintain and ‘sell’

draft common positions. Second, and related to the previous point, EU Delegations have a

crucial role to play and their working arrangements must be streamlined. EU Delegations are

now tasked with political reporting and this is essential for adding value to the work done in

Brussels. It should be done professionally and consistently, in all fields of foreign policy

(including military). Moreover, the complications of hosting both EEAS and Commission



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officials should be resolved, so as to provide a much smoother functioning of working

practices.

1.4 Accountability is an aspect for which there is no easy fix as well as only a limited need

for improvement. In my view, the EEAS does not fare particularly badly in this respect in

comparison to other diplomatic networks. The point with accountability is “to whom / to

which institution.” There are roughly four options:

i. To the European Parliament (EP) and/or to national parliaments: The situation in

relation to the EP is an improvement on the previous state of affairs. For instance,

the EP now exerts the right to question incoming Heads of Delegations, whose

quality is vital to the good functioning of the EEAS. The EP also retains a link with EU

Delegations, tasked to provide the EP with information when requested. The EP also

receives regular reports and MEPs have the right to pose questions to the EEAS. The

extent to which national parliaments are able to make the EEAS accountable is more

doubtful. Much of this is due however to the varying degrees of national

parliamentary involvement in EU affairs and to national parliamentary procedures.

The arrangements of the UK Parliament and the support it receives from the FCO

stand out very positively when compared to other examples across Europe. It is

undeniable that the EEAS (and the EU in general) are very complex and technical

issues, requiring specific competences to avoid mistaking complexity with

opaqueness. But these competences exist and this should not be taken as an excuse

for lack of supervision.

ii. To peers: This is probably the most relevant form of accountability in the context of

EU foreign policy and the one on which the EEAS fares reasonably well. The EEAS is

constantly monitored, assessed and scrutinised by the ministries of Foreign Affairs of

the 27 member states. As EU foreign policy does not exist without the unanimous

support of member states, the EEAS needs the support of member states to speak

with one voice in the name of Europe. Therefore, relations between the EEAS and member states’ diplomatic networks are vital, both in Brussels and in non-member

countries. The inclusion in the EEAS of (nearly) one third of national diplomats at the

AD (administrator or diplomatic) level contributes to strengthen the links between

the EEAS and national diplomatic services. It represents a considerable advancement

on the previous state of affairs, when the European Commission–External Relations

‘family’ had constructed its prestige by keeping a distance from member states. It is

thus a disadvantage that the European Commission continues to represent the bulk

of the EEAS and actions should be taken to dilute the legacy of its working method in

terms of relations with member states. Possible options here would be to foster

secondment to national ministries and to improve the diplomatic training of EEAS

officials, even if this might entail a marginal increase in the budget.

iii. To experts: This is the less intrusive and more technocratic form of accountability.

There is already intense scrutiny (and often criticism) of the EEAS, although there

could obviously be more. A break-through would be a more political debate about

the “finalité politique” of EU foreign policy in general. But this not only goes beyond

the scope of the EEAS review in 2013, it also depends on the political climate

prevailing in member states and among their political parties that are currently fully

absorbed by the euro crisis. In fact, the euro crisis has diverted attention away from

intense scrutiny of the EEAS and opened a window of opportunity for the EEAS to

establish itself away from the spotlight, while at the same time undermining the EEAS

overall credibility in third countries.



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iv. To the general public: Diplomacy is often viewed as a realm within which secrecy

prevails. Much of its value would vanish if everything was disclosed to the man or

woman in the street, so to speak (who would anyway very likely have at best a

limited interest in the day-to-day operation of foreign policy beyond crisis situations).

The global trend is however towards more public diplomacy, including the

involvement of non-state actors. Moreover, the role of diplomats is shifting and the

qualities most in demand include the capacity to link different contexts, issues,

cultures, etc. In this respect, the EEAS is well placed. As an experiment in linking

different institutions and involving 27 countries, it reflects the needs of contemporary

societies, even if it is not immediately accessible by the general public.

How well do the relationships with the Foreign Ministries of the EU Member

states work and how well do EU Delegations cooperate with the diplomatic

missions of the EU Member states?

2.1 It is worth stressing that the direction and content of EU foreign policy remain in the

hands of member states, and bigger member states de facto retain veto power. The EEAS

has consolidated this situation, which can be characterised as win-win. Smaller member

states have started to rely on the EEAS for the provision of crucial services, while bigger

member states have the option to cooperate more closely with the EEAS in order to affect

the direction of EU foreign policy.

2.2 Smaller member states see the EEAS as an opportunity for voicing their national

concerns, for acting in crisis situations for which they do not have the means (from military

missions to, potentially, consular affairs), and for receiving information on subjects they

know little. This last point is particularly important. Fig. 1 shows the extension of member

states’ networks of embassies (i.e. excluding consulates) beyond EU borders in 2009.1 The

situation has not changed much since then, and where so, it has meant a reduction in numbers. Therefore, smaller member states have a limited set of ‘eyes on the ground’ and

generally these are clustered in a given area (e.g. smaller Central and Eastern European

countries tend, with the obvious exceptions, to have representations in the post-Soviet

Union region). On the contrary, bigger member states and EU Delegations (now counting

140) cover the wide majority of non-member countries and are often the only ones

represented in the Southern hemisphere, as countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin

America host on average 7 missions.

1 This was the last year in which this information was published by the EU. The information was gathered with

the aim of identifying which embassies could, in case of crisis, represent the EU Presidency, thus identifying

member states’ missions with a full set of functions.



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Figure 1. Total number of missions in third countries, by country, 2009.

Source: General Council Secretariat, “Note – Presidency diplomatic representation in third

countries – Second half of 2009”, Brussels, 3 July 2009.

2.3 Therefore, since the establishment of the EEAS and the new emphasis on political

reporting, there is a significant difference in the way member states participate in EU foreign

policy making: while some have their own sources of information, others rely on EU

Delegations. This creates the opportunity for countries with a global reach to work closely

with the local EU Delegation in order to contribute significantly to the direction and content

of the EU foreign policy. Among the bigger member states, the UK has a relative

comparative advantage, given the FCO’s reputation for efficiency and local contacts, which in

turn translate in clear lines of communication and early drafts. Close engagement does not

automatically turn into influence and risks draining resources. But the EU has a track record

of magnifying the power for countries that invest in it. The FCO has recently seconded

excellent staff to the EEAS, but given a legacy of under-representation at lower levels of the

administration and the current Eurosceptic climate in British politics, this is not the time to

disengage.

2.4 In fact, the opposite is true, as this is a field in which the UK can contribute crucial

political leadership to achieve a world order that reflects its interests, as already been the

case in areas such as the Horn of Africa. Without the UK, other member states would

impress a different direction to EU foreign policy, potentially leading for instance to more

troubled Transatlantic relations. In practical terms, this means that budget neutrality should

not be the main objective of the British position in the 2013 Review. Rather, it should be

used as a starting point to achieve better value for money, especially in relation to the link

between the EEAS and member states (secondment and training being two options),

between the EEAS and the Commission (particularly in EU Delegations) and between CFSP

and CSDP (with an increase of civilian crisis management capacities, particularly for analysis).

This would multiply the influence of the UK across Europe and the world, while at the same

time making the UK a more attractive partner for the United States of America. The EEAS is

a very innovative diplomatic instrument. It is strongly in the interests of the UK government

133

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68 64 63 63 61 58 58 56 53 53 50 47

32 31

20 19 17 15 11 8 7

0

20

40

60

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FR DE UK IT ES NL RO CZ BE PL SE EL BG AT HU DK PT FI SK IE SI LT CY LV EE MT LU



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not only to engage with it, but also to work positively within these emerging structures in

pursuit of British foreign policy positions and interests.

11 January 2012

Professor Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow & Head of the EU Foreign Policy Unit, Centre

for European Policy Studies – Written evidence

17 of 133

Professor Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow & Head of

the EU Foreign Policy Unit, Centre for European Policy Studies –

Written evidence

EEAS re-loaded: some recommendations for the 2013 review

Pursuant to Article 13(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the

organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the High

Representative (HR) is held to provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the

EEAS by mid-2013. The review will cover, “inter alia”, the implementation of Article 6(6), (8)

and (11), so as to ensure an adequate geographical and gender balance and a meaningful

presence of nationals from all Member States in the EEAS. “[I]f necessary”, the review will be

accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision of the 2010 Council Decision (e.g.,

suggestions for additional specific measures to correct possible imbalances of staffing). “In

that case”, the Council will, in accordance with Article 27(3) TEU, revise the Decision in the

light of the review by the beginning of 2014.

As such, the 2013 review will offer an important first formal opportunity to assess the

strengths and weaknesses of the EEAS, to address some of its current weaknesses, and to

give a new impetus to its further development. Whereas Article 13(3) of the 2010 Council

Decision specifically mentions organisational matters as subjects of the review, the

formulation of the provision is sufficiently open-ended to allow the reviewers the room to

address more than just (short-term) organisational issues. Indeed, it would be a shame not

to use the review process prescribed by the 2010 Council Decision as an opportunity to

also look into the Service’s overall contribution to attaining the objectives of the EU’s

foreign policy (cf. Article 21 TEU), and into its cooperation with the member states’

diplomatic services, the services of the European Commission, the Council General

Secretariat, and the European Parliament. While successes have been achieved on all of

these counts and can thus serve to show the value added by the EEAS,2 important

improvements to the organisation and functioning of the Service should still be made.

However, there are obvious limits to what can be achieved in the 2013 review process, as

some organisational changes would require not just a revision of the 2010 Council Decision

but of the underlying Treaties, and/or the composition of the institutions in the wake of the

next elections for the European Parliament in 2014.

If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. This is also the mind-set of a group of scholars gathered under

the banner of “EEAS 2.0” who, with an eye to the forthcoming review, are about to publish a

legal commentary to the 2010 Council Decision, in search of the interpretative margins of

2 See, e.g., S. Blockmans, ‘The European External Action Service One Year On: First Signs of Strengths and Weaknesses,

CLEER Working Paper 2012/2, available at <http://www.cleer.eu>.

http://www.cleer.eu/



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appreciation to accommodate necessary changes to the organisation and functioning of the

EEAS “à droit constant”.3

In practice, and like in any other bureaucracy, changes to the organisation and functioning of

the EEAS continue to be made on a daily basis, without the need of opening what in some

member states is seen as Pandora’s box of negotiations on the 2010 Council Decision. The

fear of endless negotiations rests on the risk that talks may extend into the areas covered by

the flanking Staff and Financial Regulations and thus require co-decision by the European

Parliament.

Although the lead clearly lies with the High Representative, the 2013 review process should

systematically involve all member states, Commission services, the Council General

secretariat, the European Parliament, think tanks, NGO’s and civil society organisations. A

roadmap should be adopted by the High Representative and communicated by the EEAS. A

‘listening’ period should be organised so as to collect ideas and opinions, for the member

states to consider during the first Gymnich of 2013. The High Representative should then

present her report by the end of June 2013, with an aim to take on the short-term priorities

before the end of 2013, while leaving more ambitious proposals to amend the organisation

and functioning of the EEAS for the next legislative cycle and/or the next round of Treaty

revision.

On the basis of the foregoing and earlier analyses of both the strengths and shortcomings of

the EEAS,4 recommendations can be made to address some of the organisational weaknesses

of the Service, under at least 4 headings:5

1. The role of the EEAS in promoting the coherence of external action needs to

be reinforced:

- A joint communication on the comprehensive approach to foreign policy-making should

be urgently adopted by the Commission and the High Representative and implemented by

all members of the EU external action family. The comprehensive approach should make

full use of the hybrid role of the HR/VP, mobilise the different tools at the EU’s disposal,

3 The legal commentary will become available in January 2013 on the websites of a number of participating think tanks and

academic centres of excellence, including that of CEPS at <http://www.ceps.eu>, SIEPS at <http://www.sieps.se>, and the

EUI at <http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Law/Publications/PublishedWorkingPapers.aspx>.

4 See, e.g., S. Blockmans, ‘Fit for Purpose? The European External Action Service One Year On’, OXFAM Briefing Paper

159, 23 January 2012, available at <http://www.oxfam.org>; and L. Erkelens & S. Blockmans, ‘Setting Up the European

External Action Service: An Act of Institutional Balance’, in 8 European Constitutional Law Review (2012), 246-279.

5 More points can be made and have been made, especially on policy substance. See, e.g. E. Burke, ‘Europe’s External Action

Service: Ten Steps Towards a Credible EU Foreign Policy’, CER Policy Brief, 4 July 2012; F. Krätke and A. Sherriff, ‘Gearing

Up for the 2013 EEAS Review: Opportunities, Challenges, and Possible Approaches’, ECDPM Briefing Note, No. 44,

November 2012; and S. Lehne, ‘The Review of the European External Action Service in 2013’, Carnegie Europe, 15

November 2012.

http://www.ceps.eu/

http://www.sieps.se/

http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Law/Publications/PublishedWorkingPapers.aspx

http://www.oxfam.org/



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in close interaction with the member states and in close cooperation with other

international actors, and make optimal use of scarce resources.

- In order to facilitate cross-cutting coordination and integrated foreign policy-making, the

EEAS should develop the necessary expertise with regard to those internal EU policies

which have an important external dimension, such as transport, energy, climate and

migration.

- The EEAS should be better joined up with the Commission’s DG DEVCO, both at

headquarters level and in EU Delegations. To this end, the ‘Working Arrangements’

concluded between the Commission and the EEAS on 13 January 2012 should be revised.6

2. The VP persona of the High Representative’s mandate needs to be

strengthened:

- The VP should chair monthly meetings of the previously called ‘RELEX group’,

composed of Commissioners in charge of the various aspects of external action (trade,

enlargement & ENP, development cooperation, humanitarian aid & civil protection, even

monetary affairs), so as to actively coordinate external policies within the Commission.

Under Barroso I, this group used to meet on a monthly basis; under Barroso II, it has met

only handful of times.

- To alleviate some of the stress on an over-burdened HR/VP position, a deputy should be

appointed to replace the HR as (first) Vice-President in the Commission, e.g. when s/he is

unable to attend the meetings of the college. The hybrid position currently embodied by

the Commissioner for the ENP provides a good source of inspiration for this type of

deputation: all of his staff within the previous DG RELEX has been moved to the EEAS on

1 January 2011, but together with his cabinet, he plays an active role within the structures

of the Commission. Incidentally, detaching the responsibility for the ENP from the

portfolio of EU enlargement may send a clearer signal to neighbouring countries

(especially those on the southern borders of the Mediterranean) what not to expect from

the EU and its institutions, i.e. a membership perspective.

- In line with the argumentation presented at the outset of the previous point, a political

deputy (possibly from a member state – rotating Presidency) should be appointed to

replace the High Representative for his/her responsibilities under the CFSP.

3. The structure of the EEAS needs to be reinforced:

- The security policy and CSDP structures should be simplified and properly integrated

into the EEAS. A rebalancing should take place between the military elements and the

insufficiently strong civilian crisis management capacities.

6 SEC(2012) 48, Ref. Ares(2012) 41133.



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- The Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments should be fully integrated in

the structures of the EEAS. The EEAS should have the responsibility for the management

of the CFSP budget and should be given the right of operational expenditure.

- The EU Special Representatives and their staff should be fully integrated into the

geographic and thematic services of the EEAS.

- The split between EEAS and Commission staff in EU delegations should be overcome by

strengthening the authority of the Heads of Delegations and allowing them to delegate

more responsibilities, simplifying reporting lines, and ending the current separation of

financial circuits. To this end, the ‘Working Arrangements’ concluded between the

Commission and the EEAS on 13 January 2012 should also be revised.

- The Corporate Board of the EEAS should also be simplified. The division of labour

between the top executives has to be clarified and, here too, clear reporting lines should

be established.

4. Cooperation with member states’ diplomacies needs to be strengthened:

- In the interest of cost-saving and in a drive for increased efficiency, information exchange

should be further regularised and procedures harmonised, at headquarters, but also in

representations to multilateral institutions and in bilateral postings. The potential of co-

location of member states’ embassies with EU Delegations should be examined.7 What is

being done by the UK in the context of cooperation with Commonwealth countries like

Canada could also be done in the framework of the EEAS.8

November 2012

7 A good example is provided by a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the EEAS and Spain to establish Spanish

Embassy on premises of EU Delegation to Yemen, Press release A 568/12Brussels, 10 December 2012.

8 See S. Blockmans and S. Carrera, ‘The UK-Canada Agreement on Mutual Support of Missions Abroad: Loyalty

Compromised?’, CEPS Commentary, 18 October 2012.

Bond – Written evidence

21 of 133


1. Bond, the membership body for UK development and humanitarian aid NGOs,

welcomes the opportunity to provide written evidence to this enquiry. We will focus

on questions 5, 6 and 16 among those provided by the Committee in its call for

evidence.

2. Our evidence refers to a report that CONCORD, the European NGO

Confederation for Relief and Development, launched in January 2012, on the first

year anniversary of the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS).9 For

the question on crisis response, we have asked our members involved in this issue to

provide input specifically for this inquiry. To the extent possible within the short time

frame available, we have also gathered additional information from Bond and

CONCORD member organisations on more recent developments within the EEAS.

3. Bond was heavily involved in the drafting of the above mentioned CONCORD

report, which was written on the basis of interviews undertaken in the months of

October and November 2011 with a variety of non-profit organisations, including

national NGO platforms in Benin, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, as a well as EU

institutions, Member State representatives, and experts at the Overseas

Development Institute10. As it doesn’t make sense to reproduce the entire content of

that report in this submission, we invite the House of Lords EU Committee to check it and use it in its inquiry as a source of further information and specific examples.

4. Bond’s starting point in this submission is the recognition that European countries

can no longer count on their individual or collective economic weight alone to

ensure influence in a multi-polar world. If the EU and its Member States (UK

included) want to maintain their position on a rapidly changing international scene,

they can, and need to, benefit from investing in a coherent foreign policy. In addition,

a more coordinated EU external action policy has been from the start at the core of

the Lisbon Treaty, and the EEAS was put in place to help achieve that.

5. The EU and Member States have also undertaken crucial commitments to Policy

Coherence for Development (PCD), including in the Lisbon Treaty. These are

designed to ensure that their external actions at the very least do not undermine

their Treaty commitments to sustainable development and the eradication of

poverty.

6. The role of the EEAS must therefore include ensuring compliance with those

commitments – and a unified external action service has the potential to make this

easier to achieve for the EU when it deals with partner countries. This will however

require both adequate resources and, crucially, clarity on its obligation to implement

PCD. The evidence we have seen so far, however, shows that this is still not the

case.

9 CONCORD, EEAS One Year On: “Work in Progress for Poverty Eradication”, January 2012.

http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/EU_/EEAS-year-A4-lowdef.pdf

10 For a full list, see page 15 of the report.

http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/EU_/EEAS-year-A4-lowdef.pdf


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How does the balance of responsibilities between the EEAS and the Commission work in the

development area? Has the creation of the EEAS improved the implementation of the EU’s

development policy?

7. The above-mentioned CONCORD report finds that the European Union is

marginalising anti-poverty objectives within the EEAS. In particular, EU foreign policy

is turning a blind eye to poverty eradication, as the EEAS has, even since the report,

failed so far to sufficiently integrate development policy in the new service. In regions

such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, anti-terrorism and security operations have

been prioritised with little consideration to long-term development efforts. More

generally, development policy continues to be vulnerable to being used for geo-

political objectives.

8. The CONCORD report highlighted that competition rather than co-operation was

prevailing between EEAS and the European Commission institutions. Since then we

see continuing evidence of disagreements. For instance, many delegations are not at

ease with the instructions coming from Brussels especially regarding programming of

EU development cooperation. A gap is growing between the realities of development

and poverty in the field and decisions taken in Brussels. The idea behind de–

concentration and strengthening of delegations was to take decisions closer to the

actual context but we see little progress in that regard so far.

9. Other analysts – such as think-tank ECDPM - have confirmed that the EEAS appears

to be under-equipped to deal with development issues. There seems to be only one

horizontal division (VI.B.2) in EEAS Headquarters with development as core business.

10. “If this division, in charge of programming, also has to deal with all other

development policy issues (e.g. the negotiations between the Parliament and EU

member states of the legal basis of cooperation instruments), then one can wonder

whether it is sufficient to support the EEAS hierarchy and colleagues in making an

evidence-based decisions. […] This is important for policy decisions in their

portfolios that might affect development therefore promoting “Policy Coherence for

Development” as envisaged in the Treaty,” states Andrew Sheriff of ECDPM.11 This

statement reflects our own observations.

11. As mentioned above, the PCD principles require that EU policies with a potential impact externally, such as agriculture, trade, energy and tax, do not have a negative

impact on its development objectives. The CONCORD report found that the EEAS

had done little to prioritise PCD in its programmes. This appears still to be the case,

almost one year on.

12. Broadly speaking there is still a lack of clarity as to which role the EEAS should be

playing. Several institutional representatives interviewed for the CONCORD report

mentioned (external) policy consistency rather than Policy Coherence for

Development as the priority for EEAS.

13. With an unclear mandate, it seems that no capacity has been allocated to PCD within

the EEAS. So what does the EEAS itself see as its role? Defending Europe’s best

interests or those of its partner countries? If the former is what EEAS staff would

answer, it is not surprising that PCD is such a low priority. In the old set-up, DG

11 A. Sheriff, Charting Change at the European External Action Service, ECDPM Talking Points, June 2012

http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/charting-change-at-the-european-external-action-service/

http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/charting-change-at-the-european-external-action-service/


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Development’s role was much more aligned with partner countries’ best interests.

Although that remains the case, the shift of many of DG Development’s

responsibilities to the EEAS means that in practice the commitment to development

objectives, and to partner countries’ best interests, has been diluted.

Has the EEAS been effective in response to crises?

14. The EEAS has mostly reproduced the former EU crisis response scheme to date, and

one that is driven by reaction rather than anticipation and prevention. Whereas the

Arab Spring caught the EU and the world off guard, it soon became clear that the EU

had to review how, overall, it was (or was not) supporting change in third countries.

15. The policies which have been adopted ever since (Agenda for Change, Council

Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, EC Communication on EU support for

sustainable change in transition societies, EC Communication on European

engagement with civil society in external relations) demonstrate an intention to

tackle drivers of conflicts upstream and to support actors of positive change in more

proactive ways, which are positive steps.

16. However, it is critical that the necessary practical processes to translate these

principles into action actually take place. Initiatives undertaken in that respect by the

thematic Divisions of the EEAS, especially the Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and

Mediation Division in the areas of conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and early

warning, are taken on board by the geographical divisions so that the EEAS becomes

more effective at preventing conflicts rather than reacting to on-going crises. This is

crucial especially as the EEAS is working on the next multiannual programming with

other bodies in Brussels and in-country.

17. Right from its launch in December 2010, the EEAS had to deal with crises, especially

the Arab Spring, which challenged the EU internal coordination (among EU

institutions on the one side, and with the Member States on the other side) that was

about to be set up.

18. Achieving consistency and coherence of the EU external action, which is one of the

main objectives of the EEAS, is still a work in progress that Member States will also

have to support if the EEAS and more broadly the EU is to become more effective at

responding to crises. UK has a role to play in calling other influential member states

such as France and Germany for more coherence in and support for the

implementation of conflict prevention measures.

19. The current formulation of a Comprehensive Approach to conflict prevention, crisis

management and stabilisation is critical: the EEAS needs to put more emphasis on

upstream conflict prevention rather than crisis management and stabilisation.

What does the EEAS need to do over the next three years and what should it prioritise/ On which

areas should the 2013 review focus?

20. CONCORD and Bond made recommendations in the above-mentioned report

which are still valid. These can be summarised as follows.

21. Narrative on EU development cooperation: The EEAS should develop a

narrative on EU development cooperation and its interaction with security and

human rights policies. Under its watch, no further erosion of the civilian character of

development cooperation through military or quasi-military spending should take

place.


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22. Make PCD a reality: The High Representative should acknowledge her obligation

to make Policy Coherence for Development a reality through the EEAS. She should

make a statement setting PCD as a priority function for the service, explaining clearly

to staff their role in relation to PCD when developing regional and national strategy

papers.

23. Sharpen development expertise: Expertise on development policy and practice

must be present at all levels in the institutions, including the EEAS. The EEAS and the

DG DEVCO should develop a training programme for all new EEAS staff to ensure

their ability to understand and apply a rights-based approach to development issues,

including PCD.

24. Work with civil society in country: In line with the recent Communication and

Council Conclusions on engagement with civil society in external actions, at both

headquarters and delegation level, both the EEAS and DEVCO should work more

actively to engage in political and policy dialogue with CSOs and NGOs, who know

the context of human rights and poverty on the ground and can help to shape

strategies to tackle it.

25. In addition to these, Bond member organisations stress that the EEAS needs to put

more emphasis on upstream conflict prevention rather than crisis

management and stabilisation.

December 2012

Brussels & Europe Liberal Democrats – Written evidence

25 of 133


This enquiry is taking place only two years after the formation of the EEAS and is part

of the formal review of the functioning of the EEAS due to be undertaken in 2013. It must be

said that this is a very short time for such a new complex organisation – merging

different institutional cultures including those of officials coming from 27 Member States

Foreign Offices - to have found its feet properly.

Nevertheless, we believe that the EEAS has started well. Conceived in an era of

European self-confidence and plenty, and born in an age of European self-doubt and

austerity, it has managed to set up a functional organisational structure in a short

period of time without much resort to additional financial resources. Member

States’ Foreign Offices have contributed many of their finest officials into the service.

Political reporting and analysis have been given much more weight. Coordination with

Member States in the field in particular has gone remarkably smoothly. Overall we feel the

whole thing has come together rather well.

In the real world, the EEAS has found its niche. For brevity, I will focus on just two areas of

progress. The EEAS is having a major positive impact on the EU’s eastern, south-eastern and

southern neighbourhoods, especially concerning the Arab Spring, the intractable Middle

East Peace Process and in leading negotiations with Iran. Secondly, it is also making a

significant contribution to developing relations with strategic partners, an importance

not to be underestimated in this changing world where absolute priority needs to be

given to maintaining the influence of an economically-weakened EU and

Member States in the face of rapidly-growing competition for ideas, markets and

resources by the outside world. Here the EU carries weight when it acts united on

behalf of a half billion citizens. These tasks are supported by the EEAS’ 137 delegations, the

sixth largest diplomatic network in the world.

As was predicted before the EEAS’s formation, combining the previous roles of the High

Representative, Vice–President of the Commission and the Chair of the Foreign Affairs

Council would overwhelm any incumbent in an organisation with so many stake-holders.

The High Representative needs two or three very senior Deputy High

Representatives to undertake tasks when the High Representative is not able to do. In

many parts of the world, foreign ministers – or even their deputies - will not meet senior

EEAS officials as they do not consider them to be of an adequate level. Substituting the High

Representative with a Member State Foreign Minister does not ease the situation as many

Foreign Ministers might not carry the same weight and our foreign interlocutors would find

such a pre-Lisbon substitution baffling.

Ways must be found to reduce bottle-necks in decision-taking, including streamlining

internal EEAS procedures as well as the consultation process with Member States, which are

often slow due to their complexity. In this respect, the EEAS organisational structure

needs to continue evolving and simplifying.


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As the EEAS develops, it will need to generate more long term ideas to maintain Europe’s

relevance in the world. As emerging economies take over a larger share of the world’s GDP

and political power, the more Europe needs to start thinking out-of-box to stay relevant.

Therefore policy planning within the EEAS must be more strategic and provide

the framework for both EEAS and Commission policy to ensure consistency in the

development of the EU’s grand strategy towards the world.

It should not be forgotten that EEAS and European Commission services work

together in partnership in the external field. Good coordination between the EEAS

and the Commission has made it largely unnecessary at Headquarters for the EEAS to

replicate those Commission-led thematic areas (such as climate change and migration)

extensively in its own structure. However those same Commission services need to be

present in the key relevant countries in the field as well. Given the envisaged five per

cent reduction in Commission posts, this will only be possible adequately by a transfer of

posts from other services within the Commission.

As the European Union faces the future, the EEAS is clearly part of the solution in

guiding us in this new world. Brussels & Europe Liberal Democrats encourage the UK

coalition government to take a much more positive attitude towards the EEAS,

not just thinking of it as a way of enacting the UK’s national interest but using the

considerable experience of the Foreign Office to make the EEAS a success in its own right

for the good of all EU Member States. This should include taking steps to help the EU

carry more weight in its own right in the United Nations system.

In this respect, negotiations for the EU’s 2014-2020 Multi-Annual Financial

Framework are clearly not just about the overall level of the budget but how expenditure

should be allocated sensibly. Thus we call upon the UK coalition government to

concentrate on ensuring the EEAS is not affected disproportionately in a

negative way.

10 December 2012

Edward Burke, Associate Researcher, FRIDE / University of St. Andrews – Supplementary written

evidence

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Edward Burke, Associate Researcher, FRIDE / University of St.

Andrews – Supplementary written evidence

1. I am grateful for the opportunity to present a written response on the question of how to

improve EEAS accountability. The EEAS has been subjected to sustained scrutiny and

criticism since it was launched in December 2010. Some of the criticism has been fair; much

has not.

2. For example, the High Representative / Vice President has done well in establishing a new

‘crisis management board’ (which integrates planning for general crisis response among

various bits of the EU), and in introducing the concept of ‘a crisis platform’ to respond to

specific conflicts or natural disasters. In addition she has created high-level task forces to

deal with specific third country governments in the European neighbourhood. These task

forces bring together senior personnel from the EEAS, Commission, European Investment

Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Union for the Mediterranean

and other agencies in a forum for drafting assistance proposals, monitoring progress and

solving problems with foreign partners.

3. The 2011 Strategy for the Horn of Africa is also a worthy attempt by the HR/VP to

establish better institutional coherence between (and within) the EEAS, the Commission and

member-states. The short-term security measures taken to deal with escalating problems of

terrorism, insurgency and piracy in the region (primarily through a naval mission, Operation

Atalanta) and a security sector training mission (the EU Training Mission Somalia), are now

being matched by long-term thinking on how to resolve political and socio-economic

problems at the root of conflict. The EEAS proposed – and member-states approved - a

major increase in EU financial support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

AMISOM, along with Somali troops, have been steadily pushing the rebel, extremist al-

Shabaab movement away from main population centres

4. The HR/VP also deserves praise for her role in chairing international talks on Iran’s

nuclear programme. Her stewardship of these difficult negotiations on a complex and urgent

challenge to international security has highlighted a diplomatic capability within the EEAS that

many had hastily thrown into question. The HR/VP has also presided over the introduction

of complex and robust sanctions that have severely hurt Iranian and Syrian government

interests.


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5. But the EEAS has also failed to meet expectations in some areas. The HR/VP and the EEAS

are not in the lead on key areas of foreign policy – for example, with respect to external

development assistance. In 2011 the European Council complained that Commission aid

programmes, such as those under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, did not

sufficiently reflect the strategic priorities identified by member-states and EEAS diplomats.

6. Presently the influence of the HR/VP and the EEAS on the Commission on foreign policy

matters is based more on collegial co-operation than executive authority. In some areas of

the EU’s external relations, the HR/VP has less power than that enjoyed by the former

commissioner for external relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, before the amalgamation of

the latter’s post with that of HR/VP under the Lisbon Treaty. The directorate-general for

external relations was not transferred wholly to the EEAS. Instead, some assets were kept

by the Commission, including the international climate negotiation unit that was transferred

to the new directorate for climate action. Similarly, Ferrero-Waldner was able to draw upon

more trade and energy experts to assist her in developing a broad diplomatic agenda than is

the case in the EEAS under Ashton. Meetings of the group of external relations

commissioners (commissioners whose duties involve working with partners outside the EU)

have been much more infrequent since the EEAS was established than before.

7. In sum, the EEAS has made real gains on behalf of the EU – in places such as the Balkans,

the European Neighbourhood, the Horn of Africa and Yemen. But it has also failed to realise

some of its ambitions – there are persistent problems with Strategic Partnerships, Policy

Coherence for Development (PCD) etc. These failings are not always of the EEAS’s own

making but that of the Commission or the member-states. I have already submitted a report

I wrote for the Centre for European Reform on the EEAS, which provides a detailed

description of these successes and failures - “Ten Steps Towards a Credible EEAS” - and will

not repeat this discussion here.

8. The EEAS budget is overseen in a similar fashion to that of the Commission. Its main

budget allocation and lines of spending are carefully scrutinised by the member-states and

the European Parliament (the latter also has the right of approval). Oversight and

engagement by national parliaments on the question of EEAS spending could be improved.

9. The Lisbon Treaty envisioned more engagement by national parliaments in overseeing the

activities of the EU. To their credit both the HR/VP and senior EEAS officials have spent a

considerable amount of time briefing member-state parliamentarians. But such exchanges are

done on an ad-hoc basis. European and/or foreign affairs committees often listen politely to


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updates by the HR/VP and the EEAS, ask a few questions based on the particular interests of

individual legislators before thanking the HR/VP or the relevant EEAS official for their time.

10. In the past the EEAS sought to counter criticism by pumping out ‘good news’ stories.

Member-state governments, parliamentarians and civil society were often left unconvinced.

The EEAS needs to learn to re-balance towards ‘under-promising and over-delivering’. Only

when the EEAS is seen to consistently meet its objectives will member-states allocate it

more resources and responsibilities for the conduct of their foreign policy. It needs to build

trust including, most pressingly, among the legislatures of member-states.

11. The following are five suggestions to improve EEAS accountability:

i) Appoint an EU Advisory Board

12. The EU should consider appointing an EEAS 'board of elders' to advise, monitor and

evaluate the EEAS’s progress and needs. Its members should be respected former foreign

ministers, diplomats and experts. The board would report annually to the Council on EEAS

progress and challenges – making recommendations to member-state governments, national

parliaments and the EU institutions. The board would have no executive powers and would

be limited to advisory duties.

ii) Establish an EU foreign policy committee drawn from national legislatures

13. A more consistent and organised means of national parliament–EEAS exchange and

oversight would be to establish a committee of legislators from the rotating ‘troika’ of

member-states that meets to agree the agenda for their three sequential EU presidencies.

This would meet every six months (once per presidency) to put questions to the HR/VP and

the EEAS on budgetary and programmatic issues. A foreign policy committee made up of

parliamentarians from 27 member-states would be unworkably large.

14. A troika foreign policy committee drawn from member-state parliaments should not be

seen as a reversal of the Lisbon Treaty, which gave the HR/VP the lead in managing the

foreign policy agenda of the EU. But a critical rationale behind retaining a limited rotating

presidency is getting some EU business out of Brussels and bringing it to the citizens of

respective member-states. The same logic should apply to EU foreign policy.


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15. EU foreign policy remains largely inter-governmental – emphasising the importance of

enhancing oversight over the EEAS by national parliament. A troika foreign policy committee

would give national legislatures an increased sense of ownership over the EEAS, enhance

inter-parliamentary cooperation and give Europe’s diplomats increased exposure in the

member-states.

16. The membership of a troika foreign policy committee could be drawn from existing

parliamentary committees on European or foreign affairs in each member-state. A chairman

would be nominated from each of the three member-state parliaments to coordinate the

meeting during his or her country’s presidency, including topics for discussion, requests for

information and witnesses from the EEAS and elsewhere. This meeting would take place in

the rotating presidency country and would be prepared by the relevant parliamentary liaison

offices in Brussels in consultation with their home parliaments.

17. To promote continuity, at the end of each ‘troika’ of presidencies the three chairmen

would present a joint report to their successors from the next troika of member-states on

issues covered, resolved and of continued interest or concern.

iii) Strengthen oversight by the European Court of Auditors over EEAS activities

18. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) occasionally issues reports on the impact of

funds spent in pursuit of EU common foreign and security policy and development assistance

goals. Recently the Court issued a report warning of management failings (in addition to

positive findings) with respect to the activities of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

(‘EULEX’). The ECA provides a useful, if limited, oversight mechanism for the activities of the

EEAS. This role could be expanded but, in doing so, the ECA would likely require additional

staff/expertise.

iv) Harmonise EEAS budgets

19. Funds provided by member-states outside of the main budget - for example the separate

budgets created for each individual EU Special Representatives or Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP) mission - complicate oversight. These must each be considered in

turn and are often subject to less scrutiny than the EEAS’s main budget. Member-states

should consider simplifying such practices – for example by integrating the EUSRs’ funding

and personnel within the main structure of the EEAS while maintaining overall spending and

staffing.

v) Make more EEAS reports available to national parliaments


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20. A more systematic exchange of information between parliaments and the EEAS is both

desirable and feasible. The EEAS could more routinely send unclassified versions of

Mission/Delegation reports to the responsible parliamentary committee in each member-

state.

2 December 2012

Department for International Development (DFID) – Written evidence

32 of 133

Department for International Development (DFID) – Written

evidence

As the FCO’s Minister for Europe said when he gave evidence on 24 January, the EEAS has

now been in operation for two years. Baroness Ashton has established the service in

accordance with the 2010 Council Decision and it has now moved beyond institutional

issues to focus on key policy priorities. Baroness Ashton and the EEAS have had some

widely recognised successes, including their work on Iran, the Western Balkans and the

Middle East Peace Process. The creation of the EEAS has provided opportunities and challenges for EU development policy and aid. The EEAS has created the opportunity for a

more coherent approach to EU external action by linking foreign policy and aid strategies.

However, it has also introduced a new actor into an area in which the Commission leads on

implementation. This has brought challenges in terms of the overlapping roles of the EEAS

and the Commission’s DG DEVCO (Development Cooperation).

As the new structures have settled down, progress has been achieved in resolving areas of

ambiguity. Practically, there is now a dedicated unit within the EEAS, the Development

Cooperation Coordination, which coordinates work with DG DEVCO and ensures links are

made across the range of thematic issues. This unit is now fully operational, and this has

improved channels of communication. Officials are in regular contact with this unit, as well

as a number of other geographical and thematic divisions including Africa, conflict and global

issues. At a more senior level, Commissioners Piebalgs and Georgieva report to Ashton,

which is intended to help bring the strands of external action together.

As a tangible example of improved coherence in setting the overall framework for EU

development policy, the Commission and EEAS jointly proposed the new External Financial

Instruments for 2014-2020, and have used joint negotiating teams throughout the process so

far. This has meant a coherent position across development policy, foreign policy and the

implementation of financial assistance during negotiations on the new instruments. This has

been particularly evident in discussions over the ‘more-for-more’ approach in the EU’s

Neighbourhood, and in discussions regarding countries graduating from bilateral EU

assistance and the foreign policy response to this including plans for a new EU Partnership

Instrument.

The EEAS has also had a positive impact in increasing the coherence of EU external action in

dealing with stability and post-conflict situations, for example in the Horn of Africa and in

Libya. In Syria as well, post-conflict assistance planning is closely coordinated between the

EEAS and DG DEVCO. The Commission and EEAS are currently working on a joint

communication on this ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to conflict prevention and crisis

management, which involves mobilising a wide range of EU policies and instruments (political,

military, development economic) in a coherent and co-ordinated way, and in co-ordination

with other international actors. The resulting communication is likely to shape the evolving relationship between EEAS and the Commission. The UK has been active in encouraging the

EU to adopt the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ and recently set out proposals on this in a non-

paper with five other Member States. We hope the EEAS-Commission communication will

include proposals that will enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s response on the ground.

Baroness Ashton’s 2013 Review of the EEAS is an opportunity to strengthen policy

coherence and the Comprehensive Approach. Synergies between the Review and the

Comprehensive approach should be fully exploited to improve the rapidity, flexibility and

impact of the EU’s response to crises.

Department for International Development (DFID) – Written evidence

33 of 133

Challenges do however still remain. The Council decision establishing the EEAS gives joint

responsibility, with the EEAS in the lead, for the preparation of strategic programming

documents under the External Action Instruments. As the programming up to 2013 was

already in place when the EEAS was established, it has, with the exception of the response to

the Arab Spring, had comparatively little impact on existing assistance programmes. The

process for programming for 2014 onwards is currently underway, but the ‘dual reporting’

lines in EU Delegations, with Operations sections reporting both to the EEAS and to DG

DEVCO in Brussels can lead to confusion. In time the quality and coherence of programming

documents will be good indicators of whether this challenge has been overcome.

A key test will come in the implementation of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’, and the role

of development assistance in it. At present, we are still exploring whether the role of

development will be limited to supporting and complementing post-conflict and stability

CFSP operations, or whether it will be more deeply integrated. In either case, there are

challenges to making the approach truly comprehensive and integrated, while maintaining a

genuine, long-term development focus in programmes.

The relationship between the EEAS and the Commission continues to evolve and UK teams

in DFID and the FCO will continue to work with their counterparts in both institutions to

encourage effective cooperation.

January 2013

Dr Hylke Dijkstra, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford –

Written evidence

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Dr Hylke Dijkstra, Department of Politics and International

Relations, University of Oxford – Written evidence

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was the direct result of

the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. The EEAS was,

however, not created from scratch. It was essentially a merger – in Brussels and in third

countries – between the foreign policy services of the Council of Ministers and the European

Commission complemented with a significant number of national diplomats seconded from

the capitals. The establishment of foreign policy bureaucracies within the context of the

European Union (EU) goes back a long time with the Single European Act (1987) and the

Treaties of Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam (1999) bringing important innovations as well.

2. The European Commission has long played an important role in the area of external

relations. As a key actor in trade policy it has entertained extensive bilateral and multilateral

contacts with third countries and international organisations. In addition, the Commission

has been an important player in development and humanitarian policy with a very significant

budget. Moreover, the Commission has been the key negotiator in the field of enlargement

and has (had) therefore strong contacts with many countries in Central and Eastern Europe

and the Western Balkans. Many of the policies were implemented through the headquarters

in Brussels consisting of the Directorates-General External Relations, Trade, Development,

Enlargement, EuropeAid, ECHO.12 In addition, and importantly, the Commission established

over time a network of 130+ delegations in third countries.

3. While the Commission played a pivotal role in external relations broadly defined, member

states have also been interested in cooperating on foreign and security issues. They thus

created European Political Cooperation in 1970, which became the Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP) following the Treaty of Maastricht. To cooperate more effectively, the

member states have delegated over time many bureaucratic resources to the Council in

order to prepare and implement common decisions in the context of the CFSP. The EPC

Secretariat of the Single European Act was a first example. This office was subsequently

integrated into the General Secretariat of the Council in 1993. And finally, with the Treaty of

Amsterdam, the member states significantly expanded these Council bureaucracies in the

area of foreign policy, including through the creation of the post of High Representative for

the CFSP, whose first office-holder was Dr Javier Solana (1999-2009).

4. It is difficult to underestimate the significance of these Council services in the

development and implementation of EU foreign policy in the period prior to the Lisbon

12 These are the names of the relevant DGs prior to the Treaty of Lisbon.


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Treaty.13 Solana had a private office and a 30+ strong dedicated Policy Unit. In addition,

there was DG External Relations of 250 officials.14 This Directorate-General consisted of

relevant regional units, such as the Western Balkans, Middle-East and Africa, as well as two

Directorates for Defence Issues and Civilian Crisis Management. The Council machinery

furthermore consisted of a 200 officer strong EU Military Staff, some 70 officials working the

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, and 100 intelligence officers in the Situation

Centre.15 In addition, Solana had a dozen Special Representatives, who all had their own

staffs, reporting directly to him.

NEGOTIATING THE EEAS

5. One of the main fears during the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty, and in the period

after its entry into force, was the potential competition and incoherence between the

Commission and the Council services.16 Would the Commissioner for External Relations,

Lord Chris Patten at the time, or the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, speak

for the Europe Union?17 While some of the predicted 'turf battles' really turned out 'turf

tensions' and were limited to specific institutional aspects,18 it created an important input for

the European Convention, in charge of drafting the Treaty establishing a Constitution for

Europe. In line with some of the federalist rhetoric of the Convention there would be one

Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, one EEAS, and unified Union delegations in the context of

EU foreign policy. While the rhetoric was watered down, the substance remained the same

in the Lisbon Treaty.

6. The establishment of the EEAS was a classic case of 'incomplete contracting'. The Lisbon

Treaty only noted that the EEAS would consist of Council, Commission and member states

officials (see article 27(3)). It did not stipulate the scope of the EEAS, the balance between

Council, Commission and member states, accountability structures, or how the organogram

13 e.g. H. Dijkstra (2008) 'The Council Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy', European

Foreign Affairs Review 13(2), pp. 149-166; G. Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet and C. Rueger (eds), The High Representative for the

EU Foreign and Security Policy: Review and Prospects, Baden-Baden: Nomos; H. Dijkstra (2012) 'The Influence of EU Officials in

European Security and Defence', European Security 21(3), pp. 311-327.

14 Note that there was a difference between DG External Relations in the Commission and DG External Relations

in the Council.

15 All these staff figures are estimates.

16 Report by Reflection Group (1995) A Strategy for Europe, Brussels, 5 December; The Economist (2000) 'Chris

Patten, Becalmed in Brussels', 20 January.

17 D. Allen (1998) ‘‘‘Who Speaks for Europe?”: The Search for an Effective and Coherent External Policy’ in J.

Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, Routledge: London.

18 C. Patten (2005) Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs, London: Allen Lane; H. Dijkstra (2009)

'Commission Versus Council Secretariat: An Analysis of Bureaucratic Rivalry in European Foreign Policy', European Foreign

Affairs Review 14(3), pp. 431-450.


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should look like. These questions became subject to further negotiations with the member

states, the Commission and the European Parliament. The Commission was involved

because the EEAS would mostly draw on its resources. The Parliament was involved as the

establishment of the EEAS required amendments to the financial and personnel regulations,

over which the Parliament has a formal say.

7. The scope of the EEAS was an interesting topic. Would the EEAS be solely a merger

between the DGs External Relations of the Commission and Council (narrow scope), or

would it include all external relations services of the European Union, including trade,

enlargement, development and security policy (broad scope)? The eventual compromise was

somewhere in the middle. Services dealing with trade, enlargement and development

implementation stayed largely in the Commission, while development programming and

security policy, including military policy, became part of the EEAS. The member states made

the right decision to include military policy in the EEAS, because splitting it from the rest of

the work of the EEAS would have fundamentally undermined the comprehensive approach

of the EU to foreign policy.19 Arguably, however, security policy has not yet been fully

integrated in the EEAS. It is still a separate set of Directorates (located in the top-right

corner of the EEAS organogram) and most civil servants dealing directly with the Common

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have their offices in a separate building.

8. The discussions over the balance between the Council, Commission and member states

staff was equally interesting. Because many of the negotiating parties were unfamiliar with

the details of the Brussels structures, it took some time to come to a compromise.20 Initially,

for example, some people thought that the EEAS should not have permanent staff and that

all officials should be secondees with the Council and Commission staff also going back to

their institutions after 3-4 years. This was however clearly not possible because of the

different sorts of expertise in the Council/Commission, on the one hand, and the EEAS on

the other. Similarly, some people thought that the balance should be 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, yet this

clearly did not take into account that the Commission staff was much larger than the

Council staff. 1/2 Commission/Council and 1/2 member states was also suggested, but this

would be a too strong requirement for the member states' diplomatic services. So the

negotiating parties eventually settled for 2/3 Commission/Council and 1/3 member states.

9. In terms of the contribution of the member states, it is important to note that national

diplomats bring much needed diplomatic experience and expertise to the table, which the

Commission and the Council did not originally possess. Bringing in national diplomats, of

course, also allows the member states more control over the policy produced by the EEAS

and the Union delegations in third countries. Yet it is worth noting that if the requirements

19 The comprehensive approach entails using a combination of development, security and diplomacy in foreign

policy. This is supposed to be the unique selling point of the EU.

20 Putting COREPER and people from the Council and Commission's Secretaries-General in charge of designing the

new structures was probably not the best idea, as their knowledge for the specific demands of foreign policy tends to be

limited in many cases.


Written evidence

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for the member states in terms of secondments become too high, it undermines the

resources in the capitals and therefore as well the member states' ability to keep control

over the EEAS. While diplomatic services everywhere in the EU are under pressure, this is

particularly an issue for many of the smaller member states.

10. Finally, it is worth to say something on the accountability and hierarchal structures of the

EEAS. It is striking that the EEAS very much continues to look like the European

Commission. Essentially the Council staff and national diplomats have been integrated in the

what formerly were the services of the Commission. This is understandable, because the

former Commission services make up the bulk of the EEAS.21 It is also regrettable, because

the European Commission has never been the best model for rapid reaction, short lines and

the speed that foreign policy formulation requires. It is, for example, an insider joke in

Brussels that the current High Representative is always the last EU actor to put out a

statement, via traditional or social media, reacting to events in international relations.

FUNCTIONING OF EEAS

11. It is not a secret that the performance of the current High Representative, Catherine

Ashton, and the EEAS has been underwhelming. Her performance was perhaps acceptable in

the twelve months following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, during the difficult

negotiations on the EEAS, but it has not markedly improved. The current line of

communication is to blame all the problems with EU foreign policy on the member states

themselves. Michael Mann, spokesperson of the High Representative, for example, writes in

a letter to The Economist, “EU foreign policy remains the business of its member states, so

any progress can only be achieved if there is consensus. The idea that the high

representative for foreign affairs can forge her own foreign policy against the will of member

states is unrealistic. She can prod, push and pull, as she often does, but she cannot charge

ahead without the backing of the 27”.22

12. It is indeed worthwhile noting that changes in governments in France, Germany and the

United Kingdom have not made the life of EU officials, working on foreign policy, easier. To

put it bluntly, Javier Solana and his civil servants (1999-2009) had a much easier job working

with the Blair, Chirac and Schröder governments, which much more permissive towards

independent action by the EU on the international scene than the current governments. The

economic crisis is another problem for the EEAS, because it simply means that the member

21 Yet it is also noteworthy that Commission people, in particular, have had their hand in the design of the EEAS

(e.g. Catherine Day, Christian Leffler, Patrick Child, James Morisson). In addition, Commission President Barroso has been

operating effectively pre-empting and affecting the negotiations. See Z. Murdoch (2012) 'Negotiating the European External

Action Service (EEAS): Analyzing the External Effects of Internal (Dis)Agreement', Journal of Common Market Studies 50(6):

1011-1027; L. Erkelens and S. Blockmans (2012) 'Setting up the European External Action Service: An institutional act of

balance', CLEER Working Paper 1.

22 The Economist (2012) 'Letters to the Editor', 17 March.


Written evidence

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states are less interested in foreign and security policy dossiers. Finally, the war in

Afghanistan has put indirectly enormous pressure of EU foreign policy. It means that there

are no military resources for any EU operation; and without actual EU operations, the

dynamism in the area of security is low.

13. Complaining is, however, not what the High Representative is hired for. She should

instead try to get ahead of the member states by taking initiatives and by showing leadership.

Very few of the member states have genuinely global foreign policies, so if the High

Representative waits until all the member states have made up their mind about a crisis half-

way across the globe, it is clearly too late. Solana, for example, prevented open EU

disagreement during the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006 by just stepping on the plane and acting

as if he spoke for Europe without having an actual formal mandate.23 There is also a visibility

problem. For example, after an informal meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs in Cyprus

last September, the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom held a

joint press conference calling for more sanctions on Iran.24 Ashton was not there, nor

mentioned in the press, in spite of having chaired the meeting and being the sole EU

negotiator on the Iran non-proliferation dossier!

14. One of the frequently heard comments is that the High Representative has too many

jobs to do and that she cannot be everywhere at the same time, particularly since she does

not have a private plane at her disposal. This has never been a very strong argument. Solana

managed, after all, with even less resources. In some years, he visited the Middle-East 7-8

times a year to speak to all the relevant local actors. Furthermore, the United States

Secretary of State is also terribly busy, so there is absolutely no reason why the EU High

Representative cannot handle. The essence boils down to prioritising, trusting high-level civil

servants, and sacrificing one's personal life. One of the issues that may come up again during

the EEAS review is to have a system with deputies or to delegate tasks to the other EU

commissioners. Such discussions are likely to be fruitless and will not solve the underlying

problem.

15. It is also important to note is that many of the high-flyers in the foreign policy services

under Solana have resigned, retired, or been sidelined. To mention a few of the best and

brightest, Pieter Feith (former Deputy-DG External Relations), Stefan Lehne (former

Director Western Balkans) and Lt-Gen David Leakey (former DG EU Military Staff) no

longer work for the EEAS. Robert Cooper (former DG External Relations) is now a

'counsellor'. These have been, to a large extent, natural developments but it would have

been useful to keep the old guard in place, as they were officials with international networks

and had the capability to get things done. Many of their replacements lack such skills. As a

23 H. Dijkstra (2011) 'EU External Representation in Conflict Resolution: When does the Presidency or the High

Representative Speak for Europe?', European Integration Online Papers 15(1), pp. 1-23.

24 BBC (2012) 'UK, France and Germany call for tighter Iran sanctions', 8 September.


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matter of fact, many of the current high-level officials have a Commission background, which

does not lead to the desired results.

16. Needless to say, all the problems surrounding the establishment of the EEAS and the lack

of leadership at the top have not improved the morale amongst lower-level staff members.

The EEAS is, at the moment, not the most exciting place to work in Brussels or the ideal

career destination for the best and brightest in the national diplomatic services. Diplomats

and officials from the small and medium-sized member states would, in theory, be able to

take much more initiatives and be in an influential situation on the world stage while working

for the EEAS rather than their national administrations, which have much less cloud. In the

current practice, this is not the case.

THE WAY FORWARD

17. There is a thus serious risk that EU foreign policy and the EEAS will become even less

relevant over time. The track record of the last years is insufficient and there is little sign of

improvement. The Western Balkans, for example, is full of examples of missed opportunities

of EU foreign policy, the Middle-East Peace Process is no longer on the international agenda,

an adequate response to the Arab Spring has yet to be formulated, and the High

Representative and her staff have been rather naive to think that they could reach a

negotiated settlement with Iran without the appropriate sticks. In a decade, which is not

favourable for the EU and its foreign policy, it is thus of paramount importance that common

institutions such as the EEAS do not under-perform. The final section of this submission

therefore puts forward a number of recommendations.

18. The most important is that member states continue to invest in the EEAS and the

delegations in third countries.25 Member states, including the larger ones, have to realise that

unilateral foreign policy has limited effect in an era of multi-polarity. They should leave much

more initiatives, implementation and photo opportunities to the High Representative and the

EEAS. They should also make better resources available for the EEAS. Few member states,

for example, have currently serious policies in place to guarantee national diplomats

sufficient career advancement when they come back from their secondment to the EEAS.

Ideally, in the medium to long-term, spending some time in Brussels or in an EU delegation

should become a requirement for promotion to specific (ambassadorial) posts in the national

diplomatic services.

19. The member states should also invest in a more serious appointment procedure for the

new High Representative in 2014. Clearly this post requires someone with vast political,

diplomatic and multilateral experience, international networks, and the authority of a former

Head of State and/or Government. As things currently stand, it is likely that the nomination

25 S. Lehne (2011) 'More Action, Better Service: How to Strengthen the European External Action Service', Carnegie

Endowment Policy Outlook, 16 December.


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of the Commission President is becoming further politicised with the pan-European parties

(European People's Party, Party of European Socialists, etc.) each putting forward their

candidate for 2014.26 If this indeed happens, it is important that the post of High

Representative will not become subject to subsequent horse-trading with positions such as

the European Council President and Parliament President. This was what happened back in

2009.

20. Notwithstanding adequate accountability structures, the EEAS requires less hierarchy, a

more decentralized structure, and shorter lines between the High Representative and the

desk officer. At the moment, there are often 4-5 people standing in-between the High

Representative and the desk officer, which seems simply too many for the area of foreign

policy which requires rapid response. Similarly, internal bureaucratic procedures, which have

been adopted from Commission standards, need to be relaxed if they undermine the work

of the EEAS. Most important, however, is a change in culture, in which people take

responsibility and initiative, and do not have to discuss everything with everyone. It is not

difficult, for example, to find 4-5 units in the EEAS dealing with Kosovo. This still excludes

the relevant units in the Commission's Enlargement and Justice DGs.

21. Finally, the foreign, development and security services in the EEAS should be better

integrated in order to achieve a genuine comprehensive approach. This implies more than

having coordination meetings with all relevant actors around the table. A structural

integration of difference services has to be considered and command and control of CSDP

operations has to be made more inclusive. In the United Nations, for example, people have

thought much harder about how to combine scarce military, diplomatic and development

resources effectively. The ongoing EU review of the Crisis Management Procedures lack

such innovation and creativity.27

22. In conclusion, the EEAS is the most recent step in the centralisation of foreign policy in

the EU. Its establishment has not come at the best possible moment amidst the economic

crisis and several increasingly euro-critical governments. This should, however, not be used

as an excuse for what can be considered an unsatisfactory start of the EEAS. Instead, the

EEAS should work harder to get its own house in order, unilaterally take more initiatives,

and work with the member states to make EU foreign policy more effective in these dire

economic times.

26 November 2012

26 The candidate of the pan-European party that wins the EU Parliament elections will then become the Commission

President (after a formal nomination by the European Council).

27 A. Mattelaer (2012) 'Reviewing the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures', IES Policy Brief 4, November.

The European Centre for Development Policy Management – Written evidence

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The European Centre for Development Policy Management –

Written evidence

1. The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM28) is a development

cooperation and international relations ‘think and do tank’, established as an independent

non-partisan foundation in the Netherlands in 1986. Our main goal is to broker effective partnerships between the EU and the Global South, particularly Africa. ECDPM organises

and facilitates policy dialogues, provides tailored analysis and advice, disseminates timely

information, participates in South-North networks and carries out policy-oriented

research with partners from the South. ECDPM receives institutional support against

our strategy and workplan from seven EU member-states.

2. ECDPM has developed considerable expertise on EU external action in the post-Lisbon

context29, and has a strong track record for policy and impact evaluations. Recently, two

authors at ECDPM, Andrew Sherriff and Florian Krätke, published a Briefing Note on the

2013 review of the EEAS.30 The below Submission of Evidence will draw on this and

other publications of ECDPM.

Interpreting the EEAS

3. The Council Decision establishing the EEAS31 notes that it was designed to support the

High Representative in her mandate to conduct EU foreign policy, externally represent

the EU and coordinate other aspects of EU external action. In addition, the EEAS is

mandated to support and cooperate with the Member States’ diplomatic services, the

General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission services to ensure consistency

between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and

other policies.

4. The High Representative has remarked that the EEAS is not meant to speak with a single

voice on foreign policy issues, but is instead designed to assist in delivering an integrated

European message (‘joined-up government’). The EEAS thus aspires to be a single

diplomatic presence, speaking ‘on behalf of a single, globally active legal entity’, and

therefore a platform for European values and interests.

The 2013 EEAS review

28 See www.ecdpm.org

29 See, for instance: van Seters, J. and H. Klavert. 2011. EU development cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty: People,

institutions and global trends. (Discussion Paper 123). Maastricht: ECDPM. www.ecdpm.org/dp123.

30 Krätke, F. and A. Sherriff. 2012. Gearing up for the 2013 EEAS Review: Opportunities, challenges, and possible

approaches. (ECDPM Briefing Note 44). www.ecdpm.org/bn44.

31 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the functioning and organization of the European External Action Service,

(2010/427/EU). http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_decision_en.pdf.

http://www.ecdpm.org/

http://www.ecdpm.org/dp123

http://www.ecdpm.org/bn44

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_decision_en.pdf


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5. The review of the EEAS, to be completed and presented by the High Representative in

2013, is likely to be a process of political bargaining. Whereas national and institutional

interests are expected to drive the review, a strong argument can be made for the need

for learning and accountability at this stage. The EEAS is a young service, established amid

arguably adverse circumstances (i.e. the Eurozone crisis and the Arab Spring).

6. Reviews or evaluations fundamentally have two objectives: to learn from experience and

adjust strategies, operations and resources accordingly, and to demonstrate

accountability towards key stakeholders. A review of the organisation and functioning of

the EEAS would therefore, given the current climate of austerity, provide an opportunity

to increase the credibility and legitimacy of the EEAS. Clearly it is of benefit to respond

to the rising demands for public scrutiny of the EU, and to showcase the added value of

not only a new EU institution but also the much-contested Lisbon Treaty as a whole.

7. Most publications on the EEAS produced in the run-up to its establishment and the

upcoming review are based on positions and interests. While such outputs are not

invalid, they are often based on a selective understanding of what the EEAS should be

doing and how it is doing it, not objective assessment – this leaves ample room for such

efforts to be dismissed by stakeholders involved in the review.

8. Insofar as opinions on the EEAS continue to be based on normative positions or

interests rather than evidence-based analysis, stakeholders involved in the review could

stand to draw on insights from the practice of conducting reviews, evaluations and audits

in order to realise the opportunity to enhance the legitimacy of the EEAS by promoting

learning and accountability.

9. The Lisbon Treaty and the legal texts related to the review32 remain open to a degree of

interpretation; the object of the assessment is therefore open to ambiguity, which deters

from learning and accountability. We argue that there is a wealth of experience to draw

on, from which several essential components of the review can be distinguished in order

to increase the rigour of the process and therefore the legitimacy of its outcome.

Obstacles to learning and accountability for the EEAS

10. Before a structured approach to reviewing the EEAS can be established, several obstacles

to such an endeavour need to be noted. First, the EEAS’ ability to perform is not the

result of its operation alone but rather of a range of trust- and interest-based relations

and interactions. The complex institutional arrangement originating from the Lisbon

Treaty, and the EEAS’ position within that arrangement, renders it challenging to identify

the (extent to which) actions and results (were) affected by the EEAS rather than by a)

the High Representative, b) the inter-governmental dialogue process on foreign and

security policy and c) (inter)actions with/of the Commission Directorates. Crucially, a

significant amount of time has been devoted to adjusting and giving shape to the post-

32 Articles 13 (3) and, by extension, Articles 6 (6), (8) and (11), of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010.


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Lisbon configuration in the past two years – these ‘construction’ efforts should be

distinguished from ‘actual’ strategic and operational activities of the EEAS;

11. Second, many observers have noted that the EEAS (particularly its senior management)

have been constrained by the influence of the established actors in Brussels: the

Commission and the Member States. It is debatable whether it is possible to genuinely

review the EEAS without also assessing if its operating environment, shaped by its

principal stakeholders and ‘competitors’, has been sufficiently enabling. This also brings

into question whether the EEAS should be judged on its capacity to lead actions or

rather facilitate discussions on foreign policy and external action. Most importantly, the

position of the EEAS within the post-Lisbon configuration makes it challenging to

distinguish the design phase from the execution of the review.

12. Third, in all likelihood the various stakeholders will assess and contest the EEAS on the

basis of the purpose and objectives that they believe it should or should not have, rather

than what was agreed. Articles 2 and 3 of the Council Decision offer some basis on

which to structure the review.

13. Fourth, it is most likely too soon to thoroughly evaluate the sustainable impact the EEAS

has had – there is however an urgent need for the service to account for progress made

and actively learn from the past two years’ experience. While drawing the distinction

between results and impact is not straightforward, lessons learned from past evaluation

practice could be helpful, as clarified below.

Promoting learning and accountability

14. It may be tempting to simply accept that lack of clarity on the purpose and methodology

of the review allows for broader scope and greater flexibility in adapting the agenda of

the discussions to the political environment. However there is something to be said for

setting clear expectations and methodological rigour in terms of delivering credible

findings that help carry the service forward. A review informed by standard practices and

agreed criteria for evaluations could lay the groundwork for further evaluations, for

instance of the impact of EU Delegations or the EU integrated regional strategies.

15. Several components, which have proven their effectiveness in past evaluation practice,

can help increase the rigour of the review and lighten the political pressure to a degree,

and are therefore worth integrating into the process:

Establish terms of reference after an initial listening phase to guide the review, which clearly identify

the basis, objective and timeframe of the review and specify the role of each stakeholder group;

Linking internationally agreed evaluation indicators and criteria to the review, justifying alterations or

deviations;

Develop a structured set of key questions through which to conduct the review transparently, as well

as a clear process for deriving conclusions and recommendations from the information presented;

Highlight specific examples or case studies to gain an in-depth understanding of the role and value

of the EEAS in specific circumstances.


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16. Point b) above is critical: the review will need to be informed by and based on

established evaluation criteria around which to devise evaluation questions, such as those

used by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the

European Commission’s former Joint Evaluations Unit33. The criteria include: relevance,

effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, coherence / complementarity and added

value. The first five follow internationally agreed best practice for evaluations, while the

latter two criteria are designed specifically for evaluations of EU initiatives in accordance

with the ‘3 C’s’ of coordination, complementarity and coherence introduced in the

Maastricht Treaty.34

17. The agreed operational principles of the EEAS’ function - coherence, stability, cost-

neutrality and visibility - could be the yardstick(s) for the review, reflecting both the

EEAS’ grounding in the Lisbon Treaty and the guidelines of the Council Decision. The

emphasis would be placed on the role of the EEAS in obtaining (perceived) results in

specific situations, e.g. the crisis response in Haiti, in the Arab Spring countries, the

integrated approach to achieving security and development result in the Horn of Africa

and the Sahel, the role of EU in the Middle East Peace Process and maintaining peace and

stability in the Balkans.

Policy coherence for development

18. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty contains several provisions35 relating to the EEAS’ first

operational principle (that of coherence) to development issues, stating that: “The union

shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it

implements which are likely to affect developing countries.” This principal, more widely

known as Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)36, clearly links to the mandate of

the EEAS37.

19. Given ECDPM’s goals, it is of particular interest to us how the EEAS has responded to

addressing development concerns. However, it would seem that policy coherence, even

without the ‘for development’ attached, has not been a priority for the EEAS, but is

rather seen as a long-term ambition for EU external action. In this regard, the High

Representative and the EEAS have not shown the leadership and clear (organisational)

commitments expected from the letter of the Lisbon Treaty. Our research has shown

that EEAS staff considers PCD to be the responsibility of the European Commission. For

PCD to have effect, it will need to be perceived as a continuous engagement in relation

to all specific areas of EU policy.

33 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/methods/mth_ccr_en.htm#03 and

http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm.

34 See also the resource guides available at http://www.three-cs.net/index.html.

35 Specifically, Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union and Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union.

36 See also http://www.oecd.org/pcd/.

37 Specifically, Article 3(1) of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010.

http://www.oecd.org/pcd/


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20. In conclusion, the review process and outcome will not make or break the EEAS, yet it

nonetheless represents the most prominent milestone and formal opportunity for

learning and accountability of the coming years. It is therefore important that those

planning and implementing the process do so with their eyes open to potential options

and challenges beyond those political in nature.

This evidence is submitted by Florian Krätke (and Andrew Sherriff of ECDPM, acting in their

individual capacities.

5 December 2012

European External Action Service (EEAS) – Written evidence

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1. What are the main achievements of the EEAS since its establishment?

Where has it been less successful?

Following the adoption of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 on the organization and

functioning of the European External Action Service and associated changes to the financial

and staff regulations of the EU, the EEAS was established on 1 January 2011.

The EEAS was established by bringing together existing structures and staff from the

European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council and already working in

Brussels and in Delegations on external relations, including Common Security and Defense

Policy (CSDP). A number of Member States diplomats were recruited from the outset in the

service, including at the highest level of the EEAS, in line with the goal of reaching the

presence of 1/3 of seconded national diplomats.

Since its establishment, the most immediate challenge for the service has been the

promotion of a comprehensive approach to EU external relations and foreign policy in line

with the objectives of the Lisbon Treaty. In doing this, the service acts in accordance to its

main mandate which is to support the High Representative in discharging the combined

responsibilities previously assured by the rotating Presidency in the area of foreign policy, by

the High Representative and by the former Commissioner for External Relations. In the

short space of two-years, the service has established procedures and arrangements to

ensure greater synergy of the EU's external action and more integrated policy making.

In this context, one of the first challenges for the High Representative and the EEAS was to

take over the tasks previously managed by the rotating Presidency for chairing and setting

the agenda of Foreign Affairs Council meetings, of the Political and Security Committee and

of all relevant supporting Council working groups in Brussels. Similarly with the entry into

force of the Treaty of Lisbon, EU delegations around the world had to take on the additional

responsibilities of local co-ordination with the diplomatic missions of Member States and

external representation of EU foreign policy with third countries and multilateral

organizations.

Policy areas on which the HR/VP and the EEAS has particularly focused over the past two

years include:

the strong EU response to the Arab Spring and related events in the Southern

Mediterranean, drawing on the instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy and

the crisis response capacities of the EU;

the lead responsibility for the High Representative in the E3+3 negotiations with Iran on

its nuclear programme;

a stronger EU effort to move forward in the Middle East peace process through a more

active role for the Quartet;


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the central role of the EU in bringing together the parties in the Belgrade-Pristina talks;

a new concept of Task Forces, bringing together EU institutions, member States,

international financial institutions and the private sector, to support partner countries in

their reform programmes. This innovative approach has been used so far in Tunisia,

Jordan and Egypt.

a renewed commitment on the central place of human rights and democracy in the external action of the EU through the adoption of its ambitious New EU Strategic

Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, the appointment of the first ever EU

Special Representative for Human Rights and the establishment of the European

Endowment for Democracy (EED)

an active contribution from the EU, based on the concept of the comprehensive

approach, to addressing the tensions in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel through the

adoption and implementation of new EU strategies on both regions..

a more structured approach to relations with the EU's major strategic partners - including effective co-ordination of preparations for summits and other high-level

meetings -,allows for more strategic cooperation on key international issues (Iran, MEPP,

piracy, cyber security…). The HR/VP and the EEAS have contributed to strengthening

the transatlantic relationship by coordinating approaches with the US in many cases and

undertaking a number of joint initiatives including a joint visit to the Western Balkans by

HR Ashton and SoS Clinton.

an inclusive approach to crisis management, in particular through the creation of a crisis

platform, which brings together all relevant EEAS and Commission services . This was

instrumental in the rapid creation of an EU presence in Libya, South Sudan,

Burma/Myanmar and Somalia.

This progress has been achieved in parallel to the very considerable challenge of setting up

the EEAS as a functionally autonomous body in a very difficult economic and budgetary

context. The EEAS has undertaken two in-depth screening exercises of the use of its human

resources in HQ to eliminate duplication between the activities transferred from the

services of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. These have led to considerable

internal redeployment of staff to meet the new tasks under the Lisbon Treaty and to enable

the service to function as an autonomous organization with its own legal service,

communication department, financial management and recruitment policies.

The creation of the EEAS is however still work in progress. The creation of a common

corporate culture in any new organization takes a number of years – it will take a few more

years for the EEAS to reach full cruising speed, taking account of the diverse origins of the

staff of the service (national diplomats from all Member States as well as permanent officials

and other staff from the Council Secretariat and the Commission).

The service also needs more time to consolidate co-operation with Member States and the

other EU institutions (both in Brussels and through EU delegations). Finally, the service will

continue to work on developing internal human resources, as well as financial, security and

administrative policies to meet the needs of the organization in these areas.


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2. How well does the EEAS meet the objectives set out for it in the Lisbon

Treaty and the Council Decision? Has the High representative/Vice President

fulfilled her mandate and the Council Decision for setting up the EEAS? What

remains to be done?

Under the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative/Vice President is responsible for

conducting the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union and for ensuring the

consistency of the external action of the Union. The EEAS has created the necessary

departments to support the High Representative/Vice President in these areas, including

divisions responsible for policy co-ordination and strategic planning in the political affairs

department under the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs. In

line with Article 4(3) of the EEAS decision, the crisis management and planning directorate,

the civilian planning and conduct capability and the EU Military staff are placed under the

direct responsibility of the High Representative. However, consistent with the

comprehensive approach, the EEAS has developed effective co-ordination arrangements to

ensure consistency between the CSDP work of these services and the geographic and

thematic responsibilities of other EEAS departments.

The existence of appropriate administrative structures and co-ordination arrangements

within the EEAS is an important precondition for the consistency of the external policy of

the Union. However, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's external relations also

depends on the degree of political commitment and consensus between Member States and

other institutional stakeholders.

3. How effective has the EEAS been in communicating and promoting the

EU's policies and values? Has it implemented Council CSFP and CSDP Decisions

effectively?

Public diplomacy is a vital tool to communicate the Union’s policies. In 2011, during the first

year of its existence, the High Representative and the EEAS issued 593 statements and

Declarations. These included 328 statements by the High Representative, 128

spokesperson’s statements as well as 51 local EU statements and 86 declarations by the High

Representative on behalf of the EU. The latter two categories were co-ordinated and

agreed in advance with Member States.

In 2012, the EEAS has thus far produced a total of 544 statements and Declarations – of

which 226 have been statements by the High Representative, 185 statements by the

spokesperson as well as 75 local EU statements and 58 declarations by the High

Representative on behalf of the EU.

EU Delegations also carry out extensive outreach to third countries. This can include

démarches to third states and international organisations - where the Union’s positions and

policies are formally communicated to third states. EU Delegations are also in constant

contact with key interlocutors in host countries.


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The EU holds around 80 bi-lateral meetings and political dialogues on Ministerial level every

year. These meetings provide opportunities to build common understanding, to design joint

initiatives and to solve problems on sensitive issues at political level. The political dialogue

commitments originate from political commitments with strategic partners (18 per year),

with other partners (10) and with regional organisations/bodies (19) and, from legal

obligations, such as Association or Co-operation Agreements (27).

There are 14 live CSDP Missions and Joint Actions, in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Georgia, the

Middle East, Iraq, Sudan, Congo, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. These draw extensively

on experts and other resources seconded from Member States and are managed jointly by

the relevant services in the EEAS and by the Foreign Policy Instruments service of the

Commission, both working under the Authority of the High Representative.

The creation of the Strategic Communications Division has ensured a coordinated

communication of the EEAS' activities in EU member states, institutions and third countries.

4. Has the creation of the EEAS led to a more coherent and integrated EU

foreign policy?

The role of the High representative/Vice President and the support she receives from the

EEAS provide the necessary institutional framework for a more coherent and integrated EU

foreign policy. In particular as Vice President of the Commission, she is well placed to

ensure the consistency of the external projection of Community policies. And the

declaration on political accountability associated with the EEAS decision provides a

reinforced basis for co-operation with the European Parliament. Finally, the growing

presence of EEAS staff from national diplomatic services also contributes to a better

articulation between the foreign policy agenda of the EU and the priorities of Member

States.

The High Representative not only chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) but is also the

permanent EU foreign policy interlocutor for third parties, thereby ensuring continuity and

avoiding a the situation where a different foreign minister took this role every six months.

The EEAS supports her in all these tasks.

The EEAS and the Commission have jointly presented initiatives on a range of issues

including a new strategy for the European Neighbourhood, a partnership for democracy and

shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. The creation of the EEAS has also

contributed to closer co-operation between the relevant geographical and thematic services

with the EU Special Representatives, appointed to add visibility and focus to the EU's

engagement in key policy areas.

The transformation of former Commission Delegations around the world into fully fledged

EU Delegations performing political analysis and reporting and being in charge of EU

coordination contributed to a more coherent and effective EU action on the ground.


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5. Has the EEAS been effective in its response to crises?

The EEAS has strengthened the EU's capacity for crisis response, including the creation of a

new position of Managing Director with overall responsibility for this area. The service has

also created a Crisis Management Board to co-ordinate the different EU actors involved in

responding to crises and holds regular meetings of the Crisis Platform in response to specific

crisis situations in third countries, involving relevant expertise across the EEAS as well as the

Commission. These structures have made a positive contribution to the EU response in

Libya, Ivory Coast, the Horn of Africa, Syria and elsewhere.

6. How does the balance of responsibilities between the EEAS and the

Commission work out in the development area? Has the creation of the EEAS

improved the implementation of the EU's development policy?

The EEAS decision (article 9) establishes the division of labour between the EEAS and the

services of the Commission in the management of external action instruments and

programming.

The guiding principle is that decisions relating to development assistance are prepared

through close cooperation between the EEAS and relevant services in the Commission. In

particular the EEAS prepares - in consultation with the Commission's Directorate General

for Development Cooperation - decisions regarding country strategies and indicative

allocations of funds.

This co-operation has worked well particularly in the preparation of the new generation of

instruments submitted to the budgetary authority under the next multi-annual financial

perspectives. Pending a decision on the new Multi-annual Financial Perspectives, work is

under way between the EEAS and the Commission to start preparing the programming of

the new instruments, under the leadership of the Commissioner responsible for the

Development Policy and the HR/VP.

Once agreement is reached on the next Multi-annual Financial Perspectives, close

cooperation between the Commission's services and the EEAS will continue to finalize the

programming exercise and ensure implementation of the new programmes.

7. How well does the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission

work in the trade area? Does the EEAS have a role to play in EU trade policy

and its implementation?

The Commission has lead responsibility for the EU trade policy. Trade issues are naturally

an important component in the overall relationship between the EU and many third

countries and are therefore subject to the responsibilities of the High Representative/Vice

President in coordinating the external relations policies of the Union. The EEAS, working in

particular through the geographical services, supports the High Representative in this task.


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8. How well does the EEAS work as an institution?

The EEAS is not formally an EU institution under the Treaty, but is treated as an institution

for the purposes of the EU staff regulation and the financial regulation. One of the main

challenges in setting up the service has been to develop the necessary policies and systems

for management of human resources and financial management, in the absence of additional

resources for this purpose. The EEAS has made considerable progress in these areas, with

the support from relevant services in the Commission and the Council Secretariat under a

number of service level agreements (SLAs). These SLAs have provided a viable basis for the

EEAS to function, without duplicating administrative capacity in-house, but have in some

areas had as a consequence a lack of flexibility to meet the specific needs of the service.

9. How well has the objective of a geographically and gender balanced staff

been met? How well has the objective been met of one third of staff from the

diplomatic services of the Member States by mid 2013, a third from the Council

Secretariat and a third from the Commission? Have staff been adequately

trained to perform the diplomatic role? If not what are the omissions?

The EEAS circulated detailed figures on the staffing situation in the service on 24 July 2012.

This sets out progress in relation to the objectives of ensuring a meaningful presence of

nationals of all Member States as well as the increase in the number of women in the service,

including in management and Head of Delegation positions. By November 2012, 249 of the

901 staff at AD level in the EEAS were temporary agents from national diplomatic services,

representing a proportion of 27,6%. In EEAS Headquarters, 19,9% of staff at this level were

temporary agents from national diplomatic services, and in the EU Delegations, the

proportion was 39.5%. (The proportion is lower in EEAS Headquarters because there have

proportionately been fewer vacant posts to fill, although in absolute numbers the recruits to

headquarters equal almost the number of recruits in delegations.) Thus the service is

approaching the 1/3 target for seconded national diplomats, notwithstanding the challenging

budgetary context. The EEAS is committed to making further progress with the recruitment

of national diplomats by the target date of mid-2013, depending on the available posts within

the establishment plan.

The EEAS decision does not set separate targets for the origin of permanent staff from the

Commission and the Council Secretariat. There is however a requirement that at least 60%

of the AD posts in the service should be filled by permanent officials. This is the case today.

The EEAS has a range of training courses available for staff, including induction training for

newcomers and pre-posting training for staff taking up posts in EU delegations. The service

is seeking to develop co-operation with Member States in this area, on the basis of

reciprocal access to EU and national diplomatic training courses. EEAS staff also have access

to general language and management training offered by the Commission as well as specific


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courses on EU financial management procedures for Heads of Delegation and other staff

with responsibilities in this area.

10. Is the EEAS budget sufficient to meet its objectives? Are there any areas

where the EEAS could make savings?

The EEAS budget is set annually as part of the general EU budget procedure.

The baseline budget at the creation of the service in 2011 was €464m made up of transfers

from the administrative budgets of the Commission and the Council Secretariat and of a

limited reinforcement in staff numbers to provide additional capacity for political work in

delegations and to address minimal needs in Headquarters for the services to function on an

autonomous basis. Experience in the first year has shown that the baseline budget of 2011

did not accurately reflect the true operating costs of the EEAS. In addition, as a new

organization, the EEAS faced unavoidable start up costs. The budget for 2012 – the first

prepared by the EEAS - was increased by 5.3% by the budgetary authority to enable the

service to meet its statutory obligations and for limited additional staff to enable delegations

to respond to the events of the Arab Spring and other political priorities for the EU

(including the new delegations in Libya, South Sudan, Uzbekistan and Burma/Myanmar). The

budgetary authority is expected to confirm an increase of just over 4% for the budget in

2013. It is worth recalling in this context that the total EEAS administrative budget

represents 0,6 % of the administrative budget of the EU, or 0,04 % of the total EU budget.

In parallel, the EEAS has made considerable efficiency gains by redeploying staff to meet the

new needs of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular by taking over tasks previously managed by the

rotating Presidency and to support the autonomous functioning of the service. The first

screening exercise in 2011 resulted in a 10% efficiency gain through the merging of services

from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. A second wave of screening in 2012

identified 20 posts for redeployment from HQ to delegations, although the implementation

of these changes has been constrained by the uncertainty surrounding the availability of funds

in the 2013 budget to pay for the new posts in delegations. The EEAS has also made savings

in 2012 of 10% in travel budgets and 5% in representation costs and has undertaken a range

of other measures to ensure that the limited available resources are effectively targeted on

the core needs of the service.

11. In what ways has the financial and economic crisis within Member States

affected organization and activity of the EEAS?

The EEAS is subject to the same economic pressures as other EU institutions and national

public services in the face of the present crisis. This climate of strict budget discipline has

proved challenging given the unavoidable start-up costs of creating a new institution. The

need for the EEAS to have sufficient vacant posts for the recruitment of national diplomats


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to meet the 1/3 target requested by Member States has also been a factor in the annual

budget discussions.

The difficult budgetary environment for national diplomatic services has been a stimulus for

active thinking on co-operation and pooling of resources with Member States, in particular

where national authorities are forced to reduce their diplomatic network. This co-

operation includes sharing of political reporting, mutual support in organizing high-level visits

and co-location of EU delegations and national embassies. The EEAS is very open to closer

co-operation with Member States in these areas, in particular where concentrating

resources at EU level can produce considerable net savings in national budgets. The EEAS

recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Spanish Government on this and

we are working on similar projects with other Member States.

12. Has the EU created the right number and distribution of Delegations

around the world?

The EU has 141 delegations and offices accredited to third countries and multilateral

organizations. The relatively comprehensive coverage of the network responds to the global

foot print of the European Union, and has strong support from Member States, in particular

from those whose national diplomatic resources are more limited.

Since the start of the EEAS in 2011, new delegations have been set up in Uzbekistan, Libya

(Benghazi then Tripoli), South Sudan (Juba) and there are plans in 2013 to upgrade the newly

created office in Burma/Myanmar to a full delegation and to create a new delegation in the

United Arab Emirates. In 2012 or early 2013 the EEAS will close the delegation in Suriname

(which will henceforth be covered from neighbouring Guyana) and intends to close the

delegation in New Caledonia given its status as a territory of an EU Member State.

13. How well do the relationships with the Foreign Ministries of the EU

Member States work and how well do EU Delegations cooperate with the

diplomatic missions of the EU Member States?

The creation of the EEAS has led to considerably strengthened relations with the diplomatic

services of Member States both at the level of Headquarters and through the EU

delegations. To a large extent this is a natural consequence of the transfer of responsibility

from the rotating Presidency to the High Representative in her role in chairing different

formations of the Council. This is also mirrored in the Political and Security Committee and

Council Working Groups in Brussels as well as in the work of EU delegations in chairing the

local co-ordination with embassies of Member States. The growing presence of national

diplomats in the EEAS is also making a very positive contribution to relations with Member

States, not least given the established network of contacts that they bring to the service.


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As in other areas, co-operation with Member States is still work in progress, with

considerable potential to consolidate and build on what has been achieved so far. For

example, there are specific issues surrounding the role and competence of the EU

delegations to certain multilateral organizations like the UN and the OSCE.

The EEAS also provides support to Member States' national ministries with joint messages

on EU lines and useful background ahead of bilateral visits to third countries. The feedback

from Member States is positive recognition of the added value and critical analysis from the

EEAS.

14. Has the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded effectively to the

establishment of the EEAS? Has the UK been able to second high level

candidates to important positions within the EEAS? Has it also seconded a

representative number to more junior positions?

All Member States have been supportive of the creation and development of the EEAS. The

EEAS has welcomed the constructive input and advice from the FCO as from other Foreign

Ministries in Member States. The regular meetings of the Secretaries General of Foreign

Ministries have been a particular focus for these discussions, in addition to the normal

institutional decision making through the competent bodies in Brussels.

The EEAS has a strong presence of UK nationals in its staffing at all levels, including both

diplomats and permanent officials. 20 British diplomats have been recruited to the EEAS as

Temporary Agents, in addition to the 49 permanent officials of British nationality working in

the EEAS at AD level. This includes 15 in management positions in Headquarters, 11 Heads

of Delegations and 2 deputy Heads of Delegation. Overall, and including all categories of

staff, there are currently 150 British nationals working in the EEAS.

15. Have the Foreign Services of other Member States all responded with

their best candidates for EEAS posts?

The High Representative has made clear that recruitment to the EEAS is based on merit and

that she is determined to attract some of the brightest and best staff available in national

diplomatic services as well as in the Commission and the Council Secretariat. The

consistently high level of interest in published posts from both national diplomats and

permanent officials has enabled the service to remain faithful to this objective, while also

making progress on ensuring a meaningful presence of nationals from all Member Stats and

increased recruitment of women to posts in the EEAS.


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16. What should the EEAS need to do over the next three years and what

should it prioritise? How can it maximize the influence of Member States and

the EU in the future? On which areas should the 2013 review focus?

The priority for the EEAS is to consolidate the progress of the last two years in promoting a

more coherent and effective external policy for the European Union based on the

comprehensive approach concept. In particular this means strengthening the capacity of the

EU to define and articulate robust policies on the key issues of foreign policy, taking

advantage of the institutional advances in the Lisbon Treaty and drawing on all available

instruments at EU and national level.

This applies equally in ensuring an effective response to crises and security challenges, human

rights challenges and other areas of traditional diplomacy, as in emerging thematic topics that

are increasingly central to international relations like climate change, energy security,

migration, terrorism and non-proliferation.

In terms of geographical focus, the EU will need to maintain a strong engagement with the

countries of its immediate neighbourhood through the enlargement process and the

European Neighbourhood Policy. There is also scope further to develop the level of

ambition in the EU's relations with major strategic partners, as well as in strengthening

further the EU's crisis response capacity, including through effective use of CSDP

instruments and policies.

The mandate of the 2013 review of the EEAS in the Council Decision covers the

organization and functioning of the service, including in particular progress with staff

recruitment in view of the 1/3 target for national diplomats as well as progress on

geographical and gender balance. The review will be conducted by the High Representative

by mid-2013 in line with this mandate, covering a comprehensive analysis of the

achievements of the service to date and a range of options for future development and

improvements. Some of the conclusions of the review may be susceptible to rapid

implementation, whereas others may require further discussion.

December 2012

European External Action Service – Supplementary written evidence

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European External Action Service – Supplementary written evidence

Following the set of written answers to the call for evidence sent to you in December and

our meeting with M. P. Vimont on Monday last week, I promised to get back to you with

more details on the distinction to be made between the various types of offices in third

countries.

Our diplomatic network now numbers 141 EU Delegations funded mainly through the

administrative budget. These are manned by EEAS and Commission staff who implement

responsibilities conferred on us by the Lisbon Treaty. Some of these delegations are

regionalised with a Chargé d'affaires while the Head of Delegation of the "mother

delegation" is accredited to that country (for example: New Zealand/Australia,

Laos/Thailand, El Salvador/Nicaragua). In a very limited number of cases, we also have small

offices directly attached to our Delegation that have been set up to ensure effective

management of development assistance due to geographical distance or for political reasons.

For example, we have offices of our Delegation in Fiji in Samoa and the Cook Islands and an

office in Belize linked to our delegation in Jamaica.

There are also a number of ECHO offices to implement and monitor EU humanitarian aid.

The Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)

has more than 400 staff working in 44 field offices located in 38 countries around the world.

Half of these ECHO offices are co-colocated with EU Delegations (for example: in Lebanon,

Bangladesh). They are entirely funded by operational the budget and no EU civil servants or

contract agents are posted in these offices.

You also mentioned EU business centres such as the European Business and Technology

Center (EBTC) in India created in 2008. These are EU development projects. They have

been set up with the support of Eurochambers and are co-funded by development aid. There

have been several such initiatives that were designed on an ad hoc basis taking into

consideration the needs of the country in question. EU Delegations were involved in these

processes mainly as a donor. More recently, the European ASEAN Business Centre in

Thailand or the EU SME Centre in China were established.

29 January 2013

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

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1) What are the main achievements of the EEAS since its establishment?

Where has it been less successful?

EPLO assesses the EEAS from a peacebuilding perspective: has it made the EU more effective

at preventing conflict and building peace? Its success should be measured against the

objectives of EU external action specified in the Lisbon Treaty which include:

‘promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’ (Art. 3.1)

‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’ (Art. 21.2(c))

There are achievements when it comes to improving the EU’s ability to prevent conflict and

to build peace, as follows:

(1) Increased conflict policy expertise

There are now policy experts within the EEAS working on conflict and peace issues and

supporting the work of the geographic departments, notably the Division for Conflict

Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments.

In 2011, EPLO recommended that a Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy

be created to serve as the hub of conflict expertise within the EEAS38. With the right

resources and clout, EPLO suggested that it could, inter alia:

carry out conflict risk assessments and use conflict analysis to assess the impact of all

EU

policies and programmes on actual and potential conflicts;

develop conflict mitigation strategies and conflict prevention packages for use in

countries at risk of conflict;

lead in the development of innovative policies by bringing contemporary thinking on

peace, security and conflict into EU policymaking;

contribute expertise on conflict, peace and security issues to the full range of EU policies, programmes and activities in conflict-affected countries and fragile situations

by e.g. providing input into country strategies and policy programming.

There was, however, resistance to the establishment of the Division; it has been a challenge

for it to have adequate staffing and its future is uncertain. While the HR/VP has repeatedly

stressed that conflict prevention should be “a silver thread” which runs through all of the

38 See Conflict prevention and peacebuilding inside the EEAS (EPLO: 2011).

http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Working%20Groups/EEAS/EPLO_Statement_EEAS_Feb2011.pdf


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work of the EEAS (i.e. it should be mainstreamed) it was never clear how this would happen

without staff with expertise in the topic.

The regional policies and strategies which were developed before the Division for Conflict

Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation was adequately staffed could certainly have been

stronger from a peacebuilding perspective. For example, the early communication39 on the

EU’s response to the Arab Spring does not include any references to peace and security

matters, with the reform of the security sector and the need for inclusive dialogue during

transition periods notably absent.

Specialised staff working on conflict prevention, peace and mediation provide input and ideas

into the work of geographic teams and EU delegations – many of which are working in

countries affected by violent conflict. In addition, it allows for better and more strategic use

of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) through the identification of IfS actions which support

regional priorities.

(2) An integrated EU approach: development of joint strategies

EPLO recommended that the EEAS should develop genuinely joint EU strategies towards

third countries, with conflict prevention and peacebuilding at their heart40. This would

involve all relevant actors within and across the EU institutions working together to decide

on common objectives, instead of deciding them separately and then coordinating (i.e.

sharing information) afterwards.

The EEAS has started to produce country and regional strategies, which from a purely

procedural point of view is a good first step. These include the policy responses to the Arab

Spring, the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel41 and the Comprehensive

Approach to Sudan and South Sudan42. In each case, however, the strategies could certainly

have been stronger from a peacebuilding perspective43.

39 Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (COM(2011)200 final). A Partnership for Democracy and Shared

Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. (8 March 2011)

40 See Towards a Peacebuilding Strategy for the European External Action Service (EPLO: 2010).

41 EEAS (2011): Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.

42 The Comprehensive Approach itself is not a public document. For the main elements of the

approach, please consult the Council Conclusions on Sudan and South Sudan from June 2011.

43 EPLO has elsewhere assessed some of the country and regional strategies that the EEAS has

produced. Please consult Using More for More: Incentivising Peace in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy

(2011) or the meeting report ‘Peacebuilding in Sudan and South Sudan: The Role of the EU (2011)

which took place inside the CSDN framework.

http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Working%20Groups/EEAS/EPLO_EEAS_WG_Statement_Towards_a_Peacebuilding_Strategy_for_the_European_External_Action_Service.pdf

http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/122914.pdf

http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Working%20Groups/EEAS/EPLO_Statement_Incentivising_Peace_in_the_ENP.pdf


http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/CSDN/Geographic%20Meetings/Sudan%20and%20South%20Sudan/EPLO_Meeting_Report_CSDN_Meeting_Sudan_and_South_Sudan.pdf


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(3) A political role for EU Delegations

The EEAS should ultimately be judged according to the EU’s impact in third countries,

including whether it helps support peace and reduce conflict. With the Lisbon Treaty, the

status of role of EU Delegations has been raised, with Heads of Delegation now EU

Ambassadors. Early indications show that these changes are already having positive impacts

in two ways:

Allowing the EU to play an explicitly political role in its relations with third countries

which in turn increases its leverage and ability support reform. Previously, European

Commission delegations played a more “technical” role.

Allowing Delegations to play a stronger coordinating role in a) bringing together all EU actors within a country (the relationships between Delegations and CSDP

Missions and EU Special Representatives appear to have been strengthened), and b)

strengthening the EU’s ability to coordinate overall European action, for instance by

allowing the member states who so chose to be represented in country through the

EU.

Realising the full potential of this change, will depend on a number of factors:

The quality of people appointed to political positions inside EU Delegations

The degree to which they are enabled to play a more political role. The letter sent by

the foreign ministers of 12 EU Member States to the High Representative for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP)

on 8 December 201144 suggested that many Heads of Delegation were mainly

preoccupied with administrative tasks, an issue that should be addressed.

The extent to which member states allow the EU to play a stronger role and reduce

bi-lateral activities when these are not contributing to development and peace within the country in question.

In other areas, the EEAS was less successful:

(1) Continued fragmentation of EU response to conflict/ co-operation with the

European Commission

Despite some positive developments (above) the level of fragmentation and competition

across the EU remains a serious problem. Even in Brussels, work on peace and conflict is still

44 The letter was sent by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,

Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden and included suggestions as to

how the EEAS can be improved.


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divided across at least five structures (EEAS: Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding

and Mediation, CMPD, CPCC, EUMS, EUSR teams; European Commission: FPI, DEVCO

Fragility and Crisis Management Unit, etc) which do not work always work together

successfully.

When the EEAS was established, several policy areas that are part of the EU’s external affairs

such as trade, development, neighbourhood and Enlargement policies were not included in

the EEAS’ mandate and remained within the European Commission (EC). As a result, the

EEAS has encountered serious co-ordination challenges and has, in some instances, been

limited in its effectiveness due to competition with the relevant EC services.

Regarding development assistance, the Directorate-General for Development and

Cooperation – EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) has retained many of its prerogative regarding EU

development assistance which makes close co-operation between DG DEVCO and EEAS

essential (see answer to question 6). A recent restructuring of DG DEVCO could be

interpreted either as DG DEVCO shielding itself from influence of the EEAS by developing a

parallel structure or as increasing DG DEVCO’s capacity to cooperate with the EEAS45.

In the case of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, a separate Commission directorate

(Service for Foreign Policy Instruments - FPI) has been established which is involved in the

programming and management of the Instrument for Stability, which has led to a depletion of

conflict expertise from the EEAS46.

It remains EPLO’s view that the EEAS needs to be able to serve as a vehicle for collective

action on the part of Europe, this is due to evidence on effective support for peace and

development which shows that united action by external actors is important47. In addition,

given the declining power of Europe in many areas of the world, improving the impact of

overall European activity is likely to be enhanced by collective action rather than a situation

where the EU, plus a number of EU Member States acting bilaterally, are simultaneously

present and active within a particular country or region. The financial crisis should give EU

Member States additional incentives to work through the EU when it comes to engagement

in third countries.

(2) Excessive focus on crisis response

45 For further information regarding the recent restructuring of DG DEVCO please see ECDPM

Talking Points: Facing up to realities: DG DEVCO introduces new organigram for 2013 (30 November

2012).

46 For more information regarding the establishment of FPI and the transfer of staff, please see

EPLO’s statement from February 2011 entitled Conflict prevention and peacebuilding inside the

EEAS.

47 World Bank: The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development

http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/facing-up-to-realities-the-new-devco-organigram-for-2013/



http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext


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Recently, the EEAS management has focused excessively on “crisis response”, understood as

coordination at operational level in response to emergency situations, similar to

humanitarian response in that it is a reaction to crisis situations after they occur and is based

on an ad-hoc and temporary coordination of several actors as opposed to longer-term

approaches.

The creation of the EEAS has the potential to enable the EU to tackle the entire conflict

cycle in an effective manner and to bridge the gap between short-term and long-term

instruments and policies. It should also have enabled the EU to adopt a preventative

approach, for which EPLO has long been advocating. The EU’s comparative advantage lies in

longer-term conflict prevention rather than short term response to crisis (which will always

be difficult for an institution with the complex and multi-level decision-making procedures

and inter-governmental components that the EU has).

While coordination at the operational level is essential, it is not sufficient and if the EEAS

prioritises crisis response in its approach to peace and conflict, there are several policy

implications which need to be addressed:

Confusion of political and humanitarian crises

The blurring of mandates and responsibilities between ECHO and the EEAS, with the EEAS

planning and delivering activities which are humanitarian in nature and thereby duplicating

work of ECHO not only leads to confusion inside and outside the EU, but also poses a

threat to the underlying principles of the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian

assistance.

The 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding48 found

that there is a lack of conceptual clarity even within the EC when it comes to key concepts

related to conflict and peace. In the post-Lisbon set-up with more actors involved in EU

foreign policy, it is even more important that there is clarity of the key concepts used on the

strategic, policy and operational levels.

Tackling the root causes of conflict not (just) crisis response

The 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding highlighted

that addressing the root causes of conflict and upstream conflict prevention are the two

areas where the EU’s added-value as a foreign policy actor lies, due to its long-term

engagement combined with wide sectoral and geographical coverage and financial muscle.

48 Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1291_vol2_en.pdf


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Due to the complex nature of EU decision-making and the variety of actors and institutions

involved in the process, timely crisis response presents a recurring challenge to EU foreign

policy as many decisions taken under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) still

require unanimity among EU Member States. By focusing on reactive crisis response instead

of long-term conflict prevention, the EEAS seems to have prioritised the policy area where it

has the least comparative advantage over EU Member States.

Long-term Approaches

Crisis response resulting from ad-hoc deliberations runs the risk of not being sufficiently

embedded in overall EU policy approaches to specific countries and regions. For this reason,

EPLO has long argued that “crisis response needs to be embedded as one aspect of an

integrated approach towards peacebuilding rather than being a distinct operation”49. A

focus on crisis response may mean that instead of using the EU’s political and financial weight

to achieve positive long-lasting change in third countries, the emphasis lies primarily on the

completion of short-term actions, which is too modest an aim.

(3) Relationship between EEAS senior management and the EU Member States

Despite factors which create a push towards collective European action, EU Member States

remain frustrated with the performance of the EEAS, as demonstrated in by public

comments, including the letter published in December 2011.50 While there are certain

Member States which may never be fully committed to collective European external action

and may not be overly concerned about the challenges facing the EEAS, it is concerning that

the Member States which are most interested in the success of the EEAS are critical about

its performance.

When the EEAS has performed well, EU Member States have been willing to unite behind it,

for example, in the case of the strategies developed on Sudan and South Sudan, which were

supported by the Member States and led to innovations such as joint (EU and bilateral

agency) programming of development assistance.

While it is clear that the EEAS working effectively is a necessary condition for EU Member

States to be on board, it is not a sufficient condition, meaning that the success of the EEAS is

also dependent on EU Member States’ willingness to commit to EU foreign policy. Support

for and commitment to the EEAS may vary from Member State to Member State and

between the different constituencies within EU Member States.

49 See Five Years After Göteborg: The EU and its conflict prevention potential (EPLO: 2006).

50 Criticism was expressed throughout 2011, culminating in the letter sent to the High Representative

on 8 December 2011 by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,

Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden and included suggestions as to

how the EEAS can be improved.

http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/3.%20Resources/EPLO%20Publications/EPLO_Report_Five_years_%20after_Gothenburg.pdf


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Learning from the positive examples and extrapolating from EU Member States’ criticism

one can put together the factors which need to be in place to encourage EU Member States

to support joint EU action thus improve the effectiveness of overall European action:

Timely and high quality strategy and policy ideas provided to EU Member States;

Relevant analysis and strategy development which takes into account contemporary thinking in external affairs;

Appropriate resources – human and financial – allocated to the implementation of

policy commitments;

Strategic alliances built by the EEAS (in particular its senior management) in order to

generate trust.

If these factors are not addressed, then EU Member States are likely to increasingly invest in

bilateral action and not in the EU.

(4) Low levels of staff morale and high turnover

It remains the case that staff, including many at mid and senior-level, are dissatisfied with the

management of the EEAS. This has led to criticism, frequent “leaking” to the media about the

EEAS, and departure of experienced personnel. There is widespread perception of a lack of

trust and respect, with questions about the communication between staff and the senior

management.

2) How well does the EEAS meet the objectives set out for it in the Lisbon

Treaty and the Council Decision? Has the High Representative/Vice President

fulfilled her mandate and the Council Decision for setting up the EEAS? What

remains to be done?

Of the objectives set out in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 18 & 27 TEU) EPLO will comment on

the following:

(1) Contribute through proposals to the development of the CFSP and CSDP

While some commentators have argued for an update of the European Security Strategy or

the development of a grand strategy by the EU51. The value of these high-level strategies can

be questioned however there is certainly a need for mid-level strategies and policies on

particular regions, countries, and issues. This point was highlighted by Pierre Vimont in his

reflections on the first year of the EEAS in the European Parliament52.

51 See in particular the work of the Egmont Institute, www.egmontinstitute.be

52 EP Public Hearing (21 March 2012): The role of the EEAS - one year on

http://www.egmontinstitute.be/


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The EEAS management seems to have been resistant to the development of policy and

strategy, with a public rejection of the need for more “papers”. This may be one of the

reasons why EEAS staff and EU Member States have been concerned about a lack of

leadership.

On peace and conflict, there were problematic developments in 2011. A review of the EU

Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Gothenburg Programme), which should

have resulted in implementation guidelines, was discontinued in spring 2011. This has also

meant that in the year that should have celebrated the Gothenburg Programme’s 10th

anniversary, no annual report which assessed its implementation was prepared. The June

2011 Foreign Affairs Council’s commitment to revisit the issue of conflict prevention before

the end of 2011 has not been fulfilled.

The review was initiated by the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU and had the

support of all EU Member States (being unanimously endorsed by the Political and Security

Committee) and the active involvement of a core group of Member States. EPLO has

previously commented on the issue53 but what is worth noting is that this was a missed

opportunity to build strategic alliances with EU Member States who remain key decision-

makers in CFSP and whose involvement remains crucial for the EEAS’ success.

The blocking of the review also led to frustration within the EEAS and contributed to the

departure of key staff members which in turn had a negative effect on the level of morale

inside the Service and loyalty towards it.

CSDP is no longer determined by the explicitly short-term (limited to six months) policy

agenda of the Member State who chaired the rotating presidency, which is a positive

development, allowing the EU to develop civilian crisis management54 as a more strategic

tool which contributes to long-term EU objectives in a region instead of as an activity that

was perceived as supporting the interests of a particular Member State. At the same time,

CSDP missions themselves retain their short-term focus with mandates usually being

reviewed and extended on an annual basis. While there has been an initial fatigue to

launching CSDP missions immediately after the setting up of the EEAS, three civilian CSDP

missions have been launched in the last few months.

However, progress in further developing civilian CSDP has been stalled by

53 See Strengthening EU Policy and Guidance on Conflict Prevention (EPLO: 2011).

54 Civilian crisis management is an EU term to describe non-military crisis management used in EU

CSDP missions. The need to establish coordinating mechanisms for EU and EU Member States’

civilian crisis management was first emphasised at the European Council meeting in December 1999

in Helsinki. At the European Council meeting in June 2000 in Feira, four priority areas for EU civilian

crisis management were identified: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.

http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Working%20Groups/EEAS/EPLO_CPStatement_June2011.pdf


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(1) Member States holding different views about the importance of different types of CSDP

operations;

(2) debate on the relationship between CSDP and other aspects of EU external action; and

(3) over-emphasis on crisis response in the EU's approach to conflict in third countries as

demonstrated in the annual report on CFSP provided by the High Representative for of the

European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament55.

With the EEAS now established and the crisis management structures, including the Crisis

Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

(CPCC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) integrated in the EEAS, and with some of them

having gone through a phase of restructuring, EPLO believes that there are now

opportunities to revive and update civilian crisis management at a conceptual and operational

level and the EEAS is best placed to lead the process.

The EU’s adoption of civilian crisis management more than ten years ago was foresighted

and many of the ideas related to civilian crisis management have since been adopted by

NATO, the US and other countries. For CSDP missions to take a human security approach,

they have to take into consideration the increasing evidence of when external engagement is

successful in conflict-affected countries.

While civilian CSDP missions were conceived as short-term crisis management response,

this is something of a misnomer as many of them undertake longer-term complex

statebuilding work and end up operating in a country for various years. Even those missions

that primarily focus on short-term post-conflict activities such as the monitoring missions in

Georgia or Aceh include longer-term and more complex components, such as in the case of

Georgia, where the EUMM should ‘contribute to the reduction of tensions through liaison,

facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence building measures’56 or EULEX

Kosovo which has a significant part of its work in monitoring, mentoring and advising57.

55 Council of the European Union (October 2012): Main aspects and basis choices of the CFSP (point

G, paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006) – 2011 - Annual report from the

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European

Parliament. Available at:

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14605-re01.en12.pdf

56 Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring

Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia. Available at:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:248:0026:0031:EN:PDF

57 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law

Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO. Available at:


http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14605-re01.en12.pdf




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Reviewing the concepts is important not only to ensure that the EU’s engagement in conflict-

affected countries is conceptually in line with relevant EU developments, but also so that the

way civilian CSDP missions are planned and managed is adapted to the changes in the nature

of conflict and to evidence about how to respond to conflict. Where concepts have been

revised, as is the case for the Operational document ‘implementation of Women, Peace and

Security resolutions in the context of CSDP missions’, the necessary implementation

mechanisms should be spelled out as part of the review.

(2) Ensure consistency of the Union’s external action

For consistency to be ensured, the following steps are necessary:

An overall EU strategy towards a particular country and region that is developed jointly by all EU institutions with a relevant mandate and which is based on

promotion of peace;

A set of common objectives within the strategy;

Selection of tools and instruments to be used in implementing the strategy based on the objectives decided;

Integration – all EU institutions work together to meet the agreed objectives – rather

than coordination where they act separately but inform each other of their actions.

This requires senior-level staff in all EU institutions, EEAS and European Commission

included demanding their staff to co-operate and to develop constructive and integrated

working methods. In addition, Member States who have an important role to play in

contributing to consistent EU action, have to co-operate with the EEAS and other EU

institutions in developing EU policy and later-on contribute to its implementation.

3) How effective has the EEAS been in communicating and promoting the EU’s

policies and values? Has it implemented Council CSFP and CSDP Decisions

effectively?

The post Lisbon structure which brought the crisis management structures into the EEAS

and thereby contributed, albeit not sufficiently, to an integration of CSDP into overall EU

external action, provides an opportunity for CSDP missions to be developed as part of an

integrated approach of the EU to a specific country and region. In recent cases, the EU first

developed country and regional strategies (e.g. Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and

South Sudan) which define EU policy objectives and then identified a CSDP mission (e.g.

EUAVSEC South Sudan) as one tool to meet the overall objectives in the strategy which

limits the risk of CSDP missions as a short-term activity being disconnected from longer-

term EU engagement in a specific country.

Member States are the main decision-makers in CFSP and hence CSDP, and are responsible

for launching new CSDP missions and overseeing existing ones. Most of them are in favour


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of continuing and further developing civilian crisis management. This commitment, expressed

most recently in the Council Conclusions from July 201258, is crucial as the success of CSDP

missions depends to a large extent on the Member States’ willingness to support the mission

by co-operating and sharing information, sending qualified staff, and monitoring the mission’s

work.

Despite positive developments such as the Member States commitment in the July 2012

Council conclusions mentioned above, CSDP often still remains separate from other EU

policy and action, which is also due to the fact that the political culture of CSDP is more

secretive than other parts of EU external action. This reduces the impact of the EU as an

external actor, is wasteful as it leads to duplication of activities, creates confusion in the

country concerned and can easily be exploited by local actors. It may also work to the

detriment of a human security approach by having the CSDP mission operate in isolation of

other EU actors.

The different views within the Member States on the future of CSDP poses challenges to the

EEAS but also demonstrates the need for skilled, high-level diplomatic engagement on the

part of the EEAS in order to develop compromises and make progress.

EPLO believes that it is now time to review civilian CSDP, a point reinforced by the highly

critical Court of Auditors report on the EULEX mission. More effective evaluation of the

CSDP Missions could have enabled problems to be identified and addressed at an earlier

stage as many of them were widely known to organisations from/working in Kosovo.

4) Has the creation of the EEAS led to a more coherent and integrated EU

foreign policy?

As mentioned in the answer to the first question, the picture is mixed. The decision to leave

certain external relations policy areas outside the EEAS has meant that the EEAS’ ability to

provide a more coherent and integrated EU foreign policy was undermined.

EPLO argued for an integrated approach, in line with “whole-of-government” thinking,

increasingly recognised as an effective way to respond to conflict. In their own policies,

Member States are moving towards integration of security and development policies,

acknowledging that the separation of the two hampers an effective response to conflict. In

particular, dealing with situations of fragility requires an integrated approach, bringing

together institutions, actors, agencies, policy objectives, planning and project implementation

that were previously divided between security and development sectors.

In addition, the possibility of the EEAS in developing a more coherent and integrated EU

foreign policy is heavily dependent on the support from the Member States and their

58 Council of the European Union (July 2012).


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commitment to collective EU action. While there may be an overall push for effective and

collective EU action caused by (1) the declining power of Europe in many parts of the world

which suggests that for the EU to be relevant, collective action is necessary; (2) the current

economic climate, as acting through the EU is more cost-effective for Member States than

situations where the EU, plus a number of Member States acting bilaterally, are

simultaneously present and active within a particular country or region; and (3) the body

evidence which shows that collective action by external actors has a far greater impact in

fragile and conflict-affected countries59.

However, there are still many instances where Member States pursue their policy objectives

and conduct separate activities which are at best not aligned with EU foreign policy and in

the worst case, contradictory to what the EU is doing.

5) Has the EEAS been effective in its response to crises?

Please see the answers above.

6) How does the balance of responsibilities between the EEAS and the

Commission work out in the development area? Has the creation of the EEAS

improved the implementation of the EU’s development policy?

As mentioned in previous answers, EPLO argued for integration of development policy into

the EEAS. This did not happen and has consequently led to competition between the EEAS

and DG DEVCO. Close co-operation on the programming of development policy is key to

rectify this.

To ensure an integrated EU approach towards third countries, which is of specific

importance in the case of conflict-affected countries, the EU has to ensure that its policies

and activities are prepared jointly by the relevant institutions and actors involved, as

opposed to having them developed by the different actors separately and trying to

coordinate them afterwards. In order to enable collective European action, wherever

possible the second option for programming contained in the Joint Communication to the

European Parliament and the Council, Global Europe: A New Approach to Financing EU

external action should be used: ‘A joint programming document prepared by the EEAS and

Commission services with Member States’60. More information is also provided in the

proposal for the regulation establishing the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)61.

59 See World Bank (2011): World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development.

Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf

60 COM(2011) 865 final, Section 5.2.

61 COM(2011) 839 final, Article 11

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/documents/joint_communication_global_europe_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/documents/prop_reg_instrument_dev_coop_en.pdf


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Part of an integrated approach is the joint programming62 of the EU’s funding which involves

both the EEAS and the EC. Although programming may appear to be a technical issue, it

determines how the EU’s assistance is spent and could therefore have a significant impact in

conflict-affected countries.

The Council Decision establishing the EEAS prescribes that the first three stages of the

programming cycle should be prepared jointly by the EEAS and DG DEVCO. In January

2012, an inter-service agreement was concluded between the EEAS and the EC which

stipulated among other things, how the “RELEX family” of the EC would co-operate with the

EEAS regarding the programming of external action instruments63.

From presentations of the main elements of the inter-service agreement, which is not a

public document, it seems that the EEAS is leading on the first three stages of the

programming cycle for geographic programmes, under the responsibility of the respective

Commissioner and in close co-operation with the EC services. Regarding thematic

processes, the roles are turned around, with the EC leading on programming in co-operation

with the EEAS. It is not clear, however, whether this inter-service agreement, which will

guide programming from now on, specifies (1) how the geographical desk and the thematic

desks within the EEAS will work together and (2) how thematic directorates in the EEAS and

DG DEVCO, including the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, and the

Fragility and Crisis Management Unit, will be involved in the discussions and decisions on

country allocation, country and regional strategy papers, and national and regional indicative

programmes.

It is essential that the thematic divisions are involved in programming from the beginning to

avoid a situation in which conflict prevention, peacebuilding, gender and human rights are

last-minute add-ons. This critical aspect should therefore be included in the inter-service

agreement and other practical guidance on programming. For example, (1) guidelines for EU

delegations and geographic teams on programming should highlight the importance of

conflict sensitivity and (2) guidance and support on conflict sensitivity should be provided to

EU delegations by the thematic divisions.

62 In EU terminology, instruments are the programmes that define EU policy for a specific region or

topic. They also set out the amount of money that is available to implement the policy. For instance,

the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is the programme that specifies the

EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. The programming of an instrument refers to the process of deciding how

to spend the budget that has been allocated to it.

63 It is worthwhile to note that the HR/VP Report to the European Parliament, the Council and the

Commission from December 2011 (HR/VP Report) which was supposed to set out how the EEAS and

DEVCO will work together is very evasive about this issue.


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The drafting of the annual action programmes for all financial programmes is the

responsibility of DG DEVCO with a very limited role for the EEAS. However, to ensure that

the policy is jointly owned and that conflict sensitivity is integrated adequately, close co-

operation between DG DEVCO and the EEAS in drafting them would be helpful. The revival

of the EU Action Plan for Situations of Fragility and Conflict, which is mentioned in the EU

Agenda for Change, provides an opportunity to develop guidelines for co-operation which

could apply to this process.

By ensuring effective co-operation throughout the programming cycle and extending co-

operation to the drafting of annual action plans, the EU could implement several findings

from the 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding which

showed that the EC’s approach to conflict analysis is not sufficiently systematised, that it

often failed to tackle the root-causes of conflict and that the EC therefore encountered

challenges in supporting the transition to long-term peace.

A separate but related issue is the need to continue reform of EU development policy and to

fully integrate conflict prevention and peacebuilding into EU development policy and

practice, in accordance with the OECD DAC standards on eligibility of development

activities. There remains resistance within the European Commission, European Parliament

and NGO sector with widespread ignorance about conflict prevention and peacebuilding,

including frequently heard assumption that that changes will lead to use of development

assistance for military action (despite this being ruled out by the DAC eligibility criteria

referred to above).

7) How well does the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission work

in the trade area? Does the EEAS have a role to play in EU trade policy and its

implementation?

With the Lisbon Treaty, trade policy – as part of the EU’s common commercial policy –

should be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external

action. However, we see that DG Trade operates largely independent of the rest of EU

external action and is hesitant to serve wider EU objectives, focusing instead on more

narrowly defined trade objectives.

This is despite the fact that the EU as the biggest regional trading block has considerable

leverage regarding trade that it can bring to the table to support its foreign policy objectives.

At the same time, trade can sometimes undermine other policy objectives and should

therefore be subject to an assessment by the relevant EEAS services64.

64 In the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue Network, EPLO and swisspeace organised a meeting

on the private sector and conflict which also addressed the relation between EU trade policy and

conflict. For a background document highlighting the links between EIB investment, EU trade policy

and conflict, please click here. For the meeting report, please click here.

http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Civil%20Society%20Dialogue%20Network/Policy%20Meetings/Private%20Sector/EPLO_CSDN_PrivateSector_Trade&Investment.pdf

http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Civil%20Society%20Dialogue%20Network/Policy%20Meetings/Private%20Sector/CSDN_PrivateSectorConflict_Report.pdf


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How the EU could integrate trade policy but also investment in third countries granted by

the European Investment Bank (EIB) more firmly into its foreign policy should be further

explored.

One of the main findings of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict,

Security and Development is that international assistance to conflict-affected countries has to

focus on providing security, justice and economic opportunities for citizens, including

marginalised communities. In that respect, it requires international actors to pay more

attention to job creation and social and economic equality when delivering assistance to

those countries.

The economic deprivation which affected large parts of society was one of the factors that

sparked the uprisings in some of the countries in the Middle East/North Africa region. This

was recognised by the EU, which focused large parts of its response to the crisis on

economic assistance in the form of increased lending through the EIB65. In addition, the

Foreign Affairs Council approved the negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade

Areas with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Both of these measures have the potential

to increase social equality, improve living conditions and support inclusive economic growth

in the countries concerned. However, investment and free trade per se do not necessarily

lead to these outcomes and may in turn even have a negative impact. Therefore, it needs to

be ensured that the impact on social, environmental and conflict dynamics is assessed

properly before decisions about EIB loans are made and free trade areas or agreements are

negotiated.

The bulk of the expertise needed to do such an assessment lies with the geographic and

thematic units in the EEAS and DG DEVCO. For the EU to capitalise on the positive impact

which its trade and investment can have in third countries, those units should be

systematically involved in ensuring compliance with the EU’s commitment to peace, human

rights and sustainable development, and in monitoring the compatibility of economic

activities with the EU’s overall strategy in the country concerned. In this respect, it is striking

that according to the HR/VP’s report in December 2011, none of the 937 briefing requests

which the EEAS handled in 2011 was prepared for DG Trade, DG Energy or DG

Environment. For the EEAS to drive the political agenda, more proactive engagement with

these parts of the EC is vital. In addition, the increased importance of EU delegations

regarding the coordination of EU policies and activities in a third country should be

exploited, for instance, by co-locating EIB offices inside delegation buildings and involving the

delegations in public consultations on proposed EIB projects.

65 In 2011, the EIB’s lending volume to the Southern Neighbourhood increased by € 1 billion and

additional resources of up to € 6 billion were allocated by 2013. See also Using More for More:

Incentivising Peace in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (EPLO: 2011).




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8) How well does the EEAS work as an institution?

A number of the challenges that the EEAS faces –and also many of the criticisms that have

been voiced– relate to how the EEAS functions as an institution. Although concerns raised

by EEAS may initially have been dismissed as unfounded complaining or as an unavoidable

result of bringing together people from different institutions, for those working closely with

the EEAS, many of the issues did appear have a negative impact its effectiveness. Certainly,

low levels of morale and a lack of loyalty (manifested as complaining or leaking) were clear.

There are some positive developments with input being gathered from staff on possible

improvements, including in discussions on the “corporate identity” of the EEAS. It is hoped

that the 2013 review of the EEAS will be used by senior management as an opportunity to

improve relationships and build trust within the EEAS.

Given the complexity of the institutional challenges facing the EEAS, it is hoped that these

issues will be taken seriously, including in allocation of senior management time, for example,

with the Chief Operating Officer focusing on how the EEAS works as an institution, rather

than on policy issues as is currently the case.

9) How well has the objective of a geographically and gender balanced staff been

met? How well has the objective been met of one third of staff from the

diplomatic services of the Member States by mid-2013, a third from the Council

Secretariat and a third from the Commission? Have staff been adequately

trained to perform the diplomatic role? If not, what are the omissions?

EPLO’s analysis of gender balance at management level in the EEAS shows serious problems:

EEAS senior-level gender balance66

Female staff Male staff Total

HR/VP 1 0 1

HR/VP cabinet 5 6 11

Board of Directors 1 3 4

Managing Directors 1 6 7

Directors (regional and thematic) 2 7 9

66 As of 1 October 2012.


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Heads of Crisis Management bodies 0 5 5

Heads of CSDP missions / operations 0 12 12

EU Special Representatives 2 9 11

Heads of EU Delegations 21 56 77

Total 33 104 137

Percentage 24.2% 75.7%

The line taken by the management of the EEAS throughout its establishment has been that

measures to increase the number of women in leadership positions are wrong because

recruitment is based on merit. Thus, the HR/VP has ruled out quotas for women in the

EEAS.

The contention that the current system is based on merit can be challenged given that there

are many different political factors that determine appointments, including nationality and

institutional background. In addition, to argue that in a merit-based system, women would

occupy under 25 % of senior-level positions could appear sexist.

Although quotas are not a panacea and certainly not enough to ensure gender equality of the

institutional working culture, data shows that quotas, as temporary measures, could assist

(thanks to the introduction of the quota system conflict-affected countries such as Rwanda

and Uganda have respectively 56.3% and 35% of women in their national parliament

compared to the European average of 21.5%). EPLO recommends that the EEAS

management and EU Member States reconsider their position on the adoption of quotas for

EEAS senior- and decision-making levels in order to overcome the current impasse.

If the EU does not address this problem, it remains open to the accusation of double

standards – gender equality is something that it supports others to do but does not apply

itself; this in turn undermines its ability to support gender equality in other regions of the

world. In addition, evidence from conflict-affected countries shows that if the international

community only has men in leadership positions (and women in assistant roles) this can

serve to perpetuate gender stereotypes and undermine local efforts to promote gender

equality.

10. Is the EEAS budget sufficient to meet its objectives? Are there any areas

where the EEAS could make savings?

11. In what ways has the financial and economic crisis within Member States

affected organisation and activity of the EEAS?


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Currently, economic recovery within the EU is overshadowing its foreign policy aspirations.

In the longer term, cuts in Member States’ budgets may lead to an increased effort to

develop collective EU foreign policy, with Member States aligning behind commonly defined

EU objectives and engaging in sharing of responsibilities.

The recent proposals from the President of the European Council on the EU’s Multiannual

Financial Framework (MFF) include cuts to EU funding for external relations. EPLO believes

that this will reduce the effectiveness of the EEAS and the EU external action more

generally. The EEAS (and EC) need a certain amount of funding in order to work effectively,

including abiding by principles and standards for delivery of assistance (such as those

contained in the New Deal for fragile states), which require skilled human resources.

The suggested cuts will not help resolve key conflicts between Member States over the EU

budget: EU external relations currently accounts for less than 6 % of the EU budget, thus,

cutting here will have a negligible effect on the overall budget. (This compares to the

Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy which absorbs over 40% of the

budget.)

While Member States have been willing to work together to defend other budget lines,

notably the CAP and the Cohesion funds, no Member State has yet emerged as a champion

of the external affairs budget. It may thus be perceived as an “easy” item to cut.

EPLO thus recommends that the UK government supports the European Commission’s

proposal to set the ceiling for Heading 4 (‘The EU as a Global Player’) at no less than € 70

billion (excluding the European Development Fund) and that the UK works with other

Member States to defend external affairs spending.

12. Has the EU created the right number and distribution of Delegations around

the world?

13. How well do the relationships with the Foreign Ministries of the EU Member

States work and how well do EU Delegations cooperate with the diplomatic

missions of the EU Member States?

Please see comments above.

There is certainly more that the EEAS could do to involve Member States in the

development of EU foreign policy: for a number of the Member States, there are people

within foreign ministries, up to and including the Foreign Ministers themselves who are

willing to play a more active role in EU external action. Building a better working

relationship with the Member States, including finding ways to involve them in development

of strategic for the EU should be a priority for the EEAS.


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Similarly, Member States both at the Foreign Ministries and at their diplomatic missions have

to make it a priority to co-operate with and support the work of the EEAS to ensure that it

is effective.


establishment of the EEAS? Has the UK been able to second high level

candidates to important positions within the EEAS? Has it also seconded a

representative number to more junior positions?

The UK has seconded well-qualified candidates to mid- and high-level positions within the

EEAS, who are highly respected inside and outside the EEAS. Regarding more junior

positions, it is more difficult to judge, because the EEAS does not yet have a publicly

accessible directory of its staff.

EPLO’s experience of working with EEAS staff members seconded by the UK,

representatives of the UK government, and EU staff members with UK nationality, is

generally positive. UK representatives working on EU external affairs in both Brussels and

London (including seconded staff) tend to be very well-informed, highly competent and

inclined to take a constructive approach, supporting the more effective functioning of the

EEAS. In EPLO’s experience, this is true of FCO, DfID and MoD staff members. The UK

compares very well with other Member States in this regard. That said, the stance and

rhetoric of the current UK government is reducing the UK’s leverage in EU policy-making on

external affairs as on other policy issues.

15. Have the Foreign Services of other Member States all responded with their

best candidates for EEAS posts?

As the recruitment process is internal, it is difficult to make a general judgment on the

quality of candidates that have been put forward by Member States. However, there were

cases where recruitment of EEAS personnel was delayed due to the poor quality of

candidates presented by the Member States.

In addition, the High Representative pointed out several times that Member States do not

propose enough women for senior-level positions which makes it very difficult to obtain

gender balance inside the EEAS.

16. What should the EEAS need to do over the next three years and what should

it prioritise? How can it maximise the influence of Member States and the EU in

the future? On which areas should the 2013 review focus?


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Prioritise peacebuilding and conflict prevention

The EEAS should focus on peacebuilding and conflict prevention as it has comparative

advantages in these areas:

There is unmet need globally and demand from conflict-affected countries and populations for more involvement

Collective action by the EU/Europe would have a positive impact

It is less controversial for the member states who may not fully support development of “hard security” (and diplomatic) capacities by the EU

The EU has significant experience, tools, and credibility in supporting peace due the

role it is has played in generating peace and reconciliation in Europe

As the EU is not a nation state and it is often seen as more neutral by conflict parties, particularly in cases where European Member States’ colonial history is an issue

The EU has a strong track record of working with non-state actors which are

increasingly significant in both causing and resolving conflict

Other objectives of EU external action, such as the creation of European security and

the promotion of democracy and human rights, depend - at least to some extent - on the promotion of peace and stability

Focusing on conflict prevention and peacebuilding would allow the EU to retain its

identity as a normative foreign policy actor

It would allow the EU to capitalise on the recent award of the Nobel Peace Prize

Suggestions for the 2013 review of the EEAS:

1/ Focus on areas for improvement, including identification of specific changes

The review will be used by many to continue the strong criticism of the senior management

of the EEAS. Regardless of the validity or otherwise of criticism being presented, it has had

limited effect it may be more useful to focus on suggestions for improvement.

2/ Develop recommendations for ALL stakeholders

The effectiveness of the EEAS does not just depend on the management team in the EEAS, it

also depends on the Member States, the European Commission and the European

Parliament, among others. The review’s recommendations could also be targeted at these

stakeholders.

3/ Look beyond Brussels

There is a risk that the review focuses excessively on the dynamics and relationships in

Brussels. It is also important to look at the impact of the EEAS at country level (this could be

demonstrated with a couple cases)

4/ Use existing evidence


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A number of evaluations of EU external action have already been carried out and should be

fed into the review where appropriate. These include the work of the European Court of

Auditors (e.g. reports on the EULEX mission and the use of EU funds by the UN) and the

extensive evaluation of European Commission support to conflict prevention and

peacebuilding which reported in 2011 (while it focused on the European Commission many

of the recommendations should be implemented by the EEAS).

5/ Assess whether there is an integrated EU approach

How to overcome continued fragmentation in EU external affairs, including integration of

CSDP into overall EU strategies for a particular region. Cooperation and coordination

between the EEAS and the European Commission and general division of labour between

the two institutions (for instance on Neighbourhood Policy)

6/ Assess the functioning of the EEAS as an institution

Operational management: treatment of staff in the EEAS; levels of staff morale, turnover,

recruitment and retention of high-level staff; development of common identity (esprit de

corps); staff development and promotion opportunities, gender balance. Performance and

responsibilities of the Chief Operating Officer; job description of COO (balance between

operational and policy responsibilities). COO is now the Corporate Board Member

responsible for Asia. Does this detract from his operational responsibilities?

7/ Revival of civilian CSDP

Review of, updating concepts for, and better evaluation of civilian CSDP. The reform of the

EUISS and the role it should play in CSDP could also be part of the review.

8/ Relationship between the EEAS (at all levels) and the EU Member States

Identification of ways to improve the relationship between EEAS and EU Member States and

to allow greater – constructive – involvement of Member States in external affairs.

9/ Impact of the financial crisis on external affairs: scenarios

10/ Cooperation with actors outside the EU

Has the EEAS been able to establish functioning good relationships with civil society?

11/ Recruitment of next HR/VP and Deputies

The review should consider whether changes to the job description and division of

responsibilities among the HR and potential Deputies would be necessary, given the extreme

workload of the HR/VP. The Member States should be encouraged to improve the

recruitment process to ensure timely, transparent and merit-based recruitment.

18 December 2012

Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration – Written evidence

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Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public

Administration – Written evidence

The following text* is a response to the call for written evidence on the European External

Action Service (EEAS). It aims to address in particular the ninth question of the request

relating to training:

Have staff been adequately trained to perform the diplomatic role?

If not, what are the omissions?

1. Background

1.1 It is instructive to go briefly back to the Convention on the Future of Europe where

the importance of training was stressed on numerous occasions. One of the best

examples was in the form of a report submitted by Iñigo Méndez de Vigo, MEP, who

argued:

‘... training appears as an extremely effective tool to build up those personal

relations at an early stage of a diplomatic career. Training also allows to

enhance a common knowledge of the different backgrounds and diverse

administrative cultures and, therefore, to create a common European

administrative culture and a ‘spécificité du métier diplomatique européen’.

1.2 The potential of training was also reflected in an earlier 2000 report from Señor

Gerardo Galeote, MEP, who called for the creation of a ‘common European

diplomacy’ which should be supported by a College of European Diplomacy.

Interestingly, the Convention’s Working Group on External Action later

recommended that any such college should be implemented ‘independently of the

solution adopted regarding the institutional framework’. The issue of whether a

college or academy was desirable soon ran foul of debates about whether this implies

that there is a European capital of diplomacy and where that might be.

1.3 So much for the history, but it does support the assumption that training is important

for those engaged in EU external relations and that training could have a profound

socialisation effect which, in time, could lead to some form of common European

diplomacy.

1.4 The Commission’s June 2006 communication ‘Europe in the World’ also touched

upon training, albeit less euphorically. They continued to support the need to open

up training between the national diplomatic academies and the Commission and

Council Secretariat. This had been supported by the previous Commissioner for

External Relations, Chris Patten, as well as his successor.


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1.5 The subsequent development of training under DG External Relations (Relex) was

built around three platforms. First, internal training (the Diplomatic Training Path

Programme which became Train4Diplo; the Diplomatic Exchange and Secondment

Programme and the Formation Siege). The second element was intended to open up

common training elsewhere in the Commission (Human Resources and Security;

Informatics; Communications and the European Administrative School). Finally,

external linkages were provided principally through the Diplomatic Training

Programme which was designed to open up training to Relex and national officials on

a mutual basis. The numbers involved remained relatively modest.

1.6 The training legacy inherited by the EEAS therefore stressed inter-institutional

approaches to learning and implied that there was no need to reinvent the wheel

entirely. What was lacking, however, was a clear training concept and how to deal

with the more political aspects of diplomacy which would soon be introduced by the

Lisbon Treaty and the attribution of full legal personality to the EU. The main

implication of this was that the former Commission delegations would become EU

delegations and deal with all aspects of the Union’s external actions including those

pertaining to CFSP and what is now the Common Security and Defence Policy

(CSDP).

1.7 It should be noted that the growth of CSDP gave rise to demands for specialist forms

of training for crisis management tasks such as the (virtual) European Security and

Defence College and the Collège Européen de Police (CEPOL), with its modest

secretariat located in the United Kingdom. Both were established in 2005.

2.0 The Council decision

2.1 Article 6 (12) of the July 2010 Council decision establishing the EEAS mentions

training specifically:

Steps shall be taken in order to provide EEAS staff with adequate common

training, building in particular on existing practices and structures at national

and Union level. The High Representative shall take appropriate measures to

that effect within the year following the entry into force of this Decision.

2.2 In practical terms this implied the adoption of a Training Strategy within the EEAS,

the consolidation of a number of courses formerly offered through DG Relex into

the Service (including many of the staff), the establishment of new courses designed

to address specific demands (and skills) required by EEAS staff.

2.3 In addition, internal assessments were made by DG Relex/EEAS of the training

capabilities of national providers, including diplomatic academies.


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3.0 Training in practice

3.1 Responsibility for training in the EEAS falls under the Administration and Finance

(Patrick Child) and, within that, Human Resources where it is located in a modest

unit entitled ‘Career learning and development’.

3.2 The unit was originally tasked with the development of a strategic framework; the

content of the training actions and a training map; for contacting training institutes,

diplomatic schools; for organizing and managing approximately 60 training actions and

seminars yearly, mainly at headquarters but also in Delegation for Commission staff

(now Union delegations); whilst welcoming staff from the Member States and other

Institutions and preparing them for their future roles in the EEAS.

3.3 The strategic framework was adopted in 2011 and its general themes may be

summarised as:

Training for all EEAS staff (including delegations, liaison offices and EU Special Representative’s teams)

Training that relates specifically to the external relations’ functions;

Training that clearly demonstrates added value (beyond existing training offerings in the EU institutions and the Member States);

The presence of a harmonized curriculum as a fundamental tool in shaping the

Service;

A common budget.

3.4 The adoption of the training strategy and the eventual implementation of training

programmes has been partially influenced by the pre-Lisbon legacy (especially that of

DG Relex) as well as by the interaction of the Member States who often held

differing views on the role of training, training needs and the required time for

training.

3.5.1 What has emerged reflects partly the DG Relex heritage and, increasingly, the

specific environment of the EEAS. The training offered can be thought of under a

variety of headings:

Entry: Common induction for new appointees including introduction to the

EEAS and the EU’s external actions;

Geographical/analytical: History of European diplomacy, Changing patterns of European diplomacy, European Neighbourhood Policy, EU-Russia, EU-China,

EU-US, EU-Asia, Introduction to Islam, political economy, global challenges

(migration, climate change, financial crisis, security and energy security);

Skills based (external): Peace Mediation, Protocol, Public Diplomacy and the

Media, Intercultural Communication, coordination and coherence;

international negotiations, complex negotiations and political analysis and

reporting;


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Skills based (internal): Internal management, financial aspects and accountability, pre-posting training for delegations for management and financial aspects,

language training etc.

Specialist: Basic Intelligence Analysis, Security Sector Reform and courses

offered through CEPOL and the ESDC.

3.6 The Induction Course is held over one week (or even less) in June. Aside from

imparting essential information, and exposing new entrants to the principal division

heads and corporate board, the question of whether there can be any ‘socialisation’

effect from such a short course is open to question, especially when in some national

cases the induction course may even be spread over one year which would allow for

a more objective measure of any esprit de corps effect.

3.7 The initial composition of the EEAS has posed its own training challenges since a one-

size-fits-all approach is clearly unsuitable. Most national diplomats entering the

Service will have little idea of how the EU works nor of its internal management and

financial procedures while, by contrast, an EEAS official coming originally from the

Commission or Council Secretariat may not have been trained to be a diplomat

(although he or she may have some diplomatic skills). Within and between each of

these groups are not only different training needs but also, as David Spence has

observed, competing ‘mindsets’.

3.8 The question of who attends training is also flexible and it is worth noting that many

of the geographical and analytical courses are open to participants from the EU

institutions as well as national diplomats. Beyond this, the decision on whether to use

one of the ten annual training days in the individual’s training passport depends very

much upon work demands, the benevolence of the unit head, the location and

duration of the training and interest. The levels of attendees and the specific interests

are often diverse, making for a challenging training environment.

3.9 The issue of who provides the training also depends upon the training in question. The

internal management and financial management aspects are addressed internally (by

the European School of Management) while other forms of specialised training may

also be provided by internal providers like the ESDC or CEPOL. The courses

providing external expertise are organised by means of a Framework Contract

applying to all of the EU Institutions and a number of agencies, currently awarded to

the European Institute of Public Administration (Maastricht) who works in

partnership with the College of Europe. For those courses organised through the

framework contract, EIPA and the College of Europe will design the programme and

select the relevant external experts in consultation with the EEAS.

3.10 The question of how to train EEAS officials varies, according to the topic and the

issue at hand. There is no standard format regarding length or duration. The level of

interactivity also depends upon the specific training – skills-based training tends to be

the most interactive with group simulations and rapid feedback. Many of the courses


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provided by external providers are capped at 30 participants in order to allow for

adequate levels of participation and feedback.

3.11 Quality control is ensured through regular feedback from participants (evaluations) that

are shared, where relevant, with the external providers and with the person

responsible in the EEAS Training Unit.

4.0 Are staff adequately trained to perform the diplomatic role?

4.1 The response is necessarily conditional since it depends upon the staff member in

question, his/her background, the nature of the post that he/she is assuming and their

levels. Interestingly, there has been no comprehensive needs analysis to guide

the development of training in response to general and specific demand. This,

inevitably, leads to a hit and miss approach. The assumption that many of the staff

may require the same types of training that they enjoyed in their previous posts may

only be partially correct and risks providing training that may be too generic and not

necessarily honed to the demands of the EEAS.

4.2 In certain instances EEAS staff have proved that they lacked particular skills. A specific

example would be when staff assume positions in the EU delegations that demand

polished political reporting skills. This is an area where the national diplomat is likely

to have an advantage over his/her former Commission or Council Secretariat

counterparts. The assumption of new duties by EU delegations in the foreign policy

and security realms (see above) has made this an important aspect of training;

4.3 The acquisition of diplomatic skills must also be honed to the specifics of

the European-level of diplomacy and not merely gauged against national

benchmarks. For instance, the skills required to be a Head of Delegation are more

likely to demand onerous management and financial skills than would be typically

found in the role of a national ambassador. Emphasis is therefore placed on making

sure that successful candidates for high-profile positions, like heads of delegations,

are well prepared to assume the managerial and technical aspects of their duties.

4.4 It is equally important that any training stressing analytical skills sharpens the

participant’s awareness of the EU’s interests on a particular issue or country/region.

This may require specific knowledge of the legal agreements underpinning the

Union’s relations with a specific international organisation or country, a detailed

knowledge of the ongoing political dialogue, programmes and counterparts involved.

It is obviously also important to be aware of national positions and differences, but it

is especially important that the prevailing EU interest, priorities and challenges are

stressed.

4.5 The incorporation of high-level EEAS officials has assisted in the programme design

process as a way of ensuring relevance. The role of external partners is to either

provide expertise lacking within the EEAS or, more often than not, to provide

external and comprehensive perspectives on various aspects of an official’s job. One


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of the most valuable aspects of training is the chance to remove EEAS officials from

their daily routines and afford them a wider perspective.

4.6 The openness of many of the analytical courses to participants from other EU

institutions and the Member States is commendable (and reflects the mixed

composition of the Service itself) but it is far from evident that this has led to

significant reciprocation from EU institutions or the Member States themselves.

5.0 Challenges and issues (and possible omissions)

5.1 Training needs to be given sufficient political priority within the EEAS. This implies

the need for consistent leadership with a clear vision of the Service’s training needs

and how they should be met within the existing financial and human resource

parameters;

5.2 The lack of a clear needs assessment implies that many of the offerings may be

helpful, but there remains a strong reliance on legacy training models. A needs

assessment would also permit a clearer assessment of what might be developed and,

where appropriate, shared with/by other EU institutions or Member States;

5.3 The importance of the above observation also lies in the scarce budget (which is in

the process of being reduced from around €1.2 million to €1.0 million for 2013).

This figure covers all training needs of the Service (i.e. not only seminars provided by

external experts, but all internal management, financial and language seminars). The

number of staff involved in the training unit also remains modest with the attendant

risk of over-load and unacceptable stress levels;

5.4 The Non-paper on the EEAS signed by the Foreign Ministers of twelve EU Member

States of 8 December 2011 urged ‘additional common training initiatives could be

envisaged, making use of existing training facilities both at the EU level and within

Member States’. More thought needs to be given to where and how to share training

facilities across the EU institutions and the Member States. The opening up of training

across the External Relations Group in the Commission (Economic and Monetary

Affairs; Trade; International Cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response;

Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy) and the EEAS, as well as the European

Parliament, may lead to initial budgetary complications but could also lead to longer-

term economies of scale. This should be done on a reciprocal basis. When it comes

to the Member States, care will have to be taken to avoid any appearances of

promoting one national model over another (this might be prompted by linguistic

considerations as well);

5.5 If one of the basic desired purposes of training is to promote an esprit de corps within

the Service, more thought needs to be given to the timing of training. This is most

obviously the case with the induction programme which may be too brief to offer the


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kind of socialisation envisaged. One possibility would be to cluster training around

themes or skills so that there is the possibility of following multiple training events.

5.6 An obvious omission lies with the vast number of the delegation staff who receive

little to no training at all. The Junior Professionals in Delegation programme (which

will become fully operational in 2013) offers opportunities to highly qualified

graduates for professional experience. This currently consists of 34 Junior Experts in

Delegations (JED) across the EU delegations (of which, one is British) and a further

45 in the Commission. But, JEDs aside, most of the 1129 local agents in the EU

delegations (who are responsible for a wide range of duties ranging from political

reporting to drivers) and the 2056 local agents in Delegations employed by the

Commission, receive very little training.

5.7 One partial response to the general problem of maximising the availability of training

to EEAS staff, and the more specific issue of how to make training opportunities

available to far-flung EU delegations, may lie in e-learning and blended learning (the

latter being a combination of e-learning and face-to-face instruction). This would

provide the EEAS with more outreach training tools that could be widely disbursed

within the Service and even beyond. The key consideration here would be to select

the appropriate form of training for this format and to ensure that the start-up and

maintenance costs are adequately addressed before any wide scale e-learning is

embarked upon. Experience has suggested that the initial costs may be relatively high,

but with longer-term economies of scale. E-learning would also require the presence

of specific skills both within the Service as well as on the part of any external

providers.

How well has the objective of a geographically and gender balanced staff been

met?

Executive Summary

0.1 Geographical and gender balance will be an integral part of the forthcoming review of the

EEAS and specific reference to the inclusion of these aspects is made in the July 2010

Council decision establishing the EEAS;

0.2 The lack of any agreed working definitions of what constitutes an ideal balance, in either

case, risks making it a subjective exercise. Key terms like ‘adequate’ and ‘meaningful’ are

undefined;

0.3 The EEAS inherited a significant legacy problem with respect to both forms of balance,

owing to the initial composition of the Service. The legacy problem also extends to the

diplomatic services of the Member States who, in many cases, demonstrate particular

challenges when it comes to gender balance. Both need to be recognised, as does the


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limited margin for manoeuvre and time period available to redress any perceived

imbalances;

0.4 Baroness Ashton has demonstrated her personal commitment to improved balance

through her appointment role for senior positions within the Service. This has been done

principally through appointments made in the regular rotations of the EU delegations but

this is nevertheless important in order to foster wider ownership of the Service;

0.5 Geographical and gender balance are often grouped together, but each poses somewhat

distinct challenges and may therefore call for suitably tailored solutions;

0.6 The review might usefully concentrate less upon what has been done, which is limited,

and concentrate more upon longer-term strategies to introduce better balance (even if

the actual term defies an agreed definition). A number of recommendations have been

made to this end in the relevant part of the submission.

1. Background

1.1 Interest in the question of geographical balance in the Service goes back to at least the

Joint Progress Report submitted by the (then) High Representative and the President of

the Commission on 9 June 2005, in which it was mentioned that staff should be

‘recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis, drawing as appropriate on the

three sources of personnel (Council/Commission/Member States).

1.2 Following the failure of the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, the issue was not

returned to until 2009. On 12 October a fiche on the Specific arrangements concerning

EEAS staff’ was produced on 12 October 2009 which noted that the ‘selection of

personnel, open to candidates from the Member States and the relevant services of the

Commission and the GSC, should be set up in full compliance with the principle of

appointment based on merit, and recognising the importance of adequate geographical

balance, whilst avoiding the introduction of quotas’.

1.3 A few days later the Swedish Presidency Report of 23 October 2009 on the EEAS noted

that:

Recruitment should be undertaken through a transparent procedure based on merit

with the objective of securing the services of staff of the highest standard of ability,

efficiency and integrity while ensuring adequate geographical balance, a need for a

meaningful presence of nationals from all EU Member States in the EEAS and aiming

towards gender balance.


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1.4 By the end of 2009 and the first months of 2010 many of the national positions reflected

the perceived need for geographical balance in the composition of the Service. A non-

paper on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS submitted by the Visegrad Group

noted that, ‘while fully supporting the principle of “merit”, we deem it necessary to

ensure an adequate geographical balance and a meaningful presence of nationals from all

EU Member States in order to ensure that the Service could draw from a wide variety of

diplomatic culture and experience.’

1.5 The High Representative presented her ‘Step Change’ document to the Foreign Ministers

of the Member States and to the Presidency in early March 2010 and, subsequently, to

the European Parliament. She returned to what was now becoming a familiar theme,

noting the recruitment should be based on merit ‘with the objective of securing the

services of staff of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity while ensuring

adequate geographical balance and aiming towards gender balance’.

1.6 The emphasis from the Member States reflected the need for geographical

representation but the Swedish Presidency report (above) had put gender balance on the

table. This was subsequently reflected in the draft Council decision on the EEAS of 25

March 2010 whereby the High Representative was charged with responsibility for

establishing the selection procedures for the EEAS staff, ‘which shall be based on merit

and on the broadest possible geographical basis, in conformity with the Staff Regulations

and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, with due regard for gender

balance.’

1.7 The proposals for amendments to the draft March Council decision emanating from the

European Parliament indicate that the issue of geographical and gender balance was of

particular sensitivity, especially if gauged by the number of MEPs who backed specific

amendments. Sixty MEPs backed a change in the wording of Article 6, paragraph 6, of the

draft Council decision, more than on any other single issue.

2. The Council decision

2.1 The Council decision on the functioning and organisation of the European External

Action Service (EEAS) of 26 July 2010 stipulates that:

Recruitment should be based on merit whilst ensuring adequate geographical

and gender balance. The staff of the EEAS should comprise a meaningful

presence of nationals from all the Member States. The review foreseen for 2013

should also cover this issue, including, as appropriate, suggestions for additional

specific measures to correct possible imbalances.67

2.2 Reference is made to geographical and gender balance on two further occasions

(Article 6 (6) and Art. 6 (8)). The former makes reference to Article 13.3 which

notes that by mid-2013 the ‘High Representative shall provide a review of the

67Official Journal of the European Union, L 201/31,3 August 2010.


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organisation and functioning of the EEAS, which shall cover inter alia the

implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11)’.

2.3 The Council decision gives no definition of what constitutes merit or, for that

matter, what ‘adequate’ or ‘meaningful’ balances may be. Since merit is of

overriding importance a composite definition may be offered, based on different

sources. The first is based on the Commission’s ‘Compilation Document on

Senior Officials Policy’ which devoted a section to merit, which states that:

The assessment of merit involves not only taking account of the candidates’

ability, efficiency and conduct within the service during their career to date,

but also evaluating their capacity to carry out senior management duties

(authority, leadership, ability to manage a team and to work in a multicultural,

multilingual environment, etc.).

2.4 The same document also observes that ‘merit’ also applies to internal promotions

which are based on a comparison of ‘staff reports and the level of responsibility of

the functions held’. The Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union make

it clear that when considering comparative merits (in this context), particular

account shall be taken of ‘reports on the officials, the use of languages in the

execution of their duties other than the language for which they have produced

evidence of thorough knowledge in accordance ... and, where appropriate, the

level of responsibilities exercised by them’. More specific criteria relating to merit

also appear in position announcements including years of professional experience,

educational attainments, linguistic knowledge and aptitude and, where relevant,

existing grade eligibility. For higher positions (AD 12 and above) a requirement of

‘proven experience in leading and motivating multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural

teams’ also regularly appears among the requirements.

2.5 A consensual agreement on ‘adequate’ or ‘meaningful’ balance is unlikely due, in

part, to national differences of interpretation. France, for instance, has tended to

favour senior positions and has paid little attention to middle management.

Similarly, Germany put considerable effort into supporting German candidates for

top positions with less going to candidates applying elsewhere. Spain has even

advocated dual-use of diplomats whereby Spanish national diplomats working for

EU delegations might remain committed for part of their time to national

functions.

3. The legacy problem

3.1 As a result of the quadrilogue discussions held on 21 June 2010 it was agreed that

at least 60% of all staff at administrative (AD) level shall be permanent EU officials.

It had also been agreed that diplomats on temporary assignment from the

Member States may number up to one-third of the staff at AD level.

3.2 The new Service came into being on 1 January 2011 based upon the Council

decision of 26 July 2010 and the necessary amendments to the staff and financial

regulations and the 2011 budget. The initial size of the EEAS excluding the

national diplomats on temporary assignment was 1,643. This consisted of 585

posts transferred from DG Relex which then ceased to exist; 436 from


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Commission delegations under DG Relex; 93 from DG DEV; 411 from the

Council Secretariat; and 118 new AD posts.

3.3 The implications of the initial composition of the Service was that any biases in

terms of balance would tend to be reflected in the EEAS and, in order to address

any such biases, it would have to be done either through recruitment to new

posts, rotations of heads and deputy-heads of delegations or via the temporary

assignment of national diplomats.

3.4 Tables: Grade Distribution DG Relex, Dec. 2010

3.5 The legacy problem is composed, most visibly, of a dual bias in favour of the

older EU Member States in the senior AD levels as well heavy male

representation at these levels. This had already been established as an issue in the

case of DG Relex, where the majority of the EEAS’s transferred staff emanated

from. A third and often overlooked bias is that of the relative seniority of the DG

Relex staff scheduled for transferral to the EEAS. This has created a noticeable

bulge in AD12-13 levels in the EEAS. The overall ability to ‘balance’ was thus


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inherently limited by the legacies stemming from the constituent parts of the

EEAS.

3.6 The tables above also mention assistant (AST) grades which shows an interesting

reversal of the gender patterns witnessed at AD level. The general pattern is

similar to that of many parts of the Commission. Although AST grades are of

passing interest, it is apparent that any balancing efforts were oriented towards

the more politically sensitive AD levels.

3.7 Given the nature of the legacy problem and the absence of any firm criteria for

either geographical or gender balance, much of the attention has focussed on at

least symbolical adjustments attainted through the rotation of heads and deputy-

heads of delegations (see below). This has the advantage of being politically visible

and satisfies the immediate (geographical) demands of the Member States. In

making the appointments to Heads and Deputy Heads of Delegation in May 2012,

Baroness Ashton suggested a threefold criterion for balance. First, that the ‘staff

of the EEAS should come from all the Member States’; that candidates should also

come from ‘across the Union’; and that the EEAS should include ‘a meaningful

representation of nationals from all Member States’.

4. The current situation

4.1 Data provided by the EEAS as of June 2012, taking into account the third (2012)

rotation to EU delegations, shows:

Global figures

Total number of authorised AD posts in EEAS: 920

Total number of AD posts occupied by MS diplomats: 248

Percentage of MS diplomats in EEAS AD staff: 26.9%

Delegations

Total number of authorised EEAS AD posts in Delegations: 346

Total number of AD posts occupied by MS diplomats in Delegations: 131


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Percentage of MS diplomats in Delegations: 37.8%

Headquarters

Total number of authorised EEAS AD posts at Headquarters: 574

Total number of AD posts occupied by MS diplomats in Headquarters: 117

Percentage of MS diplomats in Headquarters: 20.3%

4.2 The proportion of Member States diplomats as a proportion of all staff, suggests

that the Service is near attaining the one-third target but, in spite of good

progress, it will probably not attain the overall target by the time of the review.

Recruitment for positions in the headquarters has been constrained by the low

numbers of posts available, while recruitment to the delegations has been easier

partly due to the regular rotation of posts.

4.3 Composition of the EEAS (AD level) provided by the EEAS from their June 2012 staffing

report:


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4.4 Nationals from the Member States which joined the Union in 2004 and 2007

represent approximately 16.9% of staff at AD level and 31.1% of the diplomats

recruited to the EEAS are from these 12 Member States. It is interesting to note

that the newer Member States received relatively few senior positions in the

delegations in the first round of recruitment due in part to the fact that many

concentrated their applications on their areas of diplomatic expertise

(predominantly eastern Europe and the CIS). The relatively small sizes of the

diplomatic services (with the exception of Poland) and the limited national

diplomatic representation overseas has resulted in service in the EEAS being

perceived as a valuable adjunct to national diplomatic expertise. Cost factors

cannot be ruled out either as motives for all Member States to seek more

positions in the EEAS (since the latter covers the cost of temporarily assigned

national diplomats). The possibilty of an increase in the number of seconded

national experts (SNEs) (there are currently 336 seconded to the EEAS) has been

suggested as possible counter-pressure since a number are supplied ‘cost free’

(i.e. the Member States pay). Since most of these work in the EU Military Staff

(189) it is difficult to see how their expansion (or vice versa) would impact on

diplomatic representation. The vast majority of the SNEs are men (281).


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4.5 Gender balance in Headquarters and Delegations (information supplied by EEAS,

Staffing Report, June 2012):

Headquarters

Delegations

Men Women Total Men Women Total

Total HQ/

Delegations

Grade No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Nb %

AD16 3 0,6

% 0

0,0

% 3

0,6

% 3

0,9

%

0,0

% 3 0,9 % 6 0,7 %

AD15 12 2,2

% 3

0,6

% 15

2,8

% 10

2,9

% 1

0,3

% 11 3,2 % 26 2,9 %

AD14 34 6,3

% 1

0,2

% 35

6,4

% 31

9,1

% 6

1,8

% 37

10,9

% 72 8,1 %

AD13 52 9,6

% 24

4,4

% 76

14,0

% 69

20,2

% 13

3,8

% 82

24,0

% 158

17,9

%

AD12 100 18,4

% 35

6,4

% 135

24,8

% 75

22,0

% 26

7,6

% 101

29,6

% 236

26,7

%

AD11 30 5,5

% 13

2,4

% 43

7,9

% 13

3,8

% 6

1,8

% 19 5,6 % 62 7,0 %

AD10 30 5,5

% 21

3,9

% 51

9,4

% 13

3,8

% 8

2,3

% 21 6,2 % 72 8,1 %

AD9 39 7,2

% 14

2,6

% 53

9,7

% 10

2,9

% 2

0,6

% 12 3,5 % 65 7,3 %

AD8 11 2,0

% 12

2,2

% 23

4,2

% 7

2,1

% 4

1,2

% 11 3,2 % 34 3,8 %

AD7 26 4,8

% 23

4,2

% 49

9,0

% 19

5,6

% 11

3,2

% 30 8,8 % 79 8,9 %

AD6 13 2,4

% 13

2,4

% 26

4,8

% 4

1,2

% 1

0,3

% 5 1,5 % 31 3,5 %

AD5 20 3,7

% 15

2,8

% 35

6,4

% 4

1,2

% 5

1,5

% 9 2,6 % 44 5,0 %

Total: 370 68

% 174

32

% 544

100

% 258

76

% 83

24

% 341 100% 885 100 %


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4.6 The table above poses the issue of what benchmark should be used to measure

gender balance. When judged by common metrics (such as women as a

percentage of the populations of the EU Member States; the percentage of

women in tertiary education; or even the 40% of non-executive director board

seats for women advocated by Viviane Reding) women are under-represented at

AD level (the opposite is true for AST level where, as of June 2012, there were

646 officials and temporary agents at AST level, of which 124 (27.0%) were men

and 335 women in the headquarters, while 70 (37.4%) were men and 117 were

women in the delegations). For rather obvious reasons the Member State best

represented at AST level was Belgium (24.9%) followed by France (8.2%) and

Italy, German and Spain (each around 6.8%). Those Member States joining in 2004

or 2007 are less strong represented with only 12.7% of AST appointments. A

further group are contract agents where similar trends are evident. 49 of the

contract agents in headquarters are men while 87 are women; while 70 are men

and 112 are women in the delegations.

4.7 Given the legacy problem (above), any potential for rebalancing could either be

conducted through recruitment of national diplomats or, more modestly, through

the regular rotations of posts in EU delegations. The former has proven

problematic since many of the diplomatic services of the Member States show

similar patterns as the EEAS in terms of gender representation at senior levels

and in embassies;

4.8 With this in mind much of the attention for ‘balance’ has tended to focus on the rotation of posts in the EU delegations. The results of the three rotations thus far

under the EEAS include 42 posts (management and non-management) and 12

non-management posts. The success rate of national diplomats, according to the

EEAS itself, was 52.4% -- 38.8% at management (Head and Deputy Head) level

and 62.5% at non-management level. 1m769 applications were received for the 42

posts in the 2012 rotation exercise.

4.9 Appointment to Head or Deputy Head of delegation positions involves a second

interview with the High Representative herself. In this regard she has

demonstrated her personal commitment to geographical and gender balance. On

the former all Member States (except Cyprus) are now represented at Head or

Deputy Head level. Following the 2012 rotation there are 125 Heads of

Delegation (or equivalent) posts and 141 delegations. Of these posts 24 are held

by women (19.2%) and 15 (12.0%) by nationals who joined the EU in 2004 and

2007. 40 of the positions are occupied by Member State diplomats. Of the 27

Deputy Heads of Delegation, 7 are women (25.9%) and 9 (33.3%) are nationals of

Member States who joined in 2004 and 2007.

4.10 The table above also illustrates quite clearly the seniority bulge in the EEAS

with many officials at the AD 12-13 levels competing for scarce jobs at the most

senior levels. Conversely, those in lower levels risk frustration if there is little

prospect for promotion to the over-subscribed levels. Although not specifically


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an issue related to geographical or gender balance, it neverthless represents a

further form of ‘balance’ that is often overlooked.

5.0 Thinking ahead to the review and beyond

5.1 The absence of firm criteria and thus benchmarks to judge either geographical or

gender balance against in the forthcoming review of the EEAS risks leading to

subjectivity. The presence of a significant legal problem has limited the scope for

any rebalancing and, where rebalancing has been attempted, it has been at senior

levels (principally in the delegations).

5.2 Given the limited room for manoeuvre, Baroness Ashton has demonstrated a

personal commitment to enhanced geographical and gender balance in the

Service. This is particularly noticeable at the senior levels mentioned above where

after initial selection and interview by the Consultative Committee on

Appointments (CCA), decisions on appointment are decided upon by her. This has given her the ability to demonstrate her commitment.

5.3 The review should concentrate less upon what has been done, which is

largely symbolic (but nonetheless important), and more upon longer-

term strategies (with periodic review) to move the EEAS towards an

agreed geographical and gender balance. The nature of the problems are,

however, somewhat different and may therefore demand specific courses of

action. The nature of geographical balance, for instance, may have much to do

with the lack of qualified diplomats from the newer Member States in particular

who can compete successfully for posts in the EEAS where there is little or no

national experience. On the other hand, the issue of the apparent lack of

geographical balance is less understandable (or excusable) and may require

different responses. With this in mind, the recommendations for consideration

below will differentiate between geographical and gender balance.

5.4 Longer-term geographical rebalancing: Recommendations

• To ensure that merit prevails as the basis for appointment or promotion in all

cases;

• To ensure ongoing geographical representation of all Member States at the senior

levels in order to foster and encourage political ownership of the EEAS by

officials and Member States alike;

• To ensure that all candidates, notably those from the Member States, are familiar

with the scoring used by the CCA (for senior positions) since the experience of

national and EU candidates for the same position can vary enormously. This


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would help to ensure that national candidates are able to present their

credentials in a relevant manner;

• To nominate a specific point of contact (presumably within the EEAS MDR C) to

give feedback to candidates for EEAS appointments on their performance. This

could be important to ensure that all Member States can extract the relevant

lessons from candidatures so that they may compete more successfully;

• It is equally important that panel members, including the CCA where relevant,

are routinely informed of the outcome of selection panels;

• To encourage wider geographical representation at other levels through active

preparation and training for successful recruitment to the EEAS. This includes the

ability to comply with, for instance, basic language requirements (French in

particular). In this regard the human resource departments of the MFAs should

be requested to extract ‘lessons-learned’ from the existing and ongoing

recruitment applications. This could be systematically harvested by the human

resource departments of the national MFAs and shared with other MFAs and the

EEAS in intermittent Brussels-based seminars or workshops hosted by the

Service (MDR C);

• At the EU level, with a view to the situation post June 2013, there should be

training offered to encourage successful preparation for internal competition for

EEAS posts at different levels. This training should be internal and might be

offered through the European Administrative School;

• Since this study has suggested broader recruitment efforts at all staffing levels,

equal attention needs to be paid to adequate preparation for internal ‘post bulge’

AD promotion so that in the longer-term there can be broader geographical

representation across all grades;

• To monitor geographical representation and, in addition to the annual ‘Staffing in

the EEAS’ exercise, to commission a task force with internal and external

expertise to devise longer-term strategies to address geographical balance, with a

view to compiling and implementing ‘best practices’ at the European level (this

exercise could be mirrored by a parallel task force on gender balance). The

internal expertise should include adequate representation from the Commission,

the Council Secretariat and the European Parliament, so that all EU institutions

are held against a common standard and not one particular to any institution or

the EEAS;

• The issue of ‘grade equivalence’ between EEAS officials and their national

counterparts needs to be reviewed. Wherever possible, a rough equivalence in

terms of years of service should be aimed at in order to discourage impressions

of bias or resentment;


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• The CCA should be invited to contribute to and participate in internal reflections

on geographical (and gender) balance issues, especially bearing in mind their

broader mandate in this regard. They should contribute in full to the suggested

activities above under the supervision of the High Representative.

5.5 Longer-term gender rebalancing: Recommendations

• The role and grade of women in the EU institutions and the EEAS should reflect

the external positions adopted by the EU regarding the role of women, most

notably at senior levels. In this regard it is important that the EU is seen as an

exemplar and not the promoter of potential double-standards

• Continuing recognition that gender imbalances need addressing as part of a

longer-term strategy to attract, retain and promote women;

• Provision for shorter-term measures to begin to correct the under-

representation of women such as women-dominant short lists accompanied by

targets that are reviewed on a regular basis. These could be implemented by the

High Representative for a specified period of time, subject to regular review;

• All selection panels should include at least one female, this includes at the higher

levels where there is evident difficulty in always ensuring this at the moment. The

Member States should also be encouraged to help ensure this on a systematic

basis;

• The HR departments of the MFAs should be encouraged to systematically collect

data on the role and rank of women in the diplomatic services. Representatives of

the relevant departments should be invited by the EEAS (MDR C) to the EEAS

for intermittent seminars or workshops on gender-related issues in external

relations. The meetings would serve to highlight the EU-wide importance of

gender balance issues and would also service to highlight potential ‘best practices’

stemming from national practice and experience;

• The EEAS (MDR C) should be encouraged to draw up a longer-term strategy for

gender balance drawing upon internal studies, the results from workshops with

national counterparts (see above) and with the involvement of the CCA. A task

force should be established within the EEAS’s MDR C to reflect upon gender

specific issues in recruitment, promotion and training;

• A permanent rapporteur should be attached to the CCA acting under the Chair

of the CCA and the head of MDR C (Human Resources) in the EEAS, whose task

would be to promote successful career development and to instil best practice in

recruitment policy. He/she will have special responsibilities regarding oversight


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for gender and geographical balance. The rapporteur will, by definition, be a

senior person of superior or equivalent grade to the applicant. The rapporteur’s

observations should inform the yearly report on the occupation of posts in the

EEAS to the European Parliament and the Council;

• External experts with relevant expertise should be involved in EEAS seminars or

workshops and be encourage to supplement gaps in internal expertise (on, for

instance, gender specific mentoring) ;

• With the delegations in mind, a Partners and Children’s facility should be created

within EEAS (MDR C) in order to encourage more partners to serve in

delegations, or accompany a partner, with specific information of job prospects at

the location of the delegation in question and, similarly, re-entry advice upon

return from delegations. Information on local employment at the site of the

delegation could usefully be coordinated and shared with local EU Member State

representations.

5.6 Although care has to be exercised when asserting national examples of ‘best

practice’ the example of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) could

prove inspirational. The FCO’s Diversity Equality Scheme (which included a

Gender Equality Scheme) provides some useful principles, priorities and potential

courses for action. The 2010 Equality Act and the FCO’s response may also

prove illustrative.

* The text draws upon some material prepared for a report on this issue commissioned by the

Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) of the European Parliament which is being prepared by Dr. Sabina

Lange and the author. The views expressed in this submission remain those of the author alone.

December 2012

Hugo Shorter, Head of Europe Directorate – External, Foreign and Commonwealth Office –

Supplementary written evidence

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Hugo Shorter, Head of Europe Directorate – External, Foreign and

Commonwealth Office – Supplementary written evidence

At the 1 November evidence session on the European External Action Service (EEAS) and in

response to a question from Baroness Young of Hornsey, I agreed to write to you providing

further information on where we thought there was more work to be done to ensure the

EEAS plays its role to the full on Development.

As I said during the evidence session, the Council Decision establishing the EEAS sets out

the division of responsibilities of the EEAS and the Commission for external action

instruments and programming. The Commission retains the lead on development and trade

and on managing external co-operation programmes, but the High Representative has the

task of ensuring “overall political co-ordination of the Union’s external action, ensuring the

unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action by co-ordinating external

assistance instruments, which include development funds”.

The relationship between the EEAS and the Commission is therefore fundamental to

effective policy delivery on Development. For instance, while the Commission, through DG

DEVCO, retains its role in the development and implementation of EU Development policy,

the EEAS, through its Brussels based geographical desks and its network of delegations has

also acquired a key role in shaping country programmes across the full range of the EU’s

development portfolio. This is in addition to the EEAS’ role in outlining the EU’s ‘country

strategies’, which will be in effect from 2014 – 2020 (the same time frame as the MFF).

The complexity of the inter-related roles of the Commission and the EEAS can create

difficulties between the two. These difficulties can most acutely be felt during discussions in

the EU’s internal working groups in Brussels. As the Commission and the EEAS establish the

boundaries of their respective responsibilities, working groups can face long delays in

reaching agreement. We have not seen a situation in which this has led to serious problems

in implementation of policy on the ground.

The UK, along with other Member States, will continue to support the EEAS and the

Commission to develop their working relationships and ensure smoother internal processes.

Baroness Ashton’s 2013 Review of the EEAS will offer a key opportunity to discuss this

further.

16 November 2012

Global Governance Institute

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The main developments and progress in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

at the institutional, procedural, normative and capability level were made in the years after

its establishment, 1999-2004. In a second period of active review and adaptation from 2006

to 2008 the number of missions increased and mandates became more complex and

demanding. At the same time the institutional capacity was still not fully in balance with what

seemed like rising demands for European crisis management. However, in the interregnum

of implementing the Lisbon Treaty (2008-2011), few major developments have taken place.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) was decided upon to address most of these

issues, but has so far failed to deliver what it was, perhaps unrealistically, expected to

achieve.

The EEAS was formally launched on 1 December 2010, but started to consolidate with the

move into the new premises in Spring/ summer 201268. Interviews with officials confirm their

aim to explore the opportunities of using the ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground by the EU’s

delegations since early 2012. Yet it is clear that EU Delegations remain distinct from the

crisis response and maintain institutional barriers in various conflict situations. The EEAS is,

however, a ‘service’, and far from being an independent institutions with its own decision-

making powers. While it is responsible for the strategic allocation in foreign affairs, the

Commission and its Foreign Policy Instruments Service is firmly in control of the budget for

its instruments. The delegations are a major source of power for the EEAS, but also torn

with loyalties to the Commission and member states, depending on the background of its

officials. In short, the Service is, not yet fully up to speed. 2013 will therefore be a defining

year for the new organisation.

EEAS – staffing and seconded experts

In institutional terms, the EEAS is still very much an evolving animal. Few formal rules,

doctrines and operating procedures have been firmly established and a variety of complex

and politically sensitive issues remain. This is not

helped by the fact that fights over competency and leadership on different parts of the

foreign policy spectrum persist, particularly between the Council and Commission President.

The EEAS is meant to integrate staff from diverse backgrounds and institutional cultures,

including the Commission (mainly ECHO, RELEX, DEVCO), the Council Secretariat and the

27 member states. Complicating matters further, member states fill EEAS positions on a

temporary basis69 with ‘seconded national experts’ (SNEs), adding another layer of differing

68 The first officials moved into the new building in February 2012, with the majority having moved over the

summer, with completion nearing with the end of 2012.

69 Typically, SNEs are seconded for a duration of 2 years, with the possibility for an extension of a further 2 year

period.


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institutional backgrounds and loyalties (from, inter alia, foreign ministries as well Ministries of

Interior and Defence).

The politicization of the EEAS makes career development and prospects for Administrators

difficult, as member states will always have an interest to fill higher posts with national

officials, hoping to exert more influence in this manner. Apart from issues of career

perspectives, this also emphasizes problems of institutional memory preservation and

technical expertise. The new function as diplomatic service with rotations to the delegations

and headquarters also seems not fully developed, in particular with high vacancy rates for

high-risk duty stations, such as DR Congo or Sudan.

An open-ended Journey? Reforming the crisis management structures

The crisis management structures, while formally part of the EEAS are not (yet) fully

integrated. Individual units are currently still dispersed among several buildings and are yet

still to be moved to the secure Kortenbergh 150 building, home of the EU Military Staff.

It is not yet clear what purpose the CSDP structures shall play in the EEAS and it is likely

that this will be decided over time, rather than by implementation of a strategy. The internal

consolidation of the structures is also a cause of insecurity, as institutional reforms are under

discussion. Reform proposals for shortening the CSDP planning and decision-making process

are currently under discussion.70 The establishment of the Crisis Response Department – a

potentially far-reaching institutional innovation for a more comprehensive management of

the EU’s rapid response to acute crises – has also caused considerable friction amongst a

variety of actors within the EEAS. Yet, the establishment of new coordinating tools, such as

the Crisis Response Platform, are a promising move towards more comprehensive internal

cooperation.

Crisis response platform

The crisis response platform is a new development to coordinate EU’s operational response

to political crises. The main function is to bring together all major institutions involved in

crisis management, to exchange information and to provide a quicker alternative to the

lengthy planning process for CSDP operations. However, it was also perceived by many as

an institutional ‘coup d’etat’ against existing CSDP structures and institutions. Indeed, the

crisis response structure can almost be perceived as a ‘mini-CSDP’ as one official remarked,

with a small rooster of experts to be deployed for assessment operations and headed by a

strong-minded humanitarian with distaste for lengthy bureaucratic decision-making.

Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)

The CMPD is the strategic planning directorate in CSDP, bringing together civilian and

military expertise. It engages in long-term questions, such as capacity development, strategic

70 Led by French General Yves de Kermabon


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reviews, lessons learned and drawing up concepts and guidelines for operations. It is

responsible for the overall goals of the operation, outlined in the Crisis Management

Concept.

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

The CPCC is the operational arm of CSDP, tasked to oversee and help running the

operations in its day-to-day practice. For new operations, it starts with the drafting of the

CONOPS and once approved, recruits the Civilian Head of Mission (HoM) and the CPCC

and its Civilian Operations Commander supports him to design the OPLAN.

All these structures moved to the EEAS in 2010 and need for clarification persists. For one,

it is not clear, who is responsible for bureaucratic oversight of the CSDP structures. The

Deputy Secretary-General for Inter-Institutional Affairs Maciej Popowski and former Polish

PSC Ambassador was mentioned several times, but this designation seems not yet fully

settled.

Secondly, the role of CSDP in the EEAS is not fully developed. Friction continues with the

appointment of Agostino Miozzo as Director for Crisis Response and Operational

Coordination and the establishment of the Crisis Platform, aiming to bring the Commission

and CSDP structures together at one table, informed by the EU Situation Room. Several

officials mentioned discussions about reforms but no consensus on the way forward was

disclosed.

In the complex and interdependent world of the 21st century the challenges for the

European Union are more present than they are visible for European citizens, policy-makers

and politicians. They are multiplying, becoming more dynamic and complex. Therefore EU

Member States need to be supplemented in their capacity by an independent entity that

should ideally bring together the best of what the EU27 has to offer in terms of policies,

personnel and ideas to ensure Europe’s influence in the world prevails in the 50 years to

come.

An optimist might say the EEAS was designed to achieve such ends, ensuring the European

Union can be a more effective and coherent global actor. After two years of existence the

risk of accepting only a secretarial service helping and assisting EU Member States in their

national foreign policy is high. However, the EEAS should not be judged prematurely as an

bureaucratic organisation; rather its institutional design should be discussed in the mid-term

review to ensure its potential can be used once the financial crisis is averted and it is fully

operational, from 2016 onwards.

The following recommendations are based on such an ambitious reading of the EEAS and

should give the House of Lords some suggestions on what question it might want to ask for

next phase. We have taken the liberty to respond to the questions raised by the EU Sub-

Committee on External Affairs of the House of Lords directly. At the end of each paragraph

we will list a number of short recommendation and suggest recommendations for

consideration.


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Has the EEAS been effective in its response to crises? (Question 6)

HR/VP Ashton gives special attention to the need for the EU to be more coherent and

effective in responding to both natural disasters and man-made conflicts. Following the

uncoordinated response to the Haiti earthquake there seems to be a conscious push

towards a more comprehensive and rapid approach to complex crises.

After Haiti, the creation of the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department,

headed by the Humanitarian Medical Doctor Agostino Miozzo, could represent an important

step forward. The declared purpose of the Department is to create crisis response as a

flexible instrument that could be used in the first phase of a crisis, after which other

instruments,, such as CSDP missions, sanctions or development instruments could be used

as a more long-term stabilisation device.

The Department and the EU Crisis Platform (which brings together various EEAS crisis

response/management structures as well as relevant geographical and horizontal EEAS

departments, and the relevant services of the European Commission and the General

Secretariat of the EU Council) was first activated in the context of the Libyan crisis.

The second initiative was the establishment of the EU Situation Room. It is the 24/7

situational awareness capability of the European Union, and supposed to be the single point

of contact during a crisis.

While it was NATO that ultimately acted militarily and not the EU, some lessons can be

learned from Libya. Better coordination between EU Institutions is needed in order to have

a prompt mechanism without duplication. The EU Commission needs to be considered as

the central actor in this regard. The planned Emergency Response Centre of DG

ECHO/MIC and the planned Strategic Analysis and Response Capability of DG HOME in the

European Commission are major developments in this respect. They need to be harmonised

in a single mechanism coordinated by the EEAS during complex crises. All levels of action

(political, operational and information flow) and all stakeholders need to be considered.

Recommendations

The chain of command during crisis needs to be clarified. Who is actually in charge of

convening the EU Crisis Platform? Who decides when a crisis occurs and who decides, from

the EU perspective, when a crisis is finished and the management of EEAS response should

be handed over to the relevant geographical desks for a more long-term approach? These

questions are not academic, but have important implications for a coordinated approach.

A clear definition and agreement on the division of labour and lead roles should therefore be

reached urgently. The term “response” comes from the humanitarian field, but EEAS and

DG ECHO have two different mandates. This distinction needs to be clarified. The need of

coordination has to respect mandates, in particular the need of independence of DG ECHO.

Moreover, there is a concrete need for an internal clarification on the mechanisms of all

actors during the period when no crisis occurs. Here internal discussions on the meaning


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and roles of “crisis preparedness” vs. “conflict prevention” have implications for the

competences of respective competing EEAS departments.

How well does the EEAS work as an institution? (Question 9)

As a newly formed bureaucracy, the EEAS needs to develop its institutional memory. This

needs to be different from a simple sum of different experiences coming from the EU

Council, the Commission and Member State diplomatic services. While this process will take

time, some urgent initiatives are necessary to facilitate this process.

The EEAS needs to tackle the problem of rotating staff and expertise by integrating its

rotation system into its staff development and human resources management. While there is

no alternative for a diplomatic service, the culture of staff turnover and rotations every four

years can be an obstacle to effectiveness and institutional memory.

To forge a common culture, Baroness Ashton is showing a lack of presence in the EEAS day-

by-day work. The role of the HR/VP is a political role, more than a managerial one. The HR/

VP needs to be able to act politically both with member states and abroad, but also to foster

a sense of purpose among her staff. For this she urgently needs to be supplemented with a

senior manager to deal with all practical details. This role can be a junior commissioner or a

civil servant, but the role needs to be clarified. As the situation stands at the moment, her

job is an impossible one with too many major decisions placed on her plate.

When used effectively, seconded staff from EU Member States can bring vital added value to

the system, by facilitating the informal dialogue between EEAS and capitals. The process of

recruiting seconded staff needs to be harmonised between different Member States.

Recommendations

The rotation period needs to be well developed to foster staff development, an effective

external action service and promote an institutional memory. Close consultation with

Foreign Offices is necessary here to learn from their century-long experiences.

The role of the EEAS Secretary General needs to be reinforced or supplemented by a junior

EC Commissioner as Deputy HR.

Recruiting process for Seconded staff needs to be harmonising between EU Member States.

Has the EU created the right number and distribution of Delegations around the

world? (Question 13)

The number of EU Delegation is increasing and by now more widely spread than those of

any other EU member state. In addition, however, there is a need for reinforcing EU

Delegations to regional and sub-regional organisations, which play increasingly important


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roles in the management of major economic and security issues. The criteria for creating

new EU Delegations need to be explicit and agreed by member states. This might include:

the number of European citizens present in the country; the number of EU Member States

embassies in the country. Less embassies or a high number of exposure could indicate a

need for a European Union presence. The trade and economic links are central factors as

well, in addition to the risk of natural disasters or violent conflicts. For this, the EU

Delegation need to work more on offering template solutions for consular services,

evacuating citizens and offering support. This does not mean that the EU should take on this

jobs, but act as repository of knowledge how it could be done and use its experience in

coordination to support the most efficient way of organising this.

EU Delegations should play a more active role in defining EU foreign policy. The key role is

to act on issues member states feel the need, not on issues that will be blocked afterwards.

PSC will play a key role in this respect. For the moment, too much work in the delegations

is done in secretarial support of the Commission, Council and EEAS. The delegations are too

expensive to not be used.

Recommendations

Clarifying the criteria for opening new EU Delegations;

The capacity of EU Delegations to shape foreign policy once member states issued a priority

list needs to be reinforced;

Cost effectiveness in EU Delegation should be a priority, but this includes delegations

offering their service where it is most needed and to add the most value; this includes

offering template solutions that can flexibly adapted to each country. The role as impartial

actor without interest but to coordinate needs to become a key strength.

What should the EEAS need to do over the next three years and what should it

prioritise? How can it maximise the influence of Member States and the EU in

the future? On which areas should the 2013 review focus? (Question 17)

According to GGI, the previous recommendations should be considered as priority areas for

EEAS in the coming years. In particular tying the work of the EEAS more to member states’

needs and to coordinate regional and issue-specific strategies is the way forward. For these

priorities, terms of reference and clear action plans need to be agreed for each country and

adopted by all EU27. The internal turf wars need to be overcome with common strategies

and clear role definitions.

Once internal issues will be solved, the European Union and the EEAS can start looking

outside. In this respect priority needs to be given to the relations with other international

and regional organisation to avoid duplication and to focus on the EU’s strength and


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comparative advantage. The European Union and EU Member States cannot have the

presumption to be the only actor in the picture. Increasingly, they will be marginalised and

need to focus on their comparative advantage, to be determined specifically for each country

and thematic issue.

The emerging role of other regional groupings should continue to be a priority for EEAS and

European Union in general.

Moreover, EEAS needs to fully develop its role as neutral mediator between the European

Commission and EU Member States in defining a common foreign and security policy. The

creation of a Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, underlines the

attention of the EEAS and the HR/VP for Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation

issue. Cynically, it should be used to resolve internal turf wars. Similarly, the creation of the

Crisis Response Department shows the necessity to act quicker and more decisive in crisis

situations. In quiet periods the consensus will need to be forged for such reaction to be

feasible. These two directorates should work together in defining a clear set of priorities for

EEAS and become models for reform.

A prioritised list of strategic regions for EU is necessary. This list should be incorporated

into the work programmes of all EEAS Departments, all DGs of the Commission and be

considered by member states as well. For the moment, most departments develop their

own strategies and mechanisms for coping. Opening up the discussion to the civil society,

Think Tanks and parliamentary scrutiny are necessary and will prove beneficial in the longer

term, even if frustrating at first sight. At the same time, the EEAS needs to become more

confident and assert itself. It is too expensive to accept a role at the margins of EU foreign

and security policy that can be neglected by most EU member states.

We firmly believe that the effectiveness, leadership and level of ambition of the EU’s CSDP

need to be strengthened. Particular in comparison to HR Solana, the lack of leadership by

Catherine Ashton in CSDP is an important factor for its current period of lowered ambition.

As one official described it, with the planning for the operations in the Sahel, RMCB/ EUCAP

Horn of Africa and the Airport Security Strengthening mission Juba, South Sudan now

ongoing, the CMPD, CPCC, EUMS as well as the relevant committees (CIVCOM, EUMC and

PSC) will be kept active in the coming months for implementing the comprehensive

approach in coordination with an overarching regional strategy. However, given current

budgetary pressures on all member states, disagreements between member states on the

use of military force and a general ‘mission fatigue’ questions still remain about the long-term

viability of CSDP.

Overall, the External Action Service and the crisis management structures are largely seen as

sufficient to launch and conduct operations. However, action during the start-up phase was

dependent on the political will as the EEAS has little independent capacity to push an agenda

without its own financial resources and without support from large member states or strong

leadership by the High Representative and the Commission.

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About the authors

Giulia Tercovich is an Analyst at the Global Governance Institute, focusing on European

Union Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.

Hubertus Jürgenliemk is Director of Peace and Security Section at the Global

Governance Institute.

Joachim Koops is the founding Director of the Global Governance Institute.

December 2012

Professor Elena Korosteleva, Professor of International Politics, School of Politics and IR, Rutherford

College, University of Kent – Written evidence

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Professor Elena Korosteleva, Professor of International Politics,

School of Politics and IR, Rutherford College, University of Kent –

Written evidence

The EEAS and the third countries: organisation, management and

implementation.

The case of the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Executive Summary

This report offers a preliminary analysis of the EEAS’s organisation, management and

engagement in the eastern neighbourhood. Drawing on the selective case-study of three

Eastern Partnership countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova), this submission offers

tentative observations, which may be reflective but not necessarily representative of the

wider tendencies within the EEAS, and which may require further substantive research into

the structure and the process of the EEAS representations abroad.

Although acknowledging the enormous potential of the EEAS for framing the European

Union (EU) as a global transformative force, the report also highlights some existing caveats

that the EEAS’ current organisation and management in third countries encounter, especially

in the areas of:

Inter-institutional dynamics in the structuring of EU delegations (divisions of competencies

and problems of coordination)

Relations between EU delegations and the Embassies of Member States (problems of

coordination and leadership issues)

Relations between EU delegations and partner states’ stakeholders (problems of outreach

and effectiveness)

The report concludes that the organisational and management structures of the EEAS’s

missions in third countries currently proliferate internal institutional divisions, and

unnecessary duplicate resources, thus rendering the EU’s effort at cohesion in external

action – that is, speaking with a ‘single voice’ - inefficient.

In particular, the EEAS’ internal management needs to overcome the pervasive institutional

bias towards the European Commission (EC) as the legacy of previous arrangements, and

identify a clear unified structure of line management between the centre and in-country

representation, to enable their functional continuity.

The EEAS’ in-country organisational structure requires greater coordination, to develop a

cross-institutional ethos, and at mapping out of expertise, to offer better coordination of

policies and procedures. Furthermore, clear delineation of competencies should address the

leadership issues in the process of engagement with permanent representations of Member

States.

More collegial institutional learning between the delegations and the embassies of Member States is necessary to avoid the duplication of resources and to maximise the achievement of

mutually intended outcomes. This is particularly relevant to identifying suitable pathways and

synergies of engaging with local stakeholders and national governments in the partner

countries, to avoid unnecessary separation of competences into political (traditionally the

domain of long-established embassies of the Member States) and



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technical/transactional/procedural (increasingly the domain of the delegations) spheres of

influence of the EU collective representation abroad.

The EEAS’ representation in third countries has much to offer in terms of the EU’s visibility,

political power, and technical prowess. However, for this to be effective, more attention

should be given to rectification of current structural problems to enable the full potential of

the new service.

1. Introduction

In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty’s mandate and more specifically Article 21(3) TEU, the

EEAS was established by Council Decision on 26 July 2010 to ensure ‘consistency between

the different areas of the [EU] external action and between those areas and [the EU] other

policies’ (OJ L 201/31, point 2, 3.8.2010; emphasis added).

The EEAS’ objectives include to assist the High Representative who is also the President of

Foreign Affairs Council and the Vice-President of the European Commission (Ibid: Art 2) in

the fulfilment of:

- the CFSP mandate of the EU, including the planning and conduct of the CSDP

operations and missions, without prejudice to dispositions of individual Member States;

- the functions of the President of the Foreign Affairs Council, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the General Secretariat of the Council;

- the functions of the Vice-President of the Commission, having the responsibilities (inclusive of delivery of the European Consensus on Development and Humanitarian

Aid) in external relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the EU’s external

action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the services of the Commission.

The partial inclusion of relevant competences of the Member States, the Foreign Affairs

Council, and the Commission into the remit of the EEAS, under the audit of the European

Parliament, is purposeful and deliberate to enable inter-governmental and inter-institutional

cooperation at the EU level, in an attempt (i) to maximise the utility of resources in

response to budgetary constraints and security challenges; (ii) to overcome the

governmental-institutional schism caused by the now defunct EU pillar structure, and (iii) to

fundamentally promote the EU as a collective global actor and transformative force on the

international arena.

In summary, the EEAS is envisaged to enable better coordinated and hence more effective

inter-institutional and inter-governmental approach to EU external action, having access to

and outreach from all relevant internal and external stakeholders. As a goal the project is

commendable and reflects the changing face of global public diplomacy and security



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challenges which requires a multi-level, polycentric and multi-agency approach in a restricted

financial environment; however, the practice of reform, especially on the ground, and away

from the central administration may not always enjoy a linear progression. This paper

highlights three areas of the EEAS functionality which may require further attention, to avoid

a parochial and often utilitarian view of the EEAS’ representation abroad.

2. Inter-institutional dynamics in the EEAS in-country representations:

organisation and management

Operationally the in-country EEAS is dependent on a gamut of structural caveats that may

undermine its effectiveness. These include:

Organisational issues:

- Conflictual Transference: To launch the EEAS, a considerable part of the Commission’s main body, including DGs RELEX, External Service and Development,

as well as the Council’s secretariat, have been transferred to the new service – but

not in their entirety. The new institution has been set the short term but ambitious

task of fostering a new ‘institutional ethos’ of collegiality. Consequently, the hurried

launch has generated internal rivalries, especially between the EEAS (the Council

staff) and the Commission, with the latter not only resisting the move, but also

hedging and regaining competences where possible. Particularly evident has been the

sabotage by the Commission and its staff (Smith, 22 November 2010) of the process

of transference of DG RELEX with its expertise and financial responsibilities.

Curiously, this transfer resulted in the retention by the Commission of some former

DG RELEX competencies, including the responsibility over the EU delegations with

the ambiguous remit of ‘tasks not relating to the coordination of EU external

relations’.71

- Reconfiguration of competencies in the EEAS: with the transference of the

Commission’s and the Council’s staff to the EEAS, new mapping of competencies and

budgetary responsibilities naturally took place. However, given the dual institutional

nature of staff recruitment, it caused considerable disorganisation in terms of

configuring new and altering/curtailing old competencies to ensure procedural

continuity of the new infrastructure, often leaving some unexpected gaps in line

management and policy deliverance especially at the lower levels of the EEAS (EU

delegations). This was duly reflected in the EEAS’ annual report (2011: 39-40). In

particular, the report states, ‘the transfer of budgetary resources was not accompanied by a transfer of the corresponding support staff’ forcing Delegations to

often enter a series of service level agreements with the Commission or the Council

Secretariat to ensure administrative support (Ibid: 39), thus reverting back to the

expertise and functions performed by the two institutions prior to the merger.

Furthermore, the ‘split of staff between the two institutions’ often immobilised

performance of those officials whose competences were curtailed, and who had to

71 For more information see http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_page.display_index?pLang=EN.

http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_page.display_index?pLang=EN



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rely for further approval on the Heads of Delegation, as the only authorising officer

for operational expenditure for both institutions. This, as the report concluded,

affected ‘business continuity of the administrative expenditure of the delegations’

(Ibid: 40).

- Reconfiguration of competencies in the Commission: to adapt to the new

environment, the Commission successfully lobbied to retain some responsibility for

financial instruments and procedural competences. This however created a so called ‘coordination puzzle’ (Duke 2012), with overlapping competencies, and duplication of

resources. In particular, an extensive range of financial instruments has been

transferred to the EEAS, including the Development Cooperation Instrument,

European Development Fund, European Instrument for Democracy, ENPI,

Instrument for Stability etc., also the responsibility for strategic programming of

national and regional indicative papers and action plans – a traditional competence of

the DGs RELEX and DEV (Annex, OJ L 201/31, point 2, 3.8.2010). In response, the

Commission succeeded in fighting its corner and retrieving many of the

competencies, in some instances causing duplication of resources. Notably, it created

a new service, a DG of the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) to take over the

responsibility of the former DG RELEX in managing the operational budgets for the

CFSP and other policy instruments (IC, EOMs, PPD).72 This also included the

Instrument for Stability, which has already been given to the EEAS; while the

remainder of DG AIDCO and DG DEV were merged having retained responsibility

for implementation of development aid. These Commission responsibilities appear to

be if not in direct conflict, but at least in duplication with, the competences of the

EEAS, and require further clarification and re-structuring to ensure full accountability

and transparency of the service’s functioning.

Management issues:

- Duality of management: ‘Each Union Delegation shall be placed under the authority of a Head of Delegation’ (Art 5; point 2), who is directly accountable to and

appointed by the HRVP in agreement with the Parliament. Owing to the dual nature

of the agency comprising of the EEAS and the Commission staff, the Head may also

receive instructions directly from the EEAS central administration and, where

relevant to the stipulated competences (Art 221/2 TFEU), from the European

Commission (Art 5; point 3). This however, naturally creates ‘insecurities about the

lines of reporting and the accountability of the EU Delegations vis-à-vis Brussels’

(Austermann 2012). Furthermore, given prior institutional arrangements, a home bias

effect in operations management may be observed, whereby the in-country staff,

often directly recruited from and represented by the former Commission officials,

tend to consult and seek instructions directly from the relevant sections of the

Commission, rather than in consultation with respective EEAS desks. This was particularly evident from the author’s observation of the communication process

between the Heads of EU Delegation in Belarus and Moldova and Commissioner

Füle’s Cabinet in the discussion of strategy and planning for new CSF and EAC

initiatives.

72 For more information see relevant directorates and their responsibilities at

http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_page.display_index?pLang=EN..

http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_page.display_index?pLang=EN



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- Burden of competences: Keeping line management dual and Commission and EEAS

finances separate, especially in terms of the operational budgets of EU Delegations,

places additional pressure and administrative burden on Delegations (Ibid). The

occasional absence of the Head of Delegation from the office often immobilises staff

from budgetary operations, in the light of the current competences gap caused by

reconfiguration of responsibilities and new reporting lines for the recruited staff.

- Unity or cacophony of interests: The Commission home bias effect is further exacerbated by the EEAS entitlement to second national officials for staffing of EU

delegations, and also by the insistence of the European Parliament on having a

dedicated member of staff in EU delegations with reporting responsibilities to the

Parliament, to ensure not only budgetary and legislative, but also its political control

over the EEAS. Although this arrangement may, with time, predispose the desired

multi-interest representation under the EEAS canopy; in the short term, however, it

considerably inhibits the formation of solidarity and the new ‘institutional ethos’,

while catering for differing internal interests. It also hinders cohesion and consistency

in exercising competencies and delivering policies, especially given the nascence of the EEAS.

- ‘Refraction effect’: Institutional divisions, conflicting or duplicated competences, and

internal infighting and manoeuvring, are duly reflected in the functioning of EU

delegations. From the commentary of local observers, and various stakeholders in

the partner countries, it has transpired that the staff directly recruited from the

Commission, always seem more responsive and efficient in their interactions with

local communities.

- Evaluation: owing to its rapid institutionalisation whereby the EEAS, in order to launch, had to conciliate its multiple inter-governmental and inter-institutional

stakeholders, the service is now subject to a polyphony of interests and their regular

audit and evaluation. Although problematic, given the diverging institutional dynamics

and polycentric interests within the EEAS, the EEAS central administrative staff are

responsible for internal monitoring; however, external annual audit, emanates from

the European Parliament and independent observers, and bring additional

unnecessary pressure and scrutiny to the allegedly devolved authority of Delegations

and their adaptation to the new diplomatic structures and challenges. The complexity

of its organisation and polycentricity of interests (wearing many ‘hats’ and reporting

to multiple stakeholders) hinder further institutionalisation of the EEAS’s ethos and

culture.

3. The EEAS in-country relations with Members States

This area of inter-institutional and intergovernmental relations still remains highly politicised

and sensitive, given the lingering persistence of community pillars of competences, and the

innate resistance of Member States to bargain over their sovereignty rights with the EU

supranational institutions. This is further execrated by the changing nature of national public

diplomacy, and the roles of diplomats in inter-governmental representations, the effects of

which may not be known for a while.

Several particular tendencies in the relationship between the EEAS and Member States’

Embassies are becoming apparent:

- Representation of the EU, to which the EU Delegations are now entitled by the Treaty, in practice seems to be circumscribed to representing the EU institutions



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only. This area of competence remains ambiguous and is interpreted differently by

different stakeholders within the process, and is often demanded by embassies to be

limited to the community method only. Therefore, the representative role of the

EEAS, in the form of delegations, has in practice altered little, still rendering

considerable presence and decision-making to the incumbent member states.

- EU Consular Service: Considerable ambiguity still remains in relation to the initially

unclear definition of competences for EU Delegations vis-a-vis Consular Services. This led some member states, such as the UK, to further speculate about

‘competence creep’ (Duke 2012) leading to considerable mistrust between the

delegations and embassies. Art 35 TEU only discursively refers to the competences

of the EEAS in the sphere of consular activities, stipulating that the ‘Union delegation

shall support Member States in their diplomatic relations and in their role of

providing consular protection to citizens of the EU in 3rd countries on a resource-

neutral basis’. The Council’s decision of 26 July 2010 further obfuscates the ambiguity

by discursively mentioning that this assistance should come by invitation only (Art.5,

point 10). This conflicts with direct responsibility of the EEAS over the CFSP and

CSDP operations and missions in particular.

- Asymmetrical division of labour: While it may seem expedient to combine resources in the changing environment of the EU diplomatic service, and work

collegially with Member States’ representations, this is not always the case. Often, a

tacit division of labour persists, whereby the technical and logistical responsibilities

for training/recruiting/transacting etc. are proffered to EU delegations (some of which

now appear to be better resourced), whereas political issues tend to remain the

prerogative of Member States’ Embassies. This division of labour may be of advantage

in some cases (Belarus, or Ukraine) where excessive politicisation of relations may

hinder the progress of reforms, and where some less politically involved stakeholders

could make a useful contribution. In normal circumstances, however, such a

perceptive division of responsibilities may offer disservice to the EEAS and the EU as

a whole, by potentially impeding its development into a global transformative force,

especially in the eyes of the local stakeholders.

- Leadership issues: As the author’s observations in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova note, more dialogue is now occurring between the embassies and EU delegations in

the form of roundtables and joint workshops, which leads to better visibility of the

EU as a unitary partner and donor in the eastern neighbourhood. At the same time,

given the persistence of (mis)perceptions of the EU as a mere collection of member

states in the eyes of partner countries, and their traditional prioritisation of bilateral

relations with them, it may prove difficult for the Delegations, without further

convergence with the embassies of Member States, to take leadership in delivering

competencies and implementing policies it is now entitled to. Enhancing EU

leadership, especially in the light of greater resources, capabilities and community

remit available to the EEAS, is a two-level task: it requires both internal and external

legitimation, especially in the neighbourhood, where bilateral levers of negotiation

and statecraft may have run their course.

- Outreach: in neighbourhood countries the enduring perception of the EU is of a collective and often disparate player, a composite of 27 national interests, which

renders preference to bilateral relations, with limited outreach for the new service

especially in the application and usage of the new instruments including Civil Society

Forum, Business Community Forum, Local Authorities Forum, Youth forum etc.

Unless more cooperation is afforded between different representations of the EU,

the EEAS will struggle to receive its due external legitimation in the neighbourhood.



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4. EEAS relations with national governments and local stakeholders

- Limited dialogue with national governments: the EU Delegations in the eastern neighbourhood do not always enjoy similar treatment and access to Member States’

national governments. The tradition and established presence of embassies, and their

long-standing bilateral relations with respective host countries may further enhance

bias against the EU Delegations, circumscribing their involvement to the sphere of

technical/transactional issues. The EU’s perception in the eastern neighbourhood is

not of a cohesive whole, but rather as an assembly of national interests, which is often

exploited differentially by the partner states, on a mutually reciprocal basis.

- Differentiated priorities: stemming from the above bias, and from the implicit differentiation of commitments between the EU Delegations and Member States, the

former naturally tend to gravitate towards working with the alternative/oppositional

stakeholders to the regime (NGOs, political parties and movements, youth

organisations) through offering training, resources, education and monitoring. This

contributes towards further misperception of EU Delegations as ‘politically biased’,

and subversive, in the eyes of national governments, of political order in the eastern

neighbourhood.

- Duplication of effort: national officials tend to avoid engaging with the EU Delegations and attempt to resolve their interests by lobbying specific Member States

directly. Furthermore, as the author’s research demonstrates, there is a widespread

perception on the partners’ side, that Member States are more nuanced, resilient,

and enjoy better rapport with the local stakeholders (Korosteleva 2011; Korosteleva

2012). Time is clearly a factor here: Member States have been present in the host

countries considerably longer than the EU representations; and they are more

attuned to the local needs and culture. Furthermore, they are also better trained to

engage with local communities, through prior cultural, linguistic and diplomatic

exposure. They seem to be more aware and responsive, and display more perceptive

attitudes towards compromise and accommodation of partners’ needs, compared to

a principled and uncompromising approach of the EU.

- Access: there has been a significant change in the past two years in terms of open access to the services of EU Delegations. It is true they have become more

sophisticated and resourceful, in terms of offering a multitude of opportunities online

and through other avenues. However, as many local stakeholders observe

(Korosteleva 2012), with the upgrading of the EU Delegations, their direct

accessibility has become limited, especially as a vital information resource. A general

member of the public will not be able to access the building, without prior

arrangement or appointment, which hitherto rendered open access to all interested

parties. This may inhibit facilitation of EU visibility and deter engagement at a local

level.

5. Conclusions/Recommendations

The future of the EEAS, centrally and through in-country representation, could be

enormously beneficial for the EU’s positioning as a global transformative force, and for

overcoming inherent governmental and institutional divisions, in order to face external

challenges more effectively. This however would not be feasible without addressing a range

of organisation and management issues. In particular,



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- More structural effort is necessary to ensure inter-institutional organisational and management coherence and competence continuity at the lower levels of the EEAS,

especially in their in-country representations.

- Clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities of the EEAS’ in-country

representations in relation to Member States, is necessary to ensure cooperation,

trust and balanced access to local/regional stakeholders.

- Collegial effort towards learning and engaging with local and regional stakeholders is required to foster awareness and allegiances of all-level stakeholders in the host

country.

More crucially, the EEAS does not only need time to develop itself into a distinct and

sustainable entity, with its own cultural and institutional ethos. It also requires careful

restructuring to foster the production of ‘bridging’ (horizontal) rather than ‘ bonding’

(vertical) social capital (Putnam 1993). Simply nurturing the organisational mind-set is not

sufficient, and would not, on its own, address the matter of collegiality and cohesion. There

has to be considerable structural reform within the EEAS to ensure that the duality of

structures, loyalties and competencies is replaced by the collective service to the common

good.

References:

European External Action Service, Annual Activity Report 2011

Dan Smith, ‘Time to rescue the EU’s External Action Service from the European

Commission’. 22 November 2010

Council Decision, Establishing the Organisation and functioning of the European External Action

Service, Official Journal of the European Union, 201/30, 03.08.2010

Council of the European Union, Presidency Report to the European Council on the European

External Action Service, 14930/09, Brussels, 23 October 2009

European Parliament Resolution of 22 October 2009 on the Institutional Aspects of Setting up

the European External Action Service (2009/2133(INI)), P7_TA (2009)0057

Duke, S., Pomorska, K. and Vanhoonaker, S. (20012) The EU’s Diplomatic Architecture: the Mid-

term Challenge. Policy Paper 10. Maastricht University

Austermann, F. (2012) Towards Embassies for Europe? EU Delegations in the Union’s Diplomatic

System. Policy Paper 8, Free University of Berlin

Korosteleva, E. (2011) Eastern Partnership: a New Opportunity for the Neighbours? Routledge

Korosteleva, E. (2012) The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: towards a more

ambitious partnership? Routledge



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Spence, D. (2006) The Commission’s External Service, pp. 396-425

Blockmanns, S. (2012) The European external Action Service One Year On: First Signs of Strengths

and Weaknesses. CLEER Working Paper

Murdoch, Z. (2012) ‘Negotiating the European External Action service (EEAS): Analysing the

External effects of Internal (Dis)agreement’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 50:6, pp.

1011-27

Hemra, S., Raines, T. and Whitman, R. (2012) A Diplomatic entrepreneur: Making the Most of

the European External Action Service. Chatham House Report

Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton

University Press

3 December 2012

Kristi Raik, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki and Rosa Balfour, European Policy

Centre, Brussels

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Kristi Raik, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki and

Rosa Balfour, European Policy Centre, Brussels

Evidence to be found under Balfour

David Spence, London School and Economics – Supplementary written evidence

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David Spence, London School and Economics – Supplementary

written evidence

I left the EU after a twenty-year career in the European Commission with a variety of

functions, most of which are those now the responsibility of the new EEAS. My last posting

was in the EU Delegation to the United Nations in Geneva, where I was responsible for

CFSP issues (disarmament and security) and European Commission funding for CFSP joint

actions and projects to do with mine action, cluster munitions, security sector reform etc. I

spent part of 2006 on secondment to the United Nations, assisting the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General for elections in the Ivory Coast. In my final years in

Geneva I was closely involved in the transition to the Lisbon Treaty arrangements and the

establishment of the EEAS. I have published widely on EU issues, including a standard

textbook on the European Commission, a book on the reform of European foreign

ministries, a book on security sector reform and articles on the problems and prospects for

the EEAS. My loyalty to the institution I worked for and my commitment to European

integration in general do not colour my views on the desirability of efficiency enhancement

nor relieve me of the duty of balanced criticism (or praise) of recent EEAS developments.

Some personal views

Could I start by affirming that Europe should perhaps have been more modest in its

assertion that the Maastricht Treaty, then the Nice and Amsterdam Treaties were evidence

of a strongly coordinated foreign policy? The assertion made us the butt of criticism inside

and outside the EU. In fact, as we now know, it was only with the Treaty of Lisbon that what

were in fact merely vague ambitions began to appear to be firm moves to establishing and

reinforcing a strong European foreign policy machine.

Napoleon reputedly commented that strong policy-making would bring administration in its

train. “L’intendance suit”. The EU tried it the other way round, setting up the structures in

the hope that policy would follow. Yet political leadership in the EU could not emerge from

the new diplomatic structures in the succession of treaties after Maastricht. Foreign policy

actors were unable to create effective policy; so pre-Lisbon Napoleon’s views were

unproven. Since Lisbon, there is a stronger case for believing that “l’intendance” is in place,

and there are signs that EU foreign policy is emerging - strengthened after the stresses and

strains of the first post-Lisbon period.

What were these stresses and strains?

First, one of the previous weaknesses had been lack of coordination a) between the EU

institutions b) between the EU and its member states. The EEAS was about the promise of

better coordination:

between Commission and Council


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within the Commission’s so-called ‘Relex family’

between the ‘community method’ and intergovernmentalism - with its unanimity

requirement.

Second, there were six mentalities/mindsets that needed to be melded together into the

EEAS – traditional Commission, existing Delegation staff, traditional Council Secretariat,

Solana Policy Unit staff, traditional national diplomats and national diplomats steeped in EU

political culture by dint of their previous careers. Nobody took on board that it is an

immense task to bring 6 mindsets and 27 nationalities together into one efficiently

functioning service, that training and team building would be essential, and that it required a

specific budget with an agreed and stated purpose.

Third, promises remained a substitute for action. The Christmas tree of new Lisbon

promises, like so many previous treaty-based Christmas trees, has left us waiting for the

packages to be opened and perhaps naively hopeful that intelligent, sophisticated and

authoritative policy will emerge. Some packages are still unopened. There are for example:

still several Commissioners with ‘external responsibilities’ (neighbourhood policy,

development policy, trade, humanitarian aid)

still key ‘first pillar’ policy areas where the external ramifications are enormous – energy,

climate change or, this week in Dubai, internet policy. These have remained outside the

‘coordinated’ purview of Baroness Ashton and the EEAS.

still several non-implemented but nonetheless practical implications of joined up

intergovernmentalism and supranationalism – see recommendations at the end of this

submission.

Because external policy-making remains fragmented, actors and observers remain sceptical.

Answers from David Spence to questions posed to David Spence (LSE) and Mats Persson

(Open Europe)

Add Value to EU Policy

1. In what ways has the EEAS added value to EU external relations? What

functions is it performing that were not undertaken previously? Have these been

successful?

It is a very basic point to make, but I believe it is worth recalling that when the EU does

speak through its HR, it does so after coordinating with a series of close European partners.

So statements by the EU are also statements with which 11 other states align (making 38

states, or near 20% of UN membership), namely The Acceding Country Croatia, the

Candidate Countries - the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and

Serbia, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate


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Albania and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European

Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia. All these states

frequently align themselves with EU declarations. They are informed and given a deadline to

‘opt in’, as it were.

What can the EEAS do that cannot be done by diplomatic services of national

member states acting together under the rotating Presidency?

ensure continuity inside and outside – through the formal ‘archive’ and practical knowledge

bank of the EU in all policy areas

replace varying abilities of presidencies with a single efficient presence

reflect the precise amount of power of the EU can muster

avoid accusations of acting in a ‘national interest’

In what ways does the role and activity of the High Representative differ from

that of her predecessor prior to the Lisbon Treaty? What advantages or

disadvantages do the changes bring?

She is triple-hatted.

She has a legal basis across the EU board.

She gives a notional answer to the question of ‘who ya gonna call’?

She heads up a diplomatic and development service structured on typical foreign ministry

lines

Advantages:

she is closer to the financial basis of EU power

she is triple-hatted so she 1. chairs internal coordination (and her staff lower down do too),

2. has insight into Commission areas which Solana could not have and 3. she runs the

delegations which Solana did not.

She has advantages through all this – i. an end to confusion of lines of command and ii.

mastery of professional expertise in Brussels and in the field.

However, disadvantages lie in


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the inchoate nature of current arrangements.

the fact that triple-hatted is not triply resourced but is triply overloaded.

How has the High Representative managed the challenge of setting up a new

diplomatic service? How do you see the role developing now that the EEAS

organisation is substantially in place? What further changes could assist the High

Representative in her role?

She has managed extraordinarily well. She has walked a tight-rope between bullies, turf wars,

media ignorance and bad faith, and sheer effrontery. And she has done this with no extra

resources – a fact that she has been probably brought to regret, for she accepted a self-

denying ordinance - resource restrictions despite an expanded job description.

We should remember that she has worked wonders in creating the new service. If that has

been at the cost of less pro-active policy, that was to be expected – in later

recommendations I refer e.g. to the need for deputies.

Overall building the EEAS has been a success. Eggs have been broken and the omelette is

taking shape.

Some recommendation for future developments are listed at the end of this contribution.

Accountability

How do member states ensure that the EEAS represents their viewpoints?

Through the usual channels – the summits, the ministerials, the COPS, COREPER, CFSP

working groups and the vibrant lobbying proicess.

What are the structures and processes in place to ensure that the Council Conclusions and

viewpoints of the member states are followed and put into effect by the EEAS?

The machine is an efficient one. Officials have Council conclusions and CFSP mandates

permanently before them as they go about their business.

Is there a danger that the EEAS can take an initiative beyond that mandated by

the Council and are there any examples of this?

I find it hard to believe that there would be. I can think of no important example.


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How has the EEAS acted when there is no unified position by member states?

Can you provide concrete examples?

The EEAS cannot act without a precise mandate, so I have no examples. It may, however, be

the case that a local delegation acts in wrong interpretation of a mandate, simply because the

local situation demands a fast reaction and there is no time to coordinate with Brussels

instances – though local coordination would, of course, always be sought. When the UK

blocked some 100 declarations in Geneva, EEAS officials combined loyalty to the Council.

They quietly regretted temporary EU absence from UN business, but acted diplomatically by

refraining from criticism of a (for them) recalcitrant member state.

How could the EEAS be made directly accountable to national legislatures? Is this desirable?

Do you consider that the European Parliament exercises sufficient accountability over the

EEAS and is this a good or sufficient substitute for national legislatures?

The issue is whether the EEAS should be accountable to national legislatures. Being

accountable to 27 national assembles, with in each case 2 houses, would be a recipe for

permanent paralysis. Just as we do not live in the UK in a world of constant direct

democracy, but rely on elected representatives to ensure that civil services take seriously

the role of supervision, so we have to give up the pretension that this will somehow not be

the case at EU level.

Thus, the European Parliament, with its various committees, endeavours to supervise, even

control the action of the EEAS. They could do better, but their power of the purse coupled

with their ability to step outside the national parliamentary box allow them to pose what

would for other national parliaments be unwelcome comparisons – e.g. comparing the US

senate’s power and aiming to achieve a similar ability for the EP.

It is for EU national parliamentary authorities to work out an efficient modus vivendi with

the EP, so that a) the EEAS is effectively supervised and controlled and b) that national

parliaments have a role to play in that process.

The ideal of national-European Parliament cooperation is one where the UK parliament

could propose concrete steps.

National Member States Diplomacies

What has been the impact of the creation of the EEAS on the relations between

foreign ministries and Brussels – have resources and focus moved to Brussels

from member states? How well do the EEAS and Member State diplomatic

services work together in the field? If change is needed, in what ways could

relationships be improved?


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It is too early to tell. Foreign ministries and think tanks are reflecting on these issues. Some

MFAs have redefined the roles of their delegations within the EU – as fact-finders and

precursors of EU negotiations for example. Others are reflecting on the costs of non-EU –

how much does it cost not to take advantage of the potential offered by the EEAS - to

maintain expensive buildings abroad, to finance salary packages enhanced by special

arrangements to ensure diplomatic staff are well-treated, private emergency medical

insurance, longer leave, travel time, corrective coefficients, hardship posts, annual travel

arrangements.

Politicisation of Aid and Trade

Has the creation of the EEAS led to politicisation of trade and development

policy? If so, has this been beneficial or detrimental to the efficiency and delivery

of those two policy areas?

Trade is highly political and always has been. I do not believe this has changed since the EEAS

was established. We should recall that it is the Commission, not the EEAS, which manages

EU trade relations.

As to development, this is a ‘mixed competence’ area, and we should bear in mind that

different departments guard their turfs, as they do in national ministerial business. Also there

is a general feeling on the part of development and humanitarian departments that ‘their’

responsibilities are special and not to be confused by their amalgamation with issues of

‘national’ or ‘European’ interests. … many believe that development and humanitarian aid

should not be politically inspired or influenced.

We should also not shirk the argument that some differentiated politicisation of these policy

areas might be a good thing. Our leaders have been remiss in continuing to pour aid money

into developing countries with scant regard for failing governance. That is why much of the

money was a) wasted in forests of unusable machinery rusting away or b) stashed away in

the banks of corrupted leaders abroad.

The EEAS has two major advantages. a) It can make ‘good governance’ a quid pro quo for

development aid and b) it stands above the charge that its policies are a reflection of

‘national interest’ rather than an honest attempt to ‘aid’.

ASHTON Review


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What areas should the 2013 Review focus on? What concrete suggestions could

it, or should it, make?

The answer to this question obviously depends on the starting assumptions of the

committee. Are there agreed assumptions about the desirability/need for the EEAS in the

first place? Or does the committee believe the jury is still out, not only on achievement

hitherto but on what Lord Lamont argued in a previous session of this committee; namely,

that he finds it difficult to resist the conclusion that the EEAS is “simply a piece of self-

aggrandisement; it is a self-promoting bureaucracy whose position is not entirely clear”.

If the committee feels that the role and functions of the committee are not clear, I would

suggest that the committee reflect on recommendations to make these purposes clear to all.

If the assumption is that there is no purpose in trying to go beyond the simple attempt to

coordinate national policies and thus give up if a firm view on issues is not immediately

forthcoming, then there would be little point in the committee making recommendations at

all. In sum, ideas expressed because they reflect different assumptions about the desirability

/necessity of the EEAS in the first place should be explicitly underlined in the committee’s

report.

My view is that the committee ought to suggest, along with ideas already expressed by

others, and not least by the 11 foreign ministers in the so-called ‘Westerwelle Report’, some

key adaptations that seem worthwhile in light of developments so far.

There are different packages of ideas involved.

FIRST, COHERENCE:

Promoting coherence was one of the EEAS’s key tasks. So, the committee might reflect on

three possible recommendations. First, whether neighbourhood policy along with the

relevant Commission services and staff should be integrated into the EEAS and made to

report in the final analysis to Baroness ASHTON. Second, whether development policy

instruments ought to be reinforced and integrated into the EEAS terms of reference, so that

strategic planning might be improved and links made between development projects and

foreign policy concerns. Third, Community policies with an important external dimension,

such as climate change, energy, migration, industrial issues such as internet issues discussed

in Doha in December 2012, might somehow be brought into the purview of the EEAS, by

the attribution of a clear role to the EU, separate from the views of member states, but in

clear support of them AND in support of a European policy aiming to be more than the sum

of the member state parts.


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However, a caveat needs to be introduced and it is this: ‘coherence’ would not imply that

each whole policy area would need to shift to the EEAS. Rather, a coordinating unit, akin to

a cabinet office coordination department, such as the European Secretariat, might be based

in the EEAS and from there keep a watchful eye over international implications of such

policies. In this way a given policy area might be recognised early on as a potential

coordination issue. Specific problems might be recognised and managed – with emerging

problems nipped in the bud.

SECOND, A JOB DESCRIPTION

An agreed document setting out the terms of reference (a job description in other words) of

the HR/VP is needed. This would mention inter alia, the strengthening of the coordinating

role of the HR/VP. The document might include matters ripe for improved coordination

internally, such as chairing regular meetings of the commissioners in charge of various

aspects of external action (the Relex family), plus ad hoc international implications of other

policy area as and when). At a higher level, there would also need to be formalised regular

consultations on external policy between the Presidents of institutions where otherwise

wires might needlessly risk being crossed - the European Council, the Commission and the

HR/VP.

THIRD, WORKLOAD

A frequent lament is the fact that a major problem has been that Baroness Ashton has been

triple-hatted, but without the triple support structure equivalent to the task. Any basic

management plan ought to be predicated on serious assessment of resources and

requirements. But it seems far from certain that member states assessed and agreed on

requirements, thus breaking a cardinal rule of effective management. Somehow, Baroness

Ashton has been obliged to “keep the show on the road” without the obligation and the

means to work on the support of the audience and the actors in the show.

The committee might recommend that one or more political level deputies be appointed. A

high level political deputy could replace her both in the CFSP area, whether it be in chairing

functions or representational roles, in addition to a much-needed Commission-related

deputy. It has often been said that the Commission has too many commissioners – but a

system whereby a key commissioner such as the HR/VP would have, say, two junior

commissioners would be helpful in many ways. It is after all a model on which our own

national diplomatic affairs are carried out – a foreign secretary and several other ministers

for given responsibilities.

FOURTH, REPRESENTATION


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Improved presence in international organisations has proved a difficult arena for the EU

since implementation of Lisbon. The Commission’s assumption had always been that the

EU’s status at the UN, as a non-state observer entity, needed review. The EU was not a

state, but its economic clout as a provider of funds to the UN, in many cases as the main

donor organisation, provided the basis for a claim not simply to ‘observer status’ but to

‘enhanced observer status’. The assumption within specialised parts of the Commission had

been that the promise of the Lisbon Treaty was that the EEAS would now be in a position to

advocate and negotiate for this ‘enhanced observer status’. It turned out, of course, that this

was not the view of some member states. But the EU and its member states lose out when

the framework of the EU’s international governance is kept limited by the jealousies of

national interests. The forthcoming command paper on ‘competence’ will be interesting in

legal terms, but probably unhelpful in terms of the enhancement of EU clout in international

affairs.

While the Commission’s nameplate in conferences was replaced by ‘THE EUROPEAN

UNION’, the legitimate expectation of the new EEAS was to continue the role and status

held previously by the Commission. This expectation was dashed, as a trend emerged to

treat previous first-pillar, international business not as an area where the Commission, now

EEAS, would lead, but where member states would retrieve responsibility and make any

show of EU independence depend on prior majority approval. This was a ‘pescisation’ (from

PESC, French initials for CFSP) of the Community ‘acquis’.

One recommendation in the report might be for member states and the Commission to

cooperate in strengthening the status of the EU in international forums. And a first move

could be a working party focussing on how to enhance EU status without this appearing to

be an onslaught on national prerogatives. Where an EU delegation is present abroad, it

should represent the EU across the board in international conferences and organisations –

including the diplomatic functions for which the EEAS was created. This might begin a

process leading to an adequate reflection of its leadership role – in the interests of the EU

itself, but also of individual member states. In principle this would strengthen the EU in

international negotiations and provide visibility - a recognisable face to other actors.

FIFTH, MONEY

One clear weakness in the EEAS’s existing arrangements is the continued lack of control

over budgetary resources. We know that this also hampered HR Solana’s performance. The

tools of power were in the hands of the Commission, and jealously guarded by the

Commission. So a recommendation might be for the EEAS to take responsibility for the

foreign policy instruments remaining in the Commission, not least the financial management

of CFSP projects.

SIXTH, RELATIONS BETWEEN EEAS AND NATIONAL DIPLOMACIES


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If the EEAS is to burgeon into a streamlined diplomatic service, this should not be to the

detriment of national diplomacy, even if a rebalancing of the various responsibilities clearly

needs also to take place. It will be vital to strengthen cooperation between member states’

ministries of foreign affairs and embassies and their EEAS equivalents; not simply to arrange

for a series of secondments of staff. The drafters of the Ashton review might be encouraged

to include how this could be brought about; to explain how the creation of an esprit de

corps could be produced, how the various levels of interaction between the national and the

European levels could be brought into a synthesis allowing the whole to be more than the

sum of the parts.

SEVENTH, STREAMLINING AND EFFICIENCY

The counterpart of enhanced cooperation with MFAs might be reflection on which tasks of

diplomacy might be ripe for pooling with others. Would there be mileage to be appreciated

by ministries of finance in proactive encouragement to share resources – buildings, support

staff, transport etc? This might in time lead to reflection on the advantages inherent in a

common crisis management system, a shared evacuation strategy, even the pooling of many

consular functions. There are examples of this already. On the one hand the Abuja EU

delegation did not achieve wide support for its co-location potential. The EEAS might be

encouraged to produce an assessment of the reasons for this. On the other hand, Nordic

cooperation in the sharing of resources might be a model for EU action. Is the fact of Nordic

‘togetherness’ key to understanding how the policy emerged? Does the E U possess any of

the same attributes? Are comparisons valid? These are key questions on which sensible

answers to the efficiency issues might be based.

Efficiency through shared facilities, or ‘hub and spoke’ arrangements, are issues already the

subject of internal MFA reflection worldwide. Questions about resident ambassadors and

general sound management are nothing new. Thus, reviewing the potential benefits of

common approaches beyond the level of EU member states ought not to be ignored

because the issues are themselves inherently too ‘sensitive’. It should not be beyond the wit

of man to re-site the discussion at European level, beginning with the rather obvious point

that EU delegations might be tasked with consular protection to citizens of all EU countries,

at first for those without consular representation in a given country and later, potentially, to

all member states. While there might be national reluctance, the fact that most member

states are not represented in most countries in the world (whereas the EU as such is

present in more than 140) provides room for creative thinking. As with crisis management,

there is little point in not preparing to cope with obvious issues on the grounds that,

hitherto, there has been no need to reflect on given issues, so why now? EU efforts in the

form of, for example, visa reciprocity, seem already to work well. They clearly lighten the

burden on individual member states in terms of the necessity to negotiate reciprocity


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agreements country by country73. Why not extend the principle to other clearly relevant

areas?

EIGHTH, TRAINING

Finally, attempts to establish principles of modern resource management in the

Commission’s previous External Service were hard to implement; both for want of

agreement by senior management and for resource reasons. Yet, clearly some very basic

immediate steps are required to ensure the EEAS manages staff on a par with the best

diplomatic services worldwide. This is an insight already achieved in the EEAS. But insight is

no replacement for firm action. In the case of EEAS training, a sound training needs analysis

needs to be undertaken, probably by an outside specialised organisation with proven skills in

the area. A report with recommendations based on efficient practice and experience of the

best foreign ministry training departments is clearly called for. Not only would this ensure

that varying degrees of diplomatic management skills would be made uniform, but a knock-

on effect would be a contribution to esprit de corps, team-building and general efficiency

enhancement.

12 December 2012

73 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1268_en.htm?locale=en

UK Independence Party – Written evidence

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A.1. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) believes that, before one can properly consider the

questions posed by the Committee, the role of the EEAS and of the High Representative

(HR) must be considered. In addition, careful regard must be had to the competences of the

European Union (EU) under the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) , in particular as regards the so-called ‘Common

Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) and the so-called ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’

(CSDP) which the TEU describes as an integral part of the CFSP.

A.2. The High Representative and the External Action service are the personification of a

dagger aimed squarely at the heart of the United Kingdom’s existence as a Sovereign

Independent State and of an independent United Kingdom Foreign Policy. In addition they

pose a grave danger to the United Kingdom’s permanent seat on the Security Council of the

United Nations, together with its concomitant veto.

A.3 In the preamble to TEU, to which the UK is bound as a Treaty partner, it is made clear

that, as part of our membership of the EU, the Member States are resolved “to implement a

common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence”. We suggest that these words should be

taken at face value. They mean no more and no less than that the EU intends, in due course,

to have its own foreign policy. It must be clearly understood that the existence of a

“common” policy means that it exists to the exclusion of all other such policies. Thus, when

it comes to fruition, there will be no such thing as “British foreign policy” any more than

there will be a “French foreign policy” or a “Finnish foreign policy” or a “German foreign

policy” etc. etc.

A.4. Anyone who doubts that should read further in TEU. Article 21.2, for example,

commits the UK by Treaty to support the mandatory requirement that “The Union shall

define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of

cooperation in all fields of international relations…..”. Article 24.3 makes it clear that the UK

is bound by Treaty to support the CFSP when formulated: “The Member States shall

support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of

loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area”. If a

Member State is to comply with that mandatory requirement, it cannot then have an

independent and different point of view.

A.5. Any lingering illusions – or disingenuousness – about where this all leads must be

extinguished by Article 21.1 TEU which makes all clear: “The Union’s competence in matters

of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions

relating to the Union’s

security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a

common defence.”

A.6. Furthermore, the European Union has acquired through Article 37 the right to enter

into international relations in its own right as regards the CFSP:

Article 37


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The Union may conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations

in areas covered by this Chapter

A.7. This ability is important in the context of the requirement for a CFSP and the nature of

Sovereign Independent States. It will be noted that a substantial portion of the Treaty of

Lisbon which is now embodied in TEU and TFEU was devoted to the activities of the HR

AND THE EEAS. This is no accident. We say that this was quite deliberate, because the

ability to enter into international relations, underpinned by the CFSP and executed by the

HR and the EEAS is crucial to the EU’s ability to assert that it is and fulfils the criteria for, for

the purposes of customary international law, recognition as a sovereign independent state in

its own right.

A.8. Members of Your Lordship’s House will be familiar with the Montevideo Convention

on the Rights and Duties of States74 which identifies the criteria for recognition of

entities as sovereign independent states for the purposes of customary international law:

Article 1

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:

a ) a permanent population;

b ) a defined territory;

c ) government; and

d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

Who can doubt that the EU already possessed (a), (b) and (c) at the time when Lisbon was

ratified? Who can doubt that the Institutions set out in Article 13 TEU are, for all the world

to see, the institutions which one normally associates with the concept of government. Who

can doubt that the competences of the EU as set out in Title 1 of TFEU are those which

governments of sovereign independent states have? All the EU needed to satisfy the entire

set was the right to enter into foreign relations. This was given to it by Lisbon, a Treaty to

which the United Kingdom acceded without the people of the United Kingdom having been

consulted as each of the then three then main parties promised would happen.

A.9. The EU plainly regards the Montevideo Criteria with approbation as they formed part

of the conclusions of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia

(“The Badinter Commission”), a commission established by the then EEC to deal with the

74 See for text http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897

http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897


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problems of the dissolution of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and the issues of a

successor state and the emergence of new states.

A.10. The developments in relation to governance of the Eurozone and the extinction of the

exclusive rights of Eurozone Member States’ Parliaments and Governments to set budgets –

with all that that means for independence – must be seen through the prism of the

Montevideo Convention which further states in Article 2:

The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.

The word ‘sole’ leaves little room for the existence of member States as independent

entities for the purposes of customary international law.

A.11. This is entirely consonant, of course, with the concept of “ever-closer union” to which

enthusiasts of our membership of the EEC or EU have been so devoted over the last forty

years. It lays bare, however, to the gaze of the broad mass of our people what that phrase

really means in practice and how the very essence of British independence has been steadily

and stealthily subverted over that period.

A.12. There can be no doubt – surely – but that we are, by remaining members of the EU,

on the road to complete loss of sovereignty, legally, politically and morally. Any

consideration of the EEAS and the detail of its workings and performance must be read

entirely in that context.

PART B. The Committee’s Questions

1. What are the main achievements of the EEAS since its establishment? Where has it been

less successful?

It is difficult to identify with any confidence any act of the HR and the EEAS which

might be described as an ‘achievement’ other than its own establishment and

aggrandisement.

2. How well does the EEAS meet the objectives set out for it in the Lisbon Treaty and the Council Decision? Has the High Representative/Vice President fulfilled her mandate and the

Council Decision for setting up the EEAS? What remains to be done?

In the first instance, see Part A. The EEAS performs the role intended for it well: that

is to say that it has rapidly expanded to its present – bloated – size which is entirely

commensurate with the role intended for it, namely the supplanting of National

Foreign Ministries. Whether it actually does anything very much is a moot point.

National governments seem to pursue their own interests, much as before.

3. How effective has the EEAS been in communicating and promoting the EU’s policies and

values? Has it implemented Council CSFP and CSDP Decisions effectively?

Since EU institutions routinely complain that they are insufficiently misunderstood by

the citizens of its own Member States, it must be highly doubtful as to whether those

outside the EU are in any better position. Who does President Obama now ring to

find out what is the attitude of ‘Europe’ to anything? The HR? One or other of the

Troika which went off to Oslo this week to collect the Nobel Prize for Peace? Or


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does he, as before, continue to ring the individual Foreign Ministers of the States that

matter such as The United Kingdom and Germany? One suspects the latter, but

doubtless the HR can provide us with her telephone log to answer the question

definitively.

4. Has the creation of the EEAS led to a more coherent and integrated EU foreign policy?

The events in such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Qatar, Burma, Congo and

elsewhere hardly suggest coherence and integration on the part of the EU.

5. Has the EEAS been effective in its response to crises?

No.

6. How well does the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission work in the trade

area? Does the EEAS have a role to play in EU trade policy and its implementation?

The EEAS does not bat for the UK and should have no role whatsoever in the matter

of trade which should be for the UK and the UK alone, bearing in mind that we are a trading nation and trade is our life-blood. The UK should recover its right to make

trade agreements and its seat on the WTO as a matter of vital national interest,

whatever relationship we might in future have with the single market.

7. How well has the objective of a geographically and gender balanced staff been met? How

well has the objective been met of one third of staff from the diplomatic services of the

Member States by mid 2013, a third from the Council Secretariat and a third from the

Commission? Have staff been adequately trained to perform the diplomatic role? If not,

what are the omissions? Is the EEAS budget sufficient to meet its objectives? Are there any areas where the EEAS could make savings? Has the EU created the right number and

distribution of Delegations around the world?

The EEAS staff is commensurate with the over-weening ambitions of the EU. It is

ludicrous that the EU has at least 140 worldwide missions. The size and cost of some

of these missions suggest a detachment from the real world which is inhabited by the

citizens of the Member States who are subject to belt-tightening of varying degrees

from severe to eye-watering. For example The European Union is represented in 11 Pacific Island Countries and 4

Overseas Territories by the Delegation in Suva, Fiji.75 The Delegation is accredited to

Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru,

Niue, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, French Polynesia, Pitcairn, Wallis & Futuna and

New Caledonia. The Delegation has two sub-offices in Nouméa, New Caledonia and

Apia, Samoa. In the Pacific, accredited to the Melanesian countries is a separate

Delegation based in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea with two sub-offices in

Honiara, Solomon Islands and Port Vila, Vanuatu.

The Delegation has full diplomatic privileges and immunities and the Head of

Delegation accorded full ambassadorial status.

75 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/fiji/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/fiji/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm


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It appears to have an establishment of no less than 37 people. The States adumbrated

above are, with all due respect, tiny individually and collectively, both in terms of

trade and influence. Having so large a delegation is simply ridiculous.

The Delegation to Barbados and the East Caribbean76 disposes of 44 posts. That to

Mozambique, 3277; to Uruguay, 3078; to East Timor, 2079….and so it goes on. At a

time when HMG is having to curtail its diplomatic staff, such profligacy is outrageous.

One notes that the website of the Delegation to South Africa is devoid of

information about numbers of staff. It may, of course, be a simple dereliction. On the

other hand, one wonders if the numbers involved are too embarrassing even for the

EEAS to disclose.

Whether the staff have been adequately trained is difficult to answer. The lack of

success by the Service suggests the answer may be “No”.


establishment of the EEAS? Has the UK been able to second high level candidates to

important positions within the EEAS? Has it also seconded a representative number

to more junior positions?

It can only be to the detriment of the efficient working of the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office if it has been seconding its high flyers to the EEAS. It is inevitable that if such people are not working exclusively for the UK, the quality of

the UK’s own Foreign Service will suffer. That is not in the interests of the UK which

should be deploying the nation’s brightest and best foreign service staff to work in

the sole interests of the UK and its people.

CONCLUSION

With great respect, the subject at this stage of the enquiry deals with the EEAS as thought it

was a good thing and in the interests of the United Kingdom. It is not, in our submission.

The EEAS seeks to supplant our own diplomacy and subordinate our interests to the

interests of others, few of whom sympathise with, let alone care for, the vital interests of the

UK. Such an uncritical approach is, we must suggest, entirely at odds with the view of the

British people about the EU and all its manifestations. The EEAS enjoys minimal support

from the average voter, assuming that he or she has heard of it. Voters and Taxpayers will

be deeply unhappy about the cost of this unaccountable institution and its desire to supplant

the FCO. Instead the money being devoted to it would be far better spent creating UK

Missions abroad whose principal activity should be promoting free trade with host nations

with a view to allowing UK businesses to grow, employ staff and thus contribute to the UK’s

prosperity and revenues, instead of subsidising the Caribbean life-styles of 44 Euro

Diplomats in Barbados.

76 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/barbados/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm

77 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mozambique/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm

78 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/uruguay/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm

79 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/timor_leste/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/barbados/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mozambique/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/uruguay/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/timor_leste/about_us/internal_organisation/index_en.htm


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12 December 2012

European External Action Service, Evidence to House of Lords (pp.99-106)

Documents

Transcript of European External Action Service, Evidence to House of Lords (pp.99-106)