Ethnosubordinance and anonymity: An identification, metaphor, and narrative analysis of ISIS...

Daniel M. Chick 1

Ethnosubordinance and anonymity: An identification, metaphor, and

narrative analysis of ISIS rhetoric

Building off of the work of Kenneth Burke, Cheney (1983)

firmly established the role of identification rhetoric in the

study of organizational communication. Cheney observed four main

rhetorical strategies employed by organizations to build

identification with constituents: common ground technique,

antithesis, assumed and transcendent “we,” and unifying symbols.

By applying and furthering Burke’s findings, Cheney essentially

began the contemporary subdiscipline of organizational

identification studies. However, as Cheney (1983) initially

argued of his new assertions, “the role of identification in

rhetorical criticism has been [again] unnecessarily limited” (p.

144). Organizational rhetorical studies have largely suffered

from a unitary focus on Western organizations (i.e. corporations

and nonprofits; see: Evans, 2015; Henderson, Cheney, & Weaver,

2015; Williams & Connaughton, 2012). Specifically, while the

investigation of Western organizations has been lucrative for

rhetorical scholarship, the discipline has largely overlooked

other types of organizations outside of this scope. Understanding

ETHNOSUBORDINANCE AND ANONYMITY 2

the rhetoric of ideological groups that share little aesthetic

similarity with Western organizations, such as terrorist groups,

is an appropriate, yet underexplored avenue of research.

At its core, ISIS is a terrorist organization. It produces

fear and loathing from those it deems to be enemies. Terrorism,

conceptually and methodologically, is a disturbing and

traumatizing phenomenon that moves the victim out of a realm of

contentment and reminds all who see the action of the frailty of

human life (Pojman, 2006). To provoke this response from their

enemies, ISIS employs a number of brutal tactics that

purposefully undermine the inalienable human rights of their

captors, such as gruesome beheadings (see Adams, 2014; Bucktin,

2014; “ISIS video appears…”, 2015) or burning their captors alive

to send a message to their home government (see “WARNING,

EXTREMELY GRAPHIC…”, 2015). The particularly brutal and horrific

methods employed by ISIS speak to their nature as a terrorist

organization. The shock-and-awe campaign of brutal deaths left in

their wake conceptually and methodologically aligns with all

present understandings of terrorism.


ISIS stands as a dominating force in western Asia and

northern Africa, establishing themselves in significant portions

of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey, among other Arab states (see:

“A visual guide”, 2015). Geographically, ISIS is best

characterized by its rapid spread across the Middle East, seizing

vast amounts of land as it moves forward. In one of its more

recent land grabs, ISIS invaded Tunisia and even came close to

appropriating “Tatooine,” the real Tunisian location where Star

Wars was filmed (Mazza, 2015). Politically, ISIS relies on a

theocratic governing structure, headed by their presumed Caliph

Abu Bakr al-baghdadi (Thompson, Greene, & Torre, 2014). Thompson

et al. (2014) liken their governing structure to Western

civilization by illustrating the parallels between the

commanders-in-chief, legislative, and judicial governing

concepts. Finally and ideologically, ISIS “follows a distinctive

variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of

Judgment matter to its strategy” (Wood, 2015, para. 4). Their

goal is to ultimately act as the harbinger of both a “seventh-

century legal environment, and … to bring about the apocalypse”

(Wood, 2015, para. 8).


The historical circumstance of ISIS belongs to Wahhabism, a

sect of Islam relying on a radically monotheistic interpretation

of the Quran. Those who disagreed with the Wahhabistic

interpretation of scripture were perceived by al-Wahhab as

polytheistic, were consequently guilty of heresy, and should be

put to death (Cook, 1992). The dichotomy of the other directly

pertains to Wahhabistic ideology: we are correct in our

interpretation and those who disagree are “others” deserving

death. Even those within the Islamic belief who held different

interpretations were views as the “other:”

Abd al-Wahhab, despised "the decorous, arty, tobacco smoking, hashish imbibing, drum pounding Egyptian and Ottoman nobility who travelled across Arabia to pray at Mecca.

In Abd al-Wahhab's view, these were not Muslims; they were imposters masquerading as Muslims. Nor, indeed, did he find the behavior of local Bedouin Arabs much better. They aggravated Abd al-Wahhab by their honoring of saints, by their erecting of tombstones, and their "superstition" (e.g.revering graves or places that were deemed particularly imbued with the divine) (Crooke, 2014, para. 9-10).

Thus, al-Wahhab embodied a particularly radicalized belief in the

“us” versus “them”, or “otherness” mentality. Such is the

foundation of the ideological system employed by ISIS: those who

are different shall be put to death.


What remains unclear is how this appalling group still

manages to create a constituent base that remains fiercely loyal

and identifies with the organization. This paper seeks to examine

the identification rhetorical situation present in the narratives

employed by ISIS. In the following literature review, I examine

literature pertaining to conceptual understandings of terrorism,

the rhetorical strategies of otherness employed by Americans and

the American government as a method of perceiving terrorism, and

the rhetorical strategies and historical significance of

otherness as employed by ISIS. Immediately following, I explicate

(1) the ways in which ISIS utilizes narrative fidelity, (2) the

use of the ethnosubordinance as a means of organizational

identification, and (3) the significance of anonymity as a

subrhetoric of the assumed and transcendent “we.”

Literature Review

Ideology is an important and defining characteristic of any

group (Sedgwick, 2012). Whereas Americans rely heavily on the

concept of the American Dream, ISIS, as noted above, relies on a

rigid jihadist ideology as a central, “necessary cause” of

terrorism (Sedgwick, 2012, p. 359). Sedgwick (2012) notes the


core philosophies of jihadists are guided by a concept of utopia.

The difference from the American concept of utopia is perceived

by contemporary scholarship to be their reliance on Sharia law as

a means of instilling “justice instead of injustice, prosperity

instead of poverty, with the Muslims strong and respected instead

of weak and subject to attack” (p. 364). The system to which they

strive is, in a sense, a utopian “state of affairs” that “have

wide appeal” and “almost no possibility of counter-ideology

challenging it” (p. 365). To accomplish this utopian system,

Jihadists will attempt to accomplish three means of change: “(1)

it is appropriate in general for force to be used to address the

problems” (p. 365) facing the spread of Islam; (2) this force may

or may not utilize the killing of civilians, rather than simply

attacking military enemies; (3) “it is acceptable for Muslims as

well as non-Muslims to be killed” (p. 365). Through the provided

conceptual framework, we begin to understand the ideological

reasoning behind ISIS attacks.

Beyond knowing and responding to their historical

ideological circumstances, major Western nations are struggling

to build coherent responses to the political and geographic


successes of the Islamic State. “Sectarian atrocities” grow in

numbers on either side of the conflict in the Middle East

(Stansfield, 2014, p. 1330). The United Kingdom, specifically

does not know how to combat the rise of ISIS:

It is into this environment that the UK entered, with a

self-acknowledged open-ended military strategy and with an

understanding that the political, social, and economic

levers needed to be crafted first, in order to then be

pulled (Stansfield, 2014, p. 1330).

Stansfield broadly reiterates the enigmatic nature of the Islamic

State as an organization; as such, entire governments and

developed Western militaries do not have an accurate grasp, nor

effective infrastructure, on how to effectively influence the

region and the growing state.

Organizational Identification

The inability of Western governments to respond

appropriately to ISIS ideology presents an interesting case study

from multiple rhetorical perspectives (i.e. identification,

metaphorical, and narrative analyses). Cheney (1983) established

the central means of understanding identification in


organizations. These means of identification are the common

ground technique, identification through antithesis, the assumed

or transcendent we, and unifying symbols. The common ground

technique attempts to equate the rhetor and the

intraorganizational audience member. Identification through

antithesis attempts to “unite” organizational members “against a

common enemy” (p. 153). The assumed or transcendent we is an

established, common bond between the rhetor and the audience

member, and often paints others as “they;” typically others are

other organizations or those not conforming to organizational

values. Unifying symbols manifest as the symbols a company uses

to create identification with members, such as a logo,

letterhead, colors, or uniforms.

In the organizational context, identification through

antithesis is defined as when an organization attempts to unify

against a perceived common foe. However, the category is broad

and does not take into account particular subrhetorical

strategies that utilize cultural expectations or understandings.

Ethnocentrism is one of those cultural expectations that go

unnoticed through Cheney’s original work. Defined as using one’s


own value system as the standard through which one judges other

values (Neuliep, 2002), ethnocentrism plays an important role in

the rhetoric of ISIS. Historically, as previously outlined, the

Wahhabistic ideology is contingent upon a strict adherence to

monotheistic Islam; al-Wahhab used this value system to judge the

worthiness of others around him.

Given the ethnocentrism and social dominance aspects of

ethnosubordination, one must also consider ethnosubordination as

a tactic of identification. Consequently, to the work of Cheney

(1983), ethnosubordination is a subrhetoric of antithesis insofar

as it utilizes theoretical tenets from ethnocentrism and social

dominance orientation as a means of identifying a “common

‘enemy’,” “outsiders,” or those who are “misguided” (p. 148).

Those “misguided” “others” who disagree with the ideology of

Wahhabism are immoral, and therefore are lesser than those who

are in the ingroup. Thus, according to Wahhabistic rhetoric, they

are to be put to death.

Terrorists are defined through many different lenses of

identification. Reshetnikov (2008) examines the social violence

perspective, wherein participants in terror are racked by


“identity crises and by the tendency to challenge aggressively

established norms and rules” (p. 655). Ethnocentrism also plays

an important role in determining the perception of terrorism, or,

“the almost genetic conviction that my kin, or more generally, my

ethnic group … cannot be bad, with the converse conviction that

if something has gone wrong it is the fault of the stranger”

(Reshetnikov, 2008, p. 657). Ethnocentrism is best described as

the “disposition where the values, attitudes, and behaviors of

one’s ingroup are used as the standard for judging and evaluating

other group’s values” (Neuliep, 2002, p. 201). These perspectives

directly impact one’s identification with organizations through

the use of values. Ethnocentric beliefs value identification with

the ingroup over identifying with others; the social violence

perspective furthers identification by actively challenging the

values of other groups with whom one may negatively identify.

For example, the September 11th attacks, wherein the Trade

Towers and the Pentagon were attacked, intimately affected the

perception of terrorism in Western society. Specifically, the

Bush administration capitalized on the attacks, using persuasive

rhetoric to spur American anxieties regarding personal vengeance


against American citizens. Therefore, President Bush put the

United States on the path to war by relating to the citizenry the

intimate immediacy of the threat to the American dream that Al

Qaeda presented (Rogers, 2013). The American Dream is, at its

core, a rigid hegemonic structure designed to perpetuate the

“American” way of life (i.e. capitalism, rugged individualism;

Kasiyarno, 2014). Consequently, any threat presented to this

dream, such as that from Al Qaeda (as argued by the Bush

administration), it threatens American hegemony and the very

structures upon which this country was founded. Any slight

against the dream, accordingly, becomes personal.

In response to intimate, immediate threat to the dream,

Americans build perceptive structures around their understanding

of terrorism and terrorists. Americans believe in the immediacy

of the threat of terror and that, as a nation, we must

proactively eradicate the threat (Nitcavic & Dowling, 1990). In

view of the belief of proactivity, Kossowska, de Zavala, and

Kubik (2010) demonstrate American’s perceptions of terrorists

(i.e. unreasonable, sociopathic, and/or ideologically driven).


Further, Americans rely heavily on stereotyping the terrorist to

maintain the hegemonic structures inherent to American life.

To stereotype the perception of terrorists, Westerners

commonly employ the concept of togetherness and otherness.

Westerners, relying on a common history, are together in the

fight against radicalism and terrorism. Otherness, defined as a

broad classification of difference (Kastoryano, 2010),

encompasses the perception of terrorist identity by Westerners.

Again, the Bush administration is a chief perpetrator of

persuasive rhetoric defining terrorist groups as “others.”

Throughout a number of speeches on the topic of terrorism,

President Bush employed a common theme of “their” against “our”

goals, in dichotomizing fashion (Bartolucci, 2012).

Metaphors and Narratives as a Tool of Organizational

Identification

ISIS rhetoric, as illustrated below, is contingent upon

strong member identification. Identification is accomplished

through the rigid application of the “necessary cause” jihad

(Sedgwick, 2012, p. 359), through which ISIS members identify

common foes and establish bonds. Their ideological constructs


make available other tools of rhetorical scholarship, such as

metaphorical and narrative analysis. The larger ideology that

motivates ISIS allows members to routinely use metaphors and

narratives to assist in member identification and recruitment.

First, metaphorical criticism as a tool of rhetoric largely

stems from Osborn (1967) and his discussion of the archetypal

metaphor. The archetypal metaphor is defined through five

important characteristics: popularity, time, experience,

motivation, and persuasion. Osborn (1967) first argues that

metaphors hold a distinct popularity with rhetors. Second, the

use of archetypal metaphors remains largely the same from

generation to generation. Third, metaphors arise from certain

inescapable experiences throughout one’s life. Fourth, the

archetypal metaphors becomes inextricably bound to “basic human

motivations” (p. 338). Fifth, and finally, the archetypal

metaphor utilizes each of the preceding characteristics to

exhibit a sense of universality used to appeal to a wide, diverse

audience.


The metaphor is largely an intangible concept that helps

construct one’s understanding of social reality. Deetz (1986)

engages with metaphor from this viewpoint by arguing,

Other metaphorical structurings are more specific yet no

more visible than the pervasive up structure. For example,

the notion of an ‘idea’ is abstract and hard to talk about.

‘Idea’ gets expressed metaphorically (p. 174).

Further, Deetz (1986) argues that metaphors are imperative to the

social construction of reality in the organization. Therefore,

the metaphor is an integral tool to build member identification

in organizations. Whereas Cheney (1983) argues what an

organization might do to create identification, Osborn’s (1967)

metaphor operationalizes identification and assists the reader in

understanding how an organization might go about creating it.

The narrative paradigm is also a tool for organizations to

go about creating identification amongst members. The narrative

paradigm of rhetoric is contingent upon a sense of narrative

logic (Fisher, 1987). The foundational pieces of narrative logic

according to Fisher (1987) are probability and fidelity, which

break down to coherence, truthfulness, and reliability,


respectively. The probability of a narrative is reliant upon the

construction of its argument, material coherence (comparing this

narrative to others about the same story), and characterological

coherence (the believability of the characters therein).

Fidelity, or the accuracy of a narrative, is established through

the “logic of good reasons” (p. 47) which is inextricably bound

to one’s values. Additionally, Hoffman and Ford (2010) argue,

“Organizations attempt to influence how people prioritize their

values” (p. 155). In this application, the organization will use

the narrative to establish and persuade members to adopt

organizationally-prioritized values. These values are, in a

sense, equitable to the strategies through which organizations

craft identification (i.e. a sense of “we,” common ground). In

sum, the narrative can be used in conjunction with metaphors by

the organization to create member identification.

Since there is the effective intellectual vacuum regarding

how constituents identify with ISIS, and terror groups in a

broader sense, I use the preceding literature to sensitize and

contextualize ISIS both conceptually and organizationally. The

preceding sensitizing information provides a conceptual framework


to move forward in understanding organizational identification in

this new context. Therein, otherness arises as a pervasive

narrative throughout their history and ideology, which provides

ample opportunity for research and rhetorical criticism.

Method

To conduct this rhetorical analysis, I collected a video and

relevant news articles that explain both the methods and

ideologies employed by ISIS (see “WARNING, EXTREMELY GRAPHIC…”,

2015; Thompson et al, 2015; Crooke, 2014; “ISIS video”, 2015;

Wood, 2015). To accomplish this, I employed Google searches, in

March, April, and May 2014, of ISIS history, ISIS methods, and

relevant ideology. The video depicting the burning alive of

Jordanian pilot Mu’ath al-Kaseasbeh served as the primary source

of information for this study; other news bulletins or stories

assisted in developing a coherent narrative that spans both their

historical circumstances as well as their present methods. To

draw conclusions about the theoretical implications of the

actions and narratives employed by ISIS, the author utilized

theoretical expositions on organizational metaphor and narrative

to guide and interpret Cheney’s (1983) rhetorical categories of


organizational identification and Osborn’s (1967) metaphorical

analysis to a new context.

Analysis

Present in the rhetoric of the jihadist, caliphate-oriented

terror group, ISIS, are identification rhetorics that increase

the appeal of the organization, as well as maintain ideological

consistency and member identification. These rhetorics manifest

in the rhetoric of ethnosubordination, a subrhetoric of

identification via antithesis, and the rhetoric of anonymity, a

subrhetoric of the assumed and transcendent ‘we’. To accomplish

the rhetoric of ethnosubordination, ISIS fighters routinely

utilize the rhetorical strategy of beheading, which both shocks

the audience and portrays the common enemy as lesser than ISIS

fighters.

ISIS Narrative Fidelity

ISIS attempts to influence not only the prioritization of

values outside of their organization (i.e. through acts of

terror; Almasy, 2015), but also prioritization of values of their

organizational constituents, current and potential. Through the

use of identification strategies, ISIS influences its members to


accept and value such Islamic tenets as Sharia Law and a

theocratic caliph as governed by a strict Wahhabistic

interpretation of the Qur’an. ISIS is succeeding in this

prioritization (Baker, 2014; Gaffey, 2015; Haq, 2014). A

rhetorical message is “inextricably bound to a value” (Fisher,

1987, p. 107); yet, how ISIS maintains this rhetorical message,

gains member identification, and ensures the propagation of their

values has previously escaped scholarship, analysis, or

journalistic inquiry. To this end, I offer two propositions that

attempt to bridge the gap between currently existing scholarship

and the organizational enigma that is ISIS.

Proposition 1: ISIS uses the rhetoric of ethnosubordination,

a subrhetoric of identification by antithesis.

Proposition 2: ISIS uses anonymity as a subrhetoric of the

assumed and transcendent “we.”

Through ISIS rhetoric it is clear that Wahhabistic ideology

supercedes any other organizational value. The historical

narrative of ISIS belongs to the radically monotheistic, Sharia-

driven Wahhabistic interpretation of the Quran. According to the

teachings, any non-Muslim or a Muslim practicing an incorrect


interpretation of the Quran should be put to death for their

heretical beliefs (Crooke, 2014). Additionally, ISIS believes in

one caliph who is anointed to bring about the end of times; he is

both the harbinger of utopia and the apocalypse. To this end, and

to reify the narrative in a present era, ISIS agents routinely

behead or otherwise gruesomely murder those who believe

differently than they do (Abdallah, 2014; Almasy, 2015; Fadel,

2015; Kaufman, 2015).

Each of the four stories cited above (Abdallah, 2014;

Almasy, 2015; Fadel, 2015; Kaufman, 2015) is the account of

someone else. The common themes evident in their stories,

however, illustrate the fidelity through which ISIS disseminates

and controls its values, as well as subordinating and eradicating

the values of others: a horrifying death. The commonality of the

themes inherent in the narratives told illustrates a sense of

coherence (similar events), truthfulness (multiple observations),

and reliability (commonality of the explained observations).

Hearkening to al-Wahhab’s exposition on the treatment of non-

Muslims, the manifestation of a contemporary mindset that

intimately mirrors the feelings of derision or disdain al-Wahhab


felt for ‘others’ becomes evident. Through these narratives, the

“character” that is ISIS (the organization) and its members have

believability; their actions are perceived as within the realm of

their character and are to be expected.

The organizational narrative established through multiple

beheadings and gruesome deaths explicates ISIS organizational

values. Specifically, explication manifests through the beheading

of Kenji Goto. The organizational value of derision for

“otherness” is exhibited in acts of violence against ISIS

captors. In justifying the beheading, “Jihadi John,” the infamous

ISIS spokesperson, acts as the foremost character in the ISIS

narrative. He embodies ISIS organizational values, such as the

commitment to violence against nonbelievers, anonymity, and

ethnocentrism. As a preeminent character, the words he speaks

carry weight with outside audiences. To that end, “John” labeled

Japan’s decision to actively fight against ISIS as “reckless.” In

response to Japan dropping any pretense of neutrality in the war,

the spokesperson attempts to intimidate the Japanese government

by warning them of the “nightmare” yet to come (“Jihadi John,” as

cited in Almasy, 2015, para. 9). Here, “John” uses the otherness


of Goto as both a symbol of the superiority of ISIS values—and

therefore ideology—and the inferiority of other national values.

“

ISIS narratives of beheading are particularly alienating to

the Western observer, which in turn is best described by the

values established by the actions partaken by ISIS. Specifically,

values inherent to ISIS rhetoric are depravity and ideology;

while on their face these values may not run counter to Western

values—especially given the Western penchant for war—the methods

through which the terror group establish, illustrate, and

maintain these values are particularly heinous.

For example, to evidence its value of depravity, ISIS

disseminated the video in which fighters burned Jordanian Pilot

Muath al-Kaseasbeh alive. The video was of high quality, with

polished graphics that illustrate technological sophistication

amongst its members (see “WARNING, EXTREMELY GRAPHIC”, 2015).

Through this video, ISIS purposively illustrated their

understanding of American and Jordanian politics and battle

strategies. At the end of the video, masked ISIS fighters

surrounded the pilot, who was caged and clothed in prisoner garb.


A masked fighter lit a flammable liquid that traced along the

ground. The camera follows the lighting of the fluid and affixes

on al-Kaseasbeh as the flames engulf him.

In this context, the reduction of human rights lies not in

what was explicitly said, but how ISIS carried out the killing of

al-Kaseasbeh. The burning of al-Kaseasbeh was predicated on the

belief that those who are in the outgroup—non-Muslims or, as they

perceive, polytheistic Muslims—should be denied basic human

rights, such as the right “from being subjected to torture and

other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” (UN

Documents, 1975). ISIS burned al-Kaseasbeh alive because he

belonged to the outgroup, with which ISIS is at war. Values of

depravity and ideology are organizationally established and

maintained, and hearken back to the values established by al-

Wahhab. The values as established by their logic of good reasons—

i.e. their Wahhabistic ideology—supercede that of government and

international law. Since the two factions are at war with one

another, treatment of prisoners of war is expected to encompass

certain inalienable rights as explained in the Geneva Convention,

such as humane treatment and a lack of prosecution for


participation in hostilities (“Prisoners of War & Detainees”,

2013). al-Kaseasbeh was denied these rights and subject to

inhumane conditions, including his horrifying death. Therefore,

the narrative through which ISIS made their values clear is not

merely through spoken word, but through the comprehensive message

sent through each and every action used to punish al-Kaseasbeh

for his people’s crimes.

The Rhetoric of Ethnosubordination

ISIS rhetoric, as illustrated by the assessment of the al-

Kaseasbeh video, does not simply end at a generic value judgment.

As illustrated, ISIS has made significant efforts to terrorize

and overcome those against whom they stand. It is in this context

that a group’s social dominance orientation becomes relevant.

Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle (1994) introduced this

orientation as a cognitive disposition “toward intergroup

relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such

relations to be equal, versus hierarchical … ordered along a

superior-inferior dimension” (p. 742). Throughout the rhetorical

narrative utilized by ISIS, and especially that as espoused by

al-Wahhab, their ideology is contingent upon a social dominance


orientation that prefers a strong hierarchical structure that

places stringently practicing Muslims above all others.

For example, ISIS and Wahhabistic rhetoric is contingent

upon portraying those holding different beliefs than the rhetor

as the other: “In Abd al-Wahhab's view, these were not Muslims;

they were imposters masquerading as Muslims” (Crooke, 2014, para.

10). Cooper (2004) argues that Wahhabism is predicated on the

belief of religious dominance, or the premise that the particular

sect of Islam Wahhabists exalt is principally superior to other

interpretations or religions. Those who extol a different set of

beliefs are “imposters” unto Islam and do not fully support the

Wahhabistic-perceived tenets crucial to a successful religion.

Consequently, the other, according to Wahhabistic belief, is

lesser than.

The Rhetoric of Beheading

It seems previous research has, mostly, shied away from

understanding the rhetoric of beheading. Rightfully so; the

process of beheading is an utterly barbaric and abominable act

that traumatizes the psyche to understand and consider. Rechtman

(2006) engages with this damaging task through the context of


Khmer Rouge, wherein the oppressors utilized the rhetoric of

deprivation of humanity. Therein, Rechtman (2006) claims “the

killing machine has not only killed in an almost industrial way,

but it has also claimed to destroy the human condition of all

those who came under its wheels” (p. 3). That too, in essence, is

the rhetoric of the beheading. It is the conscientious,

purposeful threat or action of removal of the head of the other,

while still alive. The rhetoric of beheading is a strategy

through which ISIS identifies its ethnosubordinate common enemy,

and rallies its fighters in an attempt to destroy it.

The threat of beheading is an all too common device employed

by ISIS fighters in their highly produced videos. In a video

aimed at the American audience, specifically President Barack

Obama, an anonymous ISIS fighter stated,

"Know, oh Obama, that we will reach America. Know also that

we will cut off your head in the White House and transform

America into a Muslim province" (“ISIS Fighter,” as cited in

MacKenzie, 2015, n.p.).

The anonymous ISIS fighter thereby simultaneously refers to Obama

as a symbol of the American culture, something that should be


toppled and overcome—a symbol of the “misguided,” common enemy—as

well as the target of the beheading. The beheading becomes,

therefore, rhetoric of ethnosubordination. Beheading is an

abominable act reserved for those with whom ISIS disagrees; those

with whom ISIS disagree are lesser than, and therefore deserving

eradication.

The Rhetoric of Anonymity

Anonymous members exist as a pervasive metaphor in ISIS

rhetoric. The nature of anonymity speaks to how ISIS may see an

increase in member identification, recruitment, and

identification maintenance. As previously mentioned, Deetz (1986)

argues that metaphors are imperative to the social construction

of reality in the organization. Such social construction of

reality is present in the rhetoric utilized by ISIS propaganda.

In each of the prominent videos released by the organization,

ISIS fighters are shown as masked individuals, with barely

perceptible voices and completely masked faces (Adams, 2014;

Bucktin, 2014; MacKenzie, 2015; “WARNING, EXTREMELY GRAPHIC”,

2015). The mask of the ISIS fighter acts as a metaphor of

darkness in this sense, illustrating the ISIS-prescribed,


socially constructed reality of the anonymity of the group. The

mask, and therefore anonymity, is metaphoric of darkness; it

commands “fear of the unknown;” it “discourages sight, and makes

one ignorant of their environment” (Osborn, 1967, p. 339). It is

in this context that we see anonymity as a subrhetoric of the

assumed and transcendent “we,” as it stands as a nonverbal

metaphor for the communal nature of ISIS, in contrast to its

enemies in Western Society.

ISIS’ masked crusaders establish themselves anonymously to

create a socially constructed perception of equality amongst its

members and the prescribed perception of fear in those who oppose

it. Equality plays an important role for ISIS: in this sense,

equality creates an environment of ignorance in its opposition.

Western Governments and secular societies have little idea who

may be an ISIS member amongst their ranks. Inevitably, this

environment ushers in “fear of the unknown” (Osborn, 1967, p.

339). Because secular Western societies have little idea who may

be a member of or sympathize with ISIS, the darkness that is

membership in ISIS shrouds light. ISIS, then, capitalizes on this

spreading darkness by claiming responsibility for domestic


attacks that may arise later such as the Draw Muhammad event in

Garland, Texas (FoxNews.com, 2015; Payne, 2015).

This anonymity presents a key departure from strategies

previously employed in Islamic terror group rhetoric. Whereas

Usama Bin Laden was the very public face of Al Qaeda throughout

the early 2000’s, ISIS has—until recentlyi—not had a public face

equivalent to Bin Laden. In that regard, ISIS allows its rhetoric

to play to the imagination of its audience: a potential jihadist

is able to see himself in this role, on camera, and making a

message known. A Western audience member sees the masked man as a

metaphor for darkness, and therefore the unknown and ubiquitous.

ISIS has no ‘face,’ therefore could be anyone, anywhere, at any

time. Through this open-ended interpretation available to

multiple audiences, I posit that ISIS holds its greatest power in

organizational identification. Further, I posit that this is why

ISIS has seen more geopolitical success than Al Qaeda ever could:

ISIS allows for the audience to envision themselves as the face

of jihad, rather than allowing the face to tell them to do jihad.

Discussion and Implications


ISIS ubiquity, coupled with the rhetorical

ethnosubordination of their enemies, makes ISIS a remarkable

threat to Western values. The sheer brutality through which this

organization engages speaks to their ruthless efficiency in

geopolitical domination of the Middle East. The Wahhabistic

influence is clear in the rhetorical strategies employed by this

organization: they routinely and ruthlessly pursue their

perceived enemies to eradicate them; a person, however, must

willingly join their ranks before the onslaught, otherwise it

seems they will fall as a victim.

To engage in the rhetoric of otherness is common fare in

contemporary Western civilizations. Habitually and

characteristically, political figures—even the President of the

United States (Rogers, 2013; Kasiyarno, 2014)—engage in the

rhetoric of division. Perhaps our collective surprise in

encountering a foe that engages organizational member

identification rhetoric equally as well as Western leadership has

led to our collective confusion in exactly how to appropriately

counteract this terror organization. Contemporary military

strategy simply is non’t enough to wipe out ISIS, as the UK


sorely understands (Stansfield, 2014). Perhaps this confusion is

equally attributable to the bloodlust found in the ongoing

American political climate; most Americans, after all, ascribe to

the philosophy that terrorism should proactively be eradicated

(Nitcavic & Dowling, 1990). This lust may have led the militaries

to jump the gun, metaphorically speaking, and engage too early

with an enemy we did not yet understand.

This paper presents a foundational understanding of the

rhetoric employed by ISIS. As such, the research is not yet—and

nowhere near—complete on the rhetorical and identification

strategies employed by this organization. To that end, this study

does contain its limitations, such as the lack of previous

scholarship on ISIS upon which this paper could build, in

addition to the relative isolation of the researcher from the

phenomenon that is ISIS. Hopefully, this paper begins to bridge

the intellectual gap found in this first limitation. At times,

research without existing foundations must occur. The isolation

of the researcher from the Middle East is, as stated, another

limitation. Because of this isolation, the researcher relied

solely on second-hand accounts found in various sources of media.


While the researcher attempted to utilize reputable sources of

information, some information is not independently verifiable. To

that end, the researcher attempted to find multiple sources

utilizing the same context and quotes to build existential

credibility to these claims.

Future research in understanding ethnosubordination and the

rhetoric of anonymity is virtually unlimited. Branching out the

rhetoric of identification from noncorporate entities allows for

a field of study that was not previously realized. For example,

applying the rhetoric of ethnosubordination to political parties

in Western civilizations would provide an excellent venue for

scholarship. Additionally, examining the effect of anonymity on

identification within public postings from “hacktivist” groups

such as Anonymous or Lulzsec is an essentially understudied

realm. It is not understood whether these subrhetorics apply to

any other organizations than ISIS; utilizing the understandings

present in this study will open many doors to future researchers.

Conclusion

Organizationally, ISIS is a force with which it is wise to

reckon. Their sheer geopolitical strength, and an ever-growing


base of constituents speaks to their ability to organize and

create identification with its base. To this end, ISIS furthers

the organizational identification rhetorics discovered by Cheney

(1983) by identifying common enemies as ethnosubordinate to

Wahhabistic ISIS ideology, as well as collectively identifying—

the assumed and transcendent ‘we’—through the rhetoric of

anonymity. To accomplish ethnosubordinance, ISIS routinely

engages in the rhetoric of beheading, a threat or action that

rallies its base to destroy the common enemy.

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